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
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LIFTING THE VEIL:  
AN AFROCENTRIC ANALYSIS OF  
RACIAL RANKINGS ON IQ TESTS

by

Ruth Reviere

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
at

Dalhousie University  
Halifax, Nova Scotia  
December, 1996

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
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
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## DEDICATION

To my mother:

Though you are gone

Your vision of what I could become

Which guided me through what I have become

Will see me through what I can yet become.

I miss you, Mummy.

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## ABSTRACT

The year 1994 saw the revival of a debate which asks, essentially, whether Black people could ever be sufficiently competent to participate fully in North American society. Some scientists (hereditarians) answer a vehement "No" to this question, while others (environmentalists) answer "Yes". This study is not an attempt to join this debate, on either side. Rather, I am arguing that traditional Eurocentric research criteria have led to inadequate explanations of human experiences, particularly Black experiences. I am also arguing that, consequently, neither hereditarians nor environmentalists provide adequate explanations of Black intellectual behaviours. This study hopes to rectify this state of affairs by facilitating and offering a more accurate and comprehensive analysis of Black intellectual behaviours.

The objectives of this study were three-fold. The first was to design an Afrocentric analytic method; the second was to apply the Afrocentric analytic method to the theories of hereditarianism and environmentalism; and the third was to make a contribution towards a clearer definition of an Afrocentric place, as envisaged by the pioneers in Afrocentric research.

This afrocentric analytic method consists of five canons: kujitoa, ujamaa, utulivu, uhaki, and ukweli which were applied to the writings of the subjects of this study in order to unearth assumptions about the various issues covered by the canons. My analysis revealed many important similarities and differences between hereditarians and environmentalists. In fact, they are more alike than different with regard to the assumptions they hold about Black intelligence, because both groups work from clearly identifiable Eurocentric perspectives. There are, however, significant differences between the two groups, both ideological and their intentions towards Black people.

The selection of research topic and methodology were influenced by personal reasons which are a critical part of the background to this study. This interaction of the personal and theoretical provided data which became part of my analysis and are described in the first and last chapters.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to use this opportunity to thank the following persons for assistance provided during the preparation of this thesis:

- My supervisor, Dr. Joseph Murphy, for his constant support and encouragement. Dr. Murphy's critical and challenging contributions to our conversations about my work have proved invaluable in helping me to develop and to articulate my ideas about my methodology and its application. The quality of my success is due in large part to Dr. Murphy's advice to which I hope I have done justice.
- My three readers, Dr. Ann Manicom, Dr. John Portelli and Dr. Sid Sodhi for so willingly agreeing to serve on my committee, and for their useful advice in the formative stages of this study, and after, which helped me to shape a useful research question, and to produce a final product of which I hope we can all be proud. I would like to thank Dr. Manicom especially for her help in shaping the methodological chapters and for her selfless support during the final stages of revision. I am also very grateful to Dr. Portelli for his collegial support for both me and my work during the years I have known him. Dr. Portelli's constructively critical support, and the opportunities he provided for me to share my work with his students, were crucial stimuli in the continuous development of my work. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Sodhi for his continued and enthusiastic support since I first approached him in 1992 with my ideas for this inquiry.
- The members of the Dalhousie Afrocentric Research Group, and the AFAM-L, ERL-L, and AERA-D mailing lists, for their constructive criticisms.
- And, finally, my family and my friends, who though they were not always physically present, provided the love and encouragement that has been my inspiration. My special appreciation goes to my husband, Matthew, for his loving support and understanding over the three years of our marriage.

## DEFINITION OF TERMS USED IN THIS STUDY

*Afrocentric place:* The perspective that allows the researcher to put African ideals and values at the centre of the inquiry and from which he or she can analyze and criticize the rules governing hegemonic inquiries that prevent accurate explanations of the lived experiences of those being researched.

*Afrocentrism:* This describes a new orientation towards data in which the scholar assumes the right and the responsibility to describe her or his people's realities from their own perspective, employing their own values and ideals.

*Canon:* In this study, the word canon is generally used to refer to a rule, principle, or criterion for regulating research practices, as in my five Afrocentric research canons. In only a few instances is it used in the sense of an authoritative body of work, at which times the distinction is clearly indicated.

*Community:* This refers to a group of people who have certain specific characteristics and or interests in common.

*Deconstruction:* A method of textual analysis where meanings are related to the differences between words rather than their reference to things they stand for. Meanings

are obtained by taking apart the structure of the language used and exposing the assumption that words have a fixed reference point beyond themselves.

*Dysgenic*: Capable of reducing the quality of a racial group.

*Egalitarianism*: This is a doctrine that advocates the equality of all persons, and of the desirability of political, social and economic equality.

*Environmentalist*: One who accepts a mainly environmental hypothesis for the IQ gap between Blacks and Whites, that is, a relatively low  $h^2$  estimate, generally, 0.50 or below.

*Eugenics*: Methods or theories for improving the quality of the human race by processes of selective breeding.

*Hereditarian*: One who accepts a mainly genetic hypothesis for the IQ gap between Blacks and Whites, that is, a high  $h^2$  value for IQ, generally, 0.80 or above.

*Kujitoo*: One of my five Afrocentric research canons. This requires that the researcher emphasize considerations of how knowledge is structured and used over the need for dispassion and objectivity.

*Ma'at*: The quest for justice, truth, and harmony. In the context of this study, it refers to the research exercise itself, in harmony with the researcher, as a tool in the pursuit of truth and justice with the ultimate goal of helping to create a more fair and just society.

*Nommo*: The productive word and here it describes the creation of knowledge as a vehicle for improvement in human relations.

*Objectivity*: A position that holds that research findings are actual truths which exist independently of perception or of the researcher's own conceptions of the object of the research, and that the conclusions arrived at are therefore undistorted by emotion or personal bias.

*Positivism*: An epistemological approach that holds that experimental investigation and observation are the only true sources of knowledge.

*Uhaki*: One of my five Afrocentric research canons. This requires a research procedure that is fair and just to all participants, especially to those being researched. It mandates that all aspects of the research exercise fit with and contribute to the researched community's search for social action and that its applications be mindful of the welfare of all the participants.

*Ujamaa*: One of my five Afrocentric research canons. This requires that the researcher reject the researcher/subject separation and not presume to be "the well from which spring theory and practice, whole and well-formed", but that theory and practice should be informed by the actual and aspired interests of the community.

*Ukweli*: One of my five Afrocentric research canons. This refers to the groundedness of research in the experiences of the community being researched. The experiences of community members become the ultimate authority in determining what is true and, therefore, become the final arbiter of the validity of research about their lives.

*Utulivu*: One of my five Afrocentric research canons. This requires that the researcher actively avoid creating, exaggerating, or sustaining divisions between or within communities, but should strive to create harmonious relationships between and within these groups.

## PREFACE

In 1994, Charles Murray, with his partner Richard Herrnstein, published a book entitled The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life which revived a debate that never seems to die, which asks, essentially, whether Black<sup>1</sup> people could ever be sufficiently competent to participate fully in American society. Murray and Herrnstein answered a vehement "No" to this question, much as Arthur Jensen had done twenty-five years before in a seminal article entitled "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" In the twenty-five year interval between Jensen's and Murray's publications many other scholars have joined the resulting mêlée, answering "Yes" (the environmentalists<sup>2</sup>) or "No" (the hereditarians<sup>3</sup>) to Murray's implied question, according to their ideological persuasion. The never-ending debate about Black intellectual ability seems to take place between these two groups of usually White scholars.

I do not believe that it is coincidental that Jensen's article surfaced during the peak of reaction against the 1954 US Supreme Court school desegregation decision, and the

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<sup>1</sup> The terms "Black" and "African" will be used interchangeably to refer to people of African descent.

<sup>2</sup>I will use the term 'environmentalist' in the sense used by Flynn (1980) to describe those who accept a mainly environmental hypothesis about the IQ gap between Black and White, that is, a relatively low  $h^2$  estimate say .50 or below.

<sup>3</sup>I will use the term 'hereditarian' in the sense used by Flynn (1980) to describe those who accept a mainly genetic hypothesis for the IQ gap between Blacks and Whites, that is, a high  $h^2$  value for IQ, say .80 or above.



resulting controversial strategies, like bussing, chosen to implement it; nor was The Bell Curve's appearance during the recent period of heightened reaction against Affirmative Action coincidental. Both Jensen and Murray have claimed to be concerned that effort and resources are being wasted trying to correct the natural, and hence uncorrectable, inferiority of Black children. The environmentalists, who tend to be politically liberal, argue against this view claiming in essence that Black inferiority is not natural, but is a consequence of their inferior cultures and environments, and hence can be corrected with the appropriate interventions. I am not interested in joining this debate, on either side. Instead I am asking two new and very simple questions, which I have not seen addressed seriously in the literature, and they are essentially these: "Why are White scholars so fascinated by questions of Black intellectual inferiority?", and, "Why do these questions surface at the times they do?"

The purpose of this study is to re-examine the hereditarian and environmentalist theories from a new orientation, that is, from an Afrocentric<sup>4</sup> place, and by so doing, provide new yardsticks (which I call Afrocentric canons) against which research should be judged. A new analysis is necessary because the literature is virtually silent on the views of Black people themselves, dealing almost exclusively with European scholars whose interpretations are inevitably coloured by European views of Black people. My analysis, which I call Afrocentric, provides a new perspective because, as an African Caribbean

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<sup>4</sup>Molefi Asante is credited with the invention of this term.

woman, I am privy to insights into the behaviour of Black people, such as their intellectual performance, that are absent from the literature. To this end, I have formulated a set of five Afrocentric canons, or research criteria, that are based on Molefi Asante's Afrocentric principles of Ma'at and Nommo (Asante, 1987 & 1990). These are ukweli,<sup>5</sup> utulivu,<sup>6</sup> uhaki,<sup>7</sup> ujamaa,<sup>8</sup> and kujitoa<sup>9</sup> and, as I will argue, legitimate inquiry must satisfy these five canons. This new Afrocentric orientation to data pushes the debate into another realm where the methodology becomes subservient to the well-being of the people being researched. My thesis is that traditional Eurocentric research criteria are inadequate and incorrect, especially for research involving human experiences. Employing an Afrocentric perspective will provide more useful criteria, such as those I have presented above.

I have chosen to do this study, and in this way, for very personal reasons. I am a Black female scholar, and I find this very public debate and persistent doubt about Black intellectual abilities very painful. While, as I have said, I have no desire to join this particular debate, I do think it important that Black voices be raised and Black

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<sup>5</sup>Loosely translated from the original Swahili as truth.

<sup>6</sup>Loosely translated from the original Swahili as justice.

<sup>7</sup>Loosely translated from the original Swahili as harmony.

<sup>8</sup>Loosely translated from the original Swahili as community.

<sup>9</sup>Loosely translated from the original Swahili as commitment.

perspectives be considered, especially in this debate that concerns us so critically. I, therefore, do not make any pretence of being dispassionate about this issue. I believe that who and what I am have contributed greatly to my choice of research question, and to the manner in which I chose to conduct the research. Bearing this in mind, I do not think this study can be understood fully without some appreciation of who I am. I have therefore elected to present an autobiographical portrait of myself as the first chapter of this thesis in order to provide a context in which to interpret the work I have done. Chapter Two will present the research on race and IQ that forms the background for the study, while Chapter Three will describe the conceptual framework, Afrocentrism, employed in this inquiry. Chapters Four and Five will present the results of the Afrocentric analyses of the writings of the hereditarians and environmentalists, respectively. In the final chapter, Chapter Six, I will present my conclusions.

## CHAPTER ONE

### Autobiographical Notes: A Link in the Chain.

*There is no theory that is not a fragment, carefully preserved, of some autobiography.<sup>1</sup>*

The construction of theory and, therefore, of knowledge, is now widely accepted as a subjective process, fraught with interference from the societal baggage that the researcher brings to the activity (Asante, 1988; Cherryholmes, 1988; Collins, 1992; Harding, 1986; and Lather, 1990, among others). More and more scholars are also coming to the conclusion that, in addition to the researcher influencing the conduct of the research, he or she has an implicit interest in its outcome (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1993). My contention is that all scholars have some stake or interest in the outcome of their work, and disclaimers to the contrary are misleading and deceptive. As a Black Caribbean woman examining the very heated and controversial debate over race and IQ, I inevitably come to this activity with a complex configuration of baggage accrued from my life as a Black person, a Caribbean, and a woman. I therefore ought not to be believed if I claim disinterest in the results of my investigation, because as a Black academic, I do have a tremendous personal stake in the way Black intelligence is theorized. Objectivity is an impossible standard to which to hold researchers; rather, researchers should be judged on the fairness and honesty of their work. Since, as I am arguing, objectivity is

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<sup>1</sup> Paul Valéry, as quoted by Nancy Miller (1991, p.1).

an impossible ideal, the researcher should present sufficient information about her or himself to enable the readers to assess how, and to what extent, the researcher's presence influenced the choice, conduct, and outcomes of the research. The purpose of this chapter is to provide such information.

Inevitably, this chapter is somewhat autobiographical since it focuses on who and what I am, and how my experiences, attitudes, and perspectives shape the way I do my work. In the context of this study, I am using autobiography as an aid in defining the location from which I do my work, that is, to provide the background and rationale that explains the context of the study. The idea of location is pervasive in Afrocentric literature, even though the actual term used may vary. Milam (1992) and Banks (1992) both called it *location*; Asante (1988 & 1990) named it *place*; and Ngugi wa Thiong'O (1993) termed it *perspective*. In honour of Asante's great contribution to the development of the Afrocentric framework I will call this location *the Afrocentric place*.

This chapter will focus on my personal history and other experiences, but only so far as they pertain to the issue being investigated, that is, the debate over the relationship between race and intelligence. In describing my own experiences, I shall try to locate, describe, and define the location or place from which I have, wittingly or unwittingly, conducted the study, so as to provide an experiential context in which to interpret it. I will also try to identify any characteristics of my personal location that may have

relevance for a more general description of an universal Afrocentric place. I shall try to do this by placing them in the broader context of diasporic African experiences so as to arrive at some commonalities that can legitimately be used to describe that part of an Afrocentrically defined location that is shared by all Africans, regardless of their personal histories and experiences. That is to say, I will seek verification of the "Africanness" of my own experiences in those of other Africans, both on and off the continent. This will be done, as described in Chapter Three, by conferring with my African colleagues here at Dalhousie, and internationally by electronic mail.

### Relating the Personal and the Theoretical

#### Examining and Reflecting on the Self.

I have found writing this chapter to be a very difficult and painful experience. It has emerged slowly, and almost literally, by dint of sweat and tears. My difficulties arose from three principal sources. The first was my continued underestimation of the difficulty of writing about myself. The second was that the self-examination and self-reflection that this exercise required of me proved to be quite traumatic. Finally, and, perhaps most importantly, I was constantly aware of the potential problems posed by my own conviction (which, as I indicated above, is amply supported in both Afrocentric and feminist literature, among others) that it is impossible to separate the researcher from his or her research. There is a still widespread demand that the researcher claim an objective stance with regard to his or her work and, consequently, I realize that the task of

persuading my committee and examiners of the necessity for inserting myself into my work, and to actually make myself one of its foci, could prove to be quite daunting.

### The personal and the theoretical.

As Nancy Walker opines, quoting Margaret Halsey:

It would seem that nothing would be easier to write than an autobiography. You just sit down and tell what happened, starting at the beginning and proceeding to the end. In reality, however, one is balanced on a knife edge all the time between being cursory and/or evasive on the one hand or longwindedly self-important on the other (Walker, 1992, p. 244)<sup>2</sup>.

I found this to be closely reflective of my own experience in writing this chapter. Deciding what and how much to include about myself was truly intimidating. I had made an early, and, it seemed to me, obvious decision, as I have already indicated, to include only those details that I was persuaded had a direct impact on determining the kind of scholar that I am today. But, in a very real sense every event in my life has contributed directly, or indirectly, to what I have become. The task for me, therefore, was, taking into consideration the limitations of space, to include just sufficient information to explain who I am, and why I have chosen to do this study, and in this manner.

Any autobiographical writing entails a giving of oneself over to the act of writing. By this giving I mean one has to open oneself up to critical self-examination and self-

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<sup>2</sup> Quoted from Margaret Halsey's 1977 autobiography, No Laughing Matter: The Autobiography of a WASP.

reflection. That is, one has to delve deeply into oneself in order to understand, and reveal to the reader, the motivations and the perspectives one brings to the research exercise. Making oneself an integral part of the research activity in this way means that any claim to objective research, or to the creation of pure theory, will ring hollow because such a stance ensures that the personal and the theoretical become inextricably linked. The emphasis necessarily shifts from objectivity to fairness and honesty, the latter two of which I firmly believe are more reasonable criteria on which to judge the creation of theory. However, placing oneself clearly in the foreground of the process of constructing theory has terrifying implications, and the process itself can be extremely painful. The terrifying aspect arises from the realization that making oneself an integral part of the research framework exposes one's own person to the critical analytical process. By insisting that the personal and the theoretical are inseparable, I am in fact compelling the reader to search for the layers of subtexts beyond what I have actually revealed, in order to come to a more complete understanding of the meaning of my text.

### Rhetorics of Representivity

#### Questioning the personal-academic dichotomy.

Nancy Miller (1991), among other feminists, credits the feminist theories that emerged from the era of the 1970s onwards with making the then widely accepted personal-academic dichotomy problematic. Theories of criticism formulated by the feminists, such as Miller's (1991) *personal criticism*, centre on an analysis of the personal, and employ



an explicitly autobiographical depiction within the act of criticism. Or, as Miller (1991) quotes Mary Ann Caws, it involves "a certain intensity in the lending of oneself" to the act of criticism (Miller, 1991, p. 1). Personal criticism, however, correctly raised crucial and timely questions about the constitution of critical authority and the production of theory and of knowledge.

Even before the feminists of the 1970s, African scholars like W. E. B. DuBois (1965), C. L. R. James (1980), and Jomo Kenyatta (1961) had already begun to challenge the personal-academic dichotomy by weaving themselves into their writings and stating clearly and upfront the personal stake they held in their work. For example, C. L. R. James (1980) states clearly that he had a very personal motive for writing his critically acclaimed account of the Haitian revolution, The Black Jacobins, which was first published in 1938:

I was tired of reading and hearing about Africans being persecuted and oppressed in Africa, in the Middle Passage, in the USA and all over the Caribbean. I made up my mind that I would write a book in which Africans or people of African descent instead of constantly being the object of other people's exploitation and ferocity would themselves be taking action on a grand scale and shaping other people to their own needs. (James, 1980, p. v)

The fact that this Black contribution is never acknowledged in the feminist or other non-Afrocentric literature points to the issue of the invisibility of the African that I will deal with in more detail later. It is a fact, therefore, that both Afrocentrists and feminists have helped to make visible the problematic of the personal-academic dichotomy. Miller's

(1991) paraphrase "the personal is part of the theory's material" (p. 21) is then clearly applicable to both the Afrocentric and the feminist schools of thought.

The inclusion of the personal is necessary for Afrocentric research, as I interpret this methodology. In my view, Afrocentric research is one kind of locational research (Asante, 1988; Collins, 1992; and Milam, 1992) similar to those kinds of feminist research (Miller, 1991) which question the personal-academic dichotomy and insist that the personal be incorporated into conventional academic discourse (Miller, 1991).<sup>3</sup> These research paradigms are based on the conviction, which I have already voiced above, that it is impossible to separate one's own attitudes and beliefs from the whole process of doing research.

My rationale for the inclusion of an autobiographical chapter in my thesis in no way argues that all Africans share a single personal narrative. Rather the contrary, since the diaspora encompasses many continents, countries, and experiences. But Africans, because of our peculiar history and its legacy of racism, share experiences that, to a great extent, help to define who we are, and, therefore, the universal Afrocentric place from which we perceive and interpret the world.

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<sup>3</sup> The Afrocentric and the feminist theories of location research differ in that the feminists focus on the private experiences of an individual whereas the Afrocentrists focus on the common experiences of a group.

### Race and theory.

The relationship between race and theory has always been troubled, and attention has been drawn to this many times before this, by both Africans and other scholars (Gould, 1981, and Ogbu, 1978, among others). The production of knowledge for Afrocentrists is therefore problematic because it is seen as a highly contextual activity, with the inevitable involvement of the scholar, and all of his or her accompanying baggage, including race, with the subject matter. It is the widespread refusal by most non-Afrocentric scholars, especially the hereditarians, to acknowledge that race can and does influence the construction of theories about race and IQ that sparked my interest in this topic. I believe that it is this refusal to acknowledge the influence of race that finds unremarkable that the Black presence is invisible in these theories relating race and intelligence. My motivations and perspectives will be discussed more fully later, but it is important to appreciate at the outset that an important influence on this work is my awareness of this exclusion of Africans from the scenes of theory. This absence is particularly worrisome in areas where they are intimately affected like the continuing debate over race and IQ with which this study is concerned.

### My Relationship to the Study

#### Locating myself in the study.

Whether one acknowledges the fact or not, one's life experiences act as a filter through which the world is viewed. Like Gallop (1988),

I found myself adding autobiographical bits, not only, I hope, because I tend towards exhibitionism but, more important, because at times, I think through autobiography: that is to say the chain of associations that I am pursuing in my reading passes through things that happened to me. (p. 4)

One's life experiences influence all aspects of the research process: the topics one chooses to research, the kind of research one chooses to do, how one interprets the data collected and even the conclusions one comes to. This is true for all, even for those who seek cover behind the shield of scientific objectivity.

It should now be quite clear that I chose this research topic for very personal reasons and that I do feel that I have a stake in its outcome. I chose to do this study because I was struck by two startling facts when I first encountered the theories of race and IQ in 1991. The first was the stark contradictions between these theories and my own experiences with learning and teaching over my academic career. The second was that despite the fact that the theories focused on Black intellectual ability and performance, especially as they compare with Whites, there was a strange absence of a Black voice in these theories. All of the frequently quoted authors on both sides of the issue were White, and this is despite the fact that Blacks had been writing about and challenging these theories since IQ tests were first introduced in the United States in the 1920s (DuBois, 1914 and Thomas, 1982). This suggested to me that the race of the author did influence the theories constructed, and this was especially convincing since all of the more prolific Black authors I looked at had perspectives that were very different from those of White authors (Hilliard, 1987 and Ogbu, 1978, for example).

The impetus for the study.

The impetus for this study was an experience I had in 1991 while studying for my MA degree in Educational Foundations. I was taking a graduate class in Educational Psychology with a group of mainly White, mainly female, and mainly able-bodied students. There were only three students outside the class' mainstream: one Black (me), one male, and one paraplegic. The only male student was assigned a class presentation on race and intelligence based on the writings of Phillippe Rushton of the University of Western Ontario, whose writings on this subject were very controversial in Canada at that time. However, I was not aware then of Rushton's notoriety, having only recently arrived in Canada. Before the class began, I was alerted to the nature of the presentation when the student expressed discomfort with his topic because of its admittedly controversial nature. It was this presentation and the reactions to it in the class that moved me to investigate this topic for my doctoral work.

At the start of his presentation the student distributed a handout which he claimed summarized Rushton's thesis on the relationship between race and intelligence, by describing the relationships between race and various other measures. The handout referred to three races: Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid<sup>4</sup>. The three races were compared on the various measures, including brain parameters such as size, cranial

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<sup>4</sup> These were the terms actually used in both the handout and the presentation. For convenience, I will continue to use them for the time being and leave a discussion of the construct of race for later on in the thesis.

capacity, and weight; parental behaviours; gestation periods; genital sizes; sexual behaviours; and IQ. Significant differences among the three races were reported for every measure presented. Caucasoids always fell in the middle with Mongoloids and Negroids at the two extremes, and with the Negroids always at a disadvantage, and by implication, deficient. The data were presented with no information about the sources for Rushton's data, and no acknowledgement that Rushton or the student appreciated the adage that "correlation is not causation".

It was pointed out by the presenter that a preponderance of measures exhibited racial variations, and that the variations were always in the same direction. The argument was presented that because the races differed significantly on so many factors, including IQ and physical measurements of the brain<sup>5</sup>, they had to be biologically, and hence innately, different. A racial hierarchy was suggested with Negroid at the bottom and Caucasoids and Mongoloids positioned well above them. The inference was clearly invited that, because these differences were a matter of biology and hence innate and immutable, therefore, Blacks (Negroids) were intellectually inferior to Whites (Caucasoids) and Asians<sup>6</sup> (Mongoloids).

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<sup>5</sup> These two are emphasized because it was suggested that they were both directly related to intelligence, and this study is concerned with intelligence and how its relationship with race is theorized.

<sup>6</sup> When I examined Rushton's work later, I discovered that he only included data for Japanese subjects, although his conclusions were extended to all Asians.

### Reflections on the Research Process

As a Black person, I found the presentation excruciatingly painful. However, another emotion quickly surfaced, and this was anger. I was angry for two reasons. The first was that in an institution of learning, and in a class that contained practising teachers, this information was, almost universally, accepted uncritically. The only challenges to the material were raised by the paraplegic student and myself, and, in a sense, we were the two outsiders in the group. On later reflection, and before I began seriously examining the literature, I realized that we two were able to bring different perspectives to the classroom, because our experiences were unique to the class<sup>7</sup>. This suggested to me then, that there could be a similar phenomenon at work in the IQ debate, in that who the scholar was mattered more than, or at least as much as, the theoretical and methodological procedures he or she gave voice to. I felt it was important to explore this idea in my doctoral work.

The second reason for my anger was that I realized that I had been deemed a non-presence in the class, that I was there, a physical presence, but that I was not seen - I had been rendered invisible and with the consensus of the class. It was my position at that time, and it still is, that it should have been apparent to all those involved in presenting

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<sup>7</sup>My thought then was that the paraplegic student had a different perspective, because as a disabled person, she had different experiences to the other White students. I, on the other hand, being Black and Caribbean had also accumulated different experiences which gave me a unique perspective on the issue.

the material to the class that, as a Black person, I had a stake in the information. I should have been offered the chance to present the material myself, or failing that, the class should have been given advanced notice, as they were for every other presentation, so that I, and any other student who felt so inclined, could have been adequately prepared to challenge the material. This would have resulted in a fairer and more open and intelligent discussion about the relationship between race and intelligence, and the class would have benefitted from it.

It is still a concern to me that 16 of the 18 teachers in that class volubly, and uncritically, supported Rushton's theories about the relationship between race and intelligence and about Black intellectual inferiority. My very loud objections were shouted down with arguments that I later found echoed in the hereditarian literature on IQ. There were arguments raised about the importance of academic freedom, which was interpreted to mean that an academic should be free to propagate any view without let or hindrance. Neither at that time, nor in the environmentalist or hereditarian literature on IQ which I examined later, did I find the converse, and to me obvious, arguments about academic responsibility. I hold the view that with freedom comes responsibility and an academic while exercising this freedom has the responsibility to ensure that the ideas he or she publishes are fairly and honestly treated, and that they do no harm.



The above leads directly into another argument that was raised in the class, and again echoed in the literature, that the good scholar must be objective and maintain a distance, a lack of involvement, from her or his work. When theorists on race and intelligence claim a total lack of interest in the results of their research, that the conclusions are a result of the scientific process scrupulously and objectively applied, it is not unreasonable to be suspicious of the claim. Even a cursory study of the prominent theorists in the field reveal that their theories are closely related to their positions on social and political issues<sup>8</sup>. The four hereditarians examined here are conservatives, and the two environmentalists are liberals. This fact is clearly recognized in the field, since each group accuses the other of being politically motivated, while never acknowledging the same for themselves (Brazziel, 1969; Cronbach, 1969; Eysenck, 1974; Jensen, 1969; and Kamin, 1974, among others).

My position, and I will justify this later in the thesis, is that the current criteria for evaluating research in the social sciences are wrong and, in addition, they are deliberately deceptive. While they may be adequate for the physical sciences from which they were borrowed (and even this is debatable) (Cherryholmes, 1988), they make no sense when human behaviour enters into the equation. Currently, research into race and IQ seems to be judged primarily on the reputation of the researcher. If the researcher is considered

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<sup>8</sup>I will develop this connection between the personal, the political and the theoretical more fully later in the thesis.

an expert by his or her peers, the usual standards of objectivity, rigorousness, and reliability and validity (mainly statistical) seem to become immaterial<sup>9</sup>. This is not to say, however, that the latter criteria are adequate for judging research. I have made the point before that I believe them to be inadequate and misleading. The more appropriate and reasonable criteria by which to judge research into race and IQ, and other social science research in which human behaviour is a factor, are the five canons of Afrocentric research which I have developed for this study. They are kujittoa, ujamaa, uhaki, utulivu and ukweli. These canons will be developed and discussed more fully in Chapter Two.

### My Story

In this section, I will reflect on the development of my understanding of the concepts of race and intelligence, and on how my background may have influenced the way I now theorize about these two constructs. I have arranged these reflections into two subsections, the first will deal with my perceptions of race, and the second with my perceptions of intelligence.

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<sup>9</sup>The most frequently cited example of this is the case of Cyril Burt of the UK who is believed to have fabricated the data for his famous twin studies (Hearnshaw, 1979). I will return to this issue later when I deal with the writings of the six authors with which this study is concerned.

## Race

### Early impressions.

I cannot recall that race, and most particularly race relations, was ever openly acknowledged as dominant or even important issues while growing up in the Caribbean. That is not to say, however, that they were not. They were, and it could not be otherwise when one considers that the Caribbean of the sixties and seventies was the legacy of centuries of European conquest and subsequent political and social domination (Brizan, 1984 and Williams, 1969). This apparent silence on race meant only that the Caribbean had accommodated itself extremely well to its history, and the different racial groups had learnt to co-exist with minimum contact, and hence minimum tension, and with an illusion of racial harmony. This accommodation meant that one could grow up in the Caribbean, as I did, with no experience or understanding of racism, while still absorbing the then universal message of White superiority.

Although race was not an acknowledged issue, I nevertheless received very strong messages about the relative merits of Black and White people. One of the earliest and most important of these messages was that Whiteness was an aesthetic and economic ideal. This notion of the European as the epitome of beauty and good fortune was heavily reinforced in all spheres of my early life, from my home environment, to the church, to the school and also in the general culture. An accompanying message was that physical characteristics were only part of what constituted race, that one needed to have

a suitable economic status, as well as the appropriate physical characteristics. That is, if one did not possess the necessary criteria to be White, one then was Black by default.

These messages were reinforced in all parts of the culture.

All of the images I saw in my books and elsewhere around me, even the religious images in my church, were of White people. I was close to my teenage years before I saw my first recognizable Black image in print, and when I left the church in my mid-teens, the religious images were still only White, and nothing else had changed. Even in my primary school art classes, and with our Black teachers' approval, our drawings depicting people were always of White people with straight hair and nose, and thin lips, just as we saw in our books and in other images around us. It never occurred to us that our own images merited representation. I recall encountering the story of Booker T. Washington in my reading text when I was about seven without realizing that he was a Black man. This confusion occurred for two reasons. The first was that I was unaccustomed to seeing Blacks represented in books, and the second was that the caricaturistic drawing that accompanied the text bore no resemblance to the Black people around me.

Whiteness as an aesthetic ideal was very much a part of our national ideology. A component of our annual Carnival celebration was a beauty show called the Carnival

Queen Competition<sup>10</sup> which was meant to select the most beautiful unmarried young woman to reign over the celebrations. Up to 1966, when I was ten years old, the girls selected as Queens of Carnival were White except for only two instances, in 1956 and 1965, when fair-skinned, and well-off, Black girls were chosen (Vincie Mas, 1994). It was not until 1971 that the first dark-skinned girl was selected (Vincie Mas, 1994). This confirms my point that European features were the generally accepted standards of beauty, since the population of St. Vincent and the Grenadines<sup>11</sup> was then less than 2% White (Brizan, 1984)<sup>12</sup>.

Despite the pervasiveness of this message of White aesthetic superiority, we did receive some contradictory messages. The fact that Black people were such a large majority of the population lent a kind of normalcy to being Black that emboldened Black children to taunt and ostracize those who were not. White and other minority children

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<sup>10</sup>Since the mid-eighties, in response to local pressure, the competition has been described as a Carnival Pageant and not a beauty show.

<sup>11</sup> St. Vincent and the Grenadines comprises the mainland of St. Vincent and 31 other islands, covering a total acreage of 133 square miles and is home to approximately 110,000 persons. The islands are found in the Eastern Caribbean and are part of the Windward group which also includes Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia. The islands are also part of another sub-regional grouping called the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).

<sup>12</sup>Brizan quotes figures for Grenada, but St. Vincent and Grenada are similar in size, population, and demographics so one would expect similar figures for St. Vincent. Brizan's figures put the White population in Grenada at about 1.2%, so it is safe to suggest less than 2% for St. Vincent.

experienced some of the same prejudices in the school yard that other minority groups face in other societies. The difference here was that these non-Black children were being positively reinforced in all aspects of the Caribbean culture that existed outside the school yard. However, being in the majority afforded us Black children a degree of acceptance and self-confidence that helped to undermine the many messages we were receiving about Black aesthetic inferiority.

Poor White people in St. Vincent were never classified as White. Whiteness was closely associated with wealth and those Vincentians of European origin who were not fortunate enough to be wealthy, in effect, seemed to have forfeited their racial heritage. It was as though conferring the label on poor people dishonoured it, that it has to be linked to social and financial status. This group of poor White people<sup>13</sup> were the descendants of Scottish and Irish indentured labour and Portuguese smallholders and shopkeepers, who to a significant extent have managed to maintain a distinct cultural identity. They, in effect, have no racial identity. Economic status was, and still is, an important criterion for racial classification.

The view that skin colour was insufficient for racial classification was a message that was being continually reinforced in our society. I recall a significant illustration of this that

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<sup>13</sup>The local name for this group is Bajans, because they are said to have immigrated to St. Vincent from Barbados. Bajan is a colloquial abbreviation for a Barbadian.

occurred when I was around nine years old. My class was studying history and the day's topic was slavery. The class was nearly all Black except for two White girls, who both happened to be absent that day. The teacher was insistent on emphasising that we all shared a common slave ancestry, and drew attention to our two absent White classmates saying that they too, even though they appeared to be White, was just as Black as the rest of us. This incident had a profound effect on me, and I have never been able to forget it. The message I took away from that class, which was meant for my two White classmates, was that Black was meant to be a humbling label, and my White colleagues were being warned against assuming privileges accorded only to genuine White people, those who were rich as well as White.

#### My views and experiences.

My knowledge of the experiences of Black people outside the Caribbean began with my exposure to Black literature and politics in my mid-teens. One of my friends had older brothers who were studying in the US and Canada and were sympathetic to the Black Power Movement and who exposed her, and through her, me, to these ideas. Students like these were returning to the Caribbean with ideas and literature about the Movement and influencing many young people like myself who were getting our first introduction to Black self-empowerment politics. Part of the allure for us stemmed from the reactions of many Caribbean governments, including my own, to these new ideas, which were considered subversive and banned from the islands, along with many of their proponents,

such as Stokely Carmichael<sup>14</sup>. This was a very heady time as I recall it, when our own Vincentian students were returning and establishing Black Power organizations, holding public meetings, and publishing newsletters to propagate the ideas of the Movement. To supply the need being created for information about Black issues, some of the local bookstores began bringing in Black books that covered a wide range of topics, and from many sources, including Africa and the United States. There was, consequently, a surfeit of information for anyone interested in these new ideas, as I was.

Even at this stage, however, I indulged in very little self-reflection, since most of my readings described situations and experiences with which I was not yet familiar, and which seemed then totally foreign to my Caribbean<sup>15</sup> circumstances. In fact, my easy empathy with what I read stemmed more from my perception that the authors were describing an experience that would have been mine were I unfortunate enough to live in a predominantly White society, rather than from any thought of shared experiences. I was mortified and indignant that people could be persecuted and demeaned solely for the physical characteristics I shared with them, and it was therefore easy for me to identify with, and show solidarity for other Blacks, whether continental or diasporic. It

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<sup>14</sup>Carmichael, although a native of Trinidad was banned from most islands including his own. His ban was not lifted in St. Vincent until 1984.

<sup>15</sup>All Caribbean references, unless otherwise indicated, relate to my experiences growing up in St. Vincent.



was not until much later that I appreciated that some of these same forces were at work, though much more subtly, in the Caribbean.

To explain my orientation at this phase of my development, I will mention some of the books and ideas that had the greatest impact on me. Probably the first political book I ever read was Chief Albert Luthuli's autobiography called Let My People Go. This directed my interest to Black-White relations. Before this, my general impression was that the virulent racism that Luthuli (1963) described was something that occurred in the past and had died with the era of our enslavement. Luthuli opened my eyes to the fact that racism was still an everyday threat to many Black people, and it made me begin to reexamine my ideas, and to try to understand what it meant to be Black, from a more global perspective.

Two works of Franz Fanon's, Black Skins, White Masks (Fanon, 1967) and The Wretched of the Earth (Fanon, 1968) were also very influential in my development. For the first time, I began to think about the psychology of colonialism and its legacy of racism. Black Skins, White Masks was particularly relevant because it dealt with the subject from a Caribbean perspective and deconstructed many of the attitudes about race that I was already familiar with. I now began to think about the history of race in the Caribbean and elsewhere and to appreciate how and why the attitudes we held were developed. Even at this stage, there was no reflection on race relations in a Caribbean

context, but only on the Caribbean perception of race. My reading and thinking about race relations were confined to societies outside my own, for racism, the overt form anyway, was still outside my own experience.

The most influential book I read at this stage was The Autobiography of Malcolm X. Like others, I was impressed with Malcolm's anger at the way racism circumscribed the lives of Black Americans, but I found Malcolm's personal intellectual development even more fascinating. I found his independence of thought and his intellectual self-confidence enticing. He allowed himself to grow and develop and to discard old ideas that no longer worked and to keep on growing. Malcolm's final vision of the unity of all African peoples is one which made a lasting impression on me, and was only reinforced when I left the Caribbean for the UK and met with other Africans and observed how much of its African roots the Caribbean culture had retained.

My first direct experiences with racism occurred after I had left the Caribbean for the UK to attend University. For the first time I could relate to the experiences that I had been reading about, from the overt acts of discrimination, rudeness and name-calling to the more subtle and paternalistic putdowns and dismissals. It was extremely disconcerting, despite what I had read previously, to appreciate that to many of the Whites I now encountered, I was no longer judged on my performance, but on the prevailing stereotypes about Blacks. This was my first appreciation of a link between

teachers' attitudes and behaviours and student performance which I realize is still a much disputed relationship in the literature, but my own experience convinces me of the truth of it. I will now recount some personal experiences that will illustrate this relationship.

When I left St. Vincent for the UK, I was already matriculated, having successfully sat the Cambridge University A-level examinations in Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry. However, I arrived during the middle of summer on a student visa expecting to start university the following October, only to discover that the English universities processed applications during December for admittance in the following Autumn. I had, therefore, a one-year delay before I could enrol at a university, but was required to attend an educational institution to honour the conditions of my visa. My choice was to sit out the year at a small college in South East England<sup>16</sup> and resit my A-levels. The above information is important because I am creating the context for an experience I had at the college that still drives a lot of my reaction to the current debate about race and IQ and its insinuations about the intellectual ability of Black people.

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<sup>16</sup>My choice was not as arbitrary as it may appear. My older sister had emigrated to England many years before and had settled in Hampshire with her family. The decision was that I live with her for the year and enrol at the University of Manchester for the following October.

My performance in Physics and Chemistry at the College met my expectations in that I was able to earn distinctions<sup>17</sup> in both, and so improve upon my previous performance. Mathematics, on the other hand, was very different in that there was no improvement, and I was only able to earn a credit, even though at home I had found Mathematics the easiest of the three subjects. The only difference in the three cases was the attitude and behaviour of the Mathematics lecturer. For all three subjects I was revisiting work I was familiar with; all three instructors were White and English; and in all three classes I was the only Black student. The Mathematics lecturer, however, was different in that she made it quite plain that she considered me an unwelcome intrusion in her class and tried her best to ignore my presence. For the entire year I spent in that class, this lady never initiated a conversation with me or asked me a question in class, although she was very friendly and interactive with the class as a whole. When I did venture to ask a question she paid more attention to correcting my accent than to responding to the question I did ask. Attending these classes was an ordeal which I bore with the best grace I could. However, for some still unfathomable reason, I could not summon up the drive to work at Mathematics.

Other similar incidents occurred after I entered Manchester University where I was again the only Black person in the Physics department of its Institute of Technology. I found

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<sup>17</sup>The passing grades for the Cambridge A-levels were A to E, with O being awarded an ordinary pass and F, a failing grade. Of the advanced passes, A and B were awarded distinctions, and C and D were awarded credits.

that each time I felt negated or unwelcome in a class or a situation, I withdrew completely rather than deal with the issue directly. Today, with my greater maturity and experience, I have learnt that the best way to deal with such situations is immediately, directly, and honestly. Based on my own experiences, I have a strong suspicion that at least part of the reason for Black underperformance in predominantly White societies is due to this feeling of estrangement that I had experienced myself, but this is not the focus of this investigation. It is for this reason I am concerned when race or culture are used as explanations for this underperformance, for I know from my own experience that there are more than quantitative factors at work here. It is my position that Black scholars like myself must be more articulate and insist that their voices be heard in this debate, which is the aim of this thesis.

### Intelligence

Caribbean society is essentially divided along the two principal fault lines of race and economic or educational status, resulting in four distinct social groups: wealthy Whites, educated Blacks, poor Whites, and poor Blacks, the last group making up the largest proportion of the population. A degree of accommodation was established between the wealthy Whites and educated Blacks who seemed to have divided the national spoils between themselves, with the Whites retaining their plantations and commercial interests

and the Blacks confining themselves to the professions<sup>18</sup> and to the Civil Service, and later, after adult suffrage, to political power. This accommodation between the better-off Blacks and the local White population is characteristic of Caribbean history, as Brizan (1984) demonstrates when he reports that in Grenada, even in the early 1800s, Free Blacks, rather than challenging the institution of slavery in existence at the time, were instead petitioning the British government to share power with the local Whites. The resulting high visibility of educated Blacks sent a message to poor Blacks that the road to material success lay with education. This is probably the strongest of the messages I received as a child growing up in the Caribbean. In this section I will discuss this message and develop the perceptions of intelligence I received as a child growing up in the Caribbean.

In the Caribbean, the concept of a measurable general intelligence, as defined in the literature, is not a familiar one. Intelligence in the Caribbean context has two meanings that at times can seem conflicting. There is one meaning that is related to the acquisition of formal education or "book sense", and another more practical meaning that is associated with "good sense" or "common sense". There was an unmistakable message being sent to us children that formal education was a good thing to have and many of our parents sacrificed greatly to help us succeed. Despite this, however, we were receiving

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<sup>18</sup>In the Caribbean the professions are generally taken to mean principally Medicine and the Law. Professions such as Accounting, Dentistry, Teaching and the like are also dominated by Blacks, but are less prestigious.

other messages that "book sense" was inferior to "common sense". There is a telling local expression "common sense mek before book"<sup>19</sup> that I think sums up the community's position. Formal education was believed to be necessary for social and material success, but was an insufficient substitute for common sense. I have been deflated many times and witnessed others' deflations from the pithy question "where is your common sense?" School performance was only one, and certainly not the most important, display of intelligent behaviour. A person who could not master the skills and tasks and maintain the relationships expected of one's age group was not thought to display intelligent behaviour. These sentiments seem to be pervasive throughout African communities. Patricia Hill Collins (1990) and bell hooks (1984) got similar mixed messages about the dichotomous relationship between formal learning and common sense. Hooks, especially, talks of her book learning being under-appreciated by her community. In his novel, Anthills of the Savannah, the Nigerian, Chinua Achebe constantly contrasts his educated and illiterate characters to show that the words and actions of the unlearned were frequently more valuable than those of the learned. C. L. R. James confirms the alienating nature of formal education when he describes growing up in his native Trinidad where the British education he received caused him, even as a child of ten, to be more comfortable with British intellectual culture than with his own environment or

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<sup>19</sup> There are almost identical versions of this expression on the other Caribbean islands. In addition, I have heard both Molefi Asante (in 1992 at Nova Scotia's Black Learners Advisory Council's conference on Education) and Asa Hilliard (in 1993 at the National Black Educator's conference) mention similar expressions from their youth in the USA.

even his own family (C. L. R. James, 1963). So, although book-learning had little day-to-day value in Caribbean society, it provided valuable social and economic status. Education was treated as an investment for the future, and parents underwent tremendous sacrifices to enable their children to become educated.

In the late 1960s education was only guaranteed up to the primary level, and there was great competition for the few secondary places available, all of which charged a fee. The only two government secondary schools at the time, the Girls' High School and the Boys Grammar School<sup>20</sup> were the most prestigious of all the secondary schools, and perversely, the cheapest. These two schools provided the additional prestige of annual full scholarships to the top students in the eleven-plus examination. All of these factors served to foster the concept of education as a highly prized commodity, and access was highly competitive. Miller et al. (1991) show that as recently as 1990, St. Vincent and the Grenadines could provide only 41.3 percent of its children between eleven and seventeen with secondary school places. The highest figure attained that year in the smaller islands was by the twin island nation of St. Kitts & Nevis which offered 4032 places to the 5235 available students. In fact, according to the 1980-81 census, only between 12 and 13 percent of the population aged between 15 and 64 had attained a secondary education in the entire Eastern Caribbean region (Miller, 1992).

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<sup>20</sup> This has been renamed the St. Vincent Grammar School and it houses the only sixth form in the country, making the sixth form coeducational while the rest of the school remains single sex.



By the late 1950s, other new and visible opportunities were opening in the area of education. By this period, local professionals (mainly doctors and lawyers) were returning to the country in significant numbers. For the first time, this number included an admitted few from communities like ours which had been previously excluded from chances like these. My own village, including my own family, began sending the first of its children to secondary schools in the capital around this time. There was truly a tangible feeling of opportunities waiting to be grasped and of doors being opened if one were willing to push hard enough.

I realize now that my mother must have been caught up in the euphoria of the times about the possibilities of formal education, and this could explain why she chose to enrol me in school when I was only three and a half years old. My first school was only a few houses away from ours and was run by a villager who had successfully completed her primary schooling. This was technically a private school, and my mother paid a fee for my attendance until I was old enough to be admitted to the public school system. This school was not a kindergarten, but followed the primary school curriculum. We were all taught to read and write and to do sums, regardless of our age, and there were a number of us who were under five. By the time I was five years old and could enter a regular school, I had already had nearly two years of primary education. When a government school was finally built in our village when I was six, my mother being closer to the action, kept a very close eye on my progress, and always visited the school

to intervene if she felt that my goals were being hindered. So from very early on in my life, I learnt that education was a worthwhile and a valuable goal and an attainable one, and this message did not come only from my mother, but from all around me.

There was always talk around our house of successful people who started from humble origins. The adults would frequently point to a prominent person, and discuss who his parents were and detail the sacrifices they had made in order to ensure his success. My mother, who had lived in many other Caribbean islands, always spoke approvingly of Grenadians. She told stories of the Grenadian custom of parents planting a nutmeg tree on the birth of a child with the intention that all the proceeds from that tree would go towards the education of that child. They spoke about "brains" and of people who had brains as though this commodity was acquired through a mixture of good luck and the direct intervention of the Almighty. I cannot remember ever feeling as a child that I owed my intelligence to any ancestor or group of ancestors. When later, I read the novel The Potter's Wheel by Chukwuemeka Ike of Nigeria, I found the similarities between my upbringing and that of his protagonist, Obu, quite uncanny. It dawned on me then, that the customs and habits that my people exhibited probably had a traceable history going back to the African continent, and this perception is stronger today now that my knowledge and interaction with other African communities have increased.

### The Afrocentric Location

I have found continental African and Caribbean writings, including fiction, to be an invaluable source of information about community perspectives on concepts like education and intelligence that are of interest to this study. This is probably because their focus is the communities themselves, and relationships among the members<sup>21</sup>. They, however, provide only peripheral information about race, and I have had to rely on my own recollections and those of my colleagues in the Afrocentric research group<sup>22</sup> for such information. North American and Southern African writing, on the other hand, including the fiction, tends to focus on the communities' relationship with the external and dominant White community, and the intra-community relationships tend to be de-emphasized. They, however, provide valuable information about the communities' perception of the impact of race on the lives of its members, but only marginal information on their feelings on issues themselves. Some non-fictional works like those of bell hooks and Patricia Hill Collins provide some redress, in that they do talk of their

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<sup>21</sup> Examples of this type of fiction from the Caribbean include the works of George Lamming of Barbados (In the Castle of my Skin), Vic Reid of Jamaica (New Day), Merle Hodge (Crick Crack Monkey) and Earle Lovelace of Trinidad (The Wine of Astonishment). Continental African examples include the works of Chinua Achebe (Anthills of the Savannah), Buchi Emecheta (Second Class Citizen) and Chukwuemeka Ike of Nigeria (The Potter's Wheel), Ngugi wa Thiong'O of Kenya (Weep not, child).

<sup>22</sup> This is a group of eight African scholars from Dalhousie and neighbouring universities who meet regularly to discuss research from an Afrocentric perspective.

origins and of their communities' attitudes to formal learning<sup>23</sup>. I have had to rely here on the recollections of the North American members of the Afrocentric research group.

The very significant messages about race and intelligence that I learnt while growing up in the Caribbean, and my later experiences of racism on travelling to the UK and Canada, have helped to shape the way I view the construct today. There were so many contradictions, and the absence of any historical context or analysis in the Caribbean treatment of the race issue that, once I was exposed to Black literature and history, it was necessary to reassess all that I had learnt, in the broader context of African continental and diasporic experiences, in order to make sense of these messages. The messages I received about the value of education and about what constitutes intelligent behaviour have informed my reaction to the debate about race and IQ. In addition, my own experiences and those of other Africans outside the Caribbean convince me that the current debate is based on the wrong premises, and Africans scholars like myself, because of our personal experiences and understanding of the issues, are in an enviable position to contribute to this debate. The debate needs to move into an Afrocentric framework, that is, to be informed by the real experiences of Africans themselves.

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<sup>23</sup> Writers like Richard Wright (Native Son) and James Baldwin (Go tell it on the mountain), although writing about male protagonists fighting for a way out of their current lives, the focus is on the immediacy of racism and not on the less concrete issues of self-development or education.

One of the major defects of the current debate is its assumption of the American society as universally representative of Black and White relations, and this is not the case. The dispersal of African peoples around the globe has resulted in African communities over the last 400 years acquiring different experiential profiles, while maintaining a common core of traditional African values and experiences that distinguish them from other cultural groups (Asante, 1990 and Ngugi wa Thiong'O, 1993). However, the relationships between Blacks and Whites in admittedly racist societies like North America, Europe, and South Africa is uniquely pathological, and in that way differs from those in other countries like the Caribbean and most of Africa. In the latter countries Blacks exercise at least nominal political power and there is an appearance that education can pave the way for opportunities waiting to be grasped.

In both Africa and the Caribbean where Africans outnumbered Europeans, educated Africans were needed to service existing institutions and to act as a buffer between the ruling Europeans and the Black masses. It would have been counter-productive in such situations to propagate theories of Black intellectual inferiority. In North America, and in a similar manner in South Africa, the converse occurred. Black intellectual outputs were not thought essential for the smooth functioning of these societies, their services only being deemed necessary for the more menial opportunities allocated to them. In such instances their participation in intellectual pursuits was discouraged. It is interesting to note that it is in those areas where Europeans had decided to settle permanently, and

where they therefore had a vested interest in preserving whatever privileges they had accorded to their own racial group, that the propagation of theories of African intellectual inferiority is most apparent. This would explain the similarities between the virulence of the racism practised in societies as disparate as the USA, Canada, and South Africa. In these societies, Europeans took on new national identities becoming American or South African, relinquishing their old nationalities, and I would suggest that the resistance to African participation in the intellectual community was, in part, to stake exclusive claim to the national spoils.

Both the hereditarian and environmentalist positions in the race-IQ debate are flawed for the very reason that they are confined to European-American reactions to what is perceived as an African-American problem. This Eurocentric approach to an issue that is so critical for Black people is clearly wrong and inadequate, especially since it is confined to quantitative descriptions of an indisputable problem. There is no dispute within either Eurocentric or Afrocentric circles that a disparity exists between test scores of Black and White children. The dispute lies in whether a quantitative measure of this disparity is sufficient to label Black people as intellectually inferior, and whether the explanation for this inferior performance is genetic or cultural. An Afrocentric approach mandates that the explanations include the experiences of Black people themselves since they are so intimately involved, and Black experiences go beyond the confines of the American society. Black experiences both inside and outside of North America show

that when Blacks are educated in less racially stressful environments their academic performance is greatly enhanced (Briggs & Robinson, 1993)<sup>24</sup>, so, therefore, Black genetic makeup or culture are inadequate explanations for the gap in test scores.

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<sup>24</sup>This article appeared in a special issue of *Emerge* magazine, published in 1993. The article included data which showed that 50% of all African-American PhDs, 85% of medical doctors, and 80% of judges and lawyers completed their undergraduate work at historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs). This is despite the fact that only 18% of Blacks attend these notoriously underfunded colleges, and these tend to have the lower SAT scores. The 82% of Blacks with higher SAT scores go to predominantly White universities.

## CHAPTER TWO

### Research on Race and IQ: Missing Voices

*I talked once with one who was not dead  
And he said  
Why doesn't Chatoyer write home any longer...  
(Ellsworth McG. Keane)*

This chapter discusses the literature on the concepts of race and IQ, and the presumed relationship between them. The definitions and development of these concepts will be examined here, within an historical context, paying particular attention to their social and political influences and implications. The format of this chapter is to introduce brief summaries of the findings from the literature, and then to explore these findings in more detail, with the relevant references, in the appropriate sections.

The literature of race and IQ reveals tremendous confusion surrounding both the concepts of race and of IQ. With regards to race there is no agreement as to whether it is a biological or a social construct, although the weight of the evidence points towards a social construction. The literature becomes even more murky when it comes to the concept of race in the North American context, especially as applied to who is Black in America. Miscegenation, coupled with the virulent racism practised in America's recent past, has meant that any Black ancestry, however obscure, was regarded as a blot, a stain, on a person's racial lineage. This attitude has led to some incongruous laws like the



"one drop of blood" rule, whereby a person was designated Black if he or she had any traceable African ancestry. The literature does not show that this fact is given much consideration by those (both hereditarians and environmentalists) who compare Black-White behaviours, in terms of influencing how the race of populations and samples are defined.

There is no clear idea in the literature, either, of what intelligence is, or how intelligence functions. Even today, after nearly a century of widespread intelligence testing there is still uncertainty as to whether intelligence could or should be measured, and once measured how such assessments should be used. Much of the controversy, understandably, lies around the issue that is the core of this study, that is, the use of the tests to demarcate intellectual boundaries between racial groups by comparing mean scores of group samples. The literature reveals a fact that is lost to contemporary critiques of intelligence and its measurement, that is, that the same statistical procedures that are being used today to provide "objective" analyses of IQ data, were initially developed in tandem with the IQ construct in order to provide the new discipline with a veneer of scientific objectivity. Hence, one can conclude that these statistical procedures are not independent mathematical procedures, as is sometimes portrayed. This failure to recognize and acknowledge the historical links between statistics and IQ has meant that there is, currently, little questioning of the assumptions underlying the mainly statistical analyses of IQ test scores.

Intelligence and its measurement have generated more discord, both within and without the psychology community, than probably all other issues combined (Taylor, 1980). It has spawned two major camps: hereditarians, who believe that intelligence is mainly determined by heredity and attempt to prove this with "objective" measurements (Eysenck, 1981; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969; and Rushton, 1989), and environmentalists who believe that intelligence is mainly determined by environmental or cultural factors and that IQ tests may or may not be valid as measures of intelligence (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1974 & 1981). There is a third group that includes mainly Black scholars (Figueroa, 1991; Hilliard, 1989; and Ogbu, 1978, among others) and some Whites (Mensh & Mensh, 1991 and Nahem, 1981, among others), but to which little popular or scholarly attention is paid (Snyderman & Rothman, 1987b), and to which I subscribe, which resists both hereditarian and environmentalist positions and argues instead that the tests, as they are currently conceived, are artifacts of a racist society, and therefore can have no validity as measures of intelligence, and certainly not as a discriminant between racial groups . This study, however, is only concerned with the former two theories, that is, hereditarianism and environmentalism, since they, together, define the parameters of the current race and IQ debate.

## Defining the Concepts of Intelligence and Race

### Definition of Intelligence

There is no single definition of intelligence currently in use, even among psychologists, although Hearnshaw (1979) has noted that the term has been in use since the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, the literature shows that European scholars and, particularly, North American scholars of European descent, have long demonstrated an abiding preoccupation with the nature of intelligence and the possibility of its objective measurement (Gould, 1981 and Hearnshaw, 1979). However, the available literature is silent on any interest that scholarly communities in other societies outside North America and Europe may have displayed in this issue. This silence suggests either that this interest in the ranking and measurement of intelligence is a preoccupation that is exclusive to Europeans and European descendants, or that the scholarly interest of the six experts, and others, examined for this study does not extend beyond these geographical confines. Either way, this preoccupation with the assumed importance of intellectual endowments is definitely an important influence on both European-oriented or Eurocentric scholarship and society. This interest stems, it seems to me, at least in part, from a fundamental assumption of Western philosophy that can be traced back to Platonic times, that is, that people differ in their worth to society (their mettle, according to the Platonic view) and that what we now call intelligence, or some variation of it, provides a measure of this worth. Eysenck (1981), Gould (1981), and Thomas (1982) agree with this view, and have suggested that the current preoccupation with IQ measurements can be traced

back, specifically, to the Platonic advice that "citizens ... should be educated and assigned to three classes: rulers, auxiliaries, and craftsmen. These ranks must be honoured for a stable society and citizens must therefore accept the status conferred upon them" (Gould, 1981). This preoccupation with rankings and classification was a characteristic of early twentieth century Western society, as described by Hearnshaw (1979), and created a hospitable climate for the first IQ tests.

Despite the long history of sorting people according to their natural worth, which is presently, as demonstrated by the IQ debate, believed by many to be intelligence, there was still no clear definition of the term at the beginning of the twentieth century when intelligence testing began. There was only a secular, and rather elastic, understanding that it was manifested as a kind of mental alertness (Hearnshaw, 1979). Even with the advent of intelligence and its measurement as a distinct area of study in the early 1900s, there was still no attempt by practitioners, as one would have expected, to arrive at some agreement as to the nature of this thing they were presuming to measure. Rather, the new psychometricians seemed to create or adopt a definition that best suited their personal philosophy, with hereditarians and environmentalists consequently adopting widely divergent definitions. For instance, hereditarian views of intelligence held it to be an

innate, general, cognitive ability"<sup>1</sup> (Hearnshaw, 1979, p. 49), and "the most important of ways in which individuals differed hereditarily" (Hearnshaw, 1979, p. 48) which could be measured objectively just like any physical quantity (Hearnshaw, 1979 and Terman, 1920). Early environmentalists attacked the hereditarian definition on every count. As Hearnshaw (1979, pp. 49-50) describes it "the concept of ability was attacked, the abstraction of the cognitive was attacked, the generality of intelligence was attacked; and finally, and most fiercely of all, its innateness was hotly disputed."

Roughly a century later, there is still no consensus, as to what intelligence really is and, consequently, what IQ tests measure (Hearnshaw, 1979; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969; and Samuda, 1975), and it is noteworthy how little things have changed in the interim, both in terms of the issues debated and the nature of the debate. Surveys of expert opinions conducted over a half century apart (1921 and 1986), confirm this and show that the confusion has not abated, and that recognized experts in the field of

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<sup>1</sup> Although Hearnshaw attributes this particular definition to Cyril Burt, variants of it have existed in Western thought since, at least, Aristotelian times (Gould, 1981 and Hearnshaw, 1979).

intelligence and its measurement have as widely differing views about its true nature as they have ever had (Snyderman & Rothman, 1987<sup>2</sup> and Sternberg & Detterman, 1986<sup>3</sup>).

Of particular interest to me as an African scholar and an Afrocentric researcher, and therefore one who is intimately connected to this issue of race and IQ, is a very important question that arises from the literature, and that is never adequately answered by either side of the IQ debate. It is this: How could one make objective and scientific measurements of a thing when one has no clear concept as to its nature and function? This question is raised in the literature (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1974) but it tends to be directed to hereditarians who generally dismiss it with allusions to similarities between

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<sup>2</sup> Mark Snyderman and Stanley Rothman conducted a survey of "expert" opinion on intelligence and aptitude testing which revealed that only a small majority of the experts (53%) agree that there is a consensus about the meaning of "intelligent" behaviours. This low figure was obtained despite the fact that the survey sample was heavily "weighted in favour of those with the most expertise, as indicated by research and publications on issues dealing with testing" (p.138), and who would therefore be expected to have a vested interest in creating a favourable image of intelligence and its measurement.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Sternberg and Douglas Detterman (1986) asked twenty-four of the "foremost experts in the field of intelligence" (p. vii) to respond to the question "What I conceive 'intelligence' to be" (p. vii). Sternberg and Detterman found the same "extraordinary diversity" (p.3), ranging from biological to environmental explanations, that had been found 65 years before in expert responses to the same question.

intelligence and the physical sciences.<sup>4</sup> But, environmentalists erroneously absolve themselves of responsibility for dealing directly with this issue, for they mistakenly confine themselves to reacting to the articulations of the hereditarians, forgetting that even the debate as to whether intelligence is due to genes or the environment is premature until intelligence can be adequately defined (Hilliard, 1987).

The hereditarians were clearly the dominant force in the twentieth century debate concerning intelligence and its measurement (Gould, 1981). Their theories on the innateness of intelligence, its heritability, and its generality have shaped the debate in its early stages and still do so today. The environmentalists, on the other hand, especially in the early years, have contributed very little in terms of new ideas, but rather have maintained a role as watchdogs and critics of the more controversial theories propounded

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<sup>4</sup> The hereditarians tend to dismiss the question with analogies to physical quantities like heat or electricity. They argue that scientists have no real conception of what these quantities are, rather, they are defined by their measurement, as is the IQ. This leads to the tautology that intelligence is what intelligence tests measure, which is a distortion of what occurs in the physical sciences. The existence of quantities like heat and electricity rests on universally accepted theoretical foundations, which is not the case for intelligence. In addition, it must be emphasised that the nature of these quantities is not deduced from their measurements, but rather the converse, in that there is usually a general consensus as to the nature and predicted behaviour of a quantity like electricity, before ways are deduced to measure it.

by the hereditarians.<sup>5</sup> There are five attributes that describe the early twentieth century hereditarian view of intelligence and which still hold true today, approaching as we are the end of the century. They are: (i) it is a fixed and innate quantity; (ii) it consists of a single general ability (generally described as Spearman's g); (iii) it can be measured objectively; (iv) it can discriminate between individuals; and (v) it is highly heritable. These are the core assumptions of the psychometric model of intelligence that has dominated intelligence testing from its inception.

### The Psychometric Model of Intelligence.

The psychometric model of intelligence with its insistence on the objective measurement of intelligence, has been responsible for the creation of IQ tests as we know them today (Gould, 1981 and von Mayrhauser, 1992). This psychometric model of intelligence is a direct result of the hereditarian theories that claim intelligence to be a fixed and innate quantity with physical characteristics that can be measured like any other physical quantity (Eysenck, 1981; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; and Jensen, 1969, among others). The model is based on the idea that individuals differ in intellectual ability, and that the distribution of intelligence in sufficiently large groups of individuals will approximate to a normal curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994 and Jensen, 1969). The basic assumption

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<sup>5</sup> This has changed somewhat in the latter half of the century. Psychologists like Asa Hilliard are challenging basic assumptions of the hereditarian theories, and others like Howard Gardner and Robert Sternberg are offering new theories of intelligence that, they argue, offer alternatives to the psychometric theories of the traditional IQ tests.



is that some people will perform better than others and that those who perform below some pre-determined average level are deficient in intelligence, whereas those who perform above that level are better endowed (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994 and Jensen, 1969).

It was the task of the newly minted American psychometricians, who were in the main hereditarians, to define the new discipline of psychometrics in America (Gould, 1981 and von Mayrhauser, 1992). It was they who produced the first mass testing of intelligence in the Army Alpha and Beta tests during the first European war<sup>6</sup> (1914-1918) (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1974). The data generated by these tests, disputed as they were at that time, generated many of the "facts" about IQ testing that are taken for granted today (Gould, 1981; Kamin, 1974; and von Mayrhauser, 1992), such as the performance gap between Blacks and Whites, with which this study is concerned.

The motivations and visceral beliefs that guided the work of the early psychometricians and influenced the interpretations of their findings and the theories they formulated, depended, significantly, on what was happening in the society around them at that time (Cravens, 1992 and Gould, 1981). Theories are never created in a social vacuum, and certainly psychometric theories of human intelligence that emerged from the early

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<sup>6</sup> For reasons of accuracy, this war of 1914-1918 will be referred to as a European war, since it was confined to the nations of Europe with North American involvement being dictated by perceived ancestral ties to Europe.

twentieth century America were not. The direction taken in the United States, which was clearly the leader in the new discipline, owed a lot to the preoccupations of the Americans of that era; hence, the early IQ testers, maybe subconsciously, sought confirmation of their prejudices (Gould, 1981; Kamin, 1974; and von Mayrhauser, 1992). There were two relevant social phenomena occurring then that influenced the creation of this model. Firstly, throughout the West, universal education was being established and issues of educability, educational selection, and educational backwardness were assuming importance (Hearnshaw, 1979). Secondly, the United States was still recovering from its Civil War (1861-1865) and the subsequent period of Reconstruction in the southern states (1865-1877) that saw the emancipation of Blacks and their attempts to become integrated into American life as free individuals after centuries of enslavement (Du Bois, 1965).

It is quite easy to see why the social phenomena described above should influence the shape of any theory of intelligence that emerged from that era. With the advent of universal public education, education was no longer the prerogative of the elite. Classrooms now contained children from all social classes and different ethnic and racial groups.<sup>7</sup> Not surprisingly, not all children were able to perform at the same level and the

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<sup>7</sup> There were still some southern American states where education was inaccessible to Blacks (Du Bois, 1965).

search for explanations was underway. For those who, like early hereditarians Lewis Terman of the US and Cyril Burt of England, subscribed to the Platonic view that

The God who created you has put different metals into your composition - gold into those who are fit to be rulers, silver into those who act as their executives, and a mixture of iron and brass into those whose task it will be to cultivate the soil or manufacture goods ... (quoted in Eysenck, 1981, p. 12)

there was the suspicion that the relative performances represented innate abilities, particularly since the underperformers tended to be members of socially and economically disadvantaged groups. It is my contention that IQ tests created after Binet's 1905 attempt, maybe subconsciously, sought to verify this suspicion.

The newly acquired freedom of Blacks and their integration into American life, especially in the southern United States, was an agonizing experience for many Whites who believed fervently in the inferiority of Blacks (DuBois, 1965). Their inclusion into the universal public education system was met with violent opposition in many parts of the South (DuBois, 1965). DuBois sums up this period thus: "it is doubly difficult to write of this period calmly, so intense was the feeling, so mighty the human passions that swayed and blinded men" (1965, p. 19). This was the atmosphere into which psychometrics was introduced in the United States. Race, understandably, became an important factor in the interpretation of the early psychometric data.

Jensen, in his 1969 article, and more recently Eysenck (1971), Rushton (1988a, 1989b) and Murray (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) have accepted the gauntlet from their predecessors in the hereditarian movement, to argue for a genetic basis for differences in Black and White intelligence test scores. They maintain that since there is a high heritability (80%) for IQ in White populations, and possibly in Black populations, it is then quite consistent to suggest that a similarly high heritability exists for IQ differences between the racial groups. Jensen, for example, goes on to say:

The fact that a reasonable hypothesis has not been rigorously proved does not mean that it should be summarily dismissed. It only means that we need more appropriate research for putting it to the test. I believe such definitive research is entirely possible but has not yet been done. So all we are left with are various lines of evidence, no one of which is definitive alone, but which, viewed all together, make a not unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the strongly Negro-white intelligence difference. The preponderance of evidence is, in my opinion, less consistent with a strictly environmental hypothesis, which, of course, does not exclude the influence of environment or its interaction with genetic factors. (Jensen, 1969, p. 82)

Despite the admitted doubtfulness of this claim and the criticisms from geneticists, among many, many others, as to the correctness of extrapolating data from within populations to between populations (Crow, 1969 and Lewontin, 1976), Jensen had sufficient confidence in his untested hypothesis to testify in 1972 before a congressional committee on educational reform, that the failure of compensatory education is assured because differences in school performance are mainly determined by genetics (Deese, 1992; Kamin, 1974; and Ogbu, 1978).

### The Development of IQ Tests

The first IQ test was created in France, in 1905, by Alfred Binet in response to a mandate from the French government to identify underachieving children for remedial purposes (Gould, 1981 and von Mayrhauser, 1992). Binet worked within the public school system and had teachers identify children who were high and low achievers in order to develop a series of tests that could distinguish consistently between the two groups. By trial and error, he created a battery of tests that matched the teachers' classification (Fancher, 1985). Binet's tests, therefore, by intention, correlated highly with school performance, and so has every other IQ test since that time. Binet never claimed, as did later test developers such as Lewis Terman who created the Stanford-Binet Test, that his tests were valid as measures of intelligence. Rather, he suggested that the tests themselves mattered very little, so long as they were numerous (Gould, 1981). Binet, again contrary to later claims, warned that it was necessary to guard against the assertion that intelligence was a fixed and innate quantity (Richardson, 1989), an assumption which has become the core of the contemporary hereditarian theory of intelligence (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994).

William Stern is credited with introducing the Binet test to the United States (Fancher, 1985 and Gould, 1981). This test was adapted by Lewis Terman in 1916 to produce the Stanford-Binet test, which has functioned as a virtual standard for subsequent IQ tests (Eysenck, 1981; Fancher, 1985; and Gould, 1981). The Stanford test was made to correlate highly with the original Binet and, therefore, correlated highly with school

performance too (Gould, 1981). Terman is regarded as one of the most significant contributors to psychology in his era (Cravens, 1992), and his work *is* reflective of his era. The motivations and theories that guided the work of Terman, and others like him, and their interpretations of their findings, depended on the assumptions they held and which were popular at that time. Both Craven (1992) and Gould (1981) agree that the formulation of theoretical frameworks, and their interpretations, depend on the assumptions, sometimes unconscious, which scientists hold and which are in vogue at the time. It is understandable that the *Zeitgeist* of an era plays a central role in framing and interpreting scientific findings and, therefore, theories of intelligence created in an inequitable society will reflect that inequality.

A fact which is often missed nowadays is that there were significant divisions among the early psychometricians, from the very beginning, that concerned quite fundamental questions like the nature of intelligence, and whether or not the current tests actually measured this construct (Gould, 1981 and von Mayrhauser, 1992). These questions are still being asked today, and it is critical that they be dealt with seriously, for the continued use of the tests for nearly 80 years has accorded them an unearned respectability. As Hilliard (1987) argues:

No position can be taken on whether "it" is genetic or environmental until we have sufficient data to determine if "it" even exists; and if so, in what form. (p. 136)

It is generally forgotten that, as Hearnshaw (1979) and Hilliard (1987) assert:

The construct "intelligence" and the IQ tests which were designed to measure the behaviour implied by the construct were fabricated and were applied in education **prior** [emphasis in original] to the time that mental functions were even described clearly.... There was not then, nor has there been since then, any general professional requirement that this undefined substance be measured in a uniform and rigorous way or that it be measured with instruments that yield comparable data. (Hilliard, 1987, pp. 136-7)

The following quote from von Mayrhauser (1992) is instructive in light of the uncritical support that these tests continue to inspire in a significant part of the psychological and educational communities:

What is surprising is the lingering commitment of modern psychometricians, testing services, educators, and even social critics to a bridge that was jerry-built by testers who did not agree on what they were building.... For some of those so committed, further consideration of the wartime testing activities of the nonintelligence testers, who initially made "intelligence" workable and much less "general" in the process, may help signal BRIDGE OUT AHEAD. One suspects this will not be enough for the true believers, however, which raises the question of why they believe so strongly in something that is so illogical, let alone unhistorical. (p. 252)

While one can accept Cravens' (1992) argument that early psychometricians were only representative of their time and must be judged within that context, one must acknowledge the link between those times and the present. Many contemporary psychologists transfer the findings of that earlier era into today's debates as evidence to support their positions (Eysenck, 1981; Jensen, 1969; and Rushton, 1989a, 1989b). This happens even though many of these findings have been discredited, or positions

modified.<sup>8</sup> In light of this, it is instructive to observe the manner in which the principal proponents of IQ tests in each era have influenced newer scholars and how this process has served as a conduit for ideas (in Chapters Four and Five I will discuss the collegiality among contemporary scholars). Terman, the acknowledged "father" of modern intelligence testing as practised in the US and Canada, was deeply interested in Galton's theories and worked with Thorndike and Yerkes in the compilation of the Army Alpha and Beta tests (Fancher, 1985; Gould, 1981; and von Mayrhauser, 1992). Burt was acquainted with Galton as a youngster and acknowledged his influence (Fancher, 1985). He would later influence Eysenck and Jensen in his role as one of the world's most prominent psychologists (Eysenck, 1981; Fancher, 1985; Kamin, 1981; and Jensen, 1972). As will be discussed more fully in Chapter Four, Jensen did postgraduate work with Eysenck in England, and was greatly influenced by his ideas (Fancher, 1985), while Rushton, a relative newcomer and a Canadian of South African birth, has repeatedly acknowledged Jensen's assistance in the preparation of his papers on Black-White differences in intelligence (Rushton, 1989a and 1989b). In addition, both Rushton and Jensen have publicly voiced their support for Charles Murray's recent work, and in the acknowledgements to the book (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. xxv), Murray has acknowledged this support.

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<sup>8</sup>One of the most notable cases of discredited data occurred with Cyril Burt's twin studies. After an exhaustive investigation, his biographer, L. S. Hearnshaw (1979) admitted that charges of fraud against him were justified. Other cases involved Morton's cranial measurements which were judged to be inaccurate, and Goddard's doctored photographs of his Kallikak family (Gould, 1981).



Throughout North America, IQ tests are used extensively in the public school system. They are firmly entrenched in the educational system (Hilliard, 1987 and Perrone, 1977), so much so, that many aspects of the educational structure, such as age-grading and streaming<sup>9</sup>, require their continued use though no support can be found for any concrete educational benefits to be derived from them (Eysenck, 1981; Hilliard, 1989; Kamin, 1981; and Perrone, 1977). Nevertheless, there has been, for the last decade or so, a climate of dissatisfaction with the tests that has forced the testing industry to retract their initial claim that the tests measure the fixed and innate intellectual capacities of children (Elliot, 1988; Richardson, 1989; and Snyderman & Rothman, 1986). Despite this, however, and although most educators and psychologists agree that the tests, while highly predictive of academic performance, do not measure innate ability, there has been little or no change over its 80-year history<sup>10</sup> in the ways the tests have been employed (Hilliard, 1989 and Samuda, 1975). The fact that they are still widely described as measures of children's potential, ability or aptitude, suggests that some residue of innateness has clung to these measures. Even more revealing than the persistence of the idea of innateness, is the fact that the test results are still used, either wholly or in part, to help decide the educational experiences that children will receive, which in turn determine, to a large extent, the life chances of these children.

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<sup>9</sup>Streaming, as used here, is meant to describe the classification of children into categories for different instructional treatments.

<sup>10</sup>I am referring here to the history of mass testing in the US.

### New Conceptualizations of Intelligence

Once the tests reached the United States, they ceased to be the remedial tool that Binet had envisaged, and were welcomed as the mental measuring device psychometricians had long sought (Kamin, 1974; Gould, 1981; Cravens, 1992; and von Mayrhauser, 1992). The new tests were instantly controversial (Lippman, 1976a, 1976b, 1976c; Terman, 1976a, 1976b; and Thomas, 1982). The dissatisfaction focused mainly on the claims that the tests objectively measured a fixed and innate unified general intellectual ability, called *g* (Elliot, 1988; Richardson, 1989; and Snyderman & Rothman, 1986). There was also dissatisfaction with the interpretations of test scores, most notably the Army Alpha and Beta tests, as they pertained to the intellectual capacity of Americans and the heritability of the scores (Brigham, 1923; Lippman 1976a, 1976e; and Terman, 1976a). Later claims, popularized by Jensen, asserted a very high heritability (80%) for IQ scores, both within and between racial groups (Gould, 1981; Jensen, 1969; Kamin, 1974; and Lewontin, 1969 among others). Such dissension, the literature reveals, erupted into periodic and acrimonious debates between hereditarians and environmentalists (Eysenck, 1981; and Kamin, 1981; Lippman, 1976a, 1976b, 1976c; and Terman, 1976a, 1976b; among others), confirming DuBois' reports of the strong feelings characteristic of that era (DuBois, 1965).

Newer conceptualizations of intelligence address these sources of conflict generated by the psychometric model. The first is that this model focuses on too narrow a range of

intellectual ability, namely, abstracting skills and logical reasoning, while there are a whole range of other abilities that are just as important (Gardner, 1983 and Sternberg, 1985, among others). The second defect is that this model maximizes reliability and validity measures, rather than reflect any particular theory or theories of intelligence (Sternberg, 1986). Gardner and Sternberg have proposed two of the best known of the new theories, with accompanying tests (Gardner, 1983 and Sternberg, 1986), which were said to correct for these defects.

Modern psychometricians admit that the full range of mental abilities is not measured by IQ tests (Jensen, 1969 and Eysenck, 1981). Thus, Jensen could write in 1969 that

psychologists know full well that what they mean by intelligence in the technical sense is only part of the whole spectrum of human abilities .... The particular constellation of abilities we now call "intelligence" and which we can measure by means of intelligence tests, has been singled out from the total galaxy of mental abilities as being especially important in our society mainly because of the nature of our traditional system of formal education and the occupational structure with which it is coordinated. Thus the predominant importance of intelligence is derived, not from any absolute criteria or God-given desiderata, but from societal demands. (Jensen, 1969a, p. 19)

Where psychologists like Sternberg (1986) and Gardner (1983) differ with Jensen, however, is that they claim no hierarchical arrangement within "the total galaxy of mental abilities", as Jensen obviously does. In addition, they both recommend that intelligence tests be based on clearly articulated theories of intelligence, not "societal demands" as Jensen would have it (Sternberg, 1986); and, going back to Binet, they view tests of intelligence as remedial rather than custodial or classification tools (Gardner, 1983 and

Sternberg, 1985, 1986). Although both Gardner and Sternberg have more progressive ideological positions than do hereditarians like Jensen and Rushton, they have made little impact on the articulations of the race-intelligence debate itself. Works published by Herrnstein and Murray in 1994, Jensen in 1991 and Rushton in both 1988 and 1989, contain the same lines of argument that were used by Terman, Brigham, or Burt decades before. Where the newer conceptualizations have some impact is in the language used by the testing industry. Tests are no longer officially described as measuring innate characteristics like intelligence, aptitude, or ability, but instead are described as measures of achievement. However, despite changes in labels there have been no substantial changes in the tests themselves (Sternberg, 1986 and Hilliard, 1992), neither in their natures nor in their uses for classifying and ranking students.

As an Afrocentrist mandated to ferret out racist assumptions that are embedded in theories such as these, I recognize that the substance of this "race-IQ debate" is still based on inquiries into, and explanations of, the differential in scores between Blacks and Whites. I also recognize the fact this holds significant social and political implications which are generally not dealt with adequately by the newer theorists in intelligence and testing such as the two mentioned earlier, Sternberg and Gardner. A more important question is, however, could newer conceptualizations of intelligence (like Gardner's or Sternberg's) influence this situation? I believe that they could, since, by broadening the meaning of intelligent behaviour, they could have aided in clearing a path for a

reexamination of the issue of the relationship between race and IQ. There is no evidence, however, that any such re-examination has taken place, and I doubt that it ever will take place. Both sides in the dispute, especially the hereditarians, seem very much wedded to their positions, even to the extent of falsifying data to bolster their arguments. The case of Burt's fraudulent data on Twin Studies, for example, is well known (Kamin, 1974 and Hearnshaw, 1979). Less well known are the charges of dishonesty made against many other testing enthusiasts, like those against Jensen by Kagan (1969), Cronbach (1969), and Kamin (1981).

Many hereditarians, Jensen and Eysenck being good examples, already accept that there is more to intelligence than what IQ tests measure, as the earlier quote from Jensen shows. They believe, however, that the abstracting and problem solving abilities supposedly measured by the tests are superior to other characteristics of intelligent behaviour and are good representations of *g*, general intelligence. The newer conceptualizations of intelligence also include an element that approximates to abstracting and problem solving skills. For Gardner it is the logico-mathematical and linguistic intelligences and for Sternberg it is componential intelligence. It is all very well for psychologists like Gardner and Sternberg to disclaim any hierarchy of intelligences within their respective theories (Gardner, 1983 and Sternberg, 1985), but this view will not necessarily be shared by all. It seems very likely that it will not be long before the elements of both theories, more specifically Gardner's, are ranked in

terms of their possible *g*-ratings. Considering the preoccupation with racial differences in intelligence, it is also likely that comparative studies will be done between Whites and Blacks to determine which of the intelligences each exhibits in comparison to the other. Rather than reducing the propensity of some psychologists for racial rankings, these new conceptualizations of intelligence may serve to refuel that penchant.

### Racial Hierarchies in IQ

Contemporary North American societies were founded on the idea of a hierarchy of races (Gould, 1981 and Ogbu, 1978). Europeans were considered superior and were accorded privileges in keeping with their perceived superior status. At the other extreme, Africans were considered inferior and their status also reflected this perception. For close to 400 years, the social, political, and economic structure of North America rested on these assumptions. This resulted, in part, from the enslavement of Africans that ended only a little more than a century ago, and led to the rigid segregation that was practised in some parts of the United States until quite recently, and the *de facto* segregation that continues to this day (Hacker, 1992). Attempts are still continuing to justify these inequalities which persist in North American societies by attempting to "prove" that Africans are inferior to Whites (Ford, Harris & Winborne, 1990; Gould, 1981; and Kamin, 1990). The IQ test is only the latest means of perpetuating a stereotype of African intellectual inferiority.

Despite this, there is still a popular, but erroneous, belief that these assumptions of racial rankings in intelligence disappeared from North American consciousness with the eradication of slavery and legal segregation. However, the legislative acts that ended slavery and segregation changed people's actions, but could not change their fundamental assumptions about race. An individual's perception about members of another race *could* change as she or he becomes more familiar with its members, but for the vast majority of people who have little or no contact with other racial groups, the assumptions persist. Like a phoenix rising from its ashes, ideas, no matter how reprehensible, will continue to resurface in the appropriate social climate. One has only to look at the persistence of these ideas of racial rankings in intelligence for confirmation of this. The literature shows that these ideas resurface periodically in times of social unrest (Newby & Newby, 1995 and Stone, 1971). This, to my mind, accounts for the fervent reception of Jensen's 1969 and Murray's more recent (1994) reintroduction of the old ideas of a racial hierarchy of intelligence that placed Africans at the bottom of the heap. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, both reintroductions were opportune, coming as they did at the times of the social turmoil. Jensen's work appeared at the height of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements in the United States, while Murray's work comes in the middle of the extreme dissatisfaction Americans are displaying about their society and its direction, as evidenced by the now vocal and active resistance to compensatory programs like Affirmative Action, in the form of legislative efforts like the California Civil Rights Initiative.

It is true that numerous findings show that on average African children have lower IQ scores than do their White colleagues. IQ tests, however, to be considered valid in any era, will have to confirm the visceral beliefs of that era. Any test that did not reflect common assumptions of African intellectual inferiority, would not have seen the light of day. Eysenck (1981) confirms this. In a published debate with Leon Kamin (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981), Eysenck described how tests are standardized to obtain equal scores for males and females, and to reflect the appropriate differential (15 IQ points) between Blacks and Whites. An examination of the history of testing in North America, such as conducted by Stone (1971) or von Mayrhauser (1992), corroborates the assertion that the construction of IQ tests, and the interpretation of test scores, carry within them the assumption of African inferiority, and therefore, a persistent deficit must occur in the performance of African children on these tests.

The idea of a racial ranking in intellectual abilities, particularly as it concerns Blacks and Whites, is a controversial one and pertinent considering the history of race relations in North America. Its very controversial nature ensures that it holds great appeal for the popular press and that it will be eagerly disseminated by them. This guarantees that research, particularly that which purports to confirm the Black-White differential, reaches a wide audience.



The history of race relations in North American is of fundamental importance to the hereditarian-environmentalist debate, although this is seldom acknowledged. The relationship between Black and White Americans prior to the Civil Rights era is well documented elsewhere, and there is no need to duplicate it here. However, I have looked at two studies by White sociologists since that time which both conclude that Whites still maintain some gut-level belief in the inferiority of Blacks (Hacker, 1992 and Wellman, 1977). Hacker (1992) describes an exercise he conducts with his White first-year students where they imagine that a nighttime visitor informs them that, due to no fault of their own, they were assigned the wrong race and must now live the rest of their lives (50 years) as a Black person.

However, inside you will be the person you always were. Your knowledge and ideas will remain intact. But outwardly you will not be recognizable as anyone you now know.

Your visitor emphasizes that being born to the wrong parents was in no way your fault. Consequently, his organization is prepared to offer you some reasonable recompense. Would you, he asks, care to name a sum of money you might consider appropriate? .... How much financial recompense would you request? (p. 32)

Hacker reports as follows:

When this parable has been put to white students, most seemed to feel that it would not be out of place to ask for \$50 million, or \$1 million for each coming black year. And this calculation conveys, as well as anything, the value that white people place on their own skins. (p. 32)

As Hacker's little experiment illustrates, there is a big gap in the perceived status of the two groups. Both Hacker and Wellman suggest that Whites see this gap in all spheres of

activity, including intellectual ability. North American history is replete with attempts to "prove" that this gap in innate intelligence really exists (Ford, Harris & Winborne, 1990; Gould, 1981; and Kamin, 1990) and the IQ test is only the latest means of perpetuating the stereotype of African inferiority (Gould, 1981 and Ford et al., 1990), with disastrous results as Richardson (1989) claims:

The early invalid studies pointing out the differences between intellectual potential by racial categories have caused unknown grief and have likely blocked the progress of studies that would have been more helpful. (p. 140-141)

This opinion of whites regarding their superiority over us, as reported by Wellman (1977) and Hacker (1992), is naturally of concern to Black people, and we must, therefore, enter into the debate so that our voices are heard.

### The Afrocentric Perspective on IQ

As I will argue more fully in Chapter Three, the Afrocentrist perspective employed in this study decrees that any critical analysis must include a Black perspective. The Black perspective on the IQ debate is essentially this: "What does this fight between hereditarians and environmentalists mean for us?" This is not a selfish nor ethnocentric position, but an attempt to face the reality that the debate does focus on the intellectual capacity of Blacks relative to Whites. Any analysis of the impact of the debate must bear the interests of the Black community in mind, since the debate is, to a significant extent, about us. A perusal of the literature on intelligence testing reveals that even though Black

people are at the core of the debate, our views are persistently ignored. W. B. Thomas (1982) in an article entitled "Black Intellectuals' Critique of Early Mental Testing: A Little Known Saga of the 1920s," examined Black social scientists' efforts, starting in the 1920s, to (i) challenge research conclusions about the innate mental inferiority of Blacks, (ii) disclaim the validity of intelligence tests currently being used, and (iii) demonstrate the influence of environment on test performance. Thomas reported that these efforts were never quoted outside a minuscule Black fraternity of writers. There are still many Blacks writing in this field (Asa Hilliard, John Ogbu, and Kenneth Clark to name a few), and their work is seldom quoted, except by other Blacks (Graham, 1992). Ignoring the contributions of Black scholars cannot be justified by casting aspersions on the quality of their works,<sup>11</sup> and this can be demonstrated easily. Ogbu, for instance, did an important study in 1978 in which he examined six societies that have caste-like arrangements for their minority groups similar to the United States. In some cases the minority and majority groups belonged to the same race and in others they did not. Ogbu found that, irrespective of race, all displayed similar gaps in performance on standardized tests. Despite its potential as a significant contribution to the race-IQ debate, I have seldom seen this work referenced and then usually by other Black authors. The study is not even included in the bibliographies of any of the major contributors to the debate,

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<sup>11</sup>Jensen (1981), for example, mentions and dismisses the work of Robert Williams on the cultural bias of IQ tests. Also Herrnstein and Murray (1994) do the same with the works of both Thomas Sowell on Black achievement and John Ogbu on social stratification and IQ.

since its publication in 1978. And this includes both hereditarians (like Jensen, Rushton, or Eysenck) and environmentalists (like Kamin, Taylor, or Gould).

My image of the hereditarian-environmentalist debate is of us, as Black people, constrained to a roundabout which is spinning out of control, and powered by the disputes between the hereditarians and environmentalists. We are objects of the attentions of both groups because we are needed as evidence for the debate. Black scholars in the field tend to be ignored. Graham (1992), examining selected APA journals, found that 80% of the articles about Blacks were written by Whites and 72.4% of these were comparative works, where we were compared mainly with Whites. Also, a search of the ERIC database revealed that since 1966, 3088 articles were published on intelligence testing of which 14% dealt with African intelligence. As the African proverb says: It's the grass that suffers when two elephants fight.

The literature of African involvement in the IQ testing debate can be reduced to three important facts. The first is that Black scholars have consistently and coherently challenged the IQ testing data, and interpretations thereof, since the 1920s and the publication of the Army Alpha and Beta Study (Thomas, 1982). Secondly, there has been little or no change in the positions and arguments of the majority of Black scholars in the seventy-odd years since the 1920s, who consistently draw attention to the racist intentions behind the hereditarian position. And, finally, theories and arguments coming

from the Black scholarly community are just as resolutely ignored today, as they were then, by White mainstream scholars (Ford et al., 1990).

The African involvement in the early debate on IQ testing was principally a response to the racist interpretations of the Army tests results. As is still the case today, the challenges from the Black scholarly community were double-pronged. The first prong consisted of qualitative, non-empirical arguments challenging the authenticity of the data, the methodologies employed, and the interpretation of the data. The second prong was quantitative, empirical arguments using data generated by their own studies with the tests.

The early counter-attacks included some of the original arguments in support of the environmentalist model for racial differences in IQ scores<sup>12</sup> (Thomas, 1982). In fact, there was unanimous support for this model within the Black intellectual community, which is not at all surprising. What is surprising was that these early critics, while challenging the data, the methodologies, and the interpretations, never challenged the testing instruments themselves, or, more fundamentally, the need for classification and ranking. In actuality, these scholars were utilizing the same values and assumptions as their European counterparts, even though their own values and life experiences told them that these led to illogical and incorrect conclusions of innate Black intellectual

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<sup>12</sup> It was Herman Canady, an experimental psychologist, who demonstrated the importance of rapport in test administration in 1928, for example (cited in Thomas, 1982).

inferiority. Their failure to move outside the Eurocentric framework meant that they could not formulate the correct questions, and in fact diminished their own positions by employing the tests within Black colleges to rank and classify Black students (Thomas, 1982).

A similar situation exists within the Black intelligentsia today. Black scholars working in the field still unanimously challenge the hypothesis of innate Black inferiority. As before, challenges are made on both qualitative, non-empirical grounds and quantitative, empirical grounds, with similar types of evidence and arguments as were used originally. The major difference today is that there is an as yet small group of Afrocentric scholars who refuse to accept the assumptions about race and human relations intrinsic to the European framework, and are articulating their own lived experiences in their challenges (Hilliard, 1987 & 1989 and Ogbu, 1978).

IQ tests have been and are currently employed in five principal ways within the educational system: (i) to determine a child's readiness for kindergarten, (ii) to predict a person's future academic performance, (iii) to classify a pupil for placement in special schools or programs, (iv) to determine if a child is socially competent, and (v) to diagnose learning difficulties (Hilliard, 1987). The tests, while they are thought to have predictive, and, more doubtfully, some diagnostic value, have no instructional value (Deese, 1993; Hilliard, 1989; and Perrone, 1977). My position as an Afrocentric

researcher committed to the well-being of the researched communities is that instructional value ought to be the principal criterion for determining validity. The onus ought to be on test constructors to show that the tests do enhance learning and instruction.

As Hilliard (1987) contends,

*Without valid or meaningful prediction, we are left with but one major use of IQ tests in education. That use is to sort students into categories so that they may be treated in special ways [emphasis added]. This assumes that the classifications will yield intellectually homogeneous groups of students who can and should be given a unique educational treatment as a group. (p. 140)*

This use of the tests for diagnosis and placement for special education classes has been the principal concern for Black people about the use of tests in schools, as demonstrated by the law suits filed against the practice.<sup>13</sup> The concerns stem mainly from the fact that this has resulted in disproportionate numbers of our children in these classes (Dent et al., 1987). There is an underlying concern that, despite the fact that even the most ardent hereditarians (Eysenck, 1981; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; and Jensen, 1969) state unequivocally that the tests have no predictive value for the individual child, but only for groups, the school system perceives every Black child as a candidate for special education, and that the onus is on the child to prove this perception false. The community does have reasons to worry about the intentions of those involved in the debate, most specifically the hereditarians. For instance, Jensen (1969) reported, without

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<sup>13</sup> Some examples include *Larry P vs Riles* (California, 1972), *PASE vs Hannon* (Chicago, 1980), and *Diana vs California State Board of Education* (California, 1970).

supporting evidence, that the threshold for mental retardation has moved up one standard deviation (15 IQ points) to 85. I do not believe that it is coincidental that this just happens to be the reported average score for Black children. This would suggest that Jensen is claiming that half the Black population is, by definition, retarded.

Many advocates of testing in schools, such as Stockard (1988), would dismiss these concerns. They argue that the tests are meant "to help teachers and school administrators understand each child's potential in the instructional program" (Stockard, 1988, p. 12). The suggestion is that on learning of the "child's potential," steps are put in place to improve his or her performance. Disputers, such as Hilliard (1987 & 1989), and Perrone (1977), argue otherwise, claiming that instructional or pedagogical issues are not important in the creation or employment of the tests, the intent is to "sort students into categories so that they may be treated in special ways" (Hilliard, 1987, p. 140). The latter perception is shared by concerned laypersons: the tests are clearly intended to rank and classify children, and many test creators themselves corroborate this.<sup>14</sup> An obvious extension of this has always been to use the tests to influence and direct social policy

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<sup>14</sup> Hilliard (1989, p. 128) recalls the following about David Wechsler, creator of the Wechsler series of intelligence tests:

I recall speaking at a symposium of the American Psychological Association in San Francisco during the mid-1970s. "The IQ test on trial" was the subject of the symposium. Upon hearing the pro and con arguments about the test, David Wechsler, author of the Wechsler IQ tests, who was in the audience, rose to speak. He said, in pained lament, "I don't know what all the fuss is about; all we want to do with the IQ test is to *rank* people."



(Brigham, 1923; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1916; and Terman, 1916). Contemporary psychologists working in this field continue to expound this latter use of mental tests (Eysenck, 1981; Jensen, 1969; Raven, 1989; and Rushton, 1989a & 1989b).

There have been many calls for a moratorium on IQ testing, starting in 1923 with the non-African, Walter Lippman (Lippman, 1976a) and more recently from Asa Hilliard (1989) and other African psychologists (Ford et al., 1990). Some of the more concerted and public efforts to stop or restrict the use of the tests have come from affected communities themselves, especially the African community in the US<sup>15</sup>, which has gone as far as to challenge the tests in court<sup>16</sup>, sometimes successfully.

The African community has challenged the legality of the tests on the grounds that (i) they are culturally biased, (ii) they are invalid for measuring intelligence, and (iii) they have resulted in disproportionate numbers of African children being placed in EMR classes (Dent et al., 1987). The community has demonstrated, quite convincingly, that it is not content to accept the practice of psychology on its own terms, particularly as it applies to Africans. It would be a serious mistake, however, for the community to limit

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<sup>15</sup> Extensive research reveals no Canadian court challenges to IQ testing. However, African-Canadians have expressed the same concerns as their American counterparts (Oliver, 1986 and Solomon, 1992).

<sup>16</sup> These challenges were raised in two ground-breaking court cases: *Larry P. v. Riles* in 1972 in California and *PASE v. Hannon* in 1980 in Chicago.

the debate to questions of cultural or other test biases, as has been the wont in Eurocentric academic circles. Demands must be placed on test creators and administrators to prove that the tests actually measure the constructs they purport to measure. Even more importantly, they must be challenged on the presumption that the ensuing rankings and classification are legitimate educational goals (Hilliard, 1987 & 1989).

Robert Sternberg's and Howard Gardner's attempts to direct the inquiry towards culture and learning styles coincide with much of the Afrocentric research conducted over the last decade (Hale-Benson, 1982). Even if Sternberg's recommendation that

One goal of the testers [be] to get away from pigeon-holing the child in terms of a seemingly immutable quantitative index that portrays the child as having a fixed amount of ability that is incapable of improvement (1986, p. 22)

is followed by more White researchers in the future, it would be a disservice to scholarship if Black contributions in this area, such as Hale-Benson (1982), Ogbu (1978) and Hilliard (1987 & 1989), are ignored.

In this chapter I have shown that the foundation of the race-IQ debate is fundamentally flawed, since the existence of both the constructs of race and of intelligence is disputed. The debate is also flawed because the voices of those who have the most at stake in this debate, Blacks, are missing. I have also shown that the hereditarians, with their theories of Black intellectual inferiority, have been framing this debate since its inception at the

start of the Twentieth Century, and the environmentalists by simply reacting to the hereditarians, have failed to challenge their core assumptions about both constructs. In Chapters Four and Five these assumptions will be described as they pertain to the hereditarians and environmentalists, respectively.

Throughout Chapters One and Two, I have referred to aspects of Afrocentricity and Afrocentric research. While some of the key principles of this approach to inquiry have been sketched, it is in the next chapter, Chapter Three, that I will examine Afrocentricity in more detail.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Conceptualizing the Afrocentric Place: Shifting the Centre

*I believe that the truth about any subject comes when all sides of the story are put together, and all their different meanings make one new one. Each writer writes the missing parts to the other writer's story. And the whole story is what I am after. (Alice Walker).*

The 1954 US Supreme Court decision on school segregation was expected to improve education for African Americans; instead, their average scores on standardized tests continue to lag all others. This study, as I stated in the preface, is an analysis of the two principal theories postulated to explain if, and how, these test scores are related to the intellectual capacities of Black people. The first, hereditarianism, suggests that the low ranking is due, at least in part, to their natural intellectual inferiority. The other, environmentalism, suggests that the inferiority is not a natural one, but is due to their poor environments and/or culture. This chapter describes the conceptual framework and the methodological procedures used to analyze these two theories, and it is divided into two parts. Part one, The Afrocentric Framework, includes a rationale for employing Afrocentrism as the conceptual framework for this study; it goes on to describe the framework itself and its development as an alternative to Eurocentric models of intellectual inquiry. Part two, The Description of the Study, describes the study itself, including the research problem, the procedures, and the methodology employed.

## Part One: The Afrocentric Framework

### Rationale

The very skewed power relations that have resulted from the last 500 years of European and African contact have left us with a uni-dimensional perspective of the human story. Using their might, Europeans have assumed the right to tell their own stories and everybody else's, and from a solely Eurocentric perspective. The result has been that the Eurocentric story is always incomplete and often distorted, and consequently untrue (Asante, 1987; Banks, 1992; Milam, 1992; and Oyebade, 1990). As Asante (1990) suggests, Eurocentric research paradigms have an intrinsic impediment due to the reluctance of European thinkers, particularly of the positivist school or empiricist tradition,<sup>17</sup> to see that human actions cannot be understood apart from the history, emotions, attitudes, and cultural definitions of a given context. Eurocentric research can be challenged on a number of basic assumptions including (i) the concept of objective, dispassionate and value-free research; (ii) the lack of a central role for questions of social justice in the inquiry process; (iii) the lack of consideration for the well-being and

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<sup>17</sup>I recognize that there are critical voices within Eurocentric scholarship. However, this study is interested primarily in the traditional Eurocentric views of positivism and empiricism as held by the principal subjects in this study. Therefore, while this study distinguishes between traditional and critical Eurocentrists, all future references to "Eurocentrists" should be taken as referring to the traditional Eurocentrists only, except where I use the specific term critical Eurocentrists.

relationships among and within stake-holding communities; and, (iv) the absence of a historical or ideological context to the inquiry.

Eurocentric research must be challenged on these assumptions. Afrocentrists reject the notion of dispassionate and objective research as an ideal in the pursuit of knowledge. The Eurocentric concept of objective, dispassionate, and value-free research is invalid operationally, since, what often passes for objectivity is a sort of collective European subjectivity (Asante, 1990 & Banks, 1992). The Afrocentric position is that an emphasis on objectivity and dispassion results in considerations of the system of knowledge construction, and of the use of knowledge, being made subservient to method and content. Asante (1987) and Collins (1990) suggest that this is a characteristic of hierarchical discourse structured on what Asante (1987, p. 25) calls the "rhetoric of dominance", which is anathema to Afrocentric inquiry.

Eurocentric research must also be challenged on questions of social justice. Current Eurocentric research into race and IQ is unjust when measured against the Afrocentric canons I have formulated, and which will be described in Part Two of this chapter. The justness of the research is measured, Afrocentrically, in terms of the fairness of its procedure and the openness of its application. Asante (1987), hooks (1990), and Collins (1990), among others, argue that what has often passed as research in the Eurocentric framework has protected social and literary theory from the scrutiny that would reveal

how theory has often served the interests of the ruling classes. This "ensures that the old guard maintains control of the rhetorical territory" (Asante, 1987, p. 25) through maintaining control over definitions of what constitutes good research and who has the right to conduct research. These are ingredients for the establishment of a self-perpetuating initiation or *rite de passage* (Asante, 1987) into the Eurocentric research community, which results in the stifling of opposing discourse and, ultimately, injustice.

Eurocentric research, generally, tends to minimize, or to ignore altogether, the effects of the inquiry on the existence and maintenance of community. The concept of community is essential to the Afrocentric researcher, but is absent from the works of both hereditarians and environmentalists. This concept mandates that Afrocentrists reject the researcher/subject separation because this is a natural consequence of the African cultural environment which encourages communalism rather than individual separation (Nobles, 1986). Even while the Afrocentric researcher works to maintain or enhance community among people being researched, he or she tries always to be cognisant of the interests of other groups. Therefore, closely integrated with the concept of community is that of harmony. The Afrocentrist must strive for the encouragement and maintenance of harmonious relationships between groups. This is an important test of the validity of Afrocentric research and is absent from both hereditarian and environmentalist research activities. The current debates around race and IQ serve to create more divisions between racial groups than to heal the ones that already exist.

Like Eurocentric critical theories, Afrocentrism defines a central, interpretive role for history (Asante, 1987, 1988, 1990; Cherryholmes, 1988; Collins, 1990; and Oyebade, 1990). In the Afrocentric context, this would have two interconnected interpretations: the history of the evolution of the paradigm itself, and the history of the peoples of Africa including the aberration of racial oppression. The Afrocentrist particularly recognises the pivotal role of the history of race relations in shaping events and, therefore, insists on its inclusion in analytic processes (Asante, 1988 & 1990). The Afrocentric approach must, therefore, include a critique of Eurocentric interpretations of African phenomena (Asante, 1990). European thought, particularly in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, held that Africans were inferior socially and behaviorally. This racist perspective has tainted most of what passes for social science in the West, definitionally and conceptually (DuBois, 1965 and Asante, 1990).

Afrocentricity, like Eurocentric critical theories, acknowledge roles for power relations, politics, and ideology in the inquiry process (Harding, 1986 and Lather, 1992b). Specifically, Afrocentric research is humanistic, emancipatory and antiracist (Asante, 1990; Collins, 1990; Oyebade, 1990; and Myers, 1992). In this context, the emancipatory role is less limiting than for the critical Eurocentrist (Asante, 1990; Collins, 1990; and Harding, 1986), for as Jones (1989) points out (quoted in Harding, 1986), emancipation, in the critical Eurocentric context could result in

the unwitting continued reproduction of an elitist academic discourse disguised as a critique of it ... [that is, a] hegemony theory where ideology



critique positions the "researched" as the problem for which the critical theorist is the solution. (p. 94)

Asante (1987), the Afrocentric pioneer, shares this view and sees Afrocentric ideology, though similar, as going beyond critical ideologies, for, as he says:

their notion of enlightenment through reflection on the subtle pressures of society tend to be totally individualistic. Reflection is a uniquely private affair. For that reason we must ask whether or not there is anything in the critical theory that relates to an Afrocentric ideology. (1987, p. 5)

He goes on:

However, in the sense that Afrocentricity proposes a cultural reconstruction that incorporates the African perspective as a part of an entire human transformation, critical theory suggests a pathway. It does not lead us down the path, because it is trapped in the quicksand of its own ethnocentric view, but its attack on the traditional ideology of empiricism is "right on". (1987, p. 5)

Afrocentrism, in its ideological guise, incorporates the unique experiences of being Black, for in heterogeneous, but hegemonically Eurocentric societies, the question of race is the most dominant aspect of social relations (Asante, 1987; Hacker, 1992; and Wellman, 1977). Being Black, then, gives one a unique perspective on the world, as

DuBois confirms:

.. the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world .... It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others ... . One ever feels his two-ness, an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body.... (DuBois, 1965, p. 2)

A truly Afrocentric rhetoric must oppose the negation in western culture. It must be combative and antagonistic to such negation, and wholly committed to the propagation of a more humanistic vision of the world (Asante, 1987). Afrocentric rhetoric, while it is in opposition to the negative in Western culture, must allow other cultures to coexist, and in that particular aspect is substantially different from Western rhetoric (Asante, 1987). Afrocentrism, therefore,

constitute[s] a radical critique of the Eurocentric ideology that masquerades as a universal view .... Yet the critique is radical only in the sense that it suggests a turnabout, an alternative perspective on phenomena.... Such a posture is necessary and rewarding for Africans and Europeans [and all others]. The inability to "see" from several angles is perhaps the one common fallacy in provincial scholarship. (Asante, 1987, p. 3)

There is a need, therefore, for a new approach to knowledge construction that can incorporate ideas from outside the Eurocentric framework, in order to provide more accurate and comprehensive explanations for the human condition. The literature shows that critical Eurocentric scholars, particularly feminists and other critical theorists, already recognize limitations in the construction of knowledge within this framework (Cherryholmes, 1988; Harding, 1986; and Lather, 1990), and some of their critiques are in harmony with the Afrocentric framework. However, these critical Eurocentrists, because they still work from within this framework, are limited in their ability to criticize, because their work is tainted by their inability to recognize the incorrect "common sense" assumptions about reality and, specifically, about other socially defined

groups that are part of the framework itself. The current disarray in Eurocentric thought which Asante (1990) and W. C. Banks (1992) have identified, provides the ideal context in which to introduce ideas from outside that framework. Afrocentrists cannot afford to ignore the state of Eurocentric knowledge, for as W. C. Banks (1992) argues, correctly, to fail to exploit the current context of disarray is to fail to understand the role that theory has always played as a justification for, rather than advancement of, ideas. A clear understanding of this fact means that one must acknowledge that the rules of Eurocentric inquiry are no longer sacrosanct, but can and must be challenged in order to influence and improve the research process.

#### Description of the Afrocentric Framework

The literature on Afrocentricity reveals a newly emerging discipline, which, because of its very newness, leaves its practitioners free to experiment with new concepts and to explore new ideas, with great freedom, and in many exciting directions. The literature shows that those who define themselves as Afrocentrists are, however, constrained by three basic guidelines which were proposed by the pioneers in Afrocentric research, namely, Molefi Asante, Muranga Karenga, and Wade Nobles among others, although Asante is usually accorded most of the credit for the invention of the Afrocentric research paradigm.

This paradigm dictates that, firstly, Afrocentrists are expected to look for any hidden, subtle, racist theories that are embedded in current explanations of the human condition. A common theme running through the Afrocentric literature is that Eurocentric research, both traditional and critical, is seriously flawed because European researchers, by and large, tend to formulate studies of Black people on the assumption that Black existence is in and of itself problematic (Asante, 1987, 1990; Myers, 1992; Ogbu, 1978; among others). For instance, Ogbu (1978) claims that this basic assumption is what has limited the explanations offered by hereditarians and environmentalists for the under-performance of Black children in schools to their home environment, school environment, and heredity. In addition, there is Du Bois' thesis that this assumption imposes a barrier to reliable communication between Blacks and Whites. Afrocentrists take the position that in order to fully understand the life experiences of Blacks one has to move beyond both the traditional and critical Eurocentric frameworks so that one can incorporate African perspectives into the analysis. This is what Ogbu did in his 1978 study in which he examined IQ differentials between various national groups. He was then able to show that performance gaps, similar to that between American Blacks and Whites, exist in other societies with similar kinds of social stratifications as the United States.

The second theme running through the Afrocentric literature is that Afrocentric scholars must work towards legitimizing the codes, paradigms, symbols, motifs, myths, and circles

of discussion that reinforce the centrality of African ideals and values as a valid frame of reference for acquiring and examining data, that is, the Afrocentric scholar must assume the right and the responsibility to describe her or his people's realities from an African perspective, employing African values and ideals (Asante, 1988 and Collins, 1990). All Afrocentric scholars stress the importance of centring African ideals and values in the research activity (Asante, 1987, 1988, 1990; Collins, 1990; Myers, 1992 and Nobles, 1986; among others). However, it is important to realize that not even two researchers from the same African community will necessarily bring the same perspective to the inquiry of what constitutes their community's values and ideals, and this fact is not sufficiently apparent in the literature. The differences could be major or minor as the following two examples illustrate. Orlando Patterson and Molefi Asante are both eminent African-American scholars. They both acknowledge a common African past and an oppressive history, yet have diametrically opposite views on the inclusion of ethnic perspectives in inquiry (Asante, 1987 and Patterson, 1977). Patterson (1977, p. 308) considers Afrocentrists to be "chauvinistic sociologists ... [suffering from] chauvinistic self delusion," while Asante sees this inclusion of an African perspective as critical for a more truthful inquiry. Another example is that of bell hooks and Patricia Hill Collins. Both describe themselves in similar ideological terms and as coming from very similar African-American communities, yet differ in the perceptions of the community's values pertaining to intellectual pursuits. Hooks sees the Black community as profoundly anti-intellectual while Collins remembers her community providing the support and nurturing

for her intellectual pursuits. Afrocentric research is not wholly dependent on the racial (or other) background of the scholar; it depends, rather, on the perspective from which one examines data (Asante, 1990). The perspective one brings to the research exercise depends upon one's experiences both within and without one's culture. And this is why it is so important that many African perspectives are employed in building the Afrocentric Tradition.

There is a third, and final, theme running through Afrocentric literature, and this, to my mind, is the most fundamental expression of Afrocentrism. Afrocentrists are expected to maintain inquiry rooted in a strict interpretation of place, in other words, he or she must centre self and community in the research activity. The correct place is a perspective that allows the Afrocentric researcher to put African ideals and values at the centre of the inquiry (Asante, 1990). Asante characterizes the concept of place as "... a fundamental rule of intellectual inquiry because its content is a self-conscious obliteration of the subject/object duality and the enthronement of African Wholism" (1990, p. 5).

Even though the Afrocentric Tradition is still in its infancy, certain characteristic features, both conceptual and operational, are emerging, which help to define the new paradigm (W. C. Banks, 1992 and Milam, 1992). Asante (1987 & 1990) has identified Ma'at and Nommo as two principles that are intrinsic to African cultures wherever they may be found, and which ought to be foundation stones of the Afrocentric Tradition.

Ma'at,<sup>18</sup> is the quest for justice, truth, and harmony, and in the context of this study, it refers to the research exercise itself, in harmony with the researcher, as a tool in the pursuit of truth and justice with the ultimate goal of helping to create a more fair and just society. Nommo<sup>19</sup> means the productive word and here it describes the creation of knowledge as a vehicle for improvement in human relations. It is these two principles that have led me to suggest the five canons, to be described later in this chapter, that I consider, from my own experience and supported in the literature, and in the experiences of African colleagues,<sup>20</sup> important and traditional in African cultures.

#### Application of the Afrocentric Framework

The literature discloses that the call by contemporary Afrocentrists for the inclusion of African perspectives in the interpretation of the life experiences and behaviours of Africans is not a new one. Black intellectuals like Frederick Douglas and W. E. B. DuBois have, since the nineteenth century, warned that one cannot fully understand African behaviours and experiences until and unless one appreciates and includes African perspectives (Asante, 1987; Coughlin, 1987; and DuBois, 1965). Many African scholars

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<sup>18</sup> See Kismet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge (1990) by Molefi Kete Asante for a comprehensive description of Ma'at.

<sup>19</sup> See The Afrocentric Idea (1987) by Molefi Kete Asante for a comprehensive explanation of Nommo.

<sup>20</sup> I have held discussions with African colleagues via e-mail discussion lists and in an informal Afrocentric research group here at Dalhousie. This will be detailed later in the section on procedure (see page 108).

and intellectuals have observed that communication between Blacks and Whites is decidedly one-way, since Africans, especially those in European-dominated societies, realized that their survival depended to a large extent on an intimate knowledge and understanding of White behaviour, while the converse is not true. To Whites, Black people have remained, in essence, an ever-present enigma. Du Bois, obviously recognized this, and was insightful enough in 1903 (Du Bois, 1965) to write:

Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter around it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I know an excellent coloured man in my town! ... To the real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word. (p. 1)

The Afrocentric movement is, at least in part, an attempt to deal with the real question "How does it feel to be a problem?" that Du Bois found underlay most of the exchanges between Blacks and Whites, by challenging all scholars to explore Black experiences.

As Asante and others have pointed out, these calls for the inclusion of Black perspectives were being voiced long before Afrocentrism was born (Asante, 1987 and Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1993). These calls were articulated most ably in the philosophy of Negritude by Leopold Senghor and Aime Cesaire, of Senegal and the Caribbean respectively (Asante, 1987 and Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1993). These ideas took life again in the struggle for civil rights in the 1960s and culminated with the birth of Afrocentrism in the works of Asante (1980), Karenga (1982), and Nobles (1986). Of these, the most



comprehensive and coherent theoretical framework for Afrocentrism as a legitimate research paradigm is due to Asante (Collins, 1990 and Milam, 1992).

In the last decade or so, many African scholars have employed the Afrocentric framework in a variety of disciplines. Some of the most interesting work occurred in Psychology. Myers (1992) and Nobles (1986), among others, have employed the framework "to expand the field of psychological inquiry to include the study of optimal<sup>21</sup> psychological health and well-being" (Myers, 1992, p. 5). Nobles (1986) is in the forefront of the development of a comprehensive African Psychology with its own formalized theories and conceptual models. In Sociology, researchers have also been putting the framework to use. Shujaa (1992), analyzed the perceptions and expectations of parents regarding African-American independent schooling using Asante's (1980) framework. Eyo (1991) also employed the paradigm in studies of intercultural communication education, principally examining Afrocentricity as an interpretive and corrective episteme, and as a context for civility in intercultural communication.

The studies done by Afrocentrists in Education have been primarily in the development of Afrocentric curricula that are more intimately tailored to the needs of African students at all levels of the educational system (Dei, 1995; Oliver, 1988; and Asante, 1991/2

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<sup>21</sup> Myers describes "optimal psychological health and well-being" as including spiritual, social, as well as physical elements, the spiritual and social being very important ingredients in African cultures.

among others). Others have attempted different uses, for example, Irvine (1990) and Solomon (1992) independently tested the hypothesis that it is a conflict of cultural values resulting from African students being in a European-centred school that is responsible for the relatively high failure rate of Black students as compared to Whites. However, it has been only Ogbu (1978), so far, who has come closest to an empirical examination of the race and IQ linkage from, at least, a partially Afrocentric perspective. Ogbu has been the only one to break out of the European frame of reference, and with an outsider's eye, offer new explanations for the racial ranking in IQ scores that is characteristic of North America.

Ogbu (1978) examined the issue of Black-White differences in cognitive skills and showed how the popular explanations of genetic and environmentalist deficits in Black children have proven inadequate. He offers an alternative, structural explanation for the differences in performance between the races by employing an Afrocentric perspective in order to analyze Black education in the context of the American system of racial stratification. He hypothesises that the differences are due to the different cognitive requirements of their respective positions in an American caste system that is like any similar system in any other culture. Ogbu positioned himself outside the Eurocentric American framework, with its antediluvian beliefs about human inequality, in order to observe that the performances of Blacks as compared to Whites are entirely predictable

if one considers that American society operates like any other caste system such as India, Japan or the United Kingdom.

Afrocentrists claim that there are no research modes or techniques that are exclusive to the Afrocentric paradigm or forbidden to the Afrocentric researcher. Any current research technique can be used with this form of inquiry, the only stipulation being that they should not be used "full cloth" (Asante, 1987, p. 159). Asante (1987 & 1990) claims that it is not the specific technique that makes the research Afrocentric, rather the research is Afrocentric because the researcher can step outside of the Eurocentric framework to create "new interpretations, new criticisms, [and] ultimately the acquisition of new knowledge" (Asante, 1987, p. 159). For Afrocentrists, research techniques should be chosen with the aim of aiding the elimination of oppressions and facilitating transformations in human conditions (Asante, 1990). The Afrocentrist cannot be subservient to method, the method must grow out of human contact with the situation being investigated and not be imposed on it, whereby this imposition dominates the scholar's work (Asante, 1987).

Afrocentrists, like some critical Eurocentrists, "search for essence by questioning all assumptions about reality that are rooted in a particularist view of the universe" Asante (1990, p. 26). The subject/object separation is rejected, since Afrocentrism comes out of a cultural environment which encourages communalism rather than individualism, and

this remains true for the various African societies, whether continental or diasporic. According to the literature, an important tenet of an Afrocentric research method must be the infusion of intellectual with social action. Afrocentric research, to be authentic, must remain centred in its base community (Collins, 1990). This centrism, "the groundedness of observation and behaviour in one's own historical experiences," (Asante, 1990, p. 25) shapes the concepts, paradigms, theories, and methods of Afrocentricity. Afrocentric research, then, is "ultimately verifiable in the experiences of human beings, the final empirical authority" (Asante, 1990, p. 25).

Data gathering techniques in Afrocentric research must be integrated with the central principles of Ma'at and Nommo. Cultural and social immersion, as opposed to the scientific distance required of traditional Eurocentric research, is the best approach to understand any phenomena. This means that the researcher must be familiar with the history, language, philosophy, and myths of the people under study, in order to understand how they interpret their experiences. Without cultural immersion, the researcher loses all sense of ethical value and becomes a researcher for the sake of research, which, according to Asante (1990, p. 27) is "the worst kind of value in the Afrocentric approach which sees research as assisting in the humanizing of the world."

The Afrocentric researcher must examine himself or herself in the process of examining any subject. Thus introspection and retrospection are integral parts of Afrocentric

research (Asante, 1990). Introspection means that the researcher questions herself or himself with regard to the subject under study. The researcher writes down all she or he believes or knows about the subject prior to beginning the activity. This ensures that any obstacles to an Afrocentric method that exists in the researcher's own mind can be unearthed. In retrospection, the researcher questions himself or herself after the project is complete to ascertain if any personal obstacles exist to a fair interpretation. Afrocentric analysis must also focus on the structure of the discourse, not its content (Asante, 1987), as do critical theorists (Cherryholmes, 1988). Without this attempt to reach the deep structure of the discourse, the analysis cannot be truly Afrocentric. To be truly Afrocentric, one must be truly critical (Asante, 1990).

#### Limitations of the Afrocentric Framework

The literature reveals that scholars in the Afrocentric tradition are principally American (Molefi Asante, Patricia Hill Collins, Maulana Karenga, Wade Nobles, Asa Hilliard, and others), with relatively few from the Continent (John Ogbu, Bayo Oyebade, and Ngugi wa Thiong'o), and none beyond myself, to my knowledge, have so far emerged from the Caribbean. In fact, most of the Afrocentric research published so far, is by male researchers, many of whom are at Temple University's Department of African American Studies, and under the guidance of Asante. This poses a problem since the discipline, according to the pioneers, ought to be diasporic in outlook and reach, and to entail a distillation of the commonalities that make up the global African experience. The

literature shows that this problem is acknowledged by some of the leaders in Afrocentric thought who call for more debate and discussion of the ideals and values that should be incorporated into the Afrocentric paradigm. The onus is then on other African scholars to contribute to the development of a truly diasporic and inclusive Afrocentric philosophy.

The Afrocentric literature reveals, as I have mentioned above, that there is not sufficient awareness among contemporary Afrocentrists of the fact that the African community is truly diasporic, its members dispersed worldwide, with different groups experiencing differing circumstances. Most continental and Caribbean communities have predominantly Black populations, so they are spared the pressures of being a minority in a majority White population, as is the case for North American Blacks. Also, most have acquired some measure of political control over their own lives. These and other similar factors could contribute to differences in perspectives among the different communities. However, regardless of differences between the groups, I believe they all share fundamental ideals and values, due to a shared history of oppression, and a shared African ancestry (Asante, 1988 & 1990 and Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1993). As Asante (1990) argues, the specific values defined as universally African can be extracted from our shared experiences and negotiated upon. What is not negotiable is the importance of incorporating African values into the research activity (Asante, 1988 and Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1993).

The great diversity among Black peoples, leads, understandably, to a problem in the location of the Afrocentric place. This important point has obviously been missed by most scholars since this diversity is not apparent in the current body of Afrocentric literature. There is, as yet, therefore, no single Afrocentric place that is representative of all of us, and it seems that it is the non-American and non-male scholars who are generally cognisant of this fact<sup>22</sup>. Collins (1990) and Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1993) are two of the few who have admitted this, for they see their work as being only part of a larger process, as individual voices in a conversation among people who have been silenced.

Asante (1987), Collins (1990), and others, are convinced that there is a basic set of values, products of our ancestry and our history, that all African communities share. The task is to find these common values and ideals. This cannot be the responsibility of any specific researcher or study, but has to be determined by individual researchers, defining, as honestly as they can, their own place; over time, we can collectively determine the commonalities between us all. Unless and until we can agree upon and define the core Afrocentric values and ideals, we lack a sound foundation on which to construct theory or engage in overall meaningful praxis (hooks, 1984). Quoting from Charlotte Bunch's essay: "Feminism and Education: Not By Degrees", hooks (1984) maintains:

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<sup>22</sup>Molefi Asante does acknowledge the diasporic experiences of African peoples and calls for a distillation of our different experiences into the commonalities that define us as an African people.

Theory enabled us to see immediate needs in terms of long-range goals and an overall perspective on the world. It thus gives us a framework for evaluating various strategies in both the long and the short run and for seeing the types of changes that they are likely to produce. Theory is not just a body of facts or a set of personal opinions. It involves explanations and hypotheses that are based on available knowledge and experience. It is also dependent on conjecture and insight about how to interpret facts and experiences and their significance. (p. 30)

Afrocentric analysis seeks to reestablish the centrality of African history, both the continental and the diasporic. However, those of the Diopian school, like Asante (1987) and Oyebade (1990), regard

the ancient Kemetic (Egyptian) civilization and the Nile Valley cultural complex as the point of reference for an African perspective in much the same way as Greece and Rome serve as reference points for the European World. (Asante, 1987, p. 159)

This position is problematic for two reasons. The first is that it tends to negate or ignore contributions from other African civilizations in much the same way that the European glorification of Greece and Rome has de-emphasized other European cultures. The second is the danger that it will reproduce the hierarchical structure of Eurocentric knowledge construction, with its emphasis on the superior/inferior dichotomy, which is antithetical to the spirit of Afrocentrism. Diopians may end up judging other African cultures in terms of similarities and differences to the Kemetic. This would negate the central tenet of Afrocentrism, that of centring of self and community. For a truly Afrocentric, as opposed to a Kemet-centred discourse, the very valuable contributions



of Kemet to African and world civilization must be considered within the context of the contributions of all African peoples, continental and diasporic, ancient and modern.

A final critique and limitation of the Afrocentric paradigm is that the principal proponents of Afrocentricity tend to marginalize or ignore the contributions of Black women to African cultures and scholarship (hooks, 1984 and Collins, 1988). A truly emancipatory Afrocentric philosophy must be structured on gender equality and both women and men must assume their rightful place in its development. Asante (1990) only partly recognizes this when he writes: "Africalogy recognizes gender as a substantial research issue .... The liberation of women is ... a fundamental part of the Afrocentric project ..." (p. 9). Gender is not given significant weight by Afrocentric theorists, including Asante. Notable exceptions include Milam (1992), and Collins (1990), who are both highly critical of Asante for this omission.

### Part Two: Description of the Study

#### The Afrocentric Methodology Employed in this Study.

As I have already made clear, Afrocentrism is the conceptual framework for this study. The Afrocentric research method described in Asante's four major works on Afrocentrism, and outlined in the previous section, has been adapted for this study. In conducting this study, I have accepted and incorporated the three dictates of Afrocentric research, as described in the three themes discussed on pages 81 to 84. That is, I have

accepted the responsibility for uncovering any hidden, subtle, racist theories that are embedded in current explanations of the human condition; to work towards the legitimizing of the codes, paradigms, symbols, motifs, myths, and circles of discussion that reinforce the centrality of African ideals and values as a valid frame of reference for acquiring and examining data; and to maintain inquiry rooted in a strict interpretation of place (Asante, 1990). My own Afrocentric inquiry into the race-IQ debate has undertaken to provide a clear description of this Afrocentric location within an autobiographical format.<sup>23</sup>

The issue of what constitutes truth in intellectual inquiry, or the verification of knowledge claims (Collins, 1990), is as problematic for me as for all others. I, however, accept that truth, in Afrocentric research has to be grounded in the experiences of the community because this provides a context in which to present the experiences of the community, as confirmed by W. C. Banks (1992) who argued that:

The mind of the intelligent scientist is not a well from which spring theory and method, whole and well-formed.... Rather, it is from the actual and aspired interests of a community of people that a program of action emerges to serve and sustain their survival and welfare. (p. 270)

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<sup>23</sup> The Dalhousie Afrocentric Research Group, mentioned elsewhere, and of which I am a member, decided that this (autobiography) was an appropriate method of locating and describing the place from which the study was done. This method has therefore been christened the "Halifax method".

Earlier in this chapter, in the description of the Afrocentric framework, I discussed Asante's key principles of Afrocentricity (that is, Ma'at and Nommo), together with the three principal Afrocentric themes that have emerged from the broader literature, previously described on pages 81 to 84. I have had to further develop these principles and themes by identifying the five core values that, I believe, unite them all. I have labelled these core values Afrocentric canons. I propose that in Afrocentric inquiry, knowledge claims be evaluated in terms of these values which I have identified as being valid representations of all African communities. The five canons are: *uhaki*, *ukweli*, *ujamaa*, *kujittoa*, and *utulivu* loosely translated, respectively, as justice, truth, community, commitment, and harmony.<sup>24</sup> The five canons are described below:

- *Kujittoa* (commitment): This requires that the researcher emphasize considerations of how knowledge is structured and used over the need for dispassion and objectivity.
- *Ujamaa* (community): This requires that the researcher reject the researcher/subject separation and not presume to be, as Banks (1990) describes

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<sup>24</sup>I decided to name my canons with the Swahili translations of these five terms, in order to avoid confusion between the precise definitions employed in this study and the general meanings of these terms, and to a lesser extent because Swahili comes closest to being a universal African language. Knowing very little Swahili, I therefore sent queries to the AFAM-L discussion list asking for Swahili terms that best described the meanings I intended to convey, and the five terms described above were the responses that came back.

it, "the well from which spring theory and practice, whole and well-formed", but that theory and practice should be informed by the actual and aspired interests of the community.

- *Utulivu* (harmony): This requires that the researcher actively avoid creating, exaggerating, or sustaining divisions between or within communities, but strive for harmony between and within these groups.
- *Uhaki* (justice): This requires a research procedure that is fair and just to all participants, especially to those being researched. It mandates that all aspects of the research exercise fit with, and contribute to, the researched community's search for social action and that its applications be mindful of the welfare of all the participants.
- *Ukweli*(truth): This requires the groundedness of research in the experiences of the community being researched. The experiences of community members become the ultimate authority in determining what is true and therefore are the final arbiter of the validity of research about their lives.

The incorporation of a search for truth, justice and harmony into my research method was influenced by Asante's Afrocentric principle of Ma'at. The idea of community was due

to the influence of W. C. Banks. The inclusion of commitment was derived from the general Afrocentric literature, and in a very loose sense, from Asante's Afrocentric principle of Nommo. In addition to relying on Asante's two universal Afrocentric principles, and W. C. Banks' concept of community for the formulation of my Afrocentric analytical canons, I have depended on two other sources. I have consulted with other Africans both via e-mail discussion lists (American Educational Research Association discussion list, Educational Research list, and the African American Research list) and through discussions with a small group of Afrocentric researchers who meet regularly here at Dalhousie to discuss issues of Afrocentricity and academic research. I have also depended heavily on my own experience as an African Caribbean woman to assist in the formulation of these canons.

In the Afrocentric analysis undertaken in this dissertation, all elements of the research process, from the framing of the research question to the data gathering techniques and the interpretive analysis, are closely integrated with the five Afrocentric canons already outlined. The unambiguous declaration of commitment that occurs in this study, when compared to the scientific distance required of Eurocentric research into race and IQ, is the best approach to understanding the phenomenon being investigated. The well documented racial differentiation in IQ scores cannot be investigated objectively. Considering the central role that race plays in North American societies, every researcher approaches this issue with all the historical and emotional baggage that have accrued

from the centuries of Black and White contact. As a Black person, I am constantly aware of the centuries of hatred, contempt, discrimination, and plain denials of opportunity, including educational opportunity, that have been the lot of Black people. I know that while White behaviour towards Black people has improved, especially over the last thirty years, centuries of beliefs and assumptions cannot be erased in a few decades. My own, and other Black experiences (Du Bois, 1965 among others), in addition to the European literature (Hacker, 1992 and Wellman, 1977), have led me to believe that many Whites still retain some residue of doubt or discomfort about our humanity and this fact is very evident on both sides of the IQ debate, as I will discuss later in Chapters Four and Five. The level of doubt appears to determine the nature of the theories proposed to explain the racial ranking in the scores. For those who truly doubt our humanity, the explanation is that we are genetically deficient as compared to the "standard human", the average White person. For those who are well-meaning but still uncomfortable about us, they postulate reasons that can excuse the difference in scores. They too claim that the scores are evidence of inferiority, but they point to Black environments and cultures as the culprits. The question, however, ought not to be whether differences in scores demonstrate a racial hierarchy in intellectual ability, but, rather, as addressed in this study, whether, firstly, there are peculiar factors present in North American societies that depress Black performance, and, most importantly, what are the assumptions about race and human behaviours that direct Eurocentric researchers to focus on the possibility of this racial hierarchy in intelligence.

### Research Questions

The purpose of this study is to apply an Afrocentric analysis to the contemporary theories of hereditarianism and environmentalism that purport to explain the observed differences in IQ scores between Black and White people, in order to unearth any underlying assumptions about Black people and their behaviours, so that a more careful and accurate analysis can be proffered.

#### The principal research question.

The principal question addressed by the study is whether the theories of hereditarianism and environmentalism are accurate or even reasonable explanations for the Black-White differentials in IQ scores. I began this investigation with three main concerns. The first stemmed from the fact that both theories in their search for explanations of the phenomenon of the Black-White score differential appear to be working from the possibly unconscious assumption that the average White behaviour is the correct standard against which Black behaviour should be judged. The second is that both theories have confined their search for explanations to Black people themselves, offering either deficient biologies or deficient environments as reasons for the Black deficit in IQ scores. My third concern is that there is an almost total lack of a Black perspective in the debate. Even though Blacks have researched and written widely about the issue of race and intelligence (Dent et al., 1987; Hilliard, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992 & 1994; and Ogbu, 1978; among others) their works are almost never cited as authorities in either the

hereditarian or the environmentalist arguments. The absence of a Black perspective in an issue that involves us so intimately, to my mind, ensures that the debate is incomplete, and consequently, inaccurate.

The subsidiary research questions.

This study addresses three subsidiary issues. The first subsidiary issue is a methodological one and concerns the location of what Asante describes as the Afrocentric place, and incorporates the processes of introspection and retrospection. My concerns here included: (i) how to locate this place from which to conduct my inquiry so that I maintain sufficient space to critique assumptions that prevent an accurate rendering of explanations of Black intellectual behaviour; (ii) once this location was found, how would I decide if it were an Afrocentric place such as Asante describes; and, (iii) what should I do with the Eurocentric intellectual baggage that I inevitably bring to my inquiry since my previous academic training was exclusively Eurocentric.

The second subsidiary issue concerns the hereditarian position about race and IQ. This involves (i) the initial outlining of the characteristics<sup>25</sup> that are shared by the principal proponents of the hereditarian theory of racial differentials in IQ scores; (ii) addressing the ideas that defined the hereditarian position, and, (iii) asking how do these ideas

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<sup>25</sup> Social characteristics here refer to race, gender, and known political orientation (conservative, liberal, or radical).



measure against my five previously defined Afrocentric canons of ukweli, uhaki, utulivu, ujamaa, and kujitoa.

The third subsidiary issue concerns the environmentalist theory of race and IQ and addressed the same questions as for the hereditarian position. That is, who were the environmentalists, what were their ideas, and how do their ideas measure against my five Afrocentric canons.

### Procedure

The study was done in two stages. The first stage was the identification and description of the Afrocentric place from which this study was conducted. The second stage was the deconstruction of the works of a representative sample of the proponents of both hereditarianism and environmentalism to determine how they measured against the Afrocentric canons of ukweli, uhaki, utulivu, ujamaa, and kujitoa.

#### Locating the Afrocentric place.

The literature describes the Afrocentric place as the perspective that allows the Afrocentric researcher to put African ideals and values at the centre of the inquiry. In this phase, I, as the researcher became the focus of the inquiry thereby creating the self-conscious obliteration of the researcher/subject duality and the enthronement of African

Wholism which Asante (1990), W. C. Banks (1992) and Collins (1990), among other Afrocentrists, maintain is intrinsic to the authentic Afrocentric inquiry.

Two methodological techniques recommended by Asante (1990), introspection and retrospection, were used to locate the Afrocentric place from which I conducted this study. Introspection was concerned with the implementation of the Afrocentric method, and retrospection was concerned with the fair interpretation of the data obtained from the inquiry. The process of introspection was aimed at ensuring that any obstacles to an Afrocentric method that existed in my own mind were unearthed (Asante, 1990). The process of retrospection, similarly, helped me to ascertain if any personal obstacles existed to a fair interpretation of the data (Asante, 1990). This step is particularly important, as I have said before, for like the vast majority of scholars, even those of us who call ourselves Afrocentric, I have been trained in an exclusively Eurocentric academic tradition. The techniques of introspection and retrospection are, therefore, two important phases of the Afrocentric research process (Asante, 1990), and provided actual data for this study.

During the process of introspection, I had to define the perspective I brought to this inquiry. A description of this perspective included consideration of who I am historically, socially, culturally, and politically. The fact that I am Caribbean, woman and African, was felt to make important contributions to the perspective I brought to my

research. The introspective process also included a close self-examination of my beliefs with regard to the issues of race and intelligence and its measurement. I have had to question my own life experiences and how they shaped my handling of this study. In addition, I had to determine which of my experiences are peculiar to my own circumstances as an African Caribbean woman and which are shared by diasporic and continental Black community. Finally, I had to determine what were my beliefs about race and IQ prior to beginning this study and how have they affected my inquiry. This process produced a description of the place from which I do my work, the Afrocentric place. The results of this introspective process was previously presented in Chapter One.

The retrospective process was thought necessary in order to arrive at fair and accurate interpretations of the data. I have had to question myself after the completion of stages one and two of the study to ascertain if any personal obstacles existed to a fair interpretation of the data. That is, I have had to determine if and how my life experiences hindered or facilitated a fair interpretation of the study. I have had to determine what were my beliefs about race and IQ at the end of the study and were they altered in any way during the process of the inquiry; and finally, how much are the interpretations of data and conclusions representative of my own position and how much are they a consensus of African opinion. The results of the retrospection are included in Chapter Six, the conclusion to the study.

### Methods of communal validation employed.

An important tenet of Afrocentric research, I would argue, is that the inquiry cannot represent the position of a single individual, but must be validated by the community which is the subject of the inquiry (Banks, 1992). Communalism is an important principle of African cultures (Asante, 1988; Collins, 1990; and Nobles, 1986), and, therefore, the views of other Africans must be included before a model can be submitted as Afrocentric. When pursuing this goal of communal validation, it is important to remember that while the views of other African scholars are of prime importance, one must also look beyond the African scholarly community to the lay community itself for this validation. In this inquiry, the ultimate subject community is the global African community, since this is the community that my subjects have researched. I, therefore, have had to devise some ways in which other Africans could validate the processes and outcomes of my inquiry and my conception of the Afrocentric place. I chose to seek the communal validation I needed in three ways. The first method involved a group of self-identified Afrocentric research scholars here at Dalhousie University who meet once or twice per month in the School of Education. I periodically presented my work to this group for critique. They provided feedback on whether or not my work embodies the principles and themes of Afrocentrism as understood in the Afrocentric research community. They also provided feedback on whether or not my findings and conclusions are representative of a consensus of global African opinion. This group was particularly

useful for deciding about consensus because its membership included persons from the Caribbean, continental Africa, and North America.

The second method of invoking communal validation through the electronic mailing system which offered a convenient and efficient way to solicit the views and critiques of other African scholars worldwide, whose work involved Afrocentric research methodologies or intelligence and its measurement. I joined three discussion lists, namely, the American Education Research Association List D, for Measurement and Research Methodologies (AERA-D); the Educational Research List (ERL-L); and the African American Research List (AFAM-L). The procedure followed here was that I sent queries relating to afrocentric theory, afrocentric methods, and the race-IQ debate to the lists and collected the responses. I also periodically submitted my own thoughts to the lists for feedback. It ought to be noted that one problem that I expected with this method did not materialize. I expected it to be difficult to distinguish the responses of African scholars from others on the AERA-D and the ERL-L lists and non-Africans on the AFAM-L list. This was found not to be the case because African respondents identified themselves as such on the AERA-D and ERL-L and non-Africans on the AFAM-L. The non-African respondents, although generally, but not always, very critical of the idea of Afrocentric research, provided useful feedback by pointing to areas of my work that needed attention. While I was convinced that the second method of validation provided some feedback from lay Africans not directly involved in the world of

academia since the AFAM-L list includes a broad cross-section of Africans, I nevertheless felt it incumbent upon me to accept every invitation tendered to me by the local African Nova Scotian community to present my work to them, and to attend seriously to questions and concerns raised by community members.

Selecting the samples for this study.

The population of interest in this phase of the study is researchers who study the relationship between race and IQ. The study was restricted to hereditarians and environmentalists, since these are the two principal groupings in this population (Snyderman & Rothman, 1987b). The sample chosen was confined to four hereditarians and two environmentalists all of whose positions are well known both inside and outside the academic community. The literature shows that these are the scholars most often quoted as authorities on the issue, and they represent the two extremes in this debate (Snyderman & Rothman, 1987b). These six also regularly air their views outside the academic arena through television talk shows and in newsmagazines and newspapers.

The hereditarians whose work were examined (see Chapter Four) are Arthur Jensen, Hans Eysenck, Phillippe Rushton, and Charles Murray. These four were chosen, as I have said, principally because while they publish frequently in academic journals, they persistently cross the line between academic and popular discourse and all actively and currently propagate their ideas outside of the academic arena through television and

radio talk shows, newsmagazines, and newspapers. This means that all four are easily identifiable as proponents of the hereditarian theory. Another consideration is the fact that they reflect the thinking on both sides of the English speaking Atlantic. Arthur Jensen and Charles Murray are Americans, Phillippe Rushton is Canadian, and Hans Eysenck is English. The sample bias in favour of the Americans is justified because the USA is the origin of most of the popular ideas on race and IQ. In addition, Charles Murray is included because he is the most recent entrant to the controversy, and is presently the most talked about.

The two proponents of the environmentalist theory selected for analysis are Leon Kamin and Stephen Jay Gould (see Chapter Five). Like the four hereditarians, both persistently cross the line between academic and popular discourse and actively propagate their ideas outside the academic arena. Although the literature shows that there are numerous critiques of the hereditarian position by other avowed environmentalists, including Black ones, less popular attention is paid to this side of the controversy, which justifies the sample being disproportionately hereditarian. The literature reveals only three persons who are popularly identifiable as proponents of the environmentalist position, namely, Leon Kamin, Stephen Jay Gould, and David Suzuki of Canada (Pearson, 1991 and Snyderman & Rothman, 1987b). Suzuki was omitted because he satisfied only one of the criteria for selection: while he is recognized in the popular press as a proponent of the environmentalist position, he has published no major work on this issue.

To accomplish the deconstruction of the hereditarian-environmentalist debate, the major works of the four hereditarians and of the two environmentalists mentioned above were analyzed in order to select the common ideas that could be said to define each position. Once this was done, these ideas were judged against the five Afrocentric canons for Afrocentric analysis that I have identified earlier, namely, ukweli, uhaki, utulivu, ujamaa, and kujitoa. The results of this deconstruction process provide the substance of the analysis described in Chapters Four and Five.

### Ethical Considerations

The ethical issues involved centre around the use of confidential data about human subjects, and the additional considerations Afrocentric researchers are obliged to consider. This study will not involve human subjects directly in any of its three stages, except for autobiographical details about myself, as the researcher, included in the first phase that were gleaned through the processes of introspection and retrospection used in defining the Afrocentric place. In phase two, that is, the data analysis, the data used for the six subjects are all previously published material and as such are already available to the public. This study, therefore, causes no additional harm to any of the six subjects in terms of invasion of privacy or potential threat to their reputations.

It was decided to be unnecessary to solicit written or other permission from the six subjects involved in the second stage of the inquiry because all the materials used were



garnered from previously published works. There will be no extensive reproduction or quoting from any of the publications so questions of copyright infringement are not involved.

For Afrocentric research, the ethical concerns go beyond those mentioned above that involve the integrity of the study and the correct treatment of subjects over the duration of the study, as set out by university ethical guidelines. In this kind of inquiry, we are concerned with issues of humaneness, racism, and in general looking after the best interests of the community most affected by the outcomes of the research, which in this case is the diasporic Black community. In terms of the ethical concerns specific to Afrocentricity, they take a more philosophical turn than the traditional Eurocentric concerns. Afrocentric research being transformative and emancipatory by definition, it is not sufficient only to understand or interpret the phenomenon under investigation, but the inquiry must be directed towards effecting change that can benefit the African community. I am, and will be, continuously aware of the negative uses to which research on racial differences in IQ has been put in the past, and will endeavour to ensure that the same cannot be done in this case. I accept the responsibility to ensure that the results of the inquiry must be of recognized value to the African community.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Of Oracles and Tin Gods: The Hereditarians.

*The silently growing assumption of this age is that the probation of races is past, and that the backward races of to-day are of proven inefficiency and not worth the saving. Such an assumption is the arrogance of peoples irreverent toward Time and ignorant of the deeds of men [sic]. (W. E. B. DuBois, 1965, p. 168)*

Du Bois wrote these words nearly a century ago<sup>1</sup>, appalled then, as I am today, at the dangerously superficial analyses that many contemporary sociologists and psychologists employ to explain Black behaviours. As Du Bois perceived so long ago, and as I will demonstrate in this and the following chapter, there seems to be a fundamental assumption of a Black pathology that informs traditional Eurocentric academic discourses about Black behaviours, and the various theories and treatises propounded about race and IQ merely reflect the authors' views about the nature of this pathology. Some, like the environmentalists whose works are analyzed in Chapter Five, blame the pathology on Black culture or environment, and optimistically suggest that it can be controlled with the appropriate interventions. Others, like the four hereditarians analyzed here in Chapter Four, are more pessimistic and believe that this pathology is innate and immutable, or, as Du Bois suggests, they believe that Blacks are not worth the saving. What the entire debate boils down to, from an Afrocentric perspective, is a

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<sup>1</sup>DuBois wrote these words in 1903 when the book, The Souls of Black Folk, was first published. The 1965 edition is the one referenced here.

debate about the educability of Black people, and, consequently, about the place we should occupy in society. The environmentalists are hopeful of the outcome if apparent cultural and environmental obstacles are removed, and the hereditarians believe that sufficient effort has already been squandered and that the results, so far, demonstrate the futility of expending more.

The above conclusions will be illustrated and expanded on in the next two chapters (4 and 5), where I will present deconstructive Afrocentric analyses of the hereditarian and environmentalist positions (respectively) on the relationship between race and IQ. As I explained before (page 2), I use the terms 'hereditarian' and 'environmentalist' in the sense used by Flynn (1980) to distinguish those who accept a mainly genetic hypothesis about the IQ gap between Blacks and Whites (that is, a high  $h^2$  value<sup>2</sup> for IQ, above 0.80), from those who accept an environmental hypothesis (that is, a relatively low  $h^2$  estimate, below 0.50). The six scholars selected for this study cover the full spectrum of  $h^2$  estimates, from  $h^2 = 0$  (Leon Kamin) to the highest value I have seen quoted of  $h^2 = 0.85$  (Arthur Jensen, though he generally uses 0.80) and, therefore, they adequately represent the opposing viewpoints in this debate. The positions of all six scholars are very well documented and they are frequently cited as authorities on the issue of race and IQ, in addition to which they are all very ardent proponents of their positions both inside

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<sup>2</sup> A heritability estimate that purports to measure the extent to which variance of IQ within a given population is due to hereditary factors.

and outside the academic arena. The hereditarians chosen, as I have already declared, are Arthur Jensen, Hans Eysenck, Phillippe Rushton, and Charles Murray, and the works of these authors are deconstructed in Chapter Four. The two environmentalists whose works were selected for deconstruction are Leon Kamin and Stephen Jay Gould, and their works will be examined in Chapter Five.

In this chapter, as I promised earlier, the works of the four hereditarians are deconstructed in terms of my five Afrocentric canons, to determine the common assumptions about race and IQ that define their positions. These works have been critiqued elsewhere extensively, and justifiably, for their scientific and technical flaws, but, as I have argued before (Reviere, 1995) such limited critiques are inadequate for the purpose of an Afrocentric analysis. Instead, this analysis will focus on their declared and undeclared assumptions about the five Afrocentric canons as defined for the purposes of this study: kujitoa, ujamaa, utulivu, uhaki, and ukweli. In section 1, I will present brief biographical sketches of the four authors explaining their social and political philosophies and how they became involved in the IQ issue. In the following five sections, sections 2 to 6 inclusive, I will concentrate in turn, on the five Afrocentric canons. These sections will begin with a restatement of the canon, and will be followed by an explanation of what the canon means in the context of the specific analysis being undertaken. The core, and major portion, of the section will be a detailing of the assumptions unearthed about race and IQ in the context of the specific canon, and

illustrated with quotes from the respective authors, and other supporting material. In the final segment of this chapter (section 7) I will present a summary of the findings of the chapter, that is, the definitive arguments and assumptions of the hereditarian position.

### Biographical Sketches

In this section, as I have said above, I will describe the social and political philosophies of the four hereditarian authors, and in so doing justify each selection as representative of the hereditarian position. In keeping with the Afrocentric canon of being just to all participants in the research, wherever and whenever possible, I have relied on the authors' own description of their philosophies. In the absence of such information I have used sympathetic sources, and only as a last resort have I relied on information from antagonistic sources. The four authors are presented below in the order in which they became prominent in the race and IQ debate. Arthur Jensen is presented first, since he is credited with reviving this phase of the debate with the publication of his 1969 article, "How Can We Boost IQ and scholastic achievement?" (Fancher, 1985; Flynn, 1980; and Pearson, 1991). Next is Hans Eysenck due to his 1971 publication, The IQ Argument: Race, Intelligence and Education, and to his much referenced debate with Leon Kamin published in 1981. Penultimately comes Phillippe Rushton who entered the fray in the middle to late 1980s with a series of articles published in the journal, Personality and Individual Differences. The last of the four presented is Charles Murray who made his

fairly recent and much publicized contribution in 1994, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, which he co-authored with Richard Herrnstein.

### Arthur R. Jensen

Arthur Jensen first began writing about race and IQ in 1968, one year before his notorious 1969 effort which marked the beginning of his rise to prominence as the most ardent and articulate proponent of the hereditarian dogma. My views about Jensen's contribution to this latest exposition of Black intellectual inferiority are amply supported by both environmentalists and hereditarians. For example, Roger Pearson<sup>3</sup> (1991, p. 141), his ardent supporter, described him as "the foremost researcher responsible for the revival of 'hereditarian' thought in recent decades", and James Flynn (1980, p. 213), who describes himself as an environmentalist, observed that "Jensen threatens to dominate the debate by the range of his learning, his skill as a controversialist, and the sheer volume of his contribution." Jensen's position as the preeminent hereditarian in academia over the last three decades is critically important because of the control he wields over both hereditarian and environmentalist thinking about race and IQ. The other five authors examined in this study were all heavily influenced by Jensen's work either positively, like the three hereditarians who all claim him as a major influence, or, negatively, like the

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<sup>3</sup>Roger Pearson, a self-confessed eugenicist (Pearson, 1991), is well known for his fascist and white supremacist connections (Newby & Newby, 1995 and Rosenthal, 1995). He was brought to the US in the mid-1960s by Willis Carto, founder of the fascist Liberty Lobby, as the foremost spokesperson for White nationalism (Rosenthal, 1995).

two environmentalists whose seminal works on this issue were both in reaction to Jensen's 1969 article.

Since 1969, Jensen's work has focused almost exclusively on the issue of Black-White differences in IQ scores as confirmed by searches of the ERIC database, the Dalhousie University libraries catalogue, and selected bibliographies, which show that in the 26 years from 1969 to 1995, there are 43 publications of which he is the sole or joint author<sup>4</sup>, and of these 32 deal with the matter of Black underperformance on IQ tests. It is interesting to note that despite his single-minded focus on Black testing behaviour, Jensen first became involved in this issue because of the anomalous testing behaviours of Hispanic children. As he claims, his involvement occurred "almost by accident" (Jensen, 1974a, p. 222) when one of his graduate students, who worked as a school psychologist, drew to his attention the observation that Hispanic children diagnosed as retarded and placed in special education classes did not act retarded outside the classroom, unlike their White counterparts (Jensen, 1974a). Jensen has never attempted to explain why he finds it more fruitful to focus on differences between Black and White performances to the almost total exclusion of all other racial groups, including his initial interest, the Hispanics. My inference is that Jensen's choice has little to do with academic merit or scientific necessity, but rather with conservative and white supremacist reaction to the

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<sup>4</sup>Jensen shares authorship in only five of the forty three publications. In the vast majority he is the sole author.

Civil Rights Movement, which was in its heyday in the late 1960s. The Civil Rights Movement, because of the widely acknowledged US history of anti-Black repression and discrimination, held the moral high ground, and was consequently able to secure apparent victories on behalf of Blacks, such as the desegregation of schools and aggressive federal attempts to include Black participation in the wider society through compensatory education and affirmative action programs. The White Supremacist community, therefore, needed a defence against liberal morality and the now widespread and passionate defence of racial equity. The revival of the centuries-old arguments of a genetic racial inequality was opportune, and White Supremacist organizations like the Pioneer Fund<sup>5</sup> were willing to finance research and publishing opportunities to provide the evidence they needed for the continued ostracization of Blacks (Connors, 1995; Elmer-Griffin, 1995; Halpern, 1995; Newby & Newby, 1995; Rosenthal, 1995; and Shermer, 1995). The late 1960s was a good time, therefore, for sympathetic and ambitious scientists to establish quick reputations and obtain easy research funding if they were willing to provide the evidence needed by these supremacist organizations. There is evidence that Jensen has accepted funding and other assistance from the Pioneer Fund (Livingstone, 1995 and Rosenthal, 1995). Rosenthal claims, explicitly, that "during the

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<sup>5</sup>According to Rosenthal (1995) and Shermer (1995), the Pioneer Fund was set up in 1937 with a clearly eugenic agenda and has supplied funding to every major researcher postulating a genetic link between race and IQ. Rosenthal goes further to claim that the Fund is "embedded in a network of fascist-oriented foundations, think tanks, publishers, global anti-Communist political coalitions, religious fundamentalists, and paramilitary organizations." (p.45)



1960s and 1970s the Pioneer Fund provided hundreds of thousands of dollars to William Shockley and Arthur Jensen in an attempt to reestablish academic respectability for the advocacy of racial differences in intelligence and eugenics" (p. 51), and, in addition, a number of Jensen's books were published by The Free Press<sup>6</sup>, a publishing house associated with the White Supremacist and neo-eugenic movement (Rosenthal, 1995). Roger Pearson provides additional, albeit indirect, evidence of Jensen's connection with neo-eugenic organizations by negating Jensen's claim of the dispassionate scientific nature of his research. He draws attention to Jensen's "inherent" conclusion about "humankind's need for a practical but strictly voluntary eugenics program" (Pearson, 1991, p. 141).

Surprisingly, and contradictorily, Jensen continues to lay claim to a higher moral and social purpose for his research while maintaining his stance as an objective and dispassionate scientist with no control or interest in the outcome of his work. He confesses to a humanitarian impulse which, apparently, was triggered by a self-professed "overwhelming fascination with Mahatma Gandhi, whose writings influenced [him] considerably in [his] formative years" (Jensen, 1974, p. 206-7). According to Jensen, his humanitarian streak is manifested in his "recent"<sup>7</sup> interest in problems that have practical

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<sup>6</sup>These books include Bias in Mental Testing (1980a), and Straight Talk About Mental Tests (1980b).

<sup>7</sup>This claim was made in 1974.

or social consequences such as racial differences in intelligence (Jensen, 1974). Jensen has consistently professed, since 1969, an overweening concern for the future and well-being of African-Americans, a claim that one would have to be very naive to accept uncritically. For, while in his writings Jensen has never explicitly declared a political philosophy, he does display a definite bias towards political conservatism in that his arguments invariably support ultra-conservative and racist stances on the various issues that are popularly believed to benefit African Americans. For instance, in his seminal work already mentioned, *How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?*, he opens with the bald statement that "compensatory education has been tried and it apparently has failed" (Jensen, 1969, p. 1). His work has provided, and continues to provide, ammunition for the anti-Civil Rights and White Supremacist backlash that spurs much of the rhetoric on the hereditarian side of the race and IQ debate.

### Hans J. Eysenck

Hans Eysenck was born in Germany, in the middle of the European War of 1914-1918, on the 4th March, 1916 (Eysenck, 1990). He spent his childhood and youth there, living with the effects of the loss of that war, and witnessing the rise of Nazism and his country's insane decision to exterminate entire groups of people, based on the demented logic of White supremacy and genetic purity. Eysenck claims that an effect of his early history was to make him a "premature anti-Nazi" (Eysenck, 1995, p. 17), and a defender of the

underdog<sup>8</sup>. However, these claims appear suspiciously convenient for the following two reasons, and more so when one recalls that after Germany's defeat, it was well nigh impossible to find a German who was not an anti-Nazi. The first reason is that for someone as averse to Nazism as Eysenck describes himself, he seems remarkably comfortable, and uncritical, of his father's<sup>9</sup> conversion to this ideology and friendship with Herman Goering<sup>10</sup> (Eysenck, 1990). It is suspicious too, that he appears completely sanguine about choosing his friends from among known Nazis. For example, in his autobiography Rebel with a Cause, he talks of a girlfriend who was a *Hitlermädchen*, and of his friendships with other students who were uniformed members of the SS (Eysenck, 1990). The second reason for suspicion is that his declarations of disgust with the Nazi doctrine of racial inequality, and his silent witnessing of the deadly interaction between science and ideology that resulted in the holocaust, are at odds with his nonchalant dismissal of the many cautions against the harmful potential of his theory that "blacks [are] actually genetically predisposed to lower IQ levels" (1995, p. 18). This irresponsible lack of concern is even more distressing when one understands that Eysenck

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<sup>8</sup>I find it hard to take seriously, as either an activist or an intellectual, someone whose credentials for social activism consists of "[making] it a practice to be particularly kind and helpful to those whom fate, society or accident have placed in a position of dependence" which actions arise "quite naturally from the genetics of [his] personality" (Eysenck, 1990, p.22). This is not social activism but paternalism of the worst kind.

<sup>9</sup>A documented Aryan, as Eysenck claims (Eysenck, 1990).

<sup>10</sup>He reports in his autobiography that in 1934 his father was sufficiently close to Goering to request an officership for him in the SS so that he could attend the prestigious Berlin University. He subsequently chose to join his mother in Paris instead.

does realize the possible consequences of the theories he is expounding, for he writes of Malaysia:

the Chinese have IQs about 15 points higher than the Malays, who are the great majority. Differences in the abilities of the Chinese and Malays have produced violent social reactions, including pogroms and murder. But IQ tests did not create the difficulties; they merely identified some of the origins (1990, p. 84).

Eysenck's prominence in this debate, in terms of the frequency with which he is referenced, is difficult to understand. He himself says that "... I have never done any research myself on the genetics of intelligence; I have merely written about research done by others. Nor have I done any research on racial differences in intelligence ... " (1990, p. 206). The list of his publications included in his autobiography confirms this, for, of the 71 citations produced between 1947 and 1989, only two deal with the issue of race and IQ (Eysenck, 1990). Clearly then, Eysenck's professional interest lies elsewhere, yet he is one of the most outspoken and frequently cited "experts" on the issue of race differences in intelligence. It suggests to me, therefore, that Eysenck's involvement in this issue occurred for personal rather than academic reasons, and I make this claim for the following reasons. First, his initial contribution in 1971 through the book The IQ Argument, was made to support Jensen, a former post-doctoral student of his, who was under severe criticism for his 1969 article, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" (Eysenck, 1990 & 1991). A second reason is that Eysenck had already made a name for himself as a controversialist, and this was a new controversy that was

proving to be quite lucrative, as evidenced by the mass of publications critiquing Jensen that occurred between 1969 and 1971, and the number of reputations that were built on the back of Jensen's article. My belief is that Eysenck's intention, in 1971, was to secure for himself a piece of this action<sup>11</sup>, and his motives were not as high-minded as he maintains.

I have found no evidence that, like Jensen, Eysenck's publications on race differences in IQ were financed by the Pioneer Fund or any similar group. However, there is evidence that Eysenck is closely linked with Roger Pearson<sup>12</sup>, whose name surfaces repeatedly as an advocate for, and link between, those academics searching for scientific support for theories of Black intellectual inferiority. Eysenck wrote the introduction to Pearson's 1991 publication Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe in which Pearson unapologetically called for eugenic solutions to the Black problem. One must assume that Eysenck was aware of and supported the contents of a book to which he, one must assume, willingly lent his name. In addition, like Jensen, much of Eysenck's theorizing about race and IQ takes the form of repeating conservative attacks on Headstart and affirmative action programs believed to benefit Black people.

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<sup>11</sup>Eysenck has shown elsewhere that he is not averse to entering into controversies in order to profit financially. In the 1950s he was employed by the Tobacco Research Council to provide them with evidence that nicotine was not addictive and that cigarettes were not a contributing factor to cancer (Eysenck, 1990). This he did, and further concluded that people smoked for genetic reasons rather than addictions.

<sup>12</sup>See footnote 3, this chapter.

Phillipe J. Rushton

Like Hans Eysenck, Phillippe Rushton was born into a society that became notorious for its official racist government policies. Despite a sparsity of personal information about him<sup>13</sup>, it can be concluded that Rushton was born in South Africa around 1950, that is, about two years after the formal introduction of apartheid. It would seem, therefore, that Rushton grew up in a society organized around race, where Black people were legally defined as inferior and denied, on the basis of that classification, all the rights of South African citizenship, including adequate education. It is inconceivable that Rushton could have remained unscathed by this early history, as his silence on this point, and that of his supporters (e.g., Pearson, 1991)<sup>14</sup> would suggest. I maintain that it is impossible to have lived with apartheid and its attendant White supremacist ideology and not have a definite view, one way or the other, on the validity of racial hierarchies. It is reasonable to assume, in the absence of any declaration to the contrary on Rushton's part<sup>15</sup>, that he did

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<sup>13</sup>Personal details about Phillippe Rushton are remarkably hard to come by. There are a few details about his academic career in prefaces to his books, and Roger Pearson, in Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe, included a chapter on him, but this chapter only describes the persecution Rushton is supposed to have suffered at the hands of his opponents.

<sup>14</sup>Pearson goes so far as to describe him as British-born, which while accurate, is certainly misleading.

<sup>15</sup>I am not suggesting that all South African Whites who lived under apartheid need to declare their position on this ideology, but it must be accepted that Rushton is in a unique position of creating theory around a postulate that his natal society held to be a truth.

accept the apartheid ideology, and, therefore, his theories are, at the minimum, influenced by an assumption of the inherent inferiority of Black people.

As with Jensen and Eysenck, Rushton came to the race and IQ issue after having worked in other less controversial areas of psychology. And, like the other two, he claims to have been so overwhelmed by the evidence for Black intellectual inferiority, that "work on other topics seemed shallow by comparison" (Rushton, 1995, p. xiv). But, as I have argued before, one would have to be extremely credulous to take these hereditarians at their own insistence of dispassionate and solely scientific interest in the subject. Since 1969, and Jensen's seminal publication, race-based research has proven to be a very attractive option for academics, with the appropriate ambition or White supremacist sympathies, to make names for themselves. As I have outlined earlier, the Pioneer Fund is only the best known of the many ultra-right wing organizations created to fund and publish this type of research (Rosenthal, 1995 and Shermer, 1995). Rushton, actually, is the only one of the hereditarians examined in this thesis who chooses to acknowledge openly his financial ties to the Pioneer Fund. For instance, in Race, Evolution and Behavior, he states that since 1989, this organization has provided funding for his work, and, in many of his papers he includes an acknowledgement of this source of funding. Nevertheless, he does not discuss nor admit to any knowledge of the Fund's unsavoury reputation as an advocate of White supremacist and eugenic ideologies, or to the probable impact or influence on his work.

Rushton seems to be a part of a very selective fraternity that includes both Jensen and Eysenck. Like Jensen, Rushton worked with Eysenck in London, in this case for a sabbatical year (1982-1983) at the University of London's Institute of Psychiatry. Also, in the acknowledgements to Race, Evolution and Behavior, Rushton cites the contributions of both Eysenck and Jensen, among others, in reading, advising on, and supplying material for the book. As with Jensen and Eysenck, Roger Pearson, already mentioned in preceding pages, seems a connecting thread linking all three psychologists. Pearson includes a chapter on Rushton in his 1991 book in which he exhibits a familiarity with Rushton's private thoughts that suggests a very intimate relationship<sup>16</sup>, although this relationship is not described, nor is any mention made of personal communications between the two. These facts only serve to reinforce my argument that there is a distinct community of scholars committed to propagating theories of Black intellectual inferiority, and that the members of this community are linked either directly or indirectly to ideological and political organizations and individuals that are dedicated to propagating eugenic and White supremacist solutions to social problems.

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<sup>16</sup>The following are some examples of the implied intimacy. On page 218, Pearson writes "Rushton *knew* (my emphasis) that his work would result, sooner or later, in a political explosion", and on page 233, he says "Now *feeling* (again, my emphasis) it to be necessary, Rushton began legal action against the Star".



### Charles Murray

Unlike the other three hereditarians discussed in the preceding pages, Charles Murray does not have a background in Psychology<sup>17</sup>, and he, therefore, seems the least qualified of the four to theorize about the constructs of race and intelligence and any relationship between the two. Yet, this is the subject of the 1994 book he co-authored with the late Richard Herrnstein<sup>18</sup>. One, therefore, must wonder what prompted Murray to join this very controversial debate. The first indication of interest on Murray's part appeared in 1992 when he co-authored, again with Richard Herrnstein, an article entitled "What's really behind the SAT score decline?" in the journal Public Interest. Herrnstein seems to have been primarily responsible for Murray's entry into the debate by inviting him into the fraternity of race and IQ theorists, promising him an exciting time (Passell, 1994). Herrnstein, along with Jensen and William Shockley, had been notorious since the 1960s for his views on the heritability and immutability of IQ, but unlike the other two, Herrnstein's interest was focused on class differences in IQ scores, not race differences. This co-authorship with Murray is Herrnstein's first attempt to focus in on race differences and it seems fair to assume that this new focus was Murray's contribution to their joint effort, especially since his previous work on welfare was largely focused on

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<sup>17</sup>Murray is a political scientist by training. His previous publications, none of which are related to the issue of race and IQ, are Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (1994) and a number of articles and seminar papers on welfare matters published between 1986 and 1994.

<sup>18</sup>Herrnstein died in September, 1994, a short while before the publication of The Bell Curve, leaving Murray to make the round of the Talk Shows to publicize the book.

race. This decision, I surmise, had more to do with the publicity, and its attendant financial rewards, expected from renewed speculations about Black intellectual inferiority, than from anything to do with true scholarship.

Of the four hereditarians, Murray is the one most publicly connected with the Ultra-Conservative Movement. He is a Bradley Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute<sup>19</sup>, and was formerly on the payroll of other right-wing organizations like the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and the Bradley Foundation (Rosenthal, 1995 and Shermer, 1995). Although there is no direct evidence that Murray has personal financial connections to the Pioneer Fund as do Jensen and Rushton, there is no doubt that he is part of the fraternity of scholars normally supported by the Fund. In The Bell Curve, Murray and his co-author cite at least thirteen obscure authors who are beneficiaries of the Fund (Rosenthal, 1995), many of whom publish frequently in that organization's masthead Mankind Quarterly<sup>20</sup> (formerly Eugenics Quarterly), and are well known for their promotion of eugenics and their ultra-conservative and White Supremacist agenda (Newby & Newby, 1995 and Rosenthal, 1995).

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<sup>19</sup>Murray's co-author, Richard Herrnstein, also worked for the American Enterprise Institute, a Conservative think-tank.

<sup>20</sup>Roger Pearson, already mentioned, used to be editor of this journal. He was dropped when his European and American Nazi connections became public knowledge (Rosenthal, 1995 and Shermer, 1995).

In all four sets of writings there can be seen two important themes. The first is that there exists a fraternity of interests around the propagation of the view of racial inequality in intellectual endowments, in which they are all prolific participants, and support each other's work both in popular and academic media. This mutual support is self-reinforcing in that it helps to build up their reputations and hence their work assumes more and more authority within the discipline, and this in turn legitimizes their work. I will revisit this issue later in this chapter when I discuss the canon of ujamaa. The second point that has emerged so far is that they all display a callous disregard for the consequences of their work, all the while claiming for themselves the highest humanitarian motives, and reluctant converts to the hereditarian position. This is despite evidence that points to their relations with groups and individuals who are involved with White supremacist and fascist groups.

### The Afrocentric Deconstructive Analyses

As I showed in the review of the literature (Chapter Two), hereditarian theories and arguments about the concepts of race and intelligence, and about relationships between the two, have been critiqued elsewhere extensively, and justifiably, for their theoretical and methodological distortions and inaccuracies (Flynn, 1980; Gould, 1981; Hilliard, 1987 & 1988; and Kamin, 1974; among others). However, an Afrocentric analysis, using my five canons, necessitates a more comprehensive approach that goes beyond questions of scientific reliability and validity to questions of how the knowledge being

disseminated is structured and used. Application of the canons mandates that the political, ideological, social, and cultural beliefs and motivations of the scientists be assessed. This assessment has revealed several specific themes associated with each of the five canons.

In the following sections, I will discuss the themes uncovered for each canon. With the first canon, *kujitoa*, three themes have emerged. The first theme relates to claims of scientific objectivity in the creation and dissemination of hereditarian theories; the second theme relates to the assumption of commonalities in measurement and behaviour between physical quantities and IQ; and the third theme revolves around questions of the scientist as popular advocate and ideologue in support of his or her research findings. My application of the second canon, *ujamaa* has revealed two themes. The first theme is concerned with the existence of, and relationships amongst, a community of hereditarian scholars who propagate theories of a genetic linkage between race and IQ; and the second theme is concerned with their relationships with the African community that is at the centre of much of their theorizing. Application of the third canon, *utulivu*, has similarly revealed three themes. The first deals with the existence of an obvious anti-African bias; the second with the concept of the Black community as a dysgenic force in North American society; and the third is concerned with the place of eugenics in the hereditarian dogma. The fourth canon, *uhaki*, has also revealed two themes. The first theme is concerned with the authors' analyses of the Black community's demands, and the

responses to those demands, for ameliorative programs and laws to counter acknowledged past injustices; and the second theme is concerned with the authors' suggestions and recommendations for a more effective treatment of the members of the Black community. Lastly, application of the fifth canon, *ukweli*, has revealed three themes. The first is concerned with the genetic explanations for the racial disparity in IQ scores and how these issues play out in the experiences of Black people themselves; the second theme is concerned with the existence of Spearman's g-factor as representative of a real physical entity called intelligence and its relative distribution among the Black and White populations; and the third theme concerned the heritability of IQ both within and between populations and the inferences drawn theretofrom.

### Kujittoa

Kujittoa, as described in earlier chapters, requires that the researcher emphasize considerations of how knowledge is structured and used over the need for dispassion and objectivity. The writings of the four hereditarians argue for just the opposite in that they stress dispassion and objectivity over considerations of how the knowledge they disseminate is used and structured. As mentioned above, my analysis of their writings has revealed three major themes that illustrate their positions in relation to this canon: firstly, they claim to practise scientific objectivity in the creation and dissemination of their theories; next, they erroneously assume commonalities in the measurement and behaviour of physical quantities and IQ; and, lastly, they have well-defined roles as popular

advocates and ideologues in support of their research findings. In the following paragraphs, I will elaborate on, and provide evidence for, these three themes from the writings of the authors themselves and from both their supporters and detractors.

### Scientific objectivity.

For the purpose of this study, I employ a definition of objectivity that holds that research findings are actual truths which exist independently of perception, or of the researcher's own conceptions of the object of the research, and that the conclusions arrived at are therefore undistorted by emotion or personal bias. That is, researchers who follow the same specific set of procedures should always obtain the same results.

All four hereditarians claim to be acting as totally objective scientists, that is, simply testing the hypothesis that the IQ gap between Blacks and Whites is fundamentally genetic in character. They claim that the evidence thus far renders this hypothesis more probable than any other, and explain the IQ gap as an immutably deficient capacity, on the part of Black people, for abstract thought which, they claim, constitutes an all-important criterion of human worth (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994 and Jensen, 1969a). This is the position that Jensen took even before his 1969 work, and has repeated in all of his subsequent publications on race and IQ. For example, he (Jensen, 1968a) argues that:

The fact that a reasonable hypothesis has not been rigorously proved does not mean that it should be summarily dismissed. It only means that we

need more appropriate research for putting it to the test. I believe such definitive research is entirely possible but has not yet been done. So all we are left with are various lines of evidence, no one of which is definitive alone, but which, viewed all together, make a not unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the Negro-white intelligence difference. The preponderance of evidence is, in my opinion, less consistent with a strictly environmental hypothesis, which, of course, does not exclude the influence of the environment or its interaction with genetic factors. (Jensen, 1969a, p. 82)

Eysenck (1974) repeated this argument in his initial foray into the IQ debate on Jensen's behalf, and has reaffirmed it in his 1981, 1990 and 1991 publications. Both Rushton and Murray have also taken similar positions in all of their publications on race and IQ. They all affirm their right to pursue this line of research in the name of academic freedom, which they complain is continually being infringed by institutions made uncomfortable by the controversial nature of the issue, and by pressures brought to bear on these institutions and individual hereditarians by ideologues of the Left. Perhaps the most notorious statement of this position was in a resolution to the APA, also published as a comment in The American Psychologist<sup>21</sup> of July 1972, which was signed by 50 prominent psychologists and other academics, including Jensen and Eysenck<sup>22</sup>. The resolution called for "free and unencumbered research" (Tobach & Proshansky, 1976, p. 3) and charged that scientists who emphasized the role of heredity in human behaviour were being suppressed, censured, punished, and defamed as a consequence. The

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<sup>21</sup>The petition, with its signatories, was reprinted in Tobach and Proshansky (1976), pages 3-7.

<sup>22</sup>Of course, this occurred before either Rushton or Murray arrived on the scene which explains the absence of their names from among the signatories.

resolution was obviously a direct result of the tempestuous reception, both politically and scholarly, of Jensen's 1969 effort and, in fact, the final two of its five "beliefs and principles" were worded in such a way as to lend specific support to Jensen's theories<sup>23</sup>. Before I go on to discuss the aftermath of this resolution, I want to draw attention to the fact that the very same charges are regurgitated today. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Roger Pearson (1991) published a description of allegations of abuse and victimization of some prominent hereditarians among whom were Jensen and Rushton. As I have also mentioned, Eysenck wrote the introduction to this text. In addition, following the publication of The Bell Curve, Linda Gottfredson, of the University of Delaware, actively solicited signatures to a petition she prepared in defense of Herrnstein and Murray which was published in the Wall Street Journal (Halpern, 1995). In his introduction to Race, Intelligence and Evolution, Rushton (1995) also made similar claims which echo many of the claims that Pearson (1991) made earlier on his behalf,

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<sup>23</sup>The actual wording of the two beliefs and principles are as follows:

4. We deplore the evasion of hereditary reasoning in current textbooks, and the failure to give responsible weight to heredity in disciplines such as sociology, social psychology, social anthropology, educational psychology, psychological measurement, and many others.

5. We call upon liberal academics - upon faculty senates, upon professional and learned societies, upon the American Association of University Professors, upon the American Civil Liberties Union, upon the University Centers for Rational Alternatives, upon presidents and boards of trustees, upon departments of science, and upon the editors of scholarly journals - to insist upon openness of social science to the well-grounded claims of biobehavioral reasoning, and to protect vigilantly any qualified claims of biobehavioral reasoning, and to protect vigilantly any qualified faculty members who responsibly teach, research, or publish concerning such reasoning.



which would seem to suggest that Pearson was at least in communication with him. Jensen also talks of this quite explicitly in an autobiographical chapter he included in The Psychologists. In all five instances the charges were grossly overstated and a special fact-finding commission set up in December 1972 by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI)<sup>24</sup> to investigate the charges, found as much (Tobach & Proshansky, 1976)<sup>25</sup>. As the Commission discovered in its proceedings, and as still pertains today, there was no evidence of censorship, punishment, or suppression of hereditarian scholarship. The charge of defamation could be considered to have merit if one considers the justifiable charges of racism made by activist groups on campus to be defamatory. The only evidence of harassment were perpetrated by these activist student groups who objected to the scapegoating of Black people that they perceived in

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<sup>24</sup>This is Division 9 of the APA and one of its oldest groups.

<sup>25</sup>Harold M. Proshansky was the Chair of the Commission, and together with another of its members, Ethel Tobach, published the documentation on the Commission's proceedings with additional commentary, in a book titled Genetic Destiny which is referenced in my bibliography.

the hereditarian theories.<sup>26</sup> In no single instance were facts provided, either in 1972<sup>27</sup> or more recently, to substantiate the allegations of systemic harassment, such as preventing these scholars from writing, teaching or researching on race and IQ. Reactions from the scholarly community consisted solely of criticisms of their published works, which is permissible. That a significant portion of the criticism was, and continues to be harsh, only reflects, to my mind, the poor quality of hereditarian scholarship. That these protests and criticisms have in no way silenced them can be easily demonstrated by the voluminous and virulent responses to their critics, and the unabated spate of publications on race and IQ.

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<sup>26</sup>It is widely reported that Jensen, Rushton, and Eysenck are among hereditarians who have had their lectures and other appearances disturbed by protesting students. However, where infringement of civil or physical liberties occurred, these, as reported, were dealt with by the appropriate law enforcement authorities (Eysenck, 1990; and Pearson, 1991).

<sup>27</sup>Proshansky, in Tobach and Proshansky (1976), reports that each of the signatories of the resolution was individually, and repeatedly, asked for specific details of the systemic harassment suggested in the five "beliefs and principles", but none was forthcoming. The responses that the Commission did receive criticized and questioned the objectivity and impartiality of the Commission and some of its members, and detailed difficulties that Jensen, Richard Herrnstein, and William Shockley experienced when trying to speak on college campuses.

IQ as a physical quantity.

All four hereditarian subjects continuously propagate the positivist<sup>28</sup> fallacy that their research conclusions represent an actual truth that there is a deficit in the intellectual capacities of Black people when compared to White people. In order to make this claim, they make a number of erroneous assumptions that call the claim into question. The assumptions are as follows:

- That there is a common understanding of the nature of intelligence and how it operates and is manifested.
- That intelligence is a real physical commodity that can be measured like any other physical quantity.
- That IQ and other standardized tests do measure a thing called intelligence.

There are a great number of literature reviews and other summaries of research on IQ that have found no agreement among practitioners or consumers as to what intelligence really is (Samuda, 1975 and Snyderman & Rothman, 1987a, among others). Jensen, Eysenck, and Murray explicitly concede this<sup>29</sup> but go on to suggest, quoting Snyderman and Rothman's work, that there is, nevertheless, majority agreement. In fact, Snyderman and

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<sup>28</sup>This epistemological approach holds that experimental investigation and observation are the only true sources of knowledge. In hereditarian hands it leads to the tautology that the act of measurement itself proves the existence of a construct.

<sup>29</sup>Rushton does not deal directly with this question, but his writings imply agreement with Jensen's position.

Rothman found that, although both lay persons and experts<sup>30</sup> share a visceral notion of intelligence, there is no single technical definition in use in the discipline, which supports the argument I am making. They found a majority, but a very small one (53%), agreeing that there is some consensus about the meaning of "intelligent" behaviours, but this small majority becomes even less meaningful when one considers that the sample was deliberately weighted in favour of those directly involved in the creation and use of IQ tests<sup>31</sup>. This point is very important because Snyderman and Rothman's data is frequently misquoted by hereditarians to suggest a consensus where there is none, and they do this by simply neglecting to report the very small majority that Snyderman and Rothman found, and the nature of the sample they used. In addition, claiming a non-existent consensus distorts the truth in the sense that it fails to take account of newer, and much lauded, conceptions of intelligence that depart significantly from the psychometric definition<sup>32</sup> that the hereditarians prefer (Gardner, 1983 and Sternberg, 1985).

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<sup>30</sup>Snyderman and Rothman define experts as "those who conduct research on the nature of intelligence and test use and those who design and validate tests, and who therefore are most qualified to evaluate criticisms of testing in the context of the body of psychometric and cognitive ability literature ..." (1987a, p.139).

<sup>31</sup>Snyderman and Rothman divided their sample into "primary" and "secondary" experts. Primary experts were those who created and researched the tests, that is, those with direct investments in the tests; and secondary experts were those who just used the tests. The sample was weighted 2:1 in favour of the primary experts.

<sup>32</sup>This is an extremely tautological definition that says that intelligence is what intelligence tests measure (Jensen, 1969; Eysenck, 1981; and Herrnstein & Murray, 1994).

At least some of the hereditarian subjects, constantly and incorrectly, attempt to reify intelligence by equating it with real physical quantities like heat (Eysenck, 1981), or electricity (Jensen, 1969). The others, equally erroneously, claim an analogous relationship between psychometrics and physics (Murray, 1994 and Rushton, 1995), arguing that the rules for measuring and defining quantities are, or should be, the same in both disciplines. These are simply attempts to defend the importance of IQ scores on the basis of a crude operationalism<sup>33</sup>. Hereditarians appear to argue that it makes little differences what IQ tests measure, just so long as the scores correlate with socially desirable traits such as scholastic achievement, SES, and so forth. Flynn (1980) and other environmentalists before and after him (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1974, among others), and Afrocentrists too (DuBois, 1914; Hilliard, 1987; and Ogbu, 1978; among others) have subjected this sort of doctrine to devastating critique. Both groups have correctly concluded that such attempts by hereditarians to clarify the important and controversial issue of race and IQ have been proven to be almost universally embarrassing, since they only succeed in drawing attention to all the glaring contradictions, biases, and other flaws within the hereditarian dogmas.

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<sup>33</sup>A philosophical doctrine which holds that the meaning of a concept is given by a set of operations, in this case, primarily by the process of the measurement itself.

Hereditarians as ideologues.

The zealousness with which the hereditarians defend their theories, and the virulence with which they attack their critics, prove more than anything else does, that they are not as detached and objective as they claim to be. Richard Nisbett (1994, p. 15) came to a similar conclusion about The Bell Curve when he concluded: "This is not dispassionate scholarship. It is advocacy of views that are not well supported by the evidence...". All four of the subjects in this study also display a regrettable tendency to dismiss their critics with the standard charges of lack of methodological rigour and ideological bias. They suggest that there are only two possible positions to take in this debate: the right one (based on "scientific" principles) and the wrong one (based on wishful thinking). Jensen (1973b) puts it this way:

... we can simply *decree* (emphasis in original) an explanation based on prejudice, or popular beliefs, or moral convictions, or one or another social or political ideology, or on what we might think it is best for society to believe. This is the path of propaganda. Or, on the other hand, we can follow the path of science and investigate the problem in the same way that any other phenomena would be subjected to scientific study.... And our experience tells us that the scientific approach, by and large, leads to more reliable knowledge of natural phenomena than any other method that man has yet devised (p. 366-7).

They misleadingly suggest that to take a rigorous scientific approach to this issue necessarily means that one has to concur with hereditarian dogma. This is far from being the case, for many of their critics, including the two environmentalists selected for this study, are scientists in their own right, and they argue that what the hereditarians are

doing is not science but pseudoscience (Flynn, 1980; Gould, 1981; and Kamin, 1974). What the hereditarians have chosen to do is to characterize the debate in a starkly oppositional manner, that is "us" hereditarians against "them" environmentalists, incorrectly lumping all their critics into this category<sup>34</sup>. They argue, illogically, that they are, and can be, the only truly objective ones in this debate. They see proof of their objectivity in the fact that they are prepared to tackle sensitive and controversial issues, and to come to conclusions that many persons find unpalatable. Having wrongly classified themselves as objective, they then equate their so-called objectivity with the scientific approach, and go on to imply that an objective and scientific approach must give rise to scientifically-based explanations, which, they imply, rule out environmental explanations in favour of genetic ones. Most insidiously of all, they extrapolate what are only hypotheses into proven fact by appealing to the visceral beliefs of many that Blacks are inferior human beings.

As I have argued before, these hereditarian scholars are not dispassionate and objective scientists as they claim, but are advocates of a philosophy that has tremendous political, societal, and economic implications. All four of my hereditarian subjects state explicitly that their intention is to challenge the assumption of racial equality that has been inherent in public policy initiatives of the last three or four decades, and to influence and direct

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<sup>34</sup> Afrocentric critics of race and IQ do not place themselves into either category, instead they argue that both groups inaccurately use Black pathology to explain the IQ gap.

public policy to take cognizance of the natural racial inequalities that reside in society (Eysenck, 1981; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969a & 1974a; and Rushton, 1989a & 1989b). For instance Jensen (1974a, p. 236-237) asserted:

Unfortunately, we have been witnessing ... ideologically motivated dogmatism concerning the cause of obvious differences in average educational and occupational performance among various subpopulations, socially identified as racial groups ... In the United States this means mainly the Negro population as compared with the majority White population.

He continued, "I see a danger to our nation, and to Negroes especially, in saying what we might prefer to believe instead of trying to find out what is actually true" (Jensen, 1974a, p. 238). Murray (1994, p. xxi) defined the hereditarian motive very bluntly and succinctly when he declared: "This book [The Bell Curve] is about differences in intellectual capacity among people and groups and what those differences mean for America's future."

Jensen began his 1969 paper with a call for an end to remedial education for Black children with his now famous declaration that "compensatory education has been tried and it apparently has failed" (Jensen, 1969a, p. 1). Jensen then, and since, blamed erroneous assumptions of equality of intellectual abilities for this failure, and has repeatedly justified his original conclusions and has suggested policy and process changes that will better match the real distribution of intellectual capacities among racial groups. As Epps (1970) and Pearson (1991) confirmed, Jensen's work was immediately influential. Pearson noted:



"[His 1969 paper], researched and documented in impressive detail, it immediately drew the attention of a wide audience, which included not only the academic community but - through the mass media - numerous policy-makers in Washington" (p. 146).

He continued:

"Typical is the letter, dated Nov. 17, 1969, that Jensen received from David Rosenthal, Chief of the Laboratory of Psychology at the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland:

Dear Dr. Jensen,

I am one of those who has tried to get a copy of the Harvard Educational Review issue that has stirred up such an outcry ... My own poorly xeroxed copy is barely readable, but I was able to discern in it a high-level job by a man who was well on top of his field. Congratulations. The attempted rebuttals that I have seen, on the other hand, have been weak, with more emotion than rebuttal ... (AJ Personal Papers)." (Pearson, p. 149).

As Jensen himself has confirmed, his interest is more than academic:

In recent years I have found satisfaction in working more on problems that seem to me to have some practical or social consequence. They can be just as interesting, just as amenable to scientific investigation, and if the results are of consequence outside the field of theoretical psychology, such as in affecting educational practices and policies in ways that others might benefit, so much the better (Jensen, 1974a, p. 217).

and, as he also pointed out:

This moves the problem into the realm of public policy, where all the answers cannot be scientifically derived. But policy cannot be wisely or effectively formulated unless it is informed by the facts. No matter how well intentioned it may seem to be, it can only be less effective and less beneficial if it is based on false premises or in contradiction of reality. (Jensen, 1973b, p. 372-3).

Based only on their untested and unproven hypotheses about the causes of racial differences in IQ scores, the hereditarians are advocating the specific changes in national policy that are part of the ultra-conservative political and social agenda. Murray (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) argued for an end to remedial education, publicly financed education, affirmative action, and welfare, based on the much disputed argument of the permanence of intellectual capacities, especially that of the lowest of the five suggested cognitive levels, labelled the underclass, which, he claimed, is predominantly Black. Jensen (1969a), besides his call, which I have already mentioned, to end remedial education, has suggested that Black students, being competent only at Level I<sup>35</sup> intellectual ability, would benefit from being educated separately from the more intellectually capable Level II students, who are generally White. Also, during the height of controversies around school desegregation and bussing, he appeared before Congress to appeal for a delay to bussing, and to school desegregation, based on the argument that it had not yet been proven empirically that desegregation or bussing had educational benefits (Epps, 1970). The positions and arguments of both Murray and Jensen mirrored exactly the right-wing agenda of their times.

My application of the canon kujitoo has revealed that despite the fact that the four hereditarian scholars selected for this study do not and would not admit the importance

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<sup>35</sup>Jensen has defined two levels of intellectual ability. The lower, level I, represents rote learning and the higher, level II, represents abstract learning.

of this canon, its presence is very evident in their work on race and IQ. While they plead a case for dispassion and objectivity in carrying out their research, the evidence shows that this is a false claim. Their commitment to their untested and unproven hypotheses is obvious in the very prominent roles they assume as advocates of the hereditarian cause, and by their financial and other supportive links to white-supremacist and ultra-conservative organizations, both of which belie their attempts to detract from the importance of the structure and use of hereditarian knowledge in laying false claim to the purity of their allegedly scientific contribution to knowledge about the cause of IQ score differentials.

### Ujamaa

Ujamaa has already been defined as the Afrocentric research canon which requires that the researcher reject any presumed or forced separation between researcher and subject, and that theory and practice be informed by the actual and aspired interests of the subject community<sup>36</sup>. While my hereditarian subjects appear to argue against this canon in that they demand a clear separation between researcher and subject, in practice they evince a definite, albeit adverse, connectedness with the African community, and a more collaborative relationship with the White lay community. For, while they argue that the researcher should be a disinterested expert who answers only to his or her peers

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<sup>36</sup>In the context of this study, community refers to a group of people who have certain specific characteristics and or interests in common.

(Eysenck, 1990; Jensen, 1974a; Murray, 1994; and Rushton, 1995), that is, the knowledgeable and disinterested audience of learned and authoritative academic journals and conferences in their field, in practice, they all exploit the popular media to disseminate their ideas to gullible, uninformed, and unsophisticated lay audiences made up of both unacknowledged Black, and targeted White members, each of whom reacts very differently, and viscerally, to the information imparted to them.

The hereditarian relationship with White communities.

The hereditarian relationship with each of the three communities I have identified, that is, the scholarly community (generally perceived as White), the White lay community, and the Black community (generally perceived as non-scholarly) seems to be heavily influenced by the ideological and financial affiliations which I have outlined previously. These relationships, as I will demonstrate below, show that hereditarians are responsive to their own lay communities instead of the subject communities, as ujamaa stipulates. Because of this, their intent must differ from that of researchers who subscribe to this canon for they are not informed by the concerns, criticisms, or experiences of the subject African community, or even the White scholarly community, but by the White lay community whose beliefs and assumptions validate their claims about African intellectual capacities. This is candidly illustrated in Murray's populist appeal for the validation of

his claims of a pathological cognitive stratification in American society, and he warns elsewhere that Africans are concentrated dangerously<sup>37</sup> at the lowest rungs:

You - meaning the self-selected person who has read this far into this book - live in a world that probably looks nothing like the figure [the normal curve divided into five cognitive classes]. In all likelihood, almost all of your friends and professional associates belong in that top class I slice [top 5% of the IQ distribution]. Your friends and associates whom you consider to be unusually slow are probably somewhere in class II. Those whom you consider to be unusually bright are probably somewhere in the upper fraction of the 99th centile, a very thin slice of the overall distribution (Murray & Herrnstein, 1994, p. 121).

It may appear that the above quote is addressed exclusively to the cognitive elite, and by extension, to the scholarly community, but this is definitely not the case. Firstly, the tone of the passage is clearly unscholarly, and secondly, the reader is frequently reassured that the book can be read at several levels so its length and complexity need not be intimidating. Most chapters in the book are preceded by a summary of the central ideas without evidence or arguments, and tutorials are included in the appendices to guide the reader through psychological and statistical concepts. An audience of "peers" would be sufficiently competent to follow complex arguments and to understand statistical and psychological concepts, so its target must be the lay community. The popularity of the book is evidence that it reached its intended audience: in just a few months the book sold nearly half million copies and reached number five on the New York Times Bestseller List.

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<sup>37</sup>As I will explain in the next section, Murray, as do the others, warn explicitly of the dangers Africans pose to the national and racial well being of Whites.

The hereditarians insist that they are responsible to the academic community and willingly engage its criticisms and concerns, few of which are forthcoming; but this is not true. There is only a very small band of scholars, all identifiably hereditarian, who wholeheartedly support the work done under hereditarian scholarship. The vast majority of scholars, however, since the start of this new phase of hereditarian scholarship, while supporting their right to do the work they do, criticize their methodologies and interpretations with charges of oversimplification (Cronbach, 1969 and Gartrell & Marquez, 1995), illogic (Kagan, 1969 and Poole, 1995), inadequate treatment of evidence (Hunt, 1969 and Lieberman, 1995), outright fraud (Cronbach, 1969<sup>38</sup> and Nunley, 1995), and racism (Brazziel, 1969 and Newby & Newby, 1995). However, rather than engaging these criticisms, the hereditarians reject them and viciously attack the critics. For instance, when Jensen published the 1969 article in the Harvard Educational Review, the editors solicited criticisms from prominent psychologists and geneticists. The criticisms of the geneticists are obviously of special import because genetic claims were being made by someone with no expertise in the field, Jensen's discipline being psychology. No geneticist, and few psychologists, were convinced that Jensen had provided the evidence to reasonably conclude that there was a genetic source

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<sup>38</sup>In his response to Jensen in the HER reprint series, Hereditarianism, Environment and Intelligence, Cronbach writes: "I have detected substantial distortions in Jensen's report of some research, and I must therefore warn the reader against accepting his summaries" (Cronbach, 1969, p.196). There are similar reports of distortions and misrepresentations in Flynn (1980). Similar charges have been made against the other three, most notably Rushton, and most recently Murray.

for racial differences in IQ scores (Bodmer & Cavalli-Sforza, 1970; Crow, 1969; and Lewontin, 1976<sup>39</sup>). However, Jensen attacked his critics for being unscientific, naively egalitarian and even Marxist (1969b, 1974a & 1970c), yet he would later admit that:

The plain fact is that at present there exists no scientifically satisfactory explanation for the difference between the IQ distributions in the black and white populations. The only genuine consensus among well-informed scientists on this topic is that the cause of the difference remains an open question (Jensen, 1989, p. 213),

which is the very same point on which he attacked his critics. This practice of arguing against obvious criticisms from the "enemy", that is, by those outside the hereditarian camp, is widespread in hereditarian literature. Murray's reactions, both in print and on television, to criticisms of The Bell Curve is typical. And this is despite the fact that Murray himself concedes these same points throughout the book.

#### The hereditarian relationship with the Black community.

As I have explained in earlier chapters, as an Afrocentric scholar I believe that it is imperative that a community that is the subject of research should have a key role in evaluating and verifying any knowledge claims made about them. I find it disturbing, therefore, that African perspectives and experiences are so consistently ignored in research on Black intellectual performance, especially by hereditarians. It is unfair and dishonest to pretend that views on race and intelligence are not racially coded, or that the Black viewpoint has no merit because Blacks are too subjective about this issue. The

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<sup>39</sup>Previously published in 1970 in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

fact is that both groups have a lot at stake in this issue and are necessarily subjective. Hereditarians are in fact trying to prove that the current indices of Black disadvantage, including educational disadvantage, are a reflection of a natural inferiority and are not related to social structures or to historical oppression. Blacks, on the other hand (and I identify with this position), are arguing just the opposite, and, in fact, go further to suggest that these positions are intentionally oppressive because they are meant to reverse any gains believed to have been won in the latest battles for Civil and Human Rights (Dent et al., 1987; DuBois, 1914; and Jackson & George, 1996; among others). I believe, therefore, that it is eminently sensible, when trying to explain why Blacks score consistently lower than Whites in standardized measures, to give at least equal weight to the Black viewpoint as to the White. When Blacks postulate that part of the IQ gap can be explained by unfair educational and other advantages that Whites have had for many centuries (DuBois, 1914 and Jackson & George, 1996), this should not be dismissed as whining, as hereditarians are wont to do (Eysenck, 1990 for example). The argument that the vile history of the last 500 years of contact between Africans and Europeans is irrelevant to the analysis of educational disadvantage defies common sense, and the persistence of the argument in hereditarian literature suggests that the hereditarian goal is not to explain the performance differential but to find support for the long-held assumption of Black inferiority.

The hereditarians, in denying the social and historical context and consequences of their work, argue that it is a purely scientific exercise and they have neither interest nor



responsibility in its societal consequences (Eysenck, 1981; Jensen, 1969; Murray, 1994; and Rushton, 1995). I find this position problematic for two reasons. The first is that their claim of responsive and responsible scholarship is not supported by their actions; and the second is that their protestation of a lack of interest and responsibility for the consequences of their work is contradicted by their open involvement in propagandizing their work to lay audiences.

I believe that Murray and Jensen, and the other hereditarians, are deliberately and deviously inconsistent in order to silence or reduce anticipated criticisms. It is obvious, therefore, that hereditarian scholarship is powered by something more sinister than common sense or the search for truth. There is ample evidence to support this view. Murray, while acknowledging the genetic hypothesis to be unproven, bases his book and its recommendations on this same faulty premise, as did Jensen twenty-five years earlier. Also, Jensen clearly acknowledged in the 1969 article that IQ tests do not measure the full potential of Black children, yet built his argument that remedial education efforts be discontinued on the observation that they produced no permanent gains in IQ scores (1973b) and went on to argue in Bias in Mental Testing that IQ tests are not biased against Black children. Further evidence is provided by the fact that despite acknowledging that there was no accepted explanation for the Black-White gap in IQ scores, Jensen testified before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Education Opportunity in 1972 in these words:

A hypothesis that I believe comprehends more of the facts and is consistent with more of the converging lines of evidence than any other I know of, in its simplest terms, is the hypothesis that (a) the heritability of IQ is the same within the white and black populations as between the populations, and (b) the genetic variance involved in IQ is about one-fifth less in the Black than in the white population (Quoted in Ogbu, 1978, p. 55).

While these hereditarians attack anyone who dares to criticize them, they do not ever challenge other hereditarians even on the most glaring errors or unsubstantiated claims. For instance, Eysenck has yet to be challenged to provide evidence to support his claim that there are 50 genes associated with intelligence (Eysenck, 1990), which, I can only assume was a senseless attempt to support Jensen's controversial claim that intelligence is polygenetic (Jensen, 1969a). Neither is Shockley, while lauded as a learned Nobel Laureate, ever challenged on his claim that every one percent of white blood increases the IQ of a Black person by one point, a less specific version of which appeared in Garrett (1971). There are numerous other examples, including Rushton's oft repeated assertion that genital size and sexual and other social behaviours are significantly correlated with intelligence. Instead, we find these assertions being uncritically repeated by Murray in 1994.

I have shown above that despite their claims to the contrary, the hereditarians are not responsive to the scholarly community and neither are they to the subject Black community, as ujamaa prescribes. What they have done, in effect, is to transfer the role

of primary validator from the African to the White lay community whose interpretations of Black behaviours differ markedly from Black communities' experiences, such as my own. I would argue, however, that the White lay experiences have been shaped significantly by the anti-Black prejudices which have been lying mostly dormant for the past thirty years or so, and which appear most reasonable to hereditarians because they mirror their own visceral beliefs. Hereditarians see a link between themselves and the wider society and their role is partially to propagate the "commonsense knowledge" of the wider community. And there is ample evidence that they have pursued this role enthusiastically, evidence of which I have outlined previously.

In concluding this section, I will briefly step off-stage and allow Jensen to speak for me:

True, many people, including a good many scientists, hold strong ideological convictions or social sentiments on this issue. This militates against open questioning. It makes investigations uninviting. It biases interpretation of evidence. And it imposes a double standard of criticism of research and of its acceptability for publication by scientific journals, depending on whether the findings are perceived as supporting or contradicting popular views. It is hardly an atmosphere conducive to scientific consensus. Few other research topics in science are so unfavourably encumbered.

But even after we cut through all the extrinsic obstacles, we are still left with crucial problems and unknowns of an intrinsic scientific nature which legitimately prevent a scientific consensus on any given theory and compel the conclusion that we do not yet have a bona fide scientific explanation for the white-black difference in intelligence. In my extensive study of this whole topic, I have not been able to find any marshalling of evidence that could reasonably warrant the passionate beliefs that so many people hold concerning the cause of the IQ gap. Perhaps if any body of evidence were truly compelling, there would be no need for passionate beliefs. (Jensen, 1980b, p. 213).

I will now return centre-stage to ask why, if hereditarians (including Jensen) are so mindful of the illogic, bias, and confusion surrounding this issue, do they hold so vehemently to their position that Blacks are intellectually inferior to Whites? As I have mentioned before, they all believe sufficiently strongly in their hypotheses to have proposed specific public policy recommendations based on this assumption of an innate Black inferiority. My analysis so far has led me to the not unreasonable conclusion that hereditarian scholars, because they are part of a distinct community with shared ideologies, beliefs and affiliations that are linked by an assumption of Black inferiority and pathology, have naturally used their scholarship to search for evidence to support such assumptions, and the following quote illustrates this:

It is commonly believed that certain national, racial and cultural groups are more intelligent than others. Jews, Chinese and Japanese are often thought of as being particularly clever, Negroes and Mexican-Americans as being less than average ... There is little debate about the actual existence of such differences: they have been demonstrated on quite large samples many times and seem very much in line with popular belief (Eysenck, 1981, p. 74).

### Utulivu

I have described this canon in earlier chapters as requiring that the researcher actively avoid creating, exaggerating, or sustaining divisions between or within communities, but instead is expected to strive for harmonious relationships. Of the five canons presented in this study, this one is, possibly, the most blatantly disregarded by hereditarian scholars. As I will illustrate in the following pages, their works are embedded with an obvious

anti-African bias that serves to create disharmony and divisions between Blacks and other racial groups. The effect, and I believe the intent, has been to isolate and label Blacks as pathologically inferior and detrimental to the interests of the wider national community, and this is evidenced by the frequent hereditarian references to Blacks as a dysgenic force in society (Eysenck, 1971; Jensen, 1969; Murray, 1994; and Rushton, 1995; among many others). Such labelling does, incontrovertibly, because of its implications of biological dangers (dysgenesis) and the loss of societal control (a force), make it more acceptable for White supremacists to argue, and for "normal" people to accept, that Blacks need to be treated differently, that their behaviours need to be controlled in order to preserve and safeguard society, as many hereditarians have already suggested (Garrett, 1971; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; and Pearson, 1991; for instance). In the remainder of this section I will expand on these three themes of hereditarian literature, that is, the obvious anti-African bias, the portrayal of Blacks as a dysgenic force in society, and the recommendations and more subtle hints for eugenic solutions to what is perceived as the Black problem.

#### Anti-African bias.

The anti-African bias in hereditarian literature is delineated in three ways. The first is that there is a huge and disproportionate research effort focused on the intellectual behaviour of Blacks as compared to all other racial groups. The second is that race and gender and their relationships to IQ are treated very differently, a difference which

explicitly reveals the influence of societal mores on scientific theories. And the third is that the extensive research on Black intellectual ability has turned up many anomalous findings that contradict hereditarian dogmas, but these findings are generally dismissed or simply explained away.

In an appendix to the book Straight Talk About Mental Tests, Jensen (1981) responded to questions frequently asked by his readers, one of which challenged the disproportionate research focus on the IQs of blacks in relation to other racial groups.

In his response, Jensen admitted the following:

True, the research literature on mental and scholastic tests involving blacks is vastly greater than that involving any other minority groups in the United States... The reason is twofold: (1) blacks are by far the largest minority population in the United States, and so the conditions of the black population are of very significant consequence to the whole society; and (2) the black population shows a disparity from the general average of the rest of the population in scholastic performance of such a magnitude as to have become *a major national concern* (my emphasis) in the *past three decades* (my emphasis). The concern has focused on scholastic achievement because of its relationship to so many other socially and economically important conditions of the adult population. (p. 255).

Jensen made two observations<sup>40</sup> in this passage that lie at the heart of the hereditarian message. The first is that the Black intellectual performance is a cause for "major national concern", thereby reinforcing the presumption that Blacks pose a danger to society. But even if it were true that Blacks were, on average, intellectually inferior to

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<sup>40</sup>Italicized in the quotation above.

Whites, as only twelve percent of the American population<sup>41</sup> (assumed here to be 250 million), they hardly pose the danger that is implied. If we use the standard definition of educably mentally retarded (EMR) as an IQ of 70 (two standard deviations below the White mean of 100, and one below the Black mean of 85)<sup>42</sup>, a very simplistic application of the mathematics of the normal curve reveals that there are numerically more Whites than Blacks who can be classified as EMR (see Appendix 1), and so the White population, using the hereditarian argument, should pose a greater danger to society. I have already established that this is not the common perception, and this is further confirmed by the composition of EMR classes which are predominantly Black and are not therefore representative of the EMR populations of the different racial groups (Dent et al., 1987).

Jensen's observation (see quote above) that the differential performance between Blacks and Whites only became a problem in the 1950s, reveals much more about his political ideology that he intended, as does Murray's remark that the mid-1950s marked the heyday of fair racial treatment in education (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). The disparity in test performances had been noted and challenged long before then, as evidenced by

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<sup>41</sup>This is a commonly quoted figure and according to Hacker (1992) is the 1990 US census figure.

<sup>42</sup>These figures represent the worst possible picture of the differences in test performance between Blacks and Whites, and the ones quoted by all four hereditarians included in this study.

W. E. B. DuBois's (1914) review of Marion J. Mayo's book entitled The Mental Capacity of the American Negro and the results of the Army Alpha and Beta tests (Yerkes, 1922 and von Mayrhauser, 1992). It is therefore surprising, to say the least, that this escaped the attention of these learned scholars. I believe the focus on the 1950s is explained by the fact that this period marked the legal end of segregated schooling as mandated by the Brown decision of 1954<sup>43</sup>, and not to any sudden realization that Blacks were dangerously stupid. Both Jensen and Eysenck, who were writing about race and intelligence during the sometimes violent and contentious enforcement of the Brown decision, are on record as opposing the desegregation attempts on the grounds that they had no proven educational benefits (Epps, 1970 and Jensen, 1973b).

Another important manifestation of anti-African bias in hereditarian literature is the very different manner in which race and gender are treated, which reveal some very important and obvious assumptions about Black intellectual behaviour. These assumptions are built into the very structure of the tests themselves as both Jensen and Eysenck confirm. Eysenck (1981) reported that IQ test designers are required to avoid gender bias by ensuring that test items give the sexes equal scores. Jensen (1981) corroborated this in a response to another frequently asked question, by explaining:

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<sup>43</sup>This case represented a landmark in American education. African parents of Topeka, Kansas brought a case before the US Supreme Court challenging the prohibition of their children from educational opportunities equal to those enjoyed by Whites. In 1954, the Court handed down a decision that made such segregated public education illegal.



A few IQ tests, for example, the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler scales, have eliminated any items that show large sex differences and have balanced out the remaining items to create a zero sex difference in the overall score. (p. 248)

It is obvious therefore that test construction begins with an assumption of gender equality in intellectual ability, but not racial equality, which exactly reflects the current societal views on race, gender and intelligence.

My final illustration of anti-African bias concerns the hereditarian treatment of the many anomalies in subgroup performances in the literature on race and IQ. There is well-documented evidence of significant differences in the performance of Black boys and girls, US regional populations, and African national populations. All four hereditarians point to underperforming Blacks in the UK and elsewhere as evidence for a genetic base for race differences in scores, yet fail to draw similar attention to, or to deal honestly with, differential performances within the Black US or global populations that suggest non-genetic explanations.

The evidence for a gender difference in Black IQ scores is certainly well documented, as I have already mentioned. In 1972 Thomas Sowell cited evidence that black girls outnumber black boys at high IQ levels (120 and above) by ratios of at least 2 to 1. In 1936 Martin D. Jenkins succeeded in securing a group of 103 Black children from a large multi-state sample, all of whom scored at 120 or above on the Stanford-Binet. He found that the ratio of girls to boys was 2.3 to 1, and that the ratio increased with IQ.

Proctor found a ratio of 1.3 to 1 in favour of girls in a study of 30 children with IQs of 129 or above (Flynn, 1980). E. G. Rodgers used a sample of 35 children with IQs of 130 or above on the Illinois General Intelligence Scale and found a ratio of almost 5 to 1 in favour of girls. Rodgers's results left no margin for error since, in selecting his sample, the score of every child in the fourth grade (usual age 9 years) in every black school in Baltimore was examined (Flynn, 1980). These data corroborate other anecdotal evidence, and my own experience and observations of Black children in the UK and here in Canada. The hereditarians, although they concede the existence of this phenomenon, tend to explain it away, unconvincingly, as an artifact of the mathematics of the normal curve (Eysenck, 1981 and Jensen, 1973b). This explanation is particularly unconvincing because the same phenomenon is not observed for other racial groups. In fact, for Whites, it is the opposite, for while White girls have a slightly higher mean than White boys, the boys are better represented at higher IQs (Flynn, 1980).

In 1977, Jensen published the results of a study of about 1,300 children, the total state school enrolment of a small rural town in south-eastern Georgia. The sample contained 826 Black children with a mean IQ of 71<sup>44</sup> (about one standard deviation below the national Black mean which is similar to the much quoted Black-White gap). Jensen reported a very curious finding among his Black subsample, he found that over the age

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<sup>44</sup>The rest of the sample was White with a mean IQ of 102. For the purposes of my argument, only the Black subsample is relevant.

range from six to sixteen, the IQs decreased by 1.42 points per year yielding a total decrement of about 15 IQ points (again, a full standard deviation)<sup>45</sup>. The fact that a 15-point IQ gap exists between six year-old and sixteen year-old Black children in this Georgia town, and between Black children in this town and the national Black population suggests to me that such gaps are much more common and more suggestive of non-genetic explanations than hereditarians allow. It is significant that while Jensen himself suggested an environmental explanation for these results by pointing to the poor environments of these rural children, he rejects, along with his hereditarian colleagues, a similar explanation for the same deficit between Blacks and Whites. It is significant too, that this study and similar ones which show regional gaps in Black IQs tend to be overlooked<sup>46</sup> when hereditarians are offering explanations for perceived Black intellectual deficiencies.

Many scholars, most notably Blacks, argue that the Black experience in America is an historical aberration and as such is insufficient to support genetic theories of racial differences in intelligence (Figueroa, 1991; Ogbu, 1978; and Sowell, 1981). For example, Ogbu in his 1978 study showed that performance gaps, similar to that between American Blacks and Whites, exist in other societies with similar kinds of social

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<sup>45</sup>No such decrement was noticed for the White children.

<sup>46</sup>This observation holds true even when these works are included in their bibliographies, for even then they are not directly confronted in the text.

stratifications as the United States. He offered an alternative, structural explanation for the differences in performance by employing an Afrocentric perspective in his analysis that took into account the American context of racial stratification, and hypothesised that Blacks, like other caste minorities, perceive only limited opportunities, educational and otherwise, and so are not as strongly motivated as the dominant-group members to set ambitious goals and to work towards them. Sowell (1981) corroborated Ogbu's thesis with his description of the successes of African Caribbean immigrants, starting from early in the twentieth century, noting among other things that, by 1969, second-generation African Caribbeans had a higher mean income than whites. Murray (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) is the only one of the hereditarians included here who cites Ogbu's and Sowell's work, which he then, unfortunately, summarily dismisses without serious engagement. The hereditarian refusal to engage plausible data and theories that challenge the concept of Black intellectual inferiority is clear evidence of an anti-Black bias.

### Dysgenesis.

The depiction of Africans as a dysgenic<sup>47</sup> force threatening the future of civilized society is a constant and potentially dangerous theme that runs through hereditarian literature. In fact, this theme could be described as one of the defining characteristics of this kind of literature. This dysgenic theme, regardless of the source, contains the same arguments

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<sup>47</sup>Dysgenic, for the purposes of this study, refers to the capability of reducing the quality of a racial group.

in one guise or another. The arguments are that Blacks experience higher incidents of all socially deviant behaviours, and lower incidents of socially beneficial ones, than any other racial group; that Blacks are naturally overrepresented among the poor and the underclass; and, most ominously, that attempts to help Blacks must end up hurting them in particular, and the whole society in general, because Black disadvantages are genetically determined and hence immutable. I will provide illustrations of these arguments in the following pages.

Among these four hereditarians, Rushton is probably the most explicit in warning of the dangers posed to Whites by the perceived deviant behaviours and limitations of the Black community. In 1988, he wrote:

Today most European populations have fertilities significantly below the 2.1 simply needed to maintain current levels. Internationally, Third World countries are reproducing so rapidly that in 50 years, if present trends continue, its population will be ten times that of the West (Wattenberg, 1987). Among the developing nations the birth rate is as expected from r/K theory, with Negroid (Africa)>Caucasoid (India)>Mongoloid (Asia). (Rushton, 1988b, p. 1039)

Murray is probably more obsessive than Rushton on this issue, though much less direct. His warnings are diffused within discussions of the cognitive underclass, as he terms it, which, even he admits, must be perceived as being disproportionately Black. But even though Murray's warnings are more diffuse, they are nevertheless quite clear as has been

pointed out by a great many critics of the Bell Curve (House & Haug, 1995; Livingstone, 1995; and Rosenthal, 1995; among many others).

Jensen is the one who echoes Rushton's warnings most directly, with Eysenck coming close behind. Here are some of their comments:

... even more important than the issue of racial differences is the probability of dysgenic trends in our urban slums, as suggested by census data showing markedly higher birth rates among the poorest segments of the Negro population than among successful middle-class Negroes. This social class differential in birthrate appears to be much greater in the Negro than in the white population. That is, the educationally and occupationally least able among the Negroes have a higher reproductive rate than their white counterparts, and the most able segments of the Negro population has a lower reproductive rate than its white counterpart. (Jensen, 1974a, p. 240)

and,

There is every reason to expect that the particular subsample of the Negro race which is constituted of American Negroes ... has been selected throughout history according to criteria which put the higher intelligent at a disadvantage ....creating a gene pool lacking in some of the genes for higher intelligence. (Eysenck, 1971, p. 156)

The hereditarians' self-appointed task of demonizing the Black community should be very evident from the previous quotations. Even attributes that ought normally to be regarded as positive, according to hereditarian logic, becomes dangerous. For instance, the fact that better educated Black people have fewer children than their White counterparts, in hereditarian arguments does not result in a call for more educational opportunities for Blacks, but rather to the warning that the Black community is being overrun by the

prolific breeding of its poor. This tone is echoed in Eysenck's incomprehensible warning above that intelligent Blacks are at a biological disadvantage because we are naturally bred for low intelligence. As I continue to immerse myself in this literature, I am more and more amazed that these persons could be regarded as serious scholars who make noteworthy contributions to the advancement of knowledge.

Jensen is of the view, along with the other hereditarians, that there is a reluctance within the academic community to face up to the dangers posed by the Black community. As he puts it:

Our disturbed conscience over the historical mistreatment of Negroes in America may hinder our ability to ask the right questions and to seek the answers through research. Scientists must take the lead in facing up to this question, and not repeatedly sweep it under the rug. I see a danger to our nation, and to Negroes especially, in saying what we might prefer to believe instead of trying to find out what is actually true. (Jensen, 1974a, p. 238)

But, according to the hereditarians, whatever the right questions turn out to be, the answer undoubtedly involves a defective Black gene pool. As Rushton explained, bolstered by Jensen (1969), and later repeated by Murray (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994): "... people create environments maximally compatible with their genotypes" (Rushton, 1988a, p. 1018). Such tautological arguments are commonplace among hereditarians, as I have pointed out before. Arguments such as these are clearly meant to silence critics, since if environments are genetically determined, any environmental theories offered to explain Black underperformance already have a genetic foundation. This is the kind of

circular reasoning that hereditarians use to reject the attempts within the last few decades to bring more Blacks into the mainstream of American life, after the many centuries of loathsome treatment and ostracism.

### Eugenics.

All four hereditarians, quite disingenuously, express shock and dismay that racist motives could be attributed to them, when they only have the best interests of Black people at heart (Eysenck, 1991; Jensen, 1974a; Murray, 1994 and Rushton, 1995). But scholars and lay people who have read their works, supporters and opponents alike, see what I consider to be a more activist and insidiously hateful agenda permeating these works. That agenda is eugenics<sup>48</sup> (Garrett, 1971; Pearson, 1991; and Rosenthal, 1995). I too, after spending nearly five years studying these works come with trepidation to a similar conclusion. I say with trepidation because it is not an easy charge to lay against anyone, considering the odious history of eugenics in just this century. However, I believe that the charge necessarily arises from the writings themselves, as I have already pointed to in the discussions on the dysgenic theme in hereditarian literature.

Many White-supremacists and other racists recognize and applaud the eugenic messages embedded in these hereditarian works (Flynn, 1980; Ford et al., 1990; and Jackson,

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<sup>48</sup>Eugenics is defined for the purposes of this study as methods or theories for improving the quality of the human race by processes of selective breeding.



1996). For instance Flynn describes (albeit second hand) a self-confessed racist British intellectual who laments that Jensen is not courageous enough to boldly state what is clearly evident in his writings, that a voluntary eugenic program is necessary to deal with the Black problem. More direct evidence is available from the White supremacist and eugenicist, Roger Pearson (1991), who concluded, approvingly, that Jensen's work contains an "inherent" conclusion about "humankind's need for a practical but strictly voluntary eugenics program" (p. 141).

If we look at some of the hereditarian writings themselves, we will see why Pearson's and others' conclusion is inescapable, both with regard to Jensen and to the other hereditarians. For instance, commenting on the high incidence of mental retardation that is supposed to exist among African children, Jensen wrote:

Have we thought sufficiently of the rights of children - of their right to be born with fair odds against being mentally retarded, not to have a retarded parent, and with fair odds in favour of having the genetic endowment needed to compete on equal terms with the majority persons in society? Can we reasonably and humanely oppose such rights of millions of children as yet not born? (1969a, p. 93).

And he concluded that "it is a very severe physical trauma for a normally gifted child to grow up in a home where the mother is mentally deficient", which, as he argued then,

is the fate of half the Black population"<sup>49</sup> (1969a, p. 93). Rushton hinted much more broadly at the solution when he wrote: "... purely genetic theories do not explain why European populations have adopted negative population growth while encouraging genetically dissimilar others to replace them (Rushton, 1988b, p. 1039). It is clear to me, as to Pearson and others, that these hereditarians are calling for eugenic interventions to remedy what they perceive as the Black problem.

### Uhaki

I have previously described this canon as requiring a research procedure that is fair and just to all the participants, especially the objects of the research, and which is empathetic to the aspirations, needs, and welfare of all the participants. My analysis reveals that these mandates of fairness and empathy are flagrantly and consistently violated by all four of my hereditarian subjects, and this is demonstrated, as I will illustrate below, by their continuously unfair, inaccurate, and hostile representations of the experiences of Black people, particularly during the latter half of the twentieth century.<sup>50</sup> In arguing that the researchers of Black issues should bear the best interests of the community in mind, I am not suggesting that they pervert the direction or outcome of their research to

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<sup>49</sup>In this publication Jensen argued that evidence existed from the National Association for Mental Retardation to reclassify EMR as 85 IQ points and below, remarkably coincidentally, the accepted average Black IQ. However, Jensen does not provide a reference, so his claim could not be verified.

<sup>50</sup>As I have pointed out previously, all four hereditarians suggest the 1950s as the start of the problem as they perceive it.

meet the needs or demands of the community, nor am I suggesting that they support uncritically any public policy or program that is intended to benefit Blacks. Rather, I am asserting that these researchers need to be scrupulously fair and honest in both the practice and interpretation of this kind of research, since both researcher and subject have so much at stake in the outcomes. Regrettably, as I have pointed out before, and as Flynn (1980) and others have corroborated, these hereditarians are wont to use their research to seek corroboration for their theories of Black inferiority and pathology, and are therefore far from unbiased in their treatment of data. I will provide evidence for my conclusions in the remainder of this section, where I will examine the hereditarian interpretations and theories of the Black-White IQ score differential. I will be focusing on how they critique and interpret the research, and also at how they react to the remedial policies and programs of the last few decades that were created to increase Black participation in mainstream American society, after centuries of ostracization resulting from slavery and forced segregation.

#### Reactions to IQ research.

As I have pointed out in the previous section (utulivu), there has been a disproportionate amount of time and effort devoted to the study of Black intellectual activity (Jensen, 1974a), much more than the percentage of Blacks, and the influence they exert on national affairs, would appear to warrant (Ford et al., 1990; Gould, 1981; and Miller, 1976). Using an Afrocentric approach as I am doing, I can classify this research

conveniently into three groups according to the apparent beliefs and methodological approaches of the respective researchers. In the first group, I have placed the research done by hereditarians, who, like the four in this study, have a clearly evident political and ideological agenda. This research is defined by a single repetitive hypothesis that postulates that Blacks are inherently inferior to Whites and, invariably, as I have pointed out before, regardless of the specific data or the individual researcher, the hypothesis is declared confirmed. In a technical sense, their bias can be illustrated in the way they define and test their hypotheses. Unlike other researchers whose status quo position assumes racial equality, it appears that their basic premise assumes Black inferiority, and they, therefore, demand conclusive evidence to prove themselves wrong. But, as they themselves have pointed out, there is no conclusive evidence available. In the second group, I have placed the research done by those scientists who, while they are known to be partial to either the environmentalist or the hereditarian position, they are less dogmatic, both in their political affiliations and in their research inferences.<sup>51</sup> In the last group, I have placed the research done by those environmentalists, who like the two in this study, have a clearly identifiable political and ideological agenda. In this kind of research, the status quo hypothesis shares the assumptions of the Black community of an equality of racial endowments. Obviously, the position of the last group is the closest to my own, although it is still significantly different as I have explained before, and I,

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<sup>51</sup>This group is not represented in the two extremes selected for this study. They are important here only to illustrate how their more ambivalent research findings are interpreted by those with definite agendas.

understandably, am most sympathetic to that position. However, the point of this section is not to examine my feelings about these kinds of research, but instead to describe hereditarian reactions and treatments.

When hereditarians like those involved in this study do research, the research direction, and its interpretation tend to be to prove or to demonstrate Black pathology, and never the converse (Erlich & Feldman, 1977; Gould, 1981; Ogbu, 1978; and Taylor, 1980; among others). Some, like Eysenck do no original work, but simply comment on, and selectively propagandize, the work of others (Eysenck, 1990). Rushton and Murray, on the other hand, while similarly selective and propagandistic, have published some original work in this field in which they reinterpret existing data to provide support for their theories of Black inferiority.<sup>52</sup> Like the other three, all of Jensen's work on race and IQ, both original and interpretive, is intended to prove the same assumption of Black genetic inferiority, although he is the only one of the four to attempt any kind of empirical work. The work of all four, then, is severely and deliberately biased against Blacks, and this conclusion is corroborated by the many, many critics who have also concluded that their use and interpretation of the available evidence is highly selective

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<sup>52</sup>Rushton (1989b), for instance, has helped to resurrect Samuel George Morton's widely discredited craniometric measurements from the nineteenth century, and Murray in his 1994 publication analyzed data collected in the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience of Youth (NLSY), 1979 to 1990.

and biased in favour of their position that Blacks are genetically inferior to Whites (Flynn, 1980; Gardner, 1995; Gould, 1981; and Kamin, 1981; among others).<sup>53</sup>

Early hereditarian attempts to correlate IQ directly with genetically-linked physiological characteristics such as pigmentation, hair colour, hair texture and the like, have all resulted in failure, as Jensen himself has admitted (Flynn, 1980; Jensen, 1972; Nisbett, 1995; and Taylor, 1980). In 1972 Jensen concluded that skin colour and other socially valued physical characteristics should be abandoned in favour of blood groups<sup>54</sup> in efforts to establish meaningful correlations between IQ and white ancestry. But, as Flynn (1980), Taylor (1980), and Nisbett (1995) report, after extensive reviews of the available literature, the correlations were found to be either negative<sup>55</sup> or approaching zero. Jensen and other hereditarians also sought evidence for their genetic hypothesis by trying to establish links between race and neural functioning; that is, by comparing speeds of information processing and reaction times for Black and White subjects, and they have reported superior performances for White subjects over the Black ones (Jensen

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<sup>53</sup>In an interview with Frank Miele published in *Skeptic*, Robert Sternberg also made this charge against Herrnstein and Murray (see, reference: Miele, 1995).

<sup>54</sup>In these experiments, blood groups found in higher frequencies in Black populations (Black blood types) and those found in higher frequencies among Whites (White blood types) were correlated with test scores.

<sup>55</sup>"Negative" here means that the hypothesis being tested was that White blood genes would result in higher test scores, and that there was no convincing evidence to confirm the hypothesis.

& Vernon, 1983). However, these conclusions have been vigorously challenged for the use of inappropriate apparatus, and methodological and interpretive errors (Borowski et al., 1985; Longstreth, 1986; Nisbett, 1995; and Welford, 1986; among others). In fact, Kamin (1981) goes so far as to suggest that the quality and accuracy of Jensen's work ought to be highly suspect, since he has ignored many requests to examine his raw data, which is not the usual practice among credible scientists.

As I have demonstrated above, and in the words of Erlich and Feldman (1977):

There is considerable evidence that committed hereditarians have, to put it charitably, sometimes permitted their zeal to overcome their judgement and care in reporting the literature (p. 117).

This zeal I believe to be a manifestation of a visceral belief in the innate intellectual inferiority of Blacks. This has meant that despite their repeated failure to find, empirically or otherwise, any real link between genes and IQ, their faith in their hypothesis remains unshaken. It is ironic that some of the questions raised by the hereditarian hypothesis, while not inherently useful, may well be answerable if not for this disturbing focus on proving a theory of Black inferiority. We can demonstrate this, and hereditarian bias, by looking at the following example at how they use the data to explain innate intellectual capacity.

If we accept that IQ tests are valid as measures of intellectual ability, then the IQ data do suggest an answer to the corresponding question of relative intellectual capacities, an

answer that is, strangely, not apparent to hereditarians. If the hereditarians had approached this question more openmindedly, looking for plausible answers, rather than for confirmation of an already firmly held belief, then they would have seen that the Black and White ranges in scores offered more convincing evidence for comparing intellectual potentials than mean scores did. As an illustration, suppose that one had administered the same IQ test to two sample populations, one Black and one White, under identical conditions as far as this is possible, and that one then obtained two sets of scores with ranges defined by the highest and lowest scores. Now, if we assume as the hereditarians do, that each member is likely to possess the intellectual characteristics as defined for the group, then, the IQ score for any member of a group can be expected to fall within the calculated range with almost complete certainty. That is, any member of the group is capable of scoring the highest as well as the lowest score obtained for the group, but must certainly score within that range. The range, then, could describe the intellectual capacity of the group members. The situation becomes much more complex and uncertain if we substitute mean scores for ranges in predicting individual abilities. The mean score tells us nothing about the actual or potential score of any member of the sample population, but only about the performance of a mythical average member. From the mathematics of the normal curve, a mean score of 85, as is calculated for Blacks, could just as easily mean that they scored within a range of 5 and 165 IQ points, as between 75 and 95. It is clear, then, that ranges could provide more and better quality information about group potential or ability than mean scores do. For instance, focusing



on ranges we can hypothesize and test whether with the best available environments the maximum score is attainable by any member of the population, or, conversely, that the worst possible environment will result in the minimum score.

Data have already been collected that can, somewhat crudely, test the hypotheses suggested above, an example of which is Jensen's 1977 study of low socio-economic rural Georgia children which I have mentioned previously. Jensen's results, as he himself realized, made nonsense of a genetic racial theory of intelligence, for he reported an inexplicably low Black mean of 71 IQ points, with a 15 point decrement between ages 6 and 16. If we employ his genetic arguments, then Jensen's results suggest that the genetic gap between the average poor, rural, Black Georgian and the average Black American (about 14 IQ points), and that between 6 and 16 year old Georgian Blacks (15 IQ points),<sup>56</sup> is the same as between the average Black and White American (15 IQ points), and, therefore, we can postulate, as the hereditarians do for Blacks and Whites, that the rural Georgian Black person is innately inferior to the average African American, as is the average 16 year old Georgian to the 6 year old. Now, we know that this defies common sense, for how can we account for such drastic genetic changes in an individual, occurring, coincidentally, during the years of formal schooling, and, possibly direct exposure to institutionalized and individualized racism? We could, possibly, employ the

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<sup>56</sup>Murray, in 1994, similarly reported a 15-point increment in the average IQ over the past century and also Eysenck, in 1981, reported a similar gap between sibling IQs.

hereditarians' pseudo-darwinistic explanation of selective migration (Eysenck, 1981; Jensen, 1969; and Murray, 1994) to account for the low scores of rural Georgian children, but this is too convenient since there is no evidence to support such speculative reasonings (Flynn, 1980 among others). As Jensen himself realised, only environmental explanations make sense here (Jensen, 1977), but his are limited because of his focus on means rather than ranges, which means that while he could attempt to explain the difference between the national and this Georgian average, he could not (at least, did not attempt to), similarly, explain the IQ decrement nor the gap between Blacks and Whites. However, if we were to consider ranges instead of means, then we could explain these apparently anomalous finding quite intelligently. The Georgian children are disadvantaged on many counts, being Black, southern, rural, and poor. If we assume that all groups, regardless of economic condition, region, or race, have similar potential, as the similar ranges do show, then we could explain, at least partially, any individual score by the degree of disadvantage that the particular child is burdened with.

The above illustration is particularly important in demonstrating the injustice of the hereditarian crusade against equal educational treatment for Blacks. As Jensen and the other hereditarians have confirmed, the range of scores for Blacks and Whites are about identical, so, one must then ask why they do not feel the same need to explain the similar ranges as they do for the dissimilar means. The fact is, they have chosen as they do

because it enables them to argue, as Jensen did in 1969,<sup>57</sup> and Murray did in 1994,<sup>58</sup> that different mean scores point to different upper limits in the capacities of the two groups, while ignoring the evidence that all groups are capable of scoring throughout the entire IQ range. All four hereditarians use this tactic to suggest, as I have outlined before, that Blacks, because of our limited capacities for learning should have suitably limited educational experiences (Eysenck, 1990; Jensen, 1969a; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; and Rushton, 1995).<sup>59</sup>

I must reiterate that hereditarian research activities do not represent a fair and just search for truth. I have already stated my view that anti-Black bias is at the root of their criticism and interpretation of the race and IQ data, both their own and those of other researchers, and I have shown above how their dogged preference for mean score differences over equal ranges in scores demonstrate their bias. The manner in which the

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<sup>57</sup>As I have mentioned before, in 1969, Jensen suggested that education be restructured to accommodate differing inherent intellectual abilities. He argues that Blacks, generally at level I, have a lower upper limit of intellectual performance than Whites who are generally at level II ability.

<sup>58</sup>Murray in 1994 used an argument similar to Jensen's when he urged that the educational experiences offered to students be determined by their IQs, for as he explained it: "For many people, there is nothing they can learn that will repay the cost of the teaching" (p.520).

<sup>59</sup>I have reported previously that Jensen (1969a) has suggested that Blacks are more suitably taught by rote and Whites by more complex methods. Also, Murray (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) argues that Blacks and other members of the cognitive underclass should not be permitted in the Ivy League colleges, but should be restricted to the less prestigious ones.

hereditarians critique and interpret other people's data also point to clear evidence of bias against Blacks. Many of their critics, whether from the environmentalist camp (Flynn, 1980; House & Haug, 1995; and Taylor, 1980) or the hereditarian camp (Cronbach, 1969; Crow, 1969; and Kagan, 1969; among numerous others), point to the inadequacies in their interpretations and their selective use of data, which, I argue, is meant to shore up their own anti-Black theories.

#### Reactions to remedial policies and programs.

Since Jensen's impassioned attack on compensatory educational initiatives, most notably Head Start and bussing (Jensen, 1969a), hereditarians have been singling out programs and policies intended to address Black underperformance for attack, with the argument that these initiatives are based on an irrational assumption of equal intellectual endowments among racial groups. When the efforts of the late Thurgood Marshall (subsequently a Supreme Court judge) and the NAACP resulted in the US Supreme Court challenge to legally segregated schooling, there were prominent psychologists like Henry Garrett of Columbia University willing to present evidence purporting to show that the status quo merely reflected a natural racial ranking in intelligence, and that any attempt to alter this situation, as the challengers were demanding, would result in irreparable harm to both Blacks and Whites (Brazziel, 1969 and Garrett, 1971). However, despite the best efforts of the hereditarian camp, Marshall and his colleagues did eventually succeed in banning segregated schooling, but the enforcement of the ban

called for measures like bussing and forced integration that again met with strong hereditarian resistance, Jensen and Eysenck being notable examples.

The furore created, especially in the American South, by the desegregation efforts is well documented, and psychologists like Jensen and Eysenck legitimated this opposition using similar arguments to those used by Garrett decades earlier. Like Garrett, they have argued that the status quo correctly reflects a natural intellectual ranking of the races, and that efforts to artificially alter this with compensatory strategies are doomed to failure. The hereditarians next took issue with the affirmative action programs initiated during the last couple of decades and again provided legitimization for the strong opposition coming from political conservatives and those further to their right with White supremacist and eugenic agendas (Eysenck, 1990 and Herrnstein & Murray, 1995). There are many conflicting arguments as to whether, and why, these initiatives failed, and, not surprisingly, the arguments offered are heavily influenced by ideology. Environmentalists argue that the initiatives have not in fact failed but that poor implementation, continued deprivation and discrimination, and premature evaluations and analyses have resulted in skewed results (Hilliard, 1987; House & Haug, 1995; Hunt, 1969; and Irvine, 1986). The hereditarians, on the other hand, point again to an unjustified and incorrect assumption of racial equality as the culprit (Jensen, 1974a and Eysenck, 1991, among others). I must reiterate that it is not my purpose to justify or to argue against these or other remedial programs and policies, but rather to illustrate a

pattern in hereditarian reactions to these efforts that is consistent with bias against Black interests. I believe that I have succeeded in showing the existence and consistency of such a pattern in that I have shown that the hereditarians display what amounts to tunnel vision when dealing with what is elsewhere widely accepted as very complex issues, preferring to focus on what they believe to be an inequality of endowment, rather than an obvious historical inequality of opportunity. In fact, in order to bolster their own position on the evidence, they offer clearly erroneous and incomplete depictions of both the historical and contemporary situation of Blacks and present an unwarrantedly pessimistic view of the future that, I believe, is meant to frighten the non-Black public into initiating and accepting what are currently unacceptable restrictions on Black behaviours and opportunities. Jensen's unreferenced quote below, and Murray's final judgment on America's intellectual future illustrate this perfectly. In 1969, Jensen reported from an unidentified and unreferenced "official" source on the futility of trying to improve the conditions of Blacks, as follows:

In fact, one official guideline goes so far as to state: "Contractors may find that they will have to undertake a program to rebuild entirely the work habits of the people they hire. This may even require knocking on their door in the morning and providing transportation to the plant. The people we are talking about have been out of the mainstream of society for so long that they have not developed [the] values which the dominant white community takes for granted." (Jensen, 1969a, p. 52)

And, in the conclusion to The Bell Curve, Murray predicted that,

Cognitive partitioning will continue. It cannot be stopped because the forces driving it cannot be stopped....Inequality of endowments, including intelligence, is a reality. Trying to pretend that inequality does not really exist has led to disaster. Trying to eradicate inequality...has led to

disaster. It is time for America once again to try living with inequality....  
(Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 551)

The single-minded propagation of these theories of Black intellectual inferiority, with their frightening consequences, as the hereditarians tell it, have the potential to do great harm to Black people both as a community and as individuals. As a group, the global Black community is in danger of being stigmatized as incompetent, stupid, and worst of all, unteachable (Ford, 1990; Jackson & George, 1996; and Miller, 1976). If such perceptions were to become widespread, it is quite possible for the old, and thankfully discarded, legalized oppressions of Black people to reappear, or to have new measures instituted to cull or to eliminate the Black population entirely. Raising this possibility may appear irresponsible and alarmist, but I do believe it is a real threat to us as a community, and many other scholars, especially since the publication of The Bell Curve have been voicing the same concern (Jackson & George, 1996; Nisbett, 1995; and Rosenthal, 1995; among many others). I suppose, even up to the 1920s and 1930s European Jews, and others, would have thought the possibility of the German government designing and implementing a plan for the elimination of the entire Jewish population similarly fantastic. Well, the Holocaust happened just a few decades ago. Even more recently, we see evidence of the evil that humans can perpetrate against others in Southern Africa, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Central African Republic and Rwanda, for example. When such horrors are discussed in the West, there is an accompanying implication that Western societies, such as North America, are too advanced to permit

such horrors, but I suggest that may not be true, because, if one were to go back only a few decades into American history, one will find abhorrent evidence of ordinary, nice Americans burning Black men alive in community organized lynchings. The propagation of these theories of Black intellectual inferiority can also hold tremendous consequences for individual Black persons, for of what use are group predictions and prescriptions if they are not applicable at the individual level? Despite protestations to the contrary, individuals are regarded and treated, to a significant extent, as members of their perceived group and inevitably accorded the characteristics of that group.

This most recent onslaught on Black intelligence begun by Jensen and carried along by Eysenck, Rushton and Murray, among others, has had the effect of relegitimizing race-based research<sup>60</sup> which already has quite a foul history as is evidenced by two well-known examples, namely, the Tuskegee Study,<sup>61</sup> and the Tuskegee Experiment.<sup>62</sup> When hereditarians claim that there is scientific evidence to prove that Blacks are, on the

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<sup>60</sup>Jackson and George (1996) compiled a list of current studies sponsored by the US government that focus on Black behaviours. The list include the Violence Initiative, the Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Syndrome (ADHDS) study, and the Adolescent Family Life Program (AFLP) study.

<sup>61</sup>In this study, which lasted over forty years (1932-19720), Black men suffering with syphilis were left untreated so that scientists could study the progression of the disease.

<sup>62</sup>This was an experiment conducted during the war of 1939-1945 by the US government, through its Armed Forces, to test whether Black men could be taught to fly planes.



average, innately stupid, I am outraged and terribly hurt, as should be every other Black person. I know that there is no mythical average Black person. There is me, however. And there are millions of other Black individuals who are each, individually, unfairly affected by the consequences of such claims, consequences such as I have outlined in the paragraph above.

### Ukweli

This canon has been described previously as requiring a research procedure that is grounded in the experiences of the community being researched, in order to tell the truth about the lives of its members. The experiences of community members must become the ultimate authority in determining what is true about that group and, therefore, the final arbiter of the validity of research about their lives. My analysis reveals that hereditarians use the false claim of disinterested objectivity to ignore the real life and historical experiences of Black people, and, therefore, come to conclusions that do not fit our experiences, and which, consequently, do not, and cannot, tell the whole truth about our lives. From my analysis, the only truth that these hereditarians tell about Black intellectual performance, that is, as verified by our own experiences, is the demonstrated fact of a persistent deficit in our test scores. It is when they move away from this observed fact, into speculations and theorizing, that the gulf opens up and there is created an obvious lack of fit between what they are saying and what our own experiences tell us. This lack of fit, I believe, results from two causes, the first of which is the

hereditarians' use, perhaps quite naturally and well-meaningly, of their own experiences as twentieth century Whites to interpret and explain this phenomenon of differential performances, and, since the Black and the White experiences are so dissimilar, the explanations proffered are necessarily inadequate, and hence untrue. The second cause for this lack of fit is that the hereditarians distort the available evidence, both theoretical and experiential, and this results in harm to the interests of the Black community. I believe that the preponderance of evidence suggest the latter cause as the more widespread, for as I have pointed out many times in the foregoing pages, the hereditarians display a worrying tendency to select only that part of the data that agrees with their own position, and either ignore, or summarily dismiss, the large body of data which do not. I would even go so far as to claim that it is this tendency which distinguishes the hereditarian scholar from others who investigate this phenomenon. In the following pages, I will present arguments and evidence to justify my position.

#### Explaining the IQ gap.

As I have affirmed many times before, there is an indisputable and persistent gap between the average test scores of Blacks and Whites in North America, a gap which has been narrowing steadily since the 1950s, as the hereditarians, for example Murray, admit. As Murray claims, "in the past few decades, the gap between blacks and whites narrowed by perhaps three IQ points (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 269). The widely

acknowledged Flynn effect<sup>63</sup> also points to the tenuousness of the core hereditarian argument that IQ scores are an immutable and highly heritable characteristic. Yet, the hereditarians suggest a future scenario that stands in direct contradiction of the evidence, but which, however, serves to further demonize the Black community, as I believe is their intent. They predict that because, as they claim, the Black population exerts a dysgenic pressure on American intelligence due to significant differences in fertility rates, both between intelligent and dull Blacks, and between Blacks and Whites, that a widening of the Black-White IQ gap should be expected (Eysenck, 1981; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969a; and Rushton, 1988b). But, as they themselves are forced to admit, the evidence is otherwise, and the Black-White gap is actually narrowing. Also, in terms of their warning that an ever increasing population of dull Blacks will cause a lowering of the national IQ, the Flynn effect clearly suggests otherwise, and in fact, they are again forced to admit that the national IQ is rising steadily (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994 and Jensen, 1980b), perhaps by as much as one IQ point per year, as Murray has suggested (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994).

Despite the abundance of contradictory evidence, both historical and contemporary, these four hereditarians assert the obvious untruth that all Americans enjoy the same quality of, and access to, education. At least, the implication is that this state of equality

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<sup>63</sup>A global, successive increase in IQ scores identified by the psychologist James Flynn.

has existed since IQ testing began, that is, since the beginning of the twentieth century. Murray, for instance, has suggested that the widespread availability of twelve years of schooling since that time has neutralized any potential inequalities in educational opportunity. He argues that those educationists who hold that variations in measures of school quality such as financing, teacher-student ratios, teacher qualifications, school ambience, and the like, actually affect the quality of education students receive, are wrong, since these measures have no effect on educational outcomes. Both Jensen and Eysenck have made similar claims for the equality of American education. Jensen (1980b, p. 207), saw Blacks and Whites as being exposed to "fairly equal instructional conditions", and Eysenck (1981, p. 76) confidently concluded that "their [Blacks] education has not handicapped them in relation to Whites". However, up to three or four decades ago, American society was still known for the forced segregation of Blacks from Whites in schooling and other areas of life. Although the Brown decision legally ended segregated schooling in 1954, even the supreme court justices recognized that its implementation would have to be gradual, as they stipulated in the now notorious caution of "all deliberate speed". It was obvious then, as it should be to any fair-minded person, that with racial segregation so entrenched in such a large segment of American society, it would take time and effort to overcome the resistance to its demise, and I am not convinced that either that time or effort has yet been expended.

In the 1960s when Jensen wrote his paper on Black intellectual deficiencies, Black Americans were still publicly fighting for the right to exercise their civic responsibilities, to use public facilities, and to share a lunch counter with their fellow White citizens, and, more to the point, they were still then dealing with the widespread public resistance to the implementation of the Brown decision<sup>64</sup> that continued for decades.<sup>65</sup> and still continues today within the White supremacist movement. It is therefore surprising, that despite all this evidence, renowned scholars like Jensen and the hereditarians, could have dismissed the effects of an unequal and segregated education as far back as the 1960s when official commitments to egalitarianism had only just been made, and had yet to be implemented. If the hereditarians wanted evidence that the unfair treatment of Blacks, which even they acknowledge has been an intrinsic part of American culture (Eysenck, 1991; Jensen, 1980b; and Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), was part of the Black educational experience, they had only to read the number of books produced by classroom teachers in the 1960s, many of whom were White, which told of the stiflingly poor quality education that Black children received, and which included accounts of indifferent teachers, deplorable environments, and poor facilities (Herndon, 1968 and

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<sup>64</sup>Many of the poignant and well-publicized incidents of Black students, protected by law enforcement officers, attempting to integrate various institutions of learning, from grade schools to universities through mobs of White protestors, are now part of the folk lore and hardly need to be referenced. One well-remembered incident occurred in 1957 when President Eisenhower was compelled to send Federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, to protect Black children trying to integrate its Central High School.

<sup>65</sup>The bussing protest that occurred in Boston, Massachusetts at the start of the 1980s is a good example of the deep-seated resentment of school integration efforts.

Kohl, 1967, among others). Importantly, these teachers made the very same charges that DuBois had made over 60 years before in recounting the severe deprivation he had observed as a public school teacher, in his book, already mentioned, The Souls of Black Folks (DuBois, 1965).<sup>66</sup>

I believe that in the above arguments I have shown convincingly that there is no evidence to support the hereditarians' claim of equal educational access and experiences for all Americans, not even over the nearly one hundred years of supposedly objective IQ testing, and that their stubborn belief in this myth of a level playing field has more to do with their ideological positions than with adherence to the truth. The hereditarians' distortion of the facts about race and IQ does not stop with the Black experience, but extends to issues surrounding theory and data. As Flynn (1980) and Taylor (1980), among many others, have observed, the hereditarian works are rife with erroneous assumptions, inexplicable gaps in the theories and incomplete analyses of data, and, in addition, their interpretations of the data are suspiciously different for Blacks than for Whites.

Additional evidence of the hereditarians' lack of regard for the truth is that they, most notably Rushton and Murray, continually refer to correlations of numerous variables with IQ (Rushton, 1989b and Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, for instance) and draw causal

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<sup>66</sup>Originally published in 1902.

inferences from these even when they themselves point out that causality cannot be inferred from correlations (Murray, 1994 and Jensen, 1969). As Murray has acknowledged correctly "causal relationships are complex and hard to establish definitely" (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 369). I would suggest that the social sciences, including psychology, have not yet brought these many complex problems of causality to a successful conclusion and this includes the causes of the racial differences in IQ scores. The hereditarians distort the IQ data in that they infer from correlational data to unlikely explanations and they manipulate the collinearity and covariation of test scores with various socially important measures like education and socioeconomic status (SES), to show that intelligence matters most by arbitrarily attributing any covariation to IQ (Murray, 1994 being a good example). They eliminate competing explanations, such as poverty, racism, or education, through dubious arguments, and propose a single-factor explanation, IQ, to account for almost everything. Of course, this simple explanation, targeted principally at Blacks as it is, enhances its political viability, especially since it agrees with the received knowledge of many about Black intellectual inferiority.

The causes of academic development and test taking skills, as measured by IQ tests, are admittedly complex and quite likely affected by racist experiences and environments. The effect of racism on test performance is supported by the well-documented fact that Blacks from Africa and the Caribbean express fewer feelings of self-doubt and inferiority

than do Blacks of the US and other White dominated societies (Flynn, 1980; Ogbu, 1978; and Sowell, 1972). In such societies, like these in North America, Black success is often perceived by some in the wider society as aberrational - and it is not unknown for these successful individuals to be referred to as "one of the good ones", "not like the others", or even as "having overcome their blackness". It is this very same message that one finds immersed in the hereditarian writings, especially those of Jensen and Murray, where there is a repetitive focus on the perceived dullness of the *average* Black person. For instance, Murray's figures in The Bell Curve suggest that only 0.3 percent of the Black population could be included in his cognitive elite as compared to 5 percent of Whites. However, Jensen had already laid the groundwork for this view when he proposed in 1969 that the cut-off IQ score for mental retardation be increased from 70 to 85, which, perhaps coincidentally, happened to be the average score he reported for the Black population. As Solomon (1992), and others, have confirmed, such perceptions have been internalized even by some Black students, to the extent that academic success is thought not to be a "Black thing" and is avoided for fear of alienation from peer groups. This fact was brought home to me very forcefully in 1994 at the Conference of Black Educators, where a local African Nova Scotian gave testimony about her experiences as a high achieving student. This student told of the pressures she encountered from other Black students to conform to the mores of their group, mores which did not include the pursuit of academic excellence. The student also told of battles



fought with teachers and the school administration to be allowed the right to take on challenging academic courses.

A critical question that the hereditarians never answer clearly is why they believe the existence of an IQ gap to be so important for effective political and social policy formulation as they have repeatedly argued, especially when they themselves have refuted, albeit equivocally, the most important assumption on which this assumed importance must rest, which is that IQ statistics are necessary and useful for individual predictions. All four hereditarians state clearly and repeatedly, that IQ data are population statistics only and have no meaning for the individual person, since they can tell us very little about the individuals who make up the population to which they refer. That is, while population statistics can be used to generalize about an individual, they can only give us useful information about an anonymous "average" member of the population, not about a particular individual with her or his own genetic makeup and his or her own unique environment. One would therefore expect them to have little or no practical use in a society supposedly based on individual rights and freedoms, as North American societies are said to be. Yet, despite these documented limitations, both Jensen and Murray have, nevertheless, misled the United States Congress with testimonies about the permanence of the gap and its importance to national policy making. In countries like the United States, which over the last few decades have declared themselves colour blind and race neutral after centuries of preferential treatment for Whites, the use of race-based

statistics are an obvious contradiction. But this is a contradiction, that, I would argue, is almost a defining characteristic of these societies, and consequently is always present in their relationships with their Black populations, and not surprisingly, is mirrored in the hereditarian writings about race and IQ. For instance, Jensen frequently reminds us that all people should be treated as individuals, yet he suggests that Blacks will benefit, as a group, from a less rigorous educational program than Whites, since they are not as equipped, genetically, to handle the higher level cognitive skills involving abstract thinking. And Murray, at the end of The Bell Curve, suggests that social policies be "highly targeted" (p. 550) to citizens of low cognitive ability, a group in which he claims Blacks are overly represented.

#### Explaining Spearman's *g*.

The hereditarians subscribe to a very narrow definition of intelligence as being equivalent to Spearman's *g*, which they claim, is measured directly by IQ tests. The hereditarians also claim that intelligence (that is, Spearman's *g*) is essentially inherited and not subject to social or educational remediation and that it represents an important personal trait, that is, the ability to think abstractly, an ability which, they claim, is essential for acquiring a whole range of skills needed in a modern industrial society (Jensen, 1969). As Murray (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) sees it: "Putting it all together, success and failure in the American economy, and all that goes with it, are increasingly a matter of the genes that people inherit...." (p. 91). However, as I demonstrated earlier

in this chapter, there is no consensus among psychologists working in this area that Spearman's *g* is really all there is to intelligence, but most believe that intelligence is far more complex than the hereditarians allow (Gardner, 1983 and Sternberg, 1985, for example). Nor do they agree that IQ tests of any kind measure mostly Spearman's *g* as they would also have us believe. It is important to bear in mind that IQ tests measure test taking skills, among other things, and the acquisition of these skills may be the common factor that Spearman identified as factor *g*, also called general intelligence, and which characterises Jensen's level 2 ability grouping (Jensen, 1969a) and Murray's cognitive elite (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Also, the research shows that many factors from nutrition to self-esteem and teacher expectations, determine how much of our intelligence we develop and use (Murray, 1996 and Schoenthaler et al., 1986). Research, and Black experiences, tell us that all of these factors are strongly influenced by racial attitudes. Jensen, Eysenck, and Murray sometimes concede the above, that *g* cannot be all there is to intelligence, and that intelligence is fairly malleable and can be influenced by non-genetic factors, but they only do so when the evidence is overwhelming. Most often, these hereditarians, and Rushton always, ignore the data to argue, as I stated above, that intelligence is immutable and easily measurable.

#### Explaining the heritability of IQ.

Much like the well-known adage relating to the above: "correlation is not causation", it is widely known and accepted, even among the hereditarians, that between-group

heritability measurements (that is,  $h^2$  estimates<sup>67</sup>) cannot be assumed from the within-group estimates (Jensen, 1969a and Herrnstein & Murray, 1994).<sup>68</sup> However, the hereditarians continually make this incorrect transference by using the within-group heritability estimate for Whites, which they estimate to be between 60% (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) and 80% (Jensen, 1969),<sup>69</sup> to explain the IQ gap (identified as a phenotype<sup>70</sup>) between Blacks and Whites (identified as genotypes<sup>71</sup>). For the remainder of this section I will use Murray's claims and figures rather than Jensen's, since Murray has offered the more modest  $h^2$  values, and his claims, at least as relating to these estimates, are not as extreme as Jensen's.

Murray has argued that since two-thirds of the variance in IQ is due to heredity, that 10 of the 15 points of the IQ gap are accounted for by genetic differences between the races (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). This seems entirely too simplistic, and a closer look at

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<sup>67</sup>This is an estimate of the proportion of the variance in a characteristic or behaviour that can be attributed to heredity.

<sup>68</sup> $H^2$  estimates are used to generalize about populations or individuals that differ both in regard to the particular characteristic or pattern of behaviour being measured and in their genetic make-up.

<sup>69</sup>These are the figures normally quoted for Whites, although Murray has suggested that the values are similar for the Black population.

<sup>70</sup>In this context the phenotype is a characteristic or pattern of behaviour such as performance on IQ tests. More specifically, it refers to the IQ score attained.

<sup>71</sup>The genotype is the genetic make-up which was established at the moment of conception, when the genes contributed by both parents joined in certain combinations.

Murray's arguments will show that it is. Any basic Statistics text would have reminded Murray that the variance, that is, the square of the standard deviation ( $\sigma^2$ ), refers to the spread of values within a specific population and not to a difference in means scores between this and any other population. This tells us that, for Whites anyway, the population variance ( $\sigma^2$ ) is 225 (assuming that  $\sigma$  is 15) and from my understanding of the definition of  $h^2$ , 151 of this amount is due to heredity and the remaining 74 to environmental factors, assuming that only heredity and environment are responsible for the variance. Murray would have been taken more seriously if he had applied the  $h^2$  estimate correctly to the variance rather than to the difference in means. When I do this, I find that if I assume that heredity were the only factor contributing to the variance, then I get  $\sigma_h$  (assumed to be the value of  $\sigma$  with only hereditary influence) as 12.3, and if I also assume that the IQ gap remains at  $1\sigma$ , then I find that heredity has accounted for 12.3 of the 15 IQ points. However, when I use the same procedure to determine the influence of the environment I obtain conflicting results. I determined above, using Murray's  $h^2$  estimate, that 74 of White variance was due to environmental factors. This suggests a  $\sigma_e$  (due solely to environmental factors) of 8.6 and, when I again assume that a  $1\sigma$  gap, I find that the environment accounts for 8.6 of the 15 IQ points in the gap. Now, it is obvious that even if Murray had applied the  $h^2$  estimate correctly, and if my assumptions are correct, the results would still have been incorrect since we get a total gap of 20.9 IQ points, and not 15 as it should have been.

The results would be equally without merit if we used the Black population data instead of the White. Both Murray and Jensen report that the Black population has a lower value for  $\sigma$  than the White (13 as opposed to 15) so we should obtain different values  $\sigma_h$  and  $\sigma_e$  and hence different contributions to the gap. Also, if the  $h^2$  values and the  $\sigma^2$  values for the two groups were different, how would you decide which value to use to determine the relative contributions? Obviously, something is seriously wrong with the hereditarian explanations of the heritability of IQ, for if these were sound the results would have been consistent irrespective of the approach taken. There are other bothersome assumptions involved here that cast serious doubt on the hereditarian position. One such assumption is that if there is high heritability in either the Black and or the White population for IQ, it necessarily follows that any difference in the mean scores is also due to heredity. I can easily imagine circumstances in which both groups have high heritability but there is no difference in the two mean scores, or conversely, where there is very low heritability in the two populations but a large gap in the mean scores. I am not yet convinced that the  $h^2$  value in either population is necessarily related to the size of the difference in the means. It is clear to me that the explanation for the racial difference in IQ scores is not as straightforward as the hereditarians would have us believe and it is astounding to me that such eminent scientists as these would make such shockingly elementary errors in both statistical procedures and logic. I find it difficult not to conclude, I think generously, that it is their eagerness to find a racial

explanation for the IQ gap that is really the source of the errors, and not their own IQ scores or general intelligence.

To conclude this section, I must reiterate that this canon ukweli mandates that the creation of theory to explain the underperformance of Blacks on IQ tests, must be done within the context of their own experiences. As I have stated before: the inequalities are there. The crucial question is how we interpret and explain them and the motivations behind such interpretations and explanations. The hereditarian literature reads like justification for these inequalities, and it employs a veneer of science, I believe, merely to buttress its positions, and to provide them with legitimacy and respectability. The hereditarians dismiss the despair, hopelessness, and anger with which Africans, and others, generally greet each new emergence of an hereditarian onslaught as unwarranted reactions due to, and encouraged by, a false and pernicious egalitarian<sup>72</sup> ideology (Eysenck, 1990; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; and Jensen, 1974a). However, I maintain that any analysis of these data must be incorrect if it does not include our experiences and perspectives as Black people, and such incomplete and incorrect analyses have the potential to do immeasurable harm to our future well-being. Again, I must assert, clearly, that my concern is not due to any feeling of paranoia, but to a realistic analysis of the hereditarian writings, and to an appreciation of how the deliberate distortion of the

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<sup>72</sup>Egalitarianism, according to the Collins English Dictionary (third edition), refers to the doctrine of the equality of mankind [*sic*] and the desirability of political, social and economic equality.

attributes and behaviours of less powerful and vulnerable groups in a population, as occurred in Germany this century, can make the majority population more accepting of actions and policies directed against such groups. My concern is well-founded in this case. I contend, for all four hereditarians worry throughout their writings that without their intervention public policy will continue to be based, as it has been since the Brown decision of 1954, on the assumption that there are no genuine cognitive differences between the races. Murray's assertion (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) that the future of American society depends on each group learning to accept its "valued" place in society, as defined by its measured cognitive ability, is one that Black people and others must view with extreme suspicion.

### Summary

This chapter described the application of my five afrocentric canons, kujittoa, ujamaa, utulivu, uhaki and ukweli, to the hereditarian writings on race and IQ. The analysis revealed that, though unacknowledged, there was clear evidence of the presence of all five canons in the hereditarian works, sometimes in accordance with the mandates of the canons, at other times in opposition to them.

In terms of the canon Kujittoa, there was strong evidence that the hereditarians are committed to their positions in the debate on race and IQ, in direct contradiction to their stated ideals of dispassionate and objective research. However, their commitment is to



their own hereditarian ideology and ultra-conservative, right-wing politics, and hostile to the interests of the Black community. The strength of their commitment is such that they appear willing to misrepresent, falsify, and distort data, in order to support their hypothesis of the innate inferiority of Blacks.

The application of the canon *ujamaa*, revealed that there is a strong, but unacknowledged community of hereditarian scholars united by their belief in the inferiority of Blacks. These scholars see their role as confirming the received knowledge of the larger White community relating to superiority of Whites over Blacks. They exhibit an extremely hostile attitude towards the Black community.

The application of *utulivu* disclosed that the hereditarians act in direct contradiction to the mandates of this canon, in that they work to create disharmony between the Black and White communities. In effect, they evince a very strong anti-Black bias, and alarmingly label the Black community as a dangerously dysgenic force, which they imply can only be controlled through eugenic measures.

Application of *uhaki* showed that the hereditarians again act in direct contradiction to the mandates of this canon, displaying no regard for issues of basic fairness and social justice. They ignore the historical and social contexts in interpreting and reacting to both

the research data on race and IQ, and the remedial policies and programs put in place in attempts to counter some of the effects of past injustices experienced by Blacks.

The last canon, ukweli, revealed that the hostility that the hereditarians exhibit towards the Black community forces them to theorize about Black intellectual experiences without the benefit of the community's experiences and perspectives, which, as the canon mandates, should be the final arbiter of truth about the community's behaviours. This has meant that the hereditarians have blinded themselves to explanations of the issues around race and IQ that do not fit their hypothesis of Black inferiority and pathology. Hence, their search for "scientific truth" is made futile.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Slow through the Dark: The Environmentalists.

*It is the calm and silent waters that drown a man [sic] (African proverb).*

As I outlined in the introduction to the previous chapter, this chapter will analyze the writings of Leon Kamin and Stephen Jay Gould, arguably two of the most prominent and ardent proponents of the environmentalist position. The procedure used is similar to that of Chapter Four, in that their works are deconstructed in terms of my five Afrocentric canons to determine the common assumptions about race and IQ that define their positions. These authors' works have been critiqued extensively by hereditarians, including the four in this study, most notably for their excessive passion and their evident commitment to an egalitarian ideology (Eysenck, 1981; Jensen, 1980a; Murray, 1994; and Rushton, 1995). However, although I commend their passion and commitment, both being important tenets of my Afrocentric analysis, I believe a truly useful analysis has to be much more comprehensive and include the unearthing of any of their own assumptions about race and IQ. This analysis will be done, as for the hereditarians, in the context of my five Afrocentric canons as I have defined them for this study: kujitoa, ujamaa, utulivu, uhaki, and ukweli. As I have done for Chapter Four, I will present brief biographical sketches of the two authors in the first section, explaining their social and political philosophies and how they became involved in the race and IQ debate. In the following five sections, I will concentrate, in turn, on the five Afrocentric canons and, as occurred

in Chapter Four, I will begin each section with a restatement of the canon, and follow this with an explanation of what the canon means in the context of the environmentalist position on the issue being studied. Then there will be a description and justification of the assumptions unearthed about race and IQ in the context of the specific canon. The final segment of this chapter will be a summary of the findings, that is, the outlining of the definitive arguments and assumptions of the environmentalist position.

### Biographical Sketches

In this section, I will describe the social and political philosophies of the two authors, Leon Kamin and Stephen Jay Gould, and in so doing justify each of these two selections as representative of the environmentalist position. As I tried to do for the hereditarians, and in keeping with the Afrocentric canon of being just to all participants in the research, I would have preferred to use autobiographical sources to allow the authors room to explain their own philosophies; however, such material is in exceedingly short supply. These two authors are either decidedly more modest than the hereditarians, or they have not generated the following and celebrity status of their opponents. In the absence of such first-hand information I have had to rely, as far as I could, on sympathetic sources, and only as a last resort have I relied on information from antagonistic sources. I have chosen to present Leon Kamin before Stephen Jay Gould because he was the first of the two to enter into this fray with his exposure, in 1972, of Cyril Burt, the internationally prominent British psychologist, famous for his studies on the heritability of

intelligence, eventually published in The Science and Politics of IQ. Gould entered the debate in 1974 with a critique of the hereditarian position, and followed this with other publications in 1980 and 1981. The 1981 publication, The Mismeasure of Man, a devastating critique of the IQ testing movement, is the best known of Gould's publications on this issue.

### Leon J. Kamin

Leon Kamin, now a professor of psychology at Northwestern University, was born on December 29, 1927 to Polish Jews who had immigrated to a small town in Massachusetts earlier in this century (Fancher, 1985 and Kamin, 1981). He grew up in this small and predominantly Christian community where he was very much an outsider, being of an immigrant family and Jewish, and these early experiences, as reported by Fancher,<sup>1</sup> appear to have influenced him greatly and sensitized him to the power of the environment in shaping lives. Fancher reported that Kamin's home environment also impacted greatly on his life in the form of his family's love of books and scholarship and the early death of his father. As Fancher reported it, these (his family's love of scholarship and his father's death) were two of the factors that precipitated his early admission to Harvard University at only sixteen years old, and his eventual decision to read for a psychology degree, and, ultimately, his involvement in the race and IQ debate.

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<sup>1</sup>Fancher has claimed that the personal and autobiographical details he recorded in his book were obtained in an interview with Kamin in December of 1982.

Kamin's involvement in the IQ debate was initiated in 1972 when he invited Richard Herrnstein to lecture at Princeton University, where he then taught, on a subject which, incidentally, was unrelated to the heritability of IQ (Fancher, 1985). His invitation led to furious protests from parts of the student body which resulted in the lecture being eventually cancelled, although over Kamin's strenuous protests. Kamin, at that time, argued for Herrnstein's right to free and unfettered speech (Fancher, 1985), much as he still does for Jensen, Murray and others (Kamin, 1995b). In the furore that followed the cancellation, a student inquired of Kamin if he had read Herrnstein's controversial article on the heritability of IQ which had been the source of their protests, and whether or not he had taken a position on this issue. Kamin had to admit that he had not read the article in question, and had no opinion on the issue, although he had taught the standard textbook positions in his introductory psychology classes. It was his response to this student's challenge that initiated his involvement in this debate (Fancher, 1985).

Kamin is probably best known for exposing the renowned British psychologist, the late Sir Cyril Burt, as a fraud (Kamin, 1974).<sup>2</sup> Fancher (1985) has reported that Kamin saw at once, upon reading the Herrnstein article, that Burt's supposedly extensive and well-documented studies on separated monozygotic (MZ) twins represented the crown jewels

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<sup>2</sup>The largest sample of MZA was thought to have been collected by the late Sir Cyril Burt and his associates. In a series of papers published between 1943 and 1966, Burt claimed that a total of 53 twin pairs had been tested and advanced an intraclass correlation coefficient of .87.

of the hereditarian case, and he decided that any knowledgeable opinion would have to be based on a reading of Burt's original papers. Burt's data immediately aroused Kamin's suspicions, for they seemed too good to be true, lacking any evidence of the "messy nature of the real world" (Fancher, 1985), in that Burt had repeatedly recorded identical correlations, accurate to three decimal places, for his MZ twins, through several different samples and tests (Kamin, 1974). As Kamin found:

The fact is that the various papers published by Burt often contain contradictory data, purportedly derived from the same study. These contradictions, however, are more than compensated for by some remarkable consistencies which occur repeatedly in his published works.... The papers of Professor Burt, it must be reported, are often remarkably lacking in precise descriptions of the procedures and methods that he employed in his I.Q. testing. The first major study of his kinship studies, a 1943 paper, presents a large number of I.Q. correlations but virtually nothing is said of when or to whom tests were administered, or of what tests were employed. (Kamin, 1974, pp. 35-36)

As he continued reading, he found more and more evidence which he believed rendered the correlations cited by the hereditarians doubtful as exact measures of heritability. He also believed that once Burt's studies were removed from consideration, the evidence of high heritability was not compelling, besides which he strongly suspected the motives of the hereditarians. In reaction to the dangers he believed inherent in the hereditarian dogmas, he decided to close down his psychological laboratories at Princeton, and to become "a professional critic,' reviewing 'with a kind of niggling detail' works on the genetics of intelligence and other socially charged topics such as the biology of mental illness" (Fancher, 1985, p. 209).

Prior to this, Kamin was known nationally for his political involvements. Having flirted briefly with Communism whilst at college, to the extent of editing a regional communist paper, he was an obvious target for Joseph McCarthy in his hunt for communist subversives (Fancher, 1985). Although finally acquitted of charges of communist conspiracy, he became unemployable in the US and ended up at McMaster University in Canada. He was only able to return to the US in 1968 when the political climate had improved. Throughout all this, Kamin seemed to have retained a deep commitment to reforming the world through intellectual and political activism, and it is this idealistic commitment, I believe, that was, at least in part, his spur for taking up the battle against what he considered the dangers inherent in the hereditarian ideology (Fancher, 1985 and Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984).

I believe that Kamin's ethnic origin, in addition to his political idealism, is an important factor in understanding his passionate and committed resistance to the hereditarian ideology. His own family probably left Poland to escape the pogroms to which European Jews were frequently subjected, and he was certainly old enough between 1938 and 1944 to appreciate the horror of the worst of all pogroms, the Nazi Holocaust. He himself has attributed the formulation of Hitler's "final solution" and the American policy of restricting the immigration of European Jews at a time when it was critically important that they escape Europe, to the racist and eugenic theories of the early testing movement. As he has written, there was a dangerous obsession, among both political and



academic forces in the US, with the "continued deluge of this country of the weaker stocks of Europe" (Kamin, 1995, p. 502, quoting Kimball Young<sup>3</sup>). In fact, Kamin was sufficiently moved to comment that:

The "New Immigration" had begun after 1890, and the law was designed to exclude the biologically inferior D- and E peoples of southeastern Europe. The new law made the country safe for Professor Brigham's Nordics, but it did little for the safety of Alpines and Mediterraneans. The law, for which the science of mental testing may claim substantial credit, resulted in the deaths of literally hundreds of thousands of victims of the Nazi biological theorists. The victims were denied admission to the United States because the "German quota" was filled, although the quotas of many other Nordic countries were vastly undersubscribed. The Nazi theoreticians ultimately concurred with biologist Laughlin's assessment, that in the case of D- and E people, "Cost of supervision greater than value of labor." (1995, pp. 502-503)

I can picture Kamin writing this passage while remembering that his own immigrant parents were lucky to have escaped these new immigration laws which, because of their alleged biological inferiority, could have made them candidates for Hitler's death camps.

In fact, Fancher (1985) recalled that when Kamin became interested in the IQ debate:

He looked into the history of American IQ testing, and was appalled to come across the racial theories propounded in the 1920s by respected psychologists such as Yerkes and Brigham. No doubt reflecting that his own middle-European family could have been excluded by the restrictive immigration laws these men supported, Kamin concluded that an arrogant and unfounded assumption of IQ heritability had helped produce an unjust social policy in the 1920s. He saw dangerous parallels in the 1970s, with questionable hereditarian arguments being used by Jensen and others to suggest the curtailment of programs for black youngsters. (pp. 208-209)

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<sup>3</sup>Kamin's source is a 1922 article by Kimball Young in the Scientific Monthly, entitled "Tests".

Kamin does not hide his ideological orientation and commitment, unlike the hereditarians discussed in Chapter Four. In fact, in the preface to Not in Our Genes, which he co-authored with Richard C. Lewontin and Steven Rose, there is a clearly stated ideological agenda, as articulated below:

Over the past decade and a half we have watched with concern the rising tide of biological determinist writing, with its increasing grandiose claims to be able to locate the causes of the inequalities of status, wealth, and power between classes, genders, and races in Western society in a reductionist theory of human nature. Each of us has been engaged for much of this time in research, writing, speaking, teaching, and public political activity in opposition to the oppressive forms in which determinist ideology manifests itself. We share a commitment to the prospect of the creation of a more socially just - a socialist - society. And we recognize that a critical science is an integral part of the struggle to create that society, just as we also believe that the social function of much of today's science is to hinder the creation of that society by acting to preserve the interests of the dominant class, gender, and race. This belief - in the possibility of a critical and liberatory science - is why we have each in our separate ways and at varying degrees been involved in the development of what has become known over the 1970s and 1980s, in the United States and Britain, as the radical science movement. (Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984, pp. ix-x)

This statement lends credence to the hereditarian criticism that Kamin's environmentalist position is fuelled by his egalitarian and socialist ideology, an influence which, as shown above, he does not deny. This issue will be examined more fully later, but for the moment, suffice it to say that it is to Kamin's credit that his ideological position is stated clearly, and not in subliminal messages lining the text, as is the wont of the hereditarians. His ideological position necessarily makes him more sympathetic to African interests in this debate, which I, obviously, find very encouraging, although one does get the

impression that this empathy is only incidental to his ideological stance. However, as is the case with many other environmentalists, including Stephen Jay Gould, he displays no awareness of an active African contribution, or potential contribution, to this debate, but rather assumes the role of protector against the dangers inherent in the hereditarian ideology. The evidence on which this claim is based will be presented later in this chapter.

### Stephen Jay Gould

Stephen Jay Gould is a professor at Harvard University and has been described variously as a biologist, and a geologist (Mensch & Mensch, 1991), and as a professional historian, an evolutionary biologist, and an anatomist (Gould, 1981, blurb). Whatever is the precise nature of his discipline, he is clearly not a psychologist nor an expert in testing, and his interest in the race and IQ debate must therefore be explained, as with Charles Murray in the previous chapter, by other than academic reasons. Gould's interest in this controversial issue seemed to have been stirred, like many others, including Kamin and Eysenck, by the publication and popular reception of Arthur Jensen's 1969 article, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement." Unlike Eysenck, and as revealed in all of his writings on this topic, Gould seemed to have been revolted by Jensen's ideas and seemed to have joined the fray to provide a restraint to Jensen's and his colleagues' advocacy of biological determinism, as he, Gould, names it.

Gould's entry into this debate seems to have occurred in 1974 when he published an article in Natural History, entitled "Racist Arguments and IQ", later reprinted in 1975 in Ashley Montagu's Race and IQ. His best known contribution so far, however, has been his 1981 publication, The Mismeasure of Man, in which he critically attacked the discipline of psychometrics by exposing its racist foundations. He has suggested, as does Kamin (1995a), that early mental testers propagated intelligence tests largely as a means of demonstrating the inherent superiority of middle- and upper-class whites, and that today's tests and those who support them represent the same agenda.

I have been unable to locate much explicit biographical information about Gould, the little I have been able to garner has been discovered enmeshed in criticisms of his writings. Like his fellow environmentalist, Leon Kamin, he does not seem to attract the same ardent advocacy as do the hereditarians, advocates of the likes of Roger Pearson who write to defend them and their ideas. However, Gould does appear to have, at the very least, close collegial relationships with others on the environmentalist front, including Leon Kamin. In the acknowledgements to The Mismeasure of Man, he records the assistance of Kamin and Lewontin, among others, who provided him with information and data for the book. Kamin and Lewontin, it will be remembered from the previous section, belong to what they describe as "the radical science movement" and have clearly articulated ideological positions on the race and IQ issue. Also, Kamin and Lewontin, along with Steven Rose, acknowledge Gould's assistance in writing Not In Our Genes,

and Mark Snyderman and Stanley Rothman imply that he and Kamin are both associated with a group in Cambridge, Massachusetts called "Science for the People" (Snyderman & Rothman, 1988, p. 122), a group which sounds very similar to the radical science movement referred to by Lewontin, Rose and Kamin (1984). Despite the apparent association, however, Gould only admits to sharing the goal of Kamin and his colleagues of fighting against scientific racism, but does not admit to sharing their ideological position. In fact, he denies a place for ideology in science and positions himself as an advocate for the integrity and political impartiality of science (Gould, 1981), which he implies that the hereditarians put at risk. As he has argued (Gould, 1981):

[I seek] to demonstrate both the scientific weaknesses and political contexts of determinist arguments ... My message is not that biological determinists were bad scientists or even that they were always wrong. Rather I believe that science must be understood as a social phenomenon, a gutsy, human enterprise, not the work of robots programmed to collect pure information. I also present this view as an upbeat for science, not as a gloomy epitaph, for a noble hope sacrificed on the altar of human limitations. (1981, p. 21)

In fact, Gould, does not question the validity and use of IQ tests, as is evidenced by the fact that he has expressed gratitude for the role of the tests in diagnosing his learning-disabled son (Gould, 1981). What he appears to object to is the clearly racist tone of hereditarians like Jensen and their politicising of science, thereby destroying its nobility (Gould, 1981). Gould's motivation, therefore, seems to be a desire to protect the integrity of science and a discomfort with the racism of the hereditarian position, and so, like Kamin, his pro-Black stance seems to be entirely incidental. Like Kamin, he sees

the IQ debate in entirely White terms, and does not seem prepared to consider a Black perspective. In none of his writings are Black authors cited, even though there exists a considerable body of published work by these authors on this issue, even going back to the beginning of the testing movement (Thomas, 1982 and DuBois, 1914). The result is that while I do support many of the criticisms and arguments of the environmentalists about the connection between race and IQ, I find their analyses to be incomplete.

With both of these environmentalists, there is an obvious antagonism to the ideas advocated by the hereditarians, both their anti-Black rhetoric and what is perceived as their attempt to co-opt science in the service of their political goals. It is this antagonism that, I believe, is the major influence in defining the environmentalist positions in this debate. Whilst Kamin more readily admits his political motivations, and has a well-documented political past, I believe that Gould must have been subject to some of the same influences, although he does not appear to be as politically radical as Kamin is. I feel confident in concluding that, as for the hereditarians, there is a definite collegiality of ideas and associations of which these two environmentalists are a representative part.

### The Afrocentric Deconstructive Analyses

As I have claimed in the previous section, and also in Chapter Three, as an Afrocentrist, I find the egalitarian ideology of the environmentalists, of which Leon Kamin and Stephen Jay Gould are representative, much more compatible with my Afrocentric

worldview than the hierarchical and racist creeds of the hereditarians. Consequently, I cannot subscribe to the hereditarian argument that this egalitarianism destroys the environmentalists' credibility as scientists (Eysenck, 1981; Jensen, 1974a; Murray, 1981; and Rushton, 1995). In fact, I think that it is to their credit, most notably Kamin's, that they state their agenda upfront (Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984), so as to provide the appropriate context in which to interpret their work. Being silent about, or denying, a political and social agenda does not necessarily mean that it is not present, as the hereditarians would have us believe. It is decidedly more honest to explore openly the conscious and other possible motivations that could influence, or have influenced, the nature and direction of one's research activities. However, while I admit to approving their egalitarian views, I believe that these environmentalists can be fairly criticized on other fronts, most notably for their obviously Eurocentric worldview, for they seem unable to provide a rhetorical space for Black perspectives, even in a debate that, as I have pointed out before, affects us so profoundly. I have been deeply disturbed to discover that the hereditarians are more likely than these environmentalists to cite Black authors (albeit, usually dismissively, Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, being an example), even though the environmentalists are the ones who profess to understand and explain the case for Blacks.

The above illustrates the point that an acceptable analysis requires a sufficiently comprehensive approach that addresses questions of how knowledge is being structured

and used. The application of my five Afrocentric canons, therefore, mandates that the political, ideological, social, and cultural beliefs and motivations of these environmentalists be assessed, and this assessment has revealed several specific themes associated with each of the five canons. With the first canon, *kujitoa*, two themes have emerged. The first relates to the use of science in the popular advocacy for social change and the second theme relates to claims about the nature of science as possessing an intrinsic integrity. The second canon, *ujamaa* has also revealed three themes. The first theme is concerned with the existence of, and relationships amongst a community of environmentalist scholars who are bonded together by their opposition to hereditarian dogma; and the other two themes is concerned with their relationships with the broader White community and the African community, respectively. The third canon, *utulivu*, has revealed three themes the first two of which are almost synonymous with Western liberalism, namely, the ideals of racial assimilation and egalitarianism; and the third is concerned with the environmentalists' perceptions and levels of understanding of the reality of Black experiences. The fourth canon, *uhaki*, has again revealed two themes. The first theme is concerned with the fit, or lack thereof, between the authors' perceptions and the reality of the Black agenda, as it relates to the purpose and use of IQ testing; and the second theme is concerned with their suggestions and recommendations for a more effective and equitable use of the tests and their artifacts, such as the Black-White gap, for the members of the Black community. Lastly, the fifth canon, *ukweli*, has revealed three themes. The first is concerned with a comparison of the positions of the



environmentalists and the hereditarians on the validity of IQ tests, and the testing processes employed in the United States since the tests were first introduced at the start of the century. The second theme is concerned with the interpretation of, and explanation for, the IQ gap between Blacks and Whites; and the third theme is concerned with the environmentalists' treatment of the history of the relationship between Blacks and Whites in the United States.

### Kujitoo

Kujitoo, as described in Chapter Four and elsewhere, requires that the researcher emphasize considerations of how knowledge is structured and used over the need for dispassion and objectivity. The writings of these two environmentalists reveal that they are not fully in agreement with this Afrocentric canon, in that while they acknowledge that science, both its process and its proceeds, is socially constructed (Gould, 1995; Kamin, 1995a; and Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984), and claim to be fully aware of how scientific knowledge has been, and continues to be, used effectively to further social and political agendas (Gould, 1981 and Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984), they nevertheless proclaim a conflicting belief in its inherent impartiality and integrity (Gould, 1995 and Kamin, 1995a). I will develop this point more fully later, but for the moment, suffice it to say that the environmentalists see the hereditarian position as a betrayal of the inherent integrity of science and it is mainly outrage at this perceived betrayal that has propelled them into the race and IQ debate. Maybe because of this outrage, they appear to share

with me, to a rather limited extent, a rejection of the hereditarian demand that passion and commitment be absent, or at least remain unacknowledged, in any treatment of data.

### Environmentalists as ideologues.

Both Gould and Kamin have stated explicitly that a committed and passionate response to the hereditarian dogmas is needed, especially in reaction to the way in which they employ science against the best interests of the society as a whole, and most particularly its vulnerable members including poor Whites, Hispanics and Blacks (Gould, 1995 and Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984). Despite this declaration, however, their position appears to be constrained by a belief in, and loyalty to, a national academic fraternity that they share with at least some of the hereditarians. For instance, in reacting to The Bell Curve, while they are both quite outspoken about the distortions and misrepresentations in hereditarian theories included in the book (Kamin, 1995a, 1995b and Gould, 1995), they restrict their most severe condemnations for Richard Lynn<sup>4</sup> and Phillippe Rushton, the acknowledged sources for much of Herrnstein and Murray's data, and who, perhaps coincidentally, happen to be Irish and Canadian respectively, and.

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<sup>4</sup>Richard Lynn, of Northern Ireland, has been described by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) as "a leading scholar of racial and ethnic differences" (p.272). He is closely associated with the hereditarian and eugenic movements. He is an associate editor of *Mankind Quarterly* (previously known as *Eugenics Quarterly*), and is a recipient of financial support from The Pioneer Fund.

therefore, are not members of the American intellectual elite.<sup>5</sup> Kamin is the more explicit on this point, and has argued that:

Lynn's distortions and misrepresentations of the data constitute a truly venomous racism, combined with scandalous disregard for scientific objectivity. But to anybody familiar with Lynn's work and background, this comes as no surprise. Lynn is widely known to be an associate editor of the vulgarly racist journal *Mankind Quarterly*; his 1991 paper comparing the intelligence of "Negroids" and "Negroid-Caucasoid hybrids" appeared in its pages. He is a major recipient of financial support from the nativist and eugenically oriented Pioneer Fund. It is a matter of shame and disgrace that two eminent social scientists, fully aware of the sensitivity of the issues they address, take as their scientific tutor Richard Lynn, and accept uncritically his surveys of research. (Kamin, 1995a, p. 86)

And he concluded that:

To admit Lynn and Rushton into the scientific mainstream - I'll say it bluntly- is a betrayal of science. To say this out loud is not to advocate what Malcolm Browne describes as a "shroud of censorship imposed upon scientists and scholars by pressure groups." It is a simple defense of truth and integrity in science. Herrnstein and Murray's defense of Rushton's racist claptrap - "we expect that time will tell whether it is right or wrong in fact" - is couched in the tones of moderation and reason. In my view both the work and its defense are contemptible. (Kamin, 1995a, pp. 102-103)

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<sup>5</sup>This may be purely coincidental, but the most prominent proponents of both the environmentalist and the hereditarian positions are members of elite Ivy League university faculties as these were defined by Murray (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). I restrict the term prominent to describe those identified by Snyderman and Rothman (1988) as popularly associated with the respective views. These would include Kamin, formerly of Princeton and now at Northeastern, and Gould of Harvard, as environmentalists; and Jensen of California, Berkeley, and Murray, an associate of Richard Herrnstein, late of Harvard, as hereditarians.

Similarly, Kamin in 1974 and Gould in 1981 showed the same hesitancy to condemn the then topical Arthur Jensen, directly, for the same "racist claptrap" that constituted his 1969 paper, and they reserved specific accusations of racism to long dead historical characters like Robert Yerkes and Carl Brigham. Environmentalists, including these two, seem to possess a strange and unsettling reluctance to directly accuse their own colleagues of "the venomous racism" for which they condemn others who are not so closely associated with them. I have noticed a similar hesitancy among Black conservative environmentalists to directly condemn their conservative colleagues who are hereditarians. Thomas Sowell (1995) and Orlando Patterson (1995), who are both Black and conservative, while strongly disagreeing with Herrnstein and Murray's arguments and conclusions, could only weakly lament that "a Harvard man [Richard Herrnstein], whom I know well and once respected, could engage in such cowardly discourse" (Patterson, 1995, p. 193), and to blame the outrage generated by The Bell Curve on the "shrill denunciations" of those "who should know better" (Sowell, 1995, p. 70).

While I do not doubt the environmentalists' commitment to "fight the doctrine of the Bell Curve both because it is wrong and because it will, if activated, cut off all possibility of proper nurturance for everyone's intelligence" (Gould, 1995, p. 13), I believe that their criticisms are often muted by two forces, the first of which is the embarrassment and shame that they experience, and which Kamin (1995a) and Patterson (1995) have

described above, because eminent social scientists who are also their colleagues, have betrayed the ideal of scientific objectivity that they are all meant to hold dear. The second force is the fear of being accused of employing uncollegial and ideological pressure group tactics to impose "a shroud of censorship on scientists and scholars" (see quotation above) as they are frequently accused of doing by their hereditarian opponents (Eysenck, 1991; Jensen, 1984; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; and Rushton, 1995). I find this ambivalence exceedingly unsettling, for it belies the very objectivity that is so often extolled by the environmentalists, and it leaves the reader to infer from their writings that hereditarians, including distinguished American scientists and scholars, are "venomously racist" (see Kamin's quotation above). This ambivalence is dishonest because the same charges of racism and duplicity levelled at those like Richard Lynn and Phillippe Rushton, are clearly applicable to Jensen and Murray, and other prominent hereditarian scholars. For instance, Arthur Jensen, like both Lynn and Rushton, as I have already documented in Chapter Four, is a recipient of funding from the "nativist and eugenically oriented Pioneer Fund". In addition, Herrnstein and Murray publicly recognized their close professional ties with both Lynn and Rushton in the acknowledgements to their book, The Bell Curve, and many of their sources were contributors to the abhorrent publication Mankind Quarterly, which Kamin, quite correctly, despises. Therefore, since the hereditarians publicly acknowledge their relationships and inter-reliance, and their works include almost identical arguments and sources, it is difficult to see why these environmentalists save their venom for Rushton and Lynn, while sparing Herrnstein,

Murray and Jensen, accusing them only of a "betrayal of science" rather than of the racism that I believe all these hereditarian works share.

Scientific integrity.

These environmentalists demonstrate an overweening desire to protect the inherent truth and integrity of science, as they perceive it, from debasement by the hereditarians, and that this is at the root of their involvement in this debate (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1974). The evidence suggests that while their professed outrage at the racism embedded within the hereditarian writings is entirely genuine, it is only of secondary importance, for the core of environmentalist concern is the "betrayal" that occurs when science is used for racist purposes. Both Kamin and Gould explicitly confirm this view. For instance, Kamin has recently argued that the hereditarian ruse of :

... provid[ing] a "scientific" basis for their reactionary politics may be a clever political tactic, but it is a disservice to and abuse of science. That should be clear even to those scientists (I am not one of them) who are comfortable with Herrnstein and Murray's politics. We owe it to our fellow citizens to explain that the reception of their book had nothing to do with either its scientific merit or the novelty of its message. (Kamin, 1995a, p. 105)

And Kamin had merely reiterated Gould's earlier argument where he accused the hereditarians of "advocacy of social policy couched as a dispassionate inquiry into scientific fact" (Gould, 1981, p. 47).

It is also important to point out that despite the frequent acknowledgements by these environmentalists that the hereditarian views are both wrong and dangerous, they both go to great pain to support the right to express these views, with no more than a cursory consideration of the dangers to which the victims of these theories, such as us Blacks, can be subjected. As an illustration, Gould has confessed that:

Herrnstein and Murray claim that they only want a hearing for unpopular views so that truth will out. And here, for once, I agree entirely. As a card-carrying First Amendment (near) absolutist, I applaud the publication of unpopular views that some people consider dangerous. I am delighted that the Bell Curve was written - so that its errors could be exposed, for Herrnstein and Murray are right to point out the difference between public and private agendas on race, and we must struggle to make an impact on the private agenda as well. (1995, p. 12)

And Kamin, in a similar vein, has conceded that:

There is, of course, the theoretical possibility that the genetic theorists are correct. Perhaps IQ is highly heritable; and perhaps differences between races, as well as among individuals, are in large measure due to heredity. There are serious scholars who have assumed this, and who have laboured to adduce supporting evidence. Their data ought not to be ignored, and they deserve a careful scrutiny. That scrutiny is a scientific necessity, even though the social and political policies advocated by many hereditarian theorists are in no sense compelled or justified by the facts which they assert to be true. (Kamin, 1995b, pp. 506-507)

As an African person, I can neither share Gould's delight nor Kamin's passive rationality in the resurgence of another dispute about African intellectual ability, since I have more than a professional or academic interest in this debate and its consequences. It is widely acknowledged among environmentalists, including Gould and Kamin, that the hereditarians do not confine their hypotheses to the supposedly rational and professional

academe, where they could conceivably remain as hypotheses, yet to be tested, and debated as such. Instead the hereditarians have diligently spread their doctrine to an untrained public through the popular media, and to receptive policymakers who appear only too eager to use their "expert" knowledge to aid them in making policy decisions (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1995b). As Blacks, we have frequently felt the brunt of such influences. Dating back to the Reconstruction era following the American Civil War, racists like Louis Agassiz<sup>6</sup> with "expert" knowledge of the degradation and degeneracy of Blacks (Gould, 1981) must have helped to set the stage to legitimize the, often violent, opposition to Black civic participation during that very brief period of hope that was Reconstruction. The hereditarians still continue to proffer their expert knowledge of innate Black pathologies to help to overturn or to retard any public program or policy that is generally thought to benefit Blacks. Two important examples of this, both of which were mentioned previously, are firstly, Henry Garrett's appearance as expert witness in the 1954 Brown desegregation case in which he testified that Blacks could not benefit from the same education offered to Whites because we are inherently unsuited to such demanding intellectual pursuits; and secondly, Jensen's and Murray's arguments, in both their writings and to congressional committees, against the desegregation of schools

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<sup>6</sup>Louis Agassiz was described by Stephen Jay Gould in The Mismeasure of Man as a Harvard professor and the leading nineteenth century spokesman for polygeny, which Gould claimed was at that time so closely associated with American thinking on human origins, that it was referred to as the American School of Anthropology. He quoted a letter from Agassiz to his mother on page 45 in which he described the "unhappiness for the White race - to have tied their existence so closely with that of Negroes in certain countries - God preserve us from such a contact!"



and affirmative action, respectively, on the grounds that these measures selectively benefit Blacks. The environmentalists do not generally suggest any sustained countermeasures to such militant advocacy, instead, they appear to prefer to confine their opposition solely to the realm of the genteel academic debate, and in only very few instances is liberatory action advocated. In fact, only Kamin, in Not in Our Genes, which he co-authored with Lewontin and Rose, and as I have pointed out earlier in this chapter, explicitly calls for liberatory political action to counter the dangers inherent in the hereditarian onslaught of biological determinism. Gould never does. Beyond this single instance, Kamin generally, and Gould always, appear to be more interested in, from an Afrocentric perspective, the futile academic exercise of debating, "in niggling detail" (see earlier reference in this chapter), the hereditarian theories of Black intellectual inferiority. Within their self-appointed roles of professional critics (as Kamin describes it) of hereditarianism, they are constrained by the traditional Eurocentric views of what constitutes valid targets of criticism, so that they focus only on the forms and content of the hereditarian arguments, and neglect the larger question of the potential and actual effects of these debates on the lives of real people, as an Afrocentric approach would have required.

### Ujamaa

Ujamaa has already been defined as the Afrocentric research canon which requires that the researcher reject any presumed or forced separation between researcher and subject,

and that theory and practice be informed by the actual and aspired interests of the affected community. Within the specific context of the environmentalist views on race and IQ, this canon refers to the structure and composition of the environmentalist community, their intra- and extra-group relationships and their perspectives on the issues addressed by the canon, that is, their relationship both to the subject material and subject community of their research. The extra-group relationships that are of particular interest to this portion of the study are three-fold, namely, those between the environmentalists and firstly, the rest of the broader academic community; secondly, the White lay community; and, lastly, the Black community.

#### The environmentalist community.

As described in the previous section, the environmentalist community is made up of scholars who share what seems to be a visceral revulsion to the hereditarian theories propagated by the likes of the four hereditarians discussed in the previous chapter: Arthur Jensen, Hans Eysenck, Phillippe Rushton, and Charles Murray. The revulsion described by the environmentalist scholars seem to have arisen from two principal causes, the first of which is their shared perception of a notion of a fair and just society (Gould, 1995; and Kamin, 1995a); and the second is their shared views about the nature and the role of science (Gould, 1981, 1995; Kamin, 1995; and Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984). The environmentalists tend to be, to a greater or lesser degree, ideologically egalitarian, and their views on the justness and fairness of society seem to be influenced by these

egalitarian leanings. Both Kamin (Kamin, 1995; and Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984) and Gould (1995), among other environmentalists,<sup>7</sup> express great concern over the plight of the powerless, all tending to concur that there is an oppressive intent to the hereditarian scholarship on race and IQ. This is the conclusion that Kamin arrived at after he first examined the intelligence literature in 1972, as was earlier described in his biographical notes. Fancher (1980), in his biographical chapter on Kamin, reported that:

Kamin decided [that] the history of testing [had] been one long attempt to keep minorities and the lower classes from usurping the privileges of those in power, [and] this politicization of science included data on IQ heritability.

And Gould (1981) concluded similarly in commenting on the oppressive nature and effects of hereditarian scholarship:

We pass through this world but once. Few tragedies can be more extensive than the stunting of life, few injustices deeper than the denial of an opportunity to strive for or even to hope, by a limit imposed from without, but falsely identified as lying within.

There is abundant evidence that Kamin's and Gould's conclusions were shared by other environmentalists, including Kamin's co-authors on Not In Our Genes, and they saw the new hereditarian onslaught of the late sixties as a reaction to the recent radicalization of

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<sup>7</sup>Other environmentalists who share these views include Kamin's co-authors R. C. Lewontin and Steven Rose of Not In Our Genes; James Flynn of Race, IQ and Jensen, published in 1980; and Elaine and Harry Mensh of The IQ Mythology, published in 1991.

the underclasses, principally, the socially and politically ostracized Black people. In Not In Our Genes, they wrote:

All of these recent political manifestations of biological determinism have in common that they are directly opposed to the political and social demands of those without power. The postwar period in Britain and America, especially in the last twenty-five years, has been marked by increasing militancy on the part of groups that have previously made few pressing demands. This militancy was in part a consequence of economic and social changes produced by the Second World War (Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984, p. 21).

It has been clearly demonstrated in the preceding pages that the environmentalists, like Kamin and Gould, regard the hereditarian theories on race and IQ as a form of "scientific racism" as Gould (1981, p. 15) termed it. That is, they regard hereditarian scholarship as unfair and unjust attacks on those, especially Blacks, who are quite powerless to defend themselves, and they regard these attacks as a betrayal of the inherent nobility and objectivity of science, and themselves as leading the fight against this form of racism. However, as with many well-intentioned idealists, in their effort to counter the hereditarian zealotry, and to protect an institution that they hold dear, that is, the academic fraternity, they have overlooked the fact that the designated victims, Blacks, are more than silent and passive victims, but are also, and should be, important players in this IQ game. This issue of the relationship between environmentalists and the Black community will be examined more fully later in this chapter.

The second source of the environmentalists' revulsion against hereditarian scholarship, as mentioned earlier, is their views on the nature of science and the role of scientists. I have mentioned before, too, that the environmentalists see science as intrinsically noble, possessing the ideals of both integrity and truth, but they believe that these ideals can only be realised when science is pursued in an objective and honest manner, which, they argue, the hereditarians have consistently failed to do. Moreover, they do not appear to view "objectivity" in the same way that the hereditarians do, that is, as "being free from social and political taint", but rather, see the practice and the outcomes of science as being inextricably bound to their social and political contexts (Gould, 1981). As Gould has described it:

Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity. It progresses by hunch, vision, and intuition. Much of its change through time does not record a closer approach to absolute truth, but the alteration of cultural contexts that influence it so strongly. Facts are not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also influences what we see and how we see it. Theories, moreover, are not inexorable inductions from facts. The most creative theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts: the source of imagination is also strongly cultural (1981, pp. 21-22).

Consequently, and unlike the hereditarians, they do not see science, especially that directly involving human actions, as a dispassionate activity, but rather as a committed and noble search for better and better explanations of the phenomena being investigated (Gould, 1981 and Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984). In the specific case concerning race and IQ, while they still maintain that the normal tenets of scientific research be observed, that is, that there be a disciplined search for plausible explanations by proposing and

testing appropriate hypotheses, they believe that the hereditarians have not been faithful to this process. They believe that the hereditarians have made the unacceptable jump from hypothesis to proven fact, and these so-called facts about Black intellectual inferiority, because they have such potentially serious consequences, they need a more direct and passionate challenge than would otherwise have been necessary. This passionate and committed challenge to hereditarianism is an important part of the environmentalist agenda. This is clearly acknowledged in The Mismeasure of Man, where Gould openly commended the well-known environmentalist scholar, Ashley Montagu, for "leading the fight against scientific racism for so many years without becoming cynical about human possibilities" (Gould, 1981, p. 15), and also in Not In Our Genes, where the trio, Lewontin, Rose and Kamin (1984), declared their intention to employ a critical science towards creating a more socially just society and, thereby, to challenge the interests of the dominant class, gender, and race.

The environmentalists, as can be seen above, and unlike the hereditarians, do not demand a clear separation between researcher and subject, and, as pointed out above also, describe themselves as committed to furthering a distinctly socialist ideological and political agenda that has as its aim a more fair and just society (Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984). Therefore, they do not see the researcher as a disinterested expert who answers only to his or her peers but as an impassioned, but fair and objective, protector of scientific truth. It must be acknowledged that they too, like the hereditarians, liberally

exploit the popular media to engage and encourage targeted White audiences to resist the hereditarian dogmas. It would seem that the environmentalist position on race and IQ, that is, while accepting a theoretical possibility that IQ is heritable, challenge a race-based explanation for the difference in IQ scores between Blacks and Whites, is, in fact, more representative of the mainstream scientific and lay communities than the hereditarian position (Flynn, 1980; Jencks, 1972; and Taylor, 1980). This fact could possibly explain, at least partially, why the hereditarians generate so much more controversy, and their views are so much more willingly disseminated by the media (possibly because they are viewed as tantalizingly daring, appealing more to the general public's secret suspicions than to their public utterances) than the environmentalists' views. In fact Snyderman and Rothman's 1988 study confirms the close affinity between mainstream and environmentalists' views. They have reported that the majority of their testing experts believed that while it is likely that heredity plays some role in the distribution of IQ, they reject the hypothesis that Blacks are genetically inferior to Whites. There is evidence to support my view. Fancher has reported that Kamin has attested publicly that "the adopted child studies, like the separated twin studies, seem to me to offer no evidence sufficient to reject the hypothesis of zero heritability of IQ scores" (1985, p. 211).<sup>8</sup> And he also suggested that the hereditarian position, like

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<sup>8</sup>Fancher claimed to be quoting here from an address given by Kamin to the Eastern Psychological Association in 1972.

Kamin's has been portrayed inaccurately by the hereditarians as an outright rejection of the heritability of IQ. As he has pointed out:

Kamin ... did not absolutely deny that intelligence is inheritable, but argued that zero or very low heritability cannot be ruled out. In contrast, he saw the reality of a substantial environment factor as unquestionably established by the greater IQ differences between better separated pairs of identical twins, and by the enhanced IQ levels of adopted children in good homes. Also like Mill, Kamin claimed it is both scientifically unwarranted and ethically irresponsible to abandon environmentalistic hypotheses, and the social programs based on them, because of an assumption that most of the variance in human intellectual ability is hereditary or innate (1985, p. 211).

Much like the hereditarians, the environmentalist have differing levels and kinds of relationships with the stake-holding communities identified earlier, namely, their ideological colleagues, other academics, the White lay community and the Black community. Within the environmentalist community, there does not seem to be the degree of collegial loyalty and support that is evident among the hereditarians. Although I have been able to find no mutual criticisms between the two environmentalists who are the focus of my study, there is generally criticism among other environmentalist scholars. For instance, Kamin's co-author, Richard Lewontin, in his review of The Mismeasure of Man, severely criticized Gould for an incomplete analysis of the place of racism in the hereditarian movement. He charged that in Gould's work "biological determinism appears as a disarticulated cultural artifact, nasty and curious ... but not integrated into any structure of social relations" (1981, p. 16). Also, Elaine and Harry Mensh (1991), self-acknowledged environmentalists, took Gould to task too for what they believed to



be an inadequate analysis of the relationship between social, political, and economic inequality and IQ. There have been other self-declared environmentalists like James Flynn (1980) who were willing to tackle other environmentalists on points of disagreement.

### Relationships with White communities.

I want to turn now to the environmentalists' relationship with the rest of the academic community and with the White lay community. I have come to the conclusion that these are the two groups that are deliberately targeted by these scholars as being the necessary collaborators to bring about the social and political changes that they desire. I believe too that the environmentalists are fuelled by concern that what the hereditarians refer to as "common sense knowledge" of a racial hierarchy in intelligence, based on the historical experiences of White domination over Blacks, could hold more currency among the general White population than they are prepared to admit, and that much of the environmentalist arguments are, in effect, indirect appeals to the better nature of their fellow Whites. This is the only explanation I can offer for the passion of their opposition to hereditarianism, and their failure to acknowledge a Black audience or a Black perspective. For, if they truly believed that the hereditarian theories of Black intellectual inferiority were simply and obviously wrong, as they clearly are, they ought to expect the ordinary good sense and judgement of the general populace to quickly dismiss such wrong ideas. Instead, I am suggesting, they are afraid, and rightfully so, that the

hereditarian teachings could serve as an excuse and justification for the unvoiced suspicions of Black intellectual inferiority. There is evidence to support my speculations in my two subjects' own writings. They both lament the readiness with which lawmakers and others use the hereditarians "expert" knowledge of Black intellectual inferiority to try to repeal programs and policies that were created to benefit Blacks (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1995a). They have both, for instance, described in detail the role of the early hereditarians like Robert Yerkes and Carl Brigham in the creation of immigration laws intended to deny entry to certain European nationalities during the 1920s on the grounds that they were intellectually deficient (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1995b). More recently, too, Kamin has pointed to the fervour with which Murray and Herrnstein, and their Conservative allies, have been calling for the repeal of the affirmative action laws created to redress past discrimination against Blacks and women (Kamin, 1995a).

#### Relationship with the Black community.

As I have said before, my environmentalist subjects do not appear to acknowledge or concede a role for Blacks in this race and IQ debate. I have pointed out in the previous paragraph that I believe all their arguments are addressed to White audiences, and that Blacks appear to be regarded as silent and invisible victims. In fact, the environmentalists manifest a disturbingly patronizing relationship with the African community, never appearing to appreciate them as currently or potentially active participants in their own cause. I find it truly disturbing that African perspectives and

experiences are so consistently ignored in research on Black intellectual performance, even by these well-meaning environmentalists. To the environmentalists the Black viewpoint appears to have no merit simply, as I have already said, because Blacks are not seen as players in this IQ game, but only as victims. They have shown no interest in the experiences of Blacks themselves, which, as I have argued in relation to the hereditarians, leads to inevitably incomplete analyses. I have deliberately and diligently searched the writings of these scholars looking for some awareness of a Black perspective, and found none. And this is despite the fact that Blacks have been articulate critics of hereditarianism since the early twentieth century, at least, when IQ testing began (DuBois, 1914 and Thomas, 1982). In fact, the only time Blacks are mentioned at all are in relation to stereotypical views and situations. Gould (1981), for example, alludes to George Jackson, the notorious San Quentin prison inmate who was shot by prison guards before he could be released, in a reference to the stereotypical defiance of the Black revolutionary. I have read the writings of George Jackson, and nowhere has he addressed, either directly or indirectly, any of the issues that Gould addressed in The Mismeasure of Man, or elsewhere, relating to race and IQ. In all of Kamin's writings on race and IQ, and included in my bibliography, I have found references to two Black persons, O. J. Simpson and Willie Horton, both, again, with connections to the criminal justice system (Kamin, 1995a), and again with no relationship to the subject at issue, the race-IQ debate. This state of affairs serves to reinforce my point that the

environmentalists do not take Black scholarship seriously, even on an issue such as this in which we have so much at stake. and ought, naturally, to be expert.

### Utulivu

I have described this canon in earlier chapters as requiring that the researcher actively avoid creating, exaggerating, or sustaining divisions between or within communities, but instead she or he should strive for harmonious relationships. This is a canon that, on the surface at least, and as they themselves would probably claim, appears to be held in high regard by the environmentalists. However, on closer examination, one finds this not to be quite the case, for there is a very striking silence about the Black perspectives on this issue. The fact that the evidence in this section is mainly by omission, there is very little direct evidence available and I have had to infer conclusions from their loud silences.

The fact is, as I will illustrate in the following pages, the environmentalists' works are rife with contradictions, both within the ideology itself, and in the related perceptions of the Black community. Unlike the hereditarians, there is neither an overt nor covert anti-African bias identifiable in the environmentalists' writings, only a deathly absence of African voices. However, I believe that they are genuinely honest and well-meaning in their stated intention to create a fairer and more just society that will enable Black people to participate more fully and more equitably (Gould, 1981; Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984; and Mensh & Mensh, 1991), but it is these contradictions, as will be

described below, which ultimately prevent the harmony, the convergence, between their own social and political goals and those of Black communities. These contradictions will be outlined and discussed in the remainder of this section where I will show how they, inevitably, though unintentionally, lead to distrust and disharmony between many Black constituencies and these well-intentioned environmentalists.

### Egalitarian tendencies.

Ideologically, the environmentalists tend to share many of the positions of the liberal end of the political spectrum,<sup>9</sup> that is, they, in general, advocate social, political and economic equality, including equality of outcomes, among all individuals, and, with few exceptions, they explicitly endorse liberal or other left-leaning political ideologies<sup>10</sup> (Gould, 1981 and Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984). This belief in egalitarianism, while commendable in itself, when it comes to the issue of Black participation in the United States society, is extremely naive and useless if one is not prepared to consider seriously

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<sup>9</sup>Notable exceptions being Black conservative environmentalists like Thomas Sowell and Orlando Patterson (both already mentioned), who while they agree with the environmentalist position that the racial disparity in IQ scores is not a function of race, they nevertheless, subscribe to the conservative ideology of the paramountcy of a meritocracy based on a free enterprise system in which each individual is accorded benefits in relation to their worth.

<sup>10</sup>Kamin, for instance, in Not In Our Genes, along with Lewontin and Rose described himself as a socialist. In addition, many other critics of IQ testing, such as Joseph Nahem in Psychology and Psychiatry Today, and Elaine and Harry Mensh (already mentioned), use a Marxist analysis to conclude that the tests are part of a pattern of class and racial oppression.

the peculiar history and current position of Blacks in the United States. Specifically, when it comes to the issue of Black underperformance on IQ tests, these environmentalists provide no real critical analysis of race or of race relations in the United States, (Lewontin, 1981 and Mensh & Mensh, 1991), but usually, and very simplistically, much in the tradition of the renowned liberals Daniel Patrick Moynihan and James Coleman, as will be illustrated later, they appear to see racism as, surprisingly, a thing of the past which, nevertheless, has been a contributing factor to the "tangle of pathologies" (Moynihan, 1965) that are said to be the source of the current Black disadvantaged status.

I believe that the impetus for much of the social reforms of the last three or four decades that were meant to assist Black people to participate more fully in American society, reforms such as compensatory education and affirmative action programs, was, in effect, a liberal reaction to, and embrace of, the passion of the Civil Rights Movement and the recognition of White culpability in the long history of Black subjugation. Prior to the 1960s, the widespread acceptance of discrimination against Blacks suggests that there was some shared rationale, at least among Whites, that explained why Blacks deserved to be treated differently, and so much worse, than other Americans. I believe that the ostracism of Blacks was easily rationalized by a, then, widespread belief in Black inferiority, including intellectual inferiority. A number of Whites, both environmentalists and hereditarians, confirm my belief, and they even go further to claim that much of this

feeling still exists among many Whites, with the difference today being that it is not currently acceptable to voice such beliefs in public, but that this suspicion (and sometimes, conviction), threads many private conversations among Whites (Hacker, 1992; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Rosenblatt, 1995; and Wellman, 1977). The arrival of the Civil Rights Movement forced many who had considered themselves liberal and now, anti-racist, to seriously question the assumption of Black biological inferiority and to search for other explanations for the obvious disadvantages that Blacks were experiencing. However, at that time, as is still very much the case, the Black presence was perceived, in and of itself, as problematic, and the anti-racist liberals, quite erroneously I contend, chose to look for defects within the Black community to explain its disadvantaged status. This was the mood and the outlook, I believe, that was responsible for two very significant reports that appeared in the mid-1960s: The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Moynihan, 1965) and Equality of Educational Opportunity (Coleman, 1966), both of which offered new liberal explanations for Black disadvantage, and which, I also contend, have informed much of the environmentalist writings about race and IQ since that time. In both of these reports, the writers suggested that it was social pathologies within the Black community itself, that is, within its environment and culture, that prevented Blacks from taking advantage of the many opportunities, including educational ones, being offered them. For instance, Coleman (1966) claimed that the poor home environments of Blacks explained their poor academic and testing performances much more successfully than did the inferior quality

of the schooling that Black children received. Moynihan (1965), in a similar vein, blamed a corrupted Black culture that he claimed had partly resulted from a history of slavery, discrimination and poverty. He further claimed these historical misfortunes had destroyed the cornerstone of the Black community, that is, the Black family, and that this, in effect, had created a Black population that, to all intents and purposes, was socially and culturally inferior to the White. As Moynihan (1965) went on to explain, the Black family, and hence the Black community, was "approaching complete breakdown", because, in essence, the "Negro Family" has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it was so out of line with the rest of the American society, seriously retarded the progress of the group as a whole, and imposed a crushing burden on the Black male and, in consequence, a great many Black women as well.

Although neither Moynihan nor Coleman are subjects of this study, because I believe that their works were so instrumental in supplying the environmentalists with a theoretical rationale for racial disadvantage, I will briefly analyze the assumptions behind their findings. It seems to me that the major accomplishment of the new liberal position, as represented by Coleman and Moynihan, was to supply a non-biological explanation for an apparent Black inferiority, with the accompanying argument that, with appropriate intervention, improvement was possible. This same argument as to whether or not an assumed Black inferiority is permanent or not, is at the core of the on-going race and IQ debate between the environmentalists and the hereditarians. And it is this assumption that



I, and many other Afrocentrists and also other Blacks, object to (Asante, 1987; Delpitt, 1988; DuBois, 1914; and Ogbu, 1978; among others). The fact is that both the liberal and environmentalist scholars, much like the hereditarians, when they have compared Black and White behaviours invariably found that Blacks were deficient in some important variable, and this deficiency was always offered as the cause of the original disadvantage that was being investigated. The difference was that, in the case of the liberals and environmentalists, they have suggested that the deficit was correctible with the appropriate external intervention. The implication always was that if the Black community could be made to live and behave more like the White community, the signs of disadvantage such as lower academic performance, lower IQ scores, or greater poverty could be eliminated (Gould, 1974 and Kamin, 1974). This seems to me to be the central idea behind much of the liberal reforming zeal of the 1960s and 1970s which I have already referred to, and of the environmentalist movement that rose up in reaction to Jensen's attacks on Black intellectual abilities with which this study is concerned (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1974). White society, then, in the form of Government, was expected to intervene to create and implement programs that would correct the deficiencies within the Black community to enable them to take advantage of the opportunities that were being offered to them. In the infrequent instances when racism was presented as a culprit, it was as an historical aberration, that is, only as something that had occurred in the distant past and with the implication that contemporary American society was now fair and, in fact, offered many opportunities to Blacks which they could not take

advantage of because of their unfortunate, but remediable, environmental and cultural deficiencies (Coleman, 1966; Gould, 1981; Kamin, 1974; and Moynihan, 1965).

Although I have found no direct connection between either Gould or Kamin, the environmentalist subjects of this study, and the liberal scholars Coleman or Moynihan, all of the first two former scholars' works are infused with much of the views described in the paragraphs above, as critics such as Elaine and Harry Mensh (1991) also point out. In addition, it seems obvious to me that these environmentalists could not fail to be influenced by Coleman's and Moynihan's highly influential publications, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action and Equality of Educational Opportunity, already alluded to above, and which many other scholars agree were, at least, significantly positive influences for the institution of programs like Headstart and the affirmative action initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s (Mensch & Mensch, 1991; Nahem, 1981; and Senna, 1973).

Both of my environmentalist subjects, like the liberals, have been criticized elsewhere for providing inadequate and incomplete analyses of race and racism and for buying into the implicitly racist deficit models of Black behaviours, including intellectual performances, that Moynihan and Coleman have popularized (Lewontin, 1981; Mensch & Mensch, 1991; Nahem, 1981; among others). They are frequently criticized too, especially by Black scholars like Ogbu (1978), as were Coleman and Moynihan (Nahem,

1981 and Senna, 1973, as already mentioned), for failing to see beyond simplistic Black-White comparisons and to look for other factors that could, quite conceivably, offer better explanations for racial variations in IQ than did the pathologic Black model. The effect of all of this, though not necessarily the intent, has been to isolate and label Blacks as effectively inferior, and in need of the protection of the advantaged members of society to which these environmentalists themselves belong.

#### Assimilationist tendencies.

The assumption that Black pathologies are responsible for differences in behaviours between Blacks and Whites lie at the heart of one of the major contradictions in the environmentalist literature, and is the source of much of the disharmony between the environmentalist and Black communities. The contradiction is essentially that while the environmentalists argue for egalitarianism, they are in fact advocating the assimilation of Blacks into the predominant White culture. Kamin (Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984) correctly pointed out the contradictions within the wider society between the myth of equality and the real inequalities that exist within a capitalist society like the US. However, he failed to see the similar contradiction between the equality that he, along with other environmentalists, commendably advocate, and the real assimilationist goal that they pursue. This contradiction is actually an old concern of Black scholarship (Asante, 1987 and Hale-Benson, 1982, for instance), but it is never addressed by the environmentalists and is the source of much of the conflict between the environmentalists

and Black scholars, especially the Afrocentrists like Asante (1988), Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1993), Nobles (1986), and Ogbu (1978). It is this contradiction that has contributed to the liberal and environmentalist misunderstanding of the goals of the Civil Rights Movement, such as Black access to equal education as argued for in the 1954 challenge to segregated schooling by the NAACP and the Black parents of Topeka, Kansas. The assumption of the Black plaintiffs was not that Black children needed to be schooled with Whites in order for them to learn effectively, but was instead a recognition that the "separate but equal" tenet of segregated schooling was not at all intended to be equal. The Black community clearly understood that while political power remained almost exclusively in the hands of Whites, especially in the acknowledgedly racist South, Black children would never be accorded equal schooling if they were educated apart from Whites, so the intention was to get Black children into White institutions with better quality schooling.

A genuine belief in racial equality would require the environmentalists to do more than support compensatory education programs to bring Black people up to a supposed White standard, and there is no evidence of such recognition in any of their writing. Such recognition would require that Black culture and accomplishments, both historical and contemporary, be treated with the same respect as the White, and that these be made accessible to all children through their school curricula, as proposed by the Afrocentric scholars Molefi Asante (1992) and Maulana Karenga (1993), proposals which some

environmentalists, though not Gould nor Kamin,<sup>11</sup> reject outright (Schlesinger, 1993). However, both Gould and Kamin are silent on this issue preferring to focus instead on providing alternative explanations to the hereditarians' argument of Black genetic inferiority. They all ignore the question of curricular content and the effects, if any, on children's school performance.

#### Misinterpreting Black reality.

Another contradiction found in the writings of the environmentalists that contributes to disharmony between themselves and Black communities is the disparity between their unidimensional portrayal of Black communities and the diversity of the Black reality. Both the hereditarians and the environmentalists, for the most part, by failing to address its diversity, portray the Black community as a totally homogeneous group of poor, underachieving, criminally inclined inner-city dwellers although such a portrayal is only partially accurate for a very small minority of even African American population, the group which most of the data specifically addresses (Rosenblatt, 1995). The environmentalists, along with other Whites, fail to appreciate that there are no innate characteristics that define Blacks as a group which could make us prone to the social pathologies that they theorize about. Rather, as Asante (1990) and others have pointed out, we, as Blacks, simply share a common ancestral past and similar experiences and

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<sup>11</sup>Neither Stephen Jay Gould nor Leon Kamin address these proposals in any of their writings on Black intellectual performance. It is such silence as this that I find of great concern.

histories of racism, to which we are subject by virtue of being Black, and the perception and effects of these experiences are by no means uniform within or between Black communities. As Ogbu (1978) and others, including DuBois (1965), have suggested the general White refusal or inability, which includes both Kamin and Gould, to see Black communities as other than a problem to explain and solve, has limited their theories of Black behaviours to deficit models.

Henry J. Grubb (1985), and Ogbu (1978), lend support to my argument that neither the environmentalists nor the hereditarians understand "the Black problem" as it relates to race and IQ. As they both have argued, it is neither the environment nor the genes that is responsible for the IQ deficit between Blacks and Whites, but there could be myriad of explanations, some as yet unexplored, including the two offered as the "cultural distance" (Grubb, 1985) or the assumed "caste" (Ogbu, 1978) approaches, that I have discussed previously in Chapter Two. Grubb and Ogbu certainly offer more useful tools for explaining the real diversity within Black communities than the environmentalists do, since they can explain in individual terms why some apparently disadvantaged persons score well, or advantaged individuals score badly regardless of their racial, genetic or environmental makeup.

### Uhaki

This canon has been described in previous pages as requiring a research procedure that is fair and just to all the participants, especially the objects of the research; and one which is also empathetic to the aspirations, needs, and welfare of all the participants in the research activity. My analysis reveals that while the mandates of fairness and empathy are generally well regarded by both of my environmentalist subjects, their failure to seriously engage the expressed needs and perspectives of Black communities on this critical debate about their own intellectual capacities, means that their possible implementation of these mandates is rather doubtful, as I believe has been the case, for they cannot fully address the best interests of the communities if they do not know what these interests are. I will provide evidence to support these opinions in the remainder of this section, where I will examine, much as I did in Chapter Four for the hereditarians, the environmentalist interpretations and explanations of this notorious Black-White IQ score differential, and the accompanying hereditarian charges of an innate Black intellectual inferiority. I will again be focusing on how these issues are critiqued and interpreted.

### Reactions to IQ research.

As one reads the writings of these environmentalists, as represented by Leon Kamin and Stephen Jay Gould, one gets a distinct, but unfortunate, impression that their scholarly interest lies solely in engaging the more notorious and prominent of the hereditarian

scholars in a public debate about their, admittedly, incorrect views about Black intellectual abilities. While their passionate, and I am sure, committed challenge to the hereditarians must be commended, there remains a sense of unease which I share with other Black scholars (Jones, 1973; Miller, 1976; Ogbu, 1978; Patterson, 1995; and Sowell, 1995) and some White ones as well (Mensh & Mensh, 1991; Nahem, 1981; and Senna, 1973) that, among other concerns which will be discussed later, such a public questioning of our intellectual competence among almost exclusively White scholars is not necessarily in our best interest as Blacks. Other reasons for my unease are that both sides of the debate, but particularly the environmentalists, steadfastly ignore the large Black scholarly contribution to this debate, as I have said before, and this, to my mind, only serves to reinforce the popular perception of Blacks as intellectually incompetent and demonstrating themselves, as the Black psychologist Francis C. Sumner charged many decades ago, "the dominant community's unwillingness to accept the fact that Blacks are capable of scholarly research" (Sumner, 1925). In addition, their preference for criticizing and reacting to the hereditarian arguments "in niggling detail", rather than proposing and undertaking original research to raise, or to answer, different and more important questions than why Blacks score less than Whites on IQ tests, leaves the hereditarians free to set the terms and agenda for this debate, which is a state of affairs clearly not in the Black community's interest.



There is no scarcity of Black scholars who have demonstrated their impressive and expert knowledge of Black intellectual history, and who have been in the forefront, decades before these environmentalists, in challenging assertions of our inferior intellect. William Thomas (1982, 1995), as I have pointed out before, reported on the contribution Blacks have been making to the IQ debate since its inception in the early years of this century. Also, Horace Mann Bond, an acknowledged authority on Black educational history (Fultz, 1985 and Thomas, 1995), and W. E. B. DuBois, acknowledged as one of the greatest minds of the twentieth century (Asante, 1990), have dutifully and ably responded to these challenges during the first three decades of this century (DuBois, 1914 and Fultz, 1985). It is indeed noteworthy that many of the current criticisms that Kamin, Gould, and other contemporary White environmentalists now make of the hereditarians were already being voiced by Black scholars nearly a century ago (DuBois, 1914; Fultz, 1985; and Thomas, 1995). For instance, they were at that time already raising questions about the causal validity of hereditarian studies (Thomas, 1995); pointing out methodological errors and abuses in the assumptions and administration of the tests (Thomas, 1995); and, in addition, doing what neither Gould nor Kamin have elected to do, that is, to develop alternative databases from their own administration of the tests (Flynn, 1980 and Thomas, 1995). Yet, despite all this, these scholars are never cited as authorities by either Gould or Kamin.

The environmentalists are to be commended, however, for recognizing and engaging all the recent political manifestations of biological determinism from such as the four hereditarians in this study, which, as both Kamin (1995a) and Gould (1981, 1995) have pointed out, have in common that they are directly opposed to the political and social demands of those, such as Blacks, without power. In so doing, these environmentalists have tried to do what this canon mandates, in the limited and ill-informed way that they are able to, and look out for the interests of the hereditarians' targets. In their crusade against hereditarian dogma, both Gould and Kamin have proceeded much like lawyers in an adversarial process, primarily emphasizing the weaknesses of the hereditarian and the strength of the environmentalist cases, with little pretence to "objectivity," and with wholesome displays of righteous indignation at the potentially damaging consequences of hereditarianism for the welfare of Blacks and other disadvantaged groups. As Kamin (1974) aptly pointed out, the question of social justice is inextricably entwined in the IQ debate, because,

the I.Q. test in America, and the way in which we think about it, has been fostered by men committed to a particular social view. That view includes the belief that those on the bottom are genetically inferior victims of their own immutable defects. The consequence has been that the I.Q. test has served as an instrument of oppression against the poor - dressed in the trappings of science, rather than politics. The message of science is heard respectfully, particularly when the tidings it carries are soothing to the public conscience. There are few more soothing messages than those historically delivered by the I.Q. testers. The poor, the foreign-born, and racial minorities were shown to be stupid. They were shown to have been born that way. The underprivileged are today demonstrated to be ineducable, a message as soothing to the public purse as to the public conscience. (pp. 1-2)

And, as he pointed out elsewhere (Kamin, 1976a), and as this canon makes clear, those who intellectualize about this issue have a particular responsibility because,

Perhaps ... it is we psychologists who have failed: perhaps again, it is the society in which we live that has failed. Those who care have a double task. We had better build a better psychology; and we had better help to build, quickly, a better society. (p. 262)

### Interpreting the IQ data.

There is a clearly observable difference between the way environmentalists and hereditarians interpret the data on IQ and race that has tremendous implications for the well-being of Black people, and both Gould (1995) and Kamin (1974) have openly acknowledged this fact. As Kamin himself has pointed out, both groups are actively and vigorously trying to influence public policy and opinion, but with diametrically opposite intentions for the future of Blacks. Kamin (1974, p. 3) has pointed out:

Throughout my own review of the empirical evidence I have commented on the differences between my reading of the data and those of Professors Jensen and Herrnstein. Their views, I believe, are fundamentally incorrect. There is more involved here than a disagreement among scientists about how to interpret a particular set of complex data. The views of Professors Jensen and Herrnstein have been influential in circles extending considerably beyond the academy. Their interpretations of the I.Q. data have been presented to committees of the Congress concerned with the formulation of domestic welfare policies. The hope I have had in writing is not only to contribute to scientific knowledge, but also to influence policy makers, and, perhaps, some scientists who do not recognize that their science and their politics are not clearly separable.

And Gould (1981), while he does not go so far as Kamin does to state his express intention to influence policy and opinion, does recognize that there are important differences in the approaches of the two groups and that these differences have important consequences. He noted that

The difference between strict hereditarians and their opponents is not, as some caricatures suggest, the belief that a child's performance is all inborn or all a function of environment and learning ... The differences are more a matter of social policy and educational practice. Hereditarians view their measures of intelligence as markers of permanent, inborn limits. Children, so labeled, should be sorted, trained according to their inheritance and channelled into professions appropriate for their biology. Mental testing becomes a theory of limits. Antihereditarians ... test in order to identify and help. Without denying the evident fact that not all children, whatever their training, will enter the company of Newton and Einstein, they emphasize the power of creative education to increase the achievements of all children, often in extensive and unanticipated ways. Mental testing becomes a theory for enhancing potential through proper education. (p. 152)

Snyderman and Rothman (1988) point to Kamin and Gould as two of the best illustrations of the environmentalist as activist. These two fight against the impact of the anti-African bias that is an inherent part of the hereditarian advocacy for the elimination of programs that are meant to redress the effects of past discrimination against Blacks, and against a rigidly hierarchical society where everyone is assigned a place as determined by their measured IQ, as advocated by Murray (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Nevertheless, despite their repeated rejection of the hereditarian concept of IQ as destiny, and of significant genetic differences between Blacks and Whites (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1974, for example), their writings are still loaded with what are, I believe,

unintentional stereotypes of Blacks as endowed with brute strength over intellect. As I have pointed out before, I have found no reference to any Black scholarship in the writings of these environmentalists, yet, as I will demonstrate below, there are frequent references to Black athletic prowess (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1981). One of the most striking references was made by Kamin to Jensen's 1974 findings comparing reaction times between Blacks and Whites. Kamin (1981) had this to say:

The Jensen data on reaction times seem to me inherently implausible. What conclusions can we draw from his supposed demonstration that blacks are inferior to whites in the speed with which they respond to complex visual information? We would have to conclude that in occupations which demand fast response to complex visual displays - for example, professional boxing and basketball - blacks would be underrepresented. This is obviously not the case, and it seems to me that any sensible person would conclude that an error of some kind has found its way into Jensen's data or procedures. (p. 143)

And, a decade and a half later he again comments on the same kind of data presented, once again, by Jensen:

To anybody who has ever watched a professional basketball game, the idea that blacks are incapable of making quick choices about how to respond to complex and changing visual displays will not be very convincing. How can scientists talk themselves into believing such a thing? But then, how can they talk themselves into believing that half of all Africans are mentally retarded? The answer to such questions doesn't require much thought. (pp. 88-89)

While I do share Kamin's view about the incorrectness of Jensen's conclusions above, I am struck by the conviction with which he argues here, a conviction that is certainly not present when he takes Jensen and others to task, correctly, for their conclusions relating

to Black intellectual deficiencies. It seems apparent to me that, despite their best intentions, these environmentalists are affected by the stereotypes that abound about Black abilities, and it is this belief that makes me somewhat ambivalent about accepting wholeheartedly their egalitarian credentials. It is equally striking too, that these environmentalists are unable to reference, even critically, any Black scholars writing about race and IQ when they both must have Black colleagues at their respective institutions who have published in this or related areas. For instance, the distinguished sociologist, Orlando Patterson, is Gould's colleague at Harvard and he has published, simultaneously with Gould, a critique of The Bell Curve in the collection of essays edited by Steven Fraser called The Bell Curve Wars, yet there is no indication in Gould's work that he is aware of Patterson's existence or publications. The point I want to make here is that even well-meaning environmentalists unintentionally perpetuate the stereotypes of Black intellectual prowess by what they choose to include, or to omit, as evidence, in their writing, and this reinforcement of negative stereotyping of Blacks is even more harmful for our welfare, and therefore unjust, when it comes from sources who are ostensibly acting to support us.

### Ukweli

This canon has been described previously as requiring a research procedure that is grounded in the experiences of the community being researched so that the truth can be told about the lives of its members. The experiences of the community members must

become the ultimate authority in determining what is true about that group and, therefore, the final arbiter of the validity of research about their lives. My analysis reveals that the environmentalists patronizingly ignore the real life and historical experiences of Black people, and, consequently, come to conclusions, much as the hereditarians do, that do not match our experiences, and which, as I have argued before, cannot, therefore, tell the whole truth about our lives. As my analysis will show, the environmentalists have a view of Black people that is influenced more by the prevailing stereotypes than by our own experiences. This lack of fit between the environmentalists' views and Black experiences, I believe, have resulted from two main reasons, the first of which is Eurocentrism and the other is the traditional view of Blacks in White dominated societies as the natural underclass. Both of these reasons, incidentally, also apply to the hereditarians. However, what distinguishes the environmentalists from the hereditarians in the context of this canon, is that the environmentalists display a more benevolent attitude towards the Black community, in contrast to the antagonism generally exhibited by the hereditarians. I believe though that their own experiences have made them unprepared and unwilling to look beyond their own experiences as Whites, that is, to look behind DuBois' metaphorical veil (DuBois, 1965) that hides the reality of Black lives from their understanding. These positions will be expanded on and explained in the remainder of this section where I will seek to show the obvious disconnection between the environmentalists and the Black community as related, specifically, to the three themes identified for this canon earlier in this chapter, namely, the use and validity of IQ

tests: the importance of the Black-White gap in IQ scores; and, lastly, the relationship between Blacks and Whites.

#### Use and validity of IQ tests.

As I discussed earlier in this chapter in the section headed *Kujitoo*, the environmentalists, as represented by Gould and Kamin, restrict much of their criticisms of IQ tests and their uses to hereditarian deviations from the proper scientific procedures (Gould, 1981, 1995 and Kamin, 1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1995b), that is, they appear to believe that intelligence can be quantified so long as the approved procedures are followed. For example, the focus of Kamin's criticisms, as illustrated by his now famous exposure of the late, eminent, British psychologist, Sir Cyril Burt (Kamin, 1974, 1976a, 1976b), has been that hereditarians employ finanglings, fallacies, and fraudulent tactics that make their data suspect at best, and at worst, totally useless. In Burt's case he found that his reports of his seminal studies on the heritability of IQ using both MZ twins and kinship testing data were not believable because they did not conform to acceptable standards of scientific reporting. Specifically, he found that Burt underreported his data, in that he did not provide information about dates, times, and nature of tests used to measure the IQ of his subjects. He also found, as I reported earlier, that Burt's data were too perfect to be believable because they did not appear to possess the degree of uncertainty or experimental error normally expected in scientific measurements. Kamin (1981) also recorded that his suspicions were aroused by Jensen's reaction rates studies (Jensen,



1974) when Jensen failed to follow the correct protocol and refused his repeated requests to have his raw data inspected. It is important to note that some Black psychologists, most notably Hilliard (1987) and Ogbu (1978), agree with the environmentalists that the hereditarians consistently fail to meet minimal scientific standards. But the Black criticisms tend to go beyond issues of the scientific process to raise questions about the racist intent of the tests, which many believe is to legitimize the status quo, where Blacks are, as they have always been in modern American history, at the bottom of the totem pole (Dent et al., 1987 and Hilliard, 1987). As evidence of this intent, Hilliard recalled overhearing David Weschler, the author of the well-known WISC tests, make the assertion that the tests are really meant to rank people (Hilliard, 1987). In fact, the approved scientific methods that the environmentalists prefer could, and do, still rank races, classes, and individuals in much the same way as deviant methods of the hereditarians. The Black community's concern about using the tests for purposes of ranking is at the heart of the class-action suits brought against various School Boards by Black parents and organizations (Dent et al., 1987; Hilliard, 1987; Ogbu, 1978; and Williams, 1971) which have resulted in IQ tests being banned in some US states.

Gould and Kamin, among the environmentalists, do not dispute the validity or use of IQ tests as genuine measures of intelligence (Mensh & Mensh, 1991), but challenge instead the procedures, including mathematical procedures, used by the hereditarians to arrive at their conclusions regarding the nature of IQ, including claims about its heritability; and

the meanings of the test scores (Gould, 1981 and Kamin, 1981). For instance, Gould used a significant portion of The Mismeasure of Man (Gould, 1981) to question the statistical procedure called factor analysis, asking whether Spearman, Jensen, and the other hereditarians could reasonably conclude that this statistical procedure could actually reveal the existence of a biological entity called intelligence, or the *g*-factor, as they have claimed (in Jensen, 1969 for example). As he later proclaimed (Gould, 1995, p. 16):

Nothing in The Bell Curve angered me more than the authors' failure to supply any justification for their central claim, the sine qua non of their entire argument: that the number known as *g*, the celebrated "general factor" of intelligence, first identified by the British psychologist Charles Spearman, in 1904, captures a real property in the head.

However, while the environmentalists do challenge the reification of intelligence as a real biological quantity, they seem willing to concede that though imaginary, it is a potentially useful mathematical construct<sup>12</sup> (Gould, 1981; Kamin, 1974; and Mensh & Mensh, 1991). The environmentalists, because they have accepted the fallacious premise that intelligence is measurable, tend to overlook their own technical criticisms and, paradoxically, they have ended up accepting the very hypotheses and assumptions they had apparently rejected. The environmentalists, in essence, have accepted that the tests

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<sup>12</sup>Part of the environmentalist protest against hereditarianism, as Elaine and Harry Mensh see it (see Mensh & Mensh, 1991), is that the hereditarians prefer to view IQ testing as a theory of limits rather than as a chance to increase opportunities for the disadvantaged, as they themselves would have preferred.

are useful for the many assessment and diagnostic purposes that have been claimed by the testing proponents, including hereditarians. Proof of this is in Gould's lauding of the tests for diagnosing his learning-disabled son, which I have already mentioned earlier in this chapter (Gould, 1981). What these environmentalists have done, in effect, is to dissociate IQ tests from their long discredited forbears such as phrenology and craniometry which were also used to justify Black people's inferior status in the society. In fact, the environmentalist reviews of the hereditarian works corroborated the Black suspicion that they, the hereditarians, were prepared to go to great lengths in trying to make their results match their prior assumptions about a biological ranking of races, and that these devious tactics have been supported, and reinforced, by the racist culture from which IQ tests emerged.

Gould (1981), and Kamin (1981) to a more limited extent, criticized what they considered to be the hereditarian departure from Binet's original intention that the tests be used for remedial rather than for custodial purposes, which they imply ought to be the proper role for these tests. But, as Hilliard (1987) pointed out, the pedagogical utility of intelligence tests for remedial purposes such as teaching and learning is questionable and, he claimed,

worse still, traditionally, it [pedagogical utility] has not even been the guiding purpose for assessment. In general, the main purpose of IQ testing has been to rank, to classify, and to label children for placement into special education categories or academic tracks, presumably for special pedagogical treatment. Yet we cannot demonstrate that there is a valid

relationship among testing, ranking, classification, labelling, placement, treatment, and successful results! (Hilliard, 1989, p. 126)

And, as Hilliard claimed elsewhere:

Without valid or meaningful prediction, we are left with but one major use of IQ tests in education. That use is to **sort** [emphasis in original] students into categories so that they may be treated in special ways. This assumes that the classifications will yield intellectually homogenous groups of students who can and should be given a unique educational treatment as a group. (Hilliard, 1987, p. 140)

This fear that the tests have been used, and were deliberately intended, to justify, in what can be claimed as an objective way, the selection of Black children for what has amounted to a de facto segregated, and inferior, schooling was addressed directly in the court challenges mentioned before, which were brought by Black parents and organizations against various School Boards. Elaine and Harry Mensh confirm the Black community's fear that despite the best intentions of the environmentalists there has been no evidence so far that the tests have been used to improve the education of Blacks, or any other groups who are recognized as disadvantaged. As they pointed out:

In the many decades since the first army tests, a great number of tests have been interpreted from an environmentalist stand point, yet there is no instance when the tests have helped to promote equality of opportunity. Nor could there ever be. It is paradoxical to maintain that IQ tests, which are inherently biased, can promote equal opportunity. The tests do what their construction dictates; they correlate a group's mental worth with its place in the social hierarchy. (Mensch & Mensch, 1991, p. 30)

As I have shown above, while Blacks generally agree with environmentalists in their technical criticisms of the IQ tests and their uses, they tend to go much further to challenge the assumptions behind their construction and use, out of what I believe to be a justifiable fear, taking into account our past experiences, that these tests have been, and could continue to be, used to roll back the forty-year attempt at a semblance of equality and fairness in the educational opportunities offered to Blacks and Whites.

#### Explaining the IQ gap.

As has been demonstrated for the nature and use of the IQ tests, there are, again, only limited areas of correspondence between Blacks and the environmentalists in the explanations offered for the Black-White performance gap on standardized IQ tests. While both reject the explanation that the IQ gap is simply a manifestation of biological differences between Black and White people (Dent et al., 1987; Gould, 1995; Hilliard, 1992; Kamin, 1995a; and Ogbu, 1978), there are still significant differences in the explanations they offer. The environmentalists ascribe the difference in scores to failings within the Black communities, though not individual Blacks, and they believe, as I have discussed before, that these failings can be corrected with the appropriate interventions. Black scholars, on the other hand, offer explanations that are centred upon the dynamics of the relationship between Blacks and Whites, which they see as pathologically hostile, and, for Blacks anyway, oppressive (Grubb, 1985 and Ogbu, 1978). As Grubb (1985) explained it, the racist hostility that has been directed at Blacks for the centuries of

contact between Blacks and Whites in the US, has resulted in Black communities being ostracized, and consequently alienated, from the major, White, culture on which culture the IQ tests are based. He called this alienation a "cultural distance" and suggested that there was a relationship between the magnitude of this cultural distance and the IQ gap. That is, the closer an individual can identify with the dominant White culture, the better they can score on these tests. Ogbu (1978) theorized that the IQ gap reflects the fact that Blacks in White dominated societies are regarded and treated as members of a lower caste, and he hypothesized that the black-white differences are due to the groups' adaptation to the different cognitive requirements of their respective positions in the American caste system. Specifically, he argued that it is the ascribed status of blacks which restricts them from participating in higher levels of American techno-economic organization and that this has resulted in Blacks adopting patterns of cognitive skills which are different from those developed by white Americans. The Black scholars' hypotheses have advantages over the environmentalists' in that they are easier to test on individual subjects as in Grubb's case, or on other cultures outside the Black-White dichotomy, as in the case of Ogbu. In addition, because they are based on the authors' own experiences as Black scholars, they take into account the diversity of achievement they have observed among members of their community, and which has also been my own experience growing up in a predominantly Black community in the Caribbean. Although both environmentalists do acknowledge that some Blacks do perform well at these tests and successfully bridge the IQ gap, they do not consider this fact when in

constructing their theories, rather the Black community is portrayed as an intellectually homogeneous mass, which does not match our own experiences. My own experiences lead me to believe that both Grubb and Ogbu are each partially right, in that Blacks in White-dominated societies, are successful to the extent that they learn to cope with the many manifestations of racism.

#### Perceptions of race and racism.

This leads to the final theme that I want to deal with in relation to this canon, that is, the different perceptions of the effects of race and racism between what the environmentalists understand and the real experiences of Blacks. I have mentioned before that Gould, and to a lesser extent, Kamin have been severely criticized for the inadequate treatment they accord to race in their theorizing about race and IQ (Lewontin, 1981 and Mensh & Mensh, 1991). Although Gould (1981) has acknowledged that racism has played a part in earlier nineteenth century hereditarian attempts to use mental measurements to confer an inferior status on Blacks, and that this still occurs today in the work of Jensen, Eysenck, Murray, and Rushton, he tends, as does Kamin (1974, 1995) to see this racism as an aberration, a rotten core (Gould, 1981) with most of its manifestations confined safely to the past.

Lewontin (1981), in fact, charged that Gould's analysis of race,

with its emphasis on the racism of individual scientists ..., *The Mismeasure of Man* remains a curiously unpolitical and unphilosophical

book. [Samuel George] Morton, [Paul] Broca, [Cesare] Lombroso, [Henry] Goddard [and others] make their appearance as if from a closet, and smelling a bit of mothballs. They are 'men of their time,' displaying antique social prejudices which on occasion come back to haunt us in the form of 'criminal chromosomes' and a brief eruption of Jensenism. Their biological determinism appears as a disarticulated artifact, nasty and curious ... but not integrated into any structure of social relations. (p. 16)

If the extent of the race problem was only that certain figures from the past displayed no more than antiquated social prejudices, we might relax and smile over the distance we have travelled from past to present, as the environmentalists appear to believe. However, our own experiences warn us not to. The racist prejudices that may have seemed so reassuringly antique to Gould in *The Mismeasure of Man* are very much alive today, though there have been substantial improvements over the past thirty or forty years. Many Black scholars have, correctly, pointed to this latent racism as the fuel behind much of the current anti-egalitarian rhetoric that accompanies the hereditarian movement and the pet peeves of remedial education and affirmative action (Irvine, 1986; Jackson & George, 1996; and Miller, 1976; among others). When one considers that the era of legal discrimination against Blacks is only a few decades into the past, it is not surprising that the Black communities feel that they have to be vigilant against its return. To most Whites, it would appear, as evidenced by the racial polarization that occurred over the O. J. Simpson verdict, the problems of race were erased with the Civil Rights attempts of the 1960s, which is certainly not the belief or the experience of most Blacks.



### Summary

This chapter described the application of my five afrocentric canons, kujittoa, ujamaa, utulivu, uhaki and ukweli, to the environmentalist writings on race and IQ. The analysis revealed that there is a greater degree of resonance between the environmentalist and afrocentric positions than was the case for the hereditarians, and that the environmentalists are more favourably disposed towards Blacks than the hereditarians are. However, the environmentalist theories are flawed because they work from a stubbornly Eurocentric perspective, refusing to consider, or even acknowledge, the Black perspective on the issue of Black intellectual capacities. In the following paragraphs I will summarize the findings as pertaining to each of the five canons.

In terms of the canon Kujittoa, there was evidence that the environmentalists act in agreement with this canon to the extent that they have committed themselves to oppose the hereditarians in their endeavours to label Blacks as genetically intellectually inferior. However, despite their acknowledgement that the scientific process is inextricably bound into its social and political contexts, they, nevertheless, view this process as possessing a fundamental truth and integrity, which the hereditarians violate.

The application of the canon ujamaa, revealed that there is a strong, but unacknowledged community of environmentalist scholars united by their opposition to hereditarianism. These scholars see their role as protecting Blacks and other disadvantaged groups

targeted by the hereditarians from the effects of what they consider to be a pernicious and dangerous theory whose intention is to justify the status quo. Despite their good intentions, however, the environmentalists display an unfortunately paternalistic attitude towards the Black community.

The application of *utulivu* disclosed that the environmentalists, at least on the surface, act in accordance with the mandates of this canon. Their espousal of an egalitarian philosophy meets *utulivu's* criterion of supporting and enhancing harmonious relationships between communities. However, it was also revealed that their avowed egalitarianism was compromised by a lack of attention to, and understanding of, the Black reality. This has led to the contradictory position of avowing egalitarianism while, in fact, arguing for the assimilation of Blacks into the dominant White community.

Application of *uhaki* showed that the environmentalists are again well-intentioned with respect to the mandates of this canon. However, there is little congruence between their own and the Black agenda as pertaining to the construction and use of IQ tests. While they oppose the hereditarian position that the tests measure an innate and permanent intellectual capacity, they appear to concede that the measurement is valid as a mathematical construct, and could serve beneficial purposes if used correctly, as the original test constructor, Alfred Binet, intended. This, however, is not the afrocentric position which is that both the construction and use of the tests have racist intentions.

The last canon, ukweli, revealed that the paternalism that the environmentalists exhibit towards the Black community forces them to theorize about Black intellectual experiences without the benefit of the community's experiences and perspectives, which, as the canon mandates, should be the final arbiter of truth about the community's behaviours. This has meant that the environmentalists have limited themselves in their explanations of the issues around race and IQ, since there is always a missing Black perspective, which would, in fact, contradict their hypothesis of Blacks as passive victims of their cultures and environments. Also, it was revealed that the environmentalists provide very little analysis of the history of race and race relations that would help to inform their theories of the relationship between race and IQ.

## CHAPTER SIX

### Conclusions

*Up the new path the advance guard toiled, slowly, heavily, doggedly ...  
The cold statistician wrote down the inches of progress here and there,  
noted also where here and there a foot had slipped or someone had  
fallen. To the tired climbers, the horizon was ever dark, the mists were  
often cold... (W. E. B. DuBois).*

The principal objectives of this study were as follows:

- to design an Afrocentric analytic method.
- to apply the Afrocentric analytic method to the theories of hereditarianism and environmentalism, both of which purport to offer alternative explanations for the observed differences in Black and White IQ scores.
- to make a contribution towards a clearer definition of an Afrocentric place, as envisaged by Molefi Kete Asante and others.

The application of this Afrocentric analytic method to the two alternative theories was expected to unearth any underlying assumptions about Black people and their behaviours that these theorists may hold, especially racist ones, in order to facilitate more accurate and comprehensive analyses. The development of an Afrocentric place was meant to help to define a location from which research, especially that involving Black people, could be conducted, which would incorporate and legitimize African ideals and values as valid frames of reference for acquiring, examining, and interpreting data. This

concluding chapter will examine how far these goals have been realized and include any useful and pertinent insights that I have acquired from the four years I have struggled with this thesis. In effect, this chapter is the retrospective analysis that Asante recommended and which was discussed in Chapter Three.

The retrospective process, as described in Chapter Three, requires a final self-examination to reveal any personal obstacles which might have prevented a fair interpretation of the data. Fairness, in the context of this study, and as defined by the canon *uhaki*, refers to all communities with a stake in the outcomes of the study, that is, African communities, hereditarians, and environmentalists. Retrospection mandates that I determine if, and how, my life experiences hindered or facilitated a fair interpretation of the study; whether my beliefs about race and intelligence testing were altered in any way during the process of this inquiry; and to what degree my conclusions were representative of my own position, or of an African consensus. In the following pages I will look at each of these mandates in turn, and end the chapter with my views on the implications of this study both for future research and for testing practices.

The quote from DuBois with which I opened this chapter illustrates quite aptly how I now view the race-IQ debate. I am more convinced now than I was at the start of this study that a hereditarian-environmentalist dichotomy is not a valid representation of the issues involved in this debate. I believe that DuBois's metaphoric description is more apt,

in which Blacks are the dogged, tired climbers constantly striving to get their voices included, to have their views and experiences validated by the Eurocentric theorists; and where the hereditarians and environmentalists, on the other hand, can be viewed as DuBois' cold statisticians, making lucrative careers out of the charting of our progress, observing whether we slip or fall according to the standards that they have established.

This research process I have chosen required that both my readers and myself be forced to search for layers of subtext beyond what is actually revealed in this text. As I explained in Chapter Three, this was felt necessary to produce a more complete understanding of the meaning of my text. On reflection, I can acknowledge that an important subtext of this study was anger and resentment. I began this research with a tremendous amount of anger engendered, to a significant degree, by the attitudes described in the previous paragraph, as I observed them in the factors that, as I have already admitted, influenced my choice of research topic. These factors, as I explained in Chapter One, were the propagation, and very public and popular discussion, of views of Black intellectual inferiority. I believe that during the process of this study, however, my anger has dissipated significantly, mainly because the process has allowed me to reflect on, and to put these views into a broader perspective. This state of affairs is due in no small measure to the power of the canon kujitoo, to analyze and interpret the structure and use of text, and to reveal the hidden assumptions embedded in the text. In fact, I am more hopeful now than when I began this study, that the debate will be

redefined so that our views and experiences become part of the public discourse. I have adopted this view because my analysis of both the hereditarian and environmentalist positions, as detailed in Chapters Four and Five reveal so many flaws and weaknesses in both, that it cannot be difficult to convince any reasonable audience that neither group knows, understands, nor appreciates, the truth of our experiences; and, therefore, they are not in a position to proffer valid or accurate explanations for our behaviour. In other words, the standards for establishing truth set by the canon ukweli have not been met, confirming the need for an Afrocentric approach such as this one.

Another important subtext of this study is the dissatisfaction I felt at the start, and still feel, towards Eurocentric research, as represented by the six subjects in this study, where the research process is reported as though there is no interaction between researcher, researched, and data. That is, as though the researcher remains unchanged by the entire process. As any experienced researcher can verify, one is inevitably changed by the research process and its findings, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the nature of the research and one's connectedness to it. On reflection, I can state unequivocally, that I am certainly not at the same place, in relation to the issues investigated in this study, as I was when I began. For instance, when I first contemplated investigating the Black-White gap in IQ scores, my intention was to conduct an empirical study that could provide the data to deny the hereditarian claim of Black intellectual inferiority. The initial intent was to administer an approved IQ test, such as the WISC-R, to Black and

White children in my homeland, St. Vincent, and to compare the test score averages for the two groups. An alternative approach contemplated, was to acquire Common Entrance<sup>1</sup> test scores from the Vincentian Ministry of Education, and to analyze these scores among urban, suburban, and rural children.<sup>2</sup> However, both approaches were abandoned for the reasons explained below.

From my own experience growing up in the Caribbean, I expected to find that the average Black Vincentian test score was greater than the White, which would have served to contradict the North American data. However, I also wanted to find an approach that would allow me to include the Black perspective on this issue, and I soon realized that an empirical approach could not accommodate this need. Thinking about what an Afrocentric approach would entail, it also became apparent that I had a responsibility to the children I was thinking of testing, and it would have been irresponsible to raise doubts in the minds of the Vincentian children, especially the White

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<sup>1</sup>The Common Entrance Examination, formerly the Eleven-plus Examination, credited to the noted British Psychologist, Cyril Burt, is administered annually to all Vincentian children between eleven and thirteen who have completed their primary education. Although it is not usually referred to as an intelligence test, it serves a similar purpose, since it is the instrument used to select children to fill the limited number of secondary school places available in the country.

<sup>2</sup> In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the obvious social stratification is based more on an urban-rural dichotomy than race, unlike the case in North America. However, a relatively crude racial comparison was possible, since the different groups tend to concentrate in specific regions of the country. The location of the school the children attended would have been a fairly reliable marker for the concentration of the different groups in that school population.



minority, about their intellectual abilities, as compared to other racial groups, assuming that I obtained the results I expected. Bearing all this in mind, I soon accepted that I had to abandon the empirical approach for a theoretical one that could incorporate my perspective and concerns.

I am now of the opinion, even more so than at the start of this study, that for the idea of an Afrocentric place to have validity in terms of providing some location or perspective to conduct effective and accurate research, we, as Afrocentrists, need to devote more effort to locating the common ground that can reliably define the global African experience. This is necessary because we ought not to talk of an Afrocentric place, unless it is reasonably representative of the true diversity of the African reality. This place may have to be derived from an amalgam of personal testimonies, much as I have provided in Chapter One, to find the common or core values and ideals that can be described as globally African. The virtually individual location, as employed in this study, presents serious problems, for it is very unstable both temporally, and experientially. To find a truly useful Afrocentric place, there would have to be tremendous collaboration among African scholars as to this most appropriate place from which to conduct research. We may even discover when we approach this ideal Afrocentric location, that it is really more encompassing than we foresaw, and, as I am now more inclined to envision after the experience of conducting this study. This ideal Afrocentric place, however, will have to be more inclusive than the Eurocentric methods

encountered in this study. I am saying this because I now believe that the "African experience" is more generic than I contemplated at the beginning, although I still maintain that our shared experiences of oppression and racism, in addition to a common ancestry, has served to band all African communities, both continental and diasporic, into a greater sense of solidarity.

Much has happened to me within the four years I have been working on this thesis that has influenced my perception of the issues I set out to investigate in this study, and possibly in ways of which I am as yet not fully cognizant. The two major changes were, in order of importance, firstly, my mother's death in August 1995 and, secondly, my own diagnosis with a chronic liver disease, primary sclerosing cholangitis, in 1994. These personal changes have caused me to undertake some significant self-reflection and re-direction in my life, and also forced me to interact differently with those around me, including my colleagues and committee members. These incidents are not as extraneous to my research as they may at first appear, for I began this study burdened by a tremendous sense of academic and intellectualized racial persecution, that had consequences for how I interpret my data. However, because of my personal experiences, I was forced to interact in a more open and empathetic way with the non-Africans on my thesis committee and around me, and to appreciate that there is a lot more common ground between Africans like me, and others, than maybe I had at first appreciated.

This inquiry has revealed that the hereditarians and environmentalists are more alike than different with regard to the kinds of assumptions they hold about Black intellectual ability, in that both groups work from clearly identifiable Eurocentric perspectives. The two groups only differ so far as their intentions towards the Black community go. As have been detailed in Chapters Four and Five, the following represent their general, and hence the Eurocentric, perception of African intellectual ability:

- Hereditarians and environmentalists are not disinterested scientists seeking after truth, in terms of finding accurate explanations for the Black-White IQ differential, but, in fact, are committed to their own ideologies, and responsive to their own academic and lay communities, not to African communities.
- Both hereditarians and environmentalists make up distinct communities with shared ideologies, beliefs, and affiliations which are linked by specific assumptions about the nature of a perceived pathology that is used to explain an assumed Black intellectual inferiority. Each group has used its scholarship to search for evidence to support their particular assumptions.
- Both the environmentalists and the hereditarians advocate some form of intervention in Black communities in order to alter Black behaviours. The

environmentalists with benevolent intent prefer remedial intervention. While the hereditarians have custodial, or more sinister, intent such as eugenic intervention.

- Both hereditarians and environmentalists work from the assumption that White behaviours and experiences should determine the standard against which Blacks should be judged, and they, therefore, do not recognize Blacks as equal actors, but only as objects of their investigations.

The above assumptions have led both hereditarians and environmentalists to formulate theories that are incomplete, and, hence, not accurate nor reasonable explanations for the Black-White difference in IQ scores, because both groups have, in effect, segregated Black views and experiences from the scenes of theory. This study has provided proof that the wide diversity of Black experiences of intellectual accomplishments must be taken into account in order to provide some semblance of accuracy and truth to explanations of Black intellectual behaviour. As I have pointed out before, Black communities are very dissimilar with regards to their educational experiences, owing to the national, geographic, political, economic, and other disparities that they experience. Any reliable explanation for Black intellectual performances must, therefore, take such diversity into account. In fact, John Ogbu (1978) and Henry Grubb (1985) have already made quite a good start in this direction, since they have employed this diversity to offer their own explanations for the Black-White disparity in IQ scores. Therefore, Ogbu's

caste theory, and Grubb's cultural distance theory, which I have discussed previously in Chapters Two and Five, could together, form the core of an Afrocentric explanation of these score differentials. Also, the demands of Asa Hilliard (1987 & 1989), and others, that IQ tests demonstrate cognitive and instructional benefits, rather than solely classificatory ones, must be taken into account, since these demands are in keeping with Black experiences and desires, as demonstrated in the legal challenges to the use of the tests in schools. As has been well documented, the effect of the improper use of the tests has been to place Black children disproportionately<sup>3</sup> in EMR classes, in effect replacing the de jure segregation of a few decades ago with this de facto version, which is unfair to all Blacks.

I believe that I am justified in concluding that the principal goals of this inquiry have been accomplished in that I have demonstrated that my Afrocentric method, comprising my five canons of kujitoa, ujamaa, utulivu, uhaki, and ukweli, is indeed viable, in that it has been employed successfully to the related theories of hereditarianism and environmentalism to unearth assumptions about race, as outlined earlier in this chapter. I have also been able to successfully show that African experiences and perspectives are indeed necessary for accurate and comprehensive explanations of human behaviour, especially as related to Blacks themselves, and in so doing I have done as I set out to do

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<sup>3</sup>As I showed in Appendix I, although there are numerically more non-Black American children with IQ scores below 70, the cut-off score for retardation, the EMR classes are predominantly Black.

with regard to legitimizing African ideals and values as valid frames of reference for acquiring and examining data. I will now verify these conclusions by commenting on the application of each canon in turn.

In applying the canon *kujitua*, while deconstructing the writings of both hereditarians and environmentalists for assumptions about how knowledge should be structured and used, I had to be cognizant at the same time that my own assumptions about the structure of knowledge and my feelings towards each of the two groups, would influence the kinds of evidence I elected to search for in each case, and how I interpreted what I did find. However, by clearly outlining my motives for doing this study, and the perspectives I bring to it as an African Caribbean woman, as I have done in Chapter One, should alert the reader to any bias I might have inadvertently employed in my analysis.

The application of *kujitua* has also revealed that the environmentalists and hereditarians use science as a tool for social change but they differ, however, in the nature of the changes they want to bring about, and these have particular consequences for Blacks. The hereditarians tend to be politically conservative and extremely antagonistic to Black aspirations for equality and for redress of past oppressive acts. They claim essentially that the status quo is natural and due only to the comparative innate abilities of the different groups. They do not hold the White society responsible for their country's racist past. The environmentalists, on the other hand, are very conscious of their country's past

relationship with Blacks, and appear to feel tremendous guilt. However, I have not been convinced that they are fully convinced of the genuine equality of the races, as they take care to articulate. They, in actuality, maintain a distinctly patronizing relationship with the Black community, seeing us only as subjects to be acted upon with their benevolence. In effect, while they appear to support egalitarianism, they are actually advocating assimilation.

The application of *ujamaa*, while revealing the community affiliations of the two groups of scholars, in addition to their own assumptions about the separation among researcher, research, and subject, also laid bare my own assumptions. My own assumptions, of course, are what has fuelled my definition of the canon in the first place, and did determine, also, how I interpreted the results. My forthright disclosure of my own community affiliations, both to the Afrocentric scholarly community and to the global Black community, together with my clear acknowledgement that researcher and research are inextricably linked, would have to be taken into account by the reader in interpreting my text.

In applying the canon *utulivu*, which mandates the encouragement of harmonious relationships between communities, the specific issue of whether the act of conducting this study was, in itself, a violation of the canon, had to be considered. This question was raised within my thesis committee and it deserves a response. Mandating that researchers

strive for harmonious relationships between and within groups, does not restrict the researcher from analyzing and exposing communities, groups, or individuals, whose intention, in the opinion of the researcher, is to create disharmony. While the interests of these person or persons must be considered, the researcher has a greater responsibility to the broader society, and especially to those who are the intended victims of the disharmony. In the specific case of this study, the interests of the African community must be paramount, not because of my affiliations to that community, but because the evidence I have presented, most specifically in Chapter Four, indicate that there is a very real threat to the future well-being of the community.

The canon uhaki mandated that the researcher be mindful of the interests and well-being of the community being researched. This mandate posed a slight dilemma for me, in that my researched community were these two groups of scholars who I believed were not always acting in the best interests of the Black community when conducting their own research on this community. This, I must reiterate, is especially true in the case of the hereditarians. The question I had to answer was which community's interest should be paramount. I decided that in the interest of justice, the well-being of the Black community should take precedence. I have no doubt, however, that the fact that I began this study with a very real fear about the intentions of the hereditarians towards the Black community, my own community, played a significant part in my decision.



I have found that both environmentalists and hereditarians exhibit a failure to address the real issues as perceived by the Black community. They focus instead, on the technical issues of scientific research and psychometric practice. In addition, the literature presents no evidence, conclusive or otherwise, about the heritability of IQ. Positions taken depend more on ideology than evidence, and these positions and arguments are being continuously regurgitated over time.

In applying the final canon, ukweli, which raises the issue of the subjectivity of truth, I realized that the question could be asked, justifiably, whether the "truth" as experienced by the Black community had more validity than that experienced by any other. However, this question is easily answered. As the quote from Alice Walker pointed out (see page 73), there could be, conceivably, a single truth towards which all could aspire. However, no community has a monopoly on the truth as Eurocentrism would seem to suggest. Instead, each community can contribute a vital part of the truth, and all contributions must be taken into account in order to approach an understanding of the whole truth. In this specific application, I have argued that the vital Black perspective is missing from the IQ debate, which invalidates it as a genuine search for truth.

### Implications of This Study

It must be remembered that one of the most important tenets of Afrocentric research is that it must be useful for effecting positive changes in the lives of the community being

researched, which in this case is the Black community. When examining the implications of this study, therefore, the well-being of this community, among all others, must be borne in mind.

One of the obvious implications of this study is in adding support and justification for the many calls for African-centred educational policies, processes, content, and pedagogy by scholars such as Asante (1991), Dei (1995), and Delpitt (1988). As Dei (1995) and Delpitt (1988) argue, it is important that the creation, examination, and implementation of educational issues and practices include African-centred perspectives. This study can make an especially important contribution to justifying Dei's (1995) call for the increased presence of African Canadian teachers in Canadian classrooms, since they must be the most valid source of such African-centred perspectives; and to his call that Canadian education be made relevant to peoples of African descent in terms of their destiny and welfare, as well as making available to them a full grasp of their environment.

The process of this inquiry, and its findings, hold important implications for future research, both Afrocentric and otherwise, some of which are outlined in the following section. It also challenges the monolithic nature of the Eurocentric canon,<sup>4</sup> revealing as

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<sup>4</sup>Canon here refers to a body of authoritative works, and should not be confused with my analytic canons.

it has, that the canon, including that part relating to the discipline of psychometrics, strongly favours works by White Europeans to the exclusion of works by other groups or cultures, including Blacks. This study presents support for the rejection of the European canon in favour of a broad revision to create a canon that is more inclusive, in order to reflect the pluralistic world we do live in. I believe that it has also been demonstrated that the inclusion of African ideals and values, both in the development of a research methodology and in its practical application, has been beneficial. This would imply, therefore, that the inclusion of these values and ideals into other research frameworks ought to enhance and improve them too. There is the additional, and important, implication that Afrocentric research like this could be employed to aid in understanding human behaviour, especially African behaviour. It would be important too if critiques of other kinds of research, including, and especially, Eurocentric research would include a search for the inclusion of many perspectives, including African perspectives.

The implications of this study for the future of standardized testing, especially as pertaining to its use in schools to classify and rank children, are very important. It can be no longer acceptable that (i) IQ tests be constructed and used in schools in the absence of an appropriate theory of cognition, or of proven instructional or other educational benefits; or (ii) that mere hypotheses suggesting possible explanations of IQ score phenomena be utilized to guide educational and social policy decisions. This inquiry

lends weight to Asa Hilliard's argument that, IQ tests, in the present circumstances, be confined to psychology or education laboratories until claims made on their behalf are verified. The possibilities are numerous, but the one of immediate interest is the implication for special education. Could it inspire a redefinition or abandonment of Special Education? The testing industry must assume the responsibility to prove that the tests do help learning and instruction, especially for special education students, who have been principally harmed and stigmatized. Educationists, at all levels, must also assume the responsibility to demand that the testing industry meet the responsibilities outlined above. Until this stage is reached, the laboratory is the safest place for intelligence tests.

#### Recommendations for Future Research

I strongly recommend that if there is an attempt to use the methodology described in this study, that the introspection be completed before the data collection is begun, in order to monitor more accurately the changes wrought by the research process itself. This introspection could be undertaken once the initial reading is done and a research question has been selected and formulated. The researcher could then reflect on where he or she is at, in relation to the issues being investigated the prospective inquiry.

A future study could confine itself to examining only one of the five canons derived for this study, since this could be done in much greater depth than this inquiry was capable of, in considering, as it did, all five canons. A suitable alternative would be a study to

compile other studies which include descriptions of Afrocentric locations, such as I have done in Chapter One, in order to arrive at some consensus of what constitutes African ideals and values.

A further recommendation is that this Afrocentric analytic method with my five Afrocentric canons be applied, either singly, or in total, to various other subjects or issues that involve human behaviour.

A final recommendation is that the empirical studies of John Ogbu and Henry Grubb, be built upon, in order to develop a reliable Afrocentric theory to explain the racial differences in IQ scores. Asa Hilliard's admonition that the tests be demonstrated to be useful and relevant before being used in schools, should be borne in mind in any work involving these tests. Henry Grubb's cultural distance theory has relevance for examining educational attainment in former colonies, for example the formerly British colonies of continental Africa or the Caribbean, whose education systems, up to a few decades ago, were borrowed directly from the former colony. John Ogbu's work on caste stratifications also has relevance for research in these former colonies, in that these communities are likely to be stratified in other ways besides race. In some communities, the stratification could be ethnic, in others class, and in still others, the stratification could be in terms of proximity to urban centres. In each of these suggested

investigations, an Afrocentric perspective should prove to be beneficial to the research exercise.

## APPENDIX 1

Calculation of the relative numbers of Blacks and Whites with IQs below the presumed cut-off point for educable mental retardation.

### For the Black population:

Assuming a total US population of 250 million, 12% of which is Black, we have:

12% of 250 million = 30 million Blacks.

i.e., 30 million Americans are Black.

Using the mathematics of the normal curve, 1 standard deviation represents 34.1% of the population.

By definition, 50% of the Black population have scores above 85 and, therefore, 84.1% will have scores above 70 and 15.9% below.

15.9% of 30 million = 4.77 million, i.e., 4.77 million Blacks could be classified as EMR.

For the White population:

Since there are 30 million Blacks, there will be 220 million Whites, assuming for simplicity that there are no other racial groups.

From the normal curve 2 standard deviations represents 47.7%.

Since, by definition, 50% of the White population have scores above 100, we have a total percentage of 97.7% with scores above 70 and 2.3 percent with scores below 70.

2.3% of 220 million = 5.06 million, or, 5.06 million Whites are EMR.

Therefore, there are more Whites classifiable as EMR than there are Blacks who can be similarly classified (5.06 million versus 4.77 million).



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





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