



COMMON MARKET ISSUE



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British entry: the political implications

In his book "The Challenge of the Common Market," I. U. Kitzinger quoted a British cabinet minister as saying, shortly after Britain applied for membership, that the economic advantages of joining the Six "are so vast that they hardly bear thinking about." Now, however, Mr. Gaitskell believes that the economic advantages and disadvantages of membership to Britain are about fifty-fifty and there is an increasing number of people who agree with him. "A cool analysis of the gains and losses through entering Europe becomes daily more difficult", says the Manchester Guardian Weekly of October 18, and Lord Amory, speaking at Dalhousie on the same day conceded that the economic consequences to Britain are highly speculative. The recent Douglas amendment to Mr. Kennedy's Trade Liberalization Bill still further reduces the economic advantages to Britain.

ANY TERMS

Yet the resurgent British Liberal Party is willing to enter Europe apparently on almost any terms. Despite the dissatisfaction of the overseas Prime Ministers, on the grounds of inadequacy and vagueness, with the terms already negotiated, and despite some rumblings of protest within the Conservative Party, it is generally agreed that the British Government came out of the Llandudno Party Conference a few weeks ago determined to enter the Market on better terms if it can get them but on existing terms if it cannot. Although some people believe that the terms on which the Labour Party will accept entrance are impossibly high, the Labour Party has not rejected entrance in principle; it only insists that certain conditions be met as the price of British adherence.

Moreover, many members of the Labour Party are profoundly unhappy about the official policy adopted by the Party's September Conference. They fear, and with some reason, that the Party's attitude toward the Common Market will turn into almost certain defeat what would, in the absence of the Common Market issue, be almost certain victory in the next general election.



THE MAN AT WORK — Symbolizes booming economy.

NOT CERTAIN

It is likely, therefore, though it is by no means certain, that Britain will soon become a member. And this is so despite the fact that the consequences for the Commonwealth are unpredictable and may be disastrous. It has been pointed out that the Commonwealth has survived the fact that only Britain and Canada belong to NATO and only Australia and New Zealand to the Anzus Pact; and the British Government professes to believe that the Commonwealth, having shown itself to be very adaptable in the past, will be able to adjust itself to British Membership in the European Economic Community.

But NATO and the Anzus Pact are primarily regional defence alliances and the fact that their adverse effect, if any, on the Commonwealth has proved to be slight, offers no real reassurance that the much more portentous event of British entry into Europe will be equally innocuous — especially if Britain lives up to the spirit of the obligation under the Treaty of Rome as she could — to promote the establishment of "an ever closer union". The Commonwealth might be able to survive the removal, for plausible reasons, of the economic underpinning of preferential or free entry of primary products into the British market. It is more doubtful whether it can survive, in any meaningful way, the close political integration of Britain into Europe. To some, the much-vaunted adaptability of the Commonwealth in the past looks in retrospect like a process of step-by-step adjustment toward a less meaningful existence and they fear that British entry into the Market will prove

to be the most significant step taken in that process.

Since, then, the economic advantages, if any, are small, and since the consequences to the Commonwealth may very well be extremely adverse, why is British entry likely?

POLITICAL

The reasons are almost entirely political. In the first place, the Common Market is there and is expected to remain there; it is strong and is expected to grow stronger; and the forces within it bearing it toward greater political unity are swelling. It is a hard, stubborn, inescapable, fact. The centuries-old British policy of preventing the domination of Europe by any single continental nation can now be carried out, as far as Western Europe is concerned, only within the Market. If France's confidence in her ability to dominate the Market be well founded, traditional British policy would require Britain to go in to check France. If, as is likely the case, French confidence derives more from her 'Folie de grandeur' and from certain real but temporary political and economic facts, rather than from a realistic assessment of the long-run possibilities, and if it is Western Germany, not France, that will soon be the dominant partner, the balance of power policy would require Britain to go in to check Germany.

In the past, competition for dominance in Europe was expressed through competing systems of alliance, largely external to one another, and Britain's balancing act consisted of throwing support to one or other of them. Today, the competition for dominance, if it takes place at all will take place within the tightly-knit Common Market. It may be unfortunate for Britain, but it is a fact, or so it seems, that she can now perform her balancing act only by permanent entry into "Europe."

In the past, however, the rise to dominance of a continental European power constituted a real threat to British security. Today, despite the enormous potentialities of the Common Market, with or without Britain, Western Europe is only a part of Europe, and the whole of Europe no longer cuts the figure it once did on the world stage. The threat to British existence and security does

not come from the military power of the Soviet bloc, from the tensions that exist because of that power, and from the possibilities that unsound and dangerous moves will be made in relation to the unresolved conflicts between the Soviet bloc and the West. British initiatives and restraints with respect to these conflicts since the war may not always have embodied perfect wisdom but Britain can hardly be blamed for not wanting to have little or no influence on the decisions taken by the West — decisions on which her own fate as well as that of the rest of the West depends.

CENTRAL REASON

This is the central reason why membership in the Common Market is considered essential by many Britons. Britain may have some fear of the eventual domination of the Common Market by Germany if she does not go in, but it is a fear of the influence that a Common Market so dominated will have on the policy of the West toward the Soviet Union. But even if the Market is not dominated by Germany, she fears the political influence of a "Europe" to which she does not belong. France currently shares German attitudes to many Cold War conflicts, notably so in the case of Berlin. Seen in this light, the old British policy of remaining aloof and attempting merely a balance of power no longer makes sense because dominance in Western Europe has already been achieved — if not by France or Germany individually, then by the Common Market countries collectively. And the further these countries move in the direction of closer political union, the easier it will be for them to speak with one voice on foreign policy.

The crucial question is, therefore, whether Britain will be more influential in the councils of the West within or without 'Europe'. Since the war, Britain has boasted of having a special or privileged position with the United States in the determination of western policy. There may have been something in this before 1958, when France was subject to extreme political instability, when the rapprochement between France and Germany had not gone as far as it now has, and when the Common Market had not shown its now undoubted strength. There may even have been something in

it as long as France was mired in the Algerian War. DeGaulle, for his own purposes, has accepted the existence of such a special position, has objected to it, and wants to put an end to it. But the prospect now is that "Europe" without Britain will soon become, if it has not already become, so strong economically, militarily, and politically, that Washington will have to listen to it more than it listens to Britain whether it wants to or not, and that talk of Britain's special position will become mere empty verbiage if it ever was anything else. Indeed, there is a possibility that "Europe" without Britain will become strong enough to constitute a "third force", capable of challenging the American leadership of the West and of initiating actions that would carry the approval of neither the United States nor Britain. Though the United States wants a united Europe for the sake of the economic, military and diplomatic strength of the West, it does not want that; and neither does Britain.

ACT AS LINK?

It is possible, of course, and it has been so argued, that by remaining aloof, Britain, could, even without occupying a privileged position, act as a link between an independent European "third force" and the United States and perform its balancing act between them. The consensus of opinion, both within and without Britain, seems to be that this is not likely and that outside "Europe" British influence will drastically decline. It is held that while she may not be able to take over the leadership of "Europe" if she enters, she will be better able within it than without to moderate its policies in the directions she deems desirable and to keep harmony between it and the United States. Since it is not to be expected that the other members of "Europe" will always unite against the British point of view on different aspects of world affairs, the British influence may often be decisive.

In addition to the economic and political factors, there are what Kitzinger calls the psychological and social factors. Despite the British reluctance to make whatever sacrifice of "sovereignty" membership involves, the challenge of the Common Market is to



THE HALIFAX SYMPHONY

On November 1, the Halifax Symphony Orchestra gave their first concert of the season. The attendance was estimated at 800, quite an increase since the symphony's beginnings in 1952 as a small string group. With the aid of the Canada Council, the government and the CBC, as well as support from the Halifax public, the orchestra has become professional.

Under the leadership of their conductor, Mr. Leo Mueller, the symphony has developed an ambitious program. A series of school concerts, for example, has proved to be not only educational but very popular as well among the students throughout the Atlantic provinces. Regular T.V. and radio concerts have made the symphony appreciated on a national scale. One of the busiest orchestras in Canada, it averages one performance every two days for the five-month season.

We felt Mr. Mueller's program Thursday night was somewhat pretentious. Weber's Overture to Euryanthe was a rather amusing attempt at program music, and the Schubert was a happy blend of

pretty little melodies, marred by atrocious tuning in the wind section.

In the second half of the program we were surprised and delighted to find Stravinsky's Pulcinella so obviously enjoyed by both audience and orchestra. Indeed the audience was so intrigued with cool trombone and jazzy rhythm that it went on listening blissfully for about a minute after the Suite was finished. Smetana's Moldau was a pleasantly undemanding finale.

Yet in spite of such a rewarding program, and at a time when Halifax is engaged in a spurt of growth, the Symphony Orchestra does not even have a regular home in which to practise.

Although audiences in other provinces have been extremely receptive to the symphony during its recent tour, many Haligonians prefer to stay at home with their record players instead of attending symphony concerts. Is the city of Halifax, so progressive in such matters as the building of shopping centres, going to accept calmly this lack of interest in its symphony orchestra?



JEUNESSES MUSICALES

Jeunesses Musicales' concert Oct. 28 was brought to Halifax under the efficient management of Mr. John Martin, who initiated the Halifax organization last spring. This series of concerts comes from the central organization in Montreal, and was chosen by a democratically elected board under Sir Ernest MacMillan, its national president. Membership in Halifax consists of some 160 students at present, and it is hoped that students will take advantage of the special \$2.00 fee for the season.

The first recital by Marek Jablonski made a tremendous impression upon those who had the stamina to endure an evening of unremitted romanticism. Jablonski showed restraint and feeling in his interpretation of the Mozart Fantasy, the Brahms and the Ravel. Chopin's B Minor Sonata was played with appropriately nationalistic fervor, particularly

MUSIC ROOM

At the beginning of this year it was found that the music listening facilities on campus were disgraceful. Those records that were kept in the Music Room were in such pitiful shape, that not even a Hun would have bothered ruining them—that job had already been taken care of by the students themselves. Not too long ago, Effie May Ross, of Vancouver, died and left some money to the university to be used for the Music Department. One of the first fruits of discussions by The Faculty has been the re-establishment of the Music Room as a place to listen to good music. A new stereo record player, a new piano, and some new records are the result of this. Further, to protect the equipment from misuse, paid monitors have been found to work in the Music Room during the week.

As of now, not too many new records have been bought, as expenditures this year are planned mostly for equipment. Those new records which have been procured, are mainly replacements for older destroyed records in the room. Mr. David Wilson is handling the choosing and purchasing of records at the present, however Dean Hicks said that if the students show enough genuine interest, he would welcome one of them to sit with the faculty committee when the records are being chosen. Needless to say it will take more than 8 students a day to prove interest.

moving in the nostalgic third classical and contemporary movement. The performer, however, seemed best suited to the music of Liszt, playing the Hungarian Rhapsody No. 12 with a bravura style like that of the composer himself. We were impressed with Jablonski's developing mastery of technique, and with his stage presence, although we regret that he had to take on the duties of the commentator. We also noted that the pianist's ability in the field of romantic music, might have been more balanced if it had included

works. Jablonski's command both of the piano and of his audience was such that he was brought back to play two encores, if that be any indication of his talent. The remaining concerts will present the violinist Andrew Dawes, winner of the Jeunesses Musicales contest for 1962; the Canadian Trio (flute, oboe and piano) and the Mixed Vocal Quartet. We anticipate with some delight Mr. Dawes' performance, which will be held at the Halifax School for the Blind on the last Sunday in November, at 8:30 p.m.

Record review

One wonders what Beethoven would have thought of all the interpretations given to his compositions. The Music Room has recently acquired a stereo recording of Bruno Walter conducting Beethoven's *Seventh Symphony*. Many critics feel that this work expresses military pomp, others see in it a procession in the catacombs, as in an old cathedral. Schumann believed the symphony portrayed the festivity of a village marriage ceremony, while Max found in it "a tale of Moorish knighthood." But music has a meaning of its own and it is perhaps not fair to attempt to compare it to other mediums of expression.

What is especially noticeable in *The Seventh Symphony* is the spontaneity of the music, although Beethoven's manuscripts reveal his many probings and rejections. The symphony races from sudden laughter which rises into ecstasy, to a gravity which becomes almost mournful. It is a symphony that, except for the second movement, cannot be listened to softly; it needs great spaces.

The Bruno Walter recording is distinctive from other interpretations through its emphasis on the individual instruments. This is most evident in the third movement: the bass tones soar up, underlining the melody so effectively that the instruments appear to be answering one another. But sure as the Walter recording is in its handling of rhythm and varying pace of the music, at times it seems almost to drag in comparison with the earlier Toscanini recording which is so dramatic as well as faster in pace; however, Toscanini's expression of this movement can sometimes become nearly discordant.

But the difference between the two director's interpretations is most noticeable in the second and fourth movements. Toscanini's recording reaches a great burst of ecstasy in the last movement, providing an apt illustration for Romain Rolland's comment that *The Seventh Symphony* is "the work of an inebriated man . . . but one intoxicated with poetry and genius." In comparison, Walter appears to lack the energy and forcefulness of his predecessor, and his rendition of the fourth movement is disappointing because of this. The first and second movements are the ones most beautifully played in Bruno Walter's recording. In the first movement especially, the ascending and descending of the melody is revealed very sensitively and subtly, without a jarring abruptness. Under Walter's direction, the second movement becomes even more powerful than the fourth and for this reason I prefer, in this particular recording to reverse the movements and listen to the second movement last. Unlike the Toscanini interpretation, Walter's second movement has a sadness that haunts one for a long time afterwards, yet it conveys a feeling of peace rather than of exaltation or depression. I don't think that even Toscanini achieves this haunting quality.

The Walter recording may not have the exuberance of Toscanini's, but it loses none of the symphony's strength and grandeur, nor does it lose the feeling of inevitability contained in all Beethoven's compositions, the impression that each note follows the other in a perfect sequence, so that one feels that no other note could have been possible. Leonard Bernstein describes Beethoven's music as leaving us "with the feeling that something is right in the world, that something checks throughout, something that follows its own laws consistently, something one can trust, that will never let us down." Of all the composers, Beethoven seems to illustrate best Romain Rolland's statement that "it's a fine thing, a musician's trade. It is to be God on earth."

Coming Events

Friday Nov. 23 — 'The Romantics'. An art film. Dunn Building. 8 p.m. Admission free.

Friday, Nov. 23-24 — The Nova Scotia One Act Play Festival. Prince Arthur Junior High School, Dartmouth.

Friday, Nov. 23, 8 p.m. — "The Ass and the Philosopher" (Gwynyth Jones) "Hello Out There" (William Saroyan) "In The Train" (Frank O'Connor)

Saturday, 2 p.m. — "Passion, Poison and Petrefaction" (Shaw) "The Twelve-Pound Look" (J. M. Barry) "Dust of the Road" (K. S. Goodman)

Saturday, 8 p.m. — "The Boor" (Chekhov) "Let There Be Farce" (Norman Walsh) "A Resounding Tinkle" (N. S. Simpson)

Sunday, Nov. 25 — Jeunesses Musicales Concert, Andrew Dawes, violinist. School for the Blind. 8:30 p.m. "Cinderella," A Russian Film of the Bolshoi Ballet. Hyland Theatre, 8:45 p.m.

Thursday, Nov. 29 — Halifax Symphony Orchestra. Andrew Dawes guest artist. Queen Elizabeth High School. 8 p.m. Program: Handel — Concerto grosso in B minor, op. 6 Mozart — Violin-concerto A major No. 5, KV 219 Beethoven — Symphony No. 1 in C major.

Sunday, Dec. 2 — Russian Opera Film: Eugene Onegin. Hyland Theatre. 8:45 p.m.

Sunday, Dec. 9 — "The Girl in Black". Halifax Film Society. Hyland Theatre. 2:30 p.m.

Political implications of Britain's entry

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many Britons an exhilarating one that appeals powerfully to the imagination. They feel that by staying out Britain will miss the bus that is on the road to an exciting future. And there are many others who believe that membership will lead to closer cultural ties that will immeasurably enrich the artistic and social life of Britain.

In the meantime the Conservative Party desperately needs, for

immediate electoral reasons, entry on terms acceptable to the British people. Equally desperate the Labour Party needs for electoral reasons failure of the Conservatives to obtain acceptable terms. Both are in a very tricky position. De Gaulle, having a veto and owing to the Conservatives' need, is in a strong position but he may yet overreach himself. After De Gaulle goes, France may well be less demanding. But there is a

tide of British entry is at the flood and that Britain, having spurned its opportunity of the mid-fifties, must take it at once. My own view, for what it is worth, is that deferment would not be fatal; that the pressures in Britain, Europe, and America that are pushing Britain into Europe are too powerful and permanent to be irked by the failure of a first attempt.



What happens to the Commonwealth if the UK enters the Common Market?

The British Government's decision to apply for membership in the European Economic Community has aroused a vigorous public inquiry both into the nature of British economic interests and into the value of the Commonwealth. The British are called upon to assess the potential value of Commonwealth trade as compared with that of the Common Market; they have to inquire whether Britain can afford to endanger the basic structure of the Commonwealth for the sake of uncertain, and perhaps illusory, economic advantages. If Britain decides to join the European Community, her commercial relations with the Commonwealth will have to be radically readjusted and adequate arrangements will have to be secured to safeguard the vital trading interests of the various countries of the Commonwealth.

Differences of Opinion

All these difficult problems are characterized and bedevilled by wide differences of opinion, even amongst so-called economic experts. Various emotional reactions and patriotic prejudices are also called into play, and so many unknown factors are involved that statistics can be recklessly employed to substantiate any eccentric point of view. Politicians of the British Labour Party and little Englanders who, for one reason or another, want to stay out of Europe have no difficulty in finding a stock of plausible arguments and convenient excuses ready to hand. Since economic experts offer no positive guidance, and public opinion is hopelessly divided, statesmen responsible for taking the final decisions can only weigh the possibilities, and for the rest, fall back on intelligent guess-work. They can only estimate what economic advantages Britain can hope to gain by entry into the Common Market. No one can tell how Commonwealth trade will develop in the next decade or so, or what effect a decision to remain outside the European Community would have on the British economy.

Everyone in the British Isles is agreed that if the standard of living is to be raised, Britain must have an expanding market for her exports. Some Englishmen believe that it would be very rash to assert that in future years the rate of growth of demand in the European Community, to which the United Kingdom now sells only about 15 per cent of total exports, will continue to be markedly higher than the rate of growth in the countries of the Commonwealth, to which Britain sends almost 40 per cent of her exports. In fact there has recently been a noticeable decline in the exceptionally high rate of economic growth of the six members of the European Community. The most that can be said is that Britain's entry might perhaps mean association with a more rapidly growing market; it would certainly mean association with what is at present a much smaller area. Furthermore, there is a distinct danger that the Community will become a selfish, closed trading block, whose relations with the rest of the world will represent nothing more enlightened than economic imperialism.

The supporters of the Common Market maintain, however, that even in the most advantageous circumstances, the Commonwealth does not offer anything like as fruitful a potential market for Britain as Western Europe. Neither in total buying power, nor in the structure of its demand, does it offer Britain a comparable opportunity. Membership of European Economic Community would remove barriers to British exports in the more fruitful market; conversely, the pattern within the Commonwealth has, with very few exceptions, tended towards the maintenance, and even the extension, of high tariff obstructions to British goods. In the past the Commonwealth countries have not done

as much as they might to help in the solution of this major problem, and they are certainly not now disposed to grant increased preferences to British goods.

Complementary Economics

Thirty years ago the Commonwealth could with some justification have been regarded as an area of complementary economies which solved its own commercial difficulties and which could well afford to be segregated by a system of tariffs and preferences from the rest of the world. The pattern of trade which the Ottawa Agreements recognized was a simple, almost bilateral system, under which the dominions exchanged raw materials and agricultural produce for British manufactured goods. Since 1932, however, considerable changes have taken place both in the value of the preference margins and in the pattern of intra-Commonwealth trade. It would now be shortsighted policy to allow the supposed sanctity of the Ottawa Agreements to obscure the current realities of world trade or the changing structure of Commonwealth economic interests.

It has been made quite clear that in 1962 few Commonwealth countries want to negotiate new and stronger preferences. They rightly want to diversify their economies, and in most instances they have already developed manufacturing industries of their own which they intend to protect and foster by tariffs. More and more the dominions meet their requirements of consumer goods, and even some capital goods, out of domestic production, with the result that their overseas buying becomes more diversified and more selective. The result of these changes in the pattern of demand can be seen in the declining importance of Britain's export trade with the Commonwealth, which has fallen from around 50 per cent of total exports in 1957 to below 40 per cent in 1961. At the same time the preferences granted to British goods have declined in overall importance, until they are now enjoyed by as little as 20 per cent of total British exports. Many Commonwealth countries accord Britain no concessions at all, and in the case of manufactured goods, preference generally takes the form of lower and not zero duties. But while preference margins have thus declined in recent years from 15 to 11 per cent, they still consti-

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from country to country, and from commodity to commodity. New Zealand sends over 56 per cent of her total exports to the United Kingdom, but India only 27 per cent, Australia 25 per cent, Pakistan and Canada 17 per cent. Roughly half of these exports receive preferences, which now average 4 per cent as compared with 10 per cent in 1937, and which vary from 2 per cent on raw materials to 12 per cent on manufactured goods. Nevertheless, while the United Kingdom is still the best single customer for all Commonwealth countries except Canada, the proportion of their exports to Britain has been steadily declining. Only a minority of these countries still regard the United Kingdom, in the long run, as their most promising market.

It would therefore be broadly true to say that in recent years the overall value of intra-Commonwealth trade had been gradually shrinking. Moreover, the volume of trade between primary producing countries and industrial nations, into which category much Commonwealth trade still falls, is expanding at a much less vigorous rate than that between industrialized countries. But whatever the precise current value of imperial preferences, Britain has some moral, if not commercial obligation to secure equivalent concessions. For without the negotiation of special arrangements, British entry into the Common Market would mean much more than simply the abolition of imperial preferences: Commonwealth trade would be faced with severe discriminations in favour of the Six and their associated

have specifically requested the complete removal of duties on these commodities. But the European Community are much more likely to agree to some form of tariff quotas—that is, the temporary exemption from duties of an agreed volume of imports.

The tropical products of Africa, Asia and the West Indies create a special problem, since European tariffs might be used to protect the old colonial territories of France against Commonwealth producers. Under the Treaty of Rome a form of associated membership has been devised whereby the exports of these French African territories, such as Morocco and Tunisia, are admitted duty-free into the Common Market. Association might similarly be granted to certain individual members of the Commonwealth in Africa and the Caribbean whose tropical products would not seriously compete with those of existing associated territories. But many nations with recently-won independence from British rule are sufficiently jealous of their international integrity to be profoundly suspicious of the political implications of the political economic status might seem to imply.

Temperate foodstuffs, such as Canadian wheat and New Zealand dairy produce, present the most intractable problem since these agricultural commodities are already produced by members of the European Community. Unless Commonwealth countries can be assured of comparable outlets to those which they now enjoy in the United Kingdom, their economies will be very seriously affected by existing rate of European tariffs. In the extreme case of New Zealand, whose economy is almost entirely dependent on its exports of dairy produce, the effect might well be disastrous. But Canada, too, is concerned to secure further concessions for her vital exports of wheat, which to Britain alone are worth \$140m a year. Otherwise the level of European duties on imported wheat will be sufficiently high to exclude a large proportion of Canadian wheat from the British Market.

Particularly Difficult

Negotiation on these foodstuffs is particularly difficult because the six members of the Community must enforce Britain's adherence to their common agricultural policy. Both in absolute quantities, and also as a percentage of total

than lower duties and specific quarantines.


Most Commonwealth manufacturers are admitted duty-free into the United Kingdom. The volume of import from the more industrialised dominions to Britain is relatively small, except in the case of Canada which supplies over half of these imports, valued at \$132m a year. Canada alone would therefore feel the loss of preference in the British market and the full effect of the European tariff of up to 25 per cent on manufactured goods. Manufactures from the less developed countries of Asia give rise to a more precise problem. The future economic development of these backward areas depends upon an expanding export trade, because it is only by this means that they will be able to buy capital equipment, foodstuffs and raw materials from the more developed countries. This is a desirable object of international politics, as well as a strictly economic problem. Some agreement has already been reached on trade relations between an enlarged European Community and India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The existing tariff of 18 per cent on tea, for example, will be eliminated, and the tariff on textiles will be applied in four stages. Even more comprehensive agreements, to be negotiated before the end of 1969, might result in further trading concessions, as well as an increased supply of capital and technical assistance.

It is not only in terms of quotas and tariffs, however, nor of trade generally, that Britain's entry into the Common Market might deal a blow to the Commonwealth. At present, Britain provides the dominions with economic aid and a steady supply of credits. With the notable exception of Canada, Commonwealth countries have enjoyed almost exclusive preferential access to the London money market. Large sums have been channelled to the overseas territories through welfare funds, through the Commonwealth Development Corporation, and more recently through the Commonwealth Development Finance Company. In these various ways Commonwealth membership has carried with it considerable financial advantages. Although these benefits are not directly at issue in the Brussels negotiations, the Commonwealth can reasonably ask for some assurance that they will not in fact disappear.

Last, but not least, Commonwealth citizens, as British subjects, possess a privileged status in the British labour market. Although the recent Commonwealth Immigration Act has severely limited this privilege, it is still true that Commonwealth citizens enjoy a superiority in status over foreigners. It would do enormous damage to the Commonwealth ideal if, as a result of British membership of the Common Market, citizens of the European Community could travel to Britain to look for work, while Commonwealth citizens could not enter unless they already had employment or some means of support. It is over issues such as this that imperial ties might be seriously weakened, in a way which is not reflected in the simple arithmetical cost of British membership of the Community, measured in terms of tariffs and quotas.

No Easy Solutions

It is obvious that there are no neat and easy solutions to the Commonwealth's economic problems. Most of them are not in fact simply European or Commonwealth problems; they are world problems of a magnitude that cannot satisfactorily be settled with the small, diverse framework of the Commonwealth, nor even within the European Economic Community itself. These economic difficulties have certainly not been created by the Common Market, nor by Britain's application for membership of it. They have merely been brought thereby into the focus of world attention, where they are at last securing the recognition and consideration they deserve. In the long term, the interests of producers everywhere would be promoted by the conclusion of general trade agreements, and there are indications, as in President Kennedy's recent proposals on American commercial policy, that such agreements are not as visionary as they once appeared. Provided that the trading in-



tute important concessions, particularly for British chemical and engineering industries, and their present total value has been assessed at around £70m a year. The surrender of these preferences, which is the price of Britain's admission into the Common Market, is undoubtedly being used as a strong bargaining point with which to secure for the Commonwealth commercial advantages that might substantially offset the losses which they will sustain in the British market.

It is the abolition of preferential treatment for Commonwealth imports in Britain, however, which presents the really difficult problem. It is impossible to estimate accurately the value of existing imperial preferences, which vary

overseas territories in the British and European market. In order to lessen the impact of this system of tariffs, the British Government have been trying at Brussels to negotiate special terms for the various categories of Commonwealth products.

Raw Materials

Commonwealth exports of raw materials, such as Australian wool will not in general be adversely affected because the external tariff of the Common Market on most of these commodities is already zero. But five products which now enter the United Kingdom free of duty—aluminium, lead, zinc, wood pulp and newsprint—would be subject to a small tariff. At the urgent prompting of Canadians, the British Government

domestic consumption, the United Kingdom is a larger importer of foodstuffs than any of the Six. As a member of an enlarged Community Britain would be forced to buy up surpluses of French wheat and Dutch butter at high guaranteed prices before imports from Canada and New Zealand could be admitted. Then again, agriculture within the Community is sufficiently productive to meet the major needs of domestic consumption, and therefore to warrant tariffs that will protect European farmers against Commonwealth producers. Special concessions for Commonwealth countries have still to be agreed, but they are more likely to take the form of world-wide trading agreements, with tariff quotas over a transitional period,

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Bad taste mars first showing

By ESU MUNDI

The first production of the Halifax Film Society was marred by taste in the choice of films. The first few movies, sprightly and original, set the audience at their ease; then the unexpected showing of a French film about German concentration camps made them sick in their stomachs.

We are, of course, not questioning the desirability of presenting such documents to the public. We question only the propriety of interpolating such a film into a programme of otherwise light entertainment.

People who had spent the previous hour laughing were taken aback by the sight of naked, starved men and women; piles of bodies bulldozed into open graves; and heads carried by the armful to fuming crematoria. Atrocities without end, stark, macabre, horrifying.

And then the evening continued in the initial humorous vein. An animated cartoon; a photo-story of the Alpine stock car rally; a clever and original English trick film.

The evening concluded with a documentary study of the tawdry life of Canadian celebrity Paul Anka. The adolescent idolotry accorded this 45 RPM hero was the occasion of incredulous howls of merriment from the audience. But our Features Editor, Mr. Leslie Cohen, expressed his concern at this disturbing phenomenon of the American Way of Life.

The succeeding two films shown by the Film Society went some way towards making up for the initial blunder. "The Gates of Hell," a Japanese production, met with unqualified praise. And "The Great Adventurer," a Swedish nature film by the noted Arne Sucksdorf, impressed and delighted the audience.

The success of the latter film derived from its poetic appreciation of natural life. Far from idealizing the animal world in the fashion of Daddy Disney, Arne Sucksdorf captured the primaevial quality of animal existence in its very atavistic nuance.

The fox eats the chicken, the farmer shoots the fox, less agile beasts fall prey to the lynx, and old Emile the fisherman stalks his rival the otter. Nasty, brutal, and short, as Hobbes would have said.

But this harshest of epics was presented with a moving lyricism that somehow gave beauty to the crudeness and grandeur to the savagery.



Margaret Mercer and Eric Hyst, who recently appeared with the Ballets Canadiens at the Capitol Theatre in Halifax, perform the Pas de Deux from the Black Swan.

McGILL CONFERENCE STRESSES NEW EUROPE

By PETER HAYDEN

The recent McGill Conference on World Affairs laid special emphasis on the effects of the European Common Market. Addresses were delivered by eminent speakers and discussions were held between the assembled delegates on central problems brought out by the speakers. It is with these problems that I shall deal in this article (the essence of the speech by Prof. S.E. Harris of Harvard on the challenge of the Common Market is reproduced elsewhere in this supplement).

The consensus of the discussion group in which this writer participated was that the Common Market would be beneficial to the world as well as to Europe, that Britain's entry into the association should not be hindered by the objections of Commonwealth countries, and that Britain would gain from such affiliation. Delegates felt that there was little likelihood of a movement towards political unity, especially in view of the recent attitudes of France. The entry of Britain would, impede such a trend.

EFFECT ON

UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS

Some delegates contended, however, that the industrial growth of the underdeveloped countries would be retarded by the tendency on the part of the Common Market to use them only as sources of raw materials. As a result, large areas might be laid open to Russian influence and infiltration. Such contentions, in the opinion of this writer, betray a mistrust of the Common Market that is, in light of concessions already made to the underdeveloped countries, largely unfounded. The success of the underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa depends in the long run on the degree of unity they can achieve in their dealings with the Common Market members.

The Common Market, it was stressed, was not intended to be a completely independent economic unit and there would still be trade with the rest of the world. In fact, while imports from Common Market countries rose 37 per cent from 1958 to 1961, imports to the Common Market from non-Common Market countries rose 25 per cent in the same period. Canada's trade has at the same time shifted from Britain to the E.C.M.

One of the problems considered was the effect of the entry of numerous, presently unaffiliated, countries. As of now, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom have applied for full membership, while Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey are seeking associate status. A treaty arranging for the association of Greece has already been signed. Certainly, the difficulties that the Common Market is experiencing in regard to the co-ordination of social and economic policies will be increased by such extension of membership.

The policy of the Common Market in respect to neutrality will not ease the entry of nations like Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. But whereas Austria's neutrality is not of her own choosing, the neutrality of Switzerland has been dictated largely by conflict between the French and German elements in the country itself.

KENNEDY TRADE BILL

The Kennedy Trade Bill was considered by delegates to be a well-advised move on the part of the U.S. in meeting the challenge of the Common Market. Indeed, some delegates expressed their surprise that the traditionally protectionist American Congress had consented to the Bill,

notwithstanding concessions made to the glass, carpet textile and oil industries.

The bill allows the President of the U.S. to eliminate tariffs completely on categories of commodities in which the U.S. and Common Market control 80 per cent of the world trade. Although only one category fits this description at the moment, i.e. aircraft, if Britain enters the E.C.M. some 80 categories will be comprehended by the Bill's provisions. But there has as yet been no indication that the Common Market is willing to throw open its doors to American products in exchange for American tariff concessions.

New French-Canadian novel: stomach's eye view of girl

By PAUL McISAAC

Marie-Claire Blais

The Canadian novel has maintained a level of often stolid conventionalism in the face of a more progressive trend which has occupied writers of other nationalities. Whereas the writers of the United States and Great Britain have treated the dissatisfaction and rebellion of their post-war generations, and whereas those of France have become enamoured of chosisme, the Canadian author has been content to stick to the well-beaten path, offering little challenge or stimulation.

Marie-Claire Blais, in her novel *Mad Shadows*, has taken a step in a new direction. *Mad Shadows*, a novel probing the relationship of a girl to her mother and brother, purports to explore, in the fashion of Baudelaire, the most secret essence of existence. The girl, incredibly homely, despises her simple-minded brother because of his great physical beauty. The mother lavishes all her attention on the boy, giving little more than perfunctory attention to the girl. When the mother takes a lover - and weds him - the girl seduces a blind boy into marrying her, having convinced him that she is beautiful. By the book's end, the blind boy has regained his sight and fled the deception, the girl has scalded and disfigured her brother, the mother suffers a dis-

figuring cancer, and the family home is burnt to the ground by the boy.

Miss Blais builds up her story with a chaotic succession of bizarre events, and sick, sick psychology. The novel is quite effective, in the development of its strange tale, but it lacks power because of the narrow range of Miss Blais' imagination. The absolute inversion of theme shocks, touches, always holds the interest, but rather as one may be interested in the deliberate murder of a captured fly.

Perhaps when she has distilled her imaginative powers to a more acceptable essence, and learned to develop the glimmer of compassion evident in *Mad Shadows*, Miss Blais will produce a novel of more significance. It is the step which is important.

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DAYS
UNTIL
?

What happens -

- Continued From Page Three -

terests of the Commonwealth can be adequately safeguarded, a closer association with the enlarged Community might result in considerable economic benefits for all. In the short term, however, Britain's entry into the Common Market will inevitably mean economic sacrifices all round. It has been estimated that Canada, for example, would lose exports sales to the value of \$200m a year.

Exactly what terms will constitute adequate safeguards for the vital trading interests of the Commonwealth no one has yet determined. Some dominions have even found it impossible to state which interests are truly vital, and which relatively trivial. But most of them have indicated that Britain's present concessions from the Community do not sufficiently protect their economic interests, and the degree to which they fall short has determined the vehemence with which they have individually opposed British entry into the Common Market. Indeed, the Commonwealth Prime Minister, invited to comment on the possible disadvan-

tages of Britain's entry, have naturally made the most of the opportunity, vigorously airing complaints and warnings. Almost without exception they strongly urged the British Government to sacrifice, if necessary, its own interests, in the name of the Commonwealth. This was a clever and powerful appeal: the concept of the Commonwealth still possess great emotional significance even if it cannot be precisely defined. And yet, at the same time the speeches of these imperial advocates were deliberately dictated by their own narrow national self-interest. Take Australia and New Zealand with living standards amongst the highest in the world. Passionately they plead that no restrictions be placed on their exports of temperate foodstuffs, and that they should be guaranteed the right to compete on equal terms with European farmers. Yet neither country will reduce its prices sufficiently to enable fellow Commonwealth countries, India and Pakistan, to import the food they so badly need. Why? Because this might mean a lower standard of living. Sir Alexander Bustamante spoke for many when he talked about "a surgeon's knife thrust into the body of the Commonwealth", but it was odd to hear such sentiments from a man whose party broke up the Carib-

bean Federation so that Jamaica need not share her wealth with her poorer neighbours. Equally typical was the attitude of Mr. Diefenbaker, who shook a most magisterial and disapproving head over the shortcomings of Brussels, and who was severely reprimanded by the British press for his pains. Yet even he can hardly imagine that the substitution of European tariffs for imperial preference would place Canada in real danger of becoming, as one commentator put it, "a sort of Manchuria-with-hockey players!"

What Hope?

If maternal instincts and the fear of losing economic advantages determine the attitude of the various Commonwealth leaders to Britain's entry into the Common Market, what hope is there for the future of the Commonwealth? In the older white dominions the emotional basis of the Commonwealth tradition is still strong—sufficiently so for them to want to preserve an informal membership. But the newly independent members do not share this emotional attachment, except perhaps in the case of the West Indies. Whether such matters as defence, democratic ideal and parliamentary traditions are still common interests is much open to doubt. Ghana's comments about colonialism and imperialism, al-

beit more radical than most, are echoed by countries like Nigeria, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Nor is a belief in the British form of democracy any longer a binding force of the Commonwealth. African states who have inherited the parliamentary machinery of Westminster, nearly all tend towards one-party political systems. If fundamental economic ties are broken, membership of the Commonwealth will then offer these newer nations little more than a vague, though genuine, spirit of fellowship, a common language, and a more influential international standing. At the same time, the Commonwealth has everything to lose if it ceases to represent amongst its ranks peoples of various races and traditions from many continents; a Commonwealth restricted to the white dominions will have no more importance in the world than an old soldiers' association.

Finally, there remains a substantial core of misgiving about the effect which closer political ties with Europe will have on the tenuous structure of the Commonwealth. So far the political implications of Britain's entry into the Common Market have been almost entirely submerged by the vigorous economic debate. The six existing members of the Community

have openly declared political union or federation to be their ultimate goal, but its exact form is a matter for speculation, and progress towards it will undoubtedly be very gradual and pragmatic. Time alone can provide the answer to this question. There can be no doubt, however, that the disappearance of already slender political cohesion would be far less fatal to the Commonwealth than the elimination of its fundamental basis of common economic self-interest. This is the major, immediate problem. By the way the negotiations are proceeding, it seems likely that the essential trading interests of the Afro-Asian nations will in general be adequately safeguarded; it is the old white dominions who will have to make the greatest economic sacrifices, at least in the short term. Will they, despite complaints, do this, in the belief that Britain's entry into the Common Market will in the long run strengthen the economic foundations of the Commonwealth as a whole? I think they will.

Certainly they themselves have offered no alternative solution within the existing imperial framework of preferential trading relations which would satisfactorily resolve Britain's current economic dilemma.

The economic impact of the ECM on the Inner Six

"Formation of the Common Market did not bring about the rapid rate of economic growth in Europe; rather, Europe's rapid rate of growth made the Common Market possible." This observation was made by Prof. Harry Johnson of the Economic Department of the University of Chicago at the Mount Allison Summer Institute in August of this year. Prior to Johnson's mild bombshell, the Institute participants, who were discussing the broad subject of "Canada, the Commonwealth, and the Common Market," had appeared to accept without dissent the proposition that the formation of a Common Market would inevitably increase the economic welfare of the member nations.

In support of this idea, had not the "Reader's Digest" just published a list of "before and after" prices, showing dramatically how the formation of the European Common Market had lowered substantially the prices of a number of consumer goods? Did not everybody know that by creating a "mass market" of 170 million persons the Common Market would enable European manufacturers to duplicate American production techniques, and, thereby, the American standard of living? Surely it was obvious that the increased competition which would result from reduction in tariffs could be nothing but benefic-

ial? And anyway, the "wind of change" sweeping over Europe would so revitalize the Old World that, with hard work, low taxes and cooperative trade unions, the millennium would be just around the corner.

Academically Obtuse?

With all of these arguments, Dr. Johnson begged leave to differ. In the space available, I propose to discuss more fully some of these points in an attempt to assess whether Johnson was simply being academically obtuse in refusing to accept the "common-sense-man-of-the-world" point of view, or whether he had a real point to make.

Valid Reasons

There are a number of valid reasons for supposing that the formation of a Common Market might be economically beneficial to the participating countries. (The question as to whether and to what extent these benefits may be at the expense of outsiders is another question, of course). The two defining characteristics of a "common market" from an economic point of view are (1) an agreement among members to eliminate all tariffs on goods transported from one member country to another,



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and (2) an agreement that all members will impose the same tariff rate on goods moving into the common market area from outside. As many people have pointed out, the six countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) which signed the Rome Treaty on March 25, 1957, have made commitments which go beyond mere agreements to adjust tariff rates, and for this reason the term "European Economic Community" (E.E.C.) is probably a more meaningful designa-

tion than "European Common Market." However, up to the present time the implementation of the Rome Treaty has been largely confined to those sections dealing with tariff adjustments. Implementations of the provisions relating to the common transport policy, the free movement of labour and capital, and the coordination of national monetary and fiscal policies, has been slight. For this reason, attention here will be focused upon the effects of reducing tariff barriers.

Proponents of the case for the economic benefits of customs unions use a multitude of arguments but it is impossible to isolate three of the most important. For ease of reference they can be labelled the "economies of scale" argument, the "benefits of competition" argument and the "psychological impact" argument.

The "economies of scale" argument, as indeed are each of the others, is perfectly straightforward and plausible. Modern techniques of production for many commodities are such that low unit costs can be achieved only by producing a large output. By increasing the size or "scale" of a factory, a manufacturer can install assembly-line techniques that will enable him to employ labour most efficiently, and he can make use of specialized and expensive capital equip-

ment. Although total installation or "overhead" costs will be high, the "overhead" cost per unit of the product in question will be low if a sufficient volume of output produced.

Under certain conditions, the larger the output, the lower will be the final cost of production per unit, and hence the lower the price paid by the consumer. However, a manufacturer faced with a small domestic market may not be able to produce at a level of output large enough to reduce his average pro-

duction costs to a minimum. Example is no exception. The growth rates of the Common Market countries were equally impressive prior to 1958, and, lest someone claim that this merely proves the efficacy of the "psychological impact" argument, rates of growth were high, even prior to June 1955, the earliest date at which anyone could reasonably have anticipated the formation of the Common Market. The high growth rates subsequent to 1958 do not, therefore, provide conclusive proof of the beneficial economic effects of the Common Market, since an equally impressive performance was registered before 1958. In fact, one author, Mr. Lamfalussy of Belgium, has shown that after one allows for various cyclical influences, it is not possible to say that the Common Market has had any detectable effect upon the growth rates.

"Benefits of Competition"

The "benefits of competition" argument is not an argument along "Capitalism vs Socialism" lines, as some might imagine, but rather an argument along even hoarier battle-lines, "Free Trade vs Protection." Generally speaking, and with certain exception, tariffs give rise to an uneconomic allocation of scarce resources since they encourage manufacturers to produce products which can be produced at a lower cost somewhere else. The so-called "tariff-wall" prevents the foreign manufacturer from underselling his domestic counterpart, the consumer paying in the form of higher prices for the privilege of keeping the high-cost producer in business. Removal of the tariff, it is argued, forces the domestic producer to meet foreign competition or to go out of business, and either way to reduce costs, in the latter he will have found a more productive line of work to which to devote his talents. Moreover, consumers gain from reduced prices.

The "psychological impact" argument, as I have termed it, is somewhat less mechanical and precise in its implications, but nevertheless it too can be articulated in a simple way which is not too much of a caricature. Businessmen, feeling that the formation of a common market is bound to give rise to an increase in the incomes of most individuals, increase their expenditures on plant and equipment in order to have factories ready to meet the additional requirements of the lucky recipients. As any post-1936 graduate of Economics 1 should know, increased expenditure on factories will itself give rise to an increase in national income. Therefore, even though the Common Market "by itself" may have no expansionary effect on national income, because businessmen thought it would have had an effect in this direction it will have such an effect.

Having gone this far, adding along the way certain qualifications and amendments which in no way change the substance of the argument many writers proceed to trot out a number of figures which show that, since the inception of the European Common Market on January 1, 1958, the economies of the six countries involved all have experienced rates of growth which are substantial, impressive and some multiple (usually two) of some other country's growth rate. (The other country is either the US or the UK: occasionally, however, one reads "Canada" at this point.) With a brief farewell not to the arguments which led the reader to anticipate this happy conclusion, the author concludes with the pious expression of a hope for even larger growth rates in the future.

Ask For Yourself

In order to avoid cluttering up the page with numbers, the reader is invited to check for himself that the growth rates of the Six have in fact been substantial and impressive, and double Canada's growth rate since 1958. As any post-350 B.C. graduate of Philosophy 1 should know, however, "post hoc" arguments of this type often prove treacherous. The present ex-

ample is no exception. The growth rates of the Common Market countries were equally impressive prior to 1958, and, lest someone claim that this merely proves the efficacy of the "psychological impact" argument, rates of growth were high, even prior to June 1955, the earliest date at which anyone could reasonably have anticipated the formation of the Common Market. The high growth rates subsequent to 1958 do not, therefore, provide conclusive proof of the beneficial economic effects of the Common Market, since an equally impressive performance was registered before 1958. In fact, one author, Mr. Lamfalussy of Belgium, has shown that after one allows for various cyclical influences, it is not possible to say that the Common Market has had any detectable effect upon the growth rates.

What, then, is one to make of the various arguments outlined above which purport to show that the formation of a Common Market would have a beneficial impact? The answer would appear to be that while logically sound, their empirical significance is slight. "Economies of scale" will increase productivity if there are any economies to be exploited. However, most of the countries forming the Common Market are in themselves large enough to enable manufacturers to take full advantage of the economies of mass production. Countries with populations of tens of millions are sufficiently large to support most industries, the main exceptions being atomic energy and commercial aircraft. The "benefits of competition" accruing from the lowering of trade barriers will tend to improve the allocation of resources, as consumers switch from high to low-cost producers, but in the over-all picture the net result may be small. Johnson has calculated that, should Britain join the Common Market, the total "once-for-all" gain from this source would be about 5% of its national income, and Scitovsky has estimated an even smaller gain for Continental countries. (See The Free Trade Proposals, ed G. D. N. Worswick, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1960, p 136). Finally, although its very nature prevents an accurate measurement of its effect, the "Psychological impact" argument taken by itself neglects the other factors which contributed to Europe's investment boom throughout the whole period of the 1950's.

Useful Key

Two thoughts will be presented in concluding. The second part of Johnson's comment, to the effect that Europe's expansion made the Common Market possible, provides a useful key to understanding the ease with which the whole affair was consummated. Economic prosperity not only made it easier for any disturbance and adjustments to be smoothed out, but it also sweetened somewhat the political implications of the Rome Treaty. Finally, the arguments put forward by the British Government in support of its application to pin the E.E.C. are relevant to the general theme presented here: a careful reading of the Government's case does not reveal any precise statement as the economic benefits to be derived by Britain from closer association with the Six, nor does the Government seem at all confident that there will be any net gain worth speaking of. This approach may be dictated by Britain's peculiar position vis-a-vis Six and the Commonwealth. It may also, however, be a realistic appraisal of the situation.

McGill Conference on World Affairs: Problems of the Common Market

(From the Mc Gill Daily)

The European Trade Union has done extremely well up to date, with respect to growth and trade, but the crucial problem still remains unanswered: Will the European Common Market and the countries outside it ever achieve a balance of trade?

Professor S. E. Harris, Professor of Political Economy at Harvard, explained why the problem is so acute at the first session of MCWA last night. As a background, he gave statistics to show how much better the West European countries, collectively, have fared in the last seven years than either Britain, Canada, or the United States.

The problems amongst the countries themselves, such as France's high tariff on manufactured goods, and Germany's high tariff on agricultural products, have been more or less settled. But the problems of the United Kingdom and of the United States and Canada involve their whole trade balance.

In general, a country which does well will export more than it imports, and this will tend to produce an unfavorable balance of payments. The European countries do not have this problem, partly because of the economic revolution that has taken place, and partly because they trade amongst themselves.

Developed Stable System

The European countries have developed a stable economic system for many reasons. There has been an increase in the size of the business unit, which reduces the cost of production, and goods have been produced more effectively. The United States has sent in capital,

trained technologists, and the tourist trade. The large countries outside this trade union are beginning to feel its growth and are preparing either to fight the Market or to co-operate with it.

In expectation of the effect of the European Common Market, the United States has introduced its "trade expansion program" which will change the trade policy to provide negotiation with the Market. Parts of this program include reducing the tariff between the USA and other countries by 50% within 5 years; and eventually completely eliminating tariffs where the USA and the Common Market countries control 80% of the trade.

The United States has fared poorly over the last seven years in comparison with the trade expansion of the countries of Western Europe. Methods to change this state of affairs have not yet been successfully devised.

Devaluation Suggested

The devaluation of American currency in terms of French or German money has been suggested, and refused for various reasons; the prestige of the government would fall. Russia and South Africa would receive a subsidy if the price of gold increased, and the European countries might not be cooperative.

Further suggestions to step up the trade of the States include making additional reserves available, and setting up an international trade organization. Neither of these have been put into effect.

The United Kingdom faces loss of trade with the Commonwealth nations if it joins the Common

Market, and thus it is very hesitant about entering. It only started to consider the possibility of entering after the Trade Union was well formed, and this put it at a disadvantage.

Britain stated that they were a higher wage country than any of the West European countries. Today, this argument no longer holds water, as Italy is the only country which has a relatively low wage per hour.


Protected by Trade

Some Commonwealth countries will be protected by their large trade, such as Canada, which exports \$4,000,000 worth of wheat each year. But Australia, whose wheat is less in quantity and poorer in quality, will suffer through the high export tariff which Britain will be forced to impose on her.

This Common Market tariff would reduce the special privileges Britain now gives the Commonwealth countries, and would raise the prices of the commodities which Britain receives from these countries. The only benefit Britain would acquire would be a reduction in taxes on foreign goods.

The final point to be considered is the benefit of the Common Market to the under-developed countries. One economist states, "The United Kingdom program is to help the rich West European countries, at the expense of the under-developed ones." This may well be true and constitutes another of the many problems that the European Common Market will have to resolve before it can be completely effective and successful.

THE BALLAD SINGER



Sunlight, move softly in this room.
 Touch the worn carpet, the table,
 The doily on it,
 The teacup, and the little book of sonnets.
 Kindle with March beams the bowl
 Of daffodils, and in the corner glow
 On the canary perched there like a tropic fruit
 Strange in a winter land. Shrill and high
 His penny-whistle song
 Flickers across the room to join
 The worn piano, faintly out of tune.
 My fading fingers touch the aging keys
 (My touch uncertain now, and once so firm)
 And now I sing, where there are none to hear,
 The ballads that I loved when I was young.


"A ship I had
 In the North Countree
 And she went by the name
 Of the Golden Vanity" . . .

Once there were minstrels,
 Now only such as I
 Who wistfully recall
 An age they did not know,
 A stronger age, grim, sinning, bold, beautiful.
 Now in the dim spring light
 Through this poor room,
 Four tiny walls, and an old voice singing,
 Pass bloody knights, the ladyes that they loved,
 Incestuous lovers,

Fouly murdered kings,
 Warriors with ruddy swords,
 Bowers, and sinking ships,
 Brave deeds, and kisses from a true love's lips
 "Out of his grave grew a red, red rose,
 And from her grave a brier" . . .

But what have I to do with songs like these?
 Merely a pastime, nothing more.
 Quiet my life has been, respectable,
 Here in this sheltered street, this pretty room,
 My canary, and my singing, and my books—
 Life is not unhappy, so I sing.
 Lightly the sunlight slips across the room . . .
 The ballads busy me all afternoon.

— Margaret Anne Doody



Where Are You Going?

Out --

he said.

Quietly and efficiently

he spun the wheels to freedom.

As he stepped beyond

the lead-swaddled hatch

a second's glimpse made me visionary:

Forest trees shifted as do waves

before an offshore summer breeze,

the sun's floating gold glittering

on flaky tips.

And gay couples

fled slowly hand-in-hand through this

too lovely landscape, breathing fresh

the spotted air.

The hatch had shut;

and he ran laughing to a mottled death.

Haiku.

The tree stood alone

And the crumbling stars stared down

Upon a dead world.

— Douglas Barbour