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**The Liberal Rationalist Solution to the Problem of War
in International Relations. Progress, Human Freedom
and Rationality in the Peace Theories of Norman
Angell and David Mitrany.**

by

Lucian M. Ashworth

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 1994

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Abstract

Conventional wisdom assumes that the study of International Relations (IR) has passed through three 'great debates', the first of these debates being the realist-idealist debate of the 1930's and 1940's. This thesis questions the view that a realist-idealist debate happened in the way that IR scholars assume. The basis of this study is an examination of the works of two twentieth century writers on international affairs, both of whom have been labelled as 'idealists' by post-Second World War IR scholars at one time or another. These two are Norman Angell, who wrote *The Great Illusion*, and David Mitrany, generally regarded as a founder of the modern functional approach to IR.

Part I of the thesis examines the philosophical background of Angell and Mitrany's liberal rationalism, showing how their ideas are influenced by an interpretation of the interconnectedness of the concepts of reason, freedom and progress. I argue that it is their view of this reason-freedom-progress nexus that differentiates these two thinkers from writers in other IR paradigms. Part II critically examines the writings of Angell and Mitrany, and sets these within the context of nineteenth and early twentieth century views of international affairs. The conclusion assesses: (i) the validity of modern conceptions of the realist-idealist debate, and (ii) the usefulness of Angell and Mitrany in a post-Cold War era.

Abbreviations and Terms Used in the Text

ILO International Labour Organisation

IPE International Political Economy

IR International Relations

UNESCO United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural
Organisation

UPU Universal Postal Union

Within the body of the text, 'World' will refer to the globe as a whole, while 'world' will refer to the synonym for 'era' or 'milieu' that is found in common speech (eg: World peace, and the world of banking)

In order to distinguish between the uses of the word idealism, the IR use of the term as an opposite for realism will appear between inverted commas (ie: 'idealism'), while the political theory use of idealism to refer to a particular school of thinkers will appear without inverted commas.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Robert Boardman, for his advice and support during the writing of this thesis. When I expressed an interest in the trials and tribulations of liberal approaches to IR theory it was he who suggested Angell and Mitrany. My two readers, Tim Shaw and Katherine Fierlbeck also deserve thanks, not only for their useful comments and suggestions, but for volunteering to wade through a PhD thesis during a busy time of the academic year. Craig Murphy, my external examiner, posed some fair and thoughtful questions, and helped make the defence both interesting and rewarding.

A special thanks should go to the staff of the archives at the British Library of Political and Economic Science, who were helpful, friendly and efficient during my visit there to examine the Mitrany papers. The Killam library inter-library loans librarians at Dalhousie also deserve praise for the work they did tracing often obscure books and articles.

During my four years as a PhD student I received funding from both the Killam Trust and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I also received funding from the Dalhousie University Faculty of Graduate Studies to do research in London, and to present my preliminary findings about Norman Angell at the 1993 ISA conference at Acapulco.

My thesis committee are not the only people who have read my thesis from first to last page. A warm and heartfelt thanks goes to my wife, Elizabeth De Boer. Her interests in different, but related, areas of political science ensured that she brought both a fresh, and an informed, critical eye to the reading of this manuscript. Many of the ideas in this thesis were also discussed with Elizabeth before I committed them to paper, so she also shares much of the praise for its strengths (but, obviously, not for its faults, which are, needless to say, all mine).

Many people have helped me with different aspects of this thesis. I would particularly like to mention Victoria Ashworth (especially for Ibn Khaldûn, and for reading an early draft of chapter one), Kiaras Gharabaghi (for our discussion on Morgenthau, and the role of violence in the reform process), Richard Ingram (for his insights into post-modernity), David Long (for our discussions on Hobson, Mitrany, Angell and Woolf -- and our mutual interest in the history of the British Labour Party), Cornelia Navari (for our discussion of Angell), Sandra Maclean (for civil society), and Bob Webber (for the finer points of the early realists, and our disagreements on the merits of Kant and Weber).

Finally, this thesis deals with many of the issues that faced the English-speaking world during the inter-war period. I was frightened to observe that at the same time as I wrote about appeasement, fascism and the ethnic fissures of the 1930's, an overtly fascist party joined a governing coalition

in Italy, the rightist Reform Party emerged as the second largest party in English-speaking Canada, a fascist party won a council by-election in London and ethnic violence erupted around the globe. My thoughts turned to those on the left and the right, who like Angell and Mitrany opposed, fascism during the 1930's and '40's. The parallels between the rise of the far right (whether fascist or not) in the 1930's, and the re-appearance of those same tendencies in the 1990's, demonstrates the extent to which we need their sort again. This thesis is gratefully dedicated to all those who fought fascism during those critical decades.

Introduction:

Chapter 1: Ideas, The Evolution of Peace Theories in IR and the Purposes of the Thesis

Quot homines tot sententiae (So many men, so many opinions).

Terence 190? - 159? BC.

Modern Western political thought has often speculated on the relationship between ideas and material forces. Do ideas exist in isolation from political and economic conditions? Are they either formed by, or are they creators of, these conditions -- or both? That ideas play a role in human society can hardly be doubted, as the triumphs of Christianity over paganism within the Roman Empire, or the end of the Soviet bloc, demonstrate. Yet the nature of that relationship is often far from clear. These issues are central, whether acknowledged or not, to the role and study of peace in international relations. Peace has been an 'idea' which has often come to the fore as a political goal when material forces have made war problematic. Equally, peace theories have often been constructed for the purpose of radically changing the forms of material conditions in the world.

Interestingly enough, despite hot disputes among modern Western scholars on many issues revolving around the question of the right way for humans to live, there is a broad consensus that peace is an ultimate goal of human society. Consequently, Kantian liberals, utilitarians, structural Marxists, critical theorists, and even those realists who owe more to an interpretation of Burke than they do to a selective reading of Hobbes, look towards a time when war will be as outdated as slave labour or trepanning. This is not to say that there are not scholars who see the idea of perpetual peace as a chimera. Those realists who claim to trace their views from the pre-Enlightenment Renaissance of Machiavelli, or the Age of Absolutism which produced Thomas Hobbes, regard perpetual peace as an unobtainable goal (a small irony here is that Thomas Hobbes did believe in the attainability of perpetual peace). On the other side of the Enlightenment, poststructuralists regard the question of perpetual peace, as it is currently formulated, ill-founded to begin with. The diversity between International Relations (IR) paradigms over the question of perpetual peace will be the subject of chapter 3.¹

This thesis looks at the idea of perpetual peace as it has manifested itself in one particular strand of the Enlightenment tradition, namely the liberal rationalist IR scholars of the twentieth century. What makes this study timely is that, in the largely Anglo-American-dominated

subject of IR, liberal rationalism went from being the dominant paradigm before the Second World War to being largely marginalised during the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union liberal rationalist IR has made a spectacular come-back, but the post-Cold War liberal rationalism has, to a large extent, developed without reference to the works of the pre-1939 liberal rationalist writers.² One purpose of this dissertation, therefore, will be to place this early period of IR scholarship in the context of the development of IR theory and western political thought in general. This will both highlight the important contributions made by the then dominant liberal rationalist paradigm of the first half of the twentieth century, and show how the development of IR theory during this period was linked to the major questions and crises that informed early twentieth century political philosophy.

In order to lay the groundwork for this study, this introductory chapter will address (i) the relationship between ideas and material conditions, (ii) the historical development of peace as an idea, and (iii) the form that this thesis will take, both in subject and in choice of methodological approach. The main theoretical pillar on which this thesis rests is the idea that early twentieth century liberal rationalism, as explained by Angell and Mitrany, based its approach to world peace on assumptions about the inter-relationships of particular definitions of reason, freedom and

progress. Further, it is argued that the viability of liberal rationalism stands or falls on the credibility of the nexus between these three concepts. Despite the serious shocks to the liberal international order from 1914 to 1945, liberal rationalism was able to adjust its views of the world so that its assumptions still carried weight. The eclipse of liberal rationalism by realism was not the result of a theoretically rigorous debate, as much as this has become the authorised version of the history of IR. Liberal rationalism's assumptions are direct descendants of Enlightenment reformulations of classical and Medieval philosophical concepts, and therefore stand and fall with the convincingness of the Enlightenment project; and the power of Enlightenment answers to the question of the right way for humans to live. By Enlightenment I mean an attitude in western philosophy that stressed the progress of humanity (whether progress in truth/ethics, technology or both), conceptions of a division between reason and passion, and a commitment to some form of human emancipation (what Kant saw as a way out of the tutelage of nature, and Foucault as a recognition and transgression of limits).³ It is from these Enlightenment attitudes that the liberal rationalist nexus between reason, freedom and progress emerges.

The continued strength of an Enlightenment-inspired liberalism as the dominant ideology of the West, therefore, means that liberal rationalism's existence as an IR paradigm

remains secure. Yet, the weaknesses of liberal rationalist IR are also the weaknesses of liberalism in general, and it is in the context of global politics that these weaknesses -- and by extension the weaknesses of the Enlightenment project as currently formulated -- are most fully revealed.

Following from this line of argument, this dissertation argues that liberal rationalism has been seriously misrepresented by realist IR scholars -- misrepresented both in its relationship with the development of political theory in general, and in its place within the creation of IR. Perhaps the most serious case of misrepresentation lies in the period prior to the Second World War. Not only have the ideas of liberal rationalists (misnamed 'idealists' in IR theory) been marginalised by misquotation, but the realists have written themselves into the history of the inter-war period in a way that gives realism a place in the inter-war period that it really does not deserve. More specifically realism has linked liberal rationalism to appeasement, and put itself in the anti-fascist camp. Chapter seven of this thesis will argue that this alignment is not justified, while chapters four to six will examine the works of two of the key liberal rationalist writers of this century -- Norman Angell and David Mitrany.

The goal of this thesis, then, is nothing more than to give back to the early twentieth century liberal rationalists their due place in the IR pantheon, with the hope that some of

the lessons that can be drawn from their work might help inform what we should be doing today. There was an old Chinese custom that, on the overthrow of a dynasty the new ruler would go and pay homage at the grave of the ruler who had been overthrown by the first member of the old dynasty. Thus, President Sun Yat Sen, after overthrowing the Manchus, went to the grave of the last of the Ming dynasty. Disciplines are not empires, and paradigms are not dynasties, but as IR readjusts itself in response to philosophical challenges and the end of the comforting simplicity of bipolarity, time might be well spent acknowledging those thinkers who were there at the creation of IR, but watched it transmute from a vehicle for perpetual peace, to being a home for a pessimistic realism.

Ideas, Material Forces and the Birth of Ideology:

This thesis is concerned with ideas, particularly their development in the construction of IR. By ideas I mean not only the way people think, but more specifically the way that people use thinking to impose order on both their view of the world and on how they would like the world to be. While thought encompasses all thinking, ideas refer specifically to that thought that gives the external reality shape, order, and purpose. In this sense, the concept of 'forest' is an idea, since it is used to put order on, and to facilitate understanding of, a collection of trees that happen to be in the same locale. Ideas also encompass what we privilege to see

as important. Do we see the state as the defining feature of politics? What meanings do we give to freedom? In sum, ideas are abstract thoughts that can impose order.

A useful distinction in the analysis of ideas can be made between what we might refer to as causal and normative ideas.⁴ By causal, I mean those ideas that make claims of a causal connection. For example, Cromwell believed that being in a state of grace would bring God's favour in public life, while H. N. Brailsford argued that the existence of capitalism caused wars. Normative ideas, on the other hand, refer to claims such as the composition of the right way to live. In an analysis of the intellectual force of liberal rationalism in IR we should make a distinction between the force of its causal claims, and the value of its normative claims in a post-Cold War era. This distinction will be drawn in more detail in chapter 8.

The view that ideas have an important part to play in political life, and that this important part is complicated by people having different ideas about the world, is by and large an Enlightenment concept. Indeed, in the seventeenth century the thought that human ideas might exist as regulators of legitimate human action was anathema. Rather, the World was part of a single divinely inspired harmony, which could be discovered by thought and the decoding of signs. Much thought, as a consequence, involved the listing of attributes and the comparison of similarities. No doubt, people could be divinely

inspired (for were not the evangelists?), possessed by devils, or even affected by the consumption of herbs (could not St John's wort cure melancholy?), but all proper thinking people would in the end think the same because they all studied the same natural harmony. Signs existed to show them the way. Hence, plants with yellow flowers cured jaundice, while that hero of modern rational amoralists, Machiavelli, accepted that harbingers and signs of danger warned people of impending disasters.⁵ Those who properly understood this harmony were 'orthodox', while those who distorted its message were heretics. Seeing the world in a different way was, consequently, a sickness.⁶ If 'ideas' existed at all, they were not the property of individual cognition, but were the 'ideal' types, outlined by Plato, that existed outside of the flux of material, and everyday human, existence.

This is not to say that people did not argue prior to the Enlightenment, whether over the right way to live or the nature of orthodoxy. Rather, ideas in the Enlightenment began to be regarded as variables in themselves, with the individual mind as a legislator of what was, or was not, reasonable. From this emerges the conception of clashing ideologies, beginning in German idealist philosophy, and forming an important part of the self-image of the twentieth century; all the way down to Fukuyama's conception of the end of history as the end of ideological conflict.

Enlightenment thought took the Renaissance concentration

on a natural harmony in two directions. The first, best exemplified in the works of Giambattista Vico, saw the laws, customs and forms of rule in different periods as part of a historical progression based on an ultimate, but distant, natural law. Natural law existed, but Vico thought it was always interpreted in a different way by different forms of society.⁷ The other way, that led to modern positivism, redirected the Renaissance view that we could use thought to understand the divinely inspired harmony. Instead, they argued that thought was a means by which we could understand the hidden workings of the physical reality. On the first path, trod by Vico and Hegelian philosophers after him, historically contingent ideas were part of the matrix of interacting variables that shaped society. To those on the second path, ideas were merely the understanding of a physical reality. This second path became the dominant view of thought in the physical and life sciences, as well as becoming the path of choice for many social scientists eager to emulate the 'exactness' of the physicist. This was particularly true for social scientists in economics, who saw the objects of their study as both knowable and unaffected by the observer's patterns of thought and assumptions.

That Enlightenment thought did not lay down a clear framework for the relationship between ideas and the material world, opened political thought up to a plethora of approaches. Between the absolute positions of the materialists

(who saw thought as merely an attempt to understand and catch up with material forces) and the idealists (who saw ideas as a crucial variable in the creation of human social reality, and are to be distinguished from the use of 'idealist' as the opposite of 'realist' in IR theory) there lay numerous attempts to define the relationship between material forces and ideas. These theories themselves became ideas that served to create order out of observable phenomena. Whether we are discussing Marx's concept of the determining material base and its effects on the limited autonomy of ideas in the superstructure, or Durkheim's paradox, in which social analysts are influenced by their own presence in what they study, the interaction of material to ideal remains a crucial part of western thought.

What the Enlightenment had brought into being was the Age of Ideology -- ideology in the sense of recognisable and separate modes of thought, that interpret the meaning of 'reality' differently. Renaissance thought recognised one hierarchical harmony that deserved study. Any other approaches were, by definition, heretical, and in need of correction. The persecution of the Bosnian Bogomils, the sudden appearance of mass witch-hunts in seventeenth century England, and the ferocity of the wars of religion, all spoke of the crucial importance of maintaining a true understanding and reverence for the divinely inspired hierarchy, and the eternal 'ideas' that existed outside of the material realm. Thought could be

verified by reference to this hierarchy. The Enlightenment abolished the supremacy of this hierarchy, and stressed the thoughts of the thinking individual as the basis of scientific understanding and political organisation. This was revolutionary, because no longer was the social hierarchy of the conservative Renaissance order sacrosanct. Rather, the activities of the mind could reform the social world. Whether it be Descartes' admiration for Spartan laws because they were the product of a single mind, or Voltaire's exhortation to burn all laws and begin again, the human mind became a tool for the shaping of society. 'Freed' of the constraints placed on them by the concept of a divine hierarchy, people began to develop different 'rationally' defensible views of the world.

Since the mind could be a source of change, different minds would create different ideologies, and naturally these ideologies would clash. For many idealists it seemed natural that ideologies should clash under set laws of reason, or in relation to 'neutral' material factors. Should it not be possible, therefore, that the most rational or relevant ideology would one day beat out its rivals? Would not this victory of one ideology lead to the end of history, since there would be nothing left to fight for?

What modern interpreters of Hegel, like Francis Fukuyama, seem to believe is that a product of human thought is capable of taking the place once occupied by the divine hierarchy of the European Renaissance, and that in the absence of divine

revelation this ideology can occupy this position through its rational fit to human wants and material conditions. Hence, to Fukuyama, the rational victory of liberal ideology has ended the clash of collective images, and hence ended (ideological) history.⁸ Fukuyama and his supporters overestimate the novelty of the victory of a single collective image. The modern Age of Ideologies dates from the morning after the dust had settled on the battlefields of the Reformation. Before then ends to ideological history in Europe have occurred in both the first century BC and the eighth century. Yet, the victory of a single ideology, to the point at which it becomes a general assumption of a period, does not necessarily seem to be a victory of rationality or a 'fit' with material conditions. The intellectual hegemony of the *pax Romani*, of Christianity and (possibly) liberalism, have occurred when they were championed by a major political power (respectively: Rome, the Frankish Empire/Papacy and the United States/Western Europe). What the relationship is between a triumphant ideology and the strength of a political actor -- is it the ideology that strengthens the actor, or the actor the ideology -- is unclear. Machiavelli's observation that the armed prophet will succeed, while the unarmed prophet will fail, might be expanded to state that the armed innovator who is not a prophet -- the Brehznevite Soviet Union, for example -- might also fail.⁹

While the difference in Western thought between the

materialist and the idealist has been a perennial one, there has been no agreement between the protagonists of ideas about what the relationship should be between ideas and material forces, if there is any at all. Much recent critical theory has stressed flexibility in the study of this relationship, rather than a more rigid assigning of particular roles and places for the material and ideal. While clarity and parsimony is lost in this approach, flexibility does allow a fairer assessment of the past. More rigid concepts about the roles of material forces and ideas have resulted in curiously anachronistic analyses of past periods. Marx's analysis of slave and feudal societies, for example, superimposed nineteenth century ideas of work and society onto societies that saw the universe in a crucially different way -- a simplification that Marx shared with his liberal contemporaries. Similarly, modern IR experts have often reinterpreted Thucydides as a proto-social scientist, rather than as the tragic prose poet that he actually was. This has led to their interpretation of Thucydides as a value-free analyst, when in fact his study was deeply involved in questions of moral blame.¹⁰ Perhaps one of the most valuable of recent attempts to understand the role of ideas within IR critical theory has come from Robert Cox.

Cox suggests that there are three historical structures. The first, material capabilities, take two sets of forms. The dynamic forms involve technological and organisational

capabilities, while the accumulated forms are natural resources, stocks of equipment and wealth. Ideas form the second structure, and include both inter-subjective meanings (commonly held ideas within an historical period) and collective images (ideas that, in any given period, differentiate groups of people). Finally, institutions make up the third structure, and include the organisations that stabilise and perpetuate a particular order. To Cox, each of these structures interacts with the others in a dialectical process. This interaction, historically, occurs on three levels: (i) the organisation of production, and the social forces engendered in this organisation, (ii) the forms taken by states, and (iii) the world orders, or "the particular configurations of forces which successfully define the problematic of war and peace for the ensemble of states". Again, the three levels, in which the historical structures interact are themselves inter-related. Each one affects the forms of the other.¹¹

Cox's approach can neither predict, nor can it give us a definitive answer about what the motors of historical change are. Indeed, it was not intended to do either of these. Rather, it gives us a tool with which to analyze historical ideas within the context of their own period. Initially, it is important to distinguish between what are the common 'inter-subjective' ideas held in a period, and what are the 'collective image' ideas that distinguish groups from one

another. The Renaissance had embedded within it the notion of a single harmonious inter-subjective body of thought, and no concept of collective images short of the distinction between orthodox and heterodox, as well as concepts of belonging to a space (city, region etc). Collective image ideas, as a legitimate ideological difference between groups, is a concept of the Enlightenment, and the subsequent three centuries that have made up the 'Age of Ideologies'. To Hegelians, it is the struggle between these collective images -- each one attempting to be accepted as inter-subjective in the same way that Renaissance Christianity was -- that constitutes the stuff of history. In these senses the victories of Rome, Christianity and, according to Fukuyama, western liberalism all represent the successful conversion of the collective into the inter-subjective.

Caution is advisable here, as the distinction between inter-subjective and collective is a tenuous one. A collective image that is held to be the absolute truth by the society that it defines, will be regarded as an inter-subjective image. Thus, Medieval Christianity was an inter-subjective image within Christendom, but a collective one when relations with Islam were concerned. Thus, we might say that on Cox's three levels liberal capitalism is fast becoming the inter-subjective image at the level of the organisation of production, and in the forms taken by the dominant states in the world, but that the world order level clings to a notion

of state-sovereignty and national competition that is still anathema to the fundamentally anti-nationalist liberalism. Liberal capitalism, at this level at least, is a collective image that defines a core of western states.

Taking a critical theory line, it is also important to distinguish ideas by their relationship to contemporary material and institutional forces, that is, to their historical context. Ideas may be justifications of material and institutional arrangements, or even codifications that allow institutions to control and order material conditions. On the other hand, ideas may be an attempt to change or criticise a current material and institutional reality. In other words, to put ideas in the context of the agency-structure dialectic, ideas may either be part of a material or institutional structure's determination of human behaviour, or it may be the force used by human action to affect change on a material or institutional reality. That a particular ideology might go from being a force for change, to being a mere justification for the status quo, seems to be an unforeseeable possibility. Thus, a structure-changing ideology such as Marxism-Leninism quickly became a structure supporting one. Going the other way, Christianity in many parts of Latin America has gone from being a major support for the status quo institutions in the continent, to being one of their sternest and most dogged critics.

Robert Cox in particular, and critical theory in general,

maintains a view of a material reality, that may not determine ideas, yet is in constant inter-relation with the ideal. What if ideas are not only dominant, but effectively all there is? What if all our understanding of our environment is shaped by the ordering principles that exist in our minds? Kant, as he has done for many subjects, lays down the groundwork for such a view, when he argues that what we know as the material world has no meaning, but is rather the realm of heteronomy. It is our mind, through rational categories, that brings order. Yet, Kant still saw the potential for a transcendental human reason to decipher the laws of nature. What if those categories of Kant's are not linked to a common acultural reason, but are instead constructs of human cultures, and thus have the potential to differ between people. Might not, then, people 'read' the material world differently, since meaning would then be located solely in the ideal? In this sense the material world only exists when we can categorise it in our thinking, and although there might be a sense in which physical 'reality' imposes limits on our categorisation, these physical limits still leave a field that contains the potential for an infinity of interpretations -- much as there are an infinity of fractions between zero and one, but it remains a finite and circumscribed place.

The view that we might be wasting our time in hunting for a non-metaphorical (*logos*, rather than *mythos*) reality is suggested by the work of Derrida. Two implications come from

Derrida's work on speech and writing. First, that our ideas, contra Plato, do not link us to an eternal reality; and second that there is no neutral material reality that we can rely on. This might be summed up in Derrida's deliberately ambiguous, and over-quoted, term: "There is nothing outside of the text."¹² What this can be made to imply is that there is no transcendental or non-metaphorical truth outside of our thinking. In fact, the implication is that what we might regard as the material world, separate from the ideals contained in our minds, is, bit by bit, revealed to be constructs of the mind, and peel off to reveal nothing. The material becomes either a subset of the ideal, the collection of ideas that we think of as the 'real world', or it becomes a place of non-understanding. A home for all those things we have no cognition of, and therefore those that have not yet entered the realm of the ideal: that which is unmediated by mind.

It is, perhaps, in the realm of anthropology -- those western academics with a particular brief to write about societies outside of Western political theory -- that we can turn to for some verification of Derrida's point. Evans-Pritchard's stay with the Azande is particularly illuminating here. Not only did he seek to explain Azande life in terms of their belief in witchcraft, but he decided to live his own life while he was there using the Azande modes of thought. The interesting point was that Evans-Pritchard found Azande

witchcraft a serviceable means to make important decisions, casting doubt on our claims that our modes of thought are based on something transcendental and, therefore, better.¹³ The Azande material reality is populated with witches, is our material 'reality' based on anything more sound?

Whether we turn to the critical theory of Robert Cox, or the poststructuralism of Derrida, serious questions are raised about two commonly held views about the nature of ideas. The first is the one associated with positivist social science, which assumes that ideas can be tested against an objective reality. While we may reject the idea of an objective reality outright, another tack is to argue along the lines of critical theory that conditions can be changed so that ideas can be proved right in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even Robert Keohane, hardly a critical theorist, has admitted that the modern capitalist world economy tends to reinforce itself by creating the conditions under which supporters of capitalist economics tend to do better economically than do its opponents.¹⁴ Capitalism is, therefore, not objectively right for an economy, but merely the right strategy under the conditions which it itself creates. The second interpretation assumes that ideas can compete with each other for rational and logical consistency. This approach is the one found in Plato's writings, as well as in medieval Christian and Islamic thought, and assumes that ideas exist in an atemporal vacuum. It is fairer to say that social needs and evolution influence

the longevity of ideas as much as does consistency to an abstract logic. Despite Plato's withering criticisms of the failures of Athenian democracy, the Athenian constitution survived numerous trials and accidents of history in the three centuries that followed the composition of Plato's *Republic*. This survival was possible because of the widespread support for democracy in Athens.

Thus the conceptions that either a material reality, or an atemporal rationality, can mediate and choose the 'correct' ideology/idea is rejected in this thesis. Rather, the history of the development of liberal rationalist peace theory, and the creation of IR is seen as part of a process of the non-rational interaction of ideas and views of the World. In a way, the underlying assumptions of the thesis oscillate between the insight of Derrida that reality rests no further than in the metaphoricity of our thinking, and Cox's conception of an inter-relation of ideas with the material. At first sight this may seem inconsistent, and at one level it most certainly is. It also reveals a cowardly inability to stick to one methodological approach. There is, however, method in my apparent muddled thinking, and it boils down to how we might define the historical developments that affected the thought of Angell and Mitrany. To Cox they are material forces, but we could give them a Derridian twist, and regard them as merely a text. In other words, Just another product of the language we use to make sense of the World.

Consistent with both, and a major part of this thesis, is the view that ideas are more than the epiphenomena of some concrete reality, and therefore may be studied in their own right as social forces. Before we can even begin to make judgements about the work of Angell and Mitrany, therefore, we must understand where their thought came from, on what goals were their plans for the World based, and what was the form and structure of their political theories. We can never do justice to liberal rationalism in IR unless we, at least initially, allow its arguments to stand on their own logic. Criticism of the assumptions of the paradigm as a whole can come later.

Peace in Western Thought: Change, but Very Little Continuity

In the history of Western thought the concept of a world at peace has taken on different meanings and has served different ends. Much of this has had to do with both the perceived utility of war at any given time, and the prevailing religious or philosophical creeds. This changeability of the concept of peace makes any attempt to understand the historical evolution of war and peace problematic; for how can a term that meant withdrawal from the world to an early Christian, the imposition of law on the point of a *pilum* to a Roman, and the absence of overt violence to the inter-war pacifist ever be explained in an historically inclusive way? The answer to this is two-fold.

First, the very changeability of the concept of peace is an interesting study. A fundamental disagreement between many advocates of peace focuses on what we actually want peace to be. The word peace has changed its meaning, often quite dramatically, depending on the society which is conceiving of it, and what that society aspires to. Secondly, although it may often be difficult for us to reconcile our own concepts of peace with past Western concepts, it is important to understand how the meaning of peace has evolved, and also that our current conceptions, while presently valid, are time-bound.

The purpose of this initial historical sketch is to demonstrate how ideas of peace and war, while on one plane have reflected what a society thinks that it needs, have on another taken different forms depending on which philosophical ideas are in the ascendancy. The implications this has for IR theory is that we have to see the growth of paradigms and peace theories within the subject as not only a reaction to current problems, but also as a reaction to the philosophical ideas that are available in the cultural baggage of the time. In times of great crisis, in which war is perceived as a problem, the leading intellectual opposition to war is found among the dominant intellectual paradigms. Thus, stoicism formed the backbone of pacifism during the Hellenistic period, Christianity emerged to tame war during the Dark Ages, and liberalism became the creed of the modern pacifist. At times

in which war was perceived as less of a problem, and more as part of the natural order of things, non-pacific theories of war emerged that took their lead from contemporary modes of thought. Thus, we can see peace theories as products of the interaction between two major historical influences: (i) the perceived effects/(non)utility of war, and (ii) the philosophical schools that are culturally to hand, and which can provide an explanation/remedy. The development of liberal rationalism and its *bête noire* realism have to be seen in this context.

In the pre-Alexandrine Mediterranean world, war carried positive, rather than negative, connotations. War was not a destructive force, but a necessary part of human existence. Indeed, Thucydides' classic, *The Peloponnesian War*, was a lament for the moral corruption of Athens, not a criticism of warfare. A vital lesson of Thucydides' work is that moral corruption brings failure in war through the agency of *hybris*. The period of Athenian moderation, as described by Pericles in the funeral oration (moderation being a key political ethic to classical Greeks), was also the period of greatest Athenian success. On the other hand, the 'feverish' behaviour during the Melian and Sicilian campaigns ultimately brought ruin and military failure.¹⁵ Thus, war was a normal part of the life of the *polis*, and moral corruption would lead to its poor prosecution. Equally, since war's relationship to morality was more complex than modern views, the absence of war carried no

natural moral worth. Yet, the Greeks of Thucydides' time did begin to ask whether war, when executed by the morally corrupt, was indeed morally wrong. Written directly after the unprovoked sacking of Melos by his native Athens, Euripides' play *The Trojan Women* presented the Heroes of the Trojan war as moral degenerates, and shifted the heroic focus to the plight of the losers:

How are ye blind,
Ye treaders down of cities, ye that cast
Temples to desolation, and lay waste
Tombs, the untrodden sanctuaries where lie
The ancient dead; yourselves so soon to die!¹⁶

It seems that the shock of the unparalleled destruction and scope of the Peloponnesian war had revealed to the Greeks that war was not always a part of the natural way of life. The ultimate source of this destruction was not the vastness of the two opposing camps, but a serious change in the nature of warfare in classical Greece. Wars before the fifth century BC had been short because siege warfare was avoided in favour of open trials of arms between heavy infantry. The Athenians, by trusting in walled fortifications and naval supremacy, short-circuited this system. The war dragged on inconclusively as long as Sparta could not raise a substantial fleet, and Athens could not match Sparta on land. The instant decision on the battlefield that had made disputes between the *poleis* so easy was replaced by a war of attrition that sapped the energies of all the protagonists.¹⁷ It is of little surprise that this should force the Greeks to rethink their view of war.

By the close of the Peloponnesian war Greeks had come to conceive of the idea that not all wars were necessarily honourable. Yet it was to be philosophy, rather than literature that fostered the first Hellenic (and, ultimately, European) peace movement. Plato, while accepting the need for war between *poleis*, constructed a philosophy that stressed the need for the inner peace of the soul. Extrapolating from this, a city of good people would be a peaceful city; and by a further extension, if all cities are at peace internally there will be peace between cities. Peace, in this context, was not the lack of war, but an inner self-sufficiency that made warfare potentially unnecessary. Yet, Plato's extension of peace only went as far as the Greek world, and war with non-Greeks was regarded as more natural.¹⁸

The stoics, beginning less than a century later, elaborated on this idea, arguing for an ultimate peaceful harmony for the whole human race, not just among Greeks. The founder of stoicism, Zeno, saw the world as a single *cosmopolis*, harmoniously joined by the laws of reason. Zeno denounced the institutions of the *polis* that divided people up into separate states, and among these divisive institutions was probably war.¹⁹ War, to the later stoics, was a vulgar necessity that was best avoided. Drawing on Panaetius of Rhodes -- the Second Century BC head of the stoic school --

Cicero classed discussion as the way men* solved disputes, while war and violence were the methods of beasts. It followed, therefore, that it was natural for humans to live in peace, and that resorting to war was only a just solution when dealing with people who behaved like beasts and refused to discuss their differences: "It is allowable, therefore, to undertake wars, but it must always be with the design of obtaining a secure peace".²⁰ This peace, again, was the natural outcome of a harmonious inner self-sufficiency. (This difference between the ways of men and those of beasts was to be given a different -- and ultimately realist -- spin in the Renaissance, when Machiavelli would turn Cicero on his head, arguing that behaving like a beast was a necessary part of foreign relations.²¹) Yet, this position was not restricted to the stoics. Popular Hellenistic culture, in the centuries that separated classical Greece from Rome, became increasingly weary of the constant warfare in the Greek-speaking world. War was no longer regarded as the font of a state's glory. Menander's misanthrope, in his *Dyskolos*, found the cause of war in people's inhumanity:

If we were all kind to one another, there'd be no need for law courts, there'd be no arresting people and putting them in prison, and there would be no more war. Everyone would have his little bit, and be content.²²

Thus, there was a clear evolution in Greek thought, which

* The gender-specific use of the term 'men' being, in Cicero's case, almost certainly deliberate.

began by regarding war as an important part of the life of the polis, but, following the crises of the Peloponnesian war, supplemented this concept with the belief that wars could be classified as just or unjust. With the eclipse of the polis, and its replacement by the Hellenistic kingdom as the most important political unit in the Mediterranean, war lost its value as a source of civic pride, and came instead to be a vehicle for the selfish desires of the Macedonian Successor dynasties. The idea of the unity of humanity in one cosmopolis, and the moral condemnation of war inherent in stoicism, was in sharp contrast to the reality of almost continual conflict. Yet, with the victory of Rome in the Mediterranean basin, and the spread of stoic ideas throughout the Roman world, the Greek ideal of a world at peace, united in one cosmopolitan state, became the ideological justification for the existence of the Roman Empire. The peaceful union of humanity was translated into the concept of the *pax romani*, a peace that was maintained within the Empire by the existence of a Roman system of law, and which ultimately relied on the strength of the Roman army for its survival. Thus, what began as a philosophical reaction to the moral degeneration of warfare in the Greek world, became an ideological justification for a Roman-led world empire. Stoicism remained the inter-subjective ideology of the Roman Empire up until the time it was replaced by Christianity.

With the triumph of Christianity Roman, stoic and Jewish

concepts of a cosmopolitan peace melded into a new form. Yet, they combined against the backdrop of the decline of the Roman Empire, and the establishment of a number of quarrelling jurisdictions that used war as a method for solving disputes. Thus, a strange division was created between an earthly political system in which war played an important part as a 'system-preserving' means of deciding disputes, and a dominant philosophy that preached peace through the unity of all humanity under God. This situation was resolved by the Augustinian interpretation of the universe, where a perfect heaven was contrasted with the imperfect secular and historical world. History was the playing out of God's plan for the redemption of Humanity, and perpetual peace could only be had outside of the secular world in the harmonious 'City of God.'²³ The Church's role was to limit the evil that existed on Earth in respect of God's plan. War between Christians was, therefore, deliberately hedged about with constraints, while war against heathens was sanctified. The ultimate secular goal was peace within a completely Christian World, brought to fruition by the universalising of the inner peace of individual souls.

Christian ideas about the merits of war and peace were further refined in the fertile intellectual climate of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In the world view of St Thomas Aquinas all material and spiritual things in the world formed a distinct and ordered hierarchy, in which the lesser's

role was always to help the greater achieve its goal. Thus, while a king's subjects had a duty to support their monarch, secular rulers were required to work for the interests of heaven. Thus, there was an imperative for all rulers to run a good administration, and to maintain the peace and good order of Christendom.²⁴ This peace was not an end in itself, but the means by which the lesser concerns of the political world could fulfil its task of facilitating the goals of heaven. The Thomasian universe was one of interlocking harmonies of interest, which were all tied together by a hierarchy which ended with a single God and a single divine plan. From God there emanated an eternal law, which was beyond the reach of humanity to alter.²⁵

On war, Aquinas was clear. Wars were only just if they complied with three conditions. First, the war must be declared by a legitimate authority. Secondly, the cause must be just. Thirdly, there must be good intent on the part of the belligerent, and that "even when war is declared by legitimate authority and there is just cause, it is, nevertheless, made unjust through evil intention."²⁶ The first two conditions conform to the stoic interpretation of war, but the final condition adds a peculiarly Christian argument. War is ultimately fought to maintain the peace of Christendom, and for the glory of God ('wars for peace'). For this reason it was that John of Salisbury stressed the importance of carefully picking who should be a soldier, and requiring them

to take an oath of allegiance to the Holy Trinity first, and their prince (as God's deputy) second.²⁷ Ramon Lull reiterated this point in his influential *Libre del ordre de cavayleria* (1275), in which he states that a knight's duty is, first and foremost, to defend his faith and church.²⁸ It is thus imperative that those who execute a just war conform to the eternal law of God, and fight the war in a state of grace and with the ultimate peace of God in mind. This first loyalty to the laws of God is very different to modern conceptions, in which an army's loyalty is first and foremost to the laws of the state it represents, although the twentieth century precedent of the Geneva conventions and the Nuremberg war trials does suggest that the soldier owes a minimum loyalty to international law as well.

Although Aquinas abhorred heresy, and believed in the inherent superiority of Christianity, there was not the same sense of the need to destroy infidels. Indeed, Christian thought would always find its relationships with non-Christians problematic. All shared the idea that peace was the ultimate good between Christians, but the ideal relationship with non-Christians vacillated between tolerance, attempts at conversion by argument, and genocide.²⁹ Because perpetual peace could only come about by universalising the inner peace of God's grace, it followed that wars, like the crusades, could be fought to impose peace. Fighting for peace was, for the medieval mind, less of a paradox than it was for the

modern.

Similar arguments evolved within Islam. The Quran was explicit that war was only justified if it was fought for defence or in the cause of righteousness. War should also end as soon as the need for it ceases.³⁰ The great Islamic historian, Ibn Khaldûn, drawing on both Quranic and classical Greek traditions, divided war into four types. The first two were fought for revenge and property, and were unjust, while the last two -- wars against usurpers and holy wars -- were just.³¹ Thus, as with Christian Europe, wars were just if they furthered the goals of the faith. Similarly, perpetual peace was only possible between the faithful, as "The Unbelievers are / unto you open enemies".³² Within the Islamic world -- the *dar-al-Islam* -- peace was the ultimate, and possible, goal. Outside in the *dar-al-harb* -- the "house of war" -- heterodoxy and the lack of enlightenment made peace an impossibility.³³ The road to peace lay in the extension of the Islamic faith to include all of humanity, and that road might include either the inner *jihad* of personal struggles of faith, or the outer *jihad* of holy war.

Medieval European and Near Eastern ideas about peace drew their inspiration from religious thought, and the harmony of interests that they assumed was supported by a belief in a single Divine Plan. Believers could conform to this plan by obeying God's law. War could be a means towards the fulfilment of God's plan, but when it was done for base ends, or if it

involved the mistreatment of Believers, the war was regarded as unjust. Although these ideological structures did not prevent unjust wars from occurring, they did help to restrict violence, and were responsible for the strict codes of honour and regulation that surrounded the conduct of war between co-religionists. In Europe sharp distinctions were made between the 'private wars' of individual magnates, in which non-combatants were uninvolved and all property was inviolate, and the 'public wars' of princes, in which booty and captives for ransom were often taken. Yet, even in the public wars of princes, churchmen and those engaged in farming were more often than not left undisturbed by the conflict.³⁴ Although instability and violent conflict were common in medieval Europe and the near East, the Christian and Islamic calls for peace between co-religionists did not fall on deaf ears. That the kind of dislocation and destruction that was common in the Dark Ages and the Thirty Years War were more often than not avoided in Christian Europe, despite the presence of serious political conflict, is largely due to the influence of Christianity.³⁵

With the collapse of the religiously inspired political systems from the Fourteenth Century onwards, culminating in the European Renaissance and the rise of the Ottomans in Asia, war returned to its pre-stoic roots as an amoral and respected tool of statecraft. A ruler's behaviour towards other states was not to be judged by ordinary moral standards, but merely

by its success.³⁶ Once religion became a matter of private choice, and the ideological unity of both Christianity and Islam had been shattered, 'God's law' no longer imposed a strict moral code on the army of believers. With European rulers welding their lands into centrally administered war-fighting machines, Renaissance scholars used pre-stoic classical precepts, such as the primacy of power and the amorality of international relations, to redirect Western political thought towards an acceptance of war as an instrument of policy. Although Christian concepts of the desirability of peace lingered on, prudence dictated that state power was the final political arbiter: "Prepare to warre when thou propoundest for peace... The best Treaty is with a *drawne* sword, and the safest peace is concluded under a *Buckler*."³⁷

This development can only be understood within the context of the abandonment of a notion of cosmopolitan religious community, and its replacement with the idea of a zone of war outside of the social hierarchy of states. While sovereign law remained the arbiter of social behaviour within states, outside the state the place of arbiter was taken by war.³⁸ Here we see a mirror of the realist contention that ethics is only possible inside the state, while outside in the international world ethics is, and should be, absent from behaviour. This is not a coincidence since, as will be argued in chapter three, there is a crucial link between this part of

early-modern conservative thought and realism, albeit only a partial transmission of ideas.

The justification for war, and for the centralised absolutist rule that followed the more diverse power bases of Medieval Europe, was grounded in the view that in the state of nature humans would be in an endless state of war, largely because human desires were unlimited, and there was no natural level of harmony between people's wants.³⁹ Since it was the lawless state of humanity that caused war, then it followed that the worst excesses of war could be controlled by a set of rules derived from 'natural law' -- that is, the divinely inspired law that allowed human society to survive (an anaemic residue of the Medieval conception of divine law). This 'international' law, however, was only meant to properly integrate war into the balance of power that maintained the stability, and certainty, between "the absolute state, the tyrant nation which acknowledged no superior and no law more potent than that of its own interests." There was no talk of actually abolishing war.⁴⁰

This nadir of the concept of a world at peace did not last long, though. As wars became less and less decisive -- and increasingly destructive -- during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, European intellectuals began to stress the wastefulness of war. Some, such as the duc de Sully (1617), William Penn (1693), and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1712), dreamed of a federation of European sovereigns that

would keep the peace in the same way that domestic law-making institutions did.⁴¹ Although highly conservative, in the sense that they maintained the absolutist state structures, these proto-Enlightenment thinkers conceived of both an evolution of human political structures -- bringing law first to domestic and then to international society -- and of a common human reason with which we could inform ourselves of our true interests. Peace as far as these writers were concerned, however, was merely the absence of war.

Reason, here, has to be distinguished from the faculty of reasoning, the former having a similar parentage to the latter, but having mutated during the Enlightenment into a number of different forms, discussed in chapter two. While reasoning is synonymous with just thinking in general, reason has been used to describe a common human faculty in which understanding is grounded. In one form, reason is the faculty which guarantees that disparate actors will act in the same fashion in a political balance of power. In another, reason is the basis on which we can formulate universal rules, that lead to human progress. Reason is seen, therefore, as a universal trait of humanity, whereas reasoning is a general term for the thinking that each of us use in different contexts. Reason, in sum, is not merely the ability to think, but the means of tapping into atemporal and truths.

The form that reason took in the evolving Enlightenment discourse was heavily influenced by the same natural law

theorists who had contributed to the development of a legal framework for the operation of war in the seventeenth century. Yet, while many of these conservatives saw natural law as the way to control power struggles, the liberal rationalists of the Enlightenment saw reason as the means by which people could understand the laws that could peacefully govern human society. It is here that liberal rationalism split into two schools. The first, associated most strongly with Immanuel Kant, maintained the idea of an immutable natural law, which could be discovered by the individual's use of reason. Where Kant differed from earlier natural law theorists was in his stress on the discovery-process. The laws of reason were not distant esoteric truths to be discovered, but were instead ideas that an individual's reason could strive to understand. In this respect, every rational person was both a legislator of, and a subject to, the laws of reason.⁴² The second, utilitarian, school, while sharing with the first the concept of a common human rationality, reworked the idea of natural law into the idea of the primacy of personal utility within a rational society that gave each individual the right to strive for their own goals. Reason had the function of assisting individuals in realising these personal goals, and morality was demoted to being the social behaviour that allowed as many individuals as possible to attain their goals.⁴³ Peace, in both cases, was justified as a means to well-being. The road to peace was through the rational conflict of ideas that

claimed inter-subjectivity.

Despite their differences, these two schools of liberal rationalism shared a concept of reason as common to all humans, and therefore, a basis for World peace that, with the right education, all people would be able to agree on. Further, armed with this concept of reason, which could be used as the ultimate guiding principle for the construction of a truly just and efficient human society, the post-Medieval study of peace ceased to be a yearning, and became a science. Reason "absolutely condemns war as a legal recourse and makes a state of peace a direct duty" Kant declared in 1795.⁴⁴ The liberal rationalists had reformulated the Medieval justification for peace, putting a common human reason in the place formerly occupied by God.

When the study of international relations emerged as a separate discipline in the twentieth century it was influenced by two competing traditions. One was a residual conservative tradition associated with the Age of Absolutism, which drew on particular readings of writers like Machiavelli and Hobbes, but whose ideas were transmitted through nineteenth century social Darwinism and national liberalism (see chapter four). The other tradition, leading on from the Enlightenment and including the liberal rationalists, has often been derided by modern IR scholars as 'idealist' (the term is used here in a different sense from the philosophical use, philosophical idealists being those who privilege ideas and ethical

development in the study of human society). While the conservatives saw perpetual peace as an unobtainable goal, those steeped in Enlightenment thought saw progress towards a more peaceful world as possible and desirable. As the horror and inconclusiveness of war became apparent in the first quarter of the twentieth century, IR theory in general came to accept the value of peace. But peace to the realist could only come about by a balance of power between competing states. By contrast, the liberal rationalists argued that the state and state power held little relevance for the modern world, and that international society needed to be reformed in accordance with the dictates of a utilitarian instrumental reason. Thus, more and more these two paradigms have privileged the same questions, focusing on the problems of stability and the need for peace. Yet their fundamental premises lead to different answers.

Although realism and liberal rationalism fundamentally agree upon what peace should be, it is as well to point out that their conception is time-bound. In the twentieth century peace is more often than not regarded, to use a phrase coined by von Hayek, as one of the 'great negatives'. Peace, in other words, is merely the absence of war, rather than a positive condition which could be defined without reference to another, opposite condition.⁴⁵ This is very different from the medieval Christian or Quranic traditions, where peace represented not just the absence of war (which it also

entailed by extension), but also a harmonious relationship with a divine order. Machiavelli's peace, which involved creating a state which could move outside of the cycle of time, was an attribute of a community, and even the stoic concept of peace involved an extended community or cosmopolis. Modern conceptions come closest to the stoic, but in the absence of either God or community peace has no meaning other than the absence of war.

Yet, this great negative, this empty space where a positive conception of peace ought to be, is never wholly satisfying to the modern world. Hence the void of peace becomes filled with the baggage of the age of ideology. Yet, the positive constructs out of the negative of peace reflect the different ideologies. The left links peace to a just social system, the democrat sees in the autocracy a regime of (by definition) constant war. Thus, the modern world as a whole regards peace as a negative, yet each ideology/culture sets up its own qualifiers to this void.

Differences also emerge over modern conceptions of what peace is good for. Here we might distinguish between three different modern interpretations of peace: the first sees peace as the condition that makes material progress possible; the second sees it in terms of enhanced security; and the third sees peace as a good in itself. Realism tends to concentrate on the aspect of security, while utilitarian liberal rationalists argue for a combination of the security

and material prosperity aspects, and Kantian liberal rationalists see peace as a command of reason, and therefore good in itself separate from issues of security and prosperity. Here, a distinction should be made between the conception of peace, as the absence of war, and security, which refers to the maintenance and enhancement of certain political actors' stability and prosperity. Security, in this case, need not mean the absence of war, since it is conceivable that war could be fought to maintain the security of an actor.

The cornerstone of both Angell's and Mittrany's views of the need for peace would be the conviction that peace was necessary for the continued prosperity of an interdependent World, and that there could be no security without a prosperous World economy. In sum, they went some way in agreeing with Hobbes that without a proper organised peace there could be no civilisation.⁴⁶ Interestingly enough, the nineteenth century social Darwinist and national liberal opponents of liberal rationalism, mentioned above and discussed in more detail in chapter four, argued that war enhanced civilisation by clearing out avaricious tendencies, and maintaining a strong social cohesion.

Thus, liberal rationalism has to be seen in the context of both the problem of the growing destructiveness of war, and the common modern view of peace as a negative quality. It also has to be seen in relation to realism and to other more

critical approaches that have, in one way or another, attempted to reassess the Enlightenment tradition. This conflict of ideas is, in Cox's terms, a struggle over the right to be regarded as inter-subjective at the level of World orders.

The Form of the Thesis

The body of the thesis is divided into three parts. The purpose of part one is to highlight the differing views within IR about the possibility of establishing a lasting peace, and to analyze the philosophical sources of their differences. Part one will consist of chapters two and three. In chapter two the philosophical underpinnings of modern IR thought will be discussed, through an archaeology of three key concepts in liberal rationalist thought. Enlightenment thought in general, but liberal rationalism in particular, can be seen to be asking three questions.

First, what is the nature of rationality, what is its role in human nature, and can it be used to help establish world peace? Secondly, what is the nature of human freedom, and is it possible for humans to consciously control their environment? Thirdly, is progress towards a more peaceful international system possible, and what form does progress take? Within liberal rationalism, the answers to the questions form a causal relationship, a reason-freedom-progress nexus, which paradigms like realism, with their different definitions

of reason, freedom and progress, do not have. The relationship between reason-freedom and progress form the basis upon which liberal rationalism constructs its theory of IR, realism, on the other hand, rests its approach to IR on a conception of human nature, which in turn explains its views on reason, freedom and progress.

Chapter three will consist of an analysis and comparison of the various paradigms of IR, and will discuss the origins and differences that divide realism, liberal rationalism and the other more critical paradigms. While, traditionally, these paradigms have been defined by the assumptions about the actors and issues they privilege within IR, chapter three will examine their assumptions about human rationality (a particularly important issue in the dialogue between realism and liberal rationalism). It will be shown that their views on rationality effect both their views on the freedom of action that agents have, and their views of progress. Realists tend to view history as cyclical, and thus while there is room for material and technological progress, human actions tend to be repeated, since they conform to the same non-rational and atemporal rules of human nature. Both liberal rationalism and structuralism have an evolutionary view of history, therefore history follows a unilinear path that may, or may not, have an end point. Critical theory, on the other hand, denies both the reoccurrence of history model proposed by the realists, and the unilinear and evolutionary model presented by the liberal

rationalists and structuralists. Instead they produce a number of views of human progress that are multilinear.

These views of progress have a profound influence on the nature of each paradigm's respective peace theories. Realism claims that a fragile peace can only come by managing the atemporal variables associated with human and human organisational nature. Liberal rationalists and structuralists see the prospect of an evolution towards a more peaceful world -- many of them looking forward to a reign of perpetual peace. Critical theorists also yearn for the prospect of perpetual peace, but regard its achievements as fundamentally more problematic than do the two unilinear approaches. The poststructural approaches in IR constitute a general critique of all four paradigms.

This chapter will also provide a lead-in to Part II of the thesis by analyzing the way in which liberal rationalism was marginalised by the post World War II realists. The subsequent creation of an IR 'tradition' has either excluded the liberal rationalist period, or presented it as a cul-de-sac. This has been a profoundly misleading portrayal. While liberal rationalism has been accepted by most westerners as inter-subjective at the levels of the organisation of production and the forms of states, it has consistently been marginalised by realism at the level of World orders. It is to Part II that we turn in order to find out why this should be.

While part I took a general view of peace theories in IR,

and treated them as ahistorical competitors, part II focuses on one particular school, putting it into historical context. To a certain extent, therefore, part II represents a case study, in which the philosophical tools of part I provide a framework in which to analyze the particular and contingent. From the point of view of the archaeology of IR theory, part II's analysis of the works of Norman Angell and David Mitrany provide: (i) an in-depth study of the liberal rationalist paradigm in IR, especially how it developed in the first half of the twentieth century; and (ii) an analysis of the way that a paradigm develops in response to earlier ideas, what makes it a popular approach, and how it adapts to its environment. Angell's ideas emerged as an attempt to respond to social Darwinist and national liberal criticisms of nineteenth century liberal rationalism. While Angell changed the stress of his work after 1918, to accommodate the lessons of the First World War, Mitrany's functionalism was a response to the failures of both the League of Nations and of free market economics.

Finally, part III will consist of two chapters. Chapter seven will analyze the historical validity of the realist/'idealist' debate, which is the event within IR that has validated the realist domination of Anglo-American IR, and also marginalised liberal rationalism within the subject. Chapter eight will concentrate on the philosophical validity of liberal rationalism's assumptions about reason and

progress. What has to be taken into consideration here is the whole floating nature of peace, and the potential for conflicts rooted in the social forces that come out of both culture/ideology and the structure of production. Here, Angell and Mitrany may be valuable to us, not just for what they included, but also for what they left out of their analyses.

Methodologically, then, this thesis will consist of a philosophical part I, which will form a framework for understanding IR theory; and an historically contingent part II, which will, in the light of the conclusions of part I, attempt to draw lessons from the works of two particular liberal rationalist writers. By so splitting the thesis it is hoped that a compromise can be reached between two competing approaches to the history of ideas. The first approach looks at one or two author's theories in depth, while the second concentrates on a single tradition or period. The first gives a more detailed picture, but divorces an author's work from its historical context. The second tells us where the ideas fit in the greater scheme of things, but fails to give us enough detail with which to subject the ideas to a proper critique. Part I of this thesis will, therefore, attempt to place liberal rationalism within its historical and theoretical context, while Part II will examine two particular author's ideas with reference to this context.

The main sources for the ideas of Angell and Mitrany will be their published works, although in the case of Mitrany it

is not possible to fully understand his World-view without reference to his unpublished papers. Angell relied on his writing and lecturing for his livelihood, and therefore he published as much as he could of his intellectual output. Mitrany, on the other hand, held back a not insignificant part of his writing, much of it in the form of memoranda and unpublished articles. As a consequence, I have used a not insignificant amount of Mitrany's unpublished papers.

I turn first to a discussion of the development of reason, freedom and progress, in order to outline how the definitions of these terms in liberal rationalist thought have formed a nexus, upon which Angell and Mitrany have based their approaches to perpetual peace.

Part I: International Relations and the Progress towards Peace

Chapter 2: The Philosophical Background to Peace Theories in International Relations

most of a philosopher's conscious thinking is secretly directed and compelled into definite channels by his instincts.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*,
ch. 3.

In the film *Roxanne* one of the characters poses the riddle, what can you sit on, sleep on and clean your teeth with? To which the answer is a chair, a bed and a toothbrush. Both the 'riddle's' solution, and its humour, relies on the fact that we assume that there is a connection between the three parts of the question. In relation to this thesis, it could be asked what have reason, freedom and progress got to do with each other, and why are they important to IR theory anyway? The answer lies in the development of Western thought, and how that thought has interpreted these three concepts. More specifically, much Enlightenment thought has assumed some form of connection, a nexus, between these three concepts, and the liberal rationalist works of Angell and Mitrany rely on a

strong connection within this nexus in their arguments about the possibilities of perpetual peace.

Other IR paradigms, especially in this case realism, look at reason, freedom and progress differently, and therefore do not necessarily see a nexus. As a result, realism falls back on a definition of human nature as the basis of its views of international affairs. In the study of the possibilities of reaching a World of perpetual peace, therefore, the interaction between these three concepts can become particularly explicit.

This chapter deals with three issues. First, it is important to clarify what meanings are attached to these terms, and to adumbrate where these meanings come from. Secondly, having clarified them, this chapter will explain how different conceptions of reason, human freedom and progress fit into the various paradigms in IR. The actual development of and relationship between the paradigms in IR will form the subject matter of chapter three. Finally, the relationship between IR paradigms and conceptions about human nature will be discussed, and related back to the various views on reason, freedom and progress.

Reason:

Modern western notions of reason evolved from a secularisation of post-Medieval concepts of Divine Law. To Medieval scholars like John of Salisbury, and even followers

of Canon Law today, God's laws were a direct imperative which existed outside of human examination. Human reason was to be used to discover God's laws, and how best to implement them. John of Salisbury argued that there were two ways to acquire an understanding of the divine: one was through being in a state of grace, and the other through reason. Reason could be used to understand those invisible things that God had written within his creation.⁴⁷

The contribution of the Renaissance was to produce a wave of thinkers who separated Divine Law from secular political actions, supplementing for it a concept of an instrumental reason that existed to no particular end save the growth and maintenance of secular authority. A hierarchical order was still thought to exist, but it was a conservative and secular hierarchical order that was linked, but not necessarily fused, to a divine one. Marsilio of Padua, a Medieval precursor to this reordering of relations between the sacred and the secular, shocked most religious sensibilities by denying the right of the sacred "to dispose...about carnal or temporal rule".⁴⁸ Similarly, Lorenzo Valla put the determination of our actions by our unchangeable natures ahead of divine intervention.⁴⁹ Actions, therefore were a product of our natures, and of the level of instrumental reason that our nature allowed us. By instrumental, I mean that form of reason that is used to accomplish the goals of the rational being, without reference to the goals of others, or the goals of a

universal imperative (be that God, a transcendental moral code, or a Platonic world of Forms). Perhaps the clearest example of the development of Renaissance instrumental reason can be found in the works of Niccolò Machiavelli -- a man whom realist writers associate with the development of IR as a separate discipline.

Machiavelli's rejection of an external and common moral law, applicable for temporal states, from God was complete. Divine law as an idea extends, by its very nature, to every age and situation without qualification. In Machiavelli's instrumental reason actions that would under normal civil conditions be construed as wicked are allowed when the object is to protect the state.⁵⁰ The Medieval striving to attain a place in the City of God requires that our actions are consistent despite circumstances, while Machiavelli's privileging of the state as the fulcrum of the Good Life means that instrumental reason, that has as its object the preservation of the state, dictates our course of action. In this, he showed himself, at least unconsciously, a good pupil of Marsilio, the latter seeing reason as the means by which a state is ordered and protected.⁵¹ Yet, just as reason in the Middle Ages was the willing slave of a divine plan, so Machiavelli's instrumental reason, in the final analysis, should be but one of the servants of the good citizen. *The Prince* certainly paints a picture of a world in which instrumental reason is unchecked, but the result of this

situation is a World in which fortune (luck) ultimately plays the most powerful role, and in which the historical cycle of the birth and decline of polities is largely unstoppable. *The Prince*, however, is a book of advice for those who rule polities that lack a proper 'republican' constitution. If we turn instead to *The Discourses*, in which Machiavelli explores his idea of a properly constituted republic, we find that instrumental reason no longer plays a paramount role. Rather, the traditions of the republic, supported by the *virtù* (virtue/ability) of the citizenry keep fortune at bay. Instrumental reason is banished to the realm of the relations between states, where it remains sovereign.

Although the thought of Machiavelli was a profound break with Medieval thought, it still maintained the view, common also in classical times, that reason was merely a part -- and not necessarily the most valuable part -- of what it was to be human. In the two centuries after Machiavelli reason was to become regarded as the most virtuous of the parts of the human make-up, and in so doing become interpreted in strikingly different ways. If we can point to any particular event that marked the move from reason-as-one-of-many-servants to reason-as-most-valued-master it is probably the 'Cartesian moment' described by Descartes in his second Discourse on Method.⁵² Descartes accomplished two things: First, he separated the mind from the body -- the rational from the non-rational. Secondly, he affirmed that a common human reason existed in

each of us that allowed us to reason about the World independently of divine revelation or historically-specific custom. "The individual mind, divorced from the material, became the eye of the universe."⁵³

From Descartes onwards, mainstream western philosophy would present the human condition as a morality play, in which reason located in the mind interacts with the natural passions, whose source is the body. This left a definitional problem, that was not really fully addressed until Weber. Since reason was one of two masters, it could no longer be defined against what it served. Plato's reason had linked the soul with the world of the forms, and his reason was consequently transcendental. Machiavelli's instrumental reason was merely a vehicle for human *virtù* and the customs of the polity. In both cases reason could be accurately defined because it was a means to an end. To the scholars of the Enlightenment, with a few significant exceptions, reason was the means by which we constructed our goals, institutions and morality. Thus, reason, as an *a priori* attribute, could not be defined by reference to anything else, but had to be defined as a thing in itself. The most important exception to this was Hume, who could define reason as merely instrumental because he saw it as a slave of the passions.⁵⁴ When the passions are *a priori*, then the reason that leads us to the fulfilment of our passions is, by necessity, instrumental. Yet, there are different kinds of instrumentality. While Machiavelli's was

amoral and purely technical, the instrumentality adopted by the British utilitarians that came after Hume had a cosmopolitan and interest-harmonising nature.

Other, continental European, thinkers were less worried about the limits of reason, and far more willing to demonise the passions. While Utilitarian instrumental reason was a slave of the passions, Immanuel Kant had constructed a view of reason that would lead to a number of interesting compromises between secularisation and a directional reason. Kant returned reason to the divine, but in a way in which it could be acceptable to the formally secular Enlightenment. Humans, Kant argued, lived in two worlds, the natural world of the passions and the intelligible world of reason. When we obeyed our instincts only we were living under the determinist rules of nature, but we had the choice as rational beings of using a common reason to both judge our actions and to set our goals. Reason, in this formulation, was not a slave of material need, but rather a transcendental force that humans might use to escape the dictates of nature.⁵⁵ Kant, like Hegel after him, regarded the natural world as primarily cyclical, while human society, by using reason, had the potential to break out of this cycle into a unilinear progression. In practice, though, because we are only finitely rational beings, we are pushed by nature towards using our directional rationality through the agency of the destructiveness of wars and the higher efficiency of commerce as a vehicle for our natural

selfishness.⁵⁶

Kant's concept of reason was to find a ready champion in the form of Hegel. Hegel's desire to link an adapted form of the Medieval Divine reason with the Enlightenment's concerns with the human ability to know was as strong as Kant's. To Hegel "Reason is the comprehension of the Divine work", and it is because humans have the capacity of reasoned thought within them that they are part of a progression towards greater perfection, rather than mere beasts caught in an unchanging cycle of existence.⁵⁷ Hegel was much more optimistic than was Kant about the opposition of nature and reason. To Hegel reason had a cunning to it which meant that it often used the passions to fight its battles for it. Behind the often unintelligible clashes of passion and instinct lay a directional reason that was pulling all the strings.⁵⁸ In Kant, reason is weaker, and the relationship between reason and nature in human progress is skewed more in favour of the autonomy of nature.

Reason, although vulgarly assumed in the Enlightenment to be a single and easily identifiable concept, was clearly a term that was being used to describe widely different tools of thought. This confusion was addressed by Max Weber, who set himself the task of bringing "out the complexity of the only superficially simple concept of the rational."⁵⁹ Weber divided rationality, as it manifested itself in the modern world, into four categories: (i) an instrumental rationality,

common in market relations, which was not dissimilar from Machiavelli's conception of instrumental rationality; (ii) conceptual rationality, commonly found in science, which constructed abstract concepts through which an increased understanding of reality could be reached; (iii) substantive rationality, and (iv) formal rationality, both of which shared some of the attributes of transcendental reason as portrayed by Kant.⁶⁰ Weber's conception of how reason had developed in modern society, pointing out its different forms and effects, hints at problems with using it as a foundational concept. Weber's analysis, with its polymorphous rationality, was also to complicate the discussion of the relationship between reason and freedom.

Within IR it is possible to pick out three different uses of reason. The first is the pure instrumental form, in which reason is no more than the short-term individual and non-moral reason in Machiavelli's account in *The Prince*. Reason is used solely for the purpose of getting what the actor wants, by comparing non-rational goals with the available means. Utilitarian instrumental reason, on the other hand, assumes that sociability is more efficient at providing human well-being and goals than is asociability, and that it is material well-being that is a common goal of all rational people. Reason, in this case, tells us how, in the long term, we can maximise the well-being of the majority of people. Moral worth in this form of reason is attached to actions that rationally

enhance people's quality of life. Ferdinand I's statement "Let justice be done, though the World perish" would be meaningless, as justice is fused to the continued existence and prosperity of the World. The third form of reason is transcendental, in the sense that reason is capable of discovering underlying truths, and of providing a non-material moral foundation for our actions, which crosses time. Transcendental reason not only informs us how we may achieve our goals, as instrumental reason does, it also is a means by which we can rationally decide what our goals should be. Kant's use of the Categorical Imperative ("I should never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law"⁶¹) stands out as a paradigmatic use of transcendental reason.

The existence of human reason implies a freedom to decide. Indeed, within Enlightenment thought two ideas can be discerned here. The continental philosophers tended to stress that the practice of reason brought freedom, while the British utilitarians reversed this relationship. Weber, while leaning to the continental way of thinking, was to add a word of caution about this relationship. The intimate link between these two concepts in Enlightenment thought cannot be overstressed, although the variety of the forms taken by both within the modern Western philosophical tradition has to be stressed as well.

Freedom:

Freedom has an even more muddled history than reason. Free to the Greeks and Romans referred to the condition of not being a slave, and, by implication being a member of a political community. Consequently, a community is free when it is allowed to decide its own fate, and the members of that community, because they have the political power as a community to decide their own actions, are regarded as free. In this sense, the population of an oligarchic or even monarchical society could be considered free, because it lives under its own rules. The Ancient World bequeathed one other form of freedom other than political freedom. Socratic freedom could be achieved by withdrawing from the World, and thus reducing the external tyrannies that would curtail an individual's freedom. The way to freedom, therefore, is to cease to need things which you can be deprived of.

A third meaning appeared with Christianity. Drawing on Saint Augustine's interpretation of Scripture, freedom became both a necessity in order for us to choose between God and sin, while at the same time true freedom meant the freedom from sin we could gain by living in accordance with Divine law.⁶² In other words, we have a free will that can choose between sin and righteousness, but true freedom lies in living a life free from sin. A similar view, secularised for a new age, would appear in the writings of Kant.

The Augustinian and Medieval conceptions of freedom, that

which is linked to a surrender to something divine and beyond time, competed in the Renaissance with a concept of freedom rooted in history and causation. This second form of freedom finds a place in Machiavelli's examination of the effects of human action. In this formulation necessity hedges our choices, but there exists a bounded realm of human freedom within necessity.⁶³ While the freedom associated with the acceptance of divine revelation, and the abandonment of sin, was meant to be the same for all times, the historical freedom associated with Machiavelli was a constantly changing freedom caught up in the flux of secular events. Sometimes an actor's historical freedom would be vast, while at other times it might be reduced to very little depending, in both cases, on the whims of fortune and the *virtù* of the actor. Both forms of freedom, the divine and the historical, were to survive into the Enlightenment, although the way they would evolve would have implications for their appearance in IR theory.

The notion of historic freedom held sway over the political interactions between the courts of Absolutist Europe. This Absolutist variant, against which the Enlightenment would react, was based on the wielding of power.⁶⁴ Power increased an actor's freedom, although it could never completely overcome necessity. The net result of Absolutist freedom was an arbitrariness that was abhorrent to the emerging Enlightenment, because this freedom appeared groundless. Enlightenment thought produced two conceptions of

freedom, one of which was an off-shoot of historical freedom, and a reaction to the freedom-as-power of Absolutism, while the other was a secular reformulation of divine freedom. The first became a major component of British utilitarianism, while the second was associated with a Continental tradition beginning with Kant. Both were to appear in early twentieth century liberal rationalist IR.

The first Enlightenment reaction to absolutism was to reformulate historical freedom into a negative, best summarised by both Isaiah Berlin and Friedrich von Hayek as the minimisation of coercion between individuals. Freedom does not, therefore, refer to the range of options an actor has, but to the protection that actor has from being coerced by other individuals: where coercion refers to "the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act."⁶⁵ Coercion of an individual by either natural forces or by general rules of a society does not affect that individual's freedom.⁶⁶ What negative freedom amounts to is the requirement to leave an individual alone as much as possible. The individual is given as much freedom to decide as society can allow, but no attempt is made to 'free' him or her from the undue influences on his or her choice of goals.

Negative freedom has been associated with utilitarian reason in much of the Anglo-American liberal tradition. The German Enlightenment tradition around Kant and Hegel, with its

transcendental reason, is associated with a different, more Augustinian, view of freedom. This rational freedom was positive, rather than negative, in the sense that rather than being a freedom from a material condition, it was freedom to think rationally without the undue influence of natural instincts or irrational errors. To Kant, the natural world, controlled by the iron laws of nature, was a realm of determinism, while through the rational side of their natures humans were capable of inhabiting a realm of freedom. This rational world was a realm of freedom for two reasons. First, reason allowed humans to legislate ethical laws for themselves by means of the categorical imperative, rather than relying on nature to dictate laws of behaviour as was the case with other forms of terrestrial life.⁶⁷ In a second sense, reason can also be used to establish a proper legal regime, which would allow its citizens to be free to choose options under a rule of law that protects them from the arbitrary will of others, and under laws that they have chosen themselves.⁶⁸ Thus, to Kant, it was reason that was behind the idea of freedom, whether that be in the situational sense of freedom within a particular political constitution, or freedom in the sense of the autonomy of the rational mind.

A similar view can be found in Hegel, who also stressed the distinction between the freedom to choose under a free constitution, and the freedom of the will to autonomously choose its goals. Hegel, however, took Kant's argument

further, seeing the unfolding of freedom as the subject of history. Where Kant's rational freedom to choose goals could be achieved by the autonomous subject at any time in history, Hegel's autonomous subject could only achieve the level of rational freedom that his or her period in history would allow.⁶⁹

Two important differences emerge here between negative and rational freedom. First, negative freedom is concerned with removing coercion in order that the human subject can enjoy material benefits. Rational freedom is concerned with the ethical autonomy of the individual, and the ultimate freedom to choose the goals that negative freedom leaves unexamined. The causal relationship in utilitarian thought between (utilitarian instrumental) reason and (negative) freedom seems often to place freedom before reason. Greater negative freedom will allow people to use their utilitarian instrumental reason in order to increase the wealth of the community.⁷⁰ This is certainly the interpretation of the relationship between reason and freedom found in nineteenth century British utilitarian thought, where freedom is a precondition for rational thought and material progress.⁷¹ With rational freedom, however, the relationship is reversed. It is the use of transcendental reason that leads to freedom, whether that is freedom-as-human-autonomy or freedom-as-submission-to-laws.

It is again with Weber that the Enlightenment took stock

of its assumptions. Both major strands of Enlightenment thought assumed that reason and freedom moved forward together, but Weber re-interpreted this relationship as being fundamentally complex, and not intrinsically harmonious. Weber used freedom in both its utilitarian negative sense (situational freedom), and its rational sense (freedom as autonomy). It was clear to Weber that the growth of formal rationality within industrial production and bureaucracies was a threat to situational (negative) freedom, and that modern capitalist society was putting people into an 'iron cage', in which their lives would be ordered and directed.⁷² Yet Weber argued that formal rationality within the legal system (rule of law) would increase human situational (negative) freedom by giving people rights to certain freedoms (eg: of movement, consciousness etc). Equally well, Weber saw the process of rationality as freeing people from ingrained habit, and thus increasing freedom as autonomy (rational freedom). In this Weber mirrors Kant's Argument. What is important here is not so much Weber's conclusions about the actual relations between reason and freedom, which in many respects reflects his continental Enlightenment background, but instead his crucial insight that the relationship is not a simple and straightforward one.

In general, however, there are four views of freedom that play important roles in modern IR theory. The first of these is freedom as power, which views freedom in historical terms

and as a zero-sum relative value. Freedom is the power to act, and thus any growth in one political actor's power results in a decrease for others. The second form, freedom as wealth, is related to freedom as power, except that it plays up the importance of the control of wealth-creation as the source of the power to act. The third and fourth forms are negative and rational freedom discussed above. While negative freedom is associated with utilitarian instrumental reason, and rational freedom with transcendental reason, it is not surprising to find that freedom as power is associated with instrumental rationality as adumbrated by Machiavelli. Freedom as wealth finds itself in much Marxist and neo-Marxist interpretations of political economy.

The combination of the differing views on reason and freedom have rebounded on modern western interpretations of history, and the nature of historical progress. The question of whether or not reason can provide us with goals for which history can strive, as well as questions over the extent to which we are free to create a future of our own making, have been found centre-stage in both academic and popular interpretations of human historical development. Modern assumptions about the roles of reason and freedom lead to assumptions about the nature of historical progression, which in turn lead to assessments about the possibility of progress towards perpetual peace.

Progress:

The idea of progress is intimately tied up with the question of whether we can talk about 'History' as a meaningful entity obeying certain forces -- as opposed to history as a mere recording of events. The pattern that history seems to take also has to be seen in relation to what a particular thinker assumes are the objects of history. The Greeks and Romans looked to societies, the European Middle Ages to an ultimate human salvation, the Renaissance increasingly to the rising and falling of political actors, while the nineteenth century liberal utilitarians looked to the unfolding of technological progress. The form that historical progress takes, therefore, is not only influenced by the habits of mind of an age, but also by what is considered to be the proper subject of history.

The oldest, and most abiding, Western interpretation of historical development is the biological analogy. It is the biological analogy -- in which all things follow a cycle of birth, growth and death -- which dominated Greek and Roman thought about the rise and fall of societies. Thucydides, Plato and Polybius all regarded societies as passing through youth, maturity and old age. Polybius went one step further than his predecessors by emphasising the link between the particular ages of a society with its form of government. A society begins as a monarchy, passes through oligarchy and democracy, before returning to monarchy. In his analysis of

Rome, however, Polybius argued that by combining the best of the monarchical, aristocratic and democratic regimes the Roman state had escaped the biological progression of societies, and thus had managed to step out of time.⁷³ Polybius, like an ancient Fukuyama, had forecast the end of his culture's view of history with the victory of one kind of government.

The Middle Ages, more than the ancient world, was responsible for setting the agenda for the study of history in the modern world. Augustine and Boethius provided the paradigmatic Medieval Christian view of progress when they distinguished between the cyclical movement of nature, the unilinear development of the 'secular' human world, and the unchanging perfection of the divine. The progress of human history, to the Medieval scholar, was the record of the gradual unfolding of God's plan for the redemption of humanity, which would end in the final battle of Armageddon between good and evil. Those who lacked faith, it was argued, were blinded to the directional nature of history, and thus saw nothing but the blind hand of fortune and the cyclical rise and fall of political actors on fortune's wheel.⁷⁴

The medieval view of a directional progression towards redemption rested on the idea of the existence of a divine providence outside of time, which was responsible for leading humanity to salvation. The Renaissance's view of a more distant divinity, coupled with the reuse of ancient authors who stressed the biological cycle, led to the development of

a cyclical view of history. While the medieval mind was not dismissive of the idea that political actors (societies, dynasties, people) would rise and fall in a natural biological cycle, they viewed the history of humanity as a whole as being unilinear. The turning of fortune's wheel would raise the worldly up, only to cast them down. Rather than take this as an excuse to turn to the more important issues of human redemption the Renaissance mind turned to the job of exploring the art of surviving in a cyclical world, with the ultimate aim of reaching a level of skill in constitution-building and political action so as to guarantee that a political actor could remain balanced on the top of fortune's wheel indefinitely.⁷⁵ The Medieval conception of humanity and its redemption as the stuff of history was counterpoised with the Renaissance idea of the cycle of the rise and fall of political actors as the subject of history.

Again, it is with Machiavelli that the Renaissance reformulation of the political World is most clearly in evidence. Without divine providence in the political realm history became a continual reoccurrence of the rise and fall of political actors. Francesco Guicciardini put both his times, and Machiavelli's position, succinctly when he wrote that all "that has been in the past and is in the present will be in the future. But the names and appearances of things change".⁷⁶ In fact, the 'reality' of circularity in history pushed Machiavelli to try to discover how the cycle of

historical rise and fall of a state could be arrested through the development of civic virtue and the adoption of the best kind of constitution. Here he was following closely the political theory of Polybius. Perhaps the best modern rendition of history as a cycle is provided by Michael Oakeshott, who likened the political community to a ship that sails on "a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage... The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel".⁷⁷ In this interpretation of politics as an endless journey of repetitions history becomes a collection of practical aphorisms and examples, which can be drawn upon by the politically active. This treatment of history as a pool of instructional parallel experiences is a hallmark of realist IR.

A return to a unilinear conception of history, albeit in a secular sense, followed hard on the heels of the Renaissance, and has been the leitmotif of Western views of history over the last three centuries. The development of an idea of secular progress required two things. First, the Machiavellian, and ancient, concentration on political actors as the stuff of history had to be replaced with the Christian, and Hellenistic, concept of humanity as the basic unit of history. Secondly, a mainspring of history, like the Christian idea of providence, had to be isolated. This mainspring was to be found in Cartesian conceptions of reason, and the consequent acceptance of science and the technical arts as

historically significant variables.⁷⁸ Progress, in the way it emerged here, could be either an ethical development, consistent with Kant and Hegel, or one focusing on material developments, such as was consistent with utilitarian thought. While political actors can plainly be seen to rise and fall in cycles, the progression of humanity in the realm of knowledge and technical know-how follows an upward progression.

The clear break between the Machiavellian conception of cycles, and the emerging Enlightenment concept of unilinear progression came with the notion that different stages of history had different forms and characteristics. The implication of this was that political laws that applied to one age did not apply in another. This was directly contrary to Machiavelli's methodology, which used historical examples from different ages without regard for differences in thought, scientific learning or ethical beliefs. Vico represents a transition from the cyclical to the unilinear, for while he recognised a cyclical development in the desires, behaviours and forms of people, he also recognised that human history had moved through stages that, though past stages might reoccur, represented progress.⁷⁹

Yet, Vico's influence on his contemporaries was slight. His fame and popularity in the nineteenth century was more due to the spread of German philosophical idealism, especially in the form given it by Hegel, which reawakened interest in philosophies of history. The German idealist view of progress

began with Kant, where it was merely a later offshoot of his ideas about reason, and has been regarded by some as more of an afterthought than an important pillar of his philosophy.⁸⁰ Progress, to Kant, is made possible by reason. It is through reason that individuals improve their moral codes by legislating their own behaviour using the categorical imperative, while reason also tempers and changes the form and constitutions of human societies so as to produce "a constitution in harmony with the natural right of man".⁸¹ Yet, reason on its own is not enough. The deterministic forces of nature, which always seek to fully develop the capabilities of any animal, push humans towards full use of their rationality.⁸² This is achieved by exploiting the selfish in human nature, which is directly responsible for war and the consequent insecurity. Communities are formed to overcome insecurity, and as war becomes too destructive -- and thus interferes with human selfishness -- commerce replaces war as a better vehicle for human avarice.⁸³ The result of these developments is the establishment of a 'rechtstaat', which provides the proper environment for the full realisation of human reason and freedom. Kant adds one important caveat to his idea of historical progression: "how is a history a priori possible? Answer: if the diviner himself creates and contrives the events which he announces in advance".⁸⁴ In other words, by believing in a prophecy we can help to make it a reality.

No such caveat exists in Hegel's reformulation of Kant's

idea of history. Hegel took Kant's afterthought on progress and remoulded it as a central part of his philosophy. Where Kant's reason was too weak, and thus needed nature to fulfil its role, Hegel's reason uses its cunning and exploits nature for its ends.⁸⁵ History becomes the study of the development of freedom. In early Oriental societies one (the monarch) was free, in Hellenic societies some (the citizenry) were free, while in the German nations all were free.⁸⁶ Critical thought and reflection is responsible for this progression and extension of freedom, according to Hegel. Greater self-consciousness, he argues, comes about as humans are able to eliminate external influences on their evaluation and construction of goals. As a result, human choices are evaluated and constructed more in accordance with reason, which in turn gives us autonomy in our thought (rational freedom). The net result is a progression of freedom, both in the number of individuals who are free, and in the quality of freedom of specific individuals. Progress, here, is defined as growing self-awareness, and thus involves the growth of rational freedom. It is, therefore, defined in non-material ethical terms.

With both Kant and Hegel the progressive nature of human society was contrasted with the cyclical, and thus fundamentally unchanging, order of nature. God -- or perfect rationality, or the Spirit -- was neither cyclical nor progressive, but perfect. Thus, we have a partial return to an

Augustinian approach to progress, with the crucial difference being that the secular was now capable of becoming a rational 'City of God'.

The Enlightenment's view of progress as unilinear has, however, taken two distinct forms. The split revolves around the question of whether progress should be interpreted in ethical/ideal terms, or predominantly in technological terms. This split was certainly active during the nineteenth century discussion of progress towards peace, as chapter four will show, but the predominant view of progress amongst the liberal rationalists who formed IR in the early twentieth century was of a material progress. Progress for Kant and Hegel was fundamentally ethical. Kant's progress was the increased moral rectitude of humans, brought about by the multiplication of properly constituted regimes, which would lead people to obey the moral duties laid out by a transcendental reason.⁸⁷

In Britain, utilitarians and early political economists were viewing progress in a significantly different way. David Hume's different treatment of the relationship between reason and passion, and Adam Smith's moral theory which stressed the effects of an action, rather than the attitude of the will, were all part of a significantly more materialist outlook on human life. Indeed, Smith made a direct link between the happiness of the labouring classes and the speed of material progress in a state.⁸⁸ This concentration on the material led to the nineteenth century British interpretation of progress

in terms of material development, with particular emphasis on the furtherance of the arts of commerce and construction. This faith in progress as manifest in the technical arts reached its zenith with the Great Exhibition of 1851.

It is at this mid-century point that the idea of progress became caught up in the division of liberal political economy into two distinct strands, both of which would foster two different IR approaches. On the one hand there was the development of a fundamentally British liberal sociology, whose main thinkers would have a powerful influence on the development of liberal peace theory within IR. The seminal thinker in this school, Herbert Spencer, remained a powerful influence on Norman Angell. Those who came after Spencer, particularly L. T. Hobhouse and Graham Wallas, were to be the teachers and mentors of the young David Mitrany. On the other hand, the works of Karl Marx would attempt to create a more radical political economy by attempting to combine the materialism of British economists with the historical outlook of Hegel. Both approaches -- represented by Spencer and Marx -- were to be heavily influenced by the evolutionary theory of nature popularised by Charles Darwin. The view of a cyclical natural World as envisioned by Augustine, Kant and Hegel was shown to be wrong, and the stage was set for the development of a material view of progress that would cover not only the social, but also the physical.

In the writings of Herbert Spencer the arrogance of

nineteenth century British optimism came of age. Rejecting the common conception of progress as the growth of mere happiness that had been so common at the time of the Great Exhibition, Spencer claimed to have found a law of progress that worked for physical and social Worlds alike. All organisms, and societies, progressed from homogeneity to heterogeneity, from simplicity to complexity. The reason for this is that each cause always produces more than one effect, whether in chemistry, biology or society. Thus, greater complexity will always occur in an active universe.⁸⁹ The idea of a common form of progress, stretching from the physical to the social, appeared in Marxism as well.⁹⁰ War, to Spencer, has a part to play in this progress. Paralleling Kant's view, but turning it into a materially-based interpretation, Spencer argued that war forced progress on people by forcing greater aggregation of society, and giving impetus to industrial development through the making of weapons. Yet, at a certain stage of industrial development war becomes counter-productive to the development of industry, and is slowly abolished.⁹¹ Again, the progress is on a pre-ordained unilinear development.

The position that had been articulated so concisely by Herbert Spencer was to form the core of the early attempts to create a science of international affairs in the service of peace. Yet, always shadowing this liberal position was the more radical materialist interpretation of historical progress that began with Karl Marx. Like Spencer, Marx saw the

progression of human history in the growing complexity of human society. Unlike Spencer, Marx privileged the organisation of production as the base which determined the superstructure of all other human endeavours. Thus, human history was the history of changes to the mode of production, and the vehicle for that change was the struggle between the social classes that were created by the mode of production.⁹² The Marxist position, which came to dominate Western socialist interpretations of progress, saw perpetual peace as impossible as long as the dominant mode of production produced antagonistic classes. During the inter-war period British and American debates about the prospects for World peace were to centre around the division between the followers of a liberal position that saw capitalist society as necessarily pacific, and a Marxist, or quasi-Marxist, position that saw perpetual peace as fundamentally untenable in a predominantly capitalist World.

Yet, it is important not to over estimate the materialist element in the nineteenth century conception of progress, particularly as it related to peace. True, Marx had dispensed with the ethical component of progress, but liberalism at this stage had not completely. Although the logic of Spencer's argument, and that of fellow utilitarians such as J. S. Mill, was materialist (as befitted an age in which 'objective' science was so revered), there was an ultimate faith in the natural goodness, and moral progress, of humanity.⁹³ This

concept of the ethical progress of humanity remained a major feature of T. H. Green's thought, who although he is regarded as the key member of the group of British Hegelians, owed much of his argument to a development of Kant's ideas.

This point will be made in more detail in chapter four, but the nineteenth century conceptions of peace in Britain represent a crucial mixing of the conceptions of ethical and material progress. Yet, with the exception of Green and his pupils, most arguments in favour of a progress towards peace, especially those of Herbert Spencer, paid lip-service to ethical progress, but relied on a totally materialist definition. Despite all his views about the ethical development of humanity, Spencer interpreted progress as a deterministic material development, which beliefs and ethical thinking could not advance -- although poor beliefs could retard progress.⁹⁴ The liberal rationalist peace theorists who emerged in the twentieth century would concentrate on the logic of material progress, rather than an ethical one, and in fact Norman Angell, in his early writings, would adopt wholesale Herbert Spencer's notion of a deterministic progress that belief can merely retard.

Thus, in the post-Medieval period two crucial distinctions appear in the view of historical progression. First, we have the reformulated cyclical view of a repeating history, and secondly we have the unilinear view, which sees a steady progression of humanity towards a better world. The

cyclical view is defined by a concentration on particular political units, and assumes that similar processes are involved in their rise and fall regardless of historical period. The unilinear, on the other hand, takes all of humanity as the subject of history, and therefore there is no sense of a cyclical rise and fall, but rather there is a steady accumulation of assets that are potentially useable by and for the whole species. The nature of these assets further divides the unilinear Enlightenment view of progress into philosophical idealists such as Kant and Hegel, and the materialists in both the British utilitarian and the Marxist traditions. The idealists regarding progress as fundamentally ethical, and the materialists seeing it as material.

The Reason-Freedom-Progress Nexus, and International Relations

Within the context of IR theory we can identify several different definitions of reason, freedom and progress, each of which refer back to definitions discussed in the sections above. Each paradigm in IR has a different conception of the definition and inter-relation of these three concepts, and it is only in three of the seven that we find reason, freedom and progress forming a nexus, upon which the paradigm bases its view of the international sphere. A division into seven paradigms may seem excessive -- most surveys of IR theory identify only three -- but significant differences exist within realism, liberalism (pluralism) and Marxist IR that a

certain amount of caution about treating them as monolithic paradigms is called for, not to mention the different approach taken by poststructuralism in IR. Paradigm, in this sense, unites ideas that share the same abstract pattern of assumptions. Obviously, this division does not create hard and fast divisions, and thinkers may be inclined to bleed over from one to another, yet it provides an effective framework with which to analyze the definitional assumptions in IR.

The reason-freedom-progress nexus is, by and large, an Enlightenment construct. As a consequence, it is those paradigms that owe most to the Enlightenment -- the liberal and Marxist ones -- that draw the strongest connections between the three terms, as well as privileging this nexus within their understandings of political action. The two realist paradigms, while proposing links between reason freedom and progress, stress the ultimate determining power of human nature in political action. Poststructuralism, on the other hand, stands as a critic of the whole idea of this nexus.

Arguably the most powerful paradigm in the subject is American school realism -- associated with the writings of Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and George F. Kennan, among others -- which forms the basis of most IR carried out in North America. American school realism is marked by a pure instrumentalist view of reason, a view of freedom defined by power and a fundamentally cyclical view of progress. Reason,

in this case, is a morally neutral tool, which can be used to achieve the non-rational interests that are rooted in the desires of human nature. This is not to say that this paradigm ignores morality entirely. For Reinhold Niebuhr there is moral potential in using reason, not because reason is intrinsically moral, but because human nature is, at an individual level, instinctively moral. Thus reason can be used as an instrument to assist the moral elements in the human make-up.⁹⁵ Hans Morgenthau was largely in agreement with Niebuhr's assessment of reason as being subservient to the non-rational parts of human nature. For Morgenthau reason's role was to harmonise relations: (i) between non-rational impulses, (ii) between these non-rational impulses and ends and means, (iii) between competing ends, and (iv) between ends and means. Reason is a facilitator and harmoniser of non-rational goals rooted in human nature, and (here Morgenthau differed from Niebuhr) it is the desire to dominate that is the main influence on political goals.⁹⁶ Thus, for both Niebuhr and Morgenthau reason is a tool for non-rational elements in human nature.

Reason, in this case, becomes a means by which the human desires can be effectively satisfied, and freedom to satisfy these goals is affected by the relational distribution of power between individuals and groups. This American school realist definition of freedom denies the existence of a "universalist and absolute freedom," in favour of freedom as a zero-sum and precarious balancing act in which "the freedom

of one is always paid for by the lack of freedom of somebody else."⁹⁷ Reason has a role in balancing these conflictual demands for freedom. While in a society this balance is achieved by social values that apportion the freedom due to its members,⁹⁸ Internationally this is achieved by a balance of power between the major competitors.⁹⁹ For Morgenthau especially, there was a crucial link between the innate desire for power and the nature of freedom. Only through acquiring power, or by cancelling out the power of others, can a person or group acquire freedom, even though in increasing their freedom they are denying it to others: "Man is born to seek power, yet his actual condition makes him a slave, but everywhere he wants to be a master."¹⁰⁰

Because reason has no power to direct, while the struggle for freedom is a zero-sum game, and because American school realism stresses that the stuff of political history is the struggle for power between political units, this paradigm regards historical progress as either cyclical or by-and-largely static. "The struggle for power is universal in time and space, and is an undeniable fact of experience", Morgenthau claimed, while to Niebuhr "the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion... makes social conflict an inevitability in human history, probably to its very end."¹⁰¹ Progress in other avenues does not translate into political progress. Technology, for example, while it has made communications easier in some cases, has made it more

difficult in others.¹⁰²

Some American school realists have claimed to be able to see a cyclical pattern of the rise and fall of great powers, with all the implications this has for the level of stability in the international system. In the forefront of these is George Modelski, who links the occasion of major wars to the decline of a hegemon, and the consolidation of the power of a rising new hegemonic power. Hegemons, once they have restored international order, eventually fall prey to imperial overstretch, and consequently decline.¹⁰³ Others are less inclined to impose a rigid cyclical interpretation on the ebbs and flows of power in the international system, but interpret the struggle for power as a static reality. In Thomas Schelling's method the sameness of political behaviour is such that the lessons of one particular historical event are as applicable as guides to similar political events throughout history.¹⁰⁴ Kenneth Waltz's reformulation of a realist theory of international politics was remarkable for its lack of possibilities for meaningful change. Instead, similar processes were assumed to be at work regardless of historical age.¹⁰⁵ This approach is cyclical more in the sense that circumstances repeat themselves, albeit with different actors.

English school realism is different from its American counterpart more in stress than in approach. Yet, this different stress leads to conclusions that are crucially different. On the surface it appears that the English school

has the same view of reason, freedom and progress as the American: a pure instrumental reason, freedom as power, and a fundamentally cyclical view of progress. On closer inspection, however, the English school's conservative stress on order and its respect for the complexities of history severely limits these definitions.

While its conception of reason is instrumental, English school realism tempers this with a view of the importance of order and justice. People seek order and justice, much in the same way that in Niebuhr people have a non-rational moral sense (This similarity with Niebuhr, and contrast with Morgenthau, has much to do with the influence that Niebuhr had on major figures in the English school, such as Martin Wight). Hence, this instrumental reason is as likely to manifest itself as a search for order and justice as it is to be used merely to aid the urge to dominate. This is not to say that the urge to dominate does not exist -- Herbert Butterfield for one was at pains to point out that "the streak of egotism in human beings" could not be ignored, and that non-rational imagination was necessary to bridge gaps that rational human understanding could not.¹⁰⁶ Yet, the desires for order and justice are made effective not by their rationality, but by the power at the disposal of the actors with the desire. Order is maintained by the power of the states interested in maintaining the status quo, while calls for justice are only heard when those who desire it are powerful enough.¹⁰⁷ An

important subsidiary to the exercise of power, though, is the establishment of a feeling of common interest -- or imagination -- which is both necessary to maintain a stable order, and important in the establishment of justice claims that are mutually recognisable.¹⁰⁸

It is this concept of order that also provides a curb on the English school concept of freedom as power. Bull, employing Hume's definition of a society, sees the creation of a society of states as bringing greater security for each, but in turn limits the freedom of states to engage in undue violence, to break promises, or to violate the security of possessions.¹⁰⁹ While these basic rules have not always been respected, they do, in the modern international system, provide a break on the freedom to dominate. Where small states in Morgenthau's formulation were protected by the balance of power between major actors, in Bull the existence of rules curtails the freedom of great powers to act as they wish, and thus a sense of order and sociability limits freedom as power.

Where more fundamental differences emerge between the American and English schools, however, is in their views of progress and history. The English school shares the assumption of the American school that political units (ie: 'states', whether they be the territorial states of dynastic Europe, or the nation-states of today) are the basic actors of history, but rather than seeing history as a realm of cycles or potential repeats, there is a sense that history is

intrinsically ironic and unpredictable. Martin Wight is at pains to point out that the current political system dates only from the sixteenth century, and thus there is no comparison between what happened before then and what happens politically now.¹¹⁰ There is reoccurrence at the international level, but this reoccurrence does not mean that we can 'ransack the past' for examples to prove points being made today, as often the questions and problems were not the same.¹¹¹ This is the irony of history: it seems to repeat itself, but differences even between similar historical events make social scientific generalisation impossible. This position has implications for English school realism as a basis for policy. In effect, the strict reoccurrence outlook of American school realism means it is able to formulate parsimonious and ahistorical laws that are capable of informing a policy-maker at any time in history of the proper actions to take. The English school, however, rejects the idea that clear parallels can be drawn throughout history, and thus clear policy guidelines cannot be constructed, like objective scientific laws, from a perusal of the historical record. Hedley Bull, for example, states that the concepts of international order and justice may or may not conflict, depending on their form and the shape of the international system.¹¹²

Just as realism can be divided into an American and English school, so liberal IR can be divided between

utilitarian and continental schools of thought. The Continental school is dominated by the figure of Immanuel Kant, whose low profile within academic IR contrasts with the sophistication of his approach to international affairs. Kant's theory of international interaction, unlike that of the realists, is based on a crucial interconnection between reason, freedom and progress. A transcendental reason makes a rational freedom possible, and in turn reason can determine goals which lead to a progression towards a freer World. Kant's conception of international affairs rests upon the view that the central question is how we can make human existence more rational, and consequently less warlike.

Yet, it is not the continental tradition of Kant that has dominated the liberal rationalist tradition in IR, but rather the utilitarian school. Thus liberal rationalist approaches to IR have tended to stress the role of (negative) freedom in promoting (utilitarian instrumental) rationality, which, in turn, is responsible for greater material progress. This link, as well as its differences with the continental school represented by Kant (the road not taken, so to speak), will be discussed in more detail in chapters 4 to 7.

The Marxist structuralist paradigm represents a variation on the Enlightenment theme, combining as it does a concept of progression with its own ideas about the nature of reason and freedom. What makes structuralism interesting, and differentiates it sharply from critical theory, is its

combination of a nineteenth century conception of material progress, with fundamentally pre-Enlightenment views of reason and freedom. In fact, the differences between structuralists and critical theorists revolve around their different interpretations and uses of Marx. The structuralists concentrate on Marx the nineteenth century theorist of material progress, while the critical theorists use Marx the Hegelian social philosopher.

The structuralist amalgam of nineteenth century progress with pre-Enlightenment conceptions of reason and freedom also represents a decoupling of the link between progress on the one hand, and reason and freedom on the other. The concept of progress is Enlightenment-inspired in the sense that it is unilinear. Immanuel Wallerstein has characterised change as spiral. Things happen that are similar to what has occurred before, but there is a definite unilinear trend towards something new.¹¹³ The vehicle for this change, however, is the material forces of production, assisted by political arrangements. Structuralists take as their starting point Marx's view that it is the mode of production that creates classes, and it is the relationship between classes that is the stuff of history. To Wallerstein the units of analysis are both the world-system itself and the classes within it, and it is the conflicts within the world-system between classes that provide the dynamic for change.¹¹⁴

Although the economic mode of production is the ultimate

determinant for the structuralist, it is the interaction of the political and economic realms that create both the structure of the world-system and the possibility of change.¹¹⁵ The nature of the mode of production puts more wealth in the hands of some societies than it does in others, and this wealth is used to impose political controls that keep poorer societies from reaping the full benefits of their labours.¹¹⁶ It is at this point of interaction between the economic forces that ultimately determine progress and the political forces that assist the building or replacement of the fundamentally economic structure, that human freedom is most clearly visible in the structuralist formulation. Yet, this is freedom defined in terms of wealth, which amounts to an economistic form of the politicist freedom as power. The strong have the power to impose a political structure that safeguards the mode of production that benefits them, while the social classes that are penalised by this system will eventually force change on the system when they are in a position to wield enough power to overthrow these unfair political structures, and set about rebuilding the mode of production. Just as the freedom employed in the structuralist paradigm is similar to that found in realism, so there is an unspoken assumption that social classes throughout history are using an instrumental reason to achieve their goals. In sum, progress goes on at the spur of material forces, while a political realm -- in which instrumental reason and freedom as

wealth figure -- retards or assists these forces.

Up until the early 1980's the preceding approaches represented the main paradigms within IR. Since then two new paradigms have appeared, one of which has attempted to remodel and resuscitate the Enlightenment project with IR, while the other has attempted to lay the Enlightenment to rest in a common grave with realism. Critical theory represents an attempt to save Marxism from the over-done materialism of the structuralists, while resuscitating the liberal ideas about the inter-connectedness of reason, freedom and progress. The main difference with the liberals is that critical theorists see inherent dangers in the use of reason, echoing Weber's warning about the construction of the 'iron cage' in an increasingly rational society.

Critical theorists argue that there is an intimate connection between thought and social conditions, and thus the role and state of reason is an important determinant of the state of social progress. Reason in the modern World, they argue, has lost its emancipatory function, and has been reduced to a technocratic form.¹¹⁷ Thus, there is in critical theory a combination of Hegelian and Weberian insights into the nature of reason. Hegelian in the sense that reason has an important role in human progress, Weberian in that reason can take many forms. There is negative reason, that the critical theorists argue we lack, which can be used to criticise the positive reason of technocratic stasis. To the critical

theorist, therefore, reason does not have a natural cunning, but can stop in a blind alley if there is not enough use of negative reason. Within IR scholarship critical theorists have drawn a similar distinction between problem-solving theory, which uses positive reason in order to work within what already exists, and critical theory, which uses negative reason to criticise what exists in order to build something new.¹¹⁸ Critical theorists are, thus, defining reason as potentially both transcendental (negative) and scientific/technocratic (positive).

Like Hegel, and before him Kant, critical theory within IR "seeks to maintain the link between freedom and reason",¹¹⁹ by defining freedom in the rational sense common to German idealism. True freedom, therefore, comes when we have the capacity to decide, free from ideas imposed from the outside. Critical theorists see the source of the externalities that prevent our autonomous reasoning in the ideological and cultural hegemony imposed on us by the ruling elite and their politico-economic structure.¹²⁰ Just as the ability to reason autonomously is freedom, so progress is linked to the establishment of freedom. Yet, progress to the critical theorist is not a necessary and untroubled single evolutionary path, but rather a possibility that is easily stalled, or (as in the case of the modern technocratic world) sent up a blind alley. We can, with much study and struggle find a proper reasonable way to progress, but the options for

taking the wrong path are legion. Progress in critical theory, therefore, forms a link between the unilinear progress of the liberals, and the fundamentally multilinear view of the poststructuralists.

Yet, while it shares so much of its interpretation of the reason-freedom-progress nexus with the liberal approaches, critical theory contains within it the basis for a critique of the utilitarian school's position. Critical theory has adopted from Hegel the notion of a dialectical process in thought, whereby our understanding as a species moves from a subjective view of the World (the thing as it appears), towards an objective view (the thing as it really is). As in Hegel, the vehicle for this development is reason. In modern positivism, however, the subjective view of the World (how it appears is how it is) is accepted as being its objective nature. The result is that positivism merely affirms the present conditions, rather than criticising what exists in order to move us closer to an objective understanding.¹²¹ Progress to the critical theorist is thus concerned with the development of ideas, rather than material wealth.

Finally, the development within IR of a poststructural paradigm has added an approach that not only criticises the relationships and definitions of the Enlightenment reason-freedom-progress nexus (as realism does), but doubts the whole foundations of the subject of IR. First, the whole notion of reason is discarded -- with the possibility that scientific

reasoning in Weber's sense, which is as much the tool of the enquiring poststructuralist as it is of any other thinker, has a role in the organisation of philosophical arguments. Transcendental reason is rejected because it assumes a necessary direction to history, as well as the ability to use reason to 'stand outside' of our historical context and decide what should come next in our progress towards a better World.¹²² Equally well, there is no necessarily neutral instrumental reason either. The belief in one form of instrumental reason that can, in all historical circumstances give the individual the answer they need (whether that be the pure instrumentality of realist reason or the other, utilitarian, variety) presupposes a non-historical clockwork mechanism that both denies historical differences in structures and ideological differences in people.¹²³ This criticism of the concept of reason attempts to eliminate the motor of history for the continental liberals and the critical theorists, while doubting the stable instrumental rationalities of the realist and the utilitarian.

On the question of freedom, poststructuralists can neither endorse the freedom to choose of the utilitarians nor the freedom as autonomy of thought for the continental liberals and the critical theorists. It is here that poststructuralists come closest to the realists and structuralists, agreeing with them about the pervasion of power in human society, and arguing that power brings the

freedom to control others. Foucault comes closest to Morgenthau's notion of all history being a struggle for power, in his view that power pervades all aspects of our lives, whether in family relationships or in political struggles.¹²⁴ Feminist poststructuralists within IR have taken up a similar argument about the power relations within the discipline itself.¹²⁵ Poststructuralism does not offer a single vision of freedom *per se*, but rather a few signposts in a World of different cultural viewpoints and interpretations. Foucault suggests that power relations should be made less vicious. Ernesto Laclau, after pointing out the dangers of the Enlightenment goal of emancipation (since it fails to recognise difference in the human condition), argues that we have to move beyond emancipation, which is universal, towards a more particularistic vision. Finally, Rob Walker looks towards a World in which the various social movements and groups that have been excluded from global concerns can be free to articulate and realise their concerns.¹²⁶

Thus, necessarily, there is no poststructuralist concept of progress. Instead, there is the interpretation of history as a non-directional collection of 'discourses' -- what Ashley calls a heterologue. Rather than talking about history, we have to think instead in terms of many different histories running simultaneously amongst different groups. At the same time, there is no necessary improvement from one age to the next, but rather there are sharp changes in the modes and

assumptions of thought and practice in both time and space.¹²⁷ Thus, it is safer to refer to the poststructuralist interpretation of 'progress' as multilinear, since there is no clear path of development, but human society changes over time, and is not forced into a cyclical reoccurrence by objective laws of human nature.

The Human Nature of the Case:

Behind the different interpretations of the reason-freedom-progress nexus rest assumptions about human nature. It is the realists' claims about human nature that are at the bottom of their critique of progressivist theories of World Politics, as much as it is the bifurcation in liberalism between reason and passion that allows it to both marginalise human nature in liberal peace theories, and also to use impassioned human nature as a whipping-boy for the failures of liberal peace theory. As with other frequently over-used political terms, human nature manages to be both often invoked, and also so little understood as to be trite and meaningless.

There are, however, two dominant interpretations of human nature. One is the view of it as common to all and set for all time (atemporal human nature), and the other sees it as constructed out of historical forces (situated human nature). Yet this simplistic typology is given some complexity by the question of the strength of human nature in relation to other

influences on human behaviour. Thus, a key question becomes to what extent are laws of human action that are distilled from assumptions about human nature valid explanations of why the political world takes the form that it does? Thus, even believers in a static and atemporal human nature can believe in progress if they accept the premise that learnt behaviour reduces our reliance on what is natural.

It is on its assumptions about human nature that realism is fundamentally differentiated from its Enlightenment protagonists in IR. Realists, with some interesting exceptions (which on further analysis prove not to be that different), see human nature as both atemporal and as a crucial determinant of political life. Differences between realists emerge only when the make-up of human nature is discussed, but not on the issue of the role of human nature. Morgenthau presents perhaps the bleakest view, arguing that human drives can be reduced to the desires to propagate, to dominate and to live. Niebuhr sees moral behaviour as a crucial element of the human make-up, while for Hedley Bull the desires for order and justice represent a crucial atemporal human craving.¹²⁸ The major exception to the overt privileging of human nature among realists is Kenneth Waltz, who abandons human nature as a foundation of his thought, in favour of standardised atemporal laws about the behaviour of human social structures.¹²⁹ Yet, this emerges as a mere back-door human nature argument, since what he is saying about the behaviour of human social

structures is that this is the way that humans, atemporarily, behave under these conditions. The atemporal behaviour of structures is linked to an unspoken assumption about human nature.

This does, however, bring us to another fundamental issue in the realist notion of human nature; namely that there is a small but important distinction between individual and group behaviours. Both Niebuhr and Morgenthau agreed that individuals are capable of altruism and self-sacrifice -- although this view is stronger in Niebuhr than in Morgenthau -- while groups are not. The result is that human groups share with individuals the same selfish desire to maximise their power, but lack the other more altruistic elements of human nature that are found only in the individual.¹³⁰ In the domestic sphere this selfishness is regulated by the rule of law, but no such arrangements exist at the international level. Hence, states in the international sphere seek to maximise their power at the expense of others. States, therefore, behave according to the dictates of the power drives in human nature, but lack all the controls to behave morally.

The question of human nature to liberal thinkers can be important, but it is far from being as vital as it is to realists. Kant, while agreeing with realists that there is a selfish atemporal human nature, does not see it as necessarily the only determinant of human behaviour. Indeed, to Kant we

may choose to be a slave to our natural instincts, but we have the capacity to be rational and free from our natures. As well as this potential to use our reason to escape the determinism of our natures, human society as a whole, according to Kant, is capable through its selfishness of evolving towards a more peaceful World. War as a vehicle of human selfishness is replaced by commerce, which also exploits selfishness, but is more rational.¹³¹ Reason, to Kant, is not a part of human nature (in the sense that realists use the term) because it is a faculty that exists prior to human existence, and is merely something that humans have an imperfect grasp of.

The unimportance of an atemporal human nature to a directional and reason-driven history is demonstrated by the ease with which writers such as Vico and Hegel were able to interpret human nature as fundamentally situated and historical, while still keeping to the spirit of a progressive project. For the English school liberal rationalists the issue of human nature becomes even more marginalised. Since progress is material and social, its grounding is in knowledge and the development of social structures. Human nature increasingly becomes irrelevant as human behaviour is more and more influenced by increased knowledge in the hands of people utilising utilitarian instrumental reason, which informs humans of rational cooperative means of achieving their goals of material prosperity. This rational means is found to be more efficient than the use of passionate instinct, and thus

the basic human drives are undermined by rational calculation.¹³² Indeed, in Norman Angell's early writings the existence of human nature was thought to be largely irrelevant to a modern society.

While an atemporal human nature can play a part in liberal rationalist concepts of international affairs, in the Marxist, neo-Marxist and poststructural treatments of IR human nature ceases to exist as an important concern. In all of these paradigms, human nature is situated in a historical context, and is dependent on other forces to shape it. Structural Marxists turn to the mode of production as the shaper of human nature, while to critical theorists both the mode of production and the ideological context make for the development of a particular human self-image.¹³³ Both paradigms draw, through Marx, on Hegel's rejection of an atemporal human nature, while the critical theorists also include Vico's critique of historians who impose modern human values on ancient societies that had fundamentally different priorities and ethics. Poststructuralists are keen to point out that human natures are constructs of particular time-bound -- and even spatially bound -- categories. Human nature is thus an empty set waiting to be filled by social agencies outside of the individual concerned.¹³⁴

What relevance does the question of human nature in IR have on the Perpetual Peace Project? It is crucial mainly because much of the realist criticisms of the Project centre

around realist interpretations of human nature. The fact that realist views of the importance of human nature are so out of line with the four Enlightenment paradigms and the counter-Enlightenment poststructuralist one, makes this issue a crucial point of departure for an analysis of the realist opposition to the Perpetual Peace Project. This issue of the role of human nature, especially in the form that it takes in the realist critique of liberal rationalism, will be discussed in more detail in Part II.

Issues for a Historian of IR:

The international sphere, through the agency of the subject of IR (the subject that largely confers on the international sphere its relative autonomy from the domestic), is consequently a ground for competition between different western philosophical conceptions of the nature of human existence. It differs from the similar contest in domestic political theory in that realism has become the privileged articulator of the parameters and nature of international behaviour. The next chapter seeks to look at the reasons for this difference by examining the creation of IR as an academic discipline in the context of the rise of the Perpetual Peace Project of the Enlightenment. The Perpetual Peace Project, of which the ideas of Angell and Mitrany are a part, provided the impetus behind the establishment of the subject of IR; and the creation of realism as the dominant IR paradigm can be

interpreted more accurately as a reaction to the Perpetual Peace Project, than it can as the 'rediscovery of timeless truths'.

In the next chapter we will put the IR paradigms introduced in the latter part of this chapter into the context of the historical evolution of the Perpetual Peace Project, and discuss the relative merits of utilitarian and continental liberal IR. This will prepare the ground for the discussion in the rest of this thesis of the high-water mark of liberal rationalist peace theory within IR, which will be explored through the works of Norman Angell and David Mitrany.

Chapter 3: The Perpetual Peace

Project of the Enlightenment and the

Construction of International

Relations as a Discipline

History is not what you thought. *It is what you can remember.* All other history defeats itself.

W. C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman, *1066 and All That*.

The period since 1945 has seen an attempt by IR to distance itself from the perpetual peace project. This is not to say that peace has ceased to be a goal for IR scholars. Morgenthau qualified his *Politics Among Nations* with the subtitle *The Struggle for Power and Peace*, and an earlier work by Georg Schwarzenberger was concerned with understanding the 'realities' of international politics so that we might differentiate possible reforms from wishful thinking.¹³⁵ It is the idea of perpetual peace that has been marginalised, in favour of the maintaining of a precarious peace through the good management of an anarchic order. Even since the end of bipolarity, with the recent popularity of 'peacemaking' and 'agenda for peace', the emphasis is on the management of the anarchic, not the organisation of the perpetually peaceful. In one sense, though, peace in general has been marginalised, in that it has often been regarded in the discipline as an

epiphenomenon -- whether of structure as in Waltz, the economy as in structuralism, or a mixture of ideology and politico-economic factors as in critical theory. Those who put the struggle for peace first in their studies, the 'peace theorists', are consigned to the margins of IR.¹³⁶

Yet IR is a subject that was originally a creation of the Perpetual Peace Project, whatever its form now, and acknowledgement of this historical cause can go a long way to explaining many of the anomalies in the theory of the subject. For example, in 1966 Martin Wight asked 'why is there no international theory' to compare with domestic political theory? Why have there been no great IR thinkers in the past, except for the snippets of interest shown in international affairs by Hobbes, Grotius or Machiavelli?¹³⁷ The quick answer to this might be that IR only dates from the early twentieth century, and therefore has no tradition to speak of outside of its twentieth century roots. This is a contentious point, which would certainly not find favour in much of the realist IR community, who like to see themselves as part of an established, yet ageless, school of thought.

This chapter will look at two things. First, the emergence of the concept of an Enlightenment Perpetual Peace Project out of an opposition to the early modern conservative political paradigm, and the extent to which the survival of conservative ideas about inter-state relations created both liberal rationalist peace theory and IR as a separate

discipline. Secondly, where the IR paradigms, discussed in the last chapter, relate to the Perpetual Peace Project of the Enlightenment. The place of these paradigms in the subject of IR, if any, depends largely, to use a First World War metaphor, on what 'front' they occur on.

The first front is the liberal/realist split, which has its roots in a previous contest that occurred before the founding of IR. The second is the dispute between realists, who defend the concept of a distinct space for IR, and more radical critics (Marxist Structuralism, Critical Theory and Poststructuralism), who doubt the autonomy of the subject. The first of these 'fronts' stands at the creation of IR, with liberals creating the subject so that the international anarchy may be studied and reformed towards the norms of domestic liberal society, and realists defending the timeless autonomy of the international sphere. The second stands at the end of the subject, where realist defenders of an autonomous IR space stand against those who question the authenticity of the domestic/international division of politics. On the first front the Perpetual Peace Project is centre stage as the subject of dispute; on the second it is marginalised. Between these fronts lies the unchallenged realist supremacy common to most interpretations of IR during the fifties and sixties, and still found in many institutions that teach solely realist IR.

This 'front' metaphor has both a chronological and a contemporary relevance. It is chronological in the sense that

the liberal dominance in IR gave way to the realist ascendancy, which is now being challenged in the so-called 'third debate'. It has contemporary relevance in that both 'fronts' are still active in different fora of the discipline. Many of the articles in the journal *International Organization*, not to mention popular introductory textbooks such as John Rourke's *International Politics on the World Stage*, assume that the major disputes in IR are between realists and liberals/'idealists'.¹³⁸ This view is particularly common in the North Atlantic area. Similarly, a plethora of work by critical theorists and poststructuralists interpret the subject as a realist orthodoxy being assailed by a radical heterodoxy.¹³⁹ At the same time, much work is executed within the realist paradigm that is oblivious to these paradigmatic disputes, and thus still continues to exist in a realm of realist supremacy between these two 'fronts'.¹⁴⁰

What this chapter has to deal with, therefore, is the morphologies of both the Perpetual Peace Project of the Enlightenment, and the discipline of IR, stressing the role of the former in the creation of the latter. Norman Angell and David Mitrany stand at this point of inter-connection, representing both the culmination of the popularity of the Perpetual Peace Project, and the foundation of IR as a discrete discipline. The important conclusion being that these two events are one and the same thing. The archaeology of

peace presented in the introduction highlighted the changing views on peace, this chapter starts where that section left off, by examining how the Perpetual Peace Project involved itself in the creation of IR, and where its protagonists now stand in relation to the other paradigms in the subject. This chapter, therefore, represents both a conclusion of the arguments made in chapters one and two, and an introduction to Part II.

Wanted: An Intellectual Vehicle for Perpetual Peace:

To comprehend the Perpetual Peace Project it is as well to sum up what it was a reaction against. In chapter two the rise of the Enlightenment views of reason as a basis of social organisation can be partially explained by the apparent arbitrariness of absolutism. Similarly, in chapter one the move towards the Perpetual Peace Project was described as occurring against the back-drop of more destructive and seemingly meaningless warfare. The link between these two is a common Enlightenment reaction against a crumbling early-modern order, which I shall refer to as 'conservatism', since many of its assumptions about society evolved into nineteenth century conservatism. This conservative paradigm of politics is important, not just because it was the view of the World against which the rising tide of the Enlightenment reacted, but also because many conservative apologists have been reinterpreted as forebears by modern realist scholars in IR.

It was conservatism which, in the wake of the collapse of the Medieval order, first articulated the modern version of the domestic/international split. The source of this split can be found in the post-Medieval divorce of the divine hierarchy from the secular one, which left the secular hierarchy of commoner, aristocrat, monarch without full divine sanction and intrinsic naturalness. It also meant that, rather than being part of the same harmonious natural order ending in God, a kingdom's secular hierarchy was distinct from the secular hierarchies in other domains. As a consequence, one kingdom could be considered as a separate entity from its neighbours - - a situation very different from the interlocking jurisdictions and allegiances of the Middle Ages. This development was further compounded by the deliberate attempts made by European monarchs to consolidate their realms, both by increases in internal control, and by the severing of ties between subjects in one kingdom, and those of another. Yet, the concept of a united Christendom continued, leading to a three tier view of the World: domestic, relations between Christian sovereigns, and relations with the World outside Christendom. In short, there was the proper order of things within proper Christian hierarchies, and the state of nature without.

Conservatism was concerned with the maintenance of both tradition and order in the domestic sphere. The rule by a monarch assisted by his or her aristocracy was both

traditional, and a guarantor of order. It was traditional because the legitimate monarch was the successor of the fatherly rule of Adam,¹⁴¹ while it was orderly because it was the form of government which could bring the most security and happiness to its subjects.¹⁴² While tradition was strong in the domestic realm, it was weak in the relations between Christian rulers, and non-existent in the Christian relationship with non-Christian peoples and sovereignties. The warrior aristocrat was a courteous defender of traditional values at home, but abroad he took up the sword and became a hyper-masculine fighter. This dichotomy between "the violent power of the conqueror and the natural power of the father" remained an important part of pre-Enlightenment conceptions of politics.¹⁴³

Elements of the standard realist binary split between the international and domestic spheres can already be seen in this formulation of the World, yet at this time there were few studies of the international sphere, and no autonomous study of IR. Rather, the international sphere was written about only as it related to domestic structures. Hobbes' advocacy of monarchy, for example, focuses on the need for defence from both internal and external enemies, and likens the relations between sovereigns to an anarchic and chaotic state of nature.¹⁴⁴ Others, such as Grotius, recognising that order and tradition existed only at the domestic level, tried to bring some legal order to relations between (Christian) states

by creating a bare-bones natural law tradition that could support a simple order.

The cause of the breakdown of the conservative order, which made the Enlightenment Perpetual Peace Project possible, was the increasingly poor fit between tradition and order as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries dragged on. This, to a large degree, had been foretold by Machiavelli, who can be considered as a proto-conservative thinker. In the *Discourses* Machiavelli saw order and tradition as compatible in a properly constituted republic, while in the *Prince* -- where Machiavelli discusses the establishment of new authority -- tradition becomes the enemy of order. In good times tradition and order could reinforce each other, but in bad times they were in danger of conflicting, and the supporters of conservatism would drop legitimacy and tradition, in favour of monarchical order, when a situation forced them to choose. A classic example of this was the crisis in the early seventeenth century between Charles I of England and the Parliamentary supporters of the traditional rights of the free-born Englishman. In response to the threat posed by tradition, Charles attempted to create a more powerful monarchy, so as to be able to impose order on a rebellious Parliament -- Parliament being an institution inherited from the Middle Ages. Hobbes, as a defender of Charles' position, reconstructed conservatism so that the now problematic tradition was replaced by a pure instrumental reason as the

legitimator of conservative authority. Since the struggle for power for Hobbes was universal, and such struggle impoverishes the lives of people, there is a need for power to be concentrated in the hands of a monarch who, enforcing covenants and rules by the sword, will free people from the anarchic strife inherent in the state of nature. Hobbes, therefore, took the idea of struggle rooted in human nature that would reappear in realist IR, and argued from it a conception of the establishment of perpetual peace through a powerful monarchical order. Similar, but less eloquently put, ideas were expressed by that other great Royalist apologist Francis Quarles.¹⁴⁵

Yet, in the absence of tradition, the attempts by monarchs and their courts to create order could be interpreted as the arbitrary use of power. This was compounded by social changes, in which a growing class of commoners, with little or no control over government, were gaining wealth through the expansion of trade and manufactures. The Enlightenment and its followers regarded the conservative order as arbitrary, and hence the search for an organising principle based on some form of reason became attractive as an alternative to the 'baseless' *ancien regime*. While the Enlightenment made strides at the domestic level -- winning out against the dead hand of conservatism through a mix of revolution and gradual reform in Britain, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, France, Germany and Italy throughout the nineteenth century -- foreign affairs,

even in the most liberal of states, remained in the hands of conservative, and often aristocratic, elites: "As late as 1914 the German foreign service included eight princes, twenty-nine counts, twenty barons, and fifty-four untitled nobleman, with only eleven commoners... even in republican France... the crucial importance of a good aristocratic position [was recognised]".¹⁴⁶

IR, as an academic discipline, emerged as a means for employing Enlightenment ideas to help solve the problems of war and conflict in international affairs. It was, in effect, the final Enlightenment campaign against the last great bastion of conservative paradigm dominance. Chapter four will deal with the precursors to Angell and Mitrany, pointing out the existence of both a conservative foreign policy orthodoxy, and of a growing Enlightenment reaction to this orthodoxy.

Although this conservative approach to World affairs was not identical to realism, there exists parallels between realist and conservative assumptions about the nature of humanity and the objects of study in IR. While IR was established as a vehicle for the Enlightenment, its recent history has been dominated by the return of ideas associated with the very position that the early IR scholars set out to refute. Similarly, the affinity felt by modern realists with past conservative thinkers, especially Machiavelli and Hobbes, is a reflection of shared assumptions about life at the international level, although the paramountcy of domestic

concerns in conservatism has been conveniently ignored by realists. Yet, because of these shared assumptions realists, especially in the American school, assume that an IR tradition exists that goes back to the dawn of time.

In the rest of this chapter two issues will be dealt with. First, I have to examine the realist/liberal dispute in IR and its relationship to the Perpetual Peace Project. Secondly, there are the recent developments in IR that threaten to marginalise both the Perpetual Peace Project and its realist critique.

Realism Versus Liberalism: The Dispute Over Perpetual Peace:

Both Angell and Mitrany were caught up in a movement to reform the international sphere, using assumptions that had been employed in the reformation of domestic society in the nineteenth century. The goal of the perpetual peace project was to bring reason to bear on the problem of war, in order to construct a World order that would progress towards an elimination of war. A belligerent conservatism opposed this position, taking as its assumptions the view that competition between states was zero-sum, that war was beneficial for society, and that there was, and should be, no exit from the form that the World took at that time.¹⁴⁷ Between the liberal Enlightenment project and the extreme conservatism lay a third group, which while it saw war as not a particularly beneficial activity, accepted that the development and deployment of

armed forces was necessary for a nation's survival. War disrupted economic activity, but conflicts were still likely to break out over the scarcity of resources or questions of justice.¹⁴⁸ Both this third group and the liberal peace theorists agreed that conservatism's claims about the moral superiority of war were spurious, while the liberal peace theorists claimed that conflicts over questions of resources and justice need not occur if the facts of modern life were truly understood. This third group, which we shall call 'national liberal', accepted Enlightenment assumptions about domestic politics, but was suspicious about claims that the Enlightenment could be spread to the international sphere. Thus, the perpetual peace project had to cope, at the turn of the century, with both an unreconstituted conservatism and Enlightenment laggards, who were not prepared to extend the assumptions of liberal domestic theory to the relations between states. These national liberals represent the link between conservatism on the one hand and modern realism on the other, in the sense that modern realism was to propose the Enlightenment at home, and pre-Enlightenment ideas abroad.

Again, it is important to stress that liberal peace theory took two forms, but only one informed the emerging subject of IR. The differences between these two schools of liberal pacifism are important, not just because they envisaged different forms of progress, but because the continentalist tradition, represented by Kant, contains within

it an important intra-liberal critique of twentieth century liberal IR. This section will, therefore compare these two branches of liberalism, before going on to analyze how realism developed as a critique of liberalism. Once realism had pushed liberalism off the centre stage of the subject, however, it ceased to be a critique, and became a prescriptive theory. This process of transformation has affected realism's outlook, leading to sharp differences between the conservative-inspired early realists, and the social scientific realism that has flourished since the sixties.

As discussed in chapter two, the main differences between continentalist and utilitarian peace theory lies in their interpretations of the reason-freedom-progress nexus. While both see a unilinear development of history towards greater peace, their different interpretations of reason, freedom and progress lead to differences in their interpretations of what progress consists of, and what it means to be truly at peace. To Kant both progress and peace assumed an ethical form, while to the utilitarians progress was material growth, while peace had utility because it allowed material prosperity to flourish.

The goal of utilitarian liberalism, given its materialist conception of progress and its non-transcendental view of reason, is to free up people's abilities to make choices, in order to maximise wealth and material well-being for all. As a consequence, the focus has always been on both the

fulfilment of human needs and the inviolability of people's choices, as long as those choices conform to generally accepted rules of behaviour. The crucial assumptions here are that choice is a non-rational and unexaminable part of the human make-up, while, when given the chance and the right social and educational conditions, people will choose to maximise their wealth, and ultimately the wealth of others. John Burton, for example, assumes that the interests of people lie in "greater efficiency in producing goods, services and cultural values". These human needs are not properly satisfied by states, and that given the choice peoples's connections would not be primarily within their 'billiard ball' states, but across state boundaries in a cosmopolitan 'cobweb'. This is mainly true because human needs are not temporarily or culturally determined, but are "ontological to the human species", and therefore are a constant.¹⁴⁹ These ideas are summed up by one of the most recent utilitarian liberal political leaders -- although he certainly lacked Woodrow Wilson's vision -- George Bush, when he said that people "everywhere want much the same thing; the chance to live a life of purpose; the chance to choose a life in which they and their children can learn, and grow healthy, and worship freely, and prosper through the work of their hands and their hearts and their minds."¹⁵⁰ Similarly, part of Francis Fukuyama's end of history argument rests on his view that a common economic self-interest becomes clearer under "a

progressive modern natural science". Hence, the end of history is partially explained as the end of external interference to human choice.¹⁵¹

Yet, people do not always make choices that serve their material ends, and utilitarian liberalism does have an explanation for this. Basically, people are blinded by "prejudice and traditional forms of authority", which can only be brushed aside by modern education.¹⁵²

Consequently, ideas play a role in international affairs, but there are right and wrong ideas. Those that are guided by utilitarian reason are right, those based on sensory misperception, prejudice, stereotypes, language problems or a faulty model of World society (ie: a realist one) are wrong.¹⁵³ The answer, therefore, lies in an education process that helps develop utilitarian reason, which in turn will release the power of human choice, leading to common decisions that will promote material well-being. To Fukuyama, for example, this education means the development of modern science, which includes the science of organisation. To Gabriel Almond it comes in the form of a modern political culture.¹⁵⁴ These assumptions about the nature of human choice, the need for education, and the cosmopolitan nature of human needs, form central arguments in the writings of both Angell and Mitrany.

Yet, these assumptions about the nature of choice and the role of reason were already questioned by Kant at the close of

the eighteenth century. For Kant, as for other continental liberals such as Hegel, the question of human choice is not a simple one, nor is a better World possible merely through the education of that choice. Because material progress was not the end that Kant necessarily sought, he did not privilege a needs-based international structure. Rather, the progress towards peace was an ethical issue, not a material one, and material solutions would not, by themselves, suffice.

Because Kant saw humans as living in both an intelligible and a natural World, and hence living simultaneously under the laws of reason and of nature, the issue was not that people should choose free from the distortions of prejudice and tradition, but how were people's choices constructed, and how might our choices be brought around to a more ethical and cosmopolitan direction. While utilitarian liberals saw human choice as given, which could be assisted by a non-ethical reason in their realisation, the continentals saw choice as a dependent variable that had to be moulded by an ethical reason if it was to have a cosmopolitan intent. Utilitarians are believers in a natural harmony of interests between individual choices and the needs of the World society, continentals only see a potential for harmony if all are governed by transcendental reason (articulated as the categorical imperative for Kant).

Kant, in fact, makes a sharp distinction between animal choice -- informed by a sense-based impulse -- and human

choice -- informed by transcendental reason. Only the second has any relation to morality and freedom, while the first is merely determined by natural laws.¹⁵⁵ Burton's "ontological" human needs would, therefore, inform merely animal choice and are not a basis for perpetual peace, since choices based on empirical factors are dependent on specific conditions, and universality (and, hence, cosmopolitanism) is lost.¹⁵⁶ In addition, whereas the non-rational and material choice of the utilitarians can be, potentially, realised by all people, thus (the utilitarians claim) leading to a more cosmopolitan needs-based structure, the human choice of Kant is a frail thing, always prey to the animal choice of the brutish side of our natures.

Hence, we are never capable of freeing ourselves totally from natural laws, and this is even more true in human social life, where reason has even more difficulty in making itself felt against selfish passions: "reason, which is revered even though impotent in practice."¹⁵⁷ Thus, continental liberalism also carries a dire warning for utilitarian liberals. Reason and education may not be powerful enough to bring about perpetual peace, and a slight of hand (such as Kant's concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy) or some form of providence (divine, natural, or a Hegelian 'History') is required to turn the 'ought' of reason into the 'is' of political practice. Both Angell and Mitrany were, at some point, forced to face this issue.

How, then, is peace possible for Kant? It is here that his proposals for a peaceful World look superficially like the proposals of the utilitarians, but there are important qualifications to Kant's argument. Reason, to Kant, is incapable of achieving peace alone, and must be helped by nature. Because human nature is partially rational, and nature always pushes animals to use their abilities to the full, nature guides us towards a greater use of our reason, according to Kant.¹⁵⁸ Through our warlike natures, he further argued, we create the state, and within the state laws develop to protect us from those who wish to opt out from society, which creates the conditions for a legal system that leads people towards the use of reason in civil affairs.¹⁵⁹ War between states is eliminated in two ways. First, commerce, which requires peace to function well, becomes a better vehicle for human selfishness. Secondly, the greater destructiveness of war and the enfranchisement of those who have to bear the greater burden of the cost of war leads to a drop in interest in violent conflict.¹⁶⁰

It seems at first glance that Kant is in full agreement with the utilitarians, yet there are several glaring differences that amount to a continentalist critique of the utilitarian position. First, while Kant's reliance on nature as a vehicle for peace is unsatisfying -- for with what safety can we rely on the forces of nature to drag us out of our own problems -- it points to the dangers of relying on some form

of directional reason and education to bring us peace. Kant's argument is, effectively, that it is the failures of war and the rules of nature that will bring us peace, and this peace will allow for reason to flourish. Even then, war has served a purpose, since it has spread the human race across the globe, and produced the state within which a transcendental reason-based legal system can operate. We must, therefore, look to some kind of natural providence, or force outside of our intelligent understanding, to bring us to a regime of peace. Secondly, Kant is not interested in need *per se*, nor does the privileging of commerce necessarily mean that Kant is praising it. Where the utilitarians would educate people in order that they could more clearly see how they could fulfil their needs, and how peace is the better course in this case, Kant sees no role for education in the promotion of commerce. Rather, education is required to bring the individual to an understanding of the laws of transcendental reason, and from there to an ethical 'republican' state. Although commerce, to Kant, was more peaceful, it was not necessarily cosmopolitan as the utilitarian concept of need is. Need is meant to unite people in a pacific common endeavour, but commerce is individual selfishness that does not necessarily involve war.

The goal for Kant is the ethical state, within a cosmopolitan federation of ethical states, which makes the ethical education of the individual possible. Human needs, on the other hand, would not be a good basis for a cosmopolitan

peace in Kant's view since they divide people, largely because needs are relative to the individual, the time and the location. The utilitarian, instead of placing education at the end of the process, places it at the front. Through education we learn to use reason in a cooperative effort to satisfy our basic and common human needs. Thus, to address a continentalist critique of their positions, Angell and Mitrany must show how their concepts of choice address the sources and nature of choice, and how their views on human needs is able to be a cosmopolitan and pacific force.

The appearance and development of realism in IR is, perhaps, the one feature of IR that distinguishes it from other disciplines. That the Enlightenment, in either its liberal or Marxist guises, did not dominate the subject in the last fifty years, differentiates IR from sociology, political economy, history, comparative politics and development studies. Rather, realism, which was fundamentally a critique of the Enlightenment, has set itself up as both the definer and the explainer of international human behaviour. It is a definer in as much as what has come to be regarded as the proper study of IR is what realism considers important. It is the privileged explainer in that its concepts have dominated our view of how the international order works. Yet, realism is not monolithic. In addition to the split between American and English schools, the thinking within these schools has developed and changed. Ironically, much of this change has

involved the creeping acceptance of Enlightenment assumptions, as realism has moved from being a negative critique, to a positive critique, and finally to a supporter of the status quo, and a fundamentally anti-critical paradigm.

In chapter two the assumptions of realism, as they were manifest in views of reason, freedom, progress and human nature, were adumbrated, with the emphasis on the realists who were responsible for creating a positive theory of realism to replace liberalism. Yet, the roots of realism in IR have to be found in both a combination of the national-liberal and conservative traditions, and in the seminal critical realist work, E. H. Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis*. The national-liberal/conservative traditions gave realism its assumptions about the nature of human society, while Carr's realism provided the critique of the Victorian optimism. This optimism had dominated western liberal interpretations of how the international sphere should be reformed. Carr neither fully endorsed the realist stance that he explored, nor did he see it as necessarily having a complete theory of human society. Rather, the modern realist paradigm emerged when Carr's notion of realism was grafted onto a series of conservative assumptions about human society, and this amalgam, in turn, came to be influenced by research methods and assumptions about the economy which were fundamentally liberal.

Carr contrasted two ways of looking at the World, which he regarded as integral to all human sciences. Utopianism is

the approach in which "unverified assumptions" are made in order to construct "visionary projects for the attainment of the ends which they have in view".¹⁶¹ Hence utopianism is intensely teleological, ignoring the facts of the present in order to construct a perfect world in the future. Because utopian thinking aims at a perfect World it supports the concept of the harmony of interests: Assuming that, in the long run, the interests of each individual are the same as the interests of the group as a whole. The assumption of the harmony of interests, according to Carr, is now most commonly articulated by orthodox liberals, and Bentham, Herbert Spencer and Norman Angell are singled out as examples of this liberalism.¹⁶² Utopianism sees morality as a shaper of political practice, hence it also requires that statesmen have free will, since without free will the morality of the individual cannot influence political action.¹⁶³

Realism, on the other hand, concentrates on understanding current reality, rather than constructing better world orders. Because of this realism lacks a teleology, but this also means that realism can relate its understanding to historical change. Because Utopianism is teleological it assumes that human action and ethics is governed by ahistorical standards, and that there is a point at which these standards are reached, the result being utopia. Realism, on the other hand, sees both theory and ethics as historically determined, and consequently determined by historical circumstance.¹⁶⁴ Carr

has used a Hegelian epistemology here. Utopianism is aiming towards an objective reality, while realism prevents a premature reification of the subjective by revealing the subjectivity of utopian 'objective' reality.

To the realist the utopian concept of the harmony of interests is an historically determined spurious reality which allows the stronger to impose their individual interests on the weaker. The doctrine of the harmony of interests is used to convince the weak that their interests are the same as the interests of the community. The interests of the strong, in turn, are served by the community.¹⁶⁵ Equally, political practice determines morality, rather than acting as a guide to activity. Morality is moulded to suit power and interests.¹⁶⁶ The end result of realism -- a product of its historical relativism and its view of the primacy of power -- is that it is deterministic. Statesmen have no free will, since their actions are decided for them by the nature of the realities of power relations and the interests that flow from these power relations.

Despite the weight Carr gives to realism -- a reaction to the supposed ascendancy of utopianism in IR between the two World wars -- he advocates a balance between realism and utopianism. Realism on its own is purposeless and stagnant, while utopianism lacks an understanding of reality and historical processes. Utopianism provides purpose, realism provides understanding. Thus, realism and utopianism, as

explained by Carr, are not separate paradigms, but two dialectical parts of any paradigm. Realism acts as a devil's advocate within a paradigm, revealing the role the paradigm plays in legitimising current power relations. The utopian element is that part which assumes that the paradigm addresses ahistorical concerns, while the realist element challenges this naivety, and places the paradigm in historical context. Carr, although he never uses the paradigm concept, recognises this relationship between utopianism and realism. Realism undermines theories by exposing their basis in current power relations, but can never settle down to provide a "ground for action", for any statement of supposed objectivity is open to the realist criticism of historical subjectivity. The pure realist can critique, but never formulate.¹⁶⁷

Effectively, Carr's distinction represents a separation of the 'is' from the 'ought' in human thought, and it is in this fundamentally negative form as a critic of the 'ought' in Enlightenment teleology that realism began its life in IR. The first half of Morgenthau's *Scientific Man vs Power Politics* was also a criticism of liberalism's faith in rational progress, while Carr's exposure of liberalism as a tool of class interest was a common theme in Niebuhr's criticisms of liberal utopianism.¹⁶⁸ In this essentially negative dialectic form realism played a role not unlike that played by modern poststructural deconstruction, revealing the hypocrisies and illusions of current thought, without necessarily trying to

replace it with any substantial alternative. Yet, Hans Morgenthau in the US, and the Augustinian/Grotian followers of Wight, Butterfield and Manning in the UK, were to take this critique and weave it into a positive theory with the aid of borrowed conservative assumptions that could be found both in pre-Enlightenment conservatism, and in national liberalism.

In his six principles of political realism Morgenthau took what he wanted from Carr, acknowledging him in the process, but showing his commitment to the conservative authoritarianism of such survivors of the Enlightenment landslide as Carl Schmitt.¹⁶⁹ Morgenthau's first principle of political realism represents the most reified element in his theory: "politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature... the operation of these laws being impervious to our preference, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure."¹⁷⁰ Morgenthau sees human nature as fixed and unchanging, while critical realism has emphasised the historical subjectivity of humanity. Indeed, Morgenthau has adopted the ideas of a fixed and self-centred human nature, which were current and popular during the period of conservative ascendancy. Indeed, Morgenthau acknowledges his debt to Machiavelli and Hobbes for his view of human nature, regarding these two conservative thinkers as "flashes of lightning" illuminating the true sources of our behaviour.¹⁷¹ This represents a reversal of Carr's realism, which rejected ahistorical laws.

The second principle is the importance of power. "Interest defined as power" is the "signpost" in which political realism connects "reason [Morgenthau uses reason as a synonym for thought] trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood."¹⁷² Third, interest defined as power is "an objective category which is universally valid," although it is not restricted to one form or meaning.¹⁷³ Thus power might take a military, economic, or even a psychological form. Fourth, moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states, while fifth, political realism rejects claims by any state that their moral aspirations are synonymous with "the moral laws that govern the universe".¹⁷⁴ These last four principles follow directly on from Carr's statement of (critical) realism, although Morgenthau's conversion of power into an objective law, rather than a critical explanation, shares more in common with the Hobbesian view of society as an arena of struggle. Again, this shares affinities with the conservative idea about the natural state of struggle between territorial units, in which power is used to preserve a legitimate authority.

Finally, Morgenthau asserts that "the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere".¹⁷⁵ This does not mean that Morgenthau ignores economic power, indeed he mentions it as an important variable throughout his book,¹⁷⁶ rather the dynamics of economic accumulation and questions of what political power is accumulated for are ignored. Again,

this is a rejection of Carr's realism, which makes no distinction between economic and political power, and its replacement with the conservative view of the primacy of political power relations as a focus of study. It is relational power relations which form the stuff of history, rather than the material/economic evolution favoured by Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer and the other utilitarian liberals.

Outside of these six principles, Morgenthau's ideas take on a more fundamentally conservative lurch, which is mirrored in the concerns of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull in the English school. In Carr's realism the criticism of the ideas on which the status quo are based is as much a part of the realist task as the attacks on those teleological utopians who want to change society. Morgenthau, Wight and Bull became primarily concerned with both legitimacy and order within the international sphere. Membership of the international society was afforded to those organised societies that were in possession of sovereignty -- those that were regarded as having a right to participate. While, at the same time, the maintenance of order became an obsession. In effect, the realism of the 1940's and '50's regarded the international sphere as a realm of conflict similar to conservatism's view of inter-state relations, but hoped that an international society could be constructed that combined the conservative domestic concerns of tradition (order) and legitimacy (state primacy/sovereignty). Thus, in the chaos that it was, and the

orderliness that it could be, the international sphere remained, to the realist, a realm of conservative ideas distinct from the liberal order to be found in the domestic.

Ironically, much realism since Morgenthau and Wight has begun to accept the idea that, rather than the conservative ideas of tradition and legitimacy, the international sphere can be reformed closer to liberal Enlightenment norms. Despite its liberal basis, functional ideas associated with David Mitrany, and collective security ideas found in Norman Angell have begun to find places for themselves in modern realist thought. While the realist concentration on the state as actor, and the primacy of politics, remains, the ideas of state security and interaction have been reformulated and recast.

The way that ideas, formally associated with Angell and Mitrany, have crept into modern realism, without citation, will be discussed more fully below. Realism's greater contribution to analysis of the Perpetual Peace Project lies in the questions it poses in its critique of the liberal position. First, there is the question of the validity of the realist notions of human nature and reason, in comparison with their liberal counterparts. These differences have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, but the issue boils down to the division outlined by Carr between the voluntarism of utopian thought and the determinism of realism. Fundamentally, reason to the liberal offers humans a freedom

of action beyond the constraints of human nature, with the utilitarians being more optimistic about the ability to break clear of these natural constraints than Kant. Realists, on the other hand, stress the constraining role of human nature, which effectively closes off all possibilities for creating perpetual peace. To Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Carr the hunger for power plays a vital role in human nature, which any amount of utopian dreaming cannot eliminate. Both Angell and Mitrany address these related issues.

Secondly, there is the realist critique of the harmony of interests. The idea that people have enough interests in common to create a regime of perpetual peace did not find favour with the early critical realists. Indeed, the concept of common human needs, and the ability to deploy a utilitarian instrumental reason to make the commonality of these needs a social fact, amounts to a harmony of interests. The question remains whether Angell and Mitrany are able to defend this harmony, and whether, in this case, a continentalist liberal approach might satisfy the realist critique more than a utilitarian one.

Reform or Revolution? Critical Theory and Poststructuralism:

There appears, at first glance, a twisted correlation between the protagonists on IR's first front, and the two new

additions on the second. Like liberalism, critical theory is a vehicle for Enlightenment assumptions, while like realism, poststructuralism is a critique of Enlightenment thought. Beyond this point, however, the analogy breaks down, for while the liberals and realists stood in intellectual opposition to each other, critical theory and poststructuralism are less concerned with the ideas of each other, and more concerned with discrediting the liberal and realist interpretations of IR. Both, in a way, are also attempting to bring IR, as a distinct discipline, to an end. Critical theory is doing this by recombining economics and politics to create a subject of International Political Economy (IPE), which covers similar ground to liberal IR, but down-plays the inter-nation aspect. Poststructuralism argues the division between domestic and international lies in our mode of thought, rather than in any intrinsic reality. Thus, IR, as a subject, is a social construct that came about as a result of the establishment of disciplinary boundaries. The study of IPE represents a radical reform of IR, which returns to liberal assumptions about the relations between politics, economics and ideology, while poststructuralism is fundamentally an attempt to end the idea of IR as a separate discipline.

Critical theory must be seen not just as a reappraisal of the Enlightenment and a critique of realism. It is also, to a fundamental degree, a replacement for the more vulgarly materialist structuralism. Critical theory attempts to combine

the insights of a more materialist Marxist conception of the World with a concern for ideas as a determinant of action. Basically, there is a parallel with Carr's view of the harmony of interests, in that ideas are seen as supporting particular class interests. This idea is developed further, and an intricate connection is seen between ideas and material forces, in which ideas can be seen as both a product of material forces, and as a means by which a current power structure can be maintained, through the imposition of what Gramsci terms hegemony.

Hegemony refers to how a ruling elite maintains the economic system through which it benefits, both at a low level through the physical structures of the state, and (more importantly) through the propagation of cultural values that support the status quo.¹⁷⁷ In order to overcome this intellectual block it is necessary to question the accepted values and order of things within a society. Theories that fail to do this, and work 'pragmatically' within the norms and values of a given society are 'problem solving' theories, since they merely attempt to solve problems that occur within the dominant mode of thought.¹⁷⁸

The question to be raised here is whether the peace theories of Angell and Mitrany are merely 'problem-solving' -- that is, working within the accepted norms of liberal society -- or whether they are in fact critics of an accepted international intellectual hegemony. To answer this question

also requires an analysis of what we mean by the international intellectual hegemony, which brings us to a comparison of the competing conservative foreign policy orthodoxy with the liberal internationalism represented by Angell and Mitrany. What a critical theory analysis will show us is that both liberalism and realism within IR began as critiques, but became positive problem solving theories once they had gained acceptance.

A second issue, common also to structuralism but also found in critical theory, is the role of capitalism as a social system in the determination and execution of war. Although a question that survives in critical theory as a vestige of its Marxist past, this question of capitalism and war was more fully addressed by contemporaries of Angell and Mitrany, including H. N. Brailsford, Harold Laski and Konni Zilliacus. Both Angell and Mitrany believed that war could be prevented but capitalism maintained if the state was weakened, while Brailsford, Laski and Zilliacus saw capitalism as a fundamental cause of war, and thus reforms of the international political structure would not bring the peace that Angell and Mitrany hoped for. Both Angell and Mitrany addressed this debate, which shall be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Finally, critical theory, which probably owes more to Kant and Hegel than it does to Marx, rearticulates Kant's question about the nature of choice, albeit in a different

format. Choice, to the critical theorists, is influenced by the particular ideology that dominates at that time, and thus we cannot talk about bring peace by giving people the freedom to choose, since it does not include the freedom to choose without the interference of external ideologies.¹⁷⁹ Both Angell and Mitrany claim that their policy prescriptions bypass ideologies. This claim has to be examined in the light of critical theory's view and interpretation of the relationship between ideology and choice.

While critical theory assumes, like liberalism, that it is possible after much struggle to go beyond ideology and to see things as they really are, poststructuralism assumes that reality is created by our ways of seeing the World, and thus we can never escape into an objective reality. The implication of this is that all our World-views are constructed, and thus there is no particular superiority of one over the other. Two issues arise out of this position.

First, poststructuralists deny the existence of a directional history, which is a cornerstone of the Enlightenment Perpetual Peace Project. Different periods had different interpretations of the World, so that one epoch's episteme cannot necessarily be judged by the standards of another. Michel Foucault, in a number of his books, explores the epistemic reasons for past behaviour (rather than seeking explanations in 'prejudice' and 'tradition', as do the Enlightenment paradigms), which he then extrapolates to show

that our own behaviour is not based on rational objectivity, but on our own epistemic assumptions.¹⁸⁰ To what extent are the theories of Angell and Mitrany based on a faulty view of the past, which extrapolates modern definitions into the past?

Secondly, poststructuralism also provides a basis for a critique of the whole project of a cosmopolitan peace, an idea common to both liberals and critical theorists. Different epistemes exist not only in time, but in space, and in an attack on Enlightenment views of peace that is not dissimilar from attacks made by Carr, poststructuralists such as Rob Walker have argued that peace has to be based not on the notion of one cosmopolitan emancipatory strategy, but on the interests and World-views of myriad different social groups.¹⁸¹ This is both an important criticism of the Project of Perpetual Peace, and a basis for moving on from the Project to a new, yet more amorphous, view of peace. Just as conservatism in foreign affairs gave rise to the Perpetual Peace Project as a critique of the status quo, so Walker's poststructuralism stands as a critique which hopes to supersede and replace the Project. The question of whether this kind of approach to peace is capable of replacing the project will be discussed in more detail in the final, evaluative, chapter of the thesis.

Angell, Mitrany, Liberal Rationalism, and IR

The next four chapters will deal with the various issues

and questions that were raised in the last two chapters. The reaction to conservatism, and the choice of utilitarian over continental liberalism as the vehicle for the Perpetual Peace Project within IR, will be discussed in chapter four, which in essence outlines the intellectual climate that produced Angell and Mitrany. In chapter's five and six Angell's and Mitrany's views will be explored, laying out both the influences on their thought, and their reactions to their critics. The two chapters in Part III -- seven and eight -- will look at two separate issues. Chapter seven will examine the realist/'idealist' debate, which does not seem to have occurred in the way that modern IR theorists imagine it did. This point is crucial, because the reason that is often given for the realist domination of IR is that realism overcame 'idealism' (ie: liberal rationalism) in a 'Great Debate'. Chapter eight will ask whether the assumptions of the liberal rationalism of Angell and Mitrany stand up to scrutiny.

Over all of this hangs the reason-freedom-progress nexus, which is such a fundamental part of Enlightenment theories of IR. Throughout the criticisms of liberal rationalism by the other paradigms we have to pose the question of whether this view of thought is a valid basis for theory construction, and if not do we need to abandon these terms and their interconnection? The crucial notion here is the concept of reason.

Part II: The Liberal Rationalism of Angell and Mitrany

Chapter 4: Precursors to Angell and Mitrany

Till the war-drum throb'd no longer, and the
battle-flags were furled
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the
World.

There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful
realm in awe,
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in
universal law.

Alfred Lord Tennyson, "Locksley Hall".

So far this thesis has taken a general look at Western European thought as it relates to the rise of the Enlightenment, and to the development of the Perpetual Peace Project that emerged from Enlightenment thought. While I have made some connections between the development of Enlightenment thought and the evolution and morphology of IR as a discipline, this has been at the level of generalisation, and has not really concentrated on the development of particular thinkers and their work. The next three chapters will examine the intellectual context and development of two particular authors' writings, both of whom can demonstrate how changes in liberalism helped create a separate discipline of IR.

The first chapter of Part III, chapter seven, will examine the basis of the strange marginalisation of liberal rationalism within this discipline after the Second World War. This chapter examines how liberalism changed in the hundred years leading up to the First World War, and how it was criticised by its opponents. Chapter five examines in detail the thought of Norman Angell, stressing the developments that, over time, subtly changed his position. The argument that Angell's ideas are no longer relevant to IR rests on a certain interpretation of the so-called realist/'idealist' Great Debate, an interpretation that is challenged in chapter seven. Chapter six explores the different interpretation given to liberal rationalist assumptions by David Mitrany, demonstrating how he developed a fundamentally institutional theory of perpetual peace.

Angell and Mitrany form an intellectual lynch-pin, holding together the Enlightenment philosophical tradition that had produced the perpetual peace project, and the twentieth century subject of IR. Their brand of liberalism, however, is a particular turn-of-the-century brand, that had developed as part of the polymorphous British Victorian world view. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to sketch out a part of this world view, most especially its liberal tradition, and to identify intellectual changes, occurring at the century's end, which had a crucial influence on both Angell and Mitrany. Another goal of this chapter is to show

how, despite a certain common heritage, Angell and Mitrany were influenced by different interpretations of how liberalism should develop. There are, therefore, dissimilarities in the nuances that Angell and Mitrany give to their works, which often resulted in crucial differences in policy prescription. These dissimilarities highlight not only difference in background, but also the differing effects of the two World Wars on these two thinkers. Angell was greatly influenced by the First World War, which, he admitted in 1921, had altered some of the arguments in his classical work *The Great Illusion*. Mitrany's functional theory, on the other hand, emerged from the experiences of the failure of the League of Nations, as well as his experiences of the Second World War and the problems of the Balkans. By contrast, the Second World War did not spur any major changes in Angell's ideas, save that he transferred his ire from the spectre of fascism to that of Bolshevism.

Nineteenth Century Liberalism Looks to the World:

Chapter two has outlined the differences between the Kantian deontological liberalism, which stressed the moral calibre of progress, and the utilitarian liberalism, that saw progress in material, rather than ethical, terms. The development of a liberal rationalist peace theory during the nineteenth century highlights the process by which the progress towards peace that was defined in fundamentally moral

terms comes, by the twentieth century study of international affairs, to be seen exclusively in material and non-ethical terms. An interesting process of substitution can be seen going on here, in which progress moves from being defined in terms of ethics only -- which it was for both continental thinkers such as Kant, and for the British non-conformist tradition¹⁸² -- to being defined in terms of both ethical and material development by mid-century peace activists such as Cobden and Bright. Towards the close of the nineteenth century the ethical component in progress is marginalised, and thus the material succeeds in squeezing out the ethical.

In addition to this drift within liberal thought, the nineteenth century intellectual climate was also one in which a residual pre-Enlightenment conservatism was in conflict with Enlightenment liberalism. As mentioned in chapter three, conservatism had retreated before a triumphant liberalism in the domestic sphere of most of the important Western states, but foreign policy was still in the hands of an aristocratic, or aristocratic-inspired, conservative elite. Liberal rationalist peace theory, therefore, emerges as a reaction against conservative foreign policy, and as an attempt to extend liberal assumptions from the domestic to the international sphere. By the end of the nineteenth century reactions would set in against liberal rationalist peace theory. Indeed, Angell's first writings were an attempt to give the liberal rationalist tradition the intellectual rigor

to overcome this challenge.

The crucial relationship for liberal peace theory, in its nineteenth century form, was between war and economic activity. Both Bentham in the late eighteenth century and Herbert Spencer in the nineteenth saw war as a practical undertaking in pre-commercial societies. The basis of their assessment was the material utility of war, on which basis war under certain historical conditions can be justified on grounds of material gain. This conflicts with the rational ethical opposition to war, which condemned violence as contrary to the proper order of things -- and thus regarded war as unethical under all circumstances. To Bentham pre-modern societies were so structured that invasions could pay for themselves through booty, ransom or annexed lands.¹⁸³ Spencer took a different tack from Bentham, seeing war as the stimulus for the creation of successful industrial societies. The need for security, Spencer argued, has two effects. First, it forces people into larger societies; and secondly, it is a stimulus for the development of industry. The net result is the creation of the large modern industrial society, for which commerce becomes a necessity.¹⁸⁴ Yet, the crucial point for the nineteenth century liberal rationalist peace theorist was that, while it may have made sense in the past, war now has no material utility, and should be abolished. Indeed, Spencer seemed to relish the irony that war had created the very society which it now endangered.¹⁸⁵

Bentham and Spencer also make good comparisons because they represent the confusion in nineteenth century liberal rationalist peace theory between circulationists, who saw commerce as the crucial opposite of war, and productionists, who focused on industrial production.¹⁸⁶ Generally, liberal publicists often confused commerce and industry, which tended to stifle any meaningful debate in their ranks between those who saw free trade as the way to eliminate war, and those who saw the development of an industrial society in that role. This difference was not to remain dormant in the twentieth century, where under the proddings from Marxism, liberal rationalist peace theorists began to address the difference between trade circulation and the mode of production. Indeed, Angell's thought began to tackle this, and the matter came to a head in the inter-war debate over the relationship between capitalism and war. In the nineteenth century however, productionists, like Spencer, and circulationists, like Cobden, could agree that war was the enemy of commerce and industry.

The extent to which war was antithetical to material prosperity was the main ingredient of the political speeches of Richard Cobden and John Bright, both British Liberal Party MP's. War, to Cobden and Bright represented the extraction of wealth from the most productive and important parts of society, namely those involved in agriculture, industry and trade. Both saw the costs of war most crucially, but not

exclusively, in the loss of men, the greater burden of taxes and the hampering of trade. While the immediate casualties of a war were plain to see, they argued, it was often not understood to what extent war impoverished even the most powerful of countries. Spiralling taxes, which were a particular burden on the productive working and bourgeois classes, were seen as one of the most damaging effects of war. In 1850 Cobden calculated that of the £50 million to be drawn by the Exchequer that year, £28 million was needed to service debts accrued during past wars. Of the remaining £22 million, fully £15.5 million would, on 1849 figures, be going to the upkeep of the armed forces. Thus, only £6.5 million out of a budget of £50 million would not be going to pay for war or the preparations for war.¹⁸⁷ Yet, over-taxation was considered a minor financial drain on the country's prosperity compared to the costs of lost trade. Modern societies like Britain, Bright argued, are dependent on trade, and by disrupting that trade, war would destroy the prosperity enjoyed by the working and middle classes: "You would find that [because of the reliance on trade] war in 1853 would be infinitely more perilous and destructive to our country than it has ever yet been at any former period of our history."¹⁸⁸ Similar arguments about the material costs of war were made, to great effect, by James Mill in Britain and Paul Leroy Beaulieu in France.¹⁸⁹

While the costs of war for material prosperity were staggering, there seemed to be no compensatory gains from

belligerence. Bright pointed out that British interventions in Europe over the last few centuries had been concerned with keeping France in check and maintaining the liberties in Europe, yet the situation in the middle of the nineteenth century seemed little changed from that of the seventeenth. War had not made Europe a safer or a better place for either Britain or its allies.¹⁹⁰ Even wars fought for commercial access, according to Cobden, provided little compensation for the expenses of war. The treaty forced on China after its war with Britain, Cobden argued, was meant to increase the exports of cloth from the UK to China, but in practice there was no increase in cloth exports at all.¹⁹¹ Forcing people to accept free trade was also, for Cobden, a self-defeating principle. The basis for free trade should be the common realisation of mutual advantage. Free trade based on the force of arms, and therefore an unequal relationship, was inherently unstable.¹⁹²

Yet, despite their view of war as a threat to material happiness, both Cobden and Bright were optimistic that the growth of commerce would eventually make war obsolete. Proponents of progress, such as Herbert Spencer and Frédéric Bastiat, seemed to accept the elimination of war as a foregone conclusion, the only serious question being how long it would take people to realise that the World had changed. Thus, since the material conditions of human society were such that war no longer made any sense, the primary concern for the nineteenth

century liberal rationalist peace theorist was to convince public opinion that war did not serve any utility.¹⁹³

These ideas had their roots in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As early as 1623 Eméric Crucé was proposing that more commerce would help promote peace, while Kant a hundred and seventy years later saw commerce as a peace-promoting outlet for selfishness that was superior to war.¹⁹⁴ Yet, the spin that nineteenth century liberal rationalism put on this idea led to conclusions that were significantly different from earlier advocates of commercially-inspired peace. First, whereas for Crucé and Kant commerce was a fundamentally selfish undertaking that helped to produce an ethical peace, for the nineteenth century peace theorists commerce came to be regarded as an ethical undertaking, albeit one that also brought individual material gain. Secondly, the peace that seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers had advocated was a peace organised and agreed upon between states; indeed for Crucé it is monarchs who establish peace, which they then cement through the promotion of commerce. By the nineteenth century the state had come to be regarded as an enemy of commerce, and sometimes as a cause of war. Cobden's opposition to the role of governments in the international sphere was particularly powerful: "As little intercourse as possible betwixt the *governments*, as much connexion as possible between the *nations* of the world!"¹⁹⁵ Trade and commerce between nations must be

encouraged, but connections between cabinets should be limited.

The vehicle for the promotion of commerce, and the creation of liberal perpetual peace, would be free trade. In nineteenth century Britain free trade had become the rallying cry for a powerful reform movement centred around the Liberal Party, and the agitation against the protectionist corn laws in the 1830's and 40's figured, along with the Reform Act of 1832, as one of the key victories against the declining British aristocratic elite. In fact, free trade seemed to offer to Victorian society a solution to most of its ills. So ingrained did the association of peace and prosperity with free trade become, that by the end of the century many serious economists had come to associate protectionism with the preparation for war.¹⁹⁶

As the nineteenth century liberal rationalist peace theorists saw it, greater trade not only brought more wealth, it also improved the lot of the labourer, who was thus less inclined to violent agitation.¹⁹⁷ This was an important consideration, since Britain in the first half of the century had been rocked by a series of violent labourer unrests, the worst being in 1819-20 and in 1830. Riots and agitation remained a feature of London life throughout Queen Victoria's reign. Free trade, it was argued, would bring people, throughout the World, together for the common purpose of improving the lives of all. In answering the question 'what is

free trade?' Cobden said that it was "breaking down the barriers that separate nations".¹⁹⁸ He might also have claimed between classes. Thus it was material self-interest that would eliminate war, through the growing interconnectedness of the World economy. Gladstone even claimed that the "mysterious movement which is drawing nations together" is doing so despite the continual "clash of arms" and "preparations for warfare in time of peace".¹⁹⁹

In the long-term the prospects for peace looked good. Yet, what seemed to prevent the short term victory of commerce over war was the imperfection of society. To idealist philosophers, such as T. H. Green, the cause of war lay in the imperfect nature of the belligerent state. To politicians like Cobden and Bright, as well as materialist philosophers such as Spencer and Bentham, it was the presence of a conservative-inspired aristocracy that was at the root of war-proneness in modern societies. Cobden and Bright both agreed that it was the aristocracy that benefited from war. Bright, borrowing an expression from James Mill, dismissed the interventionist policies of the British government as "a gigantic system of out-door relief for the aristocracy".²⁰⁰ Cobden went further, arguing that popular support for war could be put down to aristocratic vices that had infected the general populace.²⁰¹ On the one hand, this attack on the aristocracy was a criticism of the only significant enemy liberal rationalism seemed to have in Britain, namely the conservative rump that

still controlled the thinking on, and structure of, the foreign policy of the European states. On the other hand, by blaming war on an increasingly discredited aristocracy, Cobden and Bright were, by default, presenting liberalism as an inherently peaceful creed.

The war-proneness of aristocratic conservatism, and thus the desirability of conservatism's elimination, formed a crucial part of Herbert Spencer's sociology. Indeed, Spencer's categorisation of societies forms the intellectual basis for the orthodox social scientific division between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies, in which the conservative warrior ethic is associated with atavistic 'traditional' ways of life.²⁰² Spencer's division between militant and industrial societies amounted to a declaration of the superiority of pacific and materialist liberalism over bellicist and honour-bound conservatism. In pre-modern conservative societies, Spencer argued, relationships between people are regulated by their status on a hierarchy. Society is regarded as an organism, and the prime activity is war. By contrast, modern societies are based on contract, the prime activity is industrial production, and society is regarded as mechanical. The industrial society is naturally more peaceful, because war is the enemy of industrial production and commerce.²⁰³ Spencer's militant society is, in essence, the picture of the degenerate conservatism of the eighteenth century as portrayed by its Enlightenment opponents; that is, conservatism without

its code of ethics. In turn, Spencer's industrial society is a model of how nineteenth century liberals thought society should be. The conclusion of Spencer's argument is that war is caused by a particular kind of status-based, and therefore aristocratic, society. The superiority of industrial society implies a normative duty to replace the remains of the militant society, associated with conservative aristocratic values, with the attributes of industrial society.

Moving away from this demonising of the aristocracy, although an implied criticism of a certain form of aristocracy remained, T. H. Green followed Kant in tracing war to states that lacked a proper constitutional form, and were instead dominated by an arbitrary oligarchy. Under a proper constitution, that would allow free scope for individuals to develop themselves along channels that benefit all members of their state, the advantages of commerce across borders would be so great as to create a sense of common feeling amongst people of different states. To this essentially Cobdenite assertion Green added the argument that because war only favoured specific ruling oligarchies in imperfect states, states that were properly constituted would have no desire to go to war, as there would be no perceived advantage, neither to the material conditions of individuals nor to the ethical community that the state promoted and contained.²⁰⁴

Green's view of the state as, at least potentially, an ethical community serving its citizens puts him at variance

with Cobden, Bright and Spencer, who saw the state as an institution associated with aristocratic rule. Although his opposition to war and dedication to the idea of perpetual peace is unassailable, Green's state-centric approach was to be an intellectual influence, through his pupil Bosenquet, on E. H. Carr -- the very man who was to criticise the assumptions of liberal peace theory in 1939. In the further refinement of liberal rationalist peace theory, leading up to its assuming an identity as the separate academic discipline of International Relations after the First World War, it was the intrinsically anti-state and materialist (we could even say bourgeois) ideas associated with Cobden, Bright and Spencer that held sway in Britain and the United States. In continental Europe, where the forces of aristocratic conservatism were both stronger and also presided over states that did not conform with the distribution of national groupings, liberalism tended to be in alliance with national liberation movements. Mazzini, like Green, saw the roots of international peace in the constitution of the states. Mazzini's states were properly constituted when they fulfilled the goals of national self determination. The nation then became the intermediary between the individual and humanity as a whole.²⁰⁵ Yet, not all of the liberals who had allied with the concept of national liberation saw the world of nations as a necessarily peaceful one. The national liberals, who began to rise to intellectual prominence at the end of the century,

were to provide a serious challenge to the assumptions of liberal rationalist peace theory.

In the nineteenth century the prescriptions proposed by the liberal rationalist peace theorists revolved around three policies: the use of public opinion to counteract conservative aristocratic ideas of foreign policy, non-intervention in international affairs, and the use of arbitration to settle international disputes. The strong Enlightenment belief in the existence of a common reason, which can be used to construct a better world, led to the deification of public opinion. Just as even today the widespread belief exists that if only ideas and opinions are allowed to interact freely with each other the correct and reasonable position will emerge, so after Bentham British liberal thinkers and agitators assumed that, if given enough information, public opinion could be guided towards support for policies that would serve their material interests.²⁰⁶ A further assumption was that, because of the nature of industrial society, modern material interests were best served by cooperation and peaceful commerce. One of Cobden and Bright's stated purposes was to transform the public mind through education, and thereby remove the irrational aristocratic conservative vices that had infected an otherwise potentially rational people.²⁰⁷ Public opinion was to be a crucial feature of the early twentieth century liberal rationalist peace theory, and also one of the main targets for Carr's 1939 critique.

While in continental Europe the need to intervene on behalf of fellow liberals was borne out of the necessity of fighting a united conservative *ancien régime*, in Britain a sharp division continued to exist between those, such as Cobden and Bright, who opposed all foreign intervention unless unconditionally tied to self-defence, and others, such as Gladstone, who saw a strict duty to intervene abroad in the cause of liberalism. Basically, the difference between the two positions revolved around the issue of whether, as Cobden and Bright argued, the World had to be left to come to freedom and prosperity in its own time, or whether there was a duty to free enslaved peoples abroad. To Cobden, attempts to impose the benefits of liberal society would cause a reaction against those very principles. Bright, looking at the record of British involvement in Europe, argued that far from solving pressing issues of peace and order, these interventions had left Europe in the same state.²⁰⁸ Yet, Cobden and Bright probably did not represent the majority within the liberal movement on this issue. Closer to the mainstream on the duties to intervene was Gladstone, who opposed adventurism abroad, but affirmed the need to oppose foreign despotism.²⁰⁹ Gladstone supported a notion of the concert of Europe, which was not dissimilar to the idea of collective security that found favour with liberal rationalist peace theorists after the First World War, and saw this as a substitute for the old-style politics of expansion and the balance of power.²¹⁰

Cobden and Bright were equally opposed to the idea of the balance of power, but saw the cooperation associated with commerce, rather than collective security arrangements, as a worthy antidote to the problem of conflict. While Cobden and Bright's privileging of commerce over the balance of power would have powerful followers up to 1914, it was collective security that was to be the rallying cry of liberal rationalist peace theorists afterwards.

What probably, more than anything else, divides the policies of the nineteenth century liberal peace theorist from those after the First World War was their attitudes towards international organisations. While T. H. Green was willing to countenance the establishment of an international court²¹¹ -- a mere superstructural addition in his World-view, since once all states were properly constituted there would be no inducement to war -- Cobden saw free trade alone, without the hinderance of government, as "the means -- and I believe the only human means -- of effecting universal and permanent peace."²¹² Indeed Cobden opposed the establishment of international organisations because he disliked the idea of increasing government activity. The belief that economic forces could bring peace without the aid of political or technical organisations was to thrive up to the First World War, after which the pressing issue of global instability seemed to require some form of international organisation, whether federal or functional in character. The stability of

great power relations during the 'long peace' of 1815 to 1914 led to a belief among liberal peace theorists that arbitration could supersede war as a means for settling disputes in a more peaceful World.²¹³ Writing in 1898, an otherwise sympathetic analyst of Cobden's ideas was to commend Cobden for his understanding of the passions of nations, but upbraid him for over-rating the power of commerce to overcome war.²¹⁴ The half-century that followed was to give this criticism extra power.

What emerges from the liberal assault on the conservative foreign policy orthodoxy are four main arguments. First, the utility of war is tied to economic developments, and thus the nature of the economy affects whether war is rationally acceptable, and consequently whether it should occur at all. The important assumption here is that decisions relating to war and peace should be directed by human rational intelligence, which in turn would lead a modern society towards peace. Subsidiary to this point is the view of a material reality that is always progressing and changing, and the need for our ideas to catch up with this reality. The liberal's fight, therefore, is the exposing of the true nature of contemporary material conditions, which in turn discredits the old ideas about society.

Secondly, nineteenth century liberalism underscored the tension between the individual and the state. The problematic relation between state and individual was thought to be both

at the root of the causes of war, and an influence on the question of whether or not a liberal world order should involve international organisations. A common argument, popularised by Cobden and Bright, and given academic credibility by Spencer, saw the cause of war in the existence of aristocratic states, and aristocratic ideas about international relations. Reduce the power of the aristocracy within the state, and the state in relation to the individual, and peace between nations becomes more likely. Following from this, since heavy-handed government is a cause of war, international organisations would be a threat to, rather than a guarantor of peace. The industrious peoples of the World are quite capable of establishing peaceful relations without the help of government. Shadowing this idea, idealists, like T. H. Green, while they also saw the position of the aristocracy in the state as a cause of war, were more willing to accept a properly constituted state as a worthwhile instrument for human social development. Green was, therefore, far less frightened about using government, national or international, to bring about World peace.

Thirdly, a strong belief in the ultimate rationality of humanity led mid-nineteenth century peace theory to the conclusion that changing public opinion through education was the surest way to peace. Education was the crucial element here, and in fact, a number of the reservations expressed in the late nineteenth century about working class involvement in

government revolved around the issue of deficiencies in education.²¹⁵ Finally, there was a general opposition to the balance of power, although there were differences of opinion over what the alternative should be. Cobden and Bright thought that the reduction of government power would make the balance of power obsolete, and that the resulting growth in interactions between individuals would replace it. Gladstone, on the other hand, put his faith in the concert of Europe, and collective security between the major powers. In both cases -- Gladstone, and Cobden and Bright -- the balance of power was regarded as a policy prescription. The nature of the balance of power was to be a major difference between Angell and the realists, but the twentieth century's interpretation of what a balance of power means was to be significantly different from the nineteenth's.

Reaction. National Liberalism and Social Darwinism:

Towards the end of the nineteenth century a reaction set in against liberal peace theory in the US, Britain and Germany. Although the British Liberal Party had become strongly Cobdenite after the 1870's, the prevailing mood in the major industrialised states was more nationalist and imperialist.²¹⁶ The opponents of liberal rationalist peace theory can be grouped into two main camps: the national liberals, who accepted liberal assumptions at home, but not abroad; and the social Darwinists, who rejected liberal

assumptions in favour of certain modified conservative views. Both groups, to a greater or lesser extent, recast conservative assumptions within novel frameworks. Liberal rationalist peace theory reacted to these writers, and in so doing created the basis for a coherent and academic defence of liberal pacifism. It was Angell's rejoinder to liberal nationalism and social Darwinism which dominated this revival of liberal rationalist peace theory in the years prior to the First World War.

National liberalism's critique of liberal pacifism was based around three arguments: first, public opinion was not potentially rational; second, life was a struggle, and domestic institutions merely put that struggle on a more acceptable legal level; and third, that commerce did not lead to peace, but was rather part of the process that led to modern war. Following from this, liberal nationalism made a distinction between the individual, who in domestic society followed liberal assumptions, and the nation, which followed a different logic. National liberals had also adopted, for international affairs, the conservative notion of struggle outside of a social hierarchy, and the nation as an "ultimate value".²¹⁷ Similarly, because the group was not the individual, public opinion could not be expected to act rationally. Rather, when the threat of war was in the air, public opinion tended to be intolerant, and based on faith, rather than on a transcendental or utilitarian reason.²¹⁸

The cornerstone of the Cobdenite view of the World had been the natural peacefulness of commerce and industry. National liberals cast doubt on this. One German national liberal, Max Weber, made a sharp contrast between booty-capitalism that led to imperialism and war, and competitive capitalism that did not,²¹⁹ while others argued that successful military expansion brought successful trade (an argument that did not hold up too well when the trading success of such weak nations as the Netherlands and Switzerland were taken into account).²²⁰ A stronger argument, albeit one that was proposed by a sympathiser of liberal pacifism, rather than a national liberal, followed on lines similar to Weber. J. A. Hobson opened up the, until then, dormant distinction between trade and production, arguing that the nature of industrial production and political power in turn-of-the-century Britain made war with other states more likely.

Basically, Hobson argued that, because those owning wealth had more power, wages of employees were kept low. The result was an abundance of investment capital, but a population that lacked the money to purchase goods. This led to a problem of underconsumption and overproduction of goods. The long-term answer should be the fairer distribution of resources, so that the balance between consumption and production could be restored, but instead, the industrial, financial and governmental elites took to exporting goods and

capital. Yet, in order to guarantee the safety of these investments and markets it was necessary to control new lands. The result of this imperialism was to increase the antagonisms and rivalries between the great powers, and ultimately to make war more likely.²²¹ Thus, left to its own devices, the present economic conditions would make war more likely, and it was only by the regulation of economic conditions, to provide economic justice at home, that war could be avoided. An important point to note here is that Hobson was not saying that all imperialism is caused by economic factors, as many realist authors have claimed, but that imperialism, at this current stage in human social evolution, is the result of underconsumption. Hobson's argument for a more just distribution of wealth at home, in order to prevent the frictions caused by imperialism, was to be taken up by other writers in the inter-war period, who used it as a means to criticise Angell's internationalism.

The social Darwinists went further in their criticism. Where the national liberals had taken the nation as the basic unit of international affairs, with the corollary that the nation was the aggregate of its individual members, social Darwinists saw the nation as a racial unit analogous to the family.²²² Here was revived the conservative patriarchal idea, found in Filmer and Grotius among others. By rooting the state in a 'natural' society such as the extended family, social Darwinists were claiming that the state was a natural

ahistorical entity. The idea of politics as struggle was also carried further, to the point at which the social Darwinists claimed to have discovered immutable laws of history, that were based on human nature, and made the clash of race-based nations an inescapable theme of political life from which there could be no escape through progress. War was tied up in the cycle of the rise and fall of nations, in which the rise of commerce heralded the decline of national vitality. To both Brooks Adams and Homer Lea the rise of nations was linked to the need for self-defence against other groups. The development of cohesion and a martial spirit, out of the need for survival, led to the growth of the great civilisations, which tended to lose their militancy as the threat of extermination waned. Decadence then sets in, part of which is the replacement of the martial spirit with the commercial. The desire for commercial gain breaks up the cohesion of the nation, and destroys militancy, to the point at which another, more militant, nation overthrows the decadent one.²²³ The militant were, therefore, more fit, in the Darwinian sense. Because of this fear of commercial-inspired decadence, many opponents of Cobdenite free trade saw war as a national purgative, clearing out the luxurious excess which had accumulated during peace-time.²²⁴

Thus, the earlier liberal assumption that economic developments would lead to peace were attacked by liberal nationalists on the grounds that commercial rivalry was not

naturally peaceful, and by social Darwinists on the grounds that it was immutable laws of history grounded in human nature that influenced human actions, and not the changing structure of society. The liberal argument that the aristocratic state was a cause of war conflicted with the liberal nationalist idea that struggle was part of life, and that the state in fact acted to minimise that strife. Social Darwinists, playing up the importance of immutable laws of history, stressed the naturalness of the state. The third main liberal rationalist argument from the nineteenth century, that public opinion could be brought to support peace through education, stood opposed to the national liberal view that public opinion was inherently irrational, even though individuals could potentially be rational. Finally, while national liberals were not necessarily opposed to collective security, they regarded the balance of power as fundamental to the relations of a human existence dominated by struggle. Social Darwinists, seeing war as an important part of the maintenance of the vitality of a society, were unwilling to accept any international arrangement that would reduce conflict. The balance of power, coupled with frequent wars between the great powers, was a reality that could not be escaped. Angell's writing was an attempt to reform nineteenth century liberal rationalism in order that the social Darwinist and liberal nationalist attacks might be rebuffed.

One Trunk, Two Branches. The Origins of Angell and Mitrany

The works of Angell and Mitrany can be seen both as part of the general "crisis of liberalism", and as an attempt to tackle the problem of world peace as a central liberal concern, rather than as an offshoot of liberal domestic ideas. Liberal ideas about both domestic and international politics were undergoing attack, and whereas the reforming liberalism of liberal socialists, such as Hobhouse or Tawney, or the reforming economics of Keynes, focused on domestic politics, Angell and Mitrany made the focus of their work the study of international relations. Although the liberal project was generally unwilling to accept the exclusivity of either the domestic or international spheres -- with writers such as Hobson still splitting their attention between both -- Angell and Mitrany were key figures in the development of a subject that sought to understand the workings, and potential for reform, of relations between states. For only by understanding it could the international sphere be reformed, and ultimately absorbed within a thoroughly global order.

Angell, to a greater extent than Mitrany, was steeped in the Cobdenite tradition, that had become the orthodoxy among British liberals in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Although he never explicitly acknowledged his debt to Cobden, Angell was fully aware that he was a product of the late-Victorian British liberal tradition.²²⁵ Despite the Tory leanings of his family, it appears that Angell's rebellion

against his family took the form of a liberal reaction. That this Cobdenite liberal tradition was not a particularly British bourgeois phenomenon is demonstrated by the similar sensibilities that existed in liberal circles in the US. Angell's strong attachment to the US, and particularly his close political ties to self-confessed Cobdenites such as Woodrow Wilson, demonstrate the extent to which Victorian liberalism had become the property of the larger English speaking world, rather than merely a narrow bourgeois British creed. Angell had had significant input into President Wilson's policy speech of 1916,²²⁶ and -- despite the powerful anglophobia that pervaded US politics at the turn of the Century -- Angell felt that the US exhibited more of the liberal British way of life than did Canada, which considered itself as British.²²⁷

Basically, Angell's Cobdenite thinking, filtered as it was through the interpretation of Cobden's political successors in the British Liberal party, lay in his belief in the incompatibility of war and material progress, and in the power of public opinion, when properly educated, to bring about perpetual peace. Yet, it was not to Cobden that Angell turned when he wrote of his intellectual influences, but rather to John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. Spencer's notion of the march of progress formed the backbone of Angell's thesis in his pre-World War One classic *The Great Illusion*, while Mill's defence of liberty on the grounds of

utility remained a powerful influence on Angell from the age of twelve, when he first read *On Liberty*.²²⁸

Mill set a number of Angell's arguments in motion, not least of which was Mill's influence on Angell's study of the role of ideas in human progress. For Mill progress was not solely based on material development, as it seems to be in Spencer, but also on the ideas that underpin a society's development. Ideas develop as a result of both experience and discussion, and thus there is a vital role for questioning and for freedom of debate.²²⁹ In contrast to Cobden, however, Mill was not happy about the role of public opinion. Indeed, it worried Mill that public opinion was so easily swayed by the views of a single interest, such as the opinions of a newspaper. It was not the mass of public opinion that had to be encouraged in order to create a better society, as the mass was usually homogeneous and tended to mediocrity, but rather the encouragement of more individual thought outside of the manipulation of the press or demagogues.²³⁰ Angell was to take this train of thought, and from it develop his view of the importance of ideas to progress. The ease in which public opinion can be led became a particular concern of Angell's after the First World War, and Mill's distaste for mass public opinion was the starting point of Angell's study of the public mind and the dangerous role of the popular press in stifling debate.

An interesting aside to the conception of public opinion

in Mill, and later Angell, is its affinity to modern conceptions of civil society. Both Mill and Angell set aside a space, occupied by public opinion, that was separate from, though related to, the state and the economy. Civil society, as a modern political science concept, has been presented as "generally non-class-based forms of collective action" that is "differentiated not only from the state but also from the capitalist market economy."²³¹ The problem, as far as Mill was concerned, was converting a homogeneous and mediocre 'public opinion' into a more intellectually critical and aware citizenry. In much the same way, many of the political economists who use civil society contrast an intellectual hegemony (in which the ideological position of the elite becomes the ideology of the society as a whole), with critical new social movements (which form an anti-hegemonic block).²³²

Underpinning all of his argument was Mill's view that reason was superior to emotion, and that reason demonstrated what was of utility in the progression of human society.²³³ This is a utilitarian instrumental reason, which develops ideas so that they might serve a material progress, and to Mill ethics was nothing more than what served our material development. Despite his appreciation for the role of ideas in human society, Angell did not define progress in terms of the development of ideas, but saw ideas as the means by which material prosperity could be maintained and developed. Like Mill, Angell was to see ethics as merely what served the

progress of human society, in contrast to the Kantian notion of an atemporal ethical code based on reasoning outside of material conditions.

A serious difference between Cobden and Mill concerned the relations between European civilisation and so-called 'backward' peoples. Part of Cobden's concept of non-intervention included the imperative to refrain from the acquisition of colonies, as Cobden reasoned that forcing people to accept western civilisation was self-defeating. Only by example would non-western peoples be induced to accept the benefits of free-trade and liberal government. Mill, on the other hand, argued that a people that did not have the ideas capable of supporting the institutions of a free society should be treated like children. What this boiled down to was the need to impose a despotism on these people, in such a way as they could be slowly taught to be free and mature adults.²³⁴ Angell was not convinced by the Cobdenite non-interventionism, but rather spent most of his life justifying colonialism as a means by which the 'backward' could be policed and taught. In sum, despite the freedom he stood for, Angell believed that there was one kind of progress and one kind of freedom that would emerge from free discussion, and that Western civilisation had a mission to bring in those outside of it.

This view of the non-Western world dovetailed neatly with Angell's reading of Spencer, where societies could be divided

between militaristic traditional societies (ie: ruled by emotion), and peaceful industrial societies (ie: rational). Angell's work adopted Spencer's idea that a society evolves towards more efficiency and rationality, and thus militancy declines as a society develops. Although, as time went on, Angell became more accepting of government regulations, particularly by international organisations, Spencer's notion of state coercion as a part of militaristic societies and individuality as an attribute of industrial societies remained a powerful influence.²³⁵ As a result, Angell remained at heart a liberal, although for much of his career he was a left-liberal, advocating a mix of socialism and liberalism that was always willing to sacrifice collectivity when it interfered with individuality.

The influence of the mid-Victorians on Angell was, therefore, profound. It was, however, an influence that excluded the Christian view of an established code of ethics, and substituted for it a concept of a supreme 'scientific' reason. Angell's goal remained, throughout his life, the promotion of what he considered rational thought. Emotions and dogmas could be conquered, much as science had conquered nature.

Despite coming from a Rumanian-Jewish family, David Mitrany was as much a product of British liberalism as Angell. In fact, while accepting "the traditional pragmatism of English politics" as a "real influence" on his ideas, Mitrany

was quite dismissive of the idea that his early life in the Balkans had had any lasting effect.²³⁶ Having said this, Mitrany may be over-stating his case, since the work that he considered his best was a defence of peasant life against Marxist and liberal economists, while throughout his writings he showed an understanding and sympathy of peasant Europe that was deeper than the whims of most British liberals.²³⁷ Although sharing similar concerns about the desirability of World peace as Angell, Mitrany was influenced by a different set of intellectual mentors, and this led to a significantly different view of what should, and could, be done to eradicate war. Mitrany's understanding of the British liberal tradition came through the teachings of his two mentors, L. T. Hobhouse and Graham Wallas.²³⁸ Both had broken with the old *laissez faire* liberalism of Cobden, to the point at which they both saw a role for the state in the economic life of a society. Wallas was an early member of the Fabian Society, and although he left the organisation after a number of years, he remained loyal to the Fabian brand of socialism that hoped to bring about economic equality through democracy. His main criticism of socialism was its failure to live up to its promise of being a 'world-view', but this did not stop him being a socialist councillor on the London County Council.²³⁹ Hobhouse was also interested in socialism, and saw it as something that could be used to revitalise liberalism. Calling his proposals 'liberal socialism', he was also concerned with

the achievement of economic equality.²⁴⁰ The upshot of their positions, was that both recognised the importance of social arrangements beyond the individual, and both advocated a certain level of economic planning.

In addition to their scepticism about the liberalism of Cobden, both had abandoned the mid-Victorian faith in the power of a supreme reason, whether of the transcendental or utilitarian varieties. Rather, emotions were seen as a crucial part of human behaviour, and thus there could be no society based on a directional reason alone. Hobhouse argued that reason, rather than being separate from emotion, existed alongside emotion in all our actions. Following a utilitarian instrumental definition, reason to Hobhouse was about consistency in judgements, as well as a means by which emotions can be guided towards an objective fulfilment.²⁴¹

It was Wallas, however, who was the most sceptical about the use of reason in politics. "We are apt to assume that every human action is the result of an intellectual process, by which a man first thinks of some end which he desires, and then calculates the means by which that end can be attained." The reality, Wallas argued, is that most of our actions are the result of impulse.²⁴² This is not to say that human action is totally the result of impulse, indeed, intellect is important. However, Wallas argued, we can only reason (again using a utilitarian instrumental definition) once we have formulated what we consider to be the entities in our

political environment. Whereas the physical sciences have set out what the entities they study are, politics has no such firm foundations. Rather, reasoning is conducted in an environment in which the entities of political life are constantly in flux, and it is the emotions that are involved in the creation of these entities that define the nature of reasoning in politics.²⁴³ Perhaps Wallas' best example of this cooperation of emotion and reason in human action was the example of the social instinct. Emotive forces create the need to satisfy social urges -- whether they be love, loyalty, jealousy or resentment -- but it is our reason that is used when we calculate how to satisfy these feelings. The whole question of human judgement, therefore, is a subtle cooperation between emotion and reason.²⁴⁴

Mitrany both borrowed and adapted the ideas of his two teachers. Accepting the existence of a social world, Mitrany never felt as comfortable with the state as did Wallas and Hobhouse. Mitrany, therefore took a position midway between the sovereignty of the state and the individualism of classical liberalism. The old individualism had failed, but the answer to Mitrany was not state control, but international planning by organisations responsible for a single function. Mitrany learnt well the position of his teachers on the role of reason in politics, and consequently his ideas consistently attempted to use the emotions in people to fulfil what he regarded as rational. His functional theory did not appeal to

reason, as Angell's international ideas did, but to the fulfilment of need. Similarly, the whole propagandising in support of his functional theory can be seen as an attempt to apply Wallas' concept of human nature. By presenting the world as a cobweb of interlocking functional linkages, Mitrany presented a different set of entities to people from the more traditional national boundaries. He was, in sum, attempting to change our concept of reality.

In developing his own concept of what the entities of politics were, Mitrany borrowed the idea of function that was to be found in the works of Hobhouse, R. H. Tawney, G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski. Due to the absence of an obsession with footnoting in the first part of this century, it is difficult to say who borrowed the term from whom. David Long has recently argued that Mitrany probably took the term functional from Tawney, Cole and Laski, with Laski's use of function being the first time it was applied to international affairs.²⁴⁵ Earlier, James Sewell had suggested that Mitrany took the idea of function from H. G. Wells.²⁴⁶ Both of these seem reasonable, on the face of it, reasonable, since Mitrany did not use the term functional until 1933, and then it was not until 1943 that he claimed to have a 'functional theory'. Laski used the term function in 1925, Wells in 1922, Cole in 1920 and Tawney in 1921. Yet, while Laski and Cole were well known to Mitrany, it was Hobhouse, in 1911, who first suggested a functional approach to society. The possibility

exists, therefore, that the functional theories of Tawney, Cole and Laski might be cousins, rather than the parents, of Mitrany's functional theory.

To Hobhouse a society was an organism, in the sense that its parts -- namely individuals -- were differentiated, and that a state of symbiosis existed both between individuals in society and between the individual and society. The society was the sum of its individual citizens, yet the life of the individual depended on the continued existence of society.²⁴⁷ Society was maintained by the performance by individuals of functions, and Hobhouse defined economic justice as the rendering of enough wealth to those doing these functions, that these functions would keep going. All remaining wealth generated by these functions should go to the state in taxation.²⁴⁸ Tawney's definition and use of function seems to come directly from Hobhouse. Again, function is equated with social purpose, and again it is the maintenance of a function that dictates how much of the wealth of a function should be kept by the individual, and how much belongs to the society.²⁴⁹ With Cole and Laski, although they share the idea of function as social purpose with Hobhouse and Tawney, we see a drift towards the idea of function as including the many roles that individuals play in the associations of which they are a part. This is certainly the view of function that emerges in H. G. Well's writing, where Laski is referred to directly.²⁵⁰ Functions, in Laski's opinion, become a "narrow

purpose, alongside the full end of realisation as a complete human being."²⁵¹ Later, Laski was to take an even more teleological view, suggesting that the sovereign state, as well as the idea of the isolated individual, should be replaced with "a functional theory in which power is organised for ends which are clearly implied in the materials we are compelled to use."²⁵²

Mitrany's concept of function is not, by and large, the idea of association found in Cole, Wells and Laski, nor does it have the teleological element found in Laski. That Laski was the first person to suggest that function could be used to reorder the international sphere along more cosmopolitan lines, away from both state sovereignty and the isolated individual of *Laissez faire* liberalism, probably influenced Mitrany's use of function to solve the problem of war. It was, however, the use of function as social purpose within the state, as found in Hobhouse and Tawney, that was adopted by Mitrany as the definition of function in his own theory -- and it was probably from his teacher, Hobhouse, that Mitrany took this definition. In essence, Mitrany's functional organisations fulfilled a single social purpose for people all over the globe, thus by-passing the state.

Thus, Angell and Mitrany present themselves to us as similar, but different. Both are a product of the crisis of liberalism, and both concentrated on understanding the international sphere, in order that war might be eliminated.

Differences come in the way that they reacted to the crisis of liberalism. Angell took ideas from the mid-Victorians, and tried to reform them through reapplication to the twentieth century. Mitrany applied the work of turn-of-the-century liberal socialists, who had largely been concerned with the problems of domestic politics, to international relations. Angell's initial opponents would be the residual conservatism of the national liberals and social Darwinists. In the inter-war period both Angell and Mitrany would largely be writing in opposition to the Hobson-inspired liberal socialists, such as H. N. Brailsford and Harold Laski.

The need to confront an emerging realist paradigm did not emerge until 1939, and the publication of Carr's *Twenty Years Crisis* -- and the realist understanding of the complexities of the theoretical debates within liberal internationalism was, and remains, seriously flawed. The next two chapters, while laying out the structure of the international theories of Angell and Mitrany, will also act as a critique of realist interpretations and attacks on liberal rationalist peace theory.

Chapter 5: The International Thought

of Norman Angell: From the Great

Illusion to the Public Mind

Angell... is a realist... because he looks at the major forces in international relations, which will not change so long as the system of sovereign states is maintained and major states regard themselves as being in contention.

J. D. B. Miller, 1986.

Angell was a man of his historic moment, and that moment has passed.

Albert Marrin, 1979.

Norman Angell's career as a writer on international affairs spans over fifty years. Within that time, from 1903 to the sixties, international politics underwent a series of often cataclysmic changes: the two world wars, the dissolutions of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, the Russian and Chinese revolutions, the rise of the US and the USSR to the status of superpowers, the beginnings of decolonisation represented by both the independence of India and the revolutions against Western rule in Indonesia and South-East Asia, and the rise of the welfare state and the post-war compromise between labour and capital. To expect Angell's work to remain unchanged during this period would be naive, yet it is interesting to note that his core ideas remained largely the same, despite his theoretical reformulations, and his not infrequent change of focus.

Despite the length of his writing career, most of the changes to Angell's view of international affairs occurred in a short space of time, during and just after the First World War. While, for most Europeans, the Second World War remains the most traumatic experience of this century, for Britain it was the First War that came as more of a shock. It is not only that Britain, in contrast to other European states, suffered more casualties in the First than it did in the Second War, but also that 1914 shattered a Victorian-Edwardian complacency. Britain entered the twentieth century confident of both humanity's ability to progress in all forms of human endeavour, and of Britain's role at the head of this progress. After World War One the World seemed a less certain, and a much colder, place.

The coming of the Second World War was met with such trepidation, that there was almost a sense of relief in 1945 that it had not been as bad as people had thought it would be. More importantly, the experience of the Second War restored a sense of hope and a renewed faith in progress towards a better world. One Labour election poster of 1945 proclaimed "Now win the peace", and the electorate responded by breaking with politics as usual, and electing, by a landslide, the first majority socialist government in British history. A sense of world leadership -- not in military or economic terms, but in terms of pioneering a new kind of society -- was restored. Yet, the optimism of 1945 was to be Mitrany's fiefdom.

Angell's lot was to come to terms with the trauma of the First War.

It is possible to divide Angell's thought into two distinct periods.²⁵³ Angell (I) covers the period leading up to World War One, and centres around his seminal work *The Great Illusion*, first published as a pamphlet in 1909. This period is marked both by a mid-Victorian optimism in Angell's work, and by an attempt to answer the critics of Cobdenite liberal rationalism discussed in the last chapter. Angell(II), the period in Angell's career in which he drops his faith in Spencerian progress, follows the First World War, and involved a reassessment of the role of ideas in politics. At another level Angell (II) differed from Angell (I) in the sense that the latter was concerned with disproving the critics of liberal rationalism, while the former became interested in the creation of the machineries of international organisation and collective security. Angell (I), therefore, can be seen as both primarily negative in its intellectual goal -- as a rejoinder to the critics of liberal rationalism -- and as an optimistic and determinist theory of historical progression. Angell (II), on the other hand, represents a positive attempt to construct a new world, but with a theory of history that is more meliorist and voluntarist.

Some care should be taken with even this division, however. Because Angell's main source of income was what he made from publishing and lecturing, he often re-used older

arguments in later works. Thus, although the works of Angell (I) do differ from those of Angell (II), occasionally an Angell (I) idea, that is not particularly in keeping with Angell (II) was inclined to appear -- and often word for word in the same format as it had originally been published before the First World War. Thus, Angell (II)'s view that governments were strong enough to make economic decisions was often unintentionally contradicted by the inclusion of an Angell (I) idea that economic ownership and political power had become separated.²⁵⁴ Thus, by no means water-tight compartments, the writings of Angell (I) and Angell (II) do represent reactions to different political conditions.

Angell (I). Damning the Critics and Charting the Progress:

The national liberal and social Darwinist criticisms of liberal rationalist peace theory had centred around four areas. First, there was the rejection of the Spencerian view of economic development leading to the conditions that create peace. Secondly, there were the arguments that suggested that struggle could not be avoided because it was a natural part of human life. Allied to this idea was the contention that there were unchanging laws of human history that would stand in the way of the achievement of perpetual peace. Thirdly, doubt was cast on the liberal rationalist idea that the education of public opinion could lead to peace; while, fourthly, it was claimed that the relations between states, associated with the

balance of power, was an inescapable reality. In arguing against these two critics of liberal rationalism, Angell would make particular reference to social Darwinists like Homer Lea, and national liberals like Mahan and Blatchford.

To Angell (I), as with all pre-World War One liberal rationalist peace theorists, the question of the link between economic development and the progress towards peace was intimately tied up with the question of the laws of history. Central to the argument of *The Great Illusion* was a theory of human historical development in which the passions that led to violence are overcome by the rational realisation of the advantages of cooperative effort. Inefficient cannibalism gives way to the more rational enslaving of prisoners, which in turn leads to the more mutually beneficial system of serfdom, and finally to the use of wage labouring. In each of these steps the natural desire to kill or mistreat is replaced by the rational wish for greater wealth and comforts. As warlike passions are replaced by more successful rational cooperation, the parts of society become more reliant on each other's cooperation for their continuing prosperity. As a result, any re-emergence of violent and divisive passions will threaten to destroy the very tap root of humanity's prosperity.²⁵⁵

History, to Angell (I), was a unilinear evolutionary progression, in which violent passion gave way to materialist rationality. Here, Angell used, and cited, the works of

Herbert Spencer. Less intrusive and more innately cooperative forms of power in the financial and trading sectors become increasingly important at the expense of traditional military power.²⁵⁶ Consequently Angell (I)'s view of the twentieth century political economy was simultaneously different in focus from, but similar in substance to, the Cobdenite free-trader of the nineteenth century. Where Cobden had concentrated on the flow of goods, Angell (I) had looked at the flow of money in the first instance, and the trade in goods in the second. Angell had been very impressed with the way that the financial sector had increased within the last thirty years prior to the publication of his book *The Great Illusion*, and the extent to which credit had become international: "The complexity of modern finance makes New York dependent on London, London upon Paris, Paris upon Berlin, to a greater degree than has ever been the case in history."²⁵⁷ The prosperity of the World now relied on the flow of investment capital, and any interruption of that flow would create serious problems for the World economy. Angell likened the modern World economy to a single organism, and the financial sector now played the part of sensory nerves -- that is, serious conflicts which threatened prosperity would be noticed first in the financial markets.²⁵⁸

Finance was, according to Angell, the most important part of World economic relations at the turn of the century, but it was not the only part. Angell took a view of trade that owed

much to the Cobdenite free-trade tradition. Many of Angell's antagonists regarded trade as a tangible commodity, which could be owned or captured by force. Angell, by contrast, stressed the intangible nature of trade. Trade was rooted in the abilities and wealth of a population, not in the capabilities of a state, *per se*.²⁵⁹ Just as finance capital was owned by individuals, so trade relations were fostered, not by states, but by individuals and their companies. Angell also argued the same for the possession of raw materials, access to which were of deep concern to the public in the first four decades of the century. Raw materials were commodities owned by non-governmental companies, that were used and traded by those companies, not by the state. In many cases, those individuals may even be foreign owners.²⁶⁰

An important implication of the intangibility of economic valuables (ie: finance/credit and trade) was the separation of military and economic power. The possession of military might, Angell (I) argued, has no effect on trade between secure and developed states, because the decision -- by companies and individuals -- to trade or invest is made on criteria other than the strength of a nation's armed forces. What is far more important is whether money can be made for both sides: "If the British manufacturer can make [goods]... cheaper or better than his rivals he will obtain the trade... and the possession of *Dreadnoughts* will not make a wit of difference." "It is evident that the foreigner does not buy our products and

refuse Germany's because we have a larger navy."²⁶¹ In other words, economic success, and the accruing of wealth, depend on factors other than the military strength of a nation.

While military force cannot capture wealth, it can seriously disrupt trade and financial exchanges. Echoing Cobden and Bright once more, Angell said that expenditure on armaments was wasteful, but the costs of arms paled into insignificance by comparison with the losses caused by the disruption of economic activity when those arms are actually used. Modern wealth is largely intangible and cannot be stolen, but the attempt to steal it can destroy it. To illustrate this point Angell asked what would happen if a German army sacked London. The booty captured in moveable goods would not pay for the cost of the war, even if all the gold in the Bank of England was looted. The destruction of the Bank of England, however, would ruin British financial houses, many of which have strong connections with Germany. This would result in the collapse of credit institutions in Germany, not to mention the ruin of companies that traded with Britain. Thus, if a German army did capture London, not only would there be little or no booty for it to bring back, but the collapse of British credit and trade would result in a serious recession in Germany.²⁶²

This is not to say that Angell did not see any use for force at all. Rather, he made a distinction between war in the modern World, which had the goal of imposing by force the

wishes of one nation on another, and policing, in which force is used against those who stand against the community interests embodied in the World economy. This policing role can take many forms. It can be, for example, a war by an oppressed people against a militaristic power which still regards military might as usable. Thus, Angell supported the Balkan states in their wars with Turkey. Here Angell reversed the interpretation of the social Darwinists, who had argued that militaristic empires decline when they become commercial, and lose their martial spirit. Angell, instead, claimed that if a militaristic empire failed to become commercial, and does not take up its responsibility to help build a wealthier World, it will become corrupt and decadent like the Ottoman Turks had done.²⁶³

The policing role for force, according to Angell, might also be used when "the condition of a territory is such that the social and economic co-operation of other countries with it is impossible".²⁶⁴ Before 1914, this meant the non-Western World, where Angell saw the presence of European force and administration as a means of opening up new territories for the benefit of the World economy, while at the same time providing colonised peoples with the infrastructure necessary to become part of the wealth-creating global economy.²⁶⁵

This argument provided Angell with a defence of British colonial possessions, which was at variance with the writings of both Cobden and Bentham, who opposed the whole idea of

colonies as wasteful. Angell, also saw colonies as economically wasteful for the colonising nation, but argued that open colonies provided business opportunities for the rest of the World, and thus colonies were maintained as a trust for all humanity.²⁶⁶ Armed with a view of the resources of the earth as the common heritage of humanity, and a belief in unilineal progress, it followed naturally that Angell should regard colonisation as a means of releasing natural resources and assimilating 'backward' peoples. Angell, unlike Cobden, thought that force could be used to make people free against their will. Although this argument for a colonial policing role may appear abhorrent to late twentieth century readers, Angell (II) would use an argument, based upon the same premise, to support the concept of collective security against fascism.

The distinction between war and policing within Angell's thought brought him into conflict with one of his leading critics, G. G. Coulton, who sympathised with Angell's abhorrence of war, but regarded life as, ultimately, a "struggle of man with man".²⁶⁷ Coulton took issue with Angell's view of what a warlike nation was, suggesting that, in fact, the operation of a peaceful rule of law is accomplished by the existence of latent force, in the form of a state's police. He also argued that, far from becoming less warlike, industrialised states merely used their latent force to impose their will, where in the past force was more

visible.²⁶⁸ Coulton, therefore, makes a distinction between physical force, which was more prevalent in the past, and struggle, which may or may not manifest itself as physical force.²⁶⁹ The main difference between Coulton and Angell revolves around their view of struggle, which to Coulton can only be repressed by the latent force of society, but to Angell can be replaced by more efficient modes of cooperation. Policing, to Angell, is not merely a means of forcing people to cooperate, but also a means of protecting the cooperative people from the conflictual through a rule of law.²⁷⁰

For Coulton, therefore, all are warlike, but the more industrialised use their physical force sparingly. For Angell, some are warlike, and those who do not use physical force are not warlike. Coulton saw the forms of force used by industrialised countries as a mere continuation of past practices, while Angell saw this policing role as fundamentally different in its objective. Policing the international community was, in the long run, serving a growing interdependent global community, and thus was part of a very different set of human social relationships. Underlying this dispute is the question of whether people can learn to be more cooperative, or whether our natures condemn us to be in constant conflict. Coulton's argument -- which has its intellectual roots in national liberalism, and beyond that in the conservative notion of continual struggle outside of ordered hierarchies -- was to re-emerge within realism, where

all forms of international conflict throughout the ages have been seen as being caused largely by the same atemporal factors. Although Angell's argument can be accused of naivety, in that he assumed that the great power's colonial policies were acting in the interests of the global community as a whole, it did at least recognise that the use of force changes its form over time and circumstance.

Angell (I)'s political economy is, like Cobden's, circulationist. His concern is the flow of goods and capital, not the nature of production. Angell was to face a strong productionist critique during the inter-war period, in the great 'does capitalism cause war?' debate, which centred around the pages of the *New Statesman*. Angell's protagonists here were the intellectual heirs of J. A. Hobson, the liberal political economist, whose theory of underconsumption anticipated Keynes' more famous criticism of orthodox economics. Hobson's basic point was that the natures of production and the social structures in the major European states, but particularly Britain, were creating international instability. In order to keep profits high, employers tried to keep wages low. As a result the home market was not capable of consuming the goods that industry produced. The answer to this should have been to raise wages, but instead the wealthy elite had tried to export both its goods and investment capital abroad. This could be most efficiently done by the annexation of new colonies. The resulting imperialism was detrimental to

the population of the colonising power as a whole, but it benefited a powerful minority. Hobson also pointed out that the instability caused by imperial competition also benefited speculators, who gained from fluctuating markets, and the upper classes, who found jobs in the colonial administrations and armies.²⁷¹ Thus, under certain conditions, trade and investment capital could serve minority interests, and cause instability. Hobson's answer to this was greater democracy, and particularly greater democratic control of the economy.²⁷²

Both Hobson and Angell agreed that these aggressive foreign policies did not serve the interests of the majority, but where Hobson saw the unequal distribution of wealth and the structure of the economy as the cause, because it created an elite whose interests were served by aggression, Angell saw the problem in the state of mind of the majority of the population, who could not see their interests. Hobson and Angell, in this respect, form two halves of what is potentially the same argument. Hobson outlines the material conditions that create the push towards an aggressive foreign policy, Angell notices the reason why the majority go along with this policy, even though it is against their interests. Hobson saw the hope in a greater democratic control of finance, but Angell saw this as self-defeating unless the majority of the population could be made to see that the policies of aggression did not serve their material

interests.²⁷³ Angell even cited Hobson when making this point. The materialist/idealist debate over the nature of capitalism and the cause of war, that opened up between the supporters of Hobson's ideas and Norman Angell and his supporters, was to bring some of these issues into the open in the pages of the *New Statesman* in the 1930's.

Effectively, Angell's view of history and political economy forms a rejoinder to the first two criticisms made by the critics of liberal rationalism. History is progressive and -- while the pre-modern world might have had room for the use of force to acquire wealth -- in the modern world, war threatened human prosperity. Effectively, as human society progresses it becomes more interdependent, and the utility of war declines relative to the utility of peaceful commerce. The development of a global network of trade and banking made it impossible to regard any one state as a complete community. Instead, lines of interdependence criss-crossed state boundaries, creating the potential for a fully integrated community of the whole human race. The real conflicts in human society are not between the illusory national communities, but between social classes within the global inter-dependent economy, and most specifically between the forces of internationalised capital on the one hand, and of labour and socialism on the other.²⁷⁴ The nation-state, due to historical progress, was ceasing to be the unit of human political economy.

Just as the critics of liberal rationalist peace theory grounded their attacks in a certain view of human nature, so Angell based his reply on a view of human nature, and the relation of a utilitarian reason with the natural. Angell's target in his appraisal of the form of human nature was the social Darwinist view, stated most overtly in the works of Homer Lea and Treitschke, that the existence of a single, and determining, human nature laid down atemporal laws of human behaviour. Angell (I), still imbued with the optimism of the mid-Victorians, saw human nature as progressing under the influence of a utilitarian instrumental reason. In opposition to the social Darwinists, who saw natural forces as the main determinant of human behaviour, Angell (I) saw the effect of human nature on behaviour declining in favour of intellect as history progressed. This is not to say that Angell ignored human pugnacity, more that he recognised, as the vulgar advocates of a fixed human nature did not, that this pugnacity would have to interact with both the environment and the intellect. As the utility of physical force declines, Angell argued, pugnacity will be redirected by the intellect into more cooperative forms of interaction.²⁷⁵ Angell pointed to the changes in human behaviour both historically and across cultures to illustrate his point. Thus, he argued, as history progresses the 'laws' that govern human behaviour change as well.²⁷⁶ Unfortunately, and this to Angell was the crux of Europe's optical illusion, the social environment changes

faster than the ideas we have about the World. Consequently, we must continually update our intellectual input into human behaviour in order to bring it in line with the changing influence of our social World.²⁷⁷

Angell's view of the intellect's ability to modify behaviour was certainly not new, and it is implicit in much of the nineteenth century liberal rationalist philosophy. It shares with social Darwinism a belief in the separation between natural instincts and the rational intellect. Yet, while to the social Darwinist it is instinct that controls the intellect, to Angell it is the intellect that can, and should, control instinct. The failure to control instinct leads to pugnacity, decay and the demise of civilisation. That this view was in the intellectual air in turn of the century Britain there is no doubt. It comes through most clearly in H. G. Wells' popular science fiction work *The Island of Doctor Moreau*. Here, a contrast is made between the capricious and instinct dominated -- and therefore incapable of advance -- beast folk created by Moreau, and the real humans, for whom science offers hope of advance.²⁷⁸ It is as though the 'people' created out of animals lack some necessary component. A religious person might call it soul, but to the science-obsessed turn of the century liberal rationalist that something was reason.

Angell (I)'s commitment to utilitarian reason as a solution to human problems was not, however, as naively

optimistic as that of Cobden and the mid-Victorians. The faith that Cobden and Bright placed in the rationality of informed public opinion often left them frustrated and disappointed, as was the case during the Crimean War. Angell (I) -- as a prelude to the more in-depth studies of the public mind that were to form the backbone of Angell (II)'s writings, and bear some similarity to some modern conceptions of civil society -- argued that public opinion was vulnerable to corruption by a jingoistic press.²⁷⁹ Yet, Angell (I) was optimistic that the changes in the material world, and the steady improvement in human conduct, would lead people away from emotive jingoism. As a consequence, government policies would eventually be swayed by majority opinion towards a rational policy of cooperation.²⁸⁰

Thus, Angell (I) recognised that there were problems with public opinion, and that it was possible to whip people up into a jingoistic frenzy. Thus far he accepted the national liberal criticism that public opinion was not rational, especially during wartime. There was, however, hope for public opinion, since jingoism was the result of faulty thought that went against the grain of the developments of modern society. Angell (I)'s rejoinder to this, the third criticism of liberal rationalism in the nineteenth century, was that the potential for 'rational' thought was there, and the 'realities' of progress would eventually provide the push towards reasoned thought about public affairs.

The whole basis of Angell's 'progress to peace' view of history rests on the assumption that there is a common human utilitarian reason, which is capable of informing us, regardless of cultural or social background, of the correct means by which to achieve our goals. To Angell those goals, to which reason leads us, are the goals of material prosperity, and material prosperity is served best by living in an interdependent and cooperative society. Because reason is prior to culture it can be the basis of inter-cultural cooperation. Issues that arise within the global interdependent economic community can be resolved by appealing to a common reason. In addition, reason, empowered by its ability to give us greater prosperity than can our violent passions, is the means by which we can learn new cooperative practices to counteract our basically pugnacious nature. Questions of human nature, therefore, are secondary, since we have the capability through reason to learn to behave differently from the ways in which our uninformed human nature would direct us.²⁸¹ Reason, assisted by education, is able to direct our behaviour towards greater cooperation because this course leads to heightened material prosperity.

Basically, Angell (I) continues the Enlightenment liberal position that humanity, through the exercise of its common reason, whether that reason be transcendental or utilitarian, can make progress towards a better World possible. In this respect Angell (I)'s ideas demonstrate a family resemblance to

Kantian notions that a common acultural reason can, and should, be the basis of human actions and social institutions. Angell, however, seems at this stage oblivious to Kant's important qualifier to the argument that reason is common, and prior to, culture.

To Kant human rationality is constrained by two impediments to its perfect operation. First, that humans live as much under the laws of nature in the natural world as they do under the laws of reason in the intelligible world. Reason, therefore, has to compete with non-rational animal impulses. Secondly, Kant pointed out that humans are not infinitely rational, but are instead of finite intelligence. They are therefore not capable of understanding all that would be necessary to make a perfectly rational decision, and any decision they make will always be influenced by their particular background.²⁸² Because of these impediments to the effective use of reason in humans, Kant despaired of creating a better world by reason alone, and instead argued that human selfishness, and the natural desires that fuelled it, would eventually push humans towards a more rational society.²⁸³ Kant's motor of historical evolution was, therefore, significantly different from Angell's. Angell saw reason as the means by which humans could better fulfil their material desires, and therefore conceived of a reason that could overcome natural desires and cultural contingencies.

Underlying all this, though, is a more fundamental

difference between Kant's and Angell's concepts of reason.²⁸⁴ Kant saw reason as a transcendental force, which is strongly linked to concepts of what is just. War is always irrational, therefore, because it fails to tell us who is right in a particular dispute. It is also irrational in the sense that we would not rationally, and in all circumstances, wish to have done to us what we would wish in wartime to do to our enemies. War, therefore breaks the cardinal pronouncement of Kant's reason, namely the categorical imperative that "I should never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law."²⁸⁵ To wish to go to war and to kill your enemies is, consequently, to will your own death, which is irrational.

Angell, on the other hand, sees reason as fundamentally instrumental. It is a means by which to calculate what we must do to achieve our material ends. In Angell's work reason is interpreted in two distinct ways. First, it is the means by which individuals can maximise their own utility without regards for the needs of others, but in accordance with their passions. This view of reason comes close to both Machiavelli's and David Hume's definition of pure instrumental reason.²⁸⁶ Secondly, instrumental reason can show us that in the long run the individual's utility would be best served by maximising the utility of humanity as a whole, that is, utilitarian instrumental reason associated with nineteenth century British liberalism. Using either of these two

interpretations of instrumental rationality, war could conceivably be a rational choice if we could see it as a means to an end. To Angell, the Viking raid was rational (in the first sense) since it brought gain in the form of booty at little risk to the Viking. Similarly, colonial wars, to Angell, were rational (in the second sense) since they brought more of the earth's resources into the world economy, and helped to increase everyone's material prosperity. Thus, Angell's pacifism was not based on the intrinsic irrationality of war, but on the argument that war between major states would so disrupt the fragile interdependence of the world economy, that any potential gains would be outweighed by the losses suffered on all sides after the consequent economic collapse. The interdependence of the global economy was such that the first form of instrumental reason now made little sense, as any moves to steal wealth by force would result in economic dislocation. Instead, the material prosperity of any individual was tied, whether they liked it or not, to the material prosperity of others. While Angell's thought, in its Angell (II) stage, would address Kant's notion of the non-rational in human nature, he would both fail to see humans as finitely rational, and continue to see human reason as fundamentally of a utilitarian instrumental brand.

Angell (I)'s conception of the interaction of reason and progress comes directly from the school of Herbert Spencer. Like Spencer, Angell (I) argued that society was becoming more

heterogenous and complex over time, and in an argument borrowed from Adam Smith, he stressed increased specialisation and divisions of labour as a mark of progress.²⁸⁷ This progress formed a single unilinear path, upon which we could progress faster if we used our (utilitarian) reason to calculate how to increase our wealth and interdependence, but we could be slowed down if outworn ideas still dominated our thinking. Material 'realities' continued to move forward, but our thinking could slow or speed up this process, depending on whether we remained wedded to passions and atavistic ideas, or whether we used our (utilitarian) reason to see the 'facts' clearly.

Thus, we have a one-dimensional model of human progress, which is fundamentally determinist, even though for Angell (I) negative freedom plays a role in progress. Freedom, to Angell (I), is the means by which reason is able to function, and it is the use of reason that pushes progress. Reasoned evaluation is made possible through free debate, during which the weaker ideas will be exposed, and truth will emerge. This idea of free discussion as the source of truth, coming from Angell's reading of Mill, remained as a constant in Angell's thought. Where Angell (I) did differ from Angell (II) was in the evaluation of the relative importance of conscious action in relation to the unconscious. The pre-First World War Angell was still enough of a believer in a spontaneous and individual-centred view of society, that he regarded the

small-scale decisions of individuals out to increase their own wealth as unconsciously leading to a more interdependent and prosperous World for all. Conscious attempts to understand the bigger picture above individual decisions would allow the society as a whole to know how to assist these micro-decisions.²⁸⁸ In here lies the deterministic element. Freedom's role is reduced to the means by which we understand the pre-set path of our progress, rather than the freedom to follow other avenues of development.

Angell (I)'s view of the World, therefore, combines the evolutionary sociology of Herbert Spencer with the circulationist opposition to war of Cobden and Bright. Angell's conception of history is a progression to greater cooperation, interdependence and divisions of labour, in which war that does not serve a policing role becomes increasingly dysfunctional as the global economy becomes more complex. Global interdependence is manifest through the development of the international financial markets and the growth of trade. The fundamental problem is that our views of the World have not kept pace with these changes, and consequently Angell saw his role as primarily demonstrating the irrelevance of outdated views of international politics that focused on national rivalries.

Behind his view of the international political economy, Angell had assumed a particular relationship between reason, freedom and progress. Free discussion leads to the victory of

reason, which in turn assists progress. Progress moves ahead of our thinking, and feeds back to help reasoned thought catch up. What seems to be Angell's view here is that progress, in a spontaneous fashion, is pushed along by the micro-decisions of individuals keen on increasing their material well-being. Thus, "the ordinary weekday, humdrum work of banking" creates forces that are pushing the World towards closer integration.²⁸⁹ Yet, while these micro-decisions might be moving the World towards interdependence, this progress could still be undone by atavistic ideas about the role of force. Thus, while micro-decisions are leading us forward, we need a 'correct' World view to allow us to assist -- or at least not harm -- the processes of development. The feedback loop from progress to rationality exists in as much as the development brought about by micro-decisions can be studied in order to improve our ideas about the World. Ideas can change the World, but a 'proper' study of the World is capable of reforming our ideas.

At the same time, the thought of Angell (I) represents a rejoinder to the criticisms of liberal rationalism by national liberals and social Darwinists. First, he attempted to show how material progress leads to the elimination of the need for war, and in fact makes war a threat to the continuance of civilisation. Secondly, he demonstrated the weaknesses of the cyclical interpretations of history, largely by questioning the importance of human nature, and demonstrating how an

evolution of human behaviour was possible. Naturally, this meant that laws of human history were capable of change, since these traced themselves back to the question of how people behave. Thirdly, Angell (I) accepted the national liberal criticism of the reforming role of public opinion, but attempted to show how a more rational public opinion was at least a possibility. Finally, Angell (I)'s rejection of the importance of the state as a future actor in global politics, especially given his view that military power and economic development were now decoupled, led him to regard the balance of power between states as largely irrelevant to the development of human society. Although the first two of the four answers that Angell (I) had thrown back at liberal rationalism's opponents remained unchanged in the arguments of Angell (II), Angell's views on public opinion and the power relationships between states would be developed further in the light of the events of the First World War and the inter-war instability.

Angell (II): Adaptation to a Different World

After the First World War Angell adapted his ideas to conform with both a changed World and with his own experiences of the effects of a global war. The First World war taught Angell two important lessons. The first was that the international economy was not as fragile as he had assumed it was. There were certainly serious economic problems after

1918, but Western civilisation managed to survive. The second lesson was the ease with which patriotic fervour could be whipped up among the populations of belligerent nations. Angell (I) had assumed that humans were getting increasingly rational, and that the cruelties of the past were beyond the capabilities of modern civilised society. After the war Angell conceded that the non-rational elements of human nature, especially the pugnacious element, always lay close to the surface, ready to be exploited by jingoistic thinking. Although there is no evidence that Angell read Kant, this concession represents an acceptance of the Kantian notion that we are also subject, as humans, to the non-rational laws of nature. In addition to this, the behaviour of people during the war had reinforced Angell's view that ideas were critical determinants of political action.

These lessons convinced Angell that the development of a peaceful and liberal world would not be as easy, and as smoothly evolutionary, a path as he had at first assumed. Building on Keynes's analysis of the post-Versailles World, he argued that the old individualism, upon which his theory of modern historical evolution was based, ended during the war, and that for better or worse governments were now major actors in the global economy. The survival of economic activity, despite the dislocations brought on by war-time government intervention, showed that governments could control the economy without bringing ruin upon themselves. Consequently,

economic integration could be reversed, and on its own could not be relied upon to foster peace between nations. Economic integration would have to be complemented by the building of a system of international laws and organisations capable of controlling international affairs.²⁹⁰ Thus, Angell (II) turned to both the study of the workings of the 'public mind', and the creation of a properly functioning system of collective action among nations.²⁹¹

The adaptation of the belligerent economies to the dislocation of war cast doubt on a part of Angell (I)'s view of political economy. During the war, a sympathetic critic of Angell's political economy pointed out that the argument of *The Great Illusion* had over-estimated the fragility of global financial relations. Angell had assumed that a declaration of war would not cause any changes in financial arrangements, and thus the defeat and ruin of Germany would drag the British economy down, or vice versa. What in fact happened was that, as soon as war was declared, the financial markets reordered themselves, so that links between belligerents were severed. Consequently, the two sides in the War became economically independent of each other.²⁹²

Angell (II) did not wholly disagree with this criticism. Indeed, he confessed in 1921 that for "the purposes of simplicity and brevity the main argument of *The Great Illusion* assumed the relative permanence of the institution of private property in Western society".²⁹³ Rather, the war had

demonstrated how able the state was at preventing economic collapse through control of the economy. The old individualism, Angell (II) argued, was therefore dead, and to a large degree this was due to the pressures of wartime economy.²⁹⁴ Yet, in many respects the death of the old order was suicide, rather than murder. Angell (II) put much of the blame for the collapse of the old order on "private Capitalist Trusts", which had used government for their own ends before the war. These trusts had pushed government to intervene in backward parts of the World, in order to open them up for exploitation. The "illicit pressure exercised upon governments by those interested in the exploitation of backward countries was out of proportion to the public importance of their interests".²⁹⁵ The resulting instability helped lead to the war, as well as to damage the reputation of the old order.

Angell (II)'s position here seems remarkably close to Hobson's conception of imperialism. An economic elite uses state power to its own advantage, but to the detriment of society as a whole. Where Angell differs from Hobson is that he sees this as an anomaly, and his support for finance capital -- outside of self-serving cartels -- is undented. Angell also regarded such cartels as, in the long run, against the interests of the financial markets. In other words, short-sighted 'jam today' arrangements had been followed at the expense of 'jam tomorrow'. Hobson's materialist followers would see the activities of financial cartels as being in the

interests of the monopolists both in the short and long term.

Where the followers of Hobson and Angell (II) could agree was in the need for the development of international organisations to prevent global anarchy. Angell (II)'s claim that the World had changed fits into this call for global institutions. Angell (I) had seen the development of international cooperation, fuelled by internationalised credit and trade, as occurring without the need for global institutions. In this, he follows Cobden's logic that globalisation would best occur if governmental institutions were not involved. Angell (II) still regarded this as valid for the pre-First World War World. "We had seen [before the war] a congeries of States like those of the British Empire maintain not only peace but a sort of informal federation, without limitation in any formal way of the national freedom of any one of them".²⁹⁶ In the post-First World War world this was no longer true, and the nature of the global political economy now made international organisation necessary. For good or ill, Angell (II) argued, the state is now a player in global economics. Where the free-play of individuals worked for global peace in the old World of the 'nightwatchman' state, global institutions were now needed to control the potentially destructive passions of the new states in the age of economic planning. Where the state could, in the past, be successfully by-passed by economic factors, the new state was in the centre of economic activity. Because states

now had the ability to wage war, without their economies falling apart, there was a need for formal international arrangements that could control states that might want to go on the warpath.²⁹⁷

It is important to stress that Angell, more and more as the inter-war economic and political crises dragged on, saw an important role for planning by both the state and by international organisations. The old spontaneous order idea of micro-decisions leading to progress was now modified by Angell. The individualist market society associated with *laissez faire* failed because it could not properly order the division of labour and the circulation of goods that was necessary in a modern society. In a subsistence economy, Angell argued, the producer and the consumer were the same, yet once an economy became more heterogeneous there was a need for a proper ordering and regulation of the divisions of labour in order to keep it working efficiently. The answer lay in a mixed economy, where wealth was owned and operated privately, but the government regulated exchange, and worked to eliminate the waste of unemployment.²⁹⁸ Thus, while in 1921 Angell might have partially regretted the passing of the old order, by 1931 he had accepted the need for creating stronger planning organisations.

Greater state control on the economy did not, for Angell (II), only have the negative role of making an international security organisation necessary. It was also necessary for the

peace of the World. Economic well-being was, for Angell, the foundation of civilisation. Without freedom from hunger people would be too busy struggling for bread to establish civilisation. Civilisation rested on ideas that were formulated by people with leisure time, and thus the development of ideas towards a more globalised and peaceful World organisation required that people should be free from worrying about the necessities of food.²⁹⁹ Thus, where Angell (I) had seen economics and politics as sharply distinguished, Angell (II) saw them as intimately linked.³⁰⁰

Angell was not alone in this plea for formal global organisations. In fact, the demand for an international security organisation, and even a World Government, became quite vocal during the First World War. Hobson, Leonard Woolf and Hobhouse all wrote in favour of an international organisation to prevent war, even while the guns of the Great War were far from silent on the other side of the Channel.³⁰¹ The Union of Democratic Control, the main source of left-of-centre opposition to the handling of the war, provided the intellectual muscle for two committees that discussed the possibilities of establishing a league of nations. One of which -- under Fabian auspices -- resulted in Woolf's book, while the other -- under veteran politician Lord Bryce and including Graham Wallas, Hobson and Lowes Dickinson -- inspired Hobhouse's article.

The idea that ran through the discussions of a future

international organisation in the works of Angell, Hobson, Woolf and Hobhouse was the need to prevent another major war. Hobson's argument for an international organisation was based, like Angell's, on the idea that the World had changed. But whereas Angell had seen this change occurring during the Great War, and its conversion of the old individualism into state-based economies, Hobson placed the change earlier, to the alterations that occurred within Capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century. Although an admirer of Cobden, Hobson was quick to point out that Cobden was writing at a time when the actions of scattered capitalists and traders could not influence government, and were directly concerned with the avoidance of war. This had changed by the turn of the century, where "the formation of powerful companies controlled by men of great influence, not only in the world of business but in that of politics."³⁰² Going back to his theory of underconsumption, outlined above, Hobson argued that a combination of democratic control of the economy and the construction of international organisation was required in order to both prevent the creation of surplus investment at home, and to regulate the behaviour of states that might be tempted to intervene abroad.³⁰³

At the other extreme, Woolf was still influenced by the pre-war faith in progress, and saw the move towards a World government, through an initial confederal stage, as an extension of the rationalising processes that had given

civilisation good domestic government. Like Angell (I), Woolf believed that history "is continually getting ahead of the conceptions and beliefs of human beings... either our conceptions must go forward and conform with an advanced world, or the world will be dragged back into line with our primitive beliefs."³⁰⁴

It is fashionable, since the Second World War, to disparage these intellectual and journalistic calls for global government. Yet, it has to be remembered that, far from being considered Utopian, these ideas were regarded as timely, not only among intellectual circles, but also in the seats of power in London and, after 1916, Washington. The idea of a 'league of peace' formed by the voluntary alliance of the major powers -- an extension of the Concert of Europe idea favoured by Gladstone -- had been common currency in Liberal Party circles in Britain since at least the speech by its leader and future Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman, in December of 1905.³⁰⁵ During the War the need for a more formal arrangement emerged. Prime Minister Asquith, in replying to German peace-feelers in 1916, stated Britain's desire for an international system to protect the equality and rights of states.³⁰⁶ This is not to say that there was strong support for a league of nations within the British government, or even in Parliament. A. J. P. Taylor notices the luke-warm response it often got from Parliamentarians, even from such strong pacifists as James Ramsay MacDonald.³⁰⁷ Support was

stronger in the US executive branch of government. In two key speeches, one in 1916 and the other in 1917, President Wilson gave his backing to the idea of an international security organisation -- or, to use a term that perhaps began with G. Lowes Dickinson and was in current use in British circles, a league of nations.³⁰⁸

While much of the enthusiasm for a league of nations seemed to assume "that the same statesmen [who had been responsible for the bad foreign policy that had led to war] would become persistently virtuous once a League of Nations had been set up",³⁰⁹ this was far from universal. Yet, post-World War Two realists, among others, tended to characterise the enthusiasts for the League of Nations and collective security as just such naive institutionalists.³¹⁰ Angell and others, however, recognised that institutions would not be enough to ensure peace. People, and more specifically governments, would have to be persuaded, not only to establish an international security regime, but also to support it. Although he had stressed the importance of public opinion before the War, after 1918 Angell expanded this concept into a theory of the public mind.

Angell's concept of the public mind is arguably his most important contribution to the study of peace. In a nutshell, the public mind was the collective thinking that produced public opinion and commonly accepted belief systems. While the public mind was potentially able, through education and

properly reasoned argument, to act rationally (in a utilitarian sense), it was also capable of becoming a slave to unreasoning passions. This failure of the public mind, however, was due to faulty method, rather than to any limits on human rationality.³¹¹

To a certain extent, the idea of the public mind was an extension of the Angell (I) idea that saw modern bellicosity as a survival of atavistic theories, which were no longer valid in the more economically integrated World of the early 1900's.³¹² After his experience of jingoistic mob-thinking during the war Angell stressed that it was not facts that governed our actions and the course of history, but our ideas about these facts. It was not armaments that caused war, but the minds which directed those armaments, and those minds in turn were controlled by ideas. The way to end war, therefore, was not through disarmament, but by influencing the mind by "moral suasion".³¹³

Angell (I) had thought that the historical development towards a more peaceful World was being driven by economic forces and the micro-decisions of those involved in economic activity. Ideas always lagged behind this economic progress. In *The Great Illusion* Angell had assumed that the progress towards peace merely required that our ideas catch up with our economic development.³¹⁴ Angell (II), on the other hand, reversed this relationship. It was the quality of the public mind that determined the quality of a society, and hence any

corruption of the public mind had the potential to set civilisation back towards more violent and materially less satisfying stages of history.³¹⁵

What largely led Angell to reject the idea that economic forces would eventually lead human ideas away from war, was his feeling after the war that the non-rational, and ultimately violent, forces in human nature were more powerful than he had at first suspected. There was a natural instinct towards domination in humans, which had to be tamed by rational thought if humanity was to survive.³¹⁶ In the final analysis, Angell argued, the only way to replace these powerful non-rational forces was to allow full freedom of discussion. Only discussion and argument would make the more rational courses of action manifest, and only by the exercise of rationality would human civilisation advance.³¹⁷

Thus, while Angell (I) was a nineteenth century economic determinist, Angell (II) was a philosophical idealist, in the sense that he saw the development of ideas as the means by which history would advance. Yet, despite differences between the two, the equation that freedom of thought led to rationality led to progress continued in Angell's writing, even though the stress Angell (II) put on ideas as the foundation of a society put an end to Angell (I)'s feedback loop, in which progress itself would encourage the correct ideas to win out in a free society. Ideas, rather than having to catch up with material progress, were actually the cause of

material progress.

For Angell (II) it was the ideas in the heads of the operators of technology, not technology itself, which determined whether technology would actually assist or hinder economic development. In 1919 Angell wrote, prophetically as it turned out, that the discovery of atomic energy could either provide humans with material progress through cheap energy, or it could become the means to produce weapons of mass destruction.³¹⁸ Angell went on to argue that as a society became more complex freedom both became more necessary to maintain and develop those rational ideas upon which civilisation relied, but it also became easier to stifle individual thought. This is so largely because as the needs of the community grow, because of the greater inter-connection between the parts of society and the more specialised division of labour, the temptation is to over-organise and regulate society. There is, therefore the need to find a middle ground between over-organisation and *laissez faire* under-organisation.³¹⁹

A related threat to freedom for Angell was the development of a popular press, made possible by innovations in printing technology and organisation. The mass production of the media, while potentially liberating in the sense that it would increase the quantity of information available to ordinary people, can also have the effect of pandering and exacerbating the passions of the population at large. In the

absence of an educated and aware readership, the mass media actually exacerbates the problems of the uncontrolled passions.³²⁰ This problem of pandering, which is so common amongst the popular press, was (as far as Angell (II) was concerned) also a problem of democracy as a whole. In the absence of a properly informed and rational public mind, Angell argued, democracy was not a solution to the problems of war, rather it could be used to excite aggressive passions which politicians would pander to in order to stay in office.³²¹ Democracy alone, therefore, was not the answer. Rather, in order to make democracy work, Angell wrote, people would have to be able to develop their utilitarian reason, and to leave behind their natural passions.

It is here that Angell's work takes an unexpected Gramscian turn. Unexpected, because not only did Angell never come across the works of Gramsci, but also he remained, like many on the British left-of-centre, suspicious of Marxism. Although, it has to be said that Angell's acquaintance with Marxism was limited to what he heard from the mouths of British inter-war Marxists, and the equally distorted picture of the social experiment in the Soviet Union. Yet, between the wars Angell came to the same conclusion as Gramsci about the nature of power in society. Looking back at past tyrannies, and even at contemporary ones such as Nazi Germany, Angell asked why it was that the minority kept the majority under its control, even when the weight of physical force was heavily in

the favour of the oppressed. Angell argued that the enslaved forged their own weapon against themselves, in the form of ideas which legitimated their enslavement. The solution to this problem of enslaving ideas, Angell (II) argued, is for the people so enslaved to go back to first principles, and reform their ideas on the basis of the World as it is.³²² This has a certain family resemblance to Gramsci's notion of hegemony, albeit in the service of liberalism rather than Marxism. This notion of self-enslavement through ideas, as well as being linked to Angell's concept that formal institutional democracy is not enough, is also part of Angell (II)'s notion that a society can only ever be as good as the public mind that supports it. This might also be put in terms of the discussion of civil society, as it appears in modern Gramscian political economy. The answer to the hegemony of self-enslavement is the development of critical new social forces, in Gramscian political economy. The answer to the failures of the public mind for Angell was a more intellectually informed and critical mindset among the general population.³²³

As Cornelia Navari has pointed out, there is more than a hint of desperation in Angell's switch to the study of the public mind. Within the confines of nineteenth century liberal assumptions, the argument of *The Great Illusion* had been perfect. The First World War had demonstrated, however, that something was missing from the argument. Angell's study of the

public mind was one of the first faltering steps taken by the liberal paradigm to try to understand modern nationalism, although until David Mitrany the paradigm still tended to regard outbursts of nationalism as atavistic passions, rather than a modern ideological trend.³²⁴ The concept of the public mind was the corrective that allowed Angell to adapt his pre-war arguments to a post-war world, and for all its faulty parentage the public mind proved a strong explanatory tool. How else, within the confines of Angell's theory, could the support by a majority for policies that contradicted their material interests be explained?

Angell's view of the human desire to dominate also influenced his ideas about the development of international society. Where Angell (I) had happily assumed that the development of transnational economic links would lead to the acceptance of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states, Angell (II) favoured the introduction of international organisations and legal norms to control the natural pugnacities of nations. This was significantly different from Mitrany, as we will see below, who saw international organisations as necessary, not because of any natural human pugnacity, but rather because of the structural superiority of international planning organisations in the handling of modern security and economic problems. Since, for Angell, the public mind was easily moved away from rational thought, it was possible for whole states to become corrupted by a bellicose

mind-set. The ease with which a single state can threaten the functioning of the global economy, and the security of other states, made the need for collective security, followed by the development of a body of international rules of conduct under an international organisation, a crucial one.

The concepts of collective security and the balance of power are fuzzy, and have often been used to refer to similar power arrangements. Collective security has frequently been invoked when a group of states, prompted by a perceived disturbance in the balance of power, ally for the purpose of defeating a common security threat. The Allied coalitions in the Napoleonic wars would be a case in point. Much of the confusion is based on the changing meanings of both concepts, and especially changes in the use of the term 'balance of power'. Angell fully recognised that the phrase 'balance of power' had no clear meaning, which made him wonder why people were willing to go to war to preserve it,³²⁵ while realists like Morgenthau would later set out to give it a more precise, and positive, meaning.

Ralph Pettman has described the balance of power in three ways: (i) as a description of a state of affairs, in which power is distributed between a number of actors, and no one actor has a preponderance; (ii) as an explanation, in which the behaviour of states can be explained by the distributions of power, and the need to maintain a balance in order to preserve an actor's independence from others; and (iii) as

prescription, in which it becomes the ideological basis for policy.³²⁶ When Cobden and Bright were attacking the balance of power they saw it as a policy prescription, and one that did not fit the 'realities' of nineteenth century political economy. Interestingly enough, this is not how Angell (II) saw it.

Both Angell and Morgenthau, despite the caricatures of one as the archetypal utopian, and the other as the arch-realist, both saw the balance of power as the basic and innate description of human society, grounded in human nature. Where they differed was in their view of the strength of human nature in defining human action, and thus in the role of the balance of power in political relations. To Morgenthau, as with the social Darwinists, human nature determines the laws of human action to the point at which the intellect's role is reduced to providing the knowledge on how to accomplish those goals, and the moral justifications for actions.³²⁷ To Angell, we were capable of moving beyond our nature by the application of intellect. Thus, to Morgenthau, the balance of power was an attribute of human nature, and could not be escaped. For Angell, it was the form of human relationship associated with a society that allows free reign to instinct, but has little room for intellect. The balance of power, therefore, will be replaced --when a society becomes more rational -- by collective security.

Although a younger term than the balance of power,

collective security is equally emotive and fuzzy. In its most vulgar form it referred to two different extreme positions. On the one hand, it became a code-word for support for the League, and became associated in Britain with disarmament and non-intervention.³²⁸ On the other, it was seen as an argument for rabid interventionism, particularly of the kind that was in the interests of the great powers.³²⁹ A. J. P. Taylor claims that the phrase 'collective security' was never used until the middle 1930's, since previous to that the Great War was thought to be a mistake that would not be allowed to happen, thanks to the League of Nations. There was, therefore, no perceived need for collective security.³³⁰ Having acknowledged Taylor's point, it is worth noting that the concept of collective security has much in common with the ideas surrounding the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century. Yet, why Taylor thinks that the emergence of the phrase collective security is significant is that it appeared to emerge just at the point at which faith in an international rule of law faltered. It is important, therefore, to distinguish between an international rule of law and collective security. The former refers to a more structured system, in which a miscreant state can be subject to appropriate sanctions, imposed by an appropriate international body. Collective security, on the other hand, is an ad hoc alliance of states dedicated to upholding and promoting a set of values, which may not be shared by other non-member states.

The comparison that might be made is between an established legal system on the one hand, complete with police force, and a vigilante militia on the other. Angell's hope, after 1935, was that, since the nascent system of international law reflected in the League of Nations Covenant was failing due to lack of will, a collective security system should be fostered around the League. The hope was that collective security would begin to create the traditions out of which a proper rule of law could emerge. The alternative would be a slip back into the balance of power.

For Angell (II), collective security was a permanent arrangement between the members of the international community, which would prevent threats to the security of the international system from ever emerging. Dyadic alliances would be replaced by an alliance of the many against any disturbers of the international peace. In order to be effective such an alliance should be organised around the great powers, but there should also be a mechanism, like the League, that would allow smaller states to have a say. Collective security should also be open to all to subscribe to, even Nazi Germany. By offering states that threatened to disturb the peace the option of finding security in a collectivity of states, Angell hoped that the problem of aggressive states would find a more permanent solution. It was certainly more permanent than states relying on their own strength alone to keep the peace.³³¹ Morgenthau had little

faith in this form of collective security because it did not take into account the unsettled power relationships of the international sphere, while Carr, in *The Twenty Years Crisis*, had taken issue with the idea that states naturally shared a common interest in peace and security. A further criticism, used by Roland Stromberg, was that collective security could not function, because in most conflicts it is very difficult to decide who the aggressor is. Angell's replies to these criticisms of collective security, and the 'replies' were mainly written before Morgenthau, Carr and Stromberg wrote, will be investigated below. First, however, it is necessary to explore Angell's criticism of the balance of power as a means of organising society.

Morgenthau argued in the 1930's and '40's, that the balance of power was capable of keeping threatening states in line, and of preserving a fragile peace. Angell rejected the balance of power on the grounds that, in the long run, it fails to achieve what it sets out to do, namely to preserve the peace. A lasting peace could only be made possible by rules of conduct, similar to those that already exist at the national level, being introduced at the international level. The balance of power hindered this development because it privileged might over right. Under the balance of power concept states had to suspend their political and moral affiliations in order to make the balance work, and this meant that allies had to be supported even if they were in the

wrong, and enemies opposed even if their claims were just. In other words, a rule of law was impossible to establish in an international society that operated on the principle of the balance of power.³³² This is the reverse of Morgenthau's later interpretation of the development of the rule of law. To Morgenthau it was the settlement of disputes about relational power at the domestic level that led to the establishment of a single sovereign authority that was capable of imposing a rule of law.³³³ Angell rejected such a mechanistic view, arguing instead that a civilisation governed by the rule of law can only exist if the public mind of its population is sufficiently rational and informed enough to establish a rule of law. By contrast, an international balance of power, rather than existing because of the structure of power relations at the international level as Morgenthau claimed, exists because there is no will to defend justice.³³⁴

In addition to this, Angell regarded the balance of power as an intrinsically unstable method for preserving peace. Since military power cannot be judged accurately it is necessary for a state which bases its security on military strength to guarantee that it has a preponderance of power over its enemies, and not a balance. Thus, security for one is always insecurity for another. The attempt to hold a preponderant position in the power balance leads to instability, and thus to the very thing that the balance of power was meant to prevent -- war.³³⁵ Interestingly enough,

this was a point that Morgenthau conceded in his later work *Politics Among Nations*. Morgenthau accepted that the balance of power was inherently unstable because each state or coalition of states would prefer a superiority over its enemies, and that consequently the balance of power can only be stable if it is based on an intellectual and moral consensus.³³⁶ Although this consensus is a very different concept from Angell's sense of community built on the rational evaluation of common interest, Morgenthau had accepted the innate instability of any international arrangement based on a balance of power.

Where Morgenthau differed significantly from Angell was in his view that the balance of power, whether regulated by law or not, was an innate part of human society. Angell, instead, looked towards the possibility of building international institutional structures that would promote collective security, and hence a more permanent basis for peace. Carr had originally attacked the idea of collective security on the grounds that it assumed a harmony of interests between states and peoples which, in fact, did not exist. Collective security is, rather, the interests of the status quo powers, which is imposed on the weaker states, and that when push comes to shove the disparate national interests will always pull any system of collective security apart.³³⁷ According to Angell, however, Carr missed the point. Basically, collective security differs from the balance of

power in that it utilises an international code of norms, what Angell liked to call the 'rules of the road', which is enforced by an organisation, like the League of Nations, and can draw on the support of the majority of the members of the international community. In this respect, collective security requires states to sacrifice part of their irresponsible freedom in exchange for a more certain form of security.

Since the balance of power ultimately cannot guarantee a state's security, collective security provides the cheapest and most effective way to remove state insecurity. Collective security, therefore, assumes that there are disharmonies of interest between states, which require community action to prevent them from becoming causes of war.³³⁸ The only harmony of interest that is presupposed, in this case, is that each state desires security. Interestingly enough, when he ceased to look back at the liberal utopian past and began to look forward to a post-Second World War order, Carr went a long way to agreeing with Angell. In *Nationalism and After* Carr effectively advocated the creation of a transnational security organisation.³³⁹ Angell's concept of collective security, therefore, not only provided a critique of the assumptions behind the realist interpretation of what was feasible in international affairs, but also anticipated changes within the realist position.

The acid test of collective security is can it keep the peace, or rather will it be able to locate the source of

aggression and neutralise it? Angell answered the charge that collective security would not be able to tell who the aggressor was, in three ways. First, as a negative answer, he asked if it had been really possible under the balance of power to identify who was upsetting the balance. His point here is that perception will always be an issue under whatever system of governance we follow. Secondly, the whole point about collective security was that it established 'rules of the road', and it is far easier to spot who is contravening international law, and therefore should be the brunt of collective action, than it is to calculate who is 'disturbing' a balance of power. In this respect, using legal norms, "it is easier to determine the aggressor under the collective system than under the old."³⁴⁰ Thirdly, there is a prophylactic element to collective security, such that the collective force of international society acts as a deterrent against potentially aggressive states.³⁴¹

It is important to remember, however, that Angell is not claiming that mere structural change towards a system of collective security will bring permanent peace by controlling the disorders of the public mind. On the contrary, the structures of collective security can only be maintained if they are supported by a new tradition of internationalism and fairness. Basic to realism is the notion that the relative peace of the domestic sphere (at least in western Europe and North America) is due to the successful exercise of a single

sovereign power. Angell argued that domestic peace was rather the product of a tradition of loyalty to the state and the society it serves, and that any civilisation was only as good as the tradition that its public mind supported. In order for collective security to work it would be necessary to develop a tradition of loyalty to international society itself.³⁴² Yet, Angell was sceptical that such a loyalty could survive on its own against the non-rational elements of human nature. Because of his rationalist background, Angell argued that the only way to preserve, or produce, a rational and just tradition was by allowing as much free political discussion as possible. Angell believed that rational truths could come out of discussion, and that the all too frequent primacy of non-rational urges was the result of the closing of political discourse.³⁴³

It is the idea of loyalty to a global community that precedes the establishment of collective security, and ultimately the establishment of a World government, in Angell (II)'s thought. Yet, the 'correct' idea that corresponds to an 'objective' use of utilitarian instrumental reason -- and provides us with a reason to cooperate for our mutual material advantage -- can only come in a society in which free discussion is allowed. In such an atmosphere of free intellectual competition, Angell argued, the more rational ideas will emerge. Collective security emerges initially, therefore, as a common defence association of those countries

that have free discussion, although Angell was at pains to point out that other states should not be excluded just because they are 'unfree'. Obviously, in the 1930's, this would mean an association of 'satisfied' powers -- namely Britain, the Dominions, France and the United States. Here, Angell was to run into the ire of realist scholars, who saw in collective security nothing more than the interests of the 'haves' being imposed on the 'have-nots'. Both realism and appeasement were based around the idea that, far from being an instrument of peace, collective security was an attempt by the victors of the last war to hold on to their spoils. Chapter seven will deal with this realist opposition to Angell's ideas, while the next will begin with the dispute between Angell and the more materialist Hobsonites over whether it was capitalism that caused war or atavistic ideas and passions. It is from this dispute, as well as the criticisms of collective security, that Mitrany's reformulation of liberal rationalist peace theory emerges.

The Thorny Road to Peace:

Generally, then, Angell's work represents a crucial change within liberal rationalist peace theory, taken another step further by Mitrany, in which a number of the key assumptions of the nineteenth century were challenged. Angell (I) can be seen, very largely, as a comprehensive summation of liberal rationalism in its nineteenth century form, formulated

in such a way that it provided a reply to the national liberals and social Darwinists. Angell (II) updated liberal rationalism in the light of events in the First World War and the inter-war period. Basic to this change was the view that human nature was naturally pugnacious, and that international organisations were necessary to keep order in the World. Although Angell (II) still saw the potential -- nay, the necessity -- of changing human behaviour through the development of the intellect, this was a far cry from the optimism of the nineteenth century faith in public opinion.

Angell (II) also dropped the faith of Angell (I) in the micro-decisions of productive individuals, those very decisions that were meant to lead spontaneously and unconsciously to greater progress. Rather, Angell (II) came to rely more on the organisational structure of society, especially those of the state and of international organisations such as the League of Nations. Part of this move towards seeing a crucial role for government comes from general liberal self-doubts about the spontaneous order of a market-orientated society, which was adumbrated in the last chapter. These organisations should be supported by an appropriately rational public mind, but government nonetheless plays a crucial, and conscious, role in the ordering of society. Another part of this shift is due to Angell's experiences in the First World War, which led him to believe that institutions were necessary to prevent the outbreak of

anti-social passions rooted in human nature.

The link between the public mind and the form of government is important to Angell, and this extends to the need for an internationally-orientated public mind to support proper international arrangements. Where Angell still hangs on tenaciously to his Victorian roots is in his view of an easily knowable absolute truth. Indeed, Angell's faith in common human faculties led him to state, on different occasions during his half-century writing career, that truth was simple, and that much faulty logic was due to old, no longer valid, ideas that had hung around too long to be of any contemporary use. In this sense, method was more important than years of learning, since ordinary people, Angell claimed, did already know enough 'facts' to make the right decisions.³⁴⁴ This Victorian faith in the capacities of the individual human mind, stands -- along with his failure to understand the roles of culture and the structure of the system of production in the formation of human society -- among the weakest links in Angell's logic. Much of this faulty logic, in turn, goes back to Angell's interpretation of the reason-freedom-progress nexus, and will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight.

Chapter 6: Mitrany and the Emergence of Functionalism

People have always had a difficult time locating David Mitrany on the political spectrum. Everyone knew that he was in some way a liberal.

John H. Eastby

Like any reformer of a paradigm, Mitrany both created new possibilities for liberal rationalist peace theory, while at the same time closing off other potential lines of praxis. In his study of Mitrany's use and development of the term 'functional' David Long makes just this point about the relationship between intellectual innovation and its 'flip side' (or 'other', if you prefer); the process of intellectual forgetting. This chapter takes a largely similar line, although it looks at a different aspect of Mitrany's thought.

We might, like an academic Caesar, divide Mitrany into three parts: First, he is a product of the liberal rationalist tradition, and carries with him assumptions about the relationship between reason, freedom and progress. Secondly, Mitrany is the innovator, who put the issue of human needs at the centre of his theory of World peace, while also taking issues of culture seriously. Mitrany, contrary to Angell, put need ahead of utilitarian reason, which demonstrated his greater debt to Wallas and Hobhouse. His concern with culture reflects his experience of the Balkans, but I would like to

argue here that Mitrany has not escaped British liberal assumptions about the place of nationalism and culture -- assumptions that are interestingly enough also held by the proponents of multiculturalism in Canada.

Thirdly, Mitrany-the-innovator is also Mitrany-the-marginaliser. Here the story of liberal rationalism takes a Wagnerian turn which is probably out of keeping with its more Benjamin Britten spirit. Just as the old gods had to die in the *Gotterdammerung* to make way for the new Christian world, so the emergence of functionalism required the end of Angell's public mind concept. Mitrany's work also represents the reversal of a trend towards the left within liberal rationalism that had begun at the end of the nineteenth century. Although associated with the Labour Party throughout much of the inter-war period -- Mitrany was a member of the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on International Affairs, as well as a regular contributor to Fabian society meetings -- he came to see the potential fulfilment of functional ideas in both non-socialist technocratic organisations and multinational corporations. In fact, much to the shock of many left-wing friends, Mitrany later in life became a political advisor to Unilever. Yet, despite this, Mitrany was no friend of the free market right, and his place on the traditional continuum of left and right is often problematic.

Mitrany's thought does not break as clearly into two as does Angell's -- a more telling break seems to occur less

within Mitrany's thought, and more between Mitrany's 'functional theory' and the later conception of 'international functionalism'. The use that Mitrany's ideas were put to by post-war integration theorists, with their stress on East-West/North-South relations, was significantly different from the concerns of the 1930's that Mitrany had originally hoped his functional theory would solve. While the functionalists that followed Mitrany stressed the importance of efficiency and economic management, Mitrany was more concerned with the development of a perpetual peace system. The functional theory was meant to use the lure of economic well-being and efficient management to bring about a pacific international order. It is not for nothing that Mitrany's key works had titles like *The Progress of International Government*, *A Working Peace System* and *The Road to Security*. Later functionalist writings, particularly by Patrick Sewell, Ernst Haas, and Charles Pentland, would come to stress political integration and economic development. Although Mitrany's ideas were still regarded as leading to a peaceful World, this was no longer regarded as the central theme. That theme was now political integration for the sake of efficiency.³⁴⁵

Where Angell's ideas were, by and large, theories of economic exchange and psychology, Mitrany's functional theory was based around a view of the use and development of government. The second section of this chapter will deal with Mitrany's theory of government, particularly how it used a

particular nineteenth century view of progress, and how Mitrany saw the evolution of government in the context of the question of human needs. This conception of government will be expanded in the third section in order to show how this translated into Mitrany's propositions about the utility and form of international functional organisations. The fourth section will look at how Mitrany interpreted culture and ideology, which were, potential irritants to liberal rationalist schemes aimed at cosmopolitan peace. Before we get into a discussion of Mitrany's thought, however, it is helpful to explore the inter-war debate between Angell and the Hobsonite protagonists of the link between capitalism and war. This will be done in the first section of this chapter. For convenience I have referred to this debate as the materialist/idealist debate, for reasons that will be explained below.

Does Capitalism Cause War? The Forgotten Debate:

As far as Angell (II) was concerned, the fundamental cause of war in the modern World was the failure of the public mind to grasp the 'true' nature of our society. The complexity and success of a society rests on the level of rationality in its public mind. A higher level of rationality, and awareness of the 'facts' that govern human relations will produce and sustain a more heterogeneous and complex society. Since the question is rather one of the fit between 'reality' and the

ideas we operate under, and that a clearer and more rational understanding of our society will lead to greater cooperation, the issue of war and conflict is not rent by a socialist-capitalist split. In fact, Angell argued, capitalism can be just as international and pacific, often more so, than the socialist labouring classes.³⁴⁶ On more than one occasion, Angell was struck by how it was the ordinary working people, under the delusion (as Angell saw it) that they benefited from foreign conflicts, who shouted for war in the streets.³⁴⁷

Both Leonard Woolf and Alfred Zimmern agreed with Angell that ideas were the source of war. "War depends upon the human will", Woolf argued in 1933, "upon what goes on inside the heads of human beings".³⁴⁸ Similarly, Alfred Zimmern stressed the relevance of the moral question in IR (the "permanent problem"), and underscored the importance of the intellectual life to the management of international affairs. We might even say that Zimmern saw the realm of ideas as a yoke-mate to 'practical' politics.³⁴⁹ There was, therefore, what we might term a philosophical idealist school in inter-war IR, idealist in the sense that they stressed the role of ideas. In Angell's case, and probably in Woolf's, the view that ideas shape the society in which we live became the centre-piece of his view of war once the First World War had demonstrated the failure of the nineteenth century view of perpetual and unilinear progress. Although the germs of this idea are contained in the writings of Angell (I).

While the trauma of the First World War had forced a number of liberal rationalists to abandon a predominantly materialist position to embrace an idealist one, one group of more radical liberal rationalists felt under no such pressure. A few months before the outbreak of war H. N. Brailsford, in a book that, while not as influential as *The Great Illusion*, was to have a powerful effect on the inter-war debate over the causes of war, had argued that modern war was the result of economic structure. While substantially agreeing with Angell that war, in the economically interdependent capitalist World, made no economic sense for civilisation as a whole, it did make sense for an economic elite, who were able to use war to boost their investments abroad and their social position at home.³⁵⁰ Where Angell had seen investor and finance capital, before the war at least, as a transnational glue uniting all humanity in a common economic interest, Brailsford saw investments as fundamentally "part of the interests of the Motherland, covered by the flag and entitled to its protection."³⁵¹ War, to Brailsford, was not a product of an illusion, but the outcome of the structure of a society.

Capitalist society, although not an immediate cause, made the conditions for the outbreak of war possible by the nature of its operation. Capitalist production was highly efficient, but its method of wealth distribution was defective. The result was that both capital and manufactured goods were produced in the developed capitalist states at a greater rate

than they could be absorbed by the domestic market. The imperative for the capitalist elites, therefore, was to export both goods and capital to non-saturated markets, which meant foreign adventures and colonialism. The battle for markets between capitalist states, especially in a condition of international anarchy, created and aggravated differences between the great powers.³⁵² It followed, therefore, that by improving wealth distribution at home, through socialist planning, the tensions between states would be reduced. The way that the capitalist system had gone to war in 1914 seemed to confirm Brailsford's position, while the accompanying jingoism of non-capitalists gave more credence to Angell's public mind concept.

These two positions -- the idealist and the materialist -- translated into very different policy prescriptions. Salvaging his pre-war argument that war was caused by atavistic thinking, Angell advocated a two-prong policy. First, as war was caused by our inability to see that it does not serve our true material purposes, it is necessary to expose the fallacy that war can pay. Secondly, because our pugnacious passions are just below the surface of our natures, it is necessary to construct an international system of collective security capable of controlling potentially aggressive nations that give way to such passions.³⁵³ Thus, according to Angell, the existence of separate sovereign states was a permissive cause of war, while the irrational

passions of the public mind were the immediate cause of particular wars between states. In addition to this, Angell saw the structure of a society as a product of the traditions which the collective public mind supports (the liberal nation exists *because* of the general respect for the rule of law, and *because* people identify with their nation). Thus, any system of collective security at the international level will only flourish if there is a commonly held tradition of internationalism and support for international law.³⁵⁴ As a consequence, the education of the public and the building of proper international security organisations were two parts of the same policy for the idealist.

By contrast, the materialists saw the road to peace in the development of an alternative economic system. Their strategy was a two-stage one. Since it was the nature of capitalism that had led to the recent spate of imperialism, not to mention the armed peace that increased antagonisms between states, the first stage was to introduce a fairer economic system at the national level. This would not, in and of itself, make war impossible, but would make it less likely by removing the need to seek investments and markets abroad.³⁵⁵ The means towards a fairer national economy would be national planning, by which human needs and resources could be more justly dealt with.

On the second stage Brailsford parted company with fellow materialists such as Harold Laski. Both agreed that capitalism

was not the only cause of war, merely that it made war between independent sovereign states more likely. Brailsford's solution was a self-confessed modification of Kant's league of peace idea. Just as Kant's 'republics' would have no claim on each other, and no natural antagonisms, so Brailsford's 'socialist republics' would have no need to attack each other. They would, therefore, readily federate.³⁵⁶

Laski, on the other hand, could envisage a situation in which a socialist state, say one that was denied access to raw materials, would go to war against other socialist states. The answer lay in extending national planning to the international stage. The reason why the League of Nations failed in creating such an international organisation was that the nature of capitalist society prevented such confederal relations. Thus, socialism would first have to be instituted at home, removing the capitalist-inspired international insecurity. Only after this will the natural peacefulness of the socialist states (and Laski means Labour-style democratic socialism, not Bolshevism) make possible a properly functioning international organisation capable of removing the other causes of war.³⁵⁷ This was the reverse of Mitrany's conception of the relation of planning to war. While Mitrany agreed that international planning was needed, he thought that national planning was not the first step. Indeed, as will be discussed in the next sections, Mitrany regarded national planning as likely to increase the chance of war.

The differences between the idealists and the materialists came to a head in 1935, with an exchange of letters in *The New Statesman and Nation*. Yet, it was an exchange that was to reveal weaknesses in both positions, rather than produce a stronger synthesis. The materialists conceded Angell's argument that, in the long run, capitalist interests were served by peace, but they continued to claim that in the short term capitalism encouraged war because capitalists went for short term profits. As far as the materialists were concerned, capitalism is organised and run by people whose interests are in short-term gain. The interests of the capitalist class, therefore, might be peace, but the interests of individual capitalists at any moment in time can be served by imperialism and unregulated international affairs. Equally, Angell seemed wedded to the idea that the existence of the sovereign state in a balance of power system made war possible, while the irrationality of the public mind was the cause of particular wars between those states. The materialists argued for a broader set of different causes, in which capitalism made war possible by its profusion of armaments and its environment of tension between capitalist states.³⁵⁸ When it came to policy prescriptions Angell argued for the immediate establishment of an international authority to safeguard collective security, while the materialists doubted that this was feasible in a capitalist world in which the possession of armaments played such a crucial role in

capitalist accumulation.

Whether the participants realised it or not, the *New Statesman* debate revealed flaws in both the idealist and materialist policy prescriptions for peace. The materialists had, by this stage, pinned their hopes on the establishment of socialist governments in the most powerful capitalist states. Although they believed that the immediate causes of war were often a result of the anarchic nature of the international system, there was a strong consensus that nationally-based socialism would eliminate the underlying causes of wars.³⁵⁹ In doing this, they turned a blind eye both to the possibility that there were other state-based causes of war other than mercantilist capitalism, and that international power relations might be as much an independent variable as capitalism. Indeed, by arguing that sovereign states (rather than capitalism) were the underlying cause of war, Mitrany would go on to suggest that national planning, by giving the state more power, would increase the chances of war. This is not to say that the materialists were completely blind to other causes. Laski had mentioned the importance of non-economic causes in 1933³⁶⁰, while another Labourite associated with the materialists, G. D. H. Cole, admitted in 1958 that there were a host of other causes of war that should have been addressed by European socialists during this period. The obsession with the view that capitalism was the primary cause of war, however, came to dominate the movement.³⁶¹ With

the prospects of a Labour victory in Britain, many of the materialist thinkers were 'distracted' by the possibilities to be had through social democratic government.

On the other side, Angell's push for a proper collective security regime did not take account of the possibility that there would be groups, such as the mercantilist capitalists identified by the materialists, who could benefit (whether materially or otherwise) from war, even when the rest of civilisation did not. Angell was inclined to view those who opposed the League of Nations and collective security as irrational, since the long-term material interests of humanity were not served by war. He did not appreciate either the extent to which short-term interests have more relevance for individuals, nor the non-material interests that are important to people. The collective security system around the League of Nations collapsed because of the League's failure to address issues of concern to many millions of people. True, the Japanese and Italian adventures might be explained as due to a failure of the public mind, but the serious economic and ethnic problems that existed in Europe were largely left unresolved by the League. Collective security could not address issues of need and cultural difference.

Although not involved in this debate, the writings of David Mitrany bear the stamp of the questions that this exchange brought out. Indeed, Mitrany counted Woolf, Laski and Brailsford as friends, and often shared Fabian Society

speaking engagements with them.³⁶² Mitrany's worry that state-based planning would make war more, and not less, likely led him to propose international planning as an alternative. Yet, he rejected the idea of the grand international organisation, preferring to suggest smaller single-function organisations based around need. He also attempted to write culture into his argument; thereby constructing an international system, which would succeed where collective security, and the League, had failed. The concentration of Mitrany's argument would be on the issues of need and the overcoming of cultural difference, both areas of notable failure in the collective security solutions associated with the League.

While bolstering the idealist policy prescription, Mitrany also attacked the idea that national planning would lead to peace. While he saw the need to deal with the distributive failures of capitalism through some form of planning, national planning would create more problems than it solved by creating powerful welfare states that would need an aggressive foreign policy in order to overcome the dependency on imported raw materials and other external factors that impinged on proper state-based planning. Mitrany, despite his support for planning, was to reaffirm the idealist contention that the labour/capitalist split in Western societies was not relevant to a discussion of the causes of war. This represents a continuation from Cobden through Angell to Mitrany of the

notion that the nature of production does not of itself lead to conflict and war. The next chapter will explore how Mitrany took the lessons of this debate, and moulded them into a new liberal rationalist approach to the problems of war.

The Progress of Government and the Domestic/International Split:

Just as Angell (I) had had a Spencerian view of the progress of human society towards more cooperative forms of society, so Mitrany saw government as evolving from a more chaotic state towards a more cooperative and need-fulfilling form. Mitrany identified two purposes for government. First, it fulfilled the need for legal justice, a requirement that was largely met with the 'nightwatchman' state of the nineteenth century. The second purpose was the promotion of material and social justice, which would be the task of the twentieth century.³⁶³ Later, in a discussion of the development of equality, a benchmark of progress for Mitrany, he further divided legal justice into the first step of equality before the law, and the second step of the political freedom to make laws. The last, and twentieth century stage, of "equality of opportunity in the enjoyment of the benefits of communal life", remained Mitrany's view of the goal of modern government.³⁶⁴ This development was partially an issue of progress -- we solve one problem, that is the lack of legal order, and we move on to another -- but it is also a response to the increasing need for organisation as society becomes

more complex.

When he talked about government, however, Mitrany was not referring only to state governments. In fact, it was a crucial part of Mitrany's thinking that the creation of a split between the domestic and the international spheres of human life was simultaneously a mere two centuries old, and also no longer an effective basis for twentieth century political needs. Mitrany traced the split between the study of municipal (ie: domestic) and international government to the late eighteenth century. Here, the attention of the study of government came to concentrate on the government of states, while its "international branch was left to wallow in the slough of vague ethical professions and the juridical formulae of Grotius".³⁶⁵ While this left the international sphere as an area of war -- or rather, to put it in Mitrany's terms, the international sphere had not yet progressed to the stage of being able to promote legal justice -- the need to reform this situation was not so pressing just as long as states remained fundamentally self-sufficient. The economic developments of the nineteenth century, however, were to change this. Mitrany agreed with Angell (I) that by the beginning of the twentieth century the World had become economically inter-dependent, and that the new world that had emerged could in effect be regarded as a single organic whole.³⁶⁶

For Mitrany there seem to be two crucial outcomes from this development. First, greater economic interdependence

creates a situation in which an individual's needs cease to be primarily satisfied from economic activity within the state, but rather become reliant on forces outside of the state. To Mitrany this was part of a particularly old historical development, in which the social life always grows out beyond the reach of the society's means of security, and thus security functions are always playing catch-up with the social life. Cities were walled to protect the social life inside from marauders, but then the city became reliant on the agricultural produce outside its walls, and the baronial system emerged. This was followed by greater interdependence between regions, and security caught up by creating the territorial state. As far as Mitrany was concerned, the last century or so had seen the social life burst the bounds of the security arrangements embodied in the national state, and thus a new security arrangement had to be constructed on an international basis.³⁶⁷ Thus, one major effect of interdependence was that inter-state war was no longer a means to protect the social life, and in fact the state had gone from being an instrument of protection, to using the social life to serve the security interests of the state. The means of security had become the end of security, while the social life can now only be secure if international collective action is arranged.³⁶⁸ Secondly, the interdependence of the economy sets up a situation in which a state's interests become tied up with foreign economic relations, and hence the potential

for disputes between states, over the availability of economic resources, increase.³⁶⁹

These two effects of the interdependence bequeathed to the twentieth century by the nineteenth lead us in two different directions. The first, consistent with the works of Angell (I), holds out the possibility, even the necessity, of transcending the quarrels of states in the interests of the economic well-being of individuals. The second, contrary to Angell and in line with an argument of Harold Laski's, suggests that economic interdependence, under certain conditions, may actually aggravate the quarrels between states. As far as Mitrany was concerned, economic interdependence was not sufficient in and of itself to bring about World peace -- and it may even cause wars under the wrong set of conditions. Where Angell (I) saw the interdependence of the World economy as the prime mover towards a more peaceful World, Mitrany saw interdependence as merely an opportunity for World peace that would be realised only through changes in the way the World was governed. Central to this change were the twin issues of the move from a primarily nightwatchman state to a welfare state, and the collapsing of the false dichotomy created by the split between the domestic and international spheres.

Human Needs and the Functional Alternative to World Government:

The problem of government in the twentieth century, as Mitrany saw it, was that economic planning was necessary if human needs were to be met, but that state planning in an interdependent and industrialised World would cause war. The answer would seem to be, therefore, that international planning was required, but Mitrany was quick to point out that federalism and regional blocs would merely replicate the sins of the state at a higher level. A complete rethinking was required, and Mitrany suggested the establishment of function-specific international organisations -- the functional theory of World politics. Thus, to fully appreciate Mitrany's functional theory, we have to understand: (i) his defence of planning; (ii) his opposition to state-based planning; and (iii) his critique of federalism.

Half of Mitrany's life was spent during a period when the free market ideas of the nineteenth century were shown to be failing. Of the rest of his years, the balance was lived under the mixed economy that had been introduced after the Second World War as an attempt to bolster up the holes in free market capitalism. It is perhaps useful here to contrast Mitrany's enthusiasm for planning with the opposition to planning found in the writings of a contemporary of his: the right-wing economist Friedrich von Hayek. Although Hayek is no original thinker, borrowing most of his ideas from other orthodox liberals, he represents that part of the liberal creed that

Mitrany sought to replace with functionalism.

Ironically, the difference of opinion between Hayek and Mitrany centres around a common observation. Both writers regarded society as an organic whole, which was becoming more complex over time. Hayek, concentrating on our inability to consciously understand society in its entirety, reasoned that a modern economy could never be planned. The answer was to allow the free market to flourish, since only this way could the little bits of knowledge that each person has be integrated into unconscious social action.³⁷⁰ Mitrany, on the other hand, argued that an organic society could not flourish if human needs were not properly met, and these needs could only be organised through the conscious actions of organisations.

Although Mitrany does not explicitly attack Hayek, he makes two important points that stand as a functionalist reply to the old-style eighteenth and nineteenth century economics, which Hayek regarded himself as reviving. First, arguments of free market economic 'efficiency' for Mitrany were beside the point, since efficiency was not the problem. As far as Mitrany was concerned, the old system had failed to meet people's needs: "As a matter of principle [planners] are interested less in 'p.m.h' and 'cost per unit' than in seeing that industry produces the things which people need, and that the people who need them get them."³⁷¹ Some form of conscious control was necessary, Mitrany believed, because material

forces were getting out of our control, and consequently needed to be brought back under human command through the use of planning.³⁷² Here he echoes Angell (II)'s concern that without some kind of intervention the division of labour will remain skewed towards inefficient unemployment, and the consequent, and avoidable, poverty that that had brought. What divides Mitrany from Hayek on this issue is their separate views of the 'market mechanism' -- or in Hayek's terms, 'the catallaxy'. To Mitrany it is a hit and miss affair that belongs to a more provincial age, while to Hayek it is a process that finds its natural equilibrium. Hayek, for all his rejection of Christian morality, has re-awakened the Liebnitzian notion of an unconscious and natural order. Mitrany, on the other hand, is sophisticated enough to doubt that there is this kind of benevolent mechanism behind market relations. Blind actions do not lead, necessarily, in a desirable direction.

Secondly, Hayek assumes that planning sets out to understand society in its complex whole. Mitrany, on the other hand, did not. On the contrary, to Mitrany planning should occur within particular functions, not across the whole society. After all, one of Mitrany's criticisms of World federation was that it attempted to deal with too many functions at once. As far as Mitrany saw it, human needs were not being satisfied under the old system of free market economics and state sovereignty, and it followed that reform

was necessary. Looking at the World one and a half decades after the political heirs of Hayek took over in Britain, North America and elsewhere, it is not hard to feel that Mitrany was closer to the truth than Hayek. Fifteen years of Conservative government in Britain, most of those under a self-confessed admirer of Hayek, has resulted in a growing number of beggars on the streets, increased unemployment, rising urban crime, and an absolute decline in the life-expectancy of the bottom ten per cent of the population.³⁷³ Yet, the wealth of the society as a whole has grown. This represents a failure to fulfil human needs, and what effects this might have on an interdependent World was a worry to Mitrany.

Yet, why not national planning? State intervention had played important parts in the political theories of Hobson, Tawney and Hobhouse even before the First World War. Yet, despite his intellectual debt to this brand of liberalism, Mitrany saw national planning, as opposed to international planning, as a threat to World peace. Since, for Mitrany, it was the autarkic nation-state that was the main cause of war, rather than an economic system *per se*, strong state control of the economy would lead to a greater propensity for war by increasing the power of the state. This is consistent with Mitrany's view, outlined above, that the state had moved from being a means of protecting the social life, to a security end in itself. It was not the power of the state that needed to be increased in order to assure security.

The problem as Mitrany saw it was that, since security had spilled out beyond the state, new security arrangements were necessary to support the social life, crucial to this being the state's inability to properly protect its internal economy. National planning, by attempting to control an economy that is reliant on factors outside its borders, exacerbates the potential for conflict between states that is caused by interdependence. It attempts to extend control over raw materials, and thus creates the need to compete for sources of oil, coal and steel that are necessary to run an economy. This turns the interactions within international economics into a zero-sum game between states.³⁷⁴ Related to this, and to Mitrany's notion that state security had gone from being a means to an end in itself, was the way that national planning, by giving the state greater control over its economy, turned the state into a potential war-fighting machine. The First World War had been a prelude to this argument, in that economic self-sufficiency and planning had been used as a means of both guaranteeing the supplies necessary to keep the armed forces going, and as a means by which to threaten the economic viability of the opponent's armed forces. In order to wage a modern war a state has to make sure that it can sustain its war-machine through access to economically necessary materials, thus the move to create a more planned national economy naturally moves to a self-sufficiency that is now a necessary condition for the waging

of a prolonged modern war.³⁷⁵

Thus, national planning creates both the potential for disputes over economic materials and the means by which an economy can be used for war-fighting. Certainly, there was a sense of this logic in the early development of the European community, where the Monnet-Schuman plan hoped to make war "not only 'unthinkable but materially impossible'" through a customs union that made vital war-fighting industries dependent on cross-border links.³⁷⁶ Mitrany also recognised this, and praised the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC -- the forerunner of the European Union) for putting the sinews of war under the control of an inter-state administration.³⁷⁷ One alternative to national planning that Mitrany rejected, but was nonetheless popular amongst many supporters of European integration, was federalism. Mitrany spent just as much of his time dealing with what he saw as the 'fallacies' of federalism as he did with the 'fallacies' of national planning.

During the inter-war period ideas about an international security organisation or World government were common, especially in the English-speaking world, where advocates of a US-British democratic union as the basis for World peace were not uncommon.³⁷⁸ The idea usually was, as it was with Angell, that collective security was a half-way house to a pacific federation, and that the end result would be World government. There was a common feeling that the security

arrangements of the League of Nations had failed, and therefore there was a need for tighter international controls. Mitrany agreed that the League had been too weak, but to him the problem lay not in the lack of an ability to enforce its will, but in the divorcing of law and order from social and economic concerns.³⁷⁹ In effect, the League was in line with what Mitrany regarded as a nineteenth century view of government. A 'nightwatchman' organisation had tried to deal with problems that were the product of an economically interdependent, yet culturally diverse, World.

Mitrany was equally at odds with current federalist ideas, for a number of different reasons. High up among these was the idea that, by and large, federations change nothing today. Perhaps the biggest problem is establishing a federation in the first place. Not only was there apparently no will to create federations since the Second World War,³⁸⁰ but the process of establishment has, in the past, proved tortuous. Federations re-create the sovereign state, therefore a federal treaty would need to harmonise those many functions that are, currently, done by different states. The political interests involved in such a negotiation process are difficult enough when they involve a small and homogeneous set of negotiators, but conflicting interests would be magnified in an attempted treaty of federation involving the whole World. After all, Mitrany pointed out, the federation of Australia took almost twenty years.³⁸¹

Even if a federation could be arranged, the experiences of actually existing federalism did not make Mitrany think that it would work well. While federation was possible in the United States, and to a lesser extent in Canada and Australia, because the only "two functions" that were conceded at the time "as belonging to a federal executive" were "defence and foreign policy (and trade)",³⁸² it seemed that federal states were not well equipped to adapt their functions to the changing needs of their environment. Mitrany quotes with particular relish President Roosevelt's reaction to the Supreme Court's rejection of the National Recovery Act in 1935. Here he accused the justices and the constitution of living in the "horse and buggy" days, when communities were self-sufficient, and the government's role was limited.³⁸³ Certainly, the oldest surviving federation, the United States, has proved Mitrany's point effectively. Its reactions to change have usually required end-runs around important parts of the constitution. Roosevelt fought the Supreme Court to get the New Deal implemented, while the Presidency often has to create *ad hoc* institutions, like the National Security Council, in order to successfully implement policy. Federalism has left the US the most conservative of the modern Western democracies, with a constitution geared mainly to the problems of the eighteenth century.

Against those who championed the example of US federalism as a potential solution to the problems of the World, Mitrany

had one more reply. The US provides a unique example, in which the states combined in order to face common problems, yet they did not share a long history of separate development. "The true point of comparison, therefore, is not that thirteen American colonies were induced to federate some 160 years ago, but whether if the forty-eight states had developed as fully separate political and economic units they could be induced to federate *now*."³⁸⁴ We can add to this the recent fate of federal regimes around the World in the 1980's and '90's. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia all broke up, while federal arrangements are threatened by secession in Canada, India, Indonesia and Belgium -- not even to mention the problems that unitary states such as Italy, Spain and Britain are having with regionalism. It would seem that Mittrany's forecast about the inflexibility of federalism has been vindicated in the last five years. In fact, we might even argue that the process of disintegration of states since 1989 has had less to do with the collapse of the Soviet system, and more to do with the flaws inherent in both the modern state and the federal arrangements that were meant to reconcile the state with heterogeneity in culture and regional identities.

Federations and Leagues of peace were the solutions of a different century, as far as Mittrany was concerned. His alternative was meant to provide integration, along with flexibility to future changes and the minimum of clashing interests. Rather than concentrate on settling power relations

between interests, as federalism did, functionalism concentrated on fulfilling human needs. Despite Angell's conversion to the idea of the public mind, all liberal rationalists could agree that material well-being was the goal of civilisation, and Mitrany made the question of human needs central to his policy for World peace. Rather than trying to introduce the primacy of needs over the power-driven world of conventional international politics, Mitrany felt that organisations fulfilling human needs could subvert power-based politics. Functions that fulfil human needs, Mitrany suggested, should transcend nation-states, and therefore act on a global scale. This would lead to both economies of scale, meaning a more efficient service than could be offered by government organisations trying to fulfil the same function, and also a depoliticisation of these functions.³⁸⁵ He envisioned the internationalising of a variety of functions, of which industrial capacity -- especially coal, steel and other sectors that fed a state's war-fighting machine -- would be the most crucial.³⁸⁶

These functional organisations would help to promote peace by appealing to people's material needs, and by constructing a system of transnational organisations upon which human prosperity would rely, Mitrany hoped that people's loyalties would shift away from national governments (Mitrany, like Laski and Angell, saw the existence of the state as a permissive cause of war). At the same time, a state involved

in aggression could always be threatened with the removal of functional organisations from its soil, thus causing both popular unrest and the collapse of that state's economic capabilities to wage war.³⁸⁷ This answered, simultaneously, two different arguments, one from the idealists and one from the materialists.

Angell's experience from the First World War had been that the state could easily take control of its economy. Mitrany's functionally organised economy would make this more difficult, since the services offered by functional organisations would be truly international, and therefore not nationalisable, like private capital was during the war. Probably more important, Mitrany foresaw that such organisations would attract people's loyalty -- in a way that private capital certainly could not -- and thus not only would a state's attempt to oppose a functional organisation put it in opposition to its population, it also would not be able to count on all its citizens supporting a war policy.³⁸⁸ In addition, the materialist argument for nationalisation as a source of peace was countered by Mitrany's reply that nationalisation actually gave the state greater power by allowing it to add economic to its political power. It could, therefore, wage war without fear of international economic repercussions. Mitrany even echoed Laski's concern about raw material distribution in a socialist world. The need for economic self-sufficiency to a properly planned national

economy, Mitrany argued, would make the possession of raw materials a priority. This would actually encourage colonial adventures to acquire necessary raw materials.³⁸⁹

Another important aspect about functional organisations was that they acted as a means of uniting certain otherwise separated dyads. First, functional organisations collapse the dichotomy between national and international, a distinction which Mitrany saw as of late eighteenth century vintage, and largely held together by the sovereignty of the state. The creation of the state had led to a domestic society in which government was well developed, and an international society, which has no real existence, except as an inter-state continuation of domestic affairs.³⁹⁰ The creation of the territorial state, therefore, has produced a lawless sphere that has an ephemeral existence between states. Functional organisations collapsed this division by dealing with issues that crossed the divide between national and international, and looked at those issues as a whole, rather than dividing them into domestic and international concerns.³⁹¹

Secondly, Mitrany saw functional organisations as bringing together democracy and planning. As far as Mitrany saw it, the growing technocratic nature of the state was a threat to democratic control. After all, it seemed unreasonable that through elections citizens would be able to make their feelings felt across the vast range of state activities. In effect, one vote was used to decide who should

have control over numerous functions. Functional organisations, on the other hand, allow people to vote for assemblies that control only one function, and thus the actual control of the myriad of functions found in a modern society is more acute and democratic. The other side of this is that since individuals, to a certain extent, are experts in their own avenue of life, functional organisations that involve them in some form of democratic accountability can benefit from the various bits of individual knowledge via the medium of representation.³⁹² Thus, democracy is more effective in a functional assembly because such an institution is intended to watch over the "fair and faithful execution of a set purpose laid down in a constitutional document".³⁹³

Yet, at the same time as being potentially more democratic in their operation, functional organisations would also, Mitrany claimed, be better at planning than national governments. The problems of national planning in relation to the issue of war has already been discussed above, but Mitrany also thought that functional organisations would be more efficient because they would concentrate on the expert provision of one function within one area of the economy. State planning tried to control many functions in different environments, which Mitrany thought was both inefficient and potentially misleading.

In a discussion of peasant agriculture in Europe, Mitrany pointed out that in both liberal and Marxist economics there

was a tendency to see the economy in terms of production, rather than consumption or distribution; the result was a consensus that more efficient agriculture was capitalist agriculture. Yet, Mitrany argued that an actual observation of peasant agriculture showed that while capitalist goals of higher rents worked in industry, the peasant economies actually worked better with smaller units that were concerned with maximising the individual standard of living of the peasant. The smallholder is more productive than an agricultural capitalist firm run on industrial ideas, and it is only when it comes to distribution that the peasant finds difficulties -- the answer to which is cooperative marketing.³⁹⁴ The idea behind functional organisations is that they are fundamentally sensitive to what is the best way to organise the function for which they are responsible, and the whole point of the function-based assembly is that it is more sensitive to the needs of its smaller constituents than would a state, which has to balance numerous concerns. Thus, planning under functionalism, Mitrany argued, would enhance democracy, rather than threatening it.

Yet, to what extent is the state marginalised under a functional approach? In fact, states seem to have an important role in the establishment of functional organisations, much in the same way that Angell (II) saw states as playing a crucial role in the establishment of collective security. Again, this is a long way from the marginalisation of the state in the

visions of Cobden and Angell (I). States, in Mitrany's view, should collude in their own loss of power. This is possible only because states do not actually have a nature at all, according to Mitrany, but are merely the aggregates of their citizens.³⁹⁵ Thus the realist conception that states, like people, will defend their existence, is rejected by Mitrany, because he regards the state as existing only so far as its citizens recognise it. Thus, the will to participate in functional organisations comes from the citizens of the states that become involved.

This is not to say that functional organisations should be exclusively made up of state members, merely that states as the currently strongest forces in international politics are the most likely to resort to the functional approach to solve their mutual problems. Thus, Mitrany quoted the Danube Valley Authority (using the domestic analogy of the Tennessee Valley Authority) and the Alcan Highway -- both of which were made up of state governments cooperating in a single area -- but he was just as ready to acknowledge organisations that had partial or no state membership. Yet, Mitrany's examples of real existing functionalism were usually restricted to inter-government and UN agencies.³⁹⁶ If states were to be the main representatives on functional organisations this has implications for Mitrany's view of democratic representation. This issue will be discussed below.

Culture, Ideology and Nationalism:

So far I have discussed how the functional theory incorporated ideas of planning and need, yet functional organisations were also meant to solve the political problems created by the misapplication of ideas. Mitrany believed that his functional approach would safeguard cultural difference, while at the same time preventing culture from being a determinant of international action. Need, to Mitrany as to all liberal rationalists, was something that cut across cultural barriers. Because functional links would concentrate on need, this would leave culture to be practised unhindered at local levels. He thought that federal plans, which aimed at harmonising human activities across the board, would actually aggravate cultural differences.³⁹⁷ Through the fulfilment of human needs, Mitrany hoped that functional organisations would solve the ethnic problems that collective security had been powerless to deal with. The problem again was the state, which by allying itself with nationalism had caused ethnic conflicts. Reduce the centrality of the state and you solve the ethnic problem.

Mitrany's conception of cultural difference and its relation to human needs, therefore, contains two related points. First, the satisfaction of need does not interfere with the practice of culture. Needs are basic to humans, but culture comes after the satisfaction of needs. Secondly, a politics that privileges the state brings cultural issues into

the 'political' realm, while the privileging of need over state politics pushes culture back into its proper and essential role. State-based solutions, for Mitrany, are flawed because they attempt to solve problems of interdependence through an organisation that stresses its cultural separateness. Culture is, in Mitrany's scheme, both by-passed and restrained.

On an issue related to the question of culture, functional organisations would work on the principle of fulfilling human needs, and would thus be removed from ideological disputes -- disputes that Mitrany felt were endemic to the politics of the state, federation, or loose League-of-Nations-type conglomerations. While culture in Mitrany's view of the world was a social fact, ideology was a political imposition. In situations in which rational thought should have guided decisions, ideology imposed its own unthinking and substandard solutions.³⁹⁸ As a result, Mitrany argued, ideological disputes were unnecessarily divisive, while because material needs were the same for all people despite ideological difference, it followed that a system based on need-fulfilment would unite people where ideology divided them.³⁹⁹ This was the closest Mitrany came to dealing with the problem of the public mind, and the importance of the different ways in which people regard the world. Yet, by making the issue one of circumventing people's political beliefs, rather than reforming them through public education,

Mitrany marginalised the concept of the public mind.

What Mitrany had developed here was a hierarchy between utilitarian reason, culture and ideology. Utilitarian reason, as the most effective arbiter of our political decisions, should determine the ordering and workings of international society -- what we might refer to as the international public sphere. Culture, as a social fact, should be an important part of local and national life, but should not influence the workings of the international functional organisations. It should, in other words, be restricted to the private sphere. Ideology, which is neither a good arbiter of social life nor a social fact, should be excluded from both the public and the private realm. Rationally driven functional organisations would, Mitrany hoped, fulfil the material needs that collective security had failed to address, while at the same time excluding culture and ideology from the public sphere, where they had done so much damage to collective security.

In the context of the materialist-idealist debate of the 1930's, Mitrany's approach agreed with the materialists in the sense that he down-played the role of the public mind. Indeed, Mitrany often voiced the hope that functional organisations would make people more internationally minded. This is the mirror opposite of Angell's argument that a proper international society can only come about if the traditions necessary to support that society already exist in the public mind.⁴⁰⁰ Thus, to Angell the public mind was the independent

variable, while to Mitrany it was the dependent variable. Yet, like Angell, Mitrany saw internationalisation as occurring before social reform. His internationalised World would unite people despite their beliefs, not (like the materialists) because of a common ideology. The vehicle for Mitrany's brand of internationalisation, however, was (on balance) institutions and not ideas.⁴⁰¹ It is helpful here to view Mitrany's development of liberal rationalism in the context of Robert Cox's concept of historical structures. Cox envisions historic structures as being composed of three categories of forces: material capabilities, ideas and institutions.⁴⁰² While the materialists had privileged material capabilities, and the idealists ideas, Mitrany's version of the liberal rationalist project relied on institutions.

Mitrany's privileging of institutions was not the only new twist that he gave to the liberal rationalist project. Neither the idealists nor the materialists had made a serious study of nationalism, which is strange given the unique importance of nationalism in the early twentieth century. Being born in the Balkans of Jewish parents, Mitrany had a greater respect for the power and attraction of nationalism. Indeed, his early academic work had been on the minorities problems of eastern Europe. Brailsford⁴⁰³ and Laski, on the other hand, seemed to discount the power of nationalism altogether, while Angell's public mind concept lumped nationalism in with other 'irrational passions', without

trying to understand it. Basic to Mitrany's understanding of nationalism was the distinction between two forms of nationality, one associated with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the other more common in the twentieth. The earlier form was a social fact, in that those that formed a nation had a strong sense that they were part of a natural national community. This nationality often manifested itself in a nationalism that sought a state structure with which to govern this natural community.

Modern nationalism, by contrast, is a tool by which a state that already exists tries to create a nation out of its population. In its first form, nationalism was a "natural principle governing the formation of states" and the "release of a sense of self-expression", while the second is a "political directive" that attempts to suppress other forms of expression.⁴⁰⁴ This more modern form of nationality was both a threat to world peace, since it was exclusionary by nature and thus an aid to the concentration of power in the hands of states, but also an artifice of practical government with no deep historical roots. Mitrany thought functionalism would address the problem of nationalism because it would allow the more deep-rooted earlier form to develop as a cultural entity, while functional organisations would be more effective, from the point of view of practical politics, in fulfilling human needs than the more modern state-sponsored nationalism. Indeed, modern state-sponsored nationalism, in Mitrany's

thought, is an 'ideology' to be by-passed, while the older nationality is a manifestation of culture, which will be able to flourish at a local level under an international functional regime. The changing articulation of nationalism did offer Mitrany one crucial hope for the future. He noticed that, while nineteenth century nationalism was concerned with creating a nation by exclusion -- by identifying who does not belong -- modern nationalism seemed to be more concerned with social rights, and thus was potentially more universal in character.⁴⁰⁵

A closer inspection of Mitrany's argument reveals that he has consigned those parts of nationalism that he regards as 'natural' to the international equivalent of the private sphere, while questions of need that transcend nationality operate in a transnational public sphere. Nationalism, like culture, is to be practised as a non-political and local value. Mitrany could argue this because, like other liberal rationalists, he regarded a common and *a priori* reason (in Mitrany's case, of a utilitarian brand) to be the legitimate regulator of public affairs. In this rational public sphere there was no place for the primacy of provincial concerns such as nationalism.

Reason for Mitrany was, however, not supreme. While Angell could only see a change towards a more rational public mind as a source of permanent peace, Mitrany had taken in the teachings of his two mentors, Hobhouse and Wallas, and

accepted utilitarian reason as a relatively weak tool that has to be integrated into, and supported by, institutional arrangements. At the same time, Mitrany was also establishing a new view of society, out of which his functional approach emerged as rational. He often quoted Hobhouse's dictum that the purpose of the social sciences was to discover "the order of things", but he was also following Wallas' notion that the operation of utilitarian reason came after we had decided what our social entities are. Thus for Mitrany, it was not a question of proving the rationality of his functional theory alone, it was also an issue of providing a different view of social arrangements -- a different history if you like -- such that his functional theory could then be regarded as rational.

Hence, his first major exposition of the functional theory occurred in his *Progress of International Government* (1933), where the first goal was to create a different view of the history of political society from the current one; while in 1931 he wrote that pre-scientific approaches stress repetition, but scientific ones stress eternal change.⁴⁰⁶ Key in this was the need to marginalise the views that, on the one hand the state was natural and eternal, and on the other that the reality of the twentieth century was the struggle between capitalism and labour.

What we see here is a split definition of reason. There is the reason that operates within organisations, and is defined by the logic of that organisation, which lacks the

ability to show us the right way to live, yet provides answers to managerial problems. There is also the reason that Mitrany himself uses, which he sees as being free from dogma, that leads him to formulate his functional theory. The first is a form of pure instrumental reason, and depends on the organisation for the answers it gives. The second is a utilitarian instrumental reason, which like Angell's form, leads us towards cooperation and material self-fulfilment.

Although Mitrany saw reason as the means by which functional organisations would operate, and his plan for a functionally united World was itself a product of reason unhampered by ideology, it was not reason that would guide people to support functional organisations, but material needs. Here again Mitrany took the counsel of Hobhouse and Wallas that utilitarian reason itself was not sufficient to bring about a better World, while the fulfilment of need was. An interesting symbiosis now occurs in Mitrany's thought between reason and need. On the one hand, need helps to bring people to support a more reasonable system of international government. On the other, utilitarian reason is used in the creation and the operation of those functional organisations that help fulfil the growing needs of a more complex and organic society. It is the increase in the role of government in need fulfilment at an international level, therefore, that provides the opportunity to abolish war.

The Technocratic Road to Peace -- and Its Dangers:

Differences though there are between Angell and Mitrany, we do see the same form of reason operating. In addition to this, Mitrany has a conception of a negative freedom that is identical to Angell's. Freedom is important for Mitrany's functional organisations because it allows information to pass from people involved in the function and the organisation. There is, however, little sense in Mitrany that freedom is necessary to allow the full development of utilitarian reason via discussion, as there was in Angell. On the contrary, whether someone is dogmatic or rational seems, for Mitrany, to depend more on individual character than on access to free discussion. Unlike Angell, therefore, Mitrany has a weaker and less direct role for freedom. This, combined with his greater concern for institutional structure as a shaper of minds, has implications for Mitrany's conception of the role of democracy in the functional approach, as will be discussed below.

Mitrany does, with Angell, share the liberal rationalist conception of progress as a unilinear path, linked to a use of a common human reason. As with Angell, we have to distinguish between the progress associated with the socially unconscious micro-decisions of individuals that leads to economic growth, and the conscious attempts to construct government organisations to both catch up and assist this unconscious growth. While Mitrany does not necessarily see the unconscious development of what he calls the social life as the only spur

to progress, it is the growth of the social life beyond the security of its government that leads to each successive development of government. In the modern world, especially in later writings, this spur to the spread of the social life comes from technological innovations.⁴⁰⁷ Government itself is in a game of catch-up with the social life since "the need for organization grows faster than the units which are capable of organizing satisfactorily."⁴⁰⁸ At the same time, innovation in government is also a means by which greater efficiency, and thus material progress, can be enhanced and developed further. Thus, as with Angell, reason operates at both the micro-decision level of people making decisions that cause the extension of the social life, and at the macro-decision level where it is used to create functional organisations.

While still part of the liberal rationalist tradition, Mitrany's work represents both a change and an advance on previous theorists. The functional approach deals with an important gap in collective security, and effectively moves international organisations from a nineteenth century concern with law and order only, to the issues of need in an interdependent society. While offering guarded support to the League's collective security arrangements, Mitrany never seems to see this as more than a half-measure. The League was unable to deal with problems related to minorities (despite the limited status of protected minorities offered by the League), and to the severe economic dislocations of the inter-war

period. This rich humus of national and economic disturbance nourished the germination of fascism. the League, with its primary role of maintaining the peace, remained incapable of providing solutions to those problems that led to the outbreak of war in Europe. The functional approach, therefore, differed from Angell's prescriptions on international order in that Angell saw international organisations fundamentally in a policing role. Conflict was caused by a faulty public mind, therefore states involved in aggressive acts would have to be restrained. Mitrany, on the contrary, was attempting to solve the root causes of aggression -- whether that be clashes between sovereign states over issues of need, or the disturbances caused by cultural and ideological difference.

The functional approach was to collective security what the welfare state was to the nightwatchman state. Order could not be maintained by merely trying to maintain a police-imposed order. Rather, functional organisations were meant to by-pass nationalism, by directing their energies at human needs, while at the same time offering a function-by-function planning organisation, that would prevent serious economic problems from arising. In this planning role for functional organisations there is more than a hint of Hobson's economics (and Keynes' for that matter), in that the failure of the free market to offer a stable economy was stressed. The question was not should there be planning controls on economic activity, but rather what form they should take.

Several elements are missing from Mitrany's liberal rationalist peace theory that were key components of earlier twentieth century approaches. The first is any explicit psychological theory, such as Angell's conception of the public mind. There is a strong faith in Mitrany's writings that the success of functional organisations at fulfilling human needs will gain his approach the loyalty of the World's population. The second is an analysis of the nature of twentieth century political economy, beyond vague statements that the World has become more interdependent or organic, and Mitrany's study of the difference between peasant and industrial economics. Finally, Mitrany assumes that functional organisations will be democratic, but he rarely tells us why.

Perhaps a question that Angell would have put to Mitrany, and in fact Inis Claude does,⁴⁰⁹ is why should people be attracted to functional organisations, especially given the way that people often make choices that do not seem to be in their interests. Angell, for example, was often saddened to see how statesmen and the popular press pandered to popular demands, which were not in the interests of the state as a whole.⁴¹⁰ The question this raises is that, even if the functional organisations did successfully fulfil human needs better than current arrangements, why should people's loyalties necessarily shift to them. There is an assumption here by Mitrany (the same assumption that you see in the idea of a stable balance of power) that people will naturally

follow the course that is most rational. There is little sense here of the important caveat, found in both Kant and Angell, that humans also live under the dictates of the passions of the natural world, and so they are just as likely to sacrifice rational self-interest for 'reasons of passion' -- including a passionate nationalism.

Related to this is the question of the nature of need, and whether it is capable of uniting people in the way that Mitrany thought it would. Mitrany assumed that need transcends ideological disputes, and is largely the same across all cultures. As a result, it is quite possible for a functional organisation to use the same logic in delivering a service throughout the World. Yet, how true is Mitrany's vision of need? Certainly, there are requirements that are basic to all humans, perhaps air and food might be represented here, but how those needs are fulfilled might be influenced by other -- who knows, even cultural, factors. Just as Angell criticised the social Darwinists for basing their approach to human society on human nature, and ignoring the modifications made to human behaviour through the intellect, so we might argue in response to Mitrany that basic need is itself modified crucially by factors such as cultural difference. Is not the preparation of food, and even the extent to which we are willing to tolerate levels of pollution (the attitudes of north Americans to car pollution is an example here), a cultural issue, rather than solely one of need?

Yet, looking at what Mitrany regarded as functional organisations, need does not seem to be defined by purely biological functions. Rather, it is 'needs' such as transport (Alcan Highway Project, Danube Valley Authority), mail (Universal Postal Union), power generation (Danuban Hydro-electric scheme), labour (the ILO), oil and aviation that Mitrany sees as being the proper focus of functional organisations. While it is important to point out that Mitrany deliberately did not delineate what should and what should not be the subject of a functional organisation -- Mitrany wished to keep the idea as flexible as possible, in contrast to the relative inflexibility of the federal approach -- what he seems to class as 'needs' is economic infrastructure and raw materials. Certainly, the internationalising of a number of these functions had been very successful, with perhaps the stolid but important UPU being an excellent example of this. Yet, it is hard to see how culture could not impinge in many of these functions, and indeed some like the ILO were often the focus of ideological disputes between the superpowers. This question of what a functional organisation should deal with has been a concern of a number of scholars, and Sewell has even wondered whether functionalists have put too much emphasis on the 'material', as opposed to the 'human' (ie: social and constructed), dimension of problems.⁴¹¹

What functionalism seems to represent here is less an escape from ideology and culture, and more the creation of

effective international planning organisations, which potentially could themselves become the centre of ideological and cultural conflict.⁴¹² This can often be the case because cultures do have different priorities over how they would like their infrastructure ordered. Perhaps one of the most interesting examples are muslim banks, which because of strict laws about usury have a different form to capitalist banks.⁴¹³ Similarly, UNESCO has been at the centre of a storm about the definition of the role of journalists, in which Western values clashed with the security concerns of a number of poorer states.⁴¹⁴ This case is interesting, because here it was the Westerners who were pushing a cultural concern, whereas it can be argued that the states that were trying to restrict reporters' freedom were working from a purely pragmatic concern with security.

While the lower priority accorded to the public mind would be a criticism that Angell might have levelled at Mitrany, the Hobsonite materialists' concern would have been the lack of an understanding of the politico-economic structure, particularly as it related to the division in a capitalist society between labour and capital. Mitrany assumed that 'pragmatic' organisations, dealing with problems of need, could dispense with disputes arising from the structure of economic activity. Yet, why should functional organisations be able to (i) ameliorate disputes between different interests that have emerged through the nature of economic activity? and

(ii) avoid being the representatives of powerful interests in the global political economy? Mitrany has made a big assumption about the neutrality of international organisations, especially since he tends to envisage that it will be states that will be the most frequently involved in the establishment of these institutions. This issue will be pursued in more detail in the conclusion.

Although more a lacuna than necessarily a failure of functionalism, Mitrany never clearly laid out how functional organisations should (and could) be democratic. To be fair to Mitrany, the functional approach was not meant, necessarily, to be a blue-print for a new society. Thus the core of Mitrany's argument about the democratic possibilities of functional organisations merely revolved around their potential to allow people better control of each function that affected their lives, rather than the current state in a modern welfare state in which one regular election was the only means of feedback, and it was meant to cover all the functions. Yet, the issue of democratic control of functional organisations was still given little space in Mitrany, leading many later functionalists and neo-functionalists to assume, incorrectly, that Mitrany was advocating government by experts.⁴¹⁵ Although rarely a high-profile concern, the issue of control and representation has continued to be discussed in functionalism, with Ernst Haas returning to the concept of the market to argue for the merits of a competitive

interest-group politics.⁴¹⁶

Part of the problem seems to be that, while Mitrany is serious in his desire for accountability in functional organisations -- indeed, it is one of the things he praises the ECSC for -- he was more concerned with demonstrating the feasibility of the functional approach. As a result, he often emphasised and approved of international organisations that were far from democratic. In fact, representation on many of the organisations that he praised as functional was based on national representatives. This was the case with many of the specialised agencies of the UN (although not the ILO), the Alcan Highway project and the Danuban hydro-electric scheme. At its worse the functional approach emerges as the advocacy of the control of the expert over the whims of a democratic process. Functional organisations are part of a technocratic rule that even lacks the regular elections of a Western welfare state. This lack of concern about the development of a technocracy has much to do with Mitrany's rationalism, and his strongly held belief that a 'pragmatic' administration of human affairs was possible if a reasoned, rather than a dogmatic, approach was followed. Robert McLaren associates this approach with the Taylorist assumption that there is a "one best way" to organise human activities.⁴¹⁷

It is perhaps ironic that Mitrany's intellectual legacy was a school of thought that encouraged the goals of federalism, despite Mitrany's abhorrence for that form of

political integration. Neo-functionalism, which has had so much influence on the creation of the European proto-superstate, was meant to combine the functionalist method in the service of the federalist goal of a larger political community. Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, in their studies of European integration, both argued for a process in which political functions and loyalties would be shifted from the national to a multi-national level.⁴¹⁸ In Haas' words the goal was "a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones".⁴¹⁹ Was this not just recreating the nation-state, with all the problems that go with it, on a larger scale?⁴²⁰

Despite these criticisms of his functionalism, it is fair to say that Mitrany took the liberal rationalist approach to peace as far as it could go, given its assumptions. The idea of functional organisations was a wonderful piece of lateral thinking, in which the liberal rationalist reason-freedom-progress nexus could be combined with both social democratic goals of wealth reallocation, and with the potentially disruptive factors of state power and culture.

Yet, Mitrany's functional approach, like Angell's road to World peace, is built upon a set of assumptions that are not effectively sustainable. The criticism of the use of utilitarian reason puts liberal rationalism's concept of progress in jeopardy, and also lets in two issues that will be discussed in the conclusion. The first is that ideology and

culture, rather than being superstructures over the base of a common utilitarian reason, may in fact be the base for a superstructural pure instrumental reason. In other words, we may have to take different views of the World seriously as part of the public sphere, because they cannot be ameliorated by the use of a common reason. The second is that reason may not be available to bypass or negotiate different interests brought out by the economic structure of twentieth century production. Class and culture, not to mention ideology, may yet have to be dealt with head on if we are to create a 'working peace system'.

Part III: Conclusion

Chapter 7: The Inter-War Realist

- 'Idealist' Great Debate

Real or Imagined?

An understanding of the historical conditions out of which a theory grows, or to which it is a response, provides vital materials for the criticism of that theory and, for the theorist himself, provides the correction of self-knowledge.

Hedley Bull in *The Aberystwyth Papers*.

The founding event of the realist-dominated Anglo-American subject of IR was the realist/'idealist' debate, that was believed to have taken place in the 1930's. It is on the basis of this that Angell's thought was dropped from IR. The re-articulation of the realist-'idealist' Great Debate is important, because it demonstrates that Angell's ideas, and by implication the ideas of the liberal rationalist paradigm leading up to Mitrany, were not the victims of a superior realism. Any criticisms of liberal rationalism in the form it took with Angell and Mitrany await a proper and sustained realist critique.

Jacques Derrida once wrote that the 'literal' meaning of writing was, in fact, a metaphor itself.⁴²¹ History, in this sense, is also a metaphor. It does not exist as an objective and concrete reality in the past, but rather exists in the

present as a partial interpretation of what happened in the past in the light of what interests the present. As Pieter Geyl observed, the writing of history reduces an infinite into the finite space of an interpretation, which in turn is altered by the opinions of the historian.⁴²² All historical knowledge is, therefore, uncertain and open to revision; usually at the whims of changing fashion. Yet, before writing history off, as Henry Ford did, as "more or less bunk", it is important to realise that we all live in the past. History provides us with a condensed summation of past knowledge, redefined for use in the present. Heritage provides national unity, military history of the last war fuels the strategy of the next, and the events of past statecraft write the maxims for the diplomats of the future.

This is not to say that the study of history is a free-for-all, where any interpretation is as correct as any other. Rather, history is an infinite number of interpretations within a finite space of recorded situations. A good analogy might be with the fractions between the numbers zero and one. Although a finite space, the number of possible fractions that are below one and above zero are infinite. Chaos theory has a similar concept with the Koch curve, which is an infinite line containing within it a finite space.⁴²³ To return to history, many different stories might be told about the relative mixes of Saxon and Norman practices that went into the formation of the medieval kingdom of England, but to step outside of the

bounds of historical possibility and argue that Harold Godwinson won the battle of Hastings -- or even more absurd, that it was won by Santa Claus -- is to stretch revisionist history beyond its elastic limit.

IR, as a discipline, is no different in this respect, for the past history of the subject guides the theoretical underpinnings of future study. Of all the events in IR's past, perhaps the most crucial is the realist-'idealist' Great Debate of the 1930's and 1940's. Yet, while IR specialists have proved able historians of the actual events of past international history, they have proved rather lax in the study of the history of the ideas of their discipline. The purpose of history within IR has been more of a source on which current theories can be applied, rather than as a means of studying where that history has come from. Thus, the period of the 1930's has been treated more as a vindication of realist thought, and the disproving of 'idealism', rather than as the site of different ideas about the international sphere. Modern IR theorists have regarded the inter-war period as the testing ground of modern realism, and thus they have tended to ignore the theoretical debates of the time. Instead they have imposed the view of an arriviste 'idealism', which is beaten off by the atemporal tenets of realism, which in turn are given new vigour by their reapplication to post-war international politics.

It is interesting to read the works on international

affairs during this period, for what emerges as the great debates within Britain is not the realist/'idealist' debate, but rather a materialist/idealist debate, over whether capitalism causes war, discussed in the last chapter, and later the conflict between the appeasers and the advocates of collective security. The conflict over appeasement represents part of what is commonly regarded as the realist/'idealist' debate, but the literature of the time, in fact, does not confirm the modern interpretations of this so-called first 'Great Debate' in the subject. The construction of a realist/'idealist' debate is important because it represents the marginalisation of liberal rationalism. For Mitrany this meant not being considered part of the mainstream in IR, for Angell it meant exclusion from the subject.

It is this realist/'idealist' debate that has served as the justification for the marginalisation of Norman Angell, while Mitrany has also suffered from being labelled as an 'idealist'. The implication about being an 'idealist', in the IR sense, is that your ideas are immediately regarded as lacking a scientific basis, and therefore are of lesser value to both students and policy-makers in international affairs.

All That is Solid Melts into Air. The Realist/'Idealist' Debate:

The conventional wisdom in IR has it that 'idealism' (ie: liberal rationalism) was beaten in a 'Great Debate' with realist thinkers such as Carr, Morgenthau and Niebuhr. An

important part of the reason for their defeat at the hands of realism was the failure of appeasement, which had proved the realists to be right.⁴²⁴ Although well known and often quoted as a watershed event in IR, there seems little evidence that the realist/'idealist' debate ever occurred at all in the form in which modern IR writers claim. In a recent *New York Times* article Barry O'Neill charted how lists of past and present problems in schools went from a subjective and personal list of one man, to a 'scientific' study taken seriously by the media. The lists began being cited in right-wing Christian fundamentalist magazines, and moved on to be quoted by the Governor of California and the California Department of Education. After this they were cited throughout the US, and referenced back to the two California sources. A series of media self-referencings, and the "best-source-yet rule" ("The most credible party to date to recite or publish the lists becomes their source"), guaranteed that what began as a mere personal opinion came to be interpreted as scientific data.⁴²⁵

The school lists are folklore, and so is the realist/'idealist' debate. The debate is analogous to the Arthurian legends, in that it is based on a kernel of truth, but as a result of self-referencing and the best-source-yet rule, so much folklore has been added as to put the conventional account at odds with any possible interpretation of the historical record. What we are left with, as is the

case with all folklore, is a story that speaks to the present with the anxieties of the present, but has little correspondence with the period it is actually dealing with.

There are three different cuts that can be made into the realist/'idealist' myth. One is to take it on its own terms, and examine what was actually said by the different authors who have been characterised as 'realist' or 'idealist'. I shall begin by examining what was said, on the one hand by Carr and Morgenthau; and on the other by Angell, Leonard Woolf and Alfred Zimmern. A comparison of these writers' works presents a very different picture of the relationship between realism and 'idealism'. A second cut is to look at the 'fit' between the two approaches and the events of the 1930's. Again, this paints a very different picture from the one found in the orthodox literature. Finally, a third cut would look at the academic writings of the period and ask if they perceived that a realist/'idealist' debate was going on, and if so, where was it?

An important point of nomenclature, as well as a warning to the rash, should be made here. Realism, as a term in international relations, has come to mean many things, partially because those who call themselves realists cover a broad spectrum of thought. Carr and Morgenthau do, even, differ on crucial points, but their reasons for opposing a particularly liberal/utopian view of the World do coincide. Niebuhr, in some of his arguments, comes close to some of

their ideas, but the form of realism associated with C. A. W. Manning, Martin Wight and, later, Hedley Bull do not fit in so neatly with Carr and Morgenthau. This 'English school' was also not strongly critical of the liberal rationalist thinkers, and in fact Herbert Butterfield, who is often considered part of English school realism, was the victim of Carr's criticism on more than one occasion.

Many of the differences between the English and American school realists (with Carr very much in a category of his own) have already been discussed in chapter three. Suffice it to say that the 'realist' component of the realist/'idealist' debate has traditionally centred on the two major realist criticisms of inter-war liberalism penned by Carr and Morgenthau. Realist, in the context of the discussion of this debate, therefore, refers to the critical realism associated with Carr's and Morgenthau's attacks on liberalism.

Although Carr, in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, was criticising a mode of thought, rather than particular authors, he often quoted Angell as a prime example of the 'utopian' thought he sought to criticise. Indeed, in a later work Carr singled out Angell, along with Comte and Buckle, as the most typical representatives of the utopian obsession with the supremacy of the intellect.⁴²⁶ The main thrust of Carr's attack was on the view, so strongly purported in the ideas of Angell (I), that a natural harmony of interests existed between all people.

According to Carr the political corollary to the idea that moral laws can be established by right reasoning (ie: both transcendental and utilitarian reason) is the concept that in following right reason the individual serves the rest of the community, and the community serves the interests of the individual. Clashes of interest, therefore, are seen as the result of the incorrect calculation of interests by one or more of the conflicting parties. This is the nineteenth century liberal doctrine of the harmony of interests.⁴²⁷ Thus, the basic elements of the idea of the harmony of interests is of a common directional reason and of the power of the intellect to inform us of our true interests. Against these Carr placed the 'realist' conception of the relativity of thought.

The idea that thought is relative to circumstance has been an idea that has gained much ground in IR, not only from the critical-realist approaches of Carr and the early Morgenthau, but now from Marxism, critical theory and poststructuralism. In his criticism of the harmony of interests Carr went further than Kant's argument that circumstance 'clouds' reasoned judgement, arguing that thought is often directed to the purposes of the thinker. Thus, rational argument can be a cloak for the fulfilment of a political agenda. Carr quotes the cases of British opposition to privateering and the submarine, pointing out that Britain's argument that these weapons were uncivilised masked the fact

that privateers and submarines were also the weapons of the weak.⁴²⁸ A similar case today might be made about the modern Western opposition to the use of mustard gas and terrorism by poorer states, in the face of the contemporary Western possession of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers.

Certainly, the *Great Illusion* is full of arguments, based on a utilitarian reason, that in fact benefited the British and American positions as status quo powers. Angell supported Western colonialism and the American Western expansion because he believed that it contributed to the development of human interdependence. Previously these parts of the world were 'under-utilised' by their 'war-prone' inhabitants, but by taking over the territory, Angell argued, the Westerner integrated new peoples into the materially more efficient global economic system, and also provided, at great expense, the mechanisms for providing peace amongst these previously warring peoples.⁴²⁹ Angell was able to think this way because he believed in one common form of human utilitarian reason, which was capable, when unhindered by irrational passions, of leading people on the same single path of historical evolution. Thus, by colonising 'backward' peoples westerners were not disturbing a civilisation's separate development, but merely giving these peoples the economic and policing structures that they would have developed in time anyway.

Not long after Carr, Hans Morgenthau wrote a stinging attack against liberal rationalism, quoting Angell as one of

many modern liberal rationalists. According to Morgenthau the main failure of the internationalist rationalism to which Angell subscribed was that it reversed the relationship between power and reason. Angell (I) had assumed that the power of reason had led to the slow development of a more rational society, in which the pugnacious use of power was slowly eliminated. Morgenthau argued, instead, that it was the imposition of powerful sovereign institutions that allowed rationalist principles to operate, but only so far as the writ of that sovereign authority extended. Thus, the centralised liberal state allowed rational principles of law and justice to operate domestically. Internationally, however, questions of sovereign authority had not been settled, and as a consequence, questions of rational justice were irrelevant, as the prior question of how power should be distributed and exercised had not been settled. International politics was dominated by questions of power relations, and not by questions of the right way to live.⁴³⁰ Thus, Morgenthau was less concerned with creating a rationally-inspired perpetual peace among states, than he was with preserving peace by balancing competing powerful interests.⁴³¹

The upshot of the realist argument against the existence of a commonality of interests at the international level is that peace between states can only be maintained by a balance of power. Disputes over relational power shares, they claim, make up most of the conflicts at the international level, and

there is no intrinsic harmony of interests -- even between liberal states. Peace, according to the realists, can best be preserved by maintaining a balance between interests. The belief in a freely arrived at collective security between all states is based on the illusion that each state's security interests are the same, when in fact security interests are formed by concerns of relational power.

To Morgenthau the balance of power was not the opposite of collective security, as it was in Angell's thought, but a natural part of human society. The peculiar nature of the balance of power between nations was the result of the anarchical, amoral, and unsettled power relations found at the international level.⁴³² Carr, on the other hand, saw the potential for a collective security regime, on the condition that it both appealed to the interests of the great powers and was able to work through functional organisations that bypassed the selfishness of the state.⁴³³

Although most of the works that come under the heading of Angell (II) pre-date the realist criticisms of Angell, Carr's almost total reliance on pre-First World War Angell (I) works ensured that he missed many of the new twists in Angell's thought, while Morgenthau's much broader attack on liberal rationalism failed to take account of how much Angell (II) differed from nineteenth century liberalism. Angell (II)'s ideas, because they deal with the non-rational in human thought and the need for reforms to the international system,

have a particular relevance to the realist critiques of Angell's liberal rationalism. In addition, and almost completely ignored by realist scholars, Norman Angell, Leonard Woolf, Richard Coventry and Alfred Zimmern wrote competent replies to Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis*. In fact, Woolf's dissection of Carr's realist argument was comprehensive and devastating. It is interesting to note that in *Nationalism and After*, written six years after *Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr ignored his 'realist' critique, and advocated a 'utopian' solution to the World's problems.

Perhaps the idea that most separates the realist from the liberal rationalism of Angell and Mitrany is the question of the relationship between intellect and human nature. Carr and Morgenthau had caricatured liberal rationalism as fundamentally ignoring human nature, and assuming that the intellect was dominant. This is certainly not true, even in the writings of Angell (I), but is even less of the case in the work of Angell (II). The latter was well aware of the power of human nature, but he had argued that the failings of human nature could be rectified by the intellect, since human behaviour was affected by both instinct and reason. Leonard Woolf, in his reply to Carr, argued that our behaviour was not determined primarily by instinct, as the realists claimed, but "by a complicated process in which reason, instincts, desires, and emotions interact."⁴³⁴ In a similar vein, Mitrany argued in 1933 that it was less human nature, but the more malleable

habits, that were behind human action, although he saw a certain continuity in human practice as a result of a common human nature.⁴³⁵ Mitrany never specified what the relationship should be between habit and nature, but the idea of a mix is strongly present. Thus, what the liberal rationalist peace theorists were actually saying was that the intellect had the potential to modify our behaviour, so that behaviour did not have to rely on the instincts and emotions of human nature alone.

The idea of the superiority of the intellect led, in Carr's view, to the idea of the harmony of interests. This harmony was based on a conception of a common utilitarian instrumental reason, and, according to Morgenthau, liberal rationalists put reason ahead of power, when in fact it was power that allowed (a pure instrumental) reason to exist. While Angell (I) did use the harmony of interests frequently, Angell (II) did not. True, Angell (II) advocated an international rule of law and collective security, but this was less because he saw a natural harmony of interests between states and individuals, and rather because he recognised that interests were not harmonious, and thus would lead to war if they were not dealt with through other means. In reaction to Carr's accusation of following the harmony of interests, Angell stated that the choice was really between allowing individual interests to sort themselves out, as Carr and the appeasers advocated, and collective action that used the power

of the community to resolve or channel these interests into less destructive forms of conflict.⁴³⁶

Woolf was even stronger in his language, effectively accusing Carr of setting up a straw man with the notion of the harmony of interests. Woolf pointed out that the existence of the League was, itself, a recognition by internationalists that a disharmony of interests, that needed to be mediated by international organisations, existed.⁴³⁷ Yet, behind the writing of Angell and Woolf was an assumption that, through the exercise of reason, a cooperative international society could be created. Thus while in the short term they rejected the idea of the existence of a harmony of interests, there was a sense in which they believed in the ability of reason, through the intellect, to create some form of harmony. Thus, while Carr's criticism over the harmony of interests was flawed, there was a grain of truth in his statement.

Behind the criticism of the harmony of interests lies the question of whether it is power that allows reason to exist, or whether it is reason that is capable of using power to create a better World. Here the difference of opinion between realists and liberal rationalists is simultaneously at its most acute and its most unresolvable, in the sense that we are dealing with assumptions about human nature and its connection to the intellect in the determination of human action. Realism posits the simplest view, where the laws of human nature determine human behaviour, and the intellect can be used to

justify or analyze those actions afterwards. Liberal rationalism -- going back to Kant -- has a more complex relationship, where both human nature and human intellect affect action. Education, experience and other forces external to human nature can increase the role of the intellect in the determination of human nature, thus limiting the effects of nature. The all-too-frequent possibility still exists in liberal rationalist thought that people will not use their intellect properly, thus the realist notion of a nature-determined political realm -- a realm of struggle -- forms part of the liberal rationalist interpretation, albeit a representation of the World we have to move away from.

Ironically, both Morgenthau's realism and Angell's liberal rationalism can be attacked for their definitions of human nature, although because realism relies on this concept more heavily, it obviously comes off worse. Human nature as a determinant of action is in fact a circular argument. We observe human actions, see a tendency in them, and call that trend human nature. We then proceed to say that human nature determines (or influences in the liberal rationalist case) action. Thus action defines nature determines action. This obvious weakness in the Morgenthau canon, and in the social Darwinist approaches who also focused in on the determining role of human nature, has led many later realists to move realism away from this position. Waltz abandoned the conception of a standard human nature, only to reinvent it in

the form of a common and knowable nature of states.⁴³⁸ In fact, unlike the realism of the early Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Carr, the tendency in late twentieth century realism is to equate realism not with arguments about the determining role of human nature, but with a conception of states as dominant international actors.

Perhaps, though, it is the realist assumption that we cannot use our ability to learn to change the 'laws of history' under which we are meant to operate that is the most damning of it, and the most supportive of liberal rationalism. Although, it should be added that Carr and Morgenthau, in the final analysis, did accept the ability to learn as a potential source of change, despite their pessimistic conclusions about our inability to escape certain laws of behaviour. Change, to them, had to occur within the bounds of laws established by human nature, although their prescriptions, as we have seen above, often bore a striking resemblance to so-called 'idealist' plans. The realist notion of the universality of the balance of power, and of cyclical reoccurrence in history, assumes that all the intellect is good for is getting a better understanding of the constants of human behaviour. This, of course, flies in the face of the very human experience that realists claim to be masters at understanding. In fact, the intellect is often used to alter behaviour in such a way as to minimise conflict.

Woolf sees three different ways to react to a situation

in which conflict is endemic. The first, and realist, way is to leave things as they are and let the strongest prevail (or not, of course, if a successful balance of power operates -- if a successful balance of power can operate without rules). The second, associated with the League, is to change the nature of the conflict by imposing rules that regulate the disputes. The third way is to alter the conditions that created the dispute. To illustrate this point Woolf asks us to imagine people trying to get home on the bus during a London rush hour. There are not quite enough buses to handle the rush, so if the situation was left as it was then people would fight and push their way onto the bus in a disorganised fashion. In fact, this does not happen because, in line with the second scenario, people have imposed their own rules, and they will queue in an orderly fashion -- the first at the bus stop is the first to get on the bus. Finally, Woolf argues, we could solve the whole problem permanently if, consistent with the third scenario, more buses were put on that route.⁴³⁹

As well as pointing out that we learn, and use our learning to alter our behaviour and social structures, the liberal rationalism associated with Angell also stressed the importance of our ideas about 'reality', rather than 'reality' itself, as the basis of our actions. Woolf's example of Londoners spontaneously queuing in an orderly fashion, rather than throwing themselves at the buses in a free-for-all, stands as an anecdotal example of a crucial point left out of

the realist epistemology. Realism seeks to ground reality in power relations, but as Angell had pointed out, in his unconscious Gramscian turn, it is not power that is important *per se*, but rather the ideas that guide that power. Angell's argument about the slave society, where the power of the slaves in 'real' terms is stronger than that of their masters, yet the slaves through their ideas of their place in society forge their own chains,⁴⁴⁰ acts as a criticism of power as the basis of society. This conception of intellectual hegemony is also a better explanation of the lead-up to the Second World War, in which the more powerful West allowed the fascist dictators to flourish, largely because they had forged their own chains in the form of a belief in the power of appeasement, and the ultimately peaceful nature of Italy, Japan and Germany.

Realism, in the form it took in the 1930's and 1940's does not, therefore, represent a successful critique of liberal rationalism. If anything, much of what passes for realism in this case is a combination of some conservative ideas about struggle and liberal conceptions of human nature without liberal notions of the place of human nature in the determination of action. The question emerges, therefore, why did realism displace liberal rationalism as the dominant paradigm in IR? One argument that has been made by many modern twentieth century scholars is that the theories of the 'idealists' (liberal rationalists) had failed to halt the

advance of fascism, while the arguments of the realists proved to be correct.⁴⁴¹ Liberal rationalism, in sum, has been accused of aiding and abetting appeasement.

There is really very little to support this argument. In fact, it was the supporters of appeasement who were opposed to liberal rationalism, and Carr's attack on utopianism in 1939 was, rather, a belated defence of Chamberlain's failed policy to placate Germany before and during the Munich agreement. It is often instructive to read those passages that Carr cut out of later editions of *The Twenty Years Crisis*, including:

If the power relations of Europe in 1938 made it inevitable that Czecho-Slovakia should lose part of its territory and eventually her independence, it was preferable... that this should come about as the result of discussions round a table in Munich...⁴⁴²

The negotiations which led up to the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, were the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major international issue by a procedure of peaceful change... The change in itself was one which corresponded both to a change in the European equilibrium of forces and to accepted canons of international morality.⁴⁴³

Carr took the line -- which was a generally accepted maxim of the appeasement period -- that unsatisfied powers were a threat to global order only if they remained unsatisfied, but as they got more of what they want they soften their views, and "acquire the vested interest in peace".⁴⁴⁴ This, of course was not a universal 1930's realist position. Morgenthau certainly believed that the Nazis were rearming for war, while Niebuhr opposed the Munich

agreement.⁴⁴⁵ Yet, Morgenthau, for all that, was not a vocal opponent of fascism, and his actions and friendships during his time in Spain, just before and during the outbreak of the Civil War, reveal an ambivalence to fascism at variance with his personal disgust with the Nazis. Where Carr is guilty of supporting appeasement, Morgenthau is innocent, but he was, like most of his contemporaries, not particularly active in opposing fascism either.** Carr, however, was not the only realist to sympathise with German aims, and thus to be inclined to support appeasement. Kennan, in 1940, definitely equated realism with policies that aimed at working with the Germans. In one of his dispatches from Prague, this one dated October 1940 when many anti-fascist Czechs were fighting alongside Commonwealth forces in the crucial Battle of Britain, Kennan attacked those "[i]rresponsible Czechs, both within and without the confines of the Protectorate [of Bohemia-Moravia]" who opposed German rule. Kennan's praise was reserved for the Czech leaders who worked for Czech interests within the government of the Protectorate -- in other words the collaborators.⁴⁴⁶ Along similar lines, and in an earlier dispatch, Kennan compared the rump Czecho-Slovak state to the pro-Axis Schuschnigg regime in Austria. Kennan did not necessarily see this vassal status for Czecho-Slovakia as

** It is, of course, easy for someone who did not live through this period to make judgements on those who did. My aim here, however, is to criticise realism's ability to deal with fascism, not to question Morgenthau's behaviour *per se*.

being a necessarily bad thing in the circumstances.⁴⁴⁷ Thus, for both Carr and Kennan realism meant recognising the realities of German power, and thus not idealistically and unconditionally opposing it.^{***} That this policy of appeasing Germany ultimately led to ruin and near disaster demonstrates the potential unreality of following a 'pragmatic' approach that recognises the 'realities' of current power relations. That the advocates of *realpolitik* were split in the late thirties about what to do about Germany -- with Churchill, Morgenthau and Eden calling for opposition to Hitler; and Carr, Kennan and Chamberlain supporting the establishment of a working relationship -- demonstrates that realism as a paradigm did not provide the answers to the twenty years' crisis.

In fact, we might say that the true realism is to be found among those who sought to oppose fascism, rather than to accept its existence as a 'reality', and chose to argue that the World must change if international peace and freedom were to be achieved. (An argument along these philosophical lines has been made by Brian Barry, who regards the search for a system of greater justice as realistic; since humans are motivated by a sense of justice, as much as by self-interest. Indeed, Barry links the pursuit of justice for humans with

^{***} Although to be fair to Kennan, he was willing to publish his pro-appeasement analysis without comment after the war, while Carr tried to hide his complicity by cutting out the offending lines in later editions of his book.

self interest through the need for justification of our actions, and thus a 'truer realism' might be defined as a recognition of the importance of justice in human life.⁴⁴⁸) Admittedly, some of the reformers of international affairs were just as guilty of allowing the spread of fascism as were the realist appeasers. Quintin Hogg's eloquent reply to the Labour critics of the Conservative Party's appeasement policy points out that many opponents of Chamberlain spent the period of appeasement advocating spending less money on armaments. Hogg, a supporter of collective security, argued that without arms at its disposal Britain would not have been able to contribute to an early anti-fascist front at all.⁴⁴⁹ The problem was that much of the opposition to Conservative foreign policy during this period was effective at demonstrating fault, but defective at offering alternatives.⁴⁵⁰ Perhaps Harold Nicolson summed it up best when he received a letter from a constituent that asked him if he stood for the League of Nations and collective security, but against European entanglements. Nicolson's shock at this oxymoron was heightened when he read the letter at various meetings, only to find that his audiences rarely saw it as self-contradictory.⁴⁵¹

While accusations of passively allowing the spread of fascism can be levelled at some of the leftist and liberal opponents of Chamberlain's policies, it would be unfair to lay those accusations at the feet of either Angell or Mitrany.

Angell's opposition to the Dictators dates from at least 1931, when his support for collective security led him to argue, during the Manchurian crisis, that if the defence of collective security and the League against Japanese aggression risked war, then it was a risk worth taking.⁴⁵² As soon as the Nazis rose to power, Angell was arguing that Hitler was "promising to rearm the country, to hit back at his enemies, to indulge historic hates, to badger Jews."⁴⁵³ Angell also advocated action under the auspices of the League against Italy's invasion of Abyssinia,⁴⁵⁴ and throughout this period he remained critical of the British policy of appeasement towards the fascist states that, he believed, would still threaten British security however much they were appeased.⁴⁵⁵ British security would rely on the upholding of the law through alliances with other like-minded states, even if the League was to be discredited, a League-like association would be needed to oppose Germany.⁴⁵⁶

Mitrany's position is a little harder to pin down, mainly because his work on international affairs was limited by his association with Abraham Flexner's Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, where clashes between the two men led to Mitrany concentrating much of his energies, in the critical years of 1934-9, on American social issues.⁴⁵⁷ Yet, his interests in international affairs during this period inclined him towards support for collective security, in the sense that Angell envisioned it, and an opposition to the forms of

pacifism that did not allow the use of force against potential aggressors.⁴⁵⁸ There is little in Mitrany's work during this time that can be seen as a comfort to fascism.

Thus far we have seen how the realist critique of liberal rationalism was not as damning as the IR mythology believes, nor were the events of the 1930's a vindication of realism and a repudiation of that branch of liberal rationalism associated with Angell and Mitrany. Having taken this revisionist history of IR thus far, it only remains to take the final step, and argue that the Great debate between realism and 'idealism' in fact has little to do with liberal rationalism at all, least of all with the ideas of Angell and Mitrany, and far more to do with tensions within realism itself. To put the issue more forthrightly, the realist/'idealist' debate never happened, at least not in the way that IR theorists claim.

The first point to make is that, for a 'Great Debate', there is virtually no discussion in IR and political science journals on the relative merits of realism and 'idealism', unlike the other two 'Great Debates', which took up large amounts of journal space. *International Affairs*, which often included contributions from Mitrany, Toynbee and Carr does not mention the debate in the thirties and forties, while the *Political Quarterly* -- under the editorship of Leonard Woolf, limits it to a reply to Carr written by Woolf in 1940.⁴⁵⁹ The *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, which was otherwise very concerned about what should be taught in

international politics classes, not only does not mention a debate, it never bothered to print a review of *Twenty Years' Crisis*.⁴⁶⁰ Equally silent are *International Conciliation*, *Journal of Politics*, and *Political Science Quarterly*. Even Georg Schwarzenberger's *Power Politics*, written in 1941, makes no reference to a raging debate, despite his position as an early realist, and a contemporary of this supposed 'Great Debate'.

A little more success in the search for a realist/'idealist' debate comes with the American-published *Review of Politics*, which printed two articles during the forties that touched on a possible realist/'idealist' debate. One, by Waldemar Gurian, is more concerned with what academic subjects should form part of a study of international relations, but in his conclusion he stresses the importance of treading a middle way between only seeing conflicts, on the one hand, and seeing the solutions to humanity's problems in solely technical and educational reform.⁴⁶¹ The second article deals more directly with the conflict between 'realism' and 'utopianism'. Written by Hans Rommen, he saw a fundamental dispute within the League of Nations between realist and utopian elements.

For Rommen, utopianism is the idea that institutional changes can bring about peace, realism was the recognition of the importance of power struggles, particularly between states. Strangely enough, in rejecting the institutional

utopianism of World government advocates, Rommen comes to stress, like Angell, the need to create the idea of an international "natural order". Human reason fails, he argues, so the only answer is to have the conception of an international order of peace and justice, backed up by coercive force. Another interesting comment in Rommen's article is that he regards utopianism as on the rise during the Second World War, contrary to the view of many IR scholars that the Second World War proved realism right.⁴⁶² This is, presumably, a reaction to the rising pro-international organisation sentiment in the US at the time.

Thus, despite the promising use of terms, Rommen's conception of utopian and realist are not the same as Carr's. In fact, his concentration on peace and justice brings him closer to the neo-Grotian realism of Hedley Bull, with its emphasis on both order and justice. Equally, Rommen sees utopianism in primarily institutional terms, whereas to Carr utopianism is a mode of thought which posits a harmony of interests, and puts intellect and reason ahead of power. What we seem to be left with at this time is the criticisms of liberalism in Carr and Morgenthau, and replies to Carr from Angell, Woolf, and Zimmern: a literature vastly smaller than both the materialist/idealist debate of the 1930's, and the flurry caused by Angell's *Great Illusion* before 1914.

This situation changes, however, as soon as we enter the late forties and fifties. In 1951 John Herz published his

Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities, which Quincy Wright replied to in a review essay in 1952. 1951 also saw Herbert Butterfield making a distinction between scientific and moralistic approaches to international affairs, while eleven years later, summing up his philosophy of International Affairs, C. A. W. Manning distinguished between an absolutist realism that rejected all but what happens in tangible reality, and a realism that accepts intangible ideas. Even Stromberg's vicious attack on collective security did not occur until 1956.⁴⁶³ What emerges here, though, is a confused conception of 'idealism', which only tangentially seems to refer to liberal rationalism. While Herz's conception bears some similarities, by its close association with rationalist solutions to problems, Butterfield's view of 'idealism' refers to a moralistic approach. Neither Angell nor Mitrany can be particularly accused of moralism, especially since for Angell morals were merely what was rationally good for the material development of society, while Mitrany does not even consider the question of ethics.

A very different approach was taken by Kenneth Thompson as late as 1977. Thompson's conception of 'idealism' includes (i) a belief that institutions can change people's behaviour (true of Mitrany, but not of Angell); (ii) that 'idealism' makes a distinction between good and evil (certainly untrue of inter-war liberal rationalism, which blamed the existence of

war on poor education or badly organised institutions; and certainly did not use the more realist notion of a flawed, and therefore potentially evil, human nature); and (iii) that "justice is a pre-eminent concern" (which is just as true of the 'realist' Hedley Bull as it is of Angell or Mitrany).⁴⁶⁴

The possibility remains that the realist/'idealist' dichotomy has little to do with a disagreement between liberal rationalists and realists, but is actually a product of the nature of the realist paradigm, and its interaction with a predominantly liberal domestic sphere within the minds of realist scholars themselves. Indeed, most IR realists have been domestic liberals, and have stressed that different criteria apply to different political realms. That 'idealism' is the 'other' that occurs not outside, but inside, realism has been argued by Robert Webber, who uses Martin Wight's notion of the three traditions in IR as the starting point for delimiting an 'idealist' space within realism.⁴⁶⁵

In fact, the very nature of realism, in the many forms it has taken, sets up the conditions for the reification of 'idealism' from 'realism'. Realists often contrast the idea of universal ethics and justice with the problem of living in a World of competing power relations. Niebuhr's conception of politics, for example, was as "an area where conscience and power meet".⁴⁶⁶ Thus, the 'reality' of politics is the clash between an optimistic 'idealism' and a pessimistic realism. In Hedley Bull this translates into a continually changing

(sometimes conflictual, sometimes complimentary) interaction between justice and order. On another tack, Arnold Wolfers has stressed the crucial need for synthesis between a 'realism' that "is primarily interested in the quest for power" and an 'idealism' which seeks to promote universal principle to eliminate power relations.⁴⁶⁷ It is interesting to note that this other view of the realist/'idealist' split has continued today, with most impressively the publication of Martin Griffiths' book *Realism, Idealism and International Politics*, where these terms are used to explain the split between the American (Morgenthau and Waltz, seen as 'idealists') and English school (Bull and Wight, the realists).⁴⁶⁸

Why, then, is realism the dominant paradigm in IR? The answer might lie in a combination of the switch from British to American hegemony, and the onset of the Cold War. The United States entered the post-1945 era with little experience of international politics, especially experience as the dominant power. Realism, in the form in which it was presented by Morgenthau, offered "a convenient crib of European diplomatic wisdom".⁴⁶⁹ At the same time, the advent of bipolarity put the stabilisation of relations with the Soviet Union at the top of the agenda, to the detriment of other international concerns. Realism, as it emerged after 1945, was particularly directed to ideas of balance and the maintenance of order. All concerns of Western international politics during the Cold War.⁴⁷⁰ It follows from this, that the end of

the Cold War should lead to the questioning of realist assumptions.

What we have here is probably two different issues which have become fused. First, the realist/'idealist' dichotomy is a post-Second World War discussion within realism about the relationship between power politics and a universal morality. Secondly, realism is a not wholly satisfying criticism of liberal rationalism by Carr and Morgenthau. Unfortunately, these two separate issues have become confused, and the splits and anxieties associated with the realist attempts to come to terms with their relations towards universal ethics have become fused with an earlier rejection of rationalism.

Chapter 8: Angell and Mitrany in Retrospect: Perpetual Peace and the Problems of Reason

But now I have come to believe that the whole world is an enigma, a harmless enigma that is made terrible by our own mad attempt to interpret it as though it had an underlying truth...

[The pendulum] promises the infinite, but where to put the infinite is left to me.

From Umberto Eco's
Foucault's Pendulum.

Angell and Mitrany stand as both products and as reformers of a nineteenth century liberal attempt to understand and change the international sphere. They constitute the liberal Enlightenment's representatives in the twentieth century, and combined the assumptions of the Enlightenment with reactions to the conditions of the twentieth century. Angell dealt with both the challenges of the conservative residues of social Darwinism and National liberalism, and with the effects of the First World War. Mitrany reacted to the problems of collective security, while both of them took into consideration the failings of free-market economics.

This concluding section will concentrate on two main criticisms of the work of Angell and Mitrany. The first one is a reformulation of the criticisms of the materialists, namely

that Angell and Mitrany did not take into consideration the way that the means of production affects the shape of modern society. The second, which cuts to the core assumptions of liberal rationalism, is that Angell and Mitrany present a universalised view of utilitarian instrumental reason that does not stand up to a comprehensive examination. This criticism effects the validity of the causal claims in their thought, but does not mean that their normative claims cannot be seen as currently valid. In sum, even if the ideas associated with Angell and Mitrany cannot be validated using some form of the scientific method, their thought still might be relevant as normative theory. This, in turn, influences the relevance of their ideas in a post-Cold War era.

Angell, Mitrany and the Question of Production:

Both Angell and Mitrany show scant regard for the different ways that production organises itself through time and space. Angell's concern was not how industrial organisation had changed, but how people around the World had become reliant on flows of goods and finance, which was effectively a souped-up Cobdenite argument. Mitrany also thought that economic activity had spilled over beyond the borders of the state, and he was equally as unconcerned as Angell about how methods of industrial production had changed. In both writers there is a sense that industrial production is regarded as a quantitative, rather than a qualitative change.

Although the inter-war materialist thinkers oversimplified the effects of capitalist styles of production (their view that capitalism causes war being as dangerously simplistic as the current vogue for claiming that capitalism is more peaceful), they were aware that different forms of production would create different interests. These interests, in turn, might not be compatible with each other. Hobson's argument that, without some form of democratic-led redistribution, capitalism distributes wealth unevenly, thus causing under-consumption, seems to be as much a feature of capitalism now as it was a hundred years ago when Hobson wrote. This has caused an interest in freeing up both investment and export opportunities abroad, and has been instrumental in the formation of a number of international organisations, from the recent World Trade Organisation, to the dispute settlement panels of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. It was over-simplistic of the materialists, therefore, to see under-consumption as leading to war, when it was just as likely to lead to international organisations designed to facilitate export and investment without the necessity of an imperial foreign policy. In fact, as Craig Murphy has argued, much of the development of international organisations can be seen as a response to the changing needs of the World economy, and can even be regarded as a combination of coercive power and intellectual leadership in the service of a Gramsci-style hegemony.⁴⁷¹

Another part of the issue of production that found little place in Angell and Mitrany, namely that different productive practices produce different interests, or what Robert Cox called social forces. While Angell saw a natural conflict between labour and capital, he tended to regard this as a cross-national phenomena, that would bring people together, rather than drag them apart. A question not explored by Angell and Mitrany was the issue of whether such a division could create differences that would not be mediated by a 'working peace system'. This question becomes particularly acute when we bring in the post-1960's split between the North and the South. Are the interests of the South served by the international organisations of the North? In effect, Angell and Mitrany assumed that what was good for Western interests would be good for the World as a whole. This is quite an assumption.

This brings us to a question asked in chapter three: were Angell and Mitrany producing problem-solving theories for a hegemonic order that already existed, or were they producing more critical theories? Perhaps the first point to make is that both Angell and Mitrany were, like many post-Victorian British liberals, opposed to an unregulated market. An important distinction has to be made here between those liberals, such as Angell and Mitrany, who were dedicated to establishing international organisations, and "free-market fundamentalists", who (like Cobden) are opposed to the

establishment of more government.⁴⁷² Both Angell and Mitrany stood for redistribution of wealth, although Angell looked to national governments (e.g. in *Can Governments Cure Unemployment?*), while Mitrany hoped this could be achieved by international organisations.

Yet, because neither of these two men confronted the role of production, neither had really set out to change the power-relations in society. In fact, Mitrany's technocratic elite can be seen as fitting into Gramsci's notion of the organic intellectual, who turns the "politics" of the hegemonic class into the "rationality" of society as a whole.⁴⁷³ The organisations they run are meant to deal, without reference to 'politics', with the technical (ie: problem-solving) issues of the running of the World. There is, therefore, a radical edge to Angell and Mitrany, which leads them to support redistributive regulation, but the tenor of their work points to a recognition of current social relations as the basis upon which their ideas of international order are based.

Angell, Mitrany and Utilitarian Instrumental Reason:

The perpetual peace plans of Angell and Mitrany, as well as the liberal rationalism that they form part of, are based upon the view of a common human utilitarian reason. Reason here, like human nature, is a universal attribute of humanity, and is therefore accorded more reverence by liberal rationalists than are specific cultural traits. Reason, in the

form it takes with Angell and Mitrany, is not mere reasoning. Rather, as outlined in the preceding chapters, it is conceived as a tool for organising society; a common human faculty that shows us that, in the long run, everyone should cooperate in order to secure the greatest possible material advantage for the greatest number. The fundamental concern here, and it is one that cuts to the heart of the Enlightenment, is whether these privileged universals actually exist -- let alone if they are capable of being dominant. Culture and ideology are not only given a lesser role in the projects of Angell and Mitrany, they are also not really defined in Angell. Mitrany, on the other hand, did go a long way to giving them at least a marginal place in his project. Instead we are left to view them as either atavistic ideas that stand in the way of us seeing the truth, or as superstructural arrangements that can be safely tamed, given the right conditions. But what are culture and ideology?

In the introduction I explored the place of ideas in human society, particularly as they were viewed by the critical theory of Robert Cox, and by poststructuralism. The possibility exists here for an attack at the very foundation of liberal rationalism in IR, using the argument that ideas are prior to reason (ie: that reason in its utilitarian instrumental or transcendental forms does not exist), and consequently the whole basis for liberal rationalism's arguments in IR is removed. To a degree, the bare-bones of

this argument can be found in the inter-war attacks on liberalism from Carr and Morgenthau, to the extent that both author's questioned whether there was a reason that could unite us in a common purpose. Morgenthau had even gone as far as to argue that rationality could only be used in politics once issues of power had been settled.

Yet, Carr and Morgenthau's criticisms are partial and unsatisfying for two main reasons. First, they still talk in universalist terms. A universalising reason cannot operate because universal power relations are unsettled. The implication is that a universalising reason can exist when power relations become settled. This explains why Morgenthau was able, as we saw in chapter five, to support the idea of World government. Secondly, both Carr and Morgenthau still cling on to a conception of a common human reason, albeit a pure instrumental kind. The balance of power, Morgenthau's key concept, does function, after all, on the premise that each actor is able to *rationalise* its means and goals in the same way. The balance of power 'game' would operate whether it was played by Gandhi, Genghis Khan or Gauguin.

Culture to Angell and Mitrany, as much as to their realist contemporaries, was something that was added as a superstructure to conceptions such as human nature and (utilitarian) reason. I argue that this is to reverse the relationship. Cultures may not be universal, but that does not mean that they are not prior to conceptions that are believed

to be universal. Culture, rather, is the context of social ideas that articulates both goals and the legitimate means to those goals. Ideology is, on the other hand, the product of a particularly pluralist culture. Where a culture distinguishes between an orthodoxy and heterodoxies then there is a conception of 'correct' and 'incorrect' thought. As discussed in the first chapter, the idea of a clash of ideologies comes from a particular Enlightenment view that made the human mind the centre of the interpretation and reordering of the World. This opened up the possibility of disputing truths, and hence of the clash of ideologies. To use Cox's terms, culture is an 'inter-subjective' idea that defines a world view, while ideology represents particular 'collective' images that compete within an inter-subjective image that roots understanding in the human mind, rather than in a force external to it.

The question remains whether the conceptions of reason discussed in this thesis are, in fact, culture-specific. A side issue might also be: is the conception of reason -- and the question of how we know -- specific to groups within the same culture, particularly between genders? In short, is reason a social construct? Reason, as an *a priori* concept, cannot be proved using its own precepts, and thus rationalism is caught in the situation that its basic assumption is unverifiable.⁴⁷⁴ It is, therefore, as much an article of faith as the Trinity.

Might there not be some basic human faculty that allows for a minimal rational judgement (what I have called *reasoning*, to distinguish it from the forms of reason discussed above), just as much as there are other familiar human traits that exist across cultures? Certainly this may be the case, but we have to ask the question of whether different cultural and social experiences may not lead to very different operations of this 'faculty', in much the same way that human sociability is itself articulated in so many different ways, even within a society. Pure instrumental reason and utilitarian instrumental reason always assume a certain similarity in humans over the uses of means and ends that transcends culture. In pure instrumental reason, as manifest in Morgenthau's realism, human goals are the same (the maximisation of power), although they are not complementary. Means tend to vary depending on the situation, but again they cross cultures in the form of the use of coercive force. In utilitarian instrumental reason, as manifest in Angell and Mitrany, the goals for humans are the same and complimentary (material prosperity), and the means are also the same (cooperation in political economic relations). Yet, a perusal just through Western thought reveals a plethora of means and ends mediated by culture.

For both Augustine and Boethius the true end of human existence was to enter the Kingdom of Heaven, and the means one used to accomplish this was to behave in accordance with

the Divine Will. Thus, martyrdom was a rational choice, and in the end it was this means that Boethius chose to reach his goal. Even the uneducated warrior in an heroic age is more likely to be concerned with honour than with success, and conceptions of honour tend to be specific to a culture. In the Anglo-Saxon classic poem, the Battle of Maldon, the hero of the piece is a Saxon earl who sacrifices strategic position for honour -- a choice which meets with the approval of the poet. In opposition to this plurality, Morgenthau's realism assumed a homogeneity of ends based on human nature, while Angell and Mitrany assumed a similar homogeneity based on material needs.

While the transcendental reason associated with Kant assumes a similar cross-cultural presence, this is more overtly based on a religious faith. Both Kant and Hegel ground reason in Divine Providence, and thus, in a way, they have recognised the theological faith necessary for a grounding of human existence in reason. Walter Benjamin once compared historical materialism to an automaton designed to always win in chess. Yet, what was hidden from view by the use of mirrors was a little hunchback chess-player, called theology, who was actually moving the automaton's hands with strings.⁴⁷⁵ The same might be said for the two forms of instrumental reason, that claim to provide us with a logical grounding for the understanding of human behaviour across cultures and time. When we remove the mirrors, the same little hunchback of

theology is revealed. At least in Kant and Hegel the hunchback does not attempt to hide.

Reason, in the two instrumental forms it takes, is a construct of a particular Western and masculine way of looking at the World. Masculine here is not used as a biological attribute, but as a socially-constructed conception that is associated with maleness. It is, in this sense, as much a social category as is the term Western. Reason in Angell and Mitrany assumes a division between the object under review and the subject that is engaged in the review, thus what is privileged is the reduction of emotional attachment to a problem, and a distancing from the object being studied. As Lorraine Code has pointed out, this privileges the use of the detached sense of 'seeing' over the inter-personal senses of touching and listening (both of which presuppose a situated knower).⁴⁷⁶ This detachment of object and subject, with its assumption about the primacy of objective reasoning over subjective passions, is a trait that has been associated with a particularly Western masculine view of the World. To be rational we must be autonomous beings detached from our subject, whereas the traditional view of women is as having a character that embed them in social family structures, and thus makes 'rational' objective thought unfeminine.

Code's argument is that Western thought has privileged a particular masculine way of looking at things, and marginalised the 'weaker' feminine embedded knowledge.

Understanding of the World, for Code, comes not from detachment, but from involvement in the subject of study.⁴⁷⁷ The reason/passion dichotomy is the product of a particular masculine way of looking at the World, and is an implicit rejection of the idea of imbedded knowledge.

Support for this view of knowledge as embedded, and thus of the use of judgement or reason as only making sense within a context, comes from the arguments of a philosopher on a different part of the political spectrum from Code. Michael Oakeshott argued for the culturally imbedded nature of reason based on the example of the invention of bloomers in the nineteenth century as a form of dress designed to allow women to ride bicycles. The claim for bloomers was that they were invented by rationally considering only the form and use of the bicycle, and that no other considerations were consciously used. Why, Oakeshott asked, did they not go for shorts instead. The reason was that the designer was implicitly affected by the dress conventions of Victorian Britain.⁴⁷⁸ To act rationally, in this sense, is not to behave regardless of your situational baggage, but rather to act logically within the confines of that baggage. The reason of Angell and Mitrany is, therefore, the reason of people situated as they were, as liberal Western men.

Angell and Mitrany's conception of history, as a unilinear progression, is based on their views of rationality. The connection is far stronger here for Angell, who regards

history as the slow unfolding of a society more in tune with the dictates of reason. In addition to this, for both Angell and Mitrany, as for all liberal rationalists, reason provides a means of measuring historical progress against an atemporal standard. Angell is able to look back, and see the unfolding of a more cooperative and rational society. Mitrany, on the other hand, sees the evolution of government, as it introduces rational solutions to the problems caused by the expansion of society. But, if reason is finite in time and space we lose the use of an atemporal yardstick for history. We can still judge history by our own standards (advances in gender relations, technology, democracy, welfare provision, et al), but then, of course, we are judging past periods via means that they would not have judged themselves against.

Angell and Mitrany are guilty of what Herbert Butterfield referred to as the Whig interpretation of history, in which history is viewed from the point of view of the values of the present, and the historian searches for likenesses in the past, not discontinuities. This leads to a simplification of history that assumes a path of progress leading up to what the present regards as valuable.⁴⁷⁹ It is also the opposite of what good history, for Butterfield, was meant to be, namely the attempt to understand the past by the standards of the past.

This point is a key one. If we merely search in history for similarities, or for modern things in embryo, we will

leave out the vast wealth of dissimilarities, and thus provide a partial explanation. This is particularly misleading when we take into account that people very rarely see themselves as a beginning of something, unless they are a particularly successful clairvoyant, and able to know what the future holds. Rather, we see ourselves in terms that we understand, namely as a culmination of (recent) past influences. Grotius did not see himself as the father of international law, but rather as part of a quasi-theological study of the relations between natural law and war. After all, how could he see himself as the start of something that did not exist yet? Herodotus is regarded as the father of history, yet the term history did not exist in the way that we understand it until after the classical Greek period. Protestantism has been regarded as a blow for freedom against blind faith, yet Luther and Calvin saw themselves as reaffirming and cleansing that 'blind' faith, and were certainly no friends of freedom of religion. Even more ludicrous, Thucydides has been called an early social scientist, 2,200 years before the social sciences existed.

As soon as we actually look at history in detail it becomes increasingly complex, and discontinuities with the present frequently emerge. Our understanding of events is always clouded by the same epistemological issue brought up by Code, namely that a proper knowledge requires us to be situated in the period we study -- something that is patently

absurd. Rather, we attempt to piece together from the evidence left (physical and intellectual) how people viewed themselves and their World, despite our inability to completely remove our own implicit modern prejudices. In fact, the historical views of Angell and Mitrany are so simplistic, as to be next to useless.

Angell presents history as the development of cooperation and (utilitarian) reason. Putting to one side Angell's particularly modern interpretation of what reason means, this view of increasing cooperation through history hides the ways in which cooperation has changed over time and space in a non-linear form. Angell presents ancient history as though people during that time were both more aggressive and less social, yet if anything people in the ancient world tended to be more, rather than less, integrated into their societies. Classical Greeks saw their selves as intimately linked to their status as a member of their community. Within heroic age societies, such as Medieval Iceland, we find an organic conception of society that is so strong that, as a reading of the Icelandic sagas reveals, each person had no identity outside of their family relationships. In this respect, the coming of the Enlightenment, that Angell hailed as opening an era of cooperation, actually attempted to divorce people from their social context, creating the idea of the circumscribed individual. Cooperation, if anything, was reversed by the post-medieval World.

Even Mitrany's idea of government obscured how security arrangements could move ahead of the 'social life'. The Roman Empire, for example, provided an ethical and political unity that was not a response to the expansion of the social life. Mitrany was stronger on his distinctions between nineteenth and twentieth century problems of government, and it is probably on this that we should concentrate. Mitrany's description of the shift from problems of legal order, to ones of organic interdependence carries weight because the two centuries he is dealing with had similar assumptions about the goals of human existence. Yet, the society that pre-dated the Enlightenment was also concerned with viewing human existence as part of an organic order, albeit an ethical one linked to conceptions of hierarchy and a 'chain of being'.⁴⁸⁰ There is, therefore, no unilinear progression from anarchy to legal order, and finally to organic society.

Yet, this Whig interpretation of history is not limited in IR to the liberal rationalists. Many realists, with a fundamentally cyclical view of history, are happy to ransack the past for examples. In fact, Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* is full of examples that are ripped from their historical context. The only difference is that Morgenthau imposes modern ideas on past events in order to show that the laws of history have not changed, while Angell and Mitrany used historical examples to suggest how the laws of history have progressed. This universalising of the laws of history,

however, is not necessarily a characteristic of realism, and the English school realists such as Wight and Bull are much more aware of the ironies and discontinuities of history.

This is, perhaps, the lesson of Foucault's historiography. Different periods think differently; and changes in the way we think can occur quite quickly.⁴⁸¹ Yet, once we anchor our thought to a particular grounding concept, we are able to transpose our view of the world into the past. If we ground our thinking in divine providence, then all human history becomes a crawl up from the fall towards redemption. We ground it in a selfish human nature and history becomes a recurrence of power struggles. We ground it in a utilitarian reason, and history is transformed into a tale of the slow struggle for reform. What of our own world, where a directional reason is ridiculed, God smothered in a test-tube, and human nature rejected as meaningless? Are we left with what Nietzsche in another context called that uncanniest of guests, nihilism?

Perhaps the short answer is no. As I mentioned in the introduction, while discussing the negative concept of peace, a void in human thought soon sucks in meaning. In fact, as much as pundits may rave about relativism in the modern age, our problems today are more ones of too many absolutes, rather than too few. Fundamentalism, of religion, of the market, of cults, or nationality, are bigger problems than the radical doubts of a handful of contemporary philosophers. The real

question is do we allow this void to suck in any old meaning, or do we control and consciously discuss what meanings we want to consider?

Perhaps a start here is to recognise the changeability of meanings, particularly of words such as peace. Contained within the argument of the introduction about the different meanings of peace throughout Western thought is the point that perpetual peace is impossible, not because of any supposed pugnacity in human nature, but because of the inability of peace to mean any one single thing. The question is rather one of what we want peace to be at any one moment in time. Here we can appreciate the work of Angell and Mitrany, as it relates to their own time and cultural/ideological assumptions, yet at the same time wonder whether they are actually in a position to inform us of how we are to achieve peace at the close of the twentieth century.

Basically, we must regard Angell and Mitrany as an early twentieth century manifestation of the liberal opposition to residual conservatism. This conservatism was still manifest in the foreign affairs of otherwise liberalising states. At the same time as being part of the liberal reformulation of a conservative-inspired international sphere, Angell and Mitrany are also reformulators of a liberalism that had run into problems associated with failures of redistribution. This was carried out under the assumptions and logic of a Western-dominated World that assumed a homogeneity of purpose, which

although hiding political dominations (men over women, coloniser over colonised), worked for the world and interests for which it was written. Angell claimed to write for the whole World, but then supported colonial rule and the American western expansion. Mitrany supported the mandate system of the League of Nations, which was a fig-leaf for continued colonial rule.

The question today is can we say that a similar logic still exists? Developments in the last ten years have tended to subvert the logic of liberal rationalism, rather than support it. The irony of this is that, while the collapse of the Soviet Union has heralded claims of the end of ideology, the age of ideology ushered in by Enlightenment conceptions of the individual mind as legislator has taken new, and more contrasting forms. Liberalism may represent the single dominant form at present, but below this intellectual hegemony exist the many "critical social movements" highlighted by Rob Walker. What seems to have happened is that the "great progressive and revolutionary doctrines of liberalism, socialism and [liberal] nationalism" have ceased to monopolise the struggle of ideologies. To a large degree this is because these fundamentally Western and nineteenth century ideologies use "categories of understanding" that "seem out of joint with the times."⁴⁸² The spectacular Islamic revival of the last fifteen years, the growth within Western thought of environmentalist and women's movements, and the appearance of

micro-nationalisms the World over, all represent fissures in the facade of the liberal logic. Islam, which has its own universalist logic, is being use to establish Islamic republics exactly because many muslims feel threatened by Western universalism.

Angell, Mitrany and the Post-Cold War World:

What of peace; and can Angell and Mitrany still help us here? To a certain extent, the domination of a liberal logic, on at least the level of World elites, suggests that the ideas of Angell and Mitrany might not yet be exhausted. Angell's public mind concept, while assuming the existence of a deep-seated rationality, acts as a fair warning that we must not expect people to automatically accept the worth of a 'good idea'. The PLO-Israeli peace accord has the chance to bring stability and prosperity to the region, as well as guaranteeing Israeli security more efficiently than any system of National Service. Yet, we must expect resistance to it, for which the only antidote is open debate (of course, Angell expected one rational answer to emerge from debate, I argue that one rational answer can only emerge if all sides share exactly the same assumptions about ends and means). Within a region with a strong homogeneous culture we can expect this process to work.

Similarly, within the logic of standard Western perceptions of international conduct, the ideas of collective

security and functional organisations make good sense. In some ways these liberal rationalist ideas, championed respectfully by Angell and by Mitrany, have been implicitly accepted by both international practice and by the reformulations of realism within IR. Ideas of collective security have formed the basis of NATO and the peacekeeping role of the UN. The whole idea of the NATO 'Partnership for Peace' reflects Angell's concerns and prescriptions about the means by which security can be converted from a zero-sum to a positive-sum situation. Specialised agencies of the UN, as well as numerous inter-governmental regional organisations, such as the Gulf of Maine programme involving Canadian provincial and United States state governments, now play determining roles in many areas of international affairs. Realists themselves have accepted the logic of these organisations -- not grudgingly, but with open arms -- which poses the question of why Angell and Mitrany should be referred to as 'idealists', when their policy-prescriptions find so much favour with realists. In the presence of a liberal cosmopolitan logic, the peace plans of Angell and Mitrany make sense.

It may, perhaps, be useful here to turn back to a distinction, made in the introduction, between causal and normative ideas. The disproving of the former does not necessarily lead to the automatic disproving of the other. So, with Angell and Mitrany, their causal claims, based upon unsustainable universals and a weak historical vision, may

carry little weight, yet these same claims put in normative terms may still give their ideas force in the modern era.

Angell and Mitrany tried to demonstrate the importance of their support for peace, democracy and free discussion through scientific and 'value-free' arguments based on universals like reason and need. While these arguments proved unsatisfying, peace, democracy and free discussion do have power as part of modern western normative conceptions of the right way to live. Weapons technology, as well as memories of the destructiveness of the major wars this century, have given normative weight to the liberal rationalist support for a perpetual peace regime. There is also general agreement throughout the World that democracy is a proper way to live, and that sovereignty ultimately rests with the mass of citizens, even if the actual form that democracy should take is a viciously contested space. While Angell's argument for free discussion rests on the idea that (utilitarian) reason will favour the emergence of one correct idea, the abandoning of this causal claim does not invalidate the current normative claim that intellectual discussion and responsible free speech is intrinsically valuable, because it is part of what the late twentieth century regards as the right way to live.

There is also a sense that, whereas the specific causal claims of Angell and Mitrany (where they related to reason and need) may lack validity, the more general causal claims made in relation to the inter-relation of politics and economics in

a liberal order might still be valid. That democracy, free discussion and an emphasis on the satisfaction of need may lead to a more stable society is a causal claim that follows directly from the arguments of Angell and Mitrany. In the present international condition after bi-polarity, this causal claim seems to have just as much, if not more, relevance than realist conceptions of the relations of power.

Angell's ideas of international government and Mitrany's functional theory set out to deal with the problems of conflict between sovereign states, but in such a way as to extend democratic rule and intellectual tolerance. As long as inter-state peace, democracy and free discussion remain powerful normative claims across the Globe, then the peace plans of Angell and Mitrany can serve as starting points for asking questions about how we should reform the international sphere to make it more peaceful, democratic and tolerant.

A related question might ask what effect has the end of bipolarity had on the relevance of Angell and Mitrany's ideas to modern politics? There are two points to this. First, the end of the Cold War has changed the structure of the international sphere closer to the form that it took prior to the Second World War. Secondly, the apparent victory of the Western alliance has coincided with an upsurge in support for 'market' mechanisms.

On the first issue, I argued in the last chapter that the popularity of realism after 1945 might have much to do with

realism's ability to provide clear answers to the question of how the US should behave towards the Soviet Union. Realism was primarily concerned with the maintenance of order, and was fundamentally worried about the issues arising from politico-military competition. Bipolarity created the need for the development of a *modus operandi* between the US and the Soviet Union, that would keep their politico-military competition within limits, and would maintain global order. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the maintenance of a politico-military balance has been replaced, as a major Western concern, with questions of economic development/management, and the amelioration of smaller military conflicts. Unlike realism, the liberal rationalism of Angell and Mitrany attempts to deal with problems inherent in the interaction of politics and economics, particularly the issue of the form of international economic organisations. While realism was concerned with the macro-security issues of balances between great powers, liberal rationalists like Angell thought long and hard about the establishment of policing organisations at the international level. While realism focused on the balancing of relational power to maintain order, Mitrany's functional theory emphasised how the satisfaction of human needs would remove some of the causes of that conflict. Thus, the post-Cold War form of the international sphere seems to favour at least some partial return to liberal rationalism in IR.

On the second issue, Angell and Mitrany also represent a crucial liberal opposition to free-market fundamentalism. Both writers recognised that the international political economy required government involvement in order to correct the failure of the free market to properly distribute wealth. This is especially true of Mitrany, whose idea of international planning via functional organisations provides a particularly good liberal rejoinder to the neo-liberal distaste for central planning. Here, Mitrany also has the advantage over Angell, since Angell's view of international organisation did not deal directly with the question of economic planning, and certainly not in a way that could reconcile planning with Hayekian objections.

Thus, we might conclude, that although the logic of the prescriptions of Angell and Mitrany is flawed, because it is based on a false universalism, they still make sense within the current cosmopolitan liberal intellectual hegemony. The problem comes when those who do not feel served by liberalism push for a different set of cultural or ideological norms. A microcosm of this process is, say, how Quebec within Canada has worked against the assumptions of a pan-Canadian identity, and gradually severed functional links with the rest of Canada (not being part of the new constitution, having its own trade union movement, and having its own sovereigntist political parties). Internationally, we are likely to see the same process. Islamic republics (of which Iran is the only example

of any size to date) may exclude 'Western' functional organisations because they reject the form that internationalism takes in Western thought.

Angell and Mitrany can help give us answers about intra-liberal pacific relations, but on the issue of relations between liberalism and other cultures or ideologies we have very few signposts. Of course, there is always the internationalism popularised by Rome, in which a mix of physical and intellectual domination is used to construct one similar world-view. This option is always open to the West -- to bring peace (a *pax Romani* for the twenty-first century) by violence. The other is by a pacific pluralism, but we, as yet, have no answers to the question of how we mediate between different, and competing, culturally-based assumptions. Ironically, all Western notions of 'plurality' and 'multiculturalism' to date have assumed the acceptance, at base of common liberal norms.

Endnotes:

1. It is well to note that the growing diversity of theories in IR does not mean that there is a rigorous inter-paradigm debate going on. In 1985 Kal Holsti complained that the discipline was dividing into three irreconcilable camps. Yet, while Holsti recognised only three paradigms, I identify, today, at least seven (American school realism, English school realism, Continental liberalism, utilitarian liberalism, structuralism, critical theory and poststructuralism -- including feminist poststructuralism). Holsti is, by comparison with other North American realists, very generous. Most only recognise realism and idealism/liberalism as legitimate IR paradigms. The distance between these seven paradigms has reached such a state, that it is possible for a realist and a critical theorist to attend an International Studies Association conference, go to a panel in every session, and never be exposed to the other paradigm's point of view. K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline. Hegemony and Diversity in International Relations* (Boston, Allen and Unwin, 1985).

2. On this neglect see: Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, "Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Winter 1992, 21(3), 344-5. Jaap de Wilde, "Norman Angell: Ancestor of Interdependence Theory", in James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp (eds), *Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics* (Aldershot, Avebury, 1989), 14. Also see: David Long, "J. A. Hobson and Idealism in International Relations", *Review of International Studies*, July 1991, 17(3), 285-304.

3. See Immanuel Kant "What is Enlightenment? [1784]", in *On History* (New York, Macmillan, 1963), 3-10. For a more modern discussion of Enlightenment, that draws on the eighteenth century interpretation of Kant, see Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?", in Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader* (New York, Pantheon, 1984), 32-50.

4. This distinction was suggested to me by Katherine Fierlbeck.

5. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970 [c.1520]), 249-50 [I. 56].

6. For a summary of the Renaissance position see the first two chapters of Michel Foucault's *The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York, Vintage, 1973 [1966]).

7. Giambattista Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1968 [1744]).

8. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, no.16, 3-18. For a fuller discussion of his view of a directional history see: Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, Free Press, 1992).
9. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1961 [1513-6]), 51-2 [ch. VI].
10. On Marx see Jean Baudrillard, *The Mirror of Production* (St Louis, Telos, 1975), ch. 4. The views of Thucydides as some amoral proto-realist are ubiquitous in IR. A major exception is Daniel Garst, "Thucydides and Neo-realism", *International Studies Quarterly*, 1989, 33(1), 3-27.
11. Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1981, 10(2), 135-8.
12. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976 [1967]), 158.
13. Peter Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1964, I, 307-24.
14. Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Reconsidered", in John Dunn (ed.), *The Economic Limits of Modern Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), 190-1.
15. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972), 146-50 [II, 39-44]. Compare this to the moral decline recorded in books V to VI.
16. Euripides, *The Trojan Women*, Translated by Gilbert Murray (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1905).
17. For a discussion of the form that war took in classical Greece see: Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War. Infantry Battles in Classical Greece* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1989).
18. Plato, *The Republic of Plato* (New York, Basic Books, 1968), see especially 470c-471b.
19. See: H. C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965), 154. H. C. Baldry, "Zeno's Ideal State," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1959, 79, 10. Zeno's classic political work, the *Politeia*, is known to us only in fragments, none of which mention war specifically. It is, however, unlikely that Zeno would not have condemned war, as he condemned other institutions of the polis. It is to be assumed that the discussion of war was in

another, lost, section of the work.

20. Cicero, "The Offices [De Officiis]," in: *Cicero's Offices With Laelius, Cato Maior and Select Letters* (London, Everyman, 1909 [44 BC]), Bk I, ch. XI. See also: Cicero, *On the Commonwealth* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), Bk III (XXIII).

21. Machiavelli, *Prince*, 99-100 [ch. XVIII].

22. Menander of Athens, *Dyskolos, or the Man Who Didn't Like People* (London, University of London Athlone Press, 1960 [c.315 BC]), lines 741-5.

23. St Augustine, *Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972 [413-26]), 865-6, 892-3. [XIX. 11 and 27]. John B. Morrall, *The Medieval Imprint. The Founding of the Western European Tradition* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970), 63-6. J. G. A Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975), 7-36.

24. Saint Thomas Aquinas, "On Princely Government, Book One", in: A. P. D'Entrèves (ed.), *Thomas Aquinas. Selected Political Writings* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1948), 49-61 [chs IX-X].

25. Saint Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologica. Prima Secundae", in: *Ibid*, 113-7, 119-21 [Qu. 91 and 93].

26. Saint Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologica. Secunda Secundae", in: D'Entrèves, *Thomas Aquinas*, 159-61 [Qu. 40]

27. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus. Of the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990 [1159]), 115-7 [chs 7-8].

28. Lull's book is explored in: Andrea Hopkins, *Knights* (New York, Artabras, 1990), 64, 70-1.

29. For an examination of popular attitudes towards non-Christians, especially the Jewish community, see: Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium. Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1970 [1957]), especially chapters 3 and 4.

30. *Quran*, II (190-3).

31. Ibn Khaldûn, *The Muquaddimah* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 223-4 [III, 35].

32. *Quran*, IV (101).

33. See: K. Satchidananda Murty and A. C. Bouquet, *Studies in the Problems of Peace* (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1960), 44-8.

34. Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1976), 6.

35. Modern IR theorists, particularly from the realist camp, have had difficulty in understanding the importance of the concept of the hierarchy of creation to Medieval political thought. For a recent example of this lack of understanding, which combines the imposition of modern ideas unknown in the Middle Ages with a woeful lack of historical knowledge, see: Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices", *International Organization*, Spring 1992, 46(2), 427-66.

36. See: Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 40-4 [ch. III]. *Discourses*, 291-316, 514-5 [II. 6-15, III. 41]. Also, on the conception of the independence of the state/king from external authority (not including a more distant God) see J. W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (London, Methuen, 1960 [1928]), 5-7.

37. Francis Quarles, *Observations Concerning Princes and States, Upon Peace and War* (London, John Sweeting, 1642), 6. Original emphasis.

38. See R. B. J. Walker's discussion of the emergence of the idea of state sovereignty and its relation to the ideas of Machiavelli and Hobbes in *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter 2.

39. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968 [1651]), 185-6 [part I, ch. 13]. Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von Leibniz, "Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio) [1693]", in *Leibniz. Political Writings* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), 166. Machiavelli, *Prince*, 42-3 [III].

40. Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace* (London, Walter Dunne, 1901 [1625]). Leibniz, *op cit*, 170-5. Samuel Pufendorf, *On the Duty of Man and Citizen* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991 [1673]), 168-72. Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1965 [1955]), especially ch. 28. (quote from page 278).

41. Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, "Sully's Grand Design of Henry IV," and William Penn, "An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe," in *Peace Projects of the Seventeenth Century* (New York, Garland, 1972). Charles [Castel] de Saint-Pierre, "A Shorter Project for Perpetual

Peace," in *Peace Projects of the Eighteenth Century* (New York, Garland, 1974).

42. Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1959 [1785]), 51-2, [433-4].

43. David Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1968 [1739]), 415 [bk II, III(3)].

44. Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1978 [1795]) 18.

45. Friedrich A. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty* vol. 3: *The Political Order of a Free People* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979), 130-2.

46. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 186 [part 1, ch. 13].

47. John of Salisbury *Policraticus*, 15-6 [Bk III ch. 1].

48. Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor Pacis* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1980 [1324]), 117 [II, 4:6]. Marsilio remained a crucial influence on the developing split between the idea of the divine and the secular hierarchies for the following centuries (see the introduction to the above work, xix).

49. Lorenzo Valla, "Dialogue on Free Will", in Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall jr (eds), *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948), 173.

50. *Discourses*, 513-5 [III. 40-1].

51. Marsilius, *Defensor Pacis*, 90 [I, XIX:2].

52. René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and the Meditations* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968 [1637]), 35 [Discourse 2].

53. I owe this view of the Cartesian moment, and the subsequent quote, to Laura Janara. See: Laura Aleto Janara "The Modern Discourse of Rationality: Attenuated Identities, Political Exclusions, and the Need for a Dialectical Politics" (Dalhousie University, Unpublished MA thesis, 1993), 4.

54. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, 415 [bk II, III(3)].

55. For this argument see *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 29 [412-3], 69-72 [451-3]

56. For this argument see: *Perpetual Peace*.

57. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (Dover, New York, 1956 [1822-3]), 34-37.
58. *Ibid*, 32-3.
59. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York, Charles Scribner, 1958 [1920]), 194.
60. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York, Free Press, 1964 []), 184-6. Donald N. Levine, "Rationality and Freedom: Weber and Beyond", *Sociological Inquiry*, 1981, 51(1), 18-19. Ross Poole, *Morality and Modernity* (London, Routledge, 1991), 36-40, 65-8.
61. *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 18 [402].
62. Augustine, *City of God*, 190-6 [bk V, 9-10], 569 [bk XIV, 11].
63. Machiavelli, *Prince*, 130-1 [XXV].
64. For a discussion of the development of absolutist attitudes see: Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*.
65. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", in: *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969), 122.
66. Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960), 12-3.
67. Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 52 [434], 64-5 [446-447]. *Metaphysics of Morals* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991 [1797]), 42 [213-4], 52 [226-7].
68. Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 11-12. *Metaphysics of Morals*, 125 [313-4].
69. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1952 [1821]), especially, 21-32 [5-27], 208 [321]. Also: *Philosophy of History*, 17-8.
70. See, for example, F. A. von Hayek, "The Creative Powers of a Free Civilization", in *Constitution of Liberty*, 22-38.
71. See the argument in: John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947 [1859]).
72. *Protestant Ethic*, 181.
73. Polybius, *The Histories*, Volume III (London, Heinemann, 1956 [2nd century BC]), 269-77 [Bk VI, 1-4].

74. Augustine, *City of God*, bk XII, 10-21. Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969 [c.524]). Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 47.
75. Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 75-6.
76. Francesco Guicciardini, *Maxims and Reflections of a Renaissance Statesman (Ricordi)* (Gloucester Mass., Peter Smith 1970 [c. 1530]), 60 [C.76].
77. Michael Oakshott, "Political Education [1951]", in Peter Laslett (ed.), *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (New York, Macmillan, 1956), 15.
78. J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress. An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth* (New York, Dover, 1955 [1932]), 23-4, 25, 34-5, 65.
79. Vico, *New Science of Giambattista Vico*, 78-9 [241-245] for his view on cycles in history, book IV for his view on the stages of history.
80. For example: Levine, "Rationality and Freedom", 6.
81. Immanuel Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?", in *On History*, 150 [90-1].
82. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View", in: *Kant on History*, 21 [27].
83. "Idea for a Universal History", 23 [28]. *Perpetual Peace*, 26-32.
84. Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again", 137 [79-80].
85. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 33.
86. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 17-8.
87. Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again", 137-154.
88. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (New York, Modern Library, 1937), 81 [ch.8]. Adam Smith's view of the importance of the result of an outcome can be found in: Adam Smith *The Works of Adam Smith. Volume One: The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Aalen, Otto Zeller, 1963 [reprint of the 1811-2 edition]), 160-87 [Part II, Sect. III, chs 1-3]
89. Herbert Spencer, "Progress: Its Law and Cause [1857]", in: Herbert Spencer, *On Social Evolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972), 38-52.

90. See, as examples from two different centuries, Friedrich Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (New York, International Publishers, 1940); George Novak, *The Long View of History* (New York, Pathfinder, 1960 [1955]).

91. Herbert Spencer, "Struggle in Evolution", in: *On Social Evolution*, 168-74.

92. Karl Marx, "Marx on the History of his Opinions [Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 1859]", in: Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader*, Second Edition (New York, Norton, 1978), 4-5. Marx, "The German Ideology [1845-6]", in: Tucker, *Marx-Engels Reader*, 150-1. Friedrich Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific [1880]", in: Tucker, *Marx-Engels Reader*, 699.

93. See the discussion in Richard Bellamy, "T. H. Green and the Morality of Victorian Liberalism", in Richard Bellamy (ed.), *Victorian Liberalism. Nineteenth-Century Political Thought and Practice* (London, Routledge, 1990), 131-48.

94. Herbert Spencer, *The Study of Sociology* (Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1961), 365-6.

95. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society. A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York, Charles Scribner, 1932), 25-7.

96. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs Power Politics* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965 [1946]), 157-8, 169. *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Sixth Edition (New York, Knopf, 1985), 31-2.

97. Hans J Morgenthau, "The Dilemmas of Freedom", *American Political Science Review*, September 1957, 51(3), 715.

98. "Dilemmas of Freedom", 723.

99. *Politics Among Nations*, 193-4.

100. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*, 169.

101. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 38. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral society*, xx.

102. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 282-4.

103. George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, April 1978, 20(2), 214-235. A similar argument formed the backbone of the equally cyclical study of modern history by Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic*

Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, Random House, 1987).

104. Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966).

105. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1979).

106. Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (London, Epworth, 1953), 7.

107. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (London, Macmillan, 1977), 89. Hedley Bull, *Justice in International Relations* (Waterloo, University of Waterloo, 1984), 6.

108. Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 67. Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War*, 7-9. Morgenthau, in the American school, also stressed the need for common interest among states, but this was merely to facilitate the workings of the balance of power, and did not form the basis of justice claims as it does in the English school.

109. Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 4-5.

110. Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979), 23.

111. Martin Wight, *International Theory. The Three Traditions* (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1991), 6. "Brutus in Foreign Policy: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden", *International Affairs*, 1960, 36, 302.

112. Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 93.

113. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World Economy. The States, The Movements and the Civilizations* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), 98.

114. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, Academic Press, 1974), 347.

115. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Joan Sokolovsky, "Inter-state Systems, World Empires and the Capitalist World-Economy: A response to Thompson", *International Studies Quarterly*, September 1983, 27(3), 359-60.

116. Chase-Dunn, "The Kernel of the Capitalist World Economy: Three Approaches", in William Thompson (ed.), *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1983), 72-5.
117. Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1987, 16(2), 234.
118. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order".
119. Mark Hoffman, "Conversations on Critical International relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Spring 1988, 17(1), 92.
120. Robert Cox "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", in Stephen Gill (ed), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993). Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (London, Sphere, 1970 [1964]), 22-4.
121. See: George Friedman, *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1981), 113, 116, 118-20. See, also, Robert Cox's distinction between problem-solving (positivist) theory and critical theory in Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order".
122. N. J. Rengger, "Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Spring 1988, 17(1), 82-3. On historicity see: Richard K. Ashley, "Living on Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War", in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington Mass., Lexington Books, 1989), especially 262-4, 267, 274, 294, 297, 299.
123. See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism", in Robert O. Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), 293.
124. For Foucault's discussion of the all-pervading control of our lives see Michel Foucault, "Panopticism", in *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison* (New York, Vintage, 1979 [1975]), 195ff.
125. A recent contribution to this area is Christine Sylvester's *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4-9, 209-13.

126. Ernesto Laclau, "Beyond Emancipation" (Unpublished paper, no date). R. B. J. Walker, *One World, Many Worlds. Struggles for a Just World Peace* (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988).
127. Ashley, "Living on Borderlines", 280. Walker, *One World, Many Worlds*, 57-8.
128. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 39. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, 25-7. Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 4, 7-8, 81-4.
129. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, ch. 5. Also, see his criticism of Hans Morgenthau's view of human nature in *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1959 [1954]), chapter 2.
130. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, xi-xii. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate. The National Interest of the United States", *American Political Science Review*, December 1952, 46(4), 985-6; Thomas W. Robinson, "National Interests" in: James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy. A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York, Free Press, 1969), 186.
131. See: *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, esp. 71 [452-3]. *Perpetual Peace*, 31-2.
132. See, for example: Norman Angell, *The Great illusion. A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage* (Toronto, McClelland and Goodchild, 1911 [1909-10]), 157-8, 160, 164-5, 221. "Educational and Psychological Factors", in: Leonard Woolf (ed.), *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War* (London, Victor Gollancz, 1933), 456-7, 472. Leonard Woolf, *International Government* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1916), 124-5, 180.
133. See, for example, Bertell Ollman, *Alienation. Marx's Concept of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976 [1971]), 79.
134. See Foucault, *The Order of Things*.
135. Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations and Post-War Planning* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1941), especially the preface and introduction.
136. For a discussion of this marginalisation of peace theory see: Beverly Neufeld, "The Marginalisation of Peace Research in International Relations", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1993, 22(2), 165-84.

137. Martin Wight, "Why is There No International Theory?", in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations. Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966).

138. See, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization*, Summer 1988, 42(3), 485-507. John T. Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage*, Fourth Edition (Guilford Sluice, Dushkin, 1993), 139-53. Joseph Nye calls realism and liberalism "the two main strands in... the classical tradition of international relations": "Neorealism and Neoliberalism", *World Politics*, January 1988, 40(2), 238.

139. A good example of this can be found in R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), especially ch. 1.

140. Two examples of this, which add quantitative elements to give their realist conclusions a sense of objectivity, are: Patrick James, *Crisis and War* (Kingston and Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988); and Manus I. Midlarsky, *The Onset of World War* (Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1988).

141. Robert Filmer, "Observations Upon Aristotle's Politiques (1652)", in David Wooton (ed.), *Divine Right and Democracy. An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986), 110-12.

142. Leibniz, *Political Writings*, 186. Quarles, *Observations*, 1.

143. R. W. K. Hinton, "Husbands, Fathers and Conquerors: 1. Filmer and the Logic of Patriarchalism", *Political Studies*, 1967, 15(3), 291-300; and "Husbands, Fathers and Conquerors: 2. Patriarchalism in Hobbes and Locke", *Political Studies*, 1968, 16(1), 55-67 (The quote comes from page 55).

144. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chapters' 13, 17 and 18.

145. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch.10 p.41, ch.11 p.47, and ch.17, p. 85. Quarles, *Observations*, 1.

146. Paul Gordon Lauren, *Diplomats and Bureaucrats. The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth Century Diplomacy in France and Germany* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1976), 23-32 (the quote is from page 27).

147. See, for example Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics* (New York, Harbinger, 1963 [1916]), 9-10, 30, 299-300. Other protagonists of this view will be discussed in chapter 4.

148. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect. Studies in International Relations Naval and Political* (Boston, Little Brown, 1902). 'A Rifleman', *The Struggle For Bread: A Reply to the Great Illusion and Enquiry into Economic Tendencies* (London, John Lane/Bodley Head, 1913), 24.

149. John Burton, *World Society* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972), 36-7, 101. "World Society and Human Needs", in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds), *International Relations. A Handbook of Current Theory* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1985), 50.

150. George Bush, "The UN: World Parliament of Peace", *The Department of State Dispatch*, 8 October 1990, 1(6), 151.

151. Fukuyama, *End of History*, 108.

152. Fukuyama, *End of History*, 116.

153. Burton, *World Society*, 59-78. See also Michael Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", in Michael Banks (ed.), *Conflict in World Society. A New Perspective in International Relations* (New York, St Martin's Press, 1984).

154. Fukuyama, *End of History*, 108. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963). Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, "Introduction", in Almond and Powell (eds), *Comparative Politics Today. A World View* (Boston, Little Brown, 1984), 50-65. See also Almond and Powell's use of 'pragmatic' and 'ideological' in *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach* (Boston, Little Brown, 1966), 87-9, 312.

155. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 42 [213-4].

156. See Kant, *Foundations*, 59-61 [441-2].

157. Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 30.

158. *Ibid*, 24-6.

159. *Ibid*, 30.

160. *Ibid*, 12, 32.

161. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York, Harper and Row, 1964 [1939]), 5-6.
162. *Ibid*, chapter 4.
163. *Ibid*, 11, 21.
164. *Ibid*, 68.
165. *Ibid*, 80.
166. *Ibid*, 73.
167. *Ibid*, 89.
168. Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Pathos of Liberalism", *The Nation*, 11 September 1935, 303-4.
169. See: Alfons Söllner, "German Conservatism in America: Morgenthau's Political Realism", *Telos: A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought*, Summer 1987, no. 72, 161-72.
170. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4.
171. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil", *Ethics*, October 1945, 56(1), 1.
172. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5.
173. *Ibid*, 10.
174. *Ibid*, 12-3.
175. *Ibid*, 13.
176. *Ibid*, especially: 72-3, 136-9.
177. Renate Holub, *Antonio Gramsci. Beyond Marxism and Postmodernism* (London, Routledge, 1992), 6.
178. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders".
179. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, 22-4.
180. See *Discipline and Punish*, where he shows that past violent executions were based on beliefs about crime being not just an attack on human values, but against the order of the universe. Our own treatment of prisoners is not based on rationality, but on the modern obsession with controlling bodies. In *Madness and Civilization* Foucault makes the same claims about modern reactions to insanity.

181. Walker, *One World, Many Worlds*.

182. For an example of this tradition see the editorial in the January/February/March 1822 issue of the *Herald of Peace*, reprinted in Sandi E. Cooper (ed.), *Internationalism in Nineteenth Century Europe: The Crisis of Ideas and Purpose* (New York, Garland, 1976), 34.

183. Jeremy Bentham, "Principles of International Law" [1789-90], in *The Works of Jeremy Bentham* (New York, Russell and Russell, 1962), 557.

184. Herbert Spencer, "Struggle in Evolution" [1873], in: *On Social Evolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972), 168-9.

185. Spencer, "Struggle in Evolution", 172.

186. This distinction appears in development literature during the debate between dependency and Marxist approaches. It does, however, make a convenient division between liberal political economy approaches in the nineteenth century as well. See: Ankie M. Hoogvelt, *The Third World in Global Development* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1982), 184-98.

187. Richard Cobden, Speech at Wrexham, 14 November 1850, in: *Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by Richard Cobden MP* (London, Macmillan, 1903), 510.

188. John Bright, Speech in Edinburgh 13 October 1853, in *Selected Speeches of the Right Honourable John Bright MP on Public Questions* (London, J. M. Dent, 1907), 229.

189. James Mill quoted in Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (New Brunswick N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1978), 37. Paul Leroy Beaulieu, *Contemporary Wars (1853-1866). Statistical Researches Respecting the Loss of Men and Money Involved in Them* (London, Peace Society, 1869), reprinted in Cooper, *Internationalism*, 387-435.

190. Bright's speech at Birmingham, 29 October 1858, in *Selected Speeches*, 200-1.

191. Cobden, speech in the House of Commons, 26 February 1857, in *Speeches*, 383.

192. Cobden, speech at Wrexham, 14 November 1850, in *Speeches*, 518.

193. See the discussion in Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, ch. 2, especially 39.

194. Eméric Crucé, *The New Cineas* (New York, Garland, 1972 [1623-4]), 24-26 [29-32]. Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 32 [First supplement].

195. Richard Cobden, quoted in Donald Read, *Cobden and Bright. A Victorian Political Partnership* (London, Edward Arnold, 1967), 110. Emphasis in the original.

196. See, for example, G. Armitage-Smith, *The Free-Trade Movement and its Results* (London, Blackie, 1903 [1898]), 110-1.

197. See, for example, John Bright's speech in Edinburgh, 13 October 1853, in John Bright, *Selected Speeches*, 230-1.

198. Cobden's speech in London, 28 september 1843, in Cobden, *Speeches*, 40.

199. W. E. Gladstone's speech at Edinburgh on 25 November 1879, in W. E. Gladstone, *Political Speeches in Scotland, November and December 1879* (London, Ridgway, 1879), 221.

200. Bright's speech at Birmingham on 29 October 1858, in *Selected Speeches*, 204.

201. Letter from Cobden to Mr Richard 29 September 1852, reprinted in J. A. Hobson, *Richard Cobden. The International Man* (Toronto, Dent and Son, 1918?), 90.

202. In this regard, see especially, Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964 [1939]), 24-7. George Modelski, "Agraria and Industria. Two Models of the International System", *World Politics*, October 1961, 14(1), 118-43. Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics*.

203. Ernest Baker, *Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914* (London, Thornton Butterworth, 1928 [1915]), 93-4. Herbert Spencer, "Militancy and Industrialism", in *On Social Evolution*, 149-66.

204. T. H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986 [pre-1882]), 135-7 [paras 172-5]:

205. cited in F. Melian Stawell, *The Growth of International Thought* (London, Thornton Butterworth, 1929), 227-31.

206. See, for example, Gladstone's Rectorial address to Glasgow University, in *Political Speeches*, 336.

207. Read, *Cobden and Bright*, 115-6.

208. Cobden's speech in Wrexham, 14 November 1850, in *Speeches*, 518. Bright's speech in Birmingham, 29 October 1858, in *Selected Speeches*, 201.

209. For a particular example, see: W. E. Gladstone, *The Turco-Servian War. Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* (New York, Lovell Adam and Wesson, 1876), 31.

210. Gladstone, *Political Speeches*, 115. *Bulgarian Horrors*, 37.

211. Green, *Principles of Political Obligation*, 137-8.

212. Cobden's letter to Henry Ashworth, 12 April 1842, reprinted in John Morley, *The Life of Richard Cobden*, volume I (London, Macmillan, 1908 [1881]), 248. Read, *Cobden and Bright*, 113.

213. See, for example, Cobden's speech at Wrexham, 14 November 1850, in *Speeches*, 512-13.

214. Armitage-Smith, *Free-Trade Movement*, 67.

215. See Robert Lowe, "Is the Popular Judgement in Politics More Just than that of the Higher Orders? -- 1 [July 1878]", and William Ewart Gladstone, "Is the Popular Judgement in Politics More Just than that of the Higher Orders? -- 2 [July 1878]", in Michael Goodwin (ed.), *Nineteenth Century Opinion. An Anthology of Extracts From the First Fifty Volumes of the Nineteenth Century 1877-1901* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1951), 224-8

216. Read, *Cobden and Bright*, 148-9, 239. F. R. Flournoy, "British Liberal Theories of International Relations (1848-1898)", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, April 1946, 7(2), 195, 216.

217. See the discussion of Weber in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy. Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974), 26, 45-6. Sir George Tomkyns Chesney, *The Battle of Dorking. Reminiscences of a Volunteer* (Edinburgh and London, William Blackwell, 1871), 3-15. Also: 'A Rifleman', *Struggle for Bread*, esp 24, 167, 205, 209, 222.

218. Ferdinand Toennies, "The Power and Value of Public Opinion", in *On Sociology: Pure, Applied, and Empirical* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971), 260. Howard, "War and the Liberal Conscience", 68-9.

219. Mommsen, *Age of Bureaucracy*, 43.

220. 'A Rifleman', *Struggle for Bread*, 165. Chesney, *Battle of Dorking*, 62-3.

221. For Hobson's theory of underconsumption, and its centrality to understanding modern political economy, see his *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism* (London, Scott, 1894). For a summary of Hobson's economic theory see P. F. Clarke, "Introduction [1974]", in J. A. Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism. New Issues in Democracy* (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1974 [1909]), ix-xxxiv. For a critical appraisal of Hobson's work see David Long, "J. A. Hobson's Approach to International Relations: An Exposition and Critique", (University of London, Unpublished PhD thesis, 1992), especially chapters 4 and 5. Hobson's classic work on the connection between the economy and war is, of course, *Imperialism: A Study* (London, Nisbet, 1902).

222. See, for example, Homer Lea, *The Day of the Saxon* (New York, Harper, 1912), 2; von Treitschke, *Politics* (posthumously published in 1916), 5, 59.

223. Lea, *Day of the Saxon*, 9-10, 17-18, 22. Brooks Adams, *The Law of Civilization and Decay. An Essay on History* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1943 [1896]), 60-1, 330-1, 332-3, 336. See, also, Henry Adams, "The Rule of Phase Applied to History [1909]", in *The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma* (New York, Macmillan, 1919), 283. 'An Admiral of Fifty-One Years' Service', "Naval Defence by Panic", *Blackwood's Magazine*, May 1909, 736.

224. See, for example, Sir John Barnard Byles ('A Barrister'), *Sophisms of Free-Trade and Popular Political Economy Examined* (Manchester, John Heywood, 1878 [1849]), 241-2. Also, Treitschke, *Politics*, 244-5.

225. Norman Angell, *After All. The Autobiography of Norman Angell* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1951), 25-9.

226. Laurence W. Martin, *Peace Without Victory. Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals* (Port Washington NY, Kennikat Press, 1973 [1958]), 110-1.

227. See *After All*, 52.

228. *After All*, 15-6.

229. Mill, *On Liberty*, 17-9 [ch. II, 50-140], 70-1 [ch. III, 590-610].

230. Mill, *On Liberty*, 65-7 [ch. III 420-90].

231. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1992), 2.

232. For the concept of hegemony see Joseph V. Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought. Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1981), ch. 2. For the discussion of new social movements see Walker, *One World, Many Worlds*; and Marta Fuentes and Andre Gunder Frank, "Ten Theses on Social Movements", *World Development*, 1989, 17(2), 179-91.

233. *On Liberty*, 5-6 [ch. I, 180-200].

234. Mill, *On Liberty*, 10 [ch. I, 360-390].

235. For Spencer's linking of his sociology with his antipathy for the strong state see Herbert Spencer, *The Man Versus the State* (London, Watts, 1940 [1884]), especially pages 1-6, where he links the dyads of militant-industrial, Tory-Whig, and state-individual.

236. David Mitrany, "The Making of the Functional Theory. A Memoir" (hereafter known as "Memoir"), in David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London, LSE and Martin Robertson, 1975), 48 note #1.

237. David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant. A Study in Social Dogmatism* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1951); "Marx, Stalin, and the Peasants", *The Listener*, 20 March 1952, 47(1203), 455-6

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239. For Graham Wallas' ideas about socialism, see his "Socialism and the Fabian Society (1916)", in *Men and Ideas* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1940), 103-7.

240. L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964 [1911]), especially chs VI-VIII.

241. L. T. Hobhouse, *The Rational Good. A Study in the Logic of Practice* (London, Watts, 1947 [1921]), especially chs I and III.

242. Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics* (Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1916 [1908]), 21, 25.

243. Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, ch.IV.

244. Graham Wallas, *Social Judgement* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1935), 20-2, 24.

245. David Long, "International Functionalism and the Politics of Forgetting", *International Journal*, Spring 1993, 48(2), 355-79.

246. James Patrick Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics. A Study Based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966), 8n.

247. Hobhouse, *Liberalism*, 67.

248. *Liberalism*, 99, 107-8.

249. R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1920), 8, 41-2.

250. See, especially, H. G. Wells, *Men Like Gods* (North Hollywood Ca, Leisure Books, 1970 [1922]), 50 [ch. 5(3)].

251. Harold Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, Third Edition (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1934 [first edition, 1925]), 67. On Cole, see Long, "International Functionalism", 359-63.

252. Harold Laski, *Politics* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1931), 147.

253. Although he does not specifically claim that there is a sharp split in Angell's pre- and post-war thought, this division of Angell's thought is recognised by J. B. D. Miller. J. B. D. Miller, *Norman Angell and the Futility of War* (New York, St Martin's, 1986).

254. See, for example, Norman Angell, *For What Do We Fight?* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1939), 213.

255. *Great Illusion*, 65, 147-51. *Peace Theories and the Balkan War* (London, Horace Marshall, 1912), 29-30, 47.

256. *Great Illusion*, 226, 229.

257. *Great Illusion*, 46-7.

258. *The Foundations of International Polity* (Toronto, William Briggs, 1914), 89.

259. *Great Illusion*, 28. *Foundations of International Polity*, 153-4.

260. *Foundations of International Polity*, 153.

261. *Great Illusion*, 57-8, 60. See also Norman Angell, "The Next Inevitable Conflict", *New Republic*, 17 July 1915, 289-91.

262. *Great Illusion*, 27-8, 48-9. *Foundations of International Polity*, 95-6.

263. *Peace Theories*, 16-7, 21, 47-9.

264. *Great Illusion*, 115-6.

265. *Great Illusion*, 114-8, 217, 219. *Foundations of International Polity*, 158.

266. See, for example, the discussion in chapter VIII of *The Great Illusion*.

267. G. G. Coulton, *The Main Illusions of Pacifism. A Criticism of Mr Norman Angell and the Union of Democratic Control* (Cambridge, Bowes and Bowes, 1916), 1-2, 37-8.

268. Coulton, *Illusions of Pacifism*, 48-50, 70.

269. *Illusions of Pacifism*, 38-9.

270. See, for example, Norman Angell, *War and the Essential Realities* (London, Watts, 1913), 34-5.

271. Hobson, *Imperialism*.

272. This was Hobson's view throughout his intellectually active life. For a later version of this idea see J. A. Hobson, "Thoughts on Our Present Discontents", *Political Quarterly*, January-March 1938, 9(1), 53.

273. See Norman Angell, *Patriotism Under Three Flags. A Plea for Rationalism in Politics* (London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1903), 3-4, 17-8.

274. *Great Illusion*, 267-70.

275. *Great Illusion*, 157-9.

276. *Great Illusion*, 221.

277. *Foundations of International Polity*, 6-9, 70. *Peace Theories*, 112. *Great Illusion*, 44, 221, 315-6.

278. H. G. Wells, *The Island of Doctor Moreau* (London, Pan, 1975 [1895]), especially the descriptions of the Beastfolk in chs 12, 14-21, and the final vindication of science on pp 141-2.

279. *Patriotism Under Three Flags*, 14, 194-212.

280. *Foundations of International Polity*, 119-20.

281. *Great Illusion*, 157-9.

282. *Foundations*, especially 35-6 [418]. *Metaphysics of Morals*, 42 [213-4].

283. The role of selfishness as the force which pushes humans towards a more rational community is discussed by Kant in his two shorter works: 'Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View' (1784) and 'Perpetual Peace' (1795), in Kant, *On History*.

284. For the differences between Angell's liberalism and 'natural law' liberalism see: Cornelia Navari, 'The Great Illusion Revisited: The International Theory of Norman Angell', *Review of International Studies*, October 1989, 15(4), 341-2.

285. *Foundations*, 18 [402]. *Metaphysics of Morals*, 160 [354]. *Perpetual Peace*, 18.

286. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, 415 [bk II, III(3)].

287. *Peace Theories*, 29-30. *Great Illusion*, 65.

288. *Foundations of International Polity*, 83-4, 87-8.

289. *Foundations of International Polity*, 87.

290. Norman Angell, *The Fruits of Victory* (New York, Garland, 1972 [1921]), especially: 61-70, 300-1. For this book Angell drew explicitly from John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York, Harcourt Brace and Howe, 1920).

291. See Miller Norman Angell, 52-6.

292. J. H. Jones, *The Economics of War and Conquest. An Examination of Mr Norman Angell's Economic Doctrines* (London, P. S. King and Son, 1915), 39-40, ch. 4.

293. Angell, *Fruits of Victory*, 293.

294. *Fruits of Victory*, 61.

295. *Fruits of Victory*, 299.

296. *Fruits of Victory*, 300.

297. *Fruits of Victory*, 61-9. Norman Angell, "The Need of a Positive Policy", *New Republic*, 20 May 1916, 53-5; and "A New Kind of War", *New Republic*, 31 July 1915, 327-9.

298. For much of Angell's arguments for the mixed economy see Norman Angell and Harold Wright, *Can Governments Cure Unemployment?* (London, Dent, 1931), 1, 6-9, 140.

299. *Fruits of Victory*, 5. *If Britain is to Live* (London, Nisbet, 1923), 32-3.

300. *If Britain is to Live*, 96.

301. J. A. Hobson, *Towards International Government* (New York, Macmillan, 1915), especially chs I and II; Woolf, *International Government*, especially, 99-107; L. T. Hobhouse, "The Future League of Peace [1917]", reprinted in J. A. Hobson and Morris Ginsberg, L. T. Hobhouse. *His Life and Work* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1931), 309-12.

302. Hobson, *Richard Cobden*, 404.

303. Hobson, *Towards International Government*, 76. *Richard Cobden*, 406-9.

304. Woolf, *International Government*, 180. Woolf's discussion of the progressive advance of World governance can be found between pages 99 and 107.

305. A. J. Morris, *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914. The Advocacy of Peace and Retrenchment* (Totawa NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), 24-5.

306. Martin, *Peace Without Victory*, 30.

307. A. J. P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers. Dissent Over Foreign Policy 1792-1939* (London, Panther, 1969 [1957]), 128-9.

308. Martin, *Peace Without Victory*, 109, 125.

309. Taylor, *Trouble Makers*, 130.

310. See, for example, the discussion in Roland N. Stromberg, "The Idea of Collective Security", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, April 1956, 17(2), 250-63.

311. For Angell's view that we already possessed enough knowledge to act wholly rationally, contra Kant, see: 'Educational and Psychological Factors', in Woolf, *Intelligent Man's Way*, 477, 487-9; *The Steep Places. An Examination of Political Tendencies* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1947), 69. For Angell's view of the importance of method over knowledge, see: *After All* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1951), 60-3.

312. See: Angell, *Peace Theories*, 25-9, 34.

313. *Fruits of Victory*, 54-5, 182-4. *For What Do We Fight*, 205.
314. *Great Illusion*, 65, 205. *Peace Theories*, 28-9. *Foundations of International Polity*, 100, 131-2.
315. Norman Angell, *The Public Mind. Its Disorders: Its Explanation* (London, Noel Douglas, 1926), Part II. *Why Freedom Matters* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1940), 25-7.
316. *Fruits of Victory*, xxiii. *Public Mind*, 206-7.
317. This is the main argument of *Why Freedom Matters*. See also *If Britain is to Live*, 123; and *The British Revolution and the American Democracy. An Interpretation of British Labour Programmes* (Toronto, McClelland Goodchild and Stewart, 1919), 192.
318. *British Revolution and American Democracy*, 272-3.
319. *British Revolution and American Democracy*, 189-90, 206-7.
320. *If Britain Is To Live*, 29.
321. See *If Britain Is To Live*, 15-31.
322. *British Revolution and American Democracy*, 267-8, 278-9. *Let the People Know* (New York, Viking, 1943), 31-2.
323. See the discussion on Mill, Angell and civil society in chapter four, above.
324. This issue was raised by Cornelia Navari at the 1993 ISA conference at Acapulco. David Mitrany's interpretation of nationalism was summarised in: David Mitrany, 'Nationality and Nationalism', in *Functional Theory of Politics*.
325. Norman Angell, *War And the Workers* (London and Manchester, National Labour Press, 1916 [written in 1913]), 61.
326. Ralph Pettman, *International Politics. Balance of Power, Balance of Productivity, Balance of Ideologies* (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1991), 63-9.
327. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4, 39.
328. See, for example, Quintin Hogg, *The Left Was Never Right* (London, Faber and Faber, 1944), 87-8, 90-2.
329. See the discussion in Stromberg, "The Idea of Collective Security".

330. Taylor, *Trouble Makers*, 163-4.
331. Norman Angell, *Preface to Peace. A guide For the Plain Man* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1935), 155-172, 251-282; "British Policy Now", *The Spectator*, 11 November 1938, 800-1; *Defence of the Empire* (New York, Appleton-Century, 1937), 67-78.
332. Angell, "The International Anarchy", in Woolf, *Intelligent Man's Way*, 62. *Fruits of Victory*, 103-6.
333. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*, 85-6, 103-4.
334. Norman Angell, *Steep Places*, 113.
335. *Fruits of Victory*, 180-1. 'The International Anarchy', 43. *Prussianism and Its Destruction* (Toronto, McClelland Goodchild and Stewart, nd [1914]), 233.
336. *Politics Among Nations*, 223-38.
337. *Twenty Years' Crisis*, ch. 4.
338. Norman Angell, "Who are the Utopians? And Who the Realists?", *Headway*, January 1940, 4-5.
339. 58-60.
340. *Preface to Peace*, 258-9.
341. *Preface to Peace*, 266.
342. "Educational and Psychological Factors", 470-1.
343. *Why Freedom Matters*, 25, 27, 52-6. *If Britain Is To Live*, 123.
344. *War and the Essential Realities*, 20-3; *After All*, 60-3.
345. See, especially, Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964); Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration* (London, Faber and Faber, 1973); Andrew Wilson Green, "Mitrany Reread with the Help of Haas and Sewell", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, September 1969, 8(1), 50-69.
346. Angell, *War and the Workers*, ch. III, and especially page 39.
347. For Angell's earliest statement to this effect see *Patriotism Under Three Flags*, 24-6.

348. Leonard Woolf, "Introduction", in Woolf (ed.), *Intelligent Man's Way*, 9. Leonard Woolf, "Utopia and Reality", *Political Quarterly*, April-June 1940, 11(2), 178-9.

349. Alfred Zimmern, *Learning and Leadership. A Study of the Needs and Possibilities of International Intellectual Cooperation* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1928), ch. 2. Also: Alfred Zimmern, *The Prospects of Civilization*, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs no. 1 (Oxford, Clarendon, 1939), 8-14.

350. Henry Noel Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold. A Study of the Armed Peace* (London, G. Bell and Sons, 1914), ch. 5. Also see: H. N. Brailsford, *Why Capitalism Means War* (London, Gollancz, 1938), especially ch. 1.

351. H. N. Brailsford, *Property or Peace?* (London, Gollancz, 1934), 198.

352. K. Zilliacus, *The Mirror of the Past* (London, Victor Gollancz, 1944), 29-33. Brailsford *Why Capitalism Means War*, 9-13.

353. See: Norman Angell, "The International Anarchy" and "Educational and Psychological Factors", in Woolf, *Intelligent Man's Way*, especially 22-7, 458, 470-1.

354. See the arguments in: *Fruits of Victory*, especially chapter 6; "Educational and Psychological Factors", 470-1; *Why Freedom Matters*, 25-7, 102; *The Steep Places. An examination of Political Tendencies* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1947), 113-24.

355. Harold J. Laski, "The Economic Foundations of Peace", in Woolf, *Intelligent Man's Way*, especially 537; Brailsford, *Property or Peace*, 237-9.

356. Brailsford, *Property or Peace?*, 284-5.

357. Laski, "Economic Foundations of Peace", especially 543-7; Laski, *Grammar of Politics*, especially, 65-6, 165-9, 215-7, ch. 11.

358. See the letters of Brailsford, Angell, Woolf, Laski and others in: *The New Statesman and Nation*, 9, 16 and 23 February, 2, 9 and 30 March, and 6 April 1935. These were reprinted in Henry Brinton (ed.), *Does Capitalism Cause War?* (Maidstone, H. and E. R. Brinton, 1935).

359. See Zilliacus' endorsement of G. Lowes Dickinson's view of the international anarchy as a cause of war: Zilliacus, *op cit*, pp. 7-21, 50-1. For Dickinson's arguments see his *The*

International Anarchy, 1904-1914 (New York, Century, 1926), ch. 1; and *Causes of International War* (New York, Garland, 1972 [1920]).

360. See note 356.

361. G. D. H. Cole, *A History of Socialist Thought, Volume IV, Part 1: Communism and Social Democracy 1914-1931* (London, Macmillan, 1958), 359-1.

362. Mitrany discusses both his friendship with these men, and his reservations about their ideas, in his Memoir.

363. David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1933), 103; *A Working Peace System. An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organisation* (London, Royal Institute for International Affairs/Oxford University Press, 1943), 10.

364. David Mitrany, "The Problem of Equality in Historical Perspective", in *A Working Peace System* (Chicago, Quadrangle, 1966), 104.

365. Mitrany, *Progress of International Government*, 33.

366. *Progress of International Government*, 42; *A Working Peace System*, 10.

367. David Mitrany "Memorandum on Studies in International Relations", unpublished paper, dated 1933-4, from the Mitrany papers collection at the British Library of Political and Economic Sciences (hereafter referred to as the Mitrany Papers), 5.

368. David Mitrany, Outline for a Paper on Pacifism, no date, from the Mitrany Papers, 1; David Mitrany, "A Realistic Interpretation of Security", Lecture to the Students' International Union, 16 July 1935, from the Mitrany Papers, 4-6.

369. David Mitrany, "Note For Ernst Haas", 14 February 1963, from the Mitrany Papers.

370. Much of Hayek's theory on this can be found in his three-part *Law Legislation and Liberty*, and his discussion of the market can be found in volume 2, *The Mirage of Social Justice* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976), ch. 10. The relations between government and market can be found in volume 3, *The Political Order of a Free People* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979), ch. 15.

371. David Mitrany, "International Consequences of National Planning", *Yale Review*, September 1947, 37(1), 25-6.

372. Mitrany, *Progress of International Government*, 17; David Mitrany, "Research in International Relations", unpublished paper from the Mitrany Papers, dated 28 November 1931, 4.

373. "Study Shows Poor are Dying Younger" *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 8 May 1994, 10. "The Unhealthy Poor", *The Economist*, 4 June 1994, 55-6.

374. David Mitrany, "Interrelation of Politics and Economics in Modern War", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1937, v.192, 84-5; David Mitrany, "Pan Europa -- A Hope or a Danger?", *The Political Quarterly*, October-December 1930, 1(4), 463-5; Mitrany, "International Consequences of National Planning", 24.

375. Mitrany "Interrelation of Politics and Economics", 82-8.

376. Dennis Swann, *The Economics of the Common Market*, Sixth Edition (Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1988), 6-7.

377. David Mitrany, "Political Lessons of the Schuman Plan", paper intended for publication in *The Political Quarterly*, but withdrawn, 1954. From the Mitrany Papers.

378. For a particularly popular example of this federal ideal see Clarence Kirshman Streit, *Union Now With Britain* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1941). Streit argues for a union of the English-speaking democracies. See, also George Catlin, *One Anglo-American Nation. The Foundation of Anglosaxony as Basis of World Federation. A British Response to Streit* (London, Dakers, 1941); Ely Cuthbertson, *Summary of the World Federation Plan. An Outline of a Practical and Detailed Plan for World Settlement* (London, Faber and Faber, 1944).

379. David Mitrany, *The Road to Security* (London, National Peace Council, 1944), 13.

380. David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization", *International Affairs*, July 1948, 24(3), 351.

381. *Working Peace System*, 11. "Functional Approach", 352-3.

382. David Mitrany, "The Prospects of Integration: Federal or Functional?", in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds), *Functionalism. Theory and Practice in International Relations* (New York, Crane Russak, 1975), 62.

383. "Prospect of Integration", 60.

384. David Mitrany "Functional Federalism", in *A Working Peace System* (1966), 172 (emphasis in the original); "Prospect of Integration", 60.

385. For a statement of this position see especially "The Functional Approach", 357-9.

386. See, for example, David Mitrany, "Organization of International Society". Paper presented at the Fabian International Bureau's conference on international security, 8-9 January 1944, 48-9. From the Mitrany papers.

387. *Road to Security*, 14-6, 18.

388. See, for example, *Road to Security*, 15-6, 18-9. *Progress of International Government*, 172. This argument is also implicit in Mitrany's discussion in "The Functional Approach to International Organization", 358-9.

389. "Interrelation of Politics and Economics", 83-5.

390. "Memorandum on Studies in International Relations", 2.

391. See David Mitrany, "Note on Conversation Between Dr F. S. Dunn and Professor Mitrany 29.7.46, Concerning a Talk Which Dr Dunn had with Professor Ginsberg", Mitrany Papers.

392. David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective", *International Affairs*, July 1971, 47(3), 540-1; David Mitrany, "A Political Theory for the New Society", in Groom and Taylor, *Functionalism*, 31.

393. Mitrany, "Political Lessons of the Schuman Plan", 13.

394. David Mitrany, "Marx v. the Peasant", in T. E. Gregory and Hugh Dalton (eds), *London Essays in Economics: In Honour of Edwin Cannan* (London, Routledge, 1927), 322-3, 365-9.

395. Mitrany, *Progress of International Government*, 16.

396. See, for example, David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Functional Cooperation", *Eastern Economist*, 5 September 1947, 9(9), 337-8; David Mitrany, "Functional Unity and Political Discord", in David Mitrany and Maxwell Garnett, *World Unity and the Nations* (London, National Peace Council, 1950), 5-6; "Functional Approach to World Organisation", 356-7.

397. Mitrany discusses the problems of culture, and how federalism will not solve these problems, in a number of places. See especially: *Working Peace System*, especially Ch. 2; "Nationality and Nationalism", in *Functional Theory of Politics*, 144-5. *Progress of International Government*, 94.

398. Mitrany, "Research in International Relations", 1-2, 5.
399. Mitrany, *Working Peace System*, 15-6, 23. See also the "Memoir" in *Functional Theory of Politics*, 37. For Mitrany's 'discovery' that needs came before ideology see the "Memoir", and Mitrany's letter to Leo Silberman (1 February 1957), from the Mitrany Papers.
400. Mitrany, *Working Peace System*, 23, 26-7. Mitrany's optimism about people's innate rationality can be found in *The Road to Security*, 20.
401. Green, "Mitrany Reread with the Help of Haas and Sewell", 56.
402. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", 135-7.
403. Brailsford did write, early on in his career, about the plight of Macedonians living under Turkish rule. This hardly qualified as an understanding of nationalism, however.
404. David Mitrany, "Nationality and Nationalism", 139-43.
405. David Mitrany, "Author's Forward", *Working Peace System*, (1966), 18.
406. "Research in International Relations", 3.
407. David Mitrany, "The United Nations in Historical Perspective", in Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), *The Evolving United Nations: A Prospect for Peace* (London, Europa, 1971), 159; "Political Theory for the New Society", 30. "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective", 533.
408. Mitrany, "International Consequences of National Planning", 24.
409. Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, Third Edition (New York, Random House, 1964), 355. This is also a concern of Haas': *Beyond the Nation-State*, 49-50.
410. See, for example, Angell, *If Britain is to Live*, 15-31.
411. Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics*, 37-9; Robert I. McLaren, "Mitranean Functionalism: Possible or Impossible?", *Review of International Studies*, April 1985, 11(2), 141-2; Cornelia Navari, "David Mitrany and International Functionalism", in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

412. Indeed, Charles Pentland has made just such a point: *International Theory*, 71,

413. See, for example, Gerard Naulleau, "Banques Islamiques et Banques Cooperatives, la Voie Etroite des Alternatives au Modele Dominant", *Cahiers de Sociologie Economique et Culturelle, Ethnopsychologie*, 10 December 1988, 67-80; Merryll Wyn Davies, "Rethinking Knowledge: 'Islamization' and the Future" *Futures*, 3 April 1991, 23, 231-47.

414. See, for example, "UNESCO Press Curb Policies Alienate Reagan", *Winnipeg Free Press*, 5 January 1984, 7.

415. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, 21.

416. See, for example, Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, 30-3. Paul Taylor, "Introduction", in Mitrany, *Functional Theory of Politics*, xx-xxi; and Mark F. Imber, "Re-Reading Mitrany: A Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty", *Review of International Studies*, April 1984. 10(2), especially pages 114-6.

417. McLaren, "Mitranean Functionalism", 143-4.

418. For a sympathetic discussion of the works of Haas and Lindberg see Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Spring 1991, 20(1), 1-22.

419. Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57* (London, Stevens, 1958), 16.

420. Mitrany, *Working Peace System*, 5-7.

421. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 15.

422. Pieter Geyl, *Debates With Historians* (Glasgow, Fontana, 1962 [1955]), 9.

423. James Gleick, *Chaos: Making a New Science* (New York, Viking, 1987), 98-100.

424. See, for example, Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate", in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds), *International Relations. A Handbook of Current Theory* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1985), 10. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations. A Comprehensive Survey*, Third Edition (New York, Harper and Row, 1990), 6-7.

425. Barry O'Neill, "The History of a Hoax", *New York Times Magazine*, 6 March 1994, 46-9.

426. *Conditions of Peace* (London, Macmillan, 1942), 110.
427. *Twenty Years Crisis*, 42.
428. *Ibid*, 73-4.
429. *Great Illusion*, pp. 115-6, 121, 217-9. *Foundations of International Polity*, pp. 158-60.
430. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs Power Politics*, 85-6, 103-4.
431. Morgenthau's earlier critical-realism was to come closer to Angell's normative approach in later editions of his *Politics Among Nations*, when he began to advocate World government as the solution to war.
432. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 52, 189-90. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy" [1952], reprinted in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), *American Foreign Policy. Theoretical Essays* (Glenview Ill, Scott Foresman, 1989), 642.
433. E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London Macmillan, 1945), 47-74.
434. Leonard Woolf, *The War For Peace* (London, Routledge, 1940), 63.
435. Mitrany. *Progress of International Government*, 16, 172.
436. Angell, "Who Are the Utopians? And Who the Realists?", 4.
437. Woolf, *War For Peace*, 127-8.
438. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, ch. 5; *Man, State and War*, ch. 2.
439. Woolf, *War For Peace*, 130-8.
440. Angell, *British Revolution and American Democracy*, 267-8.
441. See, for example, Banks, "Inter-Paradigm Debate", 10. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories*, 6-7. Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations* (New York, Harper Collins, 1994), 47-8. Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics. The Menu For Choice*, Second Edition (New York, Freeman, 1985), 26-7. Even in the film version of "The Remains of the Day", but not in the far more sophisticated book, realist *realpolitik* is associated with the opposition to Nazi Germany.

442. page 278 of the 1939 edition of *Twenty Years Crisis*. Quoted in Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought From Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 83.

443. page 282 of the 1939 edition of *Twenty Years Crisis*. Quoted in Smith, *Realist Thought*, 84. Smith also notes that A. J. P. Taylor considered Carr's book to be "a brilliant argument in favour of appeasement." A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1964 [1961]), 344.

444. Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis*, 84; Taylor, *Origins of the Second World War*, 173.

445. See, for example, Bernard Johnson's interview with Morgenthau in Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers (eds), *Truth and Tragedy. A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau* (New Brunswick, Transaction, 1984), 354. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Must Democracy Use Force? II. Peace and the Liberal Illusion", *The Nation*, 28 January 1939, 117-9.

446. George F. Kennan, "Report Written October 1940, on 'A Year and a Half of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia'", in *From Prague After Munich. Diplomatic Papers 1938-1940* (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1968), 239.

447. Kennan, "Excerpts From a Personal Letter of December 8, 1938" in: *From Prague After Munich*, 9.

448. Brian Barry, *Theories of Justice* (London, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989), ch 10. See, especially, page 364: "the desire to be able to justify our conduct in an impartial way is an original principle in human nature and one that develops under the normal conditions of human life." I am grateful to Katherine Fierlbeck for bringing this argument to my attention.

449. *The Left Was Never Right*, especially chapters 7-10.

450. Taylor, *Trouble Makers*, 154. Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, ch. V.

451. Quoted in Donald S. Birn, "The League of Nations Union and Collective Security", *Journal of Contemporary History*, July 1974, 9(3), 131-2.

452. Norman Angell, "Japan, the League and Us", *Time and Tide*. November 1931, 1302-3. Quoted in Edward Alton Risinger jr, "Sir Norman Angell: Critic of Appeasement, 1935-40" (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Ball State University, 1977), 10.

453. Quoted in Risinger, "Sir Norman Angell", 11.

454. Norman Angell, *This Have and Have-Not Business. Political Fantasy and Economic Fact* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1936), 189-201.

455. See, for example, Norman Angell, "The New John Bull", *The Political Quarterly*, 1936, 7(3), 311-29; Norman Angell, *Peace With the Dictators? A Symposium and Some Conclusions* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1938), ch. VIII.

456. Norman Angell, "Get Effective Defence and You Get the League", *The New Outlook*, 10 June 1936, 15-7.

457. See Cornelia Navari, "David Mitrany and International Functionalism".

458. See David Mitrany, "The New Meaning of Neutrality [1937]", in *Functional Theory of Politics*, 146-50; David Mitrany, "Draft [paper on pacifism, 1955]", from the Mitrany Papers.

459. Woolf, "Utopia and Reality", op cit.

460. See the discussion in W. E. C. Harrison (followed by debate) "The University Teaching of International Affairs", *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, August 1936, 2(3), 431-9; in which it is Toynbee, Zimmern, Laski and Shotwell, all often derided as idealists, who are quoted. Also R. A. MacKay, "Canada and the Balance of Power", *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, May 1941, 7(2), 229-43; in which ideas associated with both liberal rationalism and realism happily mingle, with no sense of a debate raging within the discipline.

461. Waldemar Gurian, "On the Study of International Relations", *The Review of Politics*, July 1946, 8(3), 275-282.

462. Hans Rommen, "Realism and Utopianism in World Affairs", *The Review of Politics*, April 1944, 6(2), 193-215.

463. John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951). Quincy Wright, "Realism and Idealism in International Politics", *World Politics*, October 1952, 5(1), 116-28. Herbert Butterfield, "The Scientific Versus the Moralistic Approach in International Affairs", *International Affairs*, October 1951, 27(4), 411-22. C. A. W. Manning, *The Nature of International Society* (London, London School of Economics and G. Bell, 1962), 31-2. Stromberg, "The Idea of Collective Security", op cit.

464. Kenneth W. Thompson, "Idealism and Realism: Beyond the Great Debate", *British Journal of International Studies*, July 1977, 3(2), 199-209

465. Robert Webber, "Reconsidering International Relations Theory: The North American and English Schools in the Pre and Early Post-War Era" (Dalhousie University, unpublished paper, 1994).

466. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, ch. 1.

467. Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference", in Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, 176-8, 179.

468. Martin Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics* (London, Routledge, 1992).

469. Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969", in Brian Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers. International Politics 1919-1969* (London, Oxford University Press, 1972), 38-9.

470. See, for example, Steve Smith, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Summer 1987, 16(2), 198-9.

471. Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change. Global Governance Since 1850* (Cambridge, Polity, 1994), 4-11. See also, Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", in Gill, *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and IR*, 62-4.

472. Murphy makes this distinction throughout his *International Organization and Industrial Change*.

473. Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy, "Gramsci and International Relations: A General Perspective and Example from Recent US Policy Towards the Third World", in Gill, *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and IR*, 131.

474. This argument is made, in relation to logical positivism, in Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), 105-111.

475. Walter Benjamin, "Thesis on the Philosophy of History", in Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas Mackay Kellner (eds), *Critical Theory and Society. A Reader* (New York, Routledge, 1989), 255.

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
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Appendix II: Thinkers Discussed in Chapters 4-7

1825	1850	1875	1900	1925	1950	1975
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+						
=====	Bentham					
	=====	J. B. Byles				
	=====	Cobden				
	=====	Mazzini				
	=====	J. S. Mill				
	=====	Gladstone				
	=====	Bright				
	=====	Marx				
	=====	Herbert Spencer				
	=====	G. T. Chesney				
	=====	von Treitschke				
	=====	T. H. Green				
		=====	Brooks Adams			
		=====	Toennies			
		=====	Wallas			
		=====	J. A. Hobson			
		=====	Coulton			
		=====	G. L. Dickinson			
		=====	Max Weber			
		=====	Hobhouse			
	H. G. Wells	=====				
	Angell	=====				
	Brailsford	=====				
	Homer Lea	=====				
	Zimmern	=====				
	Tawney	=====				
	Leonard Woolf	=====				
	G. D. H. Cole	=====				
	Mitrany	=====				
	Niebuhr	=====				
	E. H. Carr	=====				
	Laski	=====				
	Zilliacus	=====				
	Morgenthau	=====				
	Kennan	=====				
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+						
1825	1850	1875	1900	1925	1950	1975

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