

VERGIL THE HESITANT HORTICULTURALIST: READING EMOTIONS FROM THE
EPICUREAN GARDEN IN THE *AENEID*

by

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ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq.
We are all a treaty people.

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To my family and partner, for being my support and most immediate *Apparatus Criticus*.

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ABSTRACT

The passions of love and anger are at the root of character motivation in Vergil's *Aeneid*, and often act as an essential narrative device for developing the poem's more cosmic themes. This thesis endeavours to apply the philosophical structures of the Epicurean thinkers Philodemus and Lucretius to love and anger as they are explored in the *Aeneid*. It subsequently explores the interpretative repercussions of the Epicurean view for the poem, and the difficulties of truly grappling with the text in strictly philosophical terms.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

<i>Aen.</i>	Vergil, <i>Aeneid</i> .
<i>Catul.</i>	Catullus, <i>Carmina</i> .
<i>DI</i>	Philodemus, <i>De Ira</i> .
<i>D.L.</i>	Diogenes Laertius, <i>Vitae Philosophorum</i> .
<i>DRN</i>	Lucretius, <i>De Rerum Natura</i> .
<i>Ecl.</i>	Vergil, <i>Eclogues</i> .
<i>Liv.</i>	Livy, <i>Ab Urbe Condita</i> .
<i>Sal. Cat.</i>	Sallust, <i>Bellum Catilinae</i> .
<i>Serv.</i>	Servius, <i>Grammatici In Vergilii Aeneidos Commentarius</i> .

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION – LUCRETIUS, PHILODEMUS, AND VERGIL

In the long history of the study of Vergil, there have been numerous forceful currents in scholarship that occasionally threaten to drown the reader in an undertow of certainty. The 20th and 21st centuries have exhibited the tumult of their time in the strong polarization that has characterized the negotiation and renegotiation of the *Aeneid*.¹ One such current in scholarship has been the Harvard school. Optimistic readings of Vergil's epic, often casting the subtle but pointed mournful notes in the text as indicative of a melodramatic tragedy of patriotic self-sacrifice, found a ready home in the propaganda of fascist Italy. A story of Roman virtue that trumpeted the success of imperialism and the end of history has been attractive to many, not least the Romans themselves; but the weaponization of the *Aeneid* for a fascist context found visceral reproach amongst the Harvard school of interpretation. This model was framed most popularly, and perhaps still most cogently, by Adam Parry in 1963.² The Harvard school seeks, roughly speaking, to pit those readings optimistically inclined towards the Augustan imperial model against the often quiet but undeniably regular pessimistic attitude towards the same. Indeed, as has been pointed out, the stakes of Vergil's Augustan poem are not only civic, but cosmic as well; there is philosophical commentary within the political.³ The interpretative consequences for this model encompass the *Aeneid*'s entire ethical superstructure.

This mode of interpretation, presented paradigmatically here, has produced a rich and insightful tradition of modern scholarship. But more recently, in readings such as that of Tarrant (2012) and Farrell (2021),⁴ the polarization that once seemed to be fitting for an inherently

¹ W.R. Johnson, *Darkness Visible* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 6.

² Adam Parry, "The Two Voices of Virgil's 'Aeneid,'" *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics* v. 2 no. 4 (1963): 66-80.

³ Johnson, 141.

⁴ Joseph Farrell, *Juno's Aeneid* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021); Richard Tarrant, ed., *Virgil: Aeneid Book XII* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

irreconcilable text now is felt as an interpretative cage. There is an increasing push towards attempts to find within the *Aeneid* not tense antitheses but unity found in tension: what is the poetic sum of conflicting ideas presented as ethical equals?

A major sticking point of the Harvard school of interpretation is the question of the passions in the *Aeneid*. Various scholars have voiced opposing positions on the same theme that seek to place the Vergilian passions on one or the other side on the spectrum of optimism and pessimism.⁵ Stoicism and Epicureanism in particular have arisen as the primary contenders for the crown of Chief Philosophical Influence upon the passions in the *Aeneid*.⁶

Both these philosophical schools have significant interpretative value. Indeed, it is likely no coincidence that Aeneas merits scrutiny in terms of both the Stoic sage and the Epicurean wise man. Vergil's hero presents a confounding blend of philosophies pitted against each other. But is this fusion of contraries not characteristic of the *Aeneid*? Attempts to settle the philosophical model for the underworld in book 6 are frustrated by a katabasis that amalgamates Pythagorean, Aristotelian, and Platonic philosophies. Vergil comfortably picks and chooses his philosophical influences with the discerning palate of a learned poet adhering to the principle of *πολυειδία*, not the zealous credence of a disciple.⁷ Indeed, Vergil's adoption of certain tenets of,

⁵ The work of Pöschl, Otis, and Galinsky can be said to represent the more optimistic range of interpretations: Viktor Pöschl, *The Art of Vergil*, trans. by Gerda Seligson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1950); Brooks Otis, *Virgil: A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964); Karl Galinsky, "The Anger of Aeneas," *The American Journal of Philology*, v. 109 no. 3 (1988): 321-348. See also Karl Galinsky, "How to be Philosophical about the End of the 'Aeneid,'" *Illinois Classical Studies*, v. 19 (1994): 191-201. A more pessimistic viewpoint is most popularly represented by Putnam and O'Hara: Michael Putnam, *Virgil's Aeneid: Interpretation and Influence* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); James O'Hara, *Death and the Optimistic Prophecy in Vergil's Aeneid* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

⁶ See C.M. Bowra, "Aeneas and the Stoic Ideal," *Greece & Rome* v. 3 no. 7 (1933): 8-21. For the Epicurean view, see Agnes Kirsopp Michels, "Lucretius and the Sixth Book of the 'Aeneid,'" *The American Journal of Philology* v. 65 no. 2 (1944): 135-148. Kirsopp Michels writes: "A careful scrutiny of the language of the Sixth Book and of the associations evoked by phrases and words used in significant positions seems to me to indicate, however, that when Vergil was composing the *Aeneid* he was still in many ways very much an Epicurean" (135).

⁷ Matthew Gorey, *Atomism in the Aeneid* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 16.

say, cosmology from one school does not necessarily entail his acceptance of that same school's moral views.⁸

In this spirit of philosophical eclecticism, I shall consider the influence of Epicurean conceptions of the passions upon the *Aeneid*. This investigation does not preclude the influence of Stoicism in other areas, or even the same area. But it is clear that for Vergil the influences of opposing schools upon the same idea were not mutually exclusive.⁹ By considering the passions in the poem from an Epicurean perspective, I contend that the psychology of Vergil's characters tends to exhibit a causal relationship between love and anger that, when taken to excess, results in their tragic ends. The aporetic character of this interpretation highlights the necessity of readings that find coherence in the poem's ethical tensions. Chapter One first will consider Dido's Epicurean passion in comparison to Creusa in books 1 and 4; Chapter Two will treat Aeneas' *amor patriae* and anger at Troy alongside his ἀπιστεία in book 10; and Chapter Three will consider Turnus' excessive rage and the gradual ethical reversal between the Rutulian and Aeneas that presages the poem's violent conclusion.

The passions seem to motivate a great deal of the action in the *Aeneid*, particularly that action which raises questions about the nature of *fatum*.¹⁰ For Vergil, fate has its terminus in the foundation in Rome. To fix the concept of empire at the end of a teleology can be reasonably perceived as a structurally optimistic decision by Vergil. The passionate dispositions of many of the characters can be viewed as relative to the force of fate, lending them, and the story as a whole, a certain grand fatalism. The voice of fate attains a certain primacy in the text; but it is

⁸ Mark W. Edwards, "The Expression of Stoic Ideas in the 'Aeneid,'" *Phoenix*, v. 14 no. 3 (1960): 151.

⁹ Alison Keith, *Virgil* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 131. Cicero's eclecticism is comparable, though his self-professed Platonism is relatively steadfast. But as Keith also notes (159 n. 16), Cicero and Vergil were both steeped in a culture of literary reinterpretation. It seems likely that the extension of this dynamic of constant appropriation extended quite naturally from the literary to the philosophical (perhaps via didactic poetry).

¹⁰ Edwards, 157.

occasionally mitigated by characters whose passions drive them to relate to Vergil's teleology in tumultuous ways.

Subversion of the belief in the ultimate position of Rome in the course of fate, or pessimism, comes at choice moments within the momentum of the teleology. Some of these instances are larger in scale than others: the tragic tone of Dido's death is one, but the golden bough's resistance to Aeneas' grasp is another.¹¹ But in the overarching picture, subversion is noticeable only by attending to the particularities of the text, being made up of subtle points that underly the movement of fate and only occasionally break through the chief narrative voice to achieve primacy. Their dramatic force is entirely contingent upon a sustained voice of optimism: without the established norm of the text so far, the killing of Turnus would hardly be shocking, since it would be just another entry in a litany of morbid horrors. Subversive moments are parasitic to the sustained hopefulness of the *Aeneid*, but when those moments are vivid, they implant doubt and an urgent inquisitiveness in the reader.

How are such moments constructed in the text? What circumstances prepare the rationally ordered, optimistic narrative for the admission of a subversive moment? The characters in the *Aeneid* occasionally find themselves overwhelmed by passionate emotion. It is these subjective emotions that admit subversion into the otherwise coherent and optimistic narrative. The overwhelming force of these emotions is often highlighted by a shift from a rational character who relates to fate sensibly to a character acting out of a passionate rationale that is only partially intelligible.

The obvious exemplar for passion in the *Aeneid* is Dido. It is in book 4 with Dido that a trend first becomes apparent: the intensity of her anger at Aeneas is caused by her prior ardent

¹¹ Steven Farron, "The Aeneas-Dido Episode as an Attack on Aeneas' Mission and Rome," *Greece & Rome* v. 27 no. 1 (1980): 34.

love for him. Without the love that Dido sees as betrayed by him, her anger would either not occur or would not have such an excoriating and ultimately self-destructive character. This anger, preceded by love, offers ready and interesting contrast to Creusa in book 2, whose love for Aeneas (though perhaps its expression is curiously abbreviated and sterile) is equally genuine. However, when Aeneas is forced by fate to leave his wife behind, as he later is with Dido, Creusa's shade expresses none of the outrage later seen in Dido.

Also in book 2 is Aeneas' Homeric anger in battle against the Greeks. There is something ignoble in this anger. Aeneas' passions here are stirred by a strongly felt desperation, a reduction of his spirits to such a low that his desire for battle is tantamount to a suicide of *desperata salus* (*Aen.* 2.354). Behind this desperation lies a love, a filial love for Priam and his house, which Aeneas had only recently seen be brutally destroyed. The hero's subsequent anger, Homeric and splendid in its savagery as it is, culminates in *dolus* – that trait so contemptible in Danaans – when Aeneas and his troop wear Greek armour. The hope imparted by the success of this deceit is curtailed by the tragic death of the Trojan warriors at the hands of their allies. This chronology presents something of a value judgement. It suggests that there is something improper at the root of the emotion that motivated the hero's martial anger – that is, something awry in his filial love for Troy and Priam (*amor patriae*).

An excellent analogue to this display of heroic principles is found in book 10, with Aeneas' exceptionally destructive ἀριστεία. The anger provoked in Aeneas at the death of Pallas is plainly rooted in a dual affection: love for the boy himself, and *fides* to his father Evander. Previous accounts of Homeric displays of violence in the text so far do imply that this iteration ought to be considered different; but more specifically, the hero's killings of Lisus and Lucagus,

Lausus, and even Mezentius are described with such an overtly tragic tone that it brings into question the fidelity of a love that is perverted into violent anger.

The killing of Turnus that concludes the epic should not be excused from analysis in the same terms. Once again, it is love for Pallas that motivates the hero's anger; once again, there are implications of the hero's possible excess. The consequences of this as a conclusion for the narrative are worthy of detailed exploration.

I believe that these moments of passion reward analysis in Epicurean terms. The poem's tension between what the Epicurean would perceive as states of heightened emotionality and the rational course of *fatum* only stresses the importance of an interpretation that finds unity in such discordance. In Epicurean doctrine, there is a certain character to excessive emotions that displays an exclusivity of focus and rationality. Love and anger reward inquiry according to a taxonomic distinction between "excessive" and "proper" love and anger, since these two emotions explicitly or implicitly motivate much of the uninhibited pessimism that breaks through the text.¹² This does not necessarily entail that this aspect of the Epicurean position on such emotions is able to reconcile the polarity of optimism and pessimism; nor does it entail that it ought to be able to do so.

An appeal to a consistently "doctrinal Epicureanism" would certainly be fallacious; Lucretius and Philodemus are the authors who provide the most complete exploration of the concepts at issue. The character of excessive versus proper anger is amply explored in the extant works of Philodemus, and an equivalent taxonomy for love can be extracted from Lucretius'

¹² Cf. Hardie's "global inversion" in Philip Hardie, *Virgil's Aeneid: Cosmos and Imperium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 234. See also Michael Erler, "Educational Travels and Epicurean 'Prokopontes': Vergil's Aeneas as an Epicurean Telemachus," in *Ethics in Ancient Greek Literature*, eds. F. Montanari and A. Rengakos (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020): 199. Erler acknowledges the shared terms of Philodemus' account of anger and Lucretius' account of love, since both are contingent upon the necessity for a λογισμός. Erler considers love and anger more in light of the methodological similarities between Philodemus and Lucretius than in terms of their connection in the *Aeneid*.

DRN. In order to properly apply these concepts to the *Aeneid*, it is necessary to carefully consider the nature of the textual sources in question.

Philodemus' *DI* (PHerc. 182) is the obvious primary text for the doctrine of Epicurean anger. It is not necessary to rely upon the biographical evidence that Philodemus tutored Vergil to establish his importance, since such reliance might easily be misguided.¹³ It is far more sensible to consider that Philodemus' *DI* is the only even partially complete account of anger in Epicureanism, and therefore holds a position of authority on the matter in the absence of further evidence. *DI* proposes a model for understanding anger that makes a distinction between φυσική ὀργή (natural anger) and θυμός or κενή ὀργή (empty anger). According to Philodemus, natural anger is the anger of even the wise man, while empty anger or θυμός is an "impulsive disturbance of the inner spirit" that finds its roots in irrationality and a lack of self-control on the part of the subject.¹⁴ Philodemus goes so far as to say that for the wise man, φυσική ὀργή is to be welcomed because it is intrinsic to the nature of a human being. Philodemus notes several other subspecies of anger – ἀκραχολία (a paroxysm), πικρία (irritation), μῆνις (a grudge) – but θυμός seems to encompass those, and none of them are found in the wise man, since θυμός is a type of μανία.¹⁵

Though a clear definition of proper and excessive anger may be straightforwardly extracted from Philodemus' text, the derivation of a similar definition from Lucretius' poem is more laborious. This is a function of the less immediate centrality of love to the text, as well as its far more literary tone, and a longer history of scholarly debate. Book 4 of *DRN* famously

¹³ Nicholas Horsfall, *A Companion to the Study of Virgil* (New York: Brill Publishing, 1995), 24.

¹⁴ Giovanni Indelli, "The Vocabulary of Anger in Philodemus' 'De Ira' and Vergil's 'Aeneid'" in *Vergil Philodemus, and the Augustans*, eds. D. Armstrong, J. Fish, P.A. Johnston, and M.B. Skinner (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 103.

¹⁵ Elizabeth Asmis, "The Necessity of Anger in Philodemus' 'On Anger'" in *Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition*, eds. J. Fish and K.R. Sanders (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 159.

concludes with a vicious invective against Venus. Lucretius seems to condemn love, but upon closer investigation his position is not so conclusive. For example: Venus, as depicted in book 4, stands in ready contrast to her depiction in the proem in book 1, where she alone is credited with the ability to bring peace.¹⁶ By this fact alone, there is evident dissonance in *DRN* concerning the issue of love.

To make sense of this disagreement, it is necessary to consider Lucretius' inheritance from Epicurus. As other commentators have pointed out, Epicurus' views on marriage are attested in Diogenes Laertius:¹⁷

Καὶ μὴν καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ φύσεως. κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν. (*D.L.* 10.119.1-4)

Moreover, the wise man won't marry and have children, as Epicurus [writes] in *The Problems* and in *On Nature*. When he does marry it is according to his circumstances.

The association of marriage with a romantic relationship precludes its suitability for the Epicurean wise man. This is also the most generous treatment of such love found in Diogenes Laertius' *Vita*, and Epicurus elsewhere seems stricter on the value of love to the wise (*D.L.* 10.6, 118). It is possible that his apparent generosity here is founded in a sexual ethic that permits sexual intercourse as long as it avoids emotional disturbance.¹⁸ But such a relationship is necessarily casual, since Epicurus is consistent in the surviving literature in his prohibition of marriage. Therefore, for Epicurus, there is a distinction made between proper sex as the casual fulfillment of pleasure for pleasure's sake, and improper sex as being a part of a long-term, marital relationship.¹⁹

¹⁶ Aya Betensky, "Lucretius and Love," *The Classical World* v. 73 no. 5 (1980): 297.

¹⁷ H.S. Long, ed., *Diogenes Laertii Vitae Philosophorum: Tomus Posterior* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).

¹⁸ B. Arkins, "Epicurus and Lucretius on Sex, Love, and Marriage," *Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* v. 18 no. 2 (1984): 141.

¹⁹ John B. Stearns, "Epicurus and Lucretius on Love," *The Classical Journal* v. 31 no. 6 (1936): 347.

It is necessary for Lucretius to present this message differently, most likely due to his distinct Roman audience, but also possibly due to his divergent genre.²⁰ In *DRN*, there is a similar twofold partition within Lucretius' account of Epicurean love, but the point of division is distinct. Lucretius' Epicurean inheritance is primarily concerned with the ethical distinction between proper casual sex and improper sexual love; Lucretius, however, differentiates between a controlled sort of love as "connected to the gradual and purposeful attainment of the Epicurean life,"²¹ and love as the surrender of autonomy and self-control. Consider Lucretius' description of the former type of love:²²

*quod superest, consuetudo concinnat amorem;
nam leviter quamvis quod crebro tunditur ictu,
vincitur in longo spatio tamen atque labascit.
nonne vides etiam guttas in saxa cadentis
umoris longo in spatio pertundere saxa? (DRN 4.1283-1287)*

What's more, habit engenders love; for that which is often struck with blows, although lightly, is vanquished after a time and still begins to totter. Don't you see that even droplets of water falling on a stone bore through the stone after a long time?

These lines conclude book 4 of *DRN*, after a lengthy and memorable diatribe *against* love. What is it about this love described by Lucretius that makes it so much more acceptable as *consuetudo* than the *cupido caeca* declaimed at *DRN* 4.1153? Lucretius' taxonomy appears to encompass simple sexual desire, for which he suggests visiting a prostitute (*DRN* 4.1070-1072), a love that overwhelms the subject, and a love without which attainment of ἀταραξία would be

²⁰ Its own set of problems, and not to be treated here; poetry is often considered insubstantial in Epicureanism. See Elizabeth Asmis, "Epicurean Poetics" in *Philodemus and Poetry*, ed. Dirk Obbink (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995), 15-34. See also Elizabeth Asmis, "Philodemus' Poetic Theory and 'On the Good King According to Homer,'" *Classical Antiquity* v. 10 no. 1 (1991): 1-45. Asmis summarizes Philodemus' basic position: "Epicurus encouraged the philosophically educated to enjoy poetry on the assumption that philosophical understanding would cancel out harmful opinions. Philodemus uses philosophical insight to draw attention to what is morally valid in poems; and this alliance between philosophy and poetry complements the use of philosophy as a defence against poetry" (27).

²¹ Betensky, *Love*, 294.

²² Cyril Bailey, ed., *Lucreti De Rerum Natura* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938). All quotations are from this text.

compromised.²³ The first part of this is shared with Epicurus, and for both him and Lucretius this sort of sexual desire seems to be inconsequential. But where Epicurus strongly discourages marriage, Lucretius considers it a natural path towards Epicurean enlightenment. He believes that not only does long-term marital love encourage wisdom, but that a lack of such a relationship would cause the subject more pain than pleasure – the ultimate equation to be avoided. I would suggest hesitantly that this is a move motivated by the importance of heterosexual marriage to Roman social structure. Although this fact does pose a frank departure from Epicurus by Lucretius – a disciple professing to repeat only the teacher’s doctrine – it is possible that Lucretius’ argument is intended as a reconciliation of cultural disparity. Taking advantage of Epicurus’ vague permission of love in certain circumstances at *D.L.* 10.119.4 above (see pp. 8), Lucretius may have thought that Epicurus’ permission of sex as avoidance of emotional disturbance entailed a counterpart in the permission of marriage as avoidance of a similar *ταραχή* (*cura* in *DRN*).²⁴

The difference between *cupido caeca* and *consuetudo* as Lucretius defines them seems to be one of passion. Lucretius fundamentally objects to a sort of love that blindingly obsessive and impinges upon the subject’s capacity for reason.²⁵ In contrast, *consuetudo* is a rational process, more like a habit (a common translation); it is “learning to live with another person.”²⁶ From here, it is possible to make sense of Lucretius’ dual representation of Venus previously discussed. A rational love represented by the goddess in the proem of the book is much more analogous to the sensible, gentle, but ultimately dispassionate process of *consuetudo*, the sort of

²³ Stearns, 346.

²⁴ Pamela Gordon, “Phaeacian Dido: Lost Pleasures of an Epicurean Intertext,” *Classical Antiquity* v. 17 no. 2 (1998): 203.

²⁵ Betensky, *Love*, 297.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

love and sexual relationship permitted for the wise man by Lucretius. However, the Venus of book 4 – blinding, overpowering, and disturbing to the soul – is much more like the *cupido caeca* that the author castigates. Venus as an analogue for the supreme capacity of *ratio* is found elsewhere in *DRN*.²⁷ Love as excessive is obsessive, and exclusive; but love as proper can be a part of the attainment of ἀταραξία, the *summum bonum* of Epicureanism.

Therefore, we see that Lucretius' picture of love contains an internal division predicated upon the degree of the subject's passion. Although his version of this contains a twist on Epicurus' distinction for the purposes of a Roman audience, such a distinction in general terms is authentic to Epicurus' doctrine; in the absence of superior direct evidence, and given Lucretius' and Philodemus' shared claim to be a simple mouthpiece for Epicurus, it is advisable to consider this concept as "doctrine," or at least shared between the two authors.

The taxonomy of anger found in Philodemus and that of love found in Lucretius provides a ready interpretative device for the *Aeneid*. As a poem with significant episodes motivated by passionate manifestations of love and anger, this established Epicurean model serves as an entryway for a thorough analysis of any possible causal connection between the two passions. It is worth considering that in Lucretius' depiction of the affair of Mars and Venus, the poet describes Mars' love in the condemnable terms of *cupido caeca*.²⁸ Book 4 of the *Aeneid* readily offers itself up for analysis of a famously overwhelming love – what lover was more overwhelmed, more tragic, and more violent than Dido?

²⁷ Monica Gale, *Myth and Poetry in Lucretius* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 125.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 222.

CHAPTER TWO: *ARDESCITQUE TUENDO PHOENISSA*

In their famous and highly pathetic treatment of Dido, books 1 and 4 of the *Aeneid* provide the poem's earliest and most explicit demonstration of the influence of an Epicurean dichotomy of excessive and proper passion. The Carthaginian queen's love for and later anger at Aeneas are described in the lexical and conceptual terms of Lucretius' *DRN*. However, Vergil departs from his Lucretian intertext in his implication of the epic's divine apparatus in Dido's *culpa*. Because of Venus' role in artificially engineering Dido's love for Aeneas, the queen's downfall can be understood not only as a pathetic challenge to the Roman project, but also as Vergil's challenge to the psychological and theological positions of Lucretius, whose atheism dictates that emotion is always human.²⁹

Dido's anger rages when she discovers the departure of Aeneas, and it is similarly framed in Philodemus' terms, though the lexical difficulty imposed by the language difference between the two authors requires that we establish what terms they share. The anger that Dido displays encourages comparison with Creusa's reaction to a similar situation, as well as suggesting causal connection between Dido's love and her anger. The disparity that emerges from the comparison of Creusa and the Carthaginian queen confirms the condemnation of Dido's anger in Philodemus' terms, though the moral ambiguity of its origin in the artifice of Venus remains a difficult point of interpretation.

Aeneas' vastly different response to Dido and Creusa affords further comparison of the emotion underlying each relationship. It also draws to the fore the curious sterility that characterizes Aeneas throughout the entire Dido episode: where is his passion for the Phoenician

²⁹ Gorey, 15. Gorey treats a similar subject in atomistic rather than ethical terms, writing: "By consistently associating atomic imagery with doubt, hesitation, violence, and disorder, Virgil casts Epicurean physics in the role of an allegorical antagonist."

queen he has taken as a lover at least, and a wife at most? It was so strongly present with Creusa, but is absent with Dido. I contend that the passion of Aeneas is not for Dido, but for his fated mission, and by extension for his *pietas*. His love for duty is erotic in character, and given its narrative proximity to a turbulent display of the dangers of eroticism, this episode affords unique early insight into a quiet challenge of Aeneas' *amor patriae*.

An expeditious analysis of Dido's love begins by approaching Aeneas' love affliction with Lucretius' dual Venus in mind. Lucretius' difficult separation of two apparent types of Venus, considered above (see pp. 9-10), finds voice in the *Aeneid* in the conflict between conjugal and erotic love. Also manifest in the position of Venus as *genetrix* of nature, the twofold character of nurturing and cruelly seducing earns the goddess Lucretius' book 4 invective. These opposing forces are clear in the *Aeneid*, but it is only Venus' excessively erotic side that deceives Dido.

The influence of Lucretius here is further explicated by the overt *Romanitas* present in the way that Venus is characterized by Vergil. As Lucretius did, Vergil responds to a specific audience that conceived of eroticism as primarily extra-marital, and conjugal relationships as for the purpose of procreation.³⁰ The latter was obviously privileged as a communal good, though the former was usually acceptable for men in certain circumstances; in Lucretius' poem, it is broadly castigated. This is the primary countercultural assertion of Lucretius' invective: it is not a controversial suggestion to a Roman audience that marriage should be *consuetudo*, *societas*, or *concordia* rather than *amor*.³¹

³⁰ Edward Gutting, "Marriage in the 'Aeneid': Venus, Vulcan, and Dido," *Classical Philology* v. 101 no. 3 (2006): 263.

³¹ *Ibid*, 264.

Similarly, for Vergil the erotic and the marital exist as opposing forces rather than complementary ones. The two appear in direct conflict, and in Dido's case it is clearly the erotic that triumphs. However, it does so at the cost of the conjugal, and without the lover's notice.³² For Vergil, the erotic force of Venus is deceitful and externally imposed.³³ The ethical and poetic distinction between the erotic and the conjugal has particularly Lucretian pedigree.

Venus' deceit is enacted in the replacement of Ascanius by Cupid. The appearance of a contest between an erotic (excessive) and a conjugal (proper) love in this episode echoes the duality of Lucretius quite closely:

*praecipue infelix, pesti deuota futurae,
expleri mentem nequit ardescitque tuendo
Phoenissa, et pariter puero donisque mouetur.
ille ubi complexu Aeneae colloque pependit
et magnum falsi impleuit genitoris amorem,
reginam petit. haec oculis, haec pectore toto
haeret et interdum gremio fouet inscia Dido
insidat quantus miserae deus. at memor ille
matris Acidaliae paulatim abolere Sychaeum
incipit et uiuo temptat praeuertere amore
iam pridem resides animos desuetaque corda. (Aen. 1.712-22)³⁴*

Foremost, the unfortunate Phoenician, destined for a destruction to come, could not satisfy her mind; she began to burn by looking, and is equally moved by the boy and the gifts. When he'd hung from Aeneas' neck in his embrace and fulfilled his false father's great love, he sought the queen. She clung [to him] with her eyes and with all her heart, and snuggled him in her lap now and then – Dido, not knowing how great a god settles there to her misery. But he, remembering his Acidalian mother, gradually began to efface Sychaeus, and tried to preoccupy her long-still soul and disused heart with a living love.

³² Ibid, 268.

³³ See Dirk Obbink, "Virgil, Philodemus, and the Lament of Iuturna," in *Vertis in Usum: Studies in Honor of Edward Courtney*, eds. J.F. Miller, C. Damon, K.S. Myers (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002): 112. On the subject of Venus and Dido, Obbink points out that "the gods often become outward personifications of the inner psychology of the victim. The mortals in the *Aeneid* are more often than not victims of the divine, much in the same way as we might see ourselves as the victims of our own emotions."

³⁴ R.A.B. Mynors, ed., *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). All quotations are from this text.

The initial position of *infelix* anticipates the perceptiveness of Venus' use of Cupid as her means of deceit, which clearly does not turn out well for Dido. Though commonly Dido's epithet elsewhere, *infelix* also has implications of infertility, and a child is foremost the impetus for proper conjugal love.³⁵ The *imago* of Ascanius is an extremely effective means of manipulation for Dido, whose previous marriage to Sychaeus was noticeably fruitless; she later says to Aeneas *si quis mihi paruulus aula / luderet Aeneas* ("if only some itty-bitty Aeneas played in my halls!" *Aen.*4.328-29), indicating the underlying conjugal motivation of her love for the hero, though it has been perverted.³⁶ The word *felix* and its relatives are surprisingly rare in Lucretius, appearing only three times. Two of these instances resonate particularly with Virgil's use of the word in relation to Dido:

*nam sublata virum manibus tremibundaque ad aras
deductast, non ut sollemni more sacrorum
perfecto posset claro comitari Hymenaeo,
sed casta inceste nubendi tempore in ipso
hostia concideret mactatu maesta parentis,
exitus ut classi felix faustusque daretur. (DRN 1.95-100)*

For lifted up by the hands of men and trembling she was led to the altar, not so that with the solemn rite of rituals she could join in the fulfillment of Hymenaeus' famous rite, but so that as a virgin at the very age of wedlock she could fall impiously at her father's sacrifice, a sorrowful victim.

*O genus infelix humanum, talia divis
cum tribuit facta atque iras adiunxit acerbas! (DRN 5.1194-95)*

Oh, unhappy race of mankind, when you ascribe such deeds to gods and attribute them bitter anger!

This first appearance is straightforward in its Vergilian analogue. The sacrifice of Iphigineia in book 1 of *DRN* is described as a perverted marriage, with Lucretius enumerating the parts of that

³⁵ Arthur Stanley Pease, ed., *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Darmstadt: Druck und Einband, 1935), 145.

³⁶ Gutting, 268.

rite that are lacking – *sollemni more sacrorum* and *claro...Hymenaeo* – apparently hinging on the fact that Iphigeneia is of marriageable age (*nubendi*) and is involved in the wrong ceremony. The use of *felix* in this context – referring to an *exitus...felix faustusque* for Agamemnon’s fleet – likely does not refer to the fertility of Iphigeneia directly. However, its inclusion in proximity to a conjugal metaphor where the *felicitas* of the woman is of prime concern emphasizes the perversity of her sacrifice through a lexical echo of a sense that is secondary in this context.

This may be applied to Dido because her marriage is reminiscent of the falsity of the “marriage” of Iphigeneia. Juno considers certain ritual aspects of Roman marriage – such as the *deductio*, the leading of the new bride into her husband’s home – as fulfilled for Dido by the hunting scene (*conubio iungam stabili propriamque dicabo*; “I’ll join them in a lasting marriage and declare her his,” *Aen.* 4.126). Nevertheless, the whole context seems otherwise improper (*coniugium vocat, hoc praetexit nomine culpam*; “She called it marriage, and with this name concealed her guilt,” *Aen.* 4.172), likely because the “marriage” lacks several important formal components – marriage torches, the bride’s bright veil, the presentation of rings – as well as the critical social and familial aspects.³⁷ Vergil’s voice on the matter, offered at *Aen.* 4.172, is similarly disapproving as that of Lucretius, coinciding with the *Aeneid*’s other suggestions that Dido herself may be a kind of human sacrifice encoded as an Iphigeneia topos.³⁸ Importantly, Vergil differentiates his work from Lucretius’ in his attitude towards *religio*, for which the poet of *DRN* credits the sacrifice of Iphigeneia at *DRN* 1.101: *tantum religio potuit suadere malorum* (“so much was superstition able to persuade to evil deeds”).³⁹

³⁷ Lauren Caldwell, “Dido’s ‘Deductio’: ‘Aeneid’ 4.127-65,” *Classical Philology* v. 103 no. 1 (2008): 434.

³⁸ Steven Farron, “Aeneas’ Human Sacrifice,” *Acta Classica* v. 28 (1985): 29. See also Bill Gladhill, “The Poetics of Human Sacrifice in Vergil’s ‘Aeneid’” in *Sacrifices humains: Perspectives croisées et représentations*, (Liège: Liège University Press, 2013), 217.

³⁹ Cf. Philip Hardie, “The Sacrifice of Iphigeneia: An Example of ‘Distribution’ of a Lucretian Theme in Virgil,” *The Classical Quarterly* v. 34 no. 2 (1984): 412. On the theological mismatch between the two poets, Hardie writes: “The emotional and sensational detail of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia obviously serves partisan ends for Lucretius;

The word *religio* can only be understood as pejorative in Lucretius, and here is a part of the poet's wholesale condemnation of superstitious belief in the gods. For Vergil, however, it is Juno who first declares the relationship of Dido and Aeneas a marriage (*Aen.* 4.126), and the entire affair is initiated by Venus. The locus of agency for the two poets is distinct: Vergil's placement of it in the divine apparatus of his poem presents a strong departure from the theology (or lack thereof) of Lucretius.⁴⁰ This relates to Lucretius' other use of *felix* in *DRN* 5.1194: Vergil also echoes the direct expression of Lucretius' atheism in order to draw attention to the disjunction between it and the divine machinery of his epic.

Though this departure is interesting, its secondary implications should not go unnoticed: the inculcation of Venus in an immoral perversion of the marriage rite also solidifies her role as an agent of excessive love. The autonomy that Venus strips from Dido when Cupid *abolere Sychaeum / incipit* ("began to efface Sychaeus," *Aen.* 1.720-21) gives the whole episode a great deal of its tragic pathos, since Dido does not seem wholly responsible for her own actions. Venus' interference also serves to vilify her in a very Lucretian fashion. While contradicting Lucretian theology, Vergil's literary decisions here maintain a close relationship to *DRN*'s taxonomy of love.

Other reminiscences of Lucretius have been pointed out by commentators in the passage under discussion. The construction *ardescitque tuendo* (*Aen.* 1.713) is a particular favourite. Dyson Hejduk points out a close grammatical mimesis of Lucretius:

Though the fire imagery in *ardescitque tuendo* may be derived from love poetry, the closest grammatical parallel for this type of line end – an inchoative verb with an ablative gerund – occurs in a passage that, though about love, is far from love poetry. Lucretius

Virgil uses the qualities to great dramatic effect, but does he, too, reveal an attitude concerning such things? The Trojans come to grief because they put their trust in just the sort of fiction that Lucretius is concerned to unmask; on the other hand *religio* in Virgil is no empty charade [...] Lucretius correctly describes the emotion, but, Virgil implies, it is an emotion that corresponds to a supernatural reality; and the gods are not always friendly."

⁴⁰ Julia Dyson Hejduk, "Dido the Epicurean," *Classical Antiquity* v. 15 no. 2 (1996): 204.

counsels his readers to avoid love assiduously, describing its wounds in almost clinical terms: ‘*ulcus enim vivescit et inveterascit alendo / inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna gravescit*’ (4.1068-69).⁴¹

With the influence of the facsimile-Ascanius increasingly taking hold as book 1 progresses – a gradual effect strikingly achieved by the inchoative *ardescit* in *-esco-* (1.713) and *paulatim* (*Aen.* 1.720) – the love that Dido feels for Aeneas gradually changes from the proper and conjugal into the excessive and passionate. Lucretius’ simile of love as a wound (*ulcus*) is a compelling one for Vergil, in whose work Dido’s love is consistently referred to as a *vulnus*. Dyson Hejduk’s description of Lucretius’ language in his lines as “almost clinical” is perceptive and apt: love as a physical wound and disease was a favourite of both Epicurean literati and Alexandrian poets even before the work of Tibullus and Propertius. The sterility of Vergil’s language recalls *DRN*’s famous simile of the honeyed cup, introduced to make the poet’s Epicurean philosophy digestible and appealing to the audience:

*sed veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes
cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum
contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore,
ut puerorum aetas improvida ludificetur
labrorum tenuis, interea perpotet amarum
absinthii laticem deceptaque non capiatur,
sed potius tali pacto recreata valescat.* (*DRN* 1.936-42)

But just when physicians attempt to give foul wormwood to children, they first spread the lip around the cup with the sweet and golden liquid of honey, so that the imprudent age of the children may be deceived as far as their lips, and meanwhile they drink the bitter liquid of the wormwood, and, having been deceived, are not betrayed, but instead by such a compromise grow strong anew.

Dyson Hejduk proposes an ingenious solution to the difficult image of the cup of Dido barely touching her lips at the banquet (*Aen.* 1.737), but eventually drinking deep of love (*infelixque*

⁴¹ Ibid, 209. Dyson Hejduk’s emphasis.

Dido longumque bibeat amorem; “and unhappy Dido drank deep of love,” *Aen.* 1.749), a subtle reading that hinges on a wordplay between Lucretius’ *amarum* (*DRN* 1.940) and Vergil’s *amorem*.⁴² Through the inversion of the function of Lucretius’ cup, Dyson Hejduk correctly suggests that Dido’s emotion in this passage has made the transition from a conjugal attraction to Aeneas (see below), restrained by *pudor* for Sychaeus, to a deeply passionate, erotic, and excessive form of love that will destroy her.⁴³ Further, the excess of this love will prefigure the excess of her later resultant anger, suggesting a causal relationship between the two excessive emotions.

Vergil’s doubling of *expleri* (713) and *implevit* (716) is also worthy of note. Gutting discusses the fulfillment of conjugal love as expressed in these words, pointing out that *genitoris amorem* (716) is exactly the sort of proper love that is gradually (*ardescit, paulatim*) being perverted by Cupid, and *expleri* denotes the initiation of this process because Cupid “pricks Dido’s maternal instinct and so makes Aeneas look more conjugally attractive to her.”⁴⁴ A consciousness of word choice is clearly at work here, as the doubling of etymologies derived from **pleo* suggests; therefore, to suggest further intentionality in a Lucretian allusion is not necessarily a substantial leap.

Forms of *pleo* are relatively common in *DRN*, particularly in images of unfulfillable desire. Lucretius’ description of the Danaids follows directly on his description of Tantalus and Sisyphus, and uses *pleo* three times in rapid succession:

*deinde animi ingratham naturam pascere semper
atque explere bonis rebus satiareque numquam,
quod faciunt nobis annorum tempora, circum*

⁴² Jane Snyder, *Puns and Poetry in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1980), 114.

⁴³ Richard F. Moorton, Jr., “Love as Death: The Pivoting Metaphor in Vergil’s Story of Dido,” *The Classical World* v. 83 no. 3 (1990): 157.

⁴⁴ Gutting, 267.

*cum redeunt fetusque ferunt variosque lepores,
nec tamen explemur vitae fructibus umquam,
hoc, ut opinor, id est, aevo florente puellas
quod memorant laticem pertusum congerere in vas,
quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur. (DRN 3.1003-10)*

Then to always feed the nature of an ungrateful mind, and to never fill and satiate it with good things, which the seasons of the year do for us when they return around and bear their fruit and various charms, yet we are never filled with the fruits of life. It is this, I think, that they mean of the maidens in the flower of youth pouring water into a riddled vase that can't ever be filled by any means.

Lucretius' Danaids, like Dido, cannot be satisfied, but continue to try to fulfill their desire.⁴⁵ The similarity of Vergil's *expleri...nequit* and Lucretius' *expleri...potestur* is particularly suggestive. The Epicurean imperative for pleasure is here changed from a means to attain ἀταραξία to an insatiable hedonism. Dido is in the process of a similar transition: her desire for conjugal love is changing into insatiable passion, an excessive pursuit of pleasure counterproductive to ἀταραξία. Lucretius' *aevo florente* (DRN 3.1008) may imply the wastage of potentially fruitful marriage in the pointless pursuit of erotic love. The Lucretian lover is inherently doomed to have satisfaction elude them.⁴⁶

Further to the unfulfillable character of excessive love is the occurrence of *expletur* in Lucretius' invective against Venus and eroticism in the conclusion of book 4. Lucretius describes how Venus causes the lover to remain in love:

*unaque res haec est, cuius quam plurima habemus,
tam magis ardescit dira cuppedine pectus.
nam cibus atque umor membris adsumitur intus;*

⁴⁵ Cf. Michael Putnam, "Virgil's Danaid Ekphrasis," *Illinois Classical Studies* v. 19 (1994): 177. The Danaids as evoking uncontrolled *eros* is played upon by Aeschylus, and may be something Vergil is evoking via the model of Lucretius: "The scene on the baldrick [of Pallas] comes from an event portrayed, or implied, in the trilogy which Aeschylus composed on the myth of the Danaids. We possess the first of the three plays, *Supplices*. Of the next two, plausibly entitled *Aegyptii* and *Danaides*, we have preserved only one assignable fragment, in which Aphrodite proclaims the universal power of *eros*." Vergil demurs from direct reference to the Danaids in general; he "reserves them for a symbolic, on-going role in the epic proper, for his development of a parallel between their lived experience and events in his epic story..." (179).

⁴⁶ Robert D. Brown, ed., *Lucretius on Love and Sex* (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 1987), 74.

*quae quoniam certas possunt obsidere partis,
 hoc facile expletur laticum frugumque cupido.
 ex hominis vero facie pulchroque colore
 nil datur in corpus praeter simulacra fruendum
 tenuia; quae vento spes raptast saepe misella.
 ut bibere in somnis sitiens quom quaerit et umor
 non datur, ardorem qui membris stinguere possit,
 sed laticum simulacra petit frustra laborat
 in medioque sitit torrenti flumine potans,
 sic in amore Venus simulacris ludit amantis
 nec satiare queunt spectando corpora coram... (DRN 4.1089-1102)*

And this is the one thing of which the more we have, so the more the heart begins to burn with fierce passion. For food and water are absorbed within the body; since they can fill certain parts, this desire for water and food is easily fulfilled. From the true aspect of human beings and from their fair complexions nothing is given to the body to be enjoyed other than frail images – which meager hope is often stolen by the wind. As when in dreams a thirsty man seeks to drink, and water is not given that could extinguish the burning in his body, but he makes for the image of water, and struggles vainly, a drinking man who's thirsty in the middle of a rushing river; thus in love does Venus mock the lovers with images, and they are not able to satiate their bodies by looking face to face.

Vergil's lines quoted at the outset of this chapter (*Aen.* 1.712-22; see pp. 14) are dense with intertexts to this one passage of *DRN* alone. Concerning the use of *expletur* at *DRN* 4.1093 above: now it is not only desire that is unsatiable, but specifically erotic desire, especially when compared to any physical *cupido* that is easily fulfilled. As a model for Dido's affliction, this is further evidence for the infinitely unsated character of her love for Aeneas. As Dido *ardescit*, so does Lucretius' lover (*DRN* 4.1090); as Dido drinks in her demise (*longumque bibebat amorem*, *Aen.* 1.749), that even Venus herself calls a poison (*ueneno*, *Aen.* 1.688),⁴⁷ so does the lover in *DRN* drink endlessly of love like someone with an unquenchable thirst (*bibere*, *DRN* 4.1097); and as Dido *ardescitque tuendo*, so is Lucretius' lover *nec satiare queunt spectando* – both an

⁴⁷ Dyson Hejduk, 214.

almost identical grammatical construction as *DRN*'s *inveterascit alendo* ("grows old by nourishing," *DRN* 4.1068).⁴⁸

Dido is plainly modelled on Lucretius' lover, particularly in this last passage. Her love for Aeneas, emergent in the above passage from the *Aeneid*, is by the end of those lines fulfilled in its nature as insatiable, erotic (through the perversion of the conjugal), destructive, and entirely excessive. As above, Gutting points out the originally conjugal and therefore proper intention of Dido's love, and its eventual perversion by Venus into excess. The initially conjugal character of the queen's love is illustrated by analogy with her love for Sychaeus. The force of *agnosco ueteris uestigia flammae* ("I recognize the traces of an old fire," *Aen.* 4.23) is that Dido feels for Aeneas a fraction of what she felt for her husband, though her love for the hero remains *uestigia* – a remembrance, but not truly present.⁴⁹ Gutting also points out an initial similarity, but eventual disparity, between the proper affection for Aeneas held by Creusa, and the perverted conjugality – manifest in the end as pure eroticism – of Dido.⁵⁰ This, he suggests, is what is intended by the similar contrast between Dido's *amorem genitoris* (*Aen.* 1.716) and Creusa's *nati...communis amorem* (*Aen.* 2.789). Such a comparison throws into relief Dido's excessive emotion.

Creusa's love for Aeneas is best considered in light of the appearance of Venus to the hero at *Aen.* 2.589.⁵¹ The Venus of this episode hardly seems to be the same character from the scene of Dido's seduction; she is all concern for fidelity to family and the maintenance of the structure enforced by conjugal love. Her words to her son are filled with encouragement to

⁴⁸ Brown, 211. Language of false images and external appearances also abounds in this passage from *DRN*; no doubt this resounds with Vergil's similar description of the disguise of Cupid as Ascanius.

⁴⁹ Gutting, 265.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 267.

⁵¹ Luca Grillo, "Leaving Troy and Creusa: Reflections on Aeneas' Flight," *The Classical Journal* v. 106 no. 1 (2010): 63.

restrain passion that is absent in later appearances of the goddess. She begins her speech by interrogating Aeneas' *indomitas...iras* (*Aen.* 2.584), and encourages him to have regard for his family (596-97). This is quite at odds with a Venus who will later mercenarily exploit Dido's proper conjugal desires for her own ends.

These words from Venus contain significant structural resonance with the later speech of Creusa (*Aen.* 2.773). Briggs provides a helpful paradigm for visualizing the correspondences between the two scenes:

Venus appears (589)	Creusa appears (773)
Venus reproaches (594-595)	Creusa reproaches (776-777)
Venus prophesies (596-619)	Creusa prophesies (777-784)
Venus comforts (620)	Creusa comforts (783-788)
Venus vanishes (621)	Creusa vanishes (791)
Aeneas returns to gather family (624ff.)	Aeneas returns to gather companions (796ff.) ⁵²

Venus acting as a model for Creusa here is a significant mark of the shared content of their words, as signalled by Creusa's direct citation of their relationship at *Aen.* 2.787 (*diuae Veneris nurus*).⁵³ As Venus encourages Aeneas to concede to the duties of his marriage to Creusa by returning to his present family, so Creusa encourages the same in him for his *regia coniunx* he will have in Italy. The primary shift in message between the two speeches is of time: where Venus is concerned with Aeneas' present family, Creusa's concern is entirely proleptic, except for her concern for their son, who, arguably, is himself representative primarily of the future

⁵² Ward W. Briggs, Jr., "Eurydice, Venus, and Creusa: A Note on Structure in Virgil," *Vergilius* no. 25 (1979): 44.

⁵³ H. Akbar Khan, "Exile and the Kingdom: Creusa's Revelations and Aeneas' Departure from Troy," *Latomus* v. 60 no. 4 (2009): 909.

(*Aen.* 2.789).⁵⁴ There is a transmutation here of Aeneas' *pietas* from immanent to distant that will become significant.⁵⁵

Venus and Creusa in this sequence align closely with the sort of proper love encouraged by Lucretius. The former is not the Venus who provoked Lucretius' invective in *DRN* 4; rather, she seems to be much more similar to the gentle and nurturing goddess in the proem of *DRN* 1.⁵⁶ Her attachment to returning Aeneas to the familial structure is truly aligned with Lucretius' *Aeneadum genetrix*, and though Vergil is less concerned with her role as the force of all material fertility, his Venus in book 2 does express, via her anxiety for Ascanius, a similar nurturing of the course of history as Lucretius' *petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem* ("seeking calm peace for the Romans, famous goddess," *DRN* 1.40). Venus does seem to condemn the gods as merciless when she says *dium inclementia* (*Aen.* 2.602), which is peculiar given that she, as a divinity herself, is included in such an indictment.⁵⁷ Perhaps Venus' allusion to *inclementia* gestures both at Lucretian theology and at Venus' dual nature. This Venus does not seem to be to blame for the destruction of Troy, but one could easily imagine the Venus of book 4 being so.

The mode of Venus' appearance seems to mirror that of Creusa: the goddess' sexual domain and her close association both with her son's first wife and later his relationship with his lover encourages a comparison between the behaviour of Creusa and Dido. Creusa exhorts Aeneas to pursue his future conjugal obligations and leave her behind. The same cannot be said

⁵⁴ In fact, even this interest from Creusa may be construed as having both conjugal and mytho-historical implications, since the future of Rome is contingent on Iulus.

⁵⁵ See Nicholas Horsfall, ed., *Virgil, Aeneid 2: A Commentary* (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2008), 565. The authenticity of the Helen passage (*Aen.* 2.567-87) is not of major importance here; Horsfall considers the lines spurious. The authenticity of the speech of Venus from ll. 589 onwards is not debated, and Aeneas' anger is still censured by her at ll. 594-95. If the Helen episode is indeed spurious, then it is likely that the *iras* Venus mentions are not those of ll. 575, but the hero's earlier rage in battle.

⁵⁶ Nicholas W. Freer, *Virgil and Philodemus* (PhD diss., UCL, 2014), 103.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 104. Freer writes: "By describing the interventions of Venus and the other gods in distinctly Lucretian language, Vergil may be subverting Lucretius' Epicurean argument that the gods have no interest in human affairs."

of Dido, though both characters are similarly collateral damage of the course of fate.⁵⁸ This shared quality alone encourages the reader to compare them. Though this comparison may take many forms, the limited role of Creusa in the epic and the similarity of the context of her final speech to that of Dido – being left behind by Aeneas – makes these monologues the most opportune ground for such analysis.

The kind of love that Dido expresses in her speech, in contrast to that of Creusa, is the sort of love condemned by Lucretius. Dido's passion remains as excessive as it was established to be in book 1. The causal connection between this excessive love and Dido's anger becomes evident in her book 4 speech to Aeneas. Provoked by the discovery that Aeneas is trying to leave Carthage in secret, her speech falls into two main parts: *Aen.* 4.305-30, in which Dido both insults and appeals to Aeneas; and *Aen.* 4.365-87, in which the queen's love turns to anger. Remembering the Lucretian imperative for conjugal love as proper, and the added nuance of producing a child as the most essential identifying aspect of this kind of love, mourning for the lost maternity that Venus perverted at *Aen.* 1.712-22 is a major motivation for Dido's words in this speech.

In an invective that varies between insults and appeals to the hero, the first part of Dido's speech seems to realize a trend of increasingly violent outbursts.⁵⁹ The rhetorical force of this speech is strengthened by its emotionality. Such an expressive and frank monologue from Dido affords a clear picture of her mind, thus avoiding any issues of reliability like those in the storytelling of Aeneas in books 2 and 3. Dido's expression of her subjective conviction is convincing and highly pathetic. The first display of such conviction is found at *Aen.* 4.307-8: *nec te noster amor nec te data dextera quondam / nec moritura tenet crudeli funere Dido?* ("doesn't

⁵⁸ Christine Perkell, "Creusa and Dido Revisited," *Vergilius* v. 67 (2021): 130.

⁵⁹ Horsfall, *Companion*, 131 n. 50.

our love, or the right hand once exchanged, or Dido – soon to die a cruel death – detain you?”). The reference to *noster amor* in these lines is particularly worthy of note.

As Fratantuono and Smith note in their recent commentary on book 4, the use of the plural *noster* “works on two levels: it refers of course to ‘our love’ in the sense of the joint affection of Dido and Aeneas, but it also functions as an expression of the ‘royal we’ with reference to Dido.”⁶⁰ For Creusa, *amor* seems to be directly connected to the responsibility of producing a child. This is suggested by her reference to Ascanius when she appears to Aeneas as a ghost at *Aen.* 2.773-91, in which she refers to *amor* only as *nati...communis amorem* (*Aen.* 2.789). In Creusa’s eyes, Ascanius is the goal their marriage, and as such should be important for Aeneas after her death. In this fashion, the conjugal *amor* between Aeneas and Creusa is a means towards a proper goal rather than an object of obsession and excess. Dido’s attraction to Aeneas was initially conjugal: Venus’ mode of manipulation hinges upon the *imago* of Ascanius and the queen’s implied infertility (*Aen.* 1.712-22). However, by describing their love as *noster amor* despite lacking the child that bonds conjugal love together, Dido gives an early hint that her love is no longer concerned with its proper conjugal goals.

This theme is elaborated upon as this first part of the queen’s speech continues. Dido famously seeks to validate her claims of the legitimacy of her and Aeneas’ relationship by invoking their apparent marriage (*dextra data*, *Aen.* 4.307). She herself even provides a possible note of doubt as to the verity of those rites (*inceptos*, *Aen.* 4.316).⁶¹ Eventually, she offers a particularly interesting rationalization:

*saltem si qua mihi de te suscepta fuisset
ante fugam suboles, si quis mihi paruulus aula
luderet Aeneas, qui te tamen ore referret,*

⁶⁰ Lee Fratantuono and R. Alden Smith, eds., *Virgil: Aeneid 4* (Boston: Brill Publishing, 2022), 491.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 501.

non equidem omnino capta ac deserta uiderer. (Aen. 4.327-30)

At least if before your flight there'd been a child born to me from you, if some itty-bitty Aeneas played in my halls, who would still recall your face, then I would not see myself as so entirely betrayed and abandoned.

This moment in Dido's speech is famous for its raw pathos and its wrenchingly elusive insight into a domestic life now made impossible by Aeneas. But from a Lucretian perspective of proper conjugal love, it only serves to indict Dido's passion further.⁶² Her professed motivation for desiring a child is only an extension of her obsessive and exclusive love for Aeneas: this is no child born of the inherent duty of marriage, but an effort to locate feeling for the beloved even closer to the self. She is oddly certain that this child would be a boy, indicating that her principal motivation is a reminder of Aeneas.⁶³ Hence it is not just a *filius* that Dido wants, but a *paruulus...Aeneas*; an *imago*, reminiscent both of Cupid's imitation of Ascanius and the maternal emotion that the boy-god exploited.⁶⁴ In contrast, Creusa's words about her son are rooted in a deep sense of filial piety as well as a proper conjugal and maternal affection: *nati serua communis amorem* ("protect the love of our shared son," *Aen.* 2.789). Her instruction to Aeneas to care for Ascanius occurs as a specific note amongst general advice for the hero to look to his family, though the application of *amor* to Ascanius is evidence of its personal and heartfelt character.

Further to this contrast between Creusa and Dido is an echo of both Lucretius and Creusa's speech at *Aen.* 2.775-89 by Dido at 4.323 while she laments the loss of her relationship

⁶² The discrepancy between these two effects will be addressed in due course.

⁶³ John and Frances Newman, *Troy's Children: Lost Generations in Virgil's Aeneid* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2005), 120.

⁶⁴ A further suggestion that Dido's love was not for Ascanius as a maternal responsibility but for an *imago* of Aeneas is her curse of Aeneas: *complexu auulsus Iuli* (*Aen.* 2.616). Spoken shortly before her death, Dido's attitude has shifted completely; Creusa, shortly after hers, remains concerned for her son and its representation of her own maternal responsibility.

with Aeneas, and castigates his disloyalty.⁶⁵ A complex allusion can be seen between *Aeneid* 2.677-78, 4.323-24, and *DRN* 3.128-29:

Aen. 2.677-78: **cui** paruus Iulus, / **cui** pater et coniunx quondam tua dicta relinquitur?

To whom am I – once called your wife – and your little son, [abandoned]? To whom is your father abandoned?

DRN 3.128-129: *est igitur calor ac ventus vitalis in ipso / corpore qui nobis moribundos deserit artus.*

Therefore, there is heat and a living wind in the body itself that leaves our dying bodies.

Aen. 4.323-24: **cui** me **moribundam deseris** hospes / (hoc solum nomen quoniam de coniuge restat)?

To whom do you leave me dying, guest, since this title alone remains from that of husband?

The passage featuring Creusa is one of great pathos in which she seeks to convince the hero to remain with his family rather than abandon them when Aeneas' heroic *virtus* drives him to seek death in battle during the fall of Troy. It is another appeal to filial piety in which concern for the object of their conjugal love is foregrounded. The rhetorical success of this pathos obviously distinguishes it from the rhetorical ineffectiveness of Dido's ultimate demise (at least so far as the poem's internal audience is concerned). Dido's "citation" of Creusa's words expresses not a filial obligation, but focuses instead on Aeneas' perceived responsibility to herself, once again embodying the sort of obsessive and exclusive love that precludes proper concern for a child, and sharpening the contrast between the queen and Creusa.

The effect and purpose of Vergil's citation of Lucretius in these lines is a matter of some debate.⁶⁶ Does this communicate Dido's personal alignment with Epicurean philosophy, or the

⁶⁵ Fratantuono and Smith, 508.

⁶⁶ See Gorey, 90ff. Gorey argues that "the absence of a disembodied spirit at the moment of death – a detail that Virgil mentions explicitly in the deaths of Lausus, Turnus, and others – creates the fleeting yet powerful impression that Dido's soul really has suffered an atomic dissolution." For Gorey, the clash this impression creates with Dido's later appearance in the underworld is a further case of Vergil's tendentious relationship to his Lucretian literary inheritance.

narrator's?⁶⁷ For our purposes, it is best to consider the effect of this allusion in conjunction with the suggestion of Creusa's words. The proximity and density of allusion in these lines of book 4 draws attention to a disparity between Dido and Creusa that is followed directly by an evocation of Dido's eventual death. If we acknowledge this discrepancy between Dido and Creusa, these passages may suggest the ethical misalignment (in the Epicurean view) that causes Dido's death: where Creusa shows a conjugal and filial concern, Dido shows an obsessive concern for herself.⁶⁸ It may even be taken as a further reference to Dido's *culpa*, in that the distinction between Dido and Creusa is primarily one between passionate love and proper conjugality.⁶⁹

The second major portion of Dido's speech, from *Aen.* 4.365-87, displays a significant change in her attitude towards Aeneas: a transition from her passionate, excessive love for the hero to anger and hatred towards him. This suggests a causal connection between love and anger also found in Epicureanism.

Significantly, Dido's angry invective begins with reference to Venus: *nec tibi diua parens generis nec Dardanus auctor, / perfide, sed duris genuit te cautibus horrens / Caucasus Hyrcanaeque admorunt ubera tigres* ("no goddess was mother to you, oathbreaker, nor was Dardanus the author of your ancestry, but Caucasus bore you, bristling with harsh crags, and Hyrcanian tigers bore you their teats," *Aen.* 4.365-67). The reason for the implication of the goddess in the queen's anger is twofold: it seems that Dido has an inkling of the divine intervention that has foisted this destructive love upon her – otherwise this is simply a generalized lament for divine apathy; and by attacking Aeneas' callousness through Venus, Dido

⁶⁷ Gordon, 205f. See also R.O.A.M. Lyne, "Vergil's 'Aeneid': Subversion by Intertextuality," *Greece & Rome* v. 41 (1994): 196.

⁶⁸ Betensky, *Love*, 296.

⁶⁹ The difficulty of this *culpa* as divinely implanted remains despite this.

is able to discredit Aeneas' lineage.⁷⁰ The invective against Venus as an opening and the angry tone of the speech are suggestive; similarly suggestive of a causal connection between love and anger in Dido's case is the overlap in the poet's language in describing the two emotions.

After describing the ways in which Aeneas and Venus have wronged and exploited her, Dido says *furiis incensa feror* ("incensed, I'm carried away by rage," *Aen.* 4.376). As has been noted by many commentators, this overlaps with several important moments; for our purposes, it is worth considering the lexical overlap Vergil constructs between anger and love as burning. It is not necessary to look far for similarities: where Dido burns with anger here, she burns with love at *Aen.* 1.713, where she first was deceived by Venus into falling in love with Aeneas. Though this connects the two emotions conceptually, it does not establish a specifically causal relationship between love and anger. The reasons that Dido enumerates for anger do this: she is only *furiis incensa* after she considers the numerous things she did to help Aeneas – acts rooted in her love for him, as well as a sense of *hospitium* he is now breaching: *eiectum litore, egentem / excepi et regni demens in parte locaui. / amissam classem, socios a morte reduxi* ("I rescued him – a needy castaway on my shore! And I madly granted him a part in my rule; I brought back his lost fleet and his comrades from death," *Aen.* 4.373-75).⁷¹ Clearly, she herself now regrets doing these things for Aeneas (*demens*). Recognition of her own impaired judgment acknowledges the contingency of her later infuriated state upon her previous love. This connection, narratological as well as subjective, identifies the connection of Dido's present anger to her previous love.

There is just such a causal connection between love and anger for Lucretius. In fact, it is raised in the proem of *DRN*: *nam tu sola potes tranquilla pace iuvare / mortalis, quoniam belli fera moenera Mavors / armipotens regit* ("for you alone can please mortals with calm peace,

⁷⁰ Fratantuono and Smith, 553.

⁷¹ Richard C. Monti, *The Dido Episode and the Aeneid* (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 1981), 39.

since Mavors rules the savage offices of war in arms,” *DRN* 1.31-33). The calming of Mavors by Venus is a famous scene, and it has been convincingly argued that it owes a great deal to the Empedoclean opposition of Love (Φιλότης) and Strife (Νεῖκος).⁷² Empedoclean thought underlies the philosophical division itself; but *DRN* also describes a relationship between love and anger very similar to that exhibited by Dido above. The dual role of Venus that Lucretius employs is predicated upon the distinction drawn from Empedocles; Venus, in *DRN* book 1, is “the source of good, of joy, and of harmony; and she alone reigns for ever.”⁷³ This, as in the inconsistency between the Venus of books 2 and 4 of the *Aeneid*, seems utterly at odds with the Venus of the invective of *DRN* book 4; for she is the source of strife and discord by bringing uncontrolled passion to men. Rather than consistency between the two Venuses of Lucretius, we find consistency between the Venus of book 4 and the Mars of book 1.⁷⁴

Mars, for Lucretius, is associated plainly with intemperance of a similar vein to Venus in book 4. In book 1, Lucretius plays on the duality of *tranquilla pace* and *belli fera moenera*; in his only other mention, in book 5, he is associated with the *belli terroribus...augmen* (*DRN* 5.1307), as well as the use of savage beasts in warfare (*sues saevos*, *DRN* 5.1309). Thus, his love for Venus is identical to the improper love that Lucretius abhors in book 4.

*nam tu sola potes tranquilla pace iuvare
mortalis, quoniam belli fera moenera Mavors
armipotens regit, in gremium qui saepe tuum se
reicit aeterno devictus vulnere amoris,
atque ita suspiciens tereti cervice reposta
pascit amore avidos inhians in te, dea, visus,
eque tuo pendet resupini spiritus ore.
hunc tu, diva, tuo recubantem corpore sancto*

⁷² H. St. H. Vertue, “Venus and Lucretius,” *Greece & Rome* v. 3 no. 2 (1956): 140; Lowell Edmunds, “Mars as Hellenistic Lover: Lucretius, ‘De rerum natura’ 1.29-40 and its Subtexts,” *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* v. 8 no. 3 (2002): 345.

⁷³ Vertue, 143.

⁷⁴ Gale, *Myth*, 222.

*circumfusa super, suavis ex ore loquelas
funde petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem. (DRN 1.31-40)*

For you alone can please mortals with calm peace, since Mavors rules the savage offices of war in arms, who often casts himself back into your lap, undone by the eternal wound of love, and thus looking with her shapely neck cast back, he eagerly feeds his greedy gaze with love upon you, goddess, and lying on his back his breath hangs from your lips. You, goddess, stretching around him from above as he's lying upon your sacred body, pour forth from your lips sweet words to him, seeking calm peace for the Romans, famous goddess.

Like the love Lucretius derides in book 4, there is a resonance of the language of love as a wound in this passage (*vulnere amoris*, DRN 1.34; *ulcus* DRN 4.1068). Mavors also feeds his love by looking (*suspiciens...pascit amore avidos...visus*, DRN 1.35-36; *nec satiare queunt spectando*, DRN 4.1102).⁷⁵ For Lucretius, the passions of love and anger are interrelated; in fact, though love seems to also have the power to calm the strife that Mavors embodies, it could be similarly pointed out that given Venus' similarly vindictive character in book 4, she would equally have the power to motivate the strife she earlier calms. Regardless, the poet's image of a Mars so utterly devoted to Venus is one of dependency, in which Mars is made entirely reliant upon her – both personally and in the concepts that the gods embody for Lucretius. The decision to make the object of Mars' love the goddess of love is no coincidence; it displays a relationship between the two that is cyclical – a concept also in keeping with the Empedoclean pedigree of Lucretius' thought.⁷⁶

The relationship between love and anger as expounded in Lucretius reinforces the character of Dido's emotions argued above: the queen begins with the seed of a proper conjugal love for Aeneas that is restrained by her *pudor* for Sychaeus,⁷⁷ but this is perverted into

⁷⁵ By transitive property, the language employed of the love of Mars for Venus also resounds in Vergil's description of Dido's love for Aeneas.

⁷⁶ Vertue, 144.

⁷⁷ Niall Rudd, "Dido's Culpa" in *Oxford Readings in Virgil's Aeneid*, ed. S.J. Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 152.

excessive love by the intervention of Cupid and Venus – the contrast between Dido’s love and Creusa’s serves to mark the impropriety of the queen’s passion; her speech, beginning in reproach and appeal and ending in anger and hatred, recalls a close causal relationship between love and anger as found in *DRN*. If, however, Dido’s love was so evidently excessive, can her anger be said to be the same?

A methodical treatment of anger in Epicureanism requires reliance upon the text of Philodemus on the subject. As explained in Chapter One, Philodemus’ model of anger contains a taxonomy similar to that of the love of Lucretius: a fundamental distinction between “natural anger” (φυσική ὀργή) and “empty anger” (κενή ὀργή, also called θυμός). Though the specificity of the term φυσική ὀργή finds no clear translation in Vergil, the use of *furor* as an expression of θυμός in the *Aeneid* does double duty for both its source in Homer and in Philodemus. Where θυμός is simply blind and unrestrained rage, Philodemus’ definition of natural anger requires a great deal of the sage, who is responsible for exhibiting it: the sage must be provoked by just motives, must exhibit moderate intensity, and be brief in his anger.⁷⁸ Revenge is also excluded from the anger of the sage, since for Philodemus it is entirely possible to wage war without anger.⁷⁹ Because revenge causes disturbance of the spirit it cannot be part of φυσική ὀργή (unless deemed necessary as a future preventative).⁸⁰ The assessment of the presence of these motives is referred to by Philodemus as a λογισμός; critically, this assessment is a rational process by which the sage assesses the validity of their anger. Anger of this kind is described by Philodemus as a sort of medicine:

⁷⁸ Indelli, 103.

⁷⁹ David Armstrong and Michael McOsker, trans., *Philodemus: On Anger* (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2020), 262, col. 32.35-38. “καὶ παρο[ρᾶ] ὄτ[ι] χω[ρ]ῖς ὀργῆς ἔστι [τὸ πολεμεῖν κ]α[ὶ] ἀγω[νί-ζε[ς]θαι κ[αὶ πι]κρῶς χει[ροῦν...” (“he neglects that there is warring and fighting and conquering fiercely without anger...”)

⁸⁰ Asmis, “Anger,” 174.

...οὔτε ὡς πρὸς] ἀ]πο[λαυτ]όν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡδ[ύ] τι προσφέρεται) ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς] ἀναγκαιότατον, ἀηδέστα-τον δὲ παραγίνεται, καθά-περ ἐπὶ πόσιν ἀψινθίου καὶ τομῆν.⁸¹

...not as to an enjoyable thing – for it doesn't add any sweetness – but as a thing most necessary and disagreeable, which is akin even to a draught of wormwood or a surgery.

Significantly, Philodemus' description of natural anger as πόσιν ἀψινθίου recalls Lucretius' honeyed cup with its *amarum absinthii laticem* (*DRN* 1.941), and by extension Dido *longumque bibebat amorem* (*Aen.* 1.789), Vergil's pun on Epicurean language of medicinal philosophy. The reversal of the medicinal wormwood for the cause of eventual destruction is what Vergil plays upon; considering this, perhaps the inclusion of Philodemus in the allusion adds *furor* to the active ingredients in the queen's destructive drink.

That Dido displays *furor*/θυμός and not φυσική ὀργή is clear from her behaviour when read in conjunction with Philodemus' definition of the former. As already noted, Dido is referred to as *furiis incensa* (*Aen.* 4.376) at the inception of her anger against Aeneas; lexically speaking, this has resonance with Philodemus' θυμός. Her anger also continues after it can serve a meaningful purpose, since Aeneas has left Carthage. This suggests its immoderate duration.⁸²

Additionally, Dido is intent on revenge, with which she first threatens Aeneas:

dabis, improbe, poenas. (*Aen.* 4.386)

You'll pay, shameless one.

Then wistfully imagines:

*...faces in castra tulissem
implessemque foros flammis natumque patremque
cum genere exstinxem, memet super ipsa dedissem.* (*Aen.* 4.604-6)

I would've carried torches into his camps and filled his decks with flame and destroyed father and son with their race, and then put myself atop it all.

⁸¹ Armstrong and McOsker, 294, col. 44.16-22.

⁸² Ibid, 256, col. 30.11-20.

And finally curses:

*at bello audacis populi uexatus et armis,
finibus extorris, complexu auulsus Iuli
auxilium imploret uideatque indigna suorum
funera. (Aen. 4.615-18)*

But harassed in war by the arms of a daring people, an exile from his borders, torn from Iulus' embrace, may he beg for help and see an unworthy end to his folk!

This desire for revenge, emphasized from the very beginning of her anger until her death, is entirely incongruent with φυσική ὀργή, and aligns closely with the μανία of θυμός. Further, her anger towards parties not directly involved in the pain Aeneas caused her indicates the hyperbolic lengths of her anger: the desire that Iulus be taken from Aeneas utterly eradicates any affection that Dido had for the child earlier in the narrative. She curses an entire nation, not just her lover.⁸³ Dido's suicide is a way of sealing her revenge, in her mind: by acting as a sacrifice, she hopes to actualize her curse by implicating deities in its execution.

Also contrary to Philodemus' φυσική ὀργή is the pointed absence of a λογισμός from Dido's anger. In fact, a contrary sense of madness is emphasized, beginning when Dido deceives Anna. The narrator says that her sister *nec tantos mente furores / concipit...* ("doesn't expect such great fury in her mind," *Aen.* 4.501-2). The madness of Dido is inconceivable to her sister, already suggesting instability. This is expanded on more explicitly later when Dido asks *quae mentem insania mutat?* (What madness alters my mind?" *Aen.* 4.595).

Vergil also offers a description of Dido's behaviour in keeping with Philodemus' interest in the internal and external "symptomology" of anger:⁸⁴ *at trepida et coeptis immanibus effera Dido / sanguineam uoluens aciem, maculisque trementis / interfusa genas et pallida morte futura*

⁸³ Monti, 61.

⁸⁴ Voula Tsouna, "Philodemus, Seneca, and Plutarch on Anger" in *Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition*, eds. J. Fish and K.R. Sanders (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 191.

(“but Dido, trembling and savage with her monstrous undertaking, rolling her bloodshot eyes, her quivering cheeks suffused with a flush, was pale at her coming death,” *Aen.* 4.642-44). The queen’s external disturbance is a manifestation of internal instability: *et partis animum uersabat in omnis* (“and she was turning her mind everywhere,” *Aen.* 4.630). Dido does not display a steady rational assessment of her situation; rather, her mind (*animum*) is uneasy, shifting rapidly and unpredictably. In Epicurean terms, she is undergoing a *ταραχή*, something that ought to be resolved in the sage; this is supported by Dido’s contest against her *curas* (*Aen.* 4.488, 521, 531, 551, etc.), which is Lucretius’ translation of the Greek.⁸⁵ The queen’s anger exhibits all those traits of passion and irrationality condemned by Philodemus.⁸⁶ Her anger cannot be the anger of the sage, φυσική ὀργή, and must belong to θυμός characteristic of someone μάταιος.⁸⁷

Vergil’s representation of Dido’s love for, and subsequent anger at, Aeneas is a carefully constructed litany of poor Epicureanism. At every turn the queen seems to be overwhelmed by passion and unable to relate to her love and anger in the ways considered proper by Lucretius and Philodemus. However, reading book 4 of Vergil’s poem from an Epicurean perspective and establishing Dido as a “bad Epicurean” does not condemn the queen – who remains the subject of much pathos and the undeniable object of considerable sympathy – but rather suggests that Vergil himself challenges the unbending application of Epicurean ethics contrary to the empathy that characters like Dido are due. Venus’ imposition of love upon Dido – a deceit that hinges on its unexpectedness and capacity to undermine resistance – fundamentally reduces the blame that can be assigned to the queen.⁸⁸ That the passions are set as beyond human control is itself a

⁸⁵ Gordon, 203.

⁸⁶ Armstrong and McOsker, 256, col. 30.25-26. “καὶ μεγάλους ἄνδρας ἐκβακχεύειν πεφύκασι” ([anger] drives even great men into a frenzy”). See also Freer, 106.

⁸⁷ Asmis, “Anger,” 156.

⁸⁸ Rudd, 163.

challenge to Epicurean doctrine; that it is a god responsible for them is an even greater defiance of Epicureanism. As investigation into the Epicurean character of the passions of the *Aeneid* proceeds, the locus of Vergil's philosophical departure from Epicureanism will narrow also.

Vergil's use of the sterile language of Epicureanism – recalled in the metaphors of the wormwood of Philodemus and Lucretius, and the latter's treatment of sex generally⁸⁹ – reminds the reader of Aeneas, who acts not only as a good Stoic (as has been pointed out),⁹⁰ but also in many ways like a good Epicurean: he refuses to permit love for Dido – which does exist, we are told (*Aen.* 4.395) – to overwhelm his rational mind and intention to leave.⁹¹ The gap between Aeneas' actions and the pathos of Dido is marked, and the queen asks the questions that the reader also feels compelled to wonder about: *num fletu ingemuit nostro? num lumina flexit? / num lacrimas uictus dedit aut miseratus amantem est?* (Did he groan at my weeping? Did he turn his gaze? Did he – overcome – shed tears or pity one who'd loved him?" *Aen.* 4.369-70).⁹² We have seen that Aeneas is capable of great passion, often in the form of outbursts that motivate his actions. If Aeneas' love for Dido is not enough to make him stay in Carthage, where do his passions lie?

We are given a suggestion in book 4. Aeneas' famous *hic amor, haec patria est* ("this is my love, this my homeland," *Aen.* 4.347) can be taken as an explicit confession of the amorous character of Aeneas' *amor patriae* – an integral aspect of his *pietas*. In Epicurean terms, this presents an impasse: is this love excessive or proper? It certainly did not come to Aeneas easily; the hero struggled to accept his obligations.⁹³ Aeneas' limited emotionality for Dido suggests a

⁸⁹ Brown, 63.

⁹⁰ Bowra, 18. Bowra contends that where Aeneas clearly diverges from Stoic *modus*, it is due to the "Augustan adaptation of those principles to their own needs."

⁹¹ Fratantuono and Smith, 504.

⁹² Perkell, 132.

⁹³ Grillo, 64.

certain capacity for restraint – but this may change when the true object of his love – *patria* – is at stake rather than a lover. Though book 4 presents a paradigmatic dynamic between love and anger, investigation into the character of Aeneas’ professed love of country requires analysis of book 2, where Aeneas’ love of country overwhelms his reason and threatens to make a Dido of the hero, and book 10, where Aeneas’ *pietas* is stretched towards excess.

CHAPTER THREE: *AMOR VERUS PATRIAE MONSTRAT*

As David Quint memorably noted, the *Aeneid* is a poem that invites suspicion of itself – especially with respect to its hero.⁹⁴ Book 2 sees Aeneas’ splendidly violent Homeric anger against the Greeks in battle, as well as his deceit of them by wearing their armour. That Aeneas narrates book 2 himself is the primary reason for suspecting his actions here: his description of his own anger is implicated in his need to salvage his heroic identity from the shame of surviving Troy when others do not.⁹⁵ It can be said, therefore, that any dissembling in Aeneas’ account of book 2 seems, peculiarly, to be closely related to his desire to be *pius*. Dissembling conveys moral insecurity over his own behaviour. It is not a new suggestion that Aeneas’ *pietas* in the first 6 books of the *Aeneid* is reluctant at best.⁹⁶

Aeneas’ Homeric anger in book 2 warrants an Epicurean analysis even if the hero’s self-narration is unreliable. From an Epicurean perspective, Aeneas’ rage is precipitated by his excessive relationship to his own *amor patriae* – a particular form of *pietas*. I contend that Aeneas’ excessive passion for his country is akin to Dido’s excessive passion as examined in Chapter One, and that it is possible to analyze his *amor patriae* in terms of *amor*’s erotic connotations. Much like Dido, Aeneas seems subject to bouts of extreme disturbances of the spirit. In his self-narration, Aeneas’ anger is primarily provoked by scenes of the destruction of his home’s culture and social systems, or by reminders of the cause of their destruction. Aeneas’ anger reaches an extreme of desperation that obliterates his capacity for rationality and is

⁹⁴ David Quint, *Virgil’s Double Cross: Design and Meaning in the Aeneid* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 34.

⁹⁵ Richard Heinze, *Virgil’s Epic Technique*, trans. by H. and D. Harvey, and F. Robertson (Wiltshire: University of California Press, 1993), 4.

⁹⁶ Frederick Ahl, “Homer, Vergil, and Complex Narrative Structures in Latin Epic: An Essay,” *Illinois Classical Studies* v. 14 no 1 (1989): 23. Ahl suggests that it also serves to manipulate Dido; these possibilities are not at all mutually exclusive.

tantamount to suicide, foreshadowing the irrationality later on display in Dido's anti-Lucretian suicide. The comparison implied by the analogue with Dido is not flattering to the hero.

Though Aeneas is required by fate to flee from Troy, his reluctance to do so has an important ideological purpose. The point at which his heroic identity and *pietas* intersect is martial courage and *virtus*: the hero, though he must flee, cannot be emasculated by cowardice in battle.⁹⁷ Therefore, his anger can plainly be seen as an element of *pietas*. His hesitation is not truly weakness of character, but an effort to salvage honour. But in this case, it is the excess of anger that serves to undermine Aeneas' morality, not his hesitation to flee. By once again reading Vergil in light of Lucretius' accounts of love, it is possible to identify shared language that suggests the excess of Aeneas' emotion. A causal link between his love of country and his anger may be similarly ascertained lexically. Comparison of the language of Philodemus' *DI* with the passages that concern Aeneas' heroic anger offers an interesting correspondence, since the Epicurean psychological texts share much of their vocabulary with the language of Homeric anger – a coincidence of which Vergil is evidently conscious in his rendition of these words into Latin. The word θυμός, for example, is realized in the *Aeneid* as *furor*. However, Philodemus also uses θυμός in *DI*, but in a different, more technical sense from its use in the Homeric epics, essentially excising the word's older sense of "spirit" or "will" in favour of its connotations of passion and anger. In the *Aeneid*, Vergil employs *furor* to encompass the sense of θυμός both as it appears in *DI* and in the Homeric epics.

The suggestion that an anger that fundamentally seeks to preserve *pietas* and its composite element, *virtus*, can also be excessive poses a significant problem for the ethical cosmos of the *Aeneid*. Vergil makes the point more plainly later in the poem, without the

⁹⁷ Ibid, 27.

intervening obfuscation of Aeneas' unreliable narration. The hero's ἀριστεία in book 10 is another striking example of clear excess, an orgy of violence almost Lucanian in its pornographic gratuitousness. There is a certain merit to the argument that Aeneas' anger is provoked by a *pia fides* for Evander, an obligation embodied by Pallas. The idea that Aeneas is also driven by personal attachment to the boy does not undermine this point. In fact, the hero's affection for Pallas and sense of *fides* for Evander solidifies his oft-noted closer alignment to *fatum* in the Iliadic books of the *Aeneid*, an alignment that includes the unified identification of the duties of the *paterfamilias* and the *pater patriae* in one man.⁹⁸ What the excess invites us to question is not whether Aeneas is *pius* in his anger, but whether the love for *pietas* and *patria* that underlies his anger is excessive itself.

The assertion that *amor patriae* is true *amor* and an integral component of *pietas* is worthy of rigorous justification. The erotic terminology with which Vergil describes the search for and colonization of Italy by the Trojans has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly disagreement. Consider, for example, a passage over which a great deal of ink has been spilled – the proem of book 7:

*Nunc age, qui reges, Erato, quae tempora, rerum
quis Latio antiquo fuerit status, aduena classem
cum primum Ausoniis exercitus appulit oris,
expediam, et primae reuocabo exordia pugnae.
tu uatem, tu, diua, mone. dicam horrida bella,
dicam acies actosque animis in funera reges,
Tyrrhenamque manum totamque sub arma coactam
Hesperiam. maior rerum mihi nascitur ordo,
maius opus moueo. (Aen. 7.37-45)*

Come now, Erato – who were the kings, what were the times, what was the state of things in ancient Latium when first a foreign army landed their fleet on Ausonian shores – I

⁹⁸ For this equivalence, see Tom Stevenson, "Acceptance of the Title Pater Patriae in 2 BC," *Antichthon* v. 43 (2009): 101.

shall explain, and I'll recount the causes of the first battle. You, goddess, you advise your poet! I'll speak of awful wars, I'll speak of battlelines and kings driven to their deaths by courage, and a Tyrrhenian band and all Hesperia assembled under arms. A greater order of things is born to me; I undertake a greater task.

The disagreement dates to as early as Servius, whose controversial note *pro Calliope vel pro qualicumque Musa* ("instead of Calliope or some other Muse," *Serv. 7.37*)⁹⁹ has been taken by some as the conclusive and authentically ancient position on the matter; others justifiably point to Propertius' *diuersaeque nouem sortitae iura Puellae / exercent teneras in sua dona manus* ("the nine different girls, having been allotted their domains, work their tender hands at their own gifts," *Prop. 3.3.33-34*)¹⁰⁰ as an indication that, contrary to Servius, the Augustan poets did delineate between the roles of each Muse. Further arguments hinge on the likely Apollonian allusion, but the explicitly erotic character of Apollonius' subject matter in his proem is not truly present in these later books of the *Aeneid*.

Fernandelli contends that the Apollonian intertext signals the ongoing importance of passion in the poem.¹⁰¹ Horsfall, however, correctly points out that "though the epic drama that ensues is not fundamentally elegiac or erotic...the *situation* is admirably suited to the patronage of Erato."¹⁰² Horsfall writes here of the romantic and sexual tension between Amata, Turnus, and Lavinia. But as he himself notes, this romantic tension lacks the emphasis one would expect to warrant the invocation of the appropriate Muse: Calliope is still the expected choice given the proem's annalistic emphasis upon *tempora, exercitus, and primae...exordia pugnae*. Fernandelli also notes such discordance:

⁹⁹ Hermann Hagen and Georg Thilo, eds., *Servii Grammatici Qui Feruntur In Vergilii Carmina Commentarii, Vol. I-III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). All quotations are from this text.

¹⁰⁰ S.J. Heyworth, ed., *Sexti Properto Elegos* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007).

¹⁰¹ Marco Fernandelli, "Il Compito della Musa: Sul Proemio di 'Eneide' VII," *Quaderni di Filologia Classica* v. 5 (1986): 88.

¹⁰² Nicholas Horsfall, ed., *Virgil, Aeneid 7: A Commentary* (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2000), 70. His emphasis.

Osserviamo ora, per completare questa rassegna, che il medesimo contrasto si verifica già all'interno del proemio tra l'invocazione a Erato (unitamente ai due versi finali, 44b-45), segnale di un approfondimento della prospettiva, ed il punto di vista 'ravvicinato' di un interesse limitato ai fatti, convenzionalmente epico.¹⁰³

Let us now observe, to complete this analysis, that the same contrast already occurs within the proem during the invocation to Erato (together with the last two lines, 44b-45); a sign of a deepening of the perspective, and the 'narrow' point of view of a limited interest in the facts – conventionally epic.

Though Fernandelli considers the use of Erato to be to bridge the 'Odyssean' and 'Iliadic' books, the observation of a mismatch between the Muse and the setting is observed by two scholars whose interpretative goals otherwise differ. Why this dissonance between "situation" and the description as it appears?

I believe that the significance of Vergil's invocation of Erato lies in the very disjunction between what is expected and what is delivered. By establishing the Muse early in the proem, the poet creates a dynamic in which the enumeration of apparently un-erotic themes is increasingly curious. The erotic content appropriate to Erato's inspiration is eventually supplied, but not until later:

*iam matura uiro, iam plenis nubilis annis.
multi illam magno e Latio totaque petebant
Ausonia; petit ante alios pulcherrimus omnis
Turnus, auis atausque potens, quem regia coniunx
adiungi generum miro properabat amore. (Aen. 7.53-57)*

Now old enough for a husband, now marriageable with full years. Many men from great Latium and from all Ausonia were seeking her; fairest before all others, Turnus sought her, rich in fathers and forebears, whom the king's wife hastened to join to her as a son-in-law with remarkable passion.

This distance from the invocation to the relevant Muse is to be read as directly correlated to its relevance: present, yes, but not primary. By not clarifying what is truly intended by the

¹⁰³ Fernandelli, 104.

invocation to Erato in the proem itself, Vergil invites us to engage in the poetics of his silence and make the connection between the Muse he invokes and the content he describes.¹⁰⁴ Even if this uncertain connection is completely clarified by *Aen.* 7.53-57 – a debatable point – the relationship between eroticism and the course of Roman history was nonetheless at least briefly present in the intervening lines.

In light of this connection, Aeneas' earlier words to Dido, as well as later lexical occurrences of *amor* applied to homeland, take on an entirely different shade. There are three uses of the phrase (or an equivalent) *amor patriae*, first by Aeneas:

*sed nunc Italiam magnam Gryneus Apollo,
Italiam Lyciae iussere capessere sortes;
hic amor, haec patria est. (Aen. 4.345-47)*

But now Grynean Apollo and the Lycian oracles have commanded me to seize Italy, great Italy. This is my love, this my homeland.

Second by Anchises:

*infelix, utcumque ferent ea facta minores:
uincet amor patriae laudumque immensa cupido. (Aen. 6.822-23)*

Unhappy, however his descendants will report these deeds: love of country and great passion for praise will conquer him.

And finally, of the matrons who witness Camilla's death:

*ipsae de muris summo certamine matres
monstrat amor uerus patriae, ut uidere Camillam
tela manu trepidae iaciunt... (Aen. 11.891-93)*

The matrons themselves from the walls, in great rivalry – true love of country showed them the way – when they saw Camilla, they tremulously flung weapons from their hands...

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Michael Putnam, *Virgil's Epic Designs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 82.

Aeneas' famous words to Dido suggest, at the very least, an equivalency between romantic love and love of country. In fact, they indicate another aspect: the exclusivity of his *amor patriae*. He cannot love both Dido and country. The force of the hero's *amor patriae* is overwhelming enough to preclude other forms of *amor*. Later, Lavinia is essentially a non-character – perhaps because Aeneas only loves her insofar as he loves Rome, for which she is requisite. The *amor patriae* of Camilla, and that which she inspires in the women who see her death, is similarly overpowering: Camilla's virginal status suggests a certain prioritization of commitments,¹⁰⁵ and the last we hear of the women who witness her demise – whose love of country is even *uerus* – they are on their way to die on the frontlines: *primaque mori pro moenibus ardent* (“they burned to die first in rank in front of the walls,” *Aen.* 11.895). These women, Vergil is clear, are mothers: *ipsae de muris summo certamine matres / monstrat uerus amor patriae, ut uidere Camillam...* (“the matrons themselves from the walls, in great rivalry – true love of country showed them the way – when they saw Camilla...” *Aen.* 11.891) – the adjective/noun relationship emphatically frames the line. Their love of country is powerful enough to alter the traditional requirements of their social roles.¹⁰⁶

The language of these matrons' love of country is notable for its emphasis upon passion. They burn (*ardent*) for the chance to display their love – an unmistakable lexical echo of erotic love apparent in examples like Dido. Another internal echo that Vergil may be invoking in this passage is the assembly of Italian rustics summoned by Tyrrhus when Silvia's stag is killed:

*olli (pestis enim tacitis latet aspera siluis)
 improuisi adsunt, hic torre armatus obusto,
 stipitis hic grauidi nodis; quod cuique repertum
 rimanti telum ira facit. (Aen. 7.505-8)*

¹⁰⁵ Robin N. Mitchell, “The Violence of Virginité in the ‘Aeneid,’” *Arethusa* v. 24 no. 2 (1991): 221.

¹⁰⁶ Nicholas Horsfall, ed., *Virgil, Aeneid 11: A Commentary* (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2003), 456ff.

They – for cruel ruin lurks in the silent forests – came unexpectedly, this one armed with a fire-hardened brand, this one with a club heavy with knots; what was available to each when he looked, anger made a weapon.

Both passages share the idea of improvisation – 11.894 *imitantur*; 7.506 *improvisi adsunt* – and the resulting clubs are described with similar vocabulary also:

*tela manu trepidae iaciunt ac robore duro
stipitibus ferrum sudibusque imitantur obustis...*
(*Aen.* 11.893-95)

They tremulously flung **weapons** from their hands, and with **clubs** of hardy oak and **fire-hardened** stakes they **mimicked** swords.

*improvisi adsunt, hic torre armatus obusto,
stipitis hic grauidi nodis; quod cuique repertum
rimanti telum ira facit.* (*Aen.* 7.506-8)

They **came unexpectedly**, this one armed with a **fire-hardened** brand, this one with a club heavy with knots; what was available to each when he looked, anger made a **weapon**.

But where the matrons are explicitly provoked by *amor patriae*, for the farmers it is plainly *ira* that makes their weapons. The significance of such a hint of conceptual equivalency between *amor (patriae)* and *ira* is clear for a Lucretian context, and will receive further analysis later.

Further, and more direct, evidence of an eroticised view of *amor patriae* is given to us by Anchises' use of the term: *uincet amor patriae laudumque immensa cupido* ("love of country and great passion for praise will conquer him," *Aen.* 6.823). Said of Lucius Junius Brutus, Anchises' wording is significant here. The emotional motivations that conquer in this passage are *amor* and *cupido*; even if the eroticism traditionally associated with *amor* is counterbalanced by its association with *patria*, no such reconciliation for the use of *cupido* can be found. It is certainly a word of passion, particularly lust.¹⁰⁷ Their use together here as joint subjects of the verb invites the reader to consider them in light of their most shared lexical ambit – passion, erotics, and

¹⁰⁷ Matthew Leigh, "Vincet amor patriae laudumque immensa cupido: Vergil, 'Aeneid' 6.823," *Athenaeum* v. 100 no. 1-2 (2012): 288.

desire. The word *cupido* in particular elicits an Epicurean analysis, as it is the word of the love that Lucretius derides in *DRN* book 4 – *cupido caeca*.¹⁰⁸

If the concept of *amor patriae* in the *Aeneid* may reasonably be considered to carry the full weight of impassioned eroticization that *amor* implies, then it is worthy of a full investigation according to the Epicurean positions on love and passion. For my purposes, the proposition of a connection between *amor patriae* and *ira* is not meaningfully undermined by the particular focus of *amor* upon country rather than romance. And yet it is also clear that to love one's country is *pius*: Lucius Junius Brutus' noble status as the founder of the Republic is predicated upon, not lessened by, his deep love of his homeland. An internal conflict emerges: applied to Aeneas, a challenge to his *amor patriae* as being prone to excess constitutes a crucial ethical problem for the hero's characteristic *pietas*.

A prime episode for the testing of Aeneas' *amor patriae* is in book 2. As has been pointed out in prior scholarship, the uncertainty and contradiction that underlies Aeneas' story to Dido is Vergil's intelligent integration of the contradictory accounts of the hero's role in the fall of Troy, an integration that preserves the ambiguity of Aeneas' actions.¹⁰⁹ But on the other hand, as Ahl pointed out, Vergil is also concerned with preserving the fidelity of Aeneas' *virtus* by making the hero's flight from battle – an otherwise deplorable act – consistent with *pietas* and less liable to accusations of cowardice.¹¹⁰ In this context, therefore, I shall undertake a hesitant

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *Liv.* 1.6.4, of the desire of Romulus and Remus to found a city apart from Lavinium and Alba Longa: *intervenit deinde his cogitationibus avitum malum, regni cupido, atque inde foedum certamen, coortum a satis miti principio* ("then an inherited flaw interrupted these considerations: love of kingdom. Thence was a foul contest, though it arose from something calm enough at first"). See also *Sal. Cat.* 10, of the decline of the Republic after Rome had established control of the Mediterranean: *Igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit: ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere* ("therefore at first the love of money, then of power grew; as though it were the stuff of every flaw"). The use of phrases like *regni cupido* and *imperi cupido* by authors roughly contemporary to Vergil suggests that *amor patriae* may contain a similarly negative connotation.

¹⁰⁹ James O'Hara, *Inconsistency in Roman Epic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 86.

¹¹⁰ Ahl, 27.

analysis of the excess of Aeneas' *amor patriae* in the fall of Troy, his subsequent anger, and eventual flight compelled by *fatum* that maintains awareness of the ambiguity of the unreliable narration and the diverse range of intertexts at play. As antidote to the necessarily tentative nature of this reading, book 10 is suited to a similar analysis without such difficult intervening factors. In this way, book 10 will act as a "control" for my reading of book 2.

The phrase *amor patriae* does not occur in book 2, but its presence is felt throughout Aeneas' story. As Betensky notes in a proposed Lucretian reading of Catullus, "what Lucretius is attacking is a romantic and obsessive attitude to love."¹¹¹ The obsessive anger evident in Catullus' attacks on Lesbia is connected to a strong sense of grief as well: *nullum amans uere, sed identidem omnium / ilia rumpens; / nec meum respectet, ut ante, amorem...* ("she's truly in love with no one, but wears out crotches again and again; may she not look back upon my love, as before...") *Catul.* 11.19-21).¹¹² For Lucretius, grief is a frequent byproduct of love – as examined in the image of the heifer whose calf has died:

*nam saepe ante deum vitulus delubra decora
turicremas propter mactatus concidit aras
sanguinis exspirans calidum de pectore flumen.
at mater viridis saltus orbata peragrans
novit¹¹³ humi pedibus vestigia pressa bisulcis,
omnia convisens oculis loca si queat usquam
conspicere amissum fetum, completque querellis
frondiferum nemus adsistens et crebra revisit
ad stabulum desiderio perfixa iuveni,
nec tenerae salices atque herbae rore vigentes
fluminaque illa queunt summis labentia ripis
oblectare animum subitamque avertere curam,
nec vitulorum aliae species per pabula laeta*

¹¹¹ Betensky, *Love*, 295.

¹¹² R.A.B. Mynors, ed., *C. Valerii Catulli Carmina* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).

¹¹³ The OCT of Bailey prints *non quit* (*O*) here, listing *oinquit* (*Q*), *oinquid* (*G*), *linquit* (*Q corr.*), *noscit* (*Lachmann*) and *novit* (*Brieger*) as possibilities. Other editions prefer Brieger's *novit*, which has been my preference here since it seems to yield the most coherent sense without the implication of a verb.

*derivare queunt animum curaque levare:
usque adeo quiddam proprium notumque requirit. (DRN 2.352-66)*

For often before the virtuous shrines of the gods a calf falls slain at the altars as they burn incense, coughing a warm stream of blood from its chest; but its bereaved mother, wandering the green vale, recognizes on the earth the footsteps imprinted by its cloven feet. Scanning every place with her eyes, if she may somewhere spot her lost baby, she fills the leafy grove with her lamentation, and often returns to their pen run through with yearning for her calf. The pliant willows and grass flourishing from the dew and those rivers lapping at their banks cannot delight her mind or avert her sudden anxiety, nor can the sight of other calves in happy pastures distract her mind and lighten her anxiety.

When a grief such as that above is caused by the agency of another, there may plausibly be reason for anger. Indeed, Lucretius outright condemns none of these emotions as such; as Konstan writes, “he is censuring, not the immediate sense of loss, which as we have seen is common to animals as well as human beings, but rather the idea that grief is insatiable and interminable.”¹¹⁴

Since, for Lucretius, uncontrolled grief will only arise as a result of an excessive love that seeks to supplant proper rationality, such grief emerges as an intermediary emotion between love and anger. The love that produces an insatiable grief may equally produce an insatiable anger where vengeance is possible. Love is requisite for grief, and though *amor* is not explicit in the second book of the *Aeneid*, the *luctus* that results when the object of *amor* is lost is a constantly emphasized theme. Since Vergil provides little direct access to Aeneas’ *amor patriae* in book 2, I propose a Lucretian reading of his *luctus* that considers the hero’s emotion against Lucretius’ vision of proper self-control.

When asked to recount the fall of Troy to Dido, Aeneas tells her that it is with reluctance that he will relate it because *animus meminisse horret luctuque refugit* (“his mind abhors to

¹¹⁴ David Konstan, “Lucretius and the Epicurean Attitude towards Grief” in *Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science*, eds. D. Lehoux, A. Morrison, and A. Sharrock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 206.

remember and flees from the grief,” *Aen.* 2.12). Already before the story is begun, we are told that the grief and memory of loss is such that it impinges upon the hero’s rational mind (*animus*). The rational connotations of *animus* are strongly present in Lucretius, who often uses *animus* interchangeably with *mens* and *consilium*, due to their shared aspect of rationality, but not with *anima*, due to its sense as prerational and belonging to both humans and animals.¹¹⁵ For Aeneas’ rational mind to behave irrationally, and from his account seemingly without his own control, we can discern an early hint of the obsessive and exclusive nature of his grief.

For the Epicurean sage, disturbance of the rational mind impinges upon ἀταραξία, and is to be avoided as akin to pain. Consider again part of the image of the heifer and calf:

*nec tenerae salices atque herbae rore vigentes
fluminaque illa queunt summis labentia ripis
oblectare **animum** subitamque avertere **curam**,
nec vitulorum aliae species per pabula laeta
derivare queunt **animum** **curaque** levare. (DRN 2.361-65)*

The pliant willows and grass flourishing from the dew and those rivers lapping at their banks cannot delight her mind or avert her sudden anxiety, nor can the sight of other calves in happy pastures distract her mind and lighten her anxiety.

In context, Lucretius is discussing the commonality between animals and humans in recognizing kinship. Though this highly pathetic passage is found in an analysis close to biological taxonomy, Lucretius is at pains to anthropomorphise the heifer and her grief.¹¹⁶ Attributing rational capacity to an animal, for example, does not otherwise align with Lucretius’ biological taxonomies; but it does serve an exceedingly effective poetic purpose.¹¹⁷ By attributing rationality to an animal, Lucretius is able to suggest the relationship between the *animus* and *curae*. The heifer is unable to recover the stability of her *animus* by “lightening” (*levare*) her

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 203.

¹¹⁶ Aya Betensky, *The Literary Use of Animals in Lucretius’ ‘De Rerum Natura’ and Virgil’s ‘Georgics’* (PhD diss., Yale, 1972), 104.

¹¹⁷ Monica Gale, “Man and Beast in Lucretius and the Georgics,” *The Classical Quarterly* v. 41 no. 2 (1991): 416.

cura, which is the Lucretian word of *ταραχή*. This sort of disturbance is the most dangerous thing for the Epicurean: although it is not unavoidable – the cow’s response to her bereavement is nothing if not natural – it poses the risk of excess and unabated disturbance that can be a lasting impediment to *ἀταραξία*.¹¹⁸ By presenting a hero whose rationality is explicitly impinged upon by *luctus* early on, Vergil gives a suggestion of a *ταραχή*, implying also that Aeneas’ removal from the immediate source of grief has not resulted in reassertion of stability, as the good Epicurean would hope.¹¹⁹ This inability to regain his composure is suggested by *refugit* at *Aen.* 2.12: for Aeneas the revisitation of his grief in the telling would produce equivalent bereavement.

This suggestion that Aeneas may be assailed by a true *ταραχή* continues to be developed throughout book 2. The character of this *ταραχή* remains primarily defined by *luctus*, until the hero’s anger achieves primacy. When first Aeneas awakes from his dream of Hector, for example, grief is foremost in the description: *Diuerso interea miscentur moenia luctu* (“meanwhile the walls were confused with grief all over...” *Aen.* 2.298), a remarkably vivid image that suggests that the city itself has literally become an embodiment of grief. Shortly after, we are given the famous lines:

*arma amens capio; nec sat rationis in armis,
sed glomerare manum bello et concurrere in arcem
cum sociis ardent animi...* (*Aen.* 2.314-16)

Madly I snatched my weapons; there’s not enough reason in weapons, but our minds burned to gather together a band for war and to rush to the defence with our comrades...

The association of grief with a loss of reason offers once again the suggestion of a *ταραχή*. The emphatic character of this expression – the striking chord of madness (*amens*), the

¹¹⁸ Konstan, 208.

¹¹⁹ Colin I.M. Hamilton, “Dido, Tityos and Prometheus,” *The Classical Quarterly* v. 43 no. 1 (1993): 249.

acknowledgement of his own irrationality (*nec sat rationis*), followed by the disappointing concessive (*sed*) that exposes Aeneas' incapacity to restrain himself all reveal a course of action that is so anti-Epicurean it could appear in *DRN* as a cautionary tale. As if to seal this contrarian account of passion, Vergil writes that *ardent animi*; for Lucretius, the last thing the rational faculty should do is burn with passion.

The adjective *amens* is an especially interesting case. Though the word is extremely common in descriptions of madness and passion in Vergil, this is its first use in and *Aeneid*, and is worthy of reading against its only use in all of *DRN*:

*ne trepides caeli divisis partibus amens,
unde volans ignis pervenerit aut in utram se
verterit hinc partem, quo pacto per loca saepta
insinuarit, et hinc dominatus ut extulerit se. (DRN 6.86-89)*

That you won't mindlessly be afraid of the part of the divided heavens whence flying fire comes, or in which of the two parts it twists itself hence, in what manner it's pierced through walled places, and how having taken hold there it takes itself out.

Though *ratio* for Vergil may mean a broad range of things, its sense as reason is a valid Lucretian reading; similarly, though the traditional translation of *amens* tends towards words like "crazed" (Bartsch), "madly" (Lewis), "insane" (Mandelbaum), its literal force of simply *a + mens* ("mindless") should not be forgotten: though more clinical, *mens* is a common word of rational capacity for Lucretius as well.¹²⁰

But more intriguing in the above passage is the vague reminiscence of Lucretius in Vergil's fall of Troy. The passage from Lucretius concerns the fear of mortals of the sky, mostly because of augury and superstition, that the poet derogatorily terms *religio*.¹²¹ Lucretius baldly states that

¹²⁰ Konstan, 203.

¹²¹ Phillip de Lacy, "Process and Value: An Epicurean Dilemma," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* v. 88 (1957): 121.

superstitious men *quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre / possunt ac fieri divino numine rentur* (“aren’t able to perceive the causes of such events with their reason at all, and imagine them to be done by divine power,” *DRN* 6.90-91).¹²² Though a direct intertextual citation is not immediately evident, the suggestion of Lucretius’ influence on Vergil’s imagery is amorously borne out: the mutual correspondence of the first usage of *amens* in each text; the generalized *dis aliter visum* (*Aen.* 2.428) sentiment and bitterness towards the divine shared between Aeneas and Lucretius; and, as will be explored, the coincidence of fire invading the walled settlement.

As noted by Heinze, it is likely that Vergil’s heavy emphasis upon fire and smoke in the imagery of his *Ilioupersis* is his own innovation, unique amongst the prior tellings of the same story.¹²³ The intersection between such accounts and Vergil’s language of passion as “burning” is no coincidence: violence born of anger also motivates the literal flames that destroy Troy. This union of the figurative fires of passion with literal flames, though fleshed out in the *Aeneid*, may have at least part of its source in the of *DRN* above. Though the *ignis* here is lightning, the basic idea of its invasive force – especially *per loca saepta* – is common between both authors. The association of such fire with being *amens* is an overlap of vocabulary between the fires of passion and literal flames that, for Vergil, further illuminates the destructive force of both passion and the fires of Troy. For both authors, this sort of passion is closely related to the invasive “fire” of an external pain that impinges upon rationality and provokes a *ταραχή*.

It is here worth considering as an aside, however, the fashion in which Vergil’s theology does not align with Lucretius’ account. As was considered in the case of Dido, that Vergil attributes the first cause of the queen’s love for Aeneas to the divine rather than to her own agency is a

¹²² The OCT of Bailey has these two lines as ll. 90-91, but other editors place them at ll. 56-57. Bailey’s placement makes the content of the lines directly contingent the idea of ll. 86-89.

¹²³ Heinze, 36f.

departure from Epicurean doctrine, since according to Epicureanism it is a lack of understanding of causes that underlies the attribution of such things to the gods. Similarly, in this case Lucretius specifically explains how attribution of natural phenomena to the gods – including the incursion of *volans ignis* into a settlement – is predicated upon fear and ignorance. However, when Venus later reveals the divine view of the fall of Troy (*Aen.* 2.604-23), Aeneas sees that the cause is quite the opposite. The association of lightning with the divine that is undermined by Lucretius is in turn subverted by Vergil’s depiction of the gods’ complicity in the sacking of the city. The divine machinery of Vergil’s epic continues to be quite contrary to *DRN*.

Now that he is *amens*, it is plain that Aeneas is impassioned beyond the initial response of being stricken with grief; his passion is reaching a height of rage that is driven by his prior grief. Indeed, as Aeneas says, *furor iraque mentem / praecipitat* (“fury and rage reign over the mind,” *Aen.* 2.316-17). Considering *mentem* as once again encompassing its Lucretian sense of the rational faculty, it is explicit that the hero no longer has rational control. Again, this is not an inherently immoral position for the hero to find himself in. Philodemus, for example, is clear that some actions may justifiably provoke passion even in the wise man: “ὄ[σπερ] τινὲς σο[φοί] τινῶν μ[ἄλ]λον ἀ-ποδώσουσι φα[ντ]ασίαν ὀ[ρ]γίλων...” (“just as some wise men will more exhibit the impression of being angry than others...”).¹²⁴ However, we have yet to see if this passion is a passing *ταραχή* from which a rational Aeneas will soon emerge, or if it will continue into the sort of obsessive and insatiable relationship to grief and anger condemned by Lucretius.¹²⁵

It continues to be useful, therefore, to consider the further symptoms of a passionate *ταραχή* exhibited by Aeneas, and the possibility of its excess. There are a couple moments that

¹²⁴ Armstrong and McCosker, 272, col. 36.17-20.

¹²⁵ Arguably, a significant hint towards the answer to this question has already been given: Aeneas expressed the symptoms of a *ταραχή* to Dido at the beginning of his narration, well after he had left behind the context of the cause of the *ταραχή* itself.

raise such concerns, primarily given that a *ταραχή* for a wise man will be a brief episode that is rationally curtailed such that it does not cause great mental disturbance.¹²⁶ The first is the deception of the Greeks by Aeneas and his band of Trojans, which will also afford an appropriate opportunity to distinguish between the sort of anger that is requisite for heroic ἀρετή, as well as providing an indication of the continued excess of Aeneas' emotion; the second is the willingness of the hero to abandon his family in pursuit of a heroic death for his country – a second symptom of excess that finds an analogue in the above example of the matrons at the death of Camilla.

Many scholars have treated the hypocritical deception of the Greeks by Aeneas and his Trojans from *Aen.* 2.370-437.¹²⁷ Horsfall compellingly notes that although the wearing of enemy armour never ends well in the *Aeneid*, it is an ethical non-issue in the Homeric tradition – and Vergil “does not tell us which set of criteria to use.”¹²⁸ As Horsfall further notes, it is likely that in Vergil's time the use of deception in warfare was considered deplorable by only a small core of traditionalists, as in Livy 42.47.4: *ueteres et moris antiqui memores negabant se in ea legatione Romanas agnoscere artes* (“the elderly and those mindful of ancient tradition often refused to recognize the arts of Rome in this embassy”).¹²⁹ The most likely proposition that emerges is that Vergil is playing on this integral attachment to traditional Roman military values by pitting it against both Iliadic traditions and more recent Roman attitudes towards the matter.

¹²⁶ Armstrong and McCosker, 40, 288, col. 42.7-12. “...ὄτ’ οὐδὲ κ[α]τὰ τὰς παρουσίαι[ς] τῶν μεγάλων ἀλγηδόνων[ν] με-γάλαις συνέχεται τ[α]ρα-χαῖς, [πο]λλῶι δὲ μᾶλλ[ο]ν κατὰ [τὰ]ς ὀργάς...” (“...that he is not inclined towards great disturbances even through the presence of great pains, and much less through anger...”).

¹²⁷ Vincent Cleary, “To the Victor Belong the ‘Spolia:’ A Study in Vergilian Imagery,” *Vergilius* v. 28 (1982): 15-29; James C. Abbot, “The ‘Aeneid’ and the Concept of ‘Dolus Bonus,’” *Vergilius* v. 46 (2000): 66f; John Rauk, “Androgeos in Book Two of the ‘Aeneid,’” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* v. 121 (1991): 293.

¹²⁸ Horsfall, *Aeneid* 2, 304.

¹²⁹ The most authoritative critical edition for these books of Livy (whose work I employ here) is by John Briscoe, ed., *Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita Libri XLI-XLV* (Stuttgart: Bibliotheca Teubneriana, 1986).

After all, Aeneas is most concerned with explicitly denying averments of flight from battle, not of deception: *Iliaci cineres et flamma extrema meorum, / testor, in casu uestro nec tela nec ullas / uitauisse uices, Danaum...* (“ashes of Ilium and funeral pyres of my folk, I call you to witness that when you fell I avoided neither the spears nor any hazards of the Danaans...” *Aen.* 2.431-33).¹³⁰

This openness of the question certainly permits a reading that understands the *dolus* of the Trojans as at the very least unethical warfare, and at worst the assertion of a departure from *Romanitas* at the very root of a story that first and foremost concerns its definition. This willingness to indulge in deception seems to have its roots in a *furor* that has given way to love of war, though the deception itself is in a (limited) way rational. The passion that underlies the strategy is exposed in the eventual downfall of the band of warriors, who are destroyed by Coroebus’ unrestrained passion.

When Coroebus initially proposes the idea, he is delighted by his recent defeat of Androgeos: *atque hic successu exsultans animisque Coroebus* (“and here Coroebus was delighting in his success and courage,” *Aen.* 2.386). The idea of the young man as *exsultans* in victory – and all the Trojan *iuuentus* are *laeta* to put on Greek armour shortly after – is an extremely foreign emotion to the otherwise somber palate of the book. Indeed, just moments before, *animis iuuenum furor additus* (“fury was added to the courage of the youths,” *Aen.* 2.355). Why this sudden shift towards joy? In Lucretius, the guards during the rites of Magna Mater delight in the memory of slaughter:

¹³⁰ The OCT of Mynors sets *Danaum* apart from *tela* and *uices* with a comma, encouraging the reading of *Danaum* with *manu* at ll. 434. The OCT of Hirtzel is consonant with Mynor’s reading. However, reading *Danaum* with *uices* is not only defensible by proximity, but is also supported by Servius (*Serv.* 2.433, 3.376).

*hic armata manus, Curetas nomine Grai
quos memorant Phrygios, inter se forte quod armis¹³¹
ludunt in numerumque exultant sanguine laeti
terrificas capitum quatientes numine cristas,
Dictaeos referunt Curetas... (DRN 2.629-33)*

Here an armoured band, Curetes by name, whom the Greeks call Phrygians, if by chance (being in arms) they make play amongst themselves and rejoice in rhythm, joyous in blood, shaking their frightening crests by the nodding of the heads, they recall the Dictaeon Curetes...

Like the Trojans, these Phrygians – a word not infrequently used of the Trojans in the *Aeneid* – also *exultant* and are *laeti* at their success in combat. Lucretius’ emphasis is upon the militarism of these men, describing at length their full panoply and later their dance, in which *armati in numerum pulsarent aeribus aera* (“the armed men in rhythm strike bronze with bronze,” *DRN* 2.637).¹³² Lucretius is ultimately concerned with the specious nature of this ritual since, as with the *volans ignis* above, such superstition can only arise (in his view) from an imperfect rational understanding of causes. As we have seen, just such a rational incapacitation can be brought about by excessive emotion. Joy in violence is consigned to just such a psychological position for Lucretius, since it is indicted under the same beliefs that are antithetical to Epicurean rationality.¹³³

Aeneas and the Trojans, it is plain to see, are not behaving rationally in a Lucretian (or any other) sense. The impingement of this faculty suggests a continued *ταραχή* that is epitomized by Coroebus’ eventual death: *non tulit hanc speciem furiata mente Coroebus / et sese medium*

¹³¹ The OCT of Bailey notes *catervas* (*O*) as an alternative reading to *quod armis* (*Lachmann*), which would make *catervas* the object of *ludunt*. The Loeb writes *inter si forte catervas*, which makes *catervas* the object of the preposition *inter*. There is seemingly no manuscript basis for this, though it does yield the most immediately intelligible reading.

¹³² A line also notable for its Augustan degree of elegance and polish. The polyptoton, the central placement of the verb after the caesura, the pleasing rhythm of *aeribus aera* after *in numerum* all contribute to a melodic effect.

¹³³ Monica Gale, “Contemplating Violence in Lucretius’ ‘De Rerum Natura,’” in *Texts and Violence in the Ancient Roman World*, eds. M. Gale and J. Scourfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 64.

iniecit periturus in agmen; / consequimur... (“maddened in mind, Coroebus could not bear this sight and threw himself to die into the midst of their ranks – we followed after him...” *Aen.* 2.407-9). The sight of Cassandra in chains provokes such anger in the youth that – with his rational faculty once again impeded (*furiata mente*) – he is unable to stop his anger from driving him to his demise. This instant is the culmination of an uncurbed *ταραχή* that ended only with his death.

The character of the anger so emphasized throughout the Trojans’ adventures in this episode is fertile ground for an Epicurean reading. Of course, from a Homeric perspective, their anger and violence are undeniably splendid. However, *ἀρετή* cannot completely reconcile the morality of military violence in the *Aeneid* in lieu of other influences, as Gregson Davis proposes of the end of the poem:

Within these historical and philosophical parameters [of Epicurean anger], what emerges as reprehensible in the expression of anger throughout the latter half of the *Aeneid*, in particular, is a lack of moderation (*modus*) on the part of leading characters who act out this powerful emotional impulse. The idea of justifiable anger in the ethical domain converges, on the socio-cultural plane, with the imperative undergirding military *arête*, for success on the battlefield, in the Greco-Roman tradition, requires an angry disposition as a necessary part of the mental equipment of the warrior.¹³⁴

Though it is true that there is a dearth of *modus* in the expression of the Trojans’ anger, it is not the case that moderation in Epicurean terms is reconcilable with *ἀρετή*. We may be reminded of Horsfall’s consideration of the armour-donning scene: he points out that the dual ethical criteria are conflicting, but which is to be preferred is unspecified.

The heroic model of *ἀρετή* is inherently martial. Though *modus* does seem to appear in some way in Philodemus’ *DI* as *λογισμός* with the aim of rationally containing the extent and

¹³⁴ Gregson Davis, “Violent Retribution and Pietas: The Closure of the ‘Aeneid’ Revisited” in *Wordplay and Powerplay in Latin Poetry*, eds. P. Mitsis and I. Ziogas (Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), 172.

duration of ὀργή, there is no evidence that this proper ὀργή that is so restrained necessarily ought to occur in battle. Philodemus writes the following in response to the Peripatetics: “καὶ παρο[ρᾶ ὅτ[ι] χω[ρ]ῆς ὀργῆς ἔστι [τὸ πολεμεῖν κ]α[ὶ] ἀγω[νί-ζε[σ]θαι κ[αὶ πι]κρῶς χει[ροῦν” (“he neglects that there is warring and fighting and conquering fiercely without anger”).¹³⁵ The vengeance also associated with Homeric ἀρετή can only be found in Philodemus if such punishment can be rationally justified as a future preventative against further harm.¹³⁶ The ἀρετή that refuses battlefield supplications in the *Iliad* can hardly be said to fall into that category.

The subjective position on such anger differs significantly also, since ἀρετή is typically laudable, and φυσική ὀργή – even manifested properly by the sage – is at best medicinal, and remains unpleasant. In fact, what Davis refers to as “an angry disposition” sounds more akin to ὀργιλότης, a disposition of irascibility that Philodemus would have condemned in martial contexts or elsewhere.¹³⁷ There is no “intersection” of anger as justifiable in battle in *DI* with ἀρετή. We are required to contend with the difficult uncertainty of parallel but irreconcilable ethical criteria. Anger in battle may be requisite for ἀρετή, and ὀργή may be unavoidable for the wise man under some circumstances; but it is not necessarily the case that ὀργή will occur in battle.¹³⁸

The symptomology of the anger exhibited by Aeneas and the Trojans in these episodes corresponds quite closely to the excessively passionate expression of *ira*, as suggested by both Lucretius’ association of irrational superstition with delight in violence, and by Philodemus’ views on the relationship between natural anger and heroic ἀρετή.¹³⁹ Further symptoms of

¹³⁵ Armstrong and McOsker, 262, col. 32.35-38.

¹³⁶ Asmis, “Anger,” 174.

¹³⁷ Tsouna, “Anger,” 206.

¹³⁸ Asmis, “Anger,” 176.

¹³⁹ Freer, 95.

Aeneas' prolonged *ταραχή* can be found in his willingness to abandon his family in pursuit of a heroic death. After the defeat of the Trojan youths and the killing of Priam (as witnessed by Aeneas), Venus' intervention is required to send her son home: *non prius aspicias ubi fessum aetate parentem / liqueris Anchisen, superet coniunxne Creusa / Ascaniusque puer?* ("won't you first see where you left your father Anchises, exhausted by age, and whether your wife Creusa and your boy Ascanius survive?" *Aen.* 2.596-98). Venus convinces Aeneas to give up his *iras* (*Aen.* 2.594) to fight and kill by rhetorical appeal to his familial duties.¹⁴⁰ When last Aeneas seized his weapons in a fog of emotion (*Aen.* 2.314), concern for his family did not even cross his mind, and is nowhere in the text. Venus' words bring to the fore a substantial blind spot in Aeneas' actions.¹⁴¹ With this corrected by divine intervention, Aeneas returns to his father's home.

However, if we had hoped that the *ταραχή* provoked by aggrieved love and consequent anger had reached its end, we are to be disappointed. After Anchises' refusal to flee, Aeneas' *ταραχή* resurfaces:

*nos contra effusi lacrimis coniunxque Creusa
Ascaniusque omnisque domus, ne uertere secum
cuncta pater fatoque urgenti incumbere uellet.
abnegat inceptoque et sedibus haeret in isdem.
rursus in arma feror mortemque miserrimus opto.* (*Aen.* 2.651-55)

However, we – my wife Creusa, and Ascanius, and all our house – were streaming with tears, so that our father would not wish to ruin everything with him and add to our imminent fate. He refused, and clung to what he had decided in the same place. Again I'm carried away into arms and most wretchedly wished for death.

Vergil repeatedly enumerates the familial character of the scene, just as Venus did by naming each member of the direct family (*Aen.* 2.596-98). And Aeneas is "carried away" (*feror*) into

¹⁴⁰ Killing either Helen or more Greeks, depending on the authenticity of *Aen.* 2.567-588.

¹⁴¹ Grillo, 62.

arms again, evoking his initial reaction to the scene of Troy's downfall that provoked a similar response: at *Aen.* 2.314, the use of *amens* and the phrase *nec sat rationis* is suggestive of Aeneas' total lack of self-possession in the face of his heroic anger; here, the verb is passive with an unspecified agent, inviting interpolation of the same sense of disempowerment in the face of emotion. Later, it is Dido who – overwhelmed with anger for Aeneas – uses similar language: *furiis incensa feror* (“incensed, I’m carried away by rage,” *Aen.* 4.376).

The hero's desperate heroic anger – otherwise referred to as ἀρετή – explicitly supersedes Aeneas' *pietas* to his family.

*hoc erat, alma parens, quod me per tela, per ignis
eripis, ut mediis hostem in penetralibus utque
Ascanium patremque meum iuxtaque Creusam
alterum in alterius mactatos sanguine cernam?
arma, uiri, ferte arma... (Aen. 2.664-68)*

Was it for this, gentle mother, that you rescued me from their spears and fire, so that I'd see the enemy in the midst of our halls and Ascanius, my father, and Creusa beside them, each slaughtered in the blood of the other? Weapons, men, bring weapons...

Aeneas is instantly brought to doubt divine will, reiterating the presence of his familial obligation in the same fashion as Venus before. These emotions resurge almost immediately, and he requests arms again in the heroic mode. This struggle that the hero undergoes displays his divided loyalties: the tension between obligations to family, and obligations to his love of country.¹⁴² His readiness to choose the latter over the former in book 2 speaks to the powerful emotional disturbance Aeneas is experiencing, since each time he decides to pursue military heroics, he had only recently been dissuaded from it – first by Hector, then by Venus, and finally by Creusa. It is only the joint solution of another instance of divine intervention – the flames

¹⁴² Ibid.

around Ascanius' head and Anchises' subsequent willingness to leave the city – that relieve the most pressing symptoms of the *ταραχή* provoked by Aeneas' *ira* and *amor*.

The total readiness of Aeneas to surrender to his ongoing *ταραχή* through his continued engagement with the requirements of irascible *ἀρετή* reminds us of the matrons from book 11. Interpolating the motivating anger of the Etruscan farmers from book 7 – *quod cuique repertum / rimanti telum ira facit* (“what was available to each when he looked, anger made a weapon,” *Aen.* 7.507-8) – into the heroic behaviour of these women, who are explicitly motivated by their love of country – *monstrat amor uerus patriae* (“true love of country showed them the way,” *Aen.* 11.892) – it is possible to discern that Aeneas exhibits a similar emotional topography in his failure to restrain his heroic impulse. Vergil's emphasis upon the transition of social roles – from farmer, mother, or father to warrior – raises the issue of the multifaceted nature of *pietas*.¹⁴³ Love of country is characteristically associated with *pietas*, as Anchises says of Lucius Junius Brutus (*Aen.* 6.823). This brand of *amor* drives the heroic actions of such mytho-historical figures, and motivates Aeneas' actions most of all. Aeneas' heroic bent in book 2 causes “heroism” and *ἀρετή* generally to become a shorthand for the anger associated with them, and the anger of Aeneas is shown to be born of an *amor* that contradicts other facets of his *pietas*.

This concept is more reliably explored in book 10 without Aeneas' intervening and unreliable voice. Indeed, it is remarkable how much Aeneas' behaviour throughout the course of his *ἀριστεία* is reminiscent of his *ταραχή* in book 2. The *ἀριστεία*, from *Aen.* 10.510-604, depicts a series of killings by Aeneas that attest not only to the excess of his anger but, in its root cause, to the precipitating character of his love for Pallas.¹⁴⁴ That the hero's anger is shockingly

¹⁴³ Cf. Michael Putnam, *The Humanness of Heroes* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 116.

¹⁴⁴ M.M. Willcock, “Battle Scenes in the ‘Aeneid,’” *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* v. 29 (1983): 93.

unhinged is not a controversial position, but the exact perversion that crowns Aeneas' violence is worthy of consideration: the killing of the brothers Lisus and Lucagus at *Aen.* 10.575-601. The Homeric precedence for Aeneas' brutality is a significant echo here.¹⁴⁵ It resolves all doubt that Aeneas is acting in any mode other than the heroic. The dual killing raises the same tension that arose in book 2, and later arises in book 11 for the matrons: the conflicting obligations of familial *pietas* with the impetus of martial rage.¹⁴⁶ It is Lucagus who reminds Aeneas of this directly by evoking the hero's own family: '*per te, per qui te talem genuere parentes, / uir Troiane, sine hanc animam et miserere precantis*' ("by yourself, by those parents who bore you thus, Trojan warrior, spare this life and pity those entreating you," *Aen.* 10.597-98). Indeed, the *fides* owed to Evander and Pallas – an agreement later made explicit at *Aen.* 11.178-79 – is the incitement for Aeneas' violence: *Pallas, Euander, in ipsis / omnia sunt oculis, mensae quas aduena primas / tunc adiit, dextraeque datae* ("Pallas, Evander, it's all before his eyes; the tables that he then first came to as a foreigner, the right hands exchanged..." *Aen.* 10.515-17). This emergent tension between family and warrior-virtue continues to be a facet of Aeneas' character.¹⁴⁷

More important is the ongoing association between the strong emotion behind Aeneas' martial rage – love for Pallas, love of country, love for his family – is manifest as a persistent *παραχή*. The ἀριστεία of book 10, morbidly dauntless as it is, does not show a hint of a Lucretian or Philodemian rational principle that could restrain Aeneas' *furia*. Vergil dedicates more space to the *pathos* of Aeneas' victims, but we are given glimpses of his mindset: he is *dira frementem* ("growling fearful words," *Aen.* 10.572), and it is *tanto fervore* ("with such great fervor," *Aen.* 10.578) that he attacks Lisus and Lucagus. There is no sense of rational restraint.

¹⁴⁵ Putnam, *Heroes*, 44.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁴⁷ Grillo, 64.

The characterization of Aeneas as an anti-Epicurean in this episode is epitomized by Vergil's depiction of Mezentius, whose ἀριστεία (*Aen.* 10.723-28) is no more violent than Aeneas'. The dramatic effect of Mezentius' transition from a figure of *impietas* and *contemptor diuum* in the narrative up until his combat with Aeneas to a figure of *pietas* in book 10 mirrors Aeneas' transition from rationality to irrationality at the onset of his ἀριστεία.¹⁴⁸ Mezentius retains several of the critical aspects of his character in this transition – namely, his contempt for the gods – but his presentation as an Epicurean sage challenges the moral status of Aeneas' relationship to the extreme emotions that motivated his ἀριστεία.

The dissonance between Mezentius' initial portrayal in which he performs horrific tortures (*Aen.* 8.478-95) and his direct appearance has been the subject of some disagreement.¹⁴⁹ Taken at face value, there is simply a change in Mezentius' character, and we need not concern ourselves with the verity of Evander's narration.¹⁵⁰ However, if we are to understand Mezentius as an Epicurean, the reality of his character and the disjunction between his description in book 8 and his appearance in book 10 become important to reconcile: if Evander is correct, it is difficult to understand Mezentius' later moral authority as anything other than an ironic indictment of Epicureanism.

One of the critical points in considering the two different characterizations of Mezentius is the reliability of Evander's initial speech. The rhetorical goals of a given speech and reality rarely seem to intersect in the *Aeneid*'s more persuasive speeches, as Highet points out.¹⁵¹ There is good reason to consider the possibility that Evander is operating under just such a rhetorical

¹⁴⁸ Leah Kronenberg, "Mezentius the Epicurean," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* v. 135 no. 2 (2005): 406.

¹⁴⁹ Heinze, 213f; J. Glenn, "Mezentius and Polyphemus," *American Journal of Philology* v. 92 (1971): 129-55.

¹⁵⁰ S.J. Harrison, ed., *Vergil: Aeneid 10* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 236.

¹⁵¹ Gilbert Highet, *The Speeches in Vergil's Aeneid* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 289. Highet concludes: "Vergil, it seems, held that powerful oratory was incompatible with pure truth, and that every speaker presented his or her own case by misrepresenting the facts."

principle, given that several details of his speech do not coincide with what the narrator later establishes as the case. For example, Evander suggests that Mezentius' cruelty has isolated him from all his allies with the exception of Turnus:

*at fessi tandem ciues infanda furentem
armati circumstant ipsumque domumque,
obtruncant socios, ignem ad fastigia iactant.
ille inter caedem Rutulorum elapsus in agros
confugere et Turni defendier hospitis armis. (Aen. 8.489-95)*

But at last, the citizens – exhausted by his unspeakable deeds – besiege the madman himself and his home under arms, cut down his supporters, and throw firebrands onto the roof. He, amidst the slaughter, escaped to flee to the lands of the Rutulians, and to be defended by the arms of his host, Turnus.

However, despite this assertion, when he marches to war Mezentius has mustered one thousand men led by Lausus: *Lausus, equum domitor debellatorque ferarum, / ducit Agyllina nequiquam ex urbe secutos / mille uiros* (“Lausus, breaker of horses and hunter of beasts, led one thousand men from Agylla that followed in vain,” *Aen.* 7.651-53). Despite this, it was earlier the citizens of Agylla that revolted against Mezentius and, considering him to be a tyrant, would presumably not fight under him (*Aen.* 8.479).¹⁵² Should Evander's rhetoric be considered dissembling, his motivations are straightforward enough: he clearly seeks to support Aeneas in the approaching war, and attach himself to the hero as an indispensable political ally (*Aen.* 8.496).¹⁵³

The content of Evander's speech should not, therefore, cloud judgement of Mezentius' character too much. Nevertheless, the initial description provided by Evander makes Mezentius'

¹⁵² See K.W. Gransden, *Virgil's Iliad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 94. Gransden's solution to this inconsistency is that “it seems feasible that some Etruscans remained loyal to Mezentius and followed him and Lausus over to the Rutuli.” This may be the case, though the suggestion in n. 50 that the discrepancy may also be due to a lack of editing on Vergil's part is less convincing; however, the fact that the contradiction is between the narrator's voice and a character's speech should remind of other signs of intentional inconsistency within the poem. See also O'Hara, *Inconsistency*, 79, 103.

¹⁵³ Kronenberg, 410 n. 26. These difficulties only consider the possible political motivations for Evander's inconsistency: Kronenberg also points out the implied philosophical differences between Mezentius and Evander, and argues towards a reading of the extreme torture (unprecedented in earlier myths) as allegorizing Evander's non-materialist horror at Mezentius' materialist ethics.

appearance in book 10 a dramatic surprise, one that throws into relief those aspects of his character that remain consistent. One such aspect is his atheism. Described as *contemptor diuum* at *Aen.* 8.6, Mezentius' continued lack of faith is restated:

*'dextra mihi deus et telum, quod missile libro,
nunc adsint! uoueo praedonis corpore raptis
indutum spoliis ipsum te, Lause, tropaeum
Aeneae.'* (*Aen.* 10.773-76)

Let my right hand and spear, the missile I brandish, now be here as a god to me! I dedicate you yourself, Lausus, dressed in the spoils stolen from robbers, as my trophy over Aeneas.

The address to either his right hand or his spear, or both, as a god, as well as the intention to dedicate *spolia opima* to a human shade rather than the proper gods flag Mezentius' atheism in book 10.¹⁵⁴ Such contempt for the gods is an initial signal of the character's Epicurean status that is only deepened as the story progresses. Mezentius' Epicurean *pietas* – which persists despite his atheism – is also defined against Aeneas. When Aeneas kills Lausus, the former mocks the latter: *fallit te incautum pietas tua* ("your piety deceives you, careless one," *Aen.* 10.812). What is this *pietas* that Aeneas attributes to Lausus?

In pursuit of locating the place of this type of *pietas* within the logic of Vergil's poem, Kronenberg observes a Lucretian intertext:

This redefinition of traditional notions of *pietas* and *impietas* is a rhetorical strategy used by Lucretius in his Epicurean poem. For example, the *DRN* begins after the proem with a depiction of *religio* as a monstrous tyrant defeated by Epicurus (1.62-79), and Epicurus' victory is followed by a dramatic example of the evils of *religio*.¹⁵⁵

This is the *pietas* exhibited by Mezentius throughout his combat with Aeneas. Indeed, as Lucretius writes, *nec pietas ullast velatum saepe videri / vertier ad lapidem atque accedere ad*

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 406.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

*aras, / [...] sed mage pacata*¹⁵⁶ *posse omnia mente tueri.*¹⁵⁷ (“it’s no piety to often be seen to turn robed towards a stone and to approach to the altars, [...] but rather to be able to perceive all things with a calm mind,” *DRN* 5.1198-99, 1203). For Aeneas, though he reveres the gods by offering the spoils of his combat with Mezentius to Quirinus at the start of book 11, such quietude is entirely beyond his reach in this episode. This kind of *pietas*-as-ἀταραξία is exhibited in Mezentius’ final scene from *Aen.* 10.833-908.

Consider, for example, the amoebic scene in which Mezentius is depicted after Lausus’ death – a tableau laden with Epicurean subtext:

*...procul aerea ramis
dependet galea et prato grauius arma quiescunt.
stant lecti circum iuuenes; ipse aeger anhelans
colla fouet fusus propexam in pectore barbam.* (*Aen.* 10.835-38)

At a distance his bronzen helmet hung from a branch, and his heavy weapons rested in the meadow. Picked youths stood around; he himself, wounded and gasping, favoured his neck, his combed beard flowing over his chest.

Mezentius’ tranquility, though disturbed by his combat with Aeneas, is quickly reasserted – his *arma quiescent*. Lucretius’ association of natural serenity with ἀταραξία, as well as the detail of Mezentius’ beard, elevates his status to that of a peaceful sage in the Epicurean Garden.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, Mezentius’ regret at Lausus dying instead of him echoes a similar Lucretian sentiment: *tantane me tenuit uiuendi, nate, uoluptas, / ut pro me hostili paterer succedere dextrae, / quem genui?* (“did such a passion for living hold me, son, that I suffered him whom I begat to fall under my enemy’s right hand instead of me?” *Aen.* 10.846-48). The concept of

¹⁵⁶ The OCT of Bailey prints *pacata* (*ed. Juntina*), but notes *placata* (*OQ*) as a possible alternative reading. In this instance, I believe *pacata* to be preferable due to its etymological connection to *pax*, a word that thus far has been associated with ἀταραξία (cf. *DRN* 1.40).

¹⁵⁷ *tuor* – the word of sight with which Dido, in her failed Epicureanism, burns (*Aen.* 1.713).

¹⁵⁸ Kronenberg, 411.

uiuendi...uoluptas, the language of the Epicurean imperative of pleasure,¹⁵⁹ recalls Lucretius' invective against the desire to prolong life for only its own sake, since death is nothing to fear: *nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas* ("and by living no new pleasure can be fashioned," *DRN* 3.1081). Mezentius exhibits great grief at Lausus' death; however, this grief does not overwhelm his reason.

When Mezentius goes to fight Aeneas, we are told that this is not tantamount to suicide, which Lucretius would condemn, but rather viewed as a necessary combat. Mezentius says to his horse:

*aut hodie uictor spolia illa cruenti*¹⁶⁰
et caput Aeneae referes Lausique dolorum
ultor eris mecum, aut, aperit si nulla uiam uis,
occumbes pariter... (Aen. 10.862-65)

Either today you will carry off those spoils and bloodstained Aeneas' head as a victor with me the avenger of Lausus' grief, or, if strength opens no path, you'll die alike...

If Mezentius still perceives his victory as a possibility in combat with Aeneas, then he does not actively pursue a death essentially by suicide that would be condemned by Lucretius.¹⁶¹

Mezentius' grief for Lausus – obviously born out of a paternal love – does not intrude upon his rationality to this extent. Nor does Mezentius seem to feel vengeful anger against Aeneas. He returns to combat motivated by *pudor* and *luctus* (*Aen.* 10.871), but there is no hint of *ira*. Once again, for Philodemus, anger is not requisite for battle, and, by extension, for ἀρετή either; it is

¹⁵⁹ Charles Segal, *Lucretius on Death and Anxiety* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 44.

¹⁶⁰ The OCT of Mynors prefers *cruenti* (*P*¹), but notes that *cruenta* is noted by the other manuscripts. Both readings are acknowledged by Servius, who correctly writes of the line: *si autem 'cruenti', intellexeris scilicet crudelis: sic enim conuenit personae loquentis* ("if, moreover, it is 'cruenti,' you'd clearly understand that he was cruel: thus it befits the character of the speaker," *Serv.* 10.862).

¹⁶¹ For a reading that considers Mezentius' death a suicide, see Gransden, 153. Gransden's assertion that Mezentius' vow to not outlive his son makes his return to battle essentially suicide does not acknowledge the possibility of victory Mezentius identifies at *Aen.* 10.862-65. It is likely that Mezentius believes his defeat of Aeneas would act as an ethical corrective to his unfulfilled vow.

this that lends force to Mezentius' *nullum in caede nefas* ("nothing sinful in slaughter," *Aen.* 10.901). Hence, as Mezentius is described in strongly heroic terms (*aere caput fulgens cristaque hirsutus equina*, "his head shining with bronze and bristling with his horsehair crest," *Aen.* 10.869), he does not display a destabilizing anger. The duration of his *ταραχή* does not impede his judgement. Indeed, already by *Aen.* 10.858, he is *haud deiectus* ("scarcely thrown off").

Despite Evander's tendentious and contradictory picture of him, Mezentius emerges as the surprising exemplar for Aeneas' poor Epicureanism. In the hero's final combat with Mezentius, his anger contrasts strongly with Mezentius' calm. Aeneas' anger continues to overwhelm his rational mind, just as it did in book 2. This is conveyed by his continued mockery of those whom he defeats, saying to Mezentius *'ubi nunc Mezentius acer et illa / effera uis animi?'* ("where now is fierce Mezentius and that savage strength of spirit?" *Aen.* 10.897-98). As Gorey points out, the formulation *uis animi* has particularly Lucretian pedigree, being used often in *DRN* of the physical force of atomic movement (of which the soul is also composed).¹⁶² This can be taken as the specifically Epicurean content of Aeneas' insult. The jibe is recognized by Mezentius, who, in his answer, asks Aeneas *quid increpitas* ("why do you mock?" *Aen.* 10.900). Kronenberg notes a tone of reproach in Mezentius' responses to Aeneas' anger, a sort of rebuke of excess that befits an Epicurean sage in Philodemus' *DI* and *On Frank Criticism*.¹⁶³ Such rebuke is something that Philodemus refers to when speaking of Epicurus, and is characterized as a type of pedagogical generosity: "κ]ἀπ[ει τα διὰ τὸ φ[ιλεῖν] ἐπιτί-μησις πυκν[ῆ καὶ] πᾶσι τοῖς γυ[ωρ]ίμο[ις] ἢ τοῖς πλεί-στοις καὶ ἐπιτεταμένη..." ("and then, on account of his affection, there's frequent and intense rebuke for all his students, or most...").¹⁶⁴ Reading with Armstrong

¹⁶² Gorey, 107.

¹⁶³ Kronenberg, 419.

¹⁶⁴ Armstrong and McCosker, 270, col. 35.17-21.

and McCosker's interpolation of -λεῖν in line 18 is convincingly supported by *On Frank Criticism* 3b.10-14: “πάντες γὰρ ὁμοίως καὶ φιλοῦσι κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκά-στου καὶ ἀμαρτίας βλέπουσι καὶ τὰς διὰ παρησιας...” (“for all [wise men] likewise also have affection for [their students] according to the worth of each and they perceive their failures, and through frank speaking...”).¹⁶⁵ We can surmise that for the Epicurean, the rebuking of excessive passion is an act of affection, an affection attributed only to a teacher.¹⁶⁶ Mezentius, then, is styled as a figure of moral authority specifically capable of informing Aeneas' moral action. The student's receptiveness to this pedagogical technique is depicted in the following lines, in which Aeneas' anger is not curtailed, and the teacher is brutally killed.¹⁶⁷

Neither Mezentius nor any other character (such as Hector, Venus, or Creusa) who has attempted to curb the symptoms of Aeneas' *ταραχή* in books 2 and 10 has been successful.¹⁶⁸ The hero persists in exhibiting a strong tendency towards excessive love, embodied in book 2 as love of country and in book 10 as love for Pallas, which consistently sows the seeds of later angry outbursts. In the terms of Philodemus, one must wonder about the implications of a *ταραχή* that has lasted years. One of the major points of difference derived from a parallel reading of Aeneas' heroism in book 2 alongside that of book 10 is the time he takes to gloat over his victims – omitted from book 2, though Coroebus boasts over Androgeos. There is a hardness to the martial rage in book 10. For Philodemus, a prolonged *ταραχή* of anger can solidify into a disposition of anger, earning the appellation *οργίλος* – irascible.¹⁶⁹ This quality begins to err into

¹⁶⁵ John T. Fitzgerald, ed., *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 96.

¹⁶⁶ Both Armstrong and McCosker's *On Anger* and Fitzgerald's *On Frank Criticism* consider σοφοί the implied subject of both quotations above, though the use of the word is not directly extant in either instance.

¹⁶⁷ Freer, 130. As Freer writes of Turnus and Drances, “the irascible cannot tolerate it when teachers and fellow Epicurean students rebuke and correct them.”

¹⁶⁸ See Kronenberg, 422 for Venus in this episode appearing in an Epicurean mode.

¹⁶⁹ Armstrong and McCosker, 256, col. 30.11-20.

the territory of the μάταιος, the counterpart of the σοφός. As the list of horrors attributed to Aeneas lengthens throughout the poem's final books, it is worthwhile to begin to consider whether the hero's passionate outbursts are discrete instances, or whether they compose a trend that has ossified into his character. Considering the comparison implied by Mezentius' depiction as an Epicurean sage, Vergil's protagonist is rather quickly seeming to be more of a negative exemplar than a paragon. The connection of these types of love that provoke Aeneas' anger – *amor patriae*, filial love for Pallas (connected to *fides* for Evander) – to his *pietas* is particularly troubling: there is an increasing sense that Aeneas' fundamental virtue contains irreconcilable tensions. The ethical strain that Vergil exerts upon his poem climbs to a violent crescendo in book 12.

CHAPTER FOUR: *SAEVIT AMOR FERRI ET SCELERATA INSANIA BELLI*

Love and anger reach their highest pitch with the conclusion of book 12. How Aeneas' anger and the subsequent killing of Turnus ought to be understood has been a difficult point of scholarly interpretation since the poem's composition. The range of interpretations has been broad, and often polarized. An Epicurean reading of this episode cannot claim in good faith any interpretative authority that has not been claimed before. It remains significant, however, that Aeneas' anger continues to be described in a similar fashion to many important fits of anger from earlier in the text. Throughout book 12, Vergil primes the reader for the final heroic confrontation in Epicurean terms. This takes the form of continued intertextual echoes that emphasize the risk of anger posed by *amor*. We are prepared to consider Aeneas in the dichotomous mode presented by Epicurean theories of anger – that is, whether it is excessive or proper. Nevertheless, the poem's final scene of vengeance seems to present an interpretative problem: Vergil's relationship to Philodemus' taxonomy of anger, which we have been using as a guide, is aporetic. The fact that the traces of the Epicurean conceptualization of anger have been so strong throughout the text and yet remain unresolved at the end is problematic. This inconclusiveness is, moreover, only compounded by the antagonism suggested by Vergil's closing account of Turnus' shade – reminding the reader of an afterlife that, in Epicurean terms, is believed only by fools.¹⁷⁰ The question of whether or not Aeneas is a “good Epicurean” is an important one, and an effective way to evaluate the moral indeterminacy of the hero; but it is also a question that, in the end, is subsumed by larger questions asked by the poem about the utility of Epicureanism in considering cosmic stakes.¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ Martha C. Nussbaum, “Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Nature,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* v. 50 no. 2 (1989): 311; Gale, *Myth*, 50.

¹⁷¹ Keith, 129.

The character of Turnus receives a great deal of attention in book 12. Much of this serves to elevate his pathos after the brutality of his earlier ἀπιστεία.¹⁷² Anger, however, continues to be his defining characteristic, as it has been from his introduction in book 7. It has often been noted that Turnus and Dido form a sort of pathetic doublet in the *Aeneid*, sharing a close entanglement with Aeneas' *fatum* and the expression of intense passion that sets in motion the circumstances of their destruction.¹⁷³ Consider, for example, the image of Allecto's intervention in book 7, where first we are told her transformation:

*Allecto toruam faciem et furialia membra
exiit, in uultus sese transformat anilis
et frontem obscenam rugis arat. (Aen. 7.415-17)*

Allecto sheds her fell appearance and furious shape, and she transforms herself into the visage of an old woman, and roughens her foul brow with furrows.

And later provided with her provocative instructions to Turnus:

*i nunc, ingratis offer te, inrise, periclis;
Tyrrhenas, i, sterne acies, tege pace Latinos. (Aen. 7.425-26)*

Now go, expose yourself to danger, scorned one; go, scatter the Tyrrhenian lines, protect the Latins with peace.

And finally told the authority on which she acts:

*caelestum uis magna iubet. rex ipse Latinus,
ni dare coniugium et dicto parere fatetur,
sentiat et tandem Turnum experiatur in armis. (Aen. 7.432-34)*

The great power of heaven commands it. Let King Latinus himself, unless he agrees to give his daughter in marriage and to obey his word, know of it and endure Turnus in arms at last.

¹⁷² Michael Putnam, *Virgil's Aeneid: Interpretation and Influence* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 187.

¹⁷³ Putnam, *Heroes*, 88. See also Pöschl, 113f.

The dynamic of divine intervention employed by Juno in this instance mirrors that employed by Venus in book 1 quite clearly:¹⁷⁴ Allecto appears to Turnus in a form other than her own – where Cupid was a child, she is an old woman. The Fury’s association with anger is immediate in her introduction: her realm of influence is, among other things, *irae* (*Aen.*7.326), and as she changes her form her limbs are *furialia* (*Aen.*7.415). Indeed, from an Epicurean perspective, the etymological connection of her name to ἄληκτος alongside this textual connection to anger¹⁷⁵ – setting aside the obvious collective term for the *Furia* – implies a passionate excess that does not know limitation. She plays upon Turnus’ heroic principles by noting his injured pride (*inrise*), emphasizing the martial necessity of the situation, its divine sanction (*caelestum uis magna iubet*),¹⁷⁶ and concludes her speech on the rhetorically forceful *in armis*.¹⁷⁷

Cupid similarly played upon Dido’s strong sense of proper conjugal love, which encourages the begetting of children.¹⁷⁸ The emotions eventually incited in the respective characters are not so different: Dido drinks deep of love (*longumque bibebat amorem*, “and she drank deep of love,” *Aen.*1.749), and Turnus’ love of the sword rages (*saeuit amor ferri et scelerata insania belli, / ira super*, “his love of the sword and the criminal madness of war raged – and anger above all,” *Aen.*7.462). The character of Turnus’ emotion is here at its most explicit. It is a sort of love that motivates him, a love of the sword that is best considered analogous to

¹⁷⁴ Mitchell, 223.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. of the anger of Achilles in *Il.* 1.224: “καὶ οὐ πῶ λῆγε χόλοιο.” ἄληκτος is a post-Homeric word, but its ancestor λήγω is fairly regularly associated with χόλος and ἔρις in the *Iliad*.

¹⁷⁶ The ambiguity of this sentence is notable. Allecto does not directly characterize the necessity of Turnus’ action as an act of *pietas*, but suggests as much by saying this; however, in truth it is only Juno’s divine power that commands, not Jupiter’s.

¹⁷⁷ See Freer, 124 for a contrary view. Freer argues that Turnus’ character was discernable as irascible before Allecto’s intervention, citing the Sibyl’s reference to him as *alius...Achilles* (*Aen.* 6.89). Achilles was an important model of excessive heroic anger for Philodemus. However, one may question the validity of the Sibyl – who does not perceive time the same way as a mortal – as a source for Turnus’ present psychology rather than his future psychology after Allecto’s interference.

¹⁷⁸ Gutting, 267.

heroic martial virtue; this, in its most extreme manifestation, is apparent as *ira super*.¹⁷⁹ By book 12, the emotion exhibited by Turnus has not softened at all (though it has shown the capacity for abatement between spates of rage). The striking initial image of the final book is of a Turnus who *ardet* (*Aen.* 12.3), as passionate characters have throughout the poem; furthermore, when Latinus attempts to assuage his rage, we are told that it *exsuperat magis aegrescitque medendo* (“surpassed even further and began to grow sick from healing,” *Aen.* 12.46). This unusual construction of an inceptive verb with a gerund evokes a similar set of intertextual echoes as Dido’s *ardescitque tuendo* (“she began to burn by looking,” *Aen.* 1.713; see pp. 17) that, if anything, are more explicitly Epicurean.

Vergil has been shown to be aware of the Epicurean medicinal language for the treatment of extreme emotion, punning on Lucretius’ *amarum* with his *amorem* when Dido drinks from her cup.¹⁸⁰ The construction *aegrescitque medendo* raises awareness of several allusions. The first of these is by grammatical construction: The *Aeneid*’s *ardescitque tuendo* (*Aen.* 1.713), and *DRN*’s *nec satiare queunt spectando* (*DRN* 4.1102) and *inveterascit alendo* (*DRN* 4.1068). The second is by the use of medicinal language in characterizing extreme emotion: *DRN*’s *amarum absinthii laticem* (*DRN* 1.941), the *Aeneid*’s *longumque bibebat amorem* (*Aen.* 1.749), and *DI*’s *πόσιον ἄψινθίου* (col. 37.25). This allusion is predicated upon the same kind of reversal as the triplet of Dido’s cup with that of Lucretius and Philodemus: what she drinks is not, in fact medicinal – like restrained anger – but will sow the seeds of her own destruction in the form of excessive emotion. Vergil folds *Aen.* 12.46 into this dynamic through these complex internal and external lexical echoes.¹⁸¹ The effect of this is the expectation that for Turnus, the attempts of Latinus and

¹⁷⁹ Marianne MacDonald, “Aeneas and Turnus: Labor vs. Amor,” *Pacific Coast Philology* v. 7 (1972): 46.

¹⁸⁰ Snyder, 114.

¹⁸¹ Dyson Hejduk, 209.

Amata to restrain his anger (*medendo*) are to be completely ineffective in the face of his anger, that, like Dido's love, is a terminal illness.¹⁸²

The suggestion of a relationship between the domains of Amor and Allecto through the similar depictions of the passions of Dido and Turnus may well be traced back to Lucretius. As noted in Chapter Two, the Lucretian representation of Mavors in Venus' lap is based upon the Empedoclean concept of the interrelation of Φιλότης and Νεῖκος.¹⁸³ Empedocles' poem *On Nature* includes the concept of Love as reigning over the four cosmic forces and over Strife, just as the proem of Lucretius' poem does.¹⁸⁴ For Empedocles, the concept of Ἔρις or Νεῖκος is a fundamental force in the universe that keeps the four elements (ῥιζώματα) divided until the force of Φιλότης brings them together.¹⁸⁵ This lends some comprehensibility to the otherwise interpretatively difficult Lucretian spring that opens *DRN*, in which Venus/Φιλότης is praised as having caused all things to grow and as the tamer of Mavors/Νεῖκος; though the Epicureans – so far as they were atomists – disagreed with the theory of the four elements, Lucretius accepts the Empedoclean elements simply as masses.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² For Latinus' characteristic ineffectuality in Philodemus' terms, see Robert Cowan, "On the Weak King according to Vergil: Aeolus, Latinus, and Political Allegoresis in the 'Aeneid,'" *Vergilius* v. 61 (2015): 97-124. Cowan contends that "the pattern of Latinus' behavior in failing to react to difficult situations in a kingly manner persists throughout the second half of the poem" (115).

¹⁸³ Catherine J. Castner, "'De Rerum Natura' 5.101-103: Lucretius' Application of Empedoclean Language to Epicurean Doctrine," *Phoenix* v. 41 no. 1 (1987): 41 n. 5.

¹⁸⁴ David Furley, "Variations on Themes from Empedocles in Lucretius' Poem," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* v. 17 (1970): 58.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁸⁶ Jason S. Nethercut, "Empedocles' 'Roots' in Lucretius' 'De Rerum Natura,'" *The American Journal of Philology* v. 138 no. 1 (2017): 91. This view is most explicit at *DRN* 1.716-33. Lucretius' atomism takes a tendentious relationship to Empedocles' ῥιζώματα; Nethercut writes: "Lucretius' line 5.554 may offer a much more direct refutation of Empedoclean cosmogony, substituting as it does Epicurean atoms for Empedocles' 'roots' in the joining together of earth and air. For Lucretius, earth and air are indeed connected by 'common roots,' the gloss on Empedocles' ῥιζώματα suggesting that Lucretius introduces Empedoclean terminology in an effort to correct Empedocles' physics" (100).

The Lucretian adoption of Empedocles' primordial forces takes the form of a codependent relationship between Venus/Φιλότης and Mavors/Νεῖκος.¹⁸⁷ It is a fundamentally Epicurean decision to treat the two as existing in a balanced cycle of atomic creation and destruction since, for Lucretius, mortal things are inevitably overwhelmed by Νεῖκος and replaced by others in an equal exchange.¹⁸⁸ Why, then, the representation of Mavors *aeterno devictus vulnere amoris* (“undone by the eternal wound of love,” *DRN* 1.34)? If the two exist in a cycle, how can Mavors' restraint by Venus be eternal? The peace of Venus is requisite for Lucretius' ability to compose Epicurean poetry,¹⁸⁹ by restraining Νεῖκος Venus establishes the conditions that will allow the path to individual – not societal – ἀταραξία to emerge in *DRN*.¹⁹⁰ The peace that Lucretius outlines is political and predicated upon his patronage from Memmius, whose political work is, as he suggests, only necessary because of the latent force of Νεῖκος:

*nam neque nos agere hoc patriai tempore iniquo
possumus aequo animo nec Memmi clara propago
talibus in rebus communi desse saluti.* (*DRN* 1.41-43)

For at this unstable time for our country I cannot act with a steady mind, nor can the famed progeny of the Memmii be lacking from the public good.

The interference of Νεῖκος in the pursuit of ἀταραξία is evident in the use of *aequo animo*: the language of unimpeded rational facility. The underlying implication of Lucretius' assertion of an endless cosmic cycle between Venus and Mavors is, however, fairly grim: even the spring of Venus that allows the potential sage to attain ἀταραξία must yield to strife eventually – Epicureanism does not offer equal-opportunity tranquility, but only to the learned sage. It is in this sense of the eternity of the cycle that Mavors' wound is eternal. This changeability is

¹⁸⁷ Vertue, 143; Edmunds, 345.

¹⁸⁸ Furley, 59.

¹⁸⁹ Donncha O'Rourke, “Lovers in Arms: Empedoclean Love and Strife in Lucretius and the Elegists,” *Dictynna* v. 11 (2014): 10.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 5.

apparent in Mavors' later appearance in *DRN*, where he is associated with his traditionally martial mode (*DRN* 5.1309). In a broader conspectus, the fluctuation of this interplay can be found in the contrast between the idyllic incipit of *DRN* and its plague-ridden conclusion.¹⁹¹ Strife for Lucretius cannot exist without the force of Φιλότης, upon the primacy of which (or lack thereof) its eventual ascendancy is predicated. The dependency of Νεῖκος upon Φιλότης is carried through to Vergil, whose epic – unlike Lucretius' – is set under the reign of Νεῖκος.¹⁹² This is evident from the contrast in the political status of Rome between the two texts: in *DRN*, the peace of Venus is a specifically Roman peace - *placidam Romanis...pacem* – while the *Aeneid* is closer to a story of civil strife, especially in the Iliadic books.¹⁹³

This dynamic plays out in the characterization of Dido and Turnus. The domination of their passion by an *amor* – whether it be for a lover or for weapons – that eventually gives way to an equally destructive anger is in keeping with this Empedoclean-Lucretian model. The doubling of the two episodes contains correspondences that cannot be ignored: Venus sends Cupid; Juno, associated with *ira* from the beginning of the epic, sends Allecto; and both episodes are placed prominently at the beginning and halfway points of the poem. Indeed, Turnus' anger continues to mirror the Lucretian love of Dido in its excess, though Vergil is explicit that its source is ultimately his *amor ferri et scelerata insania belli* (“love of the sword and the criminal madness of war,” *Aen.* 7.461), which is the first of the emotions described in Turnus after Allecto's intervention. The lynchpin for both characters is a type of Φιλότης/*Amor*, though the method of the particular minor deity's exploitation depends upon the values and desires of each character:

¹⁹¹ Damien Nelis, *Vergil's 'Aeneid' and the Argonautica of Apollonius of Rhodes* (Leeds: Francis Cairns Publications, 2001), 112.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 349.

¹⁹³ Damien Nelis, “‘Georgics’ 2.458–542: Virgil, Aratus and Empedocles,” *Dictynna* v. 1 (2004): 7 n. 31. The idea that the Trojan colonization of Italy is akin to civil war is evidenced by *Aen.* 12.583: *exoritur trepidos inter discordia ciuis* (“discord emerged amongst the fearful citizens”). This line recalls *Ecl.* 1.71-2: *en quo discordia ciuis / produxit miseros* (“look where discord has led our wretched citizens”).

the desire of Dido for children and her *pudor* for Sychaeus, and Turnus' injured pride and martial *virtus*. If a similar parallel were perceived between the passion of Turnus and that of Aeneas, would *pietas* be the value at stake for the hero in this poetic interplay?

It is commonly pointed out Aeneas and Turnus are analogous in some way throughout book 12 of the epic.¹⁹⁴ In fact, Farrell asserts that both have appeared as an Achilles-figure since Aeneas' return to battle in book 10.¹⁹⁵ By book 12, there are numerous lexical overlaps that compel the reader to acknowledge some fundamental similarities in their anger. One such word is *fervidus*.¹⁹⁶ The word is applied to Turnus and Aeneas 4 times: once for the former, and three times for the latter:

*Turnus ut Aenean cedentem ex agmine uidit
turbatosque duces, subita spe **feruidus** ardet;* (*Aen.* 12.324-25)

Turnus, when he saw Aeneas withdrawing from the ranks and their leaders cast into disarray, ardently burned with sudden hope.

*insequitur trepidique pedem pede **feruidus** urget;* (*Aen.* 12.748)

He chased after him and ardently hastened his pace to the pace of the frightened man.

*ille caput quassans: 'non me tua **feruida** terrent
dicta, ferox; di me terrent et Iuppiter hostis.'* (*Aen.* 12.894-95)

Shaking his head, he said: 'Your ardent words don't frighten me, savage; the gods frighten me, and Jupiter as an enemy.'

*hoc dicens ferrum aduerso sub pectore condit
feruidus.* (*Aen.* 12.950-51)

Saying this, he ardently planted his sword in his exposed chest.

For Vergil, *fervidus* is a word of passion, especially of anger. Its allegorical sense of heat includes it in the same sphere of vocabulary as his usage of words like *ardeo* of emotions.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Tarrant, 15.

¹⁹⁵ Farrell, 263.

¹⁹⁶ Putnam, *Heroes*, 93.

Turnus, though he embodies the splendid vigour of Homeric heroism, gradually becomes a moral exemplar – like Mezentius, though of a lesser order – as words of anger are used more of Aeneas than Turnus in the final book of the poem.¹⁹⁷ Though earlier in the book Turnus' anger still receives attention, in the last two hundred lines it is scarcely treated at all. It is remarkable that the rage of Turnus, whose anger was the subject of a long and remarkable simile in book 7 and is of divine origin, now pales in comparison to that of the protagonist.

Even more notable is the tone of reproach employed by the Rutulian in *Aen.* 12.894-95. This recalls the tone of frank speech employed by Mezentius, rebuking Aeneas for the unrestrained anger that provokes vain mockery of his enemy. Mezentius, in this scenario, was an exemplar of a particularly Epicurean brand of *pietas*, as argued above (see pp. 69-70). In contrast, Turnus demonstrates a *pietas* most characteristic of Aeneas' own virtue, following his reproof with an account of his professed fear of the gods – a reverence that could not be other than *pius*. The reversal, then, is complete: Aeneas' *pietas* has become Turnus', and the Rutulian is established as having moral supremacy over the Trojan hero. This reversal that implies a loss of *pietas* includes the reversal of unrestrained anger, with Turnus' characteristic heated heroic violence becoming Aeneas'.

Further to this reversal of moral status in the final book of the poem, Putnam points out that Turnus, who has been the cause of fear in battle up until this point, exhibits a pathetic symptomology of fear as described by Lucretius.¹⁹⁸ Aeneas adopts the corresponding heroic role of instiller of that fear. Putnam points out a correspondence between *Aen.* 12.335 and *DRN* 4.173:

¹⁹⁷ Lucretius only ever uses *fervidus* in its literal sense connoting heat. His final use of the word in *DRN* is of a fever, which is distinct from all others, which concern astronomy and geography. This, in concert with his description of extreme passion as a type of illness, may indicate some indirect lexical overlap.

¹⁹⁸ Putnam, *Heroes*, 96.

*qualis apud gelidi cum flumina concitus Hebri
sanguineus Mauors clipeo increpat atque furentis
bella mouens immittit equos, illi aequore aperto
ante Notos Zephyrumque uolant, gemit ultima pulsu
Thraca pedum circumque **atrae Formidinis ora**
Iraeque Insidiaeque, dei comitatus, aguntur:
talis equos alacer media inter proelia Turnus
fumantis sudore quatit... (Aen. 12.331-38)*

As if when before the current of the cold Hebrus bloodstained Mavors, incensed, clashes his shield and, inciting war, sends forth his ravening horses; they fly over the open plain before the South and West winds; distant Thrace groans at the strike of their hooves, and all around are driven the forms of grim Fear and Wrath and Ambush, the company of the god. Similarly eager does Turnus turn his horses steaming with sweat through the midst of battle...

*undique uti tenebras omnis Acherunta rearis
liquisse et magnas caeli complexse cavernas.
usque adeo taetra nimborum nocte coorta
impendent **atrae formidinis ora** superne;
quorum quantula pars sit imago dicere nemost
qui possit neque eam rationem reddere dictis. (DRN 4.170-75)*

...such that you'd believe that all the shadows have quit every part of Acheron, and have filled the great caverns of the sky. So entirely has a black night of clouds gathered, and the forms of grim Fear hang overhead; of which how small a part is their appearance there is no man who's able to supply a reason for it in words.

The Turnus who is likened to Mavors with his dreadful posse contrasts very strongly with the fearful Turnus at the end of the epic, where the Rutulian is physically paralyzed with dread (Aen. 12.911-914). The allusion to Lucretius' passage presages the changeable character of the fear of which Turnus is only passingly in control: the *formidinis ora* formed by clouds change and shift too quickly to understand.

*ac uelut in somnis, oculos ubi languida pressit
nocte quies, nequiquam auidos extendere cursus
uelle uidemur et in mediis conatibus aegri
succidimus; non lingua ualet, non corpore notae
sufficiunt uires nec uox aut uerba sequuntur:*

*sic Turno, quacumque uiam uirtute petiuit,
successum dea dira negat. (Aen. 12.908-14)*

Just as in dreams, when languid sleep weighs upon the eyes at night, we seem to vainly want to continue our eager course, and in the middle of our efforts, we barely succeed; the tongue is weak, there isn't enough familiar strength in the body, and neither voice nor words come out: so Turnus, with however much manliness he strove for his path, the dread goddess denied its achievement.

This resonates with Lucretius' symptomology of fear in *DRN* 3, in which the poet pays similar attention to the effect of fear upon the *oculus*, *lingua*, *corpus*, and *vox*.¹⁹⁹

*verum ubi vementi magis est commota metu mens,
consentire animam totam per membra videmus
sudoresque ita palloremque existere toto
corpore et infringi linguam vocemque aboriri,
caligare oculos, sonere auris, succidere artus,
denique concidere ex animi terrore videmus
saepe homines; facile ut quivis hinc noscere possit
esse animam cum animo coniunctam, quae cum animi[vi]
percussast, exim corpus propellit et icit. (DRN 3.152-60)*

Indeed, when the mind is troubled by a more furious fear, we see that the whole soul throughout the body feels the same way, and thus sweating and pallor are found all over the body, and the tongue is weakened and the voice is gone, the eyes are misted and there is sound in the ears, the limbs give out – then we often see men fall down from the terror in their minds; so that anyone can easily know from this that the soul is joined with the mind, which, when struck by the mind, thereafter it strikes and impels the body.

Lucretius' psychological authority channelled in Vergil's description creates a strong sense of Turnus' subjective authenticity. Indeed, though Turnus' rational facility is likely affected by fear at first (*commota metu mens*), it is evident that by the time he speaks to Aeneas twenty lines later his mind is free from such interference, and he is able to state his case clearly. The same cannot be certainly said of Aeneas, who experiences *dolor* and *ira* in very short order.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

Given that Turnus and Aeneas have undergone such an ethical and sympathetic reversal of character, it is worth considering once again the locus of emotional agency in the passages quoted above. Lucretius carefully avoids using mythological imagery literally in his description of the clouds – *rearis* is indefinite; similarly, those who seek omens and the *formidinis ora* are unable to provide a satisfactory *ratio* for them in their words. Such a treatment of superstition in *DRN* mirrors the poet’s contempt for *religio*. In the corresponding Vergilian passage, however, the simile directly implicates a divinity in its comparison, and gives no hint that Mavors is mythological content used for effect, but is rather a bona fide deity being used as a simple point of analogy.

A similar disjunction between the poets can be seen in the second pair of passages. In Lucretius’ symptomology of anger in *DRN* 3, the emotion of fear as a whole is described as *commota...mens*, language that couches the description in the same language of Epicurean rationality above (see pp. 50). Indeed, there is no mention of divine activity in the sphere of this emotion. Once again, however, Vergil specifically attributes Turnus’ crippling fear to a Fury, a divine source; it is ultimately the imposition of the *dea dira*. As with the intervention of Cupid with Dido and Allecto with Turnus, Vergil continues to tendentiously attribute emotion that is internally and rationally explicable for the Epicurean to a divine source.²⁰⁰

Regardless of Vergil’s philosophical *aemulatio*, it is clear that Turnus and Aeneas have undergone an ethical and dramatic reversal in book 12. With this groundwork laid for the poem’s final scene, it becomes all-important for the ethical stakes of the *Aeneid* to determine the moral

²⁰⁰ See Obbink, 108. The sheer frequency of divine interference is another point of difficulty for Epicurean interpretation of the poem. As Obbink points out, the only form of “divinity” for Epicureans was an ideal life attained by living fully at ease; this also entailed that the gods would have no interest in communicating with mortals. If Vergil’s theology were reconcilable with an Epicurean perspective, the gods would have no cause to meddle at all. See also Freer, 110.

status of Aeneas' anger. The character of the anger exhibited by Aeneas in this reversal with Turnus is heroic and, for the Epicurean, excessive: this is certainly what is implied by *terribilis ira* (*Aen.* 12.946-47). Additionally, Vergil's use of *furia* in *accensus furiis* not only invokes his common translation of Homeric θυμός, but also Philodemus' use of the word as κενή ὀργή. Is there a model of anger that can be granted to the hero in these final lines of the poem that can also be attributed to the Epicurean wise man?²⁰¹

In the pursuit of a rational brand of heroic anger that befits Aeneas in this scenario, the distinction made by Philodemus between experiencing φυσική ὀργή and the capacity for ὀργιλότης becomes important. For Philodemus, though ὀργή may well be a suitable sort of anger, to be οργίλος is to be excessive in this anger in some way.²⁰² For example: where ὀργή is brief and moderate, an οργίλος man may still be moderate, but be too easily provoked or otherwise tend towards anger excessively; he may therefore be said to be 'irascible' or 'rage-inclined.' In the Epicurean sage, this becomes essentially the ethical equivalent of θυμός or κενή ὀργή, and is similarly reproachable. The most important difference between being οργίλος and acting with acceptable φυσική ὀργή is in the aspects of duration and frequency:

...δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔχουσι τὸ πάθος, ὑπομιμνήσκομεν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον συνεχῶς θυμοῦνται τινες, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ ταῖς κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὀργαῖς πολυχρονίοις ἐνέχονται καὶ δυσκαποκατατάτοις, κἂν ἐπιγχεθῶσι, πάλι καὶ πυ-κνὸν ἀνοιδούσαις, τις δὲ καὶ μέχρι τῆς τελευτῆς διαμενούσαις, πολλὰ-κις δὲ καὶ παρατιθεμέ-[ν] ναις παισὶ παίδων.²⁰³

...and nor as if not having the emotion; we remind that not only are some men continuously furious, but that at times they also tend towards a series of fits of anger that are over a long span and difficult to recover from, and if they check them, they often also swell up again, and some also stay even unto death, and often are handed down to their children's children...

²⁰¹ Craig Kallendorf, *The Other Virgil* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37.

²⁰² Voula Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 196.

²⁰³ Armstrong and McOsker, 256, col. 30.11-24.

These are the most telling distinctions in Philodemus' taxonomy because an οργίλος man is less capable of moderation during a fit of anger, even if that anger is provoked by just motivation, and is more likely to display disproportionate anger at a lesser provocation.

Philodemus provides a particular taxonomy for understanding the difference between the excess of ὀργιλότης/κενή ὀργή and φυσική ὀργή. As Asmis argues, Philodemus likely follows Epicurus' doctrinal distinction between "natural" and "unnatural" desires when the former names φυσική ὀργή.²⁰⁴ In considering this issue, Epicurus further divides natural and unnatural desires into those that are necessary and those that are unnecessary.²⁰⁵ Language of necessity, in this instance, has a sense of inevitability; anger may be inevitable ("necessary") if the provocation impinges upon health, life, or lasting happiness.²⁰⁶ In combination with the distinction between "natural" and "unnatural" desires, this yields three available permutations for Philodemus: anger that is natural and necessary; natural and unnecessary; or unnatural and unnecessary (κενή ὀργή/θυμός, which is entirely excessive). Given that the judgement of necessity is contingent upon the reliability of the individual's assessment (λογισμός) of the harm of the provocation, it is clear that the maintenance of an unmuddied rational mind holds such a central position in Philodemus' argumentation for a reason: if the wise man is to feel φυσική ὀργή (i.e. "proper anger"), then he must first have accurately assessed the harm done to his life, health, or lasting happiness, and have judged that his anger is both natural and necessary.²⁰⁷

In this sense, harm is a condition for anger, since it always provokes a λογισμός that assesses the necessity of anger.²⁰⁸ However, should the λογισμός judge the harm insufficient to

²⁰⁴ Asmis, "Anger," 153.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 179.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 165.

²⁰⁷ Armstrong and McOsker, 274, col. 37.25.

²⁰⁸ Asmis, "Anger," 175.

necessity, then that harm will not result in anger. It is paramount for the wise man to be able to judge whether the harm done to him has been sufficient to make anger a necessity. For Philodemus, this usually entails concerns of intent and malice.

It follows from this concern for harm and impingement upon the spheres of life, health, and lasting happiness that punishment meted out from anger will not be pleasurable for the wise man, but dealt out as a means to limit further harm. Anger seems to exist somewhat outside the immediate necessity of the Epicurean imperative of pleasure, since its purpose is to mitigate painful things, but not to be pleasurable in itself.²⁰⁹ As contended in Chapter Two, it is in this sense that φυσική ὀργή is medicinal for Philodemus (see pp. 34), prompting the clinical language of the πόσιν ἀψινθίου:

...οὔτε ὡς πρὸς] ἀ]πο[λαυτ]όν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡδ[ύ] τι προσφέρεται) ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς] ἀναγκαιότατον, ἀηδέστα-τον δὲ παραγίνεται, καθά-περ ἐπὶ πόσιν ἀψινθίου καὶ τομήν.²¹⁰

...not as to an enjoyable thing – for it doesn't add any sweetness – but as a thing most necessary and disagreeable, which is akin even to a draught of wormwood or a surgery.

The physical aspects of the experience of anger receive a great deal of treatment in *DI*.

Philodemus is quite concerned not only with φυσική ὀργή as a passing inner disturbance, but also as a manifest set of symptoms motivated by that disturbance. That φυσική ὀργή belongs to the σοφός does not preclude its external expression; on the contrary, the acting out of the right sort of anger is an inevitable reality for the wise man, even as his “inner spirit” finds the sensation unpleasurable and painful.

Philodemus' treatment of the anger of the wise man leaves us with the following key points: the σοφός is only susceptible to φυσική ὀργή, not κενή ὀργή/θυμός; φυσική ὀργή must be moderate and just in response to harmful provocation, and brief; he is not οργίλος because

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 177.

²¹⁰ Armstrong and McOsker, 294-296, col. 44.16-28.

of his capacity for λογισμός, which restricts the intensity and frequency of his anger; his anger must be rationally judged both natural and necessary; and his anger, while also an inner disturbance, may acceptably be externally perceivable through symptoms.

Applied to Aeneas and Turnus, this model of anger can provide a possible schema for the ethical content of the ending of the poem. The idea that Philodemus' model could be applied to the two heroes was proposed by Indelli: "As we see, it is a *pathos* almost always motivated (a couple of times *ira* and *furor* or *furia* are united) which seems to correspond to Philodemus' *orge*."²¹¹ For Indelli, however, the heroes each respectively represent one of the types of anger: "In this way, I believe, one can agree with those who have seen in Philodemus' concept of anger as presented in the *De Ira* exemplars for the anger of Vergil's Aeneas (Philodemus' *physike orge*) and that of Turnus (Philodemus' *thumos* or *kene orge*)."²¹² However, this reading does not align with the otherwise consistent trend of ethical reversal in book 12, argued above (pp.78-80). It is evident that Turnus and Aeneas at least somewhat represent anger as Indelli contends in prior books of the *Aeneid* – the contrast between the heroic mode of Turnus' and the more typically restrained character of Aeneas is evident. However, the reversal in the moral status of the heroes that Vergil integrates into the fabric of book 12 suggests not only that Philodemus' categories are fairly malleable in Vergil's hands, but that it is possible to interrogate the final anger of Aeneas in Philodemus' terms.

To suppose that Aeneas' *terribilis ira* is a manifestation of φυσική ὀργή would effectively absolve the hero of any other proposed moral consequences for the killing of Turnus.²¹³ For Philodemus, anger is considered a necessity of human experience, and is

²¹¹ Indelli, 108.

²¹² Ibid, 110.

²¹³ See Erler, 200 for this view. Erler writes concerning the ethical problems posed by the killing of Turnus: "Seen from an Epicurean perspective, these problems vanish, for it can be shown that Aeneas' emotions here as elsewhere

therefore accepted as morally inevitable. Natural anger, besides this inevitability, is the refinement of anger, making it possible to employ it for good, though the emotion itself remains painful.²¹⁴ Should Aeneas' anger be natural, it interacts with his *pietas* in ethically consequential ways: the pain of his anger is undergone for the good of the external world, because the hero-as-σοφός has dealt out punishment where the harm done to him makes it rationally estimated as necessary, often as a future preventative against further harm. The rationality of this process has merit for the hero's inner spirit, allowing him to mitigate the extent and disturbance of the *ταραχή* often induced by extreme emotion.

Does Aeneas' anger as described in the final six lines of the poem coincide clearly with the taxonomic terms of Philodemus' account of φυσική ὀργή? I contend that though the hero's anger may well agree with Philodemus' definition, it equally may not; Vergil carefully denies his readership a straightforward ethical structure by which to clarify the terms of the final scene. In Epicurean terms, though Vergil seems to acknowledge the structure of Philodemus' model of anger, he refuses to completely fulfill the philosopher's taxonomy.

The brevity of the account of the hero's anger plays an important role in this refusal. Aeneas' *terribilis ira*, from *Aen.* 12.945-950, is abruptly cut short by the account of Turnus' shade. It is for this reason that the duration of Aeneas' rage is unclear: the poem ends too soon. Should it continue (either as a prolonged fit of rage or as the frequent recurrence of such fits), Aeneas would be termed οργίλος in Philodemus' terms, and therefore be inclined to a kind of anger to which the wise man ought not be prone. Should it end where the poem does,

in the poem are what the Epicurean would call natural, the disposition of Aeneas remains *pius* and the cause of his emotion is morally acceptable."

²¹⁴ Christopher Gill, "Reactive and Objective Attitudes: Anger in Virgil's 'Aeneid' and Hellenistic Philosophy" in *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, eds. S. Braund and G. Most (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 214.

then Aeneas' anger may yet be termed φυσική ὀργή, if it is also rationally judged as necessary by a λογισμός, and the extent of harm to health, life, or lasting happiness is calmly perceived and punished moderately. The poet's refusal to confirm the duration of the hero's anger, however, already denies definitive fulfillment of this taxonomy.

The open question of Aeneas' rationality in these final lines is a difficult one. Evidence of a λογισμός would be heartening, but it is not clearly given. As Philodemus writes, the wise man may well express his anger externally in a very heated fashion, depending on the individual:

‘κα-κῶς’ γὰρ ‘ἀκούων’ καὶ πάσ-χων ‘ὅστις οὐκ ὀργίζε-ται, πονηρίας πλεῖστο[v τεκμήριον φέρει’ κα[τὰ τὸν Μένανδρον, ἐνίοτε δὲ προκινησίας ἢ λύτ-της περὶ ἕτερα· διὸ φα-νερός ἐστ[ι]ν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐ-λαχίστοις παρὰ πόδας εὐθέως ἐξετρηόμε-νος — ἀγαθὸν δὲ τὸ ἀνα-δέχεσθαι.²¹⁵

For the man not made angry when he hears ill of himself and is ill-treated gives the greatest proof cowardice, as Menander writes, and sometimes that he's predisposed to excitement or madness concerning other things; wherefore he obviously suddenly loses it at minutiae before him – but it is a good thing to accept [the natural kind of anger].²¹⁶

In the single act of the punishment of Turnus, the physical description of Aeneas' anger does not preclude φυσική ὀργή: certainly, he is angry – *furiis accensus, ira terribilis, feruidus* – but there is no confirmation that his rational faculty is impinged upon by his emotion, which would confirm the absence of a λογισμός. In the earlier case of Dido, by contrast, the physical manifestation of her ταραχή mimics the internal disturbance of her rational faculty (*animus*): *et partis animus uersabat in omnis* (“and she was turning her mind everywhere,” *Aen.* 4.630); *at trepida et coeptis immanibus effera Dido / sanguineam uoluens aciem* (“but Dido, trembling and savage with her monstrous undertaking, rolling her bloodshot eyes...” *Aen.*

²¹⁵ Armstrong and McOsler, 278, col. 38.22-34.

²¹⁶ Though this may seem to be a significant interpolation, it is supported by Armstrong and McOsler's translation of the same passage.

4.642-43). Aeneas clearly exhibits only the physical manifestation of anger, making it very difficult to gauge the extent of his inner disturbance. Where we would hope for insight into the hero's *mens* or *animus* in those final lines, we are only told *ille, oculis postquam saeui monimenta doloris / exuuiasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira / terribilis* ("he, after he drank in the monument of the savage grief and the spoils with his eyes, was incensed with fury and terrible in his anger," *Aen.* 12.945-47). There is no clear evidence of the existence or absence of a λογισμός here. Prior to noticing the *saeui monimenta doloris*, there was such evidence that Aeneas' rationality was active in his ability to be swayed by Turnus' cogent appeal to his mercy: *et iam iamque magis cunctantem flectere sermo / coeperat* (And now, now, hesitating more, his words began to persuade him more," *Aen.* 12-940-41). Any such confirmation is absent from the final six lines.

It is true that the harm done to Aeneas by Turnus – the killing of Pallas – may well be sufficient damage to his lasting happiness for anger. However, it is worth recalling that, as Asmis argues, harm is a condition for anger, not an active cause of it: harm must exist for anger to occur, but the existence of harm does not mean that anger will occur.²¹⁷ For harm to result in anger, there must be an assessment of it by the wise man in the form of a λογισμός. In the case of φυσική ὀργή, he must determine not only that harm was done to him, but that the harm was of an extremity that justifies anger. That Turnus and Aeneas both recognize the killing of Pallas as harm is clear; that Aeneas rationally intercedes to assess that harm is not.

Furthermore, it is important to consider Aeneas' relationship to his anger in this moment in terms of the Epicurean imperative of pleasure. As discussed, the internal disturbance that is present (though mitigated) in φυσική ὀργή does not give the wise man

²¹⁷ Kirk R. Sanders, "On a Causal Notion in Philodemus' 'On Anger,'" *The Classical Quarterly* v. 59 no. 2 (2009): 647.

pleasure; it is “a painful means to the ultimate goal of freedom from pain.”²¹⁸ Though we see the external manifestation of Aeneas’ anger as he stabs Turnus (*Aen.* 12.950-51), we are not shown that the motivating anger causes the hero pain, especially pain that can be distinguished from that of the *saevus dolor* of the reminder of Pallas’ death. Vergil continues to avoid the introspective language he employed in the *ταραχή* of Dido, preferring to describe the hero’s physical responses to his anger – at 939, Aeneas *uoluens oculos*, and at 946 he *oculis...hausit*. There remains limited insight into the nature of the hero’s internal relationship to his emotion.²¹⁹

The poet supplies only half of each criterion of anger necessary to tell whether Aeneas’ *terribilis ira* is φυσική ὀργή or not. There is indeed clear evidence of a fit of anger, but no confirmation of its duration; there is enough of the harm that is a condition of anger, but no clear rational assessment (λογισμός) of that harm; and there are the anticipated external symptoms of anger, but no clarification of Aeneas’ inner disturbance.

This is a difficult conclusion for a poem whose protagonist has displayed a consistent capacity for excessive emotion throughout the poem as well as frequent restraint. Should we understand Aeneas at the end of book 12 to be the same Aeneas as the one in beginning of the text, the hero who has been shown to have such a capacity for poor Epicureanism in all the books leading up to this moment? Vergil invites us to draw our own conclusions from the evidence of his hero arrayed in the preceding books. Farrell, for example, struggles to discern any certain positive or negative change in Aeneas’ fundamental character beyond a greater tendency towards being harshly reactive to harm.²²⁰ Aeneas seems to have undergone a

²¹⁸ Asmis, *Anger*, 174.

²¹⁹ Putnam, *Interpretation*, 174.

²²⁰ Farrell, 292.

prolonged *ταραχή* since his mind was first disturbed during the fall of Troy. At what point does the “disturbance” imposed upon Aeneas by external forces – the gods, as expounded at *Aen.* 1.97, and by Venus when she reveals the role of the divine in the fall of Troy (*Aen.* 2.604-23) – cease to be the hero’s reaction to discrete provocations, and solidify into his personality? By concluding the poem before the reader can truly ascertain the nature of Aeneas’ anger at Turnus, Vergil provokes this question. As mentioned before, an angry *ταραχή* that solidifies into character would be the *ὀργιλότης* of Philodemus, that tendency towards irascibility of the *μάταιος*. Aeneas’ *terribilis ira* purposefully resists such a conclusive definition, and, in its ambiguity, raises the question of whether the hero is truly responsible for actions that were provoked by situations originally forced upon him by the divine force of *fatum*.

It should be noted that this issue is, ethically speaking, identical to the issue presented by Dido and Turnus. Both characters exhibit excessive emotion (in Epicurean terms) and a disturbance of the inner spirit, but the original *culpa* arguably lies with Amor and Allecto (or Venus and Juno) respectively. The parallel of Vergil’s Amor/Allecto to Lucretius’ Empedoclean Venus (Φιλότης)/Mavors (Νεῖκος) is an integral part of this. In the end, these cosmic challenges pave the narrative way for Aeneas’ challenge to the supreme poetic and philosophical mover of the story: fate itself. A challenge to the cosmic structure of the poem is mirrored by a corresponding question of the hero’s identity, one that requires the reader to ask if the divine impositions placed upon Aeneas translate to culpability.

It is possible, in this context, to discern some of the narrative shortcomings of an Epicurean reading. Vergil seems to allow no Epicurean standpoint that would yield a positive contribution to these cosmic questions. Indeed, the poem concludes on a note of disagreement – Turnus’ shade fleeing to an underworld that, for Lucretius, categorically does not exist. The

role of Amor, Allecto, and Fate in the *culpae* of the characters is an irreconcilable gulf between Vergil and Epicureanism, however much the psychological axis of the poem can be located in an Epicurean ethic of passion.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION – READERS, CRITICS, AND THE GARDEN

The litany of passionate outbursts of love and anger that punctuate the *Aeneid*'s most dramatic moments defines its central ethical problems, which culminate in the poem's conclusion. This treatment of such instances of passion has not been exhaustive; however, the selected episodes in the poem are especially illustrative of this theme and are well served by an Epicurean analysis. In the *Aeneid*, Vergil's representation of the passions regularly asserts the risk that excessive love can result in an excessive and violent anger. This dynamic resonates with the picture of human psychology in Lucretius' *DRN* and Philodemus' *DI*. The Dido episode – in conjunction with Creusa's post-mortem appearance – demonstrates not only the central role of love in laying the foundation of Dido's destructive anger, but also the fundamentally Epicurean terms in which her downfall is described. Similarly, the anger that Aeneas displays in battle throughout books 2 and 10 is founded in a similar Epicurean background, resonating strongly with Lucretius' poetic influence and the terminology of Philodemus' *DI*. Finally, the gradual ethical reversal that characterizes the relationship between Aeneas and Turnus in the poem's final book culminates in a violent coda that, even in the closing lines, can be viewed through an Epicurean lens.

The strength of the Epicurean interpretation lies in its ability to lend structure to a series of ethical impasses that may otherwise seem simply tragic or pathetic, without a joining conceptual tissue. The system of ethical evaluation that Philodemus and Lucretius provide for the passions acts as just such a means of providing moral and narrative coherence. But where the strengths of this interpretative mode should be acknowledged, so must its shortcomings. As noted, the final line of the *Aeneid* raises a problem for a wholesale Epicurean ethical interpretation of the text: Turnus' shade not only remembers the cause of his death – an

impossibility if the body is atomically dissolved post-mortem, as Lucretius contends – but flees to an afterlife that, for the Epicurean, does not exist.²²¹ This is a significant departure, and provides the reader with a final reminder of the fact that, although Vergil’s ethical structure is framed in Epicurean terms, he systematically demonstrates its incongruity with the requirements of his cosmic and theological superstructure.

Nevertheless, the utility of Epicureanism in the interpretation of the *Aeneid* has gained scholarly popularity approximately since Philip Hardie’s Lucretian experiment in *Cosmos and Imperium* (1984).²²² And this is for good reason: Lucretius, and more recently Philodemus, are sources that are indispensable for our interpretation of Vergil’s literary milieu and the environment that informed the conceptual framework for the *Aeneid*. Lucretius and Philodemus are, I contend, essential to understanding certain structural elements the poem, such as the relationship between love and anger; they are not, however, the only influence even on this particular aspect: Stoicism, Platonism, Neotericism, all remain valid and important philosophical and literary means to interpreting the text.

The representation of the Epicurean passions in the poem falls short of a totalizing interpretation; however, rather than being unsatisfactory, this fact highlights the *Aeneid*’s essential capacity to remain coherent despite the shortcomings of particular interpretative devices. The frustrating lack of finality offered by an Epicurean perspective on the *Aeneid* mirrors, to my mind, the peculiar and indirect types of textual connections found between characters in the poem itself. In his paper “Possessiveness, Sexuality, and Heroism in the *Aeneid*,” Putnam compellingly argues that there is an implicit erotic connection between Dido

²²¹ Hardie, “Iphigeneia,” 412.

²²² Hardie, *Cosmos and Imperium*, 157-240.

and Pallas, and that it is ultimately the baldric as a *monimenta* not only of Pallas' killing, but also of Dido's end and Aeneas' role in it that drives the hero's closing act.²²³

The distinct and disparate subjective experiences of Dido and Pallas are unified in the poet's hands by a tragic pathos that echoes between them. This is a phenomenon that Putnam argues towards by observing lexical resonances. However, such resonances do not alter the reality that Dido and Pallas never directly affect each other, being narratively connected chiefly by the pathos induced by their connection to Aeneas; but when the vocabulary used of Pallas reminds the reader of Dido, Pallas is altered, just as the reader's perception of Dido is also altered by her post-mortem similarity to Pallas. The two characters require renegotiation of each other. This connection is not literal, but textual; it is an illustration of figurative intersections between two distinct characters' distinct subjectivities. For this reason, measuring its effect and poetic intention by an objective metric falls short. Similarly, arguing towards the literary influence of Lucretius and Philodemus upon Vergil by some objective means, while worthwhile, falls short of the subjective effect of these resonances within the poem.

The problem presented by the Harvard school can be discerned in this dynamic. By expressing the aim of "connecting" by some means that seems unassailable – lexically, poetically, or ethically – disparate characters (Dido and Pallas) or authors (Lucretius and Vergil), scholars reveal an ingrained desire to "freeze" the shifting subjective landscape of a work of poetry. But Dido and Pallas cannot be made to meet; what are no more than hints cannot become a literal alteration of the poem's plot. Thus, all attempts to finalize such connections feel somewhat insufficient to the fluctuation of the relationship between reader and text.²²⁴ The latent

²²³ Michael Putnam, "Possessiveness, Sexuality and Heroism in the 'Aeneid,'" *Vergilius* v. 31 (1985): 12.

²²⁴ See Christopher Gill, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006): 460. Some scholars consider the *Aeneid* to be a philosophical manifesto; Gill writes that "the *Aeneid* is written from a Stoic or an Epicurean standpoint (perspectives which often, if not always, converge on each other)."

difficulties enforced by the ever-changing subjectivities at work between the poem, its allusions (internal and external), and its readership make the existence of a critically satisfactory explanation impossible. Scholarly criticism, in its pursuit of “interpretation,” has the unintended and perverse effect of eliding the critic’s capacity to be a reader and truly experience the poem in all its tensions and contradictions.

Though the Harvard school is more sympathetic to the existence of such connections, it ultimately suffers from the same issue as its optimistic counterpart: a type of epistemological dogmatism that, though it is sensitive to the effect of subjective echoes, nevertheless cannot justify its existence without construing the sum of these echoes as an objective conclusion. Though more inclined to acknowledge the *Aeneid* as an aporetic text, such thinking does not truly accept the fundamentally aporetic philosophical inclinations that underlie the poem. To ignore the poem’s epistemological challenges – that is, its rejection of our desire to “measure” its subjectivity by our scholarly apparatus – is to ignore that much empirical criticism of the *Aeneid* is really just another sort of objectivism wearing an existentialist’s clothes.²²⁵

Respecting the interpretative limitations of an Epicurean reading of the poem is essential. And yet to take the opposite approach – to ignore the poem’s uncertainty entirely and to read the *Aeneid* as a truly Epicurean work – strikes as rather too coincidental with the later philosophical trend in popular Roman culture for the nihilistic brand of Epicurean philosophy. This sense is attractive for the modern reader, seductive even; it holds in it the same risks that W.R. Johnson incisively noted of the Harvard school:

The major weakness of the Harvard school is, as I see it, that it is obviously rooted in our peculiarly contemporary brand of pessimism. It is hard to imagine

²²⁵ Such a rejection is substantiated by the constant scholarly cycle of finding successive interpretations insufficient, if nothing else.

how this reading of the poem could exist without the support of our agnostic and atheistic existentialisms.²²⁶

But understanding the *Aeneid* philosophically is rather low on the list of trending (and dangerous) scholarly approaches. Arguing the poem from an authentically ancient point of view – such as Epicureanism, or as political allegory – contains a risk that Hardie pointed out in 1998: “Those who seek a philosophical solution run the risk of simply exporting the problem of interpreting the end of the *Aeneid* into an unresolved dispute between ancient philosophical schools.²²⁷” Though he does not name it so, Hardie objects – as Johnson does – to a type of epistemological imperialism applied to the reading of poetry (an interpretative confusion that is amusingly ironic given the ethical concerns of the poem). If ancient philosophies – such as Epicurean psychology – run the risk of being a reductive imposition upon the text, then what greater risk is there than the imposition of modern ones, that layer anachronism on top of their crimes of conquest?

This is the risk of the pessimistic reading of the poem, as well as the risk of flying too close to the literary sun when interpreting the *Aeneid* in light of the biographers – a fact that Horsfall pointed out:

All else, as we shall soon see, is not biographical fact, **as we understand it**, but either explication of V.’s text in biographical terms or defence of the poet against criticism. [...] It may now be apparent that very little external information indeed may legitimately be used in the understanding of Virgil and his work.²²⁸

The crux of Horsfall’s objection here is not only that the verity of the biographers is debatable in the terms of historical truth that we moderns impute to them; it is that the desire to find a fulcrum

²²⁶ Johnson, 15.

²²⁷ Philip Hardie, *Virgil* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 100.

²²⁸ Horsfall, *Companion*, 4, 24. My emphasis.

from which to stubbornly leverage interpretation of Vergil's world is a suspicious position from which to begin reading the text.

This type of objectivity, as it strives to be, is the fundamental sleight of hand in the academic interpretation of the poem that causes it to seem to be so evasive. The poem does not seek to illustrate dogmatic belief in a philosophical school (or in a mixture of several). Nor does it display only existential ennui at the course of history, at the realization that life presents no singular moment for reconciliation of prior moments.²²⁹ Rather, the poem presents a blend of these elements, a tangled fusion that resists objective clarification because its makeup is – to the critic – not methodologically objective, but unacceptably subjective.

The conclusion of the *Aeneid* presents a man whose capacity for courage in the face of his own prior failures requires him, when he kills Turnus, to summon the courage to scramble for his own redemption once more. The terror contained in such a conclusion – the abject fear that this time Aeneas will not be able to regain his humanity – is, if anything, a brusquely didactic ending that comments on both the inevitability of failure and the necessity for courage. We do not want to be made to understand the man who does not try again. From an Epicurean perspective, this sense is present in the unresolved question of the hero's ὀργιλότης; but for Farrell, this same sense was a question of Aeneas' reactivity.²³⁰ To reduce the polysematic interpretative capacity of the poem is to attempt, one way or the other, to eliminate the subjective experience of reading it. Consider, in this vein, Martindale's words on the subject of criticism:

By exposing these contradictions [within a given text] the critic 'deconstructs' the poem, producing an *aporia*. She may then notice that a poem which so obviously foregrounds its own rhetoricity could be said to deconstruct itself, and so exhibit the entrapments of language and dramatize its own dilemmas [...] Yet, paradoxically, at an emotional level,

²²⁹ Simone de Beauvoir, "Pyrrhus and Cineas," in *Philosophical Writings*, ed. M.A. Simmons (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 120.

²³⁰ Farrell, 292.

at the point of reception, the poem achieves, for many of its readers, what it proclaims to be impossible, a move from (apparent) rhetorical intricacy to (apparent) simplicity of affirmation. We may ‘see through’ even this rhetorical move (is a writer more, or less, honest when he or she draws attention to his or her rhetorical strategies?), but even so we may still be moved.²³¹

The effect described in this quotation eerily mirrors the recent trends in the study of the *Aeneid*: tensions within the poem (Pallas cannot truly be another Dido) reveal interpretative impasses, such as the resistance of the golden bough, that have characterized the scholarship of the Harvard school, since such emphasis cannot be accidental; and thereby the poem ‘deconstructs’ its own status into *aporia* (cf. Tarrant’s proposed ambivalent position on the optimism/pessimism debate).²³²

The first step forward in the process of bridging the gap between the sterilizing effect of scholarly criticism and the capacity of the poem to affect the emotions despite criticism is understanding our interpretative dogmas and their limitations as a means of understanding the text; this is what has been necessary in the application of Epicureanism to the *Aeneid*. The lack of total coherence of the poem from an Epicurean perspective is a good sign that, as an interpretation, it does not seek to “freeze” the text, but is capable of living with and in its paradoxes and tensions. To find Epicureanism an intertext insufficient to the totality of the *Aeneid* is to verify the reading as truly discursive and relational.²³³

This discrepancy between the act of ‘seeing through’ a poet’s rhetoric as Martindale says but nonetheless being moved by it encapsulates the interpretative tension at work here. It is the conceit of the critic to suppose that cutting through “rhetoric” is more important than being moved simply because explication may (abortively, as it would turn out) lead to ‘understanding’

²³¹ Charles Martindale, *Redeeming the Text: Latin Poetry and the Hermeneutics of Reception* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 105.

²³² Tarrant, 17.

²³³ Cf. Martindale, 106. For Martindale, accepting this shortcoming is best understood as a “surrender.”

the text, and dogmatically resolve through pure force of rationality the problems of a poem that have moved the audiences of two millennia.

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