

# The Dalhousie Gazette.

ORA ET LABORA.

VOL. XX.

HALIFAX, N. S., NOVEMBER 4, 1887.

No. 1.

## PHILOSOPHY AS THE "SCIENCE OF SCIENCES."

Address delivered at Convocation, Oct. 18th, 1887.

BY JAMES SETH, M. A.,

Professor of Metaphysics and Ethics.

I believe it is customary for the professor to whom it falls to deliver the Introductory Address, to take advantage of this opportunity to explain, in general and somewhat popular terms, the nature and claims of his own special subject, as well as its relation to other departments of academic study. And while I should naturally, on the ground of precedent alone, be led to adopt a similar course, I do so the more willingly because of the peculiar position and fortune of Mental Philosophy. Here, if anywhere, there is need of explanation, and possibly even of defence. It is, indeed, significant of the irresistible claims of Philosophy that its right to a place in the academic curriculum is seldom, if ever, openly questioned. While the scientific and practical mind of this century has no hesitation in questioning the value of a classical education, it seldom ventures upon an open and avowed attack on the equally old-world and unpractical study of Philosophy. Still there is a widespread scepticism, none the less real because it is ashamed to express itself, as to the intrinsic value and present interest of philosophical study. It is allowed to retain its place by sufferance, as it were, as an interesting survival of the ancient and mediæval world, and a useful intellectual gymnastic. None, perhaps, who pretend to culture, and none without such a pretension dare intermeddle with questions of the higher education, would accept this frank and definite expression of their attitude to Philosophy. But it is the secret thought of many. Now, I believe that such an attitude is the result, solely and entirely, of misunderstanding as to the fundamental aim and spirit of Philosophy. It is only when the nature and purpose of philosophical study are not understood, or *misunderstood*, that the study itself is reprobated and requires

defence. Once understood, it needs none. What I am anxious to do, then, in this address, is to explain, so far as the narrow limits permit, what Philosophy is, in the confidence that this explanation, in so far as it is successful, will be, at the same time, its best and sufficient defence.

Philosophy, then, is a kind, or rather a stage, of Knowledge. I say *stage* rather than *kind*, because all knowledge is essentially or in kind the same. In the lower you have always the germ of the higher; in the higher only the development of the lower. We may distinguish three great stages of Knowledge—(1) the ordinary or popular, (2) the scientific, and (3) the philosophical. Each of these, however, is only a stage in the development of the same knowledge. Ordinary knowledge naturally and inevitably *becomes* scientific; scientific knowledge, as naturally and inevitably, *becomes* philosophic. The higher is not *different* from the lower; it is only the lower followed out and made conscious of its own meaning. The lower finds in the higher its explanation; sees its own content reasoned out and developed. And Philosophy is just the final and perfect form which Knowledge, in its development from lower to higher, inevitably assumes.

Ordinary knowledge is knowledge of fact. The universe is, to the ordinary man, a mass of facts, and his attitude to it that of passive observation. He is content to observe the facts as they present themselves to him—*en masse*. It is true he cannot help introducing into the facts a certain unity and relation; otherwise he could not *know* them all. He is compelled, therefore, to employ certain principles of unity, of relation. But he employs them unconsciously and unquestioningly, as mere assumptions. The great principle of the uniformity of nature, for instance, is implied in our most elementary knowledge of the physical world; but while constantly employed, it is never consciously realized, far less questioned or criticised. In short, the ordinary man does not think of explaining or

justifying his knowledge, either to others or to himself. Knowledge is to him a practical thing; it serves all the purposes of life, and life is his concern. He lives by faith; his very knowledge is a kind of faith—faith not so much in fact as in a great body of principles which underlie and make possible his knowledge of fact. For the explanation, at once of his knowledge and of the facts he knows, he looks to Science.

This task Science confidently undertakes. Not content with mere passive observation of the facts as they lie massed before it, Science seeks to reduce the facts to unity; to recognize in each fact a "case" of some law or general principle, and in each law a "case" of some law yet higher or more general. Thus the unconscious unity which inspires the knowledge of the ordinary man is in Science consciously realized. Science is just this recognition, in the endless variety of phenomena, of an underlying unity; and it is in this sense, as exacting from it an explicit recognition of the unity implied in it from the first, that Science explains our ordinary knowledge.

The explanation of Science, however, is always partial and incomplete, and it remains for Philosophy to give the complete and final explanation. For scientific, equally with ordinary knowledge, itself requires to be explained, and in two senses Philosophy may be said to contain the explanation of Science.

(1.) Philosophy completes, or seeks to complete, the partial explanation of Science. Each science deals with one part or aspect only of the universe of being. The mass of detail to be reduced to unity is so vast that it is impossible for any single science to overtake the whole. There is no such thing as a universal science. The man of science is necessarily a specialist; if he would contribute his part to the grand result, he must limit himself to some one department of existence. Science thus incurs the unavoidable consequences of Specialism. It necessarily regards the universe from its own point of view, which is not that of the whole but of the part, not central but one-sided. Each science deals with its own part or aspect of the universe, and considers this apart from the whole, as a *res completa*—a separate and independent share. The incompleteness of scientific explanation is thus the result of the incompleteness or "abstractness" of the scientific point of view—a point of view which, while legitimate and necessary in view of the peculiar work of the individual science, becomes inevitably no longer adequate when the survey is widened and the attempt made to

comprehend from it the whole of things. Its very excellence for Science constitutes its defect as a complete explanation. Emphasizing, and therefore exaggerating, the significance of the part at the expense of the whole, it misses the full meaning of both. For the part can be fully understood only in the light of the whole; the whole only as the concrete unity of the parts. Take, by way of illustration, the science of Physiology or of Political Economy. The standpoint of the former is physical life; that of the latter, material wealth. It is obvious that neither of these standpoints is adequate to a complete explanation of the universe, limited as each is to one part or phase of existence, to the exclusion of all the rest. Physiology, for instance, cannot explain conscious or spiritual life, except in so far as the conscious or spiritual is at the same time physical. Nor can political economy take into account moral and artistic considerations except in so far as these have also an economic side.

What is wanted, therefore, beyond the partial explanations of the special sciences, is an explanation of the *whole*, such as Science is unable to give. The various scientific standpoints must be co-related, and the results of the special sciences regarded from the higher standpoint of the whole, in the light of which the parts find their true meaning. This ultimate, because complete, explanation Philosophy undertakes to give. Her interest is not in the parts, but in the whole and in its unity. God, the world and man—the three great factors of universal existence—Philosophy seeks to view them in their unity and in their mutual relation. She seeks to view the whole, and from its centre; to view the parts, not in isolation and independence, but *sub specie aeternitatis*—as each informed with the idea of the whole.

(2.) Philosophy undertakes the final, as opposed to the provisional, explanation of Science. In this view her task may be said to be the final revision or criticism of knowledge. We have seen that Science compels ordinary knowledge to a consciousness of its own assumptions or uncriticised principles. Science, however, leaves this work of awakening or criticism incomplete. Science has its own assumptions. The scientific, equally with the ordinary man, employs principles unconsciously and unquestioningly; and it remains for Philosophy to complete the work of criticism begun by Science. Take, for example, the law of causal connection. The man of science does not ask whether, or how far, this is a valid principle of knowledge. He employs it in all his reasoning; but his only concern is to find the laws according to which it

is exemplified in particular phenomena. He is so interested in "cases" of the law that it does not occur to him to inquire into the nature and ground of the law itself. This is only an instance of the general truth that the principles which underlie the procedure of scientific as well as of ordinary thought are, for the latter as for the former, of the nature of assumptions. Philosophy, on the contrary, can have no assumptions. No part or phase of knowledge can claim immunity from her criticism. It is her high calling to investigate, and, as the result of investigation, to justify or condemn the assumptions alike of ordinary and of scientific knowledge.

To sum up what has just been said about the three stages of Knowledge and their relation to one another, we may take as an illustration our knowledge of space. Some conception of space is implied in our ordinary knowledge of the material world. We always *place* things at a distance from ourselves and from one another, that is, we relate them in a common space. But it is not necessary, for the purposes of ordinary knowledge, to inquire into the nature of this space or its properties; nor does the ordinary man do so. Such inquiries he leaves to Science and Philosophy. The former, not satisfied with the vagueness of ordinary knowledge, seeks to give the conception a new definiteness. The science of Geometry investigates the properties of space, and formulates the universal and necessary spatial relations. But even Geometry does not raise the question of the essential nature of space. *Given* space—the space of ordinary knowledge—Geometry deduces its necessary properties; but what space itself is, it does not inquire. Nor does Geometry consider the relation of the spatial to the other aspects of the universe; it concentrates on this one aspect with exclusive interest. It thus remains for Philosophy to complete, if possible, our knowledge of space, by investigating its essential nature, our right to employ the conception alike in our ordinary and scientific knowledge, as well as its relation to other necessary conceptions or aspects of the universe.

Thus it is that Philosophy is the last and highest stage of Knowledge—the ultimate form which, in its development from lower to higher, it inevitably assumes. It is the endeavour—consciously and completely—to *think* or *re-think* the universe, only partially and hesitatingly thought by the ordinary and the scientific man; the final and complete awakening from the sleep of unconscious or semi-conscious thought; Knowledge comes to full self-consciousness.

Let me illustrate this unique position of Philosophy as the "science of sciences," by con-

sidering a little farther its relation, on the one hand, to Science, and on the other to Theology, called by Aristotle "the first philosophy."

The one constant factor of existence—the "common denominator" to whose terms all phenomena may be reduced, is Thought. From this "magic circle" escape is impossible. Things are for us non-existent, because non-significant, until known; and to *know* things is to *think* them. The Science of Thought is, therefore, the science of universal existence, investigating as it does the essential nature of that whose special manifestations are studied by the various sciences. As has been well said, "at bottom there is but one subject of study—the forms and metamorphoses of mind. All other subjects may be reduced to that; all other studies bring us back to this study." Occupying this central or universal point of view, Philosophy is free from the limitations which necessarily beset the special sciences, and is therefore in a position to adjudicate between their conflicting claims.

Science, however, does not always recognize her own limitations, but sometimes, and more particularly in our own time, sets up a claim to that independence and ultimateness of view which, we have just seen, belongs by peculiar right to Philosophy. In setting up this claim, Science abandons her own legitimate and proper ground, and becomes Philosophy. It is strange that men, otherwise eminently fitted to represent the science of this century, should have laid themselves open to the condemnation which Bacon pronounced against the science of the Middle Ages, of "false generalization," that is, generalization which is not a strict and faithful induction from the facts observed. The whole phenomenon of Agnosticism, it seems to me, is an example of this pseudo-science. It becomes necessary, therefore, in order to clearness of thought, to distinguish carefully between the provinces of Science and Philosophy. Until we thus distinguish, in the writings of Spencer, between what is the result of strictly scientific procedure, and what is very questionable philosophical superstructure reared thereon, we are not in a position to judge of the value of the net-result. Thus one very evident service of Philosophy is, by showing the necessary limitations of its point of view, to correct the over-confident conclusions of Science.

But Philosophy has not only this negative relation to Science; it has also positive relations of a close and important nature. If what I have said above be true, it follows that Philosophy and Science are organically connected with one another. It is indeed the result, in large measure, of the growth of the scientific spirit in modern

times that Philosophy has learned to modify her conception of her task and province, and to recognize her community of interest with Science. The old conception of "Metaphysics," as dealing with a sphere of existence *beyond* or *behind* the natural has been generally abandoned. Philosophy, it is now recognized, has to do, not with a world of abstract Being or Things-in-themselves apart from the world of phenomena, but with that world of experience which is the common domain of Philosophy and Science. Its true function is not to separate that which has been joined together, to conjure up a world of absolute Reality apart from the world of experience; but rather, as we have seen, to join once more what Science has separated, the various parts or aspects of the universe in one great whole. So misleading, indeed, in this reference, because so full of archaic misunderstanding, is the term "Metaphysics," that I believe it is largely to blame for the distrust of Philosophy so prevalent in the popular and scientific mind. As suggesting the old historic conception of her task, the term is full of interest; but in view of the revolution—for it it is no less—since Kant in the attitude of Philosophy to Science, it is questionable whether it should be retained. Kant has shown, once for all, that Philosophy, in the sense of the old "Metaphysics," that is, as the science of absolute Being or Things-in-themselves, is an impossible dream, and that the only legitimate and fruitful Philosophy is the Philosophy of Experience. Not that either Philosophy or Science is empirical. While both alike are limited to experience, both, in a sense, go beyond experience, and seek its explanation. But though Philosophy goes farther than Science, and seeks to supplement its partial and provisional explanation by one that is exhaustive and final, it is always the same Experience that it is seeking to explain.

But Philosophy not only completes the work of Science; it also leads up to that of Theology, and throws light on legitimate procedure here also. This is the task of the Philosophy of Religion. For here we are still dealing with experience—experience in its highest form—that of the religious consciousness. This, like all experience, implies certain factors which make it possible; and it is in the justice done to these by the full and adequate view of Philosophy that we see its most positive service. In its appreciation of the moral—the basis the religious experience; of the great fact of selfhood in human life; of the eternal import of moral distinctions; of the destiny of the moral agent; of the counterpart in God of man's moral nature; of the subordination of the physical to

the ethical, and at the same time the working down of the ethical into the physical; in the final interpretation of the universe in the light of this, its highest characteristic—in all this Philosophy is preparing the way for Theology, finding, in the facts of the universe and especially of human life, the groundwork of religious experience. Above all, in the strange, inexplicable, yet constant fact of evil, of conflict, of failure in moral life, Philosophy finds the great religious need. The full significance of these facts is appreciated only when they are interpreted religiously. The only possible solution of the problem they present is a religious solution. The religious man conceives moral evil as Sin against God, and finds escape from the contradictions of moral life in the thought of a Divine Redemption. It is the task of Theology, and not of Philosophy, to think out this religious experience, to theorize it, if possible. In so far, too, as the element of Revelation enters into Theology, its sphere is distinct from that of Philosophy no less than of Science. Still, dealing as it necessarily does with ultimate philosophical notions, as these are implied in religious experience, Theology must receive the teaching of Philosophy as to how far these notions come within the compass of our knowledge, as to how far it is possible to theorize this highest form of experience. This connection of Philosophy and Theology is indeed matter of history. Even in the Scholastic age Philosophy was acknowledged to be "the handmaid of Theology," and in modern times a rationalistic or negative Theology has been the invariable complement of a rationalistic or negative Philosophy. While already we can see the beginnings of the influence of the new philosophical standpoint of this century upon the Theology of the time. Here, once more, Philosophy is seen to be the "science of sciences."

The task of Philosophy is thus a very ambitious one. Too ambitious, we are apt to say, when we contrast the grandeur of its ideal with the poverty of its actual achievement. If its ideal far surpasses that of Science, does not its attainment fall infinitely short? Instead of the sure march of ever wider conquest of truth, we have a prolonged war of systems, system after system, mutually destructive; the same old questions debated again and again, with no advance, no definite gain of truth. Such is the disheartening conclusion which we are apt to draw from a survey of the History of Philosophy.

But is there no progress to be traced in the history? Does not the law of evolution find verification here as elsewhere, though with less of constancy, more of freedom; less of uniform necessity, more of the free play of individuality?

Is there no development to be traced—from lower to higher, from less to more adequate views of truth? System follows system, it is true; but not arbitrarily and aimlessly, rather by a certain inward necessity, the necessity of thought. Nor is there any *going back* in Philosophy. Each apparent "return" is in reality an advance, made possible by the intervening conflict and criticism. Compare, for example, any great modern with a corresponding ancient system, as the philosophy of Hegel with that of Aristotle. Aristotle's formulæ may be capable of expressing Hegelian conceptions; but the formulæ, when thus interpreted, are infinitely richer to us than they could have been to Aristotle. So again the "return to Kant," of which we hear so much at present, is not a return to the philosophy of Kant precisely as conceived by Kant himself, to the sacrifice of all that has been done since; it is a return to Kantian conceptions illumined and developed by later thought. Such is truth, that each seed contains the whole in germ, each facet reflects, or may in the proper light reflect the colours of the whole. But the light which reveals these colours comes only after long and patient seeking, although, once found, it sheds back its lustre upon the discoveries of the past. It is thus that every part of the history of Philosophy is full of interest to the speculative mind; for each part is touched with the glory of the whole. Each thinker in turn has had his own glance of deepest insight into truth, though it may be that we, in the retrospect, can see clearly and fully what he, prophet-like, saw but dimly and afar off.

And as for the strife and tumult which mark the history of thought, as well as of action, is it not so, that through negation and contradiction, and only thus, the full content of the truth may be developed. The truth of Realism, for example, must be opposed to the truth of Idealism, that the full truth, of which each is only a partial expression, may be reached. Truth is so rich and many-sided, that it cannot be exhausted in any single view, however apparently comprehensive. Its various sides must in turn be emphasized, that at least the whole may, in all the fulness of its meaning, be seen and appreciated. It may, indeed, be that this full vision of the truth belongs to God alone, and that man can only behold and celebrate its various aspects as, one by one, they are presented to him. It may be that, as Socrates said, we can only be "philosophers"—seekers after wisdom—and that God alone is *wise*. A final and complete Philosophy may be unattainable. That full-toned harmony, which is the last result of all the discords that together make the

grand anthem of the truth, we perhaps can never hear; it may be for the ears of Him alone whose praise it tells. But that the discords do contribute to such a final harmony we know and feel, and it is this hope and confidence that has inspired the singers through all the centuries as each took up his several part.

Thus, even though complete success in the execution of its task may be impossible, yet the ideal, unattainable though it be, is the spur and spring of philosophical endeavour. Our intellectual, like our moral life, implies an ideal. But it may be that, here as there, the ideal is unattainable, and our experience is one of constant struggle and failure, borne up by the hope of ultimate success. But though the characteristic of both alike is failure and defeat, that does not express the whole of either. There is tragedy in both; but neither is *altogether* tragic. We do not know absolute good—our good is always mixed with evil; nor absolute truth—our truth is always mixed with error. But good is ever stronger than evil, and truth than error; and in failure, whether moral or intellect, which *knows itself* to be failure, there is the seed of ultimate success; in defeat, which *knows itself* to be defeat, there is the prophecy of future triumph. And perhaps it needs the lesson of failure and defeat in the struggle towards its attainment to teach us the rich significance of the ideal, alike of our moral and of our intellectual life. Perhaps if it were not for the discords of our life, and the knowledge that they *are* discords, we could not appreciate the harmony when we hear it. At any rate faith in an Ideal which, while it reveals, can also harmonize the discords, is the postulate of the highest life, whether of action or of thought.

"The high that proved too high, the heroic for earth too hard,

The passion that left the ground to lose itself in the sky,  
Are music sent up to God by the lover and the bard;

Enough that He heard it once: we shall hear it by-and-bye.

And what is our failure here but a triumph's evidence  
For the fulness of the days? Have we withered or agonized?

Why else was the pause prolonged but that singing might issue thence?

Why rushed the discords in, but that harmony should be prized?"

I fear I have already detained you too long, but I should like, before I close, to commend the study of Philosophy to you on the ground of the intense and varied interest which attaches to it.

And first there is the human interest—the interest of life. Man, in virtue of his peculiar nature, is necessarily a philosopher. As a rational

being, he is not content till he has recognized in all things a reason answering to his own. Born into a world of mystery, he cannot rest without pushing the mystery farther and farther back. He craves for knowledge—ever higher and fuller—of the world, of God, of his own nature and duty and destiny. And in knowledge there is no such thing as satisfaction; it is a constant hunger and thirst, an insatiable craving. The very consciousness of mystery—of problems yet unsolved—is the consciousness of the need of solution. Man must *think*. It is the very law of his being. And to philosophize is only to think more deeply and more unweariedly.

In all literature—in the novel and the drama especially—we find this reaching after a complete view of human life, of the working of moral forces. Philosophy is just the attempt to reach a complete and reasoned view, where literature is content with “flashes” of insight, as much of emotion as of thought. It is true that life is always more than philosophy, and it may be that literature, in spite of the fragmentariness of its view, or perhaps just because of this fragmentariness, is truer to life than philosophy. For “in literature,” as my colleague, Dr. Alexander, finely remarked in addressing you on a similar occasion, “is to be found a treasure-house of aid—suggestions the more stimulating that they are but suggestions, partial solutions the more enduring that they are but partial, and sometimes a complete philosophy implicit where least expected.” Literature, like Physiology, views the living reality; while Philosophy, like Anatomy, studies the dead skeleton. The interest of Philosophy is, like that of Science, of a different kind from the interest of literature. It is concerned with the *conditions* of that life which, in its full breathing actuality, is the subject of literature. But their interests, though different, are both equally legitimate. The philosophical endeavour to theorize life, to understand its conditions, is no less necessary than the literary or artistic endeavour to appreciate the life itself, which is the result of these conditions.

Manifold indeed are the possible solutions of the problem of Philosophy; and each of us has his own. The solution may be a practical one—the solution of life. This is, in a sense, the universal solution. Many have no interest in literature, far less in philosophy; but all must *live*, and life implies an ideal, however low or ill-considered. Or the solution may be found in religion—in an escape from the contradictions of the present in a higher life in which the difficulties of knowledge are swallowed up in a victorious faith. Or in poetry—imagination and feeling shedding their glory on the dead plain of

a merely intellectual life. Yet, in certain moods—of calm and earnest thought—which come to all of us at times, when the eager questionings of reason demand an answer, and escape becomes impossible, the human mind is content with nothing less than a *Philosophy* of life—a clear and reasoned account of its nature and conditions. And all the intense interest of that life whose nature and conditions it investigates is reflected on the study of Philosophy.

Closely connected with this human interest is the historical interest of philosophical study. Philosophy is no new thing. It is a movement of the human mind from the earliest times to the present day. Men have always pondered its questions. Wonderfully different as have been the solutions of different ages and countries, of different individual minds, the problems are eternally the same. And thus the student of Philosophy is supported by a sense of sympathy in a common search with the thoughtful of every age and country.

Again there is the literary interest. Nor is this merely incidental, in that Philosophy, as we have seen, deals fully and deliberately with the problem raised in all literature; there is, farther, a whole literary domain peculiar to Philosophy. The great thinkers of the world have also been amongst its greatest writers. The literature of Philosophy is no less important—in some periods it is much more so—than the literature of the Imagination. Would not Greek literature be poorer without the Dialogues of Plato and the Treatises of Aristotle? And in modern times are not names like Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, great in literature as well as in philosophy? Some training in Philosophy, then, is necessary—is it not?—for the appreciation of a whole department of literature, devoted as it is to philosophical investigations. We must distinguish, of course, between the value of philosophical works as literature and their value as philosophy; but we cannot appreciate the one, without in some measure, at least, appreciating the other also. For, as one of its most eminent living exponents (Prof. Dowden) has said; “The study of literature is not a study solely of what is graceful, attractive and pleasure-giving in books; it attempts to understand the great thoughts of the great thinkers. To know Greek literature, we must know Aristotle; to know French literature, we must know Descartes. In English literature of the eighteenth century, Berkeley and Butler and Hume are greater names than Gray and Collier.” One result of your study of Philosophy, then, will be to introduce you to a large and important department of literature, and to put you in

possession of some standard of appreciation, of certain canons of criticism for application there.

Once more: there is what I may call the interest of culture. Being free from the necessary limitations of the scientific standpoint, Philosophy gives a breadth of view which the study of the special sciences cannot give. It gives the right, because the ability, to judge, to criticise; the tolerance which comes of knowledge; the reverence which comes of knowledge of our ignorance. It is the lack of this philosophical culture in the scientific and theological, as well as in the popular mind, that is the constant cause of controversy between Science and Theology. Such controversy invariably arises from the interference of the one with the work of the other, or of either with that of Philosophy. So long as each restricts itself to its own proper sphere, its results are not to be questioned, and will not be found to contradict one another. So soon, however, as either touches on the ultimate questions of Philosophy, it becomes subject to philosophical criticism; and unless the man of science and the theologian is also a philosopher, he is found lacking in that perfect “culture” which is the condition of sound judgment on these questions.

There is one other interest, suggested in what I have already said, I mean the religious interest. We have seen that Philosophy, regarding the universe as it does from the ethical, and not merely, like Science, from the physical and intellectual side, calls attention to a moral situation, of which the only adequate interpretation and solution is found in Religion. It may indeed, be that a complete Philosophy of Religion is impossible. Religion is always more and stronger than Philosophy; as life is more and stronger than theory; and the faith of the “little child” may well be wiser than the deepest knowledge of Philosophy. Yet the attempt to think out this highest of all forms of experience is no less necessary than the attempt to think out its lower forms. So surely as we attain to intellectual manhood, we seek a reason of the faith that is in us; and the stronger our faith, the greater will be our confidence in seeking for its rational basis. This is the supreme undertaking of Philosophy, which investigates the ultimate notions presupposed in all Religion—God, Freedom and Immortality; and, whether wholly successful or not, at least draws attention to that side of things which points to God and the religious life of fellowship with Him, as the only true and worthy destiny of man.

Such, so far as I have been able hastily and imperfectly to describe it, is the task of Philosophy

so great its interest and importance. Some of you are entering upon this study to-day, and I would urge you, in my closing word, to earnestness and faithfulness in it. Here, even more than elsewhere, the student must co-operate with the teacher. It is but little that the latter can do alone. I cannot solve your problems for you; the solutions must be your own, or they are of no value. In Philosophy, at least, there is no work done by proxy. The reward is strictly proportioned to individual effort. But I have sufficient confidence in my subject, and in your earnestness of purpose as students of Dalhousie, to believe that you will not be slow to lend me your active co-operation in this great study. The time is propitious. I believe that the interest in the problems of Philosophy is more widespread just at present than at any former time. Men’s minds are full of them, and the tremendous interests involved are appreciated as, perhaps, they never were before. You are to prepare to take your part in the great debate; to make conquest of the truth for yourselves, that you may be able help others to it. Use well the time of preparation. You are just entering upon full and independent intellectual life, upon “the novitiate of your intelligence.” Possess yourselves of your spiritual birthright; appropriate your great inheritance. But do so with reverence and humility, with a sense of the solemnity of the trust committed to you. In all that you do, be mindful of that high trust, and faithful to it. The use you make of these student years will tell upon your whole future, and far beyond your own. Be faithful, be earnest, be courageous. And when the years of college life have come and gone, they will leave behind them a rich and abiding possession of spiritual gain.

THE MOCK PARLIAMENT.—At the opening meeting of the Law Club, in the present session, the advisability of reorganizing the mock parliament was discussed. At a later meeting a new constitution, framed to meet the difficulties of last session, was adopted. The House opened on the 8th of October, Mr. Speaker McKay occupying the chair, and Messrs. McInnis, McNeill and Lockhart taking the ministerial benches.

Owing to the unsettled state of things about the College only two sittings of Parliament have been held. Two Government bills have been introduced, one to amend the Municipal Assessment Act, the other an Act respecting the citing of Statutes. The former of these has been almost carried through committee, and the latter has passed its second reading. Mr. Armstrong has given notice of a resolution to abolish the office of School Inspector.

## THE DALHOUSIE GAZETTE.

HALIFAX, N. S., NOVEMBER 4, 1887.

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## TERMS:

One collegiate year (in advance) ..... \$1 00  
Single copies ..... 10

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WITH this issue we assume, for the first time, the duties and responsibilities of editorship. We recognize the difficulties of the position. We are aware that the amateur editor has not such a pleasant and easy task as many imagine. But we will endeavour to do our best. We do not suppose that our performance at first will be up to what we conceive should be required, but we trust that our readers will be lenient with us for a while.

This year, perhaps, more than for several years past, is the GAZETTE in need of earnest labour and careful management. The incubus of financial difficulty weighs heavy upon it—a pretty effectual damp on the prosperity of any paper. It seems necessary, therefore, that a determined effort should be made, not only to remove the existing debt, but to reduce to a minimum, the occurrence of like difficulties in the future. Perhaps the most effectual way of doing so, would be to try and increase the circulation; and to render this the more easy of

accomplishment, the literary excellence of the GAZETTE should be raised to as high a standard as possible. Under the existing order of things, it is next to impossible for the editors themselves to do, with any degree of credit, the amount of work necessary for supplying the columns of the GAZETTE with suitable and interesting matter. They therefore have to depend on the assistance of friends.

This grievance has been aired time and again, but we hope our readers will pardon us for briefly referring to it. In this College, so eminently progressive in almost every respect, it seems strange that the Faculty cannot be persuaded by any manner of means to take any account of the work done on the College papers. If this work were trivial, or of little difficulty, there would be good reasons for not recognizing it. But it is not so. To successfully and creditably edit a College paper, demands both labour and ability; and when it has to be done in addition to class work, cannot be done properly. The consequence is that the College paper suffers, and this in some degree affects the reputation of the College itself; for in almost all Colleges the College paper is now considered an established institution, and the intellectual ability or activity of the student in general, judged from its manifestation in the College paper. For the credit of our College then, we should endeavour to make our paper of as high literary value as we can. This necessitates the appointment of the best men available as editors; and to render it always possible to secure them, the work they do must be recognized as a part of their course.

OLD Dalhousie is gone, and its site is occupied by a rising structure, which will tell a tale of Haligonian pride and magnificence. But new Dalhousie has, like the Phoenix, risen from the ashes of her former self; and we predict for her a life as unending as that of the "rare Arabian bird." Every student must feel very sensibly the vast change effected in our condition within six months. Ugh! those old musty walls that left a stain on the clothes of the followers of Minerva! the strong savour of ancient days that

pervaded the entire building! But now an air of comfort breathes through each handsome room of our new home, and might inspire with some degree of ambition the most unwilling student.

Nor must we forget to render thanks to whom thanks are due for this satisfactory state of affairs. The enterprise of the Governors, and more particularly the unwearied efforts of our President, claim our admiration and gratitude. A sadder duty yet remains: to express the deep sense of sorrow and bereavement that Dalhousians feel at the death of our illustrious patron. This task, however, we delegate to a special column and more extended notice.

With regard to the new site, we understand that even its most bitter opposers are reconciled to the selection by the superior advantages of its central position. Distant enough from the noisy traders' seats to escape the din that formerly proved a serious hindrance to good work; near enough for any sake of convenience, what more could we desire? Let every true Dalhousian, then, hail with joy the new era that has dawned upon his Alma Mater. We are no prophet, nor the lineal descendant of any ancestor gifted with the Delphic spirit; but we feel that a grand future lies before Dalhousie. She has been safely tided over the dangers that beset a struggling University; and the large influx of students this autumn is but a promise of coming years.

ANOTHER year has rolled away into the past. Old friends have left us, and new ones are taking their place. Everywhere is change; but nowhere greater than in Dalhousie herself. The old college building, with its worn and antiquated appearance, has now become a thing of the past; and its old hall, rich with recollections of scrimmages, etc., its lecture rooms with their curious and suggestively carved benches, exist now only in our memories, furnishing an inexhaustible fund of material for reminiscences wherewith to delight the eager curiosity of Freshmen yet unknown. Yet who does not a little regret the change? Who does not feel as if he were leaving home in leaving the old college? There as Freshmen—timid

and shrinking as we faced the belligerent Soph, and their still more staid friends, the Juniors and Seniors,—most of us made our first bow in the college world; there many of us as Sophs strutted about in our pride of place, exercising with supercilious officiousness a rigid oversight of the Freshmen; there some of us as Juniors, began to feel the dignity and responsibility of our position, and to look forward to the cares and trials of life. But "all things must change;" and in these days the changes are so continuous and rapid, that they only receive at most a passing notice, and are then forgotten. A few years ago, any one who would have predicted that Dalhousie would occupy to-day the position she does, would have been regarded as a dreamer. No one would have believed that so much would be done in so short a time. But noble and beneficent friends have generously and unreservedly furnished the means by which a transformation has been made. To them is due the praise that Dalhousie now stands in the very front rank of Canadian colleges. Dalhousie has cause to feel proud of her position, but she seems to be only entering on her career of prosperity. Much has been done, but much remains to be done. College federation may, at present, be regarded as visionary and impracticable, but we cannot but think that it will take place some time. When that time comes, we feel convinced that Dalhousie will have attained, relatively, a greater degree of importance among the Maritime Colleges than she possesses to-day; and if so, what college could dispute her claim to be the nucleus of the new University?

THE present term of the Law School has opened with more than usual promise. There is a large attendance in all the classes, the First Year especially being one of the largest yet attending.

This year, for the first time, we have students attending from outside the three sister provinces. We are pleased to note that the claims of the School are being thus recognized by outsiders. There is no reason why, with the improved facilities for room we shall now have, a Law Library which soon will be found to none in

the Dominion, a thoroughly practical course of study, and an efficient staff of Professors and Lecturers, that we should not offer inducements to the Law students of every province of the Dominion, which they could not well afford to reject.

The changes for the present year have been numerous and important. The most important one, as affecting the students, is in the time of opening. This year, for the first time, the School opened the first week in September instead of November, as formerly. What the results of this change will be, and how it will affect the work of the students, remains yet to be seen. For ourselves, we think the change a judicious one. By this change, the months of September and October, two of the most pleasant months of the whole year for study, are included in the term. And if the School regularly closes as it will this year in February, we think we are safe in saying that two of the most disagreeable months for study and work are thus excluded from the term.

Another important change is, that after this year attendance upon the class lectures for the entire three years by Undergraduates will be imperative. This change, also, we think a wise one and in the right direction.

The changes in the Course of Study are also important, and have been made with the sole view of enhancing the value of the subjects introduced. The subjects of Sales and Negotiable Instruments have been divided, and will, in future, be the subject of distinct and separate lectures.

Sales and Negotiable Instruments will now form the subject of the Lectures for the Second and Third Years combined during alternate years.

This change is a commendable one, since by combining the two classes under one lecture much time is saved and gained, and the subject of Negotiable Instruments, which has hitherto been almost crowded out of the Course, will now receive the attention its great importance demands.

The subject of Partnership and Agency has been added to the Course this year for the first

time, under the charge of Mr. Harrington. Mr. Harrington's eminent qualifications for the subject are too well known to need any comment. All who have attended his lectures on Evidence during the past three years, must know that his lecture on the important subject of Partnership will be both pleasant and profitable.

The subjects of Partnership and Evidence will in future be taken up in the same way as Sales and Negotiable Instruments on alternate years. The lectures on Criminal Law omitted from the last year's course, have been resumed this year by the Hon. S. L. Shannon. A word in praise of the indomitable energy and deep interest manifested by this gentleman at his advanced age, in thus so cheerfully taking upon himself the work of two subjects, would, we fear, do him but poor justice. We can only say that the example of one evincing such disinterested love for his work, ought to commend itself to every student as worthy of their pride and ambition.

**T**HE financial difficulties under which the GAZETTE is commencing the present college year have already been alluded to. It is with the greatest reluctance and regret that the Editors, on assuming their new responsibilities, are compelled to make this announcement. At the beginning of the last year the GAZETTE set out with a clean sheet, and it was the fond hope of the managers that they would be more than able at the end of the year to meet the necessary liabilities, and perhaps have our treasury graced with a surplus. Such, however, has not been the result, and as already said there is a large deficit on last year's publications. Our Financial Editors inform us, that nearly one-third of the subscription list for last year is unpaid. These small individual amounts, if paid in, would reduce our indebtedness almost entirely. We therefore earnestly and urgently appeal to all who have not yet forwarded the amount of their annual subscriptions, to assist us by doing so at once.

All must realize that with matters remaining as they now are, it will be almost impossible for the Editors to do either themselves, the paper, or the College the justice it demands. It is absolutely necessary then that the debt now resting upon us be wiped off at once.

We are convinced that the financial affairs have been managed in the most economical and efficient manner possible by those in charge, often at much personal sacrifice and inconvenience. We shall aim to pursue the same course during the time we have charge with even greater strictness, if possible, and endeavor to reduce the expenditure to a minimum.

We go forward with our work, however, feeling confident that our numerous and kind patrons will give a cheerful and hearty response to our call, sincerely trusting that at an early day we may have the pleasure of announcing that the incubus that now burdens us has been removed.

#### IN MEMORIAM.

Everybody connected with Dalhousie remembers the keen thrill of sorrow they experienced when it was learned that on the 8th of last May, Sir William Young had ceased to live. "Another giant gone," sorrowfully said those who were witnesses of his political and legal triumphs, "and when shall we see his like again?" His memory shall forever remain green in the hearts of his once beloved fellow-citizens; but never so fondly treasured up as by Dalhousie.

During the last half-century he was closely connected with the College, whose fond remembrance his devotion and liberality so justly merit. The good that men do lives after them: Dalhousie has not yet realized what Sir William Young wrought on her behalf. Let her increasing prosperity serve always as a remembrancer of munificence never surpassed in the history of this Province.

We cannot express our sense of this departed worth better than by quoting Prof. Seth's tribute to the memory of this great man:

"But as we look forward with new hope to the enjoyment of the greater facilities for successful work, which the new building will afford us, we cannot but remember with sincere regret the loss of him without whom it might never have been, and certainly would not have been so soon, and who, had he lived, would have rejoiced with us in the completion of a work on which he had set his heart, and which it was one of the last acts to inaugurate. But, though he has been

called away before its completion, the name of Sir William Young will not soon be forgotten among us. Those halls which we are about to enter, will be a constant witness and memorial of his noble and enlightened generosity. Be it ours, whether as professors or as students, to prove our gratitude to him or other benefactors in the only way we can, by increased earnestness and enthusiasm in our work, and a greater devotion than ever to the interests of Dalhousie."

#### CONVOCATION.

Convocation, held on the 18th in Orpheus Hall, was unusually well attended. The beauty and respectability of Halifax was well represented in this gathering. Youthful ebullitions rendered the scene quite lively, until the Senate appeared on the platform, but, awestruck by their dignity, then almost entirely ceased.

President Forrest opened with a few remarks on Dalhousie's altered condition and future hopes. The customary address was delivered by Professor Seth, who presented his profound meditations in a style eminently pleasing. Sir Adams Archibald then made a short speech in which he touched upon the advantages of Dalhousie's present situation.

The following are the results of the Bursary and Matriculation Examinations:—

#### SENIOR EXHIBITIONS.

1. Laird, A. G.
2. Frazee, V. G.
3. Henry, J. K.
4. Putnam, H.
5. Fulton, E.

#### SENIOR BURSARIES.

1. Brown, E. N.
2. Fraser, J. K. G.
3. Macdonald, R. J.
4. Fraser, A.
5. Harvey, M.
6. Davidson, J. M.
7. Allison, E. P.
8. Burkitt, R. J.

#### JUNIOR EXHIBITIONS.

1. Magee, W. H., Digby, private study.
2. Creighton, G., West River, Pictou Academy.
3. Moore, C. L., Salisbury, N. B., do
4. Brehant, J. W., Murray Harbor, P. E. I., Prince of Wales College.
5. MacMillan, F. A., Albany Plains, P. E. I., Prince of Wales College.

#### JUNIOR BURSARIES.

1. Hugh, D. D., Murray Harbor, P. E. I., Prince of Wales College.
2. Macrae, A. O., St. John, Pictou Academy.
3. Tupper, J. W., New Glasgow, Pictou Academy.
4. Oliver, A. C. L., Digby, Digby Academy.
5. Robertson, S. N., North Bedeque, P. E. I., Prince of Wales College.

6. Robinson, C. B., Pictou, Pictou Academy.
7. McLean, J. B., Hopewell, do
8. Jordan, E. J., Murray Harbor, P. E. I., Prince of Wales College.
9. Turnbull, G. D., Digby, Digby Academy.
10. McMillan, C. E., Whycocomagh, C.B., Pictou Academy.

## MATRICULATION EXAMINATIONS.

## PASSED ORDINARY EXAMINATION:

Cameron, S. H. H.; Cox, G. H.; Harrington, Emily B.; Montgomery, John; Morash, A. V.; Muir, Ethel; Parlee, G. P.; Thompson J. W.

## PASSED ON RECOMMENDATION OF EXAMINERS FOR MUNRO BURSARIES:

The Exhibitioners; The Bursars; Atwater, J. F.; Bakin, F. W. M.; Baxter, Agnes S.; Cogswell, W. F.; Creelman, W. A.; Douglas, E. A.; Fullerton, A.; Grierson, J. A.; Hamilton, Annie J.; Johnson, E. D.; Logan, J. D.; McCulloch, W.; McCurdy, J. F.; Macdonald, A. F.; Munro, H. H.; Thompson, F. W.

## PHILOSOPHY VS. SCIENCE.

We commend to every student a careful perusal of Professor Seth's address at Convocation—which we print in full on the first pages of this issue. All present, we feel sure, admired the pleasing delivery of the man; were amazed at the profundity of the philosopher. But if one would understand in all its fulness that vast subject, deep and anxious thought must consume his breast night and day.

No one can deny but that his was a noble defence of that study which has fallen so low in the estimation of the popular classes. Who can affirm, in the light of that clear and complete vindication, that the votaries of Philosophy aim at the culture of a single class and nothing more? Science may boast of her achievements, of numberless new laws and inventions, but there is always a dark side to her triumphs. Science boasts of a Railway Engine annihilating distance; yet a loaded train falls through the Chatsworth Bridge and two hundred souls meet a horrible death. Science boasts of a proud ocean steamer, furrowing the main without white wings to catch the gale; yet a collision occurs in mid-ocean and hundreds are engulfed. On the battle-field Science vauntingly points out the grim "dogs of war," which her Titanic hands have fashioned. We hear the shrill screech of a shell and twenty or thirty brave men have gone to their last account. The warrior dies; not striving with

his spear for personal distinction, for which men dare to die; not fighting desperately, with numerous foemen slain and a smile of triumph on his lips; not a tragic death, with the canopy of heaven above him, Earth's mountains, plains and streams to witness his heroism; but cut off in the twinkling of an eye, without one deed of valour done. How much really better, we ask, has Science rendered Man? In many cases it only affords him an opportunity to be inhumane to his brother man. Has the Science of healing lightened one jot the burden of human misery? True, a plague like the small-pox cannot now depopulate a kingdom as in other times. But, apart from these few instances of its efficacy, is not physical misery a closer adjunct of civilization than of heathenism or barbarism? New diseases, new degeneracies, are let loose on the modern world, and the hand of the medicine man is powerless to stay their progress.

We have ever been accustomed to reckon the Grecian communities the grandest figure in all national existence: their intellectual conquests never surpassed or equalled. But the Greeks knew little or nothing of Science, as we know it. That they were eminently a nation of philosophers, every one will concede. Unconquered in war, unsurpassed in peace, one thing was necessary to make Greece an ideal nation; but this requisite was not a knowledge of science. Imagine the Christian religion, instead of Paganism, diffused throughout Greece, and what a Greece would that have been!

There is a greater evil than bodily pain, a greater curse than physical infirmity; and that is a mental apathy, a mind unconscious of its own operations, a soul oblivious of its transcendent destiny. Philosophy undertakes to unravel the mystery of human thought, to trace out the hidden source of ideas, to ask whether this marvellous world and uniform nature, exhibiting design, could have sprung from the blind agency of soulless chance, rather than from the reason of an almighty magician. The Philosopher and the Poet originate all lofty ideas. They can make man sublime, transhumanize him, render him forgetful of the human dross in his nature, which Science seeks to understand.

## FOOT BALL.

## DALHOUSIE vs. BANKER AND GARRISON.

The first appearance of the University team this season was on last Saturday, when the above match was played. The number of spectators was large, among them being many ladies. The day turned out very fine, although the ground was rather wet, making the ball hard to play. Our men had the kick off, and keeping pretty well on the ball, gave their opponents some hard work in scrimmaging. Throughout the first half, Dalhousie forwards seemed to have the best of the shoving, and repeatedly recovered from the effects of slips by the backs, forcing a touch for safety before time was called.

At the outset of the second half, things looked very blue for the college men. The ball was finely rushed by Almon to within a yard or so of our goal line, and there it remained for quite a time, in the midst of a series of fierce scrimmages, until being kicked across the line we were forced to rouge. From the kick off at 25 yards, our men seemed to recover, and, carrying the play to the other end of the field, forced another rouge, shortly after which time was called.

Messrs. A. Doull and J. Ritchie were the umpire. W. Duffus, referee.

The following were the teams:

Burns,	(Backs)	Laird,
		Grant,
Maule,	( $\frac{3}{4}$ Backs)	Brown,
Crerar, (Capt)		Morrison, (Capt)
Douglas,		Bowser,
Kershaw,	( $\frac{1}{2}$ Backs)	MacKay,
Wainwright,		Creighton,
Stewart,	(Forwards)	MacNeil,
Metzler,		Armstrong,
Almon,		Logan,
DeVeber,		McLean,
Paske,		Millar,
Story,		Stewart,
Dyke,		Freeman,
Clarke,		Campbell,
Wiswell,		

Of the 365 Colleges and Universities of the U. S., 278 are church schools, averaging 13 teachers and 193 students to a school, while 87 are non-sectarian, averaging 15 teachers and 136 students.—*Brunonian*.

McMASTER UNIVERSITY, Toronto, has received a princely endowment by the will of the late Senator McMaster. Besides his former gifts, he has left to the University one endowment, which at five per cent., represents an annual income of \$40,000.

## PERSONALS.

NOTICE!—Subscribers will please notify us of any change of address.

We wish all former students, professors, and those in any other way connected with Dalhousie, to be subscribers to the GAZETTE. Those now receiving the GAZETTE for the first time who do NOT wish to subscribe, as well as old subscribers who wish to have their names taken from the list, will confer a favour by giving us early notice of the same. This will obviate confusion and misunderstanding.

Owing to non-payment of subscriptions, we are this year considerably behind hand. Please pay up all back subscriptions, and in future don't let your subscriptions accumulate.

## THE CLASS OF '87.

MISS McNEILL is at home in Charlottetown.

J. C. SHAW is at home in Stanhope.

DONALD FRASER is principal of Baddeck Academy.

F. H. COOFS is principal of Port Hood Academy.

W. G. PUTNAM is studying Medicine in Edinburgh.

MISS FORBES is teaching school in Great Village.

J. E. CREIGHTON is principal of North Sydney Academy.

W. R. CAMPBELL is principal of Truro Model School.

J. J. BUCHANAN is studying law in Dalhousie Law School.

H. C. SHAW is studying law in an office in Charlottetown.

MISS RITCHIE has a fellowship and is studying Philosophy in Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.

W. S. CALKIN is continuing his Science studies in Cornell University.

A. F. STEWART is engineering on the C. P. R.

M. J. McLEOD is studying theology in Princeton, N. J.

VICTOR COFFIN is financial editor of the *Island Guardian*.

J. W. McLENNAN, M. A. '87, is taking a post graduate course at Cornell University.

LAST summer, Prof. Alexander was married to Miss Laura B. Morrow, of this city. The GAZETTE extends hearty congratulations to Dr. and Mrs. Alexander.

D. A. MURRAY, B. A., who so ably filled the position of Mathematical Tutor during the past two years, is pursuing his mathematical studies in John Hopkins University, Baltimore.

J. P. McLEOD, B. A., Classical Tutor for the past two years, has gone out west, we believe. We regret that we haven't Mr. McLeod's address. *Semper floreat.*

MISS M. F. NEWCOMBE, B. A., who graduated with Honours in English Literature and History, has been recently appointed to a position on the teaching staff of the Presbyterian Ladies College, Halifax. We congratulate Miss Newcombe.

L. L. B'S. '87.

F. A. McCULLY has entered into a Law partnership with Senator Poirrer at Moncton, N. B.

D. A. MacKINNON is continuing his studies with one of the leading law firms in Charlottetown, P. E. I.

MESSRS. W. A. LYONS, E. M. McDONALD, H. W. ROGERS, W. K. THOMPSON, C. W. LANE, F. W. HANRIGHT, and ANDREW CLUNEY, attended the final examination before the Barristers' Society of this Province, on the 19th ult. We have had no official announcement of the results as yet, but we have every reason to believe that when they are made public, "the boys" will render a good account of themselves.

We have also been informed that Messrs. T. J. CARTER, H. F. McLATCHY, and J. A. RUSSELL were successful in passing the Attorney's Examination in New Brunswick. Good!

### DALLUSIENSIA.

*We wish our contemporaries to note that this column is not intended for the public, but belongs exclusively to the students at present attending College, who are alone expected to understand its contents.*

"Move the light; I want to be looking at Mistah Millah."

OUR Fat Rascal went in search of a boarding house. The sagacious Rhino at once marshalled in her blooming eldest. The Dude immediately engaged.

THE Freshie of No. 2 Bauer, who rifled his mother's jam closet for his winter's extra, had better keep an eye on the hungry Senior with whom he lodges.

Is it because our Prof's navigation system fails in practice, that one of his honour students was beaten in a boat race last summer by Injun Joe of Big Island? We pause for a reply.

THE Freshmen are anxious to know why that big stone, with the Latin inscription, is set up in the gentlemen's waiting room. It is right to satisfy their curiosity for once: it is commemorative of Freshmen slain in an obsolete game, called "scrimmage."

JUNIOR—to a man who believes, and who acted on the belief, that "it is not good for man to be alone." "My Lord Bassanio, \* \* \* I wish you all the joy that you can wish. For I am sure you (can)

wish none from me." Bassanio:—"Thank you." (Aside.) "You are right."

THE *natu mimimus* Freshman was seen the other day promenading Spring Garden Road with the big Soph's *new* cane. The little fellow being short of stature, had to walk on tip toe to reach the top of the stick. The first offence is almost venial, and we blame the Soph for lending his cane.

H. the Freshman: "Where is the genitive?"

Senior: "I beg your pardon?"

H. the F.: "I want to see the genitive."

S.; "Why?"

H. the F.: "I want to buy a *Vera Historia* from him."

THIS column may be a place of mystery to the Freshmen. So for their benefit, we desire to sweep away some of the mysterious cob-webs with our editorial broom. We are under no obligation to exercise this haunted corner. We might justly leave them in ignorance, until experience should completely accomplish what we are now attempting partly to do. Though we thus philanthropically seek to enlighten their benighted minds, we fear some of them will close their ears to our sonorous voice, and after all must learn by experience, the only school for a certain class, what we, in our greatness of soul, volunteer to impart.

Dallusiensia is a Latinized word, which translated, means the *sin-news* of the DALHOUSIE GAZETTE. It is the index finger pointing to the place where wicked Freshmen are brought to task. True, indeed, we do not hesitate to denounce sin in high places. But in the upper crust of College society there are, happily, few offenders, and so this column is peculiarly the spot where offending Freshmen are brought before the inexorable tribunal of public opinion.

The laws which they must obey have been duly posted up as of old, and are hereto appended. These laws have been reverently handed down from the remote past. They have been scrupulously observed by successive generations of Freshmen who, after having been evolved from the *monkey* forms of intellectual life, and subjected to the sifting law of the "Survival of the Fittest," passed through the several stages of College life into the world which they made better by living in it. Their success in after life was due to the mighty moral influences brought to bear upon them during the Freshman year. These men obeyed the very laws which our Freshmen must obey. And if any offending "Freshie" hopes to

escape the transgressors punishment, after this generous word of warning now, he is egregiously mistaken.

The following are the most important laws:

I. *Nullus novitius, i. e.*, no Freshman alias βαρβαρος shall wear a cane within five stadia of the academic campus.

II. Whereas, *reverentia senectuti debita est*, all Freshmen shall lift their hats to seniors, tutors, and professors.

III. Freshmen shall on all occasions shun the society of the fair sex.

IV. All hirsute appendages must disappear from the faces of Freshmen within three days.

N.B.—Freshmen who have attained the responsible position of *pater familias*, are exempted from Regulations III. and IV.

By order of the Praetor Peregrinus.

### LAW SCHOOL FACETIÆ.

*On dit*, that the student of the First Year boarding at Pine Hill, lodges on Sunday nights at the "Halifax."

THE football second fifteen can find recruits at the Infants' Home. The residents are always on the *baul*.

A Law Student, who was better acquainted with the contents of books than with their titles, lately searched every Law Library in the city for "Ruff on Rats," edition of 1887. (London.)

At a recent debate in the Mock Parliament, the Hon. member for O—d, declared, after some minutes of silent reflection, that "knowledge is power." On being called to order, he confessed that the saying was not original.

ANY Arts men, who feel their inability to size up a boarding house by one glance at its exterior, should beware of the large brick building south of the College. The accommodations are said to be poor, and the boarders complain of the sameness of their fare. Various pointers as to boarding houses will be given gratis, at this office, to Freshmen.

ONE of the Second Year men appeared out one afternoon of last week, wearing a beaver hat of a prehistoric style. Rumour had it that he had been privately married, and had forgotten to remove all the insignia of the bridegroom. He informs us that the report is not correct; and explains that he was endeavouring to introduce the latest styles which, it seems, move in a circle.

THE First Year men are wrestling with some legal problems that have arisen within their own experience. A man from the far west spends his leisure hours in looking up the law of libel, having special reference to the liability of newspaper publishers. The whole

class have mooted the question of proceeding civilly or criminally against the Second and Third Year students for the loss of their canes. A gentleman who is suspended somewhere between the First and Second Years, has had his attention drawn to some points in criminal procedure.

### AMONG THE COLLEGES.

ONE hundred and forty-nine Americans are studying in the University of Berlin.—*Ex.*

HARVARD has received almost \$1,000,000 this year.

CORNELL Library receives on an average, ten books a day.

AT the University of Mississippi, the gentlemen have petitioned for the removal of the lady students.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY opened with 414 new men, 351 of whom are in the Freshmen class, 50 in the Law Department, and 13 post graduates.

IT is proposed to establish a new colored University at Montgomery, Ala.—*Pennsylvanian*.

AT Harvard, work on the College paper is accepted as a substitute for regular literary duty.—*Pennsylvanian*.

THE Princeton Library has been increased, during the last four months, by 4,989 new volumes.—*Brunonian*.

HARVARD's gymnasium cost \$100,000; Yale's \$125,000; Columbia's, \$156,000; Princeton's, \$38,000; Dartmouth's, \$25,000; Amherst's, \$65,000; William's, \$50,000; Cornell's, \$40,000.—*Pennsylvanian*.

THE following are a few of the blood curdling names of the literary societies of American colleges:—Zetagathian, Erodelphian, Demosthenian, Philologian, Oiogarthian, Aclionian, Orthopatelic, Eccritean, Aletheorean, Erisophian.—*Ex.*

A UNIQUE WORK ON CANADIAN TOPICS.—Mr. Erastus Wiman, President of the Canadian Club, writes to the Editor of this paper as follows:—

"It is the intention of certain members of the Canadian Club, in New York, to issue, in the form of a beautiful book, the papers which have been delivered before the Club during the past winter by prominent parties, together with those which are to be delivered during the remainder of the season.



"These papers will include a speech on 'Commercial Union,' by the Hon. Benjamin Butterworth, member of Congress, who is said to be one of the most eloquent men of that body. A remarkable production by Prof. Goldwin Smith on 'The Schism in the Anglo-Saxon Race.' A paper by Dr. Grant of the Queen's University on 'Canada First.' One by J. W. Bengough, Editor of *Toronto Grip*. By Mr. Le Moine of Quebec, on 'The Heroines of New France.' By J. A. Fraser, 'An Artist's Experience in the Canadian Rockies.' By Edmund Collins, on 'The Future of Canada.' By Professor G. D. Roberts, of King's College. By Geo. Stewart, jr., of Quebec. By the Rev. Dr. Eccleston, on 'The Canadian North West.' By John McDougall, on 'The Minerals of Canada.' And by the Editor, G. M. Fairchild, jr., on 'The History of the Canadian Club.' The work will also include extracts from the speeches and letters of the President.

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