| dc.contributor.author | Dimock, Susan. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-21T12:33:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 1994 | |
| dc.date.issued | 1994 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | AAINN93770 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10222/55406 | |
| dc.description | This dissertation provides a philosophical analysis of personal autonomy. Personal autonomy is defined as the condition of being self-directed. The conditions which make such self-direction possible are then explored. | en_US |
| dc.description | Self-direction requires that one's actions are motivated by authentic reasons for action. One makes some of one's desires authentic by critically reflecting upon and identifying with them. One identifies with a particular desire when one approves of it as a reason for action, thus desiring that it be an effective desire. Provided that one's identification with a desire is decisive and one is not ambivalent with respect to it, identification is sufficient for the authenticity of one's desires. | en_US |
| dc.description | This capacity to adopt authentic reasons for action cannot be sufficient for the autonomy of one's desires or actions, though. For authenticity is a function solely of the psychological states of an individual; yet autonomy cannot be adequately explicated solely by reference to an agent's subjective states. I refer to those theories which make the autonomy of a person's desires solely a function of her psychological states as "internalist", and argue that such theories must be rejected. An "externalist" is one who denies that autonomy is wholly a function of the psychological states of the individual, and so holds that the autonomy of a desire is determined, at least in part, by facts which are independent of (external to) the subjective attitudes of the agent. | en_US |
| dc.description | I defend a form of externalism, which makes the autonomy of a desire depend upon the following conditions: (1) the agent must approve of it as a reason for action; (2) the agent must have the capacity to respond appropriately to whatever (objective) reasons there are for and against it; (3) the agent must have been able to avoid falling into error (both evaluative and nonevaluative) concerning the object of the desire and the desire itself; (4) the agent's approval of it is not caused solely by a restriction of her feasible options or coercion. | en_US |
| dc.description | I argue that this is a more plausible theory than other externalist positions, and it can meet the objections which have beset internalist theories. | en_US |
| dc.description | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Dalhousie University (Canada), 1994. | en_US |
| dc.language | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Dalhousie University | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy. | en_US |
| dc.title | Personal autonomy. | en_US |
| dc.type | text | en_US |
| dc.contributor.degree | Ph.D. | en_US |
