Dialectics Of Family Identity

by

S. Nik Rattan

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts

at

Dalhousie University

Halifax, Nova Scotia

August, 1989

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Signature of Author

Dedicated to my mother Ajit and my father Mohindar.

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Abstract

The early Critical Theory position on 'the family' is examined in light of contemporary critical and feminist positions. It is necessary, this analysis reveals, to be constantly aware of ideological representations of 'the family'. Socio-political ideologies can dominate individuals through the implicit and explicit creation of expectations about family roles, interactions and structures. The psychodynamics of socio-political and patriarchal domination are examined to further an analysis of how normative expectations, often based on patriarchal assumptions, can lead to the oppression of individuals --particularly women and children-- in family settings. By recognizing that a multiplicity of family forms exist that are in constant dialectical relationship with changing socio-political forces, a less distorted understanding of family life might be obtained.

A concept of family identity is developed to understand how socio-political forces interact with familial understandings and affect individuals psychologically. Family identity is defined as: the interpretations and understandings that individuals have of the emotional relationships between their self and family. A dialectic that is central to family identity is that of family as lived experience-family as representation. Self-identity is in constant dialectical relationship with family identity. The implications of a self-identity that is construed dialectically as autonomous-interactive are examined in light of family identity. The family problems of distorted communication and marital violence are interpreted using family identity. How family identity might inform emancipatory praxis is briefly explored.

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"Only Distance Is The Antidote To Estrangement"

T. W. Adorno

Dialectics Of Family Identity

Introduction

During these troubled and often confusing times, 'the family' exists as a chameleon that rapidly shifts from one form to another depending on individual life circumstances. Structural and developmental changes in a particular family may alter individual interpretations and understandings of family life. For instance, a single parent family may turn into a 'nuclear' family or the breakup of a marriage may lead to the creation of single parent and blended families. An individual's understanding of 'family' may radically change in the course of a few years or even months. Aside from differences in family structure, how individuals experience family life differs from one situation to another. One family setting may consistently provide a secure and stable environment while another may be predominantly tense, hostile and threatening.

Although there is a multiplicity of family forms and individual's family experiences may differ markedly --even within the same family-- common assumptions about an ideal family form and normative family experiences permeate the social fabric. A topic that

elicits many disparate interpretations and opinions, conflicting ideas about 'the family' abound in all spheres of life. Family life has been studied and analyzed from various theoretical traditions. It is becoming clearer that much research on families is based on certain normative assumptions. When it is assumed that a particular form known as 'the family' exists to be studied, an ideology of 'the family' is perpetuated. Ideological factors sustain a valued image of family life. Whether such an ideal resonates with the actual lived experience of families is important to explore. Ideologies misinform theories and public understandings of family life, for a particular structure and certain experiences are then believed to be uniformly characteristic. Not only is it problematic to consider the family in a unitary or systematic light, but it is also misinforming to think of families as distinct entities, somehow independent of socio-political and historical factors. By recognizing that a multiplicity of family forms exist that are in constant dialectical relationship with the changing forces of society, a less distorted and less ideological understanding of family life can be gained.

In this thesis, the term "families" is employed to represent the dialectical relationship between

individuals in family settings, and their social and political context. These relationships between individual family members, between individuals and society, and families and society must always be held in focus. How the tradition of critical theory has interpreted families is drawn upon in order to assess how changes in society have effected families and individuals. As a socio-psychological treatment of the family, early critical theory has attempted to trace the changing dialectical relationship between families and society. Important insights that early critical theory on families have provided are situated in light of contemporary feminist and critical positions.

Families reside in a space of tension between individuals and society. The critical theory of society has traditionally conferred to the family a mediating role between individuals and society (Jay, 1973, Poster, 1978, Held, 1980). The dialectical relationship between individuals and society can be mediated by families, but such mediation has declined markedly over recent years. This decline in mediation is tied directly to political and historical changes in society that have changed family dynamics and structure. This is not to say that family life is devoid of any independence from society. Rather "social dynamics" and

family dynamics reciprocally effect one another (Held, 1980, p. 127). Social transitions have had complex psychological implications, and in turn these changes at the psychological level affect society.

As families have become less distinct entities between individuals and society, they have simultaneously become increasingly vulnerable to social and historical influences. According to the Frankfurt School, families have traditionally served "contradictory functions and needs" (Held, 1980, p. 128). The focal point of fundamental oppositions, family settings readily impart contradictions into the psychological experiences of individuals. Such contradictions are largely due to the "relentless separation between...productive work and domestic life" characteristic of this era (Kovel, 1978, p. 12). Indeed, this chasm between the public and private spheres has also rendered the individual more vulnerable to social and historical influences. Ideologies that perpetuate an ideal family form, patriarchal values, and normative expectations about family roles and interactions are related to the belief that families are privatized and distinct spheres, separate from socio-political and historical factors. However, it is argued that on the contrary, the public

sphere is invoked in the dialogue and interactions between family members.

Families are situated in the midst of "the central contradictions" of Western society (Kovel, 1978, p. 12). This location has shrouded "personal life [more] than any other historical factor of the entire era" (Kovel, 1978, pp. 12-13). In our times, deeper global understandings coexist with deeper contradictions in experience, and "the markers of once secure identities, public and private" are constantly "displaced, shifted, overturned" (Elshtain, 1982, p. 5). The experience of identity in the 'private domain' is the focus of this thesis.

Based on a review of critical and feminist positions on families a concept of family identity is developed. It is a position that attempts to understand how individuals and families are dynamically related to their socio-political and historical context. The concept of family identity is developed because it may be a useful way to interpret how the various dialectical relationships that are implicated in family life are experienced psychologically by individuals. The interpretation and understanding that an individual has of his or her family can be seen as inextricably bound to individual life experience and the social and

political construction of that experience. It is argued that an essential aspect of families, that is operative in daily life experience, is the understanding an individual has of his or her family in relation to his or her self. This is termed family identity.

Family identity is developed as a dialectical concept. The individual's cognitive/ideological representation of his or her family is one pole of the dialectic. The other pole is the individual's lived experience of his or her family. Family identity can be seen to oscillate between these poles. This strategy, it is contended, allows a way to investigate how changing socio-political factors influence the individual's interpretation of his or her family.

The dialectic of family as lived experience-family as representation is central to the concept of family identity. This dialectic may allow for a useful way to analyze the extent to which an individual interprets his or her family through the lens of ideological representations. Notions of ideology, as pointed out, create expectations regarding the appropriate family form, family experiences, and family roles. It is argued that many socio-political ideologies that are aimed at families and at individuals can influence family dynamics and create family problems. This may

relate to how an individual's interpretation of his or her family as lived experience contradicts his or her inculcated normative expectations. It is possible that if different family members hold various and conflicting expectations, some of which reflect their lived experience, some of which do not, distorted communication or other problems may occur. It is necessary to discuss self-identity in conjunction with family identity. One's understanding of self is in dialectical relationship to one's understanding of family. It is argued that one's subjectivity --consciousness-- is at times informed more by family identity than by self-identity. This implies that there are occasions when the individual experiences his or her self through his or her understandings and interactions with family.

It is argued that how an individual understands his or her self also exists within a dialectic of lived experience and representation. How an individual interprets and understands his or her self will have a significant influence on his or her experience of family identity. In particular, it is argued that if an individual understands their self as 'connected' and in relation to others, he or she will have a less distorted understanding of family. By understanding

their family largely through their interactions with family members they will interpret their family more in terms of actual lived experience. If, on the other hand, one understands their self as separate and 'autonomous' from others, they are more likely to understand their family in terms of socio-political representation and normative expectations. It is possible this would lead to a distorted understanding of family. Some theorists have pointed out that women predominantly understand their self as connected, while men predominantly understand their self as autonomous. These differences have important implications for how women and men understand their family. It is contended that an understanding of self as interactive allows for a better understanding of family, however, because of prevailing ideologies and power/authority relationships, this understanding is not legitimated.

Prevailing ideologies of the 'self' tend to create an ideal of autonomy. It is contended that this ideal is problematic for both men and women, but because women's experiences are more likely to contradict this ideal they may experience their self as problematic. An understanding of self as autonomous may lead to a family identity that is more governed by representation. It is argued that if individuals

interpret their family predominantly in accordance with ideological expectations, and find that their expectations aren't met they may take upon a distorted understanding of the authority that is socio-politically legitimated. Such individuals may be more likely to dominate others in the family setting.

The implications of family identity for understanding problems in family settings is explored. How it can be used to interpret problems of distorted communication and violence is briefly examined. As an interpretive strategy, family identity has implications for gaining a deeper understanding of family dynamics, how individuals subjectively experience family, and how socio-historical changes effect family interactions. An implicit belief that runs throughout this thesis is that family identity has an emancipatory potential. This is conceptualized in terms of emancipation from more specific problems that families are having, and a more general resistance from socio-political forces and ideologies.

The thesis is divided into four chapters. The chapters are entitled: 1. The Early Frankfurt School Position: The Inculcation Of Domination In Family Settings; 2. Socio-Political Domination Of The Individual In Family Settings: Critical Positions; 3. Dialectics Of Family Identity; and, 4. Family Identity As An Interpretive Strategy.

Chapter One: The Early Frankfurt School Position: The Inculcation Of Domination In Family Settings

I. The Early Frankfurt School And The Family

Early critical theorists considered the family to be an "agency of society" that played a crucial mediating role between the individual and society (Horkheimer, 1972; Jay, 1973; Poster, 1978). The dominant figures of the early Frankfurt School (1), Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, attempted to integrate Marxist and Freudian theory in order to explore the dialectic between the individual and society, and their interest in this integration is attributed to the early work of Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm (Jay, 1973; Held, 1980). The Frankfurt School study of the family's "modern transformations" was important to the synthesis of psychoanalytic and critical theory. This synthesis allowed the Frankfurt School to "counter both positivistic social science and an overly optimistic faith in the future" (Norton, 1982; Elshtain, 1982).

According to Horkheimer (1972), the family's mediating function had diminished markedly due to social and historical change. Writing as they were in the midst of the Fascist regime in Germany, Horkheimer, Adorno and the Frankfurt School attempted to understand how it was possible that such a nightmare could erupt. This

context directed Horkheimer's attention to a diachronic study of the family: from the classical bourgeois family to present familial forms. Exiled from Nazi Germany, the relocated Frankfurt School continued their reflection on the family and personality in America.

The essence of Horkheimer's argument was that the classical bourgeois family produced a character type that both necessarily resisted social and historical influence and served society's interests. This character type, essential to maintaining the social order, was manifested through the individual's "capacity for authoritarian attitudes and behavior" (Held, 1980, p. 126). In families, a "psychic economy" created character structures that allowed the individual a "reflective distance" between his/herself and "aggregates of social power" (Norton, 1982, p. 255). This idea of a "psychic economy" refers to the maintenance of balanced emotional relationships between individuals in traditional bourgeois families. Such an emotional balance provided the individual with feelings of security and stability, and the capacity to resist socio-political pressures. This fostered the establishment of a "reflective distance" between individuals and forces of "social power" creating the potential for individual meaning and freedom.

In contemporary times, familial forms and activities have weakened and disrupted the family's "psychic economy". This resulted in the "relatively unmediated integration of exposed psychic contents into the iron cages of the totally administered world" (Norton, 1982, p. 255). Adorno's metaphor for the contemporary prevalence of bureaucracy, the "totally administered society", creates an image of human existence as ordered and regulated by the rationalization of social life. Such rationalization refers to how the different areas of social and personal existence have become inundated with "administrative and political domination" through "organizational techniques" fostered in various social institutions (Benhabib, 1981, p. 42). This inundation has occured as "science and technology" have been implemented to "dominate external nature" and also "control interpersonal relations and manipulate internal nature" (Benhabib, 1981, p. 42). The desecration of the family's "economic, educational and psychological" functions (Benhabib, 1981, p. 42) place the individual in the palm of the social apparatus. In terms of assimilation and resistance, diachronic changes have "now assimilated the individual into society" (Norton, 1982, p. 255), bureaucratizing emotional experience and quelling resistance in one fell swoop. This has

rendered the individual less capable of experiencing freedom or meaning (Benhabib, 1981, p. 40-41). Such an analysis rather dramatically evokes the Marxist undercurrents of the Frankfurt School position.

Nonetheless, it is an accurate observation in that individual personality structure was shown to be vulnerable to changes in family structure, changes that rendered the family and the individual open to the powers of social authority. These changes at the psychic level of the individual were due to the "erosion and collapse" of the family and not traditional family "authority" (Lasch, 1977, p. 85). Significant political implications for the individual have issued out of these changes for "instead of liberating the individual from external coercion, the decay of family life subjects him to new forms of domination, while at the same time weakening his or her ability to resist them" (Lasch, 1977, p. 85). The individual, removed from the sheltering "psychic economy" of the bourgeois family, had supposedly lost the ability to reflect on the conditions of a better future, and could no longer resist the predominant social forces and ideologies.

This position is exemplary of the Frankfurt School's tendency to oversocialize the experience of the

individual. In effect, they create an image of an individual who no longer can make decisions on the basis of self-determination or meaning. As a result, they do not sufficiently theorize the individual's capacity as a social and reflective being. Nonetheless, the Frankfurt School position on the family is worthy of consideration, for it locates a number of important issues that a contemporary analysis of family life must grapple with. For this purpose, Horkheimer's early essay on 'the family' is analyzed, for it is representative of the Frankfurt School position (Held, 1980; Poster, 1978; Lasch, 1977).

During the 1930's, a major study of the family was initiated by the early Frankfurt School theorists at the Institute for Social Research. According to Horkheimer, Studien uber Autoritat und Familie (1936) was carried out because the family played a significant role in mediating between the experiences of the "material substructure" and the abstract representations of the "ideological superstructure" (Jay, 1973, p. 124).

Through an historical discussion of culture and authority, Horkheimer situated the family among the relationships that have existed between the individual and authority. Although Horkheimer's formulation is

somewhat dated --he tends to hypostatize gender roles, and focuses mainly on the father-son relationship-- a number of important issues arise out of his essay. These issues touch on many of the central problems with the traditional patriarchal family structure, problems still experienced in contemporary society regardless of what forms today's families take. These problems include: the increased vulnerability of families to social and historical influence and the related socio-political domination over the individual; the patriarchal oppression of women and children; the private/public dichotomy's deleterious effect on family privacy; and the contradictory and declining functions served by families and their effects on family relationships.

These issues will be discussed in light of contemporary critical and feminist positions on the family, and will illustrate the shortcomings of Horkheimer's arguments while bringing his insights up to date. The discussion falls under two general headings: 1) Familial Socialization: Socio- Political Domination of The Individual; and 2) The Socio-Political Construction Of Family Relations and Individualism. The first heading will be dealt with in this chapter and heading two will be discussed in the next chapter.

II. Familial Socialization and Socio-Political Domination

A. Contemporary Relevance of Horkheimer's Position

Horkheimer examined the socializing function of the family in order to situate it among the relationships that exist between the individual and social authority. He explicates this socializing role in terms of the conscious and unconscious influence the family has on the "psychic character" of individuals. He believes that the family reflects the specific needs of society, the most significant being the creation of a person that is capable of being dominated and dominating.

The wishes of men and women are given form by the "active educational forces" within the social context, while the child's "capabilities are shaped" by familial processes throughout his or her development (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 98). "Reality is reflected in the mirror of the family circle", thereby playing off the growing child's experiences (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 98). The family, in its position as a crucial "formative" site, ensures "that the kind of human character emerges which social life requires" instilling the capacity for "authority-oriented conduct" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 98).

Held (1980) believes that Horkheimer's position gives the family the role of an "agency for identity" (2). Poster (1978), however, feels that his view gives the family the function of "little more than a conservative socializing agency". Poster (1978) believes that Horkheimer uses an analysis similar to that of Talcott Parsons; however, "the implicit acceptance of [Parson's] functionalist model precludes taking either an interpretive or critical approach to the family and its relation to politics" (Elshtain, 1982, p. 1).

A functionalist approach would assume that there exists a "stable congruity or fit" between the economy and the family (Elshtain, 1982). As will become clear later, Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School do not embrace this standpoint. Rather, they view the family-society relationship as a dialectic of tension. However, as Elshtain (1982) notes, the "self-understandings" of the individuals in a family are not given sufficient consideration by the Frankfurt School. As will become clearer in the next section, Horkheimer was also guilty of adopting stereotypical gender roles in his explication: he ascribed an authoritative role solely to the father while focusing mainly on the father-son relationship. Such shortcomings notwithstanding, it is

important to examine what relevance Horkheimer's position holds for contemporary society.

Horkheimer contended that in the development of the "authoritarian character" failure was "individualized" under paternal "pressure", thereby repressing the social creation of problems (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 109). Failure was "hypostatized in religious terms as sin or in naturalistic terms as deficient natural endowment" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 109). In psychoanalytic terms, this redirected significant libidinal "energies" that ought to have been aimed at social causes but instead were internalized as "bad conscience".

The psychological consequences of the "bad conscience" fostered in the family became a means of social coercion. The problematic nature of family relationships, and failures in the public domain, were considered to be the "individual's failure". In contemporary times this was experienced as "a compulsive sense of guilt, taking the form of a continual readiness to be sacrificed" that rendered "fruitless any criticism of the real causes of trouble". (Horkheimer, 1973, p. 109).

According to Lasch (1977, p. 91) the Frankfurt School conception is no longer relevant to a contemporary

analysis of the family for he feels that present society no longer depends upon "authoritarian character structures". The family's imbuing of a "capacity for suffering" and the rationalizing of "injustice as religious guilt" was formulated, according to Lasch, "at the historical moment when guilt, as a means of social control, became obsolete" (1977, p. 91). Lasch too hastily dismisses the Frankfurt School position, and his periodization of guilt is problematic.

The concept of the authoritarian personality may have held more relevance as an analysis of the fascist state; however, the insight that the individual is dominated increasingly by society due to changes in the family's structure and functions is crucial to any contemporary analysis. Moreover, in Horkheimer's words, failure is hypostatized not only in religious terms but also as "deficient natural endowment". The crucial point, for present circumstances, is that problems that may be due, in large measure, to socio- political forces are experienced and justified as personal problems. The changing nature of the psychodynamics of this relationship will be examined shortly.

Poster's (1978, p. 56) contends that Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School had a problematic concept of family structure based on the notion of individual autonomy as

an emancipatory ideal. However, Poster locates "Horkheimer's individualism" in a passage where Horkheimer defined authority, and not individual autonomy as an emancipatory concept (3). He attempts to seek out an implicit "individualist-rationalist norm of autonomy" in Horkheimer; however, his misreading is due to Horkheimer's narrow emphasis on the father's significance in the family setting. Horkheimer, moreover, had illustrated that socially created problems were experienced as individual failure and therefore his concern was with emancipation from this type of repression. He does not envision this freedom in individualistic terms for he clearly repudiates individual autonomy as an emancipatory ideal in various parts of "Authority and The Family". "The principle of self-blame will show essentially its negative side as long as it does not take on, in the majority of men, its more valid form: a living awareness that in each member of a self-determining human society that all happiness flows from work in common" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 109).

Poster, in effect, simplifies the dialectical nature of Horkheimer's analysis of the individual, the family, and society as they exist in dialectical relationships of tension. Such a formulation must focus necessarily

on the contradictory nature of the individual's conscious and unconscious experiences in social life. Poster (1978) may have misread the critical intent of Horkheimer's dialectical contradictions. The centrality of identity to life experience is undeniable, and the necessity for understanding the social norms and practices of one's environment equally important. Moreover, the two processes --identity formation and socialization-- are inextricably bound and occur largely within the family setting. Poster and Lasch may be downplaying the complexity of authority relationships in society. For although Horkheimer consciously stresses the family's socializing role, he accurately points out that the microstructure of the family is infiltrated by the ideological superstructure. Indeed, in the contemporary family, parents and children alike are increasingly confronted with societal pressures as the domestic space loses certain protective capacities. It is necessary to remain aware of the hegemony of family relationships based on gender and age, for notions of "protective" can take on a different meaning if, for instance, one considers the asymmetrical experiences of the wife and the husband. However, even in light of such prevalent inequality in the private sphere there may have been moments of genuine collective security and resistance

to socio-political forces, during certain family experiences. Although relatively rare, even under present circumstances the potential for collective resistance in family settings exists. In Horkheimer's (1972, p. 114) words, public realm competition and "market" relations are opposed in families where the inspiration of "the dream of a better condition for mankind [sic]" still occurs. In the administered world such utopian "ideas and forces" although "not dependent on the family in its present form and, in fact, are even in danger of shrivelling up in such a mileau" simply have no other space in which to "survive" (Horkheimer, 1972, pp. 114-115).

B. The Psychodynamics of Socio-Political Coercion

In describing the psychodynamic changes in the nature of the relationship between the society and the individual, Lasch (1977) rejects the emotion of guilt as a "significant means of social control". He believes that in late capitalist society "the authoritarian family" is no longer a viable family form and that "the individual's emancipation from the family makes it impossible to appeal to his guilty conscience" (Lasch, 1977, p. 91).

Lasch's assertion that the individual is 'emancipated' from the family, although cast ironically, is a suspect notion. This is because even as family life fragments and loses important formative grounding, certain ideologies of "the family" keep its emotional influence viable. With respect to changes at the emotional level, guilt may have lost its primacy as a means of coercion. However, Lasch (1977) replaces the coercive role of guilt with that of the more autonomous, self-centered emotions of "shame, self-interest, and enjoyment." Society's appeal to "narcissistic" emotions and motivations may serve to dominate the individual but such prodding occurs predominantly at the conscious level. Lasch's formulation does not take into consideration the unconscious dimension of social control and thus becomes nondialectical.

The fact remains that domination occurs in part because societal factors in individual failure and success are repressed in favour of individualistic explanations. Therefore, Horkheimer's critical formulation has contemporary relevance. The importance of guilt as a means of social coercion is still relevant when one considers the prevalence and resurgence of various religions and their popularized manifestations. It could be argued that the televangelist is drawing on

the viewers "guilt" to keep him or her engaged in his sermons while evoking donations via guilt manipulation. Indeed, a variety of social agencies rely on the philanthropic sensibilities of the populace and tap into the individual's guilt that arises, in no small measure, due to the ideology of individualism.

Drawing upon the Critical Theory tradition, Kovel (1978) advances Horkheimer's spirit in important ways. Most significantly for this discussion, Kovel extensively analyses the unconscious, which Horkheimer stressed the importance of but only superficially examined. Kovel explicates how the administered society of today uses subtle forms of coercion to subvert resistance and dominate the individual. He brings to light a necessary emotional component of being dominated, that of desire, its negation by society and its consequent repression. He believes that administration "captures the desire" of the individual and negates it, thereby dominating the individual (Kovel, 1978, p. 7). During instances of love, "the one who loves the more is the weaker" and since administration does not want or recognize emotion it "remains the stronger so long as a glimmer of desire comes toward it from the human subject who is its object" (Kovel, 1978, p. 7). The social interactions

characteristic of bureaucracy reject important emotional aspects of subjectivity and this "leaves 'rationalization' if one takes an ahistorical view; administrative domination if one thinks dialectically" (Kovel, 1978, p. 7).

Such "rationalization" is what Lasch nondialectically delineates while Horkheimer, in fact, recognized the dialectical nature of this process. He believed that the diachronic changes in the family from the "absolutist to the liberalist period" resulted in the establishment of "authority" by appealing to "reason" as opposed to "obedience" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 109). However, he points out how the social creation of reason vis a vis "self- control", the work ethic, and certain value systems is often obscured by "religious or metaphysical ideology" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 101). This in turn creates the expectation that the family can always provide an education in necessary beliefs and actions. This becomes ideological, however, "in an age when the small family in most cases offers very inadequate conditions for human education as compared with the pedagogical possibilities present in society at large". (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 100-101). Horkheimer describes an historical and dialectical process. Moreover, he explains why certain implausible

ideologies concerning familial functions continue when the family has lost its ability to perform such functions.

Although the family carries out certain reproductive and domestic functions, it has lost much of the traditional private domain to the ideological superstructure. In virtually every aspect of its influence on the individual, the family is open to societal influence, and perhaps most significantly at the unconscious level. Therefore, contrary to Poster's criticism of Horkheimer, the family's role in contemporary society is, in fact, that of a "conservative socializing agency." Further, Lasch's assertion that in "western democracies the individual is 'emancipated' from the family" is also problematic. Although Lasch recognizes ironically that the individual's emancipation leaves him or her more fully in the grasp of socio-political forces, he does not sufficiently recognize the central role that family ideology plays in society.

In being open to societal influence the family is simultaneously no longer able to fullfill certain of its functions adequately, particularly those that are "countersocial". Such countersocial functions refer, in part, to the provision of an emotional space. Within

such a space, the individual does not have to conform to cultural pressures and could potentially learn to be more critical of existing socio-political conditions.

Kovel (1978) discusses how social forces in contemporary society impinge on the individual in the congealed form of an "administrative mode". This administrative or bureaucratic mode is seen to inoculate the private domain, engaging the individual directly at the psychic level. Various aspects of "social coercion" unify in a certain epoch as they are subsumed under a "bureaucratic mode" which ministers "public life" to individuals in Western society (Kovel, 1978, p. 6). This bureaucratic mode works at implicit and explicit levels and is experienced directly as "a dialectical compound of an established reasonableness and fairness on the one hand, and a certain mysterious inexorability on the other" (Kovel, 1978, p. 6). The production of "an epistemic illusion" results from the rationalization of existence in that "the more efficient, planned, scientific and immediate domination becomes, the more general, impersonal and anonymous it seems" (Benhabib, 1981, p. 42). While perpetuating the economy, this administrative mode acts as an ubiquitious "cultural influence" and "infiltrates every

pore of personal existence...beginning with the family" (Kovel, 1978, p. 6).

The dialectical nature of the administrative mode of an "established reasonableness and fairness" articulates with Horkheimer's "reason" and Lasch's "self-interest" while the pole of a "mysterious inexorability" parallels Horkheimer's "religious or metaphysical ideology". Using traditional psychoanalytic topography, Held (1980) discusses how the "bureaucratic mode's" dialectical nature is experienced by children. The moral or regulatory conscience of the superego, increasingly "the representation of collectivities" and less of parental authority, serves to thwart ego-development (Held, 1980. p. 132). This means that the individual's capacity for abiding by self-chosen values and morals, or those of his or her parents, is radically undermined. In essence, the ego's role of mediator between the id and superego no longer sufficiently develops and this parallels the erosion of the family's role as mediator between the individual and society.

As the child adapts to "external authority that is more powerful and less spiritual, less internalized than parental authority ever was" he or she became fearful and submissive to bureaucracy (Held, 1980, p. 132).

Since one does not develop from a fear of their parents to a state of rejecting such fear, "internalization fails and an autonomous ego is not formed" (4) (Held, 1980, p. 132). An identification with "external forces, the culture industry and other authorities" translates the individual's fear into "demands and prohibitions" (Held, 1980, p. 132).

This fear, that Held considers a "motivational" force that is not negated, coexists with certain urges (toward the parent) during infancy that are negated. As Kovel (1978, p. 10) observes, a level exists in the human psyche that contains the "empty unstructuredness of an original craving fused with the assignment of agency or structure to an unspecified other". This early experience most often occurs between mother and infant and is repressed from consciousness as the infant moves through the process of self-other differentiation. This is typically referred to as the "preoedipal phase", and experiences during this period are considered to reside in the unconscious of children and adults alike. Kovel accords an "historical specificity" to the act of repression, and feels that it "reflects the individual's internalization of the prevailing mode of social relations" (1978, p. 10). Modern-day repression synthesizes the rudimentary

aspects of "the self" and present-day bureaucratic administration (Kovel, 1978, p. 10). Between the undifferentiated self and administrative domination "lie the intermediary structures of everyday life and their subjective correlates" such as the family (Kovel, 1978, p. 10). Kovel thus believes that "individual history" dynamically relates to the repressed pre-self experiences and social forces (1978, p. 10). This explication offers a useful perspective on the repercussions of fragmented ego development for the individual in contemporary society. By describing how a relationship exists between the repressed pre-self experiences and socio-historical pressures, the conscious experience of everyday life can be visualized as precariously balanced between the two.

Kovel allows us to bring the Frankfurt School theory into a more truly dialectical light. The individual has a personal history that relates to his or her pre-symbolic experience of family. Such experiences will always influence the individual's symbolic confrontations with the deluge of social forces. There is, then, an internalization of early parent-infant (predominantly mother-infant) interaction that is engaged by socio-political forces, just as a more

conscious experience of administrative coercion takes place because of unmediated identification.

It is important to emphasize that the "preoedipal phase" and its negation supports and reinforces the socio-political domination of the individual. This is because, in these times of fragmented ego-development, the individual's intrapsychic capacity to contain repressed preoedipal experiences has disintegrated. The individual, in dire need of emotional security, is drawn into the seemingly supportive administered order. Thus this blindly coercive situation is met with little conscious resistance for the individual's need for security is embraced --to the detriment of his or her development. It is essential to note that socio-political domination is deeply inculcated because it has engaged a domain that is outside of the realm of cognitive symbols and therefore 'reality'. As Atlas (1985, p. 177) writes of Freudian and Piagetian developmental perspectives, "self-other differentiation is the basis for our experience of a reality, i.e. of a world that is substantial, spatial, causal and temporal". Because administrative forces have tapped into repressed experiences that occured prior to self-other differentiation, they can hardly be combated: this domination occurs at a level that the

individual does not consciously or symbolically acknowledge. It is important to recognize that the process of self-other differentiation occurs differently according to gender. Freudian and Piagetian perspectives on development are problematic for various reasons. Gender differences are examined in the next section and in following chapters.

According to Kovel (1978, p.11) the pre-oedipal experience is both "historical and transhistorical", the latter holding true because of its presymbolic "removal from the historical system of significations". The fact that there exists a pre-symbolic phase during which "the self" has not yet been "constructed" via signifying processes is extremely significant (5). It is this phase of the undifferentiated self that gives domination a "transhistorical" quality. Such transhistoricity is not an absolute, however, and must be viewed dialectically in relation to historical factors.

In summation, Horkheimer provided an historical and dialectical formulation of how socio-political forces are experienced in the family setting, act to dominate the individual, while countersocial functions of the family dissipate. The conscious experience of domination is augmented by the declining

internalization of parental authority and the increasing assimilation of societal administration, due to a displacement of fear --and the lack of its negation. However, the element of fear does not escape internalization entirely, for as Kovel's Marxist-object relations formulation points out, the pre-symbolic phase of parent-child interaction, although repressed, is operative in the daily coercion of the individual. Although the Frankfurt School seems to privilege the superego's influence over the individual, while Kovel is concerned with the id's influence, both point out how ego-development has been severely curtailed in contemporary society. The historical-transhistorical nature of such processes must be carefully examined, and one such aspect includes the gendered dimension of the socio-political coercion of the individual in family settings.

C. Psychodynamics Of Patriarchal Oppression

A multiplicity of voices resound over various issues surrounding the complexity of patriarchal oppression of women. The family is one of the major focal points for feminist theory and praxis. It is at one and the same time --at least in contemporary history-- the locus of women's oppression and the most significant locus of

women's identity. Women's experiences of family life are radically diverse, as are their respective experiences and interpretations of their oppression.

It is apparent that an emphasis on the personal and subjective aspects of power relationships is both necessary and problematic. Books published in 1970 by Kate Millett and Shulamith Firestone --Sexual Politics and The Dialectic Of Sex-- provided a much needed focus on personal experience and its politicization. However, their focus tended to obscure socio-political factors of domination in its emphasis on familial patriarchy. Marxist-feminists, on the other hand, provided a necessary recognition of economic and historical factors of patriarchy that dynamically affect the family. However, this tended to obscure the psychological intricacies involved in human development, and the importance of these psychological factors in maintaining patriarchy within familial and societal settings. A deeper subjectivity is what sustains the socio-political status quo, and it is at conscious and unconscious levels that such forces operate. A psychodynamic feminism is therefore essential to an understanding of the patriarchal domination of women and children in family settings.

A feminist analysis of family psychodynamics was developed by theorists such as Juliet Mitchell, Dorothy Dinnerstein, and Nancy Chodorow, each of whom adhered to certain assumptions. They all believed that "the unconscious was central to human life, that a difference existed between biological sexuality and the organization of gender, and that child-rearing arrangements were important, as was the family, to the construction of gender identity" which instigated and perpetuated patriarchy (Flax, 1982, p. 239).

Juliet Mitchell's Marxist-Feminism contains a very important psychodynamic moment. By asserting that the psychoanalytic theory of development should be considered as grounded in "patriarchal relations rather than biology" she made a significant contribution (Flax, 1982, p. 240). However, her construal of the unconscious relied on a "symbolic, structuralist interpretation", one that rendered it asocial ahistorical, and nondialectical.

The women's movement provided essential impetus to the recent psychoanalytic interest in the "mother-infant" bond for such theory "did not emerge from intrinsically scientific deliberations, but followed the political fortunes of women" (Kovel, 1978, p. 16). Nancy Chodorow's feminist formulation of object relations

theory (6) allows for an indepth exploration of the subjective realm of power relationships, which serves to expand the realm of subjective experience.

Differentiation from the mother is experienced differently by male and female infants, resulting in a "reinforcement in boundary confusion in female egos and boundary strengthening in males" (Hartsock, 1987, p. 167). The process of individuation is more intense for male children for it occurs abruptly and "because both mother and son experience the other as a definite "other" (Hartsock, 1987, p. 167).

The infant's first experiences of dependency and of desire occur within the mother-infant relationship. As we develop into children, adolescents and adults these early experiences stay "alive in the unconscious in the form of fantasy, feeling states and desire" (Flax, 1982, p. 245). It is within mother-infant relationships that a common "human dilemma" is first encountered, that of "the desire for mastery and creativity versus the fear of responsibility" (Flax, 1982, p. 245). The early helplessness and "fear of the mother are repressed", but because it is predominantly women who are responsible for infants, and the common existential "dilemma" is rarely confronted, human problems are generally attributed to women (Flax, 1982, p. 245).

The blaming of women for human problems is, of course, truly distorted, particularly when one considers the horrendous damage to humanity and the earth instigated and maintained by males. Chodorow asserts that the female identity as "mother" and the male negation of "relatedness" is not because of biological reasons. Rather it results from "certain forms of family relations that exist within a specific social context" (Flax, 1982, p. 245). The psychological basis for differential gender roles in later life results in women having much more potential for "intimate relations", while men "repress" such possibilities and direct their "interest outward" (Flax, 1982, p. 245).

Because of this relational versus non-relational distinction between women and men, it is possible that women and men have different needs to fulfill and are motivated to carry out certain types of actions that are governed by different morals (7). In psychoanalytic terms, super-ego development differs according to gender, however, the common observation that women have weaker super-egos is inaccurate (Stiver, 1986, p. 10). Rather, women's morality is oriented more "toward relationships and interdependence which implies a more contextual mode of judgement" (Stiver, 1986, p. 10). The relational needs of women are met through

motherhood, while the non-relational needs of men are met by activity in the public sphere and by manipulating women. Both women and men have unconscious strivings to perpetuate patriarchy, and the ensuing oppression of women. The necessity of consciousness raising as a means of bringing to awareness such hidden motivations and assumptions is readily apparent. Because gender and self-identity are inextricably bound, one's self-understandings change in relation to one's understandings of gender. Chodorow and Dinnerstein, by not focusing exclusively on "sex roles or conditioning", have conceptualized the extent to which "gender is intertwined with our core identity", and an explanation is given for "the male desire to dominate women" (Flax, 1982, p. 248).

An alternative, according to Chodorow and Dinnerstein, is that of the equal participation of women and men in child care. This alternative, they believe, would dissipate the relatedness-non-relatedness dichotomy differentially experienced by gender and in turn bring equality to the sexes. The extent to which their solution has been adopted, however, is not very encouraging, for the care of infants is still predominately a female responsibility. The essence of self-formation through preoedipal and oedipal (8)

dynamics continues to differ according to gender. Women are psychodynamically characterized by a complement between their actions and self-understandings, and because of this are more connected to both people and objects. Chodorow contends that the less abrupt experience of girls in "emerging from the oedipal period" insures that "empathy" is bound up in their sense of self, which makes girls "continuous with and related to the external object world" (Hartsock, 1987, p. 168).

Men, on the other hand, are predisposed to a rigid duality between their actions and self-understandings. This fuels the tendency for aggressive and destructive behaviors. Bound up in the boy's sense of self is a fundamental "differentiation from the other" which implants a "hostile and combative dualism at the heart of both male community and the masculine world view" (Hartsock, 1987, p. 169). In this type of theorizing, where rigid dualisms are proposed, there is a tendency toward a hypostatization of experience. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that Chodorow's formulation resonates with the cultural reality of male domination. However, other aspects of her theorizing are problematic because of a nondialectical approach. Chodorow provides an historically specific analysis; however, she does not

sufficiently situate "child bearing and rearing" socio-politically, for aspects of child care, women's work and the family have [and continue to] change" (Flax, 1982, p. 249). Her formulation of personality development does not provide an adequate understanding of how the family relates to other socio-cultural forms (Flax, 1982, p. 249). In addition, the preoedipal and oedipal dynamics are construed more dualistically then dialectically by Dinnerstein and Chodorow. Nonetheless they provide an essential understanding of how development differs according to gender, in both presymbolic and symbolic phases.

Kovel (1978) has attempted to situate "the interaction of social relations within the family with the forms of social relations outside it" which Flax (1982) considered necessary to an analysis of the family. Kovel (1978) also looks to preoedipal and oedipal dynamics in exploring the subjective realm of power relationships, and this serves to expand the realm of personal experience. He speculates that the relation between "oedipal dynamics" and preoedipal dynamics on the psychological level is "homologous to the relation between patriarchy and administration on the social level" (Kovel, 1978, p. 15). Because of historical forces, actual "parental influence" has dissipated

while society remains "structured by patriarchy" (Kovel, 1978, p. 16).

His argument is not based on a "politics of displacement" but instead attempts to understand patriarchal dominance as a societal-structural process that has been inculcated. This demands an interactional investigation between familial psychodynamics, reproduction, and production. It is to the "presymbolic" consciousness that Kovel turns --just as did Chodorow and Dinnerstein-- in order to explain the ubiquitous dominance that is characteristic of patriarchy. Rooted in presymbolic consciousness, and reflected in conscious life experience, patriarchy as an ideology continues to be perpetuated --despite its clearly prejudiced and destructive nature.

Ideologies often persist in the face of their obsolescence (9). As Kovel points out, the "oedipal parents" seem to remain within the individual's psyche, even as parental authority diminishes in contemporary society. He makes a distinction between "early oedipal neurotics" and "today's narcissitic neurotics" (10), and believes that the latter are more common because of the shift from declining paternal authority to "a more general fragmentation of relations with both parents" (Kovel, 1978, p. 16). Kovel believes that the presence

of the "historical-transhistorical dialectic" gives certain psychological strivings an "instinctual" quality. "What is 'instinctual' is a manifestation of that which is transhistorical clinging to what is historically passing away" (Kovel, 1978, p. 16). Historically left behind is "immediate paternal influence" while structures of patriarchy persist. This loss of parental influence leads children to reaffirm it as they "conjure up oedipal parents and relate intrapsychically to them" while security disintegrates underfoot (Kovel, 1978, p. 16-17). This intrapsychic dimension is instinctually experienced --an internalized 'second nature'-- as "the oedipal complex provides the subjective conditions for the persistence of patriarchy in the face of its historical obsolescence" (Kovel, 1978, p. 16-17).

However, the preoedipal formations, not amenable to direct objectification or symbolization, have transhistorical implications and particular historical relevance. This is reflected in what Kovel terms the "psychology of love". Preoedipal dynamics are involved in relationships of power and love due to "their dyadic, self-dissolving and pre-symbolic qualities" (Kovel, 1978, p. 17). Kovel's theorizing provides an essential aspect to the subjective elements of

domination (that of the non-signified). However, although he recognizes the symbolic-presymbolic dialectic, his emphasis on "preoedipal" psychodynamics tends to render abstract the gendered nature of oppression, while also obscuring its class and racial nature.

What Kovel provides is a conception of familial dynamics in the context of the present-day dissipation of parental authority. It is clearly an historical, social and political explication. However, his analysis tends to obscure the differential implications of the pre-oedipal dynamic: he contends that the essential nature of this experience predisposes women and men alike to succumb to an administered rationality, but does not explore how women and men experience this differently.

D. Horkheimer's Emancipatory Moment

His paternalistic emphasis notwithstanding, Horkheimer nonetheless recognized that it is through the mother's interaction with family members that forms of emancipation may be attainable. "Because it still fosters human relations which are determined by the woman, the present-day family is a source of strength

to resist the total dehumanization of the world and contains an element of anti-authoritarianism" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 118).

While Horkheimer focuses on the mother's connectedness with children during the symbolic phase, Kovel (1978, p. 17) notes that the mother's "actual behavior" during the presymbolic phase inspires both "the seeds of resistance as well as acquiescence" in the infant. He goes on to assert that "the refusal of history (the fount of the revolutionary impulse) is instituted in the preoedipal--and presymbolic-- experience of fusion with the mother" (Kovel, 1978, p. 17).

The harsh reality of conscious experience, however, appears to negate any unconsciously derived "refusal of history" such that patriarchal oppression continues. Aware of the prevalence of patriarchy -even as he at times perpetuated it in his theory- Horkheimer felt that the oppression of women's development in the private and public domains counteracts any potential emancipatory moments.

This problematic is, of course, prevalent today, and women are often trapped in a double bind of domination: "societal life is essentially managed by men, and the man is at the head of the family" (Horkheimer, 1972, p.

119). Horkheimer believed that the socially determined role of women that places them in a dependent position, serves to reinforce the existing structural inequalities.

In the present epoch, more women have moved into the public sphere, and some have succeeded in establishing themselves in professional and hierarchically strategic positions. However, their role in the private domain is either privileged --to the detriment of their careers-- or continues to unconsciously scrutinize and filter, potentially negating certain aspects of their public life. Many women continue to be under the surveillance of patriarchal expectations that have been deeply inculcated, such that feelings and actions that might further a woman's development may be denied or suppressed.

Even if consciously rejected, such social expectations and representations of the "domestic career" exerts pressure on women, and clearly directs many young women away from self- development and toward family life. Not that family life necessarily precludes women from self-development, but that it, more often than not, takes away many significant opportunities. This is particularly so when families continue to be structured and informed by existing "family ideologies". The

latter point is particularly relevant because even when family structures do not conform to certain ideals, the lived experience of individuals is nonetheless informed by certain ideological expectations. These expectations are modeled on idealized family structures.

How individuals, families and interactions are informed by ideologies is addressed in the next chapter. It will become clear that the increasing involvement of social forces in daily life experience creates normative expectations of feeling, thinking and behavior. These ideological influences on human existence serve to create illusions of privacy and security in family settings while obscuring the reality of socio-political domination.

Chapter Two: Socio-Political Domination Of Individuals In Family Settings: Contemporary Critical Positions

I. Socio-Political Construction of Family Relations and Individualism

The social and historical upheavels and rapid changes in contemporary society are reflected in the diversity of family forms that exist today, and the functions that they carry out. Horkheimer's understanding of the changing function of the family emphasized, as earlier discussed, its socializing role. Jay (1973, p. 126) believed that Horkheimer's essay and the Frankfurt School study allowed for the insight that "the transformation of the family's role in the process of socialization" had rendered the family less capable of "negative" countersocializing possibilities. This resulted in the "more direct socialization" of the individual "by other institutions in the society" (Jay, 1973, p. 126).

Such changes have not been accurately depicted or acknowledged by predominant social science and popular representations of family life and structure. Instead, 'the family' as an ideological form has in diverse ways obscured the encroachment of socio-political factors into personal life. In this chapter, forces of ideology are explored in relation to Horkheimer's insights into the dissipation of family life, and the concurrent rise

of 'individualism'. Contemporary critical positions on 'family ideology' are then examined.

A. Decline Of Family Life And The Illusion Of Individualism

Horkheimer attributed the disintegration of family life to economic changes in the Western world such as the "growth of large-scale manufacturing and increasing unemployment" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 113). These changes resulted in "the primacy of the political and administrative state apparatus over the economy, social life, and the family" (Benhabib, 1981, p. 41). Horkheimer believed that this accounted for the "state" increasingly taking over the family's educational functions while quelling "anti-familial" tendencies.

Although families still carry out such necessary functions as the "production and nurturing of children", these functions were carried out in an increasingly less satisfactory manner (Held, 1980). Contemporary predominant representation of 'the family' serves to obscure its ever-eroding capacity to carry out even its most basic functions. This is why it is necessary to be particularly wary of ideological forces as one theorizes about personal and social life.

Because individuals and families exist in a relationship of tension with society, it is necessary to avoid bridging the two realms together with prevalent ideological assumptions.

In order to hold the existing tensions between the individual and society in place, it is necessary not to hypostatize either realm. By the same token, one must avoid sociologizing the individual and psychologizing society. (The problematic nature of a rigid private/public dichotomy will be explored more fully in the next section). Domination exists in both spheres and, in effect, is manifested differently within the family then in the public world. This is not to say that the understanding of domination that occurs between, for instance, parents and their children is not operative in their understanding of domination in public life. It is simply a necessary psychological aspect to the functioning of coercion over the individual. "The spiritual world into which the child grows in consequence of his [sic] dependence, as well as the fantasies with which he [or she] peoples the real world, his [or her] dreams and wishes, his [or her] ideas and judgments, are all [sic] dominated by the thought of man's power over man, of above and below, of command and obedience. This scheme is one of the forms

understanding takes in this period, one of its transcendental functions" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 106).

The dependency relationship that occurs between infant and parent therefore fuels a necessary understanding of domination that will later be operative in the public sphere. It is extremely significant that Horkheimer speaks of the "spiritual world, fantasies and wishes, and ideas and judgements" of children for this provides the formative psychology of domination which, in effect, acts as a motivating force to view other people as objects over which to gain power (1).

However, the "spiritual world" of the child is precisely what allows the forces of society to engage the psyche of the individual, thereby both implicitly and explicitly creating an "identification" with the social coercion that occurs in family and public life. Social domination is thus "rationalized" as a necessary aspect of life experience. According to Kovel (1978, p. 17) the dissipation of parental authority corresponds to an intense "oedipal configuration of fantasy" that is not capable of supporting the individual's development. Rather, it is "preoedipal fantasy" that dominates in the individual's development and leaves the individual "subject to experiences of personal disintegration" (Kovel, 1978, p. 17). This reference to

"personal disintegration" relates to the fragmented nature of ego development in contemporary times. By re-experiencing the original fear and helplessness of infancy both through fantasy and in real experience, the lack of symbolic understanding of this fear is also re-experienced. The individual, then, is in dire need of security and direction. He or she will identify with the "classical 'positive' oedipal fantasies of conquest but with the 'negative' fantasies of a passive yearning for authority" (Kovel, 1978, p. 17). A "reality support" becomes necessary that takes the place of parental influence and interacts symbolically with the "passive yearnings" of oedipal and preoedipal fantasy (Kovel, 1978, p. 17). Kovel reasons that "administration" takes on this role of a reality support, which rationalizes the fragmented and chaotic external realm as "ordered reality". Simultaneously and just as significantly, administration corresponds to the deepest unconscious "strata of the inner mental world" (Kovel, 1978, p. 17). Bridging the "extremes of rationalization and irrationality" gives bureaucracy a certain relentless quality (2) (Kovel, 1978, p. 17).

The administered or bureaucratic mode has taken over a good portion of the family's socializing functions, and in so doing, has also infiltrated the emotional

dynamics of the family. Parents have become less and less "real" to their children, for reality is increasingly fabricated by the authoritative forces of society. The more detached family members become from one another, the more susceptible they are to socio-political domination. The repercussions of this are severe in that certain extremes of relating in family settings are more likely to be experienced. To risk generalization, these extremes can be visualized as a dialectic of family interaction: relating that is distanced, instrumentalized and stereotypical versus relating that is marked by insufficient distance, lack of distinction between self and other, and inconsistence (3). This dialectic articulates with the predominant ego or conscious mode of relating (instrumentalism), and that of preoedipal or unconscious relations (blurred self-other distinctions).

Kovel quite dramatically states that the basics of "family life in advanced capitalist society are psychotic" (1978, p. 17). This contention relates to the earlier research of "Lidz (1965)" which describes how problems of psychosis can result in families where "the distance between various members cannot be regulated according to the situation" (Dobert,

Habermas, and Nunner-Winkler, 1987, p. 288). Kovel believes that in the chaotic times of the present this inability to "regulate distance" has become commonplace. He attributes it to a "lack of distinction between self and other" in relations between parents and children, which renders the child less of an "autonomous individual" (Kovel, 1978, p. 17). It also renders the adult less "autonomous" and more dependent on his or her children in establishing a sense of self.

Not surprisingly, the family's dissolution in contemporary society has had equally disturbing effects on the lives of the elderly. For the socio-political destruction of certain characteristics particular to family life such as "local rootedness, religious justification or economic necessity" forces older people into nursing homes because they "no longer have their role to play in the circulation of capital" (Kovel, 1978, p. 13). The recent recognition that emotional and physical abuse of elders at the hands of adult children is a frequent occurence may be another consequence of contemporary family life. This may also be due to the extremes of relating instrumentally versus relating with diminished self-other distinction (4).

The private/public dichotomy has in many ways legitimated the social coercion of the individual, and creates tremendous distortion of relations among family members. As people feel "entitled to better lives" for both legitimate and ideological reasons, but are "systematically cut off from any real agency in public or workplace existence", they end up expecting family life to "fulfill unmet and historically expected needs" which often occurs "at the cost of the woman's individuality" (5) (Kovel, 1978, p. 14).

Horkheimer's conclusion to "Authority and the Family" is troped pessimistically. He believed that the "totality of [social] relationships" garnered strength and stability through "authority" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 128), the crucible of which was the family. In contemporary times, however, a fragmentation of life experience characterizes the one-time "dialectical totality of universality [society], particularity [family] and individuality" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 128). Such fragmentation occurs because the "dialectical totality" is now a "unity of antagonistic forces" out of which "the disruptive element of the culture" most readily resonates (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 128). Such disruptions will, out of 'necessity', be obscured by the socio-political reification of personal experience.

As Horkheimer (1972, p. 128) writes, "In the end everything about the family as we have known it in this age will have to be supported and held together in an ever more artificial fashion." The "artificial" support that Horkheimer alludes to finds its contemporary manifestation in 'family ideology'. It can be argued that, in the present age, it is 'family ideology' and not families themselves that provide individuals with a sense of security and identity. In effect, this 'ideological' support allows "disruptive elements of culture" to enter family settings undetected, and with dire consequences.

Indeed, as Kovel (1978, p. 14) writes, "The conjunction of the historical and transhistorical under capitalism devolves through the family to produce a host of damaged individuals". Changes have, as Horkheimer earlier argued, undermined the countersocial functions of the family, which in turn, serves to undermine the countersocial capacity of the individual. Even as "the idea of 'The Family'" paradoxically "promulgates the category of individualism" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 292), its existence as an ideology obscures the ostensible disappearance of 'the individual'. Similarly, psychological thought deludes itself by placing the "ego -or self, individuality, subjectivity" at the

fore- front of attention "just as in fact it is preparing to exit from existence" (Jacoby, 1975, p. 47).

The fragmentation of family life occurs with alarming frequency in this epoch, and is counterpointed with surprising alacrity by various ideologies and social agencies. Freedom from the constraints of the family may be genuine for some. However, as earlier noted, such freedom may be illusory and notions such as that of individual autonomy are problematic. The individual is at all times a social and historical creature, and the less aware of the socio-political determinants of her or his subjectivity, the less free the individual becomes. This relates to how transitions through time are in dialectical communication with the various relationships of society. For instance, change in the structure of the family is bound up with change at the ideological level.

The illusion of autonomy or emancipation is ironic, particularly when one considers the extent of present-day policing of subjective experience and how interactions are in turn subject to extensive regulation. It is necessary to provide a dialectical consideration of coercion. An understanding of how conscious experience is reciprocally reinforced and

contradicted by forces that operate unconsciously must be pursued. This will be discussed further in the next section and in Chapter Three.

II. Family As Ideology: Critical Positions And False Dichotomies

One can argue that 'the family' is nothing but a convenient representation that is evoked by a plethora of theoretical persuasions and strategies that converge and diverge, each seeking to arrive at the definitive statement on family life. In this light, the assertion that a form called 'the family' exists as opposed to recognizing that a multiplicity of family forms exist becomes an ideological statement. Everyone has not only an understanding of what form their own family takes, but also their own interpretation of what form families ought to take. Indeed, many dogmatically consider other forms of family not to be families at all. From the theoretician's perspective this is problematic. Ironically enough, however, theorists themselves often adopt a dogmatic stance. Such theories become ideological when they "present the social structure ahistorically, as a natural, inevitable, unchangeable or universal feature of human existence" (Poster, 1978, p. xix). It is especially problematic when such ideological theories become prescriptive in telling "us

that what we have is what we must have" (Poster, 1978, p. xix).

According to Bernardes (1985, p. 245), looking at the family as ideology has been either "systematically ignored by a majority of 'family' scholars" or "has been taken for granted by a minority". Barrett (1982, p. 85) believes that it is necessary to examine "the extent to which analyses themselves are constituted in political and ideological terms." It is ironic that theorists have examined family life using a particular concept of 'the family' but have rarely subjected this concept itself to analysis. Instead, most analysis turns into "a straightforward attack upon, or defence of, 'The Family'" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 275). Eichler refers to this as a "monolithic bias" in the "literature" that tends to examine 'the family' as a "monolithic structure" and focuses on a "uniformity of experience and universality of structure and functions rather than a diversity of experiences, structures and functions" (1988, p. 2). Aware that there are a multiplicity of varying family forms that "co-exist" in contemporary society, Eichler rejects the terminology of "the family" in favour of "families" or "familial interactions" (1988, p. 6). Similarly, Flax (1982, p. 237) writes that "'the family' does not exist" but is

instead a "series of social relations" which are "reified" into "social structures" thereby giving rise to an "abstract entity" known as "the family". Indeed, it is not only "structures" that differ between families but also the "experiences they provide for their members, ranging from the most emotionally satisfying to the most exploitative, brutal, and frightening types of interactions" (Eichler, 1988, p. 6). Thus 'the family' must be looked at from many distinct yet interrelated vantage points, such as "ideology, social and economic institution" (Barrett, 1982, p. 7), structure and experience. It is necessary, then, to situate an explication of the family as ideology in its socio-political and historical context. As Poster (1978, p. xviii) writes, "the family plays an important ideological role in the stability of the social system."

The inner world of family life and the outer world of socio-political public life must always be considered in any analysis of families. A dichotomy is, more often than not, taken for granted in theories of families, as is the convenient representation of 'the family'. The private world of 'the family' and the outer world of 'society' become hypostatized as opposing fields --the micro and the macro. This is problematic because while

they may be thought of as structurally distinct spheres --a chasm "that production under capitalism exacerbates" (Barrett, 1982, p. 89)-- the microsphere constantly evokes aspects of the macrosphere. Indeed, the latter is reflected in the psychology, discourse, and interactions of the individuals who are located in family microspheres. Moreover, microspheres are dynamically embedded within the macrosphere. One might just as easily refer to the private sphere as 'socio-political' family life. "In analyzing the significance --and oppressiveness-- of privitization we need to ensure that we do not reproduce at the level of theory a distinction that has been constructed historically and ideologically" (Barrett, 1982, p. 90).

There are a multiplicity of family forms and family lives that can be interpreted and analyzed, and as pointed out above, the public realm is manifested in the subjectivity, discourse and interactions of individual family members. Because of this, it is probable that the private/public dichotomy provides an elegant simplification that is illusory. This opens up an analysis that at times becomes contradictory: one attempts to understand "an ideologically constructed unity imposed on changing sets of heterogenous arrangements" and this unity --'the family'-- is acted

upon by capitalism in contradictory ways (Barrett, 1982, p. 91). Families are cultural forms that are dynamically entangled in socio-political intracacies; therefore, they cannot simply be discussed as static or categorical entities that are somehow suspended outside a social context.

According to Jacques Derrida, dualisms within theory and epistemology are problematic. Rather than being "obvious or value neutral" the use of dualisms in the social sciences typically privileges "one pole of these oppositions over the other" (Hoy, 1985, p. 46). Indeed, theorists tend to simultaneously "negate and preserve" dualisms and are faced with the "impossible position" of proposing "neither/nor, that is, either or" (Hoy, 1985, p. 46). Families are both subjective lived experience and also abstract representation --both ideological and cognitive-- and, as such, neither pole ought to be privileged over the other.

This non-privileging of dialectical poles is perhaps one of the most significant aspects of the Frankfurt School formulation. It is helpful to explore this critical aspect of the Frankfurt School tradition. Jay (1984, p. 87) conveys this in his reading of Theodor Adorno who "insisted on the ideological dangers of overcoming in thought what was still split in reality,

the antagonism between universal and particular". The significance of this cannot be understated, for the private world of family life is undeniably a different life experience than that of the public world. By taking these two realms and asserting that they somehow come together in a synthesis, so to speak, obscures, as earlier pointed out, the finer workings of domination. This is not to say that the private and public are hermetically sealed from one another, for that would simply contradict what has been written earlier. Rather, to explore existing tensions between society and the individual, it is important to retain the opposition between the two realms without turning this opposition into an absolute. This will allow a clearer understanding of how they do in fact interact, and Adorno asserted that it was necessary to remain true to life experience even as one attempts to understand it through social scientific representation. The dichotomy between sociology and psychology is "false" in that it motivates theorists to abandon the effect "to know the totality which even the separation of the two demands" (Jay, 1984, p. 87). However, Adorno also felt that this separation was justified "insofar as it registers more intransigently the split that has actually taken place in reality than does the premature unification at the level of theory" (Jay, 1984, p. 87).

In Chapter Three, the concept of family identity will be developed with the dialectic of 'family as representation- family as lived experience' in mind. An effort is made to conceptually enter the familial microsphere and allow the interpretation of aspects of "the larger order" implicit in the experiences and representations of individuals in family settings. This assumes that the individual family member is an historical creature who both subjectively experiences and is created by the 'fragments' of the cultural context within which they exist. Such contextual fragments may be understood in light of the individual's experiences within diverse settings such as work, school, family, and recreation. Equally important are ubiquitous influences on the individual that are not necessarily contextually circumscribed. These include various ideologies, forces of bureaucracy, media, geography, and so on.

It is therefore necessary to evoke, in the private sphere, those 'settings' that are typically viewed as public sphere locations. Individuals bring these settings -with all their complexity- into the family setting, while they also take the family setting with them into other settings. Perhaps the more accurate strategy, then, is to view the macrosphere as evoked in

various microsettings. Knorr-Cetina points out this method's usefulness in that "macrosystems may be represented as they are subtly imagined or registered within the ongoing life processes of an intensely studied and interpreted microsituation" (Marcus, 1986). Now that the problematic nature of the private/public dichotomy has been depicted, and a particular strategy has been adopted in relation to it, we can turn our attention to the concept of ideology and the ideological nature of 'the family'.

'Ideology' is a term that is often used when attempts are made to understand how aspects of the 'larger order' are represented on a subjective common ground or 'intersubjectively'. Bound up in the concept of ideology are dimensions of power, politics, and practicality. According to Meszaros (1986) "conditions of domination" could not be perpetuatued "without the most active intervention of powerful ideological factors on the side of maintaining the order in existence" (p. ix). Structural inequalities are in dialectical relationship with prevailing ideologies that mystify, leading people to "consensually endorse values and practical policies which are in fact quite inimical to their vital interests" (Meszaros, 1986, p. x). Similarly, Poster (1978, p. xix) contends that

ideology is constraining in its implication "that some groups of people cannot or should not attempt to remove some obstacle to their freedom."

Although competing ideologies co-exist, their situation is "decidedly non-symmetrical" as dominant ideologies have had an "immense practical impact...in a multiplicity of different societies" throughout history (Meszaros, 1986, p. xi). Ideology as a "distinctive type of consciousness" must be regarded as "socio-economically embedded and inherently historical/ transhistorical" (Meszaros, 1986, p. xi). The historical/transhistorical presence of the ideology of patriarchy serves as a good example of this. "Since the societies in question are themselves internally divided, the principal ideologies...must define their respective positions both as 'totalizing' in their explanatory claims, and as meaningful strategic alternatives to one another" (Meszaros, 1986, p. xii). Meszaros (1986, p. xiii) contends that it is not as abstract theory but instead as practical necessity that the "nature of ideology" is determined. This position differs from traditional notions of ideology as 'false consciousness'. As the typical citizen becomes aware of predominant ideologies, he or she fulfills "the imperative to become practically conscious of the

fundamental social conflict...for the purpose of fighting it out" (p. xiii). Indeed, the questions of what form the family ought to represent, what functions the family ought to undertake, and what forms and functions the family has represented and performed both historically and presently have been fought out at various times and places. The prevalence of this type of debate illustrates the nature and importance of 'the family' as ideology. Ironically, the extent to which such discussions do not resonate in family settings themselves may be another symptom of the ideology of the private/public dichotomy.

Depending on the political and ideological commitment that one has when analyzing family life, it is probable that one will fall within a number of presently viable approaches, two of which are briefly examined here. Peter Laslett's approach that "the nuclear family is suited to the functional requirements of the capitalist mode of production" emphasizes the actual functional existence of the private/public split (Barrett, 1982, p. 86). This position assumes that the chasm between the workplace and home "provides an integrated mechanism for reducing the worker's alienation and compensating for the cash-nexus character of capitalist society" (Barrett, 1982, p. 86) but disregards its

ideological implications. Alternatively, the Frankfurt School position, explicated in this thesis, and taken up presently by theorists such as Lasch and Donzelot, is that "the family has declined and much of its work is now undertaken by the state" (Barrett, 1982, p. 92). According to Barrett (1982, p. 92) "analyses of the relationship between family and state are linked to specific political positions" and such analyses are "dependent upon what 'the family' is taken to represent." Essentially, the debate surrounding the decline of the family assumes that "the family is the site of moral values" (Barrett, 1982, p. 93).

The ideology of 'the family' is both illusory and representative of practical reality. Barrett (1982, p. 21) notes how the Frankfurt School understood that family ideology is not merely "a synonym for illusion" because "like every proper ideology, the family too was more than a mere lie". Choosing to get married and raise a family is not necessarily "an artificial solution to 'false needs'" but may be a "highly rational choice" given the "material and ideological" advantages it sanctions (Barrett, 1982, p. 21).

Family settings can provide "emotional security" and a reasonable climate in which to raise children. It is difficult to discern, however, whether the above needs

and that of the "supportive intimacy" of marriage is "an ideology or the lived experience" (Barrett, 1985, p. 23). Moreover, parenthood and child-rearing activities are tied to "ideologically correct representation", as an ideology of "familialism" takes precedence over actual families themselves (Barrett, 1982, p. 24). This is related to the prevalence of social agencies and experts that inform spouses, parents, and children about 'normatively correct' procedures in child-rearing, marital and family interactions.

The image of the family is deterministic in both biological and moral terms. "The realms of the 'natural' and the socio-moral are nowhere so constantly merged and confused as in our feelings and thoughts about the family" (Barrett, 1982, p. 26). Family ideology, according to Bernardes (1985, p. 279), is "that varied and multi-layered system of ideas and practices which holds 'The Family' to be a 'natural' and universally present feature of all human societies, an 'institution' which is positively functional and the basis of morality". Deterministic stances seek to understand family life in causal terms. This is problematic for various reasons, particularly because it may serve to promulgate instrumental relations among

family members. This diminishes the opportunity for unique security and emotional intimacy that family settings might provide.

Many "bemoan the crisis and decline" of 'the family', but this is "misleading", according to Barrett (1982, p. 29), who ironically maintains that "it remains a vigorous agency of class placement and an efficient mechanism for the creation of gender inequality". In effect, "idealized family life" is a "focal point" for a number of societal ideologies, which "provides a highly significant, dominant and unifying, complex of social meaning" (Barrett, 1982, p. 29). Bernardes (1985, p. 280) locates "three specific and mutually reinforcing ideologies: 'family ideology', 'gender ideology', and 'work ideology'." He believes that their interaction is representative of the fundamental societal divisions between "the public and the private, the sexes, and labour" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 280). It is 'family ideology' that is the "keystone in, and the key to understanding, the present structure of interlocking ideologies that form contemporary dominant ideology" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 292).

Family "structure and values" are therefore inextricably bound to the "organization and ethos" of societal institutions (Barrett, 1982, p. 31). This

relates to the earlier analysis and rejection of an hypostatized private/ public dichotomy. Just as family life has its "social constructions" so is social life "familialized" (Barrett, 1982, p. 31). This is a compelling argument, particularly in relation to the concept of 'discursive fields'. This simply refers to how particular settings --fields-- evoke certain rules and understandings that provide a common ground for discussion. In any number of private and public settings, familial metaphors are used, and thus interpretations that relate to familial understandings have become relatively ubiquitious. For instance, the idea of the small business or bureaucratic department being a 'family' has important implications for how such individuals communicate with, relate to, and understand one another. It is ironic that the superficial, business-like relations that predominate in such 'public' family settings are also manifested in 'private household' interaction. Lasch (1977, p. 143) argues that "larger structures of domination have broken down the barriers that once insulated the family from market relations, invading the protective space formerly provided by the family for the young."

Indeed, the extent to which socio-political forces have infiltrated and now inform family life is undeniable.

Lasch and Donzelot invoke this infiltration in rather dramatic analyses of family and society. There are, however, important shortcomings to their approach in that they implicitly establish the "guilt" of the wife, and in effect blame women for the demise of the patriarchal family. Their positions are thus anti-feminist and conservative in that they romanticize the traditional family and patriarchy. Horkheimer also tended toward such romanticism, however, he clearly recognized the oppression of women and children in the traditional family setting.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, Lasch and Donzelot nonetheless provide an extremely important understanding of how socio-political domination is exerted through the family. They present the argument that an increasing "surveillence and control" of the middle class family has been exerted by medical/ therapeutic authorities (Lasch, 1977; Donzelot, 1979). This type of argument was popularized by Michel Foucault who believed that, in contemporary times, professional authorities --such as medicine and psychiatry-- have gained legitimacy and power because their "knowledge claims and practices (as) human sciences" have been "sanctioned" (Philp, 1985, p. 67). This has led to a "regime of power exercised through

disciplinary mechanisms and the stipulation of norms for human behavior" (Philp, 1985, p. 67). The privatization of family life coexists with the infiltration of family life by the "'tutelary apparatus' of the modern state" (Lasch, 1980). The 'tutelary apparatus' refers to a "social management through families" (Barrett, 1982, p. 97-98). Lasch and Donzelot link this "invasion" of privacy to an alliance that has developed between women and the 'medical' authority over the past century. Lasch believes that this alliance finds its modern incarnation in the relationship between women and the 'therapeutic' authority. In effect, families have been 'colonized' by the helping professions who provide prescriptions for everything from child-rearing practices to family interactions. The success of counselling and therapy acts as another ideology which "indirectly controls" while creating the image and the conditions of "private initiative" (Lasch, 1980, p. 30). The therapeutic plexus, then, leaves families "always 'justified' in theory and always suspect in practice" (Lasch, 1980, p. 30).

Barrett (1982, p. 32) contends that "the familial ideology is expressed in rigid stereotypes" and "is barely recognizable as having anything to do with the

families most people live in." Living arrangements of young single people, the elderly and many families, do not conform to the popular "imagery of the family" as typically "represented in the media" (Barrett, 1982, p. 32) and by government agencies and schools. However, practically every nuance of public existence is governed by the "assumption that people live in families" (Barrett, 1982, p. 77). Government policy and social expectation thereby privileges those who live according to a certain ideal of family life. Indeed, at the emotional level "the popular image of the family --the married couple living with their young children-- is constantly projected as the image of normality and of happiness -[which] makes everything else seem pale and unsatisfactory" (Barrett, 1982, p. 77). Even though occasionally contemporary media acknowledges the existence of alternative family forms, the prevailing ideology continues to hold legitimacy and center stage. The words of the family therapist Theodore Lidz capture this normative belief succintly: "My feeling is that for most people, without meaningful family relationships, and the feeling for children whom we must care for and help make life meaningful for, life will not seem worthwhile" (Poster, 1978, p. 125). This belief resonates most strongly with both young and older women, and older men.

The 'couples mentality' is deeply entrenched in popular images and social practices. The idea of the heterosexual couple articulates with "the cosy image of the family" placing "all other settings where people can mix and live together seem like second best" (Barrett, 1982, p. 77). Lifestyles that do not conform to that of the overvalued family ideal are "devalued" which "leaves other institutions stunted and distorted" (Barrett, 1982, p. 78). It is undeniable that family settings provide "intimacy"; however, by "privileging the intimacy of close kin" it renders other settings "cold and friendless" and thus "relationships of security and trust" are difficult to maintain "except with kin" (Barrett, 1982, p. 80). If families were not 'the' crucible of emotional support, intimacy and self sacrifice, such nurturance might be dispersed throughout the social world. According to Lasch (1977, p. 139) "the sexual revolution, the revival of feminism, the emergence of the counterculture, and the growing tolerance of 'alternate life styles' have not changed the arguments for marriage or the strategies designed to make it more attractive and durable." This is probably because of the tremendous power of the family ideal, as images of monogomous marriage and intimate family relationships permeate the social fabric.

The family as ideology, in true paradoxical form, "plays a vital role in sustaining an individualistic mode of thought in contemporary societies" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 281). This relates, in part, to family roles that are "unique structural locations which are occupied by individuals as individuals" who comprise an "irreducible human group" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 281). Moreover, symbolic interactions between family members are based on the distinction between self and other. In delineating the notion of "'I' and 'self' the idea of private ownership and property" becomes possible (Bernardes, 1985, p. 282). There is a correspondence between competition in public settings and the type of 'egocentrism' that is fostered in families. Similarly, the understanding of power that emerges in family settings is "built upon the individualistic elements of possession and ownership, competition and achievement" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 283). The instrumentalization of family interactions has been discussed earlier, and is certainly rooted in this individualistic aspect of family ideology. Similarly, the individualistic notion of "romantic love" is perpetuated by family ideology. Sexual relations between a heterosexual couple are often understood in the rationalistic light of "possession, power, competition and performance" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 283). In the 'privatized' domestic

space, such instrumentalized sexual intimacy could potentially lead to problems of violence. The general consensus that family life is carried out according to certain norms could, in effect, lead to the imprisonment of victims -behind the bars of normative expectation.

Family ideology places an "image or idol of 'The Family'" at the forefront of social attention instead of viewing "the reality of peoples' lives" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 288). This leads to a mystification of the "'lived reality' of our own lives" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 288). This, in turn, could lead to self-misunderstandings, and difficulties in interaction between family members. Indeed, "the idol may be so popular and powerful because there is, in the 'invisible' and private world of 'family' life, great opportunity to deviate from the public prescriptions" (Bernardes, 1985, p. 290). The prevalence of domestic violence and incest may operate, in part, because family settings provide a convenient facade of privatized bliss, while behind closed doors the 'tutelary apparatus' may be manifested in distorted ways.

The socio-political coercion of the individual in family settings operates both insidiously and overtly

in emphasizing 'family values' as moral ideals. The emphasis on intimate relationships in families tends to reduce possibilities of genuine human expression elsewhere. Consequently those individuals who do not live in family settings or are not part of an idealized family structure may feel inadequate. Moreover, they may not receive certain societal benefits that marriage, children and a household sanction. Not surprisingly, social scientists have upheld the ideology of the family, both in debates about its past, present and future relevance and in a focus on a uniform structure with particular functions and experiences. Interestingly, social science theory has translated into social practice such that normative prescriptions for family roles and interactions play an important function in daily existence. The potential misuse of family ideology has been tapped into by social agencies that regulate family interactions and practices, and by individuals who seek to mask a hostile and potentially violent environment. It is vitally important that the blanket concept of 'family ideology' be exposed as a complex issue in need of critical and ethical investigation.

III. Situating Horkheimer's Insights In Light Of Contemporary Feminist And Critical Positions

Horkheimer's essay provided some crucial insights on issues about individual and family life that are currently the focus of much attention. The traditional bourgeois family provided an education in domination and submission. According to Frankfurt School theorists, such paternal authority was internalized. With the rise of advanced capitalism, however, such "internalized" authority occurred to a much lesser degree. This was due to the dissipation of parental authority and socializing of children. Authority, then, was experienced as an ubiquitous and direct presence and individuals and families alike increasingly conform to external pressures. This coincides with the diminishing capacity for any "countersocializing" within the family.

It has been shown in Chapter One that because of the Frankfurt School's paternalistic focus, they marginalized the influence of maternal authority and nurturing --and paternal nurturing-- during infancy and childhood. It is therefore necessary to augment the Frankfurt School position with a theory of preoedipal (presymbolic) dynamics, and moreover to attempt to sketch out a more inclusive developmental theory of family interactions. This necessitates the exploration

of father-child and mother-child interactions throughout the child's infancy, childhood, adolescence and young adulthood. As Welton (1986, p. 240) informs us, such an analysis needs to be aware "that children and youth actively plot their social, economic and cultural strategies in the context of parental expectations, existing economic possibilities, and conditions of leisure and education." It is clear that to rely solely on parents' interpretations and understandings is problematic. It is essential to invoke children's interpretations and understandings of their interactions in family settings. Welton (1987) has termed the reciprocal parent-child interaction as one of "intergenerational transmission". He points to the necessity of understanding intergenerational transmission in dialectical relationship with "intragenerational transmission". Therefore, the interactions between spouses, and between siblings must also be considered. The gendered, class and ethnic nature of these interpretations and understandings also needs to be examined.

The arduous theoretical endeavour described in the above paragraph can hardly be attempted here; however, a potentially useful interpretive strategy is presented in Chapter Three. Family identity is offered as an

heuristic concept that may allow a way to tap into the individual's interpretations and understandings of his or her family. Because, as pointed out by Horkheimer, individuals and families are involved in a dynamic relationship with social, political, cultural and historical factors, it is necessary to attempt to conceptualize such diverse influences.

As became clear in the previous chapter the psychodynamics of socio-political coercion and oppression appear to engage the individual's repressed preoedipal/presymbolic experiences. Development out of the preoedipal phase differs according to gender. Females tend to develop a 'connected' sense of self, while males tend to develop a 'differentiated' sense of self. As Horkheimer and certain feminist and critical theorists have noted, because of historical forces, actual parental influence has dissipated while society remains structured by patriarchy. This has been linked to the transhistorical nature of the pre-oedipal dynamic. The historical shift has affected ego development such that the 'oedipal complex' may have been supplanted by a 'narcissistic complex'. This has resulted in a virtual lack of ego development as the individual in his or her fragmentary existence attempts

to eke out moments of 'autonomy' amidst a desperate search for security and guidance.

Horkheimer noted that domination exists in both private and public spheres, but that it is manifested differently. The formative psychology of domination occurs in the "child's spiritual world" and becomes a motivating force to view others as objects over which to gain power. However, this often differs according to the child's gender in that girls typically view others in relation to their self. Nonetheless a certain ideal of 'autonomy' and power is aimed at both males and females, while actual experience is often in contradiction to this ideal, particularly for women. Because of this, women have continuously been at a disadvantaged position, as are many males who do not or cannot conform to the ideal of 'differentiation'. This will be explored further in Chapter Four.

Kovel noted that oedipal and preoedipal fantasy are engaged by the 'reality support' of administration. The family's socializing function has been largely taken over and its emotional dynamics infiltrated by administration. Due to such historical changes, preoedipal dynamics come to the forefront, and this interferes with the development of the self. This has influenced family relationships such that interactions

are predominantly governed by the extremes of an instrumental rationality or a regressive lack of distinction between self and other. It is important to note that the latter situation differs from the 'connectedness' that is typical of female's identities and interactions, construed here in a positive light and developed in Chapter Four as a potential impetus for collective autonomy. Rather the 'regressive lack of distinction' is to be understood in a negative sense whereby interactions are no longer delimited by emotional or physical boundaries of any sort (ie: potentially leading to emotional or sexual incest).

The private/public dichotomy, not a rigid boundary, has had a deleterious effect on family relationships and women's oppression. This is partly because it is often taken for granted that this chasm is rigid, while factors that show the two spheres to be in dynamic relationship remain hidden. Indeed, the legitimation of privitization keeps many family horrors behind closed doors. In this sense, the private/ public chasm is very real. In addition, the predominantly gendered nature of domestic work has served to keep women disadvantaged economically and in some ways developmentally. It is probable, however, that aspects of the public sphere are invoked in the private sphere through the

subjectivity, discourse and interactions between family members. An example of this is how professional authorities have created normative ideals and 'prescriptions' for interaction that are reflected in family settings. A further example is that certain family problems may originate outside of the family setting but are only invoked inside of the family dynamic.

It is therefore necessary that the socio-political impingement on family dynamics be constantly held in focus. This requires an understanding of the diverse functions that 'family ideology' plays in this society, and a recognition that a reified form known as 'the family' does not actually exist. Instead a variety of social relations, and individual relationships comprise myriad family forms that are typical to Western society.

In Chapter Three, it will be argued that the concept of family identity is a useful way to approach such a complex and potentially confusing topic. At the psychological level of the individual family member, family identity incorporates certain dynamics of family interactions. Family identity also incorporates certain socio-political influences on the individual's subjective experiences of his or her family. The

earlier explication of family ideology becomes particularly important in this regard. Family identity then becomes a dialectic of family as lived experience-family as represented.

The focus of family identity is on the individual's interpretation and understanding of the emotional relationships between his/her self and family. This form of 'family knowledge' will probably differ between family members, however, some similarities may also be present. By bringing the individual's family identity to awareness and encouraging the communication of these interpretations and understandings between family members, important differences can then be contrasted. It is possible that this can provide a useful means to explore and interpret problems that are experienced in family settings.

Chapter Three: Dialectics Of Family Identity

I. Defining Family Identity And Its Dialectics

In contemporary Western society, family dynamics have become increasingly defined by socio-political and historical factors, and because of dynamic and structural changes, individuals are increasingly socialized by outside forces (1). This has, in turn, increasingly exposed family relationships to the influence of 'outside' factors. In an attempt to understand how these changes affect the individual in family settings at the psychological level, and thereby influence family interactions, a concept of family identity is developed.

Family identity is defined as an individual's interpretations and understandings of the emotional relationships between his or her self and family. It is contended that an individual's subjective understandings of his/her family have a reciprocal influence on his/her self-identity, emotions and actions in many social contexts. Self-identity has been interpreted variously. The present usage is most easily understood as: the sense of 'self' that an individual has through his or her interpretations and perceptions of his or her emotions, actions, beliefs, appearance,

gender, race, culture, age, various abilities, personality, and predominant roles. Socio-political and historical ideologies will have an influence on such self interpretations and perceptions. Self-identity is in dialectical relationship with family identity. Because family identity is a dynamic concept, it is subject to temporal factors and change at the social, family and individual level; therefore, it is considered to be a developmental concept.

The above definition of family identity incorporates the individual's cognitive perceptions and life experiences in relation to his/her family. Family identity then becomes a dialectic of family as represention-family as lived experience. Representation has been interpreted variously. One common usage is that it refers to "our knowledge of material objects [that] is gained through our direct perception of the private impressions or sense-data which they cause us to experience and which, in some way or other, they resemble" (Bullock, Stallybrass, and Trombley, 1988). 'Resemblance' is crucial to representation for "the human mind does not mirror reality but represent(s) it according to unconscious or semi-conscious conventions" (Bullock et al., 1988). Structuralists believe that cultural systems of signs or codes underlie

representations (Bullock et al., 1988). The present usage of representation is twofold. It refers to: 1) Ideological representation: cultural conventions that are represented as ideologies; and 2) Cognitive representation: intrapsychic representation of experience through images, thoughts and feelings. It is important to note the relationship of cognitive representation to memory. Memory can conjure up images, thoughts and feelings. It is important to note that these two representation types are in dialectical relationship.

In this chapter, a framework is provided within which an individual's lived experience and cognitive/ ideological representation of his/her family can be interpreted. It is important to note that the writing in this chapter operates at a certain level of abstraction, and is frankly speculative. There is an absence of concreteness, in various places, partly because of the nature of the epistemological basis on which arguments are being made. It is therefore recognized from the outset that many of the ideas being offered in this chapter are exploratory and possibly contentious. They are nonetheless considered important enough to present in this thesis, in the hope that the

reader will gain insight into certain issues surrounding family identity.

How do individuals experience their families? How do individuals ideologically or cognitively represent their families to their selves? An individual's experience and representation of his or her family is bound up with socio-political constructions of the family and family life. Here socio-political construction is used to refer to those aspects of everyday family life that have become defined and ideologized by cultural conventions. An individual then interprets his or her experiences using the socio-political constructions as a 'normative' reference point. Because of this, by examining families from the subject position of the individual it is necessary to consider the family as both an object and a subject (2). Not only is an individual's experience and representation of his/her family, reciprocally determined by objective factors but so is his or her experience and representation of his or her self. Here, objective refers to socio-political and historical influences that are not typically recognized at a conscious level. Such influences are believed to operate at an unconscious level. Because family experience/representation is dynamically related to

self experience/representation it is necessary to examine self-identity in some detail. This becomes a dialectic of self-identity-family identity, which intersects the family experience/representation dialectic.

The dialectic of family as lived experience-family as representation is crucial to the concept of family identity. Family as lived experience encompasses the individual's emotional, cognitive and behavioral experiences in relation to his/her family in present situations. Family as representation refers to the individual's cognitive experience of his or her family in relation to: 1) the individual's memory, and 2) the ideological forces that inform the individual's present interpretations and understandings of his/her family (3). The concept of memory has been investigated and understood from a variety of different traditions. Generally speaking, cognitive psychology likens memory to the storage capacity of a computer which is accessed when needed. This metaphor is rejected in favour of a psychoanalytic interpretation of memory which encompasses both consciously derived memory, and those experiences that are repressed. The present use of memory relates to spontaneous and reflective memory in relation to the understanding one has of his or her

family. It is important to note that representation and memory are inextricably bound concepts. The "contrast between spontaneous memory and self-conscious representation now appears increasingly difficult to maintain" (Bullock et al., 1988).

Because it is in constant dialectical relationship with family identity the concept of self-identity must be examined. A discussion of self-identity necessarily means examining subjectivity (4), and subject-object dialectics. Subject-object dialectics, according to Theodor Adorno, are fundamental to the concept of identity. For present purposes this is significant because it implies that one's understanding of the subject in relation to the object will have repercussions for how one interprets his or her self in relation to others --such as family members. Thus Adorno's philosophy of Negative Dialectics is briefly considered in relation to his explication of subject-object dialectics and identity. His philosophy is further explored in relation to subjectivity, self-identity and family identity.

Bound up in this consideration of subject and object, subjectivity, self-identity and family identity are certain psychological concepts. These include the unconscious, memory and repression, and cognition. The

term 'cognition' is used here to mean "those aspects of mental life connected with the acquisition of knowledge and the formation of beliefs" (Bullock et al., 1988) such as thought and imagery. Cognitive processes typically encompass aspects of thinking, language acquisition and use, memory, perception and attention. The term 'information processing' is commonly employed, but is rejected here because this concept is premised upon a rigid subject-object dichotomy.

The above psychological concepts will be touched upon only briefly as self and family identity are discussed. Aside from the elements of experience and representation that have been sketched out in relation to self and family identity, a number of dialectics must be incorporated into this discussion. In fact, these dialectics are already implicitly contained within the elements of experience and representation.

Out of the individual-society dialectic emanates the individual-family and the family-society dialectics. A dialectic of individual-society is bound up in the subjectivity and self-identity of the individual. This is because the individual's subjectivity and self-identity are in a reciprocal relationship with socio-political and historical influences. A dialectic of individual-family requires both self-identity and

family identity; however, because this dialectic is reciprocally determined it is also believed to be manifested in the individual-society dialectic. Similarly, a dialectic of family-society issues out of the individual-society dialectic.

It will be argued that there are situations when one's self-identity is privileged over one's family-identity, such as when the individual is in the work setting. Alternatively, one's family identity may be privileged over one's self-identity during certain family interactions. Indeed, during certain moments of shared experience with family members, family identity may become more operative than self-identity. It is possible that when family identity is engaged it provides a distancing from certain socio-political forces that typically intrude on the individual and engage his or her self-identity.

However, when one's family identity suppresses one's self-identity it may also open up the individual to certain socio-political forces and ideologies that are directed at families rather than at the individual. Such forces can be thought of as objective determinants of an individual's subjective represention of his/her family. These ideologies play off of an individual's subjective experiences of his/her family.

Because family roles are normatively constructed, family identity is engaged differently by socio-political ideologies than is self-identity. For instance, there are socio-political constructions of 'middle-aged father', 'young mother', 'teenaged daughter' or 'pre-teen son'. These constructions, aimed at the particular role an individual plays in his/her family, are likely to influence an individual's interpretation of his/her role. These contructions also create expectations regarding the emotional and behavioral relating of other family members. It is important, therefore, to investigate how certain ideological representations of particular roles and 'the family' in general, inform individual interpretations and understandings. Surely they engage one's self-identity; however, during those moments of experience when the individual is sharing time with his/her family, such representations may engage one's family identity.

Relationships between family members can constitute unique emotional intimacy and fulfillment. However, the family setting is particularly amenable to just the opposite. Emotional frustration, deep hostility and destructive interactions can just as easily characterize family relationships. Nonetheless,

security and fullfillment potentially provided by family settings is of undeniable importance. What is crucial to these special moments is individual family histories. An individual's memory of past experiences with family members can create a continuity of shared understanding and acceptance. It is contended that this continuity is collectively represented in both an emotional and cognitive sense. The idea of collective representation relates to the notion of collective memories, and collective autonomy. It is assumed that individuals who on a daily basis share significant amounts of time and experience together --over many years-- may have similar understandings and representations of the past. It is also believed that this shared understanding and acceptance over time is a particularly important aspect of the 'security' that family settings often provide. In effect, memories of past family experience might inform the individual's family identity with certain expectations. It is important to recognize that memory is open to the influence of socio-political ideologies and infinitesimal factors related to time. Memory of family experience is represented in the individual's thought, in relation to their self-identity. Just as secure feelings can be related to memory, so can feelings of

insecurity and hostility be engendered through memories of past family experiences.

II. Conscious And Unconscious Elements Of Family Identity

In order to develop the concept of family identity it is necessary to examine briefly certain concepts that are fundamentally related to identity. Such concepts include subject-object dialectics, subjectivity, the 'self', memory and repression. When an individual interacts with others he or she subjectively experiences, interprets, and understands others and the interaction in a variety of ways. One way that the subjective experience is interpreted is through cognitive representation. This process entails objectifying others and interactions with others through symbolic representation and normative constructions, in relation to one's self. When an individual interprets others in this way they become represented as objects. The representation of objects by subjects is an ubiquitous dialectic that underlies family relationships and the concept of identity.

It is Adorno's contention that a subject can only exist when in a relationship with an object and vice versa. He believes that the object always takes precedence over the subject; however, through subjective mediation

or the process of representation, the subject creates the illusion that it has primacy over the object. This ideology of the subject, which Adorno traces back to Kant's philosophy, has created the conditions for the subject's "imprisonment" in its own subjectivity. By approaching non-identity, Adorno believes that a critical stance can be adopted.

Adorno's privileging of 'non-identity' relates to his belief that the most power is held by "those heterogeneous fragments that slip through the conceptual net, rejecting all philosophy of identity" (Jay, 1984, p. 21). Non-identity or Negative Dialectics focuses on the difference between subject and object. The cognitive process, Adorno believed, "had emerged from a form-giving source" and thus the "subject's reflection upon its own formalism is reflection on society" creating a "paradox" (1982, p. 510). This paradox resonates "with the subject's objective imprisonment in itself" (Adorno, 1982, p. 510). Because of this paradox between one's subjective self and objective society, by acknowledging one's subjective experience but simultaneously distancing oneself from it, through non-identity with it, it may be possible to achieve a critical interpretation/understanding of one's self, others and interactions with others.

In order to provide an epistemological (6) grounding for family identity, Adorno's negative dialectics is drawn upon insofar as it examines subject-object dialectics, subjectivity, identity and memory. The reason Adorno's non-identitarian philosophy is drawn upon is because it is believed to contain insights that are essential to understanding the individual's subjective experience, interpretation, and understanding of his or her family in relation to his or her self. Moreover, it is believed that there is an implicit emancipatory potential in Adorno's theory. How this potential might help to clarify problematic experiences and understandings between one's self and one's family are examined.

A. Subject-Object Dialectics, Subjectivity And Discourse

Before commencing a brief journey into the philosophy of Theodor Adorno, it may be helpful to consider the words of a noted scholar of Adorno's works. Susan Buck-Morss (1977, p. 186) writes that:

> Adorno's originality lay not in the material substance of his theoretical arguments, but in the way he put them together...[His] concern was a new social reality, [and] he saw in the desire to possess even a theory the risk of reproducing the commodity structure within consciousness. His was a negative anthropology, and its goal as knowledge was to keep criticism alive...The purpose of what in Adorno's case could be called

"antitheories" was to avoid such conformism at all costs. This lends to negative dialects the quality of quicksilver: just when you think you have grasped the point, by turning into its opposite it slips through your fingers and escapes.

The Western philosophical tradition has long assumed that a chasm exists between subject and object. However, in both theoretical and practical terms this is problematic. Adorno (1982, p. 498-499) contended that this separation was "both real and illusory" for it is true that cognitively it evokes "the real separation, the dichotomy of the human condition, a coercive development" but it is false since it is often "hypostatized as invariant" turning it into "ideology". Adorno is referring to the dichotomy between human consciousness and the human body, whereby an individual views oneself as an object. An implicit assumption of this position is that without 'thought' human experience and nature would be reconciled. This relates directly to Adorno's focus on non-identity as the most truthful standpoint.

The fundamental importance of "the concepts of subject and object -or rather, the things they intend-" is attested to by their having "priority before all definition" (Adorno, 1982, p. 498). This is important to the concept of family identity because it points out that an individual's fundamental assumptions about the

subject-object relationship will underlie and inform his/her interpretation of his/her self in relation to his/her family --here termed family identity. In the act of interpretation certain definitions are invoked that permit understanding, typically definitions that are socially sanctioned. In other words, how the subject understands the object is related to the nature of the subject's identification with the object. The nature of the individual's identification with his or her family will influence his or her interpretation and understanding of family experience.

The "ambiguity" of 'the subject' became one of the central concerns of what Habermas has called, Adorno's "consciousness philosophy" (Jay, 1984, p. 58). Because the term 'subject' refers to both "particular individual" and "consciousness in general", Adorno considered the terms 'subject and object' as "patently equivocal" (7) (Adorno, 1982, p. 497-498).

The "individual ego" as subject contains "universal connotations", however, it cannot be considered as entirely "collective" for this would negate "individual difference" (Jay, 1984, p. 59). Indeed, one cannot escape "the term's polysemic indecisiveness", for 'subject' paradoxically refers to both "active agent, the source of one's own destiny, and as passive object

of domination, the plaything of an other to whose will one is 'subjected'". (Jay, 1984, p. 60).

The contradictory nature of 'the subject' relates to how individuals in society often relate to one another in terms of dominance and submission. This also applies to families, where certain individuals are "active agents" who may view other family members as "passive objects of domination". Similarly, the individual in society is both a passive object and an active subject. How an individual perceives his/her self and acts in relation to his/her environment is bound up with the concept of subjectivity, which Adorno equates with thinking. For instance, thinking about other people entails objectifying them while interacting with others also involves the process of objectification. The individual does both this thinking and acting from the vantage point of their own subjectivity. However, subjectivity is both historically and socio-politically influenced and as such 'subject' to the objective. As Adorno writes, "Subjectivity, thinking itself, is called explicable not by itself but by facts, especially by social facts; but the objectivity of cognition in turn is said not to exist without thinking, without subjectivity" (Adorno, 1973, p. 140). Therefore, even as one objectifies others in order to

think about them, such a subjective process is reciprocally an objective process. In a family setting, for instance, a teenage daughter may be involved in the act of interpreting her father. The daughter may think he acts in a punitive and emotionless way, just as do most "strict fathers". Bound up in this interpretation are the ideological representations of "father", "daughter", "strict father", and father-daughter relationships. During this subjective process of interpretation, the daughter has objectified her father and her relationship to her father according to certain self and social understandings.

The notion of distance might offer some clarification. To think of oneself as a separate person involves a certain psychic distancing from how one thinks of others. But involved in such distancing is also a consideration of how one is similar to the others one is attempting to distance oneself from. This brings to light the social and historical commonality of all people. The hermeneuticist Dilthey (1955) noted how human communication is bound up with fundamental commonalities: "Every word or sentence, every gesture or form of politeness, every work of art and every historical deed are only understandable because the person expressing himself [sic] and the person who

understands him [or her] are connected by something they have in common; the individual always experiences, thinks, acts, and also understands in this common sphere" (in Outhwaite, 1985, p. 24). The individual's subjective experience of this "common sphere" is also, as Adorno believed, the "subject's objective imprisonment in itself" (1982, p. 510). But the argument is pursued later in this section that this also provides the individual with the means to interpret and understand how he or she is constrained by these common life conditions.

The nature of the individual's subjective experience of the "common sphere" differs according to many factors. How the social and historical influence an individual's subjectivity differs according to, among other things, time, place and activity. Recent post-structuralist philosophy has expounded on the idea of 'multiple subjectivities', and it has been recognized that Adorno's much earlier theorizing on non- identity anticipated central themes of 'deconstructionist' philosophy (Jay, 1984, p. 21). As Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine (1984, p. 3) note, "Subjects are dynamic and multiple, always positioned in relation to particular discourses and practices." The fact that an individual's subjectivity is constructed, to a large

extent, by "certain norms" is often obscured because these norms are incorporated into our "common sense views of reality" (Henriques et al., 1984, p. 22). The necessity of critical discourse surrounding 'common spheres' is thus readily understandable, and in relation to a particular family microsphere, this type of dialogue may be particularly useful.

B. Self, Identity And Family Relationships

In contemporary society, the concept of self-identity has become an operative term for subjectivity. It allows one to say to his or her self or others that he or she is an individual, while simultaneously experiencing such individuality. Self-identity can be understood as a dialectic of lived experience and representation. As representation, self-identity is a "hypostatization" of an individual's subjectivity. In contemporary times, one's self-identity as representation is often reified as an actual presence.

This means that the inordinately complex, temporally bound notion of subjectivity is "captured" through certain ideas and concepts. By telling one's self or others that one has an identity that is such and that, one freezes his or her subjectivity in time, and offers

it through words as identity. However, this frozen and static sense of self, unbound by time and immediacy, may unthaw and dissipate into the discursive space within which it has been offered -clearly, in these terms, a non-distorted 'representation' of self is not possible. Through self-reflection and dialogue with others an individual's representation of self is tested against normative constructions and others' interpretations. It is probable that an individual's combined self-interpretations, conscious acknowledgement and unconscious acceptance of socio-political ideology, and others' interpretations will distort the individual's understanding of self. Unless an individual can gain distance from this representation of self, and approach non- identity with it, he or she is likely to remain unaware of important aspects of his or her self. To follow Adorno's train of thought, the more the individual's thinking is involved in identification the more the individual will be "imprisoned", constrained and illusory. Adorno (1973, p. 146) considers identity to be "the primal form of ideology" for "the more the I thinks, the more perfectly will it find itself debased into an object. Identity becomes the authority for a doctrine of adjustment."

The relationship between identity and power has enormous implications for family relationships. At the risk of presenting a stereotypical dichotomy, the often radically different relationship of a father to his family versus a mother to her family is understandable. How the father views his family is often not in relation to or identification with his self. The mother, on the other hand, often finds that her self is defined/identified almost wholly through her family relationships (see Surrey, 1985 and Miller, 1984). When Adorno writes that "identity becomes the authority for a doctrine of adjustment" one can see how it may account for the expectations placed on a mother to accommodate or adjust to the needs of her family. The father, who typically does not think about his self as rooted in his family, is less likely to be "debased into an object." Indeed, he has much greater freedom from the constraints that are the result of identification with family. Consequently he will not have to adjust his self according to family demands. But there is a greater likelihood that, given these circumstances, he will experience and interpret his family role and interactions with family members as 'ideological representation'. Although this example is stereotypical, it is probable that it resonates accurately with current socio-political and popular

ideology based on the husband versus wife relationship to his/her family. We will now return to the idea of offering a 'frozen' self to others.

Thinking of oneself as having a self-identity is a process of objectifying oneself, simultaneously distinguishing oneself from, yet placing oneself within the world of objects. It is a paradox that often escapes reflection, for as Adorno noted, when something is defined it is "subjectively captured." This is problematic because it forces philosophy --and an individual's subjectivity-- to begin "in medias res" with an "object riddled" with "doxa" (conjecture) (Adorno, 1982; Jay, 1984, p. 60-61). Recall the prior discussion of testing one's representation of self against normative constructions and others' interpretations. When one freezes one's self, it has been extracted from necessary contextual factors, and becomes an object of conjecture. Through a process of comparison and contrast this frozen self will, in a sense, dissipate into the discursive field it is discussed within. This is because it becomes identified and defined by fundamental assumptions and rules that govern the discursive space.

Designating a self-identity to oneself focuses on the difference and similarity between oneself and others,

and oneself and his or her environment --differences and similarities of 'conjecture'. In a sense, it privileges one's subjectivity; for how often does one question, for example, their own perception? This is related to the extent to which an individual's sense of self is derived through interactions with others.

It is probably the case that an individual often questions self-perceptions and self-interpretations. Whether an individual can privilege his/her subjective understandings is often dependent upon power relationships. Even if one does not doubt his or her own perception it may be that someone else's perception is considered to be more valued and thus becomes the accepted interpretation. Alternatively, an other's perception may be imposed on the individual by force or by subtle manipulation. If we make an analogy here between perception and subjectivity, and make the focus of perception self-identity, then an individual's perception of self may be the result of an other's perception. Invariably, one's self-identity is influenced by how other's perceive them, but in many instances one's identity may be predominantly defined by such interpretations --usually instances where power is a prevalent operative.

The complex power relationships between individuals is bound up with the rationalization of social life, whereby relations "have their model in exchange" (Adorno, 1982, p. 501). Such relations become "abstractly rational ones, detached from the human individuals and their relationships" (Adorno, 1982, p. 501). "If the exchange form is the standard structure, its rationality constitutes people; what they are for themselves, what they seem to be to themselves is secondary" (Adorno, 1982, p. 501). Thus it is not necessarily other's interpretations of one's self that are privileged over self-interpretations. Instead, it may be the "rationality of exchange" that suppresses or negates one's own self-interpretations. Self-interpretation, in this particular instance, is to be understood in terms of its reciprocal influence on an individual's interactions with others. A "rationality of exchange" creates the conditions for a less complex and meaningful interpretation of one's self and interactions between one's self and others. Asking a stranger for directions is a simple example. One does not necessarily need to interpret one's self or the other person in order to obtain the information required. Simple transactions such as this are obviously necessary and practical. However, when the rationality underlying this type of surface interaction

becomes predominant in more meaningful and complex interactions, such as those between family members, the result is potentially that of distorted communication and understanding. There are indications that this type of rationality does, in fact, govern many individual's interactions with 'significant others' (8). One can speculate on how the rationalization of social life can also influence family interactions that negate interpretations/understandings of both self and family in favour of "rational exchange".

Families are settings where identity is often conferred to the individual on the basis of familial hierarchy and history, and where interactions can take on an instrumentalized quality. Because family roles can supplant one's sense of self, the more the individual understands his or her self as an "idealized" family role, the more the interaction may be interpreted through the lens of ideological representation. In this case, family identity moves in the direction of family as representation. When an individual understands his/her family as representation his/her interactions may be governed by the "exchange principle". How an individual understands his or her family role is, in this case, governed by idealized expectations. The extent to which such expectations are implicitly and

explicitly accepted by individuals, without recourse to critical interpretation, will effect the quality of family interactions. When normative expectations take precedence over more contextually informed interpretations, one's identity may be predominantly governed by socio-political ideology related to family roles and interactions. As pointed out earlier, this may result in a passive acceptance of socially legitimated authority and power. How this is manifested in particular family settings will obviously differ, but the ramifications for this in terms of morally acceptable behavior is important. This is once again paradoxical. Even as socio-political ideology surrounding family roles and interactions delimits the relations between family members, it can also legitimate authority which is not delimited. Moreover, once an individual's --ie: a mother's or father's-- interpretation of what his or her power/authority over other family members means filters into his or her actions, such actions may no longer be delimited by socio-political constructions. In effect, his or her mode of relating may be governed predominantly by a mentality of "rational exchange" that is governed by irrationally understood authority.

However, it is also true that the family setting can provide interactions of a more intimate character. During such interactions the ideologically sanctioned exchange principle of the rationalized public realm is rejected and more egalitarian interactions between individuals can occur. The occurence of more genuine interactions can be understood in terms of family identity as lived experience. By not identifying with the ideological representation of his or her "family role", it is possible that the individual may experience family interactions as more spontaneous and real. However, this depends on the extent to which the individual identifies the interaction with his or her self as experience or as representation. The interpretation of the interaction is potentially through the lens of self as ideological representation, thus opening up the possibility of instrumentalized exchange. This has been briefly elaborated on in the above example of irrationally understood authority.

It is possible that through non-identity with one's self, and non-identity with one's 'idealized' family role, a potential for resistance from societal forces is created. This implies that one's family identity is privileged over one's self-identity, and that one's family identity rests toward the pole of lived

experience. An individual's interpretations and understandings of his or her family interaction is less bound by socio-political ideologies, power and authority, and memory of these. The potential for genuine relating among family members may be much enhanced in such a situation.

The paradox of identity between interactions that are understood through identity with self, family and social ideology versus individual and collective resistance through non-identity with such representations, will be developed more fully in the next chapter. It will be argued that this paradoxical combination of interactional styles based on the self-identity-family identity dialectic may account for problems of communication or even family violence.

C. Primacy Of The 'Objective' Over Self And Family Identity: A 'Negative' Psychoanalytic Interpretation

Instances where one's self-interpretations are suppressed in favour of others' more valued interpretations or the "exchange principle" may involve the process of repression. Repression occurs when "a mental process that endeavours to turn itself into an action" is not allowed into consciousness, and this "resistance" is not consciously recognized (Freud, 1987, p. 335-338). In this instance, then, an individual's self-interpretation is resisted, and this occurs because of a conscious --ego-- acceptance of others' interpretations. Although this acceptance of others' more valued interpretations is at a conscious level, an individual may remain unaware that he or she has repressed his or her self-interpretation because the repression may have been instituted due to moralizing --superego-- influence. In relationship to Horkheimer's conception of family dynamics, it is superego influence that is privileged, whereas the more recent theorizing of Kovel specifies id influence as predominant. In the former case, paternal and societal authority has been internalized in the superego which directs the ego to repress aspects of the self that are not congruent with ideological conceptions. In the latter case, repressed preoedipal experiences are

engaged directly by social authority, and therefore, ideological conceptions themselves act to repress aspects of the self. It is contended that both Horkheimer's and Kovel's formulations contain insights that resonate with contemporary times.

One may repress his or her own interpretations of his or her self, in favour of other's more valued or imposed interpretations, or that of predominant ideologies. The notion of identity as it relates to the privileging of other's perceptions immediately calls into question the subjectivity of identity. It is readily apparent that in this situation one's subjectivity is to a large extent objectively determined. In relation to family identity, the extent to which an individual interprets his or her self in relation to others' or ideologically imposed definitions creates an increasingly represented self. For instance, a child may be expected to think and act just as his or her parents dictate. If he or she does so, the experiences he or she has in family interactions are likely to rest within the space of family identity as representation. In this instance, family identity is informed by authority/power; and because this authority is legitimated through normative

expectations, the child's family identity is also informed by ideology.

Similar to this idea of an individual's perception of his/her subjectivity in relation to other's definitions and perceptions, is the relationship between socio-historical factors and an individual's subjectivity. Although a person may consider his or her subjectivity as uniquely 'individual', the subject always contains the objective moment. This is a relatively direct instance of ideological self-representation. It is Adorno's (1982, p. 503) contention that the object has "primacy" over the subject for it "qualitatively alters opinions held by the reified consciousness, opinions that go frictionlessly with subjectivism." Such unrecognized altering of opinions relate to the notion of discursive fields and "common sense views of reality", for an individual's subjective understandings are invariably informed by such objective factors. Although the individual may marshall some control over how these factors are used in interpreting experiences, such as self-perceptions or interactions with others, there is always an element of an implicit altering of an individual's interpretations. Related to this objective influence is the condition that although socio-

political and historical context is subjectively filtered, this context does not "depend" on the subject. The subject, on the other hand, is dependent on such objective 'reality'. "The object...is mediated; but according to its own concept, it is not so thoroughly dependent on the subject as the subject is on objectivity" (Adorno, 1982, p. 502). The extent of the subject's dependence on 'reality' relates to the extent of identification. It follows that if an individual can achieve a non-identity with 'reality', he or she will become less dependent on it, and more in a position to change how he or she understands it or even structurally alter these conditions. But the individual must paradoxically recognize the extent to which he or she is not an 'individual' before he or she can enter this potential emancipatory space.

Jacoby (1975, p. 79) points out that psychoanalysis exposes the "sham of the isolated individual" by revealing its "socio-sexual- biological" basis. Drawing on Adorno's writings, Jacoby (1975, p. 79) argues that by using psychoanalytic principles, critical theory "sinks into subjectivity till it hits bottom: society". Therefore, although the individual may be aware of how significant others influence his or her concept of self, it is probable that they are unaware of the

socio-historical basis of their subjectivity and thus self-identity. Delving into "subjectivity" allows the objective to be grasped for "social and historical events" begin to issue out, and this forms the dialectic of subject-object (Jacoby, 1975, p. 79).

The belief that the subject is "purely subjective" is illusory, for critical theory "sees through to the objective content of subjectivity" (Jacoby, 1975, p. 80). Indeed, the generally accepted notion that "innervations, insights, cognitions are 'merely subjective' ceases to convince" once it is recognized that 'subjectivity [is] the objects form" (Adorno, 1982, p. 504). The implication here is that one's self is always interpreted and understood on the basis of objective --socio-political and historical-- factors. This is typically repressed; however, through critical reflection this repression can be brought to consciousness. Adorno asserts that to recognize "objectivity" requires reflection "at each historic and cognitive step" not only on what is immediately "presented as subject and object" but also on "the mediations" (Adorno, 1982, p. 506). This is paradoxical for it implies that the individual has identified his or her self with socio-political influence, but through non- identity with his or her self can gain sufficient

distance to see how his or her self has been informed socio- politically. Family identity as developed here is believed to provide the potential for such reflective resistance through distance.

D. Self-Imprisonment As Emancipatory?

It is clear that after considering Adorno's, Jacoby's and post-structuralist arguments that it is problematic to consider an individual's subjectivity strictly in individualistic terms. Subjectivity exists simultaneously as objectivity. "The individual is no less imprisoned in himself [sic]" writes Adorno, "than in the universal, in society" (1982, p. 503). Adorno believes that the means to "see through that captivity" is shaped by the "forms" of captivity which reside in the individual's psyche. Such forms of captivity can be usefully equated with socio-political ideologies regarding interpretations and understandings of self, others and interactions with others. Adorno writes that "Their imprisonment in themselves might make people realize their social imprisonment" (1982, p. 505). Here he points to how the inculcation of oppressive ideologies, norms and expectations can --if brought to awareness-- allow the individual a deeper understanding of the structural --objective-- origin and nature of

such constraints. Adorno recognizes that "preventing this realization" --of the nature of oppressive conditions-- "was and is a capital interest of the status quo" (Adorno, 1982, p. 505). It is easy to see how oppression can be maintained when its structural conditions are obscured. In Adorno's framework this occurs primarily because of identity.

The power of family ideology is a good example of such "social imprisonment" for it acts to influence people to accept certain values and practices even if they are at odds with their self-interests or collective interests. A mother's deep identification with her family experience/representation may be a major factor in her oppression. However, by being so "imprisoned" a mother may "realize her social imprisonment" and thus be in a position to resist family ideology. In this respect, her oppression/ identification is also her potential for resistance/emancipation. Her capacity for critical reflection on family ideology is paradoxically increased because of her deeper structural entrenchment within traditions of family ideology.

The degree to which one's subjectivity is objectively constituted differs from individual to individual. This is related to the conditions of one's life and therefore, factors such as age, sex, family, friends,

occupation, and culture, are reflected in one's moment to moment subjective existence.

E. Repression And Memory

Critical theorists, as mentioned earlier, contend that psychoanalysis is uniquely equipped to explore the objective aspects of subjectivity. Tapping into the individual's unconscious explores the objective aspects of subjectivity of which the individual is unaware. Psychoanalysis uses communication to get to the unconscious, and the exhumed unconscious is, in turn, reflected in the consciousness as language. Therefore, the process is one of placing into a social and historical context the unconscious determinants of subjectivity.

But it must be noted that the psychoanalytic process is also subject to the distortions of representation. The psychoanalytic process of bringing to consciousness that which has been repressed involves some form of remembering. Surface memory is subject to distortion for any number of reasons --time, change in perception, rationalization, power relationships, and so on-- but rendering the unconscious conscious is purportedly non-distorting. Ironically, however, awareness of the

unconscious requires some form of symbolic representation which is distorting since it identifies unconscious contents to conscious 'signifiers'. Because language is an objectifying medium, it begins to totalize the individual's remembered experiences. This relates to how Adorno construed reification. Contrary to the typical notion of reification as "equivalent to the alienated objectification of subjectivity, the reduction of a fluid process into a dead thing", Adorno used the term "pejoratively" to mean "the suppression of heterogeneity in the name of identity" (Jay, 1984, p. 68). Heterogeneity is suppressed in favour of signified representation. Adorno believed that true memory was not the reabsorption of something that was "externalized" but rather involved the "restoration of difference and non-identity to their proper place in the non-hierarchical constellation of subjective and objective forces" (Jay, 1984, p. 68). The least distorted memory, then, is that which does not unify a past experience that was characterized by difference and non-identity. The individual in his or her subjective past experience was in dialectical relationship to objective elements of his or her context. If in remembering this experience the individual understands its dialectical relationship rather than synthesizing the subjective and objective

together, he or she may be in a position to critically evaluate how objective forces may have influenced his or her past experience.

This helps to clarify the relationship between subjectivity and self-identity. As indicated earlier, subjectivity is in varying degrees objectively determined; and an individual's identity in relation to this is similarly objectively determined. However, a 'pure' subjectivity is tantamount to difference and non-identity, therefore, an individual would not be able to ascribe an identity to themself without simultaneously objectifying themself. The implication being that self-identity is invariably distorting, and the extent to which an individual resists identifying his or her self in relation to objective conditions the more capable he or she will be of accurately interpreting such objectivity. It is important to note that Adorno privileges experience that has not been subjectively filtered. As he wrote, "To think is to identify. Conceptual order is content to screen what thinking seeks to comprehend" (Adorno, 1973, p. 4). By resisting thinking, and thus identification, one resists "conceptual order" and its tendency to obscure the intricacies of what one is attempting to understand, ie. structural factors of oppression. The

practical implication of what Adorno is leading toward is an individual who is a purely sensuous being, whose experience is entirely aesthetic, and not distorted by subjectivity or identity. Adorno believes that "the subject as unlimited experience" allows for a truer understanding than "the filtered residium" that than corresponds to the "requirements of subjective reason" (1982, p. 506). Although Adorno's position in this regard is not philosophically rejected, because of practical reality and the necessity of conceptualizing alternatives in terms of subjectivity and identity his line of argument is not pursued to its logical conclusion. Rather the attempt is made to ground his insights within the lived experience/representation of individuals in families.

A simplification is inherent in the above analysis of psychoanalytic remembering. This is the fact that although "representation" of repressed contents occurs which may create a certain distortion of what has been exhumed, the emotional dimension to this psychic exegesis must be considered as equally if not more important. Such cathartic emotional release, not being tied to the necessity of signification, may in fact be the most truthful memory, and potentially the most able to restore "non-identity and difference" to that which

has been forgotten. Having 'non-identity' is tantamount to the blending of mentation and existence, as the individual experiences life not as totalized representation (through language) but rather as the fragments of momentary existence it really is. Or as Adorno (1982, p. 509) writes, "the fleeting stirrings and instants of subjective life." In resisting a 'unified' perspective based on symbol systems, the individual can than better appreciate that heterogenous elements and differences exist. In effect, this points to a way of rejecting domination. By not viewing differences as problematic, but simply as a given reality, the individual may be less motivated to attempt to bridge the differences together through ideology. This lack of ideological synthesis, by resisting an identification between heterogeneous elements also resists the power/authority and thus domination that such unification typically marshalls.

However, the individual exists with some notion of identity at least some of the time, and this may create distorted understandings because "identity and contradiction of thought are welded together" (Adorno, 1973, p. 4). Therefore, the individual's experience of a 'continuous' existence is, in part, due to reification, for representation of the past counters

fragmented experiences. Since memory of oneself and one's experiences is incorporated into one's subjectivity --the objectifying of subjectivity-- it preconceives one's experience of the present. These memories, whether in the form of thoughts or images, identify the individual to the context of prior experience. Self-identity is then bound to memory, but also to identification with the objects of one's perception and experience. When the individual experiences self-identity as representation, it is more likely that he or she defines others in relation to his or her self rather than his or her self in relation to others.

F. The Primacy Of Family Experience Over Family Representation: Erfahrung Versus Erlebnis

Knowledge is related to self-identity, and the more non-identity is approached during experience, the less distorted becomes knowledge. Adorno's privileging of experience over representation relates to family identity in a variety of ways. Because knowledge of one's self is often reified into self-identity, this knowledge becomes increasingly distorted the more one identifies with it. Similarly the knowledge one has of one's self in relation to his/her family becomes

increasingly distorted the more the individual identifies with such knowledge.

Interpretation, understanding and misunderstanding are particularly related to knowledge through identification. The individual who interprets his/her family while not identifying with his/her family may approach a less distorted understanding of his/her family. One's family is then understood in its objective context --the object is privileged over the subject. This type of non-identity with family refers to family identity as lived experience. As lived experience, family identity implies an interpretation of one's emotional experience of one's family without identifying this experience with one's self or the various aspects of family as representation. An individual becomes bound up with his or her experience of the object --his or her family.

The opposite end of the pole --family as representation-- implies identification with various elements such as one's self, one's role in one's family, and family ideology. All of these elements of identification are bound up with socio-political and historical influences. It is important to note that family identity as 'lived experience', here believed to be the least distorted understanding one can have of

his/her family, is also bound to socio-political and historical factors. This is simply because the individual is always embedded in some sort of cultural context. Nonetheless, it is contended that when the individual's family identity approaches the pole of 'lived experience', a unique resistance from socio-political forces can occur. Such moments of family identity may not be common because it is increasingly difficult for an individual to disentangle his/her self from identification with his/her self and with an ideological representation of his/her family.

How individuals experience their self in the context of their family is partly a function of the clarity of their family knowledge. As pointed out earlier, an individual's understanding of his or her family is remembered as a form of knowledge. This knowledge is less distorted the more it is derived from the position of family as lived experience. This in turn influences the individual's self-identity and reflexively the degree of distortion with which he or she understands his or her family. Memory of family experience becomes a crucial factor in determining the extent of reflexive identity and knowledge distortion.

To elucidate, it is helpful to consider briefly how Walter Benjamin separated experience into "Erfahrung"

and "Erlebnis", for his formulation had an important impact on Adorno (Jay, 1984, p. 74). "Erfahrung refers to the integration of collective and personal traditions, while Erlebnis refers to the isolation of events from any such meaningful context, communal or individual" (Jay, 1984, p. 74).

It is contended that an individual's experience of his or her family in a present context is less distorted the more it is experienced as Erfahrung. This is because the incorporation of past experience of one's family into present experience can allow a certain distancing from the family at present, and therefore, more of a non-identity of relating. Reflection on the experience of family at present, in relation to past experiences, allows the individual to interpret critically his or her present family experience. However, this only holds true to the extent that the individual's present family experience rejects family identity as representation. This may seem contradictory. However, reflection on how one has previously identified one's self with collective and personal traditions that are bound up in family representation is essential. Such reflection allows the individual to distance his or her self from such traditions, thereby not identifying with them. On the

other hand, by predominantly experiencing Erlebnis, the individual may not be constrained by factors of identification from the past; however, the various ways in which he or she identified with traditions in the past may inform the objective conditions of his or her present experience. He or she will remain unaware of such influences, for reflection upon them does not occur. Erlebnis is therefore simply the 'illusion' of the subject as purely individual or free from various forces of tradition.

In resisting the present family experience as isolated and fragmentary the individual creates a paradoxical identity. The individual's present experience is less reified, for her or his self-identity is not solely bound to present experience; but rather, takes the form of past and present. In a sense, one could argue that the consideration of the past in the present ties the individual to a greater degree of ideologically defined identity. But because this is not so much memory of self-identity, as it is of family identity as experience the individual may in fact be retaining a certain degree of non-identity. This is because the object --the family members in past and present-- takes priority over the individual as subject. That "non-identity" approaches truth is a paradox that is

voiced by Adorno when he writes that "the subject is the more the less it is, and it is the less the more it credits itself with objective being" (1982, p. 509).

Non-identity with one's self allows the individual to retain a certain distance from the socio-political and historical constituents of self-identity. However, by not identifying with one's self, and privileging one's family identity, the situation may be created where the family as a whole, as a 'collective identity' is then exposed to socio-political and historical constituents of family experience and representation. This relates to the earlier discussion of family ideology in Chapter Two. It follows that in situations where Erfahrung predominates, family identity may be privileged over self-identity.

Family identity as lived experience may be a unique dimension of the individual's psychological experience. When the individual's subjectivity is predominantly family identity as lived experience, it may resist the moments of self-identity as experience and self-identity as representation, and oscillate between these poles. In a sense, family identity as experience issues forth the social and historical at a more conscious level than self-identity as experience. This is because, when operative, family identity as lived

experience provides a space or distancing from the socio-political setting that self-identity as lived experience cannot provide. This is related to the idea of collective experience. All the individuals in a particular family would have to be in the realm of family identity as lived experience for such collective distancing to occur. Under such circumstances, it can be argued that family identity becomes a more truly subjective dimension than self-identity.

It is now possible to turn our attention to a fuller examination of how family identity may be implicated in family problems. This will be approached in Chapter Four through a brief examination of philosophical positions on the 'self', and how conflicts between individual's differing self and family identities can lead to family problems. The potential of family identity as an interpretive strategy is illustrated using the example of family violence.

Chapter Four: Family Identity As An Interpretive Strategy

I. Introduction: Self As 'Autonomous' Versus Self As 'Connected': Differences In Domination

In this chapter, a dialectic of self is explored by contrasting self as fundamentally interactive with self as fundamentally autonomous. The implications of this dialectic for moral thinking and behavior are examined. The implications of family identity for family problems is then explored in conjunction with these differing conceptions of self. Family identity and emancipation is then briefly considered in light of conscious and unconscious restraining and coercive factors.

Why are instrumentalized interactions so prevalent in contemporary society? One possibility is that repressed presymbolic experiences, due to historical change, increasingly influence the conscious experience of the individual. These id impulses are in turn engaged by socio-political forces of administration. One's self and one's relations with others become dominated and administered to varying degrees.

It is contended that the more one understands his or her self as strictly separate, individual and autonomous the more likely he or she will be governed by the administrative forces of domination and thus

self as representation. This is because consciously experienced id impulses that create feelings of insecurity and fear are suffused by administrative rationality. On the other hand, the more the individual understands his or her self as interactive, based on relationships with others, and not as an isolated being, the more he or she may be governed by self as lived experience. This is because feelings of insecurity and fear brought on by the experience of presymbolic impulses are met and fulfilled through relationships with others. The need for a reality 'support' is not as readily met through impersonal administration.

There is a paradox in the above conception. In contemporary times because a certain conception of self is privileged --the autonomous ideal-- those who experience their self as fundamentally interactive, may be more susceptible to conscious domination by power/authority relations. Those who strive for the ideal of autonomy, although more in a position to dominate others because their sense of self is socially sanctioned, may be more susceptible to unconscious domination by socio-political ideologies.

Under different structural conditions, the illusions that predominate in the above instances might be

overcome. Emancipation from them, however, involves many processes. The assumption is made here that the family setting can be a place where extremes of self as either autonomous or connected are manifested, but also a place where interactions can take on a unique emotional intimacy and fulfillment. What governs the latter situation? A possibility is that when individuals experience their selves and others as fundamentally interactive a collective resistance to socio-political forces and instrumental rationality occurs. However, if some individuals in the family setting are not relating in this way, such that they understand their self as 'autonomous', representational factors such as legitimated authority/power may disrupt the potential for collective resistance.

To illustrate, a stereotyped example will again be invoked, based on the male as predominantly autonomous and the female as predominantly connected. It is important to recognize the self as autonomous and the self as connected dialectically rather than dualistically. It is undeniable that at times many males have experienced their self in relation to their wife or children interactively and not strictly as separate. How men are expected to act outside of the family setting, however, may contradict such

experiences. It may be difficult for some men to make the emotional transition from the public sphere to the private sphere. Traditionally, women have not experienced this contradiction to the same extent, unless they too have entered certain public domains which are governed by an instrumental rationality --a rationality that presupposes a self as strictly individual. The work that most women have traditionally procured outside of families has, however, been of the variety that emphasizes skills and modes of relating that are characterized by the domestic sphere, ie. human service employment that invokes relational and nurturing thoughts and actions.

It is important to note, however, that in contemporary society many jobs, such as that of the secretary, and aspects of nursing, have been radically redefined such that a technicized, instrumental rationality governs workplace mentality, ie. word processing and patient monitoring. This implies that women are increasingly in a position of contradiction, just as are men, in terms of how they understand their self in the workplace and in the home. However, because of gendered differences during the formative years, it is likely that women are in a better position to make the transition from one sphere to the other.

Individual and family problems of a psychological nature would perhaps be less common, or less problematic, if individuals' understandings of their self and others were to change. Traditionally women may already understand their self in relation to others, and thus be in a position of genuine relating, and self-understanding. However, because of structural constraints and the predominant ideology of self, for this understanding to be legitimated, they would have to understand their self in radically different terms. Males, on the other hand, are more firmly entrenched in the predominant ideology of self, some of whom may be living with an understanding of their self as purely 'autonomous' and separate. The situation of males is, then, perhaps more difficult to overcome. Men would not only have to understand their self in radically different terms but also change the very nature of how they view their self and actions in relation to others. Moreover, the power/authority that is sanctioned by the predominant ideology of self would have to be rejected. The fundamental subject-object relationship comes into play here. In general, the practice of males, with respect to relationships, has served to reinforce the illusion of individual autonomy. Many females do not reinforce this illusion, but rather their practices may

contradict this ideal, and they may find themselves subordinated and dominated.

Prevailing representations of self and self as gendered need to be critically examined and alternatives need to be formulated. How common representations have been inculcated must be addressed, and how such principles factor into practices must be critically examined and changed. Such changes, however, need to be conceptualized at various levels. These conceptualizations need to occur at the structural and ideological level of both the society and the individual. It is believed that the family setting is located at a crucial position for such change to be put into effect.

II. Self As Fundamentally Discursive And Interactive: The Social Construction Of Gender Identity

Although the two are in dialectical relationship, self-identity subsumes one's family identity. It is therefore necessary to explore the intricacies of 'the self'. In this section, the concept of self-identity is briefly explicated in light of its ideological, gendered and familial nature. The relationship between self-identity and family identity is then explored in light of family problems.

One of the ways that one's sense of self is represented is through discourse (1). The importance of understanding one's self through linguistic communication on the basis of "recognized norms" relates to the post-structuralist notion that "discursive practices provide subject positions" (Henriques, et al., 1984). It is, however, problematic to consider this nondialectically, for by understanding the subject purely as a discourse position, self-reflection and the subjective moment are implicitly excluded.

An individual, in his or her daily existence, may encounter a number of different "discursive fields" such as his or her work place, school, various sites of recreation, family settings and so on. Within each of these discursive fields certain aspects of one's self may become more predominant. For instance, in the family setting, the sense that one has of his or her self is bound up with his or her family role (ie: mother), and how this role is typically defined. Other's expectations of this individual within this setting serve to influence this person's sense of self. The interactions between family members may serve to reinforce certain self boundaries, such as expressive behavior.

Deep assumptions about oneself are subjectively or consciously experienced through self-interpretations. This relates to what Fay (1987) terms the activist conception of human beings, which assumes that humans are "...creatures who broadly create themselves on the basis of their own self-interpretations". However, as became clear in earlier chapters, there are significant unconscious and objective dimensions to an individual's experience of self. Self-identity must therefore be viewed as dialectical.

Self-identity is discussed as a dialectic of lived experience and cognitive/ideological representation. It is contended that self-consciousness, or self-identity, is both fundamentally interactive, communicative, and dialogic as well as self-reflective (2). This dialectical position is asserted in the face of prevailing conceptions of self as individuated, autonomous and separate. Gender differences in relation to self as experience/representation are considered in light of moral understanding. It is contended that how one understands one's self in relation to others has vital repercussions on the dynamics in family settings.

It has been argued in this thesis that one's self-identity and one's family identity are at least partially and often largely the result of social

constructions. Terms are often used in conjunction with the concept of self-identity that serve to treat the individual's understanding of their self, socially and historically. For instance, gender, ethnicity, class, occupation, and generation are all used in conjuction with identity and are interpreted variously. In Chapter One it became clear that one's gender is inextricably bound up with one's sense of self. In Chapter Three, it was asserted that family identity refers to an extremely important dimension of subjectivity, that is in dialectical relationship with self-identity.

It is becoming clearer, largely through the theorizing of feminist scholars, that women have traditionally defined their self in the context of relating to others, while men have done the obverse and typically define themselves as self-created. The socio-political pressure to conform to this gendered sense of self is undeniably prevalent, even in the modern context.

Modern psychological theory of the self is largely oriented toward the experience of males, but even so may not reflect the experiences of most men. As Miller (1984, pp. 1-2) writes, "development of the self" as modeled on male experience, is "presumably attained via a series of painful crises by which the individual accomplishes a sequence of allegedly essential

separations from others, and thereby achieves an inner sense of separated individuation". The irony is that "few men ever attain such self-sufficiency" but rather depend on the support of women and lower-status men to uphold this ideal (Miller, 1984, p. 2). The predominant theoretical bases for identity formation, "the cognitivist psychology of development; the social psychology of symbolic interactionism; and the analytic ego psychology" all converge on pointing to the development of "increasing autonomy" (Dobert, Habermas, and Nunner-Winkler, 1987, p. 278).

The emphasis on increasing autonomy corresponds to the contemporary epoch's emphasis on the existence of an "I" that "knows itself in terms of an other identified as itself" (Habermas, 1973, p. 144). Habermas contrasts Kantian versus Hegelian stances toward self-consciousness and shows that they are conflicting at the ontological level. The "monologic" conception of self, typically traced to Kant's philosophy, is an essentially asocial and ahistorical entity. The repercussions of a "monologic consciousness" are that "everything may be criticized from the standpoint a self has adopted, including the self's choice of standpoint to adopt" (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 31). It is the self's ability to avoid "any necessary

identification with any particular contingent state of affairs that some analytical and existential philosophers have seen as the essence of moral agency" (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 31). This emphasis on self autonomy, however, creates the disturbing consequence of the expulsion of "moral action from the very domain of morality itself" (Habermas, 1973, p. 150). The implications of this privileging of the monologic domain is that individual interpretations of morality are then governed by "goal oriented and ahistorical understandings" (Lindseth, 1986, p. 70) that lead to instrumental actions. Habermas believes that the monologic type of moral understanding informs "strategic action" which differs from "communicative actions~" (Habermas, 1973, p. 151). Strategic actions can be "decided between possible alternative choices monologically" and "without reaching agreement" thereby differing in principle from communicative actions (Habermas, 1973, p. 151). The Hegelian understanding of "self-consciousness" as rooted in "the interactional structure of complementary action" unveils the "concept of autonomous will that appears to constitute Kant's moral philosophy" (Habermas, 1973, p. 150). Hegel recognizes that the concept of autonomy is "a peculiar abstraction from the moral relationships of communicating individuals" (Habermas, 1973, p. 150).

There is a vitally important relationship between how one understands one's self at a fundamental or ontological level, and one's approach to others, morality, and actions. Regardless of its deleterious effects, the prevailing ideology of self, stemming from what Adorno has called the Kantian 'Copernican turn' remains the societal ideal. This autonomous ideal, aimed primarily at males, has become the basis for developmental theory in psychology.

This has led Miller (1984, p. 1) to pose the question, "do only men have a self, and not women?" As Nancy Chodorow indicates, "in any given society, feminine personality comes to define itself in relation and connection to other people more than masculine personality does" (in Harding, 1987, p. 59). In women's "social experiences", writes Sturdivant (1980), expectations are "internalized" such that one is to "relate to others in a connected and nurturing fashion." She believes that this is done "with little regard to [one's] own identity" and that this creates a "female identity that is largely circumscribed by the experiences of others rather than the self" (Sturdivant, 1980).

Surrey (1985) proposes a new model of women's self-development and theorizes "the 'relational self' as the

core self-structure in women." The different development of male and female children out of the preoedipal phase corresponds with Surrey's formulation. She also points to the "formative dynamics of this relational self-structure within the early mother-daughter relationship" (Surrey, 1985). Her model is in opposition to the emphasis of "object relations" theory on "narcissism and human separateness". Instead, her concept of "self-in-relation" moves from separation to relationship as the basis for self-experience and development.

Interestingly, Dobert et al. (1987) also develop a concept of self that is based on interaction. In their framework the key to the formation of self-identity is the "development of interactive competence" (Dobert et al., 1987, p. 281). Corresponding to the Hegelian conception of self, they write that "the reflexive relationship of the individual that is self-identified depends on the intersubjective relationships that he or she has with those others by whom he or she is identified" (Dobert et al., 1987, p. 276). How one understands one's self relates to how one views and interacts with others. This understanding articulates with Dobert et al's (1987, p. 277) assertion that "there is a structural connection between the forms of

identity of individuals and the forms of social integration of the life context by means of which they associate and deal with each other". This structural element to self-identity implicates "life context" as a factor in the development of individual psychological problems (Dobert et al., 1987, p. 277). Certain misunderstandings between family members may arise out of conflicts between an individual's self and context. It is proposed that differing self types --ie. autonomous versus interactive-- may create distorted interactions among family members. Based on Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy, Lindseth writes that there are essentially "two forms of understanding", one that is "goal oriented and ahistorical" and another that is "historical and tends toward process and dialogue" (1986, p. 70). It is contended that the "ahistorical" understanding corresponds with an autonomous self, while the "historical" understanding corresponds with an interactive self. The implicit and explicit argument made in this section has been that self as fundamentally interactive is more conducive to genuine family interactions, and sustained resistance from socio-political coercion and ideology.

This points to the necessity of deconstructing prevailing models of self-development such that they

incorporate the predominant experience of women, and do not emphasize an ideal that few individuals are able to attain. Moreover, it is urgent that this ideal be exposed as problematic for it implicitly sanctions a "monologic morality" that governs "strategic actions" that may be partly responsible for many contemporary reprehensible actions of domination and exploitation.

Women are not allowed equal opportunities for self-development in the contemporary socio-political climate. Since they often understand their self through their relationships, perhaps in a less hegemonous setting women's self-understandings would be less distorted then men's self-understandings. It is argued that the male conception of self --socially sanctioned and maintained-- is largely governed by a 'monologic consciousness' and that this leads to the ruthless male domination and exploitation of women, children, and other men through an instrumental rationality.

The above explication of self-identity provides a useful way to look at why women are oppressed and dominated by men even as their self-understandings and mode of relation may be more productive and conducive to understanding. The centrality of gender to family life experience has been referred to throughout this thesis. Here, it is used as the basis of understanding

differing self-identity types and family problems. The relationship between family identity and self-identity type is investigated in terms of its implications for interpreting distorted communication between individuals in family settings.

III. Self And Family Identity In Conflict

A. Interpreting Distorted Communication

It is useful to explore how family identity as lived experience and representation might relate to the differing self-identity types of autonomous and interactive. The following explication is very roughly formulated and often presents 'dualistic' illustrations. Initially, the assumption is made that the more interactive an individual's self-identity the less distorted his or her understanding of family will be. Moreover, family experiences are likely to be more satisfying and nonproblematic if they are characterized by self as interactive. This is because, rather than experiencing one's family from the vantage point of a supposedly rigid and autonomous self, one experiences one's self through the family interaction.

It is possible that a non-identity with one's self occurs as a privileging of the interactive experience

with one's family occurs. Family identity is privileged over self- identity in circumstances when the interaction is viewed in relation to one's self instead of apart from one's self. This probably occurs in many instances of family interaction such that the individual experiences a less distorted understanding of his or her family. However, family as representation may be invoked, and the distortions of socio- political ideology, power, authority and memory could predominate. Whether an individual's privileged family identity rests toward the pole of lived experience or representation may be influenced by the self and family identity of other members.

The dependence on the other individuals involved in the interaction is crucial. Even as an individual may predominantly interpret/understand his or her family as lived experience, other individuals may predominantly interpret/understand their family as representation. This may account for how authority and power enter into the interaction. If the authority/power element is recognized by any of the individuals, regardless of the nature of their family identity dialectic, this may negate the possibility of an egalitarian interaction. It is contended that an individual is more likely to interpret/understand his or her family as

representation, if his or her self-identity corresponds to the autonomy ideal. Moreover, even if one or more family members interpret/understand their family as lived experience, based on the self as interactive, when interactions occur between conflicting self types, power and authority will enter the situation. It is possible that when this occurs, the family identity of those individuals who were interpreting/understanding their family as lived experience will shift toward the pole of representation.

This points to a possible explanation for certain family problems. The congruency or incongruency between how individual family members understand their self may relate to the success of a communicative interaction. An individual who privileges his/her self over the interaction is more likely to misunderstand the other person(s) and the interaction itself. Depending on the other individuals involved in the family dynamic, the experience could be harmonious, difficult, or both.

It is helpful to make an analogy here between Habermas' "knowledge-constitutive interests" and the differing self-identity types pointed out above. Habermas has delineated three different forms of knowledge that are fundamentally informed by different interests. These "knowledge-constitutive interests" are that of

"prediction and control, understanding of meaning, and emancipation" (Giddens, 1985, p. 127). Prediction and control corresponds to human "interchanges with nature", understanding of meaning corresponds to symbolic interaction, or human communication, while emancipation corresponds to the pursuit of freedom from power imbalance and domination (Giddens, 1985, p. 127). Human interactions in the public sphere have become increasingly instrumentalized, minimizing the need for interpretation. Moreover, the public sphere is characterized by hegemonous relationships such that some individuals invariably dominate over other individuals.

Individuals --in particular males-- are encouraged from an early age to achieve an autonomous sense of self, and this articulates well with the predominant mode of relating in public settings. As has been argued earlier, family settings are --more than ever-- influenced by socio-political factors. This opens up the possibility that family interactions are increasingly grounded in the instrumental mode of "prediction and control", which reflects the sanctioned form of self-identity --autonomy. Alternatively, individuals who achieve an interactive sense of self-identity may be grounded in the interpretive mode

of "understanding of meaning". Family as lived experience, it is contended, if invoked in all members, articulates with the emancipatory interest, and "power imbalance and domination" are resisted.

But it is possible that in a particular family, some individuals may be relating instrumentally while others are relating interpretively. Such a circumstance is likely to create problems in communication, understanding and interaction because individuals are grounded in fundamentally different interests. These different interests are believed to be reflexively related to one's understanding of self.

In effect, those individuals who approach non-identity with their self, thereby privileging the interaction will gain a less distorted understanding of their family. However, in remaining open to the interaction and defining their self in relation to it, they simultaneously open themselves up to the possibility of being dominated and exploited. Those who are interacting in an instrumental way are in a position to exploit those who are relating interpretively and empathically. And yet they will have a more distorted understanding of their family because they have understood their experiences mostly through self-identification.

Indeed, in this way, just as family identity as lived experience contains the possibility of the least distorted understanding of one's family it may create more problems if one or more individuals are relating from the vantage point of family as representation. This is particularly conceivable when interpretive communication does not occur, because actions are not deliberated over. That which is irrational is more likely to occur through instrumental interactions. For as Habermas believes, "the concept of 'rationality' has less to do with the foundations of knowledge than with the manner in which knowledge is used" (Giddens, 1985, p. 132). It is now possible to turn our attention to the interpretation of marital violence in family settings.

B. Interpreting Marital Violence

The potential for resistance from socio-political forces through the experience of family identity does not always lead to an emancipatory or positive experience. When one or more individual's authority and power is legitimated over others, family identity can create severe problems. The illustration can be made in a family setting of a mother and her two children who understand their selves as interpretive and understand

their family as lived experience, and a father who understands his self as autonomous and his family as representation. His sense of self may be deeply detached from the others. As an autonomous-instrumental person, he may not be concerned with connectedness and interpreting others, and may operate outside the boundaries of moral consensus. Once again, this is probably because the 'instrumental' individual does not consider it necessary to enter into a discussion surrounding the rationality of his or her actions. As Habermas contends (Giddens, 1985, p. 132) "to say that a statement or an action is 'rational' is to claim that the statement or action could be in principle justified in procedures of argumentation". It is important to note that in this sense "'rationalization' means the furthering of procedures and opportunities for argumentation, its development is convergent with the growth of rationality" (Giddens, 1985, p. 133). An individual in a family setting, interpreting others through the lens of socio-political ideology and legitimated authority, may interact in a goal oriented and ahistorical way. If operating from the knowledge interest of prediction and control, it is likely that this will severely limit opportunities for discussion or argumentation. The importance of situating one's understandings in light of other's understandings is

crucial to the maintenance of a rational context of relating.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that domestic violence such as "wife beating is widespread and represents a considerable proportion of all violent offences dealt with by the police and courts" (Dobash and Dobash, 1987, p. 170). This conclusion came from an "analysis of police records and self-report studies of victims in the United States and Britain" (Dobash, 1987, p. 170). The extent of violence in family settings is believed to be underreported for "violence against wives continues to be an unshareable and hidden problem, and some women endure violence for years without telling anyone or before seeking assistance" (Dobash, 1987, p. 170). How could such a morally reprehensible act such as violence against wives be so commonplace?

A myriad of factors are probably implicated in the occurence of domestic violence, one of the more significant factors is the role of ideology. Indeed, many analyses point to prevailing ideologies of family life, based on patriarchal constructions, as creating the conditions for family violence. Barrett (1982, p. 23) writes that "the concentration of needs into marriage" creates "high expectations" that are often

not met. Moreover, the marital relationship is largely private and "protected from criticism" leading to the situation where one "puts up with a great deal more from their spouse than they ever would from anyone else" (Barrett, 1982, p. 54). Dobash and Dobash (1987, p. 171) believe that violence against wives is "firmly embedded in widely accepted and cherished ideals and patterns of behavior, such as male aggressiveness and authority and female dependence and subordination."

The privatized domain, often romanticized as a haven from social pressures, "can also be a trap, a prison whose walls and bars are constructed of the ideas of domestic privacy and autonomy" (Barrett, 1982, p. 56). Similarly, Bernardes (1985, p. 292-292) writes that "'family ideology' ensures that certain parts of everyday 'family life' are seen in a certain way and that other elements of our 'family lives' are not seen at all." This leads Barrett (1982, p. 56) to ask ironically, "Why is it that when a man is brutally assaulting his wife the police and neighbors are so reluctant to intervene?" She continues with an ironic stance in stating that "the very expectations of security and protection in the private family are what make women so vulnerable to victimization within it, and so deprived of any recourse or plausible appeal to

anyone outside its walls" (Barrett, 1982, p. 57). Quoted in Chapter Two was Ball's important insight that "the public clarity of normative prescriptions is related to the private opportunities for deviant behavior" (in Bernardes, 1985, p. 290).

Within the present line of argument these analyses can be situated within the socio-political ideologies of privatized family life, husband/father authority and wife/mother subordination. A father's family identity, in such an instance, would be largely informed by the pole of family as representation. Certainly socio-political ideologies do not uphold an ideal of men as batterers. Nonetheless, the implicit and explicit norms for men's behavior in families are that of aggressiveness, directness, and generally 'taking control of the situation'. "Family interaction" notes Bernardes (1985, p. 282) from the earliest socialization to adult conversation, involves the development, refinement, and use of power." Swift (1987, p. 3) writes that "the one feature that cuts across all family violence is the misuse of power." How men and women understand power differs in fundamental ways. "Males tend to define power in terms of the capacity to effect their own will, with or without the consent of those involved" (Swift, 1987, p. 13).

What are the psychological mechanisms that motivate men to distort their power and engage in amoral actions like abuse, and then to maintain these sorts of actions? This is only partly accountable by invoking the conception that men are taking patriarchal "values and ideals" and distorting them in the family setting. Intricate aspects of daily life in family settings all combine to create the conditions in which abuse is manifested. The structural elements of abuse must be seen as reciprocally influencing the psychological motivations of abuse. The nature of family interactions is of upmost significance during eruptions of violence.

Domestic arguments are often implicated in violence against wives, particularly over things such as "domestic work, possessiveness, and money" (Dobash and Dobash, 1987, pp. 174-177). Disputes arising over the "authority" of the husband and the "obligations of the wife to him", write Dobash and Dobash (1987, p. 178), "become a persistent aspect of the relationship and provide a crucial factor in understanding violent events." Expectations are a significant aspect of the abusive encounter and as pointed out in Chapter Four, such expectations may be largely defined by social ideals. A husband may abuse his wife because he believes he is "punishing her or correcting perceived

failures to live up to the expectations of a 'good' wife and mother"(Dobash and Dobash, 1987, p. 178), thereby enforcing a patriarchal moral order in an immoral way. The wife may somehow learn to accept this punishment, possibly by identifying with "ideals emphasizing loyalty, obedience and domestic responsibility" (Dobash and Dobash, 1987, p. 178). In interviews with battered women, Dobash and Dobash found that wives often "blamed themselves and felt guilty" when abused, probably because of "social demands [that] place responsibility for a successful marriage primarily on women and [that] require wives to be loyal to their husbands regardless of their behavior" (1987, p. 178-179).

Violence is an issue that is negated by popular representations of family life. Paradoxically, however, violence may stem from family as representation. Violent actions may relate to the negation of popular representation and the conflation of the power and authority that patriarchal ideology legitimates. For instance, a husband could have a distorted understanding of power dynamics in his family setting because he understands his family in relation to his self as representation.

It is possible that violent actions may be fueled by experiences in the public sector such as frustration at work, and so on. As pointed out in Chapter Two, it is probable that aspects of life in the public sphere are invoked in the private sphere through the subjectivity, discourse and interactions between family members. A husband's frustration may be absorbed into his self-identity, but only manifested through his family identity. This can be understood as an interpretation of frustrated feelings in relation to an understanding of legitimated authority, power and decision-making within the domestic sphere. How the husband interprets his family, if he is governed by family identity as representation, is potentially explicable in light of the earlier discussion of conflicting self and family identity types. As an individual who understands his family from the vantage point of an autonomous self, he is more likely to interact with others in the mode of "prediction and control", interpret his family according to socio-political ideologies, and base his actions and interpretations on a sense of authority and power. Conflicts may arise in the family setting for any number of reasons, however, he may lack the capacity to interpret any such conflict. Instead of approaching a conflict situation by trying to understand others in relation to his self, he may only

be able to deal with others in an instrumentalized way. Moreover, frustration that he has internalized from an earlier experience in the public sphere may come out in the present conflict as a violent action.

Within the domain of domesticity --the living space and time shared and spent solely with one's family-- the perspective of the individual is likely to be more fully filtered through his or her family identity. In the above example, the father's public sphere frustration, largely manifested through his family identity, inundates his representation of family. Whether the father's lived experience of frustration is acted out as withdrawal, verbal argumentation, or actual physical violence is bound up with an extraordinary number of factors. These may be of a personal nature (ie. alcohol and drug use, abuse as a child), the result of an other's provocation, situational factors, and so on.

A crucial factor is the immediacy of the family experience, and the reactions and family identities of the individuals toward which this withdrawal, argumentation, or violence is directed. To explore the father's representational distortion, it is important to recall that not only socio-political ideology and legitimated power and authority enter into his

understanding. Memory of these ideological representations reciprocally relates to these elements. It is contended that, as a self that is autonomous and monologic, the father will have an understanding that is less informed by meaningful context. In effect, his memory corresponds to Erlebnis. Recall that Erlebnis "refers to the isolation of events from any meaningful context, communal or individual" (Jay, 1984, p. 74).

It is contended that in the midst of a dispute, an individual may be likely to vent his or her anger as an uninterpreted and isolated event. The lack of reflection surrounding a violent action may lead to its occurence in an automatized way. This form of relating articulates with the earlier speculation on the technical knowledge constitutive interest, self as autonomous, self as represention, and family as representation.

IV. Family Identity As Emancipatory Praxis

The above illustrations, although roughly formulated and speculative in nature, served to demonstrate how family identity can be used as an interpretive strategy. A brief and speculative look at how family identity might inform an emancipatory process is now pursued, for implicit throughout this thesis has been indications of how the family setting may be a location for potential resistance. The term "emancipation" as understood from a critical theory standpoint, refers to a certain process. During this process, a group of people who are oppressed in some way are enlightened so that they "can come to see themselves in a radically different way from their current self-conception" (Fay, 1987, p. 28). Once enlightened, the group must be in a position to translate their understanding of their oppression into action. It is believed that critical theory can "become an enabling, motivating resource for its audience" such that it "empowers" them (Fay, 1987, p. 29). Once the "deep but remedial suffering" of a group has been changed through the altering of "life arrangements" (Fay, 1987), and people begin living more satisfying, enjoyable and productive lives, the process of emancipation has occured.

To recall Horkheimer's emancipatory moment, it was through the mother's interaction with family members that forms of emancipation might be attainable. "Because it still fosters human relations which are determined by the woman, the present-day family is a source of strength to resist the total dehumanization of the world and constrains an element of anti-authoritarianism". (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 118). Because the self-development of women is hampered by various forces of patriarchy, ideology and representation, the emancipatory potential contained in their mode of relating is equally hampered. It is therefore vitally important to explore the differences between the 'self' of males and females (3) and the consequences this has for explaining problems in family settings.

It is important to note that enlightenment is often understood as a process of 'consciousness raising'. This stems from the Freudian notion of bringing to consciousness that which has been repressed. It differs from Freudian therapy, however, in that it is cast as a collective process, and is directly tied to socio-political/historical factors of oppression that have been inculcated by individuals.

It is contended that some family problems may be the result of socio-political forces of administration and

ideologies of family life that create normative expectations. It is therefore essential that --at the level of the particular family-- individual's become aware of how outside factors influence their interpretations and understandings of their family, and family interactions. Idealized family roles may create expectations for one's own mode of relating, and that of other family members. Moreover, such expectations can result in faulty interpretations of one's family, such that distorted communication or other problems arise.

Since family identity focuses on the individual's interpretations and understandings of his or her family in relation to his or her self, and invokes a dialectic of family as praxis-family as representation, it may be helpful if this form of identity is explored between family members. In order to foster this in family members, individuals would have to approach a non-identity with their self, such that their family identity is privileged. The extent to which each family member conceptualizes his or her family in light of socio-political and popular representations could then be explored. The non-identity with one's self must then accompany a non-identity with one's 'idealized' family role.

Briefly explored in Chapter Three was the paradoxical situation where a mother lived in oppressed circumstances largely because of her identification with her family experience/representation. However, in being subjectively imprisoned, she also had the means to more fully understand her oppression. If involved in a process of distancing herself from her identification, she could be in a position of critically understanding the structural and interpersonal dynamics governing her situation.

This corresponds with Adorno's reasoning in relation to emancipation. The "immanent critique" that Adorno adheres to when theorizing on subject-object dialectics points to emancipatory needs. "The need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity that weighs upon the subject; its most subjective experience, its expression, is objectively conveyed" (Adorno, 1973, p. 16). During moments of family as lived experience it is indeed possible that the conditions exist for giving "a voice to suffering". Moreover, the possibility is also great that this voice will be listened to.

By acknowledging one's subjective understanding of one's family and what form representations have taken, but distancing oneself from this understanding through

non-identity with it, the individual may be able to attain a critical interpretation of this understanding. Another way to express this is that the individual's subjective understanding contains a normative discourse about family life. As such, a necessary conceptualization of the norm against which the individual can protest resides in the individual's representations. By retaining an understanding of such ideology vis a vis normative discourse, and becoming critically aware of how it inhibits certain features of existence that are desirable or creates undesirable experiences, one may gain distance from the normative discourse. Through such distancing comes the potential to explore alternative modes of thinking, relating, acting, and representing. However, unless a "voice is lent to the suffering" and dialogue is pursued, such alternatives may remain suppressed.

In a counselling environment, the subjective understanding one has of a particular moment of family experience --in relation to representational factors-- might be elicited through a form of psychoanalytic depth reflection. This type of depth hermeneutics, however, needs to be shared with other family members. This dialogic sharing, moreover, needs to occur in a

communicative forum where power relationships have been collectively recognized and then minimized.

There is an educative role to critical social science that can potentially articulate with counselling. It engages individuals in a type of consciousness raising, such that repressive constraints are more readily seen and alternatives conceptualized. "The purpose of education in terms of the knowledge provided by a critical social science is the transformation of the consciousness of the actors it seeks to understand, a tranformation which will increase their autonomy by making it possible for them to determine collectively the conditions under which they will live" (Fay, 1977).

Habermas attempts to show how the dynamics of self-reflection are relevant for a critical understanding of contemporary social and political reality. This self-reflection is potentially emancipatory to the extent that it provides critical insight into relationships of power. Relationships of power are not visible unless the social and political reality is sufficiently understood. This type of comprehension, however, is not achievable unless self-reflective processes are engaged in. A particular family that is experiencing problems would probably benefit from a similar sort of self-reflection that allowed an understanding of how

individual members and families are influenced by and in turn influence their social and political contexts. The power relationships that come to light can then be subjected to critical analysis, the result of which is potentially emancipation from family problems.

To illustrate, if a family were in a counselling setting, collective reflection on a past family experience might be useful. This type of historical-hermeneutic process focuses on represention of:
1) what individual family members perceived at a particular time to be their role and others roles in the family; and 2) how communicative interaction usually unfolded during this time. In so doing, it is hoped that the varying perspectives would shed some light on points of agreement and disagreement with respect to how each individual construed roles and communication during these particular "snapshots" of the family history.

The cognitive and affective representation of life episodes are likely to be distorted, not only because of the passage of time but also because changes in individual personality's and perspectives, and factors of representational. Certainly, "pure" reflection is impossible. Even so, dialogic representation through

reflection may provide the means for emancipatory praxis.

According to Habermas, depth hermeneutics "...includes two movements equally: the cognitive, and the affective and motivational. Critique terminates in a transformation of the affective-motivational basis, just as it begins with the need for practical transformation" (Bernstein, 1985). Habermas' knowledge constitutive interests are seen as metaphors for the historical reflection occuring: while surface reflection parallels an empirical "prediction and control". Depth reflection, however, parallels the historical-hermeneutic "understanding of meaning" --particularly when it takes into account "moments" of familial history, and brings emotions surrounding such moments into the present context. The combining of this surface-depth dialectic of reflection can be seen to correspond to the critical level of synthetic reflection in which emancipation becomes possible. For to construe a particular family's problems at either the interest level of labour or interaction may help to clarify the problem but not give one the means to overcome it. The experienced problem(s) in this situation are seen as corresponding to systems of "domination". It is believed that through the use of

critical reflection a family may come to visualize how and where forces of domination operate in their family, and can then take measures to liberate themselves from constraining factors.

Repressed emotions surrounding particular familial dynamics of interaction, are seen to fuel series of systematically distorted familial "forms", such that a family may develop toward many levels of domination by problems, particularly in the realms of labour and interaction. Distorted understandings of prediction and control, and meanings may operate in family settings. This necessitates "one making one's way over abandoned stages of reflection" (Bernstein, 1985).

The distorted predictions and control, and distorted understandings of them become, in effect, law-like and givens that are no longer subjectable to reflection. Insight into "lawlike connections", writes Habermas, (Bernstein, 1985) "sets off a process of reflection in the consciousness of those whom the laws are about. Thus the level of non-reflective consciousness which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transformed" (Habermas in Bernstein, 1985).

By not placing their observations of distorted communications and law-like behaviors within the

societal context, counsellors may attempt to reorient a particular family while excluding the reciprocal influence of society on the family. Assuming the counsellor is successful in dealing with the distorted elements of the family's problems what may confound the process is an insufficient awareness of societal factors. It is possible that the societal input into the shaping of the identified distorted relationships will reemerge in unrecognized forms creating distorted communication and law-like behaviors of a different sort where those that have been dealt with previously existed. It is always necessary for the dialectic's between families and society, individuals and society, and individuals and families to be taken into consideration.

It is important for family members to explore why particular family episodes have been recalled in distorted ways, for such remembering reveals personal ideological assumptions. "A depth hermeneutics must grasp not only the meaning of a possibly distorted text, but the meaning of the text distortion itself" (Habermas in Bernstein, 1985). Many such ideological assumptions are distorted and unless revealed the reasons they are intact remains hidden. Once such reasons are brought into the dialogue, it is likely

that present day problems will become more understandable, and it follows that emancipation from them then becomes a possibility.

It is clear that the exploration of alternatives in family settings is not, particularly useful unless it is engaged in among family members. Since an individual may change while others do not, it is likely that a family will continue to experience similar problems. Change is more likely to be incurred if it is a collective process. It is necessary to provide a framework such that the preconditions for change might be fullfilled. This entails exploring the manner in which individual family members understand their self in relation to their family, and communicating differences. A communication that is critically informed and nondistorted must be fostered among family members.

Habermas' "ideal speech situation", adapted to a family counselling context, could be useful. It is conceivable, within an ideal speech situation for the dialectics between individuals and families, individuals and society, and families and society to be scrutinized. "Communicative action <speech or nonverbal communication> requires a background consensus that is accepted or taken for granted, while discourse arises

when this background consensus is disturbed or called into question" (Bernstein, 1985).

It is highly likely that when family members reflect on a particular familial moment, conflicts may arise with respect to certain fundamental aspects of the situation under scrutiny. Whether these conflicts are characteristic of the interaction during the moment itself, or due to contradictory present-day interpretations is important but secondary to the fact that this now allows for discourse to unfold. "The output of discourses...consists in recognition or rejection of problematic truth claims. Discourses produce nothing but arguments" (Habermas in Bernstein, 1985).

During therapeutic discourses between family members, the psychodramatic technique in which individuals reverse roles could be employed in order to create more egalitarian relationships. By role playing other's roles, reified power dynamics may be disrupted. This articulates with Habermas' stipulations regarding a discourse with argumentation as the only power base. "Ideal speech is that form of discourse in which there is no other compulsion but the compulsion of argumentation itself; where there is a genuine symmetry among the participants involved, allowing a universal

interchangeability of dialogue roles; where no form of domination exists. The power of ideal speech is the power of argumentation itself" (Bernstein, 1985).

It may be necessary for the critical therapist to occasionally interject during therapeutic dialogues, particularly where the discourse holds implications for transformative action. "The results of theoretical discourse are not neutral to action" (Bernstein, 1985). The process of enlightenment occurs through the reflective theorizing and discourse of family members. If such reflection leads to self-understandings that "dissolve reified power relations and resistances" (Bernstein, 1985), thereby fostering emancipatory practices, it may be deemed successful.

The justification for the type of transformative action decided upon by a particular family is inherent in the process of critique. Changes that occur among family members are on "cognitive, affective and practical" levels that are situated within the various dialectics and therefore, are more likely to be lasting changes. "Theoretical discourse provides the basis for a depth interpretation by which we can attain an insight into causalities in the past and initiate self-reflection" (Bernstein, 1985). What Habermas terms "critical theorems" might be referred to as "familial hypotheses"

that emerge out of "moment discourses" as a family sojourn down its own historical pathways exhumes critical reflection.

What may also be helpful to explore, in addition to problematic events, is those moments of family experience that are remembered as particularly fulfilling and emotionally gratifying. It is contended that during those moments, the each individual may have understood their family predominantly from the perspective of lived experience. This may have allowed for a resistance of socio-political forces, and more genuine relating between equals.

A stance that looks to family identity as a form of emancipation assumes that individual autonomy is ideological. This means that collective autonomy becomes the ideal of emancipation. But any notion of collective autonomy necessarily implies a moment of individual autonomy. It is contended that the collective resistance garnered during moments of family as lived experience provides the individual with a resistance from socio-political forces. Family identity then becomes a concept that allows the conceptualization of collective autonomy as individual autonomy. Bound up in family interaction is a sort of

'critical theory of everyday life' that rejects society.

It is possible that a criticism of socio-political reality occurs in the "familial moments" that provide a spontaneous sharing of emotion, without the individual or collective (family) being aware of such resistance. Family identity may then be a more truly subjective consciousness then is self-identity, particularly if one argues that moments exist when an individual's consciousness can resist socio-political constructions.

Discussion

In this thesis, the perspective of early critical theory on families was explored. Horkheimer's exemplary essay, "Authority and the Family" was situated in light of more recent critical and feminist positions on families and society. The socio-political and historical climate, constantly invoked in family settings, was seen to have become increasingly important to the nature of family existence. Simultaneously, the potential of families to provide a space of resistance and security from the outside climate was seen to have declined, and 'countersocializing' in family settings became a thing of the past.

A psychoanalytic interpretation of how 'modernity' and the 'rationalization of social life' have entered the psychic realm of the individual, and disrupted the 'psychic economy' of families was explicated. Presymbolic experiences believed to be repressed as the individual develops a sense of self, and becomes symbolically competent in relation to the environment and other people, are believed to have been engaged by socio-political forces and rationalization. In effect, the argument was presented that in contemporary times, presymbolic experiences have become more significant to

the individual's conscious experience partly because of a dissipation in parental authority. Repressed presymbolic experiences when impinging into consciousness create feelings of insecurity and fear, and the forces of administration serve to quell such feelings by providing an ordered reality, normative thinking and actions. The individual's increasingly disrupted conscious experiences, on the other hand, have been engaged by ideologies of the self, and of family life thereby extending the rationalization of existence.

The gendered nature of domination in the domestic and public spheres was explored. The feminist movement has provided crucial insights into the intricate nature of subjective oppression, and the socialization of oppression. The differential socialization of gender creates radically different subjective understandings, motivations and actions between women and men. Basically, women develop a connected and empathic sense of self, while men develop an autonomous and differentiated sense of self. Men become more apt to dominate and women more apt to subordinate. Family settings have been notorious for the explicit oppression of women by men, as women are often trapped in a double bind. This can be traced to the ideology of

the patriarchal family. The necessity for change, in both the private and public spheres is imperative such that sexist and patriarchal assumptions, ideologies and actions are obliterated. It is important to recognize that such change must occur dialectically, in social settings and in family settings.

Certain ideologies of family life have become normative ideals that create expectations for particular family roles, and family interactions. However, it is these very expectations that often serve to obscure the fact that socio-political forces have intruded into the family space. The illusion of 'family autonomy' is an example of a common myth. Debunking this particular myth requires the understanding that families are in constant dialectical relationship with social, political and historical factors. Surprisingly, family theorists are as guilty as anyone in perpetuating prevailing ideologies of family life. The most common example is the common theoretical focus on a particular family structure, and particular family experiences. Often a 'nuclear' structure and idealized experiences are conceptualized and as though they existed in apart from socio-political and historical factors.

The problematic nature of the private/public dichotomy was also explored. It was argued that this dichotomy

provides the conditions for socio-political domination of individuals and patriarchal domination of women and children. In effect, there is no distinct barrier between the private and public spheres, for the public domain is invoked in the home through the subjectivity, discourse and interactions of family members. The 'privatization' of the domestic space can create a convenient facade that hides distorted, oppressive and abusive interactions. This can occur because of expectations at the social level that family life is a similar experience for most people. Family problems are often considered a private matter, and this creates the conditions for long term suffering and mis-understandings. The 'rationalization of social life' is believed to have entered the domestic realm, and created interactions that tend towards extremes of distance and instrumentality or closeness and identity confusion.

In an attempt to understand how changes in society and in families effect individuals at the psychological level, the concept of family identity was developed. This entailed drawing from the epistemological framework of Adorno's Negative Dialectics. It was necessary to explore self-identity in conjunction with family identity for the two are in constant dialectical

relationship. Family identity was conceptualized as a separate moment from self- identity, that provided the individual with an interpretation and understanding of his or her family in relation to his or her self. It is believed that at times, family identity is privileged over self-identity and vice versa. The family identity concept contains a dialectic of lived experience and representation. The pole of representation incorporates prevalent ideologies of family life, authority, power and memory. The pole of lived experience incorporates the individual's emotions, cognitions and behaviors in the family setting. It was contended that an individual would have a less distorted understanding of his or her family the less he or she interpreted experiences through the lens of representation. The implications of when individuals in a particular family interpreted interactions from different perspectives, ie. representational versus lived experience was explored. It was reasoned that in such instances, power and authority that is socio-politically and ideologically legitimated is likely to enter the situation. Moreover, it was proposed that those who interpret/understand their family from a representational viewpoint are more likely to dominate others in the family setting. The significance of approaching a non-identity with one's

self, and with 'idealized' representations of family life in the family setting was explored.

Differing self and family identities between family members are likely to lead to distorted communication and family problems. The differing self identities of 'autonomous' versus 'interactive' were explored in relation to family identity. The result of this analysis was that individual's corresponding to the autonomous ideal of self were more likely to experience a family identity that is informed by representations. Alternatively, those with a fundamentally interactive self were likely to invoke a family identity that corresponds with the actual lived experience. The latter self-identity was believed to create the conditions for more genuine and fulfilling interactions between family members based on empathic interpretation. The former self-identity, however, is likely to create conditions for misunderstandings, and conflicts. The implications of these differing self types in relation to family identity was explored in light of distorted communication and marital violence in family settings.

Family identity and emancipation was briefly investigated. The implications of non-identity for a critical examination of normative representations was

examined. The necessity for a collective approach to change and to understanding family problems was emphasized. How the critical vantage point of non-identity might be communicated was touched upon, and the assertion was made that moments of family experience are potentially emancipatory and resisting of socio-political forces.

The research conducted in this thesis, although at times speculative, points to a number of areas for empirical research. An implicit assumption in Chapter Three was that there are moments of self and family identity, and that it is important to conceptualize these moments as separate. By understanding them as separate, dialectically related moments, certain psychological experiences that are unique to family settings might be more accurately understood.

One type of research that could investigate this hypothesis would be interviewing families. Questions would be designed to probe the interpretations and understandings that family members have of the emotional relationships between their self and family (family knowledge as lived experience). Another set of questions would be designed to invoke the understandings that family members have of 'idealized' relationships and the expectations from ideologies that

they hold up to their family role and that of other family members (family knowledge as representation). These two knowledge types will undoubtably be in dialectical relationship, just as is characteristic of the individual's family identity.

How the responses to the initial set of questions overlap and differ between the members in a particular family could be explored and contrasted with factors of individual history, such as occupation, common activities outside the home, age, sex, and so on. The responses to the initial set of questions would be compared with those of the second set, and important similarities and differences drawn out. It is believed that different family members will have different understandings of the emotional relationships between their self and family, and also differing expectations based on idealized relationships. Family problems could be interpreted in light of these understandings. For instance, if communication problems existed between parents and their adolescent children, by invoking the respective understandings and expectations, important differences could be contrasted. Different interpretations/understandings could be discussed in light of the knowledge forms of lived experience and representation. By fostering an acknowledgement among

family members of how socio-political factors influence their communication and interactions, it is possible that alternative interpretations/understandings could be explored, potentially leading to change.

Because certain elements of an individual's family identity are not consciously experienced, it is necessary to bring the individual's family identity to awareness. A form of depth hermeneutics would be necessary for this process to occur. Fostering the communication of these understandings between family members is a potential practical application of the knowledge gained through interviews. It is contended that through fostering such communication, under certain conditions of speech that negated existing power and authority relationships, distorted communication patterns could be better understood and possibly altered.

In Chapter Four, it became clear that how one understands his or her self in relation to his or her family had important repercussions on his or her family identity and interactions with family. Through an understanding of these different self types, a particular family could be enlightened as to the conflicts that may stem from these conflicting self-understandings. Alternative ways of understanding

one's self in relation to one's family could be explored.

This exploration of alternatives in family settings is not particularly useful unless it is collectively engaged in. If an individual changes while others in his or her family do not change it is possible that existing problems will continue, or new problems will arise. Change is more likely to be incurred if it is a collective process and the centrality of dialogue thus becomes apparent. It is necessary to provide a framework such that the preconditions for change might be fullfilled. This entails exploring the manner in which an individual's 'self' is experienced, and how communication that is critically informed and nondistorted can be fostered among family members. In effect, this thesis provides the basis for further theoretical work that would explore how critical theory could inform the theory underlying family counselling and therapy. A major implication of critical theory is that it situates families in their socio-political and historical context. Critical theory also has the potential of informing counsellors on how to instigate self/collective reflection and change in family settings. By understanding change as a collective process of enlightenment, empowerment and

transformative action, the critical perspective brings many dimensions to theoretical work on therapy that should provide a richer understanding of family dynamics and problems in families.

Although a particular frame has been developed, that of family identity and its dialectics, implicit in the analysis has been some of the central elements for a richer understanding of the family as a learning site. Further theoretical work could be undertaken that investigated the structural aspects of learning in families. The focus could be on how family members learn certain ways of understanding their interactions with one another, and how such understandings influence their interactions. Further, how such understandings effect interactions in other settings. If certain ways of interacting create nonfulfilling and distorted relationships, it is vitally important to understand how individuals learn to interact in such ways.

Families can be seen as an incredibly rich location to investigate learning. Understanding socio-historical changes in light of their impact on families, how families actively incorporate such changes and reflexively influence the macrosphere, and how interactions between family members invoke the learning that has been incurred outside of family settings could

be explored. For instance, the inter- generational nexus could provide a useful location within the family microsphere to investigate differences in learning between parents and children. Within the family setting, how learning that children are involved in with peers and at school may enter into their interactions with parents. Similarly, learning that parents are involved with in work settings, and with peers may enter into interactions with children. An intergenerational transmission of, for instance, values and knowledge, takes place in family settings. The potential of this type of intergenerational learning for establishing a more critical understanding of various factors that might be constraining in parent-child relationships and many aspects of living is great. Indeed, under appropriate conditions of speech, and egalitarian relating that negates socio-political representations of authority, social values and moral understandings might be critically examined. Under such circumstances, the potential of family settings as learning sites for social change could prove to be vitally important during these turbulent times.

End Notes

Chapter One

1. "The Frankfurt School is an informal term for the collective thought of a group of Marxist thinkers who formulated in Frankfurt, Germany, prior to Hitler, and then in exile, a theory known as 'critical theory' or 'critical theory of society'" (Jacoby, 1975, p. xix-xx).

2. This role is commonly attributed to the family, and is important to the argument later developed in this thesis. Identity in relation to the family is often understood in terms of family role, i.e. mother or son, however, this is a surface level analysis. In chapter three, family identity will be understood as a much more complex subjective experience that is in dialectical relationship with self-identity.

3. Poster extracts a line from a passage where Horkheimer explicates authority. "Authority as accepted dependence can thus imply a relationship which fosters progress, is in the interests of all parties, and favors the development of human powers. But it can also sum up in one word all those social relationships and ideas which have long since lost their validity, are now artificially maintained, and are contrary to the true interests of the majority. Authority is the ground for a blind and slavish submission which originates subjectively in psychic inertia and inability to make one's own decisions and which contributes objectively to the continuation of constraining and unworthy conditions of life." (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 70-71). This "inability to make one's own decisions" is cast, by Horkheimer, within the context of social relationships, and as such is dialectical.

4. The notion of an autonomous ego can be interpreted variously. Held seems to be indicating that a time existed when the development of an autonomous ego was a possibility -within the structure of the traditional bourgeois family. This may have been true for many individuals. However, the gendered and class nature of an "autonomous ego" is not typically addressed by critical theorists. This will be briefly examined in later chapters.

5. For a brief discussion of how "language (and thus symbol systems) embody self-other differentiation" see Atlas (1985).

6. Object Relations theory, originated by psychoanalysts such as Melanie Klein in the 1950s, has developed into an extremely important psychoanalytic position. The crux of this position is its focus on the early infant-parent interactions and the significance of this "preoedipal" phase for personality development and psychological problems.

7. Carol Gilligan (1982) has developed a theory of moral development along these lines.

8. The terms "preoedipal" and "oedipal" are problematic for various reasons. One problem is that it is becoming clearer that female development cannot be accurately interpreted using the oedipal complex. This is because certain fundamental experiences of female children simply do not fit the assumptions of the oedipus complex. For a discussion of this see Stiver (1986), and for a perspective on women's development that more accurately articulates with women's experience see Miller (1984), Jordan (1984), and Surrey (1984).

When rooted in orthodox psychoanalysis, the terms preoedipal and oedipal invoke patriarchal assumptions. During the earlier part of this century both terms may have been relatively applicable to the actual life experience of males. This might have been so with respect to the shift from the dyadic mother-infant bond to the triangulation that involved more contact with the authoritarian father. It is likely that the child's desire of the opposite sex parent (the oedipal complex) was simply a metaphor for a combination of sensual feeling and emotion, and need not be construed in a sexual light.

The terms preoedipal and oedipal will be used throughout the thesis for reasons of simplicity, but are not to be construed through a patriarchal and orthodox Freudian lens.
Here, the shift from one phase to the other is primarily
considered to be a development from a presymbolic and undifferentiated self involved in a dyadic relationship with a primary care-giver to a symbolic and increasingly differentiated self involved in more complex relationships with many individuals.

9. Erich Fromm, in the 1930s, developed the notion that character traits tend to remain stable through time, and act as a form of psychic resistance to social changes. This may partly explain how certain ideologies lag behind as the "economic base" and culture push forward (Held, 1980, p. 119-120).

10. But in contemporary times, it it is possible that the oedipal complex may need to be augmented with what has been called a "narcissistic complex". This implies that the socio-historical context has created sufficient change in the dynamics of parent-child relationships, and in turn, has changed the fundamental balance of the id-ego-superego topography. For a useful discussion on the purported shift from an oedipal to a narcissistic complex, both in actual life experience and in the psychoanalytic research tradition, see Benjamin (1987).

Chapter Two

1. It is necessary, as pointed out in Chapter One, to remain aware of potential gender differences in relation to such formative motivation to dominate others.

2. For a discussion of how this stance is similar and dissimilar to Weber's conception of modernity --the iron cages of society-- see Benhabib (1981).

3. The research findings of "Lidz (1965) Schizophrenia and the family, and Stierlin (1974) Separating parents and adolescents confirm that the distance between various members in pathogenic families cannot be regulated according to the situation" (Dobert, Habermas, and Nunn-Winkler, 1987, p. 288). The present argument, however, is not referring exclusively to "pathogenic families" but rather family interactions in general.

4. It is possible that the regressive interactions of dissipated self-other boundaries can result in the reversing of roles between parents and their adult children. In instances of "elderly abuse", the increasingly dependent parent may become intrapsychically characterized by his or her preoedipal experiences. The adult child may then take upon the role of authoritative parent, and may have a distorted memory of the circumstances of their own upbringing. If frustration accompanies his or her memories, the adult

child may vent this on their dependent parent and rationalize it since they believe that they had received the same treatment as a child.

5. The notion of 'individuality' is problematic for various reasons. Even as Kovel's assertion that the woman's individuality is compromised is accurate, the conceptions of 'individuality' and 'autonomy' are ideological.

Chapter Three

1. It is clear, after reviewing the Frankfurt School, and contemporary Feminist and Critical Positions on families that this is the predominant experience of individuals in family settings. cf: Barrett and McIntosh (1982), Donzelot (1979), Elshtain (1982), Horkheimer (1972), Jay (1973), Lasch (1977), Kovel (1978), Poster (1978), Zaretsky (1976).

2. This will become clearer as Adorno's negative dialectics is examined in the next section.

3. The elements of memory and ideology that comprise the family as representation pole of the family identity dialectic are also in dialectical relationship.

4. Adorno equates subjectivity with the 'thinking process' (1982). Certain strands of 'post-structuralist' philosophy construe subjectivity in relation to discourse positions. Both of these interpretations of subjectivity are adopted in this discussion. Jacoby's (1975) ideas on subjectivity are also considered in the next section.

5. How the word 'distorted' is used in this thesis refers to various things. In particular, its use relates to negative or nonenjoyable communication and interaction. This can be taken to the extreme of violence in the form of physical and/or sexual abuse. In Chapter Four, distorted refers to both negative and abusive interactions and is also discussed with Habermas's notion of "systematically distorted communication" in mind.

6. Simply put, epistemology refers to the philosophy of knowledge. Different types of knowledge have been

outlined by various traditions. It is typically asserted that different epistemologies underlie certain theoretical positions. The use of the term epistemology here refers to
an underlying philosophical framework --negative dialectics-- that is used to inform the particular theoretical position being developed --that of family identity as a dialectical concept.

7. It is important to note that Adorno differentiated between viewing the subject in epistemological versus judgemental terms. "Epistemologically materially 'subject' means the thinking function, and frequently also the entity which thinks and cannot be excluded from the concept "I" except at the price of ceasing to mean what it means" (Adorno, 1973, p. 103). Judgementally the subject-object relation is "the objectivity upon which thinking works --the basic assumption and not the act of judgement or what is judged in the synthesis of the judgement" (Adorno, 1973, p. 103).

8. When this type of 'rationality' predominantly informs an individual's self-interpretations and understandings, and his or her interpretations and interactions with others, it may be termed alienation. Marx's original formulation of alienation articulates with this to some extent. Marx's alienation, however, dealt primarily with what he construed as a necessary byproduct of labour. Under contemporary technological conditions, alienation through labour should have been rendered unnecessary. But as is quite apparent, this has not occured, and the extent of human work that takes on an 'automatized' quality is significant. The lack of boundary between the private and public spheres, explicated in Chapter Two, relates directly to the contemporary prevalence of instrumentalized relating in the domestic sphere.

Chapter Four

1. This standpoint is partly based upon Habermas' (1973) reading of Hegel's Jena lectures on the Philosophy of Mind.
It can be argued that, according to Hegel, self-consciousness, subjectivity and self-identity are fundamentally communicative. As Hegel writes, "Spirit is the communication of individuals <Einzelner> in the medium of the universal" (Habermas, 1973, p. 146).

Hegel also pointed to the necessity of understanding this communication through "language" in the context of a "system of recognized norms" such that the "moment of universality" is not placed before that of singularity" permitting "the distinctive links between these singularities" (Habermas, 1973, p. 146). Similarly, the hermeneuticist Gadamer believes that "experience is at bottom a phenomenon of language; an experience prior to an interpretation mediated through language and history is unthinkable" (Lindseth, 1986, p. 67).

2. According to Hegel, the individual interprets and understands his or her "subjectivity" as "I" through "reflection" (Habermas, 1973, p. 144). At the ontological level, however, Hegel does not view self-consciousness as possible solely on the basis of solitary reflection --as do Kant and Fichte. Instead, he construes self "within the framework of the intersubjectivity of spirit" (Habermas, 1973, p. 144) and therefore as based on interactions with others. "Hegel's dialectic of self-consciousness passes over the relation of solitary reflection in favour of the complementary relationship between individuals who know each other" (Habermas, 1973, pp. 144-45). Self-consciousness is thus derived from the "experience of interaction...the intersection of perspectives" (Habermas, 1973, p. 145).

3. A dualistic formulation between men and women is not intended. Rather, it is recognized that, in contemporary times, there are both men and women who relate to others in an egalitarian and interpretive manner that contains an emancipatory potential. Similarly, both men and women may relate to others in an instrumentalized and non-egalitarian way. It is important to recognize, however, that the contemporary prevalence of patriarchy leads to the generalization that many men interact with others in an authoritarian way. Moreover, as noted in various places, the ideology of autonomy predominantly encourages men to relate to others in a less egalitarian way and uphold domineering understandings and practices.

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