PRIVATE SECURITY ACTORS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF NIGER DELTA & NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA IN WEST AFRICA.

by

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Dalhousie University is located in Mi'kma'ki, the ancestral and
unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq.
We are all Treaty people.

DEDICATION PAGE

First of all, this thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of my late father. I am grateful for his immense commitment and zeal towards my education. Although he never lived to see my undergraduate degree and master's degree graduations, I am sure he is very proud of how far I have come.

I also dedicate this thesis to my mother, Joyce, who has been my constant source of inspiration, encouragement, and my best friend during this journey.

Furthermore, this thesis is also dedicated to my younger brother, Frank. I hope that this milestone will continue to inspire and motivate you to continue pursuing your dreams in the field of biomedical and allied health sciences.
Frank, I am living proof that -with hard work, perseverance, and gratitude- any dream is achievable.

Finally, and most importantly, this thesis is dedicated to the Almighty God for his divine wisdom, understanding, strength, and favor, for without these, this milestone would not have been possible.

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ABSTRACT

Africa continues to be synonymous with a place of insecurity in contemporary times. This insecurity has met the parallel rise of private security actors. My thesis seeks to understand why private security services have become unavoidable on the continent. I argue that Africa's insecurity problem is the effect of the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning which has exposed incompatible differences and paved a way for an 'us vs them' mentality in African societies. These divisions have been further deteriorated by bad African leadership practices leading to little or no trust in the State and its security apparatus. From my case studies in Nigeria, I find that the colonial legacies of ethnic partitioning, as well as predatory neo patrimonial tendencies of African leaders, have contributed to the lack of trust in the State and its security apparatus. These have further necessitated the need for the services of private security actors thus making them unavoidable in Africa.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

PSED	Private Security Events Database
G4S	Group 4 Securicor
S.T.T.E.P	Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International
PSCs	Private Security Companies
PMCs	Private Military Companies
ICG	International Crisis Group
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
C.C.T.V	Closed-circuit television
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
MNCs	Multinational Corporation's
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
SARS	Special Anti-Robbery Squad (Nigeria)
NLSS	Nigerian Living Standards Survey (Nigeria)
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics (Nigeria)

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Post-colonial Africa has faced its fair share of political instabilities since the 1960s. From the continent's dark days of recurrent coups d'état during the cold war, through to the conflict roller coasters in the 1990s, the African continent has been eternally scarred by instability. Despite a decline in the violent conflicts in the 21st century, almost all parts of the African continent continue to face issues of insecurity. According to a wide range of scholars, insecurity can be conceptualized as a state of fear or anxiety, due to the absence of protection that entails peril, deathtraps and an uncertainty over personal safety (Achumba et al., 2013; Beland, 2005).

The insecurity on the continent has been worsened by the rise in terrorism after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. From the North African region, through to the West, Central, and Eastern African regions, non-state armed actors such as transnational terrorist organizations, rebels/insurgent groups, organized armed gangs and criminal organizations have taken hold of ungovernable spaces across particular countries. They are even more visible in post-conflict societies and fragile contexts like Libya, Eastern DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Nigeria. According to a 2020 global terrorism index research report, terrorist spaces have shifted from the Middle East to Africa (Raymakers, 2020). The research also found that, out of the top ten (10) high-risk countries, seven (7) were African countries.

In addition, even in spaces considered somewhat governable such as in urban areas and big towns, there are still forms of insecurity. Crime rates are high and there are limited or unreliable state-based capacities for internal security and border protection.

In short, the African continent continues to be synonymous with a place of insecurity in contemporary times. On the other hand, the constant rise of insecurity in Africa has met the simultaneous and or parallel rise of non-state private security actors on the continent. The emergence of some of these non-state private security actors raises a plethora of logical concerns because of their past and the fact that some scholars see it as a challenge to the Weberian notion of the State. The Weberian notion of the State is associated with the German sociologist Max Weber. He notes that the important characteristic of any state is its ability to have monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. However, emergence on non-state actors such as private security services according some scholars tend to put this element of the state into question.

In the past, private security actors such as private military companies (PMC's) were mercenary caricatures who were threats to State authority on the African continent (Singer 2003; Kinsey 2007; Percy 2007) and were largely aligned with force, militarism, and violence (Higate & Utas, 2017). The activities of PMCs such as Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone & Liberia are unspeakable as are the repercussions therefrom.

However, over the past two decades, non-state private security actors have become less of a curse, and arguably notable for peace and security efforts on the African continent. After the ban on mercenary activities globally, the private security sector is now heavily regulated globally and thus, has metamorphosized from their offensive activities into

defensive roles on the African continent. This U-turn does not wipe the slate clean; their erroneous past on the continent is still not forgotten and will live forever. Even importantly, they have genuine challenges in contemporary times and most notable among them is allegations of human right abuses in particular jurisdiction and in some cases have become a double-edged knife.

Despite the distaste for private security even in their re-emergence, insecurity continues to grow on the continent. Rebel/insurgent groups, criminal organizations and armed gangs, paramilitary as well as terrorist cells continue to flourish. The implications for security on the continent are enormous and ought to be addressed if Africa has any chance of consolidating the gains it has made over the years towards achieving peace and security, which is a key tenet of SDG 16. Hence, alternatives such as private security providers/actors have been resorted to by governments as well as individuals on the continent.

The purpose of this opening chapter is to set out the vocabulary and contextual roadmap of the thesis by establishing key elements that will be concerned with this research. In this chapter, contexts and terms that will be used in the research will be explained. This will be followed by a review of existing scholarly literature on insecurity and private security. The latter part of the chapter will lay out the hypothesis, the purpose, and the relevance of this work.

Chapter 2 presents the research architecture with a particular focus on its design and methods. This section will explain my research design, methods, and methodologies adopted for the research as well as my data collection strategies.

Chapter 3 will explore the theoretical themes, assess their importance to this research, and explain where they fit as interpretive frames to understand my variables.

Chapter 4 will examine private security services in-depth, situate them in the African context and analyze their capabilities (strength and weaknesses).

In Chapter 5, there will be a focus on the case studies for the research. While the research as a whole is situated in Nigeria which is in the West African region, the cases of North-Eastern Nigeria and the Niger Delta will be our primary focus. The second section will examine private security in Niger Delta and North-Eastern Nigeria. The role of private security services in these areas will be examined and there will be an analysis of the relationship between the independent variable, intervening variable, and the dependent variable of this study, etc. The third section will further investigate whether or not the bodies of theoretical frames in chapter 3 support or contradict our hypothesis or confirm our null hypothesis.

In chapter 6, which will be the concluding chapter, we would rehash ate the importance of this research study and point to key issues that answer our research question while exploring private security services in our case studies and understand how they have come best alternative for filling the structural insecurity gap created by our independent and intervening variables.

1.1. **Establishing Context**

<u>Insecurity</u>

Insecurity, according to Béland (2007), refers both to the subjective feeling of anxiety and to a concrete lack of protection. In his opinion, it is derived from the word insecure, which is synonymous with the words: (1) anxious or afraid, not confident or certain; (2) not adequately protected (ibid). Although this definition does capture more ground in my context, I would add that it could also be understood as the inability to be physically and psychologically free from danger and threat in a particular geographic area. Hence in this thesis, insecurity will refer to the latter definition.

<u>Private security</u>

Private security here means, provision of security from non-state actors. For purposes of my research, I will focus on two groups that fall under this umbrella. These are private security companies (PSCs), which are composed of both local companies and multi-national foreign-owned companies operating in a host country on one hand, and local but informal community protection and vigilante groups on another hand.

The distinction between these two private security providers is an interesting one. In the quest to fill the existing security lacunae in a continent made up of unequal societies, the services of PSC's (both local or internationally owned) can be purchased by African governments themselves or even local and foreign businesses as well as private citizens and individuals who are in the upper echelons of society. However, the poor and marginalized communities also need protection but are unable to purchase the services of

PSCs. Yet, burdened with securing themselves and the safety of their communities, community protection groups or vigilante groups arise.

<u>Private security companies</u>

These refer to local or foreign-owned business corporations or firms, which provide armed and unarmed security services and expertise to private and public clients. Many times, these companies are confused with defense corporations or private military corporations, who are designed to engage in combative and offensive roles. This thesis is not concerned with these defense or private military corporations. It is more concerned with private security companies that play defensive roles, securing individuals and properties rather than engaging in combat activities. Other services private security companies provide include cash-in-transit services as well as the movement of other valuables. They also conduct diverse forms of confidential investigations, including undercover or covert investigations, complex fraud investigations, and private investigations for clients (UNODC, 2014).

Furthermore, they provide services such as bodyguards, close protection, witness protection, crowd control, armed guards for nuclear energy sites, process-serving, conducting surveillance (including the use of CCTV and covert systems), collecting and disseminating intelligence, and monitoring, installing and responding to various forms of alarms among others (ibid).

Informal Community Protection & Vigilante groups

These are groups that are largely identifiable paramilitary forces with little to no military training nor experience, but yet fight or provide protection within fragile context (Shultz et al., 2004: p. 23). Vigilante groups are composed primarily of young males from the lower classes who are attracted or sometimes lured because it provides them with wealth, capital, strength, and protection. According to Shultz et. al., they may also represent a specific ethnic group, tribe, clan, community, or even religion (ibid).

Sub-Sahara Africa

Africa and sub-Sahara Africa will be used interchangeably throughout this research. According to the United Nations, geographically and ethnoculturally, sub-Sahara Africa comprises countries that lie south of the Sahara. It consists of 49 countries from the western, eastern, central, and southern part of the African continent.

1.2. Review of Existing Literature

In order to probe this issue, we ought to understand not only how private security on the continent evolved but why there is constant state of insecurity across the African continent. Many scholarly works that have brilliantly addressed these issues. Especially on the latter, there have been and continue to be studies seeking to understand security problems on the continent. The recent happenings in Mali, the Democratic Republic of

Congo as well as in the Central African Republic, among others, illustrate the complexities surrounding Africa's security. It therefore becomes necessary to reflect on historical happenings even before the creation and independence of modern African States. For it is when these reflections are carefully unfolded and understood is when we will understand why African states are inherently linked and cannot be separated from insecurity. This forms the foundation of this thesis and will be the purpose of this section.

This review will be grouped thematically in areas that touch on my research as this will help create a clear understanding of the problem as depicted in Table 1.

Theme 1	Theme 2
Source of Insecurity on the African Continent	Private Security on The African Continent

Table 1.

The first part of this review will discuss the relevant scholarly work on each theme whilst appraising their strengths and critiquing their weaknesses. I will also compare and contrast findings and methods employed by the existing literature for each theme. The second part of the review will justify why the relevant literature on these themes still does not address my research question on why private security services have become unavoidable in the continent but rather more of a necessary evil.

1.2.1 Theme 1: Source of insecurity on the African Continent

Here I will provide a chronological review of selected literature on the source of insecurity in Africa. The findings of these scholarly works make a case that Africa's security issue is very complex but sits firmly upon the ramifications of the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning of the continent by colonial powers during the scramble for Africa.

Additionally, we will realize that a large part of the existing literature on the causes of insecurity- which is largely manifested through conflicts on the African continent- exclude and or overlook the implications of ethnic partitioning. These are faults in the existing literature on this theme and thus reaffirms the gap in the literature.

Review

Many scholars have undertaken enormous and rich research in economics, political science, international relations, etc. to understand the causes of conflicts on the African continent. Further, there have been efforts made into examining key determinants such as ethnicity, and inherited political and state boundaries as core causes (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2011; Griffiths 1986; Collier, et al. 2003; Bosker & de Ree 2014; Alesina, Easterly, & Matuszeski 2011; Herbst, 2000).

Furthermore, scholars such as Collier et al. have examined political instability and explored what they call the 'conflict trap', consisting of economic stress, low economic growth, resource curse, dependence on natural resource exports, etc. as causes of conflicts and wars on the continent (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2011; Griffiths 1986; Collier, et al. 2003; Bosker & de Ree 2014; Alesina, Easterly, & Matuszeski 2011; Herbst, 2000).

While these are all impressive work, the issue is that they focus on correlative variables and also overlook or misunderstand the fundamental catalyst to Africa's insecurity problem as well as how deep the tentacles of this catalyst- which is the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning- have grown and continue to manifest in contemporary times.

This gap in literature and knowledge was eventually filled in 2016 by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou in their work titled '*The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa*' (2016). The paper formally examined the ramifications of ethnic partitioning in the context of the scramble for Africa (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2016 p. 1803).

They hypothesized that the drawing of the boundaries during the Berlin conference of 1884-85 resulted in a careless partitioning of ethnic groups on the African continent and has led to the creation of artificial States with odd boundaries (ibid). These were subsequently inherited during colonial rule and remain unchanged before and after the independence of States on the continent (ibid, p. 1805). Using this hypothesis, they further employ the scramble for Africa and the partitioning thereof as a quasi-natural experiment and assess the impact of these colonial legacies on civil wars in Africa (ibid, p. 1803). While relying on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project data set (ACLED)- which records incidences of political violence from 1997 to 2013- they concluded that civil and violent conflicts are higher in the modern African States that have ethnic groups partitioned across more than one State (ibid: p. 1804).

This is in contrast to scholars like Collier et al. or Herbst, who have done extensive and brilliant works that seek to understand conflicts and insecurity in Africa. Collier et al. in their published book- which also doubles as a world bank policy research report in 2003 titled '*Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*' -argue that the root causes of conflicts are due to the failure of economic development (2003: p. 53). In an attempt to make their argument, the first course of action taken was to debunk the notion that conflicts arise from ethnic or religious divisions.

Additionally, they rely on statistical analysis and patterns and conclude that even countries with more ethnic heterogeneity are less prone to violent conflicts than States with homogenous ethnicities. Per their statistical data, there is a high probability that States with fewer ethnic groups will fall into conflicts with each other. They argue that, when one group holds an absolute majority, there is the fear of domination, and where there is some equality in strength and or numbers, then there is also a likelihood for polarization (ibid; pp. 57 -58). Furthermore, they conclude that once a country stumbles into conflict, powerful forces—the conflict trap—tend to lock it into a syndrome of further conflict (ibid).

In the same vein, Herbst -in his award-winning book titled '*States and Power in Africa*'- argues that the failure of African States to consolidate authority/power is a result of distance, nature of political boundaries, and the State system which has resulted in the civil wars and dysfunctional policies of the leaders (Herbst, 2000). According to him, consolidation of authority/power over distance has been arduous for African leaders. Herbst acknowledges this is a problem created by colonialization as the modern African States still face the same issue. Government authority takes a nose dive the further you move from the capital.

Although I agree that these scholarly works do tackle important issues and also touch on valid reasons for conflicts on the African continent, causal relationships identified by these scholars are insufficient to explain conflicts or insecurity on the continent. I see them as correlational without acknowledgment of the fundamental catalyst – which is the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning- thus making their validity arguably questionable.

For most part, these works of literature trying to address the causality of conflicts and insecurity in Africa- with the exception of Michalopoulos & Papaioannou in their 2016 study- have missed a great piece that forms a foundation for conflict to thrive on the African continent and this is, the haphazard partitioning of ethnic groups on the continent. For it is from this which all of Africa's insecurity problem emanates.

The partitioning and arbitrary artificial creation of States and boundaries through the scramble for Africa by European powers centuries ago have resulted in a continent that is a parody of Statehood. Africans in the past were identified by empires, native groups, ethnic groups, kingdoms, chiefdoms, and tribes. However, due to this colonial legacy, ethnic groups and tribes -which have peculiar and distinct cultures, languages, and beliefs and were situated in different geographical locations, divided by distinct physical characteristics such as mountain ranges, rivers, and trade routes- were more often than not forcefully amalgamated into colonies, distorted and also divided across colonies which will later become States.

In a mapping history project database owned by the University of Oregon, a pictorial mapping of Africa before and after the "Berlin Conference" – which led to the division and the artificiality of the current African States is clearly shown above in figure 1 and figure 2 (Mohr & Nicols, 1997).

While relying on straight lines and short right angles in coastal areas, the partition fits Griffiths's description of an Africa divided by Europeans for Europeans (Griffiths, 1986). Interestingly, these partitions are largely still intact, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. According to Asiwagu, more than 177 cultural areas in the continent were

partitioned (Asiwagu, 1985: p. 206). Nigeria and the Cameroonian boundary divide over 14 cultural areas while Burkina Faso has boundaries that divide over 21 countries (ibid). Several other ethnic groups divide across several countries.

This is evident in present-day Namibia, Mauritania, and Botswana. It is the same case for Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania, as existing ethnic groups in these countries cut across all other countries.

Figure 1   African Empires and Kingdoms before the Scramble of Africa   Figure 2 African Empires and Kingdoms before the Scramble of Africa.

The result of these artificially created African States is what Robert Jackson calls "*Quasi-States*" and States that lack characteristics of Statehood (Jackson, 1987). The post-independent African States lack cohesiveness, unity, patriotism and are less peaceful. There is the inclination to be culturally bound to tribal and ethnic orientations more than the State as noted in the famous scholarly work of Peter Ekeh, titled "*Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa"* (Ekeh, 1975). Governments are elected based on tribal and ethnic affiliations despite laws banning ethnic or religious politics. Governments who can capture State power through elections are still seen as illegitimate by other groups in the country. Their legitimacy is further diminished because of bad governance in most parts of post-colonial Africa. Neo-patrimonialism and identity politics is the order of the day.

For Collier et al. (2003), the argument they make for ethnicity as not the root cause of conflict in the African case may be logically sound, but only partially right. This is simply because it goes beyond ethnicity. It is more about the ethnic partitioning of the continent. Economic underdevelopment in Africa which is argued as the cause of violent conflicts, is difficult to be attained in Africa if the State itself is problematic and lacks unity.

Additionally, Collier et al. (2003) adopt statistical data to show the pattern that, States with uniform or few ethnic groups have a higher risk of experiencing conflicts, whereas States with more diverse ethnic compositions have been relatively peaceful. Interestingly enough, in their analysis, only two countries -Ethiopia and Sri Lanka- fit the argument that countries with uniform or few ethnic groups have a higher risk of experiencing conflict. Ethiopia has over seventy-five (75) ethnic groups thus does not fit

the category. Seventy-five (75) ethnic groups in one country cannot be considered as "a few".

The latter argument that countries with more diverse ethnic groups tend to be more peaceful is also problematic. The scholars do not give any example of countries that fall in this category. However, we can test this by selecting Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone has 16 ethnic groups. Although this number is comparatively small, they have experienced conflicts and have nowhere been close to "relative peace" as concluded by Collier et al (2003). These inconsistencies make their argument insufficient to conclude that such a pattern exists.

Like Collier et al., Herbst (2000) tackles the issue partially but not on the head. The artificial political boundaries do exist, but these boundaries are also ethnic boundaries. Government authority wanes not because of political boundaries, but most importantly, ethnic boundaries which have created ungovernable spaces.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the crux of the matter on the source of insecurity in Africa has more to do with the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning of the continent which has led to a structural insecurity conundrum and less of political and socio-economic issues, on which several scholarly works in the literature are focused. The political and socio-economic issues are undoubtedly important but only useful as a major source of insecurity in Africa if situated in the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning.

1.2.2. **Theme 2: Private security on the African Continent**

The focus of this theme will be to explore relevant literature on private security on the African continent. As the concept of private security is undoubtedly a broad one, literature on it is also diverse. It cuts across security governance and studies, international relations, peace and conflict studies, and even criminology. The findings will show private security is also a complex concept when it is situated in the African continent. Private security encompasses several non-state actors. For my research and this review, I will be focusing on Private Security Services & Informal Community & Vigilante groups. The focus will be on these two because they both tend to have recognition and legitimization either by the State or the people. Although they tend to be doubled-edged swords, we will see in the preceding chapters that, they work with the State and only in a few instances do they work against it. On the other hand, private security groups such as rebel/insurgent groups, armed gangs or criminal organizations are in constant opposition to state authority.

The distinction between these two private security providers is an interesting one. In the quest to fill the existing security lacunae in a continent with unequal societies, the services of PSCs (both local or internationally owned) can be purchased by African governments themselves, or even local and foreign businesses as well as individuals who are well-to-do in society. As will be noted in the literature review, PSCs go where the market forces determine, and thus their services benefit particular classes in society. However, the poor and marginalized communities and minorities also need protection, yet, they are unable to purchase the services of PSCs. Yet they still seek to secure their safety

as well as that of their communities, hence leading to the formation of community vigilante groups.

We will outline a chronological account of how private security companies have metamorphosized from being feared by African States to one that has become largely beneficial both in partnership and relations to not only African states but also to businesses and individuals on the continent. Furthermore, we will also see how informal community vigilante groups have been legitimized. Most importantly, it will be realized from this review that, there is a gap in the literature on why services of these sources of private security have become necessary on the continent.

<u>Review</u>

In the past, discussions of private security companies particularly in Africa were primarily focused on mercenaries (Diphoorn & Kyed, 2016). There has been a plethora of scholarly work that assessed private securities in the realm of mercenary activities. Scholars such as Musah & Fayemi (2000), Singer (2003), Kinsey (2007) and Percy (2007) layout brilliant descriptive outlines and discussions of the mercenary heritage on the continent. Others have also assessed the impact of private security in fragile states (Avant, 2005; Foaleng, 2007; Higate & Utas, 2017).

However, with their long history in most African States, private security companies have evolved from mercenary activities and re-emerged as an adhesive -which although lucrative- can also be hypothesized to be beneficial to security on the continent. This has triggered a shift of focus in the literature. In recent times, scholars interested in private

security have shifted to exploring PSCs in their ethical, legal, and civil dimensions, their regulation, theoretical inquiries connecting local security practices to global trends and rationalities as well as in the lenses of hybrid security governance respectively (see Enns et al. (2020); Hönke, (2013), Hönke & Müller (2012); Leander (2010); Abrahamsen & Williams (2009); and Alexandra et al. (2008). Private security companies currently on the continent play several non-combatant roles although militarization on the African continent after 9/11 has led to footprints of private security companies that are fused in government and public security structures to fight against transnational activities on the continent.

Their evolution has been attributed to several factors. According to Enns et al. (2020), they have evolved on the African continent due to the broader processes of globalization, including (neo-)liberalization, deregulation, and financialization. Diphoorn & Kyed (2016) also relate it to neo-liberal policies of state deregulation. Abrahamsen & Williams (2011) also gauge it to be based on commercialization through globalization and the end of the Cold War. Despite these valid reasons espoused by these scholars about why and how PSCs have evolved on the continent, there is still a gap in the literature that addressed why private security companies have become a necessity.

It is undeniable that globalization and neo-liberal tenets have encouraged the movement of capital and labor across transnational borders. Globalization encourages free movement and thus, any investor or business owner has the free will to decide where to invest or do business. The market hand of demand and supply encourages PSCs as these forces ultimately are the cornerstone of the liberal world economic order.

Additionally, it is undeniable that neoliberal tenets that came with the structural adjustment programs may have forced African governments to open up their economies and embrace the market economy. Arguably, this may have enhanced the easy movement of multi-national companies who focus on private security to venture into Africa.

Furthermore, as scholars have opined, the end of the Cold War and apartheid led to redundant armies and also contributed to redundant military service persons as well as excess weaponry which facilitated activities of this industry on the continent (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011). All these are arguably valid, yet, they do not answer why private security companies have become necessary. Why has the State as well as citizenry embraced the idea of security falling into the realm of the private? Interestingly, despite bad leadership due to neopatrimonialism which has generated economic hardships, corruption, favoritism, armed robbery and insecurity on the continent, why has the State continued to fail in nipping these problems in the bud but embraced the idea of solving the issue of insecurity through security privatization? Why have these security governance issues become necessary in Africa? This is what the existing literature has is yet to tackle.

On the other hand, informal community protection and vigilante groups have long existed in post-colonial Africa. They have operated more or less parallel to State security services for decades (Minnaar, 2001; Kynoch, 2008; Lee & Seekings, 2002). Scholars such as Reno (2002) and Agbu (2004) have situated vigilantism in the militarization of patronage networks, which does the bidding of political elites in Africa and sometimes evolves to become gangs that terrorize communities. Thus, they are therefore seen as a menace that ought to be uprooted from the continent (ibid).

Despite these valid arguments, I also agree with scholars such as Pratten (2008) who have opined that vigilantism does have some benefits, as it has many times existed more or less as a form of community policing. Other scholars such as Minnaar (2001) and Schuberth (2018) have also conducted groundbreaking studies that focus on the emergence of vigilantism on the continent.

Minnaar conceptualizes vigilantism as a phenomenon whereby private citizens undertake many of the tasks more commonly associated with the State police (Minnaar, 2001: p. 221). Just as in other countries such as Nigeria and Ghana, he opines that they start by combatting crime in societies but along the way overtly go from defending communities to perpetuating crimes in their communities (ibid). In his study assessing vigilantism in post-apartheid South Africa, it was found that the causes for the emergence of vigilante groups were due to a gap in policing (ibid). Additionally, areas that saw activities of vigilantism were heavily concentrated in rural and poor communities with unattractive environments for both private and state security providers (Minnaar, 2001; Martin, 2012).

Shultz et al. also conceptualize vigilante groups as groups that are identifiable paramilitary forces, with little to no military training nor experience, yet fight or provide protection within the jurisdiction of a fragile and/or failed state (2004, p. 23). According to them, these groups are composed primarily of young males from the lower classes who are attracted or sometimes lured because it provides them with wealth, capital, strength, and protection. Most importantly, they note that these groups most often represent or are formed along lines of ethnicity, tribalism, clan, community, or even religion (ibid).

All these scholarly works are apt and contribute immensely to the literature. Minnaar's study was a comparative one that focused on three vigilante groups as case studies to assess the situation in South Africa. He found that they operate because of the security gaps, and these are mostly in rural communities that tend to have no option but to defend themselves. He concluded by calling for regulation or crushing of these groups.

However, despite the controversial role of vigilante groups, they have been quite useful in certain parts of the continent, hence their legitimization in those areas. In Nigeria for instance, vigilante groups have been utilized in the fight against transnational actors such as Boko Haram. One reason for this is that these groups of individuals know the terrain of the geographic area and thus have the ability to deal with the terrorist cell. The scholarly works reviewed in this discussion situate the emergence of vigilante groups as filling the policing gaps, at least in the case of South Africa. Where these gaps emanate from is also not clear; however, the scholars do agree that these groups tend to be legitimized because they, although arguably temporarily, fill gaps in security on the continent.

Nevertheless, the existing literature on vigilantism still does not answer why, although parts of the continent see the extreme actions of vigilantism as distasteful, it is still embraced by some as a necessary evil in many parts of the continent and even seen as very important in fragile contexts or post-conflict societies.

1.2.3. **Conclusion**

From the review based on the two themes, what stands out is the fact that, with few exceptions, insecurity caused by the colonial legacies of ethnic partitioning has not been

explored significantly in the existing literature. Although Africa's insecurity cannot be said to be solely caused by the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning of the continent, its effects on the African continent has been increased and worsened. Such manifestations are in the area of hatred and divisiveness towards and among groups which are many times exploited by political actors and deteriorated due to neo-patrimonial tendencies which is inherent in African State formation and has bred inequality, corruption, nepotism etc. in several parts of the continent.

Additionally, the fact that this has opened a window of opportunity for private security actors to not only flourish but also become arguably the only alternative to filling the security gap on the African continent is also not explored and thus worth investigating. This is what this research seeks to address.

1.3. **Hypothesis & Theoretical Approach**

This problem opens up the avenue to think about the issues surrounding why insecurity has necessitated the emergence of these private security actors on the continent. In carrying out these investigations, I seek to answer these questions below.

This thesis seeks to primarily investigate the question: why have private security services become unavoidable in the Niger Delta and North-Eastern Nigeria?

Other questions that arise include: Why do we see so much use of private security activities and what are the consequences?

I hypothesize that private security services in the West African region have become a necessary evil because of the constant insecurity on the continent which stems from the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning of the continent and most importantly have been very much worsened by a lack of trust in the state security apparatus due to bad leadership practices of African leaders.

Our null hypothesis is that there is no association between the structural insecurity created by colonial legacies and bad leadership practices of African leaders to explain why private security actors have become unavoidable in the West African region.

The relevance of this research is to underscore and illuminate the impact of the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning and the subsequent artificial creation of Western-like African states and their consequences. It would be an error to accept that all of Africa's insecurity problem stem from only the colonial legacy of the ethnic partitioning of the continent. There are other determinants in addition to this colonial legacy which have further worsened and contributed to the insecurity problem.

However, for this thesis, only one of these other determinants will be of primary concern. This is the lack of trust of the State and its security apparatus due to bad African leadership practices.

We therefore argue that, private security services have become unavoidable on the continent because of the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning which has further been worsened by lack of trust in the State due to bad leadership practices of African leaders.

In order to examine and establish whether or not this hypothesis is valid, three (3) theoretical approaches will be employed in this research study. These are:

a) Post colonialism

b) Neo-patrimonialism

c) Global Security assemblages' theory.

These theories are used as interpretive frameworks in this research since they aid in bridging the variables at play, i.e., the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning and the lack of trust in the state because of bad leadership practices, bringing clarity to how these have contributed to insecurity and thus the unavoidability of private security in the West African region.

Post colonialism sets the foundation for understanding the implications of the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning. This theory is utilized to draw out some insights on possible implications of the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning and the role it has played in Africa's insecurity.

Furthermore, the post-colonial effect of this colonial legacy finds its tentacles in the neo patrimonial tendencies adopted by leaders in Africa which have contributed to their lack of trust from the African people. Through colonialism, the neo patrimonial strategies colonial powers used to divide and rule their colonies have lived on and have also been inherited by African leaders.

The second theory, neopatrimonialism, is employed as a lens through which we can better understand actions of African leaders that have made our intervening variable (lack

of trust) possible. From this study we notice a substantive relationship between the colonial style of rule and how some of its characteristics, such as marginalization, exclusion, and ethno-regional divisions, have been employed in the predatory neo patrimonial leadership styles of many African leaders.

The last theory which is global security assemblages, aids us in understanding why States in West Africa have allowed non-state actors to operate even though it undermines the traditional notions of the power of the State as the actor with a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and violence. We see that, while that is true, because of globalization, State preservation and acknowledgement of State failures in fulfilling its security responsibilities, the State finds it advantageous to embrace non-state actors (private security services).

These theoretical approaches will be further discussed in chapter three as they are very important in this research study.

At the end of the thesis, we will see the role colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning plays in Africa's insecurity problem and how the lack of trust in the state and its security apparatus due to bad leadership practices has further worsened the situation and thus paved way for private security services to become unavoidable on the continent

Additionally, the thesis will contribute to the existing literature on private security actors in Africa and explore why private security services have become a necessary evil in Africa.

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.0 Research Design & Variables

The comparative and historical analysis designs will be employed for this study. Additionally, this study will be approached qualitatively because the variables that I plan to be working with are not easily quantifiable. Additionally, because I am interested in studying the causal chain of my hypothesis to uncover causal paths identified in my theories, the qualitative approach fits the purpose as compared to the quantitative approach.

The variables for the research will be as follows:

Independent Variables:

1. Colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning of the continent

Intervening Variables:

1. Lack of trust in the State and its security apparatus due to bad leadership practices

Dependent Variables:

1. Private Security Services i.e.

a. Private security companies (PSC's)

b. Informal community protection & vigilante groups.

Table 2.

Independent Variable	Intervening Variables	Dependent Variable

| Colonial Legacy (Ethnic partitioning) | → | Lack of Trust in State and its Security apparatus | → | Private Security Services |

2.1 **Methods**

The research will rely on the comparative research design and also employ historical analysis to aid in addressing the primary research question. This question will be addressed via verifying the hypothesis using case studies and several theories as interpretive frameworks to understand the causal relationship between variables in this study.

The past they say, is never really "past" but continuously constitutive of the "present"' (Halperin & Heath, 2020; Bryant 1994: p. 11). This research relies on historical analysis of formation of African states, post-colonial governance and activities of private

security in the past on the continent- for in order to make sense of my hypothesis, I ought to incorporate a robust temporal dimension and in the words of Paul Pierson, "place political happenings in time" (Halperin & Heath, 2020; Pierson, 2004).

A comparative approach will also be central to this research. Scholars in the field of political research have described the comparative approach primarily in terms of the laws, guidelines, and procedures for defining and describing discrepancies and similarities between cases (often, but not always, identified in terms of countries), using definitions that apply to more than one case or region (Mair 1996; van Biezen & Caramani, 2006). As a method that continues to be widely used to study phenomena in political research (Halperin & Heath, 2020), it will be a major component in my research design.

I will rely on the small N-Comparison approach where two case studies will be selected. This is largely because this method of comparison is based on a systemic study of multiple cases and has several benefits. These include the fact that, they allow for a thorough, in-depth review of case studies while still allowing contextualization of the subject (Halperin & Heath, 2020).

2.1.1 Scope of Analysis & Case Selection

The units and scope of analysis for this research include Nigeria (which is where my case studies will be extracted from) and private security actors, i.e., private security companies (PSCs) and informal community protection and vigilante groups. The period for the research will span from the 1990s through to the 21st century.

Nigeria was chosen as a unit of analysis because, as a superpower in the West African region and among the superpowers of the continent, its population is over 200

million, and thus looking at the country as a case study does not only cover much ground in West Africa but also makes findings largely associative with other smaller states in the region. Additionally, as a regional superpower, the actions of Nigeria undeniably have significant ramifications for the region and the continent as a whole hence making it an important case to study.

Nigeria alone comprises over 250 ethnic groups with over 500 different languages with diverse identities, cultural beliefs, and practices. Before the scramble for Africa and the partitioning of the continent, it was home to several kingdoms. Thornton (2000) notes that before the 19th century, these several kingdoms in that part of the region which modern-day Nigeria occupies were historically turbulent.

After the partitioning of the continent, these groups were combined into one State. Other ethnic groups and kingdoms have been distorted into other countries presently on the continent. Ethnic groups and tribes such as the Yoruba are currently present in neighboring Benin and Togo. The Hausa tribe cuts across, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Northern Ghana. The Chamba tribe in the east-central part of Nigeria also cuts across Cameroon. The Fulani tribe also cuts from the Sahel across Mauritania, Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, the Gambia, Mali into Nigeria. With its plethora of ethnic groups, Nigeria is the perfect case to study the colonial legacies of the ethnic partitioning of Africa worsened by bad governance.

Even more importantly, the current atmosphere and activities of transnational terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and armed gangs in the Niger Delta area of the country along with the recent abuse of power by the Special Anti-

Robbery Squad (SARS) -whose catastrophic and unspeakable human rights abuses continue throughout the country- more than qualifies Nigeria as a good case study.

Given the scope of analysis and time frame for this research, it is prudent I narrow down the plethora of case studies available within Nigeria. Thus, I will focus on two regions in Nigeria for this research. These are the Niger Delta region and North-Eastern Nigeria.

These case selections were based on the Most Different System Design (MDSD). This case selection method compares different cases that have one major commonality which is the dependent variable. Despite the unit of analysis being Nigeria, the two regions in question embody major differences in terms of wealth, inequality levels, level of involvement of each type of private security services as well as a difference in motivation for the continued violence and the fragility in each region.

The Niger Delta is located in the resource endowed southern part of Nigeria and thus has a higher level of socio-economic development than the North Eastern part of Nigeria -which is considerably poorer as compared to states in the south (Dapel, 2018).

Also in the Niger Delta, despite a link between the colonial implications and neo patrimonial leadership practices as contributing factors to insecurity, the prolonged violence and fragility in the region has also been motivated by the scramble for wealth from the extractive resources in the region by dissidents who feel they have been left out or excluded from the benefits of the resources in their region.

In Northern Nigeria, despite this link between the colonial implications and neo patrimonial leadership practices as contributing factors to insecurity in the region, a major motivation for the prolonged and worsened insecurity has been the transnational terrorist

group's (Boko Haram) agenda to force that region to become an Islamic State. Natural resource wealth, on the other hand, is very limited.

These differences notwithstanding, the cases are also selected based on a MDSD approach because of a major commonality in both case studies. This commonality is that, in both regions, there is a strong presence of and dependence on private security services which in this thesis is our dependent variable. This this will aid us in gauging whether or not there is a casual relationship between the other variables and thus independent variable.

2.1.2 Data Collection & Processing

(a) Secondary Data

This is a qualitative research study. As noted by Halperin & Heath (2020), data constitutes the basis of information for every analysis in the research process and therefore, without data—or evidence— an argument is little more than a conjecture. Secondary data forms a large part of this research. Despite not being collected primarily by myself, these sources are from sound scholarly sources, and also published in prominent academic journals which cut across the history, political science, and security governance fields. According to Halperin & Heath (2020), this type of data often relies upon routinely published official statistics which are documented by international organizations, governments, non-governmental organizations, etc. Despite these data emanating from 'recognized officials' I agree with scholars who have opined that this information may not always be a true depiction of political phenomena and thus the responsibility falls on me to assess its validity as well as reliability (ibid). I will do this by running these secondary

data across several sources, scholars and journals in the field in order to validate the information as well as ensure they are not outdated but fit the current political dispensation.

(b) <u>Data Sets</u>

Data sets will also be key in this research. Data sets will contribute to the analysis of the characteristics of the Nigerian State, provide information on private security activities and their roles in the country, etc. Some data sets that will be relevant to this study include, but are not limited to:

1. PSED- Private Security Events Database.

2. GROW^{up} - Geographical Research on War, Unified Platform.

3. Niger Delta Annual Conflict Tracker

4. World Governance Indicator

5. Afrobarometer

Both the secondary data and data sets will contribute and support the analysis and measurement of my variables. The PSED – Private Security Events Database will support assessment of private security activities in Nigeria which is my dependent variable. The Niger Delta Annual Conflict Tracker, GROW^{up} and the Afrobarometer data sets will support assessment of my intervening variables as well as its connection to my independent variable.

Finally, the Afrobarometer is a non-partisan, pan-African research organization that conducts public opinion polls on democracy, government, the economy, and society in 30+ countries on a regular basis. They are the world's premier source of high-quality statistics about African attitudes. I will be relying on their data to analyze Nigerians' Trust in the government and State security apparatus as well as how Nigerian governments over the time have been seen as illegitimate due to bad leadership practices. This same data platform will support the case that the colonial legacy of the ethnic partitioning of Africa that has created artificial states by bringing several ethnic identities together has a link to our intervening variable and hence has contributed to the unavoidability of private security in Africa.

Conclusion

In this research study, the methodology and methods I will be relying on will lead to an examination of the causal relationship between the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning in Nigeria, how its manifestations have been worsened by African leadership, and how this has necessitated the need for alternative forms of security services in Nigeria. Using Nigeria as our unit of analysis because of its importance in West Africa and Africa as a whole, this thesis will focus on two case studies in the country. These are north-eastern Nigeria and the Niger Delta region. Secondary data sources and data sets available will aid in testing our hypothesis to establish whether or not there is a causal relationship between our independent and intervening variables on one hand and our dependent variable on the other hand.

In short, at the end of the thesis, we will see how colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning in Nigeria has led to security issues as well as how that has affected leaders in governance leading to the lack of trust in the government and how this has affected the unavoidability of private security services in Nigeria.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.0 Introduction

In this research, I will be relying on three theories to support my hypothesis in answering the research question. This chapter seeks to set out theoretical themes that will be relevant to the research study. These theories will be used as interpretive frameworks to establish relationships between ideational and material forces as well as aid in data interpretation, and supply frameworks within which concepts and variables will acquire substantive significance (Halperin & Heath, 2020; Hoover and Donovan 2004: 37).

The theoretical frames I will be employing in this research include the following:

i.   Post Colonialism: Postcolonial theory is a school of thinking that seeks to account among others things for the continuing historical, and social consequences of European colonial rule around the world from the 18th to the 20th centuries.

ii. Neo-Patrimonialism: This is a theory evolving from Max Weber's notion of Patrimonialism. Neo-patrimonialism originates from the work of Eisenstadt in 1973. It is usually defined as the modern form of patrimonialism. Erdmann and Engel. (2006) note that it encompasses situations in which patrimonial and rational-bureaucratic rule co-exist and are sometimes interwoven.

iii.   Global security assemblage framework: This is propounded by Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams in their 2011 book titled *"Security beyond the State: Private security in International Relations*. It simply suggests that the emergence of PSCs can be explained holistically when looked at from the perspective of globalization and commercialization, which has been allowed by States because they have partially disassembled to reassemble new actors in all aspects of governance, including the security sector (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011).

3.1 **Post Colonialism**

Postcolonial theory is a school of thought that seeks to account for the political, artistic, economic, historical, and social consequences of European colonial control over the world from the 18th to the 20th centuries (Elam, 2019). It focuses its analysis on history, culture, literary sources, and discourse of (usually European) imperial powers while focusing on texts, symbols and constructed identities in core and peripheral states. Postcolonial theory takes various forms and interventions, but they all share a core claim that, "the world we inhabit is impossible to understand except in relationship to the history of imperialism and colonial rule" (ibid). It emerged from the work of scholars who saw the need to deconstruct western meta-narratives from diverse perspectives in a post-colonial context.

This is because for postcolonial theorists, active legacies of colonialism through ideas, norms, organizations, political structure and Eurocentric ideals have been passed on by former colonial powers onto elite groups in former colonies. What this leads to is that, despite States in the periphery gaining independence, there is still the existence, continuation and mirroring of the cultural and linguistic power relationship that controlled the colonial politics of knowledge about the colonized peoples of the non-Western world. These, according to post-colonial theorists continue to shape these societies.

As brilliantly espoused by Abrahamsen, while the 'post' in postcolonialism signifies the end of direct domination, it does not mean the structures and relations of power created by colonial powers do not indirectly control the former colonies (Abrahamsen, 2003). Gyan Prakash opines that, the word post colonialism sidesteps the language of beginnings and ends (cited in Abrahamsen, 2003: p. 196). In other words, it strives to transcend rigid chronological and dichotomous thinking in which history is clearly divided and the social world neatly sorted into different boxes by capturing the continuities and complexity of any historical epoch (ibid). Postcolonial theory has changed the way we interpret texts, comprehend national and international histories, and comprehend the political consequences of our own scholarly expertise (Elam, 2019). Given the broad and diverse nature of this theory, I will, for the purpose of this thesis focus on the historical account of State formation of modern African States.

Modern African State formation has been explored sparsely in the previous chapters; African States geographically exist the way they do today because of colonial legacies. The focus of colonial legacies in this thesis will be concerned with the ethnic

partitioning of the continent and its contribution to insecurity on the continent in modern times.

The study by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) discussed in our literature review notes via historical analysis some key motives behind the partitioning of Africa that took place during the Berlin Conference in 1884. They noted that, aside from Europeans having limited knowledge of the local geography at the time, their main intent was to create protectorates, not colonies, and undeniably no one could foresee the wave of independence that would come decades later (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016).

Furthermore, it is also worth noting that, even after the conference in Berlin, European powers who had gained their protectorates were unwilling to change borders after new information and knowledge from explorers and geographers came to their notice (ibid). Thus, attention was not given to the break away, amalgamation and division of clans, tribes and ethnic groups across the continent. These protectorates later became colonies in the 20th century and subsequently became modern States.

These newly formed States in post-independence Africa were imagined to fit western like standards, adopting characteristics of western states such as sovereignty, jurisdiction etc., and also resist any attempt to address the partition issues they had inherited. Scholars such as Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) note that African leaders were very reluctant for any border realignment before and after independence because it would threaten their newly found power and position whereas European powers who were either leaving their former colonies or had departed after independence also wanted to maintain the special rights and corporate deals they had established with their

former colonies and thus, did not do much to push for border changes. The conversation on border re-alignment totally froze when all African countries with the exception of Morocco and Somalia signed the OAU charter in 1964. The charter formally entrenched and legitimized existing boundaries and borders in African States while also reiterating each country's sovereignty and discouraging any form of interference by member countries. The results of this cannot be echoed enough.

However, although several studies have shown that conflicts and civil wars in Africa have an ethnic and political boundary linkage, it is not the purpose of this research to thoroughly dissect the repercussions of this legacy since several scholarly works on conflicts in Africa have explored this theme (see Cederman, and Min, 2009; Englebert, 2009; Posner, 2005; Herbst, 2000; Horowitz, 1985; Touval, 1967).

Our focus here is the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning beyond just the effect of the arbitrary boundaries created. The long-term repercussions of this legacy have inherently motivated bad practices of governance neo-patrimonialism (Callaghy, 1984; Clapham, 1985; Jackson & Rosberg 1982; LeVine,1980: pp. 657-73) which will be discussed in other sections of the paper and have had an effect on security governance on the continent.

The colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning of the continent should be seen as a catalyst that started a chain reaction of security problems, which has been further increased by actions of African leaders and governments themselves of which a major focus will be on its effects and contribution towards security governance. Although other countries outside Africa were also colonized such as those in South East Asia, they have done

relatively well to develop in several aspects and thus it is important to note that, a major part of the problem emanating from this colonial legacy is also internal.

Undoubtedly, other colonized regions outside Africa did not have these dynamics of diversity in ethnic identities; however, it cannot be denied that, it is bad choices on the part of African States that have worsened the effects of this colonial legacy.

Adopting post-colonialism as an interpretive framework to analyze the colonial legacy of ethnic partition of the African continent is undeniably valuable to this study. The theory pushes us to review, recall and interrogate the colonial past and legacies and repercussions on the variables at play in this thesis. The necessity to examine these legacies and their modern expressions as well as deliberately bring to the fore the underexplored perspectives this have contributed to the intervening variable of this study -i.e., the lack of trust of the African State and its security apparatus- become starting points for knowledge construction as well as understanding of the bigger picture and purpose of this thesis.

One may ask why this is the theory that fits the purpose? I am unaware of a theoretical framework or theory that better explains the results of colonial action in post-colonial times. Despite the several variants of post-colonial theory, when carefully and critically used, it provides the necessary understanding of how the history of colonialism has affected State creation, impacted governance practices of African leaders, and brings to light perspectives on how these have shaped security governance on the continent.

Post-colonial theory is not without critics. Among them is a brilliant criticism noted by Dirlick (1994) that, despite post-colonialism's concentration on historicity, it mirrors the 'ahistorical and universalizing' tendencies of colonial philosophy (p. 344). This

characteristic creates a picture of an internalized attitude of inferiority on the part of the colonized as a result of colonialization and also reverberates or enhances the ideational myth or fiction about the superiority of the colonizer. Often, post-colonial theory, in its quest to decolonize colonial knowledge and power, tends to find itself trapped in a binary game that projects clear-cut distinctions between the colonized and the colonizer. Without being on the lookout for this shortfall in utilizing it as a theoretical lens, we risk reinforcing the very power relations we seek to dismantle (Anderson, 2004b).

Importantly, postcolonial discourses have also been critiqued for assuming an essentialized, common experience of colonialism among members of a community (Gandhi, 1998). Although these are valid criticisms for Africa and its ethnic partition, it is indeed a common story shared across the continent below the Sahara. The impact of ethnic partition in African States below the Sahara has undoubtedly contributed to insecurity and the turn to private security services as a necessary alternative.

3.2 **Neo-Patrimonialism**

Neo-patrimonialism is a framework which is useful in understanding the problem of the African State when it comes to shortfalls in governance, economic crisis as well as state weakness (von Soest, 2006). It has been used by several scholars who focus on Africa's underdevelopment, state weakness, corruption etc. For Bratton & van de Walle (1997), Neopatrimonialism is not just a characteristic of African States but rather the core feature of its post-colonial politics. This is because informal and particularistic politics of the rulers pervade formal state institutions (ibid). They go on to argue that the division of

the public and private realms, which is at the heart of the 'modern' view of the state, is abolished (ibid). Such an opinion is echoed by others such as Darton (1994) who notes that, despite neopatrimonialism often being argued to be a core feature of African society and its politics, it is also inherent, inevitable and almost inseparable in the African State and its politics and thus has contributed quite clearly towards its lack of development.

What then is neopatrimonialism? To understand it, one must begin with an understanding of the concept of patrimonialism- a concept which forms the bedrock of neopatrimonialism. Patrimonialism, simply espoused in reference to Weber, is a system whereby political relationships are mediated through and maintained by personal connections between leaders and subjects or patrons and clients (Pitcher et. al 2009: p. 6). This is little different for neo-patrimonialism aside from the fact that, according to Pitcher et. al (2009), the modifier "neo" has been added to differentiate what scholars see as a modern variant of Weber's meaning of patrimonialism which was seen as an ideal type and what actually is not the ideal but a reality in African States. This is one which is imposed by colonialism, personalism and characterized by patronage, clientelism and corruption (ibid).

Neopatrimonialism has been treated as synonymous with and arguably used as a catch all phrase by scholars to characterize post-colonial states and difficulties they face when it comes to corruption, governance etc. African States are often viewed as exemplifying neopatrimonialism and its linkage to weak states, fragility or even state failure (see Keen 2005; Chege 2002; Boas 2001; Englebert 2000; van de Walle 2001; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999; Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Chabal and Daloz 1999;

Richards 1996; Reno 1995, 1998; Bayart 1993; Bratton 1989; Boyle 1988; Callaghy 1984, 1987).

Neopatrimonialism in African States, according to Pitcher et. al (2009), shares certain key attributes which include disregard for rational-legal authority in favor of highly personalistic rule; reliance on patron-client ties and networks for professional and political advancement or support; the use of state resources to reward supporters for their loyalty; and the repeated appropriation of state funds by African leaders.

Despite these criticisms, other African scholars such as Olukoshi (2005), Mamdani (1996) and Wai (2012), while conceding that some African problems are caused by neopatrimonialism, argue that, apart from its ability to create some form of legitimacy which is quite positive to governance in African States, neopatrimonialism has been highly dispersed. The historical experiences that explain why it is rampant in African States have been subsumed under a totalitarian grip of Eurocentric scholarship, which paints a picture that Africa's problems can only be understood as mirroring an earlier European history. Nevertheless, both sides agree that neopatrimonialism is quite problematic to varying degrees in Africa, and also agree that neopatrimonialism and its implications for the continent has colonial and historical underpinnings.

My thesis will use neopatrimonialism as an interpretive framework to explain some of the negative implications of neopatrimonialism and how it has made private security services an alternative to filling the security gap in my case studies. Following from the independent variable in this paper- which is the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning of the continent- modern African States which have been formed artificially by clusters of diverse

people and groups who are inherently allegiant to their primordial orientations, it is not strange neopatrimonialism will be rampant in governance. As stated in the previous paragraphs, although it does bring some form of legitimacy, it also breeds corruption, nepotism, favoritism, and sidelining of certain groups of people. The result of this is a lack of trust in the State and, a widely shared view of the illegitimacy of government from groups who do not benefit from these corrupt practices.

Using this framework, I will analyze how neopatrimonialism leads to distrust of the State security apparatus. As noted by Halperin & Heath (2020), this will aid in transmitting the effects of the independent variable (colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning) to the dependent variable (private security services) since without these mediating variables to act as a conduit, my independent variable would not directly affect my dependent variable.

3.3 Global Security Assemblage theoretical framework

This approach is inspired by Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams in their ground breaking 2011 book on private security in international politics. In gauging the emergence of private security globally, there have been several frames through which scholars have analyzed the proliferation of private security in contemporary times. Enns et al. note that they have evolved due to the broader processes of globalization with particular references to neo-liberalization, deregulation, and financialization (Enns, et al, 2020). Diphoorn & Kyed (2016), Avant (2005) and Singer (2003) also relate it to neo-liberal policies of state deregulation. All these frameworks are of the view that defects in the State's capacity on several levels have led to the proliferation of private security. These

arguments are sound yet inadequate to fully explain the emergence of private security globally. The global security assemblage framework lays out an airtight analysis and argument which is lacking in other frameworks. Frameworks popular for looking at the emergence of private security companies, as mentioned above, include globalization where the focus has been on neo-liberalism or deregulation or even marketization in the neo liberal era.

On globalization through neo-liberalism the argument is mostly that the State faces a fiscal crisis leading to a reduction in its spending. Abrahamsen & Williams (2011) note that this is not the case because globally, although States have cut spending in several sectors, there is evidence to show they spend enormously in their security sectors. World powers such as USA, China, France, the UK etc. have mind-blowing budget allocations going into security alone. Abrahamsen & Williams further argue that out-sourcing -which is one characteristic used by supporters of neo-liberalism as a theoretical lens to explain the emergence of private security companies- does not necessarily lead to a retreat of the State (2011). It is undeniable that States have allowed the private to exist and that it has been the backbone for its operation and so therefore the argument of fiscal restraint on the part of States cannot hold, nor can deregulation or financialization or other implications neo-liberalism brings to the table, at least not when it comes to security.

Although the global security assemblage concept concedes that globalization has a central role to play, it is particularly focused on Saskia Sassen's ground breaking conceptualization of globalization. Although the focus was in the economic domain, it was in opposition to the "mere assumption that the concept is largely about the existence or

increase of global flow of products, capital or people" (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011).

According to Sassen (2006) globalization is possible in the first place because national

States have made it possible. Through this same logic global structures and organizations

sanction the operations of the private in the global security. They do this through two

essential processes, according to Abrahamsen and Williams (2011): the process of

reassembly and realignment of the State.

1. States have made globalization of security possible through the process of
   realignment, involving the process whereby it partially disassembles itself and is
   reassembled back by incorporating new actors with different capabilities in the
   national setting. According to Abrahamsen & Williams (2011) this commences a
   change from the national to the global or national to the local which become
   constitutive of one another. This leads to a denationalization of certain sectors of
   the nation into the private and the power of the state is never lost nor shifted in any
   way.

2. States also realigns themselves after reassembling and distribute their power to
   these new embedded structures from the private through institutionalization and,
   regulations in order to work in harmony with them.

In short, the global security assemblage framework argues that, "security privatization is a

part of a wider process of partial state disassembly and a concomitant emergence of global

assemblages that link the national to the global and this leads to shifts called global security

assemblages" (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011).

The consequence of this is that, the state is the one which facilitates neo-liberalism or deregulation in the first place and privatization cannot exist without recognizing and acknowledging the power of the State which has been absent in every framework which tries to explain the privatization of security. Because this framework is concerned about the role and power of actors in the emergence of security privatization, it is important to also note that through the State's actions, private security companies have not only been legitimized through regulations and operations. They have also been legitimized through the State's institutional frameworks and even sometimes its partnerships. This means that, they have become part of the State architecture. This has created ideational capacities that has socially led to its commodification and legitimacy.

In Africa, despite the defects in State security apparatus or structure due to various political, sociological as well as historical factors that have led to its poor maintenance or performance, the framework still holds because it best explains the emergence of private security without any questions. Despite the insignificance of security expenditures in African States compared to global north countries, security privatization is flourishing first and foremost because African governments allow it to. Through the embrace of globalization and the benefit it comes with, African countries are opened up to incorporate non-state actors in areas such as their economy, health etc. and that is no different in their security sector. This does not mean that these non-state actors have diminished the power of even less strong states.

Additionally, for informal non-state actors such as vigilante groups, Laurent Fourchard, in his 2008 study on "*A New Name for an Old Practice: Vigilantes in South-*

Western Nigeria", notes that the history of vigilantism in Nigeria is a denomination initially proposed by the police in the mid-1980s to substitute the older practice of hunter guard system" or the night guard system both of which were in existence even before colonial times. Therefore, we ought to see vigilantism as a first attempt to introduce some forms of community policing to Nigeria in order to improve the appalling image of the police. He goes on further to show several times how vigilante groups have been on and off the scene as well as alternatively formalized by the state or banned. This shows that they also exist because at the State wants them to exist.

Despite its formations largely on communal or ethnic lines, States acknowledge their importance for rural communities, as well as to the larger State architecture as they sometimes aid the State security apparatus to carry out its duties. Unfortunately, their negative implications are also allowed to thrive by the State because they sometimes also become pawns for State officials to be used for their personal objectives.

The emergence of private security has created an alternative to filling the security gap in many African countries and has led to these non-state actors becoming quite unavoidable. Using this three-part framework, I will analyze how through the ideational capacity of this framework, African States and their citizens have come to embrace private security companies in terms of legitimacy, trust as well as safety and professionalism.

In my thesis I will measure how private security services have become beneficial in relation to State security apparatuses whose structure I will argue is problematic due to colonial legacies, worsened by neo-patrimonial tendencies which have led to the lack of trust in the State and its security apparatus leading to pervasive insecurity.

CHAPTER 4: PRIVATE SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTINENT

Private security has become prevalent in Africa since the 1990's. In the early post-Apartheid era in South Africa, Abrahamsen & Williams (2011) note that, there was a massive expansion of the private security industry and it has subsequently become even more prominent in urban areas and extractive sites in rural areas throughout sub-Saharan Africa. At a time that Africa is noted to be experiencing one of the fastest rates of urbanization, urban centers are becoming increasingly overcrowded and the State's task of providing security has become even more arduous.

In a staggering 2020 report by the OECD on Africa's urbanization dynamics, it was found that the massive urbanization currently in Africa is also accompanied by persistent imbalances in wealth, resource allocation, opportunities, and inequality in general (OECD/SWAC, 2020). These inequalities lead to poor employment opportunities for youth and have simultaneously contributed to the increase in crime rates across the region. While crime rates are climbing in urban centers, other non-state organizations such as terrorist groups and criminal networks are gaining more members and operating more extensively in urban and rural areas. This negative outlook compounds the already existing security issues countries in the sub-Saharan region face.

In this section, I will explore private security in urban and extractive sectors in Africa and the implications for the African continent as a whole. As noted previously,

private security in this research refers to private security companies and informal community protection and vigilante groups.

4.1 **Private Security Companies**

Despite the controversies and questions associated with private security in general, it is even more difficult to talk about private security companies in Africa. This is largely due to their history of violence and the military escapades. Conversations about them on the continent trigger bitter memories of their presence in Angola, Sierra Leone, etc. It is not until recently that the mercenary conception about them have been defused even after regulations and controls were institutionalized to govern these security firms decades ago.

Private security companies currently on the continent play several non-combatant roles even though the militarization on the African continent after 9/11 has led to footprints of private security companies that are fused in government and public security structures to fight against terrorist cells in Africa. Aside from these roles, they also are tasked with training State security forces, aiding in intelligence gathering as well as technologically inclined security provision.

Additionally, according to a UNODC (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) report in 2014, other services private security companies provide include: cash-in-transit services and the movement of other valuables; confidential investigations, including undercover or covert investigations, complex fraud investigations, and private investigations for clients; services such as bodyguard and close protection, witness

protection, crowd control, and armed guards for nuclear energy sites; collecting and disseminating intelligence, and monitoring, installing and responding to various forms of alarms, among others.

Currently, in Africa and arguably globally, South Africa is among the countries with the highest presence of Private security companies. The multi-billion USD industry was home to close to 6,392 registered companies with many start-ups entering the industry in 2011. It can boast of nearly 400,000 registered employees in South Africa alone. According to Abrahamsen and Williams (2011), as of 2004, there were about 2,000 registered PSCs in Kenya, as well as between 1,500 and 2,000 PSCs in Nigeria as of 2011. Berg and Howell (2017) noted an increase in numbers of PSCs in 2015/2016 in South Africa with over 8,692 security companies and approximately 488,666 registered and active private security employees in the country.

In 2015, Noor and Wagacha (2015) estimated there were between 2000 and 4000 such companies operating in Kenya. In Liberia, it was estimated in 2012 that there were 87 companies (Von Boemcken, 2012). In Botswana, there were reportedly 2,377 registered private security companies according to an industry association, while in Namibia in 2010, there were 216 companies with an estimated 20,000 employees (Molomo and Maundeni, 2015; Nakutta, Duminy, and Simamuna, 2015; Berg and Howell, 2017).

It must also be noted that apart from South Africa, with its well-documented statistics on registered private security companies, other countries in Africa have not been able to keep detailed data of private security firms operating in their jurisdictions (Berg and Howell, 2017). Thus, despite the fact that thousands of private security companies operate

in these countries, it is only the popular foreign-owned companies such as Group4Securicor, DynCorp, GardaWorld, Securitas AB, etc., and their subsidiaries that are known and thus used in analysis when talking about PSCs on the continent. Local and start-up companies providing security installations and unarmed security services at homes and events are largely unregistered or undocumented.

The private security event database (PSED) captured activities and events of private security companies from 1990-2012 in three regions across the world including Africa (Avant & Neu, 2019). This event database, which is the first of its kind, provided a disaggregated level of detail on private security activities in Africa. It also captures clients who have contracted the services of these private security firms as well as instances of allegations of violence and abuses committed by these organizations. The database shows that private security firms and their activities continue to grow on the African continent. From 1990 to 2012, Avant & Neu (2019) estimate that the presence and activities of these organizations grew at a rate of 57%, as compared with Latin America at 29% and Southeast Asia which at 14 %. This is shown in figure. 3.

Figure 3   The Private Security Events Database. Source : Avant, D., & Neu, K. K. (2019).

Over the years, private security services in general have arguably filled the security gap in many African countries (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2013). Despite the negative assumptions surrounding private security, it is undeniable they have had some positive impacts on the African continent. Private security companies with their complex organizational structures and sections provide jobs for all categories of people. From technology to labor specialists, the range of opportunities created is undoubtedly wide. As with the number of undocumented private security companies in service on the continent, those that are documented in well-regulated areas such as in South Africa employ over 375,315 active security officers as of 2011. In Kenya, the PSC industry officially employed over 21,000 employees in the year 2011 (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011), while in the case of Nigeria, PSCs employed over 100,000 people. It is estimated that G4S alone -which is one of the popular PSCs on the continent- employed about 7,000 people in Nigeria as of 2011 (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011).

Furthermore, and most importantly, Private security companies have been able to aid in the reduction of crime in urban areas on the continent, and their presence in urban

communities has brought some psychological relief about insecurity. Generally, PSCs, through partnering and coordinating with State security or acting within state-made regulations, have contributed to the decreasing the crime rate in urban areas in South Africa and Kenya, Ghana, etc. (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Owusu et al. 2016).

Through CCTV surveillance in public and private spaces, proactive 24/7 patrol vehicles of private security companies, sophisticated alarm systems as well as other technological tools in urban areas such as Cape Town and Pretoria in South Africa, the crime rate has been more or less relatively reduced (Minnaar, 2012). Citizens, business owners, and foreign investors have gained some confidence to operate and are attracted to invest without the fear of not only crime but also corruption, little to no professionalism, bribery, favoritism, etc.

In many urban areas, the trust in PSCs is higher than that in the state security apparatus, and thus demanded by the rich and middle class who can afford the services of these PSCs. This, however, is also problematic due to the profit motive of every business and the dynamics of economics, where supply goes only where it is demanded. A public service such as security which becomes commodified leaves the marginalized and poor communities who are unable to afford services of PSCs at the mercy of the criminals as well as also the strong and mighty classes in the society.

Another area where PSCs are evident is in extractive sectors in African countries. The relationship in recent times between PSCs and the extractive sector has revolved around the provision of security which traditionally should have been provided by the State. Today, PSCs often play this role and are largely regulated under the national laws of the

host country as well as international laws. The extractive industry in Africa has been the backbone of many African economies since independence and as such, both the State and investors who come in as MNCs see the industry as important. PSCs, therefore, are key actors in securing facilities and concessions of the industry.

Oftentimes, PSCs are contracted to provide these services since the State tends to lack the capacity to deliver security, and or the MNCs prefer private security services to provide security. The resource abundance in Africa, although beneficial to some, has undoubtedly become a more of a curse which has fueled and prolonged several conflicts in African countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, etc. A UNHRC report in 2019 notes that some of the services PSCs provide for MNC's in the extractive sector include devising risk assessments and mitigation measures, securing and guarding premises, securing the transportation of extractive products, and conducting security training for onsite extractive staff (UNHRC, 2019).

In fragile areas on the continent, PSCs may play a larger role which include, rescue missions of kidnapped foreign national employees or combatting piracy in territorial waters, and protecting extraction sites in the waters from criminals.

While the narrative has always been that MNC's in urban and extractive sectors on the continent tend to use PSCs in securing their assets in regions of fragility, there have been major issues that have arisen in recent times. Chief among them is the plethora of reports of human rights violations and misconduct of private security personnel across the continent.

From the PSED database, Avant and Neu (2019) note that in Africa, there was a significant number of reports of private security activities which involved violence as depicted in figure 4.

Figure 4   The Private Security Events Database.   Source : Avant, D., & Neu, K. K. (2019).

According to Enns et. al (2020), studies in Ghana show how communities where extractive industries operate are constantly facing abuses. Their research found that indigenes have had bitter experiences with private security personnel in their jurisdictions. Through interviews for example, the indigenes shared stories of how security personnel beat them up every time they attempted to get close to farmlands that bore harvestable produce but had been officially handed over to mining corporations (Enns et. al, 2020).

In the UNHRC report in 2019, it was found that because these MNCs who are specializing in extraction are aware of the reputational risks allegations of human rights violations can bring about, they are likely not to engage with State security forces but rely on private security where they can select and train as well as maintain direct influence over the actions of their security apparatus (UNHRC, 2019).

However, what usually happens is that these abuses still occur and are either swept under the carpet or solved privately through compensation schemes to the victims. There have been reports of sexual and gender abuses as well as targeted threats at protesters whose land or farms have been taken from them forcefully and given as concessions by private security providers who operate for MNC's in extractive sectors (ibid). Although most of these individuals are compensated, there real issue is about their inability to have a say in whether or not they are willing to give up their lands and farm lands which may contain mineral deposits.

What has contributed to these violations is also the blurred distinction between private security personnel and state security personnel. This is the case in States where security is provided by both private and public security services in the extractive sector. The mixture of security tends to be positive as it leads to efficiency as well as utilizing the complementary role the private can add to the public and vice versa when it comes to security provision. This hybridity of security provision, as noted by Enns et al., emphasizes the connection, interaction, competition, and interdependence across a spectrum of scales of modern security which is good for the entire African security architecture and places it well to tackle the issue of insecurity in the continent (Enns et. al, 2020).

However, to the general public, these abuses and violations orchestrated by private security persons are difficult to report because in their minds it is the state security apparatus that is perpetuating these crimes and these are the same people you ought to report such violations to. The public lacks an understanding of the recent trend towards hybridity in security provision and thus mistakenly identifies security persons in general in

extractive areas for State security. In the survey conducted by Enns et al. (2020), they note that in rural extractive communities in Ghana, the hybridity of PSCs and State security actors leads to difficulties in identifying who is who as uniforms were barely distinguishable, thus making it a challenge to report when they are being abused by security services (whether private or public).

Moreover, some State security officials double as private security workers in these extractive sites which makes identification as state or private security employees arduous. The 2019 UNHRC report captures this as moonlighting, with the parallel role played by both public and private security providers creating confusion in the minds of the public (UNHCR, 2019).

Private security companies (PSCs) are undoubtedly beneficial in the provision of security in post 1990s Africa. Aside from provision of security and protection of lives and properties of their clients, the industry has been a source of job creation for many on the continent. Unfortunately, because it operates by the market hand of demand and supply and thus provides services to those who can afford it, the poor and marginalized in the society are left without the protection of these firms. These communities are therefore also forced to find ways of protecting themselves, as discussed in the next section.

4.2 **Informal Community Protection and Vigilante Groups**

Another aspect of private security which concerns this research study is the informal community protection and vigilante groups. As they are qualified with the adjective "informal" this depicts the fact that unlike PSC's who are structurally organized and work within some form of legal frameworks, these groups are not that organized and do not operate under such frameworks. In fact, despite the fact that they are largely considered illegal in many countries in Africa they are often times overlooked since their actions and inactions are sometimes beneficial to the community and the state in general especially when it comes to providing security for communities they originate from. They are largely found in marginalized and poor communities both in rural and fragile urban areas where most inhabitants do not have the means to contract the services of PSCs to protect them against criminals and hoodlums.

As briefly touched on in previous sections of the paper, these non-state actors have existed in African communities even before the Cold War period, after which there has been an increase in the private security industry on the continent at both elite and grassroots levels.

Undoubtedly, these actors are a double-edged sword because despite their negative implications, they do bring to the table some positive contributions when it comes to security in African communities. They are made up of self-imposed and selected groups who have taken on the role of protecting their communities because the state is unable to do the job efficiently (Basiru & Osunkoya, 2020), or the communities they usually originate in are unable to purchase the services of private security firms. They may or may

not work within any legal framework; neither are they guided by any government regulations as with private security companies. While many of these informal community protection groups are organized, others are not. Still others are also sometimes without any formal group names but congregate or assemble whenever there is a perceived need.

One of the most important characteristics of these groups is that they are largely formed on ethnic or identity lines. As a result, some receive help from their communities because they are seen as a better alternative to remote, state-based security actors and thus have greater legitimacy. In the quest to protect their communities, they most often end up taking the law into their own hands, up to and including lynching suspected criminals.

As Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) also note, these groups are often from marginalized areas in urban centers, especially in slums, as well as rural and poor communities. While some are recruited to do the bidding of politicians and the rich by causing mayhem and public disorder, some simply stick to the protection of their communities from all forms of insecurities. Examples include but are not limited to groups such as the Baghdad Boys and Mungiki in Nairobi Kenya, the Bamba Boys, Delta forces or Azorka Boys in Ghana, the OPC or Bakassi Boys, or Niger Delta Avengers in Nigeria, Kamajors in Sierra Leone, Arrow Boys of Teso in Uganda, Zande Arrow Boys in South Sudan, etc.

Groups such as the Bakassi Boys (in Nigeria), and Azorka boys, Bamba boys, Delta force, etc. (in Ghana) are allegedly linked to political parties and become pawns at the behest of politicians. They are often privately supported by political parties in power, which publicly deny this support. Depending on the government in power, the Azorka boys and

Bamba boys are set free whenever they are arrested for nefarious activities especially during election periods when their parties come into power. Even worse, as rewards for their party affiliations and activities in the quest to provide security or cause fear and panic in communities during elections, they are employed in national security services when their political parties gain power.

While sometimes resorting to brute force, violence, and arbitrariness in their activities without fear, vigilante groups are often accountable to no one (HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). In Kenya, the grey literature acknowledges the love-hate relationship that exists between urban communities and vigilante groups (Schuberth, 2018). According to Schuberth, "while they protect neighborhoods they are also seen as protection rackets as they also extort money from residents and businesses in the areas in which they operate" (Schuberth, 2018).

Despite these negative aspects of the actions and activities of some of these vigilante community protection groups in many African societies, they are still very important as they have over the years complemented the State security apparatus. In Nigeria for instance, the Crisis Group Africa Report (2017) notes that vigilante groups in Northern Nigeria have joined in the fight against Boko Haram. Factors motivating this role include the fact that in a fragile and chaotic context such as this, they have to protect themselves from a dual-threat, both from Boko Haram and from government security forces, which were inflicting collective punishment on communities suspected of harboring militants, sometimes setting fire to houses and shops or randomly arresting people (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2017).

Additionally, the report notes that locals in these communities -which have become war fronts in the federal government fight against Boko Haram- have mobilized to fight the terrorist group because insofar as the group exists there, curfews and other restrictions put in place since 2013 cannot be lifted for commerce and business to continue, preventing civilians from making a living.

Furthermore, according to the International Crisis Group African Report (2017), vigilante organizations like the Kamajors in Sierra Leone assisted in the protection of villages from rebels and predatory troops, as well as fighting with ECOMOG forces on the government's behalf against insurgents. Teso Arrow Boys in Uganda also worked in close cooperation with security forces and local communities, effectively protected communities, and forced the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) out of Teso (ibid). Arrow Boys helped protect civilians from LRA attacks as well as resolving local disputes during the conflict in Uganda, thus earning the trust of communities.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined private security activities and their implications on the African continent. Private security has become a part of modern-day African security architecture and has been arguably more of a blessing than a curse.

Private security companies which are largely foreign-owned, as well as the few which are locally owned, contribute to filling of the security lacunae in several African countries. From collaborating with State security to fighting crime in urban areas to the

protection of the economic interests of MNC's and investors in the extractive industry in rural areas, they have made several strides towards security in Africa. While they bolster security capacity within African States, they sometimes abuse their power without facing any repercussions. As noted by Avant and Neu (2019) in their research study, figure 4, private security personnel use force and violence to bulldoze their way to the fulfillment of their objectives.

Additionally, informal community and vigilante groups are also a double-edged sword as they can be far more effective than state actors in providing local security, yet they are highly unaccountable to anyone which is quite problematic. According to the Crisis Africa Group report (2017), they have more legitimacy than state security persons as a result of their community roots, and they can be more effective in detecting, monitoring, and defeating insurgents due to their knowledge of local languages, geography, and culture. Although beneficial, they sometimes metamorphose from providing security to become a source of insecurity which is often inspired by monetary gains. As a prominent trend in many African States, they are also utilized by governments and politicians as pawns for political gains.

In the next chapter, we will examine the activities of these private security services in Nigeria where we will focus on case studies of importance to this research. We will come to appreciate how, despite private security services having their challenges, they have still become very beneficial in these regions of Nigeria where the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning as well as bad leadership practices has worsened the insecurity and how private security have become unavoidable in mitigating the insecurity phenomena.

Chapter 5: State Formation and Neopatrimonialism: Straws in the wind that have made Private Security unavoidable in Nigeria

Since attaining independence in 1960, Nigeria like many other countries in the West African region has experienced several developmental and insecurity issues. From several coups from the late 1960's to the 1990's, a civil war from 1967 to 1970, followed by autocratic regimes under military rulers such as Babangida and Abacha, development in post independent Nigeria has continued to lag soci-economically. Despite being endowed with some of the world's most precious minerals and natural resources, these resources have been both a blessing and largely a curse to the country. With a population of a little over 200 million people, and despite Nigeria being a regional hegemon as well as among the super powers on the African continent, its leadership since independence has not been able to transform the country from developing status into a developed country in either socio-economic or security terms.

While corruption and bad leadership practices have been constant, in the recent past, transnational terrorist organizations and other non-state actors have increasingly threatened the fragile security in most parts of the country and this has continued to rigorously test the country's security architecture. Furthermore, due to the most recent controversy over police brutality by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) -which led to human rights concerns in Nigeria by the diaspora and the international community in 2020 - it is undeniable that security in Nigeria is a critical issue to be examined and thus falls in line with the purpose of this research study.

Although the political space since independence has bred the ground for insecurity and the emergence and necessity of private security services, we cannot ignore the fact that the colonial legacy of ethnic partition which led to the creation of an artificial state such as Nigeria, and most countries in Africa like it, is one of the fundamental catalysts for the insecurity issue and the consequences thereof in the country.

For clarity's sake, it ought to be noted here that, undoubtedly colonialism and the legacy of ethnic partitioning which is of concern to this paper is not the sole cause of the insecurity in Nigeria but only a key and an important factor. Thus, the introduction of our intervening variable (the lack of trust in the State and its security apparatus) which is caused by an internal (within Africa) factor which is bad African leadership practices.

Working within the theoretical framework in chapter 3, this section will use Nigeria as a case study to examine the causal role of our independent and intervening variables - i.e., the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning and the lack of trust in the State and its security apparatus- and how these variables have contributed to the unavoidability of our dependent variable -i.e. private security- on the African continent. Further, although Nigeria is our country case study, the focus will be on two regions in the country. These are North-East Nigeria and the Niger Delta region which is in the South – South of Nigeria.

The chapter highlights the implications of the colonial legacy of ethnic partition in post-colonial / post-independence Nigeria. In summation, different groups of diverse origins have been forced to come together through this legacy to co-exist as one country. These differences and an "us versus them" mentality have paved way for predatory neo-patrimonial tendencies which have resulted in the lack of trust in the State and its agencies

including its security apparatus, thus explaining why private security has become an unavoidable alternative in the country.

5.1. **Background of the Nigerian State: From Pre-colonial to 21st century**

Nigeria is located in West Africa on the Gulf of Guinea and lies between Cameroon and Benin. It borders Cameroon in the east, Chad in the north-east, Niger in the north and Benin republic in the west.

Figure 5.   Political Map of Nigeria. Source: Furian (2017)

According to the Library of Congress (2008), long before 1500, much of present-day Nigeria was divided in States largely linked to ethnic affiliations. During that century, major kingdoms and ethnic groups that were geographically in the area included the Yoruba kingdom, Edo Kingdom of Benin, the Hausas and Nupe. These kingdoms were sovereign and self-governing before the scramble for Africa by European powers in the

1880's. During the Berlin conference in 1885, European powers attempted to resolve their conflicting interests in Africa by partitioning the continent amongst themselves.

In Nigeria, as in many other countries in Africa, these groups were divided across the geographic area. Some kingdoms and ethnic groups were broken off into other countries and others forced to live together. In Nigeria, States or groups which were different British protectorates were forced to become a single country. In the quest to form or build a modern Nigerian State, Odeyemi (2014) opines this has rather led to state packaging or state fabrication and the world's greatest border engineering. This is because pre-colonial Africa lacked the idea of State conceptualization as compared to Europe and thus was totally unprepared to be integrated appropriately into the international political and economic order. An implication of this state packaging or fabrication and border engineering is the North-South divide in Nigeria.

The country is currently made up of over 250 ethnic groups who have links to these pre-colonial kingdoms. As at 2008, it was estimated that 29% of the population were the Hausa and Fulani people, 21 % were Yoruba, 18% were Igbo people, 10 % were the Ijaw and the rest were made up of other small minority groups. In more recent data in 2018 as depicted in Figure 6, the Hausa and Fulani groups which due to intermarriages and history can be seen as one make up 30% and 6% of the Nigerian population respectively, making up 36% of the total population.

The second largest is still the Yoruba people which make up 15.5% followed by the Igbo people who make up 15.2% of the population. Other minority groups which make up the rest of the total 250 groups make up 33.1% of the total population.

Figure 6.   Distribution of ethnic groups in Nigeria 2018, Source: Varrella, (2021).

Although these groups are diverse in many ways, we must note that many trace their roots

to the old kingdoms that existed before pre-colonial times, and thus these groups largely

fall within the broad divide between the north and Nigeria and the South of Nigeria. Bunche

(2011) notes that broad differences between the North & South in Nigeria are historical

and Political. Modern Nigeria is undeniably far from a unified country because of this great

gap in the country.

The North-South divide in Nigeria and the country's inability to effectively gel as

one nation has over the years led to separatist calls. In the 1960's, Nigeria which is a federal

State experienced secessionist States in the South under the banner of Biafra who wanted

to form their own country because they felt that they could not co-exist with the northern states in the federal republic of Nigeria. This led to the three (3) years' war -popularly known as the Biafran war- which had devastating effects on the country within the period from 1967 to 1970. Although the states who wanted to secede failed to have their way, that objective and animosity is still evident and there continue to be rifts against the state and or other ethnic groupings attached to or associated with ruling governments.

The early 1990's saw highly destructive clashes between the Itsekiris and the Ijaws in the Delta region, the Yoruba's and the Hausa/ Fulani in Lagos, Ogun, Kwara and Kaduna States, the Yoruba and the Igbos in Lagos, the Hausa/Fulani and Igbo in Kano, Kaduna, Abia and Imo States etc. (Ikelegbe, 2005). In the late 1990's and before the 2000's, Nigeria experienced a rise of ethnic militancy with several ethnic groups having a militant group. Groups such as Oduduwa People's Congress (OPC) affiliated to the Yoruba ethnic group, Bakassi Boys and Igbo Youth Congress (IYC) which claimed to protect the Igbo's interests, Egbesu boys etc., became popular and troubling as this rise of ethnic militancy led to several confrontations between ethnic groups who felt marginalized and abused in one way or another.

In recent times, there have been several clashes between herders who are largely from the north and farmers who are largely from the central and south in Nigeria. There continues to be unrest due to grievances in the south of the country, mainly the Niger Delta region. Also, there has been a resurgence of the Biafran secessionist movement and most importantly the Boko Haram terrorist cell want the north of Nigeria to be a caliphate.

According to Bunche (2011), the issues behind the north and south's inability to overcome their tensions stems from several factors. He argues that key among them is the socio-economic imbalance between the north and the south. The south is richer and endowed with resources that have become the backbone of the Nigerian economy.

However, despite the north's enormous population they have over the years been marginalized in terms of development and has rendered the geopolitical region one of the poorest in the country for several decades (ibid). The fear of further marginalization increases tensions and grievances in the country and there is a mutual mistrust between these sides (Odeyemi, 2014). Moreover, even prior to independence the northern States were unenthusiastic about independence because of the fear that the south would dominate in governance of the federal republic.

The south is richer and boast of better socio-economic indicators. As the back bone of the Nigerian economy, it is the home of the country's enormous oil resources. Although this should be a blessing, it has become more of a curse in the South especially due to grievances among a number of groups in the south, especially in the Niger Delta region.

Northern Nigeria's reluctance to be part of the federal republic and the South's grievances especially in the Niger Delta region, including environmental degradation, poverty escalation, failed expectations, and political subjugation, are some of the dynamics which capture the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning of African kingdoms. While the Northern States relate well with one another because of their shared history, they do not see the southern states in that regard. There is a likelihood for better relations with Fulani people in bordering countries such as Cameroon etc. than other groups in the south. In this

connection it must be noted that part of present-day Northern Nigeria used to be part of Cameroon under German rule before the French and British took over. This explains why although Cameroon and Nigeria are different countries most parts of Northern Nigeria will see Cameroonians on the other side of the border as more similar than people in the South of Nigeria.

In the south, ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region see themselves as fighting for the same cause, which is that the resources in their geographical space should be used to develop their region first rather than elsewhere. Sadly, and undoubtedly, the region is faced with several grievances against the federal government. Despite the enormous resources in the region, it is riddled with poverty. It ought to be noted that, the focus here is not about ethnic groups despising each other; however, if there were no divisions in the past, problems in the North with the federal government which includes terrorist activities and issues in the south with the federal government which has led to militancy and vigilantism which have ethnic ties -which is undoubtedly a piece to the grand problem- may have not been present.

Even more, if the Northern Protectorate and Southern Protectorates had remained separate, these issues would have been easily resolved because the north would not have had to accommodate the subtle distrust of the south which they have less in common with in terms of religion, culture, and language among other factors. In the south, the resource curse may have been non-existent since the resource would have been more likely to be wisely managed to the benefit of all in the geographic region. This may have been the case especially because as Odeyemi (2014) notes, these differences between ethnic groups in

pre-colonial Nigeria never mattered in so far as they were (often) politically independent of one another.

Despite political elites' disagreement with the British colonial power's decision to join the North and South protectorates, the British went ahead in order to cut the cost of operating two separate protectorates and facilitate its economic exploitation of raw materials towards its imperialist domination etc. Odeyemi (2014) notes that political elites such as Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa -the first prime minister of Nigeria- expressed how different both protectorates were from each other. Additionally, political elites such as Sir Ahmadu Bello who was the premiere of Northern Nigeria categorically stated that joining the two protectorates *"was the mistake of 1914"* (Odeyemi, 2014: p. 8). Other statesmen such as Chief Obafemi Awolowo -who was key in the independence struggle of Nigeria- have described Nigeria as *"merely a geographical expression that lumped together an arbitrary collection of disparate groups following colonial rule"* (ibid).

At the start of the fourth republic of Nigeria in 1999, when it reverted to democratic rule after a history of military regimes and coups, many Nigerians still felt more strongly tied to their ethnic orientations than to their nationality. In a survey conducted by Afrobarometer, which is a pan-African research institution concerned with research regarding public attitudes in African societies as depicted in figure 7, it was found that in that same year which marked the start of the fourth republic constitution that is currently

in use by the federal republic of Nigeria, a large percentage of the sample felt more strongly

tied to their ethnic groups than their nationality.

Category	%/Total	Frequence
Strongly disagree	1.3%	46
Disagree	4.8%	173
Neither agree nor disagree	4.7%	170
Agree	32.1%	1,157
Strongly agree	56.3%	2,027
Don't know	0.8%	30
(N)	(100%)	(3,603)

Stronger ties to own identity group

Afrobarometer (R1 1999/2001) (Nigeria)

Figure 7 Source:Afrobarometer Data, Nigeria, Round 1 1999-2000, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org

A total percentage of 88.4% of the total sample size agreed or strongly agreed that they

saw themselves as more attached to their ethnic origins that the country.

The past is past and unrecoverable. However, attitudes and roles of leaders since

independence have contributed to further division in the country. Ethnic cleavages and

inter-ethnic fears and tensions in Nigeria which is often revealed through resource

allocation, sharing of the national cake, political appointments and the zero-sum game in

politics has further divided the country (Reno, 1993; Odeyemi, 2014). Bad leadership

practices based on neo-patrimonial tendencies have also been inherent in most African

countries including Nigeria and continue to play major role in the country.

5.2. **Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria**

Neopatrimonialism in itself is not an anathema if its elements of patrimonialism and legal rational rule are well balanced especially in African societies. As Ikpe (2000) notes, patrimonialism as developed by Max Weber is an ideal-typical model of traditional authority where a ruler dispenses offices and benefits to subordinates in return for loyalty, support and services. Although patrimonialism is evident in many political regimes in Latin America, the Middle East and other developing continents (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997), Ikpe (2000) notes that many African societies exhibit several traits of patrimonialism and thus have attracted the label of the prefix "neopatrimonialism" (which means modern form of patrimonialism). Besides adopting the modern form of patrimonialism - neopatrimonialism- many African societies have also institutionalized it into their constitutional frameworks. Thus, formal rules exist and operate alongside informal rules which are based on affection, reverence, fear, ethnicity etc., and many times obliterate formal rules (Oarhe, 2013). In other words, Bourmaud (1997) describes the neo patrimonial phenomenon as a situation whereby a State is patrimonial and bureaucratic at the same time (Bach, 2011).

Scholarly works of de Oliveira (2007) and Oarhe (2013) have noted that the genesis of neopatrimonialism in Africa emanated from the experiences of colonialism and colonial style administration, which was largely based on patrimonialism. Through direct and indirect rule, colonial powers established hierarchical particularistic exchanges and/or reciprocity as well as mutual obligations and these traits have been transferred into the governance of several post-colonial African States. The result of this is clientelism and

patronage, involving reciprocal relationships in the distribution of resources and or services between patrons & clients (Oarhe, 2013). Patrons distribute benefits to strategically placed individuals lower than themselves (clients) in exchange for support, service, and loyalty, as well as to those higher than themselves (patrons) in exchange for the continued protection of their positions and tenures.

Given the history and formation of the federal Republic of Nigeria, it has seen its fair share of military regimes and authoritarian governments that thrived on forms of authority based on neopatrimonialism. The relationship between leaders of such regimes as those led by General Babangida and General Abacha who were the patrons while strategic and important individuals in the society such as traditional leaders or ethnic groups were their clients is a great example. In Nigeria, clients are largely based on identity lines and they rally political support in the form of votes in return for public goods and even sometimes private possessions as well as government positions. Thus, instead of positions and offices being awarded based on merit it is rather based on who supports who, who is related to who and which ethnic group one is associated with.

It must be noted that neopatrimonialism in Africa may sometimes be very beneficial given the societal structure of countries on the continent. The ethnic amalgamation of diverse groups makes it quite necessary for ethno-regional balance where for inclusivity's sake, distribution of resources is formalized and regulated in a way in which all ethnic groups benefit. In return, this ensures compliance and also promotes the culture of mutual accommodation (Bach, 2011). This is what Bach (2011) calls regulated neopatrimonialism.

Despite the fact that regulated neopatrimonialism can bring some benefits, in post-colonial Nigeria, this has not necessarily been the case. Ethnic and identity politics have been tightly associated with neopatrimonialism because is it the primary basis of political relations and participation (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972; Lijphart, 1996; Ikpe, 2000). Since the independence of Nigeria, these neo patrimonial traits of clientelism and patronage have contributed to the disproportionate distribution of authority, responsibility and resources therefore delegitimizing the trust in the State over time. Wunsch& Oluwa (1995) note that, despite the power of Nigeria regionally, it is oftentimes too weak to compel its citizens to comply with its orders. This is largely because neopatrimonialism in the country has been associated with marginalization, massive corruption and exclusion of majority groups (Ojo, 1995). This makes the Nigerian State highly unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of its citizens but even more seriously, as Bratton & Van de Walle (1997) have opined, it is a recipe for instability.

Additionally, there is ample evidence of lack of trust in leaders in the country since independence either by sections of societies such as among northern states when a southerner occupies the presidency and vice versa when a northerner occupies that position. It is the same in other federal government positions. However, more worrisome is the lack of trust among ethnic groups when leaders in the federal government are from other ethnic groups as well as the overwhelming support and trust given to these leaders by ethnic groups they originate or are associated with. These dynamics of lack of trust shown by a section of the society and the enormous trust by another section captures the effects of neopatrimonialism in Nigeria which again is associated with marginalization, exclusion, massive corruption through patron-client relationships.

Unfortunately, this lack of trust in the State has also had an effect on State agencies such as the security apparatus. When the dynamics explained in the previous paragraphs play out, we see a clear sign of mistrust of State security services by sections of the society. The lack of accountability which stems from the fact that leaders (patrons) in office prioritize loyalty, nepotism, favoritism and support of clients (who are officeholders in lesser positions of the hierarchical order) to maintain their political power, their clients tend to operate outside formal structures governing their power without any accountability and repercussions whatsoever.

Furthermore, because neopatrimonialism tends to breed opportunities for exploitation and looting, state security services are under resourced, underpaid and thus also riddled with unprofessionalism, abuse of power and massive corruption. Most importantly, they are staffed based on ethnic identities depending on the boss in power at a particular time. Thus, security persons are not there because they are necessarily fit or efficient for the job but sometimes because jobs must be created for clients of patrons when they land positions of power.

Igbo & Chinwoku (2020) note that, in 2020 it was alleged in Nigeria that Col. Sambo Dasuki (Rtd), the former National Security Adviser to former President Goodluck Jonathan misappropriated over USD 2.2 billion that was supposed to be used to procure firearms for the state security services in their fight against Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. Because of corruption and greed of the political leaders -which is a product of neopatrimonialism- funds such as those described above and others that have gone unnoticed and have been diverted into individual pockets by political leaders. Among other

things, these tendencies have rendered state security services inefficient, unreliable and untrustworthy by individuals as well as businesses in the country.

In another survey conducted by the Afrobarometer it was found that mistrust of Nigerians in their head of State (the president) in the period from 1999/2001 to 2017/2018 was consistently high. As depicted in figure 8 and figure 8.1 it can be deduced that 24.1% of those sample lacked total trust in their heads of state, and 33.5 % had very little trust in the same period. Importantly however,

there is still a good number of participants who showed some degree of trust, as well as a lot of trust in the president within the specified period.

This, it can be argued, shows a very divisive society where the characteristics of neopatrimonialism such as marginalization and exclusion of majority groups are very evident.


Figure 8. Source: Afrobarometer Data, Nigeria, Rounds 1 to 7, 1999-2018, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org

Category	Total	Round						
		R1 1999/2001	R2 2002/2003	R3 2005/2006	R4 2008/2009	R5 2011/2012	R6 2014/2015	R7 2017/2018
Not at all	24.1%	22.9%	32.0%	26.4%	20.3%	18.6%	23.8%	25.5%
Just a little	33.5%	21.9%	41.8%	34.3%	35.4%	37.1%	36.1%	33.9%
Somewhat	30.1%	40.5%	18.5%	26.8%	30.1%	32.3%	29.6%	25.8%
A lot	10.2%	13.0%	3.5%	10.1%	10.5%	11.1%	9.0%	13.8%
Don't know	2.2%	1.6%	4.2%	2.4%	3.7%	1.0%	1.5%	1.1%
(N)	16,956 (100%)	3,603 (100%)	2,428 (100%)	2,202 (100%)	2,324 (100%)	2,400 (100%)	2,400 (100%)	1,599 (100%)

Table 3. Source: Afrobarometer Data, Nigeria, Rounds 1 to 7, 1999-2018, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org

I take this view because this shows a divided society where some people are benefitting from the State and others have been marginalized. An example is the inequality between the northern states in the country and the southern states. According to the NBS's Nigerian Living Standards Survey (NLSS) report for 2019, nine of the top ten poorest states in Nigeria are from the north (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019).

Furthermore, in another survey conducted by Afrobarometer to assess the trust of Nigerians in the police service from 1999 to 2018, it was found -as depicted in figure 9 and table 4 - the majority of Nigerians lack trust in the State security apparatus.

Category	Total	Round						
		R1 1999/2001	R2 2002/2003	R3 2005/2006	R4 2008/2009	R5 2011/2012	R6 2014/2015	R7 2017/2018
Not at all	51.4%	51.7%	58.1%	59.0%	43.3%	52.9%	46.3%	48.0%
Just a little	26.2%	18.4%	29.8%	23.4%	28.8%	30.7%	31.1%	24.6%
Somewhat	15.1%	20.0%	9.4%	12.7%	17.4%	12.1%	15.4%	16.8%
A lot	6.1%	9.4%	1.3%	3.6%	7.8%	4.0%	6.1%	10.0%
Don't know	1.1%	0.5%	1.5%	1.3%	2.8%	0.3%	1.0%	0.7%
(N)	16,954 (100%)	3,602 (100%)	2,428 (100%)	2,202 (100%)	2,324 (100%)	2,400 (100%)	2,400 (100%)	1,598 (100%)

Table 4.   Source: Afrobarometer Data, Nigeria, Rounds 1 to 7, 1999-2018, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org

Figure. 9 Source: Afrobarometer Data, Nigeria, Rounds 1 to 7, 1999-2018, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org

From the survey it can be seen that less than 8 % of the sample size had a lot of trust in the police or were uncertain about whether they trust the state security apparatus. Over 90% of the sample size expressed levels of mistrust towards the institution with more than half of the sample size, 51.4%, stating they do not trust the police at all within the period of the survey from 1999 to 2018. This is not surprising especially after the shocking revelations of the activities of the SARS - a unit under the Nigerian police force- in 2020 and their massive abuse of power and human rights infringements towards the youth and minority groups in the country.

The lack of trust in the federal republic of Nigeria since independence has come about through several determinants. However, it is also very evident that neo patrimonial tendencies, which are inseparable from African societies especially because of their inherent ethnic primordiality and orientation, ethno-regional balancing because of diversity present in the artificially created African States plus the lessons and experiences learned from the colonial administrative style of authority has enhanced the negative effects of neopatrimonialism. It has suppressed the benefits that could have been accrued from it and rather intensified its negative implications. As marginalization, exclusion, nepotism, corruption and favoritism based on identity and ethnic lines have become the features of neopatrimonialism of Nigerian governments, it has had a trickle-down effect into the State agencies such as its security apparatus and the level of mistrust of the government has spilled over to the level of distrust in its security apparatus. Individuals and the citizenry who are not in the clientele categories cannot and do not trust the State to provide for their security.

This lack of trust in the State security apparatus has worsened insecurity in Nigeria. Since independence, if neopatrimonialism was regulated rather than predatory as Daniel Bach (2011) brilliantly noted, the insecurity inherently caused by colonial powers through the partitioning and amalgamation of ethnic groups as well as the artificial border engineering to form western like States in Africa would have been reduced significantly. Moreover, other determinants such as features of neopatrimonialism that have continually waned the trust of Nigerian people in government and its security apparatus since independence have contributed to the constant insecurity and arguably increasing insecurity in the country.

The question then becomes how has lack of trust in the state and its security apparatus contributed to the insecurity in Nigeria to make private security an alternative? The next section will address this question while using two regional case studies.

5.3. Insecurity and Private Security Activities: Case studies of the Niger Delta Region & North-Eastern Nigeria

This section will examine how the variables in this research study have played out in the Niger Delta region and North-Eastern Nigeria. We will analyze how the insecurity of both regions have a linkage to the effects of the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning, worsened by bad leadership practices, that has resulted in the lack of trust in the state and its security apparatus, making private security services a viable alternative in both regions. Through this analysis of the case studies, we will see how the interpretive theoretical frames employed in this study establish relationships between ideational and material forces within which concepts and variables acquire substantive significance.

5.3.1 Niger Delta Region

The Niger Delta in Nigeria embraces one of the world's largest wetlands and over 60% of Africa's mangrove forest (Afinotan & Ojakorotu, 2009). Surrounded by over five ethnic groups it comprises nine states - namely Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States. Figure 10 depicts a map of this region.

With about 31 million people living in this region, it contains the largest deposit of natural gas and also over 35 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.

Figure 10. Map of the Niger Delta region in Nigeria. Source: (Sewell, 2020).

Despite these resource blessings, this area has become an arena for ethnic militia and nationalist movements, freedom fighters, and insurgent groups for at least the past 16 years. Research over the years shows a plethora of reasons for this persistent insecurity, including root as well as remote causes (Eyinla & Ukpo, 2006).

Even before the militancy issues Adojo-Adebanjoko (2017) notes that ethnic conflicts have existed in the region as far back as the pre-colonial period and in the 1960's when there were protests against the marginalization of the region. She theorizes that the genesis of the violence and insecurity in the region is based on ethno-national lines (ibid). The "we versus them" and "insiders versus outsiders" sentiments undoubtedly contribute to this insecurity.

While some of these factors have ties to the colonial legacy of forcing diverse groups to live together, actions of leaders have played a major role in the results at hand in the region. Despite the country being recognized as one nation with a common destiny, in the Niger Delta region individual states continue to be aggravated over the appropriate revenue sharing formula of oil revenues with the rest of the country (ibid). This is especially because, in the past and before discovery of oil in the region, revenue from agricultural products which was the primary source of revenue for the country and were produced from northern states were allocated in a way that allocated the largest part of the revenue to the northern states. However, upon the discovery of oil in the Delta region and also because groups in the region form part of the minority in the country, political leaders from the majority groups such as the Hausa from the north and the Yoruba people and Igbo people from the south have refused to maintain the prior formula. Thus, as minorities in amalgamated states tend to be marginalized and excluded, this has certainly been the case in the Niger Delta region.

This situation has been further exacerbated by predatory neo patrimonial practices of leaders who consider only the plights of people or groups from whom they gain massive support. These groups are largely from their ethnicity and thus they tend to favor these groups with developmental assistance and other services to the detriment of minority groups such as those in the Niger Delta region.

Despite resentments that the region does not benefit enough from the oil wealth -but instead the benefits are used outside the region-, environmental degradation, poverty escalations, and failed expectations have also been key motivations. Inhabitants in the

region have complained over the years about environmental hazards that have come with this resource. As noted by Afinotan & Ojakorotu (2009), before the discovery of oil in the region in the 1950s, it was a 'pristine environment' which was blessed with a fertile land surrounded by a river body. Indigenes were involved in subsistent farming and at the time had the largest commercial fisheries industry.

However, the discovery of oil in the region has brought along its baggage of environmental hazards with oil spills being a major pollutant to the water bodies in the area. Despite these pollutions, there have been fewer attempts and insufficient compensation towards communities in the area as well as no plan for a better social corporate responsibility on the part of MNC's in the area.

Furthermore, like many oil-producing areas, there are always great expectations when oil is discovered. For this region, especially because it was in very large quantities, expectations have always been high among the communities in the region. Oil discovery ideally should come with development in adjacent areas, including massive infrastructure such as roads and railway lines, harbors, etc. As in other parts of the world, they also come with social corporate responsibilities on the part of MNC's in the oil industry present in the region. Sadly enough, those expectations have not been met by either the federal government who gains much of the revenue accrued or the MNC's, causing direct damages to lives and the environment in the region.

In recent years, violence has become the order of the day in that region, which has been either overlooked or belittled - especially when the federal government of Nigeria and

the international community are more interested in the north of Nigeria where terrorist cells including Boko Haram's activities largely take place.

According to the Niger Delta Annual Conflict Report in 2019, there were about 416 violent incidences in the region that resulted in over one thousand deaths and in 2018, 351 incidences of violence were recorded with 546 resultant deaths (Campbell 2020). The report identified the rise in violent crimes based on cult clashes and land disputes in the area. These cults are quasi-criminal/ religious/ethnic militias and are normally well connected. In a more recent report in 2020, there continued to be an increase in violence in the region with communal conflicts which include robberies, clashes between rival gangs, ethno-nationalist agitations etc., (Niger Delta Annual Conflict Report, 2020). Fatalities related to robbery activities were about 341 from 219 incidents. Clashes between rival gangs also resulted in 204 fatalities from 78 reported incidences and ethnic tensions recorded 130 fatalities in 87 reported incidents in the region (ibid).

The abundance of natural resources (especially oil) has become less of a blessing and more of a curse in the region to the extent that there is massive corruption and misappropriation of public funds and revenue that accrue from them with little or no development in most part of the region. This has contributed to the lack of trust in governments and the loss of hope of any sustainable forms of development in the region as well as efforts towards the increased insecurity in the area. The region has become a haven for all sort of activities including criminal organizations, gangs, armed militias, separatists as well as terrorist cells whose aim have been to take their share of the national cake if it is not forthcoming from the government. They do these through armed robbery, kidnaping

employees of MNC's in the oil and gas industry, breaking into oil fields illegally for oil bunkering, and extortion in the region. In 2019, two Royal Dutch Shell oil foreign workers in the Niger Delta were kidnapped and before that year, four Britons were kidnapped in that same region leading to one losing his life (Busari & Adebayo, 2019). While governments over the years have not done enough and continue to lose the trust of citizens, there is also little to no trust in its security apparatus to protect people and property in the region.

Aside from the fact they the state's security apparatus is under resourced and highly incapacitated; they have been very inefficient in protecting individuals and businesses from criminals and militant groups. They have also been ineffective and are under staffed to protect MNC's and their assets as well as their employees. These chronic limitations have necessitated the need for individuals and businesses who can afford private security services to act. MNC's have also resorted to efficient and large-scale private security companies (PSC's) to protect their assets and employees across the region. This has been the case since the first most extensive PSC involvement in Nigeria's oil sector which was when OSL went into a contract with Chevron Nigeria Ltd in 2002 (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005).

In Nigeria, private security companies (PSC's) are legally recognized and backed by law to play major roles when it comes to security in the country. Despite the fact that CAP 367 laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1990) under the Private Guards Company Act prohibit private security companies from carrying firearms in the discharge of their duties, they are authorized under section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Act to make arrests and

hand over offenders to the police within 24 hours (Igbo & Chinwokwu, 2020). It must be noted that, PSCs in Nigeria are obligated to work hand in hand in a support role with the police; thus, although they are prohibited from carrying firearms, they still have a lot of important functions when it comes to security. Ekhomu (2005) and Igbo & Chinwoku (2020) further note that other functions of PSCs in Nigeria captured by law include joint police/PSC patrols, forensic analysis, guarding, watching, cash-transit-protection and crime prevention activities etc.

PSCs' incorporation into the Nigerian State shows the relevance of Abrahamsen's and Williams's global assemblages' theory. Although the State holds a formal monopoly on the use of force, its unreliability and untrustworthiness in the eyes of the citizenry delegitimizes this authority. However, although private security is an alternative, they have been further qualified as a legal alternative and are thriving because the State has seen its potential benefits and have allowed it to thrive under its watch. This says a lot about the Nigerian government's general insecurities and as scholars such as Reno (1998) and Patrick (2006) have noted, it also shows how the Nigerian State is a weak and fragile one where monopoly on the use of force is almost lost, and thus employs privatization of security as a survival strategy for the state to maintain this monopoly in order to aid in managing internal threats such as those in the Niger Delta region.

According to the PSED (Private security events database), Avant and Neu (2019) note that from 1990-2012 PSCs in Nigeria were found to have been involved in 113 events. They describe events as a kind of occurrence in which private security companies were involved. It captures riots, crimes, plots and violence. According to the data, it was noted

that PSCs within the period per the total events captured were 62.5% involved in providing site security. These include protection of assets and oil fields of MNC's who operate in the Niger Delta region. It was also noted that the majority of clients of these PSC's were commercial clients followed by civilians, making up 34.9% and 19.8% respectively. Figure 10 depicts a snapshot of the data captured in the PSED on Nigeria.

Figure 11. The Private Security Events Database. Source : Avant, D., & Neu, K. K. (2019).

In a fragile context such as the Niger Delta region, MNC's, businesses as well as the rich/big men who are mostly connected to or are employees in the oil and gas industry as well as politicians who are able to afford are able to purchase the services of PSCs for personal protection and protection of properties. As private security companies are profit minded businesses, they operate by the market hand of demand and supply and thus go where the bills can be footed.

Importantly, these group of people are a small minority of the region's people. The majority of civilians in the region who are poor are unable to secure these types of services and thus are left to the wrath of militant groups, criminals and gangs who exhort and from

them. Even when it comes to security provision for everyone in the region, majority of the inhabitants who have no hand in the situation of insecurity are still marginalized, excluded and left to their own destiny. Over the years, this has led to the rise of vigilante groups or informal community protection groups in the region (International Crisis Group, 2017; Agbu, 2017; Amao & Maiangwa 2017; Bappah 2016).

It is undeniable that some of these groups have become more of the problem than the solution to the insecurity in the region. However, we must note that in the area of providing community protection they execute those tasks for the benefit and in the interests of their communities, who are mostly poor and rural. Of course, one may say this protection may come at the detriment of another group (outsiders); however, that will not be the focus of discussion here. The essential point for our purposes is that these vigilante/informal community protection groups emerge to protect lives and properties of their communities. This is reaffirmed in research conducted by Asuni (2009) in partnership with the Council on Foreign Relations' Africa. The research found that motivations for the emergence of these groups include citizens' fear for their personal safety following threats from criminal/gangs/militia groups in the region or even the government security agencies and their continuous abuse of power. Additionally, it was also found among other things that the desire to avenge the death of friends and family members due to the constant insecurity in the region have contributed to the emergence of these groups. Thus, despite the fact that these groups have often metamorphosed into criminal groups and muscles for hire by politicians, as elaborated in previous chapters, they have been beneficial in their role of protecting communities unable to purchase the services of PSC's.

Another issue which is important to note is the linkage to ethnicity and ethnic allegiances when it comes to these security providers. The feeling of vulnerability without being able to protect oneself, family, or community in a fragile context such as in the Niger Delta region can inform decisions on the emergence of these groups. According to scholars such as Hilde Johnson, ethnicity becomes the only 'institution' that is trusted in such a context (Johnson, 2015). As the popular saying goes, blood is thicker than everything else. During times of violent conflicts, this is critical: you are less likely to be killed by your kin and it is quite rare to hear that people from the same faction have murdered each other during conflicts. Thus, it makes sense that these vigilante/informal community protection groups can only thrive when they are formed on ethnic lines either to target another group or protect themselves against the other as is the case in the Niger Delta region in which amidst tensions with the government, there is intracommunity as well as intercommunity insecurity issues which have existed since the pre-colonial period (Ojo, 2020; Asuni, 2009).

Additionally, ethnicity when well organized becomes the only guarantee for protection in fragile contexts. In such contexts, people are likely to organize at the basic level to protect themselves and these groups are easily legitimatized because they are considered reliable to the extent that the aligned community tends to cooperate with the group even when they are committing illegalities. So far as the community is thriving and secured, people are content even if it is at the detriment of another group.

In Nigeria in general, Ogbozor (2016) notes that although vigilantism/informal community protection groups are not officially recognized by laws, some do operate with state security services and their impact is widely felt across the country in both positive

and negative ways. Thus, despite the baggage they come with they continue to play a key role in fragile contexts in the country.

Also important is that private or non-state security providers such as vigilante groups have been allowed to operate by the state, supporting Abrahamsen's and Williams's theory on global assemblages and the fact the private security services are being utilized and have been imbricated into the State because the Nigerian government over the years has decided to let them operate.

5.3.2 North-Eastern Nigeria

Like the Niger Delta, this part of the country experiences persistent challenges of deep poverty as well as insecurity. The region has experienced clashes between herders and agriculturalists since independence which have ended up in a continuous series of violent incidents. These herders and agricultural groups are largely affiliated to particular ethnic groups and thus reflect a region where some ethnic groups have been constantly at loggerheads since pre-colonial times. In recent times, the region has even become more insecure that it has been in the past. This is especially because of transnational actors and their terrorist activities.

A popular and ruthless one is Boko Haram who have been operating in Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe and Borno states in the North-East. Their activities have also had enormous ripple effects on other parts of Northern Nigeria. Neighboring geopolitical zones such as North-Western and North-Central Nigeria have been turned into a 'theatre of war

where, states like Sokoto, Zamfara, Kaduna and Katsina have become a rendezvous for bandits, kidnappers and a host of hoodlums' (Ojo, 2020). The ripple effect of this group goes beyond international borders into neighboring countries such as Chad and Niger. The group's aim is to reject westernization of the North-East region and to remake the region as an Islamic state. This group gained international attention in 2014 when it kidnapped over 200 female students from Chibok Secondary School in Borno State. The group continues to exist and terrorize people in the region through suicide bombings, mass murder, kidnapping, proliferation of dangerous weapons and other illegal activities, thus worsening the existing insecurity in the region.

The Northeast region borders Chad and northern Cameroon. It comprises of six States with over 100 different ethnic groups who speak several diverse languages. Among these ethnic groups, the main ones are the Hausa and the Fulani.

Figure 12. Map of Nigeria showing the six States in the Northeastern Zone. Source: Saddiq, Abdullahi et. al (2019)

The region is far poorer than the rest of the country, with some of the poorest health and economic figures in the world. Its economy is in decline as a result of deindustrialization and a lack of investment in its agriculture industry which is where most of its inhabitants make their livelihoods. The persistent social and economic inequality has exacerbated the vexation of insecurity throughout this geopolitical zone (Amao & Maiangwa 2017; Bappah 2016; Deckard & Pieri 2017; Fasakin 2017).

According to Ojo (2020), the few wealthy groups are becoming richer, while the ever-increasing assemblage of impoverished people is thriving in lack. Despite the fact that since independence, most of the leaders of Nigeria have come from the North there is little to show for it. During the country's authoritarian phase, military leaders such as Shagari,

Babangida and Abacha were in power for some time. However, because of predatory neo patrimonial practices, only a few in their circle as well as family and friends gained from their looting. Massive corruption and looting were the order of their regimes and Abacha in particular was alleged to have siphoned over USD 1 billion through capital flight into tax havens in Switzerland. According to Transparency International (2008), US$723 million illicitly acquired by Abacha's family was returned to Nigeria from Switzerland in 2006. This is laudable, even though it is nowhere near the amount Abacha is reported to have stolen and deposited in the Swiss bank alone. In this region, like in the Delta, the majority of inhabitants feel marginalized and excluded due to neo patrimonial practices of their leaders.

A research project sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2017 aimed at tracing the root causes of extremism in Africa, where more than 350 apprehended extremists from Nigeria, Uganda, Somalia, Niger, Cameroon, and Kenya were interviewed. It was discovered that there was a feeling of deprivation and marginalization as well as that their governments over the years have failed them, which have made them easy recruits for terrorist organizations (Ojo, 2020). Even more importantly to our research study, the UNDP study also found that 78% of the extremists had no trust in political office holders, police or the military. This is also the case in the entire region especially because the situation in the North-East continues to intensify and spread into other regions of the country, but the government's overall response has been haphazard and ineffectual.

Oarhe's (2013) work also sheds light on how neopatrimonialism through personalized relationships has emboldened many politicians from the north to be very corrupt as well as use public offices for private gain with no accountability. This explains why the rich continue to get richer and the why there is a huge economic and social gap between the haves and the have-nots in the region. Anti-corruption efforts over the years, as Oarhe (2013) notes, have been thwarted by these leaders and big men benefiting from the system, thereby preventing accountability. This has further diminished public trust in the government and law enforcement agencies, including the state security apparatus and the judiciary. Neopatrimonialism in the North, where the conflict stricken north east region is located, has discouraged ethics and accountability and encouraged marginalization, factionalism and massive corruption.

The result of these conditions, aside from economic hardships, is that youth in the area are jobless and seek justice because of how insecure the terrain has become. In the midst of massive criminal activities and extortion from gangs and militias, there is the issue of terrorism. Although terrorist groups such as Boko Haram are in conflict with the government, such warfare is asymmetric in that parties of the conflict - in this case is the Boko Haram and the Nigerian government - differ significantly in power, strategy and tactics. While State forces tend to operate within conventions of war, this group operates however they want and in recent times have targeted the poor and vulnerable people and cities through acts of terror to make a statement to the government. These acts of terror have exacerbated the already existing hardships in the region, in that, despite the fact that the area is underdeveloped and lacks basic infrastructures and facilities, the little that exists

is being destroyed by these terrorists. This has prevented people in the region from going about their efforts to put food on their tables, including plant and animal farming.

The government of Nigeria as well as other countries in the region such as Cameroon continue to push back against Boko Haram. Nigeria especially is doing this with the help of private security services. In Cameroon for instance, due to the partitioning and border engineering of post-independence African States, hinterlands in the far north that share a border with North-east Nigeria have been ungovernable. These are where these terrorist organizations hide out. Interestingly, because of porous borders across the sub-Saharan region as well as ethnic partitioning spreading ethnic groups across several countries, cross-border movement back and forth is easy for terrorists, making efforts to combat them arduous.

A major private security company playing a massive military role in the Nigerian government's fight against Boko Haram is S.T.T.E.P international (Specialized Task, Training, Equipment and Protection) group which has roots in the infamous and dissolved Executive Outcomes (EO) security firm. The S.T.T.E.P is currently led by Eeben Barlow and the group has been working hand in hand with the Nigerian security apparatus since 2015 to deal with the Boko Haram menace. There is a view that, after several months of the private security firm's involvement, the dynamics of the conflict have effectively turned in favor of the Nigerian government. Through the joint operation between the State and S.T.T.E.P, territories Boko Haram had initially captured have been regained. Had it not been for the involvement of this private security firm and others, such success would not have been possible.

Scholars such as Varin (2018) also note that aside from the S.T.T.E.P there are Ukrainian, Russian & Israeli military PSCs who have been involved in the fight against Boko Haram in the region. However, their role has been more on training the Nigerian security apparatus on counter-insurgency measures. According to Adamo (2018), since the involvement of PSCs in the north east of Nigeria, there has been a substantial decline in the number of casualties linked to Boko Haram's terror, although they continue to operate in some parts of the region.

Despite the successes chalked up in addressing insecurity in the region by these private security providers, insecurity problem in the north east of Nigeria does not only include terrorist activities. Because the government has been concerned about Boko Haram for years, other security issues that are also present due to the chaotic environment have been ignored. Criminal organizations continue to operate amidst the operation of Boko Haram and thus have necessitated the organization of vigilante groups to join both in the fight against Boko Haram and also against crime in the region.

In an International Crisis Group Report on Africa in 2017, it was found that vigilante groups in the north-east of Nigeria have been very resourceful and vital to the successes chalked by the joint security forces against Boko Haram. These groups have been credited for providing local knowledge, intelligence and manpower towards the successes chalked over the years in the fight against Boko Haram. These vigilante group are typically made up of hunters and the youth in local communities. The report notes that many youths join these vigilante groups largely because they fear the jihadists as well as the state security services who have been known to violate human rights in these fragile situations (ibid). It

is even worse when one of their own is killed as they tend to mistake any young and able man near the area of the occurrence for a member of the terrorist group.

Also, importantly, many of the youth have joined vigilante groups in the area in order to contribute to the protection of their communities and families in the hopes of mitigating crime and terror of any kind so that inhabitants can return to farming and other economic activities that used to be their sources of livelihoods.

Despite the fact that vigilantism is not officially sanctioned by the laws of the country, the Nigerian State in its efforts to mitigate insecurity in the north eastern region has come to regard vigilantism in the area as vital to the survival of the state. Thus, over the years it has financed these groups with monetary incentives as well as logistics such as patrol vehicles to aid them in security provision and assistance in the fight against Boko Haram. Even more interestingly, in July 2013, the then president of the federal republic of Nigeria -Goodluck Jonathan- praised the efforts of the vigilante groups in the region and referred to them as the "new national heroes" (ibid).

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the country of Nigeria, and further examined two case studies within the country to analyze the relationship between the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning and how it has contributed to insecurity in the region, as well as most importantly how this insecurity has been worsened by bad leadership practices that have undermined trust in the State and its security apparatus. This analysis has shown how these

insecurity issues have become endemic and led to several challenges for the federal government as well as businesses and civilians in the region. Given the fragility in these regions, alternative forms of security service provision have come to the fore. They have bolstered government capacity thanks to its decision to see private security services as more of a blessing than a threat, thus utilizing its benefits while regulating some parts of it to reduce its disadvantages.

From this chapter we have seen that both the Niger Delta region and the North-Eastern region of Nigeria face similar issues and a few key differences. Both regions have been a product of pre-colonial legacies in that, in the Niger Delta, groups that make up the region have been at loggerheads even before independence. Yet, these diversities and animosities were ignored or overlooked in the creation of the region and the states within it. This is the same in North-Eastern Nigeria where even in the pre-colonial era, ethnic groups who are largely herders have constantly clashed with neighboring ethnic groups who are largely agriculturalists. As a matter of fact, this narrative runs through several parts of the country as well as in other parts of the sub-Saharan region in Africa.

Additionally, both regions have experienced the negative effects of predatory neo-patrimonial practices where marginalization, favoritism, nepotism and massive corruption have resulted in chronic underdevelopment and deprivation of basic social needs of the ordinary people in the area. Both regions see a government that has failed them and this has led to an increase in crime, gang related clashes and secessionist movements, including groups in the Niger Delta that have echoed the Biafran movement as well as the Boko Haram -in the north eastern part of the country- who are pushing an Islamic State agenda.

These show a clear lack of trust in the government but have also raised security concerns for businesses, civilians and the government. This has necessitated the need for an alternative source of security especially because the State security apparatus is not trustworthy and often incompetent, under resourced and lacking in professionalism.

This chapter has argued that although these private security providers do come with some disadvantages, they have been very beneficial in these fragile case studies and aided in the protection of life of both the haves and haves-not amidst these tensions. This is all a clarion call to the Nigerian government that, so long as these underlying issues of neo patrimonial (mal)governance and distorted development exist, the resulting insecurity problems can never be done away with.

Undoubtedly, they cannot do much about the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning that has forced relatively incompatible pre-colonial neighbors to live together. However, if governance is recalibrated and made to benefit the people as it is supposed to, and if neopatrimonialism which is inherently part of the African experience is regulated and utilized properly, every group will be more content. It is largely about the political will on the part of leaders to make this happen. If the right number of resources are allocated to every area according to their needs i.e., which mostly include equal employment opportunities on an equal playing field, then, marginalization and the anger that comes from exclusion will diminish. This will enhance pan-Nigerian nationalism rather than ethnicity and consequently trust in the government and its agencies including its security apparatus.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis has explored why insecurity has been so prevalent and persistent on the African continent since independence. Undoubtedly, the causes of this misfortune have been both external and internal. The scramble for Africa during the 1884/5 Berlin Conference has left an imprint on African States till this day. Among activities that took place during this conference was the partitioning of the newly found lands in Africa by European powers. In an attempt to avoid clashes among themselves, they relied on short angles and straight lines to divide Africa among themselves. This was without regard to the people and kingdoms already on these lands. The effect was political territories which were made up of divided ethnic groups across several territories as well as the amalgamation of numerous and often disparate groups into various territories.

Unfortunately, these territories have been maintained and have become modern African States and thus after independence, animosities and incompatibilities that exist between and among some of these groups have persisted leading to several conflicts and widespread insecurity on the continent.

With this in mind, it is important to note that these colonial legacies cannot be the only cause of insecurity in Africa. Over the decades, leaders of African countries have continually demonstrated bad leadership through predatory neo-patrimonial practices and thus have lost the trust of their people. With insecurity being constant and the State unable to protect its citizens from the State itself as well as other sources of insecurity such as terrorism, crimes, kidnapping and violence, Africans have embraced non-state security

providers - i.e., private security services that include private security companies and informal community and vigilante groups - as a source of protection.

Despite the availability of these security providers, especially since the 1990's, it must be noted that their operations would not be possible without the support of the State and thus, as shown in sections of this study, African States have seen these non-state actors as beneficial and thus have allowed them to operate while in many cases also utilizing their services when the State's existence is threatened by transnational organizations such as terrorist groups.

To illustrate and support our hypothesis that private security services have become necessary due to the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning and bad leadership practices which has led to the lack of trust in African governments, we analyzed two case studies in Nigeria. In the Niger Delta region and the North-Eastern Region in Nigeria, we show how the amalgamation and forcing of ethnic groups to live in the same geographical region have brought about ethnic clashes. In the Niger Delta, this is evident in the creation of several ethno-militia groups such as the Egbesu boys, OPC, Bakassi boys etc. who in their negative capacities have become sources of ethnic clashes in the region. In North Eastern Nigeria, herders and agriculturalists have constantly clashed with each other. Herders are largely from the Fulani ethnic group as against other ethnic groups in the region who are largely agriculturalists.

Furthermore, while these clashes have not decreased, bad leadership practices in the country have rendered both regions very poor, marginalized and excluded from opportunities by successive governments. Through predatory neo patrimonial practices, the

rich continue to amass wealth and the poor continue to be very poor. Despite serious agitations since independence the trend has not changed much and thus trust in the State and its agencies has severely waned. These conditions have contributed to high crime rates, secessionist movements (e.g., Biafran movements, Boko Haram etc.) and violent protests in both regions exacerbating the insecurity issues already present in the country.

While the insecurity in both regions continues to be problematic to lives and properties of civilians and businesses alike, the power and authority of government is also threatened by these issues. While the state apparatus lacks capacities in terms of adequate logistics and professionalism due to neo patrimonial practices, it has been filled with clients by successive governments. Abuse of power and unaccountability is the order of the day and these have further diminished the trust of the citizens in them.

The rich and well-to-do in society as well as MNC's and other businesses have resorted to private security companies to fill this gap and protect their lives, lives of family members and employees and their assets. The Nigerian government itself has relied on these companies for essential security tasks in order to maintain state authority. While these non-state actors are present, they are regulated under Nigerian law and are thriving because the State allows them to operate.

Despite these PSCs' contribution to security, the poor, marginalized and excluded communities in these regions are unable to utilize their services and thus rely on informal vigilante groups. These groups are beneficial in protecting the communities they originate from but are also a threat to outside communities. During elections, politicians utilize them in political aggrandizement. Although one can say they contribute to the insecurity in both

regions, they are undoubtedly also a vital security provider for poor communities. In recent years, they have assisted the government in chasing Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria and without their knowledge of the territory and their inside information, fighting this terrorist group would have been much more arduous for the government.

Although these private security services (especially informal community protection and vigilante groups) need better, more structured and transparent regulations, that is a topic for other researchers to investigate. I am convinced that the double-edged character of these security services is quite problematic for security presently as well as in the near future; however, this research study has shown why they (informal community protection groups/vigilante groups) have nevertheless become very important security providers.

Most importantly, this study has shown that there is indeed a causal relationship between the colonial legacy of ethnic partitioning of Africa and lack of trust in the State - due to bad leadership practices -that have contributed to the constant insecurity in Africa. These have made private security services unavoidable or a necessary evil on the continent.

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