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Taskforce condemns

Canadian support of Chile

"The brutal military dictatorship of Chile is being supported by Canadian business", according to a spokesperson for the local branch of the Canadian Committee for Solidarity with Democratic Chile.

The recent \$350 million investment of Noranda Mines Ltd. of Toronto, the \$125 million loan of a consortium of banks including the Royal Bank of Canada, the Toronto Dominion Bank and the Bank of Nova Scotia, and the recent use of the port of Montreal as a conduit for US arms shipments to Chile have bolstered Pinochet's regime and have established Canada as an ally.

The Canadian Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility has condemned the recent bank loan. In Halifax yesterday at the annual shareholders meeting of the Bank of Nova Scotia, representatives questioned the decision to support the repressive regime. Information was distributed which described the actions of the Pinochet government.

Since seizing power in September 1973, the military junta led by General Augusto Pinochet has campaigned hard to attract foreign investment in the face of obvious economic instability and widespread criticism of Chile's repressive economic, social and political policies. But with little success.

The reports of international bodies - such as the United Nations, the

International Labour Organization and the World Council of Churches - have kept international attention focussed on the unparalleled repression of human rights and the brutal elimination of opposition to the regime, with the result that many Western countries have refused to deal with the junta, according to the Toronto Based Latin American working group. Britain and Scandinavia would not reschedule Chile's heavy foreign debt last year, and there is speculation that this year France and West Germany will follow suit.

Many transnational corporations have rejected Chile on the grounds of economic instability and an inflation rate hovering above 300%, and even the international lending agencies like the World Bank have proceeded hesitantly due to international criticism of participation with such a brutal regime.

The local spokesperson said "The Canadian banks, corporations, and the government are willing to close their eyes to the repression to make a profit. This gives the Chilean junta an economic and moral boost that is entrenching it still more firmly in power.

"We urge people, to express their concern by pressuring the banks involved as well as our government. If all nations refuse to deal with the fascist dictatorship if will help the Chilean people's struggle for human rights".



Auth, Philadelphia Inquirer

Canada aids torture

LETTER TO THE GLOBE AND MAIL:

We, the undersigned, wish to express our grave concern over the recent loans negotiated by a number of Canadian banks with the governments of Chile and Argentina.

In the spring of 1976 it was reported that three Canadian banks—the Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Nova Scotia and the Toronto-Dominion Bank—joined a predominantly United States consortium to lend \$125-million to the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. More recently it was reported in The Globe and Mail (Nov. 20) that seven Canadian banks negotiated a \$66-million loan to Argentina. In addition to the banks involved in the Chilean loan were the following four: Bank of Montreal, Bank Canadian National, Mercantile Bank of Canada and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

Torture is widespread in both of these countries. Numerous international organizations, including the United Nations and Amnesty International, have documented the heinous treatment afforded political prisoners.

The loans negotiated by the Canadian banks serve to perpetuate these oppressive regimes. The banks respond to the effect that a loan does not imply approval of the Government's policies. Such rationalizations simply side-step the real issue. These countries are most sensitive to financial pressures. Chile, for example, prior to the loan was in dire economic straits. Many European countries were refusing to extend any more financial aid because of that government's hideous record with respect to human rights. To appease these European creditors and avoid bankruptcy Chile might have been forced to improve these conditions. The loan by the Canadian banks has permitted Chile to avoid any such compromise and the

situation has continued to worsen. Had Canada, like a number of other countries, applied an economic boycott against Chile and Argentina many of these horrendous practices might have ceased. In short, the Canadian banks are in large part responsible for every act of torture that has occurred since the negotiation of the loan.

The response of the Canadian Government is indefensible. Finance Minister Donald Macdonald has adopted a hands-off approach. In the House of Commons on May 3, 1976, he stated: "If we do not participate in the loan, of course we are not informed on all the details." We submit that Canada must make itself informed. This is no time for apathy.

These financial institutions enjoy a very privileged position in Canadian society. The non-competitive nature of the banking industry essentially means that most Canadians have little choice as to where they will do their banking. As a result many Canadian citizens have become unwitting participants in the perpetuation of these odious practices. Canadians should not be forced to tolerate such actions by their banks.

We urge the federal Parliament to consider seriously the implications of these recent loans. A failure to act constitutes implicit approval and we become no better than those whose policies we deplore. We become monsters.

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Department of Religious Studies
Prof. Bruce Barton
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Amnesty International (Canadian Section)
Gene Mino, P.J. Milne, David Himelfarb Windsor

Corporate Study Centre 'outraged'

Africa News

A major new loan to the South African government put together by a group of New York banks is causing a stir among critics of South Africa in the U.S.

The loan, headed by Citibank, the nation's second largest financial institution, will push total U.S. loans to South Africa well beyond the \$2 billion mark—nearly double the level of a year ago.

"We're outraged," says Tim Smith, director of the Interfaith Center of Corporate Responsibility of the National Council of Churches. "The loan is an indiscriminate line of credit, a carte blanche to the South African government at a time of unprecedented domestic political opposition."

Smith expects strong reaction from church agencies, against the banks involved.

Participants in the agreement have decided not to disclose details of the pact, but bank sources told Africa News that the loan would be worth about \$150 million and might include British as well as American money.

Breakthrough for Pretoria

The loan is a breakthrough for the hardpressed government of South Africa, which is experiencing a record trade deficit this year, due largely to heavy

defense spending and falling gold prices. Between April and June, government spending was up \$725 million over the same period last year, with 24% of the increase for defense expenditure.

With both debts and deficit growing, South Africa has found it increasingly difficult to acquire the capital it desperately needs. Domestic political protest that broke into open violence in June has caused investor hesitancy and some potential lenders have backed off. Reports say negotiations for a major loan from the Shah of Iran fell through last month, forcing South Africa to turn to American sources to put together the deal.

Chase Manhattan Bank analyst Joel Stern says, "These debts have placed unusual pressure on the government to resolve the crisis of deficit spending. The result is a stagnating economy that grew 7% in 1974, 2% in 1975 and none at all this year."

The need for U.S. bolstering may prove troublesome. George Houser of the American Committee on Africa, a New York-based research and information group, says his group will consider organizing a boycott against participant banks, as it did a decade ago, when a 10-bank consortium aided South Africa in the financial crisis that followed the deaths of demonstrators at Sharpeville in 1960.

Background to

South Africa's Transkei ploy

Reprinted from the New York weekly The Guardian.

As the era of white racist control of southern Africa draws to a rapid close, South Africa is about to pull a rabbit out of its hat that it hopes will reverse the trend.

It's called the "Republic of Transkei." The Transkei, largest and most important of South Africa's bantustans or "African homelands," became an "independent" state Oct. 26.

BLACK MASKS OVER WHITE FACES

The purpose behind the Transkei scheme is to give apartheid South Africa a new lease on life in the face of mounting black rebellion at home and international pressure abroad.


Formerly scheduled for "independence" in the late 1970s or early 1980s, South Africa last year moved the date up to 1976. This action followed the defeat of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola when the Pretoria government realized that white racist control of South Africa itself was jeopardized.

The advancement of the date for Transkei's political separation from South Africa also came as international pressure against the South African occupation of Namibia (South West Africa) was mounting drastically. Transkei was to be a kind of model government, designed to defuse such pressure and put an acceptable face on the unending brutalities of apartheid.

DEPENDENT RURAL SLUM

But also as never before, apartheid and the place of South Africa itself in southern Africa are under intense scrutiny as the "Republic of Tanskei" is launched. In effect, the new "republic" will remain an almost wholly dependent rural slum—as it has been since the territory's borders were legally outlined in the 1930s. Few countries are expected to recognize it as an autonomous nation—and those that may do so have thus far avoided admitting their plans. Its government has also been rejected by the Organization of African Unity, the key continental body

whose imprimatur would have lent the "republic" a great degree of legitimacy. It is thus likely that Transkei will remain South Africa's political pariah, since any recognition of it constitutes approval of the apartheid system.



land "capital", that will house the executive and legislative branches of the new government. But pre-formed concrete shells rising above Umtata slums are no substitute for both the popular support and the independent economic and political infrastructure that are so conspicuously absent in Transkei.

Launched in 1936 as one of Pretoria's "native reserves," the Transkei is the largest such area to be "given" to black Africans in South Africa. Located in the eastern Cape Province along the Indian Ocean, it is also the only bantustan to be allotted a coastline, although its only deep-water port, Port St. Johns, is to remain under South African control even after the territory's Oct. 26 "independence."

The government rationale behind the original bantustan legislation in 1936 was that the tribal trust lands designated therein were the traditional "homelands" of Africans. But even at that time, significant numbers of the tribal groups that were assigned to one or another of the reserves had been living in "white areas" as "temporary sojourners"—that is, as either recruited or independent migrant workers—for generations. Many thousands of those workers had long since abandoned the tribal designations, the new "native reserve" system sought to revive and prolong. And in many instances they had never even visited their "homeland," having only a vague notion of its geographic location.

A similar situation prevails today, on the eve of Transkeian independence—when some 1.35 million Xhosa, officially take part of Tanskei's population of 3 million, live in "white areas", in townships such as Soweto and Alexandria. Under recent South African legislation, acceded to by the Transkeian "parliament" and its "head of state," Chief Kaiser Matanzima, these workers are being denied South

African citizenship and are being told that they are hence forth citizens of the new "republic".

Under the terms of the 1936 legislation, the areas set aside for bantustan settlement were never meant to be the outline of future "independent" states. They were intended, rather, as the small areas—13% of the country's available land for almost 90% of its population—where black South Africans would be herded for permanent settlement under the direct rule of the various commissions, authorities and state-owned corporations set up by Pretoria to rule them.

During the period following this legislation, bantustan borders changed often. At times this was due to a demand by white farmers in the area of a bantustan for a part of the

tional Court of Justice decision against South Africa. The case brought in 1960 by the two African countries was a milestone on the political and diplomatic front.

There was also growing domestic opposition against apartheid by the black victims of that system inside South Africa itself. Since the late 1950s, there had been sporadic demonstrations, stoning of whites and the symbols of white administration inside the bantustans, particularly in Transkei. In eastern Pondoland, a section of Transkeian territory, there was significant opposition to increased taxation, government-sponsored soil-conservation programs and unpopular tribal chiefs. Earlier, there had been opposition to the principal collaborator among the chiefs appointed within the Transkei, Chief Matanzima. And in the white areas, the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 was the most important manifestation of this wave of resistance.

SEPARATE STATES

Accordingly, the apartheid policy elaborated under Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in the 1950s underwent significant change in the early 1960s. In April 1961, Verwoerd announced that "in light of the pressure being exerted on South Africa," bantustans would be developed in separate states, even to the point of independence. The Transkei Territorial Authority immediately responded with

Some 1.8 million "superfluous Bantus" have been removed to bantustans that have been overcrowded for over twenty years.

land designated as "native reserve". This is one cause of the fragmentation of most bantustan areas today. At other times, land from one bantustan would be taken and given to another, with the attendant population removals following. This practice served to create and exaggerate the tribal antagonisms and ethnic enmity on which Pretoria's "divide-and-rule" strategy toward Africans is built.

However, two significant developments that occurred in succeeding decades forced Pretoria eventually to redesign its original "native areas" policy.

One was the rapid growth of South African industry, a growth that was accompanied by a government-sponsored

a request to be made a "whole self-governing state."

In Tanskei, Verwoerd and the Nationalist government found a perfect model for the new policy. Its claimed population could be said to reside on a continuous piece of land—while the largest population group, the Zulus, had been 'given' some 144 fragments of unconnected land, precisely because they were the largest group.

With a sizable population, Transkei's limited independence and projected sovereignty would calm the Afrikaaner attacks against the economic patterns then in full bloom in South Africa. Henceforth, the government could claim to be taking steps toward the fulfillment of the goals of Afrikaaner apartheid. Granting semi-independence to Transkei was also designed to stop the growing resistance movement among bantustan-residing blacks—which was strongest, at that point, in Transkei.

Another reason for Pretoria's choice lay in Chief Matanzima himself. Matanzima had collaborated with the white government since the 1950s—even in the face of violent opposition to his power from 1957 on. Matanzima was ready and willing to accept the handouts of semiautonomy from Pretoria, while, to this date, only one other bantustan, Boputhatswana, has accepted even in principle, the concept of independent bantustan states. Most other bantustan leaders, even though they were installed by Pretoria, have rejected "bantustanization" in favor of a unified South Africa.

Matanzima was elected as chief of the Transkei in 1963, in an election run by the Bantu Authorities. Pretoria backed his campaign heavily and openly, while harassing the few opposition candidates that ran against him.

In the years since Pretoria's policy shift toward "independent" Black bantustan states was set in motion, Matanzima has proven a willing servant to the white government. Repression, petty apartheid, arrests and all the other commonplaces of South African life continue in Transkei today as they do in South Africa proper.

But Matanzima's chief attraction for Pretoria has likely resided in his willingness to accept political "independence" for a territory that will remain so totally

black economies in Transkei and other bantustans, however, statistics show that the overwhelming proportion of financial assistance funneled through the BIC went to white-owned industries that took advantage of bantustan labor supplies. In later years, government policy has been to shift some of this burden for bantustan "development" to the private sector.

Now under the auspices of the Transkei Development Corporation in Umtata, there is little to suggest that the "republic" will differ from BICs in anything but the address



Distant view of a Zulu bantustan, South Africa.

of its administration. A series of recent ads in numerous U.S. newspapers are indicative, noting the territory's "bright economic prospects" and its "attractive investment incentives." Through this policy, the majority of Transkeian workers will thus remain as migrants to "white areas" while industrial development in the territory will closely resemble the border industries developed in past decades—capital intensive enterprises that contribute little to the development of a local economy.

It is likely that the majority of workers outside Transkei will remain in white-owned mining industries, where they are now, and the majority of Transkei residents will remain, as they are now, on a primitive level of subsistence agriculture, or unemployed. The aim of the present development policy, according to a New York Times report from Port St. Johns Oct. 13, "is to create a black entrepreneurial class capable of running an economy that has been dominated by whites." In other words, there will be no significant change in the present structure or distribution processes of the former economy as it was administered from Pretoria—just some black masks over white faces.

The domestic response to these prospects has been almost universal rejection. An Oct. 16 rally in Johannesburg sponsored by the government to celebrate Transkei's impending "independence" resulted in a violent confrontation with South African riot police. Several weeks ago, Chief Matanzima called for a referendum in the Black townships surrounding white South African cities designed to demonstrate his "mandate" as chief of state in the coming "republic". A report in the October 1 London Financial Times tells the story: Based on a survey of polling booths in Soweto, where there is a heavy concentration of Xhosa-speaking people, fewer than five people voted at each of the

Editorial

Support South African boycott

Black leaders in Southern Africa have called for a boycott of South African products. They feel that continued investment in South Africa by multinational companies can only serve to bolster the present racist government. This request is a response to a system of institutionalized discrimination in which Blacks have been deprived of their civil and political liberties.

The boycott was called partially to pressure foreign investors and the South African government but more importantly it draws attention to the racism inherent in the South African system.

People who argue against boycotts contend that their purpose is usually self-defeating; that is the people one intends to aid are those who suffer most as the result of such action. This argument neatly avoids the main issue.

The issue at stake is whether or not one sees a person's problems as the individual's problems. "That's his problem." "It's not my concern." "I can't help them." This does not sound as bad as "Let the bastard suffer" or "I don't give a damn about them", but the effects are certainly the same: a person or a "weak" group has to struggle against injustice without your help. And naturally the fewer people fighting against injustice the less likely it will be overcome. The trite "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem" does have some truth.

The problems of Californian grape pickers or South African blacks are not just "their problems". They are ours as well. Why? Because often we indirectly and sometimes directly cause them. Our inaction also helps perpetuate their exploitation.

Our responsibility as fellow humans is to support justified boycotts. While it may ring of jargon it is our duty to show solidarity with oppressed people. We hope this concern transcends bleeding-heart liberalism to a genuine rational decision based not only on empathy but on a consciousness that oppression can only be overcome when people unite to oppose it.

We don't argue that one should boycott all those who are guilty of racism, sexism, exploitation and oppression. The list would be too long and would therefore serve only those with masochistic tendencies.

But not buying Outspan oranges or South African wines is a different matter and people do have alternatives to these products.

If a boycott is justified, on the grounds of racism, sexism, exploitation, oppression or reasons of this nature, then one should support it.

To argue that one hurts the people who are exploited or oppressed, is to lend support to the status quo, as one Black leader commented "Who cares about unemployment when you are a slave".

Black leaders in Southern Africa do not want multinational companies exploiting their cheap labour. Nor do they want them extracting the rich resources from their countries without receiving benefits. As a result they have called for pressure to be placed on foreign companies.

What has this to do with Canada? Much more than it should. Canadian multinationals and banks are very involved in Southern Africa.

During the past year Canada's trade with South Africa increased despite our government's continued denouncement of the racist system. Our imports rose by 35% and our exports rose by 65%. This duplicity hurts more than our international reputation. It helps perpetuate a system where blacks cannot vote, where 80% of them live below the poverty line and where the government sees them only as a "cheap labour supply".

While an individual's boycott may seem to be insignificant, it is more than a protest against our government's two-faced policies. Collectively we have an impact



on the South African system. If Canadian multi-nationals and banks withdrew from South Africa it would focus world pressure to change the system of oppression and exploitation.

But the companies won't withdraw without considerable pressure from home, for the simple reason that they benefit from cheap labour; they make super profits. That is why strong pressure here, as well as the refusal to purchase products from an inhumane society, is absolutely necessary.

Are the problems of the blacks in South Africa just personal problems? No, they are not, because we help maintain the system; we must fight to destroy it.

We feel a moral obligation both to boycott South African products and to pressure our government and corporations so they will discontinue support of South Africa: a country where the whites have the highest standard of living in the world and on a bantustan one black child out of three dies before the age of five.

Can we afford not to?



Children on the streets in Kwa-Zulu, a homeland in Northern Natal, South Africa.

decentralization policy that encouraged industrial investment on the rims of bantustan settlements. Concurrent with the development of these border industries, South African whites began to recognize that continuing rates of growth and profit were predicated on the permanent availability of cheap African labor.

Afrikaaner Nationalists, however, were ideologically opposed to any permanent black presence in "white areas." Their world view is dominated by their belief in the total separation of races and the preservation of white supremacy. They believe, as one Afrikaaner churchman argued in 1944, "that it is the Christian duty of the whites to act as guardians of the nonwhite races until such time as they reach the stage of being able to manage their own affairs." This meant "racial separation and the guardianship of whites over the natives."

The second development that led to an eventual change in bantustan policy occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During that period, South Africa was faced with an unprecedented level of international and domestic opposition to apartheid. Internationally, Liberia and Ethiopia had mounted a case at the International Court of Justice against South Africa's continuing presence in Namibia. This pressure culminated in the 1966 resolution by the UN that declared that occupation illegal, and in the 1971 Interna-

Transkei: "congested, denuded, overstocked, eroded and, for the most part, in deplorable condition."

--Native Affairs Commission (1938)

dependent on South Africa and its traditional allies in the West for whatever economic development takes place there. The chief has already asked the U.S. for aid in establishing the territory's economy.

Left to itself, the Transkei is incapable of supporting even the fraction of the claimed population that resides there—some 1.65 million Africans. Starvation, malnutrition, broken homes and disease are rampant, according to recent observers. The government-sponsored Native Affairs Commission, in a 1937-38 report, was even then describing the Transkei's land as "congested, denuded, overstocked, eroded and, for the most part, in deplorable condition." Government policy since that time has been to concentrate bantustan populations in order to increase their labor capacity. Between 1960 and 1970 alone, some 1.8 million "superfluous Bantu"—the families of migrant workers living in "white areas"—have been removed to bantustans that were termed overcrowded over 20 years earlier.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Pretoria had arranged for industrial development in or near the bantustans through a government-owned corporation known as the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC). Rather than develop indigenous

polling places surveyed. The report cited one returning officer who said four people had voted in the 13 hours he had manned a booth.

But there is an additional international aspect that is pressuring South Africa to create an "independent" Transkei. The U.S. has been anxious to secure a firm military foothold in southern Africa for some time, but a base on South African soil would run counter to the "new" African policy that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has been advertising among black African leaders.

Accordingly, there are signs that the Pentagon is preparing to install a naval base in Port St. Johns in order to increase its military capabilities in the Indian Ocean. Such a measure would not be possible without an "independent" Transkei in which to set it up.

This proposal was explicitly stated in the U.S. Army's July issue of Military Review, a magazine considered by most observers to reflect Defense Department views. Predicting that arms embargoes—such as they are—against South Africa will continue, the article's author, Maj. Wesley Groesback, notes that Transkei, once independent, would be likely to welcome a U.S. naval presence.

In Argentina

Attack on academic freedom

"Until we can cleanse the teaching area, and professors are all of Christian thought and ideology, we will not achieve the triumph we seek in our struggle against the revolutionary left".

General Vilas - Deputy Commander of V Army Corps Bahia Blanca, 4 August 1976

Since the coup of 24 March there has been a systematic ideological purge of the academic community in Argentina. A new law passed by the military junta at the end of March, authorises the summary dismissal or suspension from duty of any state employee for unspecified reasons ...

According to a recent report in *New Scientist* (29 July 1976) "Between March and May, more than 2000 university academics lost their jobs as well as 700 from various research institutes. Members of the Argentine Physical Society estimate that a quarter of this number have lost their jobs."

As there have been sweeping dismissals in the field of Psychiatry and in all other sectors of education, there is considerable doubt as to the accuracy of the official statement by the civilian Minister of Education, Ricardo Bruera, that about 3,000 academics, administrators and teaching assistants in national secondary schools had been dismissed since March. (Report *New York Times*, 5 August 1976).


Some of Argentina's most prestigious scientists have been dismissed or detained; centers most affected include National Science and Technology Research Council, the National Institute of Agriculture and Cattle Breeding Technology. (According to reports from three scientists at the *Centro de Investigacion de Estudios Avanzados del Instituto Politecnico Nacional* in Mexico City).

The *New York Times* (5 August 1976) reported a military investigation of academic "subversion" in the National University of Bahia Blanca. Seventeen professors have been arrested and the army issued a list of 31 other persons who were wanted (some of these are living abroad). The academics, mainly from the economics faculty, will be tried on charges of organizing subversive instruction. They include the former rector of the university Victor Benamo.

In the present atmosphere, few hold out real hopes that the purges will discontinue, nor, given the opinion of the military can one be optimistic about the outcome of the trials of academics and students by military courts.

"In the universities, the post of vice-chancellor, dean and even director of studies have been taken over by the military men, who are also in charge of research institutes. Students and staff have to submit to regulations governing political behaviour in their private lives. University libraries have been purged of "Subversive" books. Those of Marx and Freud -branded "ideological criminals" by the new secretary general of the National University of Cordoba, who is an Air Force Officer, have even been publicly burned." *New Scientist*, 29 July 1976.

Further insights into the mentality of the new regime were gleaned from the statements made on 16 July 1976 by the new director of the University of Buenos Aires, Senor Alberto Constantini, who regretted that the police could not be removed from the university faculties at



present because of the risk of subversion and he added that wherever ideological penetration is present there was no possibility of establishing respect for academic freedom.

Amnesty International has asked its

members to write to General Jorge Videla, the President, and the Minister of Education, requesting the release of all academics and students held without trial. **However, it is very important that students and academics write on behalf**

of a few individuals. The Halifax Group of Amnesty International has a long list of detained students and individuals and anyone willing to help may call: Lynn Stow - 422-2505 or Anthony Woods - 469-8472.

Future of third world students

by Ursula Wawer

Canadian and foreign students and educators concerned with the future of foreign students especially third world students in Canada, were asked to carefully scrutinize Canada's commitment to the third world at a conference held this last weekend at the University of Ottawa.

Proposals made by the provincial governments of Ontario and Alberta with respect to differential fees will in effect limit the number of foreign students able to attend Canadian post-secondary institutions. The differential fee structure triples tuition for visa students.

Dr. Pauline Jewett, president of Simon Fraser University, suggested that provisions should be made for third world students that come from countries with very low GNP and high illiteracy rates. Dr. Jewett felt that a priority list of third world countries and those most seriously affected due to natural disasters and war should be compiled and that greater assistance in the form of free tuition and travel should be extended to students from these countries.

Dr. Jewett said that she was not concerned with American students who come from a highly advanced and wealthy nation and make up only 19.6 percent of the foreign student population.

It was generally felt by conference members that the average Canadian is unaware of a foreign student's status in Canada and that an educational campaign was necessary.

Myths surrounding foreign students include: that their numbers are rapidly

increasing when in fact they comprise only 5 percent of the student population and are actually decreasing in proportion to Canadian students.

Those proposing a differential fee have suggested a substantial saving for the Canadian tax payer. This saving amounts to less than a dollar for each tax payer but would place a tremendous burden on individual students.

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funds 1500 out of about 16,000 foreign students in Canada. Should differential fees take effect the number of students funded would drop to accommodate the overall rise in cost per student. The conference also examined the immigration acts dating back to 1967 to understand the differential fee policy. In 1967 a revised immigration act took effect. Considered a humanitarian act, in the final analysis it led to its own destruction.

It made entry into Canada a simple affair. It was only one further step for individuals to apply for landed immigrants status from within Canada. Canada became a country of accessibility for people from across the world.

Simultaneously foreign student numbers rose but for different reasons. Grants and scholarships for studying abroad had become more numerous in their countries.

Then in 1972 the walls caved in with the Green Paper on immigration. This paper revealed the paranoia of many Canadians concerning the settling in the midst of so called "visible immigrants", blacks and asians. The federal and provincial governments, while protesting against these accusations, made attempts via the Green Paper, to curtail the number of immigrants from "problem areas" such as Africa and Asia.

Economic growth in Canada was slowing down during this period. It was sensible to restrict immigrant inflow in

the light of poor job opportunities but the Canadian government used the visible immigrant as a scapegoat to relieve the tension in the Canadian Labor market.

No provisions were made for foreign students who lost their rights to summer employment in Canada. Logic dictated finding jobs for Canadian students first but the 10,000 visa students did not present a grave threat to the Canadian community.

Presently foreign students must guarantee \$3500 before gaining entry into Canada. Should the money run out due to problems with the home government or family problems the Canadian government will ask the student to leave the country. In other words, the person is deported.

"There is a popular misconception that all foreign students come from rich families or are funded by CIDA. This is not the case. By implementing differential fees we will be restricting education even more to the wealthy and privileged as well as limiting cultural exchange," said Dr. Cadieux, the president of the Universite de Moncton as well as president of World University Services of Canada.

Other topics considered during the conference were; campus services and the means of cultural adaptation. It was generally agreed that more accurate and adequate information should be available to the foreign student in his home country.

In his closing remarks Dr. Cadieux said, "This has been a colorful gathering not because of the many races present but because of the diversity of people present and the issues discussed. It is now our task to reach the Canadian people and help them understand our responsibility to the Third World student in Canada and the Third World itself."

FOREIGN STUDENTS

Would you like to spend Christmas with a local family?...

If so please contact

Dorrik Stow at 422-2505.

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