THE ACTIVE POLICE ORGANIZATION:
COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING AT HALTON REGIONAL
THE YEARS 1980 TO 1995

BY

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The opportunity to do research into an organization’s philosophy and practice is not something usually given without considerable thought. It is not something that the researcher should ever treat without the utmost respect. The opportunity to study a fine organization, one that is on the leading edge with respect to the subject under consideration is very special too. If one studies a poorly-managed, ineffective service it may be easy to find flaws and make simplistic suggestions, so easy that it limits understanding and does not force the researcher to really examine theoretical questions and empirical patterns. I have had the good fortune both to secure the opportunity to study the Halton Regional Police Service and to examine a first-rate organization. I wish to thank chiefs Harding and Campbell, deputies Barratt, Middaugh and Jessop, staff sergeants Okuloski, Eaton and Kingston, sergeants Cota and Lippman, constables Smith, Walker and Ribble, Mrs. Macro and other HRPS officers and staff, past and present, for providing me this opportunity. I hope that they find this report interesting and useful.

The Halton Regional Police Service, as indicated in this report, is still very much evolving as an organization and still very much elaborating its community-based policing thrusts. I hope to be able to continue doing research on these developments since I view what is happening there to be indicative of the future for modern progressive policing.

I wish also to thank the Solicitor General Canada for providing the basic funding for this project.

I am very grateful for the hospitality
provided me while I was in the field in the Halton area by my two brothers, Jim Clairmont (and his wife Marianne) in Hamilton and Bob Clairmont (and his partner Betty) in Burlington.
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

*Chapter One:*  
**INTRODUCTION** 1  
Here the place of HRPS in Community Policing in Canada is discussed, the stages of its CBP evolution are noted and the thesis of this report is given.

*Chapter Two:*  
**CBP AND LEADERSHIP: MODERN POLICE MANAGEMENT** 6  
Here there is a review of the theory and practice of community-based policing. Also in that context contemporary writings about leadership, especially leadership in police organizations, are discussed.

*Chapter Three:*  
**THE POLICING ENVIRONMENT** 16  
Here there is a description of Halton Regional as a policing environment and of the policing infrastructure of HRPS, that is its size, structure, and the demands it faces (e.g., calls for service, crime levels). Changes over the period 1980 to 1995 are noted and the current situation is detailed.

*Chapter Four:*  
**CBP INITIATIVES IN THE 1980S** 30  
Here there is discussion and analyses concerning the establishment of community policing as an explicit philosophy at
HRPS. The various experiments in CBP are noted as well as how the organization implemented and responded to these changes. In particular here there is discussion of the split-platoon model and of the village constable system.

Chapter Five:
The Halton Model of CBP.............. 55

Here there is focus on what came to be known as the Halton model of CBP where the emphasis was on community directed patrol with all patrol officers and all ranks involved in policing designated communities and working with community consultative committees. Here too related topics are explored such as comparisons with other Canadian police systems as regards resources and police structures, the valuation of proactive and reactive policing styles at HRPS, and internal assessments of the Halton model.

Chapter Six:
Preparing for the Future: Elaborating CBP91

Here there is discussion of the current elaboration of CBP being undertaken at HRPS, its 'phase three.' The proposed 'team policing' approach is discussed and especially the processes of its planning and implementation. The challenges facing HRPS's CBP initiatives are specified.

Chapter Seven:
Conclusion: Looking Backward and Forward113

Here there is a brief overview of HRPS’s experience with Community-based Policing.
APPENDICES

Here there is an in-depth comparison of the village constable system in several jurisdictions, highlighting that in Halton Regional. Also there is some documentation relating to the phase three elaboration of CBP at HRPS.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

THIS ORGANIZATION DOES A LOT OF PROGRESSIVE THINGS NOT DONE IN OTHER POLICE ORGANIZATIONS AND YOU'RE PART OF IT. CANADA DOES BETTER THAN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA ON THE WHOLE IS MORE PROGRESSIVE IN POLICING THAN THE UNITED STATES, AND HALTON REGIONAL IS ONE OF THE BEST IN CANADA (Chief P. Campbell, June 1995, addressing HRPS’s NCOs).

The Halton Regional Police Service (hereafter HRPS) is well-recognized within Canadian policing circles and indeed beyond Canada as a leader in the implementation of the modern policing philosophy, community-based policing (hereafter CBP). British Columbia’s Oppal Inquiry cited HRPS as one of the few police services in North America which has "successfully adopted and implemented community-based policing" (Oppal, 1994, IX). It has been similarly cited in Murphy’s "The Development, Impact and Implications of Community Policing in Canada" (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988, 18) and was reported by Clairmont to be one of less than a handful of Canadian police departments where CBP has been implemented "in an integrated, thorough-going fashion" (1991, 470). Earlier Loree had written about its pioneering initiatives in the Canadian context (Loree, 1988). HRPS has also been well acclaimed as a progressive police organization – indeed a model for other police forces – in the media (see for example,
TORONTO, July 1989; Globe and Mail, Toronto, November 23, 26, 1990). Despite these citations it is interesting and quite surprising that there has not yet been a detailed study of the HRPS’s experiences in community-based policing.

There is little doubt that the leadership of the HRPS over the past 15 years has considered this police organization to be among the most progressive in Canada. While the past chief and the current chief might be seen as having common reference points for this claim of progressiveness, namely similar mission statements, commitment to the CBP philosophy and support for employment equity, multiculturalism and civilianization, there have been differences in emphases. The former chief especially related developments in HRPS to larger societal trends and policies. It could be said that he utilized his position as a 'bully box' to champion a vision of progressive policing. In annual reports (e.g., 1988 and 1989) he wrote about the national and international attention that HRPS had achieved, cited departmental 'firsts' and referred to the striving 'to be the best' not only in CBP programs but also in advancing societal ideals (e.g., multiculturalism, race relations) and in regards to investigative software techniques and other technology. The current chief has also emphasized the 'leading edge' character of HRPS but he has focused thus far in his short tenure (i.e., two years) more on how the organization actually works and the linkages it has with local government, agencies and community groups. He has been especially sensitive to the actual substantive day-to-day operation of HRPS. In many ways he combines a human relations approach to management with a sophisticated sense of organizational development. Clearly both chiefs have staked
out claims for HRPS as a police organization of excellence - both explicitly have strived for the recognition and both have publicly advanced the claim that HRPS is at the forefront as a modern policing service.

As shall be detailed below there is certainly some justification for the claim that HRPS has been on the leading edge as a modern police organization. It has been an active organization, responding to challenges that many police organizations have not even recognized as challenges. Compared with other police forces it has been a well-managed police organization, generally reviewing/auditing its innovations, open to external critics and consultants, and sensitive to 'best practices' elsewhere. HRPS has had virtually all the specializations and technologies associated with sophisticated police departments (e.g., marine unit, canine unit, victims unit, auxiliary unit, specialized services, use of video technology, mobile digital terminals). And HRPS has been among the leaders in CBP. It experimented with the split-platoon model of CBP, roughly half the officers on proactive assignment and half on reactive work, several years before the New York Police Department did so (in both cases the initiative was a rather dismal failure). HRPS has been a leader in North America in developing an extensive system of village constables policing from 'storefronts,' and in forging consultative and funding partnerships with the public, other public agencies and the private sector. It has pioneered, at least in Canada, a number of proactive programs for elders and for children and youth. Its recent foray into team policing, drawing upon contemporary management ideas of self-directed work teams, has apparently captured much interest in policing circles. In general HRPS has been pursuing the vision of CBP in a developmental sense, trying
out versions and moving on, 'but not throwing in the towel,' when these did not measure up to expectations. And as shall be seen each version or step has been an improvement both in conception and in implementation. But however substantive its progressive claims may be, the most important point is that the HRPS leadership has taken up the challenge of striving for excellence and that image has become part of the HRPS culture and 'presentation of self.' Rank and file officers are conscious of the HRPS reputation and while they may frequently bemoan it ('why are we always in the vanguard?'), it does also provide them with leverage in advancing their interests in the organization.

In sum there are good grounds for studying HRPS as a police organization of excellence in relation to the modern philosophy of CBP. It is significant that these initiatives apparently have not come at the expense of conventional policing objectives nor with large budgetary outlays. HRPS has excellent technology and has been among the leading police organizations in Canada in acquiring investigative tools such as video imaging, HOLMES software, video taping of investigative interviews and so forth. Its clearance rates for various offences have been better than average in the Canadian context. It has had a very low police to population ratio. Moreover HRPS has been quite effective in the field of public relations. A police-based chorus was established in 1984 and a police-sponsored Pipe and Drums in 1987; both organizations, basically self-supporting, continue to exist. The HRPS has sponsored annual media awards for local media work in the field of policing and crime; here awards are given to individuals and different types of media for "contributions to the maintenance of law and order or public safety" (e.g., best
police photo, best police news story, best police television broadcast). And not least, since 1985 HRPS has published an annual report which is of high quality and informative with respect to crime rates, prevention efforts and other HRPS activity. Clearly it is worthwhile probing for how deep and pervasive the HRPS success is. This is particularly the case since HRPS polices one of the wealthiest and most ethnoculturally homogeneous areas in urban Canada. Many outside observers, knowledgeable in policing, would be quick to say, that its jurisdiction is 'easy to police.' And indeed there does not appear to have been a major crime problem or social order problem or, until recently, financial exigency problem that has especially propelled the HRPS development. Under these conditions one might anticipate that given effective leadership with a sensitivity to modern developments in policing and in management theory, much could be accomplished. On the other hand the absence of the above precipitative pressures could result in the veneer of change rather than substantive and interesting change. The absence of crises has meant that the major factors in the evolution of HRPS's CBP have been especially cultural or ideational (e.g., the status of CBP philosophy and other management philosophies in policing circles) and leadership styles. These areas will be discussed in the next chapter.

It is the thesis of this monograph that in many respects HRPS is indeed a good case study for excellence in policing. CBP however is just one feature of the HRPS organization, albeit an important one in the organization’s 'presentation of self', and it is problematic whether as a everyday policing operation HRPS, at its core in the patrol division, has yet realized an impressive, effective CBP style – a CBP style which is pervasive and integrated throughout the organization, with a high level
of commitment to it by field officers and a truly supportive management system emphasizing appropriate training, performance evaluation and flexible work and compensation practices. There have been three quite distinct stages in HRPS’s elaboration of CBP. These will be discussed in depth below but in summary form here they are;

(a) the 1980s where there was significant experimentation and where the central focus of CBP was the village constable initiative supplemented with a host of excellent specific proactive initiatives;

(b) 1990 to 1995 where what was known widely as the ‘Halton Model’ was implemented; this model featured the village constable, community directed patrol and community consultation committees, again supplemented by a host of excellent specific proactive initiatives; and

(c) the present day or the third stage of CBP with its greater emphasis on team policing and decentralized decision-making.

The current CBP elaboration at HRPS holds out much promise. The new leadership style brings a more sophisticated organizational development and human relations approach to HRPS while retaining the previous leadership’s commitment to the CBP philosophy and to an explicit pursuit of excellence. At the same time the new leadership’s inheritance is mixed. As a symbol CBP often elicits a sour reaction among HRPS officers, even if they might generally agree with most of its thrusts. Financial restraint has now become a significant factor both in possibly compelling a leaner organization and also in perhaps
effecting a negative atmosphere or receptivity for change since officers’ compensation packages may be eroding. HRPS has pursued the CBP vision for some time and each of the above phases has been built on lessons learned from the previous ones. There clearly has been a developmental sequence here. If HRPS can effect the kind of CBP system it is now advancing its claim to excellence not only as a police organization but as a national and even international leader in CBP would be very strong indeed.
Chapter Two  
CBP AND LEADERSHIP: MODERN POLICE MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Since 1980 the Halton Regional Police Service (HRPS) has been embarked upon the course of community-based policing (hereafter CBP). This policing philosophy, as an alternative to so-called "professional policing," has four essential components, namely a broadened conception of the police role in society (going well beyond law enforcement), a more extensive and intensive policing partnership with communities of interest (neighbourhood, minority, victim and other), more elaborate networking with other parts of local government, and a cultural and structural reorganization of the policing organization itself (Clairmont, 1991). Advocates of community-based policing have often emphasized that to be successful in implementation and impact, a police department committed to this philosophy must engage in profound change which encompasses the entire organization. "Hived off," departmentally

1 While it clearly made sense to refer to a model or paradigm of 'professional policing' in contrast to earlier eras in modern policing, it is most unfortunate that 'community-based policing' is often juxtaposed to 'professional policing.' No serious advocate of community policing would envisage less professionalism; rather community-based policing is best seen as a reinterpretation of professional policing.
marginal experiments, putative changes in the policing role unaccompanied by changes in performance evaluation, and community outreach without alteration of organizational decision-making mechanisms (e.g., decentralization), are the kinds of initiatives that have been subject to convincing criticism (see Kelling, 1985) as not representing the new philosophy in significant depth.

To transform an organization from one that is traditionally–oriented, quasi-militaristically–managed and relatively impermeable to external policy collaboration, to one that can fully embody the community–based policing philosophy is clearly a formidable task. And just as clearly it requires committed and effective leadership. Leadership has to be of the sort that can overcome vested interests, bureaucratic rigidities and subcultural traditions within the organization. Strategies of the ‘carrot and the stick’ must be simultaneously implemented since vision and determination must complement one another (Sparrow, 1988). Forging a new relationship with the larger society, whether with local policing authorities and other components of municipal administration or with the various publics and interests, may require still other types of leadership skills, perhaps a different persona on the part of a chief and his/her close associates in change. Indeed I have argued elsewhere that at least two different styles of ‘chief and top management’ appear necessary and sequential, in order to effect a thorough-going CBP in a large police organization (Clairmont, 1993).

HRPS has become one of the leading Canadian departments exemplifying the philosophy of community-based policing. Internal organizational changes have been extensive as the department at times radically reorganized its patrol division (e.g., the
split platoon), investigative specializations (e.g., downsizing) and management structure (e.g., crime prevention sergeants in all districts); in addition it has attempted to effect a more participatory decision-making structure within the department. External linkages have been emphasized including closer collaboration with other municipal departments, community consultative committees, auxiliaries, voluntary support groups and other innovative programs. HRPS has been particularly active since the late 1980s in the area of race relations and multiculturalism, establishing new programs, departmental positions and liaison linkages. More than almost any other department in Canada it has been very active in virtually all practical aspects of CBP. And it has quite explicitly advanced an image as being on the leading edge of CBP.

Studies such as Langworthy (1986) have indicated that police chiefs’ ideology and motivation may be the most crucial factor in shaping the police organization whether in the traditional para-military style or otherwise. Legality and convention have combined to make the chief's role in Canadian police organizations pivotal for any change in the service (see Crosby, 1982; Nova Scotia Police Commission, 1982; Clairmont, 1990). The evolution of leadership at HRPS is also relevant since there have been two chiefs in the period under review here, each chief having a distinct style of leadership and a different though congruent set of priorities. In addition the chiefs have faced quite different challenges to their largely common vision of community-based policing and have mobilized organizational resources differently. To a significant extent HRPS's elaboration of community-based policing requires an appreciation of how these distinct phases both retained and advanced an integral philosophy of
policing and the progressive policing organization. It is the thesis here that both chiefs have been committed to the community-based policing philosophy and, explicitly, to establishing the department as a centre of excellence in policing circles. At the same time the first chief's primary thrust was on defining a vision of a modern proactive policing organization. His successor at HRPS, having inherited a department with that characterization has been especially focused on meeting external, largely financial challenges, and his perspective vis-à-vis HRPS internally might be better characterized as a 'human relations' one (Swanson, et al., 1988). Here though categorization fails since the new chief also appears more sophisticated in an organizational development sense, a required skill/sensitivity if community policing is to be fully realized at HRPS. The kind of transformation in policing organization implied by community-based policing and modern management theory would seem to require such a serial fusion of different leadership styles. Indeed it could well be argued, analogous to the more general issue of the institutionalization of cultural change (see Bennett, 1967), that at least three 'generations' or 'chiefs' committed to the common vision but securing and emphasizing it in different though congruent ways, are required.  

2 In any significant organizational change the leadership may well extend beyond the top executive or chief. The chief will have to have a supporting cast, whether at the senior management level or down further in the organization. In the case of HRPS both chiefs had strong allies among top and middle
THE CHALLENGE OF CBP AND MODERN POLICE MANAGEMENT

It is clear that CBP has now become the 'official morality' for modern-day Canadian policing; it has been designated as the preferred type of policing by federal and provincial governments and leading police organizations (see Solicitor General Ontario, 1989; Normandeau and Leighton, 1990; Solicitor General Canada, 1990. It is mandated though not detailed in the Ontario Police Act which regulates the HRPS and guides its Police Services Board. At the same time it is also clear (1) that its implementation and impact have been quite modest to date (Clairmont, 1991, 1993; Hornick, Leighton and Burrows, 1993). The Canadian experience in this regard is little different than that in Britain (Fielding, et al., 1990; Irving, et al., 1989) and the United States (Klockars, 1991; Mastrofski, 1991A, Cordner and Greene, 1994). Indeed there is increasing suggestion in the literature and in policing circles that CBP might be passé, yielding to a more fiscally constrained and sharply delimited philosophy of policing (Mastrofski, 1991B, Hoover, 1992) or else has been comfortably absorbed by police organizations without having a long term impact.

management, allies, especially in the Harding era, who were responsible for significant CBP innovation. To some degree the contribution of these latter have been neglected in this monograph. At the same time as noted above, the chiefs in Canadian police organizations, for reasons of law and of cultural tradition, are especially pivotal as compared with the top managers of other public services and agencies.
Such rumours of impending death seem very premature and are perhaps evidence more of faddism and neophilia in contemporary thinking. But they also indicate how difficult it has been in practice to transform police organizations and policing styles.

CBP, as operationally defined above, developed from specific important pressures, police interests and police research findings (see Clairmont, 1991). It has been readily linked in theory with greater professionalism via the themes of decentralization and the constable generalist role (Forcese, 1993), with the quality of working life movement (Clairmont, 1990), with what analogously to Etzioni's (1968) 'active society' might be termed 'the active modern organization proactively involved with its environment' (Reiss, 1985; Levine, 1985), with the pursuit of excellence organizationally (Couper, et al., 1991), and with effective accountability and order maintenance success (Kelling, 1982, 1985, 1988; Trojanowicz, 1989). In light of these theoretical rationales and the 'official morality' status noted above, why has there been such modest implementation and why are there rumours of CBP's demise?

The challenges to CBP and its associated changed police organization evidently are formidable. There has been significant internal resistance from those enjoying high status in the conventional police organization, namely the detective division, the platoon inspectors, and front-line supervisors (see Sparrow, 1988). Moreover constables as well as other officers often have resisted any change in their required job tasks that could ensnare them further in role ambiguity; and beyond the responsibility of law enforcement, there does tend to be considerable ambiguity associated with the police role (see Potts, 1982).
Moreover top police management, while often introducing CBP with a job enrichment rationale, has not successfully persuaded field level officers that CBP will improve the quality of their working lives and further empower them. The police subculture, and indeed according to Klockars (1985) the whole way policing is defined and legitimated both by police and citizens alike, work against such a transformation; as Klockars put it: "the contextual and ideological changes required [for CBP and related change] are unattainable."

Sherman (1985, 400) has suggested that achieving the new vision of policing would require greater police professionalism and an effective national police organization in order to resist local political pressures better and transcend reactive policing.

Involving the community as a meaningful partner in policing policy has met with considerable resistance too. What is the role of the community in directing police activity apart from the formal legal and administrative structures already in place? Little, it appears. Some of this resistance is within the policing organization itself (see Walker, et al., 1991). Reiss (1985) has observed that a long-term commitment to developing a style of policing that is receptive to community involvement and open to change is required; still, in his view "it is very difficult to involve and sustain the involvement of communities and it definitely requires decentralization and even then the problems may lie beyond [police leaders'] scope" (1985, 65). Hoover and others have argued persuasively the public wants "an efficient, competent, bureaucratic response and nothing more" (Hoover, 1992, 14); in his view CBP suggests neighbourhood management and the practicality of that implementation is low since police resist it and have neither the resources nor
skills to do it.

Currently academic-based police researchers appear rather skeptical about the impact of CBP and its future significance. At a 1994 international conference in Montreal on measuring and evaluating CBP there was a general angst as commentators considered evaluations to be poor to date and new experiments with new criteria to be unlikely; indeed the most dramatic positive presentation concerned New York PD's experiment with the split platoon model, an innovation subsequently shelved because management found it too divisive in the platoons. Generally too there is among academics the assessment that CBP has only been of modest impact on modern policing. Cordner and Greene (1994) claim implementation has been spotty and the impact modest in the United States; indeed Greene's view (1994) is that it has been comfortably absorbed into American policing with little impact. And Mastrofski (1994) has argued that the police are still working pretty much the same way in the field as prior to CBP; in his view there have been small gains such as "producing police who have better interactions with the public" (some police commentators and managers might well characterize such a gain as significant, not small).

There remains much confusion about what would constitute a significant implementation of CBP. Certainly not Crime Stoppers or Neighbourhood Watch since these fine programs entail no major change in patrol structure and functioning nor in the organization's external relationships. In addition to the latter considerations it would seem that the depth of involvement with community organizations and interests and the acceptance of a proactive problem solving thrust by field officers, and its measurement and being credited by the police organization, would be central aspects
of a meaningful implementation.

Nowadays it does seem that there are three significant developments in policing that have an impact on CBP. One development, akin to the 'tough love' movement, ties ideas of CBP more closely to fighting crime and the reactive priority of restoring temporary peace and order. It involves aggressive watchman style policing that entails enforcement of bylaws bearing on civility and orderliness as well as more intrusive crime fighting (e.g., stop and search). This style has been championed of late in the United States (see TIME, January 16, 1996 for New York PD). In this perspective proactive policing and community consultation are salient but limited and instrumental not ends in themselves. Another development has been occasioned by fiscal pressures and sees the retrenchment of policing to a more minimalist style (Hoover, 1992) in contradistinction to the expansive police role implied in much literature on CBP. This perspective is compatible with privatization as well as with the idea that policing is a community responsibility in which the police may not be central (see Shearing, 1993).

A third development is where police organizations still wrestle with elaborating CBP in the sense of community partnerships, and giving proactive policing equal priority with response and enforcement in patrol; this latter has been the style in Calgary, Halifax and of course Halton Regional. It is an approach that may be fading. Bailey has argued (1994) that where the focus is fiscal (as now seems to be the case for HRPS and most other police services) the police organization is more inward looking, less open to CBP and less likely to spawn devolution; where the focus is impact/output, the police organization is more outward looking, more open to CBP and more likely to spawn devolution. It is interesting
in this context to examine the current process of CBP elaboration at HRPS.

LEADERSHIP

In light of the above observations the task facing modern police leadership oriented to CBP is obviously daunting. Added to the typical leadership responsibilities (see Swanson et al., 1985) is the challenge of effecting major organizational transformation. Nevertheless, in reviewing several works dealing with recent organizational change in large police departments, Huff (1987) observed that such organizations are "more malleable than one might think and it is leadership not structural features that makes the critical difference;" he added that "while changing a police department may sometimes be reminiscent of 'bending granite' as Dorothy Guyot (1979) has suggested, even this task can be accomplished by a leader with vision and the skills to articulate and implement that vision" (Huff, 1987, 508/509).

Clearly much modern leadership 'theory' has emphasized the concepts, 'vision' and 'transformational leadership' and celebrated an assertive, dynamic striving for excellence. Vision, defined by Bennis and Nanus (1985) in terms of providing a clear, communicable direction, a future-oriented selection of 'the angle into wind' (237), appears to be the sine qua non of transformational leadership; Souryal for example even quotes the Old Testament, "where there is no vision the people perish" (Souryal, 1985, 76). While the requisite accompanying characteristics are less unambiguously stated – some writers talk of leadership skills while others emphasize power in the sense of drive and energy (Bennis and Nanus, 1985, 18) and most stress some personal characteristics such as perseverance, integrity.
and courage (Swanson, 1988; Bryman, 1992) – it is clear that mobilizing support and commitment within the organization is especially important. Here current writings sometimes refer to charisma or, more specifically, articulating the vision and 'staking a claim for excellence' which is communicated through a variety of tactics including 'management by moving around' (Peters and Austin, 1985; Bryman, 1992). In general it is contended that transformative leadership will be most successful where there is a starting point of strong pressure both externally and internally for change (Swanson, 1988) and that the transformative leader finds it easier to promulgate a vision of change in times of crisis and uncertainty (Bryman, 1992, 158).

Applied to policing organizations and CBP these ideas on transformational leadership suggest a number of important themes. Clearly as Potts has indicated the leader will have to be an educator and a persuader, persuading "officers that social service is a vital part of their job, that they have a social mission that extends beyond law enforcement, namely the preservation of social order" (Potts, 1982, 187). Mobilizing support within the organization and involving subordinates in joint decision-making ('empowering' associates in current jargon) will be another major task; such a task will be difficult since delegation is reportedly one of the least common facets of police managers' leadership styles (Kuykendall, et al., 1982) and most police managers and supervisors, while preferring a more participative system, characterize their own organization as 'benevolent–authoritative' (Bruns, et al., 1988). The police leader too will have to become more active as a municipal officer, a public policy maker and implementer effecting community involvement and police receptivity to it. Referring to this
'networking,' Levine observed: "their role [top police managers] will have to change from that of a commander of a closed hierarchy to that of an arranger of interorganizational networks" (Levine, 1985, 699). Certainly where there has been strong evidence of effective transformational police leadership there also has been evidence of strong collaborative linkages being forged with other part of the municipal government system (see Couper, et al., 1991).

Other implications of transformative leadership for police organizations may relate to the challenge of effecting both internal and external change and the sequencing of such efforts. Given among other things the expectation of stiff resistance within the organization and the tendency for people in different organizations to expect different leadership styles (Rosenfeld, 1973), the type of leadership effective internally may not be the type that is effective externally; for instance it has been observed that the way a police leader 'comes across' (e.g., inviting, empathetic) may be more significant in external relations with the media and city officials (Swanson, et al., 1988, 134). Also it would seem, given the ambiguity of the police role beyond law enforcement and the long term police commitment apparently required for community involvement (Reiss, 1985), that the foremost task of transformational leadership in the police organization would be internal change. Clearly leadership has to overcome the divide between management culture and field police culture (see for example Reuss-Ianni, 1983) as well as deal with the problems already noted.

It appears that there may be distinct phases in transforming an organization's philosophy and practice, distinct phases that require distinct leadership styles. The initial phase might well require a leader with
a vision, a bully box leader who can aggressively advance a transformation. However there are costs to be paid associated with transforming an organization and sometimes too the visionary may be less effective in organizational development and human relations skills; accordingly a different type of leader may be required in the second phase where gains are consolidated and the transformation 'worked out.' That second phase leadership may require a person who has the latter skills of human relations and organizational development.

Tolstoy drew a distinction that may be applicable here between the hedgehog and the fox, where the hedgehog doggedly pursues a vision come hell or high water while the fox is more attuned to nuances in implementation and circumstance. In sum then different leadership styles may be appropriate in different phases of the putative transformation.

In the case of HRPS and CBP it does appear that the style of the first chief was that of the hedgehog while that of the second chief could be characterized as that of the fox. In the former instance there were no apparent crises causing the CBP transformation. Rather it was triggered by the vision of the chief and his desire to have a department of excellence in the vanguard of progressive policing, considered then to be CBP. He achieved much especially in respect to resource mobilization, establishing a subculture and management team oriented to his goals, and in securing the image for HRPS that he sought after. It is less clear how successful he was in effecting deep significant organizational change and commitment. The current chief faces different circumstances, especially financially less favorable circumstances. But he exhibits much of the leadership style required in the second phase as argued above. He emphasizes teamwork, participation and customer
orientation not just as principles but in practice. He is, as Couper and Lobitz (1991) recommend in their discussion of quality leadership, a coach and a facilitator. That appears to be what HRPS requires in this phase of its elaboration of CBP.
"HALTON IS GENERALLY WEALTHY, INCLUDES IN ITS BOUNDARIES TWO OF CANADA'S RICHEST TOWNS (OAKVILLE AND BURLINGTON) AND ITS POPULATION IS MORE THAN 90% WHITE." (TORONTO, JULY 1989).

On January 1, 1974 the Ontario Provincial Government created the regional municipality of Halton. The regional authority was to exercise policing jurisdiction over a very wide geographical area (see Figure 1) encompassing some 381 square miles and a population of 213,000. The regional system introduced was a two-tiered system of government since there remained a lower tier of authority namely the four constitutive municipalities of The City of Burlington, The Town of Oakville, The Town of Milton and The Town of Halton Hills.

The Halton Region in 1980 had a population of approximately 250,000. The Region of course is part of one of the most populous and rapidly growing areas in Canada, namely Southern Ontario. Throughout its short history Halton Region has witnessed significant population growth (but perhaps modest growth in comparison to some other less affluent and more ethnoculturally heterogeneous sections of Southern Ontario). By the end of the decade it hovered around a total of 300,000 persons and by 1995 it neared 350,000. Halton Region is well-known for its high level of affluence. Both Oakville and Burlington have commonly been included in lists of the top ten Canadian cities on the criterion of household or family income. Milton is a prosperous area as well. The Region is quite ethnoculturally homogeneous
in comparison to neighbouring Metropolitan Toronto or Hamilton-Wentworth, having proportionally fewer persons of Eastern European ancestry and especially fewer visible minorities; also, as Loree (1988, 213) observed, the population, compared with Canada as a whole, is very well educated. Under these circumstances, from a policing perspective one could expect modest crime and social order problems on the one hand but, on the other hand, perhaps a more demanding public and one that would expect its police service to be progressive and in the vanguard.

Criminal code offenses declined sharply over the years 1981 to 1986 (i.e., from 9205 to 6540), showed modest increase in the period 1987 to 1989 (largely due to increases in 'theft under' and property damage) then increased significantly in 1990-1991 with sharp rises in more serious crimes such as break and enter, 'theft over' and sex offences. In recent years the level of criminal code offences (actual) has declined and then remained stable (Annual Reports, 1992, 1993). In comparison to other Ontario policing jurisdictions, HRPS has had a lower criminal offences per officer ratio and especially a lower rate of violent crimes per officer (see below). Overall criminal code offences since 1984 have not kept up to population growth. Calls for service did increase over the years 1983 to 1989 but since then they have declined at a corresponding rate, graphically representing a modest arc (see Figure 2). It is unclear however whether the calls for service figures, culled from HRPS's Annual Reports, take fully into account the services provided through the activities of HRPS's
In 1974 the HRPS employed 205 sworn members and 45 civilians but at that time the Ontario Provincial Police continued to provide policing (until 1975) for part of the region (i.e., Acton and two townships). By 1990 these numbers had increased to 372 sworn members and 144 civilians (Annual Report, 1990). The increase in employees since 1975 was greater than the roughly 50% growth in the Region’s population over the same period; accordingly then the staff to population ratio increased by about 10 percent until 1990 when it began to decrease (see Figures 3 and 4 for the period 1985-1994). It can be seen that the number of civilian employees grew three-fold between 1974 and 1990 compared to the doubling of sworn members over that period. As a result HRPS became the most civilianized large police force in Ontario (Clairmont and Murphy, 1991, 8). Since 1990 the ratio of civilians to sworn members has slightly declined (see Table 2). The number of female sworn members also increased during the 1980s, reaching fifty (48 constables and 2 sergeants) or 14 percent in 1990, higher than the average for large Canadian municipalities. By 1994 there were over 60 female officers, accounting for 15% of the

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3 One deputy chief suggested that both calls for service and reported crimes would have been 'diminished' by the use of voice mail and personal contact in the community police storefronts. Also it is important to note that Halton is part of the populous Southern Ontario region (circa 7 million people) and linked by major highways to the larger metropolitan areas which bring significant transient crime to the municipality.
total sworn members. Interestingly HRPS in addition to having comparatively high levels of civilians and female officers also has a rather young complement of officers. In 1995 there were 63 officers between the ages of 23 and 29, 185 age 30-39, 113 age 40-49, and only 21 age 50 or more. The impact of the 'Social Contract' and other government budget cutbacks has been to spawn a large number of early retirements or buy-outs. In 1995/96 more older officers (especially supervisory officers) left HRPS and a number of new recruits were taken on, with the result that HRPS has an even younger age profile now.

For policing purposes the region of Halton is divided into three districts that conform to municipal boundaries. Each district is divided into uniform patrol and detective divisions. District #1 is responsible for the policing of Halton Hills and Milton; although the smallest district in terms of population it includes more than two-thirds of the total regional area. In 1985 it had a population of about 65,000, was directed by an inspector and had a total HRPS staff complement of 73 police and 11 civilians. District #2 covers the town of Oakville which in 1985 had a population of about 83,000. In 1985 it was directed by a staff inspector and inspector and had a complement of 74 police and 10 civilians. The most populous district, district #3, served 116,000 in 1985. There a staff inspector and an inspector directed a complement of 96 officers and 10 civilians. By 1995 the population of the three districts had reached 73,000, 128,000 and 139,000 respectively.

In addition to the districts there is a Regional CID (or CIB) which was constituted in 1983; previously all detectives were in the districts and there was no formal coordinating body. In 1985 CID was directed by an inspector and had a complement of 14 police and 4
Units reporting directly to the chief in 1985 included the Support Services Division (18 police and 37 civilians in 1985), Administrative Services (39 civilians), Executive Office, Intelligence, Complaints, Planning, Community Relations, Public Relations, and Crime Prevention (all told the latter seven units in 1985 had 21 police and 7 civilians). Finally there was in 1985 a staff operations unit (e.g., joint forces, explosives) which had a complement of 10 officers and reported directly to the single deputy chief. In 1987 HRPS was reorganized (see Annual Report 1987). There were a number of modest changes that went along with the shift to a two deputy system (i.e., deputy Staff Operations and deputy Administrative Services).

Over time a number of other organizational changes were introduced as new specializations developed and specific units or functions were transferred; for example direction of crime prevention eventually was moved to the district level. While the HRPS continued to adjust itself organizationally to new circumstances it has clearly exhibited much continuity in organizational structure and resource (human and otherwise) allocation since 1987. The allocation of manpower and budget (see Figures 5 and 6) has provided more resources to the more populated and busy (measured by criminal offences and calls for service) districts. Even more equitably than it did in 1980 though district #3, Burlington, could make a case for a somewhat greater share on these two criteria. As coordination and planning have become more important and as new CBP initiatives (e.g., DARE, Children Safety Village) have been launched, it is not surprising that the budget allocation to central offices, HRPS Region, has increased vis-à-vis the districts, a trend which has
continued in the 1994-95 period (see Figures 5 and 6).

Providing overall direction for HRPS is the Halton Regional Police Services Board (earlier referred to officially as the Board of Commissioners of Police). This board is made up of elected municipal officials and appointees advanced by the Government of Ontario. It has been from all accounts an active, supportive body for the police and as Figure 8 shows it presided over a significant increase in the per capita cost of policing until the budget crisis of the Ontario Government's 'Social Contract' program.

Nowadays large governmental debt loads and management cultures advocating stringent manpower strategies have combined to effect considerable financial restraint on policing and other public sector organizations. As will be detailed below HRPS has always had a low staff to population ratio compared to other policing services. Since 1990 the ratio of staff and of sworn members per 1000 population has fallen back to 1984/5 levels and projections are for that trend to continue over the next several years (see Table 2) as HRPS deals with the phasing-out of the 'social contract' (see below) and perhaps other imminent governmental budget cutbacks. Already wage freezes and budget restrictions for overtime, court time and so forth have caused some significant erosion of staff compensation. While police work at HRPS remains clearly in the so-called central work world characterized by good wages, excellent fringe benefits, rules and associations protecting members from arbitrary management, and internal job ladders based largely on formal promotional routines, members have experienced some decline in compensation and promotional opportunities; certainly that is how the vast majority of them appear to perceive the situation.
Interestingly government has continued to pile on or mandate numerous obligations for officer training and for the police service’s administration (see Figure 7). This is the context wherein HRPS leadership has to meet the challenges of some financial exigency, officer disenchantment with ‘external’ working conditions, and increased governmental demands while at the same time advancing its CBP thrusts and realizing its goal of excellence as a policing service.
Figure 1 HERE

MAP OF HALTON
Donald Clairmont

Figure 2 HERE

HRPS calls for service
Figure 3 HERE

Uniform Officer to Popn
Figure 4 HERE

Police Staff to Popn Ratio
Figure 5 HERE

HRPS 94 Operating Budget
Figure 6 HERE

HRPS 95 Operating Budget
Figure 7
MANDATED GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS

Use of Force Training & Annual Qualification

Court Appearance by Officers - Court Security by TRU

FAC Requirements with resident inspection & arms disposal

Warrent Collection for Government ($1,50 collection)

Freedom of Information Requirements & Staffing

Stats Canada/Police (CPIC) Record Keeping

Employment Equity - Research & Coordination

Training

Recruitment

Reporting

Race Relations Training

First Aid & CPR Training

Mandated Paperwork & Reporting - Over 800 forms

Proposed changes in collection of fines, etc. - requiring officer training & administrative reporting

Requirements for New Weapons & Training (Cost $740,000)

Ongoing Training/dissemination on legislation

No Charge for Disclosures (Loss of Revenue $50,000)

Occupational Health Safety/WCB Legislation &
Record Keeping
Figure 8 HERE

Police Cost per Household
Donald Clairmont

Table 2 HERE

HRPS
Chapter Four

CBP INITIATIVES IN THE 1980s

"THE REACTIVE BATTLE AGAINST CRIME AND OTHER COMMUNITY NEEDS HAS BEEN SOUNDLY LOST." (Chief J. Harding, HRPS).

According to Barratt (1982, 1), Chief James Harding after assuming command of the Halton Regional Police Force in 1979 made two major policy statements to large assemblies of departmental employees. He announced that the management philosophy and style would change, stressing his desire to "break the shackles that bind the service to autocratic and regulatory control and move to a participatory management style." He announced also that his 'regime' would emphasize crime prevention and community policing, "bringing to life the words of Sir Robert Peel that the true measure of an effective police is an absence of crime and not the ability to detect it." While an Ontario Police Commission's special investigation had indicated that the Halton Regional Police Force had been poorly managed prior to Harding's appointment, there appears to have been no especial crisis whether in crime or finances or public support which precipitated this initiative by the chief; rather, his vision of policing and police leadership were the chief causal factors (see TORONTO, July 1989 and also Loree, 1988, 211). Harding emphasized a positive proactive policing style wherein police took the lead in advancing a model of a better society; race relations and multiculturalism were especial foci of his attention even while Halton Region itself was largely 'suburban, middle class, white and
Western European’ in population. HRPS staff gave diverse assessments of Harding’s leadership style, some praising his vision while others held that he was too oriented to "left, trendy minorities." For the most part there was agreement that while he may not have had much patience for organizational development he provided a vision, allowed subordinates to exercise initiative, and was excellent in public relations. Observers commented that he put into place a good management team and created a subculture at HRPS characterized by a 'hard work ethic,' a consciousness of being considered progressive, and as one experienced police researcher reported "a certain vibrancy."22

In the beginning of the 1980s district commanders were especially encouraged to implement, with few explicit guidelines, CBP policies. At that time, according to one of chief management initiators, "police officers, in the main, were not ready to make decisions outside their normal duties and the comment was often passed 'it is not my job to think.'" Clearly top management perceived the initiative as positive for the field constables and ay the initial CBP training the officers were told "most of the officers in this room will retire as constables; not everyone can be promoted or be assigned to specialist duties ... it incumbent upon all of us to make the constable's job the best it can be. We should all work together to develop job satiisfaction and design the role to be as interesting and enjoyable as possible." A very modest training, by today's standards at least,

4 There was a widespread view in HRPS that the departmental vibrancy and the quality of leadership began to decline after 1992.
accompanied these initial forays into CBP, basically a day or two of presentations and the provision of relevant reading materials for NCOs.

It appears that the more innovative experiments occurred in the Burlington district. In the fall of 1982 a pilot project in team policing was launched in an area of Burlington called Aldershot, a long-established community. Twelve volunteering officers, three from each platoon, were recruited for the team which was given a broad mandate and significant freedom in scheduling and job assignment in order to develop a close relationship with the community. The project lasted for less than a year. No formal written evaluation apparently was carried out but the district commander reported a significant decrease in reported crime and there has been positive sentiment expressed by participating officers in retrospect. Interestingly in the early 1970s, before regionalization, Burlington PD had also experimented with team policing. According to several officers who were involved in the program "it was true team policing as each team of about 10 officers set its own schedule and task division and was not constrained by the platoon structure;" apparently the project lasted for several years until "it collapsed due to lack of resources."

The most dramatic illustration of the new philosophy and style was to occur in the Burlington district in the 1983-84 period when the platoons were split into reactive and proactive squads each supervised by their own sergeants. The initiative appears to have been essentially ideologically or philosophically driven though, not surprisingly, reference was made at the time to 'escalating police costs' and 'the reactive response [being] ineffective with respect to the increasing criminal activity.' In fact the crime rate declined in
the HRPS jurisdiction sharply by 22% and 18% in the years 1982 and 1983 respectively (Barratt, n.d.), though among the three districts the Burlington area had the most significant level of serious crime. Moreover a survey of public opinion in 1984 revealed that a very high percentage of Halton residents were quite satisfied with the policing service they received (Barratt, op. cit.). One top management police member recalling the introduction of the split-platoon model observed that "it was a quick fix ... strictly a subjective thing." But while acknowledging that 'we fumbled' in that the system never did work properly nor achieve its objectives, he stressed that it was a strong statement that the leadership wanted to emphasize crime prevention and the goal of the department being equally committed to both proactive and reactive police work – that objective has remained essential to HRPS's CBP thrusts whatever the specific implementation strategies have been over time.

It was proposed also that the split platoon innovation would be accompanied by more frequent management meetings and with audits by task forces. The district commander at the time, the initiator of the project, has indicated that he obtained resources from CID to staff the second sergeant position in each platoon. In addition, at that time, or earlier as objectives for HRPS, the concepts of 'case management' and the 'constable generalist' were advanced in the HRPS. In the matter of case management, a number officers were moved from CID back into uniform as case managers where they would take personal responsibility for some cases (i.e., the more serious), manage others given to uniformed constables, and in general liaise with CID (Loree, 1988, 215). It is unclear but apparently these same officers were deemed to be the 'constable generalists'
(sometimes they have been referred to less ambiguously as 'general assignment constable'). This latter fact may explain what appears to be an anomaly, namely that HRPS referred to constable generalists at the same time that it was launching a reactive/proactive split among all the other constables.\textsuperscript{77} The above changes in total not only reduced the size of CID but signalled something of a change in the status of detective work in HRPS; as in other police departments (e.g., Clairmont, 1990) launched on the CBP path, CID in Burlington shrunk, focused around major crime, and ceased being the premier conduit for promotions.

**THE SPLIT–PLATOON MODEL**

\footnote{General assignment officers had criminal investigation experience and were to be the lead investigative officers in the Uniform sections. In theory at least their role involved upgrading the skills of the uniformed officers to the point where initial investigative reports were as complete as they could be. Later the term 'constable generalist' was used in Halton to identify uniformed officers "who could do anything the specialists had done in the past, subject to the constraints of time, training and geography." These concepts melded into one another and generated considerable ambiguity; interviews with field officers and supervisors, and even the Human Resources staff responsible for job description, indicated that the 'constable generalists' liaised with CID and that the term did not imply, as it usually does in police culture, a uniformed officer who carries out all the basic police functions.}
Donald Clairmont

The split-platoon model, implemented in the City of Burlington, involved a basic platoon unit of sixteen constables, two sergeants and a staff sergeant commander. Each of the four platoons policed all four designated geographical areas into which Burlington was divided. Each area was patrolled by two reactive officers and one proactive officer; two officers were assigned to Traffic patrols, one assumed the role of the platoon Crime Prevention Officer and the remaining officer was assigned to the proactive squad. The reactive and proactive sections each had its own sergeant. It was directed that "each proactive patrol officer was required to coordinate a crime prevention program within his [sic] patrol zone. To this end there will be sixteen ongoing crime prevention programmes [four per platoon] operating within the community at all times" (see appendix to this chapter for a description of the system). One important aspect, or better prerequisite, of this new arrangement was releasing the officers from having to respond to certain bylaw-related enforcement or complaints (e.g., parking, animal control); here the City was to hire a number of commissionaires to take on these responsibilities.

No evaluative materials have been located vis-à-vis the split platoon model. It is unclear how well it was implemented while it lasted. In 1984 the City of Burlington did hire the special bylaw enforcement personnel as requested. The proactive officers assigned to the geographical areas were expected to handle some calls for service and "only gradually move into a completely proactive function." The projects launched were, reportedly, basic crime prevention projects such as one project where the project officers visited businesses, assessed the security, advised changes and passed out pamphlets. It appears that the
spilt-platoon model might also be considered to have been the forerunner for HRPS' street crime unit since one project did entail four officers being assigned to old clothes and working directly with CID. The split-platoon model was introduced 'from the top' without any significant community or field-level (i.e., NCO and constable) input (Loree, 1988, 224). Virtually everyone interviewed reported that the innovation was imposed without participation and in a hurried fashion where training was minimal. Moreover there were few clear and precise instructions, in part apparently because top management deemed it part of its participatory management style that the innovation be operationalized by district officers. Loree reported that two years after the introduction of the model there was still considerable confusion and uncertainty about the implementation and much resistance in the field.

The split-platoon model was introduced into the Oakville district of HRPS about one year after its debut in Burlington but apparently (i.e., no records were available and there were no citations in the Annual Reports but some departmental documents indicate that the split-platoon concept was supposed to expand to all districts in 1985) it was never implemented as such into Halton's northern district (personal communications, senior management). In the Oakville district the area was divided into five zone or 'communities' wherein there was some identity and geographical integrity according to police managers. As in Burlington, staff sergeants directed platoons where there were both proactive and reactive sergeants; in each platoon the field structure was as follows:

- Five officers on each platoon are assigned to community (proactive) policing and each designated to a
specific community within the Town of Oakville. The remaining officers are assigned to the reactive role and special assignment duties (traffic enforcement, constable generalist and general duties).

The Oakville proactive officers, as in Burlington, were expected to develop programs or projects such as the one referred to in Figure 2. It can be seen that these projects would fit well the current label, 'problem-solving policing' insofar as the emphasis was on background 'research,' clear identification of the problem and then the advancement of solutions. In addition "an active Neighbourhood Watch program [was] seen as a major mechanism in developing close ties with the community and delivering services" (Loree, 1988, 220).

The split-platoon model where implemented had a relatively short life span. It was not implemented throughout the Region and where implemented, there was significant variation in how it was regarded and practiced by the NCOs and the constables. It was introduced by top management with significant control at the district level but without much field level or community participation. Sergeants indicated that top management did not invite them to participate in considering how to implement the model. There was very little direction provided, perhaps by design (in a speech to the Community Policing Workshop, Canadian Police College 1986, chief Harding stressed “the need to be flexible and versatile, even within the different areas of our own particular force”) but for the most part with negative implications; many officers apparently did not know what was expected of them and others, not disposed to the program, could readily obstruct it. The idea in itself had possibilities for CBP — indeed several years later a similar
version of the split platoon model was implemented in New York City — and some worthwhile projects were initiated with enthusiasm by the proactive officers. But planning and implementation were limited and the impact uncertain. In the subculture of HRPS the split platoon model is basically depicted as having been divisive, impractical and introduced without the required, significant training and orientation; this researcher found some difference of opinion with respect to the latter issue but no one suggested that there was more than a day or two of 'training.' There does appear to be consensus that the innovation was divisive; at a large gathering of Halton NCOs in 1995 one sergeant contended, without any dissent being expressed, that "the proactive and reactive split was a war on the platoons." The district commander who launched the initiative acknowledged that "there was constant friction between the two groups. The proactive officers were perceived to be not doing anything while the reactive officers were busy answering all the calls ... a caste system evolved;" he added that it was 'strange' because even when the officers were rotated they did not seem to bring any of the alternative philosophy or understanding with them!

COMMUNITY DIRECTED PATROL: THE VILLAGE CONSTABLE

In the HRPS Annual Report, 1987, Chief Harding announced that "the practice of traditional community-based policing returned to the Regional Municipality through the establishment of cooperative efforts including the Warwick Court Project in Burlington, the Village Constable in Milton and the recently developed PACT (Police and Community Together)
Donald Clairmont

Program in Oakville." Another initiative he cited as indicative of CBP was the Children’s Safety Village erected in May 1987. Undoubtedly the key organizational innovation referred to here was the 'village constable' role. In the latter, typically, an officer (or two) was given largely but not exclusively proactive policing responsibilities in a well-defined area and frequently operated out of a storefront-type setting where external contributions contributed significantly to operating costs. By the end of 1987 these types of arrangements were in place throughout the Region, in the town of Milton, in the troubled, high-rise Warwick Court section of Burlington, in the central Kerr Street area of Oakville where there was some ethnic heterogeneity (e.g., Portuguese, Italian, etc.), and other sites were on the drawing board. In addition there was Project Visibility in the rural area of Halton Regional's northern reaches (i.e., rural Milton). At the same time as this community directed patrol system was being elaborated, HRPS was launching other important CPB innovations such as the Children Safety Village (see below) wherein children were taught traffic and personal safety in a model village erected and maintained through collaboration among police, public agencies and the private sector. Indeed in all these initiatives departmental resources were committed but usually HRPS husbanded resources from other interests as well.

HRPS officials generally consider the precursors of their community directed patrol/village constable system to be a 'project visibility project launched in the rural Milton area in the early 1980s and, subsequently, the Warwick Court project in 1987. The former project was deemed to be a useful way to deal with a combination of
personnel issues (e.g., the potential demotion of a sergeant) and community concerns and policing priorities. Here the solution was for the officer to be "a mobile Village Constable [providing] a highly visible and personalized policing presence to about 6,000 people in a 100 square mile area". The 'village constable' initiative was more dramatically launched in the Warwick Court/Surrey Lane area of Burlington, a half kilometer square where 6000 people lived in a mixture of housing designs but notably in several large high-rise apartments. This small area had accounted for over 15% of all the calls for service in the Burlington district and featured a relatively high level of criminal offences (e.g., drugs) and social order problems. A project team of one supervisor and four 'community directed patrol officers' were assigned to the project area. In a letter distributed to all residents Chief Harding referred to "Community Directed Patrol ... a new concept in policing based on the idea of direct, personalized service to the community". He noted that this project team will be "in addition to the regular cruiser patrol officers in your area". The letter described the activities of the project officers as "providing foot patrol throughout your area", working with residents and their organizations on crime prevention, receiving calls for service and complaints, and investigating selected crimes; five of the seven listed police responsibilities specifically referred to crime prevention.

The Warwick Court project was dramatic not only in the extent of departmental commitment but also in the style of the officers' initial actions. Shortly after taking up their office within a high rise complex there, the officers reportedly directed and worked alongside residents in physically cleaning up the area, removing debris, old
mattresses from balconies and the like. Questionnaires were distributed to residents asking them to identify their chief concerns, what they would want the HRPS to do in the area and how satisfied they were with the service provided; a subsequent questionnaire was distributed to secure an assessment of the project. By all accounts the project was successful in that crime prevention organizations were established (e.g., Neighbourhood and Vertical Watch), the calls for service declined significantly over the next two years and client satisfaction was very high. There was an interesting pattern with respect to the trends for reported criminal offenses and for calls for service; for a while they varied inversely, indicating that over time citizens having renewed confidence and comfort with police called more frequently as the level of criminal offenses in the area declined (Clairmont and Murphy, 1991, 9). As 1989 drew to a close the HRPS project was deemed by district management to require only two community directed patrol officers or village constables.

The village constable and project visibility initiatives which constituted community directed patrol spread throughout all districts and reached a peak of 17 officers in 13 sites in 1991. In the process of establishing its village constable program, Halton management looked at other police departments’ programs (e.g., Flint Michigan’s Foot Patrol Project, Baltimore’s COPE and Calgary’s Neighbourhood Project). In HRPS the village constables were volunteers selected or hand-picked at the district level, usually after having been approached by district management who considered the officer suited for the job. A formal job description came into effect in the 1990-91 period (see appendix for the job description). Essentially the village
constable had to be a self-starter since he/she was given significant autonomy and had to find the resources required (i.e., office and other equipment) and to select an appropriate community input team. It was usually expected that the village constable would develop an 'action plan', a concept taught at the Ontario Police College's 'Proactive Practitioners Course' which village constables attended. The constable provided full-service policing while obviously emphasizing proactive policing. Ideally a feasibility study was carried out by platoon (task force) officers to determine whether a village constable post should be established in a suggested area; in practice the process was sometimes quite informal and adhoc. In general the officers selected for the village constable positions were excellent choices but as one might expect there was still much variation in tasks and in implementation; some variation, such as how active the community input team was, had as much if not more to do with how the 'village' being policed than with the officer's efforts. As might be expected given the useful projects initiated (e.g., an after-school program directed at 'latch-key' children, Neighbourhood Watch etc) and the fact that such police activity was beyond the usual expectations of citizens, the village constable activity was generally very positively evaluated by politicians, business interests and affected citizen groups; there was much favorable media coverage of the activity. At the same time there remained among many NCOs and patrol constables an ambivalence towards the innovation and there did appear to be a problem defining productivity in ways that would generate support for it in the police subculture.

In 1989 a departmental audit was carried out on the village constable/project visibility (both also called 'community directed patrol')
in HRPS documents) activity in the HRPS. A report entitled 'EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY BASED POLICING IN HALTON' was issued in December 1989. It is interesting that the title had such a generic reference while the content dealt only with community directed patrol. Clearly this underlines the extent to which CBP in the late 1980 in the HRPS was chiefly identified organizationally with the village constable program. As the decade came to a close there were ten 'communities' served by the community directed patrol program and 14 such constables in the field.

In district 1 there were village constables in the core areas of the towns, Acton and Milton, and two 'project visibility' officers policing the sparsely populated rural area out of an office in a shopping plaza. While the latter were essentially doing patrol work (e.g., radar, vacant house checks) with modest crime prevention activity (e.g., Rural Watch), the village constables in the towns 'walked the beat', sat on various town committees, and launched a variety of crime prevention/proactive projects (e.g., Business Alert, Youth programs). All officers, with occasional exception among those in 'project visibility,' worked eight hour shifts, mostly 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. The audit suggested a need for 'written goals and objectives' and in two sites the need to establish a community input team or advisory group.

The three village constables in district 2, Oakville, operated out of a condominium, storefront and converted bus respectively. All served well-recognized communities in Oakville, areas with a sense of identity. The first village constable position was established in 1987 in one of the few ethnoculturally heterogeneous areas of the city, a mixed residential/business zone where there had been a relatively large number of calls for service.
and significant social order problems. In 1988 another village constable position was put in place in the Lakeshore district and then in 1989, a third village constable arrangement was established in an area where there were two large senior citizen residences. In all cases the village constable had established and met regularly with a community input team reflecting business, institutional and citizen constituencies. Each village constable had a number of active crime prevention/proactive projects, including crime prevention seminars, school liaison and 'Watch' organizations. The hours of work were more diverse than in the case of district one's operations. The audit noted that all three village constables were well-known and highly regarded in their 'villages.' It suggested there be some improvement in their reporting procedures and that their goals and objectives be reviewed.

In the Burlington district of HRPS there were seven village constables operating out of four locations. As noted two constables continued to work the Warwick Court area, the first village constable post in Burlington and now operating from an office in a plaza. A community input team was functioning though it apparently required a lot of the constables' effort. The officers' main proactive project was in relation to an after-school recreation project. Another two officers were located in a large mall and business area. They did largely reactive policing, dealing primarily with thefts and frauds and handling about one-third of the calls dispatched in this area, but they also set up shoplifting seminars for stores and a Business Alert program. Plans were underway at the end of 1989 to expand responsibility to include the senior citizen apartments nearby. There were also two village constables operating out of a storefront in a beach strip area where new development was
'upscale.' They walked the beat but also utilized a donated vehicle to handle some of their duties in the large geographical area. Their actual work was quite evenly split between general enforcement and proactive projects such as seminars and high school liaison. The remaining village constable policed a largely residential area surrounding a large mall, the site of the officer's office. The officer's work focused on the mall though there were also on-going projects with seniors and neighbourhood schools. Interestingly the audit report reflected some concern that in three of the four sites, the village constables were not getting an appropriate share of the calls for service in their areas and also that the community input teams were either non-existent or of limited value.

The 1989 audit was an excellent management document. Its authors analyzed calls for service for specific days to eventually conclude that the community directed patrol program was, as hoped, removing workload and calls for service from patrol personnel, on the average dealing with 27% of the calls related to the village area. This ratio, it suggested, could be even better if Communications responded to village constables' requests for more referrals and for call stacking. The audit also concluded that the "village constable concept is established throughout the Region [and] the program has greatly increased citizen involvement and interaction with the police force in this community." The authors appropriately recommended that community input teams be formed in all 'villages', that care should be taken to ensure these teams "are not comprised solely of business people," and that goals and objectives be written and reviewed regularly. There was concern that the autonomy and flexible scheduling associated with the village
The constable role could marginalize the officers from the regular patrol system (e.g., by causing them to miss fall-in or parade, and by Communications and patrol supervisors neglecting them because of their idiosyncratic scheduling). New areas were identified for possible village constable assignments — and indeed three additional village constable locations were put in operation in the following year.

As noted the village constable initiative reached its peak in 1990/91 when there were 13 sites and 17 constables engaged in this community directed patrol. Of course the village constables were a small fraction of the 375 sworn members that HRPS employed in 1990. Still the initiative clearly was the centerpiece of HRPS’s CBP program. A lot of effective policing was done through the village constables and the associated, significant reduction in the workload for patrol meant that the innovation was efficient. Virtually all of the costs for facilities and equipment were met through the mobilization of community resources. And clearly there was in some areas significant police-community partnership in directing the policing effort. At the same time the police-community collaboration in general could often only be described as modest, and with a few notable exceptions the village constables were in danger of being marginal to HRPS, both in their own eyes and in those of the majority of officers. There was a problem of linkage and communication; for example few patrol officers apparently realized how many calls for service were being (and could be) diverted to community directed patrol.

HRPS undoubtedly had elaborated the village constable concept more than any other police department in Canada (see Clairmont and Murphy 1991). In the appended report on the
village constable innovation it is clear that the scale and level of commitment in Halton dwarfed similar innovations in Halifax and Fredericton (and elsewhere for that matter). The Halton program was much more extensive. The Halton village constables were better trained for the task (though the training was still modest and some received none), had more formal community input teams, and were more integrated into their department's field operations providing full-service policing and being constable generalists. They were more accountable in a formal sense with monthly reports often required and in general they were monitored by an active, inquiring management and, unlike their counterparts elsewhere, the Halton village constables did not complain about inadequate resources. At the same time they were like these counterparts in several important respects. While they reported considerable job satisfaction it was a satisfaction drawn from the intrinsic aspects of their work (e.g., the challenge, the autonomy, the things they accomplished) rather than the extrinsic aspects such as the compensation, promotional opportunities, and respect and collaboration vis-a-vis their colleagues in patrol. Like their counterparts elsewhere, the Halton village constables were often marginalized and perceived, quite correctly it appears, that especially in the street-level police culture their status was problematic. Even seasoned, accomplished village constables could complain about the real receptivity to their role in the police organization and echo the words of one such officer "I often wonder; am I doing what I ought to be doing."

THE OTHER HALF OF THE BASIC STRATEGY

As noted in the introduction a central
feature of Chief Harding's approach to CBP was the idea of participatory management. Formally all HRPS staff were to be organized into diverse management teams, to hold regular meetings and both to advance their own suggestions 'up the line' and also to be asked 'from above' for their input on various matters. In the case of patrol the constables were to form management teams, meet at least four times a year (more if warranted), have a scribe and keep minutes. These minutes would be passed along to the staff sergeant and inspector at the district level then up to top management and finally to the chief himself. At all levels the minutes/reports were to be initialled and any action or recommended action noted; in this way the Chief could get a sense not only of the concerns of the staff but also how these concerns were being dealt with by the different levels of management. This structure of participatory management has remained at HRPS to this day. In a number of instances it has resulted in rank and file officers being able to not only have input on a suggested policy but even to change top management's thinking about it; the instances most often referred to in the police subculture concern the paint colours for patrol cars (i.e., the constables persuaded management to maintain the 'white and blue stripes' format), constables' being allowed to wear guns in an open-holster fashion (i.e., American style), uniform styling, and the car seats in the 1993 patrol cars. It does appear too that the management teams have been consulted on a number of issues such as the policy of 50-50 reactive/proactive policing (see Report on Community Policing, HRPS, 1988).

It is difficult to assess how meaningful the management teams have been with respect to achieving participatory management at HRPS. There does appear to be a consensus that this
tool has provided rank and file officers with an opportunity to vent their feelings and to make suggestions and give reactions; therefore virtually everyone considers it a worthwhile innovation. It also appears that meetings are held and minutes recorded so there is in fact participation. At the same time the majority of officers reported themselves to be 'ho-hum' about the practice, largely contending that at their level the same issues get discussed and recommended ad nauseam while the big issues such as the introduction of the split half platoon model have been simply introduced from above without any participation at all. It has been commonplace to contend that there has been a lack of feedback. One interesting aspect of the management teams at the platoon level concerns the role of the sergeants. It appears that initially it was expected that as in many other police services (e.g., Halifax PD) the sergeants would attend meetings with the constables. In practice this has varied considerably at HRPS. Some sergeants attend and others do not either for lack of interest or more often because they think that the constables should meet among themselves and not be intimidated by a sergeant's presence. At the same time several sergeants have indicated that they feel their presence is ambiguous at the management team sessions that include the staff sergeants and inspectors; in fact two sergeants reported that when they attended the latter's management team meeting they were quite distinctly and explicitly made to feel unwelcome and so have never returned. In effect then the danger of the management teams practice may be that often the participation of the pivotal link – the supervising sergeant – is absent or muted.

As the decade drew to a close the HRPS was examining its CBP thrusts. In 1987 and later in the decade there was a review of the
50-50, proactive/reactive policy which after the split platoon initiative became the basic HRPS directive. In effect rather than having a 50-50 split on units, there was to be for all patrol officers a 50-50 split for proactive and reactive policing with respect to their available time. Patrol cars were equipped with a special proactive button on their mobile digital terminal and officers were presumably expected to activate that button while in proactive mode. The departmental assessments (which included an officer visiting the platoons and doing extensive interviewing and ride-alongs, and also consultation with the management teams) indicated that the 50-50 split was not working whether on a unit or a time basis. It was found that there was much confusion about what was proactive, that there was a serious rift between reactive and proactive officers in the district #3 where the split-platoon model had been most fully implemented, that there was little communication about the proactivity being done and hence little appreciation and encouragement of it, that there was little direction for proactive projects, and that young and inexperienced officers were disproportionately being given proactive tasks. And the priority of the reactive policing was evident in that "the proactive was the first to go whenever any shortage of manpower occurs." The departmental assessments suggested the need for structural integrative mechanisms (e.g., more coordination and joint planning which would include the crime prevention coordinators in the districts) and cautioned that much socialization remained to be done if CBP were to become firmly established in everyday platoon activity. Clearly the signs of change and transformation were present. HRPS leadership recognized that the 50-50 directives needed rethinking, that the VC initiative alone was not enough, and
that there was not the kind of ownership and partnership that they wanted among patrol officers and residents of Halton's communities. The organization was ready to move on.

OTHER CBP INITIATIVES

Throughout the 1980s there were several outstanding examples of CBP initiative that were developed by top management and that did not demand radical change in the platoons. An auxiliary was established - a complement of 12 volunteers established in late 1988 to be trained and formed into an auxiliary police unit to assist police officers in projects and public events (e.g., parades, races); the number of auxiliary volunteers grew to 22 in 1990. DARE (drug abuse resistance education program) began in the late 1980s with significant community support (e.g., Rotary club). This well-known project was aimed at young students at the 'experimental age' (about grade 6). A proven project in the United States, it has been well regarded by all, even by officers who professed not to be enthusiastic about community policing!

Another interesting CBP thrust was PEACE (police ethnic and cultural education) which was aimed at senior level but not graduating high school students. Here HRPS took an idea and marketed it (through an Issue Marketing Committee, a new strategy developed by HRPS to launch such initiatives) and then implemented (through an Implementation Committee) with a careful, detailed very professional plan of action which was subsequently evaluated and improved upon. In the first year, 1989, some 20 students went through this summer employment program. HRPS developed a clear mission statement for the project with both short term and long term goals specified (these included
recruiting minorities into HRPS and having students return to their schools with a video and report as an instructional tool. In the accompanying job description first generation Canadians were targeted if possible. The summer activities were well planned and quite detailed; there was clear supervision. The project was funded by Halton Regional and the Solicitor General Ontario. The project appeared great for generating a two-way flow of understanding between police and ethnocultural communities and immigrants. It was handled with sophistication and in the course of developing it, HRPS developed new mechanisms for future projects (i.e., Issue Marketing). The Children Safety Village, opened in 1987 was still another excellent CBP initiative. With the husbanding of considerable external business and agency support HRPS had a model village created on a reasonable scale, where children could be taught traffic safety, bike safety and so forth. The project has continued to be operated with only one full time officer and the assistance of many volunteers. In less than 2 years there were some 300 classes (kindergarten, grade 2 and grade 4) and more than 13000 children from throughout Halton Region were socialized and ‘traffic-proofed.’ This project attracted much deserved media attention and more than 2500 visitors from all over the world by 1990.

HRPS developed other more conventional CBP initiatives such as Crime Stoppers in 1988, various ‘Watches’ (e.g., taxi watch in 1988) and special traffic enforcement projects. It was open to new ideas and projects. Indeed it reached out to the community through activities such as ‘Torch Run for Special Olympics,’ Halton Police Blood Donor Clinic, Halton Police Choir, Halton Police Pipe and Drums and even inaugurated an annual awards event for media and individuals contributing to public safety,
crime prevention and understanding of police work. It undertook a survey of citizens’ attitudes and concerns in the mid-1980s. Clearly HRPS was a police service very conscious of its role in the community and concerned that it exercise leadership there.

At the same time HRPS continued to improve on its conventional policing technology and effectiveness. Computer-aided dispatch (CAD) was introduced to HRPS in December 1985 (The HRP Association Informer, v1, #2, 1986). A mobile digital terminal (MDT) project was launched in 1988 (Ibid., v3 #2, 1988) and by end of the year these computer aids were in all police vehicles. HRPS had its own Tactical and Rescue Unit (Ibid., v2 #1, 1987). The organization strove to be 'state of the art' on the investigative front, acquiring the latest hardware and software (e.g., the Holmes package). And in the mid-1980s it launched a project of video taping suspect interrogations (Project TIP – Taped Interviewing Procedures); this began in late 1984 and was the first of its kind in Canada (Annual Report, 1985/86). According to TIP evaluator Professor Allan Grant (The Audio-Visual Taping, 1987, 11) after 6 months of training and preparation the project began in July 1, 1985; each police officer in Burlington issued a personal videotape which was used for all interviews – each officer then had his/her electronic notebook (Ibid., 12). Grant thought it was a very good initiative, well praised by police, prosecutors and defense counsel, and urged both its extension through HRPS and its establishment elsewhere in Canada.

CONCLUSION

As the eighties came to a close HRPS had indeed accomplished much in CBP. Chief Harding noted in the 1989 Annual Report that "Halton
Regional Police Force has established itself as an innovator and leader in policing and is the focus of much national and international attention.” He pointed to a number of ‘firsts’ that HRPS had introduced, at least in Canada, during the 1980s, programs such as DARE, PEACE, TIP, The Children’s Safety Village, McGruff and so forth. The village constable program had expanded in all three HRPS districts. HRPS had established a progressive image in relating to the community, and supported various worthwhile causes. It had mobilized resources within the community for its village constable program as well as for most of its other CBP initiatives. It had undergone extensive civilianization and had begun to hire an increasing proportion of female officers. And as the decade drew to a close a Futures Research Program was launched (November 1989) with outside consultants and four teams of 10 HRPS employees to determine among other things the future for HRPS and the prospects and wishes of its employees.

Yet it was not at all clear how profoundly the basic policing organization and service had been transformed by all the above. Had the core of HRPS been thoroughly implicated in the CBP initiatives or were the initiatives largely external to it while nevertheless being significant and praiseworthy? The evidence appears to be that the latter was more the case in that the organization only modestly featured a ‘participatory management’ style, the field officers were not particularly trained in or committed to CBP, and apart from the village constables, still often rather marginal to everyday policing, there was little collaboration between police and community in the sense of community-directed policing. As Loree observed in his 1988 study of HRPS, “[the idea that] the community itself becomes a real partner in the provision of police services, not merely the recipient of programs developed
and delivered in isolation ... is probably the most difficult of the community policing ideas for police forces and their members to accept” (Loree, 1988, 207).
APPENDIX

HALTON REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE

SPILT PLATOON MODEL
Diagram
Halton Region Police Force (WORD)
DEPLOYMENT

Each platoon, commanded by a Staff Sergeant will be divided into two sections, each supervised by a Sergeant. One eight-man section will continue in the traditional reactive policing role. The other section will gradually move into a completely pro-active function.

The officers will be assigned to four geographic areas referred to as Est, West, Core and North. (Designated on attached map.) Each area will be patrolled by two reactive Officers and one pro-active Officer. It is anticipated that the Pro-Active Officers will respond to some calls for service, where a pro-active or crime prevention follow-up is appropriate (i.e., B & E).

Two Officers will be assigned to Traffic patrols, one a breathalyzer technician, the other a collision investigator.

One Officer will assume the duties of the platoon Crime Prevention Officer and the remaining member will be assigned to the Pro-Active policing squad.

STAFFING

In addition to existing staff, it is necessary to enlist community and City assistance. We anticipated that the City of Burlington will establish a By-law Enforcement of eight officers, to handle the By-laws that pertain to parking and other non-moving violations. Two officers would work with each of the platoons and handle these calls for service. We further hope that the Animal Control Officers will
Donald Clairmont

cover two shifts, 0800-2400 daily, to relieve police response to those complaints.
Each Pro-active Patrol Officer will be required to coordinate a crime prevention programme within his patrol zone. To this end there will be sixteen ongoing crime prevention programmes operating within the community at all times. The platoon CPO will coordinate his platoon's effort with the District CPO to ensure there is no duplication of effort in any geographic area.

The Pro-active Supervisors will monitor the programme to ensure that objectives are being met, and provide additional support.

The Traffic Officers will identify areas of risk to the community and design appropriate enforcement responses. Liaison of traffic problems, with the City Traffic Department, will be the responsibility of the Operations Inspector, who will set objectives and coordinate efforts through the platoon commanders.

The CID will continue to work closely with the Uniform Division with the Pro-Active squad continuing to be the focus for interchange and cooperation between the two units. The Pro-active Squad Supervisor, working closely with the District CPO, will identify crime risks and criminal trends. Platoon commanders and Supervisors together with the CPO and PAS Supervisor will design effective counter-measures to combat criminal activity.

The District CPO will be the key element in providing liaison with community groups and implementing city wide programmes which will be integrated with the local initiatives provided by the platoons. It is recognized that the
goodwill and cooperation of the citizens is essential to the success of the operation.
CORE COMMUNITY

AREAS OF CONCERN:

1 - Kerr Street
2 - Speers Road
3 - Oakville Harbour

PROBLEM:

1 - Thefts and willful damage in underground parking. Loitering in Convenience stores and Arcade. Minors soliciting purchases at been stores.

2 - Break and Enters on Kerr Street and Lakeshore Road.

3 - Thefts from vessels.

SOLUTION:

1 - Increased foot patrols. Stop, Lock, Walk and Talk - high visibility with accent on familiarization with merchants. Shift change in Fridays and Saturdays from 1600 hrs to 0400 hrs to accommodate surveillance by uniform officers in plain cars for minors soliciting purchase at beer store at Lakeshore Road and Kerr Street.

2 - Property checks, Updating RP files and recommending security systems.

3 - Increased foot patrols and contact cards. During summer months utilize marine band - to be received in Communications and District 2 front desk to monitor citizens notifying police of thefts in progress or suspicious persons in
the area. Have the high resolution antennae mounted at HQ.
JOB DESCRIPTION

TITLE: VILLAGE CONSTABLE

RANK: CONSTABLE

SUPERVISOR: PLATOON SERGEANT

OTHER SUPERVISION RECEIVED:

LOCATION/SCOPE: ALL DISTRICTS

DATE PREPARED: JANUARY 1991

SUMMARY

Develops and maintains thorough knowledge of the social, economic, cultural and physical characteristics of the assigned Village patrol area; develops a Police response consistent with identified characteristics of the patrol area; undertakes other detailed assignments as delegated.

NOTE: This assignment/positions represents a specialized application of the duties of the Patrol Constable. The proactive, reactive and crime prevention duties are an essential component of this position. All duties are performed according to the HRPS Regulations and General Orders, and the instructions of the Sergeant;
by integrating activities with patrol officers assigned to the community in which the village is located;

by speaking to community groups on a variety of subjects and concerns, and arranging for formal presentations of programs such as Neighbourhood Watch, Black Parents, Drugs and Alcohol;

by responding to telephone messages and radio call;

by conducting policing operations (proactive and reactive) as defined in HRPS Regulations and General Orders;

by gathering intelligence on criminal activities through patrolling community contacts and in the course of school presentations;

by compiling and forwarding information to CIB, Intelligence, Drug Squad or other Bureau as appropriate;

by reporting on proactive and reactive functions, community activities undertaken, and concerns identified or brought forward by community representatives;

by attending and co-ordinating any functions involving designated communities with the designated community consultation committee.

UNDEARTAKES OTHER DETAILED ASSIGNMENTS AS DELEGATED.
Chapter Five

THE HRPS MODEL OF CBP

"WE HAVE GONE THROUGH A BASIC SHIFT IN PHILOSOPHY. WE HAVE SAID TO THE PEOPLE IN OUR COMMUNITIES: WE'RE NOT GOING TO TELL YOU WHAT YOUR PROBLEMS ARE, EVEN THOUGH WE THINK WE KNOW. WHAT WE'RE GOING TO DO IS POLICE TO YOUR DIRECTION, WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS." (Staff Sergeant Dan Okuloski, HRPS. Toronto Globe and Mail, November 28, 1990).

In April 1990 the self-acknowledged HRPS style of CBP came into existence. Its basic features were the village constable operating out of a 'storefront' in the community, community-directed patrol where constables were assigned to specific areas or 'communities,' and community consultation committees (CCCs) with whom both constables and sergeants liaised. These features were to characterize the three districts which constituted the HRPS's jurisdiction. Community directed patrol was then to characterize HRPS patrol as a whole and what had formerly been the essence of community directed patrol, namely the village constable system, was now to be seen as a special CBP strategic intervention where areas "require some intensive policing" (personal correspondence, 1992). In the 1990 HRPS Annual Report (21) the HRPS's model of CBP was stated as follows:

"In an effort to provide a continuing progression to the policing style of the future, the Halton Regional Police has undertaken a reorganization which
compliments the established Village Constable concept. This reorganization encompasses a region wide commitment to Community Policing. The Region was divided into identifiable communities which have some geographic, historic and demographic commonality. Each community was given an appropriate name and assigned specific officers. The permanent officers provide a stability and a clear understanding of the needs of the people through both informal and formal input. Community Consultation Committees have been formed in each community to facilitate the formal input and concerns of citizens throughout the Region. This structure, providing feedback to the Police Service, is essential for setting priorities and meeting the concerns of the citizens of Halton.”

It may be noted that nothing was explicitly mentioned with respect to CIB (i.e., detective work) nor with respect to middle and upper management. CBP was seen as basically an organizational feature that directly involved the uniformed patrol officer and related support services (e.g., traffic). In the 'community-directed patrol system' the uniformed patrol officer was expected to answer calls for service from his/her community in patrol cars that bore the name of the community (unless there was a pressing issue the calls presumably would be stacked for the officers' attention), and to meet regularly with his/her community consultation committee. At the same time this thrust was defined as the centerpiece of the HRPS philosophy. That philosophy was stated in the 1990 report (1) as:
"The Halton Regional Police Service will respond to community needs through a combined strategy of preventative, proactive and reactive policing programs, using the concept of the constable centered generalist, the whole of which will be supported by a participatory management environment."

Moreover in the 1990 HRPS Annual Report (2) the Chief called attention to this annual report being the first "to reflect our title change from 'Force' to 'Service.'

The model introduced in 1990 was accompanied by virtually no training or participation among the uniformed sergeants and constables. Not surprisingly there was much confusion and as one internal document (Spring, 1992) put it, "it was recognized that the structure and philosophy were not being applied consistently throughout the Region."

Accordingly over the period November 4, 1991 to February 25, 1992 twenty-five one-day seminars were held wherein some 402 HRPS employees (all but seven of its entire regular workforce) received an orientation or briefing on CBP in general and on the various components of the HRPS model, especially the role of the CCCs and how to develop and relate to them (see appendix for the course curriculum). Additionally a special senior officer seminar was held in January 1992 to "develop Regional policy relating to our Community Policing model."

A number of suggestions emerged from the one-day seminars, chiefly that an appropriate corporate mandate and mission statement be developed, that the roles and responsibilities of the community officers, supervisors and CCC members be clearly identified in a handbook which would be well-distributed, and that
management and supervisors adopt flexible policies to allow for things like overtime pay to attend CCC meetings and specific community assignment requests by the officers. Directives were pronounced with respect to the expectations about CCC meetings (i.e., four CCC meeting per year if warranted and at the minimum one annual information session in each designated community). Clearly the requirements vis-a-vis the community linkages were modest. Less clear but still evident was the apparently widespread view that management policies in practice did not overly encourage strong officer-CCC linkages and that officers experienced both ambivalence and uncertainty with respect to their roles in this CBP system. Before examining the Halton model of CBP in more detail, it is useful to explore the supply/demand situation of HRPS in relation to other police forces at the time when this major enhancement of CBP was being launched.

HALTON REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN CONTEXT

It was noted above that in the Canadian context HRPS has had a quite uncommonly high ratio of population served per sworn members. This pattern is reflected accurately in table one, where the data (gathered by another police service for a different purpose) indicate that HRPS had the highest such ratio (i.e., 788) among a representative sample of Canadian police services west of Quebec. Since the CBP advocates have often emphasized the objective of greater civilianization one might expect that insofar as HRPS was orientated to CBP it might have more than the usual ratio of civilian employees and hence its ratio of population served per employee would be less out of line. Table 1 provides some support for that presumption but HRPS’s 1992 ratio of
population served per employee was still the second highest at 568. Actually as shown in Table 3, (Appendix) HRPS’s ratio of officer-to-civilian employee has been about average in the Canadian context.

Table 2 indicates that in terms of 'frontline' officers (that is sworn members assigned to general field operations, traffic and proactive programs and excluding those in investigation, operational support and administration), HRPS’s ratio of citizens per sworn frontline member was among the highest at 1,046. This finding, characteristic of HRPS’s CBP era, would suggest that frontline officers might well have found it difficult to effectively implement CBP insofar as conventional policing responsibilities were not also dramatically changed. Clearly additional factors to take into account would be the crime rate and level of calls for service on the one hand, and on the other hand how well trained the officers were in CBP practices and how flexible were HRPS policies relating to officers’ time and to handling calls for service. It appears from analyzing the appropriate data (see below) that the former set of factors would have lessened the HRPS reactive workload compared to other large Canadian municipalities. It is less clear and indeed doubtful that the latter set of factors have positively affected frontline officers’ capacity to do CBP since they received very modest training in CBP and also HRPS’s policy on calls for service would appear to have been of limited value for restructuring the reactive workload.

It is interesting to examine how HRPS's human resources at the NCO and 'sworn senior officer' (i.e., inspectors and above) levels compared with other Canadian police services. The span of control could well be one indicator of the extent to which HRPS’s management could
direct a pervasive change in policing philosophy and practice such as required by CBP. Table 4 shows that with respect to the number of employees per sworn senior officer, HRPS in 1992 was about average. It was slightly below average in the number of NCOs and constables per sworn senior officer (see Table 5) and more significantly below the average in the number of NCOs per sworn senior officer (see Table 6). On the other hand HRPS was above average in the number of constables per NCO (see Table 7). These 'span of control' data generally would not auger well for CBP. Indeed it could be argued that a more favorable structuring would be to have fewer 'white shirts' and more NCOs insofar as sergeants and staff sergeants – the frontline field supervisors – have to be 'on side' and have the time, energy and commitment to oversee the transformation to a thorough-going CBP. The large geographical area for which HRPS has responsibility, in conjunction with its regional government arrangement, can perhaps explain these span of control data (i.e., the relatively high proportion of senior sworn officers) but there seems little doubt that such a structure works against the implementation of CBP.

Earlier it was noted that one factor that could be expected to have facilitated the implementation of CBP in HRPS was the comparatively low crime rate in its jurisdiction. Tables 8, 9 and 10 clearly show that HRPS did have a favorable rate of crime. It was well below average in terms of criminal code offences per sworn member (see Table 8) and especially in terms of property crimes per sworn members (see Table 9). It is particularly interesting to note that HRPS, comparatively, had a significantly lower rate of violent crimes per sworn members (see Table 10). As police auditors have often noted
“violent crime places a police department not only at added risk but increases caseload, stress, court time, requests for backup, arrests, escort of prisoners, overtime and difficulty in shift scheduling. This also reduces the ability for proactive police work and increases administrative duties, to name only some of the adverse effects.” Clearly in terms of the level and type of crime, conditions were favorable for implementing CBP at HRPS, providing therefore some positive balance to the effects of manpower and organizational factors noted above.

HOW DID THE HALTON MODEL WORK?

There were several key reasons for HRPS moving to this second phase in the development of its CBP program. First it was clear that while the village constables were often doing excellent police work, both of the proactive and the reactive kind, they were a small minority of the department and in constant danger of being marginalized. Secondly the general directive that all patrol officers have a 50-50, reactive-proactive split in their 'available' work time was not working. There was little evidence of any significant monitoring or auditing of their time though in theory sergeants could access their constables' time-budget allocation via the data recorded on the mobile digital terminals in the patrol cars. Perhaps most importantly HRPS leadership acknowledged that the bulk of patrol did not identify with the zones in which they worked and that the citizens there were not involved much in the direction of policing. One senior management officer explained the change in the following words:

To promote the proactive essence of CBP the districts were divided into
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

communities not zones. The men could identify better with a community rather than a letter or a number [used to designate an area]. It was thought that dividing the area into communities would heighten the officer’s attachment to his area and increase his or her desire to work with the community there. At the same time the community would also be more receptive and better able to relate to the officers if they became familiar with them.

The first task then was to divide each district into ‘real communities’, a task that initially yielded a large number which was winnowed down subsequently (certainly in districts #2 and #3 where the numbers went from 16 to 9 and from 12 to 8 respectively), apparently for purposes of effective implementation and because of community interest or rather lack thereof. The structure of police responsibility in relation to communities involved collaboration across the ranks in each district. Typically each designated community was the responsibility of a constable in each of the four platoons. Every patrol sergeant had responsibility for one or two communities, coordinating and supervising therefore the activity of at least four constables, only one or two of whom would be on his/her watch. Staff sergeants (i.e., platoon commanders) in turn usually had responsibilities for several communities. District Crime Prevention sergeants typically assumed extensive responsibilities in relation to the CCCs, and constables not assigned to a community, called ‘task force constables,’ could be seconded to attend community meetings (see Figure 1 which depicts the above structure for one district).
In each community a committee was set up – the CCC – and the participants (usually around ten) were given a handbook prepared by HRPS in 1992. Later CCCs were organized into district umbrella groups to facilitate involvement on all sides and generate ideas, projects and a higher community policing profile (Audit Report, Community Policing, #3 District, March, 1994). Statistics were to be made available on a designated community basis. In the 1991 Annual Report Chief Harding observed that crime and traffic statistics were provided therein on a community or neighbourhood basis, and added: "it is the first full year of police deployment based on neighbourhoods and it underlines our ongoing commitment to community policing which continues to serve us well."

The structure of police responsibility in relation to communities meant that at all times there would be a designated patrol officer serving a designated community and also that all the field level ranks participated in the system. There were problems of course to be dealt with as there would be in any system. Here the constables from the different watches rarely met and also acted in some isolation from their fellow watch officers. The operative norm was for constables to be responsible first and foremost to their own platoon sergeant and only secondarily to their 'community' sergeant. The sergeant also had difficulty monitoring and motivating officers he or she rarely saw because they were not on the same watch. Since the sergeants were all in the same boat on this matter there was reportedly a tendency for them to "look out for each other ...they see instructions are taken care of." The system could only work well if sergeants and constables monitored what was happening on the proactive front in their community via HRPS’s excellent technology.
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

(e.g., HEART) and via appropriately compiled and maintained 'community books.'

There were numerous other potential problems. Communications would have to consistently handle the calls for service, presumably stacking non-emergency calls for the designated communities. Officers would have to collaborate in good spirit with their fellow officers on platoon (e.g., helping them handle calls when appropriate) and with their fellow community designates on other platoons (e.g., handling their share of the calls, attending CCCs). It would be important as top management noted, to ensure that the CCCs included a cross-section of the community, especially of course representatives of the different interest groups. There would have to be sensitivity to the kind of projects encouraged by the CCC members; were they appropriate?; were they simply reflective of the interests of specific members or did they reflect a larger community concern? The latter issue was often raised by the field officers, a good number of whom also expressed concern about village constables' depending upon private sector sources for office space and other materials and technology. There was still a strong sense that policing is best left to the police.

Given the devolution of responsibility with respect to working with the CCCs, the

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6 One top manager observed that communication among the watches was negatively affected by the introduction of the twelve hour shift system; in his view, "this impacted the officers in a negative way, the only desire at the end of a shift was to go home to bed, whereas in the past there had always been interaction between the platoons at shift change."
variation of commitment among officers, the paucity of training, and significant differences in the designated communities themselves, one could expect much variation and inconsistency in implementation and impact. Clearly though this phase of CBP development at HRPS represented a major enhancement of community-based policing there. Virtually all patrol officers and all field ranks were now involved. Many more citizens were involved in discussion if not direction of police activity. The number of proactive projects increased considerably and some of these latter were outstanding (e.g., crime prevention at malls, elder abuse programs).

Community Policing was audited in the Burlington district in 1993 and 1994. A comprehensive assessment was made of both the village constable arrangements and the composition and workings of the CCCs. Police officers (surprisingly, only district NCOs, no constables) and CCC participants were interviewed. Statistics were gathered on calls for service and response times. The 1993 audit found certain shortfalls (e.g., poorly recorded minutes, poorly maintained CCC books, lack of attendance by NCOs at CCC meetings) and made recommendations. The 1994 audit indicated that most of the 1993 recommendations had been met and itself advanced few new recommendations. In general community policing, Halton-style, was deemed to be working quite well. The CCCs were found to be fairly representative in composition and attendance was good, though limited on the police side. The CCC participants considered that the CCCs were useful and that police responded well to their concerns. The NCOs reported that the system was working adequately in their view. All NCOs reportedly favored the concept of CCCs but many expressed ambivalence about its practice. The NCOs indicated that they had attended about
five CCC meetings in 1993. A general conclusion from the audits was that it would be desirable to involve more field officers in the CCC meetings, to provide more continuity from the police side, and that where the CCCs had a project focus they were more likely to be considered successful. At the same time police interviewees were concerned that issues advanced by CCC participants would be idiosyncratic and of personal interest rather than 'appropriate' and/or supported by the larger community.

The auditors found that village constable and project visibility officers were generally handling a reasonable proportion of the calls for service from their area though there were a few cases where, in their view and that of the NCOs, the calls for service did not justify a village constable placement. It is interesting that the audit employed that sole criterion, a basically reactive measure. Perhaps had the constables been interviewed more proactive considerations would have been raised and such considerations might well have, indeed perhaps should have, mattered with respect to suggestions for deployment. A concern expressed by the NCOs and auditors was that the village constable and project visibility officers were not well-integrated into overall platoon activity and not monitored by the 'road sergeants.' Finally it is interesting, in light of developments in phase three discussed below, that strong recommendations were being advanced for having fewer designated communities and for effecting more proactive-reactive integration (e.g., road sergeants and village constables) and a more team-like approach to calls for service and CCC attendance (e.g., not simply a single designated community constable in each platoon).

In the fall of 1994 as part of a general
organizational review project a committee of thirteen HRPS staff examined the state of community policing at HRPS. The Community Policing Committee members engaged in a number of personal interviews with sworn members and civilians and planned an extensive, more formal survey. They also developed a statement of CBP principles and suggested regular public surveys of HRPS's 'clients'. In its November 1994 the Committee commented:

"Although the Halton Regional Police Service is recognized as a model Community Based Policing Service and is often the focus of educational exchange visits with other police service members, it is readily recognized that there are numerous problems associated with the true adoption of Community Policing in Halton."

Based on the extensive interviewing the Committee listed the positive and negative points on community policing as these had been reported to them. There was widespread support for the CBP idea. The negatives, to paraphrase, boiled down to 'there being too little time to get involved in non-police problems especially as management does not support it in terms of resources and performance evaluation criteria, so it's all window-dressing to please politicians.' Overall though, committee members were positive, especially as HRPS seemed poised for a major transformation in conjunction with the

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7 This view of many field officers was challenged by a top management officer who pointed out that a $250,000 HRPS management study included a component that revamped the performance appraisal to recognize CBP efforts.
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

organizational review introduced by the new chief, Peter Campbell.

VILLAGE CONSTABLE AND STREET CRIME CONSTABLES:
A DISCOURSE ON CBP

If proactive policing and reactive policing were equally prized in the police organization and in the several police subcultures then one might expect that officers identified with the different emphases would be similarly valued insofar as their work was of the same calibre. Observations and interviews have led this researcher to conclude that the latter presumption holds and that outstanding proactive work (e.g., the Burlington Mall village constable’s work on crime prevention and elder abuse) and reactive work (e.g., the efforts of the street crime unit concerning auto theft at the ‘go train site’) were both done. It is interesting accordingly to compare the two major types of secondments that patrol officers could obtain in HRPS, namely to become village constables or to become members of the plain clothes ‘street crime’ unit. Both options existed in all districts though district #1 had only a two person street crime unit whereas the other two more populous districts had four person units. Village constables as noted were in essence constable generalists though the level of proactive and reactive policing varied quite a bit depending upon the officer and the ‘village;’ they typically were more or less integrated into the platoon structure, taking parade, and handling calls for service among other activities. Officers seconded to the street crime unit worked more closely with CID and typically focused on specific crime fighting tasks (e.g., break and enters, auto theft in certain places). Both types of
posting were voluntary and in both cases the officers exercised considerable autonomy and had to be 'self-starters.' Both types of posting also reflected flexible organizational responses to specific kinds of situations and to that extent were indicators of a modern active policing service.

In 1994 it appeared that in HRPS the street crime posting was more sought after and garnered more accolades from field officers and even senior officers than the village constable role. There was less turnover in the village constable role, reflecting it seems a lack of demand for that posting; a senior management officer in one district commented that the street crime unit there is usually a two year secondment and there are lots of applicants. Also there was more query and criticism of the village constable role by field officers and comments such as the following were commonplace: "the village constable role has a bad rep here;" "I don't know what they do but they don't help me." Several middle level managers wanted to reduce their number or turn them into a street crime unit. Their praise from some senior officers was directed more at their 'p.r.' value than at the intrinsic value of the work accomplished. And even some of the village constables themselves were seemingly unsure about the value of their role. The street crime role however was unequivocally valued, even by the village constables with whom it was discussed. There was some 'competition' among senior officers as to who had initiated the unit and all districts wanted such a unit. Patrol officers and CID members readily cited the achievements of the street crime grouping. In one instance the CID supervisor of a street crime unit when asked about the unit quickly and enthusiastically commented: "over the past 7 to 9 months they [the district street crime unit] laid 92
criminal charges, made 700 crime clearances and recovered $300,000 in stolen property.”

There appeared to be three factors accounting for the difference in evaluation of these roles at HRPS. First there was less ambiguity about measuring the effectiveness of the street crime role player. One particularly well-informed senior management officer noted that it is hard to measure the productivity of the village constable role as compared with 'street crime' work. Still, he argued, on the former you could refer to the absence of complaints and maybe use the CCCs to evaluate the village constable’s performance - a rather telling 'damning with faint praise' type of response it would seem, reflecting much ambivalence about performance evaluation. Secondly, what the street crime unit does, tends to be more highly regarded. One village constable observed that street crime officers are better off than village constables in terms of effectiveness because 'they are associated with CIB and detective work' and so they readily get credit even if it is only catching sixteen year olds for car theft and if they typically 'clear' a lot more than they 'charge;' this same officer allowed that departmental recognition for village constables is tough, getting better, but still "the police culture says CIB can do no wrong." A third factor appears to be a sense among many officers that the work of village constables might result in their 'going native' as it were, identifying too much with the 'client.' One senior management officer commented about the village constable role: "there is the possession factor, an 'our cop'/ 'my boss' factor that could create problems. It's necessary to have an identity but a cop has to remember who he's working for." While all the village constables contacted denied any problem of allegiance (e.g., "there was no pressure;
they were just happy to have us there") that threat is perceived as real by some other officers.

While both roles call for some similar qualifications most HRPS members interviewed on the comparison indicated that they attract different types of people. Street crime officers, said one top CID officer, "have a distinctive mentality and are workaholics." Often according to others they exhibit a good deal more stress and personal instability than village constables or community constables, possibly because their work is more irregular and always 'go, go;' the village constable’s work on the other hand, in this interpretation, is "more routine and predictable ... they know that and are content to do it." Of course it could well be that people with a high stress level or personal troubles seek out the 'on the edge' role of street crime fighter but there is much evidence from many jurisdictions that, that type of police work itself does have a destabilizing affect on many officers. Perhaps in that sense there is a trade off: more recognition, status and so forth in the police organization for the street crime officer but less stress and more contacts with successful citizens for the village constable.

It would appear on the basis of the above analysis that the everyday police culture at HRPS does not accord equal value and significance at the present to proactive and reactive dimensions of policing at least in the CBP sense of proactive. It is conceivable that the two roles could approximate one another insofar as the street crime unit regularly followed up their investigative work with crime prevention education and if village constables concentrated on problems and issues more directly related to criminal offences. Still in the village constable role nowadays in HRPS one sees all the elements of CBP actually being
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

simultaneously implemented, namely the expansive police role, the accountability to 'community', problem-solving strategies, and 'decoupling' in organizational decision-making. It may be that how significant and expanding and valued the community or village constable role is in the police organization would be an excellent measure of how truly advanced the CBP approach is there. Perhaps a larger change in the organization of patrol, maybe the team policing approach discussed below, is a prerequisite for that development.

ON THE EVE OF TRANSFORMATION

By the end of 1994 there were discernible cracks in HRPS's model of CBP. The number of village constables had declined sharply; in the Burlington district there were only four left. A discussion group of district #1 officers, policing the northern, less populated part of Halton and expected by this researcher to be the most inclined to a CBP approach, yielded a consensus that the village constable role had 'a bad rep' even there. The CCCs in at least one district reportedly (and confirmed by several sergeants there) no longer had specific named constables assigned to them. A number of officers, across ranks, indicated that they did not see the CCCs as the heart and soul of CBP, usually because they questioned the idea that such bodies should in any fundamental way direct police activity and priorities; clearly if the CCCs were not basic and the VCs were being reduced in number, one could ask well what exactly is the heart and soul of CBP at HRPS? Participatory management among patrol constables, if judged by the frequency of and attendance at meetings, reportedly also was at low ebb. There was a significant amount of stress as measured by the number of officers
using the Employee Assistance Program. According to HRPS’s Human Resources, and also the Police Association, the stress level had reached as high as 15% of the members, a record high usage and well-above the average for Ontario police organizations (i.e., between 7% and 10%). Of course this was also the period of the 'social contract' where, by governmental fiat, wages were frozen and overtime and other benefits (e.g., paid court time beyond a certain point) were virtually nonexistent. HRPS in comparison with its immediate neighbouring police services had low ratios of sworn members and overall staff to population (see table 11). Under the terms of the 'social contract' which ended in April 1996, HRPS could look forward to an even leaner police force (see figure 3). It had not dealt with budgetary restraints (i.e., 5% less per year for three years) by letting staff go or cutting pay but rather by eliminating vacancies, early retirement etc) and so in April 1996, while having to operate at below the 1992-93 budget levels, it would have to meet overtime and other employee benefits restored under the terms of the social contract policy. In 1995 this meant looking at a budget deficit of 1.5 million dollars. Creating an even more threatening atmosphere was the possibility that further cuts to the police budget might be initiated by a provincial government preoccupied with deficit-reduction. As Bayley and others have remarked (see above, 8)

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8 The employee assistance program at HRPS appears to be a quite generous one, open to officers’ family members and providing a range of services including financial advice. The generosity of the program may partly account for comparatively high usage.
Chapter 2) in times of significant fiscal restraint where the organization’s focus is fiscal, the organization is more inward looking, less open to CBP and less likely to spawn devolution.

In 1994 the Halton model of CBP was being thoroughly examined by HRPS staff. Clearly despite the cracks it was one of the most significant CBP elaboration in North America. The entire uniformed division and all ranks were thoroughly implicated in CBP and this was in addition to all the other initiatives such as DARE and so forth which some police organizations might be happy to say was their CBP thrust. The Bureau of Justice (Washington, 1994) developed the three criteria of equity, efficiency and effectiveness to discuss successful CBP. HRPS would stand high on all these criteria. On equity one could point to its own hiring pattern (e.g., civilian, women, minority recruitment) and to projects such as PEACE, and Victim Services. In terms of efficiency one could point to its staff per population ratios, its marshalling of considering external resources for many initiatives, its Issue Marketing strategy, and its prioritization of calls (e.g., its channelling of auto mishap calls). In terms of effectiveness one could point to the increased participation of the public through the CCCs and the increase in problem solving activities. It is also appears that these gains did not come at the expense of conventional policing objectives (e.g., neither response time for emergencies and code 1 calls nor clearance rates for diverse offences were negatively affected). In terms of implementation and impact CBP at HRPS had been enhanced during this phase even while there were clear shortcomings with respect to communication, participation and training in planning and implementing this second phase.
And there were many other positives. Despite the manpower situation clearance rates had gone up sharply in 1994 in all districts (see Figure 2). HRPS's package of other CBP initiatives such as Drug Abuse Resistance education were going well. In one year alone DARE reached almost 2000 grade six students and it still drew upon significant outside support; in fact in 1994 only one of the four HRPS officers in DARE was budgeted for by HRPS. The Children Safety Village by 1994 had educated well over 50,000 kindergarten, grade 2 and grade 4 students in traffic and other safety measures; it operated with one fulltime officer assisted by a host of volunteers. HRPS had a busy, well-trained though modestly funded volunteer grouping in victims services (see table 12). Its volunteer auxiliary was functioning well, contributing over 3500 hours to HRPS in a variety of functions such as patrol, project and special events. And HRPS had taken initiative in other areas such as violence against women. In other words HRPS's legacy was an impressive one for the new chief to build upon. That new chief, an 'outsider' very familiar with HRPS, shared the HRPS commitment to CBP and appeared to have the organizational development and human relations skills to build upon that legacy and see it through and even enhance it in this difficult period.

CONCLUSION

In this second phase of CBP development a distinctive Halton model emerged, one which represented a clear enhancement over the previous CBP thrusts at HRPS and which could well claim to be at the leading edge of this policing philosophy. The entire patrol division and all ranks were to be committed to
CBP. Ownership and partnership by and between police and community was to be forged as specific officers and their supervisors were designated to specific communities and mechanisms (the CCCs) were put in place to effect collaborative problem solving and crime prevention. The circumstances for the most part were favorable for the launching since Halton Region was an affluent low crime area and there was no immediate crisis. At the same time there was a low ratio of officers to population and also a low ratio of NCOs to constables. These latter considerations might have signalled the need for a great emphasis on communication, participation and training and for close collaborative training especially for the supervisors and the patrol constables. Unfortunately the process was limited in all these latter regards. Implementation and planning, and conceptualization of what was being required and how it could be facilitated – at all levels of the organization – was inadequate to the level of transformation envisaged. Still HRPS was where few other policing services were. And despite the above limitations it was able to effect a system that by criteria such as employed by bodies like the Bureau of Justice, could be judged first-rate. As before HRPS was examining and evaluating its own performance in CBP and other areas. Clearly too changing the subculture, appreciating the intricacies of transformation and developing a process model for incorporating field level leadership and spelling out top management’s own change responsibilities take time and patience for pioneers. The challenge now was how to move forward again, this time unfortunately in a less favorable budgetary situation.
HALTON REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE
COMMUNITY POLICING
IN-SERVICE TRAINING

November 4, 1991-February 25, 1992
COMMUNITY POLICING SEMINAR

COURSE CURRICULUM

08:00 - 08:15  INTRODUCTION

-D/Cheif
-give seminar outline
-discuss objectives of the training, i.e.,
1) Empower officers to implement community policing
2) Officers will understand and own the philosophy
3) Equip officers to conduct community policing

08:15 - 08:45  MODULE #1

Origins of Community Policing

-Policing Task Force recommendations
-Policing Services Act mandate
-HRPS history of community policing
-slide presentation (10 minutes)

08:45 - 10:00  MODULE #2

Community Policing Philosophy

-What is community policing?
(syndicate group)
-TROJANOWICZ definition
-What it is/What it is not
- video (13 minutes) (Santa Ana PD Problem Solving)

10:00 - 10:30  morning break/tour of HQ

10:30 - 12:00  MODULE #3

OPEN DISCUSSION - COMMUNITY POLICING ISSUES
- Marketing
- Communications
- Community Consultation Committees
- Supervision
- Administrative Support

VIDEO - COMMUNITY PARTNERS PROGRAM

12:00 - 13:00  LUNCH BREAK

13:00 - 14:30  MODULE #4

ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICE CONSTABLE
- job description
- interpersonal skills
- daily goals and planning
- communication with CPO’s in your community
- HEART utilization as a resource, i.e.,
  - infor index lists
  - CCC's
  - DACT CCC project activity
  - OCCS and PRTS
  - video (20 minutes)
  - NYPD

ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

- dynamics of CCC
- CCC recruitment and maintenance
- CCC role in problem solving
- delegating duties to CCC members

PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

14:30 - 14:45  afternoon break
14:45 - 15:45  MODULE #5

HRPS COMMUNITY POLICING MODEL

- video HRPS Community-Based Policing
- dynamics of HRPS model
- villages
- communities
- relationship between villages and communities
- Task Force officers and operational support
- relationship with community
- performance evaluations

15:45 - 16:00  COURSE SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE

- questions/general discussion

16:00  seminar concludes
Appendix

SELECTED COMPARISONS OF POLICE SERVICES*

*These tables were compiled under the direction of Gail Johnson, Ottawa Police Executive Command
### TABLE 1

**Ratio of population served per employee, and per sworn member, 1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Service</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>All Employees</th>
<th>Sworn Members</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver 471,800</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>426</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton 618,200</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>549</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa, Vanier 93</td>
<td>332,300</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>559</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ottawa, Vanier 94</td>
<td>332,300</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>571</td>
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<tr>
<td>Winnipeg 616,800</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>574</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Calgary 717,100</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>609</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel Region 717,700</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>650</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Durham Region 390,200</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>667</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Niagara Region 393,900</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>677</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamilton-Wentworth 445,400</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>687</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterloo Region 387,000</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>706</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London 303,200</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>708</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Laval 313,500</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>713</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York Region 504,800</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>740</td>
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<tr>
<td>Halton Region 303,200</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>788</td>
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## TABLE 2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Service</th>
<th>Population per &quot;frontline&quot; officer</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>770</td>
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<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>822</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calgary</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa 93</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham Region</td>
<td>933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa 94</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton–Wentworth</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel Region</td>
<td>997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laval</td>
<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterloo Region</td>
<td>1,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halton Region</td>
<td>1,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York Region</td>
<td>1,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niagara Region</td>
<td>1,148</td>
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</table>

Average: 946.5
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

TABLE 3

Officer-to-civilian ratio comparison

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Service</th>
<th>Ratio of sworn members to civilian employees</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>York Region</td>
<td>6.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham Region</td>
<td>4.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>4.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>4.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterloo Region</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa 93</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halton Region</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niagara Region</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel Region</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton-Wentworth</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laval</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa 94</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Average</td>
<td>2.92</td>
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</table>
Table 5 HERE
Table 6 HERE
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

Table 7 HERE
Table 8

Criminal code offenses per sworn member in 14 police services, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sworn Member</th>
<th>Offences per 100,000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>21,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>15,556</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>15,206</td>
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<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>11,730</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamilton-Wentworth</td>
<td>10,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary</td>
<td>11,624</td>
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<td>Niagara Region</td>
<td>10,031</td>
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<tr>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>11,447</td>
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<td>Waterloo Region</td>
<td>9,415</td>
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<td>Laval</td>
<td>8,332</td>
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<td>Durham Region</td>
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<td>Halton Region</td>
<td>6,300</td>
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<td>7,166</td>
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<tr>
<td>York Region</td>
<td>6,208</td>
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</table>

Sources:
### Table 9

**Property crimes per sworn member in 14 police services, 1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sworn Member</th>
<th>Crimes per 100,000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>13,790</td>
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<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>9,890</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>9,376</td>
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<td>Calgary</td>
<td>8,163</td>
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<td>London</td>
<td>6,932</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laval</td>
<td>6,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterloo Region</td>
<td>5,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>7,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton–Wentworth</td>
<td>6,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5,960</td>
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<tr>
<td>York Region</td>
<td>4,256</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4,719</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peel Region</td>
<td>4,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4,587</td>
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Table 10

Crimes of Violence per sworn member in 14 police services, 1992

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sworn Member</th>
<th>Crimes per 100,000 population</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>1,636</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>1,770</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
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<tr>
<td>York Region</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

Table 11 HERE
1994 Police Service Comparison
Table 12

Selected Ontario Police Services, 1994
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

Figure 1 HERE
Community Policing Deployment
Figure 2 HERE
HRPS Clearance Rates
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

Figure 3 HERE
Uniform Officer to Population Ration
Chapter Six

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE: ELABORATING THE CBP FRAMEWORK

"IN LARGE COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS EVEN A MEDIOCRE DECISION WITH EVERYONE BEHIND IT WILL USUALLY WORK OUT BETTER THAN A BRILLIANT DECISION IMPOSED FROM THE TOP"

(Japan Inc., N.F.B. 1982)

The Halton Regional Police Service is in the midst of a major elaboration of its policing philosophy and practice. As other police departments have found, the continued use of the concept 'community-based policing' has become problematic in the everyday police culture. Rather than rallying the troops CBP symbolically elicits much negativity. The concept carries much baggage, baggage associated with the lack of effective training, socialization and communication at the time of its introduction, with some earlier unsuccessful operationalizations of the philosophy (e.g., the division of the platoon into reactive and proactive halves), with the almost inevitable glitches and transformational pains of a significant organizational change where norms, values and interests clash and, not the least, baggage associated with the flaws and difficulties of the CBP philosophy itself (e.g., the constable generalist idea, the equal priority of proactive and reactive foci, developing appropriate performance evaluation, etc.). This heavy baggage interferes with the implementation of and commitment to the major policy thrusts associated with that philosophy. The ideas though of team policing (rather than for
example the constable generalist), problem solving in relation to crime and order issues, and customer service are more readily accepted. The concept, team policing, for example carries with it the possibilities of job enrichment and autonomy in that the team has a variety of tasks to perform and some autonomy both in dividing up the tasks (thereby allowing for some officer specialization) and to some degree in defining and prioritizing them. Problem solving is a positive concept in modern culture where 'active mastery' constitute the underlying ethos. And customer or client satisfaction is a concept heavily emphasized nowadays in all sectors of society. While these terms are not without their own negative twists and historical encumbrances, it does seem reasonable that a successful organizational strategy might well be to downplay the symbolically negative CBP 'flag' and reorganize and advance with these three major thrusts accompanied by appropriate training and consultation/partnership with the officers. That appears to be exactly what the HRPS is doing under its new leadership.

Recent research at Halifax PD, another police service well-known for its innovations in CBP and for its strong management advocacy of the approach, has found similar, significant negative reaction to the CBP construct. So pervasively sour has CBP become as a symbol in everyday departmental culture that many officers apparently have cited it, pejoratively, in explaining why they were not interested in 'closing, memorial services' planned for the soon-to-be superseded Halifax PD as it becomes absorbed in a larger regional system in the spring of 1996. That reaction has surprised the top management in light of the fact that CBP was introduced there almost ten years ago and has remained central to the department's official self-image. Perhaps CBP
now that it has the status of 'official morality' in policing, has become a scapegoat for a generalized officer angst. In any event top management there has not yet advanced a clear-cut strategic plan which would revitalize its CBP approach but the latter suffers from many of the same shortfalls that CBP has come up against in many progressive departments such as HRPS namely, little effective training in CBP, much negativity towards the symbolic idea of CBP largely because of past transformational problems and clashes, lack of clarity of goals and objectives and ineffective partnership vis-à-vis community advisory boards, and shortfalls in adjusting other aspects of the organization such as performance evaluation and decision-making to the assumed imperatives of the CBP philosophy. It is against such a backdrop that the HRPS initiatives can best be appreciated.

TEAM POLICING AND PROBLEM SOLVING

A central feature of the current phase of HRPS's elaboration of CBP is the advocacy and implementation of team policing. The 'Team Project' in the guise of the 'self-directed work team,' has emerged as a favourite concept in present day management circles. The concept actually has had a long history in policing and was quite popular in the 1970s. In fact as noted above team policing was implemented as such in one part of HRPS (i.e., Burlington) more than a decade ago. But, as had been the experience in other policing jurisdictions, it was of short duration, a localized 'experiment' rather than a pervasive organizational transformation, and it was deemed to have been an unsuccessful innovation. It has been resurrected in part because it is consistent with the CBP philosophy that progressive police departments like HRPS advocate, in that it can
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

be a vehicle for some of the central CBP thrusts such as job enrichment, participatory decision-making, decentralization, and problem solving while possibly avoiding some of CBP shortfalls such as the baggage noted above. Moreover its resurrection is taking place in an organizational context far more supportive than in the past and where team policing is an integral part of an overall and pervasive organizational re-structuring rather than a sideshow.

Why the resurrection? The 'team project,' the self-directed work team, has been championed by many management specialists as an appropriate successor to philosophies such as 'QWL' (quality of work life with its twin emphases of job enrichment and participatory management, and 'total quality management'). The basic idea has been that each self-directed work team is "a permanent fully trained, fully committed team that is fully responsible for turning out its completed product or service" (Moran and Berry, 1993, 1). Especially significant in this new movement has been the idea that the self-directed work team format can facilitate the main themes of the above philosophies and link them to productivity and associated incentive programs (see Figures 1 and 2); gains in team productivity in other words are presumably measurable and related to compensation packages (Orsburn et al., 1990). Certainly, like the earlier philosophies of the modern progressive workplace, the team project has not been implemented successfully on a large scale. Indeed a recent article in the Globe and Mail (November 24, 1995) cited a survey conducted in the United States by a leading management firm which reported that "the latest business trend, team projects, are often a burden. Forty-one percent of the workers say their team assignments are unfair. Eighty percent of their managers disagree."
Its relevance for policing may be problematic in that the supportive measurement systems and compensation systems may not be in place or even appropriate and likely to be put in place there. Still the concept does seem to embody the central thrusts of CBP.

HRPS leadership has contended too that the basic idea of 'team policing' has come from the rank and file and is not a top–down imposition. Three task forces, part of the 1994–95 HRPS Organizational Review Project (ORP, see below), made recommendations that team policing be introduced in the uniform patrol division; it has also been championed by the chair of the ORP Task Force, a staff sergeant long identified with CBP at HRPS. Review project leaders reported that their research among field officers yielded a picture of weak proactive-reactive linkages, and officers' apperception of isolation, especially but not only in relation to village constable activity and liaison with community input teams. It seemed to several review project leaders that the patrol officers were not utilized as effectively or efficiently as desirable and that perception was widely held by the patrol officers themselves. Also as noted earlier, audits of community policing in Halton in the 1990s advanced criticisms and recommendations that would be consistent with a team policing approach though not employing that specific terminology. The sense that more emphasis has to be given to the team concept was reflected in the 1992 comments of a HRPS deputy chief that 'we still experience difficulty in having the NCOs recognize that the village constable is part of the daily strength and a member of the team.'

While there clearly is a basis for holding that the 'team project' recommendation is based on induction (i.e., evaluation and assessments of conditions) and in that sense
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

'comes from below,' it also seems valid to argue that it represented a management view of shortfalls in platoon working arrangements. Interestingly, in advancing the concept its HRPS advocates have contended that there is too little teamwork on the platoons in general. This view elicits much criticism by field officers who see the platoon already as a team and point to the level of interaction and backup that occurs during the watch as evidence for their position. Overall it would appear that the concept of team policing, as a new strategy to be employed at HRPS, was generated more by the leadership's articulation of patrol officers' criticism and concerns, in conjunction with their own awareness of the new trends in management culture cited above. In other words the push for team policing may reflect a reasonable and grounded interpretation on the part of the leadership as to what needs fixing and how best to fix it, more than an explicit wish of the patrol officers. Also at this point in time given that the team policing concept has been minimally fleshed out, one can appreciate that many NCOs and constables might dispute its emergence 'from below' and express significant anxiety about it. Even several senior officers who have been intimately involved with the ORP seemed puzzled by the advocacy of team policing and observed that team policing and problem solving were last minute items advanced by a few key officers in a review process focused around dealing with financial exigency. In any event the concepts in themselves appear widely acceptable and the organization's involvement previously with team policing has been painted positively by most staff; virtually everyone interviewed, from top to bottom in HRPS, reported that previous team policing initiatives failed basically because management at the time did not provide appropriate
resources for it; no other reasons were offered.

In advancing upon this new specification of CBP philosophy HRPS top management’s motivation appears largely to be that of seizing a creative opportunity associated with the presence of a new 'outsider' chief, some officer discontent regarding various aspects of their work and the current CBP system (e.g., lack of participation in departmental decision-making, criticism regarding the linkages of reactive and proactive policing), and the requirement of making a lean police force leaner in a time of budgetary restraint and even decline. The implications of the latter factor are difficult to discern though it is clear that there will be some shrinkage in the middle management positions since an explicit goal, shared officially by departmental management, the HRPS police board and the provincial government, is to reduce costs while avoiding reduction in field officers ('on-the-road-time'). The creative opportunity then translates into having the officers in the field managing, more and effectively, all the policing functions they have to perform in specific community areas. It has been suggested that for team policing each district would be divided into four zones.

THE NEW LEADERSHIP

As noted this third phase of community policing has been associated with the arrival of a new chief at HRPS at the beginning of 1994. He came from another police force (the Ontario Provincial Police) but was familiar with HRPS and aware of its reputation and commitment to CBP. He shared many of his predecessor’s views, certainly regarding the CBP vision and the need to transcend reactive
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

policing; in words that echoed the former chief's he commented, in a discussion with NCOs about policing, that "there's a lot more in policing than catching the bad guys ... in fact we're not that good on this." The new chief though has quite a different style, one that reflects an interesting combination of 'human relations' and 'organizational development' approaches. A popular figure at HRPS, he appears to capture the kind of quality leadership called for Couper and Lobitz (1991), namely believing in and fostering teamwork, stressing participation, being a facilitator and coach, encouraging creativity through risk taking, being tolerant of honest mistakes, and having a customer orientation. This style is reflected in the open, participatory way HRPS has launched its organizational review project. It is indicated in his encouragement of HRPS staff to participate in the process; for example in one of the newsletters (see Figure 3) which regularly inform staff of ORP findings and suggestions, he commented:

"I note the comments ... particularly regarding whether we are listening and will pay attention to your recommendations. Obviously the proof is yet to come, but I can assure you that members of senior management are sincere in wanting your views and in our desire to see an organization in which you believe and have participated in designing ... That doesn't mean we don't have ideas or opinions" (Directions, December, 1994).

His style regarding risk taking may be exemplified in his comments to a group of NCOs at a session devoted to 'team policing' where he urged them to "experiment but let me know what you are doing." During the orientation
sessions on team policing he participated freely, invited officers to give their views and visions and at the closing session returned to those who had raised issues on the first day and inquired whether their concerns had been met, an attention to detail and feedback which reflects especially an organizational development perspective. His sensitivity to clients and other bodies outside the department may be seen in his relations thus far with Halton Regional municipal authorities and members of the HRPS Police Service Board; in both instances these officials have reported much more openness, contact and involvement with HRPS under the new regime.

It does appear that the present chief complements the former chief quite well as regards effecting CBP at HRPS. The phase that HRPS is in would appear to require not the vision of the hedgehog but the savvy and warmth of the fox (see Chapter 2 for reference to these terms). The challenge is one of motivation and organizational design. The new chief, appropriately perhaps for an 'outsider,' can explicitly build on a legacy of self-conscious CBP and organizational excellence, concentrating on realizing these in difficult times. Is his style the appropriate one from a CBP perspective in these times at HRPS? In a conference on policing in 1994, Bayley, a well known American police researcher, commented to the effect:

"where the focus is financial or fiscal, the police department is more inward looking, less open to CBP and less likely to spawn devolution. Where the focus is impact and/or output, the department is more outward looking, more open to CBP and more likely to spawn devolution."

Clearly the present focus of HRPS
leadership is fiscal. Chief Campbell has repeated many times that the financial motive for HRPS’s extensive organizational review project was "unquestionably the most important" (June 1995). Unlike Professor Bayley, Chief Campbell has also expressed the view that CBP is especially appropriate in these times because of the reductions apparently required in middle management and thus the need for organizational devolution. Who is right? If Bayley is – and as noted below there is some unrecognized and unintended threat in the ORP recommendations that CBP at Halton in the future could become basically the preserve of a small centralized crime prevention unit akin the style of the pre–CBP era – if he is right, then perhaps the hedgehog style (i.e., the vision and the bully box) might be seen at least in retrospect having been more appropriate by those who advocate CBP.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS

In embarking upon this initiative top management has emphasized two principal strategies, namely the widespread and in-depth participation of HRPS members in designing and implementing the transformed structure and style of policing, and borrowing 'best practices' from whatever source, whether policing or private sector. The former contrasts sharply with the top-down, limited participation and limited training manner in which CBP was introduced into HRPS in the past. The sensitivity to best practices has meant seeing what other progressive police organizations (especially Calgary and Edmonton) are doing in the way of CBP and police management, examining some private sector practices and innovations (e.g., Dofasco Inc.) and hiring local and international consultants,
especially an international consultancy firm, Zenger-Miller Inc, recognized for its expertise with respect to 'self-directed work teams,' but also other, university-based consultants, to assist the organization in developing its new system.

According to the Bureau of Justice (1994) in understanding CBP and developing a framework for implementation action, the priorities should be a patrol focus, decentralization of decision-making, the team concept, and articulation of relevant values and principles; the latter would presumably be basically in the form of appropriate and well-communicated mission statements and philosophies of service delivery. HRPS activity in this current phase appears to be quite consistent with these Bureau suggestions. Its team policing concept is being advanced clearly as a patrol focus, with no apparent implication for CID, and as presumably yielding effective decentralization. A carefully constructed mission statement and a detailed service delivery philosophy have been formulated and approved by the Policing Services Board in the summer of 1995 (see Figures 4 and 5).

The HRPS mission statement emphasizes the ideas of 'consultation with its stakeholders,' 'contributing to the safety and wellbeing of the community,' and 'pursuing excellence' through

(a) a professional and motivated workforce representative of the community;
(b) community driven policing services and prevention programs;
(c) investigative expertise;
(d) visible presence; and
(e) sensitive and responsible law enforcement.

The service delivery philosophy reiterates HRPS’s commitment to crime
prevention and proactive policing, the constable generalist supported by specialists, and an active pursuit of public, especially community, involvement in establishing police priorities. It explicitly commits constables to 'design policing strategies in assigned communities' and to 'belong to teams (inter-platoon) focused on problem solving.'

The articulated mission statement and service delivery philosophy exhibit much continuity with HRPS's previous symbolizations of CBP, namely 'community-driven policing,' 'proactive emphasis,' and 'constable generalist and patrol focus;' there is also continuity with the expressed pursuit of excellence and wanting to be on the leading edge of modern policing. At the same time there are some important differences, perhaps the most important being the absence of any explicit reference to 'the village constable strategy,' a mainstay if not the mainstay of pre-1990 HRPS's CBP and one of the two chief pillars of the Halton model of CBP discussed in the previous chapter; and secondly, there is a detailing of the specific activities of the uniformed patrol constable, a useful strategy for clearly establishing expectations for patrol work. It should be noted that in other forums HRPS leadership has announced that it will continue to utilize the village constable system; it would appear that particular CBP strategy will be seen more clearly as a tool employed where needed rather than a fundamental feature of HRPS's CBP — to some extent this has been the definition of the situation in past years but nevertheless there does appear to have been a change in emphasis.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{9} In reviewing this monograph HRPS' top management strongly indicated that the village
It is not clear how extensive and meaningful was the consultation undertaken with HRPS members and CCC participants in the articulation of these values, principles and activities. Probably little if any discussion was held with the latter groupings (i.e., CCC members) and modest amounts with the HRPS members (see Report of the Community Policing Committee, March 1994). The 'mission' and 'philosophy of service delivery' statements apparently were drafted by senior management but were sent for vetting in the organizational review project (see below). Among field officers there has been some diversity of opinion and some questioning with respect to two aspects: (a) the symbolic significance of the phase 'sensitive and responsible law enforcement' (e.g., some officers asked: 'is this code for treating minorities differently'), and (b) the degree to which police activity should be "based on community established priorities," an enduring issue in HRPS's CBP implementation.

HRPS's top management launched in the fall of 1994 the 'HALTON REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEW PROJECT' (the ORP). The organizational review was fuelled by several concerns but as already noted the principal one was financial; HRPS had to plan for eliminating a potential deficit of 1.5 million dollars in fiscal 1996 and for potential budget freezes and cutbacks in the immediate future. This project entailed the establishment of numerous subcommittees or task forces (see Figure 6), drawing upon a significant number of police and civilian HRPS employees. Well over a hundred staff, all volunteers, have been involved directly in

constable concept remains a vital centerpiece of its CBP program.
these task forces. In order to keep all staff up-to-date and to encourage their participation, a communications support group was established which among other things published a regular newsletter called DIRECTIONS (an example is provided in Appendix B to this report). In the first issue of the newsletter (November 1994) Chief Campbell observed that "the review we are undertaking is, as I understand it, the most comprehensive review of operating procedures, policies and organizational structure ever undertaken by the Halton Regional Police Service. It has the potential to result in a state-of-the-art police organization which is optimally positioned to respond to public needs for the foreseeable future. If we are to be successful in redesigning our organization then ideas from every quarter must be sought. Our desire of course is to produce a good organization, but quite frankly you all know that underlying some of our initiatives is the need to find ways to operate in a less costly fashion. Social contract requirements on all public service agencies are forcing reexamination in order to reduce operating costs."

All task forces were provided with terms of reference spelling out the mandate they had and the criteria they should heed in following that mandate (see Appendix B to this report). The mandate entailed finding savings by identifying less costly alternatives that were in keeping with high quality, constable empowerment, and less supervisory and administrative costs. Essentially the criteria
employed were to represent all ranks, have open, ‘non-rank’ participation and relationships, acknowledge all ideas submitted, take into consideration the HRPS Mission Statement, and provide timely recommendations (see Appendix B to this report). The task forces held regular meetings, at least monthly, interviewed people and examined reports, and wrote regular updates on their activities and discussions which were published in Directions and distributed with the staff pay cheques. The chairs participated in a coordinating committee. Resources were provided for some peer consultation and other expenses. The major task forces did indeed consult. The Uniform Operations Task Force for example consulted with 14 other police organizations mostly in Ontario but including Calgary PD while the Community Support Task Force consulted with 12 police organizations, including Calgary PD. In addition to these consultation HRPS undertook a mail-back survey of 2000 citizens and also apparently conducted an internal survey. At this stage there was virtually no involvement of the CCCs. Clearly the ORP was not specifically focused on CBP at HRPS but it is interesting that the caption on most ORP organizational charts and reports read, ‘Community Policing,’ presumably a constant reminder of the HRPS’s ethos.

ORP IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING

Three of the ORP task forces as noted earlier made the recommendation that HRPS reorganize its CBP activity using a ‘team approach.’ All three task forces had the same resource person, the deputy chief Operations (reasonable enough since they were under his everyday management), and while none had a specific mandate to explore team policing, each
was expected to make suggestions using the criteria spelled out above. The Uniform Task Force (May 1995) called for a flatter hierarchy (e.g., the elimination of the superintendent position, occupied by only one person at the time), replacing the three district crime prevention sergeants by a centralized, smaller crime prevention unit and redeploying all village constables (community directed patrol) to the platoons. It contended that “the team concept with a problem solving approach is the key to success” and recommended that implementation teams be established to guide the formation of team policing in the districts. The Community Support Services Task Force made similar recommendations on these issues, suggesting that the districts’ crime prevention sergeant post be eliminated, and, in calling for a centralized unit for CBP support, it noted “we need a champion for crime prevention and community policing.” The Community Policing Task Force strongly recommended the team concept which it claimed came from analyses of feedback and recommendations made by HRPS members. It called for the adoption of team policing utilizing four areas per district, adding that “this will not dismantle the platoons” (ORP Report, 1995, 22). The Task Force also advised that readiness and training, directed by an implementation team, should be completed prior to the start of teams in any district. By way of contrast it can be noted that the CIB Task Force in the ORP was quite conventional; it recommended more resources especially for Regional Morality and Drugs, and advised against any further decentralization on the grounds of “the increasing amount of expertise required in serious criminal investigations” (ORP, 1995, 5).

Apparently these recommendations were adopted by the HRPS leadership, namely to have
the uniformed division go into inter-platoon team policing, to eliminate the district crime prevention sergeants, to reduce middle management positions by roughly 50% (it can be noted however that at the time of the recommendation a good number of these positions existed only on paper), to have the crime prevention constable remain a district post but to rename it as 'community policing coordinator,' to redeploy the village constables back to the platoons, and to have a small centralized CBP/crime prevention support unit. It was also agreed that there should be extensive orientation among senior officers, NCOs and constables (perhaps with their sergeants also present), that staff would be asked to help design the new system and that implementation planning should precede the start up in district #3 (i.e., Burlington) in the fall of 1995.

Orientation and Planning sessions were launched in May and June of 1995, the former with some 30 senior staff and the latter with about 35 sergeants and staff sergeants. In general these sessions, especially the first one, did not proceed exactly as planned. At the former meeting the Chief announced that "we are here to launch team policing which has already been agreed upon," and the deputy Chief later added that "this is the first day of the new HRPS;" a consultant was there (and also at the second session for sergeants in June) to help the senior staff group work through the implications of team policing and suggest its design at HRPS. It turned out however that in both sessions much energy had to be spent – indeed virtually all the time – by the leadership in justifying the need for team policing and change in the first place. A widespread viewpoint was "if it ain't broke don't fix it" accompanying a position that the need, for what many took as 'radical change,'
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

had not been demonstrated. It was clear too that there were significant differences in how the leadership and many attendees perceived police work at HRPS. Top management and change advocates suggested that patrol officers were not overworked and that for the most part the uniformed officers worked rather individually; many field supervisors and some senior staff had a counter–vision, namely that in the platoons there was much emphasis on teamwork already and that the officers were indeed very busy on the reactive front. A few attendees contended that this was no time for radical change, arguing that patrol constables are already confused about CBP, and “see the issues as health and safety and see response and enforcement as their responsibilities period.” There was unease too about how team policing would be implemented and what to do about obvious problems such as integration over the watches/platoons of teams assigned to the same specific zone, and what kind of performance evaluation there would be (especially in the light of the consultant’s comment that the ‘team project’ works best in the private sector where productivity is tied to compensation).

Overall then in these initial orientation and planning sessions the emphasis was on justification and explanation of the switch to ‘team policing.’ Perhaps the most persuasive justification, certainly the one returned to by advocates in the crunch, was that financial restraint required change. The explanation of the team concept was pitched at a general level, dealing with the positives and some of the challenges of the team policing approach (see Appendix C to this report). There was an initial gap in understanding and communication in that top management brought to the table a general idea (the team concept) minimally fleshed out and invited the attendees to help design its implementation in HRPS; many
attendees on the other hand wanted to know at
the outset the substance of the proposed
innovation. Somewhat surprisingly the second
session with the actual field level supervisors
appeared to be the more effective in at least
effecting common understanding. Clearly top
management had learned from the reaction of the
senior staff and spent more time up front
justifying, explaining and asking for input
from the sergeants.

As this research was ending, orientation
sessions were being planned for patrol
constables and an implementation team was being
set up for a fall start up in Burlington. Clearly HRPS leadership was emphasizing, as the
Bureau of Justice and other authoritative
sources on CBP would advise, considerable
communication and participation, including
involving constables and their sergeants
together in training sessions. Generally HRPS
leadership promised to provide considerable
training and laid out a significant role for
field officers in designing the new system. It
was of course unclear how dramatic a change
team policing would create in HRPS's CBP.
There would be some problems to deal with that
have always characterized CBP at Halton, namely
performance evaluation and integration across
the watches. There were many potential
benefits for CBP that might be associated with
the new direction. As noted there were
noticeable cracks in the existing CBP approach,
some lack of integration of the proactive and
reactive, and a field policing subculture that
was quite resistant to the CBP philosophy;
perhaps the team concept could have a positive
impact on these problems. Clearly too there
were pitfalls for proactive CBP with this new
direction. Communities were to be collapsed
into broad zones, a system that has not worked
well for meaningful community input in most
jurisdictions. The removal of the crime
prevention sergeants could mean there would be fewer field champions for proactive policing and less sympathetic evaluation of those doing such police work. Proactive, crime prevention policing done by many village constables might well be channelled more to a street crime type of policing, something that a number of sergeants indicated that they would like to see. It will indeed be likely that CBP will be reshaped under the new elaboration, perhaps in the direction advocated by many of the contemporary critics of CBP as discussed in chapter two.

CONCLUSION

In 1994 with the appointment of a new chief of police at HRPS the department went into a major organizational review project which heralded a third phase for its CBP. HRPS continued to emphasize that the Service was committed to CBP and that the change represented an elaboration or enhancement of previous efforts. There were a variety of reasons for the change. Despite overall success (especially in comparison with the CBP efforts of other police organizations), there were serious shortcomings with respect to the two pillars of the 'Halton model of CBP,' namely the community directed patrol and the village constable systems; there was significant fragmentation and isolation, not enough integration of the proactive and reactive aspects of patrol work, and limited acceptance of the approach among field officers. Another important reason was that financial exigency was compelling HRPS to re-examine the most efficient way to deliver all services and especially to do so without as many personnel in middle management and supervisory positions. A third reason was the
sensitivity of HRPS leadership to the concept and possibilities of the ‘team project’ in contemporary management culture.

The approach used to plan and implement this third phase of CBP has been quite different than in its previous elaborations. There has been extensive communication and participation among HRPS staff. Senior officers, NCOs and constables received orientation with respect to the general themes of the change and were encouraged, indeed required, to participate in the design of a new system of community policing that focused around the team approach. Implementation and planning have received high priority in contrast to earlier phases of CBP change at HRPS.

At this point in time the third phase of CBP is in the implementation planning stage. The team policing project is being fleshed out and designed in the districts. It will be interesting to see what develops and how it does. Certainly the team project approach has potential for a better integration of proactive and reactive thrusts and for generating a better appreciation of the value of some of the principal pillars of CBP such as team work, problem solving, and client orientation. At the same time there is the possibility that integration of proactive and reactive policing at the field level via self-directed work teams could spell the end of significant community policing and represent a regression to an earlier era which featured a centralized crime prevention unit and a few special officers co-existing with a field patrol virtually totally caught up in response and enforcement. Of course such an outcome may or may not be desirable depending upon one’s orientation to and assessment of CBP. It is also possible that HRPS may be forging a new model of CBP, one that as critics of CBP would
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional advocate is more closely tied to reactive and crime fighting priorities.
Strategic Organizational Change
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

Figure 2 HERE

Milestones in a Transition to Work Teams
I note the comments of the Project Coordination in this edition of DIRECTIONS, particularly regarding whether we are listening and will pay attention to your recommendations. Obviously the proof is yet to come, but I can assure you that members of senior management are sincere in wanting your views and in our desire to see an organization in which you believe and have participated in designing.

That doesn't mean we don't have ideas or opinions. For example, the recent commitment by the Police Services Board to two Deputy Chiefs is a move that I not only concur with, but one which I recommended. My eleven plus months in the Halton Regional Police have demonstrated that the activity level and number and magnitude of issues we will face over the next few years at all levels, including the senior levels, are best met by two Deputy Chiefs. This view is supported by the fact that most other police organizations of a similar size have two Deputy Chiefs. As well, I believe two Deputy Chiefs lends itself to greater senior level flexibility and increased career opportunity and development for more people. Could we survive with one Deputy Chief? Probably, but not easily. I am convinced that two Deputy Chiefs are in the best interest of the Service at this time.

The ORP Task Force looking at administrative functions and the Chief's Staff will continue to examine the operating mandates, reporting relationships and staffing levels of the Office of the Chief, the Deputies and all units associated with them, including the question of
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

one Deputy or two. Should they establish a convincing case for a single Deputy that recommendation can be realized through a longer term implementation strategy.

For those of you asking how this fits with cost reduction, I note that I do not intend to fill the Staff Superintendent position vacated by Deputy Chief Algar and, as well, the Staff Officer position and secretary to the Chief are both vacant. Both will be evaluated in the ORP. This is a significant contribution to cost reduction.

As we all travel down the reorganization trail, many other decisions will be made. Few will have 100% acceptance, but I certainly hope that the majority of decisions are consistent with majority views and flow from the Task Force. In any event, you can be assured that, to the best of my ability, I'll keep you informed of what we are doing and the rationale.
Figure 4

HALTON REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE

MISSION STATEMENT

The members of the Halton Regional Police Service, in consultation with its stakeholders, will contribute to the safety and well being of the community. We will accomplish this by pursuing excellence in everything we do and especially through:

* a professional and motivated workforce representative of the community;

* community driven policing services and prevention programs;

* investigative expertise;

* visible presence and

* sensitive and responsible law enforcement.
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

Figure 5

SERVICE DELIVERY PHILOSOPHY

* Proactive, reactive and preventative policing to improve community life

* Emphasis on crime prevention and proactive policing (apprehension and detection continues)

* Constable Generalist supported by Specialists

* Pursue community partnerships

* Activities
  - based on community established priorities
  - related to identified communities
  - intended to solve problems
  - designed to achieve pre-determined success criteria

* Police assigned and committed to a community

* Constables
  - to design policing strategies in assigned community
  - belong to teams (inter-platoon) focused on problem solving

* Organization adjusts to changing environment
Figure 6 HERE
Community Policing
"WE’VE BEEN THROUGH A LOT OF CHANGE IN RECENT YEARS, PROBABLY MORE THAN ANY OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENT IN CANADA." (Sergeant Hay, June 6, 1995).

The HRPS has staked out a claim for itself as an organization and with respect to CBP and it has kept with it. It has audited and evaluated its operationalizations like modern quality management should. It has gone forward. There are few other police organizations in Canada that have matched its developments in CBP, perhaps Calgary and Edmonton PDs. The HRPS’s leadership has kept its antenna up as to what has been happening in policing circles and in management theory and practice and has responded to criticisms and suggestions (e.g., in 1992 upon reviewing an academic report on the village constable system the leadership acted on a key recommendation and required middle management and supervisors to spend more time in the field getting a better appreciation of that role and activity). HRPS has been an ‘active organization’ in Etzioni’s sense of the term (1967) exhibiting commitment and a sensitivity to ‘best practices’ elsewhere.

Clearly much has been accomplished in CBP by a well managed department with a committed leadership. One could point to the DARE and PEACE programs, the Children Safety Village, Victim Services, Elder abuse, police auxiliary and so on. At the same time HRPS has remained too a very professionally competent
organization with respect to conventional policing as in CID, investigative technology, and technology in general. It has also been in the vanguard with respect to civilianization, and employment equity. It has been highly successful in mobilizing and husbanding resources in the larger community, whether for special projects (e.g., DARE) or for basic patrol activity (e.g., storefronts).

But what about CBP in the heart of the organization, specifically in the field operations? There the struggle for transformation has been tough. The focus has been on patrol and not CID. HRPS had went through a variety of experiments relating to patrol work, some of which were dismal failures but nevertheless provided lessons for future developments. HRPS has attained significant success in its village constable program and with its community directed patrol and community consultative committees. It does not have to take a backseat to any police organization with respect to its CBP efforts. Still there is the widespread recognition at HRPS that they have not yet got the brass ring, that CBP is not where they want it from the point of view of officer commitment and actual practice in proactive work and community participation. There is still much skepticism and reluctance in the field.

The HRPS experience illustrates the difficulty of effecting integrated, thorough-going CBP even in a very favorable policing environment where resources have been fairly plentiful, crime and reactive pressures comparatively low, the population well-educated and appreciative, management positive and able, and the staff well-trained and young. Clearly the police subculture is problematic for CBP. After 15 years many HRPS patrol officers still think that response and enforcement are their responsibilities, period! They still appear to
Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional

be strongly of the view that policing is best left to the police. Their police behaviour may not be much different that of their pre-CBP predecessors. But it is more than the field subculture that is at issue here. The level of training, socialization and implementation planning has been, until very recently, quite minimal. The transformation has been largely a top-down, imposed one and not surprisingly it has not profoundly impacted on a suspicious and wary field police culture. And there have been some aspects of CBP that fly in the face of everyday policing realities, such as the idea of the constable generalist and the equal priority of reactive and proactive police work.

All the above point out the need for greater training and orientation and for collaboration/participation by field officers at all ranks in the implementation of CBP. It points up too the need not only for a vision of change and a will to impose it but also for human relations and organizational development skills to effectively implement and manage it. There is too the need apparently to rethink some of the CBP philosophy and principles. At this point in time these needs and requirements may be getting met at HRPS. It is in the midst of change occasioned in large measure by circumstances decidedly less favorable to CBP. As HRPS goes so may the CBP movement. The 'team' approach being followed could result in a transcending of the management/field level subcultural divide and could be an effective way of integrating proactive CBP with conventional reactive policing. It could also spell the end of significant CBP in everyday patrol. It will be interesting to see what happens.
ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY


Barratt J. "Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional," n.d.


Community-Based Policing at Halton Regional


APPENDIX A

THE VILLAGE CONSTABLE AND COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING: FRONTIER OR BOONDOCKS

THIS PAPER WITH MINOR REVISIONS AND A 1995 ADDENDUM IS REPRODUCED FROM AN EARLIER PAPER CO-AUTHORED BY DONALD AND LYNDA CLAIRMONT.
The Village Constable and Community-Based Policing: Frontier or Boondocks

Introduction

The philosophy of community-based policing (hereafter CBP) as the emerging style of policing has been developed throughout the 1980s in Canada, United States and Britain (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Irving et al, 1989). It is clear from statements and recommendations by ministers of national and provincial governments, leaders of police organizations and commissioners of Royal Commissions and other Inquiries (see Clairmont, 1991) that CBP is now the official morality so-to-speak with respect to policing in Canada. The irony is that in Canada and elsewhere for that matter CBP at this point in time has seldom been put into effect in any police organization in an integrated, thorough-going fashion. When one looks to research specifying the implementation of CBP and the impact it has had, one again finds very little. In both Canada and the United States, basically, there is largely anecdotal evidence on evaluation and it is usually unclear exactly what was implemented (Mastrofski, 1991B).

CBP apparently entails three elements, namely internal organizational change away from the conventional dependence on military discipline and hierarchy, an expanded police role in society, and greater linkage of the police service with the 'community' and external environment (Clairmont, 1990). Fleshed out, these, in turn, entail more decentralized decision-making and 'QWL' or quality-of-work type change in the police organization, more
Appendix B

involvement of 'community' influences in police planning and accountability, and more status in the police organization for the uniformed officer, often renamed the constable generalist to underscore his/her more expansive police role. In the constructionism of CBP, it has been argued that it not something that can be added-on to a police department's existing style but rather must be adopted as the 'way of life', as the dominant pervasive mode for the organization (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Sparrow, 1988).

The case for CBP seems to have been based more upon critique and persuasion than upon the existence of positive research findings. Predictably the recent Los Angeles riot has spurred a large amount of pro-CBP discussion and writing, largely because of the apparent bankruptcy of "Gates-ism" (i.e., high-tech, green beret, reactive policing style). The modest Canadian literature (see Clairmont, 1991) has focused on the initiation of CBP in departments and the initial responses by police officers involved, by the police organization itself and by the 'community.' The general finding of these studies has been that the public and the police officers spearheading the CBP development report high levels of satisfaction with the CBP initiative. Mastrofski (1991B) summed up the substantially similar American literature by noting that while there was much positive anecdotal material, it just is not clear what has been implemented and certainly not much can be claimed for CBP as regards either community participation or the impact on the objective reality of crime and safety. Still given the recency of most CBP initiatives (most only began in 1985/86) it does seem premature to accept some critics' view that CBP is 'a reform that has been oversold' (see Mastrofski, 1991A). Moreover there has been a discernible
elaboration in the CBP systems adopted by several committed departments in Canada including, Victoria, Calgary, Edmonton, Halton and Halifax.

Assessing CBP’s implementation and impact necessitates identifying what are the essential aspects of implementation, rather than merely marginal strategies or tactics, and what would be the key impact measures. Implementation aspects that seem fundamental would be new organizations/committees linking closely police planning/priorities and community groups, the constable generalist role, concern and commitment by police with a wider range of community problems, decentralization and participative decision-making in police management itself. Implementation styles would also be important to assess – whether an incremental approach emphasizing slow consensual change or the ‘bold strokes approach’ emphasizing fast directed change from the top. Impact measures that come to mind would include reduction in fear of crime, more positive attitudes to police, more sense of ‘ownership’ and partnership among community groups and police in an area’s problems, and evidence of higher status within the police organization of the uniformed officer (reflected perhaps in promotion opportunities) and, in the longer run, more basic crime prevention. Of course impact assessment is more complicated than in the professional model where honest disinterestedness, arrest rates and response times were readily advanced criteria.

Most research in Canada, United States and Britain has identified two major restraints on the development of CBP, namely the ‘political’ issue of dealing with demand from special interests, the public and even the police themselves for reactive policing and responding to calls for service (Kennedy, 1987;
Appendix B

Kelling and Moore, 1988; Brown, 1989), and the resistance to CBP in the policing subculture (Fielding et al., 1990; Irving et al., 1990; Clairmont, 1990). Front-line supervisors and middle-management not only sometimes experience the threat if not the actuality of diminished authority but also often have the task of effecting the significant CBP changes while at the same time maintaining traditional productivity 'bottom lines' (i.e., tickets and response time). It is not surprising then that they are usually seen as sources of resistance to CBP. Patrol officers for a variety of reasons (Hotson, 1989; Irving, 1989, Clairmont, 1991) typical resist the constable generalist role, especially the proactive, crime prevention and problem-solving aspects.

There is surprisingly little research literature on matters of community linkages, though probably the most spontaneous definition of CBP would emphasize the idea of more in-depth decentralized police-community relations (see for example Dent and Hackler, 1992). It is unclear whether one should expect resistance to CBP implementation from elected political officials or police boards threatened perhaps by neighbourhood or 'village' advisory groups' influence or from mid-management and supervisory officers, uncomfortable perhaps at having to regularly justify themselves to such groupings. Little research is available on the kinds of community linkages that get established and why, or on their development over time. Nor is there much known about the role of top management although there seems to be agreement that CBP requires loosening bureaucratic and legalistic restrictions (Mastrofski, 1988). There is some indication (Kelling et al., 1988) that management has to be very sophisticated to facilitate the organizational 'decoupling' required by an extensive CBP system (i.e., dealing with
accountability and responsibility where there is decentralization of initiative to reflect 'community priorities') and deal with other issues such as the 'political' problem referred to above.

There has been much speculation concerning the possible dangers and shortfalls of CBP (Wycoff, 1987; Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Klockars, 1991). Basically what one encounters here is analysis from an ideal-type postulate rather than strong empirical studies. The two most common dangers identified have been the danger of police intrusion and more subtle social control power, and the danger of social class and status bias in the delivery of CBP. The first danger directs attention to police mobilization of grass-roots organizations which might enhance police powers and weaken an already weakened local governing authority (see Kennedy, 1987; McMahon and Ericson, 1987) as well as to police activity vis-a-vis legal and civil rights. The issue of biased delivery of a more intrusive police service could be reflected in police accommodating advisory groups pressing for aggressive order-maintenance against panhandlers and other street-people or siding with certain groups over others in community problems. While the dangers are real enough it also appears that much CBP has been centered in low income areas and/or areas with heavy demand for policing where the residents have welcomed the police presence and reported that previously they were ignored by police (Clairmont and Murphy, 1991).

Village Constable Programs

Clearly the jury is still out on CBP's implementation and impact. While the dangers noted above bear watching, the foremost issue
is the extent to which anything distinctive happens - whether in a phrase, the emperor (here CBP) is wearing any clothes at all - or whether like the rehabilitative ideal in the field of Corrections CBP will be rendered passe by the pace of modern social change without ever having been thoroughly tried.

It remains to be seen whether CBP’s distinctive thrusts will ultimately be left to a few officers working with volunteers and advisory groups while the rest carry on a conventional, basically reactive, incident-driven style of policing. Even now among the Canadian departments best-known for CBP such as Halifax, Halton, Edmonton, Victoria, Calgary and Fredericton it is largely in the context of neighbourhood foot patrol or village constables operating out of a ’storefront’ where one sees the distinctive elements of CBP being simultaneously implemented. The reasons for this are on the one hand the obstacles and constraints to a thorough-going CBP noted above, and on the other hand the fact that the village constables are removed either symbolically or otherwise from the rest of the force and given an expressly different mandate and generally supervised differently.

How significant and expanding and valued the village constable role is in the police organization may be an excellent measure of how truly advanced the CBP approach is there. While not in principle a structural requisite of CBP the village constable program may be the leading edge of CBP as a new paradigm in the policing service. It may also turn out to be the residue of a more modest CBP movement, yielding more community involvement by some officers largely specializing in crime prevention and related task force activity, something that existed in the ’professional policing era’ but was generally accorded lower value and lower priority than may be the case
The concept, village constable, is expressly used by some police departments such as Halton, Halifax, Fredericton and Edmonton to describe the pattern whereby officers are assigned full-time to a particular defined area (e.g., a mall, housing complex, mainstreet storefront, socially recognized area). Operating out of an 'office' there they are expected to maintain a high police presence (walking or patrolling, interacting with people) and to work closely with interests in the area to deal not only with conventional offences but also a wide range of community problems relevant for peace and order. At the minimum they are expected to be constable generalists (e.g., Edmonton and to a lesser extent Halton), if not more wholly oriented to proactive, crime prevention and problem-solving in collaboration with 'community stakeholders' (e.g., Fredericton, Halifax). It is usually expected that village constables will have significant flexibility in objectives and strategies (i.e., the 'decoupling' noted above) and will form local committees to develop a sense of shared ownership with stakeholders there in relating the police service to local problems and concerns. Of course there are alternative labels such as community officer (e.g., Fredericton), Neighbourhood Foot patrol officer (e.g., Edmonton), Neighbourhood Station officer (e.g., Victoria) and in practice there is significant diversity in the way the role is implemented.

In discussing the village constable program here the focus will be on the programs in Halton, Halifax and Fredericton (1). In light of its potential significance for CBP during the past two years this researcher has been examining the village constable program across Canada. In 1991 a conference was held in Halifax where senior management with the
leading departments in Canada -with respect to this initiative- were brought together to discuss the development, implementation and future of this program in their areas of Victoria, Edmonton, Halton, Montreal, Fredericton and Halifax respectively (Clairmont and Murphy, 1991). In the case of the three departments noted above direct research is ongoing but considerable information has already been gathered via observations, in-depth interviews and mail-back questionnaires; thus far, with the exception of Halifax, the research contact has been limited to police and the policing organizations. Here the perspectives of the village constables will be examined and then discussed in light of the issues raised above about dangers, future directions for CBP and the like. In order to place this examination in context a brief overview of the programs in the three areas will be offered.

Overview of Village Constable Program in Three Jurisdictions

In the Halton, Halifax and Fredericton Police Services the village constable programs were initially launched in relatively low-income areas where there were many complaints about police service and higher than average levels of calls for service. Low-rental housing complexes were the sites for the Halton (2) and Fredericton programs in 1987 and 1986 respectively while Halifax's, set up in 1990, served the larger community dominated by two large low-income complexes. The Fredericton program with one officer later expanded to include another public housing complex while Halton's has expanded to involve 17 VCs in 13 'villages', most of which, as might be expect in this affluent region, are not in socially
disadvantaged areas but still readily definable areas with relatively high levels of calls for service or crime or complaints. Two VCs continue to police the recent Halifax initiative. In establishing these village constable operations senior management in all jurisdictions had broad CBP objectives along the lines espoused by Halifax's chief of police: "I look at the police as the front-end to social agencies ... [our goal] is to become familiar with people in the area and try to help them with various problems". The VCs recruited were given quite a lot of freedom in determining precise objectives; this was a major component of the autonomy offered by management as an inducement for recruits. A good example of the latter is the case of Fredericton where each of three successive VCs put their distinctive stamp on the program, each adjusting the project's initial emphasis.

All of the VCs have operated out of offices in their 'village'. In Halton, with few exceptions, once a site has been selected, subsequent to assessment sometimes by a task force of officers policing in the area, the cost of the office must be met by interests in the area whether businesses, service organizations or other sources. In Halifax all costs including office costs are met from the department's operating budget whereas in Fredericton both office costs and officer salary have been met by funding from New Brunswick Housing and the City. The VCs themselves have usually been recruited by supervisors and others in management on the basis of interests, personal style and the like; only in Halifax has the program depended somewhat upon formal posting procedures. The recruited VC according to themselves and management have been 'self-starters interested in people and in crime prevention'. Most have been white males in their mid-thirties with
significant police experience. In all jurisdictions the VCs received very limited training though some of Halton's VCs have taken the "Proactive Practitioners" course at the Ontario Police College and some VCs had taken relevant courses in earlier years.

Halton is the only one of the three jurisdictions to have a formal job description for the VCs but it is a very general description. The Halton Police Service has constructed a full-service mode of the village constable role though de-emphasizing aspects of conventional patrol policing especially the response function. Most Halton VCs handle few calls from dispatch but they are expected to always inform Communications as to their whereabouts. Apart from VCs in the malls and business districts enforcement has also been rather limited. The emphasis has been on visibility, crime prevention seminars (a popular concept among Halton VCs) and special projects but it is difficult to generalize as the range and style of village constable activity varies so dramatically in the Halton region. In Halifax and Fredericton the VCs have been expected to do little enforcement, investigation or response; in fact in Fredericton the VCs' thrust was the most intentionally focused and the style was 'plainclothes and unarmed', strongly supported by the Chief who did not want the VC to 'wear too many hats'. In Halifax the VCs, apart from being visible and familiarizing themselves with their 'village', have mounted special projects such as cross-walk safety and working with immigrant groups and seniors, while in Fredericton the VCs have worked significantly on 'social development' and other residents' problems with social agencies.

In all three jurisdictions the VCs are not in effect included in the platoon structure (Halton's VC job description does indicate that
the platoon sergeant is the supervisor) nor are they viewed as shift manpower strength. They are directly supervised by crime prevention NCOs in Halton and Fredericton and in Halifax, which does not have a crime prevention segment per se, by the zone commander with whom the VCs share premises. In Halifax and Fredericton there is little contact with Communications and the VCs do not usually attend parade or fall-in (though in Halifax they have begun attending morning CID briefings). In Halton the opposite is true though there is much variation as regards fall-in. Upper level management in all cases but especially Fredericton tend to be much more accessible to the VCs than to patrol officers, a fact that could be attributed to the 'decoupling' of the VC role and management's corresponding high stake in the program.

Turning to community linkages the three main issues here are the extent of the linkages, with whom they are developed, and to what extent is the community input marginal or profound as regards shaping the policing service provided. In the case of Fredericton where the VC program is sharply focused in two housing complexes, the linkages are extensive and intensive, with both residents and social agency personnel involved and it appears that negotiation and compromise about the VC policing activity has been commonplace. In the case of Halifax the many linkages that have been established have been either informal or with respect to specific projects. There is no advisory committee collaborating with the VCs and they in turn have not usually involved themselves formally with village voluntary organizations. For the most part these VCs have not become closely involved with the major community organizational players in the area so while they control their own agenda they have thus far been marginal to the everyday politics
of the community.

In Halton the VCs are expected to form community consultation committees (CCC), considered by senior management to be 'the key by which community problems and concerns are identified'. While not optional the Halton CCCs vary considerably in their meaningfulness and a significant problem for VCs apparently has been 'keeping the CCC alive'. VCs have the responsibility to form the CCC though management has suggested drawing members from the established 'stakeholders' such as aldermen, business representatives, leaders of voluntary associations and schools. Management monitors CCC activity by requiring copies of minutes. Whether because of the commonality of interest of the CCC members or the more conventional issues being tackled, the large majority of Halton VCs indicated there has been little controversy and that they have experienced little cross pressures from CCC members. Certainly the VCs there also generally considered the informal networks they have established to be at least of equal importance as the CCCs.

The Village Constables' Perspective

Having described what the village constables do and how they fit into the police organizational structure we now turn to how they assess the role. A combination of observational data, in-depth interviews and mail-back questionnaires were employed to examine various themes from the perspective of the village constables themselves. Apart from information on what was actually done in the role, the themes included job satisfaction, job control, career mobility, linkage with the rest of the organization and specific problems/issues encountered.
Perceptions of Village Constable Work

The VCs' commitment to the usual village constable emphases on crime prevention, problem-solving and foot patrol interaction - something expected given their volunteering for the positions - was reflected in their questionnaire responses. All but one of the twenty VCs agreed (most strongly so) with the statement, 'AN OFFICER ON FOOT CAN DEVELOP A GREATER AWARENESS OF CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS OF THE POLICE THAN MIGHT BE LEARNED IN A SQUAD CAR'. The majority of them (fourteen agreeing and five uncertain) also agreed that if as much police effort was directed to crime prevention as to investigation after a crime has been committed 'WE WOULD BE FURTHER AHEAD IN REDUCING CRIME'. Again, not unexpectedly given their own generally proactive focus, the VCs either agreed with (fifteen persons) or were neutral about (five persons) the statement, 'IT IS MORE IMPORTANT THAT AN OFFICER HAVE VERY FEW CITIZEN COMPLAINTS THAN AN IMPRESSIVE ARREST RECORD'. Their openness to a more general problem-solving orientation was presumably indicated in their general disagreement (fifteen disagreed and three were neutral) with the statement, 'ALL THE LAWS SHOULD BE ENFORCED AT ALL TIMES OTHERWISE PEOPLE WILL LOSE RESPECT FOR THE LAW'. One Halton VC commented here "a charge does not always solve the problem and that is my objective". At the same time the VCs were not uncritically accepting a 'the public is always right' doctrine; most of them agreed that 'AN OFFICER WHO IS DOING A GOOD JOB IS BOUND TO GET AN OCCASIONAL CITIZEN COMPLAINT'.

While VCs in Halifax and Fredericton had essentially only proactive responsibilities and did virtually no response, enforcement or investigation, the situation was quite
Appendix B

different in Halton where responsibilities varied considerably. One Halton VC defined his task in quintessential CBP terms namely "interact with members of the community, identify their needs and problem areas, provide police service to the area and help people feel comfortable about dealing with police"; in this vein another Halton VC defined his responsibilities as "to determine the needs of the community, both real and perceived, and try to meet those needs. In some ways I am a community ombudsman". On the other hand another Halton VC, whose 'village' is a large mall, defined his responsibilities as "75% reactive, investigating frauds, theft and other offences and providing high visibility and 25% proactive, doing educational seminars to reduce frauds etc and developing an elder abuse program". All Halton VCs were at least constable generalists if not more focused on proactive problem-solving.

Across all jurisdictions the VCs defined themselves as providing highly visible, and, especially in Halton and Fredericton, flexibly scheduled policing to their particular constituency. Commonly as the VCs became more involved in the community they adjusted their schedules to accommodate community concerns; as one VC observed, "I've become more flexible [scheduling hours] as I've taken a greater interest in the community". Walking the community whether as conventional foot patrol or more as a strategy of learning and interacting (exclusively the case in Halifax and Fredericton where VCs did not patrol) was considered 'very effective' by virtually all VCs. Asked why he thought it effective one Halton VC replied "high visibility, trust, better communication, respect, cooperation". Certainly the VCs perceived the 'foot patrol' as providing a valuable sense of security to community residents -"the high visibility
increases the community's perception of security and acts as a deterrent against loiterers"—and sometimes reducing crime—"crime has been reduced by about 50%; street gangs no longer exist in the mall". They were confident in their perception of being appreciated for this visibility; one VC expressed a common view: "the feedback from the community when the foot patrol officer is absent is incredible; when the officer is there problems are less".

A number of problems were identified by VCs when asked "what are the key problems in your village", but the two chief ones in Halton by far were 'youth-related problems such as loitering' and property crimes such as fraud, theft and burglaries. The overwhelming emphases on these two problem areas would suggest that the VCs' focus was still quite conventional (3). Their strategies to deal with problems were also, for the most part, quite conventional, namely 'strict enforcement' (their label) via visible patrol, and crime prevention programs such as seminars and workshops. One Halton VC described his strategy in his mall 'village' as follows: "high visibility patrols, identify offenders and taking action to remove them; educational seminars on prevention measures"; another Halton VC's strategy was "high visibility and educating the community on ways to counteract the problems". Still even in Halton where VCs were 'full service' officers, some VCs concentrated more on primary causes and social development, particularly those VCs working in the few less advantaged areas in the affluent Halton jurisdiction. One of these latter officers described her strategy as "trying to improve the reputation of the area ...setting up a domestic violence program in conjunction with a women's shelter ... [and] an after-school program for the kids"; another such
officer described similar strategies in his area and added "[I] started a committee involving the various social service agencies in an attempt to establish a resource centre for the community".

In Halifax and Fredericton the VCs saw their work as unconventional in its objectives and strategies. One Fredericton VC described herself as "a change agent building a community". VCs in Fredericton clearly were engaged in problem-solving directed at social development or the primary causes of crime. Not only did they coordinate social service activity but they assisted in developing new organizations in the public housing complexes and new programs for women and youth as well as bringing in resources, including some employment. Tenants evicted from one public housing complex as undesirables complained that the VC helped engineer their eviction and in so doing went beyond the acceptable police mandate. In Halifax the VCs worked with seniors, school children and an immigrant group but in addition to these not unusual policing foci they worked to improve conditions in a large low-income housing complex (pressing the absentee landlord for change, identifying 'undesirable' tenants etc) and to develop better police-community relationships especially with minorities; in their view they were engaged in problem-solving of a sort that conventional constable duties would have made impossible.

Job Satisfaction, Job Control and Career Mobility

Despite some initial reservations with the village constable program, all the VCs in Halton reported high levels of job satisfaction and control...
satisfaction. Of course given that all were volunteers for the position this finding is not too surprising. In any event this perspective was illustrated by comments such as "I love the freedom", "I am more than happy", "I look forward to coming to work". Task variety and more intimate contact with the community were clearly part of the job’s allure. Other factors contributing to job satisfaction included seeing tangible evidence of success in individual person or community-level change, acceptance and approval by the 'public' and the flexible work schedule that the position allowed. Perhaps the most important factor in job satisfaction and one cited by most VCs was the considerable job autonomy. Virtually all VCs reported minimal direct supervision. They had the freedom to assess community needs, design strategies and arrange their work schedule so they could get on with the job. They perceived themselves as accountable (e.g. monthly reports etc) but not closely supervised. The major factor that officers cited as impacting negatively on job satisfaction was the absence -or ambiguity- of policies and procedures. The VC position did seem to call for persons to be 'self-starters' and some VCs had trouble with that. One officer commented "I couldn't get used to it... in patrol you had x amount of time for lunch ... you leave the office at a certain time..." while another expressed anxiety that he was "... doing everything right".

The VCs because of their work and the general departmental concern for harnessing all favourable publicity (partly of course to sell the program to the community and even within the department itself) certainly were much more likely than regular patrol officers to receive media attention and to be noticed by senior management. This might be expected to increase their career mobility chances. At the same time
Halton like the other police departments has competitive promotion routines and it is unclear if the village constable position, with its greater isolation from the mainstream department, advantaged or disadvantaged one as regards these competitions. No quantitative data were available and most VCs indicated that the program was still too new to judge its implications for career mobility. The most common view was that "it certainly can't hurt" given the greater visibility and the opportunity to accomplish things; as one sergeant observed "if you do it well, you get noticed". A viewpoint held by several VCs was that being a VC was not a good career choice for a junior officer as presumably they would have more difficulty in winning over the community, might have trouble making all the required decisions and might be 'branding' or limiting themselves; on the other hand a senior VC might expect "a positive return" for participation in the program.

In the case of Halifax and Fredericton VCs, also all volunteers, different patterns of job satisfaction and perceived career mobility might be expected given their greater marginality in the department and their more exclusive 'proactive policing' mandate. Indeed two of the five VCs here were happy to have left (or to be leaving) the village constable role, one because of concerns for promotion and desire for more varied policing experience and the other because of declining job satisfaction associated with cross-pressures and complaints within his 'village'. Still Halifax and Fredericton VCs reported high job satisfaction and largely for the same reasons as in the case of Halton. Certainly autonomy or job control was the foremost factor articulated. A Halifax VC commented: 'we're free to do what we want [in contrast to patrol work where] you have to call in all the time" while another said "we
just log-in in the morning ... we don't tell Communications where we are or what we are doing ... it would be easy to abuse this limitless freedom". In both cases but especially in Fredericton the VCs were left to formulate their own objectives, design and implement their own programs and schedule their working hours. One characterized the situation as follows "I had all kinds of freedom ... I was pretty much left to my own devices" while another VC suggested that management 'kept tabs on me' for a brief period but feeling confident in his commitment, subsequently left him alone -"once you have proven yourself they don't bother you".

Of course there were other stated reasons for high job satisfaction. Apart from the more expected, such as flexible hours, 'the people we meet,' 'the challenge' and 'learning different cultures', an often expressed sentiment was the sense of accomplishment associated with a new thrust of policing. This might be likened to a "Hawthorne effect" in industrial sociology wherein workers responded positively to being 'the experimental group'. One Halifax VC commented "it is a self-motivating project ... we could make or break it ... we're breaking new ground ... I hope it stays and makes a difference"; a Fredericton VC similarly talked of being able to witness positive problem-solving which generated a good feeling (e.g., facilitating single mothers attending university).

There was a more pessimistic perspective in both Halifax and Fredericton as to career advantages associated with being a VC. Only one VC considered the position to be 'a stepping stone' and that person was somewhat ambivalent. None of the Fredericton VCs considered their positions to be "on the fast track". Both Halifax and Fredericton VCs observed that promotion routines are quite competitive and
the opportunities for advancement quite limited, with inter-unit transfer used to prevent burn-out and boredom. In both areas there was in contrast to Halton much less sense of significant positive publicity and departmental notice for any VC accomplishment; especially in Fredericton it was held that while being in the limelight could help one's career, nothing could be further from the limelight than the reality of being a village constable in a low-income housing project!

The above observational and interview derived data were consistent with the patterns found in the mail-back questionnaires completed by the twenty VCs in the three jurisdictions. In these the VCs responded to a series of statement to which they were asked to strongly agree, agree, uncertain/neither, disagree or strongly disagree. Aside from one individual who faced 'a lot of squabbling' subsequent to his replacing a very popular female VC and changing the VC focus from single mothers to youth, virtually all respondents reported high job satisfaction. Nineteen officers agreed (most strongly) with the statement, 'GENERALLY SPEAKING I AM VERY SATISFIED WITH THIS JOB' while eighteen agreed (ten strongly) with the statement, 'I ENJOY NEARLY ALL THINGS I DO ON MY JOB' and eighteen disagreed (sixteen strongly) with the statement, 'ALMOST NONE OF THE WORK I DO STIRS UP ENTHUSIASM'.

All but one VC apparently thought that their work was significant in substance; for example they disagreed (fifteen strongly so) that 'MOST OF THE THINGS I HAVE TO DO ON THIS JOB SEEM USELESS OR TRIVIAL'. Seventeen also thought that the work was quite manageable, disagreeing (ten strongly) with the statements, 'I AM DISSATISFIED WITH THE AMOUNT OF WORK I AM EXPECTED TO DO' and 'THE AMOUNT OF WORK I'M EXPECTED TO DO MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR ME TO DO MY JOB WELL'. And the large majority of VCs
were confident that they had grasped the essence of the work, disagreeing (eight strongly) with the statement, 'I OFTEN HAVE TROUBLE FIGURING OUT WHETHER I AM DOING WELL OR POORLY AT THIS JOB'. Consistent with data already presented concerning immediate supervision and job autonomy, all VCs disagreed (and all but two strongly so) with the statement, 'THE SUPERVISION I RECEIVE IS THE KIND THAT TENDS TO DISCOURAGE ME FROM GIVING EXTRA EFFORT', and all agreed (fifteen strongly so) that 'MY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISORS ARE VERY SUPPORTIVE OF MY VILLAGE CONSTABLE WORK'. Perceived high levels of job control are reflected in the fact that seventeen VCs agreed (seven strongly) that 'I AM MY OWN BOSS IN ALMOST EVERY WORK-RELATED SITUATION'.

Clearly it was the above intrinsic aspects of the village constable position which were producing the high levels of job satisfaction among the VCs. Extrinsic factors such as compensation, co-workers' behaviour, and promotion likelihood were much less positively assessed; in fact in all these cases the modal response category was 'uncertain or neutral'. The VCs were 'normally distributed' along the agree-disagree continuum in their responses to a statement on compensation, namely 'FOR THE JOB I DO I FEEL THE AMOUNT OF MONEY I MAKE IS GOOD'. Similar patterns (i.e., normal curve distributions) described responses to the statements, 'THE WAY CO-WORKERS HANDLE THEIR JOBS ADDS VERY LITTLE TO THE SUCCESS OF MY WORK', and 'BECOMING A VILLAGE CONSTABLE IS A GOOD WAY TO GET AHEAD'; in the former instance the number agreeing matched perfectly the number disagreeing whereas in the case of promotion, while the modal response was uncertain, more than twice as many VCs disagreed as agreed - in other words very few VCs saw their position as a good way to get ahead in the organization, a somewhat more
negative view than was indicated in other data.

Integration in Police Organization and Subculture

The village constables in all jurisdictions recognized that their role was atypical and somewhat experimental. They realized that while they had much support from their own immediate supervisors (usually a corporal or sergeant in crime prevention and also an inspector) and from senior management, many within the organization had to be convinced of the position’s value, particularly patrol constables, detectives and supervisors/middle management personnel in field operations. The perception of marginality or segmentation was pervasive but especially strong in Halifax and Fredericton where the village constable program was more clearly atypical, only modestly developed and where there was less media attention or senior management focus.

In Halton there appeared to be some tension in the VCs' relationships with their peers, the patrol constables (called either community or task force constables). Basically from the VCs' perspective it was a matter of their not getting appropriate respect since some patrol constables were wont to challenge the village constable role as being 'real police work'; as one VC put it, "the crime control mind set often affects officers' objectivity on what the police function really is". The VCs tended to see the source of the disrespect as rooted in the patrol officers' inaccurate perception of the role and responsibilities of the VC and the lack of communication between the two groups, a reasonable presumption given the conventional focus of much Halton VC work. It was commonly
held that internal opposition to the new policing style was to be expected but was subject to change as the latter's value was made evident. As one VC noted in commenting on this problem "occasionally the VC is looked upon by the other patrol officers as a nothing type of job. Most officers coming into this style of policing enjoy it once they have started". There was implicit in some VCs' views (especially those in lower income areas, high crime areas) the idea that the role might be seen by some officers as weakening constable solidarity vis-a-vis the 'external environment' but none explicitly made this argument. The tension and disrespect was reflected in 'put-downs' such as referring to the VCs as 'the smile and wave gang' but in the police environment with its emphasis on solidarity and dealing with the 'bad guys' such verbal 'binging' (to use a phrase from industrial sociology describing informal social control in the workplace) reportedly has been meaningful enough to deter competition for and participation in the village constable program and to cause some VCs to formally complain about their treatment at parade or fall-in.

The Halton VCs' anger and frustration was especially directed at supervisory and middle management personnel such as platoon sergeants and staff sergeants for not providing leadership and example favourable to the village constable program. It should be recalled too that these platoon leaders did occasionally second VCs for regular patrol duties. In any event the VCs often questioned their commitment to community-based policing and decried their setting a pejorative tone for the village constable position by making disparaging comments about the work and hence "[given that] why would anyone want to be a big joke ... a village idiot". Another VC
contended that by these leaders not supporting the department's new philosophy "at least 50% of the patrol constables are not living up to their potential and are providing poor service to their community ... missing the boat".

Senior management as noted was seen by Halton VCs as supportive though quite demanding with high expectations; as one VC remarked "they want it all". The only significant criticism directed at this level was the claim that senior management has to do more to meet its responsibility to better educate officers on community policing and the village constable idea and to direct better the sergeants and middle managers on the issues and problems cited above. There was little appreciation among the VCs that sergeants and staff sergeants in field operations might themselves have grounds for complaint insofar as senior management expected them to maintain regular 'bottomlines' while resources were being diverted to the village constable program. In any event strategies to facilitate communication and understanding such as more contact with patrol officers and more site visits by middle managers have not been particularly successful (partly because of little actual implementation) but Halton management presumably has now given priority to these concerns.

In the mail-back questionnaires roughly half the Halton VCs specifically commented on problems with the village constable program in the organization and subculture of the department. Virtually all referred only to problems with sergeants and middle management in field operations. Discussing the program's effectiveness, one officer emphasized that the major requirement was "more understanding and support from conventional policing levels, especially middle management where there's a traditional reactive law enforcement, anti-
community policing mind-set"; in his view there is a lack of acceptance of 'radical' problem-solving methods and when this is combined with conflicting interpretations of departmental community policing policy, it results in 'counter productive edicts' by middle and upper management. Another VC noted that "some staff sergeants are negative because you are not out in a cruiser taking calls" while another decried "the old school, archaic s/sgts that believe reactive policing is the only way, pass that poor attitude down to their platoon officers". Several VCs, confident in the meaningfulness of their work, believed that the solution would be to show these leaders exactly what the village constable does; one VC opined that "[the problem of ignorance] can be changed by other-level supervisors coming with us to see what we actually do".

In the case of Halifax and Fredericton the VCs experiences and perspectives closely mirrored those of their Halton counterparts. Since these VCs did virtually no conventional police work and their programs were more modest and marginal in the department, the patterns were more sharply evident. It was noted for example that relations with other patrol constables were often strained and that the VCs had to fight an uphill battle for respect. One Halifax VC noted that "they [patrol constables] do not look favourably on this job", especially since both VCs there were seconded without replacement from a zone squad which has a very heavy response and enforcement load; accordingly the patrol officers (and the sergeants of course) often complained about their workload while adding "yet they [senior management] can spare a couple of guys to shake hands". In Fredericton the VCs similarly reported low-level conflict and tension with some patrol officers; they considered the attitude of their patrol counterparts as 'poor'
or 'lacking' and encountered put-downs such as "what are you doing with the dirtbags ... dooners ... you're going backwards in your career".

In both Halifax and Fredericton the VCs worked in comparatively poor socio-economic areas where minorities were commonplace and police-community relations somewhat negative; in some ways this aggravated the problems for the VCs since from both sides, theirs and the patrol officers, collaborating with these residents strained police solidarity. In both areas but especially Halifax the VCs expressed concern that the attitude and behaviour of the patrol constables could diminish "what we are trying to do here ... ruin the image".

Fredericton and Halifax VCs like their Halton counterparts attributed much of the above tension to limited awareness on the patrol officers' part; one VC observed that "no-one explained to the other constables what we are here for" while another added "they think we should be doing calls in the area; many think we don't do anything". In the case of Fredericton where the 'storefront' is in public housing units there has been some effort by VCs to persuade other constables to drop in for coffee and attend community functions if not volunteer for some programs; this strategy has produced some limited positive results from the VCs' perspective. In Halifax since the VCs operate out of the zone storefront headquarters right on the main street, the problem is less one of physical isolation and more entirely one of persuading other constables as to the value and efficacy of the village constable approach. There it has also been advanced that the key to better integration might well be for the VCs to take on more conventional policing responsibilities (i.e., become 'full-service').

VCs in Halifax and Fredericton not unexpectedly, considered their immediate
supervisors (crime prevention corporal/sergeant and operations inspector) and top management to be enthusiastic supporters of the VC program. One Halifax VC referring to the Chief's support, said "100% I can honestly say". In Fredericton too for these role players the VCs had high praise -"incredible support and interest", "more than supportive", "gave 100%" and "anything I wanted they fought tooth and nail to get me"; particularly in Fredericton was it was noted that the top police brass visited the 'community' a couple of times a year and found time to participate in special community events". On the other hand the VCs reported minimal support or interest from front-line NCO managers who they saw as having the view that VCs were "a waste of manpower", "extras ... do-nothings". Personal observations indicated that VCs at special zone meetings virtually begged for recognition from the assembled NCOs. The chief complaint about the NCOs appears to hinge on the VCs' view that they are the major gatekeepers to VC acceptance; as one VC put it, "it's not what they've done, just a feeling, it's what they haven't done". As with the Halton VCs, those in Halifax and Fredericton do not especially link NCO (or patrol officer) response and senior management production expectations so while there is the sense that top management should more aggressively socialize the NCOs on CBP and the VC program, the problem is seen as attitudinal and subcultural rather than organizational.

Mail-back questionnaire data were generally consistent with the above patterns. Only five of the twenty VCs disagreed with the statement, 'ONE OF THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH VILLAGE CONSTABLE WORK IS THAT YOU GET ISOLATED FROM YOUR FELLOW OFFICERS'. Fredericton and Halifax VCs were especially likely to concur with the assertion. Satisfaction with senior
management and the interpretation of problems with patrol constables and NCOs as largely attitudinal and subcultural is reflected in the high levels of agreement with statements such as 'I AM CONFIDENT I KNOW WHAT TOP MANAGEMENT EXPECTS ME TO DO AS A VILLAGE CONSTABLE' (sixteen of twenty agreed) and disagreement with statements such as 'MANAGEMENT USES INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA TO JUDGE THE VILLAGE CONSTABLE ROLE' (fourteen disagreed and five were uncertain) and 'ONE OF THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH VILLAGE CONSTABLE WORK IS THAT YOU ARE OFTEN UNSURE TOP MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOUR IDEAS AND PLANS' (fourteen disagreed and four were uncertain). Here again though the VCs in Halifax and Fredericton were more likely than those in Halton to have reservations concerning top management's plans and commitments to the village constable program.

It can also be noted that the greater perceived marginality of the latter VCs is also indicated by the fact that they basically accounted for the handful of VCs who agreed with the statement, 'I RARELY RECEIVE PRAISE FOR THE WORK I DO'.

Despite definite problems in departmental integration of VC activity, especially where it has only modestly been implemented and where it effects a truly different policing style, there was as noted a high level of job satisfaction among the VCs. Further the VCs perceived themselves to be securely rooted in their police organization. Virtually all VCs agreed with the statement, 'THIS DEPARTMENT IS A GOOD ORGANIZATION TO WORK FOR'. None agreed with the statement, 'I FREQUENTLY THINK OF QUITTING THIS JOB'; in fact twelve disagreed very strongly. Finally no VC agreed (and nine disagreed strongly) with the statement, 'I AM SOMEWHAT WORRIED ABOUT MY FUTURE IN THE DEPARTMENT'.
Problems and Issues in Village Constable Work

On the whole the Halton VCs did not report any special needs or resource shortfalls for their work. Asked what they needed in order to do more effective problem-solving the modal response was "nothing" and the next highest was simply 'time' (e.g., "I could always use more time"); only a few indicated a significant need for more training or departmental resources. Consistently most also disagreed with the statement, 'ONE OF THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH VILLAGE CONSTABLE WORK IS THAT YOU DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH RESOURCES TO WORK WITH'. The VCs in Halifax and Fredericton however were quite the opposite, identifying training needs (e.g., multiculturalism, women's issues), calling for more departmental resources and generally agreeing with the statement above. These findings reflect perhaps the largely conventional policing focus that characterized much Halton village constable activity in contradistinction to the other sites where as noted the entire thrust of VC activity was crime prevention and problem-solving. Certainly Halton P.D. did not provide more training for its VCs nor did it give them any more departmental resources. The fact that Halton VCs operated in environments relatively affluent and ethnoculturally 'white european' may also be an important factor in their uniqueness.

VCs were also interviewed about their perceptions of community reaction to their activity, the extent to which they had to wrestle with cross-pressures from different community groups or interests and, more implicitly, the civil rights implications of a potentially more intrusive policing style. Generally they reported an enthusiastic response, indeed in some instances a significant expectation and dependency almost
instantaneously rooted. 'Winning over the community' was more problematic, initially at least, in low-income areas in all jurisdictions; there the officers had to overcome the fear that they were simply 'spies' out to make arrests more than to ameliorate the area's basic problems. For the most part despite often 'strict enforcement' against loiterers, panhandlers and vagrants and sometimes mobilization against 'bad tenants', there was little reporting of cross-pressures on the VCs and apparently little reflection or soul-searching as to the appropriateness of their activity from a favouritism or civil rights viewpoint. They appeared to readily identify with the mall operators, the shopkeepers, Housing Authorities and 'good tenants', a reflection partly based on legal/crime grounds and perhaps partly based on shared life styles and values.

In Fredericton there were indications of significant community cross-pressures as different community interests tried to co-opt the VC and as each successive VC put his/her particular stamp on the VC activity and emphasized different priorities. For example the first VC worked with single mothers a great deal while the second was more oriented to youth; the change caused much tension and 'squabbling' and led to the VC's leaving. Similarly in Fredericton the VC was accused by ejected tenants (six families) and their lawyer of overstepping the policing mandate and collaborating in their dismissal; the VC acknowledged the collaboration but did not consider her actions to violate either the VC mandate or the 'bad tenants' civil rights. These issues apparently did not arise in either Halton or Halifax for several possible reasons.

Unlike the Fredericton case there was not in Halifax the sense of close partnership between the VCs and dominant community
interests and perhaps less of an 'ownership' orientation on the part of any particular interest group. An advisory citizen committee was not established and the significant linkages were more with the schools, senior complexes and an immigrant group than with core community organizations and leaders in the dominant black population. The police were seen as more distant and as setting their own agenda more than negotiating it. In the case of Halton it appears there was some modest ombudsman-type activity but VCs operating in malls and other service or corporate-sponsored storefronts either were more free to set their own agenda (thereby avoiding cross-pressures) or basically shared (adopted?) the conventional viewpoints of the sponsors and authorities.

To the extent that VC activity has been atypical and somewhat experimental the issue of how to measure success or failure clearly arises just as it does in full-blown community-based policing generally. It has already been noted that VCs were confident that their work was not trivial or useless, that they reported little trouble figuring out how they were doing and that they were confident they understood management's expectations and that the latter were appropriate. At the same time it was also noted that this assessment was less strongly held by VCs more clearly engaged in atypical and unconventional police work. For some VCs conventional indicators such as number of complaints or investigations handled can be useful measures but there was among both management and VCs the sense that the two chief measures of success would be 'client satisfaction' and crime reduction. These criteria relate on the one hand to the fact that the location of a VC site has often been a response either to complaints or proffered resources (in that sense 'political'), and on the other that all VCs have been expected to do
more crime prevention work than regular constables. It would appear that some organizational 'decoupling' has also been characteristic of VC activity since VCs, especially in Halifax and Fredericton but also in some Halton instances, reported little explicit direction either in objectives or strategies by management. The implication appears to have been that the VCs had considerable autonomy but would also bear the responsibility for failure or 'unwise' activity.

Many VCs specifically pointed to community or client satisfaction as a key criterion for performance. One VC reported asking a top management official somewhat anxiously about his performance and being told that "you must be doing a good job, we no longer get complaints from people there". VCs whether engaged in the malls or housing projects also typically pointed to a reduction in crime rates and calls for service as indicators of their success. These latter indicators were especially likely to be stressed when the VCs were interacting with regular patrol officers at platoon and other meetings. Most discussed too the criterion of getting at 'repeat calls' -targeting and successfully dealing with acknowledged trouble-spots even if only exporting them to other districts. At the same time there was the sense among some VCs especially those involved in unconventional activity (e.g., food banks, after-school care) that much of the positive result "is not so definable", having long-term and indirect impact on matters such as complaints and crimes. Many VCs had a sense of personal accomplishment related to assistance provided some person or set of persons. It was not uncommon for them to keep personal files (e.g., press coverage, letters of thanks and recommendations) to show supervisors and others
the meritorious things they had accomplished.

Discussion

It was observed earlier that the three most basic dimensions of community-based policing appear to be the assumption of a wider policing mandate, greater permeability between police organization and local 'community' reflected in meaningful community participation in policing policy and practice, and more decentralized decision-making and 'quality-of working life' within the police organization. The village constable program seems to match well on all three dimensions. Virtually all VCs emphasized their job autonomy and the fact that while they are accountable they are not closely supervised but rather relatively free to develop priorities, strategies and adjust working schedules. The concept 'organizational decoupling' appears to describe reasonably the VC initiative in some jurisdictions. It is difficult to see anywhere else in these police organizations where decentralized decision-making has made such significant in-roads. Clearly too there is among the VCs the assumption of a wider policing mandate exemplified not only in crime prevention and problem-solving seminars, pressuring absentee landlords, setting up tenants associations and food banks etc but even in those VC situations such as shopping malls where conventional policing (i.e., patrol and reactive investigation) receives high priority; in these latter situations one observes a concern for educational, crime prevention seminars and an openness on the part of the VCs to address less conventional problems. The 'permeability' dimension is reflected in the existence of community consultation committees and in the day-to-day 'negotiation and compromise' that
appears to characterize at least some VC-community interaction in all three areas examined in this project. It appears too that the village constable programs exemplify many of the potential problems or biases of community-based policing. Reference was made earlier to the three main CBP issues of more intrusive social control, social class-type bias and less political accountability. In the case of the village constable program there is some evidence that a more pervasive kind of social control could result as VCs increasingly deal with loiterers, panhandlers, 'bad' tenants and other deviations from 'community' norms (e.g., unsightly premises), solving problems less tractable from a criminal code or civil rights perspective. From a social class point of view the VC programs in Fredericton and Halifax and some Halton instances appear to represent more police resource allocation for the disadvantaged though there are of course 'levels within levels' (i.e., some critics claim police work with the more respectable and stable elements in the poorer areas) and some VC operations have been directed at problems defined by authorities and by the advantaged. While there appears to be only modest support for the hypothesis that VCs, or even CBP more generally, have been 'mobilization for the already advantaged' the threat is clearly there especially if for example space and other VC necessities are increasingly provided by private sources and large organizations with their own agendas and concerns; and the costs of an extensive village constable system such as found in Halton Regional P.D. would probably necessitate police departments' finding funds outside the public purse exactly as Halton P.D. has done. Of course too one would expect that officers like other people would respond more emphatically to persons with life styles and
values similar to their own (see Perrott, 1991).

The issue of political accountability is also very relevant. Direct political control over policing priorities and practices has shifted in the last decade or two to the more depoliticized, 'professional' police boards. Police boards, basically part-time, 'volunteer' and relatively resourceless bodies, have their hands full monitoring budgets and labour-management relations, absorbing departmental inputs and reacting to specific issues. They are hardly in a position to monitor various initiatives — even fund-raising — carried on at the village constable level. And indeed a close monitoring of neighbourhood initiatives might be counterproductive for CBP. Since such boards do have a mandated responsibility for general direction of the police service it would not seem inappropriate for them to develop broad guidelines which might ensure that these kinds of valuable new policing initiatives do not get 'captured' by the well-off and more powerful but perhaps especially help (and certainly not further disadvantage) those without resources or social favour.

It was noted that the VCs activity was somewhat segmented from the rest of police activity in all three jurisdictions but especially in Halifax and Fredericton where the program was modest and unconventional vis-à-vis the work of other uniformed constables. There were perceived problems of status and respect from field supervisors and middle managers and from patrol constables widespread among VCs in all jurisdictions. If VC activity is where CBP is currently being manifested then of course this augurs poorly for the CBP movement since the VC impact unless there is change, may well turn out to be minimal and hived off. Certainly in Halifax and Fredericton residents of the
respective 'villages' perceived sharp differences between 'our police' and 'the regular police'. While VCs themselves as we have seen were of the view that the benefits of their activity could be communicated to patrol officers and managers, developing communicable measures of success for their activity can be problematic (see Fielding et al., 1989).

This situation of fragmentation in turn raises the question of whether contrary to CBP constructionism there could be several styles of policing coexisting and equally valued in the same organization. If so (for a position on this possibility see Walker, 1991) then VC activity could perhaps become a flexible and highly regarded tool or specialization to be used in the policing service; if not, then hived off it could approximate in essence and departmental impact, the older, rather marginal, crime prevention units. The former does appear to be happening in the Halton case where the village constable system has expanded and allows for considerable diversity in policing style; in fact senior management there has in recent months been revitalizing its internal training in the community-based policing philosophy and targeting the issues of supervision, integration and the understanding of the village constable role. The hived-off, more marginal, alternative appears to have been happening in the Fredericton and Halifax cases where there has been little development of the village constable concept organizationally; future departmental plans for the program are unclear to the researchers at this time though both departments continue to develop their community-based policing programs more generally.

Apart from the alternative paths of development noted above, another issue is whether the VC program might perhaps be an obstacle to the realization of a fullblown CBP
insofar as it could lessen the pressure for problem-solving and constable generalist policing to be established throughout patrol. Such a possibility obviously runs counter to the central premise of this paper and has not been considered here. Obviously like CBP itself the thrust of the village constable concept is still indefinite.

1995 Addendum

The trends suggested in the above discussion written in 1992 do appear to have become more firmly rooted. The village constable program in Halifax and Fredericton has remained small, almost exclusively proactive and hived off from the rest of the field operations. In the case of Halifax P.D. all three zones now have a village constable or community officer in addition to a crime prevention coordinating constable. The village constable program continues to be a useful project but it is clearly an addition rather than a strategy for changing, or harbinger of change for, the basic style of policing for field operations. And it could well be argued that indeed the effect might be to have lessened the pressure for problem-solving and constable generalist policing to be established throughout uniformed patrol. On the other hand the village constable program in Halton has clearly been recast as 'not the centerpiece but an important strategy and tool' in the organization's CBP approach. The number of officers and number of sites in the village constable system have declined since the peak years of 1990-91 but Halton has continued to elaborate its CBP thrust, taking on the challenge of a truly thorough-going, patrol-wide CBP and in that connection the village constable construct is appropriately seen as
strategic rather than fundamental. The objective for Halton now is to integrate all such strategies into a comprehensive CBP system and surmount the problems of segmentation and subcultural divide that have been noted above. For this reason Halton's leadership has decided to explore the path of team policing.
Notes:

1. The authors wish to thank Halton Regional, Halifax and Fredericton Police Services for their generous cooperation throughout this continuing research. Officers and management in all three Services have been frank and engaging. Clearly all three Services have a determination to effect effective and progressive policing. Useful feedback on an earlier draft of this paper was received from the Services.

2. In the case of Halton the village constable project had its roots in two earlier initiatives, one being a special high visibility project undertaken by a veteran officer in the rural Milton area and the other a special project involving four officers in an area with a high density population. The first 'village constable' project referred to here was a consequence of the latter project which started out as a task force to deal with some major anti-social problems and "when the problems were reduced became our first 'Village' with its own Village Constable" (Halton Regional, Personal Communications, 1992).

3. A senior manager at Halton Regional observed that the village constables have a great deal of latitude within their respective villages and it follows that one of the first responses to be utilized is the approach that worked in the past, i.e., enforcement. He added "we hope we are moving to more non-traditional methods of resolution as we and the citizens become comfortable with the partnership ... some officers are better at finding innovative ways to deal with problems and these are circulated for others to emulate" (Personal
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Note: This bibliography contains all sources examined in the course of writing this paper and includes items not specifically cited in the text.
APPENDIX B
Appendix B

DIRECTIONS
DIRECTIONS CON’T
Appendix B

DIRECTIONS CON‘T
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Appendix B

COMMUNITY POLICING CHART
Halton Regional Police Service
Organizational Review Project
General Scope of Activities for all Task Forces

- Members selected from Volunteer list wherever possible with appropriate representation from all ranks and positions

- Participation and relationships should be "non-rank" with open discussion

- Review draft Mission Statement as to how the values and goals expressed impact on a service area for the future

- Determine if the service provided currently or planned for the future can be provided in a more effective manner with less resources - can the service be reduced, eliminated or be provided in other ways

- What tasks or activities are currently impeding the quantity and quality of direct services by our officers

- Are there services which we do not currently have but should provide

- Review communication lines and determine if alternate supervision resources are available

- Determine what reports are produced (Process Audit Team can provide some support)
  - Who do they go to
  - Who produces
  - How produced
  - Review need
  - What reports do we not have but would
like to have
- What reports can be combined
- Can they be paperless
- Can they be interactive or self-generated

- review paperwork process from supervisor perspective

- Review Occurrences process - i.e., how goes through the system constable to inspector, etc.

- Review parallel/crossover of supervision/coordination within and between Districts

- Review increased empowerment of constables/investigators to minimize supervisor intervention (where applicable)

- Identify possible Uniform support tasks that can be civilianized

- Identify problems that can be submitted to Technology Support Group to brainstorm potential technology solutions now or in the future

- What services can be provided through alternative methods or other police services

- Other tasks as determined by ORPWG
Halton Population Estimates
**ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEW PROJECT TIMELINES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Select Volunteers for Task Force</td>
<td>9/15/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Analysis forms distributed to all employees</td>
<td>9/15/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet to establish actions and submit objectives by</td>
<td>9/30/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminar - McMaster</td>
<td>9/30/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Forces meet as required, at least monthly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORP Working Group meets</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORP Steering Committee meets</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Report from Task Forces</td>
<td>12/15/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Report to ORPWG</td>
<td>1/15/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to Steering Committee</td>
<td>2/28/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to Police Services Board</td>
<td>Mar. 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of Actions</td>
<td>Apr. 95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NB Some Actions may occur before depending on need*
Halton Regional Police Service
ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEW PROJECT
TASK FORCE TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Chair (and Co-Chair) is also a member of ORP Working Group (ORPWG). As tasks and activities may overlap between Task Forces, the ORPWG will also act as a "sounding board" with further input encouraged from the Chairs who are members of each committee. Any potential duplication of effort will also be reviewed at this level.

2. Members selected from Volunteer list wherever possible with appropriate representation from all ranks and positions and Association representation. All ideas submitted to the project must be acknowledged. Where appropriate, members of the public can be consulted or act as members of task force. A file of names is available. Also, Community Consultation Committees and their constables can be used as a sounding board. Due to the time commitments expected for this project, participation by a volunteer on more than one Task Force should be minimized.

3. Participation and relationships should be "non-rank" with open discussion. It is the objective to ensure that all issues are identified and discussed freely. Accordingly, the mix of participants should encourage unbiased, objective and frank discussion.

4. The draft Mission Statement proposed by the Police Services Board and senior management should be distributed and form
part of the review of each Task Force. The findings and research should be driven by the values and goals identified in the Mission Statement. However, if there are changes required to the Mission statement, they can form part of your recommendations.

5. Project timelines are to finalize specific Task Force terms of reference, short and long term objectives and action plan by September 30. Draft Report to be submitted to ORPWG by December 15. Final report to be submitted by January 15 outlining accomplishments, research, recommended actions for short term and long term and additional research wherever possible.

6. All Chairs can make direct requests for information and support where appropriate from support units such as Human Resources, Finance, Computer Services, Administration, Training, etc. Secretarial support for minutes etc. will be provided. Project Coordinators and Deputies also available as resource for consultation as required.

7. Recommendations or areas of study completed in 1993 will be disseminated to the appropriated Task Force for integration into current scope of work.
APPENDIX C

HALTON REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE

THIRD STAGE COMMUNITY

POLICING TRAINING