

## NEW BOOKS

BISMARCK'S DIPLOMACY AT ITS ZENITH. By Joseph Vincent Fuller, Ph.D. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 1922.

The student of diplomacy will welcome this monograph on a highly important cross-section of Bismarck's career. The book fully sustains the reputation of the series in which it appears. The *Harvard Historical Studies*, comprising now some twenty-six titles, have uniformly exhibited a high standard of scholarship. For the most part, they explore by-paths of history or set forth obscure social institutions in a clear and critical manner. This volume on Bismarck is the first of the series to concern itself with the field of modern diplomacy, and possibly no part of the field requires more sifting of facts and motives than international politics in the late eighties. Hitherto the investigator of that period has lacked many essential data, but gaps have recently been filled by the publication of secret documents from the archives of Vienna and Berlin. While the record is still by no means complete, enough is now available for a critical and even for a definitive estimate of the later phases of the Bismarckian régime. On the whole, Dr. Fuller has done the work in a temperate and scholarly spirit. *Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith* will doubtless remain authoritative on the subject of which it treats.

As a drama, the diplomacy of Bismarck satisfies the Aristotelian canon. It had a beginning, a middle, and an end, and some men still living have seen the whole play. Like the Brahmanic deity, the Iron Chancellor sustained a triple part. He was at once creator, preserver, and destroyer, for it is now fairly clear that, in the logic of history, his diplomacy carried within it the causes of its ultimate collapse. As was said of Wolsey, so it may be said of the great Prussian, that he sought from diplomacy more than diplomacy could give. The supreme juggler managed to keep the manifold balls of a tortuous foreign policy a-going in the air, but in the hands of his less skilful successors they all came crashing to the ground. True, some attribute the downfall of Germany to the fatuity of William II, who—they say—when he dropped the pilot, threw away the pilot's chart. Dr. Fuller holds to the contrary opinion:

The foreign policy of imperial Germany is now a closed chapter of diplomatic history. A general survey of the chapter shows it to possess a degree of unity not always attributed to it. *Alter Kurs* and *Neuer Kurs* are, at most, subdivisions of the story. William II, when he took over the pen from Bismarck in 1890, wrote on in a different style, but without breaking the thread of the narrative. "Above all, it is false" writes Delbruck, "fundamentally false, to maintain that he struck out an essentially different path from Bismarck's. Everything that he undertook and strove after has its origin, is present in embryo, in the policy of Bismarck. . . . The errors of German policy after 1890 were the results of a change in temperament, rather than in direction."

The creative period of Bismarck's statesmanship culminated in 1871. By that year the broad lines of his policy had been realized with a degree of success never before attained in modern Europe. The hegemony of Prussia was established. Austria had been thrust outside the German pale. And, to crown all, a new State, the visible sign of Germanic unity, had been created in the heart of Europe—strong, self-sufficient, and, for the moment, unassailable. There was no more just then to take. But there was much to keep. The creator must preserve his creation, and for nineteen years Bismarck laboured to that end with masterly skill. By processes of subtle manipulation the delicate balance of political forces was made to oscillate around Berlin. Here the skein of diplomacy was tangled and unravelled to suit the purpose of the master weaver, who, in spite of "great combinations of interlocking agreements", kept one simple aim in view. "The dominant position of Germany in international politics, which she had held since 1871, was to be maintained." Conservation, not expansion, was the sovereign word.

The problem for Bismarck after 1871 was clear, if difficult to solve. In essence, it was to prevent—by hook or crook—the gravitation of Russia to the orbit of France. By the débâcle of 1870, France was left "in the air" and in need of an alliance. Bismarck, with consummate ability, had kept Russia out of his two great wars. Antagonism to Russian aspirations, however, would drive her into the arms of France. Germany had no direct point of collision with Russia, but Austria had. The Pan-Slav movement towards the Balkans and Constantinople ran counter to the Austrian *Drang nach Osten*, and as the first principle in his diplomatic policy Bismarck gave steady support to Austrian designs—for German reasons. He had forbore to humiliate Austria after Sadowa in the teeth of opposition from the German military chiefs, because, on a long view of international politics, Germany needed to preserve Austria as a Great Power. But Austria must be kept from brooding upon revenge. Hence the encouragement given to her Eastern policy. Hence, too, the inevitable Balkan question, which, in spite of Bismarck's declaration that it was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, has ever since remained the storm-centre of European affairs.

Other questions, to be sure, kept cropping up. But always and everywhere these were treated as subsidiary factors; the constant element, in relation to which everything else was viewed, was the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Near East. After 1876, and especially after the Berlin Congress, Bismarck was in a real sense the "broker", honest or not, and he got his commission in the Dual Alliance of 1879. But the Congress sounded the knell of the old League of the Three Emperors; henceforth the Franco-Russian Alliance was inevitable. Bismarck succeeded in bridging the interval with sundry devices, which, from the point of view of diplomatic artistry, are to be considered triumphs of finesse. But all of them fell with their contriver, and with them, in the fulness of time, the Imperial German State.

It is with the penultimate scene in the second act of the drama that Dr. Fuller deals,—the two years and a half between August, 1885, and February, 1888. In this period occurred the unification of Bul-

garia, the abdication of Prince Alexander, the war scare of January, 1887, the Schnaebelle incident, the election of Ferdinand of Coburg, the renewal of the Triple Alliance, and the two ententes between England and the Mediterranean Powers. It was a time of unstable equilibrium, taxing the resources of diplomacy to prevent the "inevitable" appeal to arms. But, through it all, Bismarck's position was clear, "though at no stage of his career are his actions to be interpreted according to any pre-arranged and inelastic plan." He himself has given the key to his diplomacy in the *Gedanken*: "International policy is a fluid element which under certain conditions will solidify, but on a change of atmosphere reverts to its original diffuse condition." Consistent with this general principle, however, his course was uniform:

The Austrian Alliance was to remain the basis of that position, as it had been virtually since 1876; and the interests of Austria were accordingly to be furthered to the greatest extent which other factors would permit. Good relations with Russia, only second in importance with those with Austria, were to be kept as far as possible unimpaired.

Bismarck always insisted that the wire to St. Petersburg should not be cut:

He was always opposed to surrendering Germany entirely to the direction of her ally, as must inevitably result from severing all relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg. . . . Not the least serious of his objections to so doing was the consideration that such a course would certainly precipitate the Franco-Russian alliance. . . . and possibly involve England and even Italy against him. In the event of an appeal to arms, such a course would at least bring upon Germany the dreaded war upon two fronts. He never faltered in his determination to live up to his guaranty of Austria's existence as a Great Power. . . . But he would do all in his power to avert such an embarrassing situation by restraining Austria's impetuosity; above all, he would avoid taking the initiative in forcing a final solution of the Balkan problem. . . . Instead of hopes, he kept only fears before the eyes of the Austrian statesmen.

The Russo-Austrian situation is the main thesis in Dr. Fuller's narrative, but scarcely less important is the consideration given to Bismarck's attitude towards Great Britain. Since the recent war, one school of opinion has favoured the view that Germany's fatal mistake was a hesitation in choice between Britain and Russia, which in the end lost her both. By a careful comparative method Dr. Fuller keeps these two strands in Bismarck's diplomacy well in hand, and makes a strong case for the view that the German Chancellor did not aim at a British alliance, especially after 1881:

As early as 1882, he had written: "We can only give positive support to English wishes within very narrow limits, unless we are prepared to take up a more hostile position than necessary towards Russia. . . . The greatest difficulty, however, we encounter in trying to give a practical expression to our sympathies for and our relations with England, is in the absolute impossibility of confidential intercourse in consequence of the indiscretion of English statesmen in their communications to Parliament, and in the absence of security in alliances for which the Crown is not answerable in England, but only the fleeting Cabinets of the day. It is therefore difficult to initiate a reliable understanding with England otherwise than publicly and in the face of all Europe. Such public negotiations. . . . would be highly detrimental to most of our European relations."

Gladstone once described himself as a Highlander in the custody of a Lowlander. Bismarck was more extreme in both directions—a

Berserker in the custody of a Machiavelli. And of all his Machiavellian contrivances perhaps the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 was the masterpiece. Until recently the facts surrounding this agreement were obscure and, indeed, some historians have misunderstood it altogether. But with the publication of Pribram's *Secret Treaties* and Goriainov's article in the *American Historical Review* (January, 1918), the transaction has been fairly well cleared up. In his chapter on it, Dr. Fuller gives a satisfying account of its negotiation and the motives underlying it, and estimates the effect upon German policy of the failure to renew it. In brief, its notoriety proceeded from its inherent inconsistency with Germany's previous engagements. Under the terms of the treaty with Austria, Bismarck had undertaken to protect the Dual Monarchy against Russia. In the agreement of 1887, he sought to reinsure against a war between Germany and Russia on Austria's account, by promising Russia German neutrality in a Russo-Austrian conflict in the case where Austria should be the aggressor. Of course, Bismarck would in the last resort be the judge of the aggression, and for the term of the treaty he had both Russia and Austria in camp. But *cui bono*? Hardly for the benefit of Austria, nor, though she might think so, of Russia. The profit, as usual, inured solely to Berlin.

Dr. Fuller closes his narrative with a summary of Bismarck's great speech in the Reichstag on February 6, 1888. Perhaps no pronouncement of modern times, delivered in time of peace, has had such reverberation. The occasion, the office, and the man all combined to invest it with an air of momentous significance. How significant, few, if any, could then divine. But in a few months the young Kaiser was in the saddle; after that came the decline and fall.

Throughout, Dr. Fuller carefully relies upon primary sources, and shows judicial caution in his use of secondary material, especially that supplied by Bismarck in his memoirs, which were written with an eye to the verdict of posterity upon his personal quarrel with the Kaiser. By way of appendices, the texts of the chief treaties of the period might well have been added, together with the famous speech, which is not easily accessible to the general reader.

A discussion of this kind does well to avoid an impressionistic treatment and the snares of fine writing. But even in the restrained, scientifically historical method of Dr. Fuller, the old Chancellor stands forth fully revealed. Probably never before was such primal energy conjoined with so prescient an adaptation of means to ends. Yet in the long run his work proved as futile as that of Wolsey or Talleyrand. Apparently the stars in their courses fight against diplomacy.

H. F. M.

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THE PRINCIPLE OF OFFICIAL INDEPENDENCE: With particular reference to the political history of Canada. By Robert MacGregor Dawson, M.A., D.Sc. Gundy: Toronto. 1922.

This is a very interesting volume, dealing with political questions familiar enough in themselves but seldom made the subject of special

enquiry by writers on political science. The book is more notable for the questions which it raises, and the interesting discussions thereon which it introduces, than for any satisfactory solutions which it presents. It exhibits much honest industry in the collection of facts, and no little shrewd insight into practical affairs with which the author is not always personally familiar. In his preface he has fully recognized and frankly acknowledged a certain misleading tendency which a hasty reading of the volume might induce. In bringing out the shortcomings incidental to the selection of officials and the actual operation of the public services in Canada, mistakes and imperfections are cited and discussed, rather than the humdrum average product of a multitude of officials, whose obscure merits or demerits attract no particular attention. Thus Canadian official administration might appear to be much more defective than it actually is. As a matter of fact, of course, it is not the exceptional or prominent exhibition of official delinquency which is most injurious to the system and hence to the State, but the lowering of official standards in the mass, which can neither be so convincingly demonstrated nor so effectively remedied.

Although the greater part of the volume is occupied with methods of selection, the appointment to official positions, and the permanence of tenure therein, yet in the introduction to the subject in the first chapter, "The Principle of Official Independence", the writer recognizes that even when official independence—in which permanence of tenure is so important a factor—is secured, it does not follow that efficiency and conscientious responsibility are also secured. He holds, of course, that these should be secured, but he does not develop to any extent this important phase of the problem. Yet the very protection which is provided for the most efficient and conscientious public servants is provided also for the least efficient and most unscrupulous, and for a much larger number whose very security may promote indolence and indifference. Although the volume deals with the official independence of members of parliament, including senators, and even of the Governor General, the most vital features of the discussion centre around the civil service, the bench, and the permanent commissions. It is impossible, of course, to enter into details; but it may be said that the analyses of the various situations presented, and especially of their shortcomings, are more fully and more satisfactorily presented than the remedies suggested for the correction of the defects brought out. In the case of the judges, many very pertinent criticisms are made and various remedies discussed. As regards the latter, however, one may say, taking some slight liberty with Fitzgerald's quatrain, he has made "great argument

About it and about; but evermore  
Came out by the same door wherein he went."

In the survey of the civil service he recognizes the false principles on which the recent American classifiers proceeded in the case of the Dominion Civil Service, and the consequent injury to the cause of civil service efficiency and the merit system. This, as he anticipates, has given rise to a reaction which may not stop at salutary reforms, but go far towards the re-establishment of political patronage. Altogether



the volume certainly presents much food for reflection and much suggestive ground for discussion.

ADAM SHORTT.

OUTSPOKEN ESSAYS. Volume II. By William Ralph Inge, Dean of St. Paul's. Longmans, Green & Co. London. 1922.

The writer of this book has won for himself a great name. He is, perhaps, the best known member of the clerical profession in the world to-day. The palm of eloquence may have gone to others, and so also may first place in social service or in works among the poor. But there is no doubt that Dean Inge stands in a class by himself, and that his utterances command a hearing which not even the mighty voice of Jowett or of Mercier can rival.

This is owing in part to the fact that he is Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral. He is at the central church of the English-speaking race, whence every word of moment at once flies east and west until it has girdled the globe. Yet, much as it means to him to stand in such a position, it would be a mistake to suppose that it is the position which makes Dean Inge. His impression is himself. Other facts have their value in the complex result. His reputation as "the gloomy Dean"—a description which conjures up the image of one not unlike him in some respects, Dean Swift,—and the real merit of many of his contributions to current thinking, must all be taken into account. But it is for other reasons in the main that the world's eye is fixed upon him. One discerns in him a most interesting union of things different,—a vast learning and a transparent honesty; a real passion for truth, together with the straightest and bluntest courage in telling the results of any enquiry; a power of taking a comprehensive view of a subject in its various relations; a detachment from the idols of current opinion, which gives to his judgment the freshness of a breeze coming up from the sea. It is this combination of intellectual and moral qualities which attracts the man of to-day. To be a scholar,—that is much, for the great twentieth-century idolatry is the idolatry of Brain. But to be a great scholar and also a big man,—that is rather an unusual arrangement of character, and is an element in the powerful form of psychic appeal known as magnetism.

It would be idle in the space of this review to attempt anything like a full estimate of the opinions of Dean Inge. Nearly everything he says is interesting, but with the interest there is much that is debatable. His views on government, on democracy, on the present discontents, on progress, and on social and political regeneration, are clear and definite, often sound and convincing, often open to dispute. The main criticism to be passed upon them is that much learning may have made him a little mad. We are conscious in his writings of an immense sweep of vision, but it is a sweep that somehow overlooks the individual. He seems to us to be so busy with the "towered cities" and the "spacious times" as to have forgotten that this is a world of men and women after all. He careers wildly among the higher mathematics, threading his way with ease and freedom among calculations as to tendencies and

movements of thought, where the ordinary brain reels as it follows him, until we are glad to come down from these frosty altitudes to the low levels of common arithmetic, and the dealing with such simplicities as that two and two make four.

His religious convictions are our present concern. Here, as often elsewhere, we meet with a shock of surprise. Somehow the learned Dean has managed to gain the reputation of being a heretic. The radical tone, which has marked many of his public utterances, has given rise to a suspicion of unsoundness in the minds of some among his stricter brethren. There is a rumour even that one of the most brilliant of recent converts to Rome gave as a reason the presence in the Anglican communion of such lax believers as Dean Inge. But in the *Confessio Fidei* at the beginning of this second volume of *Outspoken Essays*, there is little for the most orthodox to quarrel with. Certainly the famous retort of Disraeli to Dean Stanley, "No Dogmas, no Deans" would find a scanty basis in this statement of conviction. Let me illustrate.

Here is his creed as to a transcendent God:

There is no escape from pantheism and from a creed which, if not pessimistic, is without hope for the future and without consolation in the present, unless we abandon the doctrine of equivalence between God and the world, and return to the theory of creation by a God, who is, in His own being, independent of the world and above it.....

The world is a hymn sung by the creative Logos to the glory of God the Father. Its object, so far as we can discern, is the manifestation of the nature of God under His three attributes of Wisdom, Beauty and Goodness. We call these the Absolute Values.

There are equally strong words on the future life:

Secularism, in promising us a delusive millennium upon earth, has robbed mankind of the hope of immortality. It promises men an earthly paradise at the end of a flowery path, and leads them to a premature hell at the end of a way of blood..... One of the greatest needs of our time is a standard book on the doctrine of immortality.....

Our contemporaries desire a religion without a hell; and they even seem to prefer a religion without a heaven.

Here follows a reference to Spiritualism:

As to the pitiful fancies of our modern necromancers, it seems a shame even to speak of them. In them we see in part the rebound against the tyranny of nineteenth century materialism; an assertion, however misguided, of the right of the will and affections to make themselves heard in any discussion of the ultimate values; in part the pathetic longing of the bereaved to realize the continued existence of those whom they have loved and lost; and in part a revolt against a secularized religion which has practically confined our hopes in Christ to this life. The remedy is to offer a more worthy conception of human immortality.

He passes to the discussion of Christianity itself:

The Incarnation and the Cross are the central doctrines of Christianity..... I have made the weight of my theological position rest on a certain conviction about the historical Jesus, namely, that He was the Incarnate Word or Logos, a perfect revelation of the mind and character of God the Father.

So also of the supernatural:

The circumstances of Christ's birth into the world, and of His withdrawal in bodily presence from it, may well have been unique.

The new scientific knowledge is regarded as imposing upon us three reforms:

(1) More freedom within the Church.

Institutional Christianity has not kept pace with the growth of human knowledge. The traditional Christian lives in a pre-Copernican universe, and refuses to adjust his cosmology, which fits only into a geocentric frame.

(2) A duty towards the lower creation:

The lower animals are literally our distant cousins. . . . .  
The morality of field sports is dubious. I cannot doubt that the opinion will before long be generally held, that to kill animals for pleasure is barbarous and immoral.

The Dean seems to have been a sympathizer with the Plumage Bill.

(3) A duty to posterity:

Eugenics is the most important of all social questions. . . . .  
We are largely responsible for the physical, intellectual and moral outfit with which the next generation will face the duties and difficulties of life.

He who thoughtfully reads the writings of Dean Inge will find much to question or to disagree with, but he will at least enjoy the privilege of contact with an independent and original mind. It is refreshing to find loyalty to the main lines of truth accompanied by so open and receptive an outlook.

J. P. D. LLWYD.

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THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARGOT ASQUITH. Volume II. Thornton  
Butterworth, Ltd.

Mrs. Asquith's second volume of reminiscences is less provocative and more interesting than her first. Two years ago she broke into literature with a publication that looked like another of those escapades of "social courage" upon which she had plumed herself in her youth. But the reviewers seem to have done her good, and there is a tone of sobriety about this last book. Her scorn for criticism still finds one outlet on the title page, where she quotes the Persian proverb—*Les chiens aboyent, la caravane passe*. The victims, however, of this rather unkind description will be consoled by the thought that, while Mrs. Asquith has pilloried them in a phrase, she has in some slight degree acted upon their advice.

The tale is resumed at the beginning of 1896, and the epilogue at the close of the book is concerned with the ineffectiveness of the Treaty of Versailles. On purely personal matters we get two chapters, one called "My Last Riding Adventure", the other "My Theories upon Children and My Baby". The first is a very amusing account of transactions with an Irish horse-dealer, who seems to have been even less scrupulous than most of his kind, and whose keen eye to business almost cost Mrs. Asquith her life. The reflections about children are reproduced from diaries written from time to time, which show the writer's tender and often sagacious concern about a mother's duties. Of wider public interest are the chapters on the Jameson Raid, on



Joseph Chamberlain and his enterprise of "Tariff Reform", on the great Liberal triumph at the polls in 1905, on the Lloyd George Budget of 1911, on the struggle for the Parliament Act, and on the successive stages of the Great War. Mrs. Asquith writes as one who was behind the scenes, who knew intimately the chief actors in the drama, who was even personally consulted at crucial moments of decision. The personal letters from statesmen on both sides of the House reveal an extraordinary degree of importance which seems to have belonged to this lady's judgment in the eyes of public men, and it is obvious that their personal regard for her was most friendly. We get lifelike pictures of Cecil Rhodes, of Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, of Mr. Winston Churchill, of Lord Kitchener, of Lord Fisher, of Lord Grey, and of many more. On war policy Mrs. Asquith was a pronounced Asquithian.

One of the most interesting passages of the book is the record of an interview in the train with an unnamed American lady, who regaled her—in complete ignorance of her identity—with the most vicious gossip about Mrs. Asquith's callousness in the war and in particular about her German friendships. The effect upon the glib talker when she found out to whom she had been talking was electrical, and she asked why—if these awful stories were untrue—they were allowed to pass without public contradiction. Mrs. Asquith replied:—

Would you have me say in Trafalgar Square that a man who has been Prime Minister of England for nearly ten years is not likely to be a knave or a fool? Would you have me go round the street with a bell, crying "Mrs. Asquith is not a German spy; Miss Asquith is not engaged to a German Admiral; Mrs. Asquith does not know where Donnington Hall is; Mr. Asquith's sympathies are with *our* soldiers and not with those who have killed his son"?

And there is another paragraph of like nature, which we are left to interpret for ourselves:—

When a lady of foreign birth, too flippant to feel and too noisy to pray, posed before the public and pandered to the Press by saying that she had constantly been to 10 Downing Street on matters of vital importance during the war, and had felt horrified at the indifference exhibited by the Asquiths, she was not merely improvising, but displaying the kind of cruelty which is the exclusive property of women. No man would have said that of a family who had had one son killed, another shell-shocked, and the third maimed for life.

There is not much of interest about Mr. Lloyd George, except one diverting anecdote about the forwarding from the Post Office of letters received at 10 Downing Street during his régime, and marked "Unknown" by the Prime Minister's secretaries. No one of the name of "Asquith" had apparently been heard of by the staff! This "pleasantry", we are told, went on for a good while.

The diaries published in this book weary one a little at times by their minutiae of trifling detail,—the kind of dresses Mrs. Asquith wore on this occasion and on that, the precocious things that were said by her young children, the compliments paid to her, the stupidity of those who annoyed her. One might gather that she was a member of the Cabinet, if not its most important member, from the decisions and perplexities in which "we" are declared to have been involved. The smart rejoinders that she made at a dinner party are a little too

well remembered, and we are startled to hear of scribbled notes that she sent down from the Ladies' Gallery to colleagues of her husband telling them what course they should take in a debate. Her photograph too appears six times in the book.

Mrs. Asquith has been criticized with great severity for her lack of self-restraint, and there are indeed few signs of reticence in her autobiographic work. But is this altogether a fault? An autobiograph<sup>y</sup> is self-disclosure, and its first essential is that the *real* self should be disclosed. A writer's "lack of self-restraint" may be more charitably called "candour", just as the usual inhibitions of modesty are so often a cunning disguise. If Margot Asquith was unconventional in her behaviour, truth requires that she should be unconventional in depicting this. At all events we may say of the volumes she has given us that they do make us acquainted with herself. Whether Margot is in all respects a desirable addition to the spiritual circle of her readers, may be open to dispute. But most of those readers undoubtedly welcome many a writer who has far less than Margot's merit. To the present critic she appears a vivacious companion for the library, quick-witted, widely informed, a warm friend to those she likes, a good hater of those who have offended her, radiantly affectionate towards those who worship at her own—and especially at her husband's—shrine, able to say pleasant things with sweetness and unpleasant things with bitterness and everything with a pungent wit, a little too much absorbed in reflection about her own wonderful personality, intellectually vain, spoiled to some extent by the profusely expressed admiration of so many distinguished people, and driven to a retaliatory contempt for those others who have been unfair or ungenerous to her. Is not this "a very woman",—human, all too human? She is not of the company of the saints, and her books are no part of our literature of devotion. But they are human documents. In them deep is not calling unto deep. But some persisting qualities of mankind—and of womankind—are displayed therein with more than the usual vividness and honesty.

H. L. S.

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LOUISBOURG. From its Foundation to its Fall, 1713—1758. By J. S. McLennan. With Illustrations. Macmillan and Co.

Prior to the peace of Utrecht in 1713, the most important place in Nova Scotia was Port Royal, because it was the site of the first European settlement and the chief seat of French power in Acadia. After the treaty, when its name was changed to Annapolis Royal, it continued to be the capital under British authority, but its importance in the eyes of the world gradually diminished, while that of the new French stronghold—created by edict of the King of France immediately after the cession to the latter of the island of Cape Breton by the treaty of 1713—became more and more marked, especially in the eyes of statesmen of the leading countries. As it grew in strength, its geographical position caused it to be regarded as the dominant strategic centre in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the western portion of the North Atlantic. Its menace was particularly felt by the shrewd and

determined leaders of the American seaboard colonies, who, as they grew in strength in the first half of the eighteenth century, relentlessly cherished the idea of breaking the power of the French in Canada, and of driving them from their strongholds. Though the plan of attack first conceived by Peter Schuyler of Albany in the latter part of the seventeenth century had never been attempted, it had not been completely forgotten, and when the successful venture of the New Englanders against Louisbourg in 1745 made them conscious of their power, the great scheme of a combined naval and military attack on Canada emerged from the secret pigeon-holes of the governments of New York and Massachusetts, and became the inspiration of a few determined leaders whose insistence finally induced William Pitt to undertake the memorable campaign of 1758-60. The Americans were deeply chagrined when Louisbourg was given back to the French by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, three years after its capture. They believed that the mother country had been indifferent to their interests or had been willing to sacrifice them in the game of international politics.

To what extent the British Government were influenced by the American attitude is not certain, but it is evident that they believed a strategic blunder had been committed, for they immediately gave orders to establish a new stronghold in Nova Scotia on the shores of the inlet of Chebucto. The rise of Louisbourg is, therefore, to be regarded as the direct cause of the establishment of Halifax in 1749 as the chief seat of British power on the North American coast, and of the immediate transfer to the latter of the Government of Nova Scotia from Annapolis Royal. It is very gratifying that the story of the rise and fall of Louisbourg has been at last fully told by a Canadian, the Hon. J. S. McLennan.

His work is monumental, and is based upon the most thorough investigation of State documents existing chiefly in London, Paris, Ottawa and the United States. It is a storehouse of information, and is invaluable as a work of reference to all students of the eighteenth century history of Canada. It is not, however, valuable only as a storehouse of facts. Its philosophical analysis of the complexities of international rivalry, and of the delicate and varying relations between the mother countries of Britain and France and their colonial dependencies, reveals in the author a grasp of the questions at issue found only in statesmen of the first rank. Canada has, as yet, produced very few men of this calibre either among its writers or among its political leaders. It is not difficult to find an explanation. Our country has not been lacking in men of ability. Their defects have been due to their educational limitations. A fundamental requisite for the attainment of the highest statesmanship is a thorough educational equipment, combined with a profound mastery of the basic facts and philosophy of history. Our leaders have been mainly so-called "practical politicians", content with playing the game of parties, regardless of aims other than those dictated by political bosses or by the clamorous demands of their local constituents. The dominant ambition of our leaders is merely to succeed in the game. They become experts in dealing with its trickeries, they become adepts in following the ever-changing whims and wishes of the people.

True leadership implies greater knowledge applied to the enlightenment of the masses, a mastery of political problems which have been considered by the leading countries in past centuries, and a prophetic vision capable of directing the thought of a people to a higher plane of national existence. This high standard can be attained only through the influence of far better educational facilities than now exist, and through the power of a virile press and a national literature. The latter is almost non-existent in Canada. The best thought of the country is unwritten and, therefore, is not an active influence in moulding the destiny of the country.

The production of a book such as that of Senator McLennan is a hopeful sign. It is an indication that research work in history and literature is possible in Canada. And it does not stand alone. A few splendid works of similar character have preceded it; let us hope that others will follow. Canada has a splendid historic past. What is needed is exposition and interpretation, for the benefit of the mass of the people. Only thus can an enduring interest in their country be created. Senator McLennan's book should serve a high purpose, but it can do so only by being widely read. It is the duty of all lovers of their country's history to recommend it as worthy of careful study.

J. CLARENCE WEBSTER.

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THE STORY OF THE CANADIAN REVISION OF THE PRAYER BOOK. By W. J. Armitage, D.D., Ph.D., Rector of St. Paul's, Canon and Archdeacon of Halifax, N. S., Custodian of the Canadian Book of Common Prayer. With a foreword by The Most Rev. S. P. Matheson, D.D., Archbishop of Rupert's Land and Primate of All Canada. Cambridge University Press.

No one was better equipped than Dr. Armitage for writing this "story". A member of the Revision Committee from the initial stage, since 1913 its careful and painstaking Secretary, later appointed Custodian of the revised Book, well acquainted with the personnel of the General and Sub-Committees, a writer able to make dry facts interesting,—he has turned out quite a readable record which no doubt others, besides students, will enjoy.

In his preface the author expresses his indebtedness to liturgical scholars both in Canada and elsewhere. To the present critic the contents of Chapter V,—the story and methods of revision in other Churches—was most attractive. Here is the outline summary:—

The first portion of the book is mainly historical and biographical, deals with the genesis of the movement for Revision in Canada, and attempts to portray the Revisers at their work. The second part of the book is mainly of the character of a commentary upon the new prayers and services.

The appearance of this volume synchronized with the issue of the revised Prayer Book, to which it is intended to be a companion or manual. As the author himself tells us, his work does not pretend to

be a history of the Book of Common Prayer. There is evidence all through of keen and wide research,—something more than a mere summary of his Minute Book. Dr. Armitage knows also how to find apt quotations whether of prose or of verse.

At first it seemed as if the revisers were going to satisfy themselves with an appendix to the revision of 1662. An elaborate appendix was drawn up, but Chapter II of Dr. Armitage's book narrates its "sad and chequered history". He tells of the final purpose to perform a major operation, which should let in the new blood of a full and strong resolution calling for the combined movement of both Houses, Upper and Lower, to have the Prayer Book revised completely. This step was taken in 1911 when the real work of revision was made possible. From this point we are given a very close view of all that took place in the various phases of the process. The difficulties are fully presented and the methods of the committees are made plain.

We are introduced in a series of pen pictures to archbishops, bishops, clergy and laymen who formed the personnel of the various working committees. They were representative men of the Church. Very few of them were trained liturgiologists, but "they had the supreme satisfaction of seeing their work accepted as with unanimous voice by the body which appointed them". In subsequent chapters we are led through the committee stages, by the issuing of the Draft books (1915) to the adoption of the famous Canon XII, and up to the revision of 1918. Thence we pass through the work of the Provincial Synods to the final confirmation at Hamilton in 1921. All this is depicted with great wealth of detail. Two features stand out prominently in these pages,—features that must always redound to the credit of the Anglican Church in this enterprise. These are, first, a large possession by the revisers of "sanctified common sense"; and, second, a very general recognition of Canada's present day needs in this "sober standard of feeling in matters of practical religion". How else could we have seen this marvellous result, that those who were wedded to 1549 and those who considered 1552 as sacrosanct could put out from their common mooring ground of 1662, and set sail upon the treacherous sea of revision,—a sea as unknown to them as was the Atlantic to Cabot—and attain their Bona Vista of 1921?

The second and larger division of this book is incapable of summary. It is here that the author has placed the concrete results of revision enrichments, adaptations and additions in all fulness of detail,—a storehouse stacked for future years. Here, too, it is that so many and varied sidelights of specific information are thrown upon the work as it proceeded as well as upon the contributions of individual revisers to the great sum-total. The account of the struggle over the Athanasian symbol in Chapter XVI is one of the most interesting in the book. The source and history of the various prayers and collects in the different offices form a valuable body of liturgical material that one could not find elsewhere in so small compass. In the introductions to many of the services, particularly those peculiar to the Canadian Book, Dr. Armitage has given us items of really valuable information, for example in Chapter XXXVII on "Laying a Foundation Stone".

The Cambridge University Press has maintained in this volume



its usual high standard of workmanship. The type is good and easily legible. The misprints are very few. There are one or two *lapsus calami*. For example, on page 145 the author remarks that we are "more than three centuries" from the Preface of 1662. On page 205 we hear of "Mother of Parliaments". This term is often wrongly applied to the British Parliament, and it is so applied here. It referred originally to *Ecclesia Anglicana*, that in her Synods gave to the nation a model for the national Parliament. Perhaps we might have been spared some of the lesser details in Part I, where the archdeacon somewhat labours his story. And was it in order to lessen and lighten the tedium of many in the heavier parts that we were given on pages 74, 75, and 76 the "Study in Transmigration"?

H. W. CUNNINGHAM.