

HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE DECADE 1990-2000:
REMODELLING THE CONCEPTS OF IMPARTIALITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

By

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 2012

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DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Dated: August 13, 2012

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Readers: _____

DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

DATE: August 13, 2012

AUTHOR: Laurence Therrien

TITLE: Humanitarian Military Interventions in the Decade 1990-2000:
Remodelling the Concepts of Impartiality and Political Independence.

DEPARTMENT OR SCHOOL: Department of Political Science

DEGREE: MA CONVOCATION: October YEAR: 2012

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To my mom, for her contagious energy and for always knowing what to say to keep me going,

To my dad, for his strong headedness and for his words of encouragement – even from far, far away.

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ABSTRACT

The concept of Humanitarian Military Interventions has become a core issue within the international community since the 1990s. Human rights violations carried out on a massive scale are no longer perceived as purely domestic concerns but are now recognized as a central concern of the international community. This study of four cases of HMI -Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and East Timor- is intended to shed the light on two political factors that play a determining role in HMI: the national interests of the interveners and the level of neutrality of the operations. I argue that the level of success of HMI is highly dependent on the presence of national interests in the region for the interveners and a low level of neutrality. This thesis also reflects on the ongoing challenges facing the international community regarding the most efficient ways to address massive human rights violations and presents suggestions towards addressing them.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

UN	United Nations
US	United States
HMI	Humanitarian Military Intervention
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
ICISS	International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance mission in Rwanda
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank first and foremost my supervisor, Professor Margaret Denike, who always had the right words of encouragement for me to keep going. Her enthusiasm and her advices have led me in the right direction. I would also like to say thank you to Professor Frank Harvey and David Black for their support, their time, their ideas, and their dedication. All three have inspired me and guided me throughout this whole process and made is so much more enjoyable and dynamic,

And a special thank you to my sister for being my moral support throughout the year, always a phone call away. Merci Kik.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

“ . . . If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda or a Srebrenica -to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?

In essence, the problem is one of responsibility: in circumstances in which universally accepted human rights are being violated on a massive scale, we have a responsibility to act.”¹

Kofi Annan

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of a need within the international community to recognize that the security of individuals, not only of the State, ought to be a priority for national and international actors around the globe. The idea that the rights of the people rather than the rights of states constitute the foundation of a just and peaceful world has slowly gained acceptance on the international scene following the end of the Cold War. As a result, human rights violations carried out on a massive scale within state borders are no longer perceived as purely domestic concerns but have become recognized as a core issue of international politics. In his article “Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention” David Scheffer, American diplomat and first US Ambassador-at-large for War Crime Issues, discusses this transformation, noting the emergence of “a new standard of intolerance for human misery and human atrocities...something quite significant has occurred to raise the consciousness of nations to the plights of peoples within sovereign borders. There is a new commitment –expressed in both moral and legal terms- to alleviate the suffering of oppressed or devastated people.”² With the international community increasingly willing to recognize human rights abuses as a threat to international peace and security and to act accordingly, we now stand at the edge of a new era, which Raimo Vayrynen has cleverly referred to as the “age of humanitarian emergencies.”³

¹ Annan, Kofi A. *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*. New York: United Nations, Dept. of Public Information, 2000. 35.

² Scheffer, David J. “Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention.” *University of Toledo Law Review* 23 (1992). 259.

³ Vayrynen, Raimo. *The Age of Humanitarian Emergencies. Research for Action No.25*. Helsinki: World Institute for development Economics Research, 1996.

Alongside this normative shift, the post-Cold War era has witnessed growing political instability marked by what former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has defined as a “new breed of civil wars.”⁴ Interestingly enough, since the late 1980s, over one-third of states in Africa have collapsed or are at risk of doing so,⁵ the number of internally displaced people has been on the rise,⁶ and the number of intra-state conflicts has now surpassed the number of any other type of conflicts. In fact, during the 1990s decade, the UN has registered ninety-eight armed conflicts, of which ninety-one were domestic.⁷ As a result of the rise of this particular type of conflicts, it is now estimated that the civilian casualties produced by armed conflicts have reached close to 90% of all casualties.⁸

The United Nations (UN), alongside the international community, has responded to the changes that occurred at the domestic and international level by developing a broad range of operations intended to address intra-state conflicts, humanitarian crises, as well as gross and systematic violations of human rights; operations which would’ve been unimaginable in the previous decades. Those include conflict prevention and mediation, peacemaking missions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building. My work focuses on Humanitarian Military Interventions (HMI), which fall under the category of peace enforcement operations. I draw on the definition of HMI that has been coined by Holzgrefe and Keohane in their book *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*. As understood by the authors, HMI are “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state or group of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, with or without the permission of the state within whose territory

⁴ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*. New York: United Nations, 3 January 1995.

⁵ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. New York: Cambridge UP, 2000. 2.

⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). *The State of the World's Refugees*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995.

⁷ Smith, Dan. “Europe’s Suspended Conflicts.” *War Reports*. February-March 1998. 11.

⁸ Weiss, Thomas G. *Military Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 1.

force is applied.”⁹ Since 1991, over a dozen HMI have been launched in the name of protecting civilians from human rights violations and violence, thus radically transforming the course of post-Cold War international relations.

Now a core security issue on the international scene, HMI has become one of the hottest topics in international relations and politics. As Robert Keohane writes when discussing the newfound popularity of the concept of HMI, “saying ‘humanitarian intervention’ in a room full of philosophers, legal scholars and political scientists is a little like crying ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre.”¹⁰ The emergence of HMI still continues to generate lots of skepticism and controversy, mostly regarding the legitimacy, the conditions for success, as well as the pros and cons of such military operations. There is still no common agreement, neither in theory nor in practice, as to what HMI entail, when HMI should be launched, whether they are legitimate operations and how and in what cases they should be conducted. There is no doubt that the public, political and academic debate regarding these types of military operations has moved ahead considerably since the end of the Cold War. Old barriers to HMI are slowly beginning to be brought down, and a precedent has been established with the launch of a growing number of interventions in all corners of the globe. However, the persistence of major human rights violations, genocides and ethnic cleansing unfolding nowadays in places such as Darfur suggests that the practice of HMI remains a highly controversial topic among intellectuals, activists and policymakers, and that HMI remain inconsistent with regards to when and where they are launched and how they are conducted. Nonetheless, HMI continue to be discussed, debated, invoked and launched on a regular basis, and show no sign of fading away any time soon.

⁹ Holzgrefe, J. L., and Robert O. Keohane. *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. 18.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 1.

HMI: an historical overview

My work on HMI would be incomplete if I did not provide a brief historical overview of the evolution of the practice of HMI following the Cold War and of the normative context surrounding it. Up until the beginning of the 1990s, the international system was based on the principle of sovereignty and its corresponding norm of non-intervention, which dates back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The norm of sovereignty has, since then, been integrated in the UN Charter under article 2.7, which stipulates that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (...).”¹¹ All throughout the Cold War, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states was strictly upheld, as peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions were relatively limited both in number and in scope. Such operations focused on activities including the protection of aid convoys, ceasefire enforcement and the monitoring of demarcation lines, and were only permitted if all parties to the conflict were to give their consent.

Since 1988, a more activist and interventionist international community has developed, along with the desire to react to, and even prevent, the rise of intra-state conflicts -including ethnic and communal violence, and systematic and gross violations of human rights- at the expense of state sovereignty. The UN and the international community have developed over the last few decades a broad range of activities to address such crises and maintain international peace and security throughout the world. These operations include conflict prevention and mediation, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace building. Today’s multidimensional peace and security operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security but also to facilitate peace processes, protect civilians, assist in disarmament, defeat the perpetrators of violence, demobilize former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and restore the rule of law.

¹¹ *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1968.

HMI, which fall under the category of peace enforcement, have grown to become a central concern of the UN and of major decision-makers around the globe, a tendency that is reflected in the increased number of missions launched each year and in the growing number of personnel involved in the field of HMI both at the national and international level. Such a transformation in the practices of the international community has paved the way for a more cooperative international society. As Michael Ignatieff wrote with regards to the hopes of the international community following the end of the Cold War, "it was not utopian to expect a new age of robust but pragmatic collaboration between the superpowers to damp down the proxy wars that were beggaring so many regions of Africa, Latin America and Asia."¹²

The growth of the HMI "industry"¹³ has not been a steady one however. In some cases, such as in Haiti, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Libya, HMI have been launched with relative success. In others, including Rwanda, Somalia and more recently Sudan, they have been heavily discussed but failed to be carried out or have been largely misconceived and poorly executed. This reluctance to act and the inadequacy of the means used in times of intervention arise not only from the tensions that exist between the up-and-coming norm of intervention and a respect for sovereignty as the dominant principle of the international system, but also from a clear understanding that such interventions imply tremendous costs at the human, political and financial level. Despite these shortcomings, the idea of using human rights and security as legitimate justifications for military interventions is gaining world-wide acceptance. And while it is still too early to claim the emergence of a new principle of customary international law, the growing consensus within states and the United Nations as well as the strong precedents set by previous operations, do suggest an emerging norm of intervention at the expense of state sovereignty.

¹² Ignatieff, Michael. *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*. New York: Metropolitan, 1998. 89.

¹³ Kent, Randolph C. "International Humanitarian Crises: Two Decades Before and Two Decades Beyond." *International Affairs* 80.5 (2004): 851.

The contested nature of HMI

Despite the growing number of interventions being launched every year, policymakers and academics have yet to reach a consensus regarding when and how HMI should be conducted. The fact that the concept has probably as many definitions as there are articles and books on the topic illustrates the chaos and the inconsistency that exist both in theory and in practice when it comes to HMI. Originally, the practice of humanitarian intervention was founded on four of the seven core principles of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which have provided the most broadly acknowledged principles to guide humanitarian actions:

(1) The humanity principle: the idea that humanitarian interventions' aim is to prevent and alleviate suffering wherever it is occurring;

(2) The neutrality principle: the principle according to which humanitarian interveners do not take sides or a political stance in a conflict;

(3) The impartiality principle: the idea that humanitarianism does not make the distinction between people according to race, sex, religion, nationality or class;

(4) The universality principle: all human beings have the same humanitarian rights and deserve help.¹⁴

As initially conceived, humanitarian operations were meant to be apolitical and impartial activities, meaning that a clear distinction was to be maintained between the humanitarian and the political aspects of the humanitarian crisis to be addressed by the intervention. UN officials construe impartiality as refraining from two things: "one is publically judging or even implying any judgment concerning the merits of a dispute or conflict; the other is acting in any way which affects the balance of power among contending groups."¹⁵ Traditionally, humanitarian interventions were intended to address the humanitarian needs of the population and therefore focused on aid delivery; the priority was on alleviating the immediate human suffering and saving lives

¹⁴ Wheeler, Nicholas J. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. 34.

¹⁵ Farer, Tom J. "Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase." *Human Rights Quarterly* 18.1 (1996): 3.

rather than getting entangled in the socio-political issues that had generated the crisis in the first place. Although highly debated and criticized since 1991, neutral interventions still remain the norm for many NGOs and UN agencies which continue to argue that their activities are impartial and apolitical. The analysts and practitioners who accept the idea of neutral HMI, including authors such as Andrew Roberts, Jim Whitman and also Alan James (Roberts 1993, Whitman 1996, James 1997) will generally agree that the best way to address humanitarian emergencies is to focus on improving the efficiency of aid delivery and to keep such actions separate from any political actions or judgments.

In contrast to this apolitical approach to HMI, a new perspective has emerged in recent years with the work of scholars which include Walter Clarke, Jon Herbst and Jeffrey Ebersole (Clarke and Herbst 1996, Ebersole 1995). This perspective is based on the idea that humanitarian interventions are inherently political activities. Because humanitarian crises are, most of the time, the consequences of deep-rooted socio-political issues, HMI do have a political facet that cannot and should not be ignored by interveners. Not only is the decision to intervene in a humanitarian crisis a political one in itself, the actions led by humanitarian aid workers and peacekeeping troops have political consequences on the region in which they launch the intervention. First and foremost, food and medication can be diverted to sustain rebel armed groups instead of civilians. Such supplies can also be used by militias to manipulate populations or by leaders to legitimize their own power. In addition, the refugee camps set out by the interveners can quickly become recruiting bases for militias for example. According to this perspective, the recognition of the political nature of HMI is essential when launching HMI, and will ultimately lead to more efficient operations and help avoid unintended consequences. Such an approach to HMI opens the possibility of addressing the deeper roots of the humanitarian crises and could lead to a more rapid end of conflicts. My work will focus on the political aspect of HMI, and how the recognition that certain political factors do occupy a central role in the practice of HMI could potentially lead to the launch of more successful interventions in times of humanitarian crisis.

Statement of objective

HMI are multi-faceted operations; my thesis will focus on the political facet of such interventions. I argue that because of the inherent political nature of HMI, it is crucial that we analyze the role of political factors in ensuring the success of this particular type of interventions. Following an extensive review of the literature on HMI and a detailed analysis of the operations carried out in the decade following the Cold War, I will elucidate two political factors pertaining to HMI which should be studied in more depth: political neutrality and the national interests of the interveners.

In this work, I have analyzed the role political neutrality and national interests play in either ensuring the success of HMI or guaranteeing their failure. First, I have observed how the launch of so-called neutral operations - operations that place the focus on the delivery of humanitarian supplies and other logistical activities and refrain from taking sides in the conflict- have led to ineffective, chaotic operations and ultimately have had disastrous results. These interventions are usually perceived as counterproductive due to the fact that by addressing solely the humanitarian issues of the crises and not attempting to solve the socio-political causes of the conflicts, they end up “feeding the war” and not bringing any real long-lasting and meaningful changes to the situation. I then proceeded to analyze the role of the interveners’ national interests in determining the success of HMI, based on the premise that politically independent interventions - operations that are launched by interveners who do not have vested geo-strategic or economic interests in the region in crisis- often tend to be less effective in putting a rapid end to the crisis due to the lack of strong political will and commitment on the part of the interveners.

My work demonstrates that successful HMI require two things. First, the success of the intervention is conditioned by interveners taking a clear political stance in the conflict in order to address not only the humanitarian needs of the population but also the deeper socio-political causes of the crisis. Second, the level of success of HMI is conditional on the interveners having geo-strategic and/or material interests at stake in

the region in order to ensure that they have a strong political will to fulfill the mission's mandate.

The following chapters underline how the presence of both the act of taking a political stance in the conflict and having vested national interests in the region can lead to a more rapid end of the violence or ceasefire. In order to analyze this correlation, I have studied four cases of HMI: Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and East Timor. All four are pivotal cases, from Rwanda – a country in which interveners had no political interests and which is considered the poster child of neutral interventions- to East Timor, a region in which the interveners had great interests and during which the principle of neutrality was quasi non-existent. I have examined how, in each case of intervention, both the presence of interests in the region for the interveners and the fact that the interveners took a clear stance in the conflict led to a more rapid resolution of the crisis, meaning a rapid end of the violence. It is critical to get a better understanding of the role of these two political variables that seem to have been largely ignored by the scholarly community, or discussed extensively but never analyzed in terms of their impact on the success of HMI. My work sheds the light on national interests and neutrality, which are understood here as intertwined and mutually reinforcing variables, rather than as two distinct factors as it is the case in most work published on the issue today.

Policy relevance

The study of HMI and more precisely of the political aspect of this new “industry,”¹⁶ as Larry Minear describes it, is crucial to political leaders and analysts. Political leaders in future decades will have no choice but to continue to respond to human rights violations and implement considerable measures to restore civilian human rights and welfare in all corners of the globe, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, intra-state conflict is a phenomenon that has witnessed a spectacular growth since the

¹⁶ Minear, Larry. *The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries*. Bloomfield, CT.: Kumarian, 2002.

beginning of the 1990s and that shows no signs of diminishing.¹⁷ Of the 56 armed conflicts that have occurred between 1990 and 2000 identified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as major -meaning that they involved more than a thousand battle related casualties in the span of one year- 53 of them were intra-state.¹⁸ In addition, the industry of HMI will continue to grow because of the unprecedented level of media coverage and the growth of public awareness regarding humanitarian crises, as well as the strong precedent set by the HMI launched since 1991. However, the failure of the international community to stop mass killing and atrocities in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda just to name the most prominent cases, and the more recent debate over whether to intervene or not in Darfur have demonstrated that when it comes to HMI, there are still many questions that remain unanswered in order to render these interventions a successful enterprise. What makes some operations more successful than others? Why does the international community decide to intervene forcefully in a country like Kosovo but fail to intervene in Rwanda or Darfur? How and when should operations be launched, and what should they address? My study is an effort to provide answers to some of the questions surrounding HMI in order increase the effectiveness of such operations.

In doing so, I have focused on the political dimension of HMI, a topic that has unfortunately been widely left out of the academic debate. In the past, most interventions that have failed to restore peace and security and to put an end to systemic violence were the ones that were politically blind. Therefore, by raising awareness on the political aspects of such interventions, this research might prevent further failures and disasters such as Rwanda in 1994. This study is intended to generate a better understanding of what makes HMI efficient by improving the strategic framework around which they are structured and providing a better understanding of the political factors that play a key role in the success of the interventions.

¹⁷ Evans, Gareth. "The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention." *American Society of International Law* 98 (2004): 80.

¹⁸ Harbom, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. "Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990-2005." *SIPRI Yearbook*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. 108-19.

In recent years, the Canadian government has promoted the concept of an international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, and politically induced humanitarian catastrophes. As a leader in the field, I believe Canadian leaders would greatly benefit from such a research. HMI are dangerous, expensive and chaotic operations. They are very costly for politicians, both financially and politically speaking. Therefore, given the mixed records of success and failure in the last twenty years, I believe my study has great policy implications, especially for the Canadian government which has been an advocate of the *Responsibility to Protect* and of the respect of human rights around the globe for decades. Using force the wrong way can not only exacerbate the conflicts, it can get a lot of people killed, including Canadian troops. It is therefore urgent for our political leaders to develop strong general guidelines regarding the launch of HMI in order to avoid such consequences. As Matthew Krain suggested in his article *Intervention in Genocides and Politicides*, “policymakers faced with situations like those in Darfur are forced to rely on past experience with interventions in other types of internal conflicts, often with disastrous results.”¹⁹ This study is a step towards a better understanding of what makes past and eventually future interventions successful and effective in times of humanitarian crisis and internal conflicts.

The structure of this thesis

The following chapters will attempt to elucidate the correlation between the level of neutrality of HMI, the national interests of the intervening powers and the level of success of the military operations. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on HMI and a review of the major debates of the moment pertaining to the topic. It is intended to provide the reader with a clear understanding of the essential ideas, arguments and issues of the community of scholars regarding the topic. Chapter 3 clarifies the methodological approach of this thesis. In this chapter, I discuss how I have

¹⁹ Krain, Matthew. “International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides.” *International Studies Quarterly* 49.3 (2005): 364.

measured my variables and also why and how I have selected the four cases I have decided to analyze. Chapters 4 to 7 are the case studies of Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and East Timor. Each chapter is subdivided into three categories. The first provides a brief overview of the historical background and the international interventions that have ensued. It is followed by an assessment of the level of neutrality of the interventions and a discussion on whether the interveners had national interests at stake or not in the region. Finally, all four chapters are concluded by a discussion on the effects of neutrality and the presence or absence of national interests on the success of the HMI. The final chapter of my thesis is the chapter in which I present my final remarks and thoughts and provide policy recommendations with regards to the conclusions I have reached throughout my work.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

“In the modern history of humanitarian action dating from civilian relief during the Second World War, never before has the legitimacy of the enterprise been so profoundly and publicly challenged, while at the same time never has the services of humanitarian organizations been more in demand.”²⁰

William DeMars

In Michael O’Hanlon’s article *Doing It Right: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention*, he concludes that the use of military force to save lives and protect human rights is difficult, dangerous and rarely politically rewarding, and yet, it is here to stay.²¹ Although HMI is a fairly recent trend of international relations, the literature on the topic is far from being scarce. On the contrary, the amount of work found on the topic is voluminous. The large quantity of literature on HMI illustrates not only how the field has responded quickly to this new trend of the post-Cold War era but also how controversial this topic truly is. However, since HMI is a fairly recent enterprise, there is very little research leading to a general theoretical understanding of HMI. While most scholars and policymakers will agree to say that HMI are interventions for the purpose of saving people from gross violations of human rights, there is a general disagreement as to what these operations truly entail.

What has emerged from this literature review is the lack of general consensus and the absence of a strong framework regarding the concept of HMI. While debates are going full force within the academic community, and the amount of work being published on the topic is growing exponentially, there seems to be a lack of consistency among scholars regarding even the most fundamental issues pertaining to HMI. This lack of unity within the scholarly world has translated on the ground, as the HMI currently being launched reflect the chaos, misunderstandings and disagreements found on paper. If scholars cannot agree on anything with regards to HMI, not even its definition,

²⁰ DeMars, William. “War and Mercy in Africa.” *World Policy Journal* 17.2 (2000): 1.

²¹ O’Hanlon, Michael E. “Doing It Right: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention.” *The Brookings Review* 18.4 (2000): 35.

then how can policymakers in charge of designing the military interventions be expected to launch adequate and efficient operations?

In this chapter, I have reviewed a broad selection of international relations and international law literature on HMI, in order to provide an overview of some of the main issues surrounding the topic. The most frequently talked about questions and debates that arise concern the tension between sovereignty and human rights; what should such operations address and how; whether states have a duty and a responsibility to intervene; whether HMI are launched for purely humanitarian purposes or for other motives such as economic self-interests; and finally if HMI should remain politically neutral. Before discussing these key issues, I would like to present one of the foundational international documents pertaining to HMI: the 2001 *Responsibility to Protect* as well as the key UN reports and documents that have since then been published. It is essential to discuss these documents and central themes in order to get a better portrait of the tensions, debates, disagreements and consensuses that surround the topic of HMI, before any work on such interventions can be done.

The *Responsibility to Protect* and other key documents

The term *Responsibility to Protect* was first coined in the report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001, which addressed the issue of whether the international community should intervene militarily in the affairs of states for humanitarian purposes. This document is now central to the practice of HMI and is considered a ground-breaking piece of work on the topic. It offers guidelines for military interventions in exceptional cases aimed at protecting populations from imminent danger. Starting from a presumption of non-intervention, the Commission concluded that any deviation from the non-intervention and sovereignty principles have to be justified, authorized by the Security Council, and carried out solely in extraordinary and exceptional cases. Derived from the “Just War” theory, the Commission stated that “all the relevant decision-making criteria can be

succinctly summarized under the following six headings:²² the need for a *right authority*; a *just cause*; the *right intention*; the *last resort* principle; *proportional means*; and a *reasonable prospect for success*.²³

One of the major contributions of *Responsibility to Protect* to the practice of HMI and even to international relations as a whole is probably its reformulation of the concept of sovereignty. As stated in the report, “state sovereignty implies a responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies in the state itself.”²⁴ The report concluded that the sovereignty of states implies a dual responsibility. First and foremost, sovereign states have the responsibility to respect the sovereignty of other states and therefore refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of nations. Sovereign states must also respect the dignity and basic human rights of their people. If a state fails to uphold one or both responsibilities, it automatically loses any claim to sovereignty and becomes subject to outside military interventions. As Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner underline, *Responsibility to Protect* reflects the emerging consensus within the literature that sovereignty and the protection of human rights are mutually constitutive, not contradictory principles.²⁵

With regards to HMI, the *Responsibility to Protect* encompasses three responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, to protect and to rebuild. The responsibility to prevent was highlighted by the Commission as the most important dimension of the *Responsibility to Protect* and of HMI in general. It requires the interveners to address both the root causes of humanitarian crises as well as the more immediate issues of the crises, using a vast array of measures, which include political and diplomatic means, legal means, economic sanctions and military operations. On the other hand, the responsibility to rebuild necessitates the interveners to follow through

²² International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. 32.

²³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. 32.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Goldsmith, Jack and Stephen D. Krasner. “The Limits of Idealism.” *Daedalus* 132.1 (2003).

after the intervention, to provide assistance for reconstruction and reconciliation of the region, which requires a long-term commitment on the part of the interveners to help build a durable and stable nation. *Responsibility to Protect* underlined the importance of all three responsibilities in ensuring the success of HMI.

Following the publication of the *Responsibility to Protect*, a large number of international documents have been written on the topic of HMI, most of which commissioned by the UN. In March 2000, the Secretary General appointed the Panel on UN Peace Operations, with the mandate to assess the weaknesses of the peacekeeping system and to make recommendations for future reforms. The Panel ultimately issued a report, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, also known as the *Brahimi Report*, which was published on 17 August 2000. It called for a renewed political commitment to HMI and the protection of human rights on the part of UN member states, significant institutional changes and an increased financial support.²⁶ Following the *Brahimi Report*, UN member states and the Secretary General continued to work towards reforming and strengthening the field of peace operations. These efforts have resulted in a multitude of publications and international gatherings, the most significant being:

- *Captstone doctrine* (2008), which outlines the principles and guidelines for peacekeepers;
- World Summit (2005), which reassessed the commitment of the international community to the *Responsibility to Protect*.
- *The New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (2009), which assesses major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN peacekeeping today and in the coming years.
- *Peace Operation* (2010), which is a reform strategy elaborated by the department of Peacekeeping operations.

²⁶ Brahimi, Lakhdar. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. New York: United Nations, 2000. 17 Aug. 2000. Web. 15 May 2012. <http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/>.

All the international documents discussed above illustrate the changing nature of international relations and the growing commitment on the part of the UN and its member states to the protection of human rights above any considerations of sovereignty. The growing number of reports commissioned by the UN and the publication of documents dedicated to establishing a framework for the conduct of HMI clearly demonstrates the normative evolution that has taken place since the end of the Cold War regarding humanitarian emergencies. The fact that the UN has dedicated time, effort, money and personnel to evaluate the practice of HMI, formulate guidelines for such operations, develop reform strategies, and establish a Commission dedicated to HMI is a testimony to the idea that HMI has now become a core concern of the international community and has established itself as a central component of international relations.

Current debates within the literature

- The Principle of Sovereignty and Human Rights

The concept of HMI is highly debated and controversial mainly because it undermines the traditional understanding of state sovereignty, which has been a dominant principle of the international system for the past three centuries. While the concept of sovereignty has long been the chief legal, moral and political pillar of the international system, and the major obstacle to military interventions in pursuit of humanitarian objectives, it seems that the general consensus on the sovereignty principle is currently shifting. Although the concept remains a major obstacle to assisting and protecting victims of internal conflict, it is no longer as insurmountable as it once was, as Francis Deng discusses in his book *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*.²⁷

Raphael Lemkin, best known for his work on the concept of genocide, was one of the first to question the principle of sovereignty and its limitations. Way ahead of his time, in the early 1920s, he argued that “sovereignty implies conducting an independent

²⁷ Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, et al. *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996. 10.

foreign and internal policy, building of schools, construction of roads... all types of activity directed towards the welfare of people. Sovereignty cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people.”²⁸ A few decades following Lemkin’s work, the academic community has reached a general agreement regarding the need to reassess the concept of sovereignty in order for it to better suit the contemporary context. As Louis Henkin heralded in his work on international law, “it is time to bring sovereignty down to earth, cut it down to size, discard its overblown rhetoric; examine, analyze, reconceive the concept and break out its normative content; to repackage it, even rename it.”²⁹ Like Lemkin and more recently Henkin, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has been a key academic figure in the promotion of the re-assessment of the concept of sovereignty, has stated in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace* that “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed.”³⁰ As a result, he urged the international community to “rethink the questions of sovereignty -not to weaken its essence, which is crucial to international security and cooperation, but to recognize that it may take more than one form and perform more than one function.”³¹ This effort to re-evaluate the principle of sovereignty has generated a massive amount of academic work. A new form of sovereignty has been extensively discussed by academics; a sovereignty which is exercised on behalf of the people by governments or as Michael Reisman put it, “people’s sovereignty rather than the sovereign’s sovereignty.”³² Michael Reisman, professor of International Law, was one of the first to argue in 1987 that “to qualify for the name of government, a government now has to meet certain standards, all of which involve restraints on the use of power: no torture; no brutalization; no seizure of property; no state terror; no discrimination on the basis of

²⁸ Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 19.

²⁹ Henkin, Louis. *International Law: Politics and Values*. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1995. 16.

³⁰ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992*. New York: United Nations, 1992. 9.

³¹ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. “Empowering the United Nations.” *Foreign Affairs*, 71 (Winter 1992-1993): 99.

³² Reisman, Michael W. “Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Responsibilities in Human Rights Programs.” *Iowa Law Review* 72 (1987): 391.

race, religion, or sex; no prevention of people leaving a particular country, and so on.”³³ In 1991, an International Conference was held, titled *Human Rights Protection for Internally Displaced Persons*. The conference denoted the change in attitude of the international community regarding the tension between human rights and the norm of sovereignty. The report issued at the end of the conference underscored the “steady erosion”³⁴ of the concept of sovereignty, thus making it easier for outside forces (states, international organizations and NGOs) to intervene when governments fail to uphold their commitment to protect the human rights and ensure the security of their population.

In the same line of thought, a few years later, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan developed the concept of “positive sovereignty,”³⁵ which revolves around the idea that sovereignty is no longer a power or a right but a responsibility. Based on the premise that “the sovereignty of states must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights,”³⁶ positive sovereignty is the idea that states have the responsibility to protect their citizens from gross violations of human rights. States that fail to do so are not properly exercising their sovereign authority and therefore are no longer entitled to the right of non-intervention. The general consensus that is being reached on the tension that exists between sovereignty and HMI is that “although principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are essential values of international society, a state forfeits its domestic legitimacy when it perpetrates outrages against humanity.”³⁷ This view is shared by many authors including Charles Beitz who argues that states failing to provide human rights guaranteed to all their citizens exercise illegitimate political control and therefore lose moral standing as well as their right to

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Refugee Policy Group, *Human Rights Protection for Internally Displaced Persons: An International Conference*. Washington: June 1991. 7.

³⁵ Annan, Kofi. In Ed. Jonathan Moore. *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

³⁶ Annan, Kofi. "The Nobel Lecture given by the Nobel Peace Laureate 2001." Oslo. 10 Dec. 2001. Lecture.

³⁷ Udombana, Nsongurua J. "When Neutrality Is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan." *Human Rights Quarterly* 27.4 (2005): 1170.

autonomy and sovereignty.³⁸ Authors such as Michael Smith have also argued that when states act in a way that threatens the existence of the basic human rights of their population, the sovereignty of that state can be overridden by outside forces.³⁹ Silviya Lechner, who has done extensive work on politics and philosophy, has joined the debate, articulating that “each state must earn a right of non-intervention, conditional on it demonstrating that it is a capable and responsible state (in terms of protecting its citizens from harm, which include human rights abuses).”⁴⁰

While this idea of sovereignty as a responsibility and not as an untouchable right has become widely accepted, a few scholars continue to resist this normative transition, including Michael Walzer, prominent American political philosopher, who writes that the autonomy of all states, even the most despotic ones, should be respected, “based on the idea that the principle of sovereignty depends on the people’s right to self-determination, which gives only the domestic community, not foreigners, the right to challenge their institutions.”⁴¹ Despite the shift that has been taking place in recent decades, some scholars, of which Walzer is certainly the most vocal, still argue that “the world system hasn’t changed fundamentally and statism remains the most accurate model of world politics.”⁴² Nonetheless, the general consensus within the literature is that although sovereignty continues to operate, it no longer holds supremacy; it is no longer sacrosanct (Meron 2000, Chopra and Weiss 1992). Although it is still premature to assert that the international system has cast aside completely the Westphalian order and brushed aside the idea of sovereignty, it seems to be widely understood within the body of work on HMI that “the process of subjecting national authority to international

³⁸ Beitz, Charles R. *Political Theory and International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979. 76-81.

³⁹ Smith, Michael. “Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues.” *Ethics & International Affairs* 12 (1998): 63, 77.

⁴⁰ Lechner, Silviya. “Humanitarian Intervention: Moralism versus Realism.” *International Studies Review* 12 (2010): 440.

⁴¹ Walzer, Michael W. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical illustrations*. New York: Basic Books, 1977. 87-89.

⁴² Krasner, Stephen. “Compromising Westphalia.” *International Security* 20 (1995-1996): 115-151.

standards of responsible sovereignty seems to be irreversibly advancing.”⁴³ As Thomas Weiss summed up in his book *Military Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*:

The concept of domestic jurisdiction has changed in substance, if not in law. The two dominant norms of world politics during the Cold War – namely, that borders were sacrosanct and that secession was unthinkable – no longer generate the almost universal enthusiasm and acceptance that they once did. The automatic and almost reverential respect for non-intervention in the internal affairs of states has made way for a more subtle interpretation according to which, on occasion, the rights of individuals take precedence over the rights of repressive governments and the sovereign states they represent.⁴⁴

Within the literature on HMI, the most widely discussed issue is, without a doubt, the tension that exists between the respect for sovereignty and non-intervention and the protection of human rights, which has been extensively articulated in the past few decades. When studying HMI, it is essential to discuss this particular issue, since such operations reside at a crossroad between the two principles. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in *An Agenda for Peace*, set the tone for the search of this equilibrium, writing that although the respect for sovereignty and the integrity of the state are crucial to the international system, human rights are of transcendent importance as a legitimate area of concern for the international community.⁴⁵ The search for such a balance has been extensively discussed and analyzed by authors including Carola Weil, Caroline Thomas, Francis Deng, Jarat Chopra and Thomas Weiss just to name those few (Weil 2001, Deng 1995, Thomas 1994, Chopra and Weiss 1992). There is a consensus that is developing, both within the academic circle and the international community, around the idea that “the interests of the individuals should be paramount, and the interests of the state subordinate, and that the primary purpose of the state is to

⁴³ Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, et al. *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996. 18.

⁴⁴ Weiss, Thomas G. *Military Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 1999. 21.

⁴⁵ Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, et al. *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996. 16.

protect the interests of the individual,"⁴⁶ as Francis Deng, articulated in his work on sovereignty. Javier Perez de Cuellar, former UN Secretary General declared in 1991: "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."⁴⁷ Within the academic circle, this shift has been widely studied by authors including Richard Lillich, Michael Reisman and Francis Deng, (Deng 1996, Reisman 1995, Lillich 1993) who have all articulated the idea that international human rights are a matter of international concern, and therefore should not be "shielded by domestic jurisdiction."⁴⁸ Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, who have conducted extensive research on humanitarian interventions, just war theory and the ethics of interventions, have advanced the idea that nowadays, "human rights values are given as much weight as state system values."⁴⁹ The tension between human rights and the respect for state sovereignty has also been central to the work of Michael Smith, Thomas Weiss and Jack Donnelly (Smith 1999, Weiss 1999, Donnelly 1995), who all agree that "the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) should be recognized as the highest principle of world order, ethically speaking, with state sovereignty as a circumscribed and conditional norm."⁵⁰ On the tension between sovereignty and human rights, the literature on HMI reveals an ongoing normative shift from the traditional understanding of sovereignty as absolute and untouchable to a more universal understanding of the sovereignty. Although a consensus has yet to be reached, the literature underscores the idea that human rights are no longer a purely national concern but constitute an international concern.

⁴⁶ Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, et al. *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996. 5.

⁴⁷ De Cuellar, Javier Perez. *Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization*. New York: United Nations (1991). 12.

⁴⁸ Reisman, Michael W. "Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies." *Fordham International Law Journal* 18 (1995): 795.

⁴⁹ Ramsbotham, O. and T. Woodhouse. *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. 60.

⁵⁰ Smith, Michael J. "Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues." *Ethics & International Affairs: A Reader*. Ed. Joel H. Rosenthal. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown UP, 1999. 289.

- **What should be addressed by HMI**

Another area of focus in the literature on HMI is what should be addressed by such interventions and how the operations should go about in addressing these issues. The question of what HMI should target has been fueling the academic debates for over two decades now. The divergent understandings that exist regarding what the purpose of HMI is have had direct consequences on the development of a tangible framework regarding how to conduct HMI which would be acceptable to all international actors. While some academics and policymakers argue that HMI should address solely the humanitarian need of populations by providing food, clean water, shelter and medication, others believe they should address the socio-political issues at the root of the crises.

To this day, only a shrinking number of scholars maintain that the long-term goal of resolving the underlying political issues of the conflict or the crisis should not be taken on by HMI, and that such operations need to focus on addressing the humanitarian needs of the populations. Organizations such as the Red Cross defend this style of intervention, arguing that “prioritizing the moral good of peace building may not be the right ethical choice at a time when the sheer volume of people’s suffering dictate that more emphasis should be placed on simpler life-saving.”⁵¹ Others including Chaim Kauffman, Donald Horowitz, Richard Haas and Ted Gurr tend to reason in the same line of thought, arguing that trying to solve the underlying issues associated with domestic conflicts and humanitarian crises would be too complex and is not the ultimate purpose of HMI (Kauffman 1996, Haas 1994, Gurr 1993, Horowitz 1985). Consequently, they argue that “the aim of the interventions shouldn’t be peace but safety”⁵² and that the interventions in question “should largely stay outside or minimize [their] role in situations requiring nation-building”⁵³ since “solving the deep seated issues associated

⁵¹ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. *World Disasters Report 2003: Focus on Ethics in Aid*. Bloomfield, Conn: Kumerian Press, 2003. 13.

⁵² Kauffman, Chaim. “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars.” *International Security* 20.4 (1996): 136-175.

⁵³ Haas, Richard. “Military force: A User’s Guide.” *Foreign Policy* 96 (1994): 36.

with ethnic, religious, or ideological conflicts will require a much more concerted effort⁵⁴ than the type of interventions carried out now.

On the other hand, more and more scholars and policymakers are starting to push for HMI that would address the socio-political issues that are at the root of humanitarian crises. Many academics and humanitarian workers now tend to perceive humanitarian aid as a flawed solution to intra-state crises, which are usually “not humanitarian at their root,”⁵⁵ as articulated by former Médecins sans Frontières president Rony Brauman. As Mary B. Anderson, author of *Do No Harm*, pointed out, “we know that aid provided in conflict settings can feed into and exacerbate the conflicts that cause the suffering it is meant to alleviate. And we know that aid too often does nothing to alter –and very often reinforce- the fundamental circumstances that produced the needs it temporarily meets.”⁵⁶ Agency for International Development director Brian Atwood has also directed his critique of humanitarian aid in the same direction, writing that the main goal of interveners should be “to invest in the development and treat the root causes of instability before a situation becomes chaotic.”⁵⁷ The logic behind this reasoning is that since the crises are usually caused by socio-political factors, and since aid has political consequences, it should “not restrict itself to the provision of beds and blankets,”⁵⁸ as noted by David Rieff in his controversial book *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner have joined that approach to HMI, arguing that such interventions should involve an element of reconstruction and that putting an end to the killing should not be the sole and unique goal of such interventions (Goldsmith and Krasner 2003). For both authors, interveners who decide to launch HMI have an obligation to rebuild the country, meaning to ensure the return of refugees, the respect of human rights, the

⁵⁴ Regan, P. M. "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40.2 (1996): 336-59.

⁵⁵ Brauman, Rony, and Philippe Petit. *Humanitaire: Le Dilemme*. Paris: Les Éditions Textuel, 1996.

⁵⁶ Anderson, Mary B. "'You Saved My Life Today, but for What Tomorrow?' Some Moral Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid." *Hard Choices*. Ed. Jonathan Moore. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1998.

⁵⁷ Rotberg, Robert I. "Clinton was Right." *Foreign Policy* 102 (1996): 139.

⁵⁸ Rieff, David. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002. 307.

consolidation of judiciary system as well as a police force and to create institutional arrangements necessary for the good functioning of the country. Jan Pieterse and Kimberly Stanton have also studied the issue and believe that the main problem of HMI as they are launched today lies in the failure of interveners to address the structural issues of the conflicts and to “produce institutions that are sustainable at the local level.”⁵⁹ While this debate is going full force both at the national and international levels and within scholarly circles, it seems that more and more authors are directing their critique of HMI towards the fact that they continue to address purely the humanitarian aspect of inherently political activities.

- **Motives**

A third element that is central to the literature on HMI has to do with the motives that influence states’ decision to intervene in times of humanitarian crises. Do states really decide to launch interventions because of their respect for democratic values and human rights? Or do they have some material and/or geo-strategic self-interests which motivate them to act? Should the motives that motivate states to act even matter? Authors are highly divided on the subject, and previous interventions have left many scholars sceptical when it comes to states’ real motives behind interventions in times of humanitarian crises.

After having reviewed the literature on the topic, I have found that very few scholars contend that HMI are driven by purely altruistic motives. To this day, only a handful argue that HMI are motivated solely by states’ desire to defend and protect human rights around the globe, such as Richard Betts, who discusses in his article *The Delusion of Impartial Intervention* the fact that “most interventions since the end of the Cold War were not driven by the material interests of the outside powers but by their moral interests: peace and justice.”⁶⁰ On the other hand, a number of scholars perceive HMI in a totally different light, associating them with imperialism and colonialism. David

⁵⁹ Stanton, K. "Pitfalls of Intervention: Sovereignty as a Foundation of Human Rights." *Harvard International Review* 16.1 (1993): 14.

⁶⁰ Betts, Richard K. "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 31.

Rieff, who has articulated a critique of the current approach to HMI in his book *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* states that the “vision of the enterprise that they have a right to intervene is too close to the old colonial norms to be viewed independently from them.”⁶¹ Authors including Jean Bricmont, Neta Crawford, and Michael Butler study HMI with suspicion and understand them as a cover for selfish invasions of weak countries by stronger powers (Bricmont 2006, Butler 2003, Crawford 2002). To this day, many authors as well as politicians continue to criticize HMI on the basis of the similarities the practice shares with colonialism. As written by Eric Dachy, who has worked in the field of humanitarianism and published an extensive amount of work on the topic: “the right of intervention (...) constitutes so many variations on a misleading theme: to accompany, or mask, a deliberate political choice with gestures of generosity and compassion.”⁶²

Most of the literature reviewed reveals a general agreement within the scholarly community that “taken case by case, these interventions invariably reveal mixed motives and hidden agenda.”⁶³ The general consensus that has developed regarding the motives behind such interventions is that although “military forces rarely, if ever, have a purely humanitarian agenda,”⁶⁴ this is not an impediment to the legitimacy and effectiveness of HMI. This view is articulated by authors including Bhikhu Parekh, Daniele Archibugi, Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner (Archibugi 2004, Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, Parekh 1997) who understand that “the presence of mixed motives doesn’t detract from the fact that such interventions might help local populations.”⁶⁵ Pushing it even farther, Michael Walzer argues that “the fact that an agent has some interests may be good news for those in danger since the agent will be more willing to take risks and pay the costs.”⁶⁶ Jean Daudelin has also made a similar argument, writing that “an interventionist regime needs mixed motives: harnessing national interest is key

⁶¹ Rieff, David. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002. 66.

⁶² Ibid. 321.

⁶³ Ibid. 39.

⁶⁴ Loescher, G. "The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?" *Journal of International Affairs* 47.2 (1994): 1.

⁶⁵ Goldsmith, Jack and Stephen D. Krasner. "The Limits of Idealism." *Daedalus* 132.1 (2003): 59.

⁶⁶ Michael Walzer, "The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention." *Dissent* (Winter 2002): 4.

to the success of interventions. It gives staying power to interventions and it greatly facilitates the mobilization of resources.”⁶⁷ On the issue of motives, the scholarly community remains highly divided and a consensus has yet to be reached.

- **Neutrality**

Another prominent theme in the literature on HMI is neutrality, and specifically whether HMI should remain neutral operations or rather take a political stance in the conflict or crisis in question. There is a growing consensus both in practice and on paper that HMI should not and cannot possibly be neutral activities; few scholars and policymakers still believe that neutrality as a guiding principle of HMI is viable and should continue to be applied to interventions.

The general agreement that has aroused in the last decades is that interveners who decide to launch HMI should “recognize that intervening forces are already a party to the tragedy when they arrive,”⁶⁸ as discussed by Alex de Waal, former Oxfam consultant, who proceeded to leave the field of humanitarian aid and articulated an important critique of humanitarianism. The growing consensus within the literature is that although neutrality would make sense in old fashion UN peacekeeping missions where the role of interveners was not to make peace but to monitor ceasefires already accepted by all parties, it becomes damaging when it is applied to the chaotic realm of peace enforcement, Richard Betts explains.⁶⁹ As Jon Ebersole, former UN Officer for Political Affairs, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs has concluded in his article *The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies*, “as the mandate of military forces has steadily been broadened, the international community increasingly risks violating traditional humanitarian mandates of impartiality and neutrality.”⁷⁰ Authors which include Clarke, Herbst and Ebersole (Clarke and Herbst

⁶⁷ Daudelin, Jean. *Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention*. The North-South Institute (2000). 17.

⁶⁸ De Waal, Alex and Rakiya Omaar. “Can Military Intervention be Humanitarian?” *Middle East Report* 187/188 (1994): 8.

⁶⁹ Betts, Richard K. “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention.” *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 20.

⁷⁰ Ebersole, J. M. “The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies.” *Human Rights Quarterly* 17(1995): 192-208.

1996, Ebersole 1995) have done extensive work on the subject and have argued against the proponents of neutral interventions on the basis that no intervention in a failed state or in times of humanitarian crises can realistically be politically neutral. As British relief specialist Fiona Fox once stated, the new humanitarianism that is currently emerging “will not stand neutral in the face of genocide and human rights abuses. It rejects the traditional humanitarian principle of neutrality as on the one hand morally repugnant and on the other hand unachievable in the complex political emergency of the post-Cold War period.”⁷¹

Consequently, many scholars have pushed for what Betts coined as active and harsh neutrality instead of a gentle one, meaning that “interveners should act decisively by lending military weight to one side.”⁷² Neutrality in this perspective is viewed as prolonging the suffering instead of relieving it, by enabling the fighting, feeding the war and working cross-purpose. Many authors go as far as saying that neutrality is as bad as inaction. Those include Betts and Rieff who believe that “neither inaction nor neutrality can be justified in the face of egregious crimes.”⁷³ However, although this idea is gaining widespread acceptance within the literature, in practice impartiality remains the norm in many cases of HMI.

Deficiencies within the literature

The main deficiency I have encountered in the literature on HMI is the extent to which people talk past one another, which impedes on the development of a general framework or a consensus on the topic of HMI. While some writers focus almost exclusively on the moral side of the debate such as whether countries have a moral right or a duty to intervene, others are solely concerned with the political and legal aspect of HMI. There is a clear problem within the literature of separating the issue, even though the moral, legal, political and strategic dimensions of HMI are all highly interconnected

⁷¹ Rieff, David. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002. 314.

⁷² Betts, Richard K. "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 31.

⁷³ Fixdal, Mona and Dan Smith. "Humanitarian Intervention and Just War." *Mershon International Studies Review* 42.2 (1998): 297.

and the field is in great need of a framework that embraces all of them. There is no agreement on anything, not even on the most fundamental concepts of HMI within the literature. Although the body of work I have reviewed indicates a normative development on the issue of humanitarian intervention, there still remains a lack of general understanding regarding what HMI truly entail and appropriate guidelines under which HMI should be conducted. Interestingly enough, while analyzing the literature, I have not encountered the same definition of HMI twice. Each analyst, scholar, politician has his/her own definition and understanding of the concept, which can be quite problematic for HMI to be successfully put in practice. All the debates surrounding HMI, whether they focus on the legitimacy of such operations, how HMI should be conducted, where and when they should be launched, if they should remain neutral or not, remain highly inconclusive. Consequently we end up with a large body of work constituted of independent, contradictory and isolated conclusions about whether or not such interventions are justified, legal or legitimate.

The lack of general agreement or consensus discussed in this chapter can be attributed to the fact that Humanitarian Military Interventions is a fairly recent enterprise. Prior to the end of the Cold War, HMI technically did not exist, and would have been regarded as unacceptable violations of state' sovereignty. It is only since the 1990s that the international community has started to recognize the legitimacy, the legality and even the moral necessity of such interventions. As a result, we have yet to develop a framework that encompasses what HMI entail, how they should be conducted, what they should address and so on. Nonetheless, the large amount of literature on the topic published in recent years clearly underscores the normative shift that is slowly unfolding at the national and international levels regarding the protection of human rights and the responsibility of the international community to intervene in times of gross and systemic violations of those rights.

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

“The path of justice and honour involves one in danger.”⁷⁴

Thucydides

Why are some Humanitarian Military Interventions understood as a success and others criticized as failures? What do those successful interventions have in common? What do the failed interventions share in terms of how the operations were carried out? How can past interventions help us establish a better framework and understanding of HMI in the future? The purpose of my study was to analyze how neutrality and national interests can affect the course of HMI and ultimately their success. This chapter provides a detailed overview of the methodology I have developed for the purpose of my research. This section of my work is divided into four segments. First, I present the methods I have developed to measure the success and failure, the level of neutrality of each operation and the presence of national interests in the regions where HMI are launched. The fourth and final section of this chapter discusses the cases I have selected to analyze and the reasons as to why I have decided to focus on these four in particular.

Measuring the level of SUCCESS

Despite the centrality and the importance of measuring the success level of HMI, few academics, policymakers and analysts have attempted to come up with a methodology to measure whether an operation can be qualified as a success or not beyond single case studies. Codifying interventions as successful or as a failure is difficult for a number of reasons. As discussed by James Meernik, the measurement of the success of HMI (or any military intervention for that matter of fact) is quite problematic, since there are multiple goals associated with the launch of these operations and a multitude of factors which may affect the outcome of the intervention.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Trans. Rex Warner. London: Penguin Classics, 1954. 361.

⁷⁵ Meernik, James. “United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy.” *Journal of Peace Research* 33.4 (1996): 398.

First, there is the issue of what elements should be included in the calculations and what factors should not be taken into account in determining the level of success of an HMI. Measuring the level of success of HMI can be an arduous task mainly because the definition of what HMI is has yet to be firmly established. As a result, when trying to measure success, a number of questions arise. Should we focus uniquely on the number of people saved by the operation to assess the success or failure of a mission, or should social factors such as infant mortality and literacy rate also be included? Should political factors –including the re-building of a judicial system and the establishment of strong and lasting accountable democratic institutions- also be taken into account in the calculations? And if so, how can such factors be measured?

In addition, success is a “continuous, not a dichotomous variable,”⁷⁶ David Edelstein points out. The assessment of whether an intervention was a success or not is therefore tricky since most interventions encompass elements of both success and failure. There is no black and white delimitation when it comes to HMI; all interventions fall into the grey area.

Other issues that may surface when measuring the level of success of HMI have to do with linking the intervention with the actual outcomes of the crisis or conflict. The causal relationship between the launch of an HMI and the actual resolution of the humanitarian crisis or conflict remains an obscure one and determining whether an intervention is directly a catalyst, a cause of the resolution of a crisis is a complex process.

For the purpose of my research, the success of an operation will be established in terms of how rapidly the ceasefire was declared or how quickly after the beginning of the conflict the violence in the country ended. What is important to underline here is that the success of HMI is a continuous, long-term process. While the end of violence in a region may be a milestone for the intervening forces, the success of an intervention cannot be simply understood in terms of how fast the troops halted the killings. What happens after the end of violence is as significant, if not more, for the measurement of

⁷⁶ Edelstein, David M. "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail." *International Security* 29.1 (2004): 56.

the level of success of HMI. The long-term development of a country post-HMI, which can be understood in terms of higher education rates, lower child mortality rates, strong democratic governmental institutions and an accountable judicial system and policy force, is also a core indicator of success when it comes to HMI. As discussed in my literature review, the *Responsibility to Protect* encompasses not only the immediate responsibility to protect civilians from harm, but also the responsibility to rebuild, which illustrates the sequential, long-term nature of HMI. The success of such operations is also sequential; a “stage process” which can be measured at different phases throughout the mission. While measuring success in terms of how fast the violence ends is a sensible way of assessing the success of HMI, it does not necessarily reflect the overall success of the involvement of the international community in the region. The success of military operations in times of humanitarian crises is a progression which evolves long after the violence has ended. While an intervention can be successful in rapidly putting an end to the violence, it can also fail to address the longstanding socio-political and economic development of the country, thus ultimately failing to achieve overall success. The reason I measure success in terms of the end of violence is that the end of violence is the first landmark on which further development towards long-term success will be built. So long as violence has not ended, education, judicial, governmental and economic reforms cannot be successfully implemented. I have therefore chosen the end of violence to measure the success of each operation as the first stage of success of HMI among many others, rather than as the ultimate success of such operations.

Measuring the level of NEUTRALITY

Measuring neutrality is also an arduous task. Neutrality has a wide range of meaning and an even wider range of ways to be applied during interventions. The UN understands impartiality as refraining from “publicly judging or even implying any judgment concerning the merits of a dispute or conflict and from acting in any way

which affects the balance of power among contending groups.”⁷⁷ In this work, neutrality is understood as refraining from taking a political stance in the conflict or addressing the political aspect of the humanitarian crisis using coercive or enforcement measures. Just like success, neutrality is not a dichotomous variable. An intervention is not either fully neutral or not neutral at all. The level of neutrality varies from one operation to the other on a spectrum. So how to measure it? I have developed a method to measure neutrality by reviewing all the Security Council resolutions pertaining to the launch and conduct of each intervention, the mandates and the tasks carried out during the operations as well as the means used by the interveners. I have built a “neutrality spectrum” in order to assess and nuance the level of neutrality of each HMI, which is presented below.


For each of my case study, the information I gathered regarding the level of neutrality of the HMI was then organized in a chart, which can be found in the appendixes, as follows:

Table 1 How to measure the level of neutrality of the HMI

Language used in the Security Council resolutions	- - -
Mandate of the operations	- - -
Means used/tasks performed	- - -

⁷⁷ Rieff, David. "The Peacekeepers Who Couldn't: The Real Reasons for the UN's Retreat in Bosnia." *The Washington Post* 11 Dec. 1994: C1-C2.

Figure 1 The spectrum of neutrality pertaining to HMI from low to high neutrality



Measuring the presence of NATIONAL INTERESTS

The realist school of thought understands national interests as the primary factor that determines states' actions (Wight 1978, Morgenthau 1967). Through an extensive literature review and a historical study of the cases, I have analyzed for each HMI

whether the interveners had geo-strategic and/or economic interests at stake in the region in which they launched operations. In his article *Clinton was Right*, Robert Rotberg defined American national interests in terms of four components: securing American territory against foreign attacks, maintaining domestic and social stability, ensuring American prosperity and advancing American values and core principles.⁷⁸ For the purpose of my research, I have re-organized those four components into two categories: geo-political interests and economic interests, described in the chart below.

Table 2 Measuring the presence of national interests for the interveners

Type of interests	How to measure the presence of the interests
Geo-strategic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desire of superpowers to establish or maintain “zones of influence.” - Desire to establish political control over a region or to secure some political influence in a region. - Security concerns: Border control and instability; violence threatening to spread; international order and peace threatened.
Material/economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Presence of natural resources (minerals, oil, gas, forestry). - Presence of factories and industries in the region; low cost of labor. - Cost of refugee flows, desire to avoid the costs of a refugee crisis.

Some might argue that my definition of national interests is quite narrow. From a more constructivist perspective, national interests can also encompass factors such as public pressure, electoral considerations, political popularity concerns for the governments in power as well as moral concerns. I have focused on the geo-strategic and economic interests only. The reason for my selection is that I wanted to analyze solely the role of long-term interests of governments rather than short-term political concerns. My goal was to study how vested national interests can influence the course

⁷⁸ Rotberg, Robert I. “Clinton was Right.” *Foreign Policy* 102 (1996): 135-141.

of HMI. Issues such as public pressure or political leaders' popularity concerns, I have come to understand in my work, will usually lead to governments making decisions purely "for the show" to satisfy the population back home. However, deep-rooted interests at stake of a more long-term nature will usually trigger more forceful actions, less for the show and more for viable results. In a way my definition of what constitutes interests is much more a realist one than it is a constructivist understanding.

The cases

I have conducted a historical analysis on the cases of Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and East Timor. I have chosen those four cases first of all because they have all been organized and conducted around very different applications of the neutrality principle. In some cases such as Rwanda, the interveners refused to take a side between the Tutsi population and the Hutus, while in others such as East Timor, the interveners took a clear stance from the beginning by supporting the political choice of the population against the interests of the Indonesian government and militias. When placed on the neutrality spectrum, all four cases range from low neutrality to high neutrality, and this wide range of operations definitely helped me reach some conclusions regarding HMI and political neutrality. By analyzing whether interveners took a political stance in each HMI, I was then able to establish a causal link between successful interventions and neutrality (or the lack of neutrality).

In addition, the interveners in these operations did not always have national interests at stake in the region in which they were intervening. In some cases such as Somalia and Rwanda, the interveners had no vested interests in the countries which resulted in a weak political will to intervene on their part. On the other hand, in East Timor and Haiti for example, those who intervened had clear national interests in the region. By examining all four cases on the basis of the intervener's interests in the region, I was then able to establish a link between the presence of interests and the success of the operations. By combining my results, I then proceeded to study how both

the presence of interests in the region and the act of taking a side in the conflict led to more successful operations.

An important factor that affected my decision regarding the selection of the cases I have studied is that all interventions have been extensively criticized and have set a precedent in international relations for one reason or another. Somalia is often referred to as the poster child for bailing out when it gets hard and was long used as an example of what happens when the intervention fails to remain neutral. Its failure then hindered the launch of intervention in other humanitarian crises, including Rwanda, which is seen as a model of holding back when an intervention was needed most. On the other hand, Haiti has set a precedent in international relations because for the first time, the UN and the Security Council authorized a military intervention under Chapter VII of the Charter even though the situation in the country did not present any direct threat to the international order. In the case of the East Timor operation, the interveners took clear a political stance in the conflict and failed to remain neutral, which raised the question once again of the importance of addressing humanitarian crises' political dimensions.

The similarities between all five cases are considerable:

- In each, diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions were the first response of the UN and its member states. In each, these efforts not only failed to stop the violence but also in some cases triggered more intense acts of violence;
- The United States was involved in each case, either diplomatically, financially and/or militarily;
- All four have taken place during the decade following the end of the Cold War; less than eight year separate the beginning of the crisis in Somalia and the beginning of the conflict in East Timor.
- All four humanitarian crises were initially caused by political conflicts.

Given that the concept of HMI is a fairly recent one, the study of such operations is a rather delicate process. There has yet to be a single method to measure any of the variables with regards to this type of military interventions. Since academics and

policymakers all perceive HMI in a different light, whether an operation was successful or not or whether an operation was neutral or not, remains highly subjective and few scholars have attempted to come up with such a methodology beyond single case studies, with the exception of a few authors, including Wheeler and Weiss (Wheeler 2000, Weiss 1999) The methodology I have developed in the present section was tested and applied in order to conduct my case studies, which are presented in the following four chapters.

CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY – SOMALIA

“There are two kinds of injustice:
The first is found in those who do an injury,
The second in those who fail to protect another from injury when they can.”⁷⁹
Cicero

The international operations conducted Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and East Timor are all landmark cases of HMI conducted during the 1990s, the decade referred to by Taylor Seybolt as “the formative decade after the end of the Cold War.”⁸⁰ Each crisis has been addressed by the international community and has triggered the launch of HMI, which vary in terms of the strategies used, the resources committed, and the level of neutrality. All four cases also exhibit great differences both in terms of the outcomes of each crisis and the level of international support they received.

In this chapter and the three that follow, I will present my analysis of four humanitarian crises and the international involvement they have triggered. Each chapter presents the case study of one region, and is divided into three sections. The first section contains the historical background of the country and an overview of the interventions carried out by the international community in response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis. In the second section, the reader will be presented my assessment of the level of neutrality of each operation as well as an assessment of the presence or absence of national interests for the interveners in each region affected by a humanitarian crisis or conflict. The final section is a discussion on how the variant levels of neutrality and national interests have affected the course and the success of the HMI in each region.

Historical background and the interventions

Somalia gained its independence from Britain and Italy in 1960. Nine years after the declaration of independence, General Mohamed Siad Barre took over power during a

⁷⁹ Cicero. *De Officiis*. Trans. Michael Winterbottom. Oxonii: E Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1994.

⁸⁰ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 46.

coup and established a military dictatorship over the territory. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a drought severely hit the country, precipitating economic collapse. What resulted from this chaotic situation was a civil war which erupted in 1988, and reached the capital, Mogadishu, in December 1990. A month later, Barre was fleeing the country,⁸¹ leaving Somalis without any State institutions capable of dealing with the outbursts of violence, the political crisis and the collapse of the economy. Among the multiple militias and rebel groups fighting the civil war, the most prominent and powerful was the Somali National Alliance, led by General Muhammad Farah Aidid. The violence continued to escalate between Aidid's faction and other militias, with casualties amounting to 15,000-40,000 people between January 1991 and August 1992.⁸² This situation also forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes, causing an urgent need for emergency humanitarian relief. An estimated 500,000 Somalis left the country, and another 350,000 became internally displaced persons.⁸³ In the meantime, the famine alone –a result of both the civil war and the drought- is estimated to be responsible for the death of up to 152,000 people.⁸⁴ Over 4,5 million Somalis, half of the estimated population, were also threatened by severe malnutrition.⁸⁵

UNOSOM I

By March 1991, two months following Barre's downfall, the UN and its agencies were fully engaged in Somalia. Despite the violence and political turmoil that persisted throughout the country, the international community directed its efforts solely towards the delivery of humanitarian aid. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council passed resolution 751, creating the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) which

⁸¹ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 52-53.

⁸² Haansch, S. et al., *Lives Lost, Lives Saved: Excess Morality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Emergency*. Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group. 1994. 15-25.

⁸³ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 59.

⁸⁴ Haansch, S. et al., *Lives Lost, Lives Saved: Excess Morality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Emergency*. Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group. 1994. 15-25.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

became operational in September and lasted until March 1993. The mandate of this operation included the provision of protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies at seaports and airports, as well as the provision of escorts for the delivery of humanitarian supplies from these points of entries to the various distribution centres in Mogadishu and its surroundings.⁸⁶ The resolution also mandated the deployment of “50 UN observers to monitor a ceasefire”⁸⁷ between the various militias fighting in Mogadishu and imposed a general weapons and military equipment embargo on Somalia.⁸⁸ As the situation on the ground became more volatile, and given the complexity of the political, security and humanitarian situation, the mandate of the operation was strengthened in Security Council resolution 775 on 28 August 1992. The resolution “authorized the increase in strength of UNOSOM,”⁸⁹ to enable the UNOSOM troops to ensure the effective provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. However, despite the efforts on the part of the international community, the situation in Somalia continued to degenerate. By October 1992, the country still had no central government with which UN officials could negotiate, and the territory remained torn by internal divisions, general lawlessness and political chaos. As Mohamed Sahnoun explains in his book *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, UNOSOM troops were fired upon, arms, humanitarian supplies and vehicles were stolen, and the airport and seaport were constantly under attack, thus impeding the efficient delivery of the much needed humanitarian aid.⁹⁰ By the end of 1992, it became clear that the situation in Somalia had become intolerable, and that the efforts of the international community had to be readjusted.

⁸⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 751, 24 April 1992. The text of this and other UN Security Council resolutions referred to in this work is available online at <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Sahnoun, Mohamed. *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*. Washington, DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994. 20

UNITAF

On 3 December 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 794, which recognized that “actions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible”⁹¹ and authorized UN member states to use “all necessary means”⁹² to do so. The multinational force known as United Task Force (UNITAF) was organized and led by the United States and was to work in collaboration with UNOSOM to fulfill its mandate. UNITAF forces were formed by a coalition of 24 states and were deployed in Somalia on 9 December 1992. The mission’s troop count amounted to 38,000 troops and the operation was to last up to 5 months.⁹³ The three main objectives of UNITAF were to secure the seaports, airstrips and food distribution points; to protect relief convoys from recurring incidents of looting and banditry; and finally to assist UN agencies and international NGOs in providing relief to the population suffering from the famine.⁹⁴

UNITAF successfully secured the major population centres and ensured the delivery of humanitarian aid. UNITAF troops guarded airport, seaport and warehouses in Mogadishu and provided convoy escorts from one city to another.⁹⁵ They also upgraded the Mogadishu airport and repaired thousands of kilometers of roads, thus allowing for a more rapid distribution of goods. In fact, in a report to the Security Council issued on 26 January 1993, the Secretary General congratulated UNITAF for “rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed without impediment.”⁹⁶ As Seybolt has argued, the mission was successful in deterring attacks on aid operations because it engaged in

⁹¹ UN Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention.” *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 77.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 152.

⁹⁶ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*. Rep. no. S/26738. United Nations, 12 Nov. 1993. Web. 18 July 2012. <<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20S26738.pdf>>.

communication with warlords and had capability that far superseded the Somali military capability.⁹⁷ The levels of malnutrition and starvation consequently decreased significantly during this period of time, as was noted in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Report of the secretary general on Somalia*.⁹⁸ However, despite the improvements made by UNITAF regarding the humanitarian needs of the population, no secure environment was established as a result of the deployment of the mission, and the general lawlessness and high levels of violence that characterized the country remained a reality.

UNOSOM II

UNOSOM II was established by Security Council resolution 814 on 26 March 1993 with the mandate to overtake the tasks previously under the mandate of UNITAF and to restore peace, stability and order within the country. Its main objectives, as stated in resolution 814, included to "assist in the provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of Somalia, (...) the repatriation of refugees and IDPs, (...) promote and advance the political reconciliation through broad participation, (...) and the re-establishment of national and regional administrative institutions (...)." ⁹⁹ The resolution also included in the mission's mandate the disarmament of Somali parties and the implementation of a political settlement to resolve the political crisis. Following the official transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II in May 1993, the situation in Somalia went from bad to worse. On 5 June, a series of armed attacks were conducted against UNOSOM II troops by Somali militias reported to be part of General Aidid's faction, resulting in the killing of 25 Pakistani soldiers. The following day, the Security Council passed resolution 837 which authorized "to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attack (...) the investigation of their action and their arrest

⁹⁷ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 153.

⁹⁸ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*. Rep. no. S/26738. United Nations, 12 Nov. 1993. Web. 18 July 2012. <<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20S26738.pdf>>.

⁹⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 814, 26 March 1993.

and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment.”¹⁰⁰ Aidid was named responsible for the attacks, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Following the issue of the warrant, the objectives of the operations were clear: to capture Aidid and to disarm his faction. As Karin Von Hippel has extensively discussed in her work on the Somali crisis, troops conducted attacks on weapon storage sites as well as on Aidid’s command centres, and major operations were carried out against strong political and financial supporters of Aidid and in areas of the capital known for supporting the warlord. This culminated in a man-hunt in pursuit of General Aidid by UN personnel, which climaxed on 3 October 1993, when US Rangers launched an operation in Mogadishu to capture a number of key members of General Aidid’s faction. 18 Rangers lost their lives during the mission, 77 were wounded, and several bodies of US soldiers were subject to what Von Hippel describes as public acts of outrage, which were broadcasted on television throughout the world.¹⁰¹ In addition to the American casualties, an estimated 300 Somali were killed, 700 wounded; up to 30% of the victims were women and children.¹⁰² The mandate of UNOSOM II was further revised on 4 February 1994 by Security Council resolution 897.¹⁰³ Under the new mandate, UNOSOM II would no longer use coercive measures but instead would rely on the use of diplomatic means to achieve national reconciliation. These efforts however “came to nothing” Seybolt claims.¹⁰⁴ By June 1994, the security situation in Somalia remained characterized by clashes among factions, especially in the capital, and by an increased number of banditry and looting incidents against UN personnel and convoys. On 25 August, the Security Council even expressed grave concern regarding the deteriorating security situation in Somalia.¹⁰⁵ After two further extensions of UNOSOM II’s mandate, the initial phase of withdrawal began in

¹⁰⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 837, 6 June 1993.

¹⁰¹ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 61.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 60.

¹⁰³ UN Security Council Resolution 897, 4 February 1994.

¹⁰⁴ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 58.

¹⁰⁵ "United Nations Mission in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)." *UN News Center*. UN, n.d. Web. 18 July 2012. <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm>>.

December 1994 and the final phase was concluded on 3 March 1995, after which the international community completely disengaged from the country.

Assessment of the level of neutrality and of the presence or absence of national interests

In September 1994, more than two years after the launch of the first international intervention in Somalia, UN Secretary General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, described the situation within the country as “very volatile and virtually uncontrollable.”¹⁰⁶ Violence continued to ravage Somalia long after UNOSOM II concluded its mandate, and no ceasefire or peace agreement was achieved as a result of either UNOSOM I, UNITAF or UNOSOM II. A decade after the withdrawal of the UNOSOM II, Somalia remained “a failed state with practically no functioning government institutions.”¹⁰⁷ With no political settlement in sight and a high risk of Somalia falling back into civil war, the international involvement in the country has often been portrayed by policymakers and scholars as the perfect example of a failed HMI (Von Hippel 2000, Seybolt 2007, Clarke and Herbst 1996). As Clarke and Herbst conclude in their article “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” “the operations’ end did not come close to being desirable.”¹⁰⁸

Measuring the level of neutrality of the operations

(See Appendix A for a detailed account of the Security Council resolutions, mandates and tasks performed by the HMI)

The first two operations launched in Somalia, UNOSOM I and UNITAF, were purely humanitarian in nature. The language used in Security Council resolutions pertaining to both HMI underline the purely humanitarian character of the operations. Resolution

¹⁰⁶ Hirsch, J. and R. Oakley. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking*. Washington, DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995. 25.

¹⁰⁷ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 60.

¹⁰⁸ Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention.” *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 85.

751, 775 and 794 constantly refer to “the magnitude of the human suffering,”¹⁰⁹ the “deterioration of the humanitarian situation”¹¹⁰ and underline the need to establish “a secure environment for humanitarian relief,”¹¹¹ which illustrates the commitment of both missions not to get entangled in the political crisis on the ground. Throughout all three resolutions, regrets are expressed at multiple occasions, and expressions such as “deeply disturbed” and “gravely alarmed” are constantly used with regards to the “magnitude of the human suffering.” What is interesting here is that although the human suffering and the deteriorating humanitarian situation was clearly the result of the civil war launched by Somali warlords, not once in all three resolutions are the actions of these warlords and of the numerous militias ever directly condemned. The Security Council resolutions condemn the “impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies” as well as the numerous incidents of looting and banditry, but never address the violence perpetrated by Somali factions against the population. The source of the humanitarian crisis –the war between militias- is never pointed out as the root of the crisis, let alone condemned as such. The three resolutions pertaining to UNOSOM I and UNITAF indicate a desire on the part of the international community to remain a neutral actor in Somalia and to not interpose itself between the warring parties. The neutrality of both HMI is also reflected in the tasks performed by the international troops in Somalia. As described by Lt. General McCaffrey, the three objectives of UNITAF were: “to secure the seaports, airstrips, and food distribution points; to protect relief convoys and ensure the smooth operation of relief agencies; and to assist UN agencies and NGOs in providing relief to the famine-stricken population.”¹¹² These tasks once again denote how the focus of both HMI was placed on addressing solely the humanitarian needs of the population and coordinating logistical operations without getting involved in the underlying political aspects of the crisis, taking part in the fighting, siding against one faction or even actively protecting the population in danger.

¹⁰⁹ UN Security Council resolution 751, 24 April 1992.

¹¹⁰ UN Security Council resolution 775, 28 August 1992.

¹¹¹ UN Security Council resolution 794, 3 December 1992.

¹¹² Adibe, Clement. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995. 58-59.

While UNOSOM I and UNITAF's mandates revolve around addressing the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, UNOSOM II's mandate is described by Seybolt as "hugely ambitious and overtly political."¹¹³ The analysis of the resolutions pertaining to UNOSOM II, and particularly resolution 837, has indicated that UNOSOM II was designed to address not only the humanitarian needs of the population but also to take a political stance in the conflict, get involved in the fighting in order to put an end to the ongoing inter-militia fighting. While the resolutions regarding the two first operations only discuss the humanitarian facet of the crisis and mandate the operations to establish a secure environment in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, UNOSOM II was developed with a totally different aim. As we can observe when analyzing the language used in resolution 837, the Security Council takes a clear stance against the "United Somali Congress,"¹¹⁴ not only condemning the violent acts perpetrated by the faction and recognizing their "calculated nature"¹¹⁵ but also pointing a finger at the "factional leaders involved"¹¹⁶ and authorizing their arrest, trial and incarceration. With UNOSOM II, the international involvement in Somalia, which had remained purely humanitarian until then, quickly became entangled in Somali politics as the Security Council took a clear stance against General Aidid, leader of the United Somali Congress. The mandate and tasks performed by the operation also reflect the involvement of the international community in Somali politics and the rejection of the principle of neutrality. UN troops under UNOSOM II's mandate directly targeted Aidid's faction and launched disarmament operations and military operations on political and military sites controlled by Aidid. They also attacked his most influential political and financial supporters and raided their headquarters. The mission abandoned its stance of neutrality when it sided against Aidid and used coercive measures to defeat his faction and capture the warlord.

¹¹³ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 57.

¹¹⁴ UN Security Council resolution 837, 6 June 1993.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Measuring the presence of national interests in the region

The command and implementation of military operations in Somalia was left primarily to the United States. As the most prominent intervener in Somalia, the US had “no strategic, economic or narco-interests”¹¹⁷ in this poor country of Central Eastern Africa that could have triggered an intervention, as suggested by Karin Von Hippel in her book *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Oberdorfer’s account of the decision-making process and public statements made by members of the American administration has led to similar conclusions. As former Vice-Chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral David Jeremiah stated following the launch of UNITAF, “there was nothing of geopolitical value in Somalia that should engage US interests... the intervention therefore had only one motivation – humanitarian.”¹¹⁸

The intervention was therefore triggered by factors other than the presence of national interests in the region. I have identified two factors that prompted the American administration to launch an intervention in Somalia. In Peter Jakobsen’s article “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?” he studies the decisive role of national interests and the media in triggering UN peace enforcement missions following the Cold War. In the case of Somalia he argues, the crisis was enjoying tremendous media coverage and, following the publication of pictures and videos of starving Somalis on national television, the American public was quick to start pressuring the government to intervene and put an end to the humanitarian crisis.¹¹⁹ It is what many scholars refer to as the “CNN Effect” that put the Somali crisis on the American foreign policy agenda, rather the presence of economic or geo-political strategic interests in the region. As Former White House Press Secretary Fitzwater later summed up, “the media had free time and that was when the pressure started building up. We heard it from every

¹¹⁷ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 56.

¹¹⁸ Natsios, Andrew S. “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia.” *Learning from Somalia*. Ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst. Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1997: 78.

¹¹⁹ Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?” *Journal of Peace Research* 33.2 (1996): 209.

corner, that something must be done. Finally the pressure was too great. The President said: 'I just can't live with this for two more months.'¹²⁰ The CNN effect however cannot explain on its own the decision of the US to launch an HMI in Somalia. The decision to intervene should also be understood as a result of then US President Bush's personal political ambitions, as suggested by George Church in his article "Out with a Bang."¹²¹ His administration perceived the launch of a humanitarian military intervention in Somalia as a relatively easy and inexpensive way to leave office on a positive note; the intervention was seen as the best approach to improve Bush's popularity in the US (Church 1993, Oberdorfer 1992). Interestingly enough, the Pentagon delayed the landing of the Marines in Somalia of a day in order for the US television crews to be on set to film the troops entering Somalia,¹²² which strengthens Church's argument regarding the role of Bush's political ambitions in triggering the HMI in Somalia. In sum, the CNN effect and the need for a presidential popularity boost put the case of the Somali crisis on the American foreign policy agenda, rather than the presence of geo-strategic or economic interests in the region.

On neutrality and national interests: A discussion

The operations launched in Somalia suffered from a lack of strong political will on the part of the intervening governments, stemming from the absence of any national interests for them in the region. This lack of political rapidly translated into two things: insufficient resources and inadequate timing as well as mandates that were either maladapted to the crisis and not backed by the appropriate means.

Since the ongoing crisis was not a priority for the American administration of the time and for other Western powers, the operations were slow to be launched and to be deployed in the region. Although the crisis began in January 1991, UNOSOM I was only established by the Security Council in April 1992. Even more astonishing, the mission did

¹²⁰ Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. "National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33.2 (1996): 209.

¹²¹ Church, George J. "Out with a Bang." *Time* 141.2 (1993): 13-15.

¹²² Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. "National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33.2 (1996): 209.

not become operational before September of the same year because UN member states were reluctant to commit troops and equipment to a mission in a region which presented to interests for them, as underlined by Seybolt.¹²³ In times of crisis like the one in Somalia, Seybolt continues, where every day hundreds of people are dying of famine and are being victims of violent inter-clan fighting, to wait over five months to launch an operations means going in too late.¹²⁴ As for UNOSOM II, the operation also encountered issues of timing, as the troops “did not arrive in country as scheduled.”¹²⁵ The main reason all three operations failed to put an end to the violence and provide the much needed humanitarian relief to the population is that they arrived too late and let the conflict grow out of proportion before any operation was even authorized. This delay cost the lives of tens of thousands of Somalis who would have benefited from an earlier intervention. While all three operations were launched too slowly and too late, due to the lack of political will on the part of the international community, there is another aspect of timing which resulted from a lack of national interests in the region. As Clarke and Herbst have studied in their article “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” operations that are launched by interveners who perceive no interests on the region will not only be too late, they will also have strict deadlines that impede on the missions’ ability to accomplish their mandates. In the case of Somalia, because the US perceived no interests in the region, the Bush administration wanted the troops in and out quickly. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time even stated that UNITAF was to last no longer than six weeks.¹²⁶ This short-ranged involvement, Clarke and Herbst conclude, meant that it was very difficult, if not improbable, for the missions to take any credible steps to ensure the end of violence in

¹²³ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 149.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid. 158.

¹²⁶ Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention.” *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 77.

Somalia.¹²⁷ In the case of Somalia, the authors continue, “it only let the warlords know how much time they had to prepare for the next round of fighting.”¹²⁸

The lack of vested interests for interveners in Somalia also meant for all three HMI the lack of sufficient equipment and troops to fulfill their mandate; resource allocation proved highly inadequate. As Von Hippel noted, “the means did not match the mandate”¹²⁹ especially with regards to UNOSOM I and II. UNOSOM I, mandated to secure and monitor the ceasefire, and to assist humanitarian aid operations, was physically weak. The UN sent a mere 50 unarmed military observers and an additional 500 armed units in a situation that was characterized by socio-political anarchy, banditry, looting and high levels of violence.¹³⁰ Just like UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II was also “understaffed and under-resourced both at the civilian and military level,”¹³¹ as Seybolt describes. The troops, although more numerous than UNOSOM I, were not adequately equipped to confront warlords and to fulfill its overly political mandate. Chopra, Eknes and Nordbo in *Fighting for Hope in Somalia* denounce the weakness of UNOSOM, “a force that was supposed to exert control over an entire country.”¹³² Due to the high complexity of the mandate and the high risks associated with the operation, UNOSOM II should have been heavily armed and the troops should have outnumbered the Somali warlords and factions if it really wanted to address the political violence within the country. This however, was very unlikely, mostly due to what Seybolt describes as an “extraordinarily slow level of recruitment.”¹³³ As Chopra, Eknes and Nordbo underline, it took months to get even 100 people on staff on the civilian side compared to the

¹²⁷ Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention.” *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 78.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 83

¹²⁹ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 74.

¹³⁰ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 150.

¹³¹ Ibid. 158.

¹³² Chopra, J. Eknes, A and Nordbo, T. *Fighting for Hope in Somalia*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1995. 70.

¹³³ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 158.

authorized 800.¹³⁴ The military side was also under-resourced, as troops not only did not arrive in country as scheduled, they were also not adequately equipped, as concluded in UN Secretary General Report on Somalia.¹³⁵ UNOSOM II had too few troops that were lightly armed, which reflects the lack of political will on the part of the interveners to commit both financial resources and troops to the operation.

Besides the inappropriateness of the operations' equipment and timing, the lack of strong political will on the part of the interveners also resulted in the launch of operations whose mandate were not adapted properly to the situation on the ground. As Tom Farer writes, "Bush repeatedly emphasized the planned brevity of their stay and the narrowness of their mission which could have been summed up as Feed and Leave."¹³⁶ As Karin Von Hippel understands it, "the inability or unwillingness to discern the essential political dynamics of the country and to effect remedial measures to foster civil society –out of expedience, disinterest or naïve neutrality- lie at the root of the world's failure in Somalia."¹³⁷ This disinterest on the part of the interveners, to use the words of Von Hippel, meant that the operations were designed to address the humanitarian needs of the population, to stop the starvation. But never, as Weiss argues in his article "Triage: Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era," had UNITAF "considered the implications if other necessary steps –disarmament and trusteeship."¹³⁸ Such steps were of crucial importance in Somalia, given that the famine ravaging the country was in fact the result of years of inter-clan fighting and not of natural causes. Despite the political nature of the humanitarian crisis, the US and other Western powers, having no interests at stake in the region, were inclined to launch purely

¹³⁴ Chopra, J. Eknes, A and Nordbo, T. *Fighting for Hope in Somalia*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1995. 105.

¹³⁵ United Nations. *Further Report of the Secretary General*, UN Document S/26317, 17 August 1993. paras 6, 9.

¹³⁶ Farer, Tom J. "Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase." *Human Rights Quarterly* 18.1 (1996): 7.

¹³⁷ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 81.

¹³⁸ Weiss, Thomas G. "Triage: Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era." *World Policy Journal* 11.1 (1994): 66.

humanitarian missions, which incurred fewer risks of casualties and less financial costs. The focus was placed on logistics rather than on disarming the militias, which would have ensured a relatively stable and secure environment necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and would have addressed the factors causing the famine in the first place. When UNITAF was launched, the US troops had the greatest capability and equipment, and would have been able to disarm the belligerent forces. The US with its 30,000 troops had more power than anyone and the greatest capability to fulfill this task, as underlined in Clarke and Herbst's work on the Somalia.¹³⁹ However, the lack of national interests in the region translated into a highly neutral operation, as US officials told the Somali warlords they could keep their weapons,¹⁴⁰ and dedicated three quarters of their troops to logistics.¹⁴¹ Tom Farer has criticized this move on the part of the US, and writes that "the world's most powerful army and richest government was assuming the relatively easy task of safeguarding the delivery of food,"¹⁴² a mission that was very politically rewarding for the Bush administration and presented close to no risk in terms of casualties. "Dealing with the warlords from the start especially without bothering to reduce the amount of weaponry was a fatal mistake,"¹⁴³ Von Hippel concludes, since a concentrated effort to disarm would have sent an early message that UN and US were serious about addressing the crisis in Somalia.

As the interveners did not perceive national interests at stake in the region, they were neither willing to commit the troops for the operation, nor were they willing to take risks in Somalia. As a result, both UNOSOM I and UNITAF were designed as highly neutral missions, mandated to monitor a ceasefire and provide humanitarian assistance to the population in need. This strategy, although less costly and risky for interveners

¹³⁹ Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 75.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 55.

¹⁴² Farer, Tom J. "Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase." *Human Rights Quarterly* 18.1 (1996): 8.

¹⁴³ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 84.

than a more forceful approach to the conflict, ended up being highly damaging because by focusing solely on feeding the people, and remaining a neutral actor in the conflict zone, the interveners ended up prolonging the situation. By not addressing the violence within the country and focusing all the troops' efforts on humanitarian relief, the UN operations failed to put an end to daily incidents of banditry and looting that were ravaging the country and impeding the delivery of food, medical supplies and other humanitarian aid. Hirsch and Oakley present a detailed account of the situation in Somalia in their book *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peace-making and Peacekeeping*, and concluded that although the volume of food entering Somalia increased in a significant manner during the fall 1992, the quantity of food that was actually reaching the most desperate population dropped by as much as 40%.¹⁴⁴ Because of daily incidents of banditry and looting, and given the purely humanitarian mandate of the operation which did not authorize the troops to use force, the operations were not prepared or equipped to prevent such attacks. As a result, foreign food could no longer reach the population in need, due to the constant plundering of relief supplies by warlords. Andrew Natsios, who was the assistant administrator for the US Agency for International Development during the Somalia crisis, noted that "food imported for the relief effort became a prized plunder of merchants, unemployed workers and gangs of young men."¹⁴⁵ The food supplies imported and delivered by both HMI were not only stolen by militias, they were then used as weapons of war, which is often the case in violent environments where the local economic activities are disrupted and the population is desperate. Somali warlords would sell the food in exchange for more weapons, or distribute it to desperate civilians to ensure their loyalty. While US troops knew that Somali warlords were diverting massive amounts of food, they did nothing to address the issue because of their commitment to staying out of Somali politics¹⁴⁶ and avoid confrontation which would entail casualties and other costs the

¹⁴⁴ Hirsch, J. and R. Oakley. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking*. Washington, DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1995. 25.

¹⁴⁵ Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 74.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 82.

interveners were not willing to incur. Von Hippel powerfully describes UNOSOM I and UNITAF troops as they “watched helplessly as most food aid filtered through the corrupt system in hope that some of it would trickle down.”¹⁴⁷ Instead of appeasing the humanitarian crisis and bettering the situation in Somalia, UNOSOM I and UNITAF ended up feeding the war. The aid strengthened the militias while the population starved. The humanitarian aid provided by both HMI served to sustain the militias and perpetrated the war instead of alleviating the famine because the forces on the ground failed to understand the importance of addressing the violence and other political issues first, which then would have permitted an effective delivery of humanitarian aid. Instead, they worked cross-purpose by providing aid that did not even get to the people who actually needed it. Military forces that don’t recognize their political role are likely to unintentionally aggravate the conflict, which was the case in Somalia where the interveners insisted they were only there to feed the people. Humanitarian crises are symptomatic of a larger problem, Clarke and Herbst discuss, and that problem is invariably political. The implication of those who support only humanitarian intervention is that Somalis were starving because of an act of nature. But the famine that gripped Somalia resulted from the degeneration of the country’s political system and economy.”¹⁴⁸ However, Western governments leading the interventions in Somalia continued to use humanitarian aid instead of political or military action to address the cause of the violence and suffering. As a result, the humanitarian crisis persisted long after the withdrawal of the international missions. Two years after the start of the first intervention, the situation was still described as “very volatile and virtually uncontrollable”¹⁴⁹ by the UN Secretary-General.

¹⁴⁷ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 59.

¹⁴⁸ Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention.” *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 74.

¹⁴⁹ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 59.

While UNOSOM I and UNITAF's strategy was highly inadequate as a result of the reluctance of the interveners to get involved in the political aspect of the crisis, the case of UNOSOM II is quite different and illustrates the danger of missions that abandon their stance of neutrality taking place in regions where the interveners have no interests at stake. On 4 December 1992, President Bush declared "Our mission [in Somalia] is humanitarian... we do not plan to dictate political outcomes."¹⁵⁰ Less than a year later, in June 1993, the Security Council passed resolution 837, authorizing the arrest of general Aidid; thus triggering an open man-hunt in Mogadishu. As Von Hippel remarks, "the mad Aidid man-hunt invalidated any residual pretensions of impartiality."¹⁵¹ In sharp contrast to UNITAF's refusal to address the political cause of the Somali crisis, the UN Security Council mandated UNOSOM II to establish control over the warlords and disarm them. The operation directly targeted Aidid and his faction; condemning his actions as they set out to arrest him and to destroy his supporters and headquarters. Although the mandate did address the political roots of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the problem was that the objectives were never matched by the necessary means and political will to achieve them. As noted by Clarke and Herbst, there was an "asymmetry between US forces and the operation's goals."¹⁵² UNOSOM II could have been more successful had it had "the resources and the political will (neither of which existed)"¹⁵³ adds Von Hippel. As a result, the missions carried out by UNOSOM II troops were weak and indecisive, and "the little disarming that did take place was sporadic and voluntary, while eventually most of the weapons were stolen from the cantonment sites."¹⁵⁴ Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, former UN commander, criticized the disparity between rhetoric and reality: "There is a fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions and the means available to

¹⁵⁰ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 76.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* 72.

¹⁵² Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 76.

¹⁵³ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 73.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 71.

commanders in the field.”¹⁵⁵ In the case of UNOSOM II, while the resolutions underlined the strong and forceful character of the operations’ mandate, the interveners had neither the will nor did they commit the means to execute the mandate. The thing to remember here is that because the Western powers intervening in Somalia had no interests in the region, they were not willing to incur the risks –both at the financial level and with regards to casualties- of a more forceful and activist mission. The lack of political will of the interveners in the case of UNOSOM II was reflected first and foremost in the refusal to accept the risk of casualties. As Seybolt has interestingly coined, governments were no willing to sacrifice the lives of their troops for charity.¹⁵⁶ Consequently, UNOSOM II failed because it wasn’t strong enough to defeat Aidid at a cost that was acceptable for the intervening powers in terms of casualties. Intervention force was weak, and its actions showed its inability to repel Somali attacks while keeping the number of casualties low. As Von Hippel concludes in her book *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*, it was “the fear of body bags in the United States, which ultimately undermined the operation”¹⁵⁷ Although weaker in numbers and equipment, Somali fighters had the advantage of being more motivated than the interveners. They were willing to sustain high costs and able to inflict enough damage on foreign troops to make foreign political leaders unwilling to carry on the operations. Seybolt sums up the dilemma of interventions such as UNOSOM II and has illustrated how because the local belligerents have their most cherished political interests on the line and often will fight to protect them, an intervener with no interests at stake in the region will be likely to withdraw if the level of violence rises and its soldiers are killed.¹⁵⁸ When the going got rough, the US forces left; as Seybolt writes, “foreign governments disengaged when the costs began to mount.”¹⁵⁹ Following the deadly fight in Mogadishu

¹⁵⁵ "UN Commander Wants More Troops, Fewer Resolutions." *New York Times* 31 Dec. 1993: A3.

¹⁵⁶ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 235.

¹⁵⁷ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 83.

¹⁵⁸ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 27.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 236.

of 3 October 1993 during which 18 US rangers lost their lives, the American administration disengaged militarily from the country. However, Seybolt proceeds to explain, “withdrawal is tantamount to defeat. Once an intervener withdraws, the perpetrators no longer have to be constrained by the fear of interference.”¹⁶⁰

Somalia’s interventions failed for two reasons. One, the neutrality of the first two missions prevented the troops to address the causes of the humanitarian crisis and perpetrated the cycles of violence and reinforced the power and popularity of the warlords. When the international community abandoned its stance of neutrality and took a side in the crisis, the objectives of the operation were not backed by the necessary political will due to the lack of national interests for the interveners in the region, which had devastating consequences on the situation in Somalia. The case of Somalia illustrates how purely humanitarian interventions, although they have the immediate and short-lived effect of saving lives, will usually fail to address the underlying socio-political dynamics that have triggered the conflict in the first place. As Simon Chesterman has observed, “around half the countries that emerge from war lapse back into it within five years.”¹⁶¹ Given such a record, it is surprising that governments do not make it a priority to address these dynamics when they intervene in humanitarian crises. As Catherine Lu pointed out, while saving lives is a morally significant outcome, it is somewhat minimal, secondary, in such situations, given that most humanitarian crises are in fact symptomatic of deeper political issues (Lu 2007). In the case of Somalia, humanitarian aid was used by the American government and the international community in order to be seen “doing something” in the face of humanitarian suffering without having to commit the resources or take the risks necessary to tackle the issues at the root of the famine and the human suffering –the inter-militia fighting. And when the interveners did in fact decide to address the fighting

¹⁶⁰ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 228.

¹⁶¹ Chesterman, Simon. “From State Failure to State-Building: Problems and Prospects for a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission.” *Journal of International Law and International Relations* 2.1 (2005): 155-176.

and take a more pro-active role in the crisis, its efforts were refrained by an unwillingness on the part of Western governments to incur the costs and casualties risk involved in doing so. Karin Von Hippel concludes her analysis of Somalia by acknowledging that the international community “certainly contributed to the collapse of Somalia (...)”¹⁶²

¹⁶² Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 91.

CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY – RWANDA

“Man’s inhumanity to man is not only perpetrated by the vitriolic actions of those who are bad.

It is also perpetrated by the vitiating inaction of those who are good.”¹⁶³

Martin Luther King

As Taylor Seybolt writes regarding the operation in Somalia, “it tested the UN’s political and military abilities and found them severely limited.”¹⁶⁴ For years to come, the Somalia debacle would be used as a cautionary tale on the costs and risks of HMI. As a result, when the crisis in Rwanda started to unfold, the international community was nowhere to be found, and ultimately decided to take a very different approach to the conflict, which ended up costing the lives of close to a million Tutsis. The following chapter analyzes in depth the Rwandan genocide and the international involvement in the region during this period of time.

Historical background and the interventions

Rwanda is a country in central Eastern Africa and is one of the most densely populated ones of the world. Its population is constituted of three main ethnic groups: the Hutu (85%), the Tutsi (14%) and the Twa (1%).¹⁶⁵ Although all three groups have always shared the same language and culture, the Belgian colonial rule which ended in 1962 succeeded in institutionalizing and solidifying differences between the Hutus and the Tutsis, which resulted in a long history of ethnic violence and waves of internally displaced people.

In 1973, Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana organized a coup d’état and took over power in Rwanda. Samantha Power, who has conducted an extensive study on the case of Rwanda, discusses how the Hutu-dominated government of President Habyarimana

¹⁶³ King, Martin Luther. *Autobiography of Martin Luther King*. Ed. Clayborne Carson. London: Abacus, 2000.

¹⁶⁴ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 72.

¹⁶⁵ "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)." *UN News Center*. UN, n.d. Web. 18 July 2012. <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamir.htm>>.

was known not only to favor the Hutu population but also to openly persecute the minority Tutsi population through the implementation of discriminatory practices and policies.¹⁶⁶ Such programmes triggered the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an armed force composed mainly of Tutsi refugees living in neighboring Uganda, to launch a civil war against the government of Habyarimana in October 1990. After three years of fighting, a peace agreement between the RPF and the Rwandan government was signed on 4 August 1993 in Arusha. Known as the Arusha Peace Process, the agreement dictated the terms of power sharing between the Hutu-led government and the RPF.¹⁶⁷ Hutu extremists within the government who opposed to power sharing began to elaborate a concrete plan to intimidate all those in favor of the Arusha Peace Process. To illustrate the resolve of the Hutu extremists, Bruce Jones remarks that by late 1993, a Hutu militia, the Interahamwe, had been created, and weapons were being distributed to them by the government and stocked across the country.¹⁶⁸ In addition, Hutu extremist discourses and anti-Tutsi propaganda could be heard all over the country, demonizing the RPF and the Tutsi and encouraging aggressive Hutu nationalism.¹⁶⁹

The situation further degenerated on 6 April 1994, when the President was killed in a plane crash. Within days of the crash, the Rwandan authorities set out a curfew, and Hutu militias with the help of the national army began to install roadblocks around Kigali. Killings of Tutsi by Hutu militias began all over the country, coordinated from the capital through “bureaucratic lines of authority and the pro-government radio station.”¹⁷⁰ The killers were extremely rapid; as Prunier remarks, the Rwandan genocide is now recognized as the fastest and most efficient mass killing campaign of the 20th

¹⁶⁶ Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic, 2002. 336.

¹⁶⁷ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 71.

¹⁶⁸ Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 36.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 72.

century.¹⁷¹ By the end of the first month, notes Philip Gourevitch, the majority of the 800,000 victims of the genocide were already dead.¹⁷²

On 4 July, the RPF managed to establish military control over the territory and declared a ceasefire on 18 July, which marked the end of the civil war. By then, between 500,000 to one million Rwandans had been killed, and even more were displaced.¹⁷³ The conflict is said to have produced 1,5 million internally displaced people and an additional 400,000 refugees in the neighboring countries.¹⁷⁴

UNAMIR

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established by the Security Council Resolution 872 on 5 October 1993. Its main objective was “to establish and maintain a climate conducive to the secure installation of the transitional government.”¹⁷⁵ The mission was to last for a period of six months and it was mandated to “contribute to the security of the city of Kigali (...) to monitor observance of the ceasefire agreement (...) to assist with mine clearance (...) to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons (...) to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities (...)”¹⁷⁶

The situation rapidly degenerated on 6 April 1994, when the aircraft carrying the President crashed and killed all people aboard. Soon after, the genocide began, thus creating a political and humanitarian crisis with unprecedented dimensions. Due to the increased level of violence, UNAMIR found itself incapable of carrying on its initial mandate. Under the circumstances, the ceasefire and negotiations were rendered highly unlikely as the violence continued to escalate. On 21 April, following the death of 10

¹⁷¹ Prunier, G. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 263-265.

¹⁷² Gourevitch, Philip. *We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we Will Be Killed with our Families: Stories from Rwanda*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1998. 133.

¹⁷³ Prunier, G. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 263-265.

¹⁷⁴ “UNHCR – The State of the World’s refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action.” UNHCR. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1 January 2000. Web. 12 July 2012. <<http://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bb60.html>>.

¹⁷⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 872, 5 October 1993.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

Belgium soldiers, the Secretary General declared that UNAMIR personnel could no longer remain in the country in such an unstable environment.¹⁷⁷ On the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 912, cutting UNAMIR forces by 90% to a mere 250 lightly armed troops which would remain in Kigali.¹⁷⁸ The objectives of the operation were to “act as intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure ceasefire (...) to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible (...) to monitor the security and safety of civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR.”¹⁷⁹ The problem was that UNAMIR had no power to take effective actions to halt the massacres and was therefore unable to protect civilians. On 17 May 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 918, which modified once more the mandate of UNAMIR.¹⁸⁰ For the first time since the beginning of the crisis, the international community officially acknowledged the systematic killing of the Tutsi as the Security Council recalled in the resolution that “the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law.”¹⁸¹ The resolution imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda, increased the number of troops to 5,500 men and enabled the forces to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk through the establishment of secure humanitarian areas.¹⁸² As discussed by Seybolt, the mission was successful in carrying out small but effective rescue operations and managed to deter attacks on large groups of people who were seeking refugees in Kigali’s landmarks, which included the Amahoro Stadium, the King Faisal hospital, the Hotel Mille Collines and the Meridian hotel.¹⁸³ The operation also participated in logistical activities, assisting aid operations with point protection, escorting NGOs, guarding warehouses and conducting daily and nightly patrols in several parts of Kigali. Although it was unable to put an end to the ethnic violence,

¹⁷⁷ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 72.

¹⁷⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 912, 21 April 1994.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 918, 17 May 1994.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 74-75.

UNAMIR, which, as Prunier remarks, was the only deterrent and protection force present in the country, managed to save the lives of most of the 20,000 Tutsi who were in Kigali.¹⁸⁴

Operation Turquoise

Eleven weeks following the beginning of the genocide, on 22 June 1994, the Security Council passed resolution 929, authorizing member states to conduct operations using all necessary means to achieve humanitarian goals for a period of two months.¹⁸⁵ France immediately undertook the responsibility of the operation, as French foreign minister at the time, Alain Juppé, declared that France would send troops to Rwanda in order “to stop the massacres and to protect the populations threatened with extermination.”¹⁸⁶ Operation Turquoise was launched on 23 June, with the mandate of contributing “in an impartial way to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda”¹⁸⁷ and to “provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.”¹⁸⁸ The mission was also designed to implement the necessary conditions for the ceasefire and to encourage further political negotiations between the Hutu interim government and the RPF.

The main achievement of the operation was the establishment of a “humanitarian protected zone” in South-Western Rwanda. According to Seybolt, the establishment of the safe zone succeeded to “deter the forward advance of the civil war front, deter conventional military operations within the zone, and deter some, but not all, attacks by militiamen within the zone.”¹⁸⁹ Within less than two weeks of the launch of the operation, troops had established their presence over one fifth of the Rwandan territory. Operation Turquoise managed to deter some military operations within the

¹⁸⁴ Prunier, G. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 264.

¹⁸⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 929, 22 June 1994.

¹⁸⁶ Des, Forges Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 668.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 925, 8 June 1994.

¹⁸⁹ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 75.

safe zone, although small militias still succeeded in launching attacks. However, as Prunier explains in *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, since the operation did not have enough troops or the proper equipment to police the entire territory, genocidal attacks continued to occur long after the creation of the zone.

Assessment of the level of neutrality and of the presence or absence of national interests

Both HMI that were launched to address the crisis in Rwanda failed to halt the massive acts of violence carried throughout the country by Hutu militias against the Tutsi population. In the end, as Gourevitch suggests, the genocide died down on its own.¹⁹⁰ The declaration of a ceasefire was not the result of the operations launched by the international community but of a military offensive conducted by the RPF. In his account of the Rwandan genocide, he explains that the genocide ended not because of the presence of international intervening forces but because the Hutu militias found fewer and fewer victims to target.¹⁹¹ Neither UNAMIR nor Operation Turquoise acted to stop the genocidal attacks. As Bruce Jones remarks in his book *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*, “by the time [Operation Turquoise] had established itself in Western Rwanda, the genocide in that territory was virtually complete.”¹⁹² The international involvement in Rwanda is, to this day, studied and discussed as the poster child of failed HMI, as an example of what happens when the international community acts too little, too late.

¹⁹⁰ Gourevitch, Philip. *We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we Will Be Killed with our Families: Stories from Rwanda*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1998. 133.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 125.

Measuring the level of neutrality of the operations

(See Appendix B for a more detailed account of the Security Council resolutions, mandates and tasks performed by the HMI)

The international community was determined to remain an impartial actor in the small African country, despite the one-sided nature of the killings. After having reviewed the resolutions pertaining to the Rwandan interventions, I have concluded that the focus of all four resolutions is placed on addressing the humanitarian needs of the population through the provision of “humanitarian assistance commensurate with the scale of the humanitarian tragedy in Rwanda.”¹⁹³ In each resolution, the crisis is constantly referred to as a humanitarian tragedy but rarely is the political violence addressed. At multiple occasions in the resolutions, the Security Council condemns the violence targeting UN personnel and expresses “its deep concern for the safety and security of UNAMIR and other UN personnel”¹⁹⁴ but never condemns the violence systematically conducted by the Hutu militias against the Tutsis or expresses concerns for the safety and the Tutsi population. The resolutions speak of “large-scale violence, which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians,” and the “ongoing violence (...) which endangers the lives and safety of the civilian population”¹⁹⁵ but nowhere does the Security Council address the organized nature of the violence, who organized it and who was targeted.

The resolutions express a tremendous disregard for the one-sided nature of the killing and almost a fear of condemning what was going on. As discussed by Alyson Des Forges, the resolutions of the Security Council reveal a reluctance to speak of the genocide.¹⁹⁶ Only once in all four resolutions is the one-sided nature of the violence discussed, although the term genocide is nowhere to be found. In resolution 918, passed by the Security Council in mid-May -more than a month after the start of the genocide- members of the international community recall that “the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part,

¹⁹³ UN Security Council resolution 912, 21 April 1994.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ UN Security Council resolution 918, 17 May 1994.

¹⁹⁶ Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 599.

constitutes a crime punishable under international law.”¹⁹⁷ Despite the Security Council’s recognition of the one-sided nature of the violence, the four resolutions address all parties to the conflict on an equal footing. At multiple occasions, the Security Council urges “all parties to cease forthwith any incitement to violence and ethnic hatred”¹⁹⁸ and demands “that all parties to the conflict (...) immediately bring an end to all killings.”¹⁹⁹ One of the key aspects of the resolutions that indicate a high level of neutrality is this tendency to avoid siding with or against one side of the conflict. Not once in all four documents has the Security Council pointed the finger at, or condemned the actions of one side of the conflict, despite the known fact that Hutu militias were systematically eliminating the Tutsi population. In each resolution, the Security Council reiterates that international troops were to remain “a neutral force.”²⁰⁰ Even in the latest resolution, which authorized the launch of Operation Turquoise more than a month after the beginning of the genocide, the Security Council makes sure to specify the purely humanitarian character of the mission, “stressing the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an interposition force between the parties.”²⁰¹

In addition to the resolutions themselves, the mandates and the tasks performed by both missions also indicate a high level of neutrality. Both the mandate of UNAMIR and the mandate of Operation Turquoise were highly humanitarian, focusing on logistical operations which included refugee repatriation, the establishment of a safe-zone area and the protection and delivery of humanitarian aid rather than on active population protection. Never was it question of security operations such as disarmament, of direct confrontation with the Hutu militias conducting the genocide or of a proactive protection of the population in danger. In fact, as Samantha Power recounts it in her book *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, when Dallaire proposed arm raids against Hutu compounds, Kofi Annan’s department of Peacekeeping

¹⁹⁷ UN Security Council resolution 918, 17 May 1994.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ UN Security Council resolution 929, 22 June 1994.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

Operations replied: “You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality or act beyond your mandate.”²⁰² The objective of both missions was first and foremost to remain out of the political situation in Rwanda, and to avoid any kind of military confrontation, thus underlining the neutral nature of the missions.

Measuring the presence of national interests in the region

Similarly to the case of Somalia, the countries that had the capability, the strength and the means to lead an intervention in Rwanda had no national interests in the region that could have motivated them to act. Rwanda is a small landlocked country in central Africa with few natural resources and therefore presented no economic interests for Western powers. In addition, because of its location in the heart of Africa, the refugee flow that was bound to result from the crisis did not have the possibility to threaten the American or European continent. As a result, the international community saw no urgency in getting involved in Rwanda. According to Seybolt, “not a single government with the power to act had any interests in stopping [the genocide].”²⁰³ And since Rwanda is not surrounded by any powerful African states, none of its neighbours were able to pressure the international community to act and prevent the massive population displacement and the genocide that was triggering it.

In the case of Rwanda, the most important player was France, which launched and organized Operation Turquoise. Many scholars including Colette Braeckman, Richard Dowden and Mireille Duteil suggest that France did in fact have national interests at stake in the region (Braeckman 1994, Dowden 1994, Duteil 1994) that drove the French government to act. France had always regarded francophone Africa as an area of strategic interest, Peter Jakobsen argues, and had great incentives to maintain close contact with its former colonies in the region, including Rwanda, in order to preserve its

²⁰² Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 352.

²⁰³ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 72.

credibility on the continent.²⁰⁴ However, despite the somewhat close relations France had entertained with these countries, there was no interest –economical or strategic– for France in the region. As for the US, probably the only country which truly had the means and capability to put a quick end to the crisis, the American administration perceived no interests in the region that may have pushed it to intervene. As Samantha Power claims, “Rwanda had never been more than marginal concern to Washington’s most influential planners.”²⁰⁵ Moreover, the timing of the crisis could not have been more wrong. Power goes on to explain that following Somalia and the tragic death of 18 Rangers who were later dragged in the streets of Mogadishu, the US public was more than ever opposed to the launch of another military intervention that could result in more American casualties. An account of the debate surrounding the Rwanda crisis within the American administration is provided in Power’s work. She quotes a high ranking member of the Defense Department’s African Affairs bureau: “Look, if something happens in Rwanda, we don’t care. Take it off the list. US national interest is not involved and we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on the lists... Just make it go away.”²⁰⁶ This quote sums up very well the attitude not only of the US but of all Western powers regarding the unfolding genocide in Rwanda.

So if Africa and most particularly Rwanda were not considered a priority, what then prompted an intervention? Just like in the case of Somalia, Peter Jakobsen suggests, it was public awareness and pressure that pushed the international community and most particularly France to intervene. First, domestic pressure in France was growing rapidly, mostly due to the extensive media coverage of the crisis. A source in the French Foreign Ministry confirmed the role played by mounting pressure and stated that “the emotion in public is strong... It is no longer possible to watch the massacres occur.”²⁰⁷ As the public awareness was increasing, it became impossible for the French government to

²⁰⁴ Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?” *Journal of Peace Research* 33.2 (1996): 209.

²⁰⁵ Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 330.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.* 342.

²⁰⁷ Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?” *Journal of Peace Research* 33.2 (1996): 210.

ignore the necessity of an intervention. The numerous accounts of the Rwanda interventions underline a general consensus regarding the motivations of the intervening powers behind both HMI. Since neither France nor the US had vested national interests in the region, the intervention was motivated, just like in Somalia, by public pressure and extensive media coverage.

Neutrality and national interests: A discussion

Reflecting on the international involvement in humanitarian crises where major powers with the capability to end the massacres stood by and witnessed the genocide unfold, Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary General, admitted that states were not willing to incur the costs and risks of intervention “where no perceived vital interests are at stake.”²⁰⁸ The case of Rwanda is no exception to this rule. The lack of interests in the region for Western powers meant that the interventions launched in Rwanda would not be backed by the necessary political will on their part. As a result, both UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise were under-resourced but also highly inadequate in addressing the high levels of violence in the country.

As Samantha Power discusses, the lack of national interests in Rwanda rapidly translated in an “unwillingness of the US government [and of the international community as a whole] to make financial sacrifices to diminish the killings.”²⁰⁹ As a result, UNAMIR’s forces lacked two essential components which were essential for the operation to carry out its mandate, which Bruce Jones coined as “a strong intelligence capacity and defensive equipment such as armored personnel carriers.”²¹⁰ The absence of strong political backing was clearly reflected in the limited strength and equipment of the operations. By early April 1994, as General Dallaire –head of the UNAMIR mission- recalled, the few troops that had arrived in Rwanda did not have “the kit they needed to

²⁰⁸ Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Tim Dunne. “East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism.” *International Affairs* 77.4 (2001): 825

²⁰⁹ Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 371.

²¹⁰ Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 108.

perform even basic tasks.”²¹¹ UNAMIR’s equipment also suffered from the weak political will of the interveners. It was equipped with hand-me-down vehicles from the previous UN mission in Cambodia, and only 80 out of the 300 vehicles sent were usable.²¹² Jones, in line with Power’s criticism of the weakness of UNAMIR, denounces the deployment of the operation without the appropriate equipment or manpower, which he described as “placing an immobile and ineffective force in the middle of an increasingly hostile environment.”²¹³ On 21 April 1994, less than two weeks after the start of the genocide, the Security Council passed resolution 912 thus approving the downsizing of the UNAMIR forces on the ground to a mere 270 military personnel, which Daniele Archibugi labels as a laughable contingent of blue helmets, underlining the inadequacy of the mission’s strength given the escalating violence in the country.²¹⁴ In *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, Alyson Des Forges concludes that because of the reduction of the number of troops to such a symbolic level, the mission in itself became a “defensive survival exercise”²¹⁵ in which UNAMIR had to focus all its efforts to protect its own men rather than a mission to protect endangered civilians. The withdrawal of the majority of troops from Rwanda following resolution 912 sent a clear message to the Hutu militias that the international community would not stand in their way while they carried out the genocide. As Jones reflects, the downsizing of the mission “left Rwanda’s genocide planners a clear field to put their killing machine into motion.”²¹⁶ Operation Turquoise suffered a similar faith as UNAMIR. Although France’s intended firepower seemed almost too important for a humanitarian mission, as Prunier remarks in his book *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, the operation’s equipment was highly insufficient and maladapted to the situation on the field. Mandated to establish a

²¹¹ Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 342.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.

²¹⁴ Archibugi, Daniele. “Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention.” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29.1 (2004): 8.

²¹⁵ Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 599.

²¹⁶ Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 121.

safe-zone area and ensure the protection of Rwandan civilians, it did not have enough troops to patrol the zone, or even enough trucks to carry people to the safe area, thus allowing the perpetration of genocidal attacks within the zone,²¹⁷ as Taylor Seybolt attests in his analysis of the international response in Rwanda. Due to “insufficient number of transport capacities, [the French troops] often had to stand by in medium-size towns while killing went on few kilometers away,”²¹⁸ Prunier writes.

In addition to being ill-equipped, UNAMIR was highly inadequate. Des Forges discusses how UNAMIR officers in charge of the security in Rwanda feared that siding with the Tutsis would discredit the neutrality of the UN in the region. Des Forges continues to say that neutrality in Rwanda was paramount since any deviation from this principle could result in attacks against UNAMIR, which was weak, lightly armed and therefore unable to defend itself.²¹⁹ The weak political will of Western powers in Rwanda translated in operations that were mandated to fulfill purely humanitarian tasks and to avoid getting involved in the violent conflict unfolding on the ground, which would have required more money and involved more risks—a sacrifice the interveners were not willing to make in a region that presented no interests for them. As Douglas Anglin summed up in his work *Confronting Rwandan Genocide: the Military Options*, “although some divergence of views was apparent, the dominant opinion in the Security Council was the need to avoid becoming entangled in a conflict in which few evinced any real interests.”²²⁰ An intervention to put an end to the violence in the country and to confront the Hutu militias would have required more UN forces, which proved to be too costly both in terms of money and time, as Des Forges also underlines.²²¹ Unwilling

²¹⁷ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 74.

²¹⁸ Prunier, G. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1995. 293.

²¹⁹ Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 612-613.

²²⁰ Anglin, Douglas George. *Confronting Rwandan Genocide: The Military Options: What Could and Should the International Community Have Done?* Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping, 2002. 29.

²²¹ Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

to halt the genocide, the Council tried instead to alleviate the suffering by directing UNAMIR to assist humanitarian relief operations “to the extent feasible.”²²²

While the symbolic value of humanitarian aid is great for political leaders (Seybolt 2007, Prunier 1995), it was not what was needed at the time in Rwanda, as underlined in a statement made by RPF European representative Jacques Bihozagara: “We are not asking for any bloody humanitarian aid, this is a political problem for God’s sake!”²²³ In the case of Rwanda, humanitarian action was used in lieu of a political solution to an inherently political problem. As cleverly illustrated in Randolph Kent’s article “International Humanitarian Crises: Two Decades before and Two Decades beyond,” “humanitarian action was the filler that was used to plug the policy gaps caused by the inability of the major powers to agree on political solutions to a profoundly political problem.”²²⁴ In a situation of escalating violence, UNAMIR’s role can be best described as limited, neutral and pacific, which “minimized its relevance and ability to influence the course of events”²²⁵ argues Jones. The reluctance of the international community to send more troops and enlarge the mandate of UNAMIR to include disarmament missions and active population protection which would have been needed to halt the violence in the country, was “in part a consequence of the weak political support for UNAMIR” he continues. Anglin also reasons in the same line of thought, writing that “the crucial missing ingredient in an effective UN response was adequate political will on the part of the Security Council.”²²⁶ The case of UNAMIR illustrates the problem that emerges when intervening governments have no interests at stake in the region in which they are intervening. When no interests are at stake, governments will tend to launch purely humanitarian operations because such interventions comprise a relatively

²²² UN Security Council Resolution 912, 21 April 1994.

²²³ Prunier, G. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1995. 288.

²²⁴ Kent, Randolph C. “International Humanitarian Crises: Two Decades before and Two Decades beyond.” *International Affairs* 80.5 (2004): 856.

²²⁵ Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 116.

²²⁶ Anglin, Douglas George. *Confronting Rwandan Genocide: The Military Options: What Could and Should the International Community Have Done?* Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping, 2002. 12.

low level of risks and lower costs than an intervention mandated to actively protect citizens, disarm factions or get involved in the fighting on the ground.

Operation Turquoise was no different. From the start, the mission was described as purely humanitarian both in the Security Council resolutions and in French officials' discourses (Des Forges 1999). As French Prime Minister Balladur declared in his Parliamentary speech of 21 June 1994, "the operation should be purely humanitarian and have no exclusively military component."²²⁷ Just like UNAMIR, Operation Turquoise was guided by a reluctance to get embroiled in the political affairs in Rwanda and a desire to avoid confrontation and remain a neutral actor.²²⁸ Any activist role for the mission was ruled out,²²⁹ as noted by Anglin and the troops were instructed to "adopt an attitude of strict neutrality to the different parties to the conflict."²³⁰ As a result, Des Forges writes that "rather than to intervene and actively protect the population, all the troops could do was to patrol the city and remain visible."²³¹ Operation Turquoise proved inefficient in stopping the genocidal attacks not only because it held on to a stance of neutrality and refused to side against the Hutu militias, but also because it "played the passive role of simply protecting those who sought refuge" in the Safe Humanitarian Zone, as argues Des Forges.²³² And due to the lack of adequate equipment of the operation, attacks continued to be perpetrated from within the zone. Prunier has also remarked that Operation Turquoise, by entering Rwanda in small foot patrols, "and by the process reassuring several Tutsis who were in hiding, actually exposed more civilians to the génocidaires, who rounded up Tutsis during the period between Turquoise's first foot patrols and their return (roughly 36 hours later) with sufficient trucks to evacuate survivors."²³³ By declaring a Safe Zone it was ill-equipped to protect,

²²⁷ Prunier, G. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1995. 289.

²²⁸ Ibid. 295

²²⁹ Anglin, Douglas George. *Confronting Rwandan Genocide: The Military Options: What Could and Should the International Community Have Done?* Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping, 2002. 12.

²³⁰ Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 672.

²³¹ Ibid. 603

²³² Ibid. 628.

²³³ Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 124.

and by refusing to side against the Hutu militias or use coercive measures to halt their attacks, the zone became what Jones refers to as “a sanctuary for retreating leaders of the genocide.”²³⁴

The desire to remain a neutral actor in the crisis, which stemmed from the weak political will on the part of the interveners, was also reflected in the strategies that were used by the international community to address the crisis in Rwanda, which proved to be highly inadequate, maladapted and reflected a total disregard for the one-sided nature of the killings. When resolution 912 was passed on 21 April 1994, the mission was mandated first and foremost to secure a ceasefire, although Dallaire “criticized this excessive emphasis on a goal that was unlikely to be met.”²³⁵ The emphasis on a ceasefire was problematic for numerous reasons. First and foremost, “the wish to ensure neutrality in order to mediate the conflict kept officials from the frank and forceful condemnation of the genocide that might have affected Rwandans”²³⁶ and that might have signaled to the Hutu militias that the international community was not going to stand by as they murdered the entire Tutsi population. Even after the Hutu government began exterminating the Tutsis in April 1994, US diplomats continued to focus their efforts on re-establishing a ceasefire and getting Arusha back on track instead of disarming the militias or actively protecting the Tutsi population,²³⁷ as Power notes, which reflected a clear lack of commitment but also a total misunderstanding of the situation on the ground. As Anglin denounces, “restoring the ceasefire rather than focusing on the genocide was to put saving money ahead of saving lives.”²³⁸ Foreign government with no interests in the region favored less risky and less costly solutions,

²³⁴ Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 125.

²³⁵ Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 632.

²³⁶ *Ibid.* 640.

²³⁷ Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 347.

²³⁸ Anglin, Douglas George. *Confronting Rwandan Genocide: The Military Options: What Could and Should the International Community Have Done?* Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping, 2002. 23.

which also turned out to be highly ineffective and reflected a total disregard for the one-sided nature of the killings (Jones 2001, Power 2002, Anglin 2002).

Another strategy used in Rwanda was the arms embargo authorized by Security Council resolution 918. The embargo's ineffectiveness was acknowledged by the US Defence Department itself even prior to it being implemented: "we do not envision it will have a significant impact on the killings because machetes, knives and other hand implements have been the most common weapons."²³⁹ In addition, as Des Forges understands it, "because the trade in small arms is not subject to the same monitoring as the traffic in heavier weapons, arms embargoes targeting such weapons can be nothing more than futile gestures."²⁴⁰ As a result, although the embargo did in fact slow down the delivery of weapons to the militias, it remained a relatively weak and ineffective strategy. Had the embargo been implemented earlier and enforced more thoroughly, Des Forges continues, "it might have pushed the interim government to end the slaughter."²⁴¹

In Rwanda, apart from limited actions such as the creation of safe areas, the international community's attempts at settling the conflict were limited to diplomatic embargo, economic sanctions and no-fly zones; weak and hesitant actions. As discussed in Richard Bett's article "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," "the logic behind such actions is that even-handedness will encourage the fighting factions to negotiate a settlement."²⁴² However, the results in the end were not peace or an end of the killings but years of "military stalemate, slow bleeding and delusionary diplomatic haggling."²⁴³ The strategies used by UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise merely signaled that the world was watching the genocide unfold and was likely to do very little to stop the massive acts of ethnic violence. As discussed in Matthew Krain's work, the immediate reaction of

²³⁹ Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 371.

²⁴⁰ Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 652.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Betts, Richard K. "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 25.

²⁴³ Ibid.

the international community in Rwanda was to “seek magical quick fixes and respond incrementally, hoping that warring parties will somehow come to their senses,”²⁴⁴ a strategy that was very unlikely to be successful in a situation characterized by decades-old ethnic rivalry and discrimination, strong nationalism and extremism and ultimately by high levels of genocidal violence. Neutral interventions in Rwanda did not appear to have much of an ameliorative effect. It might in fact have exacerbated the killing, as the establishment of safe areas have demonstrated. Neutrality in this case satisfied the “law of the strongest,” as pointed out Fiona Terry in her book *The Paradox of Humanitarian Action: Condemned to Repeat?* Quoting a Bosnian woman during the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans, Terry illustrates the dilemma not only of Bosnians but also of all civilians affected by humanitarian crises and violent conflicts: “we have no need of you, we need arms to defend ourselves, your food aid and medicines only allow us to die in good health.”²⁴⁵

The lack of a strong political will on the part of the interveners was also reflected in the reluctance of the interveners to take risks, not only at the financial level but also regarding the launch of more forceful missions and risks in terms of casualties. From the very beginning, as Des Forges points out, “policymakers both at the UN and in national governments talked more about the fate of soldiers than about that of the defenceless civilians,”²⁴⁶ which impeded on the missions’ capacity to interpose themselves between the Tutsis and the Hutus. The interveners’ unwillingness to risk either financial resources or casualties was illustrated in one of Dallaire’s statements following the Rwandan debacle: “An operation should begin with the objective and then consider how best to achieve it with minimal risk. Instead, our operations began with an evaluation of risks and if there was risk, the objective was forgotten. You can’t begin by asking if there is a

²⁴⁴ Krain, Matthew. “International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides.” *International Studies Quarterly* 49.3 (2005): 366.

²⁴⁵ Terry, Fiona. *Condemned to Repeat?: the Paradox of Humanitarian Action*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2002. 22.

²⁴⁶ Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 622.

risk. If there is no risk, they could have sent Boy Scouts, not soldiers.”²⁴⁷ By putting troops on the ground without expecting them to take risks, without mandating them to take forceful actions to halt the violence, the interventions were not as effective as they could have been. In Anglin’s account of the operations in Rwanda, he discusses extensively the various options and strategies that could have been used by the international community. “The arsenal of policy instruments at the disposal of the international community ranged from persuasion to coercion. Of these, only preventive diplomacy was realized with any degree of energy and consistency.”²⁴⁸ Had the interventions been more forceful he continues, “it would have introduced an element of uncertainty into Hutu power calculations and forced its leaders to rethink their strategy. By demonstrating that UNAMIR was not toothless, it would have raised worrisome questions as to how big the peacekeepers’ bite was.”²⁴⁹ Jones also analyzes the failure of UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise and discusses how the outcomes would have been different had the international community acted more forcefully: “Had UNAMIR been able to respond forcefully to the attack instead of withdrawing, it would have weakened the génocidaires’ position. (...) Had UNAMIR been mandated as an enforcement operation, with a robust mandate and the muscle to respond to attacks, its capacity to respond at this initial stage to the implementation of the genocide, and thereby to frustrate the extremists’ plans would have increased.”²⁵⁰ However, given the refusal of the intervening governments to drop their stance of neutrality in order to avoid the costs related to doing so, they “continued to conduct diplomacy as usual, dealing with the interim government as a valid party to the negotiations which they hoped to broker”²⁵¹ and to mandate the mission with humanitarian tasks, Des Forges concludes. As Dallaire stated with regards to Operation Turquoise, “my mission was to save

²⁴⁷ Des Forges, Alison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 600.

²⁴⁸ Anglin, Douglas George. *Confronting Rwandan Genocide: The Military Options: What Could and Should the International Community Have Done?* Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping, 2002. 2.

²⁴⁹ Ibid. 15.

²⁵⁰ Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 120.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

Rwandans, their mission was to put on a show at no risks.”²⁵² Rwanda thus illustrates the danger of HMI that are launched by governments who perceive no interests in a region but have to act nonetheless because of public pressure back home. Such interventions will usually be weak and inadequate, both in terms financial commitment and in terms of the actions carried out, and will tend to either exacerbate the conflict as in Somalia, or be too hesitant to affect the course of the crisis as was the case in Rwanda.

The conclusions that have been reached by various scholars and policymakers regarding the international involvement in Rwanda are numerous, yet they all reflect a sense of failure, of shame, of helplessness and of disenchantment. “Put it simply, there was no international intervention of any seriousness designed and deployed to halt the Rwandan genocide,”²⁵³ Bruce Jones concludes. While it cannot be denied that both missions did succeed in saving the lives of tens of thousands of civilians, either by launching small dramatic rescue operation, by protecting Rwandans in key locations in Kigali or by establishing a Safe Humanitarian Zone, it failed to halt the genocidal violence in a decisive manner. “The safety and stabilization process definitely could not be seen as having been anything other than temporary,”²⁵⁴ Prunier explains with regards to the outcomes of both UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise.

²⁵² Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 376.

²⁵³ Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 126.

²⁵⁴ Prunier, G. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1995. 311.

CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY – HAITI

“Haiti n’a pas besoin de larmes mais d’énergie.”²⁵⁵

Dany Laferriere

The failure to act in Rwanda was denounced for years following the debacle, and the international involvement still to this day puts to shame the numerous diplomats and policymakers who refused to intervene in the face of gross and systemic violations of human rights. Once again, the focus was placed on treating the symptoms of an inherently political crisis instead of addressing the deep-rooted causes of the humanitarian crisis. On a more positive note however, the failures in Rwanda launched a new debate on the international scene. While prior to the Rwanda crisis the discussions revolved around whether HMI was a legitimate enterprise, following the Rwanda genocide the debate focused on whether the international community had an obligation to act in the face of massive acts of violence against civilians and violations of human rights. This new approach to HMI soon translated in practice, as the intervention in Haiti illustrates. In this section of my work, I present the case study I have conducted on the Haitian humanitarian crisis and the international military operation that has ensued.

Historical background and the intervention

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. Its history, like many countries in the region, has been tainted by outbursts of political instability, violence, corruption and poverty. In fact, as David Covey suggests, during its two centuries of independence, Haiti has encountered almost 200 revolutions or coups.²⁵⁶

In 1956, elections were won by François Duvalier, commonly referred to as “Papa Doc.” Duvalier remained in power for 24 years, during which millions of Haitians were exiled and tortured and over 50,000 were killed.²⁵⁷ His dictatorship was characterized by

²⁵⁵ Laferriere, Dany. “L’Énigme du Retour.” Montreal: Éditions Boréal, 2009.

²⁵⁶ Covey, David C. “Building Bridges in Haiti.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 125.1 (1999): 93.

²⁵⁷ Abbott, Elizabeth. *Haiti: The First inside Account*. New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1988.

widespread corruption, intimidation and high levels of poverty. Another defining feature of his regime, Elizabeth Abbot explains in *Haiti: The First inside Account*, is the Tontons Macoutes, a religious terrorist group formed with the purpose of infusing fear in those who opposed the regime.²⁵⁸ He was succeeded by his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier after his death in 1971. His regime was also characterized by what Judson Jefferies describes as “high levels of violence, oppression and unremitting poverty,”²⁵⁹ until he was brought down from power in 1986. Following his demise, Haiti’s socio-political situation remained highly unstable; the fact that the country had a succession of five governments in five years is a clear indicator of such unsteadiness. On 16 December 1990, elections were held and won with an overwhelming majority by a radical populist priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.²⁶⁰ As discussed in Jefferies’ article “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention,” Aristide promised democracy, land redistribution and an end of to the cycles of violence and corruption.²⁶¹ Given his leftist tendencies, his government was the target of multiple coup attempts, and in September 1991, he was overthrown in yet another coup, after which he had to flee the country. General Raoul Cedras, Roger LaFontant and Major Michel Francois, all part of the Haitian police and members of the Tontons Macoutes, immediately established their control over Haiti.²⁶² Under Cedras’ rule, John Canham-Clyne discusses, Haitians were subject to various acts of barbarity, including random arrests, torture, rapes and murders.²⁶³ During the three years during which he was in power, over 5,000 Haitians were killed, tens of thousands fled the country and around 300,000 became internally displaced persons according to a UN News Center report on the crisis.²⁶⁴

²⁵⁸ Abbott, Elizabeth. *Haiti: The First inside Account*. New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1988.

²⁵⁹ Jefferies, Judson. “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention.” *Caribbean Quarterly* 47.4 (2001): 73.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid. 75.

²⁶² Jefferies, Judson. “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention.” *Caribbean Quarterly* 47.4 (2001): 76.

²⁶³ Canham-Clyne, John. “US Policy on Haiti: Selling Out Democracy.” *Covert Action* 48 (1994): 4-6.

²⁶⁴ “United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).” *UN News Center*. UN, Web 18 July 2012. “United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).” *UN News Center*. UN, Web 18 July 2012.

Diplomatic actions were rapidly undertaken by the international community in an effort to pressure Haiti's military junta to put an end to its repressive measures against the Haitian people. As discussed in Jefferies' account of the crisis, the United States organized negotiation processes and mediation sessions to promote the discussion between Cedras and Aristide in an effort to put an end to the violent unconstitutional actions perpetrated by Cedras' regime. The US also imposed an oil and military embargo on the country, which the Security Council stiffened in May 1994 with resolution 917, which cut all trade with Haiti except for food and medicine. However, as Jefferies continues, "these measures did little to pressure the putschists from power."²⁶⁵

Operation Uphold Democracy

On 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council passed resolution 940, giving the green light to UN member states to restore democracy in Haiti through "all means necessary,"²⁶⁶ including the use of military force. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council authorized its member states to "form a multinational force under a unified command (...) to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership (...) to prompt the return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment (...)." ²⁶⁷ US President at the time, Bill Clinton, launched operation Uphold Democracy, with the goal of prompting the return of Aristide in power –by force if necessary-. The mission's objectives also included the provision of assistance in the preparation of future elections and to help the Haitian government in creating a civilian-controlled security force.²⁶⁸ The US committed 20,000 troops to the mission,

²⁶⁵ Jefferies, Judson. "The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention." *Caribbean Quarterly* 47.4 (2001): 79.

²⁶⁶ UN Security Council resolution 940, 31 July 1994.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

which also received the support of 27 countries and of an additional 2,000 non-US troops.²⁶⁹

On 18 September, the day before the planned invasion of Haiti, an agreement was successfully reached by former president Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn and General Colin Powell in which Cedras was agreeing to cede power to the elected government.²⁷⁰ In *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*, Karin Von Hippel argues that this agreement was reached “by Carter’s negotiations backed by the imminent threat of arriving troops.”²⁷¹ On 19 September 1994, 22,000 troops invaded Haiti without encountering any opposition on the part of the Haitian authorities or people. Air-landed and seaborne US forces successfully secured initial entry points at Port-au-Prince international airport and facilities.²⁷² As Clinton declared in a letter to the Congressional Leaders dated 18 September 1994, “in the first phase of the operation, the force [was] of sufficient size to overwhelm any opposition that might arise despite the existence of the agreement”²⁷³ Activities carried out by the troops included the immediate search for weapon caches, the seizure of military equipment and the destruction of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) - a neo-duvalierist death squad. Troops raided its headquarters, seized a large cache of weapon and arrested its most influential members.²⁷⁴

On 27 September, the multinational force issued a report to the Security Council which summarized its operations to date. The report stated that the troops were on the right path to establishing the necessary conditions for the restoration of democracy in

²⁶⁹ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 104.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Clinton, William J. “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Deployment of United States Armed forces to Haiti.” *The American Presidency Project*. 18 September 1994. Web. 6 July 2012.

<<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49107>.>

²⁷⁴ Jefferies, Judson. “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention.” *Caribbean Quarterly* 47.4 (2001): 81.

Haiti.²⁷⁵ On 10 October, a second report was submitted, which discussed the second and third week of the operation. The situation in Haiti was said to be relatively quiet, with sporadic and contained incidents of violence.²⁷⁶ On the same day, Cedras resigned from power, and on 15 October 1994, following the departure of the military junta, President Aristide returned to the country to resume his functions.

Assessment of the level of neutrality and of the presence or absence of national interests

By 30 January 1995, less than four years after the beginning of the crisis, the Security Council adopted resolution 975, in which it recognized that “a secure and stable environment has been established in Haiti.”²⁷⁷ In his article “Clinton Was Right,” Robert Rotberg concludes that “the results of the intervention have been almost wholly positive.”²⁷⁸ Operation Uphold Democracy managed to restore order in Haiti, he continues, and the violence in the country for the most part ended, both in the rural and urban areas of the country.²⁷⁹ Jefferies also discusses the positive effects of the operation, noting that “human rights violations significantly decreased after US troops arrived in the country,”²⁸⁰ a position that is adopted by Robert Pastor as well (Pastor 1997). Although the intervention has received some mixed reviews, President Clinton’s decision to launch a military intervention in Haiti has been widely recognized as a success, remarks Michael Reisman.²⁸¹

²⁷⁵ “United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).” *UN News Center*. UN, Web 18 July 2012. “United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).” *UN News Center*. UN, Web 18 July 2012. <http://un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmih.htm>.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 975, 30 January 1995.

²⁷⁸ Rotberg, Robert I. “Clinton was Right.” *Foreign Policy* 102 (1996): 136.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Jefferies, Judson. “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention.” *Caribbean Quarterly* 47.4 (2001): 80.

²⁸¹ Reisman, Michael W. “Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies.” *Fordham International Law Journal* 18 (1995): 795.

Measuring the level of neutrality of the operation

(See Appendix C for a more detailed account of the Security Council resolutions, mandates and tasks performed by the HMI)

The neutrality of an operation, as previously discussed, is measured in terms of whether the interveners take a political stance in the conflict and take on security operations before they undertake logistical operations. As Betts writes, in Haiti, the UN and the US “clearly did choose sides, supporting the exiled president, Jean Bertrand Aristide”²⁸² as well as the choice of the Haitian population against the military junta in power. When observing the Security Council resolution 940, which authorized the launch of Operation Uphold Democracy, the low level of neutrality of the mission is evident. With resolution 940, the international community took a clear stance in the ongoing political crisis by labeling the regime of Cedras at the “illegal de facto regime”²⁸³ and by referring to Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the “legitimately elected President.”²⁸⁴ The discourse used in the resolution denotes a clear willingness on the part of the Security Council to abandon its stance of neutrality. By recognizing the illegitimacy and illegality of the military junta in power and siding with the democratically elected President Aristide, the international community abandoned its stance of neutrality and got involved in the political issues at the root of the humanitarian crisis. On the eve of the deployment of the troops in Haiti, Clinton addressed a letter to congressional leaders, in which he declared that, acting as “pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 940, a multinational coalition has been assembled to use all necessary means to restore the democratic government to Haiti and to provide a stable and secure environment (...).”²⁸⁵ The operation was mandated first and foremost to remove Cedras from power, to ensure the return of a democracy and to put back Aristide in power, which illustrates how the operation was launched expressly to affect the balance of power in the country

²⁸² Betts, Richard K. "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 27.

²⁸³ UN Security Council resolution 940, 31 July 1994.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Clinton, William J. "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Deployment of United States Armed forces to Haiti." *The American Presidency Project*. 18 September 1994. Web. 6 July 2012.

<<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49107>.>

and to defeat one side of the crisis. The mission's objectives also included the provision of assistance in the preparation of future elections and to help the Haitian government in creating a civilian-controlled security force.²⁸⁶ Although humanitarian assistance did remain a priority for the international community, the core objective of the US-led operation was first and foremost to prompt the return of democratically elected Aristide.

The tasks performed by the troops also illustrate a low level of neutrality on the part of the troops that entered Haiti. Prior to the establishment of logistical operations, the troops destroyed potential threats to the stability of the future democratic regime of Haiti and assisted in the dissolution of the armed forces. They carried out disarmament operations, destroyed weapons, and most importantly launched major military operations against the FRAPH, thus underlining the will of the interveners to become an active and decisive force in the political crisis in Haiti and to show their resolve regarding the restoration of Aristide to power. Instead of refusing to condemn one side or another like the interveners did in Rwanda, or to enter the country as an impartial actor with the unique goal of feeding the people like the interveners did in Somalia, in Haiti the intervening governments adopted a clear stance in the inherently political crisis and authorized the use of coercive measures from the start to address the issues on the ground.

Measuring the presence of national interests in the region

In May 1994, President Bill Clinton, declared with regards to the launch of a military operation in Haiti: "Now the greatest opportunity for our security is to help enlarge the world's communities of market democracies."²⁸⁷ The US-led multinational force was launched a few months later and justified in terms of promoting democracy and human rights around the globe. This selfless justification used by the American administration

²⁸⁶ Clinton, William J. "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Deployment of United States Armed forces to Haiti." *The American Presidency Project*. 18 September 1994. Web. 6 July 2012.
<<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49107>.>

²⁸⁷ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 95.

to explain the launch of a military operation in Haiti covers up the true motives that triggered the US to act. Unlike the cases of Somalia and Rwanda, the American administration perceived great interests in the region, both at the economic and the geo-strategic level, although Washington insisted at multiple occasions that the promotion of democracy was what motivated the US to intervene. As former US National Security adviser Anthony Lake concluded regarding that matter, “the US is not starry-eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy, but it knows that to do so serves its interests.”²⁸⁸ Its interests, in the case of Haiti, were first and foremost economic. Contrary to popular belief Jefferies explains, “the US has had significant economic presence in Haiti for years.”²⁸⁹ During the Bush years, the island had become “an offshore platform for low-wage assembly of electronics, textiles and other products for re-export to the US market”²⁹⁰ Jefferies goes on to explain. As Kathleen Dorsainvil also discusses, the trade between US and Haiti at the time exceeded the trade between Haiti and any other countries.²⁹¹ The presence of economic interests in the country for the US created incentives to restore stability in Haiti which was being threatened by the violence and wide-spread human rights abuse under Cedras’ regime. As Anthony Lake stated, “democracies create free markets and offer economic opportunities and they make for reliable partners,”²⁹² which can explain -in part- the resolve of the US to intervene in Haiti.

Besides the presence of economic interests in the region, the US perceived yet another interest in intervening in Haiti. The US understood that by restoring the democratic regime in Haiti and ending the widespread human rights violations carried out by Cedras’ regime, it would put an end or at least slow down the refugee flow from Haiti to the US borders. The American administration had always had concerns

²⁸⁸ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 125.

²⁸⁹ Jefferies, Judson. “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention.” *Caribbean Quarterly* 47.4 (2001): 86.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Dorsainvil, Kathleen. “US-Haiti Trade Relations: From Bilateral to Trade Bloc.” *The Repositioning of US-Caribbean Relations in the New World Order*. Ed. Ransford W. Palmer. Connecticut: Praeger, 1997. 96-99.

²⁹² Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 124.

regarding the flow of thousands of illegal immigrants coming to the US from Haiti but also from the Caribbean region in general.²⁹³ As a result of the widespread violence and human rights violations ongoing in Haiti, in the two first months of spring 1994, approximately 21,000 refugees had left Haiti in direction of the US and it was said that over 300,000 more were waiting to do the same.²⁹⁴ Von Hippel, who coined the refugee flow as one of the reasons why Washington had interest in intervening in Haiti, notes that the refugee flow that ensued from the Haitian crisis put a tremendous burden on the US economy. From the start of the crisis up until the intervention was launched, Haitian refugees that were held in the US military base of Guantanamo cost the US government \$200 million and the cost of their maintenance was said to be of \$14 million a month.²⁹⁵ To add to this, the government of Florida had initiated a lawsuit against the federal government for \$1 billion to cover the costs of education, health care and social welfare for the illegal immigrants over the years. As Von Hippel underlines, “the Haitian refugee dilemma reinforced Florida’s claim and apprehension.”²⁹⁶ Jefferies also concurs with this reasoning, as he writes that “the only threat serious enough to prompt intervention by the US was the prospect of thousands more poor, black refugees making their way to North America.”²⁹⁷ On 15 September, Clinton made a speech to the nation in which he announced that troops were going to be launched in Haiti. In his speech, he talked about “the safety of our borders” to justify the intervention. What he truly meant, Patrick Bellegarde-Smith argues, is: “we have to protect our borders, so we have to invade Haiti or Haitians will invade us.”²⁹⁸ Since those living in a democracy are less likely to flee their country in the search for safety,

²⁹³ Dupuy, Alex. *Haiti in the New World Order*. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press. 1997.

²⁹⁴ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 102.

²⁹⁵ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 102.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Jefferies, Judson. “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention.” *Caribbean Quarterly* 47.4 (2001): 86.

²⁹⁸ Bellegarde-Smith, Patrick. *Haiti, The Breached Citadel*. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press. 1988.

Von Hippel concludes, the restoration of democracy in Haiti seemed to be the best way to protect the American borders.²⁹⁹

While the rhetoric of the American administration regarding Haiti at the time focused on the spread of American values and the safeguard of democracy, the underlying issue at stake was one of regional stability and economic prosperity rather than the spread of democratic values. As Tony Smith cleverly remarks, the intervention was launched with the intention of promoting democracy -not as a value but to ensure the stability of the region as a whole.³⁰⁰ The advent of democracy throughout the Western hemisphere was synonymous in Washington of political and economic stability. As President Clinton declared in his speech of 15 September, “history has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America’s security and prosperity. Democracies are more likely to keep the peace and to stabilize our region, and more likely to create free markets and economic opportunity and to become strong, reliable trading partners (...).”³⁰¹ It is the economic interests that US had in Haiti and the fact that the Haiti crisis was threatening the stability of US borders that propelled the Clinton administration to launch an intervention in the region rather than the purely normative justifications that were provided by Washington.

Whether they be economic or security oriented, it is clear that the US did have national interests at stake in the region. The following section explores the effects of the low level of neutrality of Operation Uphold Democracy and the presence of American national interests in Haiti on the HMI.

On neutrality and national interests: A discussion

As Vertzberger has extensively discussed in his work on foreign policy decision-making, all military interventions are an inherently risky activities; there is always the possibility of the loss of equipment or personnel (Vertzberger 1998). In the cases

²⁹⁹ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 102.

³⁰⁰ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 102.

³⁰¹ Smith, Tony. “In Defense of Intervention.” *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 42.

previously studied in my thesis, I have examined the negative impact of Western governments launching interventions in regions where they have no national interests at stake. Haiti illustrates the other side of the mirror; what happens when the intervening forces do have interests in the country in which they deploy their troops. The presence of interests in Haiti for the US translated in a strong political will on the part of the intervening forces and a willingness to undertake risks in order to tackle the causes of the crisis rather than to merely treat its symptoms.

The strong political will of the US with regards to Haiti can be illustrated first and foremost by the number of troops committed to the operation. The US alone committed 20,000 troops to Operation Uphold Democracy. As McDermott explains, “the success of HMI depends in part upon the size of the forces deployed.”³⁰² Missions that involve large numbers of troops signal a higher commitment to the mission, while missions involving smaller troop counts “may call into question the salience of the conflict to the third party”³⁰³ have concluded Carment and Rowlands. While the intervention in Haiti did benefit from the agreement Carter had reached the day before the intervention was to be launched, it is very unlikely that the military junta in power would have backed down without the US’s 20,000 troops ready to enter the country. The large number of troops in the case of Haiti acted as an incentive for the Cedras military government to leave power without engaging in more repression and violence. The operation was well equipped in terms of troops, which gave the mission a large advantage on the ground and demonstrated the resolve of the interveners to their opponents. However, a large troop count may not always ensure the success of HMI. As discussed in the case study on Somalia, although UNITAF was composed of over 38,000 troops, the mission failed to put an end to the violence in the country and to restore security and stability. The main reason for UNITAF’s failure is not that it was ill-equipped or not financed properly (the

³⁰² McDermott, Anthony. “The UN and NGOs: Humanitarian Interventions in Future Conflicts.” *Contemporary Security Policy* 19 (1998): 23.

³⁰³ Carment, David and Dane Rowlands. “Three’s Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1998): 588.

US committed over \$1,6 billion to the mission);³⁰⁴ it is that the intervening forces were unwilling to risk the lives of their troops in a region in which they perceived no interest. As a result, three quarters of the troops in Somalia were dedicated to less-risky logistical operations such as infrastructure repair, which did nothing to address the ongoing violence in the country. This unwillingness to become a proactive actor in the crisis and to truly commit the troops to the operation that characterized the Somali mission was nowhere to be found in Haiti.

When countries commit themselves to HMI, they must be ready to fight, and the US in Haiti rapidly understood that. As Seybolt points out, “intervening forces should be able to dominate the battlefield in order to attain their objectives.”³⁰⁵ This in return requires “significant air and ground forces and a large logistical infrastructure,”³⁰⁶ which the US had and willingly committed. Operation Uphold Democracy’s troops dominated on the battlefield not only in numbers but most importantly in its willingness to take actions against the military junta and its allies to fulfill its mandate. The troops directly challenged the perpetrators of violence by confiscating weapons, dissolving the Armed Forces and attacking and dismantling organizations and factions that presented potential threats to Haiti’s security and stability. As Von Hippel notes, “[Operation Uphold Democracy] attempted some disarmament. Unlike in Somalia, when disarmament was sporadic and weapons were merely stored in secure areas, to be stolen at a later date, the weapons collected in Haiti were mostly destroyed.”³⁰⁷ In the work of Carment and Rowlands, as well as Rothchild and Lake, the authors discuss the benefits of interventions that directly challenge the perpetrator by acting against them, or for the target, which clearly signal the credibility and resolve of the interveners. One reason previous interventions might not have been successful is because the perpetrators of violence viewed their credibility and resolve as low, while in Haiti, it was

³⁰⁴ "United Nations Mission in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)." *UN News Center*. UN. Web. 18 July 2012. <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom.htm>>.

³⁰⁵ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 263.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 118.

clear from the start that the intervening governments were committed to remove the military junta from power and restore Aristide (Carment and Rowlands 1998, Rothchild and Lake 1998). Haiti illustrates how HMI are most likely to succeed when the political interests of the intervening states are strongly engaged because only then will other important factors be present such as adequate resources and the commitment to persevere in the face of adversity. As Archibugi articulates, the presence of interests in the region meant that the US was “prepared to risk the lives of its own soldiers to save the lives of the community threatened.”³⁰⁸ However, when national interests are not involved or threatened, “it is impractical to expect great powers or the UN to expend the resources for an overwhelming and decisive military action”³⁰⁹ as Betts remarks. While the US were unwilling to get embroiled in Somali politics and violence, in Haiti, the American government addressed the security issues from the start rather than focusing on purely logistical operations like it did in Somalia. This strategy proved to be highly efficient, and by doing so, Operation Uphold Democracy avoided the faith of the previous interventions in Somalia. By concentrating “primarily on security to prepare the way for the humanitarian operations,”³¹⁰ the US government avoided the unintended consequences of “feeding the war.”

While the US did commit to the mission in Haiti, accepted the possibility of risks, and the troops rapidly established their dominance on the territory which sent a powerful message to the military junta, the main issue remained timing. The crisis in Haiti started in September 1991, when Cedras overthrew Aristide, and Operation Uphold Democracy was launched in September 1994. Although it is true that it took less than a month from the time the Security Council resolution authorized the launch of a multinational force in Haiti (31 July 1994) to the deployment of troops on the ground (18 September 1994), it took exactly three years for the international community to actually deploy a military operation in the region. During the three years separating the start of the crisis and the

³⁰⁸ Archibugi, Daniele. “Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention.” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29.1 (2004): 11.

³⁰⁹ Betts, Richard K. “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention.” *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 31.

³¹⁰ Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 116.

launch of the international intervention, Washington's involvement in the Haitian crisis was limited to the imposition of economic sanctions, which Richard Betts denounced as a "trickle-up strategy of coercion that was bound to hurt the innocent before the guilty."³¹¹ As discussed by Karin Von Hippel, "the Haitian embargo affected the long-term recovery because family planning programmes and health care facilities were forced to shut down due to the lack of available supplies and financing, (...) causing more migration to the United States."³¹² The delay of the intervention as well as the inadequacy of the strategies used prior to Operation Uphold Democracy underline the persistent reluctance on the part of major Western powers to launch HMI in the name of human rights and democracy. However, as Rotberg writes, "our long and muddled vacillation over Haiti cost us more in aid flows for relief than we would have spent"³¹³ had the intervention been launched earlier.

Although the situation in Haiti did suffer from the delayed intervention and from the inadequacy of the economic sanctions imposed by Washington, ultimately the international involvement in the country managed to put an end to years of violent repression and human rights violations, and to restore the elected president in power. The commitment of the US to condemn and confront the military junta, along with its willingness accept the possibility of risks and to take on major military operations provide a well-rounded explanation as to why Operation Uphold Democracy succeeded in fulfilling its mandate. For the first time in Haitian history, Rotberg salutes, "power was transferred peacefully from one democratic leader to another."³¹⁴

³¹¹ Betts, Richard K. "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 27.

³¹² Von, Hippel Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 124.

³¹³ Rotberg, Robert I. "Clinton was Right." *Foreign Policy* 102 (1996): 139.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.* 137.

CHAPTER 7 CASE STUDY – EAST TIMOR

“Where there’s a will, there’s a way.”³¹⁵

Roméo Dallaire

In sharp contrast with the missions carried out in Somalia and Rwanda, the mission carried out in Haiti illustrated the benefits of HMI that are launched by interveners who have strong national interests at stake in the region and thus abandon the stance of neutrality. The case of East Timor analyzed in this chapter presents great similarities with the case of Haiti, with regards to the level of neutrality of the operations and the presence of vested interests for the intervening nation. The operation led by Australia in East Timor reinforces the idea that the international community has learned some lessons from past interventions with regards to taking into considerations the political issues on the grounds as well as the humanitarian ones. In this following chapter, I present the case of East Timor and the military operation that was launched in the region, and analyze the role of neutrality and international interests in determining the success of the HMI.

Historical background and the interventions

East Timor occupies half of an island of the Indonesian archipelago and was administered by Portugal until 1974. That year, the Portuguese government decided to establish a provisional government in East Timor and to let the people of the region decide whether they would prefer to become an independent country or integrate the neighboring Indonesia. A civil war broke out in 1975 between East Timorese who favored independence and those who favored the integration with Indonesia. Unable to stabilize or contain the situation, Portugal withdrew from the territory. By the end of 1975, close to 60,000 people had died as a result of the conflict,³¹⁶ and Suharto, the Indonesian president, invaded East Timor and integrated the region within Indonesia.

³¹⁵ Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic, 2002. 344.

³¹⁶ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 86-87.

The territory became Indonesia's 27th province in 1976. For the next two decades, East Timorese were subject to political repression, regular massacres and massive human rights violations. According to the UN, around 200,000 East Timorese (around one third of the total population) died during the Indonesian occupation of the territory as a result of torture, famine, diseases and regular assassinations.³¹⁷ Suharto's downfall in 1998 was accompanied by a severe economic crisis in Indonesia, which increased dramatically the level of poverty and socio-political unrest within the region, as Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey discuss in their article "East Timor: Picking up the Pieces."

Since the UN never recognized East Timor's integration to Indonesia, the Indonesian government was under constant pressure from the international community to revise the status of East Timor. In June 1998, President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, who succeeded to Suharto in May 1998, granted limited autonomy to the East Timorese within Indonesia. In January 1999, he also gave his approval to the organization of a referendum that would settle the issue of East Timor's political status.³¹⁸ In May of the same year, the Indonesian and the Portuguese government signed a set of agreements aiming at facilitating a popular consultation which would decide of the future of the East Timorese territory, to be organized and supervised by the UN Secretary General. While the international community saluted these agreements as an act of goodwill on behalf of the Indonesian President, the Indonesia National Defence Forces (TNI), an important Indonesian political actor, categorically opposed the process.³¹⁹ Having vested economic interests in East Timor, the TNI did not agree to the upcoming popular consultation in the region regarding the political status of the territory.

The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was authorized by the Security Council resolution 1246 on 11 June 1999 and was mandated to organize and conduct the public consultation agreed upon on 5 May 1999 by Portugal and Indonesia. UNAMET

³¹⁷ Hainsworth, Paul, and Stephen McCloskey. "East Timor: Picking up the Pieces." *Fortnight* 381 (1999): 14.

³¹⁸ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 87.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

was successful in that it managed to register the majority of the East Timorese population -which was mostly illiterate underline Hainsworth and McCloskey- to vote, despite the climate of violence and intimidation.³²⁰ However, in the weeks preceding the election, the militias attacked UN offices and displaced between 40,000 and 85,000 people in order to prevent the voting from taking place.³²¹ UNAMET remained powerless in the face of such acts of violence and intimidation due to the restrictive nature of its mandate. Despite the tensed climate of instability, John Haseman points out, the referendum still took place on 30 August 1999, and 99% of the registered voters showed up.³²² An overwhelming majority (78,5%) rejected the proposed autonomy as a part of Indonesia and opted for independence.³²³ Immediately after the results were made public, pro-integration militias with the support of parts of the Indonesian security forces, launched terror campaigns throughout East Timor, destroying homes, crops, public buildings and utilities, killing people and forcing them to flee their homes.³²⁴ This wave of terror engendered “more than 1,000 deaths, the destruction of most utilities, damage to 60-80% of private and public property, paralysis of the education system, and the disruption of more than 70% of health care services (...)”³²⁵ as described by Thomas Weiss in his study of the East Timorese crisis. According to a UNICEF report, out of a total population of 890,000, in late September, 141,000 people had been deported to West Timor, and between 190,000 and 300,000 people were hiding in East Timor.³²⁶

³²⁰ Hainsworth, Paul, and Stephen McCloskey. "East Timor: Picking up the Pieces." *Fortnight* 381 (1999): 14.

³²¹ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 88.

³²² Haseman, J. "Security Implications for an Independent East Timor." *Jane's Defence Weekly* 32.11 (1999): 57-58.

³²³ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 88.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

³²⁵ Weiss, Thomas G. *Military Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 2005. 133.

³²⁶ United Nations. United Nations' Children's Fund (UNICEF). *East Timor Updates*. New York: United Nations, 23 September 1999. Web. 10 July 2012 <http://www.unicef.org/easttimor/>

INTERFET

Diplomatic efforts on the part of the Secretary General and the Security Council were conducted, in order to halt the violence and pressure the Indonesian government to ensure the security of East Timorese during this period of political transition. Following a Security Council visit to Jakarta and Dili in September 1999, the Indonesian government accepted the help of the international community to stabilize the precarious situation.³²⁷ As a result, on 15 September 1999, the Security Council passed resolution 1264, and authorized the deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) “to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations (...).”³²⁸ INTERFET was a multinational forces led by Australia under Prime Minister John Howard and created with the goal of addressing the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in the region. Troops entered East Timor on 20 September, led by Australian Defence Force officer Major-General Peter Cosgrove. Control was rapidly established over the main airport and sea points of entry in Dili on 20 September 1999 and Bacau on 23 September 1999.³²⁹ In the following weeks, the operation managed to spread across the country and to gain control over the main towns and roads, thus ensuring that the killing and intimidation stopped and that the TNI and the militias evacuated the region.³³⁰ INTERFET raided militia compounds, confiscated weapons and gained control over the capital, and chased away the TNI and militias.³³¹ It also set up a border security management system and established an internally displaced people repatriation plan. Most of the killing and harassment ended in places where INTERFET was present. In addition to the security operations, INTERFET worked in collaboration with UN agencies and international NGOs to secure the delivery

³²⁷ Jago, Marianne. "InterFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor." *International Peacekeeping* 17.3 (2010): 377-94.

³²⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1264, 15 September 1999.

³²⁹ Jago, Marianne. "InterFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor." *International Peacekeeping* 17.3 (2010): 377-94.

³³⁰ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 88.

³³¹ *Ibid.* 89

of humanitarian aid. It provided logistical assistance, reconstructed roads and public utilities, protected aid stocks and escorted aid convoys.³³² From September 1999 to January 2000, INTERFET progressively established and ensured control throughout East Timor. Having maintained a secure environment for three months without any major incidents, INTERFET handed over control of the region to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on 28 February 2000.³³³

When INTERFET handed over control to UNTAET, East Timor's security situation had been stabilized, except along the Western border where sporadic violent outbursts persisted, Seybolt explains.³³⁴ During the first half of 2000, more than 167,000 refugees returned from Indonesia, and the majority of the IDPs returned to their homes.³³⁵ By July 2000, UN Secretary General reported that the operation had "contributed to the alleviation of the emergency... maintained a secure environment... established the foundations of an effective administration and...established a relationship of mutual respect and trust with the East Timorese."³³⁶

Assessment of the level of neutrality and of the presence or absence of national interests

The crisis in East Timor began on 30 August 1999 and ended less than six months after, on 28 February 2000, when INTERFET officially handed over responsibility to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). By the time UNTAET took over INTERFET, the acute emergency had passed and the militia activity had all but stopped,³³⁷ Seybolt writes, thus underlining the effectiveness of the operation.

³³² Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 90.

³³³ Ibid. 91.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Ibid. 90-91.

³³⁶ Ibid. 92.

³³⁷ Ibid.

Measuring the level of neutrality of the operation

(See Appendix D for a more detailed account of the Security Council resolutions, mandates and tasks performed by the HMI)

The mission launched in the East Timor was not a neutral intervention, as can be observed in the Security Council resolution that authorized INTERFET and the tasks it carried out. Operations that abandon their stance of neutrality are those that either side with one of the factions on the ground –which was the case in Somalia and Haiti- or commit to actively protect the oppressed against their oppressors, through the use of military force if necessary. The case of the international mission in East Timor is a great example of the latter. While the Security Council regarding Haiti clearly sided against the regime of Cedras, and in Somalia it took a clear stance against General Aidid, this time around in East Timor, the international community sided not with one of the factions against another but with the oppressed population against those perpetrating the acts of violence. As stated in resolution 1264, the Security Council “reiterates its welcome for the successful conduct of the popular consultation of the East Timorese people of 30 August 1999 and takes note of its outcome, which it regards as an accurate reflection of the view of the East Timorese.”³³⁸ Throughout resolution 1264, the Security Council salutes the choice of the East Timorese as the legitimate one, condemns at multiple occasions the violence perpetrated against the East Timorese population and expresses concern for the “continuing violence against and large-scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians.”³³⁹ The use of such language clearly illustrates that the international community has taken the side of the East Timorese against those committing the acts of violence. The resolution does not point the finger at one side or faction in particular like it was the case in Haiti and in Somalia, but it does clearly demonstrate its commitment to ensuring that the East Timorese be able to choose whether to remain part of Indonesia or gain their independence.

As it can be understood when studying resolution 1264 and the tasks undertaken by the troops, INTERFET was both a humanitarian and political operation rather than being

³³⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1264, 15 September 1999.

³³⁹ Ibid.

humanitarian action in lieu of political action, which was the case in Rwanda and in Somalia at the start of the international community's involvement. It was launched expressly to support the political choice of the population against the interests of the Indonesian government, military and militias. As Seybolt explains, "there was no pretext of impartiality or neutrality as foreign troops acted to protect the population from indigenous forces."³⁴⁰ The operation was mandated to essentially defeat and deter militias' activities in order to protect the East Timorese population and ensure that their political will was respected. The use of coercive measures and the launch of successive military operations to push back the militias out of East Timor indicate the commitment of INTERFET forces to influence the balance of power in favor of the East Timorese people and the rejection of the principle of neutrality.

Measuring the presence of national interests in the region

Australia played a defining role in the East Timorese crisis, write Wheeler and Dunne, as it provided the leadership, the infrastructure and the biggest troop deployment.³⁴¹ Why was it motivated to lead the operation?

The study of the presence of Australian national interests in East Timor is not as straightforward as the case of the US in Haiti. While Haiti has always been part of the sphere of influence of the US and has remained at the top of its foreign policy agenda, East Timor occupied a different place on the agenda of the Australian administration prior to the end of the 1990s. The government of Indonesia and Australia entertained, until 1998, a privileged relation both at the political and economic level (Jaggo 2010, Wheeler and Dunne 2001, Hainsworth and McCloskey 1999). Australia, having vested economic interests in the region, was committed to maintain good relations with the Indonesian government in order to secure the Indonesian market for its exports, as explain Wheeler and Dunne.³⁴² In addition, the authors continue, given that Indonesia is

³⁴⁰ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 92.

³⁴¹ Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Tim Dunne. "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism." *International Affairs* 77.4 (2001): 806.

³⁴² *Ibid.* 808.

the fourth most populous state in the world, the Australian government had always perceived the island as a potential threat. As a result, there was “a consensus in Australian foreign policy that good relations with Indonesia were more important than the self-determination of the Timorese.”³⁴³ Known as the “Jakarta first policy,” this strategy ensured economic prosperity as well as political stability for Australia. In addition to these considerations, as members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia had made the commitment not to intervene in the domestic affairs of the member states, including Indonesia. In his article “Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia,” Richard Leaver interestingly summarizes the position of Australia regarding Indonesia and East Timor: the “de facto and de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty [over East Timor], were parts of a larger price that was willingly quietly paid in the name of national security.”³⁴⁴

This all changed however at the end of the 1990s, following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. As explained by Wheeler and Dunne, the crisis hit Indonesia badly, as its currency plummeted and industrial output contracted massively.³⁴⁵ In addition, the downfall of Suharto’s government in May 1998 had devastating consequences on the State-society relations within the country, and the socio-political climate in Indonesia at the time became extremely volatile and was characterized by student-led protests and inter-communal violence. Australia therefore faced a different economic as well as political situation in Indonesia than in earlier decades, although as Derek McDougall writes, “the assumptions about the importance of the archipelago for Australian security remained.”³⁴⁶ Faced with a sudden change in the situation in Indonesia and its newfound unsteadiness, the Australian government was motivated to act by security considerations and to protect its economic interests in the region.

³⁴³ Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Tim Dunne. “East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism.” *International Affairs* 77.4 (2001): 808.

³⁴⁴ Leaver, Richard. “Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia.” *Pacific Review*. 14.1 (2001): 3.

³⁴⁵ Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Tim Dunne. “East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism.” *International Affairs* 77.4 (2001): 811.

³⁴⁶ McDougall, Derek. “Intervening in the Neighbourhood: Comparing Australia's Role in East Timor and the Southwest Pacific.” *International Journal* 62.4 (2007): 870.

The precarious situation that characterized the socio-political environment in Indonesia and East Timor in the late 1990s created what McDougall refers to as “new possibilities for instability”³⁴⁷ for the region but also for Australia. When the new Indonesian government gave signs that it was losing control of the situation, Australia felt compelled to re-establish order in the region, first and foremost in order to prevent the spread of instability in the region. “Australia was concerned that if growing defiance towards Indonesian rule was met by renewed TNI repression, the situation in East Timor could deteriorate beyond control.”³⁴⁸ Given that East Timor’s capital Dili is 700km away from Darwin, capital of Australia’s Northern Territories, a violent civil war in East Timor would have threatened the regional stability of the region and may have resulted in tens of thousands of refugees at Australia’s doorstep, which the Australian government wanted to avoid at all costs. As then US Assistant Secretary of State Stan Roth recalls, Howard discussed with Clinton the fact that his government could not remain aloof from the security implications of the crisis in Indonesia.³⁴⁹

In addition to these security concerns, the Australian government had great economic interests in the region that a civil war could have greatly undermined. Indonesia provided a large market for Australian exports, significant investment opportunities for multinational companies looking for cheap labor as Wheeler and Dunne underline, and East Timor possessed natural resources such as oil and gas reserves which were attractive for the Australian government.³⁵⁰ As the authors also explain, the Australian administration at the time had its eye on a joint exploitation of the Timor Sea, rich in mineral resources. The Howard government understood that such a plan, along with all other economic ventures in the region, would be put on hold or even discarded if the situation between East Timorese and Indonesian militias escalated

³⁴⁷ McDougall, Derek. "Intervening in the Neighbourhood: Comparing Australia's Role in East Timor and the Southwest Pacific." *International Journal* 62.4 (2007): 870.

³⁴⁸ Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Tim Dunne. "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism." *International Affairs* 77.4 (2001): 812.

³⁴⁹ Kelly, Paul. *The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia*. Carleton: Melbourne University Press, 2009. 496-498.

³⁵⁰ Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Tim Dunne. "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism." *International Affairs* 77.4 (2001): 809.

into a full-blown civil war. Given the degenerating situation in East Timor, the Australian government decided to act in order to safeguard its assets both in Indonesia and in East Timor. A full out war between the TNI and the East Timorese may have jeopardized the economic interests of Australia for decades and therefore it was more in the interest of Australia to put an end to the cycles of violence rapidly and restore a stable and secure environment which would facilitate the rehabilitation of trade and natural resource exploitation, and prevent the spread of instability in the region.

On neutrality and national interests: A discussion

The success of the Australia-led military operation in East Timor lies in the strong political will of the Australian administration which then translated into a commitment not to remain impartial and neutral in the face of the atrocities being carried out by the TNI and Indonesian militias against East Timorese. The presence of national interests for Australia in the region meant that the Australian government was willing to incur the costs and the risks of an intervention needed to put an end to the conflict and not just to address the immediate humanitarian needs of the population. It also meant that the Australian government was highly motivated to restore peace and stability in the region in order to protect its assets. INTERFET was launched not to put on a show and satisfy the public back home like the operations in Rwanda and in Somalia were, but to address the humanitarian as well as the political crisis in East Timor and to put an end to the ongoing cycles of violence. This resulted in the launch of an intervention mandated to use force when necessary and to address the root causes of a political crisis with humanitarian repercussions. The presence of a strong political will and the launch of an operation that abandoned any pretence of neutrality meant three things for INTERFET: the intervention was well equipped and rapidly launched, the interveners were more willing to take risks, and the intervention's strategy was adequate and well adapted to address the crisis in the region.

As Peter Jakobsen remarks, the “difficulty of humanitarian intervention puts a premium on rapid response.”³⁵¹ In situations that involve human rights violation, starvation, as well as high levels of violence, the author continues, civilians die quickly from deprivation or violence or both; consequently, the longer the delay of intervention, the more people die.³⁵² The Australian government understood this logic rapidly, which explains the speed with which the mission in East Timor was launched. The deployment of the forces happened extremely fast which stands in sharp contrast with all three previous cases of HMI studied in this work. The violence in East Timor increased rapidly on 3 September 1999, as soon as the results of the referendum were announced. 17 days later, Australian troops were entering Dili, capital of East Timor.

In addition to the rapidity that characterized the intervention, INTERFET was also well-equipped and well-financed. It did not suffer, like in Rwanda, of governments’ unwillingness to incur the costs of a mission in a territory that presented interests for them. Five days after the operation was authorized by the UN Security Council, on 20 September 1999, INTERFET deployed an airlift of more than 1,000 troops. The next day, an additional 2,000 were sent, as described in Jonathan Moore’s article “Violent Aftermath of East Timor Referendum.”³⁵³ Although the number of INTERFET troops was relatively low (it peaked at 9,900 troops), they were highly trained, capable troops that knew how to fight, as Seybolt describes.³⁵⁴ The troops were extremely well equipped, he continues, with light armored vehicles, helicopters, night vision equipment, an array of supply vehicles as well as modern communication equipment.³⁵⁵ The budget for the operation also illustrates the strong political will of the Australian government and its commitment to INTERFET. In a statement made by John Howard on 23 November 1999, he estimated that the costs of the deployment of forces to East Timor, the raising of the

³⁵¹ Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?” *Journal of Peace Research* 33.2 (1996): 212.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Moore, Jonathan. “Violent Aftermath of East Timor Referendum.” *Keesing’s Record of World Events* 45.9 (1999).

³⁵⁴ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 260.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

two new battalions and the additional air force numbers would amount to \$907 million in 1999-2000, \$1.089 billion in 2000-2001 and \$901 million in 2001-2002,³⁵⁶ which illustrates the strong political will of the Australian administration and its commitment to the mission both in the short and long-term.

Besides the financial commitment of the Australian government to the mission, the success of INTERFET can be largely attributed to the Australian government's willingness to risk the lives of its troops in order to fulfill the mandate of the operation. In a speech to the House of Representatives on 21 September, Minister of Defence John Moore warned the government and public to "be prepared for the possibility that some peacekeepers will be injured or killed."³⁵⁷ As discussed by Wheeler and Dunne, INTERFET marked "an important departure from previous Western humanitarian interventions"³⁵⁸ with regards to casualties. The Howard government understood and accepted that in order to launch an efficient operation in East Timor, it had to put Australia soldiers in harm's way. This stands in sharp contrast to the strong reluctance on the part of other Western governments to incur such risks in their intervention in previous interventions. The Australian-led mission, Wheeler and Dunne write, "was not comprised by similar nervousness about the risk of casualties that had undermined the success in Rwanda and Somalia."³⁵⁹ Given that HMI are dangerous and difficult missions, if an intervener decides to take a side and defeat the perpetrators of violence like Australia did, the intervener needs a strong political will, which can only stem from the presence of national interests in the region. As Seybolt underlines, "the level of violence is very likely to increase, possibly for an extended period of time before it subsides."³⁶⁰ If interveners have no interests in the region, they are most likely to

³⁵⁶ "John Howard's Statement on East Timor." Address to the House of Representatives. Sidney, Australia. 23 November 1999. Web 20 July 2012. < <http://australianpolitics.com/executive/howard/pre-2002/991123howard-timor.shtml>>.

³⁵⁷ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 170.

³⁵⁸ Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Tim Dunne. "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism." *International Affairs* 77.4 (2001): 825.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 806.

³⁶⁰ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 27.

withdraw, which was the case in Somalia and in Rwanda. On the other hand, an intervener with interests is more likely to accept some losses and persist until the mandate is fulfilled. In the case of Somalia, the US was not prepared to fight because it wasn't willing to incur costs in a region that presented no interest for the country. Consequently, it quickly lost against Aidid and disengaged from the country as soon as the news of US soldiers being under attack reached the Pentagon. On the other hand, in East Timor, INTERFET's commitment to defeat the militias, its unwillingness to remain an impartial actor in the situation, and its willingness to take risks led to an almost immediate drop in violence in East Timor.

In addition to the willingness of the Australian government to accept the possibility of casualties in East Timor, the success of INTERFET can be attributed to the readiness of the intervening troops to take risks and use force. As Walzer has pointed out, "the fact that an agent has some vested or unvested interests may be good news for the people in danger of being massacred since agents will be more prepared to take the risks of intervention."³⁶¹ The presence of national interests for Australia in the region meant that the Australian government had strong incentives to put an end to the crisis as rapidly as possible. The Howard administration understood that in order to do so, the operation had to address not only the humanitarian needs of the population but first and foremost to address the high levels of violence perpetrated by Indonesian militias against East Timorese. As a result, the mission was tailored to defeat the militias carrying on the acts of violence before it was to focus on any sort of humanitarian activity. While operations in Rwanda focused on neutral, low-risk and low-cost (in terms of financial resources and casualties) strategies such as the establishment of safe-zone areas, point protection and patrols, as soon as INTERFET established its presence in East Timor, it quickly undertook disarmament missions to ensure that militias no longer posed imminent threats to East Timorese civilians. From the start, the operation in East Timor was not limited by the principle of neutrality which impeded on the capacity of the troops in Rwanda to act in order to prevent the genocide. John Moore, who has

³⁶¹ Archibugi, Daniele. "Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29.1 (2004): 4.

worked in close collaboration with the UN Research Institute for Social Development discusses that the troops raided militia compounds, confiscated weapons, and gained control of the territory in a matter of days, due to its highly trained troops and to its will to use force when necessary.³⁶² INTERFET also sent out mobile units to control the roads and to disrupt militia activities and force them away from towns.³⁶³ The militias, although outnumbering the INTERFET troops, were of no match for the highly capable international troops. As a result, killing and harassment stopped in places where INTERFET had presence soon after the intervention was launched. The case of INTERFET illustrates how while the number of troops is important to the success of a mission, the capacity, training, equipment and mandate of the troops is as important, if not more. The mission in East Timor had merely 2,000 troops more than the mission in Rwanda. However, the troops were better trained, well equipped, and most importantly had a strong mandate that authorized them to take forceful action in order to protect the civilian population and to push back the militias threatening them. INTERFET troops demonstrated at multiple occasions their resolve by responding militarily to militias' attacks. On 11 October, soon after the deployment of the mission in East Timor, INTERFET troops repelled a militia ambush, which resulted in the death of two militiamen and two Australian soldiers were wounded. As a result of such calculated use of force, by the end of the month militia attacks on aid convoys were practically non-existent.³⁶⁴ By sending highly trained and capable troops that were not bound by impartiality or neutrality, that were willing to take forceful actions against the militias and by showing its readiness to fight when necessary, INTERFET sent a strong message to whoever wanted to perpetrate attacks against the East Timorese population. By acting decisively, the INTERFET troops demonstrated that they were serious about

³⁶² Moore, J. "Violent Aftermath of East Timor Referendum." *Keesing's Record of World Events* 45.9 (1999).

³⁶³ Bostock, I. "By the Book: East Timor, an operational Evaluation." *Jane's Defense Weekly* 33.18 (2000). 26.

³⁶⁴ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 169.

protecting the population. Consequently, the militias, “well aware that they could not stand up to a trained military force fled once the foreign troops entered the area.”³⁶⁵

Although the willingness of the troops to use force was criticized by the international community as being “heavy-handed,”³⁶⁶ “foreign troops fired at adversaries only seven times during the first 30 days of the intervention, and only 13 times during the entire five-month operation,”³⁶⁷ emphasizes Bostock in his article “By the Book: East Timor, an Operational Evaluation.” What mattered in the case of East Timor and in all humanitarian crises of the sort is not necessarily the use of force itself but that the opponents understand that force will be used if necessary. As Seybolt explains, the Australian-led force used a strategy of coercion to defeat the militias and push them back across the West Timorese border. One of the biggest assets of INTERFET was not necessarily its high troop count but its ability to convince the TNI and the militias that if they did not comply, they would face the consequences of their actions.³⁶⁸ Because it was willing to take risks and proved that right at the beginning of the intervention, the threats of INTERFET were taken seriously by the local militias, unlike in Rwanda where the threats of Operation Turquoise were considered weak and Hutu militias usually brushed them off. In order to make the TNI and the militias comply, not only did INTERFET troops make verbal demands, they also signaled their resolve by deploying a highly capable force that confiscated weapons and shot back when shot at.³⁶⁹

The success of INTERFET illustrates that the Australian government understood the importance of acting quickly when militiamen and soldiers attack unarmed civilians. It also reflects, as discussed by Seybolt, how the interveners grasped “the benefits of well-trained military units moving aggressively against poorly trained and ill equipped

³⁶⁵ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 256.

³⁶⁶ Robinson, Geoffrey. “Canberra Disquiet on Role in East Timor.” *Financial Times*, 4 October 1999. 5.

³⁶⁷ Bostock, I. “By the Book: East Timor, an operational Evaluation.” *Jane’s Defense Weekly* 33.18 (2000). 23.

³⁶⁸ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 258.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

militias.”³⁷⁰ But most importantly, INTERFET illustrates how the presence of national interests for the intervening powers can trigger the launch of more successful operations due to the willingness of the intervening forces to take on more risks and incur the costs of more decisive interventions.

Given the nature of the conflicts in regions such as Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and East Timor, it is most likely that the strongest faction in the region will tend to carry out acts of violence until, as former president of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS) Tom Farer suggests, “it encounters a disabling force (...) [or] unless external actors either club them into submission, break the stalemate by helping one of the coalitions or factions, and/or guarantee the safety of those willing to assume a defensive posture.”³⁷¹ In the case of Haiti and East Timor, the interveners understood the importance of interposing themselves between the victims and the oppressors in order to address the underlying causes of the humanitarian crisis. In the case of Rwanda the intervening forces were so intent on remaining an impartial actor in the conflict that they watched helplessly as the genocide unfolded. The case of Somalia is quite particular in the sense that the international community did end up siding against one of the factions of the conflict, but this decision was not backed by proper political will and commitment on the part of the interveners in order to be successful. The analyses of all four cases of HMI, which have succeeded one another in the 1990s decade, illustrate the evolution that has occurred within the international community with regards to how to address human rights violations and intra-state conflicts.

³⁷⁰ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 92.

³⁷¹ Farer, Tom J. "Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase." *Human Rights Quarterly* 18.1 (1996): 15.

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS

“Hope is definitely not the same thing as optimism. It is not the conviction that something will turn out well, but the certainty that something makes sense, regardless of how it turns out.”³⁷²

Václav Havel

Randolph Kent has discussed in his article “International Humanitarian Crises: Two Decades before and Two Decades beyond” how over the past decades, the humanitarian role of the UN “has become more efficient and effective.”³⁷³ The logistics of peace operations have greatly improved, the coordination of responses is much more systematized, he argues, and there has been a large quantity of initiatives developed to improve on-the-ground operations.³⁷⁴ The study of peace operations however remains a delicate matter given that the concept of HMI is fairly recent and that the international community has yet to develop a comprehensive framework on how to conduct these missions. In addition, the study of HMI is even more arduous due to the fact that each case is so distinct from one another, which makes it hard for scholars to compare cases or try to extract lessons from one crisis to another. As Thomas Weiss points out, “lessons are difficult enough to identify in the first place because political, temporal, military, strategic and geographic translations from one situation to another are methodologically arduous and operationally problematic. (...) there are severe limits to comparisons across cases.”³⁷⁵ The study of the four cases of HMI I have conducted in my thesis has nonetheless shed the light on a number of factors that I will discuss in this section, regarding the centrality of political factors, the importance of not only the *Responsibility to Protect* but also the *Responsibility to Rebuild*, and the ongoing normative transition that the international community is ongoing. I will also present a brief overview of more recent humanitarian crises –Libya and Darfur- and how my

³⁷² Havel, Václav. “The Politics of Hope.” *Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hviždala*. New York: Knopf, 1990.

³⁷³ Kent, Randolph C. “International Humanitarian Crises: Two Decades before and Two Decades beyond.” *International Affairs* 80.5 (2004): 852.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Weiss, Thomas G. “Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons.” *Journal of Peace Research* 38.4 (2001): 420.

argument regarding neutrality and national interests is still relevant with regards to ongoing crises. Finally, I will conclude this chapter with a set of policy recommendations I think the Canadian government as well as the international community would benefit from taking into considerations, given the mixed record of success and failures of HMI over the years.

Politically aware, not politically blind³⁷⁶

First and foremost, my study has illustrated the importance of what Taylor Seybolt coins as being “politically aware, not politically blind.”³⁷⁷ While purely humanitarian interventions –operations that help deliver aid and assist humanitarian organizations- are relatively successful in saving lives and often very politically rewarding for the Western governments who launch them, they do no more than treat symptoms of violent conflict, has argued Seybolt.³⁷⁸ Although they do help to save lives, reduce the spread of diseases and starvation, they seldom lead to any sort of political transitions, end of violence, security or stability.

In all too many cases, as we have seen in the case studies presented in earlier chapters, the interveners, due to a lack of political will, have launched purely humanitarian and logistical operations in regions torn by violent conflicts instead of addressing the deep-rooted causes of the crisis –which include ethnic violence, man-made famines, inter-militia fighting, general lawlessness, coup d’état, undemocratic ruling, military repression and the list goes on. The over-emphasis on remaining an impartial and neutral actor in the face of violence and human rights abuses that characterized the mission in Rwanda and the two first missions in Somalia have resulted in ineffective operations that failed to effectively protect the civilians in danger. The case of Rwanda and Somalia illustrate the problems that can arise when “humanitarian assistance is used as an alternative to political solutions to complex political

³⁷⁶ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 21.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid. 262.

problems,”³⁷⁹ Randolph Kent explains. What the interventions in both countries have taught the international community, Betts discusses, is the importance of “settling the issue that fuels the war”³⁸⁰ in order to avoid unintended consequences including “feeding the war,” having countries fall back into conflict or standing by as an entire population is destroyed. The repeated emphasis on the words “humanitarian” and “neutrality” which has characterized so many HMI launched since the end of the Cold War, Adam Roberts writes, “reflects the natural desire to do something in the face of disaster, and a tendency to forget that in all these cases the disaster has been man-made and requires changes in institutions, even sometimes in the structure of states and their boundaries.”³⁸¹ If the cause of human suffering is mass killing, ethnic cleansing, political chaos or a certain type of regime in power, how can the suffering be alleviated, let alone prevented, without taking a political stance and addressing these causes?

What has emerged from my study regarding HMI is not necessarily the importance of taking a side in the crises per se, but of understanding and addressing the root causes of the humanitarian crisis instead of addressing solely the issues at the surface, i.e. to feed the people and provide water, medication and shelter, whether it means to side with a faction or side with the population against its oppressors. While in some cases it is vital for the interveners to take sides, which was the case in Haiti where the international community sided against Cedras and which would have been necessary in Rwanda where the international forces should have sided against the Hutu militias, in other instances it is preferable for the interveners to interpose themselves between the warring parties and the endangered population, instead of going against one faction in particular, like the interveners did in East Timor, and which would have been preferable in Somalia instead of going against a powerful warlord. Being politically aware does not necessarily mean automatically siding with one of the parties or launching a full-out war

³⁷⁹ Kent, Randolph C. “International Humanitarian Crises: Two Decades before and Two Decades beyond.” *International Affairs* 80.5 (2004): 857.

³⁸⁰ Betts, Richard K. “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention.” *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 22.

³⁸¹ Roberts, A. “The Road to Hell...A Critique of Humanitarian Intervention.” *Harvard International Review* 16.1 (1993): 13.

but to understand the dynamics on the ground and to address the socio-political factors generating the humanitarian crisis in the first place. As the experience in Haiti and East Timor have shown, success does not necessarily depend on the use of force per se but on the willingness to use force if necessary, which shows the resolve of the interveners from the start. The Haiti intervention and the East Timor mission did not engage in violent battles, but from the start they made clear that they were ready to fight back if fired at, which sent a powerful message to the oppressors on the ground. The hypothesis that has emerged in my study and also in the work of many scholars in recent years, including Seybolt, Wheeler and Dunne as well as Weiss, is that earlier and more robust interventions should be pursued (Seybolt, 2007, Wheeler and Dunne 2001, Weiss 1999). Otherwise, limited and supposedly impartial interventions are likely to be counterproductive and prevent peace rather than facilitate it. As Weiss has interestingly discussed in his article “Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome – Operations Rekindle Hope?” “half steps, symbolic actions and misplaced even-handedness are not necessarily better than no intervention at all.”³⁸²

“The solution is not indifference or withdrawal but appropriate engagement,”³⁸³ Thomas Weiss writes, emphasizing the importance of designing each operation based on an in-depth study of the local socio-political and cultural situation as well as a good understanding of the history of the conflict. The four case studies conducted in my thesis underline the importance of what Karin Von Hippel describes as “tailoring the operations to the specific needs of the particular culture.”³⁸⁴ As John Drysdale also remarks, the failure of UNOSOM II in Somalia has “demonstrated that when humanitarian peacemaking becomes a compelling necessity, actions must be carried out with full knowledge of local political, social and cultural norms.”³⁸⁵ Without such

³⁸² Weiss, Thomas G. “Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome – Operations Rekindle Hope?” *Global Governance* 1.2 (1995): 184.

³⁸³ Weiss, Thomas G. “Principles, Politics, and humanitarian actions.” *Ethics and International Affairs* (1999): 9.

³⁸⁴ Von Hippel, Karin. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge UP, 2000. 81.

³⁸⁵ Drysdale, John. “Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia.” *Learning from Somalia*. Ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst. Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1997. 134.

knowledge, the interveners are bound to exacerbate the killing and increase the level of violence. As illustrated in the case of Rwanda, a lack of proper knowledge on a crisis can lead to catastrophic failures. As Dallaire's executive assistant, Major Beardsley recalls regarding UNAMIR, "we flew to Rwanda with a Michelin road map, a copy of the Arusha Agreement and that was it."³⁸⁶ Interveners failed to tailor the intervention to the specific needs on the ground because they had no knowledge of the crisis and therefore stood by as Hutu militias prepared and carried out the genocide. In Somalia, the interveners did take a side but failed to recognize which Somali had been the victim, as Clarke and Herbst discuss.³⁸⁷ The operation sided against most powerful, popular and supported faction leader instead of disarming all major combatants and actively protecting the population most affected and powerless in the midst of the civil war. The interveners in Somalia sided against Aidid without understanding that he had the support of the population and was the most powerful leader out there, which resulted in the early disengagement of the international community from the country. What needs to be understood here is that although in some cases it is vital for the interveners to take sides, in other instances it is preferable for the interveners to interpose themselves between warring parties and the endangered population instead of going against one faction in particular. All this however depends on an extensive study of the crises and conflicts on a case-by-case approach rather than a one size fits all approach. As O'Hanlon concludes, "we should be able to take sides when one party to a conflict is clearly the better choice for its own country and when taking sides is likely to end a conflict."³⁸⁸ In the case of Haiti the author continues, "the Clinton administration was right to threaten to depose the Cedras regime to allow the Aristide regime to take charge. Had the global community been willing to step up its involvement in Rwanda in 1994, it would have been wisest to ally with the Tutsi-led RPF against the Hutu-led

³⁸⁶ Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 340.

³⁸⁷ Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 79.

³⁸⁸ O'Hanlon, Michael E. "Doing It Right: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention." *The Brookings Review* 18.4 (2000): 36

armed forces that ultimately carried out the country's genocide."³⁸⁹ However, in the case of Somalia, taking sides is ultimately what led to the mission's failure, because it reflected a poor understanding of the conflict and the dynamics on the ground. The interveners should have acted forcefully to disarm all warlords and factions in order to protect the population, as the troops did in East Timor, instead of launching a man-hunt against the man who was regarded by the population as the legitimate leader. All four cases of intervention illustrate the core place that political factors occupy when it comes to the design and the deployment of HMI troops as well as the necessity to approach each case as a unique crisis and to develop an in-depth understanding of the events that triggered the crisis in the first place.

Another factor I have abundantly discussed in my work is the importance of national interests as one of the principal determinants of the level of success of HMI. As discussed all throughout my work, the presence of the national interests for the intervening governments in a region in crisis has heavily influenced the course of HMI. The interests I have focused on do not include however interests of a political nature such as public pressure, since these kind of interests are usually short-lived, and will lead to the launch of interventions purely "for the show," so the governments can be seen by the public back home as "doing something." As the case of Rwanda has illustrated, interventions that are launched to appease the public's moral conscience by governments desirous to gain popularity points will tend to be weak, ill-financed and hesitant. On the other hand, the presence of economic and geo-strategic interests – long-term interests- for the interveners in Haiti and East Timor translated into a strong political will, financial commitment, a willingness to take risks and accept the possibility of casualties, and comprehensive and clear mandates that authorized the troops to use force when necessary in order to address not only the humanitarian needs of the population but also the causes of such needs. However, although the presence of national interests can be understood as a blessing, it is also a curse, as Fiona Terry -

³⁸⁹ O'Hanlon, Michael E. "Doing It Right: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention." *The Brookings Review* 18.4 (2000): 36.

director of Research for Médecins sans Frontières in Paris- discusses in her book *Condemned to Repeat?: the Paradox of Humanitarian Action*, since it creates discrepancies in the aid provided and some crises are left ignored. As she goes on to explain, if we take a look at the humanitarian crises that have occurred around the globe and that are still occurring, we can rapidly conclude that “far from giving in accordance with the greatest need, most donor governments allocate aid funds according to their political priorities, creating major differences between crises.”³⁹⁰ In addition to funding discrepancies, critical situations are often ignored by Western powers simply because governments are not willing to get involved in regions where they perceive no interests. As Archibugi has discussed, “critical situations are ignored simply because there is nobody willing to address them.”³⁹¹ In the absence of great powers’ interests, Catherine Lu remarks, international interventions will usually suffer from “deficient resources; chronic under support of UN mandated missions has translated into ineffectual peace enforcement and peace support operations.”³⁹² The crisis in which Western powers perceive no interests will generate multiple Security Council Resolutions but “very little material commitment towards an effective intervention force in the case of Somalia and Rwanda.”³⁹³

Interestingly enough, what I have come to understand throughout my study of the four cases is how national interests and neutrality are two intertwined variables; the presence of one affects the level of the other. In the case of operations in regions where interveners perceived interests, the level of neutrality was automatically low, given that the interveners were willing to incur the costs and the risks associated with operations comprising low-levels of neutrality –which was the case in Haiti, East Timor and more recently Libya. Although I first approached the two variables –national interests and

³⁹⁰ Terry, Fiona. *Condemned to Repeat?: the Paradox of Humanitarian Action*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2002. 23.

³⁹¹ Archibugi, Daniele. “Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention.” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29.1 (2004): 7.

³⁹² Lu, Catherine. “Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Ambition and Political Constraints.” *International Journal* 62.4 (2007): 946.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*

neutrality- as separate entities, the case studies I have conducted have underlined the correlation that exists between the two. Far from being independent from one another, what my work demonstrates is that the presence of vested national interests for the interveners in a region ultimately determines the level of neutrality of the operation. I would even go as far as arguing that the level of neutrality of an HMI is representative of the presence or absence of national interests for the interveners. My study has shed the light on the fundamental connection that exists between two variables which, at first glance, seem to be independent from one another. The absence of national interests will lead to the launch of highly neutral operations which are less-costly and involve less risks and casualties, which was the case in Rwanda, while the presence of national interests will guarantee a low level of neutrality and more forceful operations, which are more costly, comprise more risks, but are ultimately more successful in ending violence and establishing a secure and safe environment in a region in crisis, as demonstrated in East Timor. A low level of neutrality thus denotes the presence of interveners' national interests. The fact that neutrality is applied seldom, and not in every case of HMI illustrates how neutrality is not a fundamental principle of HMI but is rather used by states to cover up weak and inexpensive operations in regions where they have no interest in expanding the resources and funds and expertise. While governments continue to state neutrality as a core principle of HMI by which they ought to abide when launching such military operations, they do so on an irregular basis, which underlines the fact that neutrality is used by political leaders when it suits their needs, and is put aside when intervening governments are willing to launch more forceful and effective interventions. The level of neutrality of operations, interestingly enough, is not an independent variable but varies according to the presence or absence of interests for the interveners.

My first reflex was to approach both factors as highly independent, and my hypothesis was that the presence national interests combined with low levels of neutrality guarantee the success of HMI. In retrospect, having done a more in-depth

study of the cases, I have concluded that the presence of national interests ensure low levels of neutrality which in return guarantee the level of success of HMI.

The Importance of the *Responsibility to Rebuild*

While my work has focused on the reactive military operations launched to address humanitarian crises and not on what happens after the interveners have fulfilled their mandate, follow-up missions or missions to rebuild are nonetheless a vital component of securing peace and stability around the globe. My study of cases such as Somalia on the one hand and East Timor on the other has illustrated the importance of long-term commitment to regions torn by conflict. “Even at their most successful, [reactive military operations] can only control a situation, not resolve it,”³⁹⁴ Nsongurua Udombana explains. The further use of other tools such as development, reconstruction, conflict management and peace-building are necessary to ensure that the conflicts are in the past and that the possibility of future conflict is all but eliminated.

Without this long-term commitment, a country is more likely to fall back into war, which is what happened in Somalia immediately after UNOSOM II withdrew from the country in 1995 without the implementation of any sort of follow-up missions. As Hirsch and Oakley have discussed, the reforms that had been implemented in Somalia by the international troops such as the formation of courts and police stations “were not given prolonged support after the withdrawal of [international troops] and consequently they soon disintegrated.”³⁹⁵ On the other hand, the experience in East Timor illustrates how follow-up missions mandated to ensure the long-term stability and security of the country can have a positive impact on a country emerging from conflict. The international community’s involvement in East Timor continued long after INTERFET withdrew from the country and after East Timor acquired its independence in May 2002. In 2002, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission of

³⁹⁴ Udombana, Nsongurua J. "When Neutrality Is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan." *Human Rights Quarterly* 27.4 (2005): 1198.

³⁹⁵ Hirsch, J. and R. Oakley. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking*. Washington, DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1995. 92

Support in East Timor (UNMISET) to provide “assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor.”³⁹⁶ The operation was extended after the end of its mandate and remained in East Timor until 2005. As Catherine Lu underlines, “meeting post-intervention obligations helped ensure that the conditions that prompted military interventions would not repeat themselves or simply resurface.”³⁹⁷

There is an urgent need to develop and apply a comprehensive approach to HMI, which encompasses the *Responsibility to Protect* but also the *Responsibility to Rebuild*, in order to reduce the risk of conflict recurring in the future and ensuring the long-lasting success of these operations. As Seybolt stated, “humanitarian interventions have far more meaning and legitimacy when they are accompanied by a long-term commitment to conflict resolution and reconstruction of the political, economic and social system of the country torn by the crisis.”³⁹⁸ The success of HMI should not be limited to the end of violence but should encompass long-term developments with regards to the economy, education, governmental institutions, police forces and judicial systems. Although I have focused on the immediate responses to humanitarian crises and the short-term protection of civilians from harm and have discussed success mostly in terms of the end of the violence, we should not forget that success is a stage process, in which the end of violence is the first milestone among many others. Of the three components of the *Responsibility to Protect* document published in 2001—responsibility to prevent, protect, and rebuild—political leaders seem to have focused too literally on the title of the document, on the protection aspect of the responsibility, while the two other responsibilities have been brushed aside and left in the background. What history has taught us however is that the responsibility to prevent and to rebuild are as important, if not more, than the responsibility to protect, and need to be brought back

³⁹⁶ UN Security Council resolution 1410, 17 May 2002

³⁹⁷ Lu, Catherine. “Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Ambition and Political Constraints.” *International Journal* 62.4 (2007): 949.

³⁹⁸ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 276

at the forefront of the talks and debates regarding interventions in times of humanitarian crises.

The normative shift hasn't been reached just yet

Two decades ago, disaster relief was not regarded as an issue of major concern to the international community; humanitarian crises were not perceived as events of great political consequence or significance. Today, the humanitarian enterprise has attracted the attention of more and more bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental organizations and finds itself a “growth industry,” as coined by Larry Minear.³⁹⁹ The analysis I have conducted in this thesis has led me to conclude that although concepts such as the *Responsibility to Protect* does occupy a central place within international relations, states' national interests are still the principal determinant of the actions of governments.

When the international community decided to launch an intervention in Somalia in 1992, African ambassador talked of a “universal conscience” being aroused.⁴⁰⁰ In the last few decades, many scholars and policymakers have discussed the emergence of a “new world order” in which states' decisions are motivated less by national interests, and more by moral, humanitarian and selfless concerns. The study of the four cases of HMI I have conducted however has shown that this new world order has obviously not materialized yet, and that the universal conscience that is discussed has yet to be fully awakened. Although the launch of HMI does suggest that human rights and humanitarian concerns do matter more than they did before or during the Cold War, my study has shown that national interests still shape, for the most part, states' foreign policy. While states are slowly redefining their national interests and identities “to include a large dollop of humanitarian values,”⁴⁰¹ Thomas Weiss has interestingly

³⁹⁹ Minear, Larry. *The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries*. Bloomfield, CT.: Kumarian, 2002.

⁴⁰⁰ Lu, Catherine. “Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Ambition and Political Constraints.” *International Journal* 62.4 (2007): 946.

⁴⁰¹ Weiss, Thomas G. “Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons.” *Journal of Peace Research* 38.4 (2001): 422.

described, economic and geo-strategic interests are still central. Human rights violations will often trigger governments to launch interventions in regions in crisis, but such concerns do not ensure the presence of the political will necessary to safeguard the success of an intervention. As Matthew Krain writes, “recent UN history shows noble or humanitarian aims do not always translate into effectiveness.”⁴⁰² We cannot ignore that the international community is undergoing a transformation and we are moving towards a new world order. Countries can no longer brush aside massive and systematic violations of human rights, due to high levels of public pressure and media coverage on such issues and to a newfound concern for the suffering of civilians around the globe. However, the transition hasn’t occurred just yet. Concerns for human rights, although they do create a push for interventions that we cannot ignore- do not translate into political will, adequate mandates, financial commitment and appropriate equipment. As Catherine Lu writes, “unfortunately, having a conscience does not automatically translate into having a sound political or military strategy.”⁴⁰³ National interests still determine whether a country will provide the necessary troops and equipment required to launch effective operations, whether the intervention will be launched rapidly after the start of the crisis, and whether the interveners will be willing to incur the costs and the risks of a forceful intervention. National interests no longer determine whether the countries will intervene; however they determine the kind of interventions that will be launched and ultimately the level adequacy and success of the operations.

And what about today?

While my study focuses on four cases of HMI in the 1990s decade, the conclusions I have reached seem to still apply to more recent humanitarian crises. Since 2000, two major humanitarian crises have gathered the attention of the international community:

⁴⁰² Krain, Matthew. “International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides” *International Studies Quarterly* 49.3 (2005): 366.

⁴⁰³ Lu, Catherine. “Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Ambition and Political Constraints.” *International Journal* 62.4 (2007): 943.

Libya and Darfur. While the crisis in Libya was rapidly and forcefully addressed, the situation in Darfur continues to deteriorate under the eyes of Western governments.

The Libyan civil war started on 15 February 2011 with the popular protests of Benghazi.⁴⁰⁴ A month later, on 19 March 2011, a coalition of states launched a military intervention in Libya to implement Security Council resolution 1973. The intervention was rapidly launched, efficient, and troops were well trained and equipped. Troops conducted airstrikes, naval blockades and firing campaigns, air campaigns and enforced a no-fly zone,⁴⁰⁵ and the fighting ended in late October following the death of Gadhafi. The troops immediately took a stance against the Gadhafi regime and did not hesitate to use force. The case of Darfur could not have been more different. The actual crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, although the country has been torn by a civil war for decades. Since 2003, Scott Straus explains, the Sudanese government has ethnically purged the region of Darfur by providing arms and support to Arab militias killing, robbing and raping black Africans in the region.⁴⁰⁶ To this day, the crisis has resulted in 1,65 million internationally displaced people, 200,000 refugees in neighboring Chad, and the current death toll is estimated by the UN at over 300,000 people.⁴⁰⁷ It is only more than a two years after the start of the crisis that the Security Council authorized the establishment of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005 through resolution 1590. The operation was a purely humanitarian one, mandated to support the implementation of a ceasefire, provide humanitarian assistance and assist with the repatriation of refugees and IDPs.⁴⁰⁸ In January 2011, eight years after the start of the crisis in Darfur, a coalition made of Human Rights Watch, the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies and The Enough Project declared that “there are clear signs that the

⁴⁰⁴ Zoubir, Yahia H. “Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?” *Third World Quarterly* 23.1 (2002): 33.

⁴⁰⁵ Damon, Arwa, Chris Laurence, Jull Dougherty, et al. “Gunfire, explosions heard in Tripoli.” *CNN*. 20 March 2011. Web. 13 July 2012. <<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/19/libya.civil.war/>>.

⁴⁰⁶ Straus, Scott. “Darfur and the Genocide Debate.” *Foreign Affairs* 84.1 (2005): 123-133.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 7.

⁴⁰⁸ Security Council resolution 1590, 24 March 2005.

situation in Darfur is getting worse. But the international community is failing to monitor and respond properly to what is happening in Darfur.”⁴⁰⁹

The international intervention in Libya, a country located just south of the Mediterranean Sea and rich in oil, unfolded swiftly, despite a much larger and critical humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Just barely a month passed between the first protest in Libya and the first airstrikes. In Darfur, where 1,8 million people have died since February 2003 and where mass atrocities unfolded for years, the international community is still trying to figure out what to do.⁴¹⁰ One of the main issues here, Rebecca Hamilton has argued, is that contrarily to Libya, Darfur is located much farther from the European coast and is poor in natural resources.⁴¹¹ This illustrates how national interests still play a central role in determining governments’ actions, just like it did in all four cases studied in this thesis, and how the level of neutrality is dependent on the presence of national interests. Since in oil-rich Libya, Western powers understood that if the crisis degenerated, the flow of refugee from the country could soon reach European borders, the intervention was launched rapidly, and the interveners were willing to use force and take risks to address the causes of the social unrest in the country. On the other hand, Darfur did not generate any kind of political will in the international community that could have triggered a rapid and forceful intervention.

Here again, geo-strategic and economic interests can explain this situation and illustrate how my study is still highly relevant two decades after my case studies. In 1999, Kofi Annan declared with regards to Kosovo and Bosnia that “a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel or murder an entire people must be met with all necessary means... It requires the use of force to bring halt to the planned and

⁴⁰⁹ “Sudan: Deteriorating Situation in Darfur.” *Human Rights Watch*, 8 January 2011. Web. 20 July 2012. <http://hrw.org/news/2011/01/08/sudan-deteriorating-situation-darfur>.

⁴¹⁰ Straus, Scott. “Darfur and the Genocide Debate.” *Foreign Affairs* 84.1 (2005): 2.

⁴¹¹ Hamilton, Rebecca. *Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

systematic killing and expulsion of civilians.”⁴¹² However, more than a decade after this statement, HMI remain weak and indecisive in the face of mass murder, and continue to address inherently political crises through the use of humanitarian measures, as the case of Darfur illustrates. Due to the lack of national interests in some regions of the world -policymakers continue to send small, poorly equipped and poorly trained military forces into dangerous places and constrain them with mandates that further restrict their ability to act.

Policy recommendations

The increase of UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era has triggered the production of a large body of scholarly work and government policies, especially since the publication in 1992 of Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* and more recently of the *Responsibility to Protect* in 2001. Despite the drastic increase in the demand and launch of HMI since the 1990s, which has been accompanied by numerous innovations, studies, and international agreements as well as a professionalization of the field itself, the international community when faced with a humanitarian crisis still remains unprepared and somewhat clueless with regards to what to do in the face of humanitarian crises. As Randolph Kent has denounced at multiple occasions, “over the years the UN has never seemed prepared for changes in types and dimensions of disasters and emergencies that have occurred.”⁴¹³

In order to address such weaknesses, there is an urgent need for a clearer understanding of the concept of humanitarianism. Michael O’Hanlon has discussed the lack of consensus within the international community regarding HMI and how this in return affects the success of the operations on the ground. He writes that “at a minimum, the international community needs some sense of how it will apply military force before intervening. Should it simply do enough to feed starving people, should it

⁴¹² Krain, Matthew. “International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides.” *International Studies Quarterly* 49.3 (2005): 366.

⁴¹³ Kent, Randolph C. “International Humanitarian Crises: Two Decades before and Two Decades beyond.” *International Affairs* 80.5 (2004): 865.

create safe havens for individuals or groups at risk, should it impose a ceasefire line between warring parties –or might it even help one side win the conflict?”⁴¹⁴ It is difficult to promote the concept on the international scene and to launch interventions based on that concept without a clear appreciation of what HMI truly entail. There is a need to closely define humanitarianism in order to change its all-embracing and ambiguous nature and to come up with a more precise understanding of HMI’s core elements. The confusion that exists regarding HMI needs to be addressed not only on paper but also in practice. As my study has shown, the lack of understanding of when and how HMI should be launched and what such operations should address has led to hesitant operations failing to restore peace and stability in regions where they were mandated to intervene.

There has been in recent decades an emerging understanding that humanitarianism entails both a humanitarian aspect and a political one. Many interventions that have been launched in the last few decades, including Somalia, East Timor and Haiti, have encompassed both aspects. However, both the humanitarian and the political sphere are often confused and addressed simultaneously in the operations’ mandate, which often creates confusion and leads to failed strategies and missions. When studying the four cases of HMI selected for my thesis, one of the most flagrant things I have come across is the confusion and overwhelming complexity of each mandate. Humanitarian and logistical operations are interconnected with security and disarmament operations. Troops are expected to escort aid convoys, feed the starving, guard warehouses, but also to disarm warring parties, attack military and political headquarters and patrol safe-zones. The fact that humanitarian objectives are intertwined so closely with political ones, and that peace-enforcement military troops are expected to fulfill this broad array of tasks only adds to the confusion and chaos on the ground. I believe HMI would be much more successful and efficient if the humanitarian aspect of the crises and the political one were addressed as two separate crises, by two different entities. This would help the mandates of each operation be less overwhelming and confused, more

⁴¹⁴ O'Hanlon, Michael E. "Doing It Right: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention." *The Brookings Review* 18.4 (2000): 36.

to the point and concise, thus much more achievable. Each aspect should be addressed by two separate operations, in order to avoid adding chaos in already chaotic situations. HMI should target uniquely the causes of the humanitarian crises (the socio-political factors that led to the crisis in the first place), not the symptoms, while a purely humanitarian mission should address the humanitarian needs of the population in parallel. While the HMI should focus on putting an end to the violence through the launch of peace enforcement missions, the use of coercive measures, disarmament operations and other security operations, the humanitarian component of the crisis (the provision of food, shelter, medication to the population) should be delegated to a new organizational entity established to deliver emergency aid in the active war zones where HMI are taking place. Thomas Weiss in his article “Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome” has advanced the possibility of creating what he refers to as a “UN humanitarian entity.”⁴¹⁵ This entity would be composed of resource and relief specialists, and of a core of soldiers and civilians in possession of both expertise and body armor. The operation in charge of the humanitarian relief would work alongside the HMI and would only be present in war zones. It would replace the NGOs and various UN agencies for the duration of the HMI, since such organizations are usually weak and ill-equipped in the face of violent conflicts and uncomfortable with coercive measures. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs should focus their limited resources on providing humanitarian emergency aid and reconstruction after the ceasefires are declared, after the end of the HMI. For the duration of the HMI however, as Weiss argues, they should “keep their distance until security is re-established.”⁴¹⁶

Another problem with today’s system is that the UN has left the task of deciding how to intervene, how many troops and how much equipment should be committed and what strategy to be used, to governments willing to carry out the intervention (Archibugi 2004). However, as previously discussed, national interests remain the core factor influencing the political will of interveners. As my study has shown, weak political

⁴¹⁵ Weiss, Thomas G. “Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome – Operations Rekindle Hope?” *Global Governance* 1.2 (1995): 182.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid. 185

will on the part of the interveners can often lead to the implementation of weak, insufficient, and inadequate interventions, which was the case in Somalia and Rwanda. Because governments are still ultimately in charge, decisions as to which strategy is followed are taken not on the basis of an assessment of the nature and intensity of the human rights violations but on the basis of the willingness of states to provide the financial and military resources for the intervention. With this in mind, I believe there is a need for the UN to appoint an independent Commission of civilian and military experts whose main role would be to study the crises in depth and prepare accordingly the guidelines and strategies to be used in each case. The role of this Commission would be to understand the socio-political history and situation on the ground and determine the most adequate approach to address each crisis. The last decades have taught us that it is not enough to have a deliberation about when or where to intervene; it is also necessary to develop appropriate strategies that should be put to use during the interventions. What I am suggesting is a division of labour at the international level. The Commission would have the responsibility to decide how the intervention should be organized, and what it should address, in order to avoid the negative consequences of individual governments' weak political will.

The creation of such a body raises two main issues: feasibility and commitment. The creation of international institutions has always brought about skepticism on the part of national governments, usually stemming from a reluctance to commit the funds and expertise necessary for its development and functioning, and to delegate power to an independent entity. Why would a government such as the US, with a well-developed and well-trained staff of military experts, agree to fund and to subject itself to the decisions of a body in which it has no say? First, while national military experts are well trained for war, they have no expertise per se in HMI military strategies, which can lead to the launch of highly inadequate operations. Such operations in return cost governments millions, if not billions of dollars, but do not lead to a stabilization of the situation or the establishment of a secure environment in regions in crisis. In Somalia,

UNOSOM II cost the US and other Western governments \$1,6 billion,⁴¹⁷ but the country fell back into war right after its withdrawal. The creation of the Commission would prevent such waste of resources and money by developing strategies tailored to each case of humanitarian crises. The Commission would therefore help governments save money which would have been spent on inefficient interventions and direct these resources and funds in a more effective, viable way. Regarding the issue of commitment, the goal of the Commission at first would not be to dictate guidelines to governments, which would not be possible anyways, but to provide guidance, more adequate strategies, which military experts may not have thought of or brought forward in the first place. The Commission would help governments and their military experts see the crises in a different light, not from a war or military perspective but from an HMI strategy perspective. It would slowly help shape what HMI entail and how they should be conducted what they should address. By doing so, the independent body would slowly ensure governments' commitment instead of imposing mandatory cooperation from the start.

This study's findings are in line with the recent consensus that attempts to prevent or alleviate mass killings should focus on opposing, restraining or disarming perpetrators of violence and removing them from power (Valentino 2004, Krain 2005). The work I have conducted provides more evidence to suggest the strength and efficiency of such an approach over alternatives such as impartial and purely humanitarian military interventions. If humanitarian intervention treats only the symptoms of conflict and not its causes, should it be done at all? As Taylor interestingly points out, HMI are often criticized on the basis that they prolong wars, make them more violent and politicize aid.⁴¹⁸ The big question, he asks, "is whether these observable problems are inherent to HMI or are a function of the way in which interventions have been conducted so far."⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁷ "United Nations Mission in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)." *UN News Center*. UN, Web. 18 July 2012. <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm>>.

⁴¹⁸ Seybolt, Taylor B. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford UP, 2007. 227.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*

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APPENDIX A SOMALIA

Table 3 Measuring the level of neutrality of the HMI launched in Somalia

<p>Language used in the Security Council resolutions</p>	<p>UNOSOM I:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Res. 751</u>: <i>Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering (...).</i> - <u>Res. 775</u>: <i>Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation (...).</i> <p>UNITAF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Res. 794</u>: <i>Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation (...); Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede the delivery of humanitarian supplies (...).</i> <p>UNOSOM II:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Res. 814</u>: <i>Regretting the continuing incidents of violence in Somalia (...); Deploing the acts of violence against persons engaging in humanitarian efforts (...).</i> - <u>Res. 837</u>: <i>Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (...) on 5 June 1993; strongly condemning such actions (...); Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the United Somali Congress, to incite attacks (...); (...)Committed to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks (...) including (...) their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment; requests the Secretary-General urgently to inquire into the incident with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved.</i>
<p>Mandate of the operations</p>	<p>UNOSOM I</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide a secure a stable environment for UN humanitarian personnel, equipment and supplies; - Escort the delivery of humanitarian aid supplies and coordinate airlift operations to areas with the most urgent needs; - Assist in the provision of relief and rehabilitation aid; - Maintenance of a ceasefire throughout the country;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promotion of the peace process and reconciliation process through consultations with all warring parties in Mogadishu. <p>UNITAF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; - Assist in the re-establishment of a local police and secure the rule of law. <p>UNOSOM II:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Assist in the provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of Somalia; - Assist in the repatriation of refugees and IDPs; - Assist in the re-establishment of Somali police; - Assist with mine-clearance; - Restore peace, stability and order in the country; - Complete an effective programme for disarming all Somali parties.
Means used/tasks performed	<p>UNOSOM I</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Monitoring of the ceasefire; - Provision of escorts for the delivery of humanitarian supplies; - Conduct negotiations with warlords to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian supplies. <p>UNITAF</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Convoy escort and point protection; - Infrastructure repair and maintenance. <p>UNOSOM II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of a civilian peace force; - Issued a warrant for Aidid's arrest; - Attacks on a number of military and political sites controlled by Aidid; - Attacks on weapon storage sites; - Conduct of force operation against Aidid' most influential supporters; - Military confrontation of UNOSOM troops against Aidid.

APPENDIX B RWANDA

Table 4 Measuring the level of neutrality of the HMI launched in Rwanda

<p>Language used in the Security Council resolutions</p>	<p>UNAMIR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Res. 872</u>: <i>Stressing the urgency of an international neutral force in Rwanda (...).</i> - <u>Res. 912</u>: <i>Expressing deep regret at the failure of the parties to implement fully the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement (...); Appalled at the ensuing large-scale violence in Rwanda (...); Deeply concerned by continuing fighting, looting, banditry (...); Expressing its deep concern for the safety and security of UNAMIR and other UN personnel (...).</i> - <u>Res. 918</u>: <i>Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the very numerous killings of civilians (...); Deeply concerned that the situation in Rwanda (...) [which] constitutes a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions; Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict (...); Strongly urging all parties to cease forthwith any incitement (...) to violence or ethnic hatred.</i> <p>Operation Turquoise:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Res. 929</u>: <i>Deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic and widespread killings of the civilian population in Rwanda; Stressing the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an interposition force between the parties; (...) aimed at contributing in an impartial way to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda; Demands that all parties to the conflict (...) immediately bring to an end to all killings (...).</i>
<p>Mandate of the operations</p>	<p>UNAMIR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contribute to the security of the city of Kigali and establish weapons-secure areas; - Monitor the observance of the ceasefire; - Act as intermediary between the parties in attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Monitor the process of repatriation of the refugees and resettlement of displaced persons; - Assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities; - Arms and other military material embargo; - Assist with mine-clearance. <p>Operation Turquoise:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda through the establishment of “humanitarian safe zones”; - Implement the necessary conditions for the ceasefire and for further political negotiations between the Hutu government and the RPF.
Means used/tasks performed	<p>UNAMIR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encourage the process of dialogue between all parties; - Small rescue operations; - Escort of humanitarian convoys; - Point protection; - Daily and nightly patrols; - Deterrence of attacks on large groups of people seeking refuge in Kigali. <p>Operation Turquoise</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of a large safe-zone in south western Rwanda.

APPENDIX C HAITI

Table 5 Measuring the level of neutrality of the HMI launched in Haiti

<p>Language used in the Security Council resolutions</p>	<p>Operation Uphold Democracy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Res. 940: Condemning the continuing disregard of those agreements by the illegal de facto regime, and the regime's refusal to cooperate with efforts by the United Nations (...) to bring about their implementation; Reaffirming the goal of the international community remains the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide (...).</i>
<p>Mandate of the operation</p>	<p>Operation Uphold Democracy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Restoration of democracy in Haiti and to prompt the return of elected President Aristide; - Facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement; - Sustain the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protect international personnel and installations - Assist in the Professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and create a separate police force.
<p>Means used/tasks performed</p>	<p>Operation Uphold Democracy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Diplomatic talks and negotiations; - Deployment of over 20,000 troops dispatched to the island; - Restoration of electrical supply, repair and maintenance of roads; - Assist in the dissolution of the Armed Forces; - Disarmament operations and destruction of weapons; - Destruction of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH).

APPENDIX D EAST TIMOR

Table 6 Measuring the level of neutrality of the HMI launched in East Timor

<p>Language used in the Security Council resolutions</p>	<p>INTERFET:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Res. 1264: Deeply concerned by the deteriorating in the security situation in East Timor, and in particular by the continuing violence against and large-scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians; Deeply concerned also at the attacks on the staff and premises of the UNAMET (...), Appalled by the worsening humanitarian situation in East Timor (...), Expressing its concern at reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have been committed in East Timor, and stressing that persons committing such violations bear individual responsibility; Condemns all acts of violence in East Timor, calls for their immediate end and demands that those responsible for such acts be brought to justice.</i>
<p>Mandate of the operation</p>	<p>INTERFET:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Restore peace and security in East Timor; - Protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks; - Facilitate assistance operations.
<p>Means used/tasks performed</p>	<p>INTERFET</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Raid of military compounds and confiscation of weapons; - Gain control over the capital and over main roads and towns; - Defeat militias and the TNI and drive them back to West Timor; - Patrolling to deter militia attacks and activities; - Disrupt militia activities and force them away from towns; - Reconstruction of roads and public utilities - Protection of aid sticks and escort of aid convoys.