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Republic V: The Argument of the Three Waves

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

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## Dedication

To all those friends and colleagues who have helped in various ways, both in the long haul and in the short run--especially DEGS--without whom the work would not be done.

Above all, to Vanessa and Rachel.



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## Abstract

### Republic V: The Argument of the Three Waves

In light of its history of interpretation, an interpretive essay on the fifth book of Plato's Republic is advanced, on the premiss that existing views of the relation of Book V to the rest of the dialogue are inadequate. The metaphor of the "three waves" indicates more than a mere formal unity to the argument of Book V, since the logic of the first two "waves" (Plato's celebrated proposals for a community of men and women, and a community of wives and children) only becomes evident in light of their dependence upon the logic of the third "wave" (the proposal for a philosopher-king). The "three waves" constitute a single, unified argument, which discloses the dependence of justice, as defined in terms of the state and individual in Book IV, upon the idea of the good set forth in Book VI.

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## Introduction

The body of this thesis consists of two parts: a critical survey of the history of interpretation of Republic V, followed by an interpretive essay on the same text. The critical survey suggests that there has been a general failure to attend sufficiently to the philosophic status of Plato's ideal state. It is most evident in considerations of Socrates' proposals for a community of men and women, a community of wives and children and a philosopher-king. This failure is seen to originate with and be sustained by the dogmatic, literal acceptance of Aristotle's critique of Republic V in Politics II. Focussing upon Socrates' proposal for a community of wives and children, Aristotle condemns Plato's state as an impracticable practical ideal, since it is contrary to the institutions of oikos and polis, both in principle and in practice. The interpretive essay which follows receives its impetus from the possibility of understanding Aristotle's critique to suggest further that the obvious impracticability of Socrates' proposals demands a less literal, more philosophic approach to the text. For, although Aristotle finds that "the scheme [of the community of wives and children] taken literally, is impracticable", he also admits that, "how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated."

It is the view of the critical survey that the history of interpretation of Republic V embodies various realizations of these two basic attitudes: on the one hand, there has been what may be called the "traditionalist interpretation" which, taking Socrates' proposals literally, regards Plato's state as an impracticable practical ideal; on the other hand, the history also contains what may be called "alternative interpretations", which, in widely different ways, interpret Plato's state as something other than a practical ideal. Of these latter, the critical survey suggests that there are currently three positions of special

interest: those of Allan Bloom, Hans-Georg Gadamer and J. N. Findlay. The interpretation set forth in this work rejects Bloom's view that Book V is simply "preposterous", while admitting the need to recognize the preposterous element in it. It generally favours Gadamer's more concrete interpretation of Plato's state as "paedagogical" over Findlay's more abstract view that it is an "imaginary Pythagorean commune hanging in the pure ether of hypothesis"; yet, it is most often nearest in spirit and in matters of detail to Findlay's exegesis, than any other view. It is, however, most directly from a consideration of the import of Aristotle's critique, that the alternative interpretation set forth in this thesis is derived. The premiss of this exegesis is that Aristotle's critique refers to Plato's own reminder that the ideal state is a hypothetical model or paradigm, constituted in lexis, not for the purpose of its literal translation into praxis, but solely for the purpose of a dialectical inquiry into the truth of justice (V, 472-473).

This view is taken to be consistent with a cardinal proposition of Book V, that lexis is nearer than praxis to aletheia, which serves as a guiding principle for the discussion of the possibility of translating the ideal state from lexis into praxis. In effect, this principle corrects the argument to the true form of the question: whether states which exist in praxis might not be converted to the ideal state of lexis. Once this correction has been made, it may be then proposed that such a conversion rests upon the possibility of a philosopher-king; the argument for the philosopher-king discloses how this division between praxis and lexis is only overcome in discovering their relation to aletheia.

The argument for a philosopher-king introduces the Platonic hypotheses of the many, eide and the good, on which rests the logic of the division between the sensible instantial realm of becoming and the intelligible eidetic realm of being. The principal contention of the thesis is that the logic of the arguments by which

Socrates implements the communities of men and women and of wives and children, implies these hypotheses, and the real purpose of these proposals is to bring these hypotheses to light. Commentators of the late 19th century, taking the traditional position that Plato's state was a practical ideal, were forced to dissolve the state into its practical and ideal elements. This resolution of the difficulty of regarding the state as a practical ideal is rejected in this interpretation. The communities of men and women and of wives and children, together with the proposal for a philosopher-king, are not interpreted as practical measures here. It is not a matter of existing states conforming to the ideal state in some literal sense, as though the ideal state were literally a practical model; rather, it is a matter of conforming to the ideal content of the ideal, i.e. to approach the idea of justice which is imaged in the ideal state.

To regard the ideal state in any sense as a practical model for instantiation in the realm of becoming is as erroneous as to regard a beautiful statue as a practical instantiation of beauty. The beautiful in the visibly beautiful is not what is visible--even the visible harmonies and ratios of its composition; rather, what is beautiful is the purely intelligible principle of harmony and ratio, the essence of which is never instantiated, but only imaged in the visible. The difficulty of holding to this principle is precisely what is expressed in the allegory of the cave, which tells of a prisoner whose liberation involves a long arduous ascent from the captivating appearance of reality which belongs to the sensible, toward the invisible reality of the intelligible.

From the standpoint of these convictions, it is argued that the purpose of these proposals set out in the argument of the "three waves" is to provide a concrete content in which the practical necessity of attaining to a philosophic standpoint may be disclosed. In other words, the purpose is to convert the reader from a practical to a philosophic viewpoint, which can only be undertaken

from the side of the practical. In terms of the late 19th century commentators, the practical is seen to have its ground in the ideal; against their tendency to divide the practical and ideal, this interpretation refuses to the "practical" aspect of the state any independence from the "ideal" aspect, and contains their distinction within this purely philosophic standpoint.

This conversion is through the logic of utilitarian arguments, which call into question dogmatic assumptions about what is beautiful and just, true and good. The question which introduces the argument of the "three waves" is two-fold: on the one hand, there appears to remain only the practical question of how this ideal state may be translated from lexis into praxis, from ideal theory into sensible reality; on the other hand, through the course of the argument it is discovered how there is still present in the argument the original question of the dialogue--how there can be said to be a true justice in which the good of individual and community are reconciled, which is the most complete form of the question of the nature of human praxis. The ultimate resolution of both difficulties lies in the disclosure of the dependence of the sensible and practical realm of becoming upon the intelligible reality of the eidetic realm of being, which is precisely to have attained to a philosophic or ideal view of the practical and sensible.

The logic of the first wave begins the ascent to this philosophic standpoint, arriving at a point from which men and women are regarded as sharing a common eidetic nature as rational, which is prior to their instantial, accidental sensible difference as male and female. It is not the practical equality of men and women which is of concern, except so far as to provide the concrete content in which might be discerned the necessity and validity of an eidetic standpoint. Implicit in the logic of the argument is that the principle of the state--the idea of justice--transcends this primary form of natural difference. Where this insight has been

concretely established in the institution of the community of men and women, the necessity of regarding such practical matters as the right relation of men and women in the human community is seen to depend upon a philosophic perception of the truth of human nature, which is not available from a standpoint which is ignorant of the logic of intelligible cause and sensible condition, eidos and instance. The concrete significance of this logic is seen in the establishment of the idea that a rational virtue is the good to be sought in the practical life of political community--men and women are to regard one another not in their sensible difference as male and female, but in their rational identity as guardians of the state.

The logic of the argument of the second wave discloses further the concrete content of the life of reason, so far as this is attainable within the practical realm of political life, as the cause of civic harmony, social concord and individual happiness. In so doing, it completes the demonstration of the validity of the eidetic standpoint undertaken in the first wave. By instituting the community of wives and children, the priority of a transcendent eidos of justice to the sensible conditions of human existence is established. The oikos is assumed to be the most primary form of natural unity; it is shown instead to be a rational form of unity. The foundation of the family is not the exclusive immediacy of blood-ties, but the mediating virtue of religious piety, whose content is disclosed to be an ethical reason, capable of ordering the most natural aspect of human life, the innate desire for sexual union, to an ethical end.

The logic of the argument of the second wave discloses that the truly effective principle operative at the level of natural difference and unity is an universal principle of reason--the idea of justice. What appears is that the life of the individual guardian participates, at the level of the sensible and practical, the life of the state, the ideal content of justice, so far as this is present in the



political good of honour or virtue. The life of the individual guardian and the common life of the state are seen as possessing an eidetic identity in their mutual participation of the ideal content of justice.

It is precisely the eidetic life of the state and individual which is illustrated in the succeeding discussion of the life of the state in times of war and peace, by which Socrates completes the transition from the practical to the philosophic, from the instancial to the eidetic standpoint. The logic of the third wave, as it argues the necessity for political life to be governed by philosophic knowledge, shows the dependence of the life of the political community upon the philosophic life of the individual soul. The philosopher participates directly in the eidetic life of the community of eide. The ideal content of justice is disclosed as finally inseparable from the content of the good. The argument looks forward to the ultimate disclosure of justice as the logos of the intelligible relation of all things to the good, represented in the central images of the Republic: the sun, the line and the cave. There, one comes to know the mutual dependence of political upon philosophic life, and the philosophic upon the political--the community needs to be ruled by the philosopher, and the philosopher is in need of the community, which he can only participate in as a ruler.

The thesis concludes with a brief statement of its findings, setting these in relation to other interpretations. It may be that some points of interpretation are weak or wrong; nevertheless, Plato's state ought to be regarded, in whole and in part, as a philosophic paradigm, constructed only with an eye to the dialectical disclosure of the truth of justice, demonstrating the practical necessity of converting to a philosophic standpoint, which is only possible where the Platonic hypotheses of the many, eide and good come into view. As Aristotle teaches, it is not practical in any literal sense.

## A Critical Survey of the History of Interpretation of Republic V<sup>1</sup>

### (i) Aristotle.

There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution evidently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means to the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally, is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated. I am speaking of the supposition from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, that it is best for the whole state to be as unified as possible.<sup>2</sup>

The "posthumous life" of Plato's Republic falls beneath the long shadow of Aristotle's critique in Politics II, which targets the community of wives and children in Republic V as the flawed cornerstone of Plato's ideal state. He argues that such an institution is demonstrably impracticable as a means to its proposed end of unifying the state, which is itself demonstrably undesirable. His critique is well-aimed, since it is precisely upon demonstrating the possibility and utility of the community of wives and children that Socrates rests the possibility of the state.<sup>3</sup> Whether Aristotle altogether hits the mark is the aporia taken up in the further history of interpretation of Republic V; we simply observe at the outset how his aim is clearly not amiss.

Generally instructive about Aristotle's critique are four points: (1) he interprets the Platonic state of the Republic as a practical ideal; (2) the argument for the community of wives and children is targeted as the crux of Plato's argument, since it is taken to declare the principle of the state; (3) this institution (together with the abolition of private property) exemplifies the impracticability of Plato's state as a practical ideal; (4) although Aristotle finds that "the scheme [ of the community of wives and children], taken literally, is impracticable", he admits that, "how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely

stated." Despite, or, perhaps even in light of his own critique, Aristotle concluded that the interpretation of the community of wives and children in Republic V was problematic. From his conclusion, we may infer a more general statement--that Plato's ideal state, taken literally as a practical ideal, is impracticable; but, since how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated, its interpretation remains problematic.

Aristotle's critique is based upon his objection that Plato proceeds from a false notion of unity. Plato is said to predicate unity out of "similars", whereas "the elements out of which a unity is to be formed differ in kind."<sup>4</sup> The conception of unity as simple self-identity is illogical; the self-identical cannot be the unity of anything. Unity presupposes, not uniformity, but the plurality of difference in kind. The simple self-identity of the unit or "one" is the abstraction of the identical in the numerically different, i.e., the "one" of many "ones". For Aristotle, "unity" as understood by Plato is an empty abstraction of what is identical in the same.<sup>5</sup>

The ground, then, of Aristotle's critique of the principle that unity is the good of the state<sup>6</sup> is his criticism of the Platonic concept of unity as self-identity and as principle. For it is this view of unity which he takes to underlie Plato's concept of state, family and individual as larger and smaller forms of unity, the larger (state) being less of an unity than the smaller (individual). Unity is conceived as this single principle of all three forms of unity, which may differ quantitatively in number and qualitatively in degree, but are substantially several instances of the self-identical *eidos* of unity itself. It is this logic which Aristotle takes to underlie Plato's intention to seek for the state the unity of the individual, by way of instituting the community of wives and children.<sup>7</sup>

. . . in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it [the state] becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family

may be said to be more one than the state, and the individual than the family.<sup>8</sup>

It is also understood as the ground of the impracticability of the community of wives and children as a means to the end of unity.

The life which they [the guardians] are to lead appears to be quite impracticable. The error of Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts.<sup>9</sup>

From his own inquiry into the nature of the state in Politics I, Aristotle concluded that the state is, like other forms of finite ousia, a syntheton or "composite" whose irreducible elements are independent oikoi, which are themselves ousiai, whose irreducible elements are individuals.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, Aristotle's objection is that Plato's concept of unity is contrary to the actual nature of the state.

Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot.<sup>11</sup>

The premiss that unity is the political good also contradicts the principle which brings states --including Plato's state--into existence. The state is generated out of the natural insufficiency of individuals and its practical good is to realize the condition of self-sufficiency. And it is just this practical end of self-sufficiency which would be negated by the quest for unity. If unity is sought as the practical good of the state, the state will destroy its own possibility of existing within the conditions attendant upon human life. Although Aristotle goes on to a detailed analysis of how the community of men and women would fail as a means to this proposed end, its intention seems more as an illustration of his primary objection, than a separate, more pragmatic consideration. The

final word of Aristotle's critique is that the Platonic principle of unity is contrary both to the natural origin and intelligible end of the Hellenic institutions of polis and oikos.

Hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves them. Again, from another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.<sup>12</sup>

Aristotle was, of course, Plato's own most astute critic and pupil, for which reason alone his critique should be regarded as most instructive. His basic criticism was that Plato's state was contrary to the very notion of the polis and oikos as these institutions had been actualized in the history of Greek political life. The community of wives and children is singled out as clearly illustrating this contrariety, not only to the traditional practice of Greek states, but to the very principles both of polis and oikos. How one is to understand Plato's state of the Republic, Aristotle argues, depends on what sense one is to make of this proposal for the community of wives and children.

But since this institution contradicts both practical experience in existent states and ideal theory in its principle, how is one to understand that Plato conceived it? How did Plato intend his own students to interpret the proposal for the community of wives and children? It is as though Aristotle simply leaves these questions to future students of the Republic, knowing full well that these are precisely the questions Plato has Socrates raise against the community of wives and children as the very means of introducing it into the logos of the state.

The conclusion reached in this work is that, one must draw from Aristotle the inference that the whole business is intended to be problematic, that it

belongs to the dialectical nature of Plato's inquiry into the nature of justice to present proposals whose most obvious purpose is to awaken a philosophic reflection upon the underlying principle both of polis and oikos. This principle is discovered to be the Idea of the Good. Without knowledge of the Good, all other knowledge is most impracticable and entirely useless, and even these most fundamental institutions of human life, oikos and polis, are without meaning and value. Plato's interest, therefore, in the state must not be taken as practical in some literal sense, but in a philosophic sense. His state is a hypothetical ideal which exists in, and for the sake of, lexis. It is a philosophic state, one which emerges out of and exists for a dialectical reflection upon the existence and meaning of the foundation of Hellenic life--Justice.

In this view, Aristotle's critique points back clearly to his master's own teaching concerning the business of philosophy; if we wish to understand his teacher's meaning, we must keep in mind always both the method and intention of the inquiry. Perhaps Aristotle left to his own students to recall that the quarry pursued in the Republic is justice, and that the way to it is dialectic. There seems no other way to interpret the community of wives and children properly except in light of such a design.<sup>13</sup> Only where one is recalled by its practical absurdity to the primary philosophical interest of the dialogue, may one safely swim through the sea of arguments necessary to bring one to the shore of reason. Yet, one finds most often in the posthumous life of the Republic, just this tendency toward pragmatism, which is avoided by both Plato and Aristotle.

## (ii) Middle Ages and Modernity

For the two millenia between Aristotle in the 4th century b.c. and Hegel in the 19th century a.d., there is no substantial commentary upon the Republic,

which remains of interest to the contemporary study of Plato.<sup>14</sup> (A commentary by the 5th century Neo-Platonist, Proclus, has had little impact upon the life of the Republic.) The Middle Ages in the Latin West is defined by the loss of the Platonic corpus, save the Timaeus, with the closure of the Academy in 529 a.d., and its recovery through the Renaissance Academy of 14th century Florence. A vague knowledge of the Republic passed into the Middle Ages indirectly, mainly via a Latin Timaeus, Cicero's Somnium Scipionis, the writings of St. Augustine, and Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy. The re-introduction of the Republic to the Latin West from the Greek East in the 14th century was preceded by the recovery of Aristotle's Politics in the 13th century. It was Aristotle's critique which became the authority upon and chief source of knowledge about the Republic for late Medieval Scholastics, beginning with Albertus Magnus.<sup>15</sup>

The Florentine Academy revived Plato in a spirit of mystical enthusiasm, consciously overthrowing Aristotle's reign over antiquity in Medieval Scholasticism.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, Plato's state of the Republic could only be apologetically defended against Christian objections (by Cardinal Bessarion in the 14th century).<sup>17</sup> A general interest in Plato's state was generated by Ficino in the late 15th century;<sup>18</sup> however his Neo-Platonic "symbolic interpretations" (influenced by Proclus?) were rejected in the 16th century (by a certain Muretus, who sought to illumine Ficino).<sup>19</sup> The 16th century fell under the influence of Erasmus, who took an unfavourable view of Plato's state in his Praise of Folly, as "an imaginary place".<sup>20</sup> The verdict of Erasmus would lend support to the Reformed view, expressed in Luther, that Plato's state was "pure phantasy".<sup>21</sup>

However, religious and political strife in 16th century Reformation England, together with the social upheaval of the emergent market economy, did

inspire Thomas More with a remarkable new interest in the Republic.<sup>22</sup> Utopia offers both a critique and reformed vision of Plato's ideal state; it proposes to translate Plato's "myth in prose" into a practical reality, and the keystone of this "new republic" is none other than a reformed vision of Plato's communal society. By the grace of Christian baptism, the "new republic" of More is re-generated out of the death of the "old republic" of Plato.

The main philosophical movements of modernity in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries--rationalism and empiricism--tended to neglect Plato. However, Rousseau, in the revolutionary conditions of 18th century France, while rejecting the Republic as a political treatise, held it in high esteem as a treatise on education.<sup>23</sup>

### (iii) Origins of Contemporary Scholarship in the 19th century.

Contemporary scholarship on the Republic has its origins in 19th century Germany, with the rise of classical philology,<sup>24</sup> which effected a revolution in Platonic studies heralded by Schleiermacher's "general introduction" to his translation of the Platonic corpus [1804-1862; Republic, 1828].<sup>25</sup> On the basis of this new science of literary-textual criticism, Schleiermacher introduced a 'systematic' approach to the Platonic corpus, which involved a critical re-evaluation of both the authenticity of individual works and their sequential arrangement.

Schleiermacher maintains that the corpus of Plato's writings forms a single systematic work written in a definite order upon a scientific plan laid down in advance. The single dialogues form a coherent sequence, of which each successive part presupposes the effect which the previous one is intended to produce upon the reader. Their content and form are indivisible. This natural sequence must be established.<sup>26</sup>

Within this new science, there immediately appeared the 'Platonic question', of



'system' or 'development', as Hermann<sup>27</sup> "tried to prove the gradual development of Plato's philosophy by dividing his dialogues into three groups, the Socratic, the dialectic and the constructive."<sup>28</sup> The 'Platonic question' remains the context of contemporary studies on Plato.

'System' or 'development' were, however, antithetical theses within a single school.<sup>29</sup> Philology was rejected by philosophy in Hegel's outright rejection of Schleiermacher, and a rift was born between these two approaches to the study of antiquity, which also remains.<sup>30</sup>

. . . it is quite superfluous for Philosophy, and belongs to the hypercriticism of our times, to treat Plato from a literary point of view, as Schleiermacher does, critically examining whether one or another of the minor dialogues is genuine or not. Regarding the more important of the dialogues, we may mention that the testimony of the ancients leaves not the slightest doubt. . . .

. . . We have to speak in the first place, of the direct mode in which Plato's philosophy has come down to us; it is found in those of his writings which we possess; . . . His philosophy is not, however, properly speaking, presented there in systematic form, and to construct it from such writings is difficult, not so much from anything in itself, as because this philosophy has been differently understood in different periods of time; and, more than all, because it has been much and roughly handled in modern times by those who have either read into it their own crude notions, being unable to conceive the spiritual spiritually, or have regarded as the essential and most significant element in Plato's philosophy that which in reality does not belong to Philosophy at all, but only to the mode of presentation; in truth, however, it is only ignorance of Philosophy that renders it difficult to grasp the philosophy of Plato.<sup>31</sup>

Even anti-Hegelians should appreciate Hegel's contribution to the contemporary study of Plato in his introduction of a philosophic-historical perspective, necessary to a scientific evaluation of antiquity.<sup>32</sup>

In Hegel's view, the community of wives and children must be understood within a philosophic-historical context.

The want of subjectivity is really the want of the Greek moral idea . . . By the exclusion of private property and of family life, by the suspension of freedom in the choice of the class, i.e. by the exclusion

of all the determinations which relate to the principle of subjective freedom, Plato believes he has barred the door to all the passions; he knew very well that the ruin of Greek life proceeded from this, that individuals, as such, began to assert their aims, inclinations, and interests, and made them dominate over the common mind. But since this principle is necessary through the Christian religion--in which the soul of the individual is an absolute end, and thus has entered into the world as necessary in the Notion of the mind--it is seen that the Platonic state-constitution cannot fulfill what the higher demands of a moral organism require. Plato has not recognized the knowledge, wishes, and resolutions of the individual, nor his self-reliance, and has not succeeded in combining them with his Idea; but justice demands its rights for this just as much as it requires the higher resolution of the same, and its harmony with the universal. The opposite to Plato's principle is the principle of the conscious free will of individuals, which in later times was by Rousseau more especially raised to prominence: the theory that the arbitrary choice of the individual, the outward expression of the individual, is necessary.<sup>33</sup>

His critique, though proceeding from the modern standpoint, which presupposes a rational subjectivity as the basis of a free personality, finds agreement with Aristotle. They agree that the impracticability of Plato's state proceeds from an abstract idea of unity as its principle, which is contrary to the concrete nature of family and state.

These are the main features of the Platonic Republic, which has as its essential the suppression of the principle of individuality; and it would appear as though the Idea demanded this, and as if this were the very point on which Philosophy is opposed to the ordinary way of looking at things, which gives importance to the individual, and thus in the state, as also in actualized mind, looks on the rights of property, and the protection of persons and their possessions, as the basis of everything that is. Therein, however, lies the very limit of the Platonic Idea--to emerge only as abstract idea. But, in fact, the true Idea is nothing else than this, that every moment should perfectly realize and embody itself, and make itself independent, while at the same time, in its independence, it is for mind a thing sublated. In conformity with this Idea, individuality must fully realize itself, must have its sphere and domain in the state, and yet be resolved in it. The element of the state is the family, that is, the family is the natural unreasoning of the state; this element must, as such, be present.<sup>34</sup>

Hegel's agreement with Aristotle's critique of the Republic would effect the

renewal of Aristotle's view that, taken literally, Plato's state is an impracticable practical ideal. However, while Hegel approached the Republic in the same philosophic spirit as did Aristotle, the divergent paths of philology and philosophy in the 20th century, along with the rejection of Hegel, would mislead many to often cite the authority of a more "literal minded" Aristotle, forgetful that his critique rested upon the qualification, "taken literally".

(iv) Early Contemporary Scholarship in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The immediate task of Platonic scholars, after Hegel and Schleiermacher, was to incorporate these two approaches of philology and philosophy, despite their self-proclaimed mutual exclusivity, into a single method of critical analysis. Such a task was undertaken by the great commentators on the Republic, whose work was published at the turn of the century-- Zeller, Bosanquet, Nettleship, Gomperz, Adam and Jowett. (Grote published a bit earlier, ignoring the controversy.) Of these, especially Bosanquet, Nettleship and Adam established a new criterion for Platonic studies, which has become standard--a close analysis of the relation of dialogic form to dialectical content.

By 1920, a philological dissertation from the University of Chicago proclaimed that,

The philosophic and structural unity of the Republic, attacked by Hermann, Krohn, Pfeiderer, Rohde, and other German scholars has been established beyond a doubt by the arguments of Hirmer, Zeller, and Campbell.<sup>35</sup>

Properly speaking, it was not the "philosophic and structural unity of the Republic" which had been substantiated by the outbreak of WWI, but the integrity of its composition. The great commentaries published at the turn of the century, while vigorously defending the unity of the Republic, only guaranteed that the text would pass on as a single work of one weave. What

would remain problematic in the 20th century was precisely this issue of the "philosophic and structural unity" of the Republic. Lacking in their defence of its unity was sufficient recognition of the aporetic character of Plato's dialectic underlieing the problematic aspects of its dramatic design. Nevertheless, it was the positive achievement of these scholars to establish the framework for further discussion of the "philosophic and structural unity" of the Republic in the 20th century, by their common agreement upon its structural design .

It has become standard to regard the Republic as commonly divided into five parts, expressed in terms tending to preserve its traditional division into ten books:

I--II 367. Introductory prologue--historical setting for the ethical inquiry into justice.

II 368--IV. The State--definition of justice by way of the analogy of state and soul, but primarily the "political" aspect of the ethical inquiry.

V--VII. The Ideas--the education of the philosopher-king, but primarily the "metaphysical" aspect of the ethical inquiry into justice.

VIII--IX. The Soul--decline of ideal state and soul, concluding in the comparison of just and unjust lives, but primarily the "psychological" aspect of the ethical inquiry.

X. Concluding epilogue--mythical account of the afterlife, sometimes read as the "theological" aspect of the ethical inquiry.

The unity of the Republic was argued to reside in the way these separate spheres of history, politics, metaphysics, psychology and theology were taken to be inseparable parts of Plato's ethical inquiry into the nature of justice.<sup>36</sup>

However, it should be noted how this common agreement upon the basic structural design of the dialogue tended to suppress, rather than explain, its discontinuity in defence of its unity. It is a tendency especially evident in their

expositions of the relation between II 368-IV and V-VII; specifically, in the relation between the two main proposals of V. V, as a whole, belongs to VI-VII; yet, in its parts, belongs also to II-IV. The argument for the community of wives and children completes the political discussion of II-IV; the argument for a philosopher-king begins the metaphysical discussion of VI-VII. Evident in the defence of the compositional integrity of the Republic is how the argument of the three waves in V was a focal point of tension between the elements of structural design and philosophic unity; for this reason, V was the central focus of the argument concerning the integrity of the Republic's composition.

What is problematic about Republic V comes to light in the various attempts by these early contemporary scholars of Plato to reach a satisfactory understanding of his state as a practical ideal. The common view is to distinguish between practical and ideal; the practical governs the state in II-IV; the ideal governs the state in V-VII. But there are two opposed attitudes within this common view: either to emphasize the practical of II-IV; or, to emphasize the ideal of V-VII. Those who emphasize the practical tend to emphasize the distinction between the practical and ideal, on the side of the practical; those who emphasize the ideal tend to emphasize the unity of the practical and ideal, on the side of the ideal. Extreme positions tend to dissolve one side into the other.

Nevertheless, these late 19th century and early 20th century commentators fall principally within a single position, that of seeking to translate the Aristotelian view--as restored by Hegel--into terms amenable to contemporary social, political, and philosophical currents, especially that of utilitarian liberalism, as had been advocated by Mill, and what is often referred to as "neo-Kantian" Idealism. One can hardly distinguish (even with respect to interpretations of the Platonic eide) these differences, for what is characteristic

of the period is a pragmatic approach to idealism, which is easily read into a practical idealism of the Republic, except in certain matters. One notes the recurrent favourable assent toward Plato's community of men and women; it contrasts sharply with the recurrent reproach of disgust cast upon the community of wives and children.

The Aristotelian interpretation of Plato's state as an impracticable practical ideal is affirmed by both Grote<sup>37</sup> and Zeller,<sup>38</sup> who both stress its practicality. The community of wives and children is considered as a practical institution, whose purpose is to secure the stability and unity of the state by way of purging the individual guardian of private interests, grounded in the family, which might oppose the common good of the state. As in the Aristotelian view, when the institution is examined from within the logic of Plato's argument, it is found a positive institution, which secures the unity of state and individual in a common good; however, when it is examined from an unPlatonic Aristotelian standpoint, it is criticized as negative institution, which denies the good of the individual in favour of that of the state. There is, however, a tendency for Zeller to emphasise the former position, Grote the latter.

From the objective standpoint of "true morality" or justice, Zeller lays emphasis upon the community of wives and children as a positive means of purging the individual of a naturalism, which is a hindrance to the inculcation of virtue.<sup>39</sup>

. . . the ultimate basis [of communism] lies in the fact that the whole character of his system prevents the philosopher from seeing in the sensual and individual side of human existence anything more than a hindrance to true morality, and from regarding it as the means of realising the idea.<sup>40</sup>

Grote, regarding the relation of state and individual from the subjective

standpoint of the individual, stresses how the community of wives and children negates the basis of personal moral responsibility.<sup>41</sup>

There is no point of the Platonic system in which individual choice is more decidedly eliminated, and the intervention of the Rulers made more constantly paramount than this, respecting the marriages . . . .  
42

Grote and Zeller do not address the dialogic aspect of the Republic; like Hegel, they treat Plato's argument as a whole. In the commentaries of Bosanquet<sup>43</sup> and Nettleship,<sup>44</sup> the more problematic aspects of regarding the Platonic state as a practical ideal come to light through their analysis of the structural and philosophic design of the Republic.

In Bosanquet, the practical is distinctly set apart from the ideal; in Nettleship, the practical is wholly taken up into the ideal. Bosanquet proposes that II 368-IV constructs a practical "Hellenic" city; V-VII an ideal "Philosophic" city.<sup>45</sup> Nettleship proposes that the practical community of II 368-IV both implies and demands the ideal foundation of V-VII.<sup>46</sup> Both offer ambiguous interpretations of the community of wives and children. On the one hand, the community of wives and children is understood to complete the construction of the practical state in II-IV as a practical measure taken to ensure political unity; therefore, they exclude the proposal from the ideal community of V-VII, which begins with the philosopher-king. On the other hand, when they address the apparent impracticability of the community of wives and children, they tend to associate it more closely with the ideal community of V-VII.

For Bosanquet, the proposal has the effect of dissolving the distinction between the practical Hellenic city and the ideal Philosophic city:

It is noteworthy that the conditions which most distinctly remove the Republic from the province of literal realization are first introduced by Plato as the conditions of its possibility, i.e., of its hypothetical reality. This surely amounts to directing the interpreter neither to

look for literal fulfillment nor again to lay the conception aside as ideal in the sense of chimerical, but to expect the verification of its essential points in proportion as the awakened intelligence--this is the root condition insisted on--shall assume the control of human affairs.<sup>47</sup>

For Nettleship, it has the effect of emphasising the practical aspect of the ideal community. The ideal community of wives and children has the practical effect of unifying a political community.

The ideal community would be one which was literally and indeed a community (*koinonia*), and every member of it would be absolutely a partaker in it (*koinonios*); he would have nothing private (*idion*); [Plato] would be content with doing certain external acts of a common life, but would literally feel that he was one with other men. In fixing upon this point, the community of wives, as deserving further discussion, Plato is forcing himself to carry out his fundamental principle in detail and to the fullest consequences which, he thinks, can be drawn from it.<sup>48</sup>

The ideal knowledge of the philosopher-king has the practical end of governing an ideal political community.

. . . in Plato's mind is an idea that if society were governed by real knowledge and if men saw clearly what their real interest is, they would see that they could only live at their best by living a perfectly common life. He finds in the constitution of human nature something which makes common life possible to man; and this is the highest thing in man, that which makes him human and that also in which he partakes of the divine, the philosophic element. The more it predominates the better; its complete predominance over the lower elements in man would involve a perfectly common life, and, conversely, perfect community would only be possible through its complete predominance. . . . Thus communism and the sovereignty of philosophy, which together form the subject of this Book, appear together to Plato as the ultimate consequences of the principle upon which his ideal state is based.<sup>49</sup>

What is particularly unclear in Nettleship's account is whether the community of wives and children and the philosopher-king are necessary to actualize an ideal community, or to idealize an actual community. For, on the one hand, he speaks of these as consequences of the principle of justice; on the other, as conditions of



the realization of justice.<sup>50</sup>

Bosanquet and Nettleship express the contrary tendencies in the interpretation of the Platonic state as a practical ideal. Other well-known commentators, such as Jowett and Gomperz, really do not develop the position, as much as bespeak a certain discomfort with it. For instance, while Jowett tends to follow Bosanquet's thesis of the historical "Hellenic" city, he concludes that Plato never intended a historical realization of his ideal state: "Nothing actually existing in the world at all resembles Plato's ideal State; nor does he himself imagine that such a State is possible."<sup>51</sup> The basis for this view is found in Jowett's condemnation of the community of wives and children, especially for its eugenic marriages.

The most important transaction of social life, he who is the idealist philosopher converts into the most brutal. . . . That the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations about marriage have fallen into the error of separating body and mind, does indeed appear surprising. Yet the wonder is not so much that Plato should have entertained ideas of morality which to our own age are revolting, but that he should have contradicted himself to an extent which is hardly credible, falling in an instant from the heaven of idealism into the crudest animalism. Rejoicing in the newly found gift of reflection, he appears to have thought out a subject about which he had better have followed the enlightened feeling of his own age. The general sentiment of Hellas was opposed to his monstrous fancy.<sup>52</sup>

In Jowett, the community of wives and children manifests the contradiction of the practical and ideal elements in the Platonic state. Gomperz tends to follow Nettleship, but fails to discover the same degree of unity in the Republic.

No doubt it was impossible to attain perfect smoothness and continuity in the composition of a work whose purpose, apart from its numerous subsidiary subjects, was to weld together into a single whole three main themes whose internal connexion was but slight--moral philosophy, political philosophy, and the philosophy of history.<sup>53</sup>

J. Adam stated the problem and solution of the interpretation of Republic V so far as it had been obtained by the dawn of the 20th century.

Considered in its merely formal aspect, the portion of the Republic contained in Books V-VII may be described as a digression (ἀναμνησκόμεν πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα VIII 543 C). In reality, these books fulfil the hopes held out in sundry parts of III and IV . . . and complete the picture of the perfect city and the perfect man by giving us Plato's third or crowning effort--the Philosophic City and the Philosopher-King. . . . In the first two divisions (V 451C-466D), the dominating principle is still φύσις or Nature. . . but from 474D onwards the psychological standpoint is gradually superseded by the metaphysical, until in Book VII the Idea of the Good becomes the supreme inspiring force--at once the formal, the efficient, and the final cause--of Plato's City.<sup>54</sup>

The division between Hellenic and Philosophic is Bosanquet, although the emphasis upon the idealism underlieing the Hellenic city may be Nettleship, since Adam would temper Bosanquet's emphasis upon V 470E--οὐκ Ἑλληνὶς ἔσται;

Plato speaks hopefully, as if his perfect city were but one Greek city among many--a living example to the brotherhood of Hellas. It may be admitted that the city of II-IV has not a few claims to be called Hellenic. But the 'third city' -- that of the philosopher-king-- is not Hellenic, nor even, in any proper sense, an earthly city at all: it is an ideal, an ensample in the heavens--ἐν οὐρανῷ παράδειγμα τῷ βουλευμένῳ ὅραν καὶ ὁρῶντι εἰαυτὸν κατοικίσειν (IX 592 B).<sup>55</sup>

Adam's view of the Platonic state is made clear when he addresses the question "what is phusis?" in the Republic.

The City of II-IV is a κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα πόλις. Not organic Nature, but the 'nature' of a πόλις or aggregate of πολίται, i.e. (as the unit in a city is the man) human nature, in other words, the nature of the human soul, which, according to Plato and Socrates, constitutes a man's true and proper individuality. It is not however human nature as it is, but as it ought to be, which is the foundation on which the Platonic State is built; so that, although the doctrine of transcendent Ideas is excluded from the first four books . . . Idealism at all events is present.<sup>56</sup>

All these 19th century commentators found common philosophic ground in liberal doctrines of moral progress, which they commonly "discover" in Plato, especially with respect to the content of the Ideal knowledge of the philosopher-king--as

though the actual content of these Ideas were somehow a matter of indifference to the fact of their existence. A relative, subjective idealism of this sort is clearly revealed in these authors, one to which the Republic is altogether opposed.

The abiding truth of Plato's suggestion is "that somehow or other the best and deepest ideas about life and the world must be brought to bear on the conduct of social and political administration if any real progress is to take place in society" (Bosanquet). But it was a paradox in the Athenian democracy, or so at least Plato, like Socrates, thought: hence πολλὸν παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθίσεται 473E.

Barker reviews and summarizes contemporary scholarship on the Republic and gives it the final form in which it was translated across the breach of WWI into the remainder of the 20th century.<sup>57</sup> He offers some criticism of Nettleship and Adam, and stands more to the side of Bosanquet; however, he insists on only one state in the Republic.

Adam, in his edition of the Republic, follows the view that a distinction is to be drawn between the Greek or earthly city of Books II-IV (which contain the first sketch of education and the suggestion of communism), and the heavenly city, meant for humanity at large, of Books V-VII, in which the suggestion of the rule of philosophers and the second sketch of education occur. The view seems subjective. The rule of philosophers, duly trained by science and philosophy, is an essential part of Plato's first (and only) city, which always remains specifically Greek (cf. the preceding note [This passage(540 E) is important as showing that Plato has in mind some actual Greek city, and the actual reform of that city. The passage, it should be noticed, comes at the end of Book VII, after the description of those higher studies which are to train the philosopher-kings.]).<sup>58</sup>

The Platonic State is a practical ideal, designed for practical political reform, though it might fall short of detailed realisation--one of the least realisable, and least acceptable reforms, is the community of wives and children. Barker is simultaneously more practical about the practical aspect and more ideal about the ideal aspect of Plato's State, than his predecessors; he understands the community of wives and children as a most straightforward pragmatic

consideration necessary both to inculcate civic virtue in the individual, and in order to guarantee political unity in the state. Most often, Barker corrects and emends preceding commentators from a Hegelian standpoint; of greater interest, is how he supports Plato's defence against the primary objections of Aristotle--as had Grote, Bosanquet and Adam--especially on Aristotle's critique of the principle of unity. The question is whether Aristotle is understood by Barker (and others) who posit that the Platonic state is not an abstract unity but is composed out of the irreducible elements of the three classes. Obviously, Aristotle would not consider the three classes within the state as the kind of elements out of which a state is composed by nature. What this defence of Plato amounts to in these commentators is a tendency toward the kind of pragmatic thinking which marks 19th century liberalism, and is represented elsewhere in ideas of moral progress. In Barker, Plato's state becomes a pragmatic practical ideal, a platform for political and social change of an enlightened liberalism.

(v) Current State of Contemporary Scholarship in the 20th Century.

The current state of scholarship on Plato is most clearly characterized by the fragmentation of contemporary studies. Foremost, is the separation between the strictly philological interests of classicists, which attempt to exclude philosophical bias, and more philosophical interests, which incorporate the methods of philology into distinct philosophical approaches. Among these latter, there are three prominent figures: Leo Strauss in America, J. N. Findlay in England and Hans-Georg Gadamer in Germany. These scholars have in common a genuine philosophic interest in Plato, which arose for each (in quite distinct ways) from philosophical positions worked out in relation to the collapse of Idealism and the twin rise of Phenomenology and Analytical Philosophy in the

first half of the 20th century. With respect to the Republic, Findlay, a self-proclaimed Platonist, is the strongest advocate for recognizing the significance of Plato's "Unwritten Doctrines"; Gadamer, to a considerable degree influenced by Heidegger, has most often drawn on the evidence of the 7th Letter. Strauss stands somewhat apart, and has created something of his own school of thought, which has produced its own translations and interpretations of the Republic, Laws, and other dialogues. However, he appears to regard Politics II as a reliable critique.

These philosophic Platonic scholars offer "alternative interpretations" to the "traditionalist" interpretation, which holds to Aristotle's Politics as an authority over the Republic. For, while German Idealism (both Hegelian and neo-Kantian) might be rejected in the 20th century, Hegel's restoration of Aristotle's critique was preserved. The great majority of 20th century Platonic scholars have accepted from the 19th century a literal interpretation of Aristotle's view of the Republic as setting forth a practical ideal, which (especially in a literal interpretation of its abolition of private property and community of wives and children) is clearly impracticable.

(a) Continuance of Aristotle's critique: Traditionalist interpretation.

Except on minor points of emphasis, the position summarized in Barker has become a standard (basically Aristotelian) view of Plato's state in the Republic as an impracticable practical ideal, which many post-WWI commentators reiterate, though they might tend more toward Nettleship's spiritualism or Bosanquet's Hellenism. Usually, they do not share the idealism or utilitarian liberalism of the pre-WWI commentators, but neither are they so strictly opposed to it either. Their continuity with the earlier school is based on the separation of classical philology and philosophy, and a continuity within the

classical philological tradition. The following survey of opinions is designed to show that, while the view developed among the pre-WWI commentators has been often challenged, it remains, sometimes with dogmatic insistency, the common opinion in contemporary scholarship.<sup>59</sup> (For sake of convenience, the date of a particular publication or available translation will follow the scholar's name.)

A. E. Taylor (1927) argues, like Nettleship, that Plato's state has an "otherworldly" ethical or spiritual end, since it has

all through for its central theme a question more intimate than that of the best form of government or the most eugenic system of propagation; its question is, How does a man attain or forfeit eternal salvation?<sup>60</sup>

Nevertheless, the community of wives and children loses its idealism to the pragmatic political function of "the elimination of the conflict between public duty and personal interest."<sup>61</sup>

R. Chance (1928) expresses, with Jowett, a common indignation.

Plato's proposals for political regulation of the relations of the sexes are even more startling . . . What a nightmare of some eugenist and co-educational Utopia! The verdict of posterity is almost unanimous in condemning these proposals, in so far as they can be considered seriously (and Plato, with Sparta in his mind, thought they were practicable). Yet they cannot be dismissed as entirely absurd . . .<sup>62</sup>

R. C. Lodge (1928) would restore an underlying idealism to the conflict of private and public spirit, seeing in the proposals of V,

a more rational and enlightened attitude which, in the spirit of service and co-operation with the deepest forces in the universe, seeks to utilize the opportunities which life brings so as to raise the whole of human living gradually towards a higher, freer, and more ideal level.<sup>63</sup>

Leon Robin (1928), an early promoter of the "unwritten doctrines" in Aristotle, seems to follow Aristotle's critique closely.

... the just state is that which achieves the greatest possible unity, and ... that result can only be obtained if the government is in the hands of true philosophers. So Books V, VI, and VII, the keystone of Plato's philosophy, are intimately connected with the subject [the nature and effects of justice.]

... We know how Plato hoped to ensure this unity by a generalized, strictly regulated communism. ... In this way, the undivided family seems to Plato realize the most beautiful unity in the service of the general good and among those whose duty is to ensure it.<sup>64</sup>

C. Ritter (1933) would have liked to have defended Plato from the objection that,

The Platonic state violates human nature; its noblest impulses are bound by the legislation of the state concerning artistic creation, and above all by the abolition of the freedom of choice in the selection of a wife and by the abolition of permanent marriage for the guardians.

But he finds such regulation a political necessity.

It necessarily follows from the fundamental principle that the guardians may not possess any property. ... since it alone can remove the temptations of the soldiers, temptations inherent in the possession of power. Otherwise they would misuse family life by exploiting the helpless masses; they would form parties among themselves by whose wrangling the whole state would be disrupted.

In Ritter's account, the usual assertion of an underlieing practical idealism appears as a sort of deus ex machina from this inherent conflict of private and public interest within the Platonic state.

The appeal to the celestial prototype indicates that Plato is not presenting chimerical dreams, that knowledge of man's place in the scheme of nature is to serve as the prerequisite for the state which corresponds to human nature.<sup>65</sup>

P. Shorey (1933) re-presents the old argument for the compositional integrity of V-VII as the "keystone of the arch in the completed structure". He does so without mention of the communal proposals of V--the connection between II-IV and V-VII is found in the philosopher-king, with only a formal connection to the community of wives and children, which is reckoned really as part of the ideal state of II-IV.<sup>66</sup>

In F. H. Andersson (1934) appeared a more reflective attitude, which

might relate back to Aristotle's critique, in so far as he thought the community of wives and children had an other than literal function; namely, to indicate their principle by their obvious impracticability.

Socrates proposes for consideration an ordinance or two, in order to throw into sharp relief certain aims of a good city. The impracticability of these regulations and their incredible departure from accepted practices will serve to accentuate their ends.<sup>67</sup>

G.M.A. Grube (1935), however, takes up the same element of impracticability, again from within the Platonic position, and restores its literal practical function.

Almost any reader of the Republic will feel that such a scheme is both impracticable and undesirable; impracticable because of the unnatural continence required, the faked ballot, the fact that physical resemblances will betray the parental relation in most cases; undesirable because it does violence to the deepest human emotions, entirely ignores the love element between the 'married pair', and deprives the individual of the security of his family circle. Why then did Plato desire it, even in his ideal state? . . . the chief reason is that he realized that the family is the point at which private property and all the evils that go with it are centered. . . .  
. . . Truly, the philosopher . . . is the only true practioner of political science. Harmony and community of interest can only be attained among the guardians by destroying those two causes of self-interest, private property and the family.<sup>68</sup>

M. B. Foster (1935) sought to restore from Hegel a more philosophical interest to the question of Plato's failure to grasp the true nature of a state.

. . . a city which is the product of merely a philosophical speculation, can possess no more than an ideal being. It must necessarily lack reality; and it is the recognition of this consequence, thrust forcibly upon him by Glaucon [V.471c], which induces Socrates to break off abruptly from any further particularization of the constitution of the ideal Polis,. . . Plato surrenders the idea that his rulers can do more than preserve a constitution already founded, accepts the consequence that his Polis cannot be real. . . .

Almost every confusion in which Plato is involved may be reduced to a failure to distinguish universal from individuals. Thus he identifies beauty with usefulness [V.457b], and fails to distinguish the fine from the useful arts, because he does not see that beauty depends upon perfection of individual form, but usefulness upon perfection of specific form; so that the perfection of a tool, for example,



is unlike that of a statue in that it depends upon the realization of an essence common to all others of the same kind, not something unique to itself as an individual. Thus again, he confuses the work of eugenics with that of education because he does not see that the end of breeding is the production of a perfect specimen of a type, but that of education the production of an individual excellence. And it may be even suggested that the Platonic identification of philosophical knowledge (Episteme) with love of the object known depends upon his failure to recognize that while the proper object of philosophical knowledge is universal, the object of love is individual.<sup>69</sup>

Unfortunately, philosophical speculations within the traditional position tend to be met with some degree of silence, since the general continuity is more along such strict philological lines as the summary analysis of Grube.

In the field of political theory, G. H. Sabine's textbook summary of the Republic, published just before the outbreak of WWII (1937) would acknowledge its debt to Barker's summary, which indicates the kind of dogmatic slumber into which the analysis of the Republic had fallen--although, it should be mentioned that, among political theorists, Plato became more of a political theorist than a practical reformer.

To Plato when he wrote the Republic this determination to be scientific implied that his theory must sketch an ideal state and not merely describe an existing state. Though it may seem paradoxical, it is literally true that the Republic pictures a utopia not because it is a "romance", . . . but because Plato intended it to be the start of a scientific attack upon the "idea of the good." . . . Plato's state must be a "state as such", a type or model of all states. No merely descriptive account of existing states would serve his purpose, and no merely utilitarian argument would vindicate the philosopher's right. . . . This procedure accounts for the rather cavalier way in which Plato treats of questions of practicability, . . . the question whether his ideal state could be produced really was irrelevant. He was trying to show what in principle a state must be; if the facts are not like the principle, so much the worse for the facts. . . . [Plato] carries out a line of thought relentlessly and with little regard for difficulties that are manifest to feeling even when they are not explicitly stated. The unity of the state is to be secured; property and family stand in the way; therefore property and marriage must go.<sup>70</sup>

In 1941, F. M. Cornford published his popular translation of the Republic.

which seems to have initiated a new sort of structuring of the dialogue, which he divided into large "parts" and smaller "chapters". Obviously, this structural design was intended to remove the popular reader as far as possible from the traditional division of the Republic into ten "books", which had always been known to be an invention of copyists, and not originating with the author. Other popular translations of this century might either carry this principle of externally structuring the dialogue according to its perceived inner logical structure; or, they might well resist this development as imposing upon the original text a design which reflected more the understanding of the translator than the author. For example, Desmond Lee and Raymond Larson would produce new translations structured similar to Cornford; G. M. A. Grube and, especially, Alan Bloom would resist this movement altogether, preferring the traditional division into ten books as imposing less upon the text, and thus interfering less with the reader's direct relation to Plato. The argument between the two approaches of traditional and innovative design reflects something of the diversity which begins to appear within the study of Plato after WWII.

Cornford simply caused the outer design of the dialogue to reflect the common view of its internal logical structure, which had been developed in the late 19th century; however, it brings sharply into focus the unresolved ambiguity of the status of V-VII, and especially of the community of wives and children in V, which remains present in these 20th century interpretations. According to his divisions, the first two 'waves' of V are really an "Appendix" to "Part II", which covers the argument of II-IV, designed to provide an "interlude"--or, what others would call a bit of comic relief-- before going on to "Part III", which begins with the philosopher-king.

Justice being now defined and admitted to be more profitable than injustice, Socrates seems to have answered the challenge of Glaucon

and Adeimantus. But Plato more than once hints that the argument so far has been carried on at a superficial level. Virtue is, directly or indirectly, dependent upon that wisdom the love of which is 'philosophy'; we have yet to learn what wisdom is and how it can be attained. This will be the subject of Part III, which will also answer the question whether the ideal state, however desirable, can be realized on earth.

Meanwhile, the next three chapters form an interlude, supplementing the institutions described above and only formally connected by the metaphor of the three 'waves' with the account of the philosophic statesman which follows in Part III.<sup>71</sup>

The general design may be traditional, but the reduction of the first two proposals of V to the status of "interlude" marks a clear departure in post-WWII scholarship from the pre-WWI view that the community of wives and children were the very foundation of Plato's ideal state. Whereas the early contemporary view emphasised that the dramatic indications which set these proposals outside the main argument were mere formalities, Cornford has inverted the emphasis, so that the community of men and women and that of wives and children are only formally connected with the main argument--as though Plato's argument would have been better off without them.

It is not as though Cornford has departed from the basic position developed between Hegel and Barker, which tends to recognize the validity of Aristotle's critique; rather, it is a radical shift in emphasis away from Aristotle's shadow, so as to put Plato in a more favourable light of his own. Thus, rather than quote Aristotle's objections--as nearly every commentator mentioned here would do--Cornford makes reference to Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, thereby giving new life an old thesis that had been dismissed by Adam.

Before proceeding to the central paradox, the rule of the philosopher-king, Socrates explains how the Guardians are to 'have wives and children in common', as he hinted earlier (424A, p.115). The common life of the Guardians, it now appears, involves that men and women shall receive the same education and share equally in all public duties: women with the right natural gifts are not to be debarred by the difference of sex from fulfilling the highest functions. So when the best Guardians are selected for training as Rulers, the choice may fall

upon a woman. At Athens, where women lived in seclusion and took no part in politics, this proposal would appear revolutionary. it is the theme of one of Aristophanes' later comedies, Women in Parliament (Ecclesiazusae), which shows that the question of women's rights was in the air as early as 393 B.C. This topic is introduced as if it were a digression. Socrates is interrupted as he starts upon a description of the degenerate types of constitution and human character, which is not resumed till Chapter XXIX.<sup>72</sup>

Cornford did not argue --as Alan Bloom would --for a historical connection between Aristophanes' comedy and Plato's dialogue, which Adam would not allow; rather, it was simply a way of removing Plato's communal proposals as far as possible from the grim struggles within 20th century political life fought out on the fields of war during WWII. To do so, it was clearly necessary to disassociate Plato from the seriousness imported by Aristotle to these proposals, and set them in a more congenial, playful context, far removed from the battlegrounds of 20th century political life during WWII. By mere association with Aristophanes, Plato could be more favourably viewed within the general climate of freedom and enlightenment associated with intellectual life in 5th century Athens, than if he were regarded as a participant in current ideological struggles of the 20th century. (As mentioned above, but to be considered later, this association of Plato with Aristophanes in Republic V would be given a more serious consideration in America, by Bloom, which might not be unrelated to that country's controversial involvement in the Vietnam War.)

The impact of WWII would cause some to seek to remove the Republic from the realm of "realpolitik", as is evidenced in the remark of A. Koyre (1945)

Notwithstanding whatever may be said on the subject, especially by German critics, Plato is totally free from worship of the State, that curse of modern thought, at least of a certain modern trend of thought. What preoccupies Plato is not the State, but the man; not the city, as such, but the just city, that is, a city in which a just man, a Socrates, can live without fear of being condemned to banishment or to death.<sup>73</sup>

Nevertheless, Koyre affirms the traditional view that Plato is concerned with

constructing an ideal city, though he would emphasize (with Nettleship and Gomperz) that it is "hence unreal, almost as unreal, basically, as the genesis of a geometric figure". Still, it has the function to "help us understand its nature as well as to discover the place and role of justice in the State."<sup>74</sup> Within this view, the communal life of the guardians regains both its traditional priority, which it lost in Cornford, and pragmatic function of ensuring political stability through the purgation of self-interest in the ruling class--"power should be entrusted only to those who are free from all special, egotistical self-interests. Otherwise, abuse and corruption will always and necessarily exist."<sup>75</sup>

G. C. Field (1949) wrote one of what becomes a diminishing number of major works on Plato's thought, which sought to restore to the discussion of the Republic the larger, ethical context, which the early commentators had agreed upon as the unifying theme of the work.

The Republic, like all the dialogues, is written with a limited purpose. And that purpose has been achieved when we have been shown the ideal for the individual character, as we know it in this life, the ideal organization of a community, and the right relation between the two. But in the end Plato makes it clear that this is not the whole story. Our understanding of individual and society alike is imperfect until we have seen them in relation to the whole of reality, and understood their purpose in the light of the ultimate purpose of all things.<sup>76</sup>

The pragmatic function of ensuring political stability is assigned to the community of wives and children, although there is mention of a philosophic aspect to life in the ruling class, which would connect the community of wives and children to the philosopher-king, and the practical state to the realm of philosophic speculation.

In general, the whole scheme is aimed at the removal of any personal rival claims either on the attention or loyalty of the guardians. They must live wholly for the service of the community, and must have no selfish or particular interests which could possibly set them against either each other or the rest of their fellow-citizens.

There is, however, one interest . . . And that is the pursuit of

truth for its own sake by philosophical thinking.

N. R. Murphy (1951) wrote one of an even fewer number of postWWI --let alone postWWII--commentaries on the Republic. However, it is limited to a kind of philological interest in purging philosophical bias from contemporary scholarship, which is an interest he shares with his predecessor, P. Shorey.

The prime object of this work is to try to get the interpretation of the Republic on what seems to me to be the right lines. It is hard not to think that views ascribed to Plato, whether they swing towards Neoplatonism, or towards Aristotelianism, or towards Nineteenth-century Idealism, have sometimes had little to do with the text and would have been quite unfamiliar to Plato himself. Professor Shorey has written an excellent work called What Plato Said, thus stating his intention to give an exposition of Plato as contrasted with an examination of the truth of his doctrine. But there is a prior question: 'what Plato said', as contrasted with what he is sometimes supposed to have said; and it is with that question that I am chiefly concerned here, i.e. with the mere paraphrase or precis of the Republic.<sup>77</sup>

That Murphy attained his goal of "mere paraphrase" is somewhat doubtful. Certainly, his comments upon V, which consider the details of the organization of the guardians' manner of life as "irrelevant to the main issue", are more interpretative than a mere precis would demand or allow--indeed, one could argue that Murphy's precis seems to be more directly of Cornford's analysis than of Plato's text.

There are cases where the political study is pursued beyond what the analogy [of state and soul] requires, for example in the investigation of marriage and the education of women in Book V. That is a political or social problem and has no obvious analogy in the relation between the parts of the soul. But Plato expresses his sense that it is irrelevant to the main issue by making Socrates reluctant to undertake the main inquiry until he is prompted to do so by the curiosity of Polemarchus and Adeimantus (449); this is not the only occasion where Plato marks and excuses a digression by ascribing it to the initiative of one of the speakers other than Socrates.<sup>78</sup>

Publishing a year after Murphy, K. Freeman (1952) echoes a more cold-blooded literalism, assumed by Popper's attack on Plato (1950) and against which Plato would be vigorously defended for the next two decades--that is, of

the presence of racism in the practice of eugenics: "The famous Fifth Book lays down rules for the production of a healthy and intelligent race", which she believed Plato thought necessary to bring the ideal state into existence.<sup>79</sup> By 1960, the "Popper controversy" --which we are leaving to a separate consideration--was dying out, and future philological studies published over the next thirty years, would tend to reiterate the traditional Aristotelian view, customarily emended and defended against Aristotle himself. The most significant of these studies are several full commentaries on the Republic; but worthy of mention are some lesser, general studies of Plato.<sup>80</sup>

W. Boyd (1964) reasserts, with dogmatic certainty, the practical intention of the Republic, not as a political ideal to be realized in the world, but to inspire and guide political reform.

We commonly think of the Platonic city as a Utopia, too ideal ever to become real, and Plato himself when he despaired of its realization gave warrant for this view by speaking of it as a pattern in the heavens. But that does less than justice to the practical intention of his proposals. It was not the dream state of a man who had given up hope but a working plan made in an effort to show how the city-states of Greece and Athens in particular might be made more stable.<sup>81</sup>

The community of wives and children is thus assigned its familiar pragmatic function of ensuring political stability, and thus as one of the conditions of the realization of the ideal city--or ideal reform of existing cities.<sup>82</sup>

D. Kagan's (1965) dogmatic, general survey of Greek political theory, acknowledges (like Sabine) its debt to Barker .

The Republic belongs to the genre of political writings which we call Utopian . . . . It is not bound by practical considerations and is therefore free to seek the ideal without compromise. It is, moreover, a general approach to the entire question of society and not a treatise on a limited special problem.<sup>83</sup>

Plato's communism is distinguished from modern versions--as had been done in

nearly every treatment since Bosanquet, Nettleship, and Barker--and the community of wives and children assigned its role of ensuring political stability against the divisive influence of "family loyalties".<sup>84</sup>

J. Moreau (1967) emphasized the moral, more than political, function of the community of wives and children. Rather than seeing it as simply the corollary of the abolition of private property, it is seen more directly as supporting the moral educative function of the state.

Tout le programme d' éducation décrit au livre III de la République a pour but de former cette opinion droit; et le système d' institutions établi au livre V, l' abolition, dans la classe des gardiens, de la famille et de la propriété, a pour but de la préserver.<sup>85</sup>

Moreau finds in Plato an unSocratic, proto-Aristotelian doctrine of moral virtue--where virtue can be inculcated by discipline rather than by scientific knowledge;

Ainsi, au-dessous de l' education rationnelle, qui implique la connaissance du bien et qui ne s' accomplit que dans la réflexion philosophique, il y a place pour une activité éducatrice qui fait usage de la suggestion esthétique et de toutes les ressources de l' art pour produire une opinion morale conforme au vrai, mais séparée de ses raisons, un jugement droit et spontané concernant les valeurs, un véritable sens moral.<sup>86</sup>

If Moreau's distinction is that between practical and ideal virtue, then it would seem that V suffers here the usual division between the practical necessity of the community of wives and children and the ideal knowledge of the philosopher-king. (Of course, one may wish to raise the question of why a communal society is necessary to preserve orthodoxy, and whether its principle does not offend orthodoxy.)

There are short introductions to Plato like the ones by W. S. and M. L. Sahakion (1977) and by R. M. Hare (1982). The Sahakion's are able to dogmatically assert the purpose of the community of wives and children, as "to eliminate the causes of political corruption."<sup>87</sup> Hare may modestly observe



that, "The Republic contains [Plato's] first full-scale design for an ideal state, though it is concerned with much else besides, and is, on this as on other questions, a bit sketchy and programmatic."<sup>88</sup>

There have been several significant translations--with introductions-- of the Republic into English since that of Cornford, by: H. D. P. (Desmond) Lee (1955; substantially revised for 2nd edition in 1974); Alan Bloom (1968); G. M. A. (George) Grube (1974); R. Larson and E. Brann (1979). Bloom's edition, which contains an "Interpretive Essay", will be considered later as a "Straussian interpretation". But, as mentioned above, like Grube, he presents the Republic in its traditional division into ten books. Grube's edition, however, offers a similar view of the structure of the dialogue as that of Cornford. Corresponding to Cornford's assignment of the first part of V to an "Appendix" to IV, Grube holds, with customary pragmatism, that

The fifth book is transitional. The first two-thirds deal with subjects which have been omitted or but lightly touched upon in founding the city, while the last third begins the description of the Platonic philosopher, his wisdom and his methods, which continues through the next two books.<sup>89</sup>

Lee's edition, and that of Larson and Brann, follow Cornford in presenting the text to the reader by way of their own interpretive divisions. The edition by Larson and Brann offers an innovative structure; Brann's introduction presents an interpretive viewpoint which falls outside the traditionalist Aristotelian, and so it will be discussed later.<sup>90</sup> Whereas Cornford organized 40 "Chapters" into 6 "Parts", Lee divides the text into 11 "Parts", subdividing each part into smaller sections.<sup>91</sup> Cornford's divisions are a straightforward commentary on the logical order of the text; Lee's divisions indicate "topic headings". For instance, whereas Cornford assigned the first part of V to an "Appendix" to IV, Lee simply makes it a separate division. As "Part VI: Women and the Family"

[V, 449 -470], it is set apart from both the preceding "Part V: Justice in State and Individual" [IV, 427-end], and the subsequent "Part VII: The Philosopher Ruler" [V, 471-VII,520]. Nevertheless, to distinguish "Women and the Family" from "Justice in State and Individual" on the one hand, and, on the other, "The Philosopher Ruler", is not simply a topical division, but, in light of the history of interpretation, a comment upon how the text is to be read. By his arrangement of the text, Lee suggests that Plato's proposals for a communal society of Guardians is a consideration significantly independent of what precedes--the practical life of the state --and what follows--the ideal knowledge of the philosopher-king.

Lee's edition includes a substantial introductory essay, "Translator's Introduction", which discusses the diversity of topics and underlieing unity of purpose in the Republic , against expectations of a modern political treatise.

There is of course a good deal of discussion of social and political matters; for example the discussion of contemporary forms of society . . . which occupies most of Books VIII and IX (Part IX). And Parts II [II 367-375], IV [III 412-IV 426]and VI [V 449-470] deal largely with political and social topics. But even in these parts of the book Plato is more interested in principles than in details, and we find moral considerations constantly coming in. And the rest of the work is largely devoted to what we should regard as ethics (Parts I [I-II 366] and V [IV 427-end]), education . . . theory of knowledge . . .and religion. . . . The Republic . . . was written in the years after the founding of the Academy: the Academy's aim was to train philosopher statesmen, and the Republic, as a statement of that aim, was bound to deal at length with education.<sup>92</sup> Plato had decided that the world's ills would not be cured till philosophers ruled; the education of philosophers therefore becomes the most important of political activities. . . . For all these reasons,<sup>93</sup> the Republic was bound to deal at length with education, and with the moral principles underlieing the organization of society, as well as with the general lines on which it should, ideally, be organized; which leaves little room for more practical details, much as we should often like to have them. We have therefore a book which is as much about ethics and education and philosophy as about politics in the strict sense.<sup>94</sup>

Under the single topic heading "Society and Politics", Lee says that,

"What Plato has to say on these topics can conveniently be considered under three headings: the Class System, Property and the Family, and the Philosopher Ruler."<sup>95</sup> Here, then, "Women and the Family" and "The Philosopher Ruler" (Parts VI and VII) are brought together with "Part IV: Guardians and Auxiliaries" [IV,412-426], where the Guardians' way of life was outlined. In this discussion, the proposals of V would seem to be united within the practical life of the state, where the philosopher-king is regarded from a practical rather than ideal standpoint--but, then, Lee has also spoken of "the general lines on which [society] should, ideally, be organized; which leaves little room for more practical details", which suggests V is to be regarded from an ideal standpoint. In other words, Lee's interpretation suffers the ambiguity concerning V, which characterizes the traditionalist Aristoteleian view. Indeed, Lee's commentary on the communal society of the Guardians is governed, with dogmatic literalism, by Aristotle's critique. So, when Lee cites Aristotle's objection that Plato was unable "to distinguish between unity and uniformity", the principle of a philosophic critique is actually lost in a pragmatic understanding of it.

[Plato] assumes that family affections and loyalties can only be a source of weakness: that the good family man must be a worse citizen. Family loyalties can, of course, be distracting. But the assumption is an absurd one, though typical of Plato's love of uniformity. He could not see that the greater loyalty draws strength and force from the lesser which it contains, or that his attempt to diffuse family and other loyalties and affections through the community . . . could only lead, as Aristotle pointed out, to their dilution and weakening. He was unable, as Aristotle again said, to distinguish between unity and uniformity.<sup>96</sup>

Lee's also includes a "Final Assessment" of the Republic, which addresses the contemporary critique of Plato--especially by Popper and Crossman (where Lee betrays a certain sympathy for the anti-Hegelian spirit of

Popper's critique; Popper saw in Plato the source of Hegel, and in Hegel the source of Hitler.) Lee's own "final assessment" is that

The Philosopher Ruler is a mirage, a product of the kind of idealism which asks too much of human nature and is then disappointed by what it finds; but he does stand for a set of problems which are real, and to which every society must find its answer.<sup>97</sup>

The commentaries by Cross and Woosley, Guthrie, White and Annas are not the only in-depth studies on the Republic in the last thirty years. They are considered here by themselves for a couple of reasons: they generally intend to represent the current state of philological interpretation of the Republic, rather than new or alternative interpretations of philosophical bias; they have attained the status of some authority, since they are now cited favourably in any "select" bibliography on the Republic. A less favourable opinion might be that they tend to reiterate, dogmatically, the traditional Aristotelian "literal" interpretation, with the aim of bringing it up-to-date in relation to recent "issues", which have been debated in leading classical philological journals.

Cross and Woosley (1964) claimed to offer a "philosophical commentary" on the Republic, but it is really quite unphilosophical, and completely within the philological tradition. With respect to their interpretation of V, it is quite disappointing to be offered no more than a mere paraphrase of the argument. At best, they fulfilled the ambition of Shorey and Murphy to simply state "what Plato said", apart from anything he might be "supposed to have said."

By the end of Book IV the ideal state has been constructed and justice examined both in the state and in the individual soul. . . . There now follow the three "waves"--a metaphor used by Plato at 457b to describe the three contentious points with which he is now engaged and which the argument has to breast. . . . Plato's aim is to secure unity in the state. In this latter connection, it is perhaps sufficient to notice two points. First, the passage from 462a-466d deserves the closest attention, since here we have the language of organic theories of the state. . . . Secondly, Aristotle's criticisms in the Politics, Book II, Chapters 1-5, of this way of attempting to attain unity should also be studied. . . . The second wave is followed by a

digression on war (466d-471c) in which certain rules are laid down to humanize the strife of Greek against Greek, and then (471c-474b) Socrates faces the third and greatest wave, the question of the practicability of the ideal state.<sup>98</sup>

Had Cross and Woollz themselves discussed the matters their commentary indicates to be of importance, e.g. Aristotle's critique of Plato's concept of unity as the good of the state, their work would have better filled what has obviously become a real need--a truly "philosophical commentary" on the Republic.

W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) has published the (philologically) authoritative edition of the history of Greek philosophy for the 20th century.<sup>99</sup> The great merit of his work is to have undertaken a modest assessment of contemporary scholarship. Guthrie wisely observes the philological limitations of his history. Indeed, what distinguishes it as a "20th century" history of Greek philosophy is just this self-imposed limit of classical philology.

Guthrie devotes an entire section to a survey of the history of opinion on the issue, "Is the Platonic City Intended as a Practical Possibility", but he tends to trust himself on this and other matters, to F. M. Cornford, who "was right to say that Plato takes human nature as it is and tries to construct a social order that will make the best of it."<sup>100</sup> Of the proposals in V, he adds,

This insistence on returning to discuss the why and how of a radical social reform perhaps suggests that Plato did think of his state as within the realm of practical politics; but if so, he might have done better to leave it in the air like other proposals.<sup>101</sup>

What Guthrie was doing for the history of Greek philosophy, N. P. White decided to accomplish for the Republic, and so published a 20th century "companion" to the Republic, a kind of up-date of Bosanquet's 19th century version. Again, 19th century philosophical idealism is replaced with 20th century philological scholarship. Nevertheless, White's commentary is more "philosophical" than that of Cross and Woollz. In comparison with the more

recent commentary of J. Annas (1981) it is much more focussed. Annas' "Introduction" wears a familiar feature of late 20th century works of classical philology, which often seek to replace particular philosophical bias with a kind of empirical scholarly rectitude.

In his emphasis upon the "principle of the natural division of labour" as, when applied to the city "precisely what Plato says justice is", White's philosophical commentary bears some similarities to the thesis of M. B. Foster. However, he stays within the common view of Republic V, and also with the division between the practical state of II-IV and the ideality of V-VII; despite his emphasis upon the underlieing seriousness of the proposals in V, the community of men and women, and the community of wives and children, are of secondary concern, final practical measures which depend upon philosophic knowledge to be realised, and on whose realisation rests that of the state.

Having given an account of what justice is both in the city and in the soul, and described what he takes to be a good city and a good man, Plato feigns readiness at the beginning of Book V to consider cities and men less just and less good. He eventually does precisely this in Books VIII-IX, but in Books V-VII he occupies himself instead with a further elaboration of his description of his city and its rulers. With tongue in cheek he presents this part of the work as a digression, and with tongue further in cheek he presents it as merely a response to pressure from Socrates' interlocutors to explain his statement in Book IV that the guardians will hold "wives and children in common". In fact, however, Books V-VII supply a foundation that has been missing from Plato's description of his city and its rulers in the preceding books.

The basic fact is that Books V-VII lead up to and present a discussion of the notion of the Good that is essential, according to Plato, to a clear understanding of justice and its role. The obvious connection between the Good and the earlier material on the city is the use of the notion of goodness that Plato has, we have seen, already made in his effort to identify justice. The city was said to be good, like the corresponding sort of man who ruled in it, and justice was one of the things that made them both good. But another connection, not yet plain in Book IV, has to do with the motivation of the rulers to rule the city as Plato says they must. In Books VI-VII it emerges that this motivation is their effort to see that the Good is

exemplified in the city, in a way that explains their efforts to adhere, and to see that the city adheres, to the principle of the natural division of labour, and likewise their efforts to keep the city cohesive and stable.

Along with problems concerning the Good, Plato also treats another problem in Books V-VII, the question whether it is possible for a city such as he has described to be established on earth. . . [It] is an effort to show that the principle of the natural division of labour is true and has been correctly applied (472e-473b). . . . To show that the establishment of the city is possible is to show that the kind of unity advocated in Books II-IV can in fact be attained.

It is the third part of Plato's discussion in Books V-VII (his response to the "third wave") that provides the most important connection between his views on the Good and the construction of his city. For he holds that, appearances notwithstanding, the only way in which his city could be established would be for philosophers to become rulers, or rulers to become philosophers. . . . What a knowledge of the Good must give to the rulers, accordingly, is an understanding of how adherence to that principle, and the justice that emerges from it, is truly good for the city and a virtue of it (505a-b).<sup>102</sup>

With respect to her interpretation of Republic V, Annas follows Guthrie's lead in submitting to Cornford's thesis, which is, for the most part, consistent with the Aristotelian view of the 19th century.

. . . the conclusion of Book 4 gave an account of justice in the individual, and that there Plato is concerned with human nature as it is; he wants his proposed account to be such as plausibly to have application in people's lives; whereas in Book 5, in talking of the state, he feels free to talk of idealized conditions where human nature is likewise idealized. He is not interested in 'partial compliance theory' or in adjusting actual difficulties and conflicts of interest. Several times in Book 5 he makes clear that in discussing various proposals he is simply skipping the matter of their practicability. He assumes that what is for the best is possible, this being the ideal state; and then considers all in one go the question of whether such a state is feasible at all (at 471c ff.)

Plato's political proposals are often misunderstood through being inflated. He is not trying to put forward a whole 'political philosophy' dealing with all matters important for the relation of individual and state. We have only a sketch of the ideally just city, presented in an unsystematic way; the bitty passage from 412b-427d gives us a basis for the account of the virtues, and the Book 5 passage (449a-471e) takes up only some of the points in it. Plato says so little about the city except in so far as concerns its justice, that we know virtually nothing about the citizens' way of life (a lack that has been filled in by different scholars in very different ways). . . .

Plato's ideally just state is not a full detailed picture of a Perfect City, but an implementation of what would be needed, in his view, to make existing cities just.

If we are cautious, and avoid the romantic and polemical embellishments that often mark discussions of 'Plato's political philosophy', the Republic can be seen to contain seminal (and very controversial) opening moves in many important political debates.<sup>103</sup>

In this most recent commentary on the Republic, the traditional Aristotelian view of the Republic, recovered from the 19th century, is established once again near the end of the 20th century.

(b) Alternative Interpretations of Republic V.

After World War I, certain new possibilities of interpretation also began to appear.<sup>104</sup> These new possibilities of interpretation have arisen out of two tendencies in 20th century scholarship: (1) the various ways philological studies have been incorporated into, or separated from, contemporary philosophical developments; (2) the replacement of Aristotle's Politics, with Plato's 7th Letter and the "Unwritten Doctrines" located in Aristotle's Metaphysics, as keys to Plato's intention in composing the Republic. To some degree, the motivation for replacing the Politics with the 7th Letter and "Unwritten Doctrines" as interpretative keys to the Republic was increasing discontent with the dogmatic, literal acceptance of Aristotle's critique. However, this dogmatic literalism in the traditional view was more easily converted into a controversial attack upon its principle. In this way was born the "revolutionist" interpretation of Plato, which expressed itself in terms of "20th century realism" versus "19th century idealism".

(α) "Revolutionist" Interpretation.

In 1937, it seemed to R. H. S. Crossman that,

Before the First World War, the Republic was often treated as the 'Ideal State' which Plato never intended to put into practice . . . .



World war has changed all that. Plato's so-called 'idealism' is now seen for what it is--a grimly realistic estimate of the moral and intellectual capacities of the masses . . . . Our modern objection to Plato is that he is much too 'realistic' in his analysis of human nature.<sup>105</sup>

On the one hand, Crossman's "realistic" Plato is but the most extreme literal and pragmatic interpretation of the practical ideal state. On the other hand, what is truly "revolutionary" is the clear inversion of elements. For the traditionalists, the practical element, however strongly emphasised, is understood as finally subordinate to and subsumed by the ideal element; in the revolutionary view, the ideal is subordinate to and subsumed by the practical.

The Republic contains Plato's plan for the building of a perfect state in which every citizen is really happy. . . . But if you are going to build a perfect society, you can only do so by reconstructing existing institutions; and so Plato was forced to ask himself what was wrong with Athens. When he had discovered this, he could construct a city free from the evils of Athenian society.<sup>106</sup>

In this view, Plato becomes a secular saviour, who "imagines himself invested with supreme power and asks how he would use it to save humanity from its miseries".<sup>107</sup> However, one should not see the revolutionist as a mere reactionary; there is a genuine interest in grasping the truth of Plato's teaching; although, whether this spirit is not simply a dogmatism of another kind, would be difficult to deny.

This revolutionist interpretation of Plato's intention is most clearly evidenced in Crossman's account of the community of wives and children--where one sees the familiar conversion of the Platonic state into a Medieval monastery, converted instead into a modern technological state.

When Plato abolished marriage and the family he was not preaching a doctrine of free love and easy morals. He was demanding a more rigid self-control for his ruling class than the ordinary man can achieve. His ideal was not unlike that of the monk or priest who takes vows of celibacy and tries to sublimate his earthly emotions and his human love into love of God and service to the community.

But the Platonic ruler differs from the monk in two particulars. Firstly, he considers the future: he sees that if none marries there will be no children; . . . So Plato advocated not celibacy for his rulers, but eugenics . . . . In the second place, Plato did not believe that human love or physical passion were in themselves wicked as some religious people are inclined to believe . . . if [human passion] was treated as a passing pleasure, like a glass of good wine, Plato would have found it wholesome: but if it meant falling in love with someone, wanting to be with her always, missing her when she was away, worrying whether she cared for you, and so on--then Plato would have said it had become a distraction and must be forbidden to the man whose work was ruling. Plato would have welcomed the invention of contraceptives . . . . 108

Besides a healthy antidote to medievalising tendencies (e.g. Nettleship), the revolutionist interpretation attempts, on this point, to identify an underlying--as opposed to merely formal or corollary--connection between the abolition of private property and the community of wives and children in Plato's utilitarianism.

This brings us to Plato's second reason for forbidding marriage and the family to his ruling class. Falling in love, he argued, and wanting a family are really expressions of the acquisitive instinct. He had forbidden his ruling class any form of property whatsoever, and so he argued that marriage and the family, which are really a sort of property, must be forbidden to them too. The love of man for woman is based on a longing for ownership and pride of possession . . . .

Plato thought this exclusive sense of property was an inevitable accompaniment to marriage, and that for this reason marriage was just as dangerous to the ruler as property. It would corrupt his loyalty to the State and give him a private interest which would distract him from his job. For Plato was a revolutionary; he wanted his pupils to be men who could work miracles and change the world: and he thought that the only people that really change the world are the people who have no feeling for private property as such, even wives and children. Four hundred and fifty years later Jesus was to urge the same thing to His chosen apostles.<sup>109</sup>

A. D. Winspear (1940) continued the revolutionist interpretation, though his claim that Plato was the first socialist seems more like socialist propaganda, than historical observation.

It is a great historical moment when a philosopher realizes that the things which divide mankind are largely based on economics, or possessions. . . . It is tremendously significant that for the first time an analyst of society should see clearly and express firmly the idea that social divisions are a result of private and individual property. . . . It is, moreover, of great interest to observe that it was just this aspect of Platonism which drew the heaviest fire of criticism from Aristotle and others.<sup>110</sup>

However, Winspear seems more critically aware of Plato's underlying idealism, which is where Plato falls short of socialist science.

The problem that Plato faced of putting forward a program in purely political terms was not a simple one. The Republic, we ought by now to be convinced, was not a monument of abstract thinking, but in a very real sense a "tract for the times." . . . At the stage of the Republic he introverts the argument, as it were, and, in default of a political manifesto, takes refuge in psychological analysis and sociological typography.<sup>111</sup>

Neither Crossman nor Winspear would cause the furor of Karl Popper's (1950) post-WWII interpretation of Plato as a totalitarian.

What did Plato mean by "justice"? I assert that in the Republic he used the term "just" as a synonym for "that which is in the interest of the best state." And what is in the interest of the best state? To arrest all change, by the maintenance of a rigid class division and class rule . . . . Plato's demand for justice leaves his political program at the level of totalitarianism . . . .

. . . We know from Plato's sociological theories that the state, once established, will continue to be stable as long as there is no split in the unity of the master class. The bringing up of that class is, therefore, the great preserving function of the sovereign, and a function which must continue as long as the state exists.<sup>112</sup>

Plato had, of course, his defenders, and the whole controversy forms a distinct chapter within contemporary Platonic scholarship. What is to be observed in it, is both the absurdity which results from taking a literal interpretation of the Republic to the extreme, as well as the need to recall certain poetic elements in the dialogue, which suggest a less practical intention than social and political reform.<sup>113</sup> The "defenders" of Plato attempted to rescue the Republic from this dogmatic literalism, equally present among the "traditionalists" and

"revolutionists", by arguing for a more philosophic interpretation of an imaginary utopia or poetic city. J. Wild (1953) stated precisely this new development.

The Republic is an imagined ideal community which in Plato's conception demands the discovery of actual truths, especially concerning the most important and basic matters of a moral and philosophic nature. Crossman and Popper claim that there are no such truths. Therefore they cannot distinguish between the claim to possess such truth and undiluted dogmatism and tyranny.<sup>114</sup>

As R. S. Brumbaugh (1962) pointed out, there was need to recall that the Republic was primarily a philosophical inquiry into the nature of justice.

Following the discussion of social classes and psychological excellence, Socrates spends some time illustrating what he means his ideal rulers to be . . . the account is not a practical program but a fascinating description of family and education in an imaginary community of these guardians. It is primarily intended to show in more detail what sort of rulers his abstract aristocrats are. They must never put personal interest ahead of the welfare of the community as a whole. . . The way to insure that there will be no conflicts of interest is to give the rulers no personal ties that could interfere. This means no private property; it also means no private families. Women and children will be held in common, so that the rulers form a single family. To judge from later reactions of its readers, one might think the main intention of the whole Republic was to advocate such communism, rather than to define justice. . . This community, like the earlier discussion of society is really to define an idea; it is not a program that is recommended for actual operation.<sup>115</sup>

Two more recent contributions to the "revolutionist" vs. "traditionalist" debate are Barrow's defence of Plato's utilitarianism against the liberal-democratic critique of Popper, Crossman and Bertrand Russell, and a Marxist critique, inspired by Winspear, by Wood and Wood.

While Barrow (1975) suggests that "the importance of Plato, today, lies in his principles and not in his detailed proposals", the two are not always distinguished in his account.<sup>116</sup> For instance, on the one hand, the argument for the state might be reduced generally to the view that, "Plato claims (not proves)

that a community constituted on the principle of relating a man's activity to his needs is a just one, . . . . "117 On the other hand, the account of the "detailed proposals" of V are not reduced to some such general principle, but retain the usual pragmatic utility.

. . . The need to foster unity amongst the auxiliaries and rulers, and the need to prevent them from acquiring acquisitive possessive instincts, led to a decree that they should lead a communal life (416); it follows as a matter of course that the same regulation will apply to women who, on grounds of aptitude and ability, are being trained for either of these two groups. To preserve the institution of marriage amongst these groups would be to foster private interests and would lead on occasion to disharmony (via jealousy, for instance). Therefore, 'wives and children will be held in common' (457C).118

The critique by Wood and Wood (1978) declares its possibility on grounds of its irrelevancy to classical studies, by its own philosophical bias. Obviously, it is the product of the divorce of philosophy and philology, as well as philosophy and political science.

This book has been written primarily from the standpoint of political theory rather than as a work of classical scholarship. . . . as a study of the founding texts in the long tradition of Western political thought, and as a statement on the nature of political theory. Our view is that the classics of political theory are fundamentally ideological, and that to be understood and appreciated as fully as possible, they must be much more closely and systematically related to their social contexts than they often have been in the past. . . . A. D. Winspear's ground-breaking studies have certainly helped to place Plato . . . in socio-historical perspective. . . . 119

It is most interesting for its dependence upon a historical understanding of the Greek polis as the rule against which the "Socratics" (including Plato and Aristotle) are unfavourably measured.

If democracy is the essence, the 'final cause', of telos of the polis, it is not in the works of Plato and Aristotle, or in the ideas of Socrates which inspired them, that the nature of the polis is to be found. On the contrary, their doctrines must be understood as a negation of the polis. . . . The essence, the telos, of the Socratic polis is aristocracy and

hierarchy, not democracy and equality; . . .

The Socratic polis, as described for example by Plato in the Republic and concretely in the Laws, assumes the existence of a fully developed civic community and the virtual disappearance of tribal institutions, even a weakening of kinship ties--to a greater extent than even in the most advanced polis; but in Plato's polis the whole elaborate civic apparatus is used to reinforce, not to weaken, hierarchy, and to establish and enforce inequality and social immobility more rigidly than the historical oligarchies could ever have done. The Socratic polis . . . runs counter to the historical experience. . . . [It] is deliberately antithetical to the principles and values of the polis . . . . [It] violates the historical reality of the polis and deprives it of its significance in the evolution of human social organization.<sup>120</sup>

This thesis, applied to the Republic, argues that Plato is the "architect of the anti-polis".

. . . Plato's genius lies in his attempt to 'aristocratize' the polis and politicize the aristocracy, to transform the notion of the polis in such a way as to synthesize two essentially and historically antithetical principles, the political and the aristocratic. . . . In [the Republic] Plato systematically reconstructs the polis so that its very essence becomes the subordination of the community to a ruling class that personifies the values of the Athenian aristocracy. At the same time, he formulates the modern aristocratic code in such a way that it does not entail rejection of the polis. . . . In the Republic he does not yet [as later in the Laws] outline a complete transformation of the economic and social infrastructure of the polis. Instead, he simply imagines the superimposition of a new aristocratic ruling class upon the existing social structure, and addresses himself primarily to the problem of philosophically justifying its rule.<sup>121</sup>

(β) "7th Letter" Interpretation.

According to H-G. Gadamer,

. . . classicists in Germany came to emphasize the so-called political Plato . . . [which] began with the Plato studies of Wilamowitz. Wilamowitz made his point of departure the political content of the Seventh Letter, which by that time was again considered to be authentic, and he was followed in his approach by many . . . .<sup>122</sup>

Certainly, non-German classical philologists knew the work of Wilamowitz and his followers, who had replaced Aristotle's Politics with Plato's 7th Letter as the interpretative key to the Republic.<sup>123</sup> Nevertheless, the "Popper vs Plato"

debate in England and North America inspired a more widespread, sympathetic interest among English Platonic scholars in the German school.<sup>124</sup>

The most significant representatives of this German school in the English-speaking world are Paul Friedlander and H-G. Gadamer, whose works, originating in the 1920's, have been undergoing translation (and revision) at least since the 1960's. It is not just the precedence given to the 7th Letter, which makes of these scholars a single school, but their interpretation of Plato as a "political" philosopher. In his 1934 essay, later translated as "Plato and the Poets", Gadamer argued that

. . . Socrates erects a state in words, the possibility of which is given only in philosophy. . . .

. . . Thus the exposition of this ideal state in the Republic serves in educating the political human being, but the Republic is not meant as a manual on educational methods and materials, and it does not point out the goal of the educational process to the educator.

. . . Plato's critique of the poets is thus to be interpreted in terms of the two faces which the Republic presents: on the one hand, the strict utopian constitution of the state and, on the other, a satirical criticism of existing states. The very immoderation of this critique of the poets gives us tangible evidence of the purpose which Plato has in mind. It is his aim to bring about the possible, i.e., the actual, education of the political human being by providing a picture of the impossible, i.e., an organized paideia whose unlimited capability derives entirely from itself and in no way from a given ethos.

. . . Paideia for Plato . . . . is the shaping of an inner harmony in the soul of a person, a harmony of the sharp and mild in him, of the willful and the philosophical. . . . for Plato harmony means the tuning of a dissonance which is inherent in man.

. . . And when communal property, communal living, communal women and children are made the rule for the guardians and for all education, musical and gymnastic, and when finally even the begetting of proper new generations is to be determined by a number calculated in some profound and mystic way (and when the decay of the state is said to begin with a mistake in the calculation of the calendar of wedlocks)--all this is supposed to make one aware that this educational state is not meant as a proposal for some actual new ordering of man or the state. Instead it teaches us about human existence itself and the basic impulses in the latter which makes it possible to establish a state: The state is possible only when the difficult and delicate tuning, the aforementioned harmonization of the schism in man, succeeds.<sup>125</sup>

For Gadamer, then, Plato is "political" in the sense that he is an "educator" of the political; the ideal state of the Republic is an "educational state"; the communal life of the guardians is not governed by pragmatic political necessity, but more universal educational reasons. The school of the 7th Letter emphasizes that "political" for Plato is essentially "paideia". In 1942, Gadamer published an essay later translated as "Plato's Educational State", which argued this underlying thesis of "Plato and the Poets".

It is in his capacity as the true political educator that Plato writes his Republic, and most certainly this can also be taken to mean that the pedagogical state which he develops there refers as well to the actual, living community where such education was being practiced in the academy.<sup>126</sup>

R. F. Cushman (1958) shows the influence of this teaching on English Platonic scholars.

Nineteenth-century Platonic interpretation was so under the spell of Hegelian idealism that it gave disproportionate stress to the Platonic theory of Forms. It tended to lose sight of the pressing human situation in the light of which the rationale of Plato's metaphysics can best be understood. . . . It is fitting, then, to draw attention to Plato's own statement that he forsook politics for philosophy, not to find an irrelevant retreat, but, through right education, to create a moral climate from which better politics might come. . . . It would be plainly absurd to deny that a main contention of the Republic is this: No ruler can be trusted whose vision is not "sighted" upon the eternal paradeigma of goodness and whose primary affection is not centered upon the city whose home is the ideal. In this we come closest to discovering the raison d'etre for Plato's so-called ideal state. It is not that he expected its realization; and, certainly, its envisionment is no invitation to world-flight. It is, rather, that the vision of it and the love of it can alone assure goodwill capable of disinterested administration of justice in the affairs of men.<sup>127</sup>

A. Dies (1932) is representative of its influence upon French scholars.<sup>128</sup> His commentary on V is particularly enlightening.

Nous avons donc construit la cité et montré qu'en elle, aussi bien que dans chacun de ses membres, la justice naîtra du fait que leurs parties composantes resteront chacune à leur place et joueront leur



rôle propre. Mais, dans cette appropriation des parties, garantie du travail harmonieux de l'ensemble, à qui revient le rôle principal? Evidemment à la partie dirigeante, à celle qui, voyant l'ensemble et son but, tient orientée vers ce but sa propre action et celle des autres parties. Quelle sera donc la condition fondamentale pour que se réalise cette justice parfaite, sinon que la partie dirigeante ne cesse de voir et de vouloir la fin générale, de la voir dans une clarté totale et inamissible, de la vouloir et de s'y consacrer sans partage et sans retour? Cette clarté inamissible, c'est celle de la science: il faut donc que nos gardiens cherchent et conquièrent la science, il faut, en un mot, qu'ils soient philosophes. A ce degré, voir, c'est vouloir. et l'intuition claire fait l'action infallible. Mais se consacrer sans partage à la fin et, pour cela, monter sans arrêt vers la vision totale, réclame une volonté dégagée de toutes les entraves, purifiée de toutes les attaches étrangères: aussi, comme nous avons précédemment enlevé à nos gardiens les passions et les soucis de la vie matérielle, nous leur enlèverons maintenant les passions et les soucis de la famille. La communauté des femmes et des enfants est la condition négative, la <<philosophie>> des gardiens est la condition positive de réalisation de la justice parfaite.<sup>129</sup>

Though they have different interpretations, both Dies and Gadamer see Republic V as a unified whole, which begins a new division in the argument to the end of VII. In Dies' divisions of the text, II-IV concern the definition of justice; V-VII, the conditions for the realization of the just state; VII-IX, injustice in the state and individual. Likewise, Gadamer sees V as answering the question of the possibility of the just state. The "traditionalists" divided the Republic in the middle of V: the community of wives and children concluded the practical state; the philosopher-king begins the ideal state. The "political" Platonists are really transferring the whole of V to the ideal state, where they see the three waves as united by the single question of the possibility of the just state, as defined in II-IV. It is a more satisfactory division of the text, since it agrees with the dramatic structure of the work, whereas the traditional division opposed logic and dramatic elements. One reason may be that the "political" Platonists are also of the opinion that the dramatic structure of the dialogues are inviolable guides to an understanding of the meaning of the argument.

Paul Friedlander (1928 Germany; 1960 America), like Gadamer, pays close attention to the dramatic context of the dialectical movement of the dialogue--but, like Gomperz before him, the drama of the narrative seems to overwhelm the logic of the argument, as is evident in his account of the "three waves".

Three waves break in upon us, each one more powerful than the other. With this pictorial metaphor, Plato raises the conversation to its highest level. This level is reached--and on it everything that has been said before will suddenly be transformed--when we come to the core of the whole Republic, the incredible paradox that philosophers be kings, and that the ideal state will not be realized unless they are (473D). From then on, this new knowledge will stand at the center and direct our view to the realm of true being.

To this realm, then, we are carried by the wave that threatened to drown us. Precisely because this wave is so overwhelming, Plato does not introduce it by itself, but as the third and last wave long kept in the background. Two paradoxes precede it. These paradoxes are not of the same overwhelming power, however, but of such a kind that they might have been dealt with on the level we are leaving.<sup>130</sup>

It is disappointing for Friedlander to find only a formal unity to V, where Gadamer and Dies had discovered a logical unity in the issue of possibility. Still, because Friedlander recognizes the dramatic--or poetic--element, he is also able to recognize the underlying dialectical logic. Thus, while he may place the first two waves with II-IV, he argues more for a philosophic than pragmatic interpretation--a proper antidote to Popper.

These are paradoxical proposals, and Plato plays with them--pour épater le bourgeois--by having the women exercise naked with the men in the gymnasium and by elaborating on the institution of communal marriage, with many amusing and even grotesque details. Yet, he is deeply serious behind the jest. For here, as everywhere in the Republic, it is not the institution that matters to him, but the principle represented by it. In principle, the forces that tear the state apart are the greatest evil and those that bind it together are the greatest good, and the strongest bond is forged by a communion of pleasure and pain (462AB). The more striking the paradox, the clearer the principle.<sup>131</sup>

(γ) "Straussian" Interpretation.

Leo Strauss created his own school, out of his rejection of the divorce between science and philosophy, particularly his rejection of the divorce of political science from political philosophy. The Straussians share some common ground with the school of the 7th Letter--especially in their attention to the dialogic character of Plato's writings. However, Straussian interpretations are usually recognizable more by agreed criteria, than explicit theses of interpretation. Modern interpreters ought to be as faithful to the spirit of the text as translators to its letter. Ironically, given their platform, the Straussians have been the most controversial among Platonic scholars since WWII. With respect to the Republic, besides writings by Strauss himself, there is especially the translation and interpretation of A. Bloom.

Strauss' most influential publication on Plato was an entry in the History of Political Philosophy, (1963) of which he was co-editor. A central thesis in Strauss' view of the Republic is his understanding of the role assigned therein to eros.

It seems that there is a tension between eros and the city and hence between eros and justice: only through the depreciation of eros can the city come into its own. Eros obeys its own laws, not the laws of the city however good; in the good city, eros is simply subjected to what the city requires. The good city requires that all love of one's own--all spontaneous love of one's own parents, one's own children, one's own friends and beloved--be sacrificed to the common love of the common. As far as possible, the love of one's own must be abolished except as it is love of the city as this particular city, as one's own city. As far as possible, patriotism takes the place of eros, and patriotism has a closer kinship to spiritedness, eagerness to fight, "waspishness," anger, and indignation than to eros.<sup>132</sup>

Bloom (1968) accepted this thesis,<sup>133</sup> and built a controversial interpretation of Republic V around it<sup>134</sup>--one which resurrected the "Aristophanes' Ecclesiastusae thesis, the historical likelihood of which Adam had long ago disproved.<sup>135</sup>

Now Socrates proceeds to try to make public or common everything that remains private. Full communism, from Socrates' point of view the only form of just regime, requires not only the abolition of private property but also the sharing of women and children and the rule of philosophers. Women, family, and philosophy are all of the domain of the erotic, which seems to be what is most intransigently private. . . . The first two waves--the same way of life for women as men and the community of wives and children--have never existed in reality or in the thoughts of serious men; they are the absurd conceits of a comic poet who only suggested them in order to ridicule them. And the last wave, the rule of philosophers, is a total innovation, beyond the wildest thoughts of that same comic poet who had also ridiculed philosophy.

Book V is preposterous, and Socrates expects it to be ridiculed. . . . As such it can only be understood as Socrates' response to his most dangerous accuser, Aristophanes, and his contest with him. In the Ecclesiazusae Aristophanes had attacked the public in the name of the private, and in the Clouds he had attacked philosophy in the name of poetry. Here Socrates suggests that, if philosophy rules, the political can triumph over the private life. . . . The Republic is the first book of political philosophy, and attempts to show that philosophy can shed light on human things as no other discipline can. Socrates is the founder of the city in speech and, hence, of political philosophy. In Book V he tries to show the superiority of the philosopher to the comic poet in deed; he does so by producing a comedy which is more fantastic, more innovative, more comic, and more profound than any work of Aristophanes.<sup>136</sup>

Bloom offers the most radical of alternative interpretations, and one which rests upon treating Plato principally as a poet--although, limited to V. Yet, Bloom does not represent the furthest extreme of possibility in taking Plato's proposals in V in some way other than literally. One might here mention Randall (1970) (self-proclaimed protege of Woodbridge<sup>137</sup>), who has argued that "Plato is a philosopher because he is a poet." In Randall, philosophic sense tends to be converted into poetic nonsense.

. . . men have read the Republic, and imagined that Plato is urging a practical political program--they have been insensitive enough to Plato's irony to think, Socrates is taking the stump for the Perfect City Party in Athens! They have judged that Plato was himself eager to catch a king, and to train him into becoming a philosopher. It is really hard to understand that over the ages readers of the Republic, with its layer upon layer of dramatic irony, have assumed, from the

literal-minded Aristotle on, that Plato himself wanted or that any sane man in his senses could want, to live under such institutions as Socrates is made to elaborate--institutions so fascinating to talk about, but so intolerable to have to endure. . . . The Republic is a dramatic critique of the utopian spirit, of social idealism.<sup>138</sup>

If the problem with the "traditionalist" interpretation was the dogmatism of their "literal-minded Aristotle", here, one goes to the opposite extreme--where what is said is no longer any guarantee to what is meant, and Socratic reason becomes an unPlatonic slave to dramatic irony. One can see such interpretations arising out of the ("anti-systematic") principles guiding David Grene (1950), who cites Strauss, in a footnote to the following passage, as his source ( Wilamowitz is alleged to have neglected to give "sufficient attention" to V).

. . . it is quite absurd to treat the argument of the Republic in logical terms . . . The dialogues are not treatises designed to teach the reader by the rigor of logic; they are not exhaustive as Aristotle tried to make his treatments of particular subject matters. They are rather designed to make the reader understand imaginatively one point of view and neglect others. He cannot learn Plato's doctrine from pieces of the dialogue; he cannot learn the methods of Plato's philosophic pedagogy. But he may be persuaded that one way of seeing politics is truer than another.<sup>139</sup>

#### (6) Interpretation through "Unwritten Doctrines".

Alongside Gadamer and Strauss, then, there remains Findlay (1974), who represents for the English-speaking world the third school in modern Platonic scholarship--that which is grounded in the "Unwritten Doctrines".<sup>140</sup>

Findlay represents the general structure of the Republic as follows.

The Republic was very possibly written in sections at various times and in progressively extended forms. Of its ten books, the first is an ordinary logic-chopping Socratic discourse on Justice, quite possibly published as such before the later books were written. Books II, III and IV form a fairly self-sufficient unit and supplement to I: they deal with the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Courage, Self-restraint, and Justice. Books V, VI and VII belong together and work out Plato's theory of the metaphysical foundations of the world, knowledge and

society: they are at many points nothing but a fine web of hints and pictures, and clearly point to the Unwritten Doctrines with which Aristotle and others have made us acquainted, and without which as a background these books would be largely unintelligible. Books VIII and IX are a study in Political Pathology . . . Book X sums up the whole . . . 141

In this view, the practical and political aspect of the Republic, emphasized by the 7th Letter and Straussian schools, is completely subordinate to an underlieing mathematicizing concept of reality Plato learned from the Pythagoreans.

Plato is not . . . primarily interested in souls or states, but in the divine patterns, the 'Numbers', that they instantiate, and which alone can give them sense or substance. It is only if we ourselves can think in this abstractedly structural manner that we can hope to see the point of his extraordinary comparisons and provisions.<sup>142</sup>

It is thus a school of thought which most investigates the philosophical ground of the concept of unity as principle in the Republic, to which Aristotle had drawn attention.

Plato is best regarded as having constructed an imaginary Pythagorean commune hanging in the pure ether of hypothesis, in order to show how political life derives from the metaphysical Ultimates of the universe, and how the same Unity which everywhere disciplines variety into excellence and limit, and which expresses itself in cosmic and individual Life, Soul and Mind, is also expressed in the mutual regard that different individuals and groups of individuals have for one another in an ordered social whole.<sup>143</sup>

One finds in Findlay's account both the most sound philosophic analysis of the argument of the three waves of V, together with their formal dismissal from serious consideration.

The way Socrates-Plato meets the first two waves does not merit very great attention. . . . The main point [in overcoming the first wave] is that it is eidetic insight which alone can decide whether or not there is a genuine difference of eidos or phusis--the two are deeply associated in the thought of Plato--in the difference between men and women: procreative, grammatical and conventionally social distinctions do nothing to decide the issue. And logic-chopping or eristic is precisely the sort of reasoning that confounds genuine distinctions of eidos or phusis with conventional, verbal or contingently factual distinctions. . . . The second wave is the general

strangeness of the plan to share wives and offspring: . . . But that this strange form of contrived sharing maintained by deception is truly desirable is argued on the ground that there is an equation between unity and goodness: there can be no greater evil in a state than what dirempts into many instead of making it one, and no greater good than what binds it together and unifies it (462a, b). The community of parents and children creates a wider community of joy and grief and a more extended sense of what is one's own: it brings a group closer to the condition of a single man, who overcomes bodily dispersion through the unity of his soul, so that he is as a whole affected by each pain or pleasure in each bodily part (462c, d). Just as a man suffers in his finger, so will the commune suffer in each insured member.<sup>144</sup>

In a later summary, Findlay stressed the importance "in reading of all these fantastic arrangements not to take them for a set of practical proposals".<sup>145</sup>

#### (ε) Independent Interpretations

Crombie (1962), like Findlay, addresses V at a philosophical level, where the communal proposals are seen as involving a relation between rational principle and natural order.

The way in which the interlude [V-VII] contributes to the theme of the dialogue is not made explicit by the parties to the conversation (Plato is careful to make the Republic develop after the manner of a natural conservation). One purpose of the interlude, as I believe, is to suggest that there exists a rational order which is somehow reproduced in whatever is orderly in nature, and to indicate to us how we can come to know this rational order. As we have seen, this points needs to be made in order that the reader may be convinced that the human soul is essentially a pure intelligence. However the way in which the interlude is constructed directs attention more towards another contribution which it makes, which is the supremacy of reason in the third of the senses distinguished above, that in which the question how we ought to live depends in the end on philosophical insight. The structure is something like this. It becomes clear that Socrates' criticisms of ordinary Greek life are much more far-reaching than we have yet realised. In particular he does not believe in marriage and the family. The drastic nature of his proposals makes it necessary to ask how we really know what the good for man is. We assume that justice, courage, and so on are virtues and therefore goods, but he who proposes radical reforms cannot rest on this assumption or tradition or common consent.<sup>146</sup>

Fehl (1962) reminds one of the argument of Nettleship, except he seems more Augustinian, so to speak. The Republic is generally thought of as concerning the "pilgrimage" of the soul to the divine; within this context, the ideal city is the universal city of humanity, governed by reason. On the other hand, the communal proposals of V are an afterthought.

We have now come to the threshold of a new society: the ideal republic. This is a city that transcends the simply economic and the simply nationalistic city. Primary education is adequate to the former and secondary to the latter. But the true republic is something more. It is the city of man, of all men, the kosmo-polis, the world city, the Platonopolis, the ideal city of Plato's dream. For this new city, the foundations are human nature itself--the ideal of what is possible in terms of human nature. Its rulers must be more than police, more than soldiers. The general is not enough. The ruler must be a philosopher. . . .

. . . . Plato digresses! As Eve was an afterthought of Yahweh, so women and the family are dealt with in a parenthesis in Plato's dream of the ideal society.<sup>147</sup>

The Republic as translated by R.Larson, received from E. Brann (1979) an innovative view of its structure; Brann's view is close to that of Gadamer, in its emphasis upon education --but parts company where paideia is altogether separated from politics:

The Republic indeed has a rather large and obvious architecture, a symmetry which suggests too much to be a pattern for pattern's sake. Let me set it out roughly by books:

1 and 10: The rewards of justice

2-5 and 8-9: The construction and corruption of the best city;

2 and 10: The critique of poetry;

6 and 7: The philosopher's function and education.

This arrangement may be imagined as a set of concentric circles with the themes lying on a diameter through them. The major themes are repeated going into the center and coming out, of course under a different light . . . .

But what the concentric construction primarily effects is the clear definition of a dialogic center, namely Books 6 and 7, in which are contained the heights and the depths of the dialogue. . . . In the center of the Western tradition's first book on political theory, then, politics is replaced by philosophy. . . . Perhaps then it is better to say



that Socrates transforms a political question into an educational one. .

..

This transformation of politics into pedagogy is necessitated by what might be termed the "founding paradox" of the ideal city. For suppose such a city has been constructed in argument, how is it to be realized? It is under the pressure of this question from Glaucon that Socrates gives the absurd, or at least not very common sensical, answer already cited: Such a city can come about only if either philosophers become kings or kings philosophers.

. . . . the point of the Republic is not a political but a personal founding, a self-constituting, which is accomplished both in and by the dialogue. Socrates resolves, or rather, bypasses the founder's paradox by founding, through conversation, right here and now an educational community whose members are all the present and future participants in the dialogue. The very development of this community "in speech", that is, the course of the argument itself, educates his interlocutors "in deed". . . . The establishment of this dialogic community and the conversion and reformation of its philosopher-citizens is itself the Socratic accomplishment--not the preparation of future philosopher kings, and the choice of of the obscure Glaucon as chief interlocutor signifies.<sup>148</sup>

Wolz (1981), like Brann, emphasizes the educational relation of the Republic to the reader; like Randall, he finds an underlieing Socratic irony.

With the expansion of the state and the introduction of luxury, the natural harmonious interaction of the citizens which was present in the primitive state disappears and manmade safeguards against conflicts must be established in the more sophisticated society. This raises the problem of education, especially of the warrior class, on whose competence the life of the state depends.

During the rest of the dialogue, Socrates speaks of training which, when closely examined, aims not at justice but at efficiency and safety. The citizens are carefully conditioned so as to remain reliably obedient to their ruler, and the ruler is endowed with infallible knowledge, which enables him "to shape the pattern of public and private life into conformity with his vision of the ideal" (6. 500). The state which emerges from the discussion not only falls short of the ideal of justice, but reduces all except the rulers themselves to a subhuman level, depriving them of their specifically human function of contributing significantly to the formation of their own lives. Thus, submission to the wisest and best intentioned rulers, just as the excessive adherence to a fixed rule of conduct, is found to be fatal to morality and hence to manhood.<sup>149</sup>

The communal proposals of V have the intended effect of drawing attention to the impracticability of the ideal state, with the further design of directing the

reader's attention toward the underlying dramatic element of "Socratic irony", which suggests that the Republic is actually an existential tract against the very idea of an ideal state in favour of an "authentic" individual.

What could induce the members of a community, the reader might ask, to give their consent to a form of government which [especially by the marriage regulations of V] robs them of their integrity as human beings? What advantage could offset such a sacrifice? . . . we are dealing here not with a conviction of either Socrates or Plato, but with an exercise of Socratic irony. Before the philosophers can take control so that "the state and individuals will have rest from trouble" (6.500), they must first be transhumanized and acquire an unearthly wisdom, which in turn would make them fit only to rule over an ideal realm and not the transient situations of the world which we inhabit. So far from describing how the ideal city can come about, Socrates seems to call attention to the impossible conditions which would have to be satisfied, and thus warn the individual that he can never hope to escape personal responsibility for his own welfare or for that of the state.<sup>150</sup>

In his summary of the Republic, Wolz seems to forget how "Plato's way of simultaneously concealing and disclosing his thoughts, in order to induce and direct the reflections of the reader, makes it all too easy for the interpreter to read his own ideas into the dialogue."

The Republic is not interested in teaching a doctrine, either about education or government or human knowledge and aspiration. At the center of Plato's concern, however, there is always the free human spirit. This spirit is as precious as it is fragile. It is threatened not only by lack of education, but also by the wrong use of it, not only by the despot bent on self-aggrandizement, but also by the benevolent ruler willing to take his subjects' responsibilities upon himself. If we now return in thought to the beginning of the dialogue we find that we have no answer to the question suggested by the opening scene: How far should a man yield to the pressures and demands made upon him by his friends, by society, the world at large, and perhaps even the gods? Neither custom nor rule of law, nor man in authority, no matter how wise and well-intentioned, can be wholly relied upon as guides. But it may well be that this is the most significant lesson for an individual to learn. For only if he has been made aware of the futility of seeking security in a world essentially precarious and full of risks, will he be inclined to throw away all crutches and at last stand on his own feet. Only then is he ready for the supreme test, the

choice of a way of life. And how can he be a genuine self, unless he succeeds in choosing his own life?<sup>150</sup>

One recognizes how, generally, in the accounts of the Republic, since the "ideological" attacks on Plato, there is a strong interest to distinguish between "principle" and "proposal"--in other words, to arrive at a more philosophically satisfactory account of the "practical ideal" state of the Republic, than is obtainable in a more literal reading of the dialogue, often ascribed to Aristotle. Such an interest is obvious in Rowe (1984).

. . . we must distinguish here between [Plato's] political proposals as such, and what those proposals are designed to achieve. There are many aspects of the kind of state outline in the Republic which are quite monstrous: for example, its extreme stratification, and the consequent loss of political freedom in the ordinary sense; the virtual suppression of creative art and inquiry; the proposals for the mating and breeding of citizens. But the broad aim, of securing a just and virtuous society, is hardly in itself objectionable.<sup>151</sup>

Clay (1988) shows a similar concern.

This inner polity is the foundation of Kallipolis, and its development is perhaps the overriding purpose of the Republic. Without the third wave of paradox that Socrates confronts in Republic 5, and without the deep sense of pessimism about the possibility of founding Kallipolis in anything but speech that this wave bears with it, the project of the Republic would have been very different. But the recognition of the antagonism between philosophy and society that Socrates voices in Books 5-7, and finally at the end of 9, forces attention away from society back to the individual. It is not true that "in the fields of politics, the individual is to Plato the Evil One himself [Popper, Open Society, p. 104]. In the Republic, the growing pessimism over the possibility of a society governed by philosophy is qualified by an emergent hope for the perfection of the individual soul.<sup>152</sup>

#### (vi) Conclusion.

The view taken of the history of interpretation of Republic V in this critical survey is that it develops out of Aristotle's critique in Politics II basically two opposed lines of interpretation: the "traditionalist" and the "alternative". The survey suggests that both the traditionalist acceptance and the alternative rejection of Aristotle's critique as an interpretive key to the Republic are inadequate. What is taken to be the true import of Aristotle's

critique forms the critical standpoint from which the history of interpretation of Republic V has been surveyed.

Disagreements among the traditionalists substantiates what one might infer from Aristotle: that the interpretation of V is problematic. What is problematic about V is the interpretation of the community of wives and children. The problem becomes evident within the context of the general view taken of the structure of the dialogue, which divides the argument between the practical state constituted in II to IV, and the ideal state of V to VII. There is nearly universal agreement that Plato brings before us a practical ideal state; however, in nearly every view, the practical and ideal elements are divided and, in some instances, even opposed. The community of wives and children is the focal point of this dissolution of the state into its elements: on the one hand, it is assigned to the practical aspect of the state, and thus associated with the argument of II to IV; on the other hand, it is assigned to the ideal aspect of the state, and thus associated with the argument of V to VII. In nearly every account, it is recognized as the most impracticable ideal measure of a state taken to be a practical ideal--the problem lies with this very determination of the state as a practical ideal.

The conclusion drawn from this survey is that the problem originates in the traditionalist tendency toward a dogmatic and literal acceptance of Aristotle's critique of the Republic in Politics II. They learn from Aristotle the impracticability of Plato's state taken literally as a practical ideal; yet, they fail to recognize the alternative of interpreting it for what Socrates is made to say it is--a philosophic paradigm which exists--part and whole--in and for lexis, not praxis. Most of all, they pay insufficient attention to the theoretical basis of Aristotle's critique--that Plato's concept of unity is contrary to the concept of oikos and polis; thus, they misinterpret the significance of his critique that, taken literally, the ideal state is also contrary to these institutions in practice. Aristotle does not simply condemn Plato's state, but suggests the need to regard it more as a philosophic than practical model, which would seem to encourage the alternative line of interpretation.

Alternative interpretations, however, have appeared most directly as a rejection of the traditionalist acceptance of Aristotle's critique as an interpretive key, with the result that both schools of thought fail to realize Aristotle's directive to consider the dialogue within its own philosophic terms. Many express a desire to seek out new interpretations of the Republic; to some extent, the survey has attempted to measure these by a critical evaluation of their proximity to what is taken to be the main hypotheses of the Platonic philosophy--the many, eide and good. Few tend to stay within the logic of the dialogue; too many obviously read into the argument the common biases of the day. The most interesting of these address the dialogue dialogically--especially, within the context of the relation of dialogue to reader; however, the most promising of a satisfactory account of the Republic are those which address the dialogue philosophically from within a Platonic standpoint.

The one-sidedness of the most noteworthy alternative accounts of the dialogue--those of Findlay, Gadamer and Bloom--are demonstrated by their mutual exclusion of each other. Against Gadamer and Bloom, the weakness of Findlay's tendency to reduce the concrete matter of the dialogue--the practical life of state and individual--to the abstract principles of the "unwritten doctrines" is most evident; against Findlay, Gadamer's tendency to interpret the dialogue from an existential standpoint becomes evident, as well as the limitation of granting too much weight to the authority of the "seventh letter", so that the philosophic content tends to become subject to an existential concern with political life--and in this tendency, the Straussian position is not far away; Bloom represents the liability of interpreting the dialogue almost on private grounds, where there is no other authority than one's own ingenuity.

In general, the weakness of extant interpretations is the general failure to keep the end of the argument in view: the thesis of the following interpretive essay is that the Republic is concerned, above all, with the dialectical disclosure of how justice is the right relation of all things to an ultimate principle of intelligible causality, the Platonic Good.

Endnotes: "Critical Survey"

<sup>1</sup>For a complete history, see F. Novotony, The Posthumous Life of Plato, The Hague, 1977; for a more concise account, E. Barker, Greek Political Theory, London, 1918. The following outline is, for the most part, based upon Novotony.

<sup>2</sup>Politics II, 1261a10-17, Aristotle, The Politics (trans. Jowett, ed. S. Everson), Cambridge, 1988.

<sup>3</sup>Republic V, 457; VIII, 543a.

<sup>4</sup>Pol. II, 1261a25-30.

<sup>5</sup>The logic of Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic concept of unity implies his more fundamental critique of the Platonic doctrine of Forms and of the Platonic One.

<sup>6</sup>Rep. V, 462a9-b2.

<sup>7</sup>Rep. V, 464b1-6.

<sup>8</sup>Pol., II, 1261a19-22

<sup>9</sup>Pol. II, 1263b25-30.

<sup>10</sup>See Everson's "Introduction" to Aristotle, The Politics, pp.xv-xxi.

<sup>11</sup>Pol., II, 1263b31-36

<sup>12</sup>Pol. 1261b6-15.

<sup>13</sup>"No one else has introduced such novelties as the community of women and children, . . . : other legislators begin with what is necessary." Pol., II, 7, 1266a31-37. Of course, the historical veracity of this statement has been questioned.

<sup>14</sup> Barker, GPT, p.445.

<sup>15</sup>Novotony, PLP, pp. 314-316.

<sup>16</sup>"In [Petrarch's] Trionfo della fama Plato walks at the head of the philosophers as the one who most nearly attained the goal set by heaven--thus the primacy which Dante attributed to Aristotle is here transferred to Plato."Novotony, PLP, pp.327-328

<sup>17</sup>Novotony, PLP, pp. 351-352.

<sup>18</sup>Novotony, PLP, p. 372.

<sup>19</sup>Novotony, PLP, p. 386.

<sup>20</sup>Novotony, PLP, pp. 399-400.

<sup>21</sup>Novotony, PLP, p. 395.

<sup>22</sup>Barker, GPT, pp. 448-451.

<sup>23</sup>Generally on modernity, see relevant chapters in Novotony, PLP; specifically on Rousseau, see Barker, GPT, pp.452-454.

<sup>24</sup>"Its object, task and method were elucidated particularly by Friedrich August Wolf (1795-1834) . . . who was the first to separate it clearly from pedagogy, theology and philosophy." Novotony, PLP, p. 519.

<sup>25</sup>". . . hardly anyone doubted that a new era of Platonic studies started with this translation in Germany . . . . ", Novotony, PLP, p. 521.

<sup>26</sup>Novotony, PLP, p. 521.

<sup>27</sup>K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, Heidelberg, 1839.

<sup>28</sup>Novotony, PLP, p. 522.

<sup>29</sup>Hermann understood his work as a correction, rather than refutation, of Schleiermacher. (Novotony, PLP, p. 522.)

<sup>30</sup>See H-G. Gadamer, "Plato's Unwritten Dialectic" in Dialogue and Dialectic, pp.124-125.

<sup>31</sup>Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 2, (1892) (trans. E. S. Haldane), New York, 1955, pp.10;14.

<sup>32</sup>For a less favourable view, see Novotony, PLP, pp.52 - 52 .

<sup>33</sup>Hegel, HLHP, pp.114-115.

<sup>34</sup>Hegel, HLHP pp.112-113. (Underlining mine.)

<sup>35</sup>Grace Billings, The Art of Transition in Plato (Diss. for U. of Chicago, 1920), Garland Publishing, New York, 1979, p.33.

<sup>36</sup>For a final resume, which goes back to Hegel, see Barker, GPT, pp. 168-169.

<sup>37</sup>"[Plato] is resolved to prevent the growth of any separate interest, affections, or aspirations, in the mind of any individual Guardian. Each Guardian is to perform his military and civic duties to the Commonwealth, and to nothing else. He must find his happiness in the performance of his duty: no double functions or occupations are tolerated. . . . If the Guardians aspire to private ends of their own, and employ their force for the attainment of such ends, nothing but oppression and ruin of the remaining community can ensue. " George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, London, 1865, p.198; for the impracticability of the state on historical grounds, see Grote, POCS, p. 218.

38" . . . in order that the [Guardians] may discharge their mission satisfactorily . . . their education and the arrangements of their life must be entirely conducted by the State, and directed to its aims. . . . For the rest of their lives they are compelled to belong wholly to this order, for by the removal of private property, and the family, the State cuts asunder the roots of those private interests which are the hereditary foes of the unity of the state. That Plato is quite in earnest with these proposals, and regards them not only as wholesome but as capable of being carried out, is beyond a doubt. . . . This State cannot be explained merely by the pattern of Spartan or Pythagorean arrangements, or by the opposition to the excesses of the Attic democracy; . . ." E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, London, 1890, pp.158-160.

39Grote defends Plato against Aristotle's critique on similar grounds. See POCS, p. 220, note.

40Zeller, OHGP, p. 160.

41Grote's main objections to the Republic appear to be from the viewpoint of an 19th century "utilitarian": (1) the unity of the state is prohibited by its failure to inculcate virtue in the lower class of guardians (POCS, pp.207-220); (2) virtue is not self-regarding, but exists only through regard for others. (POCS, pp.122-159)

42Grote, POCS, p. 204.

43Bernard Bosanquet, A Companion to Plato's Republic, New York, 1895.

44R. L. Nettleship, Lectures on the Republic of Plato (1897), London, 1963.

45Bosanquet, CPR, pp. 34, 171, 185 and esp. 197.

46Nettleship, LRP, pp. 12, 163 ff.

47Bosanquet, CPR, p. 197.

48Nettleship, LRP, pp. 164-165.

49Nettleship, LRP, pp.165-166.

50This ambiguity is doubtless a consequence of Nettleship's view that there need not be a definite content to philosophic knowledge; philosophic knowledge is not necessarily a knowledge of the Platonic Ideas; moreover, he holds that the Idea of the Good need not a definite content,

51B. Jowett, The Republic of Plato (1908), 2, 3rd ed., London, 1933, p.110.

52Jowett, R.P., pp. 121-122.

53Theodore Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 3, London, 1905, p.53.

54J. Adam, The Republic of Plato (1902), 1, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1969, p.274.



- 55 Adam, Republic, 1, p. 324.
- 56 Adam, Republic, 1, p.95. Underlining mine.
- 57 E. Barker, Greek Political Theory (1918), London, 1960, especially Ch. XI, "Plato and the States of Greece", pp. 277-313.
- 58 Barker, GPT, n. 2, p. 278-279.
- 59 Select comments from various scholars on more particular matters of interest will be considered in "A Commentary on Republic V".
- 60 A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, New York, 1927, p.265
- 61 Taylor, PMHW, p.277. On p. 278, Taylor (like Burnet) offers the thesis that "the proposals of Republic V are no more than necessary consequences of this [Socratic] position."
- 62 R. Chance, Until Philosophers are Kings, London, 1928, pp.86-87.
- 63 R. C. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, London, 1928, pp. 286-290.
- 64 L. Robin, Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit, New York, 1928, pp.191-192;201-202.
- 65 Constantin Ritter, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy, London, 1933, pp. 328-330; 332.
- 66 Paul Shorey, What Plato Said, Chicago, 1933, pp. 216; 225. (On pp.226 ff., Shorey re-asserts Nettleship's indifference to the content of the Ideas, especially the Idea of the Good, which he argues is not given.)
- 67 F. H. Anderson, The Argument of Plato, London, 1936, pp.77-78.
- 68 G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, London, 1935, pp. 270; 277. Grube follows Aristotle's critique in detail, and might be easily called a summary. Grube's translation, Plato's Republic (1974), will be considered later. He also wrote a significant article, "The Marriage Laws in Plato's Republic"( Classical Quarterly,21, 1927, pp.95-97), which discusses the topic most pragmatically.
- 69 M.B. Foster, The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, Oxford, 1935, pp. 34-35.
- 70 G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, New York, 1950, pp.46; 59.
- 71 F. M. Cornford, The Republic of Plato, Oxford, 1941, p. 144.
- 72 Cornford, Republic, pp. 144-145.
- 73 Alexandre Koyre, Discovering Plato, New York, 1945, p.71.

<sup>74</sup>Koyre, DP, pp. 72-73.

<sup>75</sup>Koyre, DP, note, p.85.

<sup>76</sup>G. C. Field, The Philosophy of Plato, London, 1949, p.100.

<sup>77</sup>N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato's Republic, Oxford, 1951, p. v-vi.

<sup>78</sup>Murphy, IPR, p. 76.

<sup>79</sup>Kathleen Freeman, God, Man and State: Greek Concepts, New York, 1952, p.140.

<sup>80</sup>The general tendency has been to publish short works--articles and essays-- which focus on a very specific concern; though some of these works are whole volumes by one author, most are editorial compilations of related articles.

<sup>81</sup>W. Boyd, Plato's Republic for Today, London, 1964, p.53.

<sup>82</sup>"The ideal city cannot be realized unless all the temptations to the misuse of power on the part of the rulers are removed.", Boyd, PRT, p. 59.

<sup>83</sup>D. Kagan, The Great Dialogue. History of Greek Political Thought from Homer to Polybius, New York, 1965, pp. 162-163.

<sup>84</sup>Kagan, GD, pp. 168-169. The discussion does lead into a more interesting apology for Plato's totalitarianism, which proposes the unhistorical character of Plato's state as "at once the highest development and the utter denial of the Greek concept of polis" (pp.173-175.)

<sup>85</sup>J. Moreau, Le Sense du Platonisme, Paris, 1967, pp. 71-72.

<sup>86</sup>Moreau, LSP, p. 74.

<sup>87</sup>W.S. and M. L. Sahakion, Plato, Boston, 1977, p. 100.

<sup>88</sup>R. M. Hare, Plato, Oxford, 1982.

<sup>89</sup>G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Republic, Indianapolis, 1974, p. 111.

<sup>90</sup>Among the "Alternative-independent" interpretations.

<sup>91</sup>H. D. P. Lee, Plato The Republic, (1955) Great Britain, (2nd. revised) 1974, pp. 5-7.

<sup>92</sup>Insofar as Lee rests his view upon the evidence of the 7th Letter, he could be said to belong to that school of interpretation (to be reviewed shortly), which emphasizes that the "political" aspect of the Republic is "paideia". However, Lee does not, as will Gadamer, strictly regard the Republic as an "educational state"--it remains for Lee about a political--practical ideal--state.

<sup>93</sup>The other main reason was expressed in a quotation from W. Jaeger (Paideia, 2, p.157): "The 'ancient Greek view' was 'that the law of the state is the source of all standards of

human life, and that the virtue of the individual is the same as the virtue of the citizen.' "  
Lee, Republic, p.32.

<sup>94</sup>Lee, Republic, pp. 31-32.

<sup>95</sup>Lee, Republic, p. 41.

<sup>96</sup>Lee, Republic, p. 48.

<sup>97</sup>Lee, Republic, p. 56. Here, Lee is again close to the spirit of the "7th Letter" school of interpretation, which held to the "open-endedness" of Plato's dialogues.

<sup>98</sup>R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozly, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary, London, 1964, pp.134-135.

<sup>99</sup>W. K. C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, 1975.

<sup>100</sup>Guthrie, HGP, p. 486.

<sup>101</sup>Guthrie, HGP, p. 480.

<sup>102</sup>N. P. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic, Indianapolis, 1979, pp. 20-22

<sup>103</sup>Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic, Oxford, 1981, pp. 171-172.

<sup>104</sup>Thus realizing the possibilities of interpretation offered originally by More and Rousseau, although no contemporary scholar takes either as the basis of their own interpretation of the Republic.

<sup>105</sup>R. H. S. Crossman, Plato Today (1937), London, 2nd rev. 1959, p.84.

<sup>106</sup>Crossman, PT, p. 71.

<sup>107</sup>Crossman, PT, p. 71.

<sup>108</sup>Crossman, PT, pp. 117-119.

<sup>109</sup>Crossman, PT, pp.119-120.

<sup>110</sup>A.D. Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought, (1940) 2nd rev. ed. New York, 1956, pp.261-262.

<sup>111</sup>Winspear, GPT, p.267.

<sup>112</sup>Selections from K. R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 1: The Spell of Plato, in Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat, ed. by T. L. Thorson, New-Jersey, 1963, pp. 45; 92-93.

<sup>113</sup>Essay collections covering the debate: Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat (see n. 112); Plato, Popper and Politics, ed. by R. Bambrough, Cambridge, 1967. In the latter, an essay by H. Meyerhoff covers the history of contemporary scholarship--see esp. p. 188.

<sup>114</sup>J. Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, Chicago, 1953, p.55.

<sup>115</sup>R. S. Brumbaugh, Plato for the Modern Age, New York, 1962, p.89.

<sup>116</sup>R. Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, London, 1975, p 4.

<sup>117</sup>Barrow, PUE, p. 27.

<sup>118</sup>Barrow, PUE, p.28.

<sup>119</sup>E. M. Wood and N. Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory, New York, 1978, p. ix.

<sup>120</sup>Wood and Wood, CIAPT, pp.13-15.

<sup>121</sup>Wood and Wood, CIAPT, p. 137.

<sup>122</sup>Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Plato's Unwritten Dialectic"(1968), Dialogue and Dialectic, London, 1980, p. 125.

<sup>123</sup>Of course, it was not just the Republic, nor even just the "political" dialogues (Statesman, Laws), which Wilamowitz subjected to this interpretation. His work, Platon (1919), places a study of the dialogues within the context of events in Plato's life.

<sup>124</sup>The coincidence of this strictly philological movement with certain philosophic developments effected a strong anti-dogmatic school of interpretation, of which Gadamer was a participant in the 20's and 30's."Thus it came to pass that more and more, philosophers, in taking note of the dialogical character of Plato's work and of the inherent inconclusiveness and open-endedness of dialogue, turned against establishing any doctrine of Plato's." (Gadamer, DD, p.125.)

<sup>125</sup>Gadamer, DD, pp. 51-54; 58.

<sup>126</sup>Gadamer, DD, p.76.

<sup>127</sup>R. F. Cushman, Therapeia, Connecticut, 1976 [Rep. of 1958], pp.30; 33.

<sup>128</sup>See A. Dies, "Introduction" to E. Chambry, Platon VI, Paris, 1932, p. X.

<sup>129</sup>Dies, Platon, p.XLIII

<sup>130</sup>P. Friedlander, Plato: The Dialogues, 3, (trans. H. Meyerhoff), Princeton, 1969, p.102.

<sup>131</sup>Friedlander, Plato 3, p. 103.

<sup>132</sup>Political Philosophy, Six Essays by Leo Strauss, ed.H. Gildin, Indianapolis, 1975, p.181.

<sup>133</sup>As did another Straussian, Stanley Rosen, evident in "The Role of Eros in Plato's Republic", The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry, 1988, pp.102-118. He cites The City and Man as demonstrating how "the dramatic structure of the dialogues is an essential part of their philosophical meaning." (p.103)

<sup>134</sup>See S. Burns, "Women in Bloom", Dialogue XXIII (1984), pp. 135-140. E.g., "Bloom . . . takes such an exceptional view of Book V that his account of the text deserves to be challenged in some detail." (p.135)

<sup>135</sup>Adam, RP,1 "Appendices to Book V", pp. 345-355.

<sup>136</sup>A. Bloom, The Republic of Plato, New York, 1968, pp. 380-381.

<sup>137</sup>F. J. E. Woodbridge, The Son of Apollo (1929), New York, 1971, pp. 77-78 .

<sup>138</sup>J. H. Randall, Jr., Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason, New York, 1970, pp.165; 167.

<sup>139</sup>D. Grene, Greek Political Theory, Chicago, 1950, p.150.

<sup>140</sup>J. N. Findlay, Plato. The Written and Unwritten Doctrines, London, 1974, p. 160.

<sup>141</sup>Findlay, PWUD, p. 176.

<sup>142</sup>Findlay, PWUD, p. 159.

<sup>143</sup>Findlay, PWUD, pp.177-179.

<sup>144</sup>J. N. Findlay, Plato and Platonism, London,1978, p. 111.

<sup>145</sup>I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, New York, 1962, p. 100.

<sup>146</sup>N. E. Fehl, A Guide to the Study of Plato's Republic, Hong Kong, 1962, pp. 46-50.

<sup>147</sup>R. Larson and E. Brann, The Republic, Illinois, 1979, pp.xxxiv-xxxvii.

<sup>148</sup>H. G. Wolz, Plato and Heidegger. In Search of Selfhood, Toronto, 1981, p.180.

<sup>149</sup>Wolz, PHISS, p.187-188.

<sup>150</sup>Wolz, PHISS, p. 203.

<sup>151</sup>C. J. Rowe, Plato, New York, 1984, p. 130.

<sup>152</sup>Diskin Clay, "Reading the Republic", Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings (ed. C. L. Griswold), New York, 1988, p. 32.

## An Interpretive Essay on Republic V

### I. 449-451c3 Introductory Narrative: the new beginning.

The character of the narrative interlude at the beginning of Republic V is aporetic: its purpose is to introduce a "new beginning" in the argument concerning the nature of justice, which has so far been established as the principle of the ideal politeia.

(i) 449a-450c5 The aporia of the just politeia.

(a) 449a-b1 The just politeia as complete.

Republic V begins with Socrates' intention to complete the argument for justice in the way outlined at the end of Book IV. On the assumption that the argument concerning the nature of the constitution of the just politeia is now complete, he begins by laying down as already established that the politeia of the state and its analogous counterpart, the politeia of the individual, are agathe and orthe.

*'Αγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ  
ὀρθὴν καλῶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον·*

449a1-2

The basic premiss on which the completion of the argument appears to depend is that this politeia is a true definition of the idea of politeia, and is in this sense an ideal politeia. It is assumed that the definition of justice in Book IV is a true definition of what justice is.<sup>1</sup> The ideal politeia can now be used as a true measure of other kinds of politeiai. By means of the analogy of state and soul, justice can be compared to injustice, and it can finally be determined whether a just life is preferable to an unjust life.

The hypothesis which Socrates now sets out to prove, therefore, is that, as measured by the ideal politeia, the other four basic kinds of politeiai are degenerate forms of the ideal.

*κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, εἴπερ αὕτη ὀρθή, περὶ τε πόλεων διοικήσεις καὶ περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν, ἐν τέτταρσι πονηρίας εἶδεσιν οὕσας.*

449a2-5

Socrates is about to explain the process of degeneration when he is interrupted.

*Καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἦα τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἐρῶν, ὥς μοι ἐφαίνοντο ἕκασται ἐξ ἀλλήλων μεταβαίνειν·*

449a7-b1

The theory of constitutional decline is not resumed until Book VIII, which suggests that the intervening books, V to VII, have to do with the relation between the one ideal and the many degenerate forms of the state. The underlying logic of the relation is here unknown. What V-VII bring to light is the logic of the Platonic hypotheses of the Good, the eide and the many.

(b) 449b-450c5 The just politeia as incomplete.

That the interruption constitutes a major division in the argument is suggested by the re-introduction of Polemarchus and Thrasymachus into the narrative, who have been absent from the argument since the beginning of Book II. The origin of the interruption is a subversive whisper of discontent, which leads to the arrest of Socrates' intention to complete the argument. This "rebellion" originates with Polemarchus; its cause is championed by Adeimantus, and supported by Thrasymachus and Glaucon.<sup>2</sup>

Ironically, Socrates is accused of sinning against philosophy. It seems to his interlocutors that he has tried to get away with cheating the argument concerning the just politeia of an entire and essential division -- an explanation of

how the maxim "common are the possessions of friends" would apply to the family in the community of guardians.

*'Απορραθυμείν ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καὶ εἶδος ὅλον οὐ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκκλέπτειν τοῦ λόγου ἵνα μὴ διέλθῃς, καὶ λήσῃσι οἰηθῆναι εἰπὼν αὐτὸ φαύλως, ὥς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται.*  
449c2-5

It is not the case that the principle koina ta philon estai does not seem applicable to the possession of wives and children.

*Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς, ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε; Ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.*  
449c6-7

What is unclear is how the principle koina ta philon estai would be "rightly" applied to the possession of wives and children. One could imagine a number of different ways of organizing a koinonia of wives and children. What is not clear is the right way for it to be organized.

*ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ τᾶλλα, λόγου δεῖται τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο.*  
449c7-8

They have been expectantly awaiting a more complete account of the koinonia of wives and children since its proposal. For they believe the question of how the koinonia of wives and children would be rightly or wrongly organized is not only important, but essential to the logos of the ideal politeia.

*μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον.*  
449d4-6

The question of how the koinonia of wives and children should be organized is raised not for its own sake, but as somehow essential to the logos of the ideal state. The necessity of the koinonia of wives and children is not questioned, but is the basis of the demand to hear an account of it. They are not objecting to the koinonia of wives and children. They are objecting to completing the argument for justice without the logos of the koinonia of wives and children.



Both Glaucon and Thrasymachus support the objection (450a3-6).

Socrates argues, however, that the logos of the koinonia of wives and children would require such an argument that it would be as though they were to start the logos of the just politeia all over again from the beginning. His comparison suggests that the logos of the koinonia of wives and children would demand nothing less than a "new beginning" in the argument concerning the logos of the just or ideal politeia.

*Οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰργάσασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοι μου. ὅσον λόγον  
πάλιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας·*  
450a7-8

The completion of the logos of the just politeia was possible so long as the logos of the koinonia of wives and children was simply assumed by it.

*ἢ ὥς ἤδη διεληλυθὼς ἔγωγε ἔχαιρον, ἀγαπῶν εἴ τις ἐάσοι  
ταῦτα ἀποδεξάμενος ὥς τότε ἐρρήθη.*  
450a9-10

The reason he attempted to simply pass over the matter earlier was to avoid the "host of arguments" such a controversial proposal would be certain to stir up.

*ἃ νῦν ὑμεῖς παρακαλοῦντες οὐκ ἴστε ὅσον ἐσμὸν λόγων  
ἐπεγείρετε· δι' ὁρῶν ἐγὼ παρήκα τότε, μὴ παράσχοι πολὺν  
ὄχλον.*  
450a10-b2

Socrates' apology fails to satisfy Thrasymachus, by whom he is reproached for subjecting the free, inner necessity of reason to the external necessity of expediency.<sup>3</sup>

*Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Θρασύμαχος· χρυσοχοήσοντας οἶει τούσδε  
νῦν εἰθάδε ἀφίχθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγων ἀκουσόμενους;*  
450b3-4

Socrates agrees with Thrasymachus, but argues that reason itself necessitates the observance of a "measure" in argument.

*Ναί, εἶπον, μετρίων γε.*  
450b5

Socrates' agreement is consistent with a cardinal principle of philosophic discourse, which demands that an argument not be left incomplete, by way of unexamined assumptions.<sup>4</sup> His disagreement, however, is consistent with his account, in Book IV, of the aporia of completing an argument, when it comes against the kind of endless contentious objections that are predicated of a (eristic) position, which would, for instance, contest the very basis of rational argument, such as the law of non-contradiction.<sup>5</sup> The "measure" which would determine whether to answer such objections is the difference between an argument which necessarily reasons on the basis of certain principles, e.g., the principles of reason, and an argument which reasons about those principles. One should proceed on a hypothetical basis to complete the former kind of argument, or, at least take it to the point where it becomes necessary for its assumptions to be examined. If the hypothetical ground of the argument is ever proven false, the argument will be considered invalid.<sup>6</sup>

Given his anticipation of a multitude of arguments concerning the koinonia of wives and children, it still seems best to Socrates to let the proposal go unexamined. His argument against taking up the logos of the koinonia of wives and children is that the argument for justice can be completed without it, so long as they themselves agree to the proposal.

It is Glaucon who finally persuades Socrates to answer their objection. For Glaucon argues from the same position as Socrates himself, that of a philosophos.<sup>7</sup> He believes that the argument is at a point which necessitates taking up the logos of the koinonia of wives and children. Therefore, it is subject to the cardinal rule of philosophic discourse, that the argument be completed in the examination of its assumptions.

*Μέτρον δέ γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαῦκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὁλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν.*

450b6-7

He now encourages Socrates not to tire in face of the "host of arguments", but to take up the argument for the koinonia of wives and children, at their request.

*ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον ἔα· σὺ δὲ περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶμεν μηδαμῶς ἀποκάμης ἢ σοι δοκεῖ διεξιῶν,*

450b7-8

His encouragement is striking in contrast to a parallel instance in Book IV. The parallel is his response to Socrates' argument that they not address the plurality of contentious arguments which would question the necessary assumptions of rational argument. He had encouraged Socrates not to tire himself by answering them, but to proceed in the hypothetical manner he had proposed.<sup>8</sup> The difference in Glaucon's present attitude follows from their agreement that the argument has come to a point where it is necessary to give an account of the logos of the koinonia of wives and children.

The most complete form of the objection is now stated by Glaucon as well. Adeimantus has already told us that they want to know about the tropos of the koinonia of wives and children, the details of organization. Glaucon's formulation of the objection emphasizes that the logos will involve giving an account of that period in the life of the guardian, which lies between one's birth and formal education in the state.

*τίς ἡ κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν ἡμῖν παίδων τε πέρι καὶ γυναικῶν ἔσται καὶ τροφῆς νέων ἔτι ὄντων, τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ γιγνομένης γενέσεώς τε καὶ παιδείας, ἣ δὴ ἐπιπονωτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι.*

450c1-4

The nature of the objection appears to be practical. It seems essential to the logos of the just politeia to determine whether and how a koinonia of wives and children will work. The aporia of the logos of the just politeia appears to be a question concerning its practicability.

(ii) 450c6-451c3 The aporia of the koinonia of wives and children.

The aporia of the logos of the koinonia of wives and children is that of a certain, yet unspecified, skepticism (apistia) regarding, not only its possibility, but also its utility.

*πολλὰς γὰρ ἀπιστίας ἔχει ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ὧν διήλθομεν. καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπιστοῖτ' ἂν, καὶ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα γένοιτο, ὡς ἄριστ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, καὶ ταύτη ἀπιστήσεται.*

450c6-9

Unless the koinonia of wives and children can be proven to be possible and best, its logos will be regarded as impractical, or, "idealistic" in the sense of "wishful thinking".

*διὸ δὴ καὶ ὄκνος τις αὐτῶν ἄπτεσθαι, μὴ εὐχὴ δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος, ὃ φίλε ἑταῖρε.*

450d1-2

Glaucón understands the nature of this skepticism to be of a different sort than the reason which demands the logos of the koinonia of wives and children. He would straightway amend the aporia by liberating the logos of the koinonia of wives and children from having to answer directly to it. He would contain the argument, so far as possible, within some sort of rational limit.

*Μηδέν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὀκνεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγνώμονες οὔτε ἀπιστοὶ οὔτε δύσνοι οἱ ἀκουσόμενοι.*

450d3-4

Glaucón's amendment does not contradict the reason for the demand of a logos. It does not remove the demand that the practicality of the koinonia of wives and children be shown. His amendment suggests that he distinguishes between an ordinary skepticism grounded in Hellenic custom and tradition, a rational skepticism, grounded in an enlightened attitude, which assumes a certain freedom from custom and tradition, and a more radical (sophistic) skepticism which is capable of opposing itself to both reason and custom. Glaucón seems to assume

that the logos need only justify itself in relation to an enlightened reason, and not in relation to either unenlightened assumptions, or radical skepticism.

Socrates refutes this amendment at a deeper level. The logos of the koinonia of wives and children is of such a sort that it can make no allowances. It is a dangerous argument, for it must proceed entirely hypothetically, altogether without fixed assumptions, yet it will involve a consideration of matters of greatest importance.

*ἐν γὰρ φρονίμοις τε καὶ φίλοις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ  
φίλων ἀληθῆ εἰδότες λέγειν ἀσφαλὲς καὶ θαρραλέον,  
ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ  
ἐγὼ δρῶ,*

450d10-451a1

The measure of such an argument is the truth, not simply an enlightened reason, which might easily accommodate its assumptions. Neither is it an unenlightened tradition nor sophistic reason, either of which might easily subject it to ridicule. Rather, the true ground of skepticism regarding the argument, is Socrates' own skepticism of the capacity of human reason to determine the truth.<sup>9</sup>

*φοβερὸν τε καὶ σφαλερόν, οὐ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν-παιδικὸν γὰρ  
τοῦτό γε-ἀλλὰ μὴ σφαλεῖς τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ  
καὶ τοὺς φίλους συνεπισπασάμενος κείσομαι περὶ ἃ ἥκιστα δεῖ  
σφάλλεσθαι.*

451a1-4

The real aporia which must be faced by the logos of the koinonia of wives and children is the aporia of trespassing beyond the realm of assumptions. The argument will move beyond the nomima of what is just, beautiful, and good, toward the aletheia of what is just, beautiful, and good. And it can only do so by calling the nomima into question. It is an argument which will call into question the fundamental assumptions and principles of human institutions and society; even of human life. Socrates prays to Adrasteia, punisher of proud words, lest he unknowingly offend the divinities of the just, the beautiful, and the good.

προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν, ὦ Γλαῦκων, χάριν οὐ μέλλω λέγειν·  
ἐλπίζω γάρ οὖν ἔλαττον ἀμάρτημα ἀκουσίως τινὸς φονέα  
γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπατεῶνα καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων  
νομίμων πέρι.

451a4-7

The introductory narrative concludes with Socrates' metaphor of the male drama and female drama. The metaphor suggests both the continuity of the logos of the koinonia of wives and children with the logos of the ideal politeia, and also that a "new beginning" is being made in the argument.

Λέγειν δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χρή ἀνάπαλιν αὖ νῦν, ἀ τότε ἴσως ἔδει  
ἐφεξῆς λέγειν· τάχα δὲ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι, μετὰ ἀνδρείου  
δράμα παντελῶς διαπερανθέν τὸ γυναικεῖον αὖ περαίνειν,  
ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ σὺ οὕτω προκαλῇ.

451b9-c3

The metaphor of the male and female drama suggests that the relation of the logos of koinonia wives and children to the logos of the just politeia is reasonably explained by the dialectical method of proceeding on the basis of hypotheses.<sup>10</sup> The logos of the koinonia of wives and children does not fall within the logos of the just politeia, but addresses the basic assumptions on which the logos of the just politeia as a whole rests.

The first part of the narrative introduces the demand for a logos of the koinonia of wives and children as presenting an aporia to the logos of the just politeia. That the logos of the politeia is "good and right" has not been questioned. That is, it has not been questioned with respect to lexis. The second part of the narrative indicates that the logos of the politeia does appear to be questioned with regard to praxis, insofar as it appears to depend upon the practicability of the koinonia of wives and children. The aporia would therefore apply also to the question concerning the good of justice. Justice has been defined, and proven to be the fundamental principle of politeia; as such, it must be regarded as a necessary good of human life. The question of practicality, however, raises the aporia of whether justice, so defined in lexis, can be obtained

in praxis. What is the good of justice if it can only be realized in lexis and not in praxis? But Socrates' formulation of the aporia has taken the objection one great step further. The whole question of the translation of the politeia from lexis into praxis involves uncovering the relation of justice in lexis to justice in aletheia.

The narrative suggests that the "new beginning" in the argument is one of moving from justice as it appears in the realm of human institutions, toward justice as it appears in the realm of the divine; from the realm of "true opinion", of what is agathe and orthe, to the realm of aletheia.

## II. 451c4-457b6 The First Wave.

### (i) 451c4-452a9 The proposal for the koinonia of men and women.

Socrates introduces the female drama by laying down that the domestic life of the guardians must be in accordance with their political function, for which they have been fitted by nature and education.

*Ἀνθρώποις γὰρ φύσι καὶ παιδευθεῖσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη ὀρθὴ παίδων τε καὶ γυναικῶν κτῆσις τε καὶ χρεῖα ἢ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ὁρμὴν ἰοῦσιν, ἥνπερ τὸ πρῶτον ὠρμήσαμεν·*

451c4-7

Their political function has required that they live in a koinonia, rather than in private households. The koinonia of the guardians has been required by justice. The guardians were instituted in the state at the beginning as a community, like a herd or flock. Their domestic life is to be in accordance with their communal life.

*ἐπεχειρήσαμεν δέ που ὡς ἀγέλης φύλακας τοὺς ἄνδρας καθιστάναι τῷ λόγῳ. Ναί. Ἀκολουθῶμεν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφήν παραπλησίαν ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἡμῖν πρέπει ἢ οὐ.*

451c7-d2

On the basis of the original analogy between the guardians and guard-dogs, Socrates proposes the koinonia of men and women in the guardian class. It abolishes the traditional basis of division between the political realm of the polis, as the principal interest of the male polites, and the domestic realm of the oikos as the principal interest of the female polites. Women will not be separated from men for the domestic duty of bearing and rearing children. Instead, men and women will share the office of guardian.

*τὰς θηλείας τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν πότερα συμφυλάττειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν ἅπερ ἂν οἱ ἄρρενες φυλάττωσι καὶ συνθηρεῖν καὶ τὰλλα κοινῇ πράττειν, ἢ τὰς μὲν οἰκουρεῖν ἔνδον ὡς ἀδυνάτους διὰ τὸν τῶν σκυλάκων τόκον τε καὶ τροφήν, τοὺς δὲ πονεῖν τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν περὶ τὰ πόλινια;*

451d4-9



Glaucón agrees that the natural division of male and female would not constitute a basis of division in the guardian class. Sexual difference is not taken to constitute an essential difference in human nature. It is reduced to a difference of physical strength, external to the inner nature of a guardian.

*Κοινῇ, ἔφη, πάντα· πλὴν ὥς ἀσθενεστέραις χρώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὥς ἰσχυροτέροις.*

451e1-2

If women are to share the office of guardian, they must receive the education of a guardian.

*Εἰ ἄρα ταῖς γυναῖξιν ἐπὶ ταῦτά χρῆσόμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ταῦτά καὶ διδασκτέον αὐτάς.*

451e6-7

The education of women is the means of instituting the koinonia of men and women in the guardian class, which is the first step towards securing the koinonia phulakon, on which depends the unity of the political community as a whole.

(ii) 452a10-456c3 The possibility of the koinonia of men and women.

The proposal that women be educated to serve a political function must be defended against the accusation that it will offend the nomima of the just, beautiful, and good. The logos of the koinonia of men and women must overcome this offence by establishing its possibility and utility. The first part of the logos (452a10-456c3) is an elenchus which refutes three objections against the possibility of the koinonia of men and women:

- (a) 452a-e3 - that it is against custom: para to ethos;
- (b) 452e4-454e3 - that it is against reason: antilogos;
- (c) 454e4-456c3 - that it is against nature: para phusin.

These three objections embody three separate positions. The objection para to ethos embodies the unreflective dogmatism of traditional morality; the objection antilogos embodies the radical skepticism of sophistry; the objection para phusin embodies the philosophic reason of dialectic.

(a) 452a-e3 The objection para to ethos.

The objection para to ethos questions the possibility of translating the koinonia of men and women from lexis into praxis.

*Ἰσως δὲ, εἶπον, παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γελοῖα ἂν φαίνοιτο πολλά περὶ  
τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, εἰ πράσσεται ἢ λέγεται.*  
452a7-8

Socrates begins his elenchus by citing what, kata to ethos, would be most ridiculous about the koinonia of men and women. Obviously, it would be women exercising in the gymnasium naked alongside men; not only the young, but the old as well.

*Τί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γελοιότατον αὐτῶν ὄρας; ἢ δὴλα δὴ ὅτι  
γυμνὰς τὰς γυναῖκας ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις γυμναζομένας μετὰ  
τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐ μόνον τὰς νέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤδη τὰς  
πρεσβυτέρας,*  
452a10-b2

The spectacle of old women in the gymnasium is compared to the burlesque of old men whose fondness for frequenting the gymnasium compels them to expose their aged and wrinkled bodies to the ridicule of society. These aged philogumnastikoi are gelaioi because the mere sight of them exercising in the gymnasium is aesthetically unpleasant (me hedeis ten opsin), especially in contrast to the beauty of young athletes.

*ὥσπερ τοὺς γέροντας ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις, ὅταν ῥυσοὶ καὶ μὴ  
ἡδεῖς τὴν ὄψιν ὁμῶς φιλογυμναστῶσιν; Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη·  
γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν, ὥς γε ἐν τῷ παρεστῶτι, φανείη.*  
452b2-5

The extreme terms of contrast set out by this burlesque spectacle of naked old women exercising alongside young male athletes seems obvious ground for rejecting a koinonia of men and women. It is just the obvious in its simple immediacy that Socrates seeks to destabilize, the first step toward which has already been taken. There are now not one but two instances of ridicule: the one based on (a reaction to) the difference of sex, the other based on (a reaction to) the difference of age. The point is subtle but sure: the basis of the objection para to ethos is not the difference of the male and female simply, for that is but one occasion for ridicule; the ugliness of the aged beside the beauty of youth is another, and more universal. What gives rise to ridicule is what is present in both instances: the pleasant and unpleasant.

The ground of this comic laughter is not the immediacy of phusis, but the intermediacy of aisthesis. Phusis would be the ground of an objective ethos. This laughter lies not, as its immediacy suggests, in the obviousness of the objects of ridicule, but has its hidden origin within the subjects who laugh at them. What is concealed in the unreflective standpoint of to ethos is the subjective element of relativity which belongs to the realm of the aesthetic. To unearth the presence of this subjective relativity in the immediacy of appearances is to initiate the destabilization of the certainty which is expressed by this comic laughter at the burlesque spectacle imagined in the gymnasium of men and women, young and old, beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant. Only by exposing the origin or ground of to ethos will it be possible to overthrow the customary division of men and women institutionalized in the division of family and state.

The establishment of a koinonia of men and women would be a "great revolution".

*Οἰκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπεὶ περ ὠρμήσαμεν λέγειν, οὐ φοβητέον τὰ  
τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα, ὅσα καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἰποῖεν εἰς τὴν*

τοιαύτην μεταβολήν γενομένην καὶ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ περὶ  
μουσικὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τὴν τῶν δπλων σκέσιν καὶ  
ἵππων ὀχήσεις.

452b6-c2

At the level of the ethos itself, and not its aesthetic origin, what is gelaios is this apparent contradiction of women acting like men, and the aged acting like youth in a situation where the natural differences of male and female, youth and age, have been made obvious by the custom of exercising naked. It is just because in the gymnasium natural difference is obvious rather than concealed that is gelaios. But it is gelaios not kata phusin, but kata ethos, an ethos which Socrates defines as a Hellenic moral aesthetic (452c6).

The customary view would find the sight of women exercising naked gelaios - because it is so obviously aischros. Not only is it so obvious because they are naked, but also because they are in contrast with young male gymnasts who are customarily viewed as kaloi. It is a moral aesthetic that informs the standpoint of to ethos: what is aesthetically kalos is agathos; what is aesthetically aischros is kakos.

If one side of the objection para to ethos is the superficiality of judgement whose basis is appearance and custom rather than the objective reality of nature, the other side is the possibility that this comic subjectivity which is free to laugh might have some objective basis of its own which is independent of the natural, and by which it is rather able to determine the natural. What is the basis of beauty and ugliness? - it is not the natural distinctions of youth and age, or male and female, since a young woman may be more beautiful than an old man. What is the hidden cause of this comic laughter that arises from the measure of to ethos? It lies neither simply on the side of given nature nor on the side of reason, but underlies the unreflective relation of the two sides.

Socrates takes up the origin of the present custom of male athletes stripping to exercise in the gymnasium. His account is a paradigm instructive in the nature of ethos, habituai, unreflective custom; more generally, it is a paradigm instructive in the essentially rational character of the Hellenic ethical order.

Socrates recalls how, not long ago, the sight (horasthai) of men naked seemed (edokei) to the Greeks both "shameful" and "ridiculous" - as even now it seems so to the barbaroi.

*οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἔξ οὗ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐδόκει αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα ἅπερ νῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων, γυμνοὺς ἄνδρας ὁρᾶσθαι,*

452c6-8

Customs - unlike nature - change; they vary from place to place, and the custom of men exercising was actually taken up by the Athenians from Spartans, who took it up from the Cretans with whom the custom originated. And so, too, was this custom the object of ridicule at the point of its introduction, since it went against the established ways and customs, upon which are based the unflective doxa of the many.

*καὶ ὅτε ἤρχοντο τῶν γυμνασίων πρῶτοι μὲν Κρήτες, ἔπειτα Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐξῆν τοῖς τότε ἀστελείς πάντα ταῦτα κωμῶδειν.*

452c8-d1

So, to begin with, the custom of men exercising naked is not an innate property of the male animal; it is not an ethos kata phusin. Rather, it is ethos kata logon, an ethos of a rational animal. Once it became clear to the Greek mind that it was more rational to exercise naked than clad, they gave up the doxa which identified the civilized with clothing as against the unclad savage, and accepted this new custom for themselves. Their reasoned acceptance of the ethos as agathon kata logon, caused them to give up their more primitive view that it was kakon because it was alogon and kata phusin, and therefore barbaron; this reason overcame their doxa that it was gelaion and established among the Greeks the

current doxa that this ethos is ariston. The habituation of the passions in the human community in accordance with that doxa finally overcame in them, at the level of aisthesis, the unsophisticated reaction to the mere sight of men exercising naked as aischros, as they were converted to the current, enlightened aesthetic view that it is kalos.

*Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ οἶμαι χραμένοις ἄμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ  
συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς  
ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρήνῃ ὑπο τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις  
μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου·*

452d3-6

The origin of ethos lies within the reason of man to determine for himself, not in the givenness of the natural order. Logos is the ground of ethos, ethos is the ground of aisthesis.

The division Socrates draws between the Greeks and barbarians is between the civilized view of man as a rational animal who is free to determine his own manners and customs according to rational principle, or what he believes is right and just, best or good, and the barbarian who is not capable of this rational freedom, who has not set apart what is human from what is natural, but lives ever in an immediate relation to the natural, and knows no free independence of it. Those who adopt an unreflective attitude toward their customs and beliefs, who do not seek an understanding of their ground, fall back into a state not far removed from barbarism. They are prone once more to confuse what is according to logos and what is according to phusis since they assume their connection without knowing their difference. That is the nature of the aporia which is generally being addressed in these arguments of Books V to VII, and this may most generally be said to be the need to make the philosophical distinction between being and becoming, or nature and reason. Their confusion is barbaric; their clarification is the basis of civilization. The concealed confusion of reason and nature in to ethos

must be stripped away through the clarification of what is according to reason and what is according to nature. This enlightenment is the activity of philosophy which has for its ground a rational confidence in the primacy of the intelligible good as the measure of human activity both in thought and in feeling.

*καὶ τοῦτο ἐνδείξατο, ὅτι μάταιος ὡς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγείται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοίου ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὐτὸ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στησάμενος ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.*

452d6-e2

Whether there is a rational ground to the objection of para to ethos depends upon the question of human nature, which is taken up in the course of the next two objections. What is laid down is the principle assumption upon which the argument advances, viz., that the measure of ethos and opinions generally is the good as known by reason, and not the good assumed in habitual custom which may or may not be rational or ortha doxa. This assumption is the principle of the dialectical investigation of the nomima of the just, beautiful, and good; or, generally, the relation of human activity to divine principles.

(b) 452e4-454e3 The objection antilogos.

The objection para to ethos, which was grounded in the confusion of the human and the natural, is now followed by an enquiry into the nature of phusis anthropine. The logos of the koinonia of men and women seeks to establish that, prior to the natural division of male and female, there is an underlying humanity, a rational nature peculiar to the human animal, which is common to both sexes.

The question of the rationality of the koinonia of men and women depends upon the question of whether the nature of the female is substantially different from the nature of the male. It is necessary to determine whether, or to what degree, women are able to share in the work of men. The principal assumption in

this argument is the correspondence of praxis and phusis: that a particular kind of human activity is proper to a corresponding particular kind of nature. Whether the koinonia of men and women is kata logon, then, depends upon whether it is kata phusin. The question of possibility is to be answered at the level of determining the nature of anthropine phusis.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνομολογητέον, εἰ  
δυνατὰ ἢ οὐ, πότερον δυνατὴ φύσις ἢ ἀνθρωπίνη ἢ θήλεια τῇ  
τοῦ ἀρρενὸς γένους κοινωνῆσαι εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ ἔργα ἢ οὐδ' εἰς  
ἓν, ἢ εἰς τὰ μὲν διὰ τε, εἰς δὲ τὰ οὐ,

452e4-453a3

Socrates proposes that the best way of proceeding would be through the dialectic of an agon logon, setting against their own logos for the koinonia of men and women, a heteros logos which raises against it the objection that their logos would be antilogos.

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡμεῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν  
ἄλλων ἀμφισβητήσωμεν, ἵνα μὴ ἔρμα τὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου λόγου  
πολιορκῇται;

453a7-9

Although the agon logon of logos and heteros logos is employed dialectically, it is a device which suggests that the ground of the aporia is the opposition of sophistic to dialectic.<sup>11</sup>

The fundamental principle of their own logos - that upon which they had founded the state - had been that each citizen ought pursue that activity which corresponded to one's own given nature. The justification of the logos of the just state is that it is kata phusin.

Λέγωμεν δὴ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὅτι "Ὁ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Γλαῦκων,  
οὐδὲν δεῖ ὑμῖν ἄλλοις ἀμφισβητεῖν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς  
κατοικίσεως, ἦν ὠκίζετε πόλιν, ὡμολογεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν  
ἕκαστον ἓνα τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν."

453b2-5

The objection antilogos addresses the question whether the koinonia of men and women would be logically consistent with the logos of the just politeia.



It raises the aporia that the principle of political unity, koina ta philon, is opposed to the principle of political differentiation, to ta hautou pratein. The koinonia of men and women is argued to be impossible on the basis that it contradicts the principle of justice on which the logos of the just politeia rests.

It is obvious that difference in gender is a primary form of natural difference.

*"Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως οὐ πάμπαν διαφέρει γυνή ἀνδρὸς τὴν φύσιν;"*

453b7-8

Therefore, a different activity ought be assigned to men and women according to their difference in gender.

*"Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἔργον ἑκατέρῳ προσήκει προστάττειν τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν;"*

453b10-c1

Since the political identity of men and women would appear to contradict their natural difference, the heteros logos accuses the logos of koinonia of the hamartina of self-contradiction or antilogos. It would be contrary to the logos of the just politeia to institute a koinonia of men and women, according to the principle of justice.

*"Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνετε νυνὶ καὶ τὰναντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγετε φάσκοντες αὐ τοῖς ἀνδράς καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράττειν, πλείστον κεχωρισμένην φύσιν ἔχοντας;"*

453c3-5

It was this kind of an aporia that Socrates sought to escape when he first introduced the proposal for a koinonia of wives and children (453c10-d3). That is, the kind of difficulty which questions the basic assumption of the logos of the just politeia that different natures ought perform different works. The aporia is the possibility of a contradiction in its logos. The politeia depends upon the koinonia of the guardians, which depends upon the koinonia of wives and children, of which the koinonia of men and women is part. Yet the principle of politeia appears

opposed to the principle of koinonia. The politeia appears to be grounded in the logos of the natural order, to hold together in virtue of a principle of natural justice where different natures have different functions. There appears to be a contradiction between a principle of justice grounded in natural necessity, and a principle of justice grounded in political necessity. The nature of the opposition is the apparent contrariety natural difference and rational unity, the order of nature and that of reason. The unity of the koinonia of men and women kata logon, appears contrary to the division of the politeia kata phusin. The logos of the politeia is threatened to be destroyed through the apparent contrariety of nature and reason.

The significance of the argument with respect to the logos of politeia is to show how natural justice is really grounded in a rational principle, which is shown where nature is seen to be determined by the ideas known to reason. In other words, the logos of natural justice kata phusin is demonstrated to be a form of rational justice kata logon, where the natural order is perceived to be grounded in the order and structure of eide.

Socrates indicates the magnitude of the difficulty, against which they must advance an apologia for the koinoniai of the female drama, by use of poetic metaphor. It is as though one had to overcome as enormous and dangerous a barrier as swimming across the open sea; yet, there is a remarkable philosophic calm in his reflection that, whether at sea or in a pool, one must swim all the same.

ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥδ' ἔχει· ἄντε τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικράν ἐμπέσῃ  
 ἄντε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πελαγὸς μέσον, ὅμως γὰρ νεῖ οὐδέν  
 ἦττον.

453d5-7

Socrates complements this poetic suggestion of an impossible human task with a poetic suggestion of anticipating divine assistance, perhaps in the form of divine

inspiration, which would rescue their proposal from the sea of argument like the dolphin which rescued Arion.

*Οἰκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειραιέον σῶζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ἥτοι δελφινά τινα ἐλπίζοντάς ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἂν ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον σωτηρίαν.*

453d9-11

These poetic images of human difficulty and divine assistance suggest that further progress in the argument depends upon overcoming the contrariety of reason and nature by discovering their relation to a divine principle of unity.

As though suddenly graced with Apollonian insight, Socrates divines that they have been swept asea by the great power of the sophistic art of eristic.

*Ἡ γενναία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης.*

454a1-2

Their present aporia is due to having fallen into eristic, which confounds the discernment of objective ideas with the subjectivity of language. They have lost the firm ground of their logos by being swept away in the tidal flux of words and meanings, the sea of language which is the realm of the eristic art of contention. They have failed to practice the dialectical method of drawing distinctions according to eidetic differences.

*δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἷσεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.*

454a4-9

Glaucon does not recognize how they entered into an eristic position (454a7-8). This is because the logos of the ideal politeia has not clarified the basis of the dialectic reason on which it proceeded. Socrates' intention in raising the aporia of the objection antilogos becomes clear. By defining the contradiction as belonging to a sophistic position, he has brought before those present the need

to understand how the principle of justice is not grounded in the immediacy of natural necessity, but in the intelligibility of ideas.

As Socrates has already indicated, what they have failed and now need to recognize is how contrary sensible qualities are united in an underlying, rational eidos.

*τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον  
ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν  
ἐναντίωσιν,*

454a4-6

That male and female are contrary qualities of the sensible individual, of which the individual is the subject, and not to which one is subject, is the distinction which needs to be made. Human nature is to be distinguished from male and female, as uniting male and female, and not rather as subject to their contrariety. The eristic position makes no distinction between the qualities of a subject, and the subject to which the qualities belong. This is because the erist does not recognize the relation of sensible and ideal in the sensible individual.

Eristic does not recognize that there are different eide of natural contrariety, of natural sameness and difference:

*Τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν δεῖ οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ  
ἐπιτηδευμάτων τυγχάνειν πάνυ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἐριστικῶς  
κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκομεν,*

454b2-6

The distinction in the kinds of natural difference and identity, discerned by dialectic, is the distinction between sensible contraries and the rational eidos in which they are united.

*ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δὲ οὐδ' ὀπθοῦν τί εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρας τε καὶ  
τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τί τείνον ὠριζόμεθα τότε, ὅτε τὰ  
ἐπιτηδεύματα ἄλλη φύσει ἄλλα, τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτὰ  
ἀπεδίδομεν.*

454b6-7

Socrates explains the difference between sensible and eidetic difference by use of two examples. The first example is of a hairy and a bald cobbler, which illustrates the nature of non-eidetic natural difference. The second example is of two doctors, and a doctor and an architect, which illustrates the nature of eidetic identity and difference.

In the first example of the cobblers, one is able to distinguish between the essential, eidetic identity of the cobblers qua cobbler, and their accidental contrariety qua hairy and bald. One distinguishes the rational universal or eidos of cobbler as constituting the essential nature of the sensible individual, and the contrary sensible qualities of hairiness and baldness as conditions of his sensible nature. Although one cobbler might be hairy, another bald, the contrariety of these qualities is accidental to their rational identity qua cobbler. Sensible qualities do not determine the being or nature of a sensible individual, but are the conditions of his being. They are not an instance of a determinate or eidetic difference of human nature. The relation of sensible attributes to the inner rational nature of humanity is not determinate of the inner or true nature of the sensible individual; rather, their relation is determined by the inner reason of the soul. Sensible attributes are categorized according to their utility in relation to the rational activity of the soul. Some are conditions of the operation of a rational intelligence in sensible externality, others are not. With respect to the cobbler, hairiness or baldness are not conditions of the rational art of cobbling.

*Ἄρα κατ' ἄλλο τι, εἶπον ἐγὼ, γελοῖον, ἢ ὅτι τότε οὐ πάντως  
τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν ἐπιφθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ  
εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν,  
τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα;*

454c5-d

In the second example, two doctors are said to have the same nature (phusis), in virtue of their eidetic identity qua doctor. On the other hand, the doctor and architect would be said to have different natures on the basis of eidetic difference.

*οἶον ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχειν  
ἐλέγομεν· ἢ οὐκ οἶει; Ἐγώ γε. Ἰατρικὸν δὲ καὶ τεκτονικὸν  
ἄλλην; Πάντως που.*

454d5-d4

Socrates concludes that it remains to determine whether sexual difference is an essential condition of some particular techne or epitedeuma of the state according to which male and female should be assigned different activities (454d5-7). It is obvious that the sexes differ in respect of the natural procreation of children, the female bearing, the male begetting, and that this is therefore an essential condition of the sensible nature of humanity (454d7-e1). But this difference in itself is irrelevant to the political order, as much as hairiness and baldness to a doctor or architect. Therefore, if the sexes differ only in their respective roles in reproduction, male and female guardians ought be assigned the same activities by the state (454e1-3).

(c) 454e6-456c3 The objection para phusin.

The significance of the logos of the koinonia of men and women is to be found in its introduction of the eidetic foundation of dialectic. The argument which refutes the objection antilogos clarifies the ground of dialectic or a philosophical reason to be the discernment of the eidetic structure of reality. The ideas have been discernible to a dialectical reason as determinate of sensible nature. The direction of the argument becomes even more clear in the refutation of the objection para phusin, where the dialectical logic of the division and relation of sensible condition and rational cause is employed to sort out of the sensible individual, a composite nature composed of the rational soul as the essential

nature of humanity, and a sensible body as the condition of human existence in the sensible, and as the instrument of a free or self-determinate intelligence, the ground of which is the knowledge of the independence of reason from nature.

Addressing the position of the heteros logos, Socrates asks whether there is any art or activity required by the constitution of the state for which the nature of a man and woman are not the same but different (454e6-455a3). The question is formed in a way that makes the rational capacity for a techne or political epitedeuma the measure of the relevancy of sexual difference. The argument is free to proceed directly on the dialectical ground established in refuting the eristic position (455a5-b2).

Socrates seeks a definition of what is meant in saying that one does or does not have a natural aptitude or innate capacity for something in particular.

*τὸν μὲν εὐφυῇ πρὸς τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀφυῇ*  
455b4-5.

He begins by establishing that instances demonstrative of euphuēs and aphuēs are those of learning (manthanein). That one is naturally suited for some art or activity is demonstrated by an ability to learn it easily; that one is not so disposed is proven by a difficulty in learning it (455b5-6). The one who is euphuēs in some respect, having been taught a little, can learn a lot more about it on his own; the one who is aphuēs in this same respect, after much instruction and practice cannot even preserve for himself what he has been taught (455b6-8).

So far Socrates has established that natural capacity is primarily intellectual, that the good of human nature is with respect to the rational capacity for knowledge, the measure of the knower is that which is known. He turns now to the other side of human nature, the bodily or sensible side, and defines the euphuēs and aphuēs by the capacity of their bodies in some respect to be good or bad servants of their intellect.

καὶ τῷ μὲν τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετοῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, τῷ δὲ  
ἐναντοῖτο;

455b9-c1

Thus, through the logic of the relation of rational cause and sensible condition laid down in meeting the objection antilogos, Socrates concludes that they have obtained a satisfactory definition of euphuēs, which is essentially a definition of the sensible or bodily side of human nature: that it is a "servant of the mind".

ἀρ' ἄλλα ἅττα ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα, οἷς τὸν εὐφυνὴ πρὸς ἕκαστα  
καὶ τὸν μὴ ὠρίζου; Οὐδεὶς, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλα φήσει.

455c1-3

Human nature is defined as this union of rational soul and sensible body, in which relation the rational powers and purposes of mind is the measure of the sensible powers of body, as master of a servant. The ensouled body is an instrument of the embodied soul; the body has no purpose or end independent of that required and commanded of it by mind. The purpose of the body is to be an effective instrument of the rational soul's pursuit of knowledge. This notion of the unity of body and soul is consequent upon the previous analysis of human nature in terms of the logical relation of a causal reason and sensible condition as discovered in the activity of the technai.

Socrates proposes that in all human pursuits men excel women (455c4-6), and easily secures agreement that those domestic arts in which women excel are an inconsequential exemption to their argument (455c6-d5). The only true measure of human nature is the state, and with respect to the activities that constitute the state, there is none found which a man or woman perform qua male or female. Rather, the "natures" (hai phuseis) which perform these activities are dispersed alike to both "creatures" (zoon), so that it is by a common essential (and rational) nature (kata phusin) that both men and women share in these activities together. There is no eidetic difference made in this essential human



nature by sexual division, but only a accidental distinction with regard to the degree of physical superiority men have to women in strength.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν διοικούντων  
 γυναικὸς διότι γυνή, οὐδ' ἀνδρὸς διότι ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως  
 διεσπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ζώοις, καὶ πάντων μὲν  
 μετέχει γυνή ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἀνὴρ, ἐπὶ  
 πᾶσι δὲ ἐσθηνέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός.

453d6-e2

On the other hand, there has been established an eidetic difference between this essential human nature that is rational and the sensible nature of sexual difference in humanity that is equally essential to the human animal, but not to the political animal. Human nature, anthropine phusis, is present in the human zoon as reason is present in human activity. The rational nature of humanity is its essential cause; the sensible nature of humanity is its necessary condition. The most necessary of sensible conditions is sexual differentiation; nevertheless, it remains the condition of humanity, not its cause.

Human nature appears in Socrates' argument as this rational power of the soul, wherein lies the capacity of humanity for rational activity which distinguishes it from other creatures, which is so far known as the activity that constitutes the state. Sexual difference, copulation, and reproduction belong to all zooi, and in this respect the human differs not from the beast. It is in virtue of this capacity for partaking of the rational life of a political community that humanity differs from other creatures. Political life essentially requires a rational nature, a nature capable, moreover, not only of technai, but also educable in moral virtue, the aretai. That the rational nature required by the state is more than that capable of productive activity, and is rather principally a moral rationality, is already implicit in Socrates' argument, but is made explicit in his conclusion.

Having shown sensible nature to be conditional to the human animal in which a rational nature common to both sexes is essential or definitive, Socrates

finishes his logos for the institution of a koinonia of men and women by finally defeating the objection that it is para phusin. His argument lays down that women share with men the same divisions of an embodied rational nature. They may be "by nature" suited to study medicine, or mousike; or be naturally amousos. Their nature might suit them to study gumnastike, or, the art of war, polemiike; or, they might be naturally apolemos or not philogumnastike. So far, Socrates has moved through the various arts and activities detailed in his account of the education of the guardians.

Socrates now turns from discovering in women the ideal classification of human "natures" that are manifest in the various activities that constitute the education of the guardians, and looks at how women possess the "natures" of the soul which are manifest in these activities, and are, together, the constituent elements of the phusis of a guardian: a nature which is both spirited and philosophic, and capable of the concrete integration of reason and will obtained in complete moral virtue.

*Τί δέ; φιλόσοφος τε καὶ μισόσοφος; καὶ θυμοειδής, ἡ δ' ἄθυμος;*

456a4-5

Socrates concludes that some women are naturally suited to be guardians, some not, having or not having the phusis of a guardian; also, the nature of a female guardian is the very same as that originally described as belonging to the male guardian (456a4-6). Therefore, that the essential nature of men and women is one and the same, save for an accidental difference in strength, is proven with respect to their common nature as guardians of the state:

*Καὶ γυναικὸς ἄρα καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις εἰς φυλακὴν πόλεως, πλὴν ὅσα ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστίν.*

456a10-11

It is considered demonstrated that in virtue of an essential nature, humanity is unified as sharing a single common rationality; and, that the sensible division of male and female, although a necessary condition of the human animal, is no more than an accidental difference of physical strength with regard to the sensible conditions and ideal causes necessary to the technai and epitedeumata that constitute the state. There is then no ground for objecting to a koinonia of men and women who are guardians, since in respect of their essential nature, they are the same. Therefore, the females who have the nature of a guardian should be elected to share the life and office of the male guardians, since they share already the same essential nature.

*Καὶ γυναῖκες ἄρα αἱ τοιαῦται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδράσιν  
ἐκλεκτέαι συνοικεῖν τε καὶ συμφυλάττειν, ἐπεὶ περ εἰσὶν ἱκαναὶ  
καὶ ξυγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν.*

456b1-3

The reason for proposing a common life and function in the state is nothing less fundamental than the founding principle of the state, and their whole logos, that the same natures ought pursue the same activities and receive the same education, and different natures different activities.

*Τὰ δ' ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέα ταῖς αὐταῖς  
φύσεσιν; Τὰ αὐτά. Ἦκομεν ἄρα εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι,  
καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων  
γυναιξὶ μουσικὴν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἀποδιδόναι.*

456b5-10

The proposal for instituting a koinonia of men and women in the guardian class of the state is passed as it finally answers all the objections that might be brought against it: that it is against custom, but custom is rightly determined by reason; that it is against reason, but reason must be grounded in a true knowledge of nature; finally, that it is against nature, but human nature is

essentially rational. Therefore, the possibility of a koinonia of men and women is established on the ground that it is in accord with right custom, right reason, and right nature; on the contrary, the prevalent division of society into political and non-political according to difference in sex rather than rational nature is perverse.

*Οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὁμοία ἐνομοθετοῦμεν,  
ἐπεὶ περ κατὰ φύσιν ἐτίθεμεν τὸν νόμον· ἀλλὰ τὰ νῦν παρὰ  
ταῦτα γινόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὥς ἔοικε, γίνεται.*

456b12-c2

(iii) 456c4-457a5 The utility of the koinonia of men and women.

In demonstrating that a koinonia of men and women is in accord with both logos politikos and physis anthropine, Socrates has removed the objection<sup>2</sup> against its possibility. Now he offers a proof that it is not only possible, but best, to demonstrate its utility. This proof, which shows his proposal as resting ultimately on the political good, concludes the logos for the koinonia of men and women.

On the one hand, since male and female guardians have the same nature, they should receive the same education; on the other hand, there is an essential difference in natures between guardians and cobblers, which the state must recognize. It is a difference which is measurable by the standard of political good: the education of the guardian makes him a better citizen than the cobbler. It is agreed that the guardians, both male and female, are the best citizens of the state.

*τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν οὐχ οὗτοι ἀριστοί; Πολὺ γε. Τί δέ; αἱ  
γυναῖκες τῶν γυναικῶν οὐχ αὗται ἔσονται βέλτισται;*

456d12-e4

And further agreed that it belongs to the good of the state to produce within itself the best men and women.

*Ἔστι δέ τι πόλει ἀμεινον ἢ γυναῖκας τε καὶ ἀνδρας ὡς  
ἀρίστοις ἐγγίγνεσθαι;*

456e6-7

Therefore, given that this political end or good is accomplished through the education of the guardians in mousike and gumnastike, the proposal for a koinonia of men and women in the guardian class is the best possible institution for the state for the purpose of obtaining the political good of producing in itself the best possible citizens. On these grounds, the koinonia of men and women is writ into the constitution.

*Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δινατόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστον πόλει νόμιμον  
ἐτίθεμεν.*

457a3-4

(iv) 457a6-b6 The principle of the koinonia of men and women.

Socrates' proof has an epilogue in which the principle of the koinonia of men and women is stated. He returns to the objection para to ethos which mocked his proposal for a koinonia as obviously absurd. It has become explicit how the institution of a koinonia of men and women is in possession of an explicitly rational foundation. It is beyond the standpoint of the unreflective reason of ethos, the habitual reason of custom which is ignorant of the distinction between the rational and sensible natures of the human animal. But, supposing only that liberation, there is the danger of falling into the reflective, pugilistic abuse of reason in a self-serving sophistic which destroys the unity of the rational and natural aspects of human nature by grounding human reason in a natural individualism. Through this koinonia of men and women, it is intended that the guardians be habituated in the ethos of an institution whose ground is a dialectical reason which sets them beyond the sophistic collapse of rational determinations into a supposed natural indeterminacy. As the epilogue of the first

wave makes clear, there is to be assumed present in the guardians , and to be encouraged by this institution, a heroic moral virtue, essentially and radically a rational virtue, and thus as much the possession of a heroic rationality (but not a pure philosophical reason.) This heroic virtue is represented by Socrates in the image that the men and women of the guardian class will no longer require clothing, since they will be clad in virtue:

Ἀποδυτέον δὴ ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀρετὴν  
ἀντὶ ἱματίων ἀμφιέσονται, καὶ κοινωνητέον πολέμου τε καὶ τῆς  
ἄλλης φυλακῆς τῆς περὶ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτέον.  
457a6-9

The man who laughs at women exercising naked in the gymnasium only proves his incapacity for a reason which can discern the distinction of sensible and rational natures in humanity, and to recognize which is cause and which condition, which master and which servant. He proves himself ignorant of the nature of human praxis, its assumption of human rationality as its governing principle. The man who laughs at this proposal which is founded upon that knowledge is a man who knows not what he does:

οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ᾧ γελαῖ οὐδ' ὃ τι πράττει.  
457b3

Socrates had answered the objection para to ethos by laying down that the measure of humanity must be the rational good. In accordance with the measure of reason, his proposal is proven kalos; the established custom is aischros:

κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελεξέται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν  
ὠφέλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερόν αἰσχρόν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.  
457b4-6

The three waves are the successive steps by which Socrates uncovers the good of the state. At the end of this first wave, it is established that the good of

the state is to educate its citizens, male and female, to a rational freedom and virtue which is the foundation of a true humanity. Individuals will regard themselves as essentially rational creatures whose sensuous nature must serve and be governed by rational virtue. Men and women are to regard one another not in their sensible difference, but in their common rationality. The male and female guardians are to regard one another in the very light by which the state regards them. They are to be habituated, by their life and education together in the state, to regard each other as citizens of the state rather than as natural individuals. The good of the state is not to satisfy the sensuous will, but lies in the purgation of that sensuousness. This then is so far defined as the good of the state: to produce citizens capable of a rational virtue and freedom which is essentially heroic, and capable of ruling their sensible nature. The good of the state is to educate individuals in their essential rationality, that humanity is essentially rational.

### III. 457b7-466d5 The Second Wave.

The argument of the first wave has established that the logos of justice transcends natural difference; the argument of the second wave will establish that the logos of justice transcends natural unity.

The argument of the second wave addresses more directly the aporia of how political order is to have an inner unity and stability in face of the demand that the rulers sacrifice their own private interests, especially as these are taken up into the realm of the oikos. The most obvious consequence of a communal domestic life would be the abolition of the exclusive basis of a private ancestral cult. This difficulty is never addressed in the argument explicitly, partly because of the "noble lie" in Book IV, which would identify the natural origin of the guardians with the birth of the city. But it is addressed implicitly in the arguments which provide the transition from the second wave to the third. On the basis of the argument of the second wave, there is established in the place of the familial ancestral cult, a civic cult of the guardians. What is addressed, then, in the second wave is more than merely the question of the abolition of natural goods. It involves most directly an enquiry into the spiritual basis of human life. Philosophy here treads -or trespasses- the hallowed ground of religion and tragedy; it enters directly into relation with the nomima of the beautiful, the just and the good.

#### A. 457b7- 461e5 The Proposal for a Koinonia of Wives and Children.

At the point where his proposal for a koinonia of men and women is accepted, Socrates introduces the structural metaphor of the three waves, which had been foreshadowed in the earlier metaphor of swimming in the sea of argument.



Τοῦ το μὲν τολύνν ἔν ὥσπερ κῦμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν τοῦ  
 γυναικείου πέρι νόμου λέγοντες, ὥστε μὴ παντάπασι  
 κατακλυσθῆναι τιθέντας, ὥς δεῖ κοινῇ πάντα ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς  
 τε φύλακας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας, ἀλλὰ πῃ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν  
 αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι ὥς δυνατὰ τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα λέγει;  
 457b7-c2

The metaphor of the three waves is employed to connect the foregoing argument for the koinonia of men and women with the following argument for the koinonia of wives and children.

ἔπεται νόμος καὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τοῖς ἄλλοις  
 457c7-8

Socrates warns that the first wave of opposition will seem small in comparison with the second wave (457c3-8). The reason for Socrates' warning is given in the new details he adds to his proposal for a community of wives and children. They introduce its purpose by stating for the first time the immediate benefits a common family for the guardian community is intended to obtain.

Τὰς γυναῖκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων πάσας εἶναι  
 κοινὰς, ἰδίᾳ δὲ μηδενὶ μημέριαν συνοικεῖν,  
 κοινοὺς, καὶ μήτε γονέα ἑκγονον εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτοῦ μήτε  
 παῖδα γονέα.

457c10-d3

The terms of division within the proposal are koine and idia. The communal family will establish to koinon and abolish to idion as the basis of the family. Wives will be common in order to prevent the private union of individuals in marriages; children will be common in order to prevent the private union within families between parents and children. The obvious political good of common wives and children is to prevent the division of the political community into private households in which the singular unity of a common political good would be divided by the internecine multiplicity and particularity of domestic oikoi.

If the koinonia of wives and children is a matter of even greater magnitude than the koinonia of men and women, Glaucon greets it with even greater disbelief (meizon pro apistian) in its possibility and utility (457d4-5). Ostensibly because

he has just given those political benefits he intends to obtain by this koinonia, Socrates replies that it is surely self-evident that the koinonia of wives and children would be the greatest good (megiston agathon). But Glaucon, looking to the abolition of the private oikos which that political good demands, is unmoved: it is as necessary to demonstrate the utility or good of this community of wives and children as it is to demonstrate its possibility.

Socrates' claim that the good of the community of wives and children is self-evident is a likely use of eironeia, the purpose being to compel Glaucon to admit openly that he does not know the principle which causes Socrates to propose these koinoniai of the female drama. In this way the present aporia of the argument is defined. "You speak", Socrates laments, "of a conspiracy of arguments" (logon sustasin - 457e2).

The conclusion of the first wave was that, in the realm of human praxis, the possibility of accomplishing some end depends principally upon seeing its utility. On this basis, the second wave can begin by dividing utility and possibility. The second wave will demonstrate the utility or good of a common family; the third wave will demonstrate its feasibility. In order to demonstrate the good of the community of wives and children, Socrates asks to be permitted the leisure of idle speculation, something akin to the useless, unproductive and therefore impracticable activity of daydreamers (hoi argoi ten dianoian). Such activity, he admits readily, makes the idle, non-productive mind but more idle:

*ἀργὸν καὶ ἄλλως ψυχὴν ἔτι ἀρογετέραν ποιοῦντες*  
458a7-b1

Socrates' point is clear enough: so long as the argument for the ideal state remains within the division of utility and possibility, it is no more than a daydream. But the possibility of realizing a common family depends principally upon recognizing its utility. Therefore, Socrates requests a kind of "philosophic"

license to imagine how the rulers (archontes) would actually arrange this community of wives and children in order that its rational good may be made obvious, manifesting the good of human life which yet remains obscure to all save Socrates himself.

*ἤδη οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς μαλακίζομαι, καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐπιθυμῶ  
ἀναβαλέσθαι, καὶ ὕστερον ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἢ δυνατά, νῦν δὲ ὡς  
δυνατῶν ὄντων ἄλῃς σκέψομαι, ἂν μοι παρήγῃς, πῶς διατάξουσιν  
αὐτὰ οἱ ἀρχόντες γιγνόμενα, καὶ ὅτι πάντων ξυμφορώτατ' ἂν  
εἴη πραχθέντα τῇ τε πόλει καὶ τοῖς φύλαξιν.*

458b1-b6

The argument of the second wave moves between these two fixed points: it begins with the koinonia of wives and children as a kind of daydream; its conclusion is at the point where such a politeia which is grounded in this koinonia is described as a paradeigma. In that conclusion, the division of utility and possibility is overcome. The ideal state is real in its pure ideality.<sup>12</sup> The argument of the second wave, taking up the argument from the first wave, where the eide are disclosed to underly and order sensible reality, moves toward the standpoint where the eide are disclosed as existing in pure ideality. At that point, philosophy transcends the realm of religious myth and poetic image to the vision of the truth of the beautiful, just, and good. The political life of the state is seen to depend upon the philosophic life of reason.

(i) 458b9-d7 The necessity of the koinonia of wives and children.

The necessity of the koinonia of women and children is the necessity for political koinonia, which depends upon the unity of the ruling class, or koinonia phulakon. The koinonia of guardians requires that the primary division within the phulakai, between the epikouroi who must accept orders and the archontes who must give them, be preserved as the condition of unity in the ruling class.

εἴπερ ἔσονται οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄξιοι τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἱ τε  
τούτοις ἐπικούροι κατὰ ταῦτά, τοὺς μὲν ἐθέλησιν ποιεῖν τὰ  
ἐπιταττόμενα, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιτάξιν

458b8-c2

Above the archon is the nomothetes, the author of the constitution of the ideal state. The archon will legislate and exercise his authority in accordance with the intention of the constitution established by the nomothetes. The role of the nomothetes is not of immediate concern here, but it has a certain significance to the argument insofar as it indicates that the unity of the ruling class of guardians depends upon a knowledge beyond that which belongs to the archontes as they have been so far educated. The knowledge and power of the nomothetes, whom Socrates identifies here with themselves, are later seen to belong to a philosopher-king.

τὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς πειθομένους τοῖς νόμοις, τὰ δὲ καὶ  
μνησκόμενους, ὅσα ἂν ἐκείνοις ἐπιτρέψωμεν. Εἰκός, ἔφη. Σὺ  
μὲν τολύνη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς

458c2-5

This unity of the diverse orders within the ruling class is the condition of the political good: the archontes must legislate, and their epikouroi must faithfully execute their commands, an activity which must be carried out within the strictures of the constitution, to which the archontes must be faithful. The condition of preserving justice in the state is that the spirited element obey the laws laid down by the rational element in accordance with its essential constitution. If there is to be a right order in the community, then the spirited element must act as ally to the rational element, the epikouroi must carry out the commands of the archontes.

The male and female guardians are to be united in accordance with their common nature as rational (homophueis). Since an identical rational nature and political function is the basis of their social unity, as opposed to natural

differences, the same commonality should be expressed in a completely common life, including houses, meals, and relationships, in which natural individuality, to idion, is abolished in favour of to koinon.

*τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐξέλεξας οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐκλέξας  
παραδώσεις καθ' ὅσον ὅλον τε ὁμοφυεῖς· οἱ δὲ ἅτε οἰκίας τε  
καὶ ξυσσίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες, ἰδίᾳ δὲ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο  
κεκτημένου,*

458c5-d1

The political necessity of koinonia for the rulers is already known from the argument of Book IV. The proposal for a completely common life of both male and female guardians is a result of the combination of the arguments for the abolition of private property and for the institution of a koinonia of men and women. The necessity for a koinonia of wives and children is more directly a result of the aporia of a natural individualism originating in erotic necessity.

The koinonia of wives and children is first proposed as the means of overcoming the apparent, immediate contrariety of eros and justice. Eros is introduced into the argument as a natural principle of unity opposed to justice as rational principle of unity. Eros is regarded as the principle of to idion; justice is the principle of to koinon.

Socrates takes up the argument from where it left off, where men and women exercise together in the gymnasium, naked, as is just and good according to custom, reason, and nature. But that argument now appears as one-sided. Granted that men and women will now regard each other as identical in their rational activity as guardians of the state, there falls outside of that how they will regard each other naturally, not according to the necessity of reason, but according to the necessity of eros. It is obvious that, by necessity of their sensible nature, such common activities would awaken in individuals the innate natural desire for sexual union.

ὁμοῦ δὴ ἔσονται, ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναμειγμένων καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις  
καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, αἶμαι, τῆς ἐμφύτου  
ἄξονται πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μίξιν.

458d1-3

Socrates' term, hupo anagkes . . . tes emphutou, signifies that this sexual desire in individuals is a form of necessity that is innate to human nature. The first wave has laid down that what ought to govern human activity is a rational good. Socrates has argued that sexual difference is not determinate of that good. Eros is a natural principle which recognizes the sexual difference that political justice does not recognize. The immediacy of eros in the form of sexual desire is introduced into the argument as the origin of division in the state, compelling the guardians to act, not according to the reason of a common political good, but according to an inward natural necessity that has for its end the private good of sexual union among individuals.

Glaucon's reply is an objection which indicates the terms of division in the aporia Socrates raises: what moves in the guardians in their desire for sexual union is not the abstract reason of geometry, but the concreteness of erotic necessity, the immediacy of which, coming from within rather than from without, is likely to overcome them.<sup>13</sup>

ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά σοι δοκῶ λέγειν; Οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε, ἢ δ'  
ὅς, ἀλλ' ἐρωτικάις ἀνάγκαις, αἱ κινδυνεύουσιν ἐκείνων  
δριμύτεραι εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν τε καὶ ἔλκειν τὸν πολὺν  
λεών.

458d3-6

(ii) 458d7-e5 The principle of the koinonia of wives and children.

In the argument which establishes the necessity of a koinonia of wives and children eros appears in a two-fold relation. On the one side is the relation of eros to justice, which is signified by the contrariety of erotic and mathematical necessity. On this side, eros appears as a concrete principle of natural unity,

against justice as a unifying principle of abstract reason. On the other side, eros appears in relation to piety, and in this relation it is eros which appears to be abstract. In relation to piety, eros appears as the unifying principle of an abstract individuality which is without relation to an ethical end. Eros is the origin of political lawlessness and religious impiety.

The burlesque element of the first wave reappears as we are free to imagine the guardians throw themselves into a sexual orgy. Such a spectacle of licentiousness will not to be permitted. Socrates' argument that it would be unjust for the rulers to permit the warriors to engage lawlessly in sexual activity, however, is not based on the immediate necessity to prevent disorder in the gymnasium. Instead, he argues that this immediate form of natural freedom would be unjust because it would be "sacrilegious in the city of the blessed".

*ἀτάκτως μὲν μίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν οὔτε  
δοσιον ἐν εὐδαιμόνων πόλει οὔτ' ἑάσουσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες. Οὐ  
γὰρ δίκαιον, ἔφη.*

458d7-e2

The ground of the objection is primarily religious, and secondarily political. Injustice is a consequence of impiety. His argument grounds justice in holiness, human law in divine authority. He argues that sexual license would be "unholy in the city of the blessed". The political injustice of sexual license is that it would constitute religious impiety against the state. The polis is to be regarded primarily as a religious institution, whose laws (nomoi) embody not only the authority of human convention, but are consecrated with the authority of divine law. As a sacred institution, the polis confers upon the legislative class of archons a divine authority which transcends both the immediacy of natural necessity and the political necessity of subordinating private desire to public welfare. It is upon

such an authority that Socrates proposes that they legislate laws instituting sacred marriages, hieroi gamoi.

*Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι γάμους τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποιήσομεν ἱεροῦς εἰς  
δύναμιν ὃ τι μάλιστα· εἶεν δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ ὠφελιμώτατοι.  
Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.*

459e3-5

The principle of the koinonia of wives and children lies in this identification of sanctity and utility:

*εἶεν δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ ὠφελιμώτατοι.*

The koinonia of wives and children is justified on religious grounds. Piety and justice are united in the identity of sanctity and utility. The nature of this equation is made more explicit in the argument for the utility of the koinonia of wives and children. Here, Socrates simply sets it forth as an uncontested hypothesis.

The identity of sanctity and utility, however, has an early precedent in the argument. The principle of the purgation of the poets was the identity of the divine with the good.<sup>14</sup> But the identity of sanctity and utility can also be regarded as a further development of the principle of the koinonia of men and women, which equated the beautiful with the good.<sup>15</sup> At this point, the koinonia of wives and children begins to call directly into question traditional assumptions concerning the nature of the divine principles of beauty, justice, and good. Philosophy here treads directly on the ground of religion.

The principle of the koinonia of wives and children is not a natural unity per se, for that is reduced to a material cause of unity. Its principle is the identification of the sacred with the rational good. Plato's argument for a communal family supposes throughout that the family has its ground in religious piety; that the cause of familial unity is religious virtue, not natural affection. It is on this basis that he proposes the koinonia of wives and children: the basis of the hieroi gamoi, in which eros is governed and sanctified by piety, as interpreted by justice. It is



in the equation of justice and piety, where they are seen to have the same ethical content, to originate from the same principle in which the useful, or human good, and sacred, or divine good, are one, that the political unity of the state is established.

(iii) 459-461e4 The organization of the koinonia of wives and children.

The trophe of the koinonia of wives and children involves four principal laws:

- (a) Eugenic procreation.
- (b) Public adoption of children.
- (c) Exposure of undesirable offspring.
- (d) Prohibitions of intercourse.

The interest of these laws is in their determination of the relation of reason and nature in the family. Nature is reduced to a sensible condition of the family; reason is the formal cause. Sexual desire is subordinated to political utility through the mediation of religious piety, which is common to both sides. The division of natural necessity and political necessity is overcome in an utilitarian relation to divine authority. The family, as organized through the koinonia of wives and children, is constituted of this unity of eros, piety and justice.

Straightway, however, there is added to this combination of natural, religious, and political elements, a fourth element: time -- honour. Honour has a crucial place in the argument. The love of honour, philotimon, is taken to be the proper object of eros for the spirited soul of the guardian. If, on the one hand, eros in the form of sexual desire is completely subordinated to political reason, eros in the form of philotimon is promoted by it. From the standpoint of obtaining the good of the state, the argument can be characterized thus: through the subordination of sexual desire by piety, and the promotion of ambition by justice,

the erotic elements of the guardians soul are utilized for the sake of achieving the desired end of koinonia.<sup>16</sup> From the standpoint of obtaining the good of the individual, however, the argument can be seen as providing an answer to the question, what is the (political) good proper to the guardian? The answer is the (political) good of honour.<sup>17</sup> Through the koinonia of wives and children, there is intended the reconciliation of the subjectivity of personal ambition and the objectivity of public honour. In honour, the subjectivity of eros, and the objectivity of logos, are to a certain degree reconciled on the side of the individual. Honour mediates between, and is the unity of, the justice of the individual and the justice of the state. To a large extent, the argument for the koinonia of wives and children is concerned with the purgation of thumos of an undesirable naturalism, and with its purification in a desirable rationality. Through the purification of thumos, there is intended the reconciliation of the good of state and individual, where these meet in the personal ambition for, and the public conferring of, honour.

(a) 459-460b6 Eugenic procreation.

Socrates, asking how the most beneficial marriages might be brought about, recalls that Glaucon has in his house a great number of dogs and birds that are used for hunting, and asks whether there is not a certain method by which he breeds and rears them. He ascertains that the practice employed in order to breed a race of thoroughbreds among any kind of animal is to breed in their prime the best as often as possible with the best. To prevent the degeneration of the race, the worse should be bred as least often as possible with the worse. Glaucon agrees that any other method would be absurd (atopon).

Granted that the same principle of nature applies to the human species of animal, Socrates raises the difficulty that it would not, however, be as easy to practice, requiring the very best rulers to do so.

*ὥς ἄρα σφόδρα ἡμῖν δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἴπερ καὶ περὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὡσαύτως ἔχει.*

459b10-c1

The practice of eugenic breeding will require once more the medical art of deception.<sup>18</sup>

*Πρὸς τὸδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· συχνῶ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ τῇ ἀπάτῃ κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν δεήσειν χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀρχομένων. ἔφαμεν δέ που ἐν φαρμάκου εἶδει πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι.*

459c8-d2

The difficulty lies not with the natural immediacy of sexual desire, but with the element peculiar to the human soul of philotimon. It is the spirited, rather than appetitive, form of eros, that is the main concern.

Socrates argues that the practice of eugenic breeding and exposure of undesirable offspring must be carried on without the knowledge of the auxiliary class of guardians, if dissension is to be avoided.

*Δεῖ μὲν, εἶπον, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνεσθαι ὥς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις τούναντίον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μή, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποίμνιον ὅτι ἀκρότατον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λανθάνειν πλὴν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀρχοντας, εἰ αὖ ἡ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅτι μάλιστα ἀστασίαστος ἔσται.*

459d7-e3

Specially devised lots are proposed to determine who unites with whom, so that the outcome can be secretly manipulated to ensure the desirable unions of the best women and men, and to prevent the unions of the worse. In this way, those

deprived of sexual activity will blame their bad luck on chance, and not the rulers.<sup>19</sup>

*Κλήροι δὴ τινες οἶμαι ποιητέοι κομψοί, ὥστε τὸν φαῦλον  
ἐκεῖνον αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστης συνέρξεως τύχην ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς  
ἄρχοντας.*

460a8-10

The need for the archontes to deceive the epikouroi through the manipulation of the democratic device of lots to prevent stasis in the class of guardians testifies to the capacity of eros, in an immediate relation to philotimon, to generate a lawless individualism among the lower class of guardians that is potentially destructive of the common political good. What is to be avoided is the affront to personal honour that an open process of selection, which divides the epikouroi into better and worse, would inevitably inspire. On the other hand, philotimon is to be utilized by justice as a means of bringing about desirable unions. The young men who display political and military virtue are to be honoured with the licence for more frequent sacred marriages.

*Καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γέ που τῶν νέων ἐν πολέμῳ ἢ ἄλλοθι  
που γέρα δοτέον καὶ ἄθλα ἄλλα τε καὶ ἀφθονεστέρα ἢ ἐξουσία  
τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν συγκοιμήσεως, ἵνα καὶ ἅμα μετὰ προφάσεως  
ὥς πλεῖστοι τῶν παίδων ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σπείρωνται.*

460b1-5

Erotike anagke and philotimon are to be brought into a right relation to each other. Sexual pleasure is to be sought not primarily for its own sake, but for the sake of honour. On the one hand, the spirited pursuit of honour is divided from its immediate association with the sexual pursuit of pleasure; on the other, they are united through the mediation of an objective reason which determines the naturally pleasant by the rational good of utility. In this way the potential lawlessness of natural eros is hoped to be overcome, and a greater bond between guardian and state to be forged. The natural eros of sexual desire is given a

rational foundation and purpose through its mediated relation to the spirited eros of philotimon. Eros, as the combination of both forms, is made an ally of reason.

The guardians are seen to be moved here principally by a desire for honour, rather than for the family. The device of manipulated lots is to prevent a sense of injury to one's honour; the practice of honoring the warrior's virtue with marriage subordinates eros as sexual desire to eros as philotimon. On the one side, eros is considered only as seeking sexual pleasure; on the other side, it is identified with the desire for honour. Neither form of eros, sexual desire or the love of honour, is seen to have its end in the family. Neither form of eros, then, is regarded as the principle of the family. Eros is abstracted from its relation to the family. The direction of the argument in this aspect is toward the view that the communal family is the true form of the family, as opposed to the private oikos, which is taken to be the result of the natural individualism in which sexual desire and personal ambition are undivided by a mediating reason.

(b) 460b7-c7 Exposure of undesirable offspring.

The proposal for eugenic procreation reduces natural necessity to a material condition of the communal family. The next proposal, for the exposure of undesirable offspring, in principle negates nature altogether as a principle of the family. The natural in itself, as determinate of the family, is regarded as nothing; it is only as useful, as sanctified by utility, that the natural becomes something, that it receives a determinant reality. The natural individual, qua natural, is regarded as a non-entity without the sanctification of the state.

These sacred marriages are to be consecrated with proscribed religious ceremony and ritual (heortai tines . . . kai thusiai), and celebrated with hymns (humnoi) specially composed by the poets for the occasion; their number is to be limited only by a concern to maintain a stable population (459e5-460a6).

Defective and undesirable offspring of the inferior guardians will be exposed; the desired offspring of the superior guardians will be raised by nurses in a sekos in a separate part of the city (460c1-5). Glaucon agrees that these measures are necessary to guard the purity of the breed:

*Εἴπερ μέλλει, ἔφη, καθαρὸν τὸ γένος τῶν φυλάκων ἔσεσθαι.*  
460c6-7

(c) 460c8-d8 Public adoption of children.

Mothers are permitted to nurse the young until their milk has been exhausted, but with care taken to prevent them from recognizing their own children:

*Οὐκοῦν καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἐπιμελήσονται τὰς τε μητέρας ἐπὶ τὸν σηκὸν ἄγοντες ὅταν σπαργῶσι, πᾶσαν μηχανὴν μηχανώμενοι ὅπως μηδεμία τὸ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεται*  
460c8-d1

The abstraction of the children from these marriages is a strong image of the abstraction of eros from its natural end in marriage and family. Natural eros as a principle of familial unity, that is accomplished through the private union of husband, wife and children, is negated by justice. Instead, the begetting of children becomes the public duty of begetting and bearing offspring for the state.

*τίκτειν τῇ πόλει . . . γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει.*  
460e4-7

Natural eros is thus made the servant of justice. The good of natural eros lies not in the good of the natural individual, but in the good of the state. The family is not to be regarded as a private institution which secures the good of the natural individual, but as a public institution which secures the good of the state. Justice is thus taken to be the good of eros considered as a principle of natural unity. The

good of eros, considered as the principle of the family regarded as a natural form of unity, is the good determined by justice, the good of political unity.

(d) 460d8-461e4 Prohibitions against intercourse.

The state will limit the period during which fertile men and women are to beget children within the public hieroi gamoi to the prime age for child-bearing (460e1-461a2). These restrictions are to be lifted once citizens have passed beyond the child-bearing age, except those to prevent incest (461b9-c7). Guardians who transgress the laws of the hieroi gamoi are to be pronounced guilty of impiety and injustice.

*οὔτε ὄσιον οὔτε δίκαιον φήσομεν τὸ ἀμάρτημα*  
461a4-5

Illegal offspring will be condemned as contrary to natural law, human law, and divine law.<sup>20</sup>

*νόθον γὰρ καὶ ἀνέγγιον καὶ ἀνίερον φήσομεν αὐτὸν παῖδα τῇ πόλει καθιστάναι.*

461b6-7

Natural law determines the metrios chronos for child-bearing to the

*ἄκμῃ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως.*

461a2

Human law determines the restriction of child-bearing to the service of the common good .

*Οἰκοῦν ἕαντε πρεσβύτερος τούτων ἕαντε νεώτερος τῶν εἰς τὸ κοῖνον γεννήσεων ἄψηται,*

461a3-4

Sacred law determines the restriction of child-rearing to what is most beneficent to the city of the blessed.

*ἱέρειαι καὶ ἱερεῖς καὶ σύμπασα ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀμείνους καὶ ἐξ ὠφελίμων ὠφελιμωτέρους ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους γίγνεσθαι,*

461a7-b1

Two of the measures by which the koinonia of women and children is established are traditional customs of the Hellenic family: the practice of exposure, (though controversial in the fifth century) and the prohibition against incest. These customs suggest in themselves that the family was not traditionally conceived as principally a natural unity, but as an ethical unity which had a religious ground. Exposure suggests that natural relations are nothing in themselves; that the natural individual is nothing in itself. The prohibition against incest suggests that natural relations were given their reality by being invested with divine significance.

The exposure of children negates the assumption of the natural individual as something in its own right. The child's substantiality is given to it through its association with the family. The child has no status in the human community, or in the ethical order of the cosmos as determined by the gods, until it is accepted into the family. By nature alone, one is nothing. The family is not grounded in eros. The family is not a natural unity; rather, it is the institution in which the natural is substantiated.

The prohibition against incest is not taken to be grounded in nature; incest is not looked upon primarily as a crime against nature. It is not eros which prohibits incest. Rather, eros must be governed by hosiotes. Eros without hosiotes is what produces incest. For the end which eros seeks is natural unity, the unity of the natural individual. If eros were the principal cause of the family, the family would destroy itself through incest, that is, through the impulse toward immediate self-unification that originates in eros. The family originates out of the correction and government of eros by hosiotes.

Hosiotes recognizes incest to be abhorrent to the gods. Incest is not thought of principally as an unnatural act, but as the greatest act of impiety and sacrilege. It is primarily an act contrary to divine law, not natural law. Plato's



argument in the Laws against homosexuality is that it is contrary to nature. The argument against incest in the Laws is the same as his argument in the Republic: that it is contrary to divine ordinance.

#### B. 461e5-466d5 The Utility of the Koinonia of Wives and Children.

The argument which demonstrates the utility of the koinonia of wives and children is one which defines the good of the state, and the good which the individual is to seek in the state. In short, it defines the nature of the (human) good so far as this is disclosed and is obtainable in the life of political community. This good is said to be unity: the unification of the state, the unification of the individual, and the unification of state and individual.

The good of unity is demonstrated in large part through the purgation of the assumption that the natural good of the individual is the good of endless pleasure and an endless leisure in which to enjoy it, and that as such is simply opposed to the political good of the state. The good of to idion is defined as not opposed to the good of to koinon. They are taken to be reconciled in the spirited good of honour, which embodies both the good of the laws, and that of the individual guardian.

##### (i) 461e6-462e3 The political good as unity.

Socrates declares that the outline of the koinonia of wives and children to be complete. He now proposes a logos to demonstrate that it is good and just.

*ὥς δὲ ἐπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ καὶ μακρῶ βελτίστη, δεῖ δὴ  
τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.*

461e6-8

Socrates' logos is that the megiston kakon of the state would be whatever dissolved its identity as a state back into its constituent elements; its megiston agathon would be whatever unified its elements into its identity as a state.

*Ἔχομεν οὖν τι μείζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο δ' ἂν αὐτὴν  
διασπᾷ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; ἢ μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δ' ἂν  
συνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.*

462a9-b3

The state is unified through the koinonia of pleasure and pain.

*Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία συνδεῖ, ὅταν οἱ  
μάλιστα πάντες οἱ πολῖται τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνωμένων τε καὶ  
ἀπολλυμένων παραπλησίως χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται; Παντάπασι  
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.*

462b4-7

The state is divided by the individualization of pleasure and pain.

*Ἡ δέ γε τῶν τοιούτων ἰδίωσις διαλύει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν  
περιαλγείς, οἱ δὲ περιχαρεῖς γίγνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς  
παθήμασι τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει;*

462b8-c1

The cause of disunity is private individuality.

*Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκ τοῦδε τὸ τοιόνδε γίγνεται, ὅταν μὴ ἅμα  
φθέγγωνται ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ τοιάδε ῥήματα, τὸ τε ἐμόν καὶ τὸ  
οὐκ ἐμόν; καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου κατὰ ταῦτα; Κομιδῇ μὲν  
οὖν.*

462c3-6

The cause of unity is corporate unanimity.

*Ἐν ᾗτινι δὴ πόλει πλείστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταῦτα τοῦτο  
λέγουσι τὸ ἐμόν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν, αὕτη ἄριστα διοκεῖται;  
Πολύ γε.*

462c7-10

The ideal unity of the state is analogous to the unity of the individual.

*Καὶ ἥτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει;*

463c11

The unity of the state is its corporate identity, which is analogous to the corporate identity of the individual, who consists of both a plurality of bodily parts and a soul. Whenever any individual part of the body experiences a sensation, it is felt by the individual as a whole. In this account of the relation of the sensitive limb to the soul, the seat of sensation is reason; the sensitive, animate nature of the body originates out of the rational, animating power of the soul. It is the power of the living soul which animates the bodily parts and draws them into relation to itself.

*οἷον ὅταν πού ἡμῶν δάκτυλός τοῦ πληγῇ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἀρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἥσθητό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα συνήλγησεν μέμρους ποιήσαντος ὧς, καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ.*

462c10-d3

The corporate unity of the individual consists of different parts that can be distinguished from each other as the constituent elements of its corporate identity. What unifies the constituent parts of the body with one another is not any one part of the body itself. The body is not by itself a corporate unity: the individual is not the external union of body and a soul. He is one with himself: ho anthropos. The body is unified only through its participation in the self-identity of ho anthropos in which body and soul are united. The cause of the identity of the individual is the inner unity and identity of the soul as that ruling and unifying element which all the parts of the individual are dependent upon. The corporate unity of the body exists through the relation of the bodily parts to the identity of the soul, which is present in each part as the principle of this relation.

The conclusion to be drawn from the analogy is that the identity of the ideal state is analogous to the self-identity of the individual composite of body and soul.

τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγγύτατα ἢ ἄριστα πολιτευομένη πόλις οἰκεῖ.  
462d6-7

The plurality of diverse individuals would be drawn into the universal identity of the state as a single unity, where every part would participate in the corporate unity of the whole, and the corporate identity of the whole be present in every part.

Ἐνός δὴ οἶμαι πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτιοῦν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ  
κακὸν ἢ τοιαύτη πόλις μάλιστα τε φήσῃ ἐαυτῆς εἶναι τὸ  
πάσχον, καὶ ἡ συνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ συλλυπήσεται. Ἀνάγκη,  
ἔφη, τήν γε εὖνομον.

462d8-e3

Socrates' logos that the principle of the state is unity is central to the argument, not only of the second wave, or the three waves taken together, but, as Aristotle pointed out, to the argument of the Republic as a whole. Unity is the principium and summum bonum of the state, without which the state would not be what it is. The state is a form of unity; unity defines what the state is. The political good of justice is unity.

Plato's argument is not that the state depends upon the unity of the family, which would be to argue that political unity rests upon natural unity. A closer examination of the account of the koinonia of pleasure and pain in terms of the unity of the individual reveals that precisely the opposite is true: that natural unity depends upon the unity of reason, the unity of a logos which belongs to a ruling principle. It is a most important consideration insofar as criticism of Plato's ideal state has so much centered upon the koinonia of wives and children, with the understanding that it is a natural form of unity, i.e. an unity based on natural affections identified with the (falsified) kinship of blood-ties and marriage-ties.

The essential point of Socrates' account of the unity of the sensible individual is that it is constituted out of the unity of the soul with itself. His account demands that one distinguish between the soul as universally present in

all parts of the body, and as retaining its own inner identity as separate from the body. This is the distinction between soul as part of

*πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν*

and soul distinguished as

*ὁ ἄρχων ἐν αὐτῇ.*

That which characterizes the unity of the individual (ho anthropos),

*τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν,*

is the logos of the relation between these two sides. Soul is seen as distinguished and as united with itself as both life and thought; soul as living is seen to be have its origin in soul as thinking. The essence of the life of the soul, the true life of the soul, is as a thinking being. The unified life of the sensible individual is the logos which belongs to the soul as logos.

Body and soul are distinguished in the individual as the unified and the unifying, the organized and the organizing; the soul is further distinguished as self-unifying, self-organizing. The body is a diverse plurality of mutually external parts which is dependent upon the soul for its organization and unity. The soul is the unifying element in the soul-body composite. It is capable of this unification so far as it is capable, on the one side, of being universally present throughout the diverse plurality of bodily parts, even while on the other side, it remains in a self-identical relation to itself.

The inner self-identity of the soul is expressed through the external appearance of unity in the body. What reveals the soul's inner self-identity is just the unity and organization which is visibly present in the sensible individual and cannot be attributed to its bodily nature. The soul is capable of organizing and unifying the body only if the soul possesses a relation to an inner self-identity. The unity and organization which the soul gives to the body is derived

from the unity which the soul as universally present throughout the body has with itself as separate from the body in its inner self-identity.

The unity expressed sensibly in the koinonia of pleasure and pain is an expression of the unity of the inner identity of soul with itself. The koinonia of pleasure and pain can be said to express the natural unity of the body, the unity of sensible parts with one another. Every part of the body is united with every other part, so that the corporate unity of the body remains undivided by the division of pleasure and pain. If any one bodily member feels pain or pleasure, the sensation is shared by all the other members of the body.

*πᾶσα ἅμα συνήλγησεν μέμρους ποιήσαντος ὅλη*

However, the natural unity of the body exists not in virtue of the body, but in virtue of the universal presence of sensitive soul in the body which incorporates each bodily member into in the self-identity of the individual. Pleasure and pain, which represent the division of nature, are overcome in this unity. The pain in one finger, which appears to divide it from the rest of the body as not in pain, is not really perceived in the finger. It is neither the finger which perceives pain, nor the whole of bodily members, but the human being who suffers pain in the finger.

*καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ.*

Socrates' account of the logos of the self-identity of ho anthropos in relation to his composite nature as body and soul is intended to establish that natural unity is derived from a rational principle. The soul unifies the body, not the body the soul. As the unifying principle, soul both transcends and comprehends the natural unity of the body. Nature is governed by a reason which organizes and unifies sensible elements into the logos of a mia suntaxis. It is the logos of the participation of the sensible particular in the universal idea.

As the soul orders the body and gives it its unity, so must the state order and unify its individual citizens. The koinonia of women and children will be justified if it can be shown to effect a natural unity in the state analogous to the koinonia of pleasure and pain in the sensible individual, that is, a natural unity which is derived through the government of the ruling principle in the state.

The connection between the unity of the individual and that of the state is more than analogous. It is only in light of the understanding that the natural unity of the sensible individual is derived from a rational principle, that its unity consists of a logos, is it possible to understand how the state is able to overcome the natural independence of its citizenry in the family. The state can order and unify the phulakes because of the presence of the same ruling principle in both state and individual, which is the source of unity in each. If the logos of the identity of anthropos and polis were other than identical, the contariety of justice and eros, of common political good and natural individuality, could not be overcome. The comprehension of the dependence of the natural upon a rational principle is the basis on which the state obtains its unity. The state possesses its unity in virtue of its universal reason which both transcends and comprehends the natural life of its citizens as derived from the rational principle of unity that orders and unifies the state: justice.

The argument has comprehended that the sensible particular, the natural individual, is not simply what it is, but is what it is through its relation to the self-identity of the rational universal. Justice is the political form of this same relation. Justice is the logos which relates the independence of eros to the good. Eros is analogous to the pleasure or pain experienced in the individual member. Piety is the mediation between justice and eros. Piety is the ruling principle of the family, and is analogous to the universal presence of the soul in the body of the sensible individual. It is the awareness present in each member of the dependence of its

identity upon the the self-identity of the ruling principle. Justice is the ruling principle, the good of the state and individual alike. The logic of the rest of the argument of the second wave is that of unifying the state through the comprehension, and ordering of natural divisions into an unity derived from and held to the rational good.

(ii) 462e4-466d5 The good of the koinonia of wives and children.

Having demonstrated the good of justice to be unity, the argument now demonstrates how that good is realized through the koinonia of wives and children (462e4-7). The good of justice is realized in three forms of unity: harmony in the state (462e4-464a); friendship among the guardians(464b-465d1); happiness in the individual guardian (465d2-466d5). The koinonia of wives and children is demonstrated to be the chief means of realizing the good of the state, next to the constitution of the state itself (464a8-b7). Properly speaking, the koinonia of wives and children is the sunaitia, the condition without which justice would be ineffective as the aitia of unity. It is the sense of the argument that piety is the necessary condition of the realization of the good of justice.

(a) 463-464a Harmony: the good of political unity.

(α) 463a-b5 The logos of political unity.

The way in which political reason converts a human community from a natural association into a political order is by dividing the community into a ruling class of archontes and a ruled demos.

*Τί οὖν; ἔστι μὲν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ;*

463a1-2



Through the reciprocity of the ruling and ruled, all members of the community are converted into politai.

*Πολίτας μὲν δὴ πάντες οὗτοι ἀλλήλους προσερούσι;*  
463a3

Politeia exists to the degree that there is universal participation of all politai in the political reason by which the community governs itself as a whole. The good of the state is unity. It is for the sake of unity that the community is divided into the ruling and the ruled. Unity is the rational arche of the logos of politeia. The polis exists in and through the unity of political reason.

The political good of unity is destroyed in the destruction of reciprocity between ruling and ruled. The opposite extremes of political order, beyond which the unity of the state is destroyed, are despotism and democracy. The majority of existing politeiai are said to be despotic; others are democratic.

*Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις δῆμος τοὺς ἄρχοντας προσαγορεύει; Ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις αὐτὸ τοῦνομα τοῦτο, ἄρχοντας.*  
463a6-9

Democracy is the limit to which political unity can be exposed to the lack of division between ruling and ruled; despotism is the limit to which political unity can be exposed to the division between ruling and ruled.

*Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄρχοντες τοὺς δῆμους; Δούλους, ἔφη.*  
463b4-5

Where the state is divided between the extremes of the absolute rule of despotai over the absolute subjection of douloi, there is the least degree of reciprocity between archontes and demos, and the least degree of self-government in the community as a whole. Universal participation of the politai in self-government exists in its most limited and abstract form, where the interests of ruler and ruled are most external to one another. In the despotic association of master and slave, political unity is nearly lost in the extreme externality of one part of the state to

the other. The unity of the state, which lies in the common interest of the community in self-government, is wholly external to the self-interests of the parts of which the state is composed.

Against these extremes, the ideal state preserves the integrity of both the division of the political community into ruling and ruled, and its unity in the universal participation of all politai in the common interest of self-government. It is the most complete conversion of the human community from a natural association into a political order, since there is the most complete form of reciprocity between the ruling and ruled.

*Τί δ' ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτᾳ τί τοὺς ἄρχοντας φησὶν εἶναι; Σωτήρας τε καὶ ἐπικούρους, ἔφη. Τί δ' οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον; Μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφείας.*  
463a10-b3

Political reason ideally divides the state with regard to the division of economic interests in the community from political-military interests. The ruled regard their rulers as their "saviours and helpers"; the rulers regard the ruled as their "wage-payers and nurses". Each side regards the other as belonging to themselves; the ruling and ruled see the interests particular to each part as completed through its relation to the other part. Through the reciprocity of the economic and political-military interests, the unity of the politai is comprehensive of their division into archontes and demos. As against the abstract externality of unity in the despotic and democratic extremes of political order, the unity of the ideal state is concrete.

(β) 463b6-c2 The origin of stasis.

The unity of the state resides principally in the ruling class. The rulers in the extremes of political community rule only for the sake of ruling. They are abstractly united in the indeterminacy of their rule as sunarchontes.

*Τί δ' οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀλλήλους; Συνάρχοντας, ἔφη.*  
463b6-7

Sunarchontes is without reference to anything outside the interest of the rulers in ruling. It expresses the externality of indifference which ruling for its own sake has toward the ruled, and the good of ruling. The unity of the state is subordinate to the good of ruling for its own sake.

The proper end of ruling is the unity of the state. The rulers in the ideal state rule for the sake of the community as a whole. Their rule is determined by the common good of unity. It is primarily as guardians of the political good that they are united as sumphulakes.

*Τί δ' οἱ ἡμέτεροι; Συμφύλακας.*  
463b8-9

Sumphulakes expresses the concrete unity of the ruling classes in its reference to the ruled. Their unity is grounded in the unity of the whole community, through the reciprocity of mutual benefit between archontes and demos. The sumphulakes are united in what distinguishes them from the demos: their knowledge of how the division of ruler and ruled is derived from the unity of the state. They are united in the identification of the good of ruling with the good of the state as a whole.

As the unity of a state derives principally from the unity of the ruling class, so is the ruling class its principal source of stasis. The origin of stasis in the state is through the naturalism that remains unpurged from the ruling class in the conversion of the human community from a natural association into a political order. The natural is least purged in the political extremes of despotism and democracy which fail to ground the division of ruler and ruled in the separation of the private and natural interests of individuals from the public reason of government. This separation constitutes the division between economic and

political-military life in the ideal state. This division is the basis of the reciprocity between the archontes as soteriai and epikouroi and the demos as misthodotai and tropheai. The freedom of the sumphulakes from natural necessity, obtained through the labour of the demos, secures their unadulterated service to the common good of all politai.

The abstract political unity of the sunarchontes, their identity with one another as archontes, is not equal to their difference as natural individuals. The sunarchontes are divided from each other by the natural identity of the individual within his own family.

*Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν,  
εἰ τίς τινα ἔχει προσειπεῖν τῶν συναρχόντων τὸν μὲν ὡς  
οἰκεῖον, τὸν δ' ὡς ἀλλοτριον;*

463b10-12

In the ruling class of the sunarchontes, the family constitutes a natural unity which distinguishes between oikeios and allotrios, between "belonging to one's own" and "belonging to another".<sup>21</sup> The family is a closed circle. It distinguishes between those who are within and those who are outside the family circle of marriage and blood-ties. The allotrios, however, refers not only to that which does not belong to the family, but also that to which the family does not belong. The natural unity of the family is the ground of the natural individualism of self-possession. The individual claims there is that which belongs to him, and that to which he does not belong.

*Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν οἰκεῖον ὡς ἑαυτοῦ νομίζει τε καὶ λέγει τὸν  
δ' ἀλλότριον ὡς οὐχ ἑαυτου;*

463b14-c1

In the ruling class of the sunarchontes, the family is the ground of a natural individualism which asserts against the common political unity of all politai a realm of private interests which is not only self-inclusive but also self-exclusive. The family not only excludes others, but excludes itself from others. The family

insists upon its natural independence from the state. In relation to the natural life of the family, the individual claims that he belongs to himself rather than to the state.

The family appears in the ruling class of sunarchontes as a natural unity. Its principle is eros. Where eros is taken to be the unifying principle of the family, the family is taken to be primarily a natural unity. Eros is the principle of natural individualism. Where the family is taken to originate in eros, the individual is not so much taken to belong to the family, as the family is taken to belong the individual. In the ruling class of sunarchontes, the individual does not exist for the sake of the family, but the family for the sake of the individual.

(γ) 463c3-e2 The purgation of stasis.

The unity of the ruling class of sumphulakes is not divided by natural exclusiveness of the family. All are members of the koinonia of women and children, they are all members of the same family.

*Τι δὲ οἱ παρὰ σοὶ φύλακες; ἔσθ' ὅστις αὐτῶν ἔχει ἂν τῶν  
συμφυλάκων νομίσαι τινὰ ἢ προσειπεῖν ὥς ἀλλότριον;  
Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.*

463c3-5

It seems that all fall within the natural unity of the family, all are united by the unity of eros. All are oikeioi, none are allotrioi.

*παντὶ γὰρ ᾧ ἂν ἐντυγχάνῃ, ἢ ὥς ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὥς ἀδελφῇ ἢ ὥς  
πατρὶ ἢ ὥς μητρὶ ἢ ἱκεῖ ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων ἐκγόνοις ἢ  
προγόνοις νομιεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν.*

463c5-7

But the unity of the koinonia of women and children is not really grounded in eros. The basis of the koinonia of women and children is not eros. The members of the koinonia are not members through the natural relations of blood-ties. By nature, the children are not the same offspring of the same parents. The

natural relation of parent and child has been carefully concealed: it has been purged from the family. Its purgation is the principal condition of the koinonia of women and children. No one knows who their natural parents and children are. If the family is determined by the natural unity of eros, the sumphulakes are only members of the same family in name.

*ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τόδε εἰπέ· πότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον  
οἰκεῖα νομοθετήσεις . . .;*

463c8-9

If eros were the principle of unity in the koinonia of women and children, there could be no unity. If eros were the primary principle of unity in the natural family, there could not be a koinonia of women and children. It would be a family only in name; it would be a sophistic family, contrary to nature, contrary to the family as a natural unity. The argument would be absurd.

However, to begin with, the family is not simply a natural unity, but an ethical unity. Its unity lies principally in the ethical relations between the members of the household. The unity of the family is grounded in its ethos, not eros. Eros is not the ground of the ethos of the family; it is grounded in the ethos of the family. The relations between the members of the family are not simply natural, but ethical. The natural relations are invested with ethical significance. The members of the family are only nominally a family if their relation is reduced to natural unity. The family consists in the substantiation of natural ties through a rational ethos, a rational virtue which governs the natural relations, and through which the natural individuality of its members are elevated into an ethical unity.

*πότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον οἰκεῖα νομοθετήσεις, ἢ καὶ  
τὰς πράξεις πάσας κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα πράττειν, περὶ τε τοὺς  
πατέρας, ὅσα νόμος περὶ πατέρας αἰδοῦς τε πέρι καὶ  
κηδεμονίας καὶ τοῦ ὑπήκουον δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων,*

463c9-d3

The koinonia of women and children purges the family of the tendency to confuse its ethical unity with its natural unity. It purges the family of its assumption that it is primarily a natural unity; it clarifies that the family is essentially an ethical unity, an unity grounded in religious piety, in divine ordinance. Hosiotes recognizes the family as a rational institution constituted out of ethical virtue, justice. The ethos of justice is grounded in piety, a divine reason, the reason of divine law.

*ἢ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι,  
ὥς οὔτε ὄσια οὔτε δίκαια πράττοντος ἄν, εἰ ἄλλα πράττοι ἢ  
ταῦτα;*

463d3-6

The pious relation which the family has to the universal justice of a divine order is one in which its individual members are to regard themselves as the possession of the gods, and the family as a whole as the form of mediation between the human and divine. The particularity of human interests are given up to the universal reason of the divine order.

The principal demand of the gods is the surrender of the natural independence of the human, in the recognition that his life as a natural individual is dependent upon the hidden purposes of the divine. The rational virtue required of family members is grounded in the religious obligation of the human to the divine. The family is constituted out of the unifying reason of a justice which is grounded in hosiotes.

The justice and piety of the family is not private; the religious virtue of the private household brings it into relation to the universal order of the gods, which is the common ground of every family. Through this relation of the particular family to the universal order of the gods, there is a relation of one family to another. The religious piety of the family incorporates it into an universal religious community in which all families are included. Divine justice includes

family justice within social justice. Family justice involves a relation to the whole community. The natural individual, who offends the gods through an offence against the family, offends the religious community of families.

μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι, ὥς  
οὔτε δῖα οὔτε δίκαια πράττοντος ἄν, ἀλλὰ πράττοι ἢ ταῦτα;  
463d3-6

Hosiotes not eros, then, is the true ground of all practical ethical relations that constitute the ethos of the family. The koinonia of women and children is purged of eros; its ethos has a pure relation to hosiotes. The members of the koinonia of women and children, therefore, are not members in name only, but oikeioi in the truest sense. The koinonia of women and children is the purest form of the family. That the koinonia of women and children would constitute a true family, not one in name only, therefore, would be recognized and supported by the whole (religious - humnesousin) community of politai.

αὐταί σοι ἢ ἄλλαι φῆμαι ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ὑμνήσουσιν  
εὐθύς περὶ τὰ τῶν παίδων ὧτα καὶ περὶ πατέρων, οὓς ἂν  
αὐτοῖς τις ἀποφήνη, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν; Αὐται,  
ἔφη·

463d6-e1

It would not be the koinonia of women and children, then, that would be absurd, but that family which would be merely natural. It is the notion that the family is principally a natural unity, whose principle is eros, and whose end is the satisfaction of the natural individual, that is absurd, that is a family in name only.

γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἶη εἰ ἄνευ ἔργων οἰκεῖα ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν  
στομάτων μόνον φθέγγονται.

463e1-2

(δ) 463e3-6 The rational unity of koinonia.

The purification of the family that takes place in the koinonia of women and children, the purgation of eros by hosiotes, purifies the ruling class of



sumphulakes of the natural individualism that infects the ruling class of sunarchontes. The contrariety of "mine" and "not mine" is comprehended within the rational universal "mine" of the koinonia of the sumphulakes.

*Πασῶν ἄρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ συμπωνήσουσιν ἐνός  
τινος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος ὁ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ  
ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς.*  
463e3-5

The universal "mine" spoken by each and every individual produces the natural unity of the koinonia of pleasure and pain.

*Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τούτου τοῦ δόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος ἔφαμεν  
συνακολουθεῖν τὰς τε ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας κοινῇ;*  
464a1-2

The sumphulakes are united through the rational virtue of the family ethos. The family ethos constitutes a koinonia whose unity is prior to the individuals of which it is composed. Through the unity of the family, the sumphulakes are united in the universal good of their koinonia as a whole: they are united in the universal oikeioi. The good of the whole is universally present in every individual. There is no allotrios. All externality between individuals has been purged in their common identity with one another as oikeioi.

*Οὐκοῦν μάλιστα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ πολῖται, ὁ  
δὴ ἐμὸν ὀνομάσουσιν; τούτου δὲ κοινωνοῦντες οὕτω δὴ λύπης  
τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μάλιστα κοινωνίαν ἔξουσιν;*  
464a4-6

The cause (aitia) of unity in the koinonia of sumphulakes, besides the principle cause of the constitution, is the koinonia of women and children. The koinonia of wives and children is the condition without which justice would be ineffective as a principle of unity.

*Ἄρ' οὖν τούτων αἰτία πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ καταστάσει ἡ τῶν  
γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν;*  
464a8-9

The argument has been purged of the assumption that the family as a natural unity is the good upon which the state rests; that is, that the good of the state is to serve the natural and private interests of the individual. The conclusion to be drawn from the argument at this point is that the family, not the natural family as oikos, but the rational family as koinonia, in which the family has been purged of its naturalism, is the sunaitia of the ideal or just politeia. The unity of the state has been shown to require, as a necessary condition to itself, the unity of the communal family, in which the relation of the life of the individual to his proper end has been purified. Justice, as the aitia of unity, requires piety as its sunaitia.

Piety has appeared as the universal ground of human virtue. It is the ground of family virtue, which in turn is presupposed by civic virtue. Family piety is the condition of political justice. But the inner content of piety has not yet been shown; rather, one sees piety only as imaged externally in the justice of familial relations. What is known of piety is that it is a religious awareness that one's life is not one's own; that human life is the possession of the gods. This is to say that human life is determined by a divine principle.

In another way, of course, piety can also be seen to presuppose justice. That justice is the ground also of piety, is clear insofar as the education of the guardians began with instruction in the poets' representation of the gods, and these as reformed on the basis of the same principle as is the basis of the koinonia of wives and children, the identity of sanctity and utility, of the divine and the good. The purgation of the poets, one might say, was the first true act of justice, that is of human legislation. The institution of the koinonia of wives and children is a further act of legislation. Piety is to be acquired first through the koinonia of wives and children, and then through the education of the state. The ethical content of piety is principally that by which the soul of the to idion is

informed by the principles and life of to koinon. Piety involves the identification of to idion with to koinon.

(b) 464b-465b11 Friendship: the good of social unity.

The unity of the state depends upon the unity of the ruling class of guardians, who are not divided according to a political reason, being members of the same political class. The source of division among the guardians is rather the potential division between to idion and to koinon, as that relates especially to the principle motive force in their character or soul: philotimon, the love of honour which is properly the eros of the spirited element. Such a division is seen to be grounded in a natural individualism which lays claim to what is one's own: the private possession of goods, wives, and children, i.e. the oikos. The good of the koinonia of wives and children is as a means of purging division within the ruling class through the purgation of to idion, the private. The ambitious temperament of the guardians is grounded in to koinon. The source of civic strife, which occupies the law courts with civic suits of one individual against another, is thus to be eliminated; the unity of friendship, where the good of one is identified with the good of another as one's own, is to establish a harmonious peace.

(a) 464b-e3 The abolition of to idion.

The unity of the just state lies in the unity of the ruling epikouroi and the ruled tropheai; the unity of the ruling and ruled depends principally upon the unity of the ruling class of sumphulakes. Just as the corporate unity of the body in its parts depends upon the self-identity of the soul. The unity desired in the state, and required by it, is the unity of the self-integrated individual.

Ἄλλα μὴν μέγιστόν γε πόλει αὐτὸ ὁμολογήσαμεν ἀγαθόν,  
ἀπεικάζοντες εὖ οἰκουμένην πόλιν σώματι πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ  
λύπης τε πέρι καὶ ἡδονῆς ὥς ἔχει.

464b1-3

The unity of the sumphulakes depends upon the unity of the koinonia of wives and children. So far as the political unity of the state as a whole depends upon the familial unity of the ruling class, the koinonia of wives and children is seen to be a cause of the greatest good of the state.

Τοῦ μεγίστου ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡμῖν πέφανται ἡ  
κοινωνία τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν τε παίδων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

464b5-6

The political reason of justice converts the human community into a political unity through the purgation of naturalism. Justice divides the community into a class of rulers whose interest in ruling is to be divided from the realm of private interests that belong to the ruled demoi. Justice grounds the division of ruling and ruled in the division of a private realm of economic interests from the realm of unadulterated service to the public good. The unity of the politiai is effected through the reciprocity of soterai te kai epikouroi and misthodotai te kai tropheai. The principle measure which justice takes to ensure this division is the abolition of private property in the ruling class.<sup>22</sup>

ἔφαμεν γάρ που οὔτε οἰκίας τούτοις ἰδίᾳς δεῖν εἶναι οὔτε γῆν  
οὔτε τι κτῆμα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφήν λαμβάνοντας,  
μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινῇ πάντα ἀναλίσκειν, εἰ μέλλοιεν  
δυντὼς φύλακες εἶναι.

464b8-c3

Private property has its ground in the adulterated ethos of the "natural" family of the oikos ho idios. It is the essential condition of the natural independence of the private household from the political order.

However, the family is not a natural unity, but an ethical unity whose unifying ethos consists in the universal presence of rational virtue in all its members. The rational unity of family requires the purgation of natural

individualism. The oikos ho koinos requires the abolition of an independent idios; idios is identified with oikeios. The purification of the family completes the purification of the state; the unity of the family unifies the state.

*Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὅπερ λέγω, τὰ τε πρόσθεν εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ νῦν  
λεγόμενα ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται αὐτοῖς ἀληθινούς φύλακας,  
καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ διασπᾶν τὴν πόλιν τὸ ἐμὸν ὀνομάζοντας μὴ τὸ  
αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἄλλον ἄλλο, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίαν  
ἔλκοντα ὅτι ἂν δύνηται χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων κτήσασθαι, τὸν δὲ  
εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐτέραν οὔσαν, καὶ γυναῖκά τε καὶ παῖδας  
ἐτέρους, ἡδονάς τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ἐμποιοῦντας ἰδίῳ ὄντων  
ἰδίας, ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δόγματι τοῦ οἴκου περὶ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ  
τείνοντας πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ὁμοπαφθεῖς λύπης τε καὶ  
ἡδονῆς εἶναι;*

464c5-d5

The abolition of the private household effectively purges the ruling class in the state of civic stasis. There is no longer a conflict of a plurality of independent private goods since the private is reduced to the body; all else is held in common. There is no ground for legal disputes in which the individual seeks through the authority of the law, that is, in the justice of the political community as a whole, to assert the claim of his household against that of another. To koinon is established through the abolition of to idion.

*δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ οἰχνησεται ἐξ αὐτῶν  
ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἰδιον ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ  
δ' ἄλλα κοινά;*

464d7-9

Through the oikos ho koinos, the phulakes possess an unity in which they enjoy a harmonious peace which transcends civic strife. The unifying reason of the oikos ho koinos transcends the finitude of private property, and blood-ties. An universal family is established in a pure relation to its principle, which transcends the natural.

*ὁθεν δὴ ὑπάπχει τούτοις ἀστασιάστοις εἶναι, ὅσα γε διὰ  
 χρημάτων ἢ παίδων καὶ συγγενῶν κτήσιν ἀνθρώποι  
στασιάζουσιν;*

464d9-e3

(β) 464e4 -465b11 The purgation of thumos.

It is taken that the guardians are purged of stasis that originates from the division between eros and dikaios, oikos and polis. The unity of the koinonia of wives and children elevates them beyond the natural particularity of property and private families. Socrates turns now away from the origin of stasis that is present in the pursuit of pleasure and leisure, the good sought in the natural unity of the private household. It is taken that the thumos of the guardians is purged of its relation to eros as a principle of natural individualism. What he turns to is the nature of thumos itself, and the division that lies in its own object, honour.<sup>23</sup>

What is left that is private among the guardians is their bodies. It is just the private relation of the guardian to his own body that is taken to be a final ground of natural individualism.<sup>24</sup> There is assumed present in the guardians a selfish ambition which takes the form that arises from their spirited nature. Just as the innate necessity of eros will impel the guardians toward sexual union, so will the thumos of the epikouros-phulax, his high-spirited, war-like nature, compel him toward contests with the others.

The ruling class of epikouroi and archontes is subject to division. The epikouros, as distinct from the archon, will identify with the particular natural attributes which he possesses, especially his strength. In this tendency there is this final danger to the unity of the ruling class that originates in the privacy of the body: that the epikouroi will not distinguish between the reason which is the cause of their virtue, and the strength which is its natural condition. They will identify themselves as the strong, and seek to assert their identity against that of the others. Each in his particularity will seek to assert himself as universal. The epikouros will seek an immediate form of self-unity in the individuality of the strongest. The danger is that the universality of honour will be made subject to

the particularity of strength. This danger exists because honour is not itself a pure universal. It is through the logic of such ambition that military coups overthrow both democratic and despotic forms government.

*Kal γὰρ οὐδὲ βιάων γε οὐδ' ἀκλῆς δίκαι δικάως ἂν εἶεν ἐν αὐτοῖς·*

464e4-5

The law-suits that Socrates now speaks of as arising from bodily assault would stem from this tendency among the epikouroi to assert their natural individuality as warriors, in which the universality of honour is confused with the particularity of their own ambition to possess it, and the cause of their virtue is confused with its condition. For in their youthfulness, the spirited nature of their ambition, their thumos, has not been stabilized in relation to its object, honour. Thus they confuse honour with that form of natural individualism which is peculiar to themselves, viz. primarily a form of universal recognition of their individual virtue which they assume to possess through natural attributes. In truth, honour is not to be understood primarily as the universal recognition of the individual, but rather the individual's recognition of the universal. This is the division latent in honour that is to be overcome, and it is this division between the ways in which the individual relates to the universal that distinguishes between the epikouroi and the archontes. The youthful epikouroi seek to make the universal their own, identifying the universal with their own particularity. The elder archontes recognize that their individuality depends on the universal. They identify their particularity with the universal. The difference is the dependence of personal honour upon the universal good of the state.

In Socrates' argument, there is no need to distinguish between the assaulted and the assaulter, which dikai would demand. All quarrels between the youthful epikouroi are to be regarded as contests of strength and courage.

ἡλιξί μὲν γὰρ ἡλικας ἀμύνεσθαι καλὸν καὶ δίκαιόν που  
 φήσομεν, ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελεία τιθέντες.  
 464e5-6

For it is recognized that what is moving in the soul of the youthful epikouroi is the desire for honour. The desire for the universal recognition of the individual, which moves the youths is the immediate appearance of the desire for honour in youthful ambition. Ambition takes this form because its true object is not separated out from its appearance in particular forms. At this level, ambition is nearly the same thing as natural passion. Thumos is little more than wrath, the avengance of one's honour.

Καὶ γὰρ τόδε ὀρθὸν ἔχει, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ νόμος· εἴ ποὺ  
 τίς τῷ θυμοῖτο, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πληρῶν τὸν θυμὸν ἦττον ἐπὶ  
 μέλζους ἂν τοι στάσεις.

465a1-3

What the youths confuse, the elders hold clearly: that the universal recognition of the individual, which moves the youths and is the immediate appearance of the desire for honour in youthful ambition, that this depends upon and is finally to be seen to have for its true form the individual's recognition of the universal, and of his dependence upon it.

Πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴν πάντων ἄρχειν τε καὶ κολάζειν προστετάξεται.  
 465a5-6

The unifying reason of the koinonia of wives and children overcomes the natural contrariety of weak and strong, young and old. The universal reason of justice and piety not only transcends natural contrariety, but comprehends it within its logos. The ethical virtue of the phulakes not only transcends the limits of natural contrariety, but unites natural contraries in the logos of the oikos ho koinos.

In their natural particularity as young and old, the young and the old seem to be independent of one another; that is, they have nothing in common, there is no relation between them. But as weak and strong, there appears a natural contrariety between them; they are related as contraries. The strong asserts its



identity over and against the weak, by which the identity of the weak is also revealed. In this relation, the young would rule the old.

In their rational community, the more virtuous elder rules over the less virtuous youth, and thus stabilizes the relation of the youth to the universal reason of the community. The strength and vitality of the youth is united to his virtue in the protection of the old. Natural contrariety is reduced to a condition of rational reciprocity. The virtue of the elder and that of the youth are completed through one another.

*Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε νεώτερος πρεσβύτερον, ἂν μὴ ἄρχοντες  
προστάττωσιν, οὔτε ἄλλο βιάζεσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει ποτέ οὔτε  
τύπτειν, ὥς τὸ εἶκος.*

465a8-10

The objective reason of religious virtue overcomes the natural contrariety of weak and strong which is the basis of natural contrariety between the old and young.

*οἶμαι δ' οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἀτιμάσει· ἱκανῶ γάρ τῷ φύλακε  
κωλύοντε, δέος τε καὶ αἰδώς, αἰδώς μὲν ὥς γονέων μὴ  
ἄπτεσθαι εἰργουσα, δέος δὲ τὸ τῷ πάσχοντι τοὺς ἄλλους  
βοηθεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ὥς ἑκείνους, τοὺς δὲ ὥς ἀδελφούς, τοὺς δὲ ὥς  
πατέρας.*

465a10-b3

The religious virtue of the phulakes transcends the natural contrariety between the strong youth and the weak elder. A harmony is established between them through the logos of their koinonia which recognizes the priority of rational virtue to natural strength. The strong youth and the weak elder are united in the universal reason of their virtue as phulakes. The conflict of their natural contrariety is stabilized within the unity of mutual dependence.

*Πανταχῇ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄνδρες  
ἄξουσι; Πολλήν γε.*

465b5-7

The purgation of naturalism from thumos is taken to be complete in the reciprocity of archontes and epikouroi. Their division of command and obedience

is seen to be the ground of unity; or rather, that unity is ground of their division. Honour is completely present in the unity of the two sides: the subjectivity of a natural ambition which has for its object the universal recognition of the individual, and the objectivity of ambition which has for its object the individual's recognition of the universal. (Although one must keep in mind the limited grasp of the universal that is present in honour. For even in this complete relation, the universal is grasped only as unifying particulars, as their logos. The transcendent self-identity of the universal as pure eidos is not comprehended. This division is that between the ruling class as a whole and the philosopher-king, whose pure ambition has the inconsequence of not wanting to rule.)

The unity of an universal reason in the ruling class, to which the ruling class stand in a pure relation, purged of naturalism, and which transcends and comprehends the natural, is thus taken to unify the state. The unity of the state transcends its own divisions.

*Τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ποτε ἡ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διξοστατήσῃ.*

465b8-10

(c) 465b12-466d5 Happiness: the good of the individual.

(a) 465b12-d1 To idion as the cause of unhappiness.

The result of the purgation of naturalism, to idion is the liberation of the rational individual from the obvious hardships and evils that are associated with the natural life of the household. The natural good of family and property are viewed as a source of unfreedom, where the individual is caught in the contingency of life, subject to the claim of necessity. Wealth and poverty are viewed together as sources of individual unfreedom and unhappiness, where one is subject to the extremes of dishonour. The natural life of the private household

is not a source of freedom and happiness, but imprisonment within all the conditions that attend an embodied existence, all the petty and worrisome particularities of life in which one is unfree, and thus a life of misery and endless strife.

*Τὰ γε μὴν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν δι' ἀπρέπειαν ὀκνῶ καὶ λέγειν, ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴεν, κολακείας τε πλουσιῶν πένητες ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ὄσας ἐν παιδοτροφίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχουσι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δ' ἐξαρνούμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι θέμενοι παρὰ γυναῖκάς τε καὶ οἰκέτας, ταμιεύειν παραδόντες, ὅσα τε, ὦ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ὅσα πάσχουσι, δηλὰ τε δὴ καὶ ἀγεννῇ καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν. Δῆλα γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ τυφλῷ.*

465b12-d1

(β) 465d2-e3 Honour as the political good.

The abolition of the private household, the purgation of natural individualism, is seen to be the means of liberation from endless strife; the koinonia of wives and children to be the cause of a life of peaceful harmony transcending the external limitation of natural necessity. It is in the life unified by an universal reason that one obtains true leisure and pleasure. For what one enjoys is the stability of the universal, where the particular has its true ground. Such a life, in which the individual is grounded in an universal reason, is nearest to the life enjoyed by the gods themselves on Olympus. It is that life which is celebrated and participated in the great religious festival of the Olympia, where athletes strive for honour in the Olympian games.<sup>25</sup> For this is the true content of heroic virtue, the fullest participation in the life of divine reason as is possible for those confined to an earthly existence. The victory the guardians shall win for the state, and the honour they shall win for themselves, is thus even greater than the victory of those in the contests at the religious festival of the Olympia.

*Πάντων τε δὴ τούτων ἀπαλλάσσονται, ζήσουσί τε τοῦ  
μακαριστοῦ βίον ὃν οἱ ὀλυμπιονίκαι ζῶσι μακαριώτερον.  
465d2-3*

The victories of the olympionikai are those of particular individuals; the victory of the guardians is universal, for theirs is the universal victory of the unity and self-identity of rational law over the particularity, division and strife that originates in natural necessity. The true content of the particular Olympian victories, the reality of which they are an instance or image, is the universal victory of a free human reason over the necessity of nature that is won for the state by the guardians. In such a victory, man stands nearest to the gods; the honour the guardians shall receive is nearest to the honour the gods receive from mortals.

*Διὰ σμικρόν που μέρος εὐδαιμονίζονται ἐκεῖνοι ὧν τούτοις  
ὑπάρχει. ἢ τε γὰρ τῶνδε νίκη καλλίον, ἢ τ' ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου  
τροφή τελεωτέρα. νίκην τε γὰρ νικῶσι συμπάσης τῆς πόλεως  
σωτηρίαν, τροφῇ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσων βίος δέϊται  
αὐτοὶ τε καὶ παῖδες ἀναδοῦνται, καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς  
αὐτῶν πόλεως ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας  
μετέχουσιν. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, καλά.*

465d5-e3

(γ) 465e4 -466b3 The unity of the individual.

The objections raised at the beginning of Book IV against the life prescribed for the guardians have been answered. (465e4 - 466a6) The individual stands in an undivided relation to his own good as rational where he now stands in a pure undivided relation to the good of the state. The universality of rational law is equal to the universality of honour. The good of individual, family, and state, are identical, for they have their identity in the good of an universal reason that is the single principle of unity in all three forms. Their unity is the unity of justice. Justice is the identical content of family, state, and individual. The cause of individual freedom and happiness is the universal reason of justice. The laws of

the state are proven just, for they are shown to possess the inner self-identity of an universal logos.

It is in his participation of the life of an universal reason, in his identity with justice as the unifying principle of life, that the guardian is free and happy, or in an unity with himself. His freedom consists in his transcendence of the natural and particular, in his participation in the self-identity of the universal which unifies and orders all particularity. The honour he receives as a consequence of his honouring the laws and preserving the honour of the laws, is a good beyond that of the economic order in the state. The division of the ruling and ruled, the division of the political and economic interests of the state, is the division of the universal and particular. It is the reason of the universal, the rational law, which both transcends and brings unity to particulars. True freedom and happiness, true leisure and pleasure, lies in the unity of the universal. For to the universal belongs the self-identity of the particular as a part of the whole. The guardian possesses a true individuality in virtue of his capacity to participate in the universal reason by which all particularity within the state is ordered and unified in relation to the self-identity of justice. He possesses a true freedom in the life of obedience to reason, in his capacity for a rational individuality. Human freedom is the possession of the rational soul, the true life of the soul is the life of reason.

*νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ τῶν ἐπικούρων βίος, εἴπερ τοῦ γε τῶν  
ὀλυμπιονικῶν πολὺ τε καλλίων καὶ ἀμείνων φαίνεται, μὴ πῃ  
κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων φαίνεται βίον ἢ τινῶν ἄλλων  
δημιουργῶν ἢ τὸν τῶν γεωργῶν;*

466a8-b2

(δ) 466b4-d5 The limitation of the political good.

The cause of unfreedom and misery is the assumption that the universal and particular are not united in a logos that belongs to the universal. Natural individualism, which views the universal as an abstraction from the particular, or

which does not know their division at all, is the life of unhappiness. Because the inner self-identity of the universal is not purely apprehended in law and honour, the guardians are recognized as still possessing a tendency to mistake the image of happiness for true happiness, the natural life of leisure and pleasure that one has in the city of pigs in a way, for the leisure and pleasure that is truly present in the life of reason, in which mistake the image is then a false image for it misrepresents itself as the true and not as an image of the true. This tendency to mistake the image for the reality of which it is only an image, Socrates had noted as especially the characteristic of children, who yet lack an education in reason. It was the principle by which the poetic images of heroism and divinity were purged. Thus, it is described here as "childish".

*εἰ οὕτως ὁ φύλαξ ἐπιχειρήσει εὐδαίμων γίνεσθαι, ὥστε μὴδὲ  
φύλαξ εἶναι, μὴδ' ἀρκέσει αὐτῷ βλῶς οὕτω μέτριος καὶ βέβαιος  
καὶ ὥς ἡμεῖς φάμεν ἀριστος, ἀλλ' ἀνόητός τε καὶ μειρακιώδης  
δόξα ἐμπεσοῦσα εὐδαιμονίας πέρι ὁρμήσει αὐτὸν διὰ δύναμιν  
ἐπὶ τὸ ἅπαντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκείουσθαι, γινώσεται τὸν  
Ἡσίοδον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἦν σοφὸς λέγων πλέον εἶναι πῶς ἡμῖν  
παντός.*

466b5-c3

The limitation of the political good, which with respect to the good of the individual takes the form of honour, is to be seen in the possibility of the guardian falling away from the universality of to koinon, back into the particularity of to idion. The limitation of the good to be obtained from life in the justice of political community is further illuminated in the next section of the argument, which forms the transition between the argument of the second wave, and that of the third. The highest form of good which the ideal polis offers to the individual is sanctification through the public worship of heroes in a civic cult. The immortalization of the guardian by the state shall be seen to a very clear illustration of the limit of happiness, or self-unification, that is to be obtained through practical or political life.

What has already come into view, however, is how the life of the ideal state, as enjoyed by the guardians, is a higher life than that of the city of pigs. The natural life of pleasure and leisure that has been associated with the life of the family, which was represented in the city of pigs, is now known to be only an image of the true pleasure and leisure that is to be found in the city of reason. The natural image of happiness has been purged of its false content, the content of naturalism, and purified in its true inner reason which has now become explicit and conscious. The koinonia of women and children is justified, not simply as a means of securing the good of the state, but as securing the good of the individual. The koinonia of women and children justifies itself.

*καὶ πάντα πάντα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν κοινωνεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα  
πραττούσας τὰ τε βέλτιστα πράξειν καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν τὴν  
τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, ἣ πεφύκατον πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ  
κοινωνεῖν; Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.*

466d1-5

#### IV. 466d6-471c3 Transition from the Second to the Third Wave.

The argument of the second wave, insofar as it is taken to argue for the utility of the koinonia of women and children is complete. What follows, from 466d6 -471c3 is a transition from the conclusion of the second wave to the question of the possibility of the state in the third wave. The transition takes place through a discussion of the state at war, in which the principal interest at that level is to demonstrate how the unity of the state transcends all division, both stasis and polemos. In this sense, it is really a discussion of the state at peace, within itself, and with other states.

The discussion of war falls easily into an external, bi-partite division, between 466d6-469b4 and 469b5-471c3. The first part deals with how the unity of the state overcomes the possibility of stasis which might arise in war between the individual and the state, in the conflict of glory and death. The second part deals with the unity of the state with other states, in which polemos is reduced to war with the barbarians. The discussion as a whole treats of three principal subjects: the honouring of living heroes, the honouring of dead heroes, and the possibility of philhellenic peace. What it brings before the reader is a vision of the ideal state as an universal city, which contains all forms of difference within itself. Such a view of the state is nearly that which sees it as a paradeigma. As the universal city, the ideal state is shown to possess the unity of an universal reason which transcends and comprehends all forms of particularity within itself.

The discussion of war discloses the unity of two further forms of koinonai that the politai of the just state participate: the koinonia of the living and the dead (466d6 - 469e6), and the koinonia poleon (469e7 - 471c3). The transitional character of this section of the argument is seen in how these forms of koinonai fall between the koinonia of the state and the koinonia of ideas. In these koinonai, there is a participation of the koinonia phulakon in more universal forms of unity



than the koinonia poleos, and through them, the participation of the state as a whole. The third wave brings the state in relation to the pure universal form of koinonia: the koinonia eidon. There, if not before, it is clear how the more universal forms of koinonai transcend lesser forms.

(i) 466d6-469b4 Koinonia of the living and dead.

That the discussion of war is transitional between the koinonia of women and children and the necessity of a philosopher-king is indicated by Socrates in Plato's usual fashion of first introducing a new subject, and then delaying its discussion. In this way he indicates the significance of the discussion which is actually about to take place. The argument of Books V to VII was thus introduced in relation to the intention to set the just state along other forms of politics to indicate that the intervening argument was necessary to that comparison. In the same way again, the discussion of the koinonia of women and children was deferred to the discussion of the koinonia men and women.

Here, he suggests they are ready to undertake the question of whether the koinonia of women and children is possible, its utility having been demonstrated. (466d6-9) It is assumed that this demonstration will demonstrate the feasibility of the just state. What is not yet known is that the question of its possibility depends on whether it is possible that a philosopher can be king. But he then raises the issue of how the state will conduct itself in war, in an ironical way that recalls how he raised the issue of the utility of the koinonia of women and children: by declaring it is no doubt obvious, and thereby suggesting it would not be what one might suppose. (466e1-3) What is to be disclosed in the discussion of warfare is thus indicated to be the connection between the possibility of the just state and that of the philosopher-king. What the discussion does is purge the assumption that the just state is one among others. It is disclosed to be an

universal state, which refers back to the initial intention at the beginning of Book V to compare the just to the unjust. The discussion of warfare thus brings one to the argument of the third wave which begins with the surprising hypothesis that the whole question of the feasibility of the just state has no bearing on its reality. Where the state has been disclosed to be universal in its reason, one is prepared for the hypothesis that its reality lies in its eidetic universality as paradeigma.

(a) 466e4-467e Koinonia of young and old.

The unexpected proposal is that children should go to war. The internal unity of the city is displayed in the march of the entire koinonia of guardians to the battle-front, male and female, young and old.

*κοινῇ στρατεύσονται, καὶ πρὸς γε ἄξουσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅσοι ἄδρῳι, ἢν' ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεῶνται ταῦτα ἂν τελεωθέντας δεήσει δημιουργεῖν.*  
466e4-6

Just as the rational unity of the state transcends the natural divisions of male and female, so does it transcend the division of young and old. The children are regarded in their rational identity as members of the guardian class, as future warriors. They are to acquire a knowledge of the techne of warfare. Nor are they to play an entirely passive role. They are already regarded as having a active role in the full life of the community. As assistants, they shall participate in all the business of warfare, as well as attending upon their common parents. The image is one of a koinonia of young and old, of a common self-identity which transcends natural difference in age.

*πρὸς δὲ τῇ θεᾷ, διακονεῖν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ θεραπεύειν πατέρας τε καὶ μητέρας.*  
467a1-2

The identity of the guardian transcends the natural difference of young and old, for one is primarily determined by what one knows. It is the rational

content of the soul that is determinant of the identity of the individual. (The difference in their rational capacity for different kinds of knowledge is what distinguishes the guardians and artisans--467a3-9. On the other hand, both classes share in a common rationality. The rational life of the soul is universally present in the rational divisions within the state.) The soul is to be regarded in its self-identity as rational, as prior to the natural contrariety of youth and age.

Young and old are united in the logos of the rational life of the state and soul; their contrariety as the natural extremes of human life, short of birth and death, are brought together as extremes in the self-identity of the rational life of the rational soul as a "becoming". The young stand in relation to the old, not in their difference in age, but in their common identity as rational warriors, in which relation the contrariety of youth and age is disclosed as relative extremes in knowing. Thus those appointed to take charge of them will be "generals" whose age and experience fit them to the role of educators, paidagogoi.

*Καὶ ἄρχοντάς γε που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους  
αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήσουσιν ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐμπειρία τε καὶ ἡλικία ἱκανοὺς  
ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς εἶναι.*

467d5-7

The young and old are brought together in a koinonia of knowing, through which the rational life of the institution transcends the natural termination of the life of the individual. The life of the state is constantly renewed in a cycle of intellectual becoming, which transcends the natural division of life and death. The universal reason of justice in the state transcends the natural life of the individual, which is subject to the contraries of birth and death.

The way in which the state regards the natural life of its individual members is the way in which sensible individuals are regarded as members of species. The children are regarded in their natural individuality only as members of the species, as offspring.

*Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ μαχεῖται γε πᾶν ζῶον διαφερόντως παρόντων ὧν  
ἀν τέκῃ.*

467a10-b1

The dependence of the continued life of the state upon the continuation of generations of endless individual guardians necessitate precautions be taken for the young lest a disastrous loss in war should destroy the continued line of guardians, and the universal reason of the state be destroyed through the destruction of the nature cycle of generations. (It is significant that this concern to protect the children from danger does not arise out of an expectation of parental objection based upon natural affection. Natural affections have been transcended.)

*κίνδυνος δέ, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐ σμικρὸς σφαλεῖσιν, οἷα δὴ ἐν  
πολέμῳ φιλεῖ, πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς παῖδας ἀπολέσαντας ποιῆσαι καὶ  
τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν ἀδύατον ἀναλαβεῖν.*

467b2-4

Nevertheless, since the life of the state lies principally in the continuation of its rational life, to which the continuation of the natural life of individuals is a condition, this danger must be met.

*ἀλλὰ σὺν πρῶτον μὲν ἡγῇ παρασκευαστέον τὸ μή ποτε  
κινδυνεύσαι;*

467b5-6

(b) 468a-468c9 Honouring of heros.

The argument for the proposal that children should go to war has set forth, in a radical form, the demand that the natural life of the individual be sacrificed to the life of the state. The proposal is a dramatic introduction to the question of how the unity of the state overcomes the division which the natural individual faces in the extremes of life and death. If the state is regarded as simply analogous to a natural eidos, there remains the apparent division between the immortality of the state, and the mortality of the sensible individual, which the individual experiences as the conflict between honour and death.

Those who display cowardice in battle will be thrown out of the guardian class, and sent down to live with the artisans. (468a5-7) They have revealed their incapacity to participate fully in the universal life of justice in the state that is participated by the ruling class. Cowardice reveals that the ambitious desire for the universal recognition of the individual is not grounded in the true recognition of the universal by the individual. Their desertion of the universal for the sake of preserving their own sensible particularity reveals they do not have a true view of their relation to the universal, or of its content. The artisan class are those who are incapable of transcending their own particular interests as sensible individuals, and view the universal only as unifying particular interests. They are unable to comprehend how the universal transcends particularity in any form.

Those who are captured alive by the enemy are to be made a gift to the enemy. (468a9-10) They are looked upon as having deserted the state, and so are deserted by the state. Their desertion of the universal has been complete and they are left in their own particularity. Theirs is a greater act of cowardice, if it be that, than those who merely desert their posts. There is no distinction drawn between those who might be captured unwillingly, and those who might willingly surrender. They did not fight for the state to the death, but allowed themselves to become subject to the will of the enemy. The apparent underlying thought seems to be that no life other than the life of the just state should be considered preferable to death. What is also present is the notion of the independence of the universal from the particular. The good of the state is not to be made subject to the good of the individual; the good of the individual lies in the good of the state. Thus, there is no provision made to retrieve prisoners of war.

The honour awarded to those who display heroic virtue in battle is the universal recognition of the individual by the state. Heroic virtue displays a willingness to die for the sake of the common good. The hero shows that he is

ready to sacrifice his own life as a sensible individual for the universal life of the state. The heroic individual is recognized as transcending his own natural particularity and as embodying the universal life of the city. The visible form of his recognition is to be universally crowned by all his comrades, and then the children. (468b2-5) The nobility of this gesture is to be coupled with the more vulgar reward of universal affection, against which Socrates perhaps anticipates some objection.<sup>26</sup>

*Ἀλλὰ τόδ' οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτι σοι δοκεῖ. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ φιλεῖναι τε καὶ φιληθῆναι ὑπὸ ἐκάστου.*

468b9-11

Glaucon, however, seems eager to add that, while on campaign, the hero should be permitted an universal license to embrace whomever he or she pleases, whether the object of this affection be willing or unwilling.<sup>27</sup> (468b12-c4) His intention is to unite the ethical good of honour with the natural passion of eros. Socrates affirms the proposal by recalling the objective reason of the utilitarian law that limits private natural affections to the desired public end of eugenic gamoι. (468c5-8) The importance of this final remark is that it indicates the object of the hero's affection will be another hero, since the hieroi gamoi will be the union of the best (male) with the best (female).

The proposal is best treated principally as a philosophic image, that is, in terms of its philosophic content. What is being recognized in both forms of universal recognition, being crowned by all and embraced by all, is how heroic virtue partakes of the universal reason of the just state, that the life of the individual has this universal content. The unity of the crown and the embrace is an image of the true content of eros: the love of the universal. The heroic individual is then seen to be free to embrace all and to be embraced by all because his virtue embraces and is embraced by the universal reason by which all politiai

are embraced, and which all ought to embrace. In his heroic virtue, the life of the individual embodies the life of the state. He does not simply participate the immortality of the institution, but possesses it. As one who is embraced, he is one who is participated. He has obtained the life of the universal; he is both participant and participated.

The other side of this relation is what is disclosed about the nature of the universal life of the state: that it not only transcends the particular, but embodies the true content of the particular. The hero is loved by all because of his universal virtue. His freedom to love whomever he desires has in it the freedom of the state to send children to war, to demote the cowardly, and to desert the captured. This unqualified affirmation of the passions in the heroic individual has on the other side the unqualified negation of the passions in those who are the object of his passion. He is to be embraced because he ought to be embraced; the object of eros ought to be virtue. The beautiful is the good. The relation which the hero has to the others is that of the universal to the particular, of both transcending particularity and comprehending it. The crown and the embrace signify the two-sides of this relation. The life of the hero is the life of the city; the life of the city is the life of its heroes.

(c) 468c10-469b4 Divinization of heros.

The state is the city of the blessed; justice has the same content as piety. The life of the state is the life of universal reason, which transcends the life of the particular individual; the individual's participation in the state partakes of the immortality of the institution. The glory of heroes transcends even their death. They embody the life of the city, the life of reason which transcends the limitations of natural necessity, even the extremes of life and death. The state has an eidetic life, and the hero not only participates this eidetic life, but his own life becomes

eidetic. The life of the hero has an universality which the other politiai participate. The hero is both a particular participant in the universal reason of the state and an universal life which is itself participated by others. Those who most fully participate in the life of the city are those who are most capable of transcending the limits of their sensuous, contingent nature. Their life is beyond that of human mortality; they participate most fully the immortal life of the state. Like the heroes of Homer, the heros of the just state are to receive the religious honours of sacrifices and hymns that are offered as well to the gods; their virtue is to be honoured as divine.

*καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐν τε θυσίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἀγαθοὶ φαίνωνται, καὶ ὕμνοις καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τιμήσομεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔδραις τε καὶ κρέασιν ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάσεσιν, ἵνα ἅμα τῷ τιμᾶν ἀσκῶμεν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας.*

468d7-e2

The highest honour the hero is to receive is this recognition of the divine character of his virtue, that it transcends and rules over his sensuous nature. That through his virtue, the hero transcends the limits set upon mortals, for he participates in the life of the gods, the life of an universal reason which sets him beyond the sensible world of life and death. The hero is one who lives according to a good which transcends his own life and his own death. In his heroic identification with the state, the individual transcends and comprehends the limits of his own natural finitude.

The natural division of life and death is thus to be regarded as accidental to the true immortal nature of the hero. The heros of the just state will be taken to join the immortal heros of Hesiod's "golden race" (tou chrusou genou), the heros that protect the city-states of Greece. Their heroic virtue shall transfigure them into immortal guardians of the state. Hesiod on this point is to be believed: the heroic dead will become state-divinities.<sup>28</sup>



*οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἀγνοῖ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν, ἐσθλοί,  
ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων*

469a1-2

The funerary for the guardians shall be designed by the gods for it is to be such as to recognize that their death is the moment in which their humanity is transfigured into divinity.

*Διαπλυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ πῶς χρή τοὺς δαιμονίους τε καὶ  
θείους τιθέναι καὶ τίνι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτη θήσομεν ἣ ἂν  
ἐξηγήται;*

469a4-6

It is the universal life of the state which is displayed in the heroic virtue of the guardians to be a divine life. This will be recognized by the institution of continual worship of the dead. Public ancestral cults of the dead are to be established, not only those who die in battle, but all whose lives display heroic virtue shall be recognized as transcending the limits of mortality.

*Καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὥς δαιμόνων, οὕτω θεραπεύσομέν τε  
καὶ προσκυνήσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας; ταῦτ' αὖ δὲ ταῦτα  
νομιοῦμεν ὅταν τις γήρα ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τελευτήσῃ τῶν  
ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀγαθοὶ κριθῶσιν; Δίκαιον  
γούν, ἔφη.*

469a8-b4

What is revealed to the other politai through these ultimate honours of heroic virtue is that the life of the state is a life which takes one beyond the limits of the sensible world. The life which transcends the limits of the sensible and contingent is divine; it is the life of the gods. The life of the state is a life which participates in the life of the gods. The public cult of the heros, their worship as state-divinities, replaces the ancestral cult of the family.<sup>29</sup> The ancestral cult of the family is done away with in the class of guardians for there is no longer any need for it.

(ii) 469b5 -471c3 Koinonia poleon: the universal city.

The koinonia of the living and the dead carries the argument into the koinonia poleon. The city of reason is recognized as the universal city. The koinonia of the living and the dead overcomes the division of life and death; it also purges the individual of the final characteristics of a natural particularity. All men are identical as rational animals. The universal reason of humanity even overcomes the particularity of the political animal, of belonging to a particular polis.

What divides Greece is the natural divisions of racial tribes, which were institutionalized into political differences. All Greece is to be united in their identity as rational animals. They are to be united against the irrationality of the barbarians. The purgation of naturalism extends to the relation of the just state to other states. It would be contrary to the rational freedom of the just state to enslave those states who share the freedom of reason. No Greek state should reduce another to slavery; no Greek should be made a slave. The relation of slave and master is that between the irrational and rational man. The distinction between them is rational, for they are distinguished as possessing or not possessing a rational character. If reason is spoken as natural to humanity, then this distinction can be spoken of as natural, or not contrary to nature. But it is not a natural distinction in the sense that natural differences should be its basis. The difference between these two ways of speaking of what is natural is the difference between the accidental natural characteristics that differentiate sensible individuals, and the essential characteristic of reason or a lack of reason. All of humanity is united in its reason. Greeks are those who live according to their essential rational nature, who govern themselves by reason. Barbarians are those who live according to the natural accidents of human nature.

Neither Greek nor barbarian is to be refused burial. Nor shall any corpse be stripped or in any way defiled. The universal reason of justice which contains within it the division of life and death recognizes this division to be that between body and soul. It is the soul, not the body, which is the life of a man. In the koinonia of body and soul, the body is external to the inner identity of the soul. The rational soul is the life of the individual. The body dies because it is accidental to that life. The argument has come to the point where the soul is completely distinguished from the body. Death is the point where the soul divests itself from the body. Death reveals the distinction between the essential cause of human life, the rational life of the soul, and the accidental condition of life, the body. The body is nothing more than the mortal instrument of the immortal soul. The one who does not know this essential distinction in human nature does not possess a free rational nature. He does not know the free nature of the soul in its rational life. He is unfree (aneleutheros), the barbarian who lives within the unfreedom of the sensible and contingent (philochrematos). He is comparable to an irrational animal, like a dog; or to a woman who regards death (e.g. of a loved one in battle) only as the loss of the sensible individual (failing to apprehend how it confers an immortal glory).<sup>30</sup>

*Ἄνελεύθερον δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ φιλοχρήματον νεκρὸν συλᾶν, καὶ γυναικείας τε καὶ σμικρᾶς διανοίας τὸ πολέμιον βομίζειν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ τεθνεώτος ἀποπταμένου τοῦ ἔχρου, λελοιπότης δὲ ᾧ ἐπολέμει; ἢ οἶει τι διάφορον δρᾶν τοῖς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας τῶν κυνῶν, αἱ τοῖς λίθοις οἷς ἂν βληθῶσι χαλεπαίνουσι, τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἀπτόμεναι;*

469d6-e2

The principle which unifies the state unifies all men in their common humanity as possessing the freedom and divinity of a rational nature. The principle which unifies the state is the unity of an universal reason which is the

essential nature of humanity. The Greeks are those who worship the gods of reason and order, the gods of the polis. All those who participate in the universal life of reason, of justice, are united in a single universal koinonia of friendship. They share the divine the life of reason.

*Ἄλλ' οὐ φιλέλληνες; οὐδὲ οἰκείαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἡγήσονται,  
οὐδὲ κοινωνήσουσιν ὥνπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἱερῶν;*

471a1-2

All the evils which attend upon the naturalism of racial and national particularity that are the chief causes of war are to be abolished from the community of Greeks, on the ground of their friendship in the reason of justice (471a - 471c).

The life of reason transcends all forms of natural division: the difference of sex, family, race, age, and even life and death. The unity of the reason in the state and in the soul transcends the sensible divisions of the natural and particular. The good for man is so far known as that freedom and unity which transcends and unites differences. The true citizen is the citizen of the universal state of reason. In the koinonia of reason, all are united in their identical rational nature. The determinations of nature of male and female, parent and child, young and old, weak and strong, living and dead, Athenian and Spartan are all transcended.

Justice transcends all that is given and determinate in humanity. There is no otherness that falls outside justice to limit its universal nature. Its self-identity appears in its complete universality. The logos of justice is universal. It is not the particular principle of the state as against the family or individual; it is not the principle of a particular race or state as against another. It is not the principle of thought as against life. It is not the unifying principle of the soul as against the body. What falls outside justice is what is incapable of participating the principle of unity. The body, the barbarian, the non-ideal cities, the artisans,

the coward, the young, do not fall complete outside justice, but are unable to fully participate in it. They are comprehended by that which they do not comprehend.

What the two waves have overcome is the assumption that there belongs to the natural order a principle of difference and unity which stands opposed to the rational distinctions and unity of justice. Justice has been shown to be the universal principle of unity, the single principle of all forms of unity. It is the universal reason of justice which is recognized in the koinonia poleon as comprehending the whole of humanity in its capacity to participate in the universal life of reason.

#### V. 471c4-480 The Third Wave.

The argument of the third wave extends from this point in Book V, through the whole of Books VI and VII. The argument begins in Book V with a preliminary discussion in which Socrates gains assent to the intention of the argument (471c4-473b4); then, the hypothesis is set forth that the just state is only possible if its ruled by a philosopher-king (473b5-474c6). The argument reaches a certain conclusion by the end of Book V with the definition of what is meant by a philosophos, and how he is to be distinguished from a philodoxos (474c7-480). The argument which defines the philosopher brings to light the epistemological distinction between knowledge and opinion in relation to the ontological distinction between being and becoming. The sensible is distinguished from the intelligible, the particular from the universal, nature from reason. Book VI takes up the argument from this point by stating that it is already obvious that philosophic knowledge should be the ground of political life. The question of the utility of philosophy is really a question of the utility of the philosopher (484). The dialectical force of the third wave thus compels one to ride out its entire course, a statement which can be said as well of the whole dialogue.

The koinonia of the living and the dead, in which the life of the state and of the individual were completed through each other, rested upon poetic images of the death of heroes: the mythology of Homer and Hesiod; the content of the dramas of the Dionysia. The universal life of the city is an image of the life of the universal which is the true object desired by the soul. Its life is eidetic, but it is not the life of the eidos. The immortality of the state and its heroes is an image of the immortal life of the soul, of reason. The principle of the state, justice, has come into view as a rational eidos, but only as this appears as an unifying principle of the divided and sensible. Justice is the unity of state and individual, it is the unity of life and death. But it is an unity known only in terms of diversity.

Justice is known and not known; the eidos is seen and not seen. The nature of that reason by which the state is ordered and is completed in the life of the guardians has not yet come into view, it is known only in the life of the state. The eros of the philosopher transcends the life of the state, it seeks an unity which transcends diversity altogether. Its object is the self-identity of the universal in itself. The life of the state is the life of participation in the universal, where there remains the division of participant and participated. The universal life of the state participates in the universal of justice, but it contains a diversity which does not belong to justice. The argument of the two waves brings one to the point where the universal as a separate eidos can be brought into view; where the eros of the philosopher can be brought into view; where the state as paradeigma can be brought into view. What would keep the reality imaged in the state hidden from view has been purged. What is desirable is no longer taken to be that which is sensible and particular. The desirability of the philosophic eros, of being over becoming, eidos over image, paradeigma over polis can be assented to because the desirability of the universal life of reason has already been established.

A. 471c4-474c6 The Proposal for a Philosopher-King.

(i) 471c4-473b4 The possibility of the ideal state.

(a) 471c4-472b2 The question of possibility.

The third wave is introduced by Glaucon's ready agreement that the utility and necessity of the koinonia of women and children in the just state has been sufficiently demonstrated. He is impatient that they should turn finally to the outstanding question: whether the just state is possible, and how it should come into being.

*ἄλλ' ὥς ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι εἴη ἂν καὶ  
ἀλλὰ γε μυρία, εἰ γένοιτο ἡ πολιτεία οὕτη, μηκέτι πλείω περὶ*

αὐτῆς λέγε, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἤδη περιώμεθα ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν,  
ὥς δυνατόν καὶ ἡ δυνατόν, τὰ δ' ἀλλὰ χαίρην ἐώμεν.  
471e

As at the beginning of Book V, the readiness of Socrates' interlocutors to enter into a further stage of the argument is matched by his own reluctance. The possibility of realizing the just state in praxis involves the third and greatest wave of paradox (paradoxon-- 472a). Like the koinonia of men and women, and the koinonia of women and children, it requires a logos that must overthrow a traditional assumption or custom, i.e. doxa. Glaucon is undaunted by Socrates' warning, and reminds him that he shall remain their captive (cf. 450a) until he has demonstrated how the just state is to be realized. Glaucon's zeal suggests a certain confidence that Socrates will indeed show them how the just state can be realized. He has already met their own objections to the koinonia of women and children, on which the possibility of the state seemed to depend. The theory of the just state appears to be complete; what remains is to see how one might put theory into action. He agrees they possess the just state in lexis; how can it be realized in praxis?

Ὅσῳ ἂν, ἔφη, τοιαῦτα πλείω λέγῃς, ἦττον ἀφεθήσῃ ὑφ' ἡμῶν  
πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἰπεῖν πῇ δυνατὴ γίνεσθαι αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία.  
ἀλλὰ λέγε καὶ μὴ διάτριβε.

472a8-b2

The force of the demand that the just state be shown possible lies in the assumption that justice is embodied in the life of the city. Justice has been identified with the life of the state. The reality of justice is embodied in just laws and just men, the virtue of the state and individual. The vision of justice at this point in the argument is the vision of an universal justice embodied in the life of the universal city. The difficulty is that justice is thus known only as the universal which orders and unifies the sensible and particular; it is not known in its own



separate identity as chorismos. Justice is not known apart from that in which it appears.

(b) 472b3-473b4 The just politeia as a paradeigma.

Glaucon has demanded that the argument, which has shown that justice is the good in lexis, be completed by showing that justice can be realized in praxis. It has come to the point where Socrates must declare whether and how the just state is possible. Socrates' answer is that first they must agree on what they mean by possible.<sup>31</sup>

Socrates' immediate answer to this demand that the state be proven possible is to recall them to the original intention of their argument, which was to discover whether there was a true justice which was the good of state and individual alike. Whether justice was the good depended upon discovering the nature of justice in itself.

*Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε χρή ἀναμνησθῆναι, ὅτι ἡμεῖς ζητοῦντες δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι καὶ ἀδικίαν δεῦρο ἡκομέν.*

472b3-5

The most important part of Socrates' argument is the statement that follows--

*ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὔρωμεν οἷον ἐστι δικαιοσύνη.*

--"but should they discover what sort of thing justice is". The rest of his argument depends altogether on this statement: that although they have constituted a just state and a just man in lexis, they have not yet discovered what justice is in itself.

Should they discover what justice is, they must not expect true justice to be perfectly embodied in the life of the individual. There is this difference between the ideal of justice, the reality of justice, and the possibility of its realization in the world. The just man will be he who most nearly approximates the ideal of justice,

the one who most fully partakes or participates (metechein) the ideal. Possibility must be distinguished from reality.

*ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὖρωμεν οἷον ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν δίκαιον ἀξιῶσομεν μηδὲν δεῖν αὐτῆς ἐκείνης διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν; ἢ ἀγαπήσομεν ἐὰν ὅτι ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ἢ καὶ πλείστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνης μετέχῃ;*

472b7-c2

The purpose of their inquiry into the nature of justice was to discover a paradeigma, a model or measure of justice.

*Παραδείγματος ἄρα ἕνεκα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷον ἐστὶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον εἰ γένοιτο, καὶ οἷος ἂν εἴη γενόμενος, καὶ ἀδικίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον,*

472c4-5

What they were looking for, then, in constituting the just man was a paradeigma of justice by which they could determine whether justice was the good of the individual. The paradeigma is the measure by which they are to judge justice and injustice as it appears in praxis. The good and evil of justice and injustice which they are seeking to discover in the paradigm of the most perfectly just and unjust men is the measure of living individuals.

*ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνους ἀποβλέποντες, οἷοι ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνωνται εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ὁμολογεῖν, ὅς ἂν ἐκείνοις ὅτι ὁμοιότατος ἦ, τὴν ἐκείνης μοῖραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἔξειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, ἵνα ἀποδείξωμεν ὥς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γινεσθαι.*

472c7-d2

The measure of the paradeigma is not the reality of praxis. The paradeigma of justice is comparable to the idealized portrait of beauty which the zographos paints in the form of the most beautiful man. The measure of the truth of its beauty is not whether it conforms to the beauty of sensible individuals.

*Οἷοι ἂν οὖν ᾔττον τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι ὅς ἂν γράψας παράδειγμα οἷον ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα εἰς*

τὸ γράμμα ἱκανῶς ἀποδοῦναι μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδείξαι ὥς καὶ δυνατόν  
γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα;

472d4-7

This example of the painter must be set alongside the same example at the beginning of Book VI. Here, one has the painter creating the paradeigma of beauty in the form of a most beautiful man. The paradeigma is not itself modelled on an invisible ideal of beauty, nor on a visible beauty. In Book VI, the painter seems to paint a portrait looking at a visible paradeigma.<sup>32</sup> This is the usual way the painter is employed as a metaphorical type of the creator, as copying a visible reality, where the painting is less real than the model. But as used here, the painter creates the paradeigma, he does not copy it. He is the inspired artist of the Phaedrus. The basic Platonic criticism of mousike or poetry in its most general sense, is that it mistakes the image for the reality of which it is the image. This criticism is suppressed here in favour of establishing the superiority of the paradeigmatic to the sensible particular individual. Yet it is still present in the underlying criticism of lexis. The way in which the superiority in truth and reality of lexis to praxis is established is by reference to the inferiority of lexis to aletheia.

The paradeigma which they have created in speech then is no less an accurate portrait of the just man, than is the artist's picture an account of the beautiful man. The proof that their argument is true, that it is a true account of justice and injustice, does not depend on showing that their paradeigma, which they have created in words, of the just man and just state conforms to the reality of praxis. It is not any less true or real if it is or is not possible in praxis.

οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς, φαμέν, παράδειγμα ἐποιοῦμεν λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως; Πάνυ γε. Ἡττόν τι οὖν οἶει ἡμᾶς εὖ λέγειν τούτου ἕνεκα, εἰ μὴ ἔχωμεν ἀποδείξαι ὥς δυνατόν οὕτω πόλιν οἰκῆσαι ὥς ἐλέγετο;

472d9-e4

Their attempt to show whether and how the paradeigma of the just state and just man might be possible, that is, might be realized in praxis, must not be understood as an attempt to prove that the paradeigma is or is not a true account of the just man and just state. (472e6-9) The question of possibility is not a question of reality. To show whether the just state is possible to realize in praxis is not a matter of proving that the paradeigma in lexis is real. Lexis is nearer to the truth than praxis; the reality of praxis depends upon the reality of lexis. Lexis is the measure of praxis. Truth is the measure of lexis. Truth and reality transcend lexis, and give the paradeigma its reality; the truth of the paradeigma, of the definition of the universal in thought depends on its approximation to the true reality of the universal itself.

*Ἄρ' οἷόν τε τι πραχθῆναι ὥς λέγεται, ἢ φύσιν ἔχει πράξιν  
λέξεως ἥττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι, κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ;*

473a1-3

The truth and reality of the paradeigma does not rest on possibility; rather, the reality of what is possible is to be measured by the reality of the paradeigma in its relation to truth. They will be satisfied then if they can show how the nearest approximation to the paradeigma can be realized in praxis.

*Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ μὴ ἀνάγκάζε με, οἷα τῷ λόγῳ διήλθομεν,  
τοιαῦτα παντάπασι καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δεῖν γιγνόμενα ἂν  
ἀποφαίνειν· ἀλλ' ἐὰν οἷοί τε γενώμεθα εὔρεῖν ὥς ἂν  
ἐγγύτατα ὥς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἂ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις.*

473a5-b1

Socrates' argument defines the just politeia as a paradeigma of politeia. It is the universal form of politeia, of which all other existing polities are participants. It makes no difference whether the just politeia exists in the form of an "actual" constitution, since that is nothing other than the participation of the human community in the "actuality" of the paradigmatic or universal politeia. Other forms of polity would only be the degenerate forms of the ideal.

(ii) 473eb5-474c6 The philosopher-king.

The question of the possibility of the paradeigma has been purged of any assumption that this is a question of its reality or truth. The question of possibility depends rather on the conversion of existing politeiai, those which are kakai kai hemartemenai, to the true polity.<sup>33</sup> The question is what prevents these poleis from participating in the reality of the true politeia, and what would convert them. In this respect it is a question of praxis, not lexis.

*Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὥς ἔοικε, πειρώμεθα ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι τί ποτε νῦν κακῶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται δι' ὃ οὐχ οὕτως οἰκοῦνται,*

473b4-6

Practicality guides us to look for the least, single change or fewest number of changes that would convert these bad forms of polity to the true form.

*καὶ τίνος ἂν σμικροτάτου μεταβαλόντος ἔλθοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις, μάλιστα μὲν ἑνός, εἰ δὲ μή, δυοῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι ὀλιγίστων τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ σμικροτάτων τὴν δύναμιν.*

473b6-9

What we are seeking to discover is the principal cause in existent polities that deprives of them of their participation in the true and universal just politeia. The practical has an inherent theoretical interest. To convert these unjust polities to just polities, we must discover whether there is a single underlying cause of privation of justice in them, which can be purged. We are looking for the universal cause of injustice in all unjust forms of government. There is a single change that would effect a conversion from injustice to justice in existent polities. It is not a small change, nor an easy one to bring about, but it is possible.

*Ἐνός μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβαλόντος δοκοῦμέν μοι ἔχειν δεῖξαι ὅτι μεταπέσοι ἄν, οὐ μέντοι σμικροῦ γε οὐδὲ ῥαδίου, δυνατοῦ δέ.*

473c2-4

It is the greatest of the three waves, the greatest paradox of all. One which is surely to be ridiculed even more than the proposals that women be

guardians, or that families be common. It will go against the force of accepted doxa, and will be branded adoxia, for it goes beyond the limit of what custom holds to be noble and reputable. What is required transcends doxa, and cannot be known by doxa.<sup>34</sup>

*Ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰμὶ δ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσηκάζομεν κύματι.  
εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλῳτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κύμα  
ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσειν.*

473c6-8

The universal cause of injustice is that philosophers are not kings. The cause of justice is the philosopher-king. Existent polities are unjust because in them the political power of their rulers is not grounded in the wisdom of philosophy. The conversion of the unjust polities to just polities requires, on the one hand, that in them political rule be united with philosophic wisdom, and, on the other hand, that the "many natures" who pursue either of these activities apart from the other, are of necessity excluded from them. It is the creation of a philosopher-king which is the necessary cause, along with the purgation of pursuing philosophy or politics apart from each other as its necessary condition, which is the means of translating the just politeia from lexis into praxis.

*Ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτόν συμπέσῃ, δύναμις τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ὃ φίλε Γλαύκων, ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία μή ποτε πρότερον φυῇ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατόν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἦν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν.*

473c11-e2

The philosophos-basileus is para doxan because it is difficult to see how the good of the individual and of the state depends upon the unity of philosophical reason and political ability.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμοὶ πάλαι δοκίον ἐντίθησι λέγειν, ὁρῶντι  
ὥς πολὺν παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν  
ἄλλη τις εὐδαιμονήσειεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ.  
473e3-5

Socrates' argument has three principal premises: (1) the universal cause of injustice in existent polities is the separation of philosophy and politics; (2) the universal cause of justice in existent polities would be the union of philosophy and politics; (3) the principal difficulty which opposes the conversion of unjust forms of polity to the just form of polity is ignorance of the dependence of the good of practical life, both public and private, upon philosophy. As the course of the argument in Book V will show, what is not known is how justice depends upon the good.

Significantly, not only will Socrates' proposal be received by the present state of opinion with ridicule, but it will be rejected with violent hostility. (473e6-474a4) It seems that Socrates could become a martyr of justice, if he is unable to give an apology (amunein toi logoi) for the philosopher-king. In the existent state of things, "the many natures" (hai pollai phuseis) who practise politics and philosophy consider their professions as, not only mutually exclusive, but mutually opposed to being brought together. The necessary defence of the philosopher-king lies in distinguishing between these "many natures" and the nature of the philosopher. The true philosophic nature is one which knows the unity of political life and philosophy. The philosopher-king alone is the true philosopher and the true politician; the "many natures" are false philosophers and false politicians, pretenders to the throne.

ἀναγκαῖον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μέλλομέν πη ἐκφεύξεσθαι οὐς  
λέγεις, διορίσασθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς φιλοσόφους τίνας  
λέγοντες τολμῶμεν φάναι δεῖν ἄρχειν, ἵνα διαδήλων γενομένων  
δύνηται τις ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι τοῖς μὲν προσήκει  
φύσει ἅπτεσθαι τε φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονεύειν τ' ἐν πόλει, τοῖς  
δ' ἄλλοις μῆτε ἅπτεσθαι ἀκολουθεῖν τε τῷ ἡγουμένῳ.  
474b4-c3

B. 474c7-480 The Definition of the Philosophos.

The remainder of the argument of Book V is now concerned with defining the philosopher. First, the philosophic nature must be distinguished from those of the many other natures, particularly those which unknowingly pretend to be philosophic. This distinction is brought out in terms of recognizing what distinguishes philosophic eros from other forms of eros. It is essential to the significance of the argument of the three waves to consider the logos concerning eros to the previous consideration of eros in the second wave. The movement of the argument which defines the philosopher is the familiar Platonic dialectical ascent "ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora". The argument moves from the consideration of the outward and visible activity of a philosophic nature to the inward activity of the soul, from the epistemological activity of knowing, to the psychological faculty of mind which knows, and finally to the ontological reality of its object.

(i) 474c7-475e2 Philosophic eros.

The nature of the philosopher is distinguished from the natures of the "many" in respect of his eros, the fundamental desire by which he is moved in relation to the nature of its object by which it is defined. It is necessary first to determine the nature of eros, which is to be done by citing instances of eros in the different kinds of erotikoi. Socrates' intention is to disclose that eros is fundamentally the universal desire for the universal. The various kinds and degrees of eros are united in their origin: the primary desire of the soul for self-identity, i.e. unity with itself, which it seeks through unity with the pure universal form of unity.



(a) 474c7-475b11 The nature of eros.

The universal and definitive characteristic of eros is that it is an universal form of desire. One should properly call one a lover of something only if one loves something as a whole, as opposed to loving one part of it but not another. One is a lover if one's love is universal, and not particular.

*Ἄναμιμνήσκειν οὖν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ μέμνησαι ὅτι δν ἂν  
φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτόν, ἐάν ὁρθῶς λέγεται, οὐ τὸ  
μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα;*  
474c8-11

Citing a host of examples, Socrates considers two sets of erotikoi: the first set consists of the philopais or aner erotikos (of whom Glaucon is used as an unwilling example), and the philotimos; the second set consists of the philotheamonon and the philosophos. There is also mention of other erotikoi: the philooinos and philositos should be associated with the first set. The philotheamonon is inclusive of philekooi other than the festival goers: the mathetes who lacks a philosophic spirit either because of his youth or nature, the philotechnos and the praktikos. The division between the two sets is obvious: the first deals with forms of eros that are appetitive and spirited; the second with rational or intellectual forms of eros. Generally, however, the philopais and philotimos are included within the philotheamonon, and so the main division is that between the philotheamonon and the philosophos.<sup>35</sup>

The consideration of the nature of eros here brings before us the connection between the first two waves and the third. In the treatment of the family and of honour in the second wave, the eros of sexual desire and the love of honour were purged of the naturalism which corrupts the philopais, philotimos, and the philotheamonon.

The philopais has a corrupt love of a false image of the desirable, the philotimos has a corrupt love of a false image of honour, the philotheamonon has

a corrupt love of a false image of wisdom. They enjoy a false pleasure, honour, and wisdom, by which their souls are corrupted. Having fallen away from the true forms of good, they have sunken into corrupted forms. The cause of their corruption is their respective intoxications with the images of sensual beauty, honour, and wisdom, which they mistake for the reality of beauty, honour, and wisdom. They are ruled by forms of *eros* which are divorced from *logos*, by a reason which can measure the sensible by the reality of the ideal. Because they cannot distinguish *eidos* and image, they cannot distinguish between true and false instantiations of the *eide* of the beautiful, just, and good in the realm of the desirable, honourable, and wise. Their confusion of image and reality makes them comparable to drunkards. They are instances of corruption comparable to the *philoinoi*.

τοὺς φιλοῖνους οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιούντας ὁρᾷς; πάντα  
οἶνον ἐπὶ πάσης προφάσεως ἀσπαζομένους;  
475a5-7

The intoxication of the *philopais* with youth leads him to see sensual beauty where sensual beauty is not present. Every youth is beautiful, no matter how ugly they actually are. The truly undesirable appear desirable.

καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζεσθὲ τε καὶ πάσας  
φωνὰς ἀφίετε, ὥστε μηδένα ἀποβάλλειν τῶν ἀνθούντων ἐν ᾧρᾳ.  
474e5-475a2

The intoxication of the *philotimos* with honour leads him to seek the highest he can obtain, no matter how low degree of honour that might be. If he cannot become a general, he will become a captain; if he cannot obtain a position in society where he will be honoured by the most honourable, he will seek honour from the least honourable.

Καὶ μὴν φιλοτίμους γε, ὥς ἐγώμαι, καθορᾷς ὅτι, ἀν μὴ  
στρατηγῆσαι δύνωνται, τριττιναρχοῦσιν, κἂν μὴ ὑπὸ μειζόνων

*καὶ σεμνοτέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ σμικροτέρων καὶ φαυλοτέρων  
τιμώμενοι ἀγαπῶσιν, ὥς ὅλως τιμῆς ἐπιθυμηταὶ ὄντες.*  
475a9-b2

The lovers of honour and those of youth are comparable to the lover of wine in that they mistake a finite good for the whole or universal good. They treat a particular good as though it were universal, because they do not know the distinction between the universal and the particular.

The true object of eros is the universal good. The eros of the philopais and the philotimos are corrupt forms of eros in which the universal is sought in the form of the particular. The finite goods of pleasure and honour are not known in their dependence upon the infinite good, but are sought independently of their relation to the good. What is finite is pursued as though infinite. There is no limit to the eros of the philopais and philotimos. There is a lack of reason which would separate the universal of beauty and virtue from the particular forms of its instantiations. The corrupt forms of eros are states of intoxication, drunken desires which do not clearly discern their true object. There is a lack of sober judgement which would distinguish between the beautiful and ugly among youths, the noble and ignoble among society. The ideal universal is known and sought as it appears in the sensible and particular as an abstract universal. Essentially the corruption of eros stems from an ignorance which abstracts finite goods from the good itself and pursues them as the good because the dependence of the sensible and finite upon the ideal and infinite is not known.

(b) 475b5- 476e3 The nature of philosophic eros.

(a) 475b4- e2 The eros of the philothaemonon.

The universal is known and desired as apprehended abstractly in the multiplicity and diversity of its particular instances. However, even in the finite

and particular, eros appears as the desire for the universal, as the desire of the whole.<sup>36</sup>

*ἄρα δὲ ἂν τινος ἐπιθυμητικὸν λέγωμεν, παντὸς τοῦ ἔδους  
τούτου φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μέν, τοῦ δὲ οὐ; Παντός,  
ἔφη.*

475b4-7

The kinds of erotikoi are thus distinguished in accordance with the universal they pursue. The philosopher is characterized by the universal nature of his eros for wisdom. He pursues wisdom in all its particular forms, he desires wisdom universally, not one part but not another.

*Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι,  
οὐ τῆς μέν, τῆς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάσης;*

475b8-9

The eros of the philosopher is no different from that of the philotimos and the philopais in so far as his desire for knowledge is universal. The true philosophic spirit pursues learning with the same limitless appetite.

*Τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύεσθαι καὶ  
ἀσμένως ἐπὶ τὸ μαθεῖναι ὄντα καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τοῦτον  
δ' ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν φιλόσοφον.*

475c6-8

However, as Glaucon notes, in respect of the mere love of learning, the philosopher cannot be distinguished from the philotheamones. In that respect, they are equally philekooi.

*Πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄτοποι ἔσονται σοὶ τοιοῦτοι. οἳ τε γὰρ  
φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν  
χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, οἳ τε φιλήκοοι ἀτοπώτατοί τινές  
εἰσιν ὥς γ' ἐν φιλοσόφοις τιθέναι*

475d1-4

Like the philosopher, the philotheamones are interested in listening to arguments. But while they love to be so entertained, they would not be entertained by serious discourse. For them, learning is a form of entertainment, like the Dionysia, not a pursuit of wisdom.

οἱ πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβὴν ἔκοντες οὐκ ἂν  
ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ὥτα ἐπακοῦ  
σαι πάντων χορῶν περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ  
πόλεις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι.

475d4-8

The philothaemones are not true philosophoi. They bear a likeness to philosophers, just as images bear a likeness to that of which they are the image. They are really pretenders to philosophy, just as an image pretends to reality. This is the truth of the philothaemones: in their love of learning to resemble the reality they do not possess for themselves. They love the image they believe is real, not the reality that is truly knowable.

Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις.

475e2

(β) 475e3-476e3 The eros of the philosophos.

The difference between the philothaemones and the philosopher is that the philosopher is a lover of the spectacle of truth.

Τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἔφη, φιλοθεάμονας.

475e4

The philosophos is distinguished from the philothaemonon by the nature of the object of his eros, the truth as opposed to the image of truth, not simply by the character of his eros, the universal desire to learn. This distinction discriminates between the one true or pure form of eros and the many corrupt forms of eros, including those of the philopais and the philotimos. Although their eros has really for its object the beautiful and the noble, these are not pursued in their eidetic truth where the beautiful and noble are known as apprehensions of the good in the finite and sensible. This is what characterizes the false lovers of wisdom as well. The philothaemones are not true lovers of wisdom because they do not recognize the distinction between (true) knowledge and the appearance of knowledge. They are lovers of images.

How the philothaemones include as well the philopais and the philotimos comes to light when one reflects on the epistemological character of their erotic objects. The lover of beauty or pleasure seeks the good or universal at the level of aisthesis; the lover of honour seeks the good or universal at the level of doxa. The realm in which their object exists is the sensible and particular realm of becoming. The lover of wisdom seeks the good at the level of episteme; the realm of being or unchanging reality. His object is the pure universal, not its divided appearance in a particular instance or image.

The argument which defines the object of philosophic eros begins with the admission to the presence of distinct, contrary qualities among sensible particulars: the beautiful and ugly, the just and unjust, the good and bad. Because they are contraries, they must each be one thing itself: these contrary qualities are to be regarded as eide.

*Ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχροῦ, δύο αὐτῷ εἶναι. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δύο, καὶ ἐν ἐκάτερον; Καὶ τοῦτο. Καὶ περὶ δὴ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἑκάστον εἶναι,*  
475e9-476a6

The single self-identity of an eidos, by virtue of its association with other eide, as well as with actions and sensible bodies, appears in the realm of the sensible and contingent in the form of a multiplicity and diversity of appearances

*τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκάστον.*  
476a6-7

This division between the self-identical eidos and the multiplicity and diversity of its appearances in the sensible and contingent realm of particular instances, is the basis of the division between the philothaemones and the philosophos.

*Ταύτη τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, διαιρῶ, χωρὶς μὲν οὐς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες φιλοθεάμονας τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτικούς, καὶ χωρὶς αὐ*

περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οἷς μόνους ἂν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι  
φιλοσόφους.

476a9-b2

The inclusion of the philotechnoi and; praktikoi with the philothaemones makes clear how the whole pursuit the good in the active life of the polis is subject to the criticism of the philothaemones. The whole life of the state in its economic, military, and political orders are to be found within the class of philothaemones. The life of the state is the life of the philothaemones, the life which participates the paradeigmatic justice of politeia.

The philothaemones are distinguished by the rational-aesthetic object of their eros. They love the multiple and diverse instances of beauty that are the appearance of the eidos of beauty in the sensible and particular, but their nature is incapable of going beyond these appearances to the apprehension of the eidos of beauty itself. They love the images of the eidos because they are incapable of the reality of the eidos.

Οἱ μὲν που, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τὰς τε  
καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χροὰς καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ  
ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ  
ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἢ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπασσθαι.  
476b4-8

It belongs to the nature of the philosopher, who are few as opposed to the many philothaemones (the "many natures" who pursue philosophy or politics separately, which were spoken of earlier?), to behold the eidetic reality of beauty, to apprehend the reality of the eide. It is the nature of his eros to seek the universal in its pure self-identity as eidos.

Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε καὶ ὁρᾶν καθ'  
αὐτὸ ἄρα οὐ σπάνιοι ἂν εἴεν;

476b10-11

The nature of the philothaemones is that of the prisoners in the cave, described in Book VII. He not only takes the sensible and particular as the real, but denies the reality of the universal. Because he is convinced of the reality of

the sensible, and of the unreality of the eidos, he is incapable of conversion to a philosophic standpoint. Such a state is like that of a dream, where one is caught in an illusory reality one takes to be real.

Ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε  
νομίζων μήτε, ἂν τις ἡγήται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος  
ἔπεσθαι, δυναρ ἢ ὑπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; σκόπει δέ.  
476c2-4

The soul of the philotheamonoi is imprisoned by his own conviction that the images of reality are themselves the reality of which they are the image. He is his own prisoner; his life has the illusory reality of a dream out of which he refuses to be awakened.

τὸ δειρώττειν ἄρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάντε ἐν ὑπνῳ τις ἐάντ'  
ἐγρηγορώς τὸ δμοιόν ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγήται εἶναι ὃ ἔοικεν;  
476c5-7

The life of the philosopher has the reality of the eide. His life is grounded in his knowledge of the distinction between the self-identity of the universal and the sensible particular as having its reality as a participant in the eidōs. The philotheamones mistakes participants for the participated because he does not know the reality of the eidōs as separate from its instantiations. The philosopher does not live in this confusion, the confusion of reality and image, the confusion of a dream. His life partakes of the clarity and reality of the eide.

ὁ πάναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος  
καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ  
μετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος, ὑπαρ ἢ  
δυναρ αὐ καὶ οὔτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ὑπαρ.  
476c9-d4

The metaphorical distinction between the state of dreaming and that of being awake is in fact the difference between knowing and opining, knowledge and opinion.

Οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γινώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν  
ὀρθῶς φαίμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος;  
476d5-6



The translation of dreaming and waking into knowing and opining makes the transition from the argument of defining the nature (phusis) of the philosopher in terms of philosophic eros to his definition in terms of philosophic nous. The eros of the philosopher, the true form of eros, which is what is primarily moving in the lesser forms of eros in the philopais, philotimos, and the philothaemones, is the pure rational desire of the soul for possession of the pure universal. The eros of the soul is principally and purely the desire of its fundamentally rational nature to know. The appetitive, spirited, and rational-aesthetic forms of eros are the divisions of eros that correspond to the divisions of the soul as embodied.

What is represented by the metaphor of the philosopher as alone existing in a conscious state is the philosophic state of the soul as self-consciousness of its own inner identity as rational. Eros is primarily the eros of the rational nature of the soul. It is the rational desire of the soul for the rational universal or eidos which is universally present in the appetitive, spirited, and rational-aesthetic desires for universal pleasure, honour, and beauty, which are the divided forms of the good as it appears, and is apprehended and desired by the divided soul, in the realm of becoming. The being or reality of pleasure, honour, and beauty is derived from the good.

(ii) 476d8 - 480 Philosophic nous.

The argument which defines philosophic nous is set out in the form of a dialectical argument between the philosophic standpoint and that of the philothaemones.<sup>37</sup> The argument arises out of the need to convince the philothaemones that what he takes to be knowledge is only opinion. It is in fact an argument which most clearly shows the connection of the second and third waves, how the the third wave has arisen, not directly out of the argument as one has it by the end of Book IV, but as it has been developed by the first two waves

to the point where the third wave is able to take up the argument by defining the politeia of the just state as a paradeigma.

The argument should be understood as establishing the reason why a philosopher must be king. The guardians of the just state are philothaemones, just as the politeia is a paradeigma, the truth as represented in lexis. The need to convince the philothaemones of the truth of their position embodies the need to show the necessity of a philosopher-king. What is incomplete about the complete polity is its need to be grounded in a higher knowledge than belongs to the active life of the state. The difficulty of convincing the philothaemones of his need of philosophic knowledge is the difficulty of showing the dependence of the active life of the polis upon the contemplative life of the philosopher.

*Τί οὖν ἐὰν ἡμῖν χαλεπαίνει οὗτος, ὃν φάμεν δοξάζειν ἀλλ' οὐ  
γιγνώσκειν, καὶ ἀμφισβητῇ ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν;*  
476d8-9

There is something inherently wrong with the position of the philothaemones. They must be made aware that in their present state of ignorance, their life is an unhealthy one.

*ἔξομέν τι παραμυθεῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ πείθειν ἡρέμα,  
ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιανίνει;*  
476e1-2

The metaphor hugianinei suggests that the philothaemones are in a state of delirium. Such a delirium is also possible in the just state. What is in danger is the life of the soul, that it would mistake images of the good for the good. The life of the just state is not itself sufficient to prevent this error. Although there is a true opinion of justice in it, this is not sufficient. The guardians are liable to the confusion of the philothaemones; they are apt to mistake what is not just for what is just, since the justice embodied in the laws of the politeia are not known to have their ground in the eidos of justice. The guardians hold to the justice of

their laws by conviction; the laws are themselves belong to the realm of ta ton pollon polla nomima kalou (479d3-4) that are the object of the eros of the philothaemones.

The argument by which philosophic nous is defined has a clear logical structure: (a) epistemological definition (476e4-477b) -- the distinction between knowledge and opinion as forms of thought; (b) psychological definition (477c-478d) -- the distinction between knowing and opining as faculties of soul; (b) ontological definition (478e-479d2) -- the distinction between the being of the eide and the becoming of the participants as objects of thought.

The argument has the form of a kind of dialectical ascent from the activity of knowing, inward to the soul as what knows, and upward to the being of the eide which are the objects of thought. The logical structure evolves from the dependence of thinking upon the soul as what thinks, to the dependence of the soul as what thinks upon the being of the eide. The conclusion proves his thesis that it is the distinction between the eidos and its participant that underlies the distinction between the philosopher and the philothaemones.

(a) 476e4-477b Epistemological definition of philosophic nous.

The intention of the argument is to show that what the philothaemon assumes to be knowledge is really just opinion. Allowing the philothaemonon that he may know something, it is a question of what it is that he knows. If he knows something, he must know something that is.

*ὁ γινώσκων γινώσκει τι ἢ οὐδέν; . . . Ἀποκρινούμαι, ἔφη,  
ὅτι γινώσκει τί. Πότερον οὐκ ἢ οὐκ οὐκ; Ὁν πῶς γὰρ οὐκ  
μὴ οὐκ γέ τι γνωσθῆι;*

476e7-477a1

The premiss of the epistemological argument is that knowing corresponds to being, in such a way that knowing depends upon and is determined by being.

This premiss depends upon agreement to the primary principle of logic, the fundamental assumption of reason, of the absolute ontological contrariety of being and not-being. Granted the distinction between being and not-being, and the correspondential dependence of knowing on being, the argument reaches a point of agreement by which they can define whether the philothemonon, knows, and what is the nature of his knowledge.

What is known, is; what is not, is not known. What is absolutely knowable, absolutely is; what absolutely is not, is absolutely not knowable.

*Ἰκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κὰν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὄν δὲ μηδεμῇ πάντῃ ἄγνωστον; Ἰκανώτατα.*

477a2-5

If something existed in such a way as both to be and not be, it would be that which existed in a state between (metaxu) absolute being and absolute not-being.

*εἰ δὲ δὴ τι οὕτως ἔχει ὥς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ ἂν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὐτῷ μηδαμῇ ὄντος; Μεταξύ.*

477a6-8

The epistemological state that would correspond to this ontological state must be that which is between (metaxu ti) knowing and not-knowing, since knowing (gnosis) is with respect to being, and not-knowing (agnosia) is with respect to not-being. (477a9-b2) Opinion (doxa) is a faculty or power (dunamis) which is different from that of scientific knowledge (episteme). (477b3-9) Episteme is the form of knowing which has being for its object.

*Οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι μέφυκε γινῶναι ὥς ἔστι τὸ ὄν;*

477b10-11

Socrates does not proceed straightway to the conclusion that opinion must be the epistemological state between science and ignorance which has for its

object the ontological reality of that which is between being and not being. The epistemological argument has led to the assumption of a psychological distinction between that which opines and that which knows, which must be proven. The psychological distinction between the faculty of opinion and that of science is based on the assumption of an ontological object of thought which lies between being and not-being.

The way the argument proceeds is to first establish that there is a psychological faculty of opinion which is different from that of knowledge, and on that basis to determine that it must have for its ontological object that which exists between being and not-being. The argument depends on ascertaining the objectivity of ontological reality, but this it can only do by proceeding from the side of the activity and nature of the soul.

(b) 477c - 478d Psychological definition of philosophic nous.

The epistemological argument has established the epistemological reality of doxa and episteme. The psychological argument seeks to establish the psychological reality of the dunameis of soul which perform these activities of knowing and opining. Both of these arguments depend upon proving the objective reality of ontological objects which are the object of knowing and opining, knowledge and opinion. The primary assumption of the argument which defines philosophic nous in contradistinction to the dianoia of the philotheamones is that knowing is dependent upon being. Thus it is the primary assumption of the argument which the argument seeks to prove. The method is dialectical. The first hypothesis to be agreed upon is the apparent epistemological phenomena of opinion and knowledge. The truth of this hypothesis depends upon ascertaining the objective reality of knowledge and opinion. Proof of their objective reality depends upon ascertaining the reality of the psychological dunameis that perform

the functions of knowing and opining. The reality of these psychological dunameis is deduced from the first hypothesis that there epistemological activities of knowing and opining, on the basis of the second hypothesis that distinct epistemological activities are performed by distinct psychological faculties.<sup>38</sup>

The logic of the psychological argument is as follows:

(α) 477c1-5. Dunameis are, by definition, the sort of thing by virtue of which we are capable of what we are capable, e.g. we see with the power or faculty of sight, hear with our hearing, etc.

*Φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς  
δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα*

477c1-2

(β) 477c6-d6. These psychological powers are themselves without the qualities by which we distinguish their objects; they can only be identified and distinguished in relation to the identity of and difference between their respective kinds of objects. [ E.g. Sight is known to be sight and different from hearing because we can identify the visible which we see and are aware of its difference from the audible which we hear.]

(γ) 477d7-478a2. The conclusion of the epistemological argument was that episteme and doxa are both kinds of dunameis. Episteme is the most powerful (erromenestate) dunamis; doxa is the dunamis by which we are able to form opinions (doxazein). That they are not the same kind of dunamis is clear: episteme is incapable of error; doxa is not incapable of error.

*Πῶς γάρ ἄν, ἔφη, τὸ γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ  
ταυτόν τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθείη; Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον  
ὅτι ἕτερον ἐπιστήμης δόξα ὁμολογεῖται ἡμῖν.*

477e4 - 478a2

(δ) 478a3-b5 Since episteme and doxa are different kinds of psychological dunameis, they must have different kinds of ontological objects. The ontological object of episteme is being; it is the capacity to know the nature of that which is.

*Ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πῶς ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν ὥς ἔχει;*  
478a6

Since the knowable is being, the opinable must be something other than being.

*Οἰκοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ δὲ γινωστόν, ἄλλο τι δὲ δοξαστόν ἢ τὸ δὲ εἶη;*  
*Ἄλλο.*  
478b3-5

(ε) 478b6-c9 If it is not possible to say that the object of opinion is being, neither is it possible to say that it is not-being. What is not is not knowable. The unknowable is relative to not-knowing, or ignorance.<sup>39</sup> Not-knowing is related to not-being. What is unknowable is what is not. Since there is a psychological power capable of forming opinions, opinion must have an object, but the opinable can be neither being nor not-being. Opinion is neither knowledge nor nescience.

*Οὐκ ἄρα δὲ οὐδὲ μὴ δὲ δοξάζει; Οὐ γάρ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀγνοία οὔτε γνῶσις δόξα δὲ εἶη; Οὐκ ἔοικεν.*  
478c6-9

(ζ) 478c10-d1 Logically, knowing and not-knowing are absolute epistemological-psychological extremes relative to the absolute ontological extremes of being and not-being. Opinion cannot be outside" (*ektos touton*) the extremes of knowing or not-knowing, but must "lie within" them (*entos d' amphoin keitai*). It cannot be more lucid than knowing, but darker; it cannot be more obscure than not-knowing, but brighter. *Doxa* is the *dunamis* "between" knowing and not-knowing.

*Μεταξὺ ἄρα δὲ εἶη τοῦτοι' δόξα.*  
478d1

(η) 478d2-12 The "being" of the opinable is the relative being of the "between", which is relative to the absolutes of being and not-being, the knowable and not-knowable. The opinable must be that which both is and is not. Opinion is the *dunamis* that is "between" the *dunamis* of *episteme*, and the state of *agnoia*; opining is a knowing and not-knowing.

Οἰκοῦν ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἴ τι φανείη οἶον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κείσθαι τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὔτε ἐπιστήμην οὔτε ἀγνοίαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν φανέν ἀγνοίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης; Ὅρθως. Νῦν δέ γε πέφανται μεταξὺ τούτων ὁ δὴ καλούμεν δόξαν; Πέφανται.

478d5-12

(c) 478e-479d2 Ontological definition of philosophic nous.

The argument now depends upon ascertaining the ontological reality of the objects of episteme and doxa. With this argument, the transition from the argument of Book V to the argument as it is to be taken up in Books VI and VII is completed. The transition is made through establishing the separate realms of being and becoming. The logic of the ontological argument is as follows.

(a) 478e7-479a5 The position of the philotheamones is that it is the diverse plurality of sensible particulars which is real or has being; the rational universal is an abstraction in thought which is without ontological reality. There are only beautiful, just, and good things; there is no ontological idea of beauty, justice, or good whose being or reality is eternal and unchanging.

αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἡγεῖται ἀεὶ μὲν κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει, ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος ἂν τις ἐν τῷ καλὸν φῇ εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ τάλλα οὕτω.

479a1-5

This is the primary assumption of opinion: the implicit denial of the ontological reality of the eide. Because he does not believe in the reality of the ideas, he is convinced of the reality of the sensible.

(β) 479a6-b2 What must be admitted is the division in the sensible particular of being and not-being. The many particular instances which appear to be beautiful and noble, just, or pious, also appear to be ugly and ignoble, unjust, and impious.<sup>40</sup>

τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται, καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀδίκον; καὶ τῶν δσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον;

479a6-8



There is no particular individual, whether person or thing, which cannot be shown to be contrary to what it appears to be. They cannot be defined by one single opinion, without predicating the contrary.<sup>41</sup>

Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλὰ πως αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχροὶ  
φανῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐρωτᾷς.

479b1-2

(γ) 479b3-8 The predication of contraries is as true of quantitative predicates as it is of qualitative predicates. The double can appear as the half, the great to be the small, the heavy to be the light.

Τί δε τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια; ἥττόν τι ἡμίσεα ἢ διπλάσια  
φαίνεται; Οὐδέν. Καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ  
βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ  
τάναντία; Οὔκ, ἀλλ' αἰεί, ἔφη, ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἔξεται.

479b3-c8

The relativity of the quantitative examples underscores the relativity implicit in the qualitative examples. Their significance might be that of suggesting what Aristotle called Plato's Indeterminate Dyad. The being of the particular individual is relative, not absolute. The qualitative examples suggest that the beautiful grow ugly, the just become unjust, the pious become impious, by the loss of their quality through temporal change either in their own nature or in their circumstances (e.g. a change in the laws or in religious belief). The quantitative examples suggest that what underlies qualitative change is the relative nature of the being of particulars. What appears to be beautiful, just, or pious in comparison to one less beautiful, just, or pious, would appear to be ugly, unjust, and impious to one more beautiful, just, or pious. The qualitative examples suggest that the particular possesses and not does possess the being of the universal; the quantitative examples suggest that the particular possesses the being of the universal only relatively.

The quantitative examples bring the argument closer to the notion of "becoming" as process between being and not-being as taking place within the indeterminacy of the greater and the less. In the later development of Plato's doctrine of the Forms, it is the indeterminacy of the greater and the less which underlies the appearance of being in becoming. The being of becoming is relative.

(δ) 479b9-c5 It is inherent to the nature of "the many" that whatever something can be said to be, it can as well be said not to be. Neither its being nor its not-being can be affirmed or denied.

*Πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν  
τοῦτο ὃ ἂν τις φῇ αὐτὸ εἶναι;*

479b9-10

It is the relative being of particulars that is the object of ordinary riddles, as well as sophistic arguments which can always show something to be as well its contrary. Because the objects of opinion are the divided nature of "the many", the sophist can exercise his art of refutation, antilogikes.

*καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, οὐτ' εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι  
οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατόν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτε ἀμφοτέρα οὔτε  
οὐδετερον.*

479c3-5

(ε) 479c6-d2 The conclusion of the ontological argument is that it is the sensible many which belong to the realm of that which is between being and not-being.

*Ἐχεις οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι χρήση, ἣ ὅποι θήσεις  
καλλίω θέσιν τῆς μεταξὺ οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι;*

479c6-7

That which is and is not real, but an image of reality, is the realm of the objects of the philothaemones. The many belong to the realm of shadows, between the absolute light of being, truth, and reality, and the absolute darkness of not-being. Their reality is the shadowy realm of appearances, the appearance of being, truth, and reality.<sup>42</sup>

οὔτε γὰρ που σκοτεινέστερα μὴ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον μὴ εἶναι φανήσεται, οὔτε φανότερα ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

479c6-d2

(d) 479d3-480 Conclusion of the definition of the philosophos.

Opinions about the opinable (doxasta) share the same divided nature as their objects. Furthermore, the realm of opinables includes, not only sensible particulars, e.g., trees, horses, etc., but opinions themselves as well. In particular, the opinable includes opinions (those of the philotheamones) about justice, beauty, and other eide that appear in the realm of becoming in the form of opinion.

Ἡύρηκαμεν ἄρα ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς. . . Προωμολογήσαμεν δέ γε, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον φανείη, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οὐ γνωστὸν δεῖν λέγεσθαι, τῇ μεταξύ δυνάμει τὸ μεταξύ πλανητὸν αἰσκόμενον.

479d3-9

Those who apprehend only the apparent reality of the many in ignorance of the self-identical being of the eide of which they many are appearances, and who are incapable of this philosophical dialectic which leads from appearances to reality, opinion to knowledge, such persons (philotheamones) have only opinions about appearances. What is more, since they have no knowledge of the reality of the eide which are the reality of the opinable, they do not even know the nature of the opinable.

Τοὺς ἄρα πολλὰ καλὰ θεωμένους, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὁρῶντας μηδ' ἄλλω ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἄγοντι δυναμένους ἔπεσθαι, καὶ πολλὰ δίκαια, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, δοξάζειν φήσομεν ἅπαντα, γιγνώσκειν δὲ ὧν δοξάζουσιν οὐδέν. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

479e1-6

The knowable are the purely intelligible eide; knowledge belongs only to those who contemplate the unchanging, self-identical being of the eide.

Knowledge is not to be had by looking to the opinable, but only to the knowable.

There is no knowledge of the opinable, only knowledge of the knowable eide.

*Τί δὲ αὖ τοὺς αὐτὰ ἕκαστα θεωμένους καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα  
ὡσαύτως ὄντα; ἄρ' οὐ γινώσκειν ἀλλ' οὐ δοξάζειν;  
Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.*

479e7-9

The nature of the philosophoi is to be lovers of the intelligible, eternal and unchanging reality of the self-identical being of the eide. It is the pure universal which is the object of their eros. In this essential respect, of what they desire and what they know, are they to be distinguished from those whose object is opinion.

*Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα  
φήσομεν ἐφ' οἷς γνῶσις ἐστίν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἐφ' οἷς δόξα;  
479e10-480a2*

The philothaemones are really philodoxoi. The character or nature of the eros of the philodoxoi is that, not only do they love the changing and divided images of the eide as their object, but they are opposed to the conception of the eide. They are not able to suffer, endure, or bear up to (anechesthai) the reality of the eide.<sup>43</sup>

*φωνάς τε καὶ χρώας καλὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν τούτους  
φιλεῖν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ἀνέχεσθαι ὥς τι  
δύ*

480a2-4

However, there would nearly seem to be the same kind of opposition on the part of the philosopher to the notion that he should in any way desire or opine about the images of reality that are embraced by the philodoxi. The philosophos is singularly defined, as against the initial definition as a lover of learning, the uninformed eros of a rational nature, by the love of being, and especially to possess this pure eros, as distinguished from the eros of the philodoxoi.

*Τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ δὲ ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἀλλ'  
οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον;*

480a11-12

This definition of the philothēamones is obviously neither flattering, nor easily recognizable by them. However, the definition, along with its implicit judgement, is irrefutable. The opposition of the philodoxoi to the philosophos is silenced by the law of truth, against which it is not just to be opposed.

τῷ γὰρ ἀληθεῖ χαλεπαίνειν οὐ θέμις.

480a9-10

### C. Republic VI: The Necessity of the Philosopher-King.

The argument of Republic VI is introduced by way of articulating the conclusion to which the argument of the three waves has come in Republic V. The conclusion is that the just politeia, the paradeigma of justice, requires that a philosopher rule, since the laws of a politeia are not by themselves sufficient to maintain a stable order in the human community. This conclusion is the outcome of the argument for the philosopher-king which began with the dogma that praxis depends upon lexis, lexis depends upon aletheia. Truth and reality are known only to the philosopher. The argument of Republic VI uncovers that this is to know that the political good, whose limit is honour, is not a sufficient end to human life as essentially rational. The true, ultimate, and finally the only good which is the object of the rational soul is the absolute good. (502-506) The ordering of a diverse plurality of goods to a common good by political justice, depends finally upon knowing the dependence of these many goods, which are the content of the active life of the individual and human community, upon the absolute good, which is the object of the contemplative life of the philosopher. There is not, for Plato, a true praxis. The life of praxis is the life of the philothēamones, which falls short of truth and reality. The only true form of practical activity is contemplation.<sup>44</sup>

(i) 484 Philosophy is the ground of politeia.

Republic VI begins by referring to the continuity of the argument of the three waves with the argument of the Republic as a whole. Plato has Socrates remind us that the argument which has distinguished between the philosophers and philodoxoi is a stage in the journey toward answering the original question of the difference between the life of justice and the life of injustice:

*μέλλουσι κατόψεσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου.*  
484a7-b1

The reminder also suggests what the argument of Republic VI is to show: that the definition of justice and injustice, and the comparison of the just and unjust life in Republic IV was not at all a sufficient account.<sup>45</sup>

The next question to be asked, then, is whether the philosopher, who steadily gazes upon the eternal and changing, or his semblance, the philothamones, who wanders about in the errant realm of the multiple and diverse, ought to rule in the state.

*ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος  
δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀλλ' ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως  
ἰσχουσιν πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως  
ἡγεμόνας εἶναι;*

484b3-7

The criterion of the rulers is that they must be those who are most able to guard the laws (that constitute the fixed politeia of the just state) and the pursuits of society (as distinguished, ordered, and governed by the laws). In other words, the rulers must be those most able to unite the form and content of the polis, the reason of the politeia together with the life of its politai.

*Ὅποτεροι ἂν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνωνται φυλάξαι νόμους  
τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, τούτους καθιστάναι φύλακας.*  
484b9-10

The unity of politeia and politai, of the reason of justice that is embodied in the laws of the state, and the lives of the individuals which it orders and governs,

is to be found only with reference to the eternal ideas which the laws of the just state, the paradeigma of justice, embody or image. The division of lexis and praxis is only to be overcome in relation to aletheia. The ruler of the just state is comparable to an artist who makes his image by copying his model. So must the ruler of the just state possess for himself, in his own soul, the paradeigma of the eide, if he is to be able to bring about the paradeigma of justice, that is a just politeia, in the world. He must possess the aletheia of the eidos of justice, if he is to realize the paradeigma of justice in lexis in the realm of praxis.

The philodoxoi, those who desire and possess only the polla nomima,<sup>46</sup> are nothing other than blind to reality, and ignorant of the ideal justice by virtue of which laws are just. Without a knowledge of what justice itself is, the philodoxos cannot be entrusted with the guardianship of the laws of the paradeigma, or with the responsibility of legislating new laws that are just.

Ἡ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος  
ἐκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ  
ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς  
τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ  
θεώμενοι ὥς οἷον τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε  
νόμιμα καλῶν τε περὶ καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαι τε, ἐὰν  
δεῖ τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σῶζειν;

484c6-d3

It is agreed that it would be best that philosophers should rule in virtue of their knowledge of the ideal paradeigma, the paradeigma of being. It is no longer a question of whether a king should be a philosopher. The dependence of the life of the polis upon philosophic knowledge has been sufficiently demonstrated. The question with which the argument of Book VI properly begins is whether it is possible that a philosopher could be a king.

Ἄτοπον μὲν τάν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἰρεῖσθαι, εἰ γε τᾶλλα μὴ  
ἐλλείποντο· τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν  
προέχοιεν.

484d8-10

(ii) 502-506b3 The argument of the "three waves".

The argument with which Book VI begins is recalled later on in the book (502-506), at the point where the necessity for the philosopher-king to possess a knowledge of the good is to be established. For the purposes of this thesis, which seeks to establish both the logical continuity and, more importantly, the logical development of the argument of the "three waves" in Republic V in relation to the argument as it stands at the end of Republic IV, that section has direct significance. For there, it is made perfectly clear that the philodoxoi are not only those who live in existent states, but comprehends as well the guardians of the just state as it stands, not at the end of Book IV, but at the beginning of the third wave in Book V.

(a) 502-503 The unity of the argument of the three waves.

By the beginning of 502, the possibility of a philosopher becoming king has been established (502a). It is also agreed that this, the third wave, is the final difficulty to be met by way of proving that the ideal state is best and possible. The question to be addressed is that of the education of the philosopher (502d). At this point, Socrates recalls the whole argument of the three waves, as a single argument addressing the question of the utility and possibility of the just state. He does this by way of reference to where he first mentioned the community of wives and children, and the appointment of rulers in Book IV, and sought to avoid discussing it because he knew the "absolutely true" to be "odious and difficult" (502d). Since the proposal for the community of wives and children has been dealt with, there remains only the question of the education of the rulers, which must be dealt with all over again.

His argument begins by recollecting the means by which the guardians are to be selected from among the multitude and tested for "purity" (Books II to IV),



and how they are to be honoured in life and death (Book V) (503a). These means, however, are still insufficient for the education and election of the philosophoi-archontes. The ways in Book V by which they distinguished the nature of the philosopher from that of the philothaemones must also be applied. The blend of philosophic and spirited elements in their soul must be such as to enable them to pursue the highest and most difficult program of studies (503). It is in their capacity for the higher form of education that the philosopher-kings are distinguished from the rest of the guardians. They alone are fit to become archontes.

(b) 504-506b3 The principle of the argument of the three waves.

What is lacking in the paradigmatic polity, as defined at the beginning of the third wave, is the recognition of the dependence of politeia and politai, upon a knowledge of how there is justice only when there is a just ordering of all ends or goods to a final and absolute good which alone is the cause of good in all lesser forms of good. What is not known, then, is the relation of justice to the good.<sup>47</sup> Socrates' argument, at this point, establishes the limit or insufficiency of the political good of justice and honour to be the principle of the state. This limit is the limit of politeia properly speaking.

It has already been established that the knowledge required by the just politeia lies properly beyond itself; it is the knowledge of the philosopher who transcends the active life of the polis, to gaze up the eternal eide (500-501). The division of the good of the state and that of the individual is only overcome in relation to the good. It is only when justice is known to have its ground in the good that the good of the state and that of the individual can be truly reconciled. It is only with respect to the good that they are unified. So far as the philosopher must be compelled by some form of necessity to rule, rather than to contemplate

the eternal order, it is clear that the unification of this division of state and individual in the active life of the polis, lies beyond the polis, i.e., it can not be realized within political life.

(α) 504 Justice apart from the good.

The account of the virtues in Book IV was really a hypothetical account, which no longer suffices the argument. The only true measure in an argument which considers the ethical content of life is the measure of perfection. The only form of knowledge of virtue is the episteme of the being of virtue. (504a-c) The virtues, as they were discovered in the life of the just state, are an inadequate account of virtue. There is a greater education in virtue than the lower class of guardians are able to undertake, that is proper only to the nature of a philosopher-king.

*τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος*

504d2

There is something greater than the justice they discovered in the just politeia and just politai.

*Οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλ' ἔτι τι μείζον δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν διήλθομεν; Καὶ μείζον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,*

504d4-6

(β) 505a-e3 The good beyond justice.

The ultimate object (and thus the principle) of all knowledge is the knowledge of the idea of the good. It is only by reference to the good that one can know the good of what is just, and the good of anything at all.

*ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας ἢ δὴ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τᾶλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνονται.*

505a2-4

Apart from a knowledge of the good, it is impossible to utilize the good of any particular. All possessions (including the possession of virtues, and even of justice), and all forms of knowledge, apart from knowing their dependence upon the good, are of no worth.

*εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τᾶλλα  
ἐπισταίμεθα, οἴσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ  
κετήμεθά τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἶει τι πλεον εἶναι πᾶσαν  
κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθὴν; ἢ πάντα τᾶλλα φρονεῖν  
ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν;  
505a6-b3*

The nature of the good has been much disputed. The "many" (especially as led by the sophists) have taken the good to be the immediate and sensible good of pleasure, hedone. The "more refined" have taken the good to be the rational good of wisdom, phronesis.

*Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἴσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ  
δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψωτέροις φρόνησις.  
505b5-6*

Both are one-sided accounts of the good. The former limits the good to the sensuous particular; the latter has it in the form of an abstract universal. Both accounts can be controverted. There are both good and bad sensible pleasures; pleasure by itself cannot be the good. (505c6-11) Those who say the good is phronesis, can give no definite account of it, and are compelled to admit they mean that it is a knowledge of the good, which begs the question of what the good is. (505b8-c5)

Socrates' argument recalls the argument concerning the nature of eros, and especially of philosophic eros. Just as there were three principal kinds of eros other than philosophic eros, so is there three kinds of good other than the idea of the good. Pleasure and wisdom, especially as sought by the philothēamones, are appetitive and rational forms of the good. The third form, is justice or honour. The limitation of honour as the good sought by the epikouros-phulax appears to be

emphasized in the argument, which is still governed by the need to establish the dependence of the just politeia upon philosophic knowledge.

The division of the good in honour is specifically that between the (false) appearance of justice, which is possible in the realm of praxis and doxa, and the reality of justice as an eidos. The pursuit of justice and honour, without regard to their relation to the good, is often the intentional pursuit of their mere appearance, without their reality. (E.g. in the form of flattery, notoriety, or simply "fame" for its own sake. As had been noted in the discussion of the eros of the philotimon, honour is desired even from the unhonourable.) To appear honourable and just is often more desirable to the many, than to be honourable and just.

It was this very division in justice, as it appeared in the lives of states and individuals, in the realm of experience or praxis, that had originally given rise to their enquiry into nature and good of justice.

τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὥς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἔλοιντο  
τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν εἰ μὴ εἴη ὁμῶς ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ  
κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν,

505d5-7

Those whose eros is for the good (especially the philosophers, but all who seek virtue or goodness for its own sake), however, are unanimous in their pursuit of nothing short than the reality or being of the good itself. None who pursue the good seek the appearance of the good; unlike those who seek honour, none wish to simply appear good, but desire to be good, to possess the good which is good.

ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα  
ζητοῦσιν, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει;

505d7-9

The nature of the good can be described so far as it is known as the object of desire, from the side of the subjectivity of the eros which seeks it as its object. As known subjectively, it is known to be the single and primary motive principle

of the soul. It is the eros for the good which underlies all other forms of eros; it is the good itself which is sought in all the multiplicity and diversity of goods. It is the primary and universal desire of the soul which has the primary, universal, and absolute good as its object.

*Ὁ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπαντα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει,*  
505d11-e1

It is the absolute and universal good which is the principle of good in any particular form of good. It is this good which is dimly sought by every soul, in an intuitive grasp of its object, but in virtual ignorance of its nature or reality.

*ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν  
ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίσκει χρῆσασθαι μονίμῳ ὅα καὶ  
περὶ τᾶλλα,*  
505e1-3

Because the soul does not have a clear grasp of the nature of the good which, by its own nature, it seeks, it is unable to have any stable relation to it, either in thought or in action. The lack of knowledge concerning the good is the cause of instability in the nomimos concerning its nature: the division of opinions and beliefs concerning which have just been shown to be inadequate. There can be no stable belief concerning the good unless the nomimos is grounded in a sufficient knowledge of its nature.

It is this dispossession of the good which is the cause of the dispossession of good in all potential, particular forms of good, whose good can only be effectively realized when brought into relation to their principle.

*διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὀφελος ἦν,*  
505e3-4

(γ) 505e3-506b3 The unity of justice and the good.

Given the absolute necessity of a sufficient knowledge of the good itself in order that the good of any particular good might be effectively realized, it is clearly

necessary that the archontes, who govern and order all forms of activity in the polis, must not be ignorant of this knowledge.

*περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν  
ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς  
πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν;*

505e4-506a2

The unity or good of the just state, which had rested upon the good of honour and justice prior to the argument which has proposed and established the necessity of the philosopher-king, is now seen to rest ultimately upon the knowledge of the good. Justice depends upon the good; the good of justice is only known and only realized when it is known and realized in relation to the good.

*Οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνούμενα ὅπη ποτὲ  
ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, οὐ πολλοῦ τιμῆς ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν  
ἐαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοῦντα· μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ  
πρότερον γνῶσεσθαι ἱκανῶς.*

506a4-7

Where the political good is grounded in the good, and the ruling class is ruled by a knowledge of the good, and where justice is grounded in the good, the just politeia is complete: it is just.

*Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὁ τοιοῦτος  
αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.*

506a9-b2

The good of justice is the idea tou agathou. The question, to which the argument of the "three waves" has led, now is: what is the idea tou agathou?

*ἀλλὰ σὺν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῆς  
εἶναι, ἢ ἡδονήν, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα;*

506b2-4

## Endnotes: "Interpretive Essay"

<sup>1</sup>IV 443d-444.

<sup>2</sup>Both Polemarchus and Thrasymachus are re-introduced in much the same way as they were in Book I. In both places, it is Polemarchus who plays the role of 'interrupting' Socrates, by threatening, in a friendly way, to forcibly hold him captive if he is unwilling to comply with his wishes. Thrasymachus re-plays his role of a practitioner of eristic.

<sup>3</sup>His reproach recalls Socrates' own comparison of the search for justice to the search for gold, in Book I (336e4-9). The point of the comparison was to assure Thrasymachus that the argument would not move on the basis of unexamined assumptions. Thrasymachus has 'leaped' into the argument about justice like a 'wild beast', ferociously attacking Socrates for practicing eristic (336b-d). Adam, who has argued that Thrasymachus is now reconciled to Socrates, misses the parallel, which indicates irreconciliation. The "host of arguments" Socrates must meet are soon shown to originate, at least in part, in the assumptions of the eristic art of antilogike (454a1-2).

<sup>4</sup>Such a principle is often the conclusion of the early or "Socratic" dialogues, which are so named because it is taken that the conclusion of Socratic elenchus is the knowledge of ignorance, which is also the starting point for a philosophic education. Republic I is argued to have been originally the Thrasymachus on this basis. Its conclusion is a sufficient example of the position from which Socrates here agrees with Thrasymachus.

<sup>5</sup>IV 436b-437a.

<sup>6</sup>IV 437a.

<sup>7</sup>Glaucón's principle, that the only measure of philosophic discourse is "the whole of life", suggests he has the sort of philosophic spirit required of a philosopher in Book VI. The difference between Glaucon's attitude and that of Thrasymachus is the difference between the legal erist and the philosopher described in the Theaetetus (172).

<sup>8</sup>

*Μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκάμης, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ σκόπει.*  
435d8

<sup>9</sup>Both the difference and the relation between "pure" Socratic skepticism and a Platonic-Socratic skepticism is well-illustrated when one sets this passage against the conclusion to which Socrates comes in the Apology with respect to the limitation of human knowledge.

<sup>10</sup>In speaking about Plato's dialectic, one must always contend with the controversy regarding the difficulty of speaking of dialectic, on the one hand, as the strict science

outlined in Book VII, and on the other as the art employed by Socrates in, at least, the middle Platonic dialogues. In view of the controversy, it seems best to use the term "dialectical method" to describe Socrates' method of argument since the beginning of Book II, as distinct from both Socratic elenchus and dialectical science.

<sup>11</sup>The agon logon were contests made popular by the sophists among the intellectual circles of the Athenian aristocracy in the fifth century. In Protagoras, Plato has Protagoras boast that his fame has been the result of winning many such contests (335a).

<sup>12</sup>472b3-473b4.

<sup>13</sup>The argument, as it is formulated in relation to Glaucon's objection, which opposes an abstract mathematical reason to the concreteness of erotic necessity, in particular, calls into question Findlay's description of the ideal polity as "an imaginary Pythagorean commune". It is in relation to the Republic's consideration of eros that the opposition between the positions of Findlay and Strauss is most clearly illuminated.

<sup>14</sup>II 379b-c8. E.g.

*Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὁ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὔτω;*  
379b1

On the basis of this principle, Socrates argues that the divine can be only the cause of good, not of evil. The argument is noteworthy here also for its consideration of the good and beneficial: ophelimon to agathon (379b11). The absolute divine good (to agathon) is said to be the cause of all relative human goods (ta ophelimata):

*Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον*

379b15-16.

<sup>15</sup>452d6-e2.

<sup>16</sup>Philotimon is one of the "three forces" employed in the Laws to subordinate eros as sexual desire to justice. Laws, 841.

<sup>17</sup>The primacy of philotimon as the moving principle in the spirited soul, as that form of eros which is peculiar to the guardian, as opposed to sexual desire as peculiar to the artisan, the appetitive soul, is a point on which Strauss' interpretation of the argument is called into question. In his account, erotic desire as sexual is silenced in favour of a philosophic eros. (The City and Man, pp. 110-113.) But the whole argument for the koinonia of wives and children supposes that philotimon is the primary form of erotic desire in the spirited part (to thumoeideis) of the state.

<sup>18</sup>The comparison of deception to the purgative use of drugs was made in Book II 382, where Socrates distinguished between to toi onti pseudos and to 3en tois logois pseudos, the real lie and the verbal lie. The real lie is ignorance in the soul of the



deceived concerning reality, of which the verbal lie is only an image, a mixture of the true and false, the real and unreal. The verbal lie, which does not necessarily contradict truth and reality, since its object is not necessarily truth and reality, but the realm of appearance and opinion, can be employed to a good end both against enemies and for the sake of those friends who are driven by madness or thoughtlessness to commit some wrong. Such uses of verbal lies are compared to the medical use of drugs for averting evil:

ΤΟΤΕ ΑΠΟΤΡΟΠΗΣ ΞΥΝΕΚΑ ΩΣ ΦΑΡΜΑΚΟΝ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ ΓΙΓΝΕΤΑΙ;  
382c9-10

The deception to be practiced in the second wave appears to be a continuation of the "noble lie" (III 414b8 ff.), which was to persuade the guardians that their education was really a period in which they were begotten within the earth, and were born of the land of the city. They were to believe that they were an autochthonous race, bred of different metals, a natural distinction which corresponded to their rational capacity for virtue. The necessity of the noble lie was to prevent the natural bonds between parent and offspring from taking precedence over the rational distinctions in virtue. The truth of the noble lie was that the citizens were, regarded as rational souls, really the children of the state by whom and for whom they were reared and educated. The lie was to deny the reality of their natural parentage. The noble lie was necessary because of the tendency of men to regard natural unity as primary, rather than the unity of political class and state of character. The noble lie is kind of true image for those who mistake image for truth. Since they tend to regard the natural as real, the real is presented in the form of the natural, and the misleading literal truth of the natural is purged. The divisions of character and office are presented as natural divisions innate to the soul.

<sup>19</sup>Like most points in this part of the argument, the effectiveness of the proposal appears highly questionable. But if one accepts the credibility of the "noble lie", this part of the argument can hardly be objected to as incredible. However, Plato's emphasis is upon the principles involved, rather than their practicality.

<sup>20</sup>See Adam's note on anegguon, p.302 (461b11): "'unauthorized,' because the child of an irregular union. An anegguon gamos is a marriage without an eggune or contract between the parents of the betrothing parties".

<sup>21</sup>Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon.

<sup>22</sup>This division was secured through the "noble lie" which brings the argument of Book III to a conclusion. There is a purgation of the demoi in the laws of Book IV, but it does not extend to the family.

<sup>23</sup>Cf. J. Doull, "Christian Origins of Contemporary Institutions: Part I", Dionysius, 6, 1982, p. 121, ". . . human desire has an endlessness which must receive its limit from the rational soul. This same endlessness is found in the active, aggressive temper of the ruling class, in the ambiguous mixture of ambition and service to the common good which not even so extreme a measure as the abolition of private households is sufficient to eradicate." Doull has before him the necessity by which the second wave leads into the third. "To discover an end in which private and public good are

undivided it is necessary to turn to the universal, to the ideas and finally to . . . the good itself . . . . The question whether there is a true justice which is the good alike of the individual and of a community living according to a rational law has its answer thus in a principle beyond both."

<sup>24</sup>Strauss appears to assume that in the reduction of the private to the body the purgation of the private is complete. In other words, that the privacy of the body is of no account and that it marks the term of the abolition of private good. But it is finally in relation to the body that Socrates concludes the purgation of individualism, and the identity of "political" with "natural" justice that is the effective cause of the three waves. The City and Man, pp. 114 ff.)

<sup>25</sup>The passage which Crombie points out in Laws VII 804 is indicative of how Plato viewed human life in its purest form as a kind of divine play: "the noblest feature of man is that he is God's plaything, whom it therefore behoves to live his life playing as nobly as he may". The games were regarded as an end in themselves, and thus, since Homer, represented for the Greeks the nearest mortals could come to a divine enjoyment. Through the free activity of the games, there was thought to be the closest possible relation to the gods themselves, who were understood to have a great interest in the games. The games were thus part of the great religious festivals in Greece, which celebrated the participation of humanity in divine freedom. Burkert notes that the Homeric association of the games with the burial of the dead survives in the later panhellenic festivals. Such an association is evidence that the games were not "not a profane festival". GR, p.106. These aspects of the Olympia, panhellenism and the funerary for dead heroes, must be potentially significant in Socrates' likening of the guardians to the olympionikai. They are the subject of the transition from the second to the third wave. There is one other interesting feature about these religious festivals, which the Greeks referred to as "the fulsome banquet of the gods", that Burkert describes. "The natural and straightforward (*sic*) aim of a festival is feasting - eating and drinking. In Greek sacral practice this element is always present. The meal in the sanctuary may be marked as extraordinary when, in contrast to normal civilization, the ancient way of life is imitated: a bed of twigs, stibas, takes the place of seats or banqueting couches, and the house is replaced by an improvised hut, skene - misleadingly translated as tent." GR, p.107. The similitude of the sacred feast to the flout in the city of pigs is so utterly striking, that one must wonder if Plato did not have it there in mind. The comparison of the guardians to the victors at such festivals does in fact mark the restoration of unity in the human community through a justice which is grounded in religious piety. The state is united as a religious community; the unity of justice lies in the participation of the human in the reason of the divine.

<sup>26</sup>Adam interprets Socrates as speaking "with playful irony, for Glauco is an aner erotikos (474 D). A vein of irony runs through all this passage . . . ; but it is not wholly ironical." Rep. n. 468B 13, p. 318. Adam gives the proposal a pragmatic justification, which is inferior to that by Socrates himself, and is no better than Shorey's pragmatic revulsion.

<sup>27</sup>Shorey seems to react as Plato thinks a literal-thinking reader might: "The

deplorable facetiousness of the following [viz. Glaucon's addition] recalls the vulgarity of Xenophon's guard-house conversations. It is almost the only passage in Plato that one would wish to blot." *Rep.*, n.d, p. 489. The ridiculousness of the extreme pragmatism into which Shorey and Adam fall serves once more to point us toward a more reflective interpretation of the comic vulgarity which has often surfaced in Book V. Plato has already given us the rule of thumb for interpreting such passages, which is to treat them more seriously as philosophic images than pragmatic political proposals. The question of how "seriously" we ought to take Plato, in a pragmatic and empirical sense, is often unanswerable, as Aristotle pointed out about the *Republic* long ago. However, we are ever so often exhorted by Plato to take seriously the philosophic content of his arguments, to grasp the principle. If we do this, we shall avoid what is perhaps the greater error: to reduce his images to mere instances of *hedone*, bits of meaningless "comic relief" meant to offset the laborious gravity of dramatic dialogue. The arguments about poetry in Books II and X should have provided a sufficient guide against such a trespass upon Plato's use of philosophic images.

28 The place of the divinization of the heroes in the ideal state is true to Hellenic custom. A recent article by P. Atherton notes that, "Dead heroes kept watch over [the city], manifesting themselves to encourage the citizens at moments of stress and crisis, as Theseus did at the battle of Marathon." "The City in Ancient Religious Experience", *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality*, ed. A. H. Armstrong, Crossroad: New York, 1986, p318. This article is quite useful in providing an account of the Greek *polis* as "a religious as well as a civic association", in light of which Plato's community of wives and children appears less radical, where it is recognized as principally a religious rather than natural institution.

29 Plato takes to the extreme what was already a tendency present in the historical life of Hellenic institutions. According to Burkert,

The rise of the hero cult under the influence of epic poetry has its significance and its function in the evolution of the Greek polis; the prominence given to specific individual graves goes hand in hand with the suppression of the customary cult of the dead. The extravagant expenditure, which is still evinced by the late Geometric vases, decreases and is then limited by law; the funeral games for noble lords are replaced by the institutionalized *agones* of the sanctuaries, in honour of a hero nominated for the purpose. Accordingly, the importance of the individual family declines in favour of events which involve everyone present in the area." *GR*, p. 204.

Burkert goes on to make the point that, "The hero cult, in fact, is not an ancestor cult at all; its concern is with effective presence, not with the chain of blood across generations, even though founding ancestors might naturally receive heroic honours." Burkert places the hero cult midway between the family cult of the dead, and the worship of the gods. "The hero cult, like the cult of the dead, is conceived as the cthonic counterpart to the worship of the gods . . . . An important difference between the hero cult and the cult of the gods is that a hero is always confined to a specific locality: he acts in the vicinity of his grave for his family, group, or city. . . Above all, heroes assist their tribe, city, or country in battle . . . . The gods are remote, the heroes are near at hand. *GR*, pp. 205-7.

<sup>30</sup>Cf. a comment by D. K. House on Phaedo 60a: "Phaedo begins his account of the dialogue by remarking on how those present felt during their final meeting with Socrates. Xanthippe, naturally, knew only pain because the death of Socrates for her was the loss of a husband and father to her children. Her relation was to the mortal Socrates and not to the philosopher." "A Commentary on Plato's Phaedo", Dionysius, 5, 1981, p.42.

<sup>31</sup>It is at this point, where it is assumed that all that remains of the argument is to show how the state is possible, how it is to be realized in praxis, that it has become necessary to distinguish between possibility and reality, and between the nature of lexis and praxis. The division brought out in the first two waves was that between utility and possibility; the division which is brought before them at the beginning of the third wave is that between possibility and reality.

<sup>32</sup>Rep. VI, 484c. This interpretation is one which takes that passage as only referring to the painter in passing, as do Shorey and Adam. Burnet reproduces the clause in which the reference occurs thus:

. . . καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ  
δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε  
δεῖ ἀναφέροντες . . . .

Shorey translates,

". . . those who have no vivid pattern in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal . . . ."

<sup>33</sup>V449a.

<sup>34</sup>In this context, adoxia seems to suggest strongly the root meaning of its parts a- doxa: that which does not fall within the realm of doxa. The specific doxa which regards philosophers as useless in practical matters seems to result from the way episteme transcends doxa per se. The para - doxical reason of all three waves is here revealed to be ultimately beyond the limit of doxa. It seems reasonable to read adoxia here as implying the division between philosophic episteme and political doxa. So read, adoxia suggests that what is required to convert the unjust politics to the just is the knowledge which transcends the limits of doxa, and cannot be justified by doxa. Admittedly, this suggestion, which I make on grounds of its context, is subject to philological considerations. For the present purpose, I have considered adoxia (ill repute [also = paradoxos, unexpected]) in relation to adoxastos (not matter of opinion) and antidoxazo (contrary to opinion), as cited, respectively, in Liddell & Scott at Phaedo 84c [citations from Sophocles, Aristophanes, and Aristotle]; Phaedrus 84a; Theaetetus 170d. Adoxia would still be translated here by its common meaning of "ill repute", but as suggesting the meaning of adoxastos in context of the argument. The philosopher-king will not be received easily because episteme transcends doxa, rather than being simply outside or contrary to it.

<sup>35</sup>In the same way, the Republic consistently divides the soul into three parts, the appetitive, spirited, and rational, but draws a more general and fundamental division which separates the inner self-identity of the soul as purely rational from the diversity

which attends its embodiment. The primary division is that between the soul and the body. The division between the philothēamonon and the philosophos will be seen to rest on the division in the nature of the objects of eros. The division of thought and reality in the fifth book is that between knowledge and opinion, truth and image, being and becoming. This is the primary division set out in the analogy of the line in Republic VI, where it is developed into further sub-divisions.

<sup>36</sup>Cf. Bury's remark on Aristophanes' account of eros: "it is with the development of the sex-problem that we arrive at the heart of this comedy in miniature,-- the definition of Eros as 'the craving for wholeness' (tou holou epithumia -193E)." Symp. p.xxx.

<sup>37</sup>This argument has a certain affinity with the quarrel between philosophy and poetry in Republic X. The positions and the argument is essentially the same, and with a similar interest.

<sup>38</sup>At the end of the second hypothesis, the argument is still purely hypothetical, for if there is no real object of a faculty and its function, then it cannot be said to exist. The third argument, then, sets out to prove the third and final hypothesis that there is that which is, that which is not, and, principally, that which is between being and not-being: becoming. It is with the establishment of the realm of becoming as participating in being and not-being that one arrives at the Platonic standpoint. To establish the distinction between the nature of becoming and the nature of being is what is desired by the argument of the third wave in the fifth book. From the standpoint of this distinction, the nature of the dependence of the just city upon the eidōs of justice is established; the necessity of a philosopher-king is proven.

<sup>39</sup>I have deferred translating agnoia into its latin-mediated english equivalent, ignorance, until this point, where the argument has clearly established the difference between doxa and agnoia. Our use of ignorance is more often used to mean "lack of knowledge" in a relative sense that can easily mean "false opinion", than it is to mean "not-knowing" in an absolute sense. While it is precisely this same notion as ordinarily understood by agnoia which Socrates seeks to correct, I believe his argument is more visibly presented in the obvious contariety of agnosia and gnosis, than in the english equivalents of ignorance and knowledge. However, while I have considered this method preferable, it is not really necessary. The argument clearly establishes that what one must mean by agnoia or ignorance is the state of not-knowing relative to the unknowability of what is not.

<sup>40</sup>"The many" here obviously refers to the whole realm of particular instances e.g. inanimate objects, works of art, laws, states, and living individuals. The class includes, then, also "the many" who are none other than the philothēamones, who only appear to be just, noble, and pious. See n.3, on 479c, for how Shorey seems to confirm this suggestion is present.

<sup>41</sup>Shorey's note on this passage seems to be correct in interpreting the argument in terms of logical contradiction at the level of opinion: "Plato consciously uses mere logic to lend the emphasis and dignity of absolute metaphysics to his distinction between the two types of mind, which is for all practical purposes his main point here. If you cannot correctly define the beautiful, all your imperfect definitions will be refuted by showing that they sometimes describe what is ugly." Loeb I, p. 530.

<sup>42</sup>Shorey finds that the suggestion implicit in 479a, that the many instantiations of justice, beauty, piety and their contraries, also hinted at "the many" philothēamones, is here made explicit.

"A further thought is developed here, suggested in 479 A, B. Just as the many particular horses, trees or tables shift and change, and are and are not in comparison with the unchanging idea of each, so the many opinions of the multitude about justice and the good and the beautiful and other moral conceptions change, and both are and are not in comparison with the unalterable ideas of justice and beauty, which the philosopher more nearly apprehends." Loeb, I, p.532.

<sup>43</sup>Anechesthai, "hold oneself up" is particularly suggestive here in its connotation of elevation and ascent. Unlike the philosopher, the lover of opinion cannot bear to forsake the "earthly" images for the sake of the "heavenly" forms. They cannot "ascend" to the "heavenly" because of their inordinate love of the "earthly". The whole passage foreshadows the allegory of the cave in Book VI, where the philosopher must compel the prisoners at the bottom of the cave to turn away from the shadows of reality, and to make the long ascent of dialectic toward the "sunlit" realm of forms above. So, too, does the passage foreshadow the paradox in Book VII, that the philosopher is opposed to living and ruling in this land of shadows.

<sup>44</sup>Cf. Doull's general remark on Plato's political thought: "Ethical and political questions for Aristotle as for Plato are about the form of that limited human good which stays short of the deepest conflict of good and evil. Plato . . . had not discovered how this finite human realm could have a certain separation and independence from its absolute foundation, how there could be present in it an actual human freedom which was all the same limited." COCL, pp.126-7.

<sup>45</sup>Cf. Adam's note: "From the standpoint of Books VI and VII it is impossible to say what 'just life' means unless we know the idea tou agathou etc. (see 506 A): hence polla ta loipa dielthein." N.484 A5, Rep., 2, pp.1-2.

<sup>46</sup>Cf. 479d3-5.

<sup>47</sup>Doull's comment, cited earlier, is most applicable here. "To discover an end in which private and public good are undivided it is necessary to turn to the universal, to the ideas and finally to an object--the good itself--on which hangs all division of the ideas and their difference from the thinking soul. The question whether there is a true justice which is the good alike of the individual and of a community living according to a rational law has its answer thus in a principle beyond both." COCL, p. 121.

## Conclusion

In general, the principle concern of the interpretive essay has been to demonstrate the validity of a more philosophic approach to the text, which interprets the proposals set forth in V, both in their details and as a whole, as representative and paradigmatic rather than literal and practical. Its concern is not so much with whether this interpretation is correct on every point, as it is to have convinced the reader that such an approach is viable. The interpretive method is consistent with the interpretation of the text, which understands the purpose of the argument of V to be the conversion of the reader from a literal and practical to a philosophical standpoint.

Simply, then, it has been argued that one must read the Republic ultimately in light of the standpoint established by the dialogue; one must come to interpret the "practical" aspects as leading toward the philosophical standpoint from which they are rightly viewed. Other interpretations, both traditional and alternative, in various ways and to different degrees have fallen short of this standpoint. My thesis shall conclude with the following summation of its findings, along with a statement of where they stand in relation to the principal, rival interpretations of the dialogue.

Introductory Narrative: the new beginning.

My interpretation agrees with what has become a nearly universal view of the structure of the dialogue, established by the 19th century commentators, where V is seen to mark a "new beginning" in the argument. However, as pointed out in the historical survey, how one ought to interpret this "new beginning" is precisely the point of controversy. Barker, for instance, rejected Adam's distinction between the earthly city of II-IV and the heavenly city of V-VII, a thesis generally held by all 19th century commentators. Barker argued that "Plato has in mind some actual Greek city, and the actual reform of that city." Nevertheless, a firm point of agreement was that the community of wives and children and the philosopher-king were the practical

foundation and ideal crown of the Platonic state. In 1940, Cornford separated these proposals, and divided the dialogue in the middle of V; the proposal for a philosopher-king introduced the new division; the remainder of V, the first "two waves", was reduced to an "interlude", supplementing the argument of II-IV. Since World War II, Bloom has argued the very thesis which had led to the 19th century debate: that the community of wives and children was irrelevant to the main topic and Lee renders it a special topic. Against this later 20th century tendency to reject the traditional consensus that the community of wives and children was integral to the Platonic state, the most recent and complete accounts of the Republic by White and Annas have tended to re-affirm the integrity of the community of wives and children as a corner stone of the ideal state.

This interpretation likewise re-affirms the integrity of the community of wives and children, but on other grounds than those mentioned. The whole of V is held to constitute a transition in the argument from the account of justice in terms of the state and individual in II-IV to the account of the good in VI-VII. The introductory narrative has been interpreted as introducing a "new beginning" by way of presenting the aporia of the possibility of realizing the ideal state constructed in lexis in praxis. The details of the narrative are interpreted as suggesting that what seems a wholly practical concern with the community of wives and children really has a thoroughly theoretical or philosophic purpose, which is to bring the reader from the practical standpoint of IV to the philosophic standpoint of VI.

1st Wave: Koinonia of Men and Women.

It was Grote who first interpreted the proposal for a koinonia of men and women, in light of Mill's utilitarian condemnation of the subjugation of women, as an enlightened concern for the equality of women. Until most recent times, this interpretation has been as standard as it has been popular. One can find in Annas



sufficient reference to a more critical view of Plato's supposed feminism. In my view, Plato is least of all concerned with practical social reform; his intent is, as Findlay notes, to bring the reader from a practical to an eidetic standpoint. Such a conversion requires a consciousness of the dependence of the sensible upon the ideal, which is to acquire a new perception also of human nature and of the principles which govern human activity. The argument of the first wave destroys the certainty of the unreflective standpoint of custom, yet refutes as well the skeptical confidence of the erist. In place of dogmatism and skepticism, it lays down the principle of a dialectical reason: the distinction of sensible condition and intelligible cause, whereby it may come into view that human nature is not determined by such a primary sensible condition as sexual differentiation, and that human activity is not determined either by sensible nature nor unreasoned custom. Rather, human nature appears as rational and self-determinate--it is the good known to reason which is to determine what is human.

This interpretation establishes that the argument of the first wave has a greater formal structure than has been recognized, and that it is concerned chiefly with the destruction of the dogmatic and skeptic standpoints in favour of the philosophic standpoint of dialectic. With this conversion accomplished, the first step has been taken toward the philosophic viewpoint which knows how to regard the life of states and individuals in light of an ultimate principle of causality--the Good.

## 2nd Wave: Koinonia of Wives and Children.

Against the common view that the purpose of the koinonia of wives and children is concerned to establish a natural unity in blood-ties of kindship, which Aristotle rightly criticised as self-contradictory, I argue that such was never Plato's intent. Aristotle's critique is based upon his own view of what constitutes the family and state; from an Aristotelian standpoint, Plato's proposals make no sense. Clearly,

Aristotle does not accept the view of the family which Plato has Socrates set forth. Plato's whole purpose is for Socrates to bring into view precisely that the family is not a natural unity, that it has not its ground in the immediacy of blood-ties and sexual relations. Instead, the family is discovered to have its ground in the religious virtue of piety, wherein the individual surrenders any assumed natural independence to the ethical life of the family. In this view of the family, familial piety is shown to have the same ethical reason as civic justice.

The cornerstone of this view is the interpretation given of the illustration of political unity in terms of the natural individual. Whereas the example of the man who suffers pain in his finger as a whole is commonly interpreted as an illustration of how the state is to be united by the natural feelings of kinship, it is precisely such a view which I have rejected. Instead, it seems evident that the example illustrates clearly how such a "natural" unity rests upon the intelligence of the individual, and thus demonstrates how the natural is dependent upon a rational principle for its unifying principle.

The argument of the first two waves taken together are interpreted as having demonstrated the inadequacy of an unphilosophical standpoint, which is associated with the practical standpoint of experience, or the ordinary life of individuals within the institutions of oikos and polis. The ground of these institutions has been exposed to be a principle of reason--justice--which both transcends and determines the most primary determinations of the natural. The reader is taken to have been converted to the philosophical standpoint which recognizes human physis and praxis to be determined rightly by an intelligent apprehension of the good so far as its knowable to reason.

Transition: The Universal City.

Whereas the next section of the argument, a discussion of the city at peace and

at war, is universally interpreted as another digression, I have interpreted the details of this discussion as representative of the concept of how the city, thus purged of those assumptions destroyed by the arguments of the first two waves, now appears as the truly universal city of reason. Where some commentators, notably Shorey, have been sorely disappointed by the idea that victorious heroes should be granted sexual license, I have interpreted the image of the crown and the embrace as emblems of the eidetic identity of the life of the state and individual. It seems most reasonable that Plato would use the city as an image of the life of the eide to complete the transition to the philosophic standpoint where the life of the eide, the koinonia eidon, is directly apprehended by the eros and nous of the philosopher king.

### 3rd Wave: Philosopher-King.

It is not the intention of my interpretation to offer any new view of the argument of the third wave. It does, however, call attention to the implication of the censure of the standpoint of the "lover of spectacle" as embracing the life of the state and as demonstrating the limitation of the good so far as it can be known within the life of praxis. Here, the limitation of pleasure and honour is clearly exposed, along with the necessity of bringing the good itself into view as the only true object of the soul. This interpretation does emphasize, however, that the argument of the third wave is not at all concerned with the translation of the ideal city of lexis into praxis, but it is precisely the correction of this view, the original impetus in the argument of Book V, which forms the introduction to the proposal of a philosopher-king. Thus, the argument is understood as an kind of "ascent" from lexis to aletheia--to the hypothesis of the good--rather than as a "descent" from lexis to praxis--the movement of Books VIII and IX, which finally discuss the decline of the state, mentioned at the outset of Book V. With the argument of the philosopher-king, the philosophical standpoint which knows of the need to measure the content of human life, human nature and human

activity, in light of the good, is attained.

Where this interpretation of the third wave differs from others is once more in its insistence that Plato is least of all concerned with the question of how to realize the ideal state in the world; rather, his concern is wholly with the conversion of his reader to the need to take up the life of the philosophy. This view is nearest to Gadamer, although differing from his view that Plato's concern is to educate future philosopher-kings, since it is argued that the third wave, and the Republic generally, is really about the need to attain to a philosophic standpoint--what practical consequences might follow are really outside the interest of the dialogue. Certainly, at least, this interpretation demands that the Platonic state be nowhere interpreted as a practical ideal in any literal sense; it exists in the realm of thought for the sake of an eidetic or philosophic reflection upon the dependence of human life upon a perception of the ultimate good to be sought in it. The Republic has in common with such other middle dialogues as Phaedo and Symposium the intent to establish the hypotheses of the many, eide and good as an philosophic account of how the world of experience stands in relation to the Socratic good.

### Appendix: Women in Ancient Greece

The thesis has committed itself to certain statements concerning the position of women in ancient Greece, which ought to be further illuminated. In particular, the thesis has assumed the position stated by Sara Pomeroy that, "The effect of urbanization upon women was to have their activities moved indoors, and to make their labor less visible and hence less valued." (Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves, Shocken Books, 1975, p.71.) It should be noted that this effect was noted with reference to 5th century Athenian as opposed to Spartan society. Generally, the thesis holds that it was a panhellenic custom for a division of labour, between the oikos and polis, to be drawn along lines of male and female. There were no female citizens, strictly speaking; wives and children of ancient Greece were citizens only indirectly, as members of the oikos, and thus represented by the male head of the oikos in political life. Simply, if a citizen were one whose minimal function was to vote in a popular assembly, this franchise was not extended to women. Strictly speaking, women in ancient Greece were excluded from political life. Plato's arguments concerning koinonai of men and women, and of wives and children, assumes especially the distinction between male and female as political and non-political, which he sets out to overthrow as false grounds for human community.

On the other hand, Plato's argument seeks further to demonstrate the Hellenic position, stated later by Aristotle, that the difference between barbarian and Greek is that the barbarian knows not the difference between women and slaves. That the oikos rests upon a religious virtue whose ethical content assumes the rationality of women is a chief tenet of Plato's argument for a community of wives and children.

It is the view of the present author that the work of Pomeroy provides the most interesting discussion of this subject. Lacey offers a prosaic account, which proceeds from Aristotle's definition of the oikos in his Politics (The Family in Classical Greece,

Cornell U. P., 1968). R. Just (Women in Athenian Law and Life, Routledge, 1989) and R. Sealey (Women and Law in Classical Greece, U. of North Carolina Press, 1990) provide most recent discussions of the subject of women in Athenian law, both of which provide ample evidence of the nearly complete exclusion of Athenian women from direct participation in the legal system due to their restriction to the oikos. It should be noted, however, that political life is not precisely the same as social life. So it may be said that Gomme's earlier dispute with what he regarded as the simplistic view that Athenian women "were powerless in law, scarcely stirred from the rooms in which they were locked, and were systematically treated with contempt", has been supported by more recent evaluations of the position of women in Athens (Essays in Greek History and Literature, Books for Libraries Press, 1967, p.91). A useful brief critical survey of more recent literature is that of Gillian Clark, in the series, Greece and Rome New Surveys in the Classics, entitled, Women in the Ancient World (O.U.P. 1989). A useful text of primary sources in translation is Women's Life in Greece and Rome (John Hopkins, 1982) by Lefkowitz and Fant. The author would like to thank his examiner, F. Schroeder, for drawing attention to the need for this Appendix, and for providing a bibliography on the subject, inclusive of the above works, in conjunction with his colleague, A. J. Marshall.

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