THE 2014 HRM ROUNDTABLE REVIEW

VOLUME I: THE MAIN REPORT

BY
DON CLAIRMONT

In collaboration with
KIT WATERS
CHRIS MURPHY
VERONA SINGER
STEPHEN KIMBER
DON SPICER
JOHN PEACH
STEPHEN SCHNEIDER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Review benefited from great cooperation from the officers of the Halifax Regional Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The analysts in both police services, especially Christine Fisher of the HRP and Ray Hobin of the RCMP, also were very helpful. The municipality’s Mayor, Chief Administrative Officer and Councilors were very supportive and provided many insights. The retired and current Public Safety officers, Don Spicer and Scott MacDonald, were valuable contacts and provided reports, many contact leads and much contextual information. Special appreciation is extended to Allan Waye and HRP Superintendent Sean Auld who, over many meetings, provided friendly advice and insightful analyses. About 250 individuals were interviewed, usually at length and frequently on multiple occasions. They were generous with their time and wise with their views and suggestions.

As principal investigator I am tremendously indebted to my colleagues who collaborated in this Review. It was a privilege to work with them and a wonderful learning experience since each, taking responsibility as Lead in his or her dimension of the Review, was informed, committed and truly collaborative. Charlene Gagnon was the central research assistant over the extended period of the Review work and she made a significant contribution. Adrienne MacDonald was the other research assistant and she contributed both in the research on several Review themes and in the writing of one of the supplementary papers.
Roundtable Review Acronyms

AHANS – Affordable Housing Association of Nova Scotia
ANSAIO – African Nova Scotia Affairs Integration Office
BOD – Black-Out Drunk
CAH – Community Action on Homelessness
CCTV – Closed Circuit Television
CFMH – Crime Free Multiple Housing
CMA – Census Metropolitan Area
CMP – Community Maintenance Program
CNSCF – Central Nova Scotia Correctional Facility
CPTED - Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CRO – Community Response Officers
CSC – Corrections Services Canada
DCS – Department of Community Services
DOJ – Department of Justice
DTC – Drug Treatment Court
DV – Domestic Violence
GSS – General Social Survey
HCJS – Halifax Community Justice Society
HHH – Halifax Housing Help
HPS – Homelessness Partnering Strategy
HRM – Halifax Regional Municipality
HRP – Halifax Regional Police
HRPS – Halifax Regional Police Service
HSW – Housing Support Worker
HYAC - Halifax Youth Attendance Centre
IPV – Intimate Partner Violence
ISH – Independent Supportive Housing
JEIN - Justice Enterprise Information Network
JHS – John Howard Society
LBGTO – Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay, Transvestite, Other
LCA – Liquor Control Act
LEU – Liquor Enforcement Unit
MLSN - Mi’kmaq Legal Support Network
MNPXA – Metro Non-Profit Housing Association
MOSH – Mobile Outreach Street Health
MPD – Municipal Police Department
MVA – Motor Vehicle Act
NCPC – National Crime Prevention Centre in the federal Department of Public Safety
NIST – Neighbourhood Integrated Service Team
NSRJ – Nova Scotia restorative Justice
NSYF – Nova Scotia Youth Facility
PSO – Public Safety Office
RANS – Restaurant Association of Nova Scotia
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RJ – Restorative Justice
SAP – Strategic Action Plan
SCC – Supreme Court of Canada
SGRBA – Spring Garden Road Business Association
SIRT – Serious Incident Response Team
SNS – Social Networking Site
SoW – Status of Women
SOT – Summary Offence Ticket
UCR – Uniform Crime-Reporting
UDI – Uptown Drug Intervention
UDIP – Uptown Drug Intervention Program
WOOF - Working on Our Future
YAO – Youth Advocate Program
YCJA – Youth Criminal Justice Act
CONTENTS

GENERAL INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 7

PART A: NEW PATHS FOR THE ROUNDTABLE REVIEW ...................................................................... 10

GUNS, SHOOTINGS AND THE DRUG CULTURE .................................................................................. 18

THE PROBLEMATIC ................................................................................................................................. 18

PATTERNS OF HOMICIDE AND ATTEMPTED HOMICIDES IN HRM .................................................... 19

CONTEXT .................................................................................................................................................. 21

POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 24

GENDERED VIOLENCE .............................................................................................................................. 28

INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE ............................................................................................................. 28

SEXUAL ASSAULT ..................................................................................................................................... 30

VIOLENCE AND SEX WORKERS .............................................................................................................. 32

TIMELINE – SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS ON GENDERED VIOLENCE, 2007-2013 .......................... 35

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY .................................................. 41

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 41

THE 2008 ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE RESPONSE TO THEM .............................. 42

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL MEDIA ............................................................................................... 43

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................. 46

TIMELINE - SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIOLENCE 2006-2013 .......................... 47

PART B: THE 2008 ROUNDTABLE DIMENSIONS UPDATED .................................................................. 50

THE MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION ............................................................................... 50

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 50

The 2008 ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE RESPONSES .............................................. 51

ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES TIMELINE ..................................................................... 52

THREE KEY COMPONENTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ............................................................... 54

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................. 62

TIMELINE - SELECTED PSO AND MUNICIPAL ACTIVITIES, 2008-2013 .................................................. 64

THE DOWNTOWN ...................................................................................................................................... 68

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 68

THE 2008 ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND THEIR OUTCOMES ........................................ 68

ANALYSES OF DOWNTOWN INCIDENTS ................................................................................................. 71
ANALYSIS OF TIMELINE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOWNTOWN.......................................................... 76
KEY THEMES IN DOWNTOWN VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY...................................................... 78
RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................... 80
TIMELINE - DEVELOPMENTS IN DOWNTOWN HALIFAX, 2007-2013.................................................. 81
HOUSING, VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY .................................................................................... 84
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 84
The 2008 ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND OUTCOMES.................................................. 84
ANALYSIS OF TIMELINE DATA FOR HOUSING ............................................................................. 87
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................... 88
TIMELINE FOR HOUSING DIMENSION IN HRM, 2008-2013 .......................................................... 90
OFFENDER REINTEGRATION, VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY .................................................... 94
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 94
THE 2008 RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE RESPONSE ............................................................... 95
 PATTERNS OF REPEAT OFFENDING AND INCARCERATION ......................................................... 96
ANALYSES OF TIMELINE DEVELOPMENTS IN OFFENDER REINTEGRATION ................................ 101
KEY ISSUES IN OFFENDER REINTEGRATION .................................................................................... 103
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................... 104
TIMELINE - OFFENDER REINTEGRATION DIMENSION .................................................................... 105
VARIATIONS IN VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION ......................................................................... 109
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 109
YOUNG OFFENDERS: THE 2008 REPORT AND RESPONSES ............................................................. 110
YOUTH CRIME PATTERNS SINCE THE ROUNDTABLE .................................................................... 111
YOUTHS: FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................... 113
RACE / ETHNIC VARIATION IN VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION .................................................. 115
THE 2008 ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE RESPONSE TO THEM ......................... 115
 PATTERNS OF RACE / ETHNIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIMinally JUSTICE SYSTEM ................ 116
RACE – ETHNICITY: FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................... 118
VARIATION IN VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION BY VULNERABLE NEIGHBOURHOOD .................... 119
VULNERABLE NEIGHBOURHOODS: THE 2008 RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSES ............... 120
VULNERABLE NEIGHBOURHOODS: KEY ISSUES FOR VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION ............... 121
VULNERABLE NEIGHBOURHOODS: FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................... 122
THE PUBLIC HOUSING COMPLEXES: KEY ISSUES ......................................................................... 123
PUBLIC HOUSING: FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................. 125
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The task assigned by Council to this Roundtable Review was “To review the implementation of the recommendations of the Round Table Report of 2008, and provide a “snapshot” assessment of current levels and manifestations of violent crime in Halifax Regional Municipality as well as corresponding public safety initiatives”. Specifically the Review was to:

1. Provide an analysis of local and national data on violence and public safety;
2. Review the work done since 2008 with observations about progress and areas that still need attention. Particular attention will be paid to the core recommendations and their relevance today;
3. Identify any new issues that need attention; and
4. Provide suggestions on how to proceed, including identification of possible strategies and associated partnerships that might improve the current landscape.

In accomplishing those tasks, the basic strategy of this Review has been two-fold namely (a) to assess the core dimensions of violence and public safety that were highlighted in the 2008 Mayor’s Roundtable in terms of the implementation and outcomes of the Roundtable recommendations and key developments since 2008 that have impacted on them; (b) to examine other important dimensions of violence and public safety in HRM that had emerged subsequent to the Roundtable or were not considered at that time. In both cases, up-to-date salient data would be gathered and analysed, an environmental scan of policies and programs undertaken, and extensive interviews would be carried out with a large number of diverse stakeholders and informed persons to determine what the achievements and shortfalls have been and the challenges of new, emerging issues for reducing violence and enhancing public safety in HRM.

The dimensions highlighted in the 2008 six volume Roundtable report, and the focus of much attention in the current Review, include

1. Organizational strategies for the municipal government to play a more significant role in dealing with the roots of violence, victimization and social disorder
2. Violence and public safety issues in the Downtown
3. Housing, Violence and Victimization (Virtually all “Roundtables” carried out in large Canadian cities have highlighted housing issues and their resolution as central to dealing with violence and public safety)
4. The challenges for offender reintegration in HRM

5. Variations in violence, offending and victimization by age, race-ethnicity and vulnerable neighbourhoods / communities

Three dimensions of violence and public safety concern in HRM that were not highlighted in the 2008 Roundtable but have emerged as very significant in recent years and were examined closely in this Review are:

- Guns, Shootings and the Drug Culture (Homicides and attempted homicides have been a major problem in HRM in recent years)
- Gendered Violence (the 3 aspects focused on here are Intimate Partner Violence, Sexual Assault and Violence directed at Sex Workers, none of which were discussed in the 2008 Roundtable report)
- The impact of the explosive growth of Social Media on the social construction of violence and public safety in HRM

In addition to analyses of trends in violence and crime in HRM and in comparison to other Canadian CMAs, each of the dimensions identified above has been reviewed and has its own data, timeline and specific recommendations; as well, supplementary papers have been contributed in Volume Two by the expert Review collaborators for seven of these dimensions. The dimensions do differ significantly and required different interviews, analyses of different data sets and underlying factors, understanding different types of governmental involvement, and awareness of and discussions with different sets of stakeholders. The specifics are detailed in the introductory paragraphs for most dimensions. There is much overlap as well; for example, housing issues are important in considering violence and public safety for several dimensions, and in all cases there is commonality in a basic recommendation, namely what the implications are for the capacity and strategic intervention by municipality government action.

The scope and depth of the complex task required a robust methodology. Pertinent data were sought from all levels of government; over 250 individuals were interviewed, some on several occasions, and usually in some depth. Timelines were created for all dimensions, identifying key policies, programs and specific initiatives that were developed since the Roundtable by various stakeholders – the municipal bureaucracy, the Public Safety Office, the police services, the provincial and federal government, and in both the non-profit and private sectors. It was considered crucial to a fair and evidence-based Review that these efforts were acknowledged and, where possible, assessed for their impact on the different dimensions of violence and public safety.
A major strategy utilized was to draw upon the expertise of scholars and policy providers and advocates in the different dimensions identified, and to invite their collaboration as part of the Review team. Most collaborators had in fact been engaged in the earlier Roundtable activity and had headed focus groups and prepared position papers for the dimension on which they were asked to contribute in this Review. Their contribution has been enormous. There was close collaboration between the principal investigator and each “Lead”, in most cases reflected in terms of developing strategic outlines, preparing interview guides, co-interviewing and sharing individual interviews (roughly half the interviews were carried out by the collaborators and half by the principal investigator), accessing data and discussing recommendations. The principal investigator wrote Volume One and the collaborators’ authored their own papers found in Volume Two but the cross-collaboration was crucial in all respects.

In the 2006-2008 Roundtable there were several major incidents that set the agenda, namely the killing of an American sailor in the Downtown and the random swarmings, exemplified in an older woman being beaten and robbed by a group of young girls in the area of the Halifax Commons. While conventional issues such as Downtown violence and swarmings continue to be important signal crimes (i.e., crimes that effect significant public concern), their number and impact have diminished and, over the past few years, targeted shootings, bullying, gendered violence especially sexual assaults, and the explosive impact of the social media in mobilizing attention and calls for response by elected leaders and authorities have dominated. The issues have also shaped the focus of this Review and how it has approached violence and public safety in HRM.

As noted in the 2008 Roundtable Main Volume Report, there were two key premises underlining the Roundtable, namely that (a) there is a real problem of violence and public safety in HRM, reflected in the police and justice data and in public opinion; and (b) municipal government and community initiatives can effect positive changes to the problem. What are the premises in this Review? There are three, namely that (a) for a variety of reasons (demographic, police activity, private security and related technology), there has been a significant and seemingly permanent decline in the type of violence and public safety concerns highlighted in that Roundtable Report (robbery, swarming, and gangs, as well as most kinds of property crimes). That does not mean that such violence is not still on the police or public radar but that their diminution is real and substantial and their decline evidenced in police stats, GSS victimization data, and public surveys; (b) gendered violence has been more resistant to such change and indeed appears to have been enhanced at points due to technological and societal changes and this in turn has resulted in a different character of violence and a wider net of offenders and victims; (c) much has been developed in effecting public security and developing salient governmental policy at all three orders of government but more is required; there is much more that can be
done especially at the municipal level either because recommended changes were not implemented to best effect or because new recommendations can be more effective in responding to the changing violence and public safety milieu.

PART A: NEW PATHS FOR THE ROUNDTABLE REVIEW

POST-ROUNDTABLE TRENDS IN VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

Overall, HRM crime tables for both the HRP and RCMP jurisdictions indicate that there has been a sharp decline since the Roundtable period. Earlier findings for the five years immediately preceding the Roundtable (i.e., 2002 to 2006) indicated that among the 30 largest municipalities in Canada having an MPD (i.e., independent municipal police service), HRM’s urban core HRP jurisdiction’s rank for rate of violent crime was 1,2,1,1,2 respectively. Similarly, for the metropolitan area which in HRM includes both HRP and RCMP jurisdictions, the rate of violent crime was high compared to others among the 30 largest CMAs in Canada, with ranks for the same five years of 5,3,3,3,5 respectively. In other works, HRM unfortunately was far ahead of the other municipalities in terms of its high level of violent crime and had been for a number of years. HRM also had a relatively high rate of property crime, usually ranking #7 or #8 among its Canadian counterparts in the pre-Roundtable years (Clairmont, 2008).

The tables below indicate the considerable decline in violence and property crime in HRM in the years since the Roundtable. Looking at two year averages (a more conservative measure) the decline in HRP’s jurisdiction has been consistent and significant especially in property crime (see Table 1.1). Both commercial and residential break and enters have declined by roughly 50% from 604 to 303 and 1004 to 526 respectively in the two year periods from 2006-2007 to 2012-2013 while in other categories of break and enters the numbers have fallen from 306 to 112 (a whopping 66%). Thefts from vehicles and of vehicles have also been sharply reduced in the HRP jurisdiction, the former falling 25% from 2006-2007 to 2012-2013, while the later declined by 50% over the same period. Turning to violent crime, there is, as will be discussed in depth below, a more nuanced picture. Robberies (as categorized by HRP, robbery refers to both institutional and personal robbery, the latter including “swarmings”) have declined by well over 50% from 2006-2007 to 2012-2013, while the later declined by 50% over the same period. Assaults (excluding sexual assaults) have fallen off by 30% over the same years 2006-2007 to 2012-2013. Sexual assaults, a clear
exception, have remained roughly at the same level of actual incidents over the 2006 to 2013 years, and homicides / attempted homicides have also not followed the above trend.

Generally, in the RCMP jurisdictional area of HRM, there have been roughly 33% of the HRP annual total of crime against persons and 40% of the HRP annual total of property crime. Essentially the same results as above for HRP – though less dramatically in the case of property crime - are conveyed in the RCMP data. Break and enters have declined by 26% over the past three years, mischief and property damage by over 40% and overall property crime by roughly 30%. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 indicate the patterns for violent crimes and their distribution by district. Weapon offences, robberies and assaults (excluding sexual assaults) have quite consistently been declining; robberies fell 40% from a two year average of 69 in 2007-2008 to 42 in 2012-2013 while assaults diminished 30% from 770 in 2007-2008 to 537 in 2012-2013. These patterns on violent crimes mirror well those pertaining to the HRP jurisdiction. And, as was the case in the HRP jurisdiction, sexual assaults did not exhibit any pattern of decline between 2007 and 2013 and in fact were significantly higher (i.e., almost 40%) in 2012-2013 than in 2007-2008; homicides in the RCMP-police districts were few but not declining.

Table 1.3 shows that among the RCMP-policed districts, the most populous Lower Sackville area clearly regularly had the largest number of assaults and, more interestingly, that Cole Harbour had significantly more assaults than Tantallon, an area of just slightly less population. Also, as shown below in the section on gendered violence, Cole Harbour and Lower Sackville had quite similar levels of sexual assaults over the period 2007 to 2013.

Tables 1.4 and 1.5 provide an update with respect to HRM’s ranking on crime and violence compared with other Canadian municipalities – CMAs – on crime severity and violent crime severity indexes created by Statistics Canada. For the five year period 2008 to 2012 HRM ranks #7 with an average index score of 90.16, well above the Canadian CMA average of 82.60, and examination of the five years of index scores reveals no clear pattern of decline. HRM’s rank on violent crime severity shows an average index score for the five years of 109.43, well above the Canada average of 88.93 but well below Winnipeg, Saskatoon and Regina, the perennial leading CMAs for crime, especially violent crime. While this ranking on violent crime severity for HRM as a CMA is within close range of the five year average preceding the Roundtable, Table 1.5 indicates that there has been a trend of decline in the index scores over the past five years, as there has also been for Winnipeg, Saskatoon and Regina.

Table 1.6 compares HRM with Nova Scotia as a whole for different types of crime over the period 2008 to 2012 inclusive. It confirms the consistent decline in actual incidents involving violent crime in both areas but the decline in HRM was greater, percentage-wise; as reported by HRM police services there was a rate of 172 accused per 10,000 population in 2008 and a rate of 115 in 2012, a decline of 33%; the comparable decline of
rates in Nova Scotia as a whole was 20%. Similarly, there was a rate decline in accused persons (actual incidents) in both areas but the percentage rate decline was roughly half the level for violent crime, namely 15% for HRM and 10% for Nova Scotia as a whole.

Overall, then, crime, including violent crime, has been on the decline in HRM as it has been in Canada as a whole and throughout Western societies. Three factors have been generally accepted as causing this trend (see for example, “The curious case of the fall in crime”, The Economist, July 20, 2013) namely the aging of the population, improvement in policing (e.g., ComStat techniques involving the mapping of “hot spots” and development of accountable strategies include the deployment of officers) and enhanced security measures throughout society (e.g., CCTV). These three factors blend especially well with respect to their major impact for property crimes, so much so that some senior police officials have argued that in HRM “we have crushed crime and can now do more on the prevention side and get ahead of crime”. Some violent crimes such as robbery and general assaults do seem readily amenable to this circumstance but others such as sexual assaults and homicide / attempted homicide appear to be more resistant to that general trend and to demand more in the way of understanding their impetus and advancing more strategic interventions.

The overall decline in violence and crime generally in the past five years has been emphasized by HRM elected officials; about two-thirds in their interviews agreed with the common police view that there has been a significant decline, with the remainder contending that there has been little change – no one suggested that the violence and public safety has worsened. It can be noted too that public surveys in HRM have shown a very positive assessment of the situation by the public over the past five years. So, in the case of HRM, significant progress has been achieved in dealing with violence and enhancing public security but the war has not yet been won. The factors that were identified in the 2008 Roundtable Report as conducive to violence – a comparatively high proportion of young adult males, a culture of alcohol misuse and a tradition of violence - are still extant. There is still a high level of violence and in particular there is the challenge of responding effectively to sexual violence and to homicide / attempted homicide; both these latter concerns will be expanded upon below. Clearly the societal anti-crime policies and programming and the policing strategies in play have had a positive impact on crime and need to be maintained but with some tweaking (e.g., more utilization of the Crime Free Multiple Housing approach, maintaining police presence in the Downtown) but new thinking and new recommendations need to be developed to deal with the violence crimes more resistant to existing strategies and with regard to the areas and persons associated with the highest levels of crime and victimization.
TABLE 1.1 - SELECTED TRENDS, POLICE-REPORTED ACTUAL INCIDENTS, HRPS JURISDICTION, 2006-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2 year average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;E COMMERCIAL</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 year average</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>303</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;E RESIDENTIAL</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 year average</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>526</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;E OTHER</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 year average</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBBERIES</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 year average</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>209</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEFT FROM VEHICLE</td>
<td>3107</td>
<td>2383</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2277</td>
<td>2201</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1686</td>
<td>2745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 year average</td>
<td>2745</td>
<td>2118</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1812</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEFT OF VEHICLE</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 year average</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>366</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEXUAL ASSAULTS</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 year average</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>225</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSAULTS</td>
<td>2614</td>
<td>2450</td>
<td>2306</td>
<td>2286</td>
<td>2288</td>
<td>2208</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1701</td>
<td>2532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 year average</td>
<td>2532</td>
<td>2296</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Halifax Regional Police Service, 2013
TABLE 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assaults</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robberies</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Murders</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Assaults</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE 1.3

RCMP Halifax District - All Assaults
2007 - 2013 Calendar Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cole Harbour</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Sackville</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musquodoboit Hbr.</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheet Harbour</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tantallon</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>939</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 1.4 - CRIME SEVERITY INDEX, BY CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREA (CMA), 2008-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>5-YEAR AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>90.39</td>
<td>87.53</td>
<td>82.67</td>
<td>77.43</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>82.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGINA</td>
<td>164.20</td>
<td>143.15</td>
<td>132.54</td>
<td>123.41</td>
<td>116.00</td>
<td>135.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASKATOON</td>
<td>138.85</td>
<td>133.49</td>
<td>128.66</td>
<td>114.87</td>
<td>107.08</td>
<td>124.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINNIPEG</td>
<td>124.60</td>
<td>135.61</td>
<td>115.53</td>
<td>101.33</td>
<td>96.10</td>
<td>114.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VANCOUVER</td>
<td>118.85</td>
<td>109.96</td>
<td>101.32</td>
<td>93.78</td>
<td>92.67</td>
<td>103.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDMONTON</td>
<td>123.27</td>
<td>115.56</td>
<td>102.78</td>
<td>88.08</td>
<td>85.03</td>
<td>102.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JOHNS</td>
<td>86.85</td>
<td>90.78</td>
<td>100.69</td>
<td>90.97</td>
<td>86.30</td>
<td>91.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALIFAX</td>
<td>95.95</td>
<td>97.15</td>
<td>96.39</td>
<td>87.02</td>
<td>74.28</td>
<td>90.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTORIA</td>
<td>102.10</td>
<td>91.65</td>
<td>85.45</td>
<td>71.06</td>
<td>69.55</td>
<td>83.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTREAL</td>
<td>90.99</td>
<td>88.98</td>
<td>82.44</td>
<td>80.30</td>
<td>75.11</td>
<td>83.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAINT JOHN</td>
<td>87.45</td>
<td>82.62</td>
<td>79.72</td>
<td>69.21</td>
<td>67.12</td>
<td>77.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONCTON</td>
<td>72.87</td>
<td>75.57</td>
<td>72.21</td>
<td>68.83</td>
<td>79.31</td>
<td>73.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALGARY</td>
<td>84.73</td>
<td>80.57</td>
<td>76.15</td>
<td>65.12</td>
<td>60.51</td>
<td>73.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMILTON</td>
<td>77.08</td>
<td>73.76</td>
<td>70.82</td>
<td>63.94</td>
<td>60.06</td>
<td>69.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORONTO</td>
<td>66.71</td>
<td>63.85</td>
<td>59.70</td>
<td>55.39</td>
<td>52.13</td>
<td>59.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada. CANSIM Table 252-0052 - Crime severity index and weighted clearance rates, annual

### TABLE 1.5 - VIOLENT CRIME SEVERITY INDEX BY CANADIAN CITY, 2008-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>5-YEAR AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>94.88</td>
<td>94.04</td>
<td>88.91</td>
<td>85.38</td>
<td>81.42</td>
<td>88.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINNIPEG</td>
<td>163.32</td>
<td>188.58</td>
<td>164.46</td>
<td>159.73</td>
<td>145.35</td>
<td>164.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASKATOON</td>
<td>162.52</td>
<td>156.17</td>
<td>156.44</td>
<td>130.51</td>
<td>126.42</td>
<td>146.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGINA</td>
<td>171.05</td>
<td>155.47</td>
<td>151.14</td>
<td>120.69</td>
<td>110.11</td>
<td>141.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDMONTON</td>
<td>131.56</td>
<td>118.88</td>
<td>108.29</td>
<td>105.94</td>
<td>95.78</td>
<td>112.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALIFAX</td>
<td>116.22</td>
<td>119.96</td>
<td>105.33</td>
<td>113.28</td>
<td>92.36</td>
<td>109.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTORIA</td>
<td>125.10</td>
<td>120.26</td>
<td>108.46</td>
<td>95.50</td>
<td>92.63</td>
<td>108.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTREAL</td>
<td>105.41</td>
<td>101.75</td>
<td>97.81</td>
<td>97.17</td>
<td>87.83</td>
<td>97.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORONTO</td>
<td>97.97</td>
<td>95.62</td>
<td>89.31</td>
<td>82.63</td>
<td>78.40</td>
<td>88.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAINT JOHN</td>
<td>87.10</td>
<td>86.07</td>
<td>82.89</td>
<td>76.62</td>
<td>67.95</td>
<td>80.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONCTON</td>
<td>65.84</td>
<td>79.96</td>
<td>73.63</td>
<td>71.90</td>
<td>73.40</td>
<td>72.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMILTON</td>
<td>88.09</td>
<td>84.48</td>
<td>80.49</td>
<td>73.72</td>
<td>62.49</td>
<td>77.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALGARY</td>
<td>89.43</td>
<td>88.13</td>
<td>80.56</td>
<td>69.81</td>
<td>61.19</td>
<td>77.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JOHNS</td>
<td>74.02</td>
<td>69.64</td>
<td>89.33</td>
<td>74.86</td>
<td>77.34</td>
<td>77.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTORIA</td>
<td>81.37</td>
<td>81.18</td>
<td>83.73</td>
<td>71.16</td>
<td>63.66</td>
<td>76.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada. CANSIM Table 252-0052 - Crime severity index and weighted clearance rates, annual
TABLE 1.6 - ACTUAL INCIDENTS (# AND RATE PER 10,000 POPULATION), BY YEAR AND TYPE OF CRIME, NS & HRM (HRPS/RCMP) 2008-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL CRIME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>65495</td>
<td>28446</td>
<td>65146</td>
<td>28471</td>
<td>65792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIOLENT CRIME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>16024</td>
<td>6741</td>
<td>15549</td>
<td>6603</td>
<td>14766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-VIOLENT CRIME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>49471</td>
<td>21705</td>
<td>49597</td>
<td>21868</td>
<td>51026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPERTY CRIME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>38989</td>
<td>17734</td>
<td>39265</td>
<td>18326</td>
<td>40847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER CRIME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>10482</td>
<td>3971</td>
<td>10332</td>
<td>3542</td>
<td>10179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nova Scotia Community Counts - NS Dept. of Justice - Policy, Planning, and Research Division; Social-Crime by Jurisdiction-Actual Incidents & Rate per 10,000 Population-HRM Justice Police District & NS

REFERENCES CITED

DON CLAIRMONT, VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE HALIFAX REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY, MAIN REPORT AND SIX VOLUMES. HALIFAX: HRM, 2008
GUNS, SHOOTINGS AND THE DRUG CULTURE

THE PROBLEMATIC

As noted above, violence and conventional crime have declined significantly since the Roundtable Report in 2008. Throughout HRM, assaults, robberies, break and enters, and thefts have been sharply reduced. Clearly, though HRM still has a serious problem with violence, especially shootings related to the drug milieus. 2011 saw the highest rate ever in the municipality for homicides and 2013 the highest rate for attempted murders. Violence, where there was use of firearms, marks off HRM as one of the more dangerous metropolitan areas in Canada. In 2011 metropolitan Halifax had the second highest rate of homicide among CMAs in Canada and in 2012 the fourth highest. HRM has the highest rate of firearm-caused homicides in Canada. As a well-known and knowledgeable public housing resident/leader observed, in describing the circumstances of violence as so different from previous decades, “the boys got guns now”.

Clearly one strategy to deal with this shooting outrage is to disrupt and shut down the supply of weapons. The police services have tried to do this in a variety of ways, most obviously in programs such as “pixels for pistols” where a person can turn in weapons for cameras or other items (cash is problematic), with “no questions asked”, and also by collaborating as part of the National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST). There is a federally-funded designated officer linked to the NWEST in the HRP who oversees an RCMP and a HRP member as the team assists with all aspects of firearm investigations and prosecution for the province including warrant preparation, suggestions on charges, and verification and history of seized weapons. Unfortunately, while necessary, such supply-oriented strategies have not been as effective as hoped for (because the black market in weapons and perhaps the cross-border trade for illegal weapons – there are diverse but equally authoritative views about the quantitative importance of guns coming across the border - are not affected in a significant or “game-changing” way by such initiatives), a situation evidenced by the high rates cited above. It appears very unlikely that resorting to more punishing sentencing (such as increased mandatory sentences) would make a difference even if that were an option (unlikely). It would appear then that other strategies directed at impacting demand factors for taking up and using guns would be crucial to complement existing strategies and the six-officer Integrated Guns and Gangs unit fully formed since 2011.

The perspective adopted here is that the emphasis on guns is central in the HRM drug milieu. In this context, being engaged in the drug milieu provides a rationale for guns and vests (e.g., self-defence, intimidation) as well as contacts for obtaining guns and perhaps the funds to buy them. The possession of guns by the young male adults, in addition to conferring status in that milieu, provides them with ways of settling problems/disputes or venting that reinforce their learned dispositions for aggressive and impulsive responses in relationships,
especially given sub-cultural influences that glamorize the criminal role (e.g., life styles, gangsta rap music themes); but, also, since they are usually considered replaceable by the high-ups in the drug trade and there is apparently little in the organization of the local drug business that is reining in their explosiveness and compensating for their low skills or interest in alternative ways to solve problems.

The main themes suggested by the above argument that will be explored below are five, namely (a) that the majority of shootings in HRM occur in the drug trade milieu, (b) that some other societies and urban areas such as Britain and even CBRM may not show that pattern in their drug milieus, (c) that the style reflects an inner city American sub-cultural linkage though now prevalent in HRM among both Whites and Blacks in the illicit drug business, (d) that the shootings, while sometimes serving utilitarian ends (e.g., home invasions to obtain drugs or money), are much more reflective of young men expressing violence over a variety of non-business turf issues and using guns to settle personal grievances; (e) changing these behaviours involves at least in part changing individual dispositions, social relationships and the norms and other cultural supports for the behaviour. Such solutions on the demand side are as difficult to achieve as those in use on the supply side. The following tables and analyses provide evidence for such a perspective.

PATTERNS OF HOMICIDE AND ATTEMPTED HOMICIDES IN HRM
The table below describes the patterns of homicides and attempted homicides primarily since the original Roundtable was initiated in 2006. In the period 2004 to 2012 inclusive there were 92 homicide incidents with 94 victims and 100 accused persons, indicating that the homicides were essentially one-on-one incidents. Males accounted for 90% of the accused and 80% of the victims, so clearly homicide is largely a male phenomenon. Homicides averaged 7.6 per year over the five years 2004 to 2008 but 12 per year in the five years 2009 to 2013 (including here the number of homicides from 2013 that was available separately). Other data not shown in the table indicate that the male accuseds and victims are in large majority young adults less than thirty years of age. The homicides took place essentially within the urban core area of HRM and were well-distributed amongst the three zones – Central, East and West – that constitute the jurisdiction of the HRP. Apart from the urban core, North Preston (RCMP jurisdiction) stood out as a modest sized community (population estimates range from 1500 to 3700 persons presumably in large part because of frequent movement between North Preston and Dartmouth) with a serious homicide problem, accounting for nearly 10% of all HRM homicides. There was a variety of weapons / M.Os. used in the HRM murders but the two dominant ones were firearm shootings (35%) and stabbings (28%). Fights (33%) and drug context (30%) were identified by HRP as the top two contexts for the homicides. In identifying the context as drug-related, interview data indicate that the police were highlighting the fact that the persons involved as accused and victim were known in the HRM drug milieu, not necessarily
that the incident’s motivation was specifically linked to a drug deal. Finally, fully 66% of all firearm shooting
homicides between 2004 and 2012 were considered in police reports to be linked to the drug milieu by the
above definition.

Turning to attempted homicides, the data are available only for the period 2006 to 2012 inclusive but they
exhibit a similar, though not identical, set of patterns. There were 158 incidents involving 231 accuseds and 186
victims, indicating some variance from the one- to - one pattern observed for homicides, a variance largely
attributable, according to police sources, to “drive-by shootings among rival “gangs”. Males were almost
exclusively (97%) the accused and also the usual victims (80%) and, again, the interviews with informed police
sources indicated that the majority of offenders were unquestionably adults less than thirty years of age.
Dividing the years into two four year periods, one finds, as in the case of homicides, a significant increase in the
period 2010 to 2013 (as in the case of homicides, data for 2013 were available to supplement the table on this
point) compared to the earlier 2006 to 2009, namely an average per annum of 28 attempted homicides in the
later period vis-à-vis 19 in the 2006 to 2009 years. The location factor also mirrored the homicide data in that
the attempted homicides occurred basically (80%) in urban core of HRM (i.e., especially here in the Dartmouth
area of the HRPS jurisdiction) and the most significant site for this offence outside the urban core was North
Preston. The weapon in attempted murders was much more likely to be a gun than in the case of homicides (i.e.,
60% to 35%), the context overall to be drug-related (61%) and, in the case of shootings, the link to the drug
milieu was highlighted by police records in a whopping 84% of all such incidents.

The data illustrate well the significance of firearms in homicides and attempted homicides in the drug trade
milieu. This can be underlined by examining shootings outside that drug context. In the case of robberies since
the Roundtable Report in 2008, robberies with firearms have consistently accounted for roughly 16% of annual
total robberies. Robberies (especially of businesses and institutions) have declined steadily over that time
period, and between 2008 and 2013 by approximately 50% for both HRP and RCMP jurisdictions. So, while the
percentage involving a firearm generally remained at 16%, the number of such incidents has been halved. Also,
some of these incidents (e.g., the 25 robberies with firearms in 2013) have involved home invasions and person-
robberies where the offender and victim have been known to each other and been involved in the drug milieu
so the number of firearm robberies outside the drug context would be significantly less than 25 in 2013. In the
instance of homicides, over the past ten years there have been three robbery homicides and only one where a
firearm was used. In the case of sexual assault and family homicides, over the past decade there has been no
instance of a shooting murder, while, in domestic homicides, shooting has been identified as the M.O. in two of
the eight cases. In sum, then, firearms and the drug culture are strongly linked and focused around specific kinds of violence and social circumstances.

TABLE 2.1 - HOMICIDES AND ATTEMPTED HOMICIDES IN HRM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HOMICIDES 2004-2012</th>
<th>ATTEMPTED HOMICIDES 2006-2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># OF INCIDENTS</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># OF ACCUSED INVOLVED IN INCIDENTS</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># OF VICTIMS FROM INCIDENTS</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALES ACCUSED</th>
<th>FEMALES ACCUSED</th>
<th>MALE VICTIMS</th>
<th>FEMALE VICTIMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90 (90%)</td>
<td>10 (10%)</td>
<td>75 (80%)</td>
<td>19 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>225 (97%)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
<td>150 (80%)</td>
<td>36 (20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LOCATION OF INCIDENT (TOP 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HRM CENTRAL</th>
<th>HRM EAST</th>
<th>HRM WEST</th>
<th>NORTH PRESTON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 (27%)</td>
<td>22 (24%)</td>
<td>20 (22%)</td>
<td>8 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41 (26%)</td>
<td>48 (30%)</td>
<td>34 (21%)</td>
<td>13 (9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WEAPON (TOP 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHOOTING</th>
<th>STABBING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32 (35%)</td>
<td>26 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94 (60%)</td>
<td>42 (26%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTEXT (TOP 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DRUGS</th>
<th>FIGHTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 (30%)</td>
<td>30 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96 (61%)</td>
<td>23 (15%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHOOTING CONTEXT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DRUGS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 (66%)</td>
<td>79 (84%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Halifax Regional Police, Fall 2013

CONTEXT

Homicide rates have been decreasing in Canada and the USA for several decades, receding to levels last seen in the 1960s but, as noted above, this has not been the case in HRM. 2011 was a particularly bad year for shootings and murder (75 shooting incidents and 19 homicides were reported by HRP, both HRM records) and while homicides have declined appreciably since then, HRM currently has the highest rate of firearm homicides in Canada and the number of attempted homicides in 2013 (i.e., 40) has surpassed the previous high-level mark of 32 in 2011. Minutes of the HRM Police Board indicate clearly that beginning in 2009 guns and shootings increasingly became a problem and regular topic of discussion at Police Board meetings and in one 2009 session
the HRP police chief is reported as saying “guns and vests are now tools of the crime trade”. The strong linkage of guns and shootings to the small number of African Nova Scotians involved in the drug milieu was also discussed at these meetings. Strategies and programs to deal with the shootings were frequently discussed, basically targeting the supply side (e.g., pixels for pistols, national firearm registry, the NWEST) and in 2010, just prior to the egregious violence of 2011, it was reported that “HRP police seize illicit firearms once every couple of days and roughly 800 guns were taken off the streets last year, 250-300 of which “can be directly tied to crime”; clearly, even impressive implementation of such supply-side strategies had a limited impact.

It is useful to place the HRM rates in context. While high in Canada, the rates for homicide are quite low compared with American cities, being a maximum of 5 per 100,000 while larger urban areas such as Chicago, New Orleans, Detroit and St. Louis have rates per 100,000 of 16, 58, 48 and 35 respectively and many smaller urban areas there also have much higher rates than HRM. Many observers link the high rates with the availability of firearms and American culture with its “enshrined right to bear arms”. In the larger American cities the high rates have been consistently linked with “inner city” subculture. The “inner city” has been heavily populated by Black Americans (more recently also Latin Americans) where, as Whites and middle class Blacks fled along with factories and large companies to suburbs and other outlying areas, a subculture emerged over generations of unemployment, poverty, single parent families, violence and, in varying degree, a deviance service centre where drug use was rampant and outsiders would come for drugs, alcohol and sex. In that context there also developed a strong association among gangs, guns and the illicit drug trade, an association that was further strengthened and celebrated by “gangsta rap”, hip-hop music and imagery that reflected the experience of some creative people living there, “documenting the culture of the inner city” as some would say (Jenkins, 2013).

Many American studies, television programs (e.g., the critically acclaimed “The Wire”) and movies have described the above developments in great depth and have advanced strategies for ameliorative social policy. Typical has been a St. Louis study (Jacobs and Wright, 2006) carried out over several years and published in 2006 where the authors described and offered explanations for the very high level of homicides (roughly 250 annually) largely involving Black American young adults with linkages to the drug trade. Focusing on street justice and retaliation, they found that in this street-level, low status criminal milieu, the number one preference of the victimized criminals was for face-to-face, immediate retaliation and that they rejected for a variety reasons any recourse to the justice system. The shooters, like their victims, were depicted as marginalized persons, having low status vis-à-vis the mainstream legitimate world, and believing that, should they not retaliate, they would invite further victimization and forfeit whatever status they have in their own milieu. It is
not clear what the retaliation was for but the incidents discussed were ostensibly minor from an outsider’s perspective. Research in the mid-1990s spawned by Kennedy in the Boston area (Kennedy, 2011), where essentially the same features characterized its high rate of homicide (i.e., Black males, gangs, guns and drug trafficking), pin-pointed small circles of males goading one another to violence, violence sometimes about turf and money but usually, according to Kennedy, “it’s beefs, disrespect, boy-girl stuff”.

Though on a smaller scale, it appears that the “guns, gangs and drugs” association in HRM has indeed followed the inner-city pattern discussed above. The connection among the three components however does not follow like a DNA-trait. In CBRM for example there is a high rate of drug trafficking but, according to police and other CJS officials there, there has not been a homicide in the drug milieu for many years and the one recorded in 2000 involved an outsider. The CBRM justice officials, including African Nova Scotians, and community activists, readily agreed that the situation in HRM was different, more like the classic inner-city American model, and several characterized Halifax streets as much more dangerous because of it. In CBRM on the other hand, the drug trade was depicted as controlled by family-like, non-competitive small groups obtaining drugs from groups like the Hell’s Angels not the HRM gangs and having no significant young male adult presence wreaking havoc with weapons. Also, there is limited cultural support in CBRM for the inner-city life style – the local Black population is well-integrated and has never had any significant involvement in crime, and while gangsta rap and hip-hop celebration of guns may be popular among youth of all stripes, there seems to be no particular impact on behaviour. In other Canadian areas such as Edmonton, labeled the murder capital in Canada in 2012, the homicides were primarily among street people (i.e., the homeless, often Aboriginal) and the M.O. was the knife. Toronto was seen by both CBRM and HRM respondents as having a drug milieu more similar to that in HRM.

Research for this Review found considerable consensus among various police specialists in HRM that firearm homicides and attempted homicides reflected the “inner city” American cultural style. The underlying motives were seen as basically similar to the patterns described in American studies. As one well-traveled, senior detective officer in HRM commented, “I found here [HRM] there is a high degree of wanton violence and the three Rs – respect, reputation and retaliation – are the immediate causes”. And, as in the American inner cities, virtually all informed CJS officials considered that the low level traffickers earned little money and faced serious risks both of being arrested by police and being robbed and assaulted by their peers, a complex circumstance that would presumably generate much frustration (Bourgois, 2003, Venkatesh, 2008). Bourgois in his three year participant observation in Spanish Harlem found that low level dealers frequently quit the business but then drifted back into it; Venkatesh in his similar longitudinal research in Chicago commented on the frustration and noted “For all their bragadocio, to say nothing of the peer pressure to spend money on sharp clothes and cars,
these young members stood little chance of ever making a solid payday … Now I knew why some of the younger BK members supplemented their income by working legit jobs at McDonald’s or a car wash”. A common opinion among HRM police and informed others also was that the organization of the drug trade at the street level was not conducive to reining in the violent young men. Police officers, White or Black, HRP or RCMP, held views similar to informed community leaders (mostly African Nova Scotians) assembled by the Nova Scotia Department of Justice in 2012 to discuss what to do about the drug milieu-linked violence, namely that the problem was especially critical among young Black men in several areas of HRM, “solving” personal issues with firearms. It was acknowledged by virtually all parties that currently Whites as well as Blacks were involved in the drug milieu and resorted to firearms to deal more or less impulsively with a range of issues, and that while utilitarian motivations (e.g. economic gain) were important factors in their use of firearms, the core was deemed to be the classic “inner city subculture” sustained by both lifestyle and organizational factors.

POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The persons engaged in trafficking in the drug milieu in HRM reputedly are few in number and those involved in the homicides and attempted homicides are usually well-known by the police, as is evident in the common phrases that follow the publication of these events, namely “not a random shooting”, and “persons involved known to police”. So why should the public worry about safety; as long as they shoot straight, “it’s bad guys hurting bad guys”. And the significant over-representation of a small minority of a small minority African Nova Scotian population may reinforce such a perspective. Essentially though, the designated drug-milieu minority, usually living in low status rentals, often products of vulnerable and poor families and much exposed to real and symbolic violence, are largely the creation of a sub-culture abetted by societal inequality and a legacy of racism. Their action and its consequences (e.g., high risks of incarceration, murder etc) have grave implications for their families and communities. Shrugging off the violence is not an option. Nor is public safety not threatened in a more general sense. Considerable, costly policing effort is required to keep the violence reined in and for police officers the risk to themselves is quite significant. In December 2013 the head of the HRP Association commented publicly: “There just seems to be an awful lot more incidents where we're running into firearms or getting involved with people who have the edged weapons... We are still rated as number one with respect to the likelihood of being shot and killed in Halifax, which is not really a ranking you'd like to brag about ... city officials and police officers [need to] sit down and try to come up with a solution”.

Given the huge scale of the drug problems and the high level of homicides associated with drug milieus in the USA it is not surprising that there is considerable American attention to policies and programs directed at radical change. The American emphasis, War on Drugs, until recent years, has been on tough penalties for low level
trafficking (prisons there are overwhelmed with young Black men), gun control (verging on the impossible) and
greater police presence through special enforcement units and community based policing. Jacobs and Wright,
for example, suggest that the key to reducing the criminal victims’ retaliation is police action in seizing the
criminal’s guns and becoming more proactive in preventing the spread of retaliation and counter-retaliation.
Ultimately, though, as the authors acknowledge, the key is getting at the marginality, the zero-level social status
that translates into a violent quest for “respect” in the face of slights and modest victimization.

Signs of significant changes in policies and programs are many nowadays in the United States. The War on Drugs
has been increasingly criticized for the high levels of incarceration and exorbitant costs it has wrought and the
current Obama administration has called for waiving mandatory sentences for low level drug offences. In the
Western states (USA) there is a strong trend to regulate, not criminalize, the sale and purchase of marijuana
(Colorado in January 2014 will be the first state to launch this approach). In exploring new approaches to the
drug and violence problem, the work of Kennedy (Don’t Shoot, One Man, A Street Fellowship and the End of
Violence in Inner City America, 2011) has become path-breaking in advancing feasible solutions at the local level.
His approach in Boston emphasized the police and community agencies working with the small number of
persons and gangs (“crews” in the drug business) in the drug milieu who accounted for most of the violence.
Through what might be called a “weed and feed” strategy (i.e., clearly conveying an enhanced likelihood of
punishment for those individuals and crews continuing the violence while concerned members of their
community expressed to them a strong desire for the violence to stop, and social workers offered services to
help them detach from the cycle of violence). The Boston initiative led to a sharp reduction in violence for
several years and the program, labelled Ceasefire and informally known as the Boston Miracle spread to a host
of other American cities, generally operating in poor, predominantly Black neighbourhoods as in Boston. In 2004
Kennedy’s approach was implemented in High Point North Carolina but there the focus was not only with
violence but also on ending the open-air drug markets that existed. There was apparently much greater
involvement from community leaders as well as police and key players in the local drug markets but the same
basic carrot and stick strategy was employed whereby key drug gang members were assembled and convinced
to cease violence and the open-air drug trafficking or spend “decades in jail beginning tomorrow” – presumably
the police had grounds for charges but the charges would be waived if the imposed arrangements held up. This
initiative also proved to be successful, virtually ending homicides and open-air trafficking in the area for at least
seven years.

The Boston Ceasefire project and its North Carolina adaptation are not without some limitations as is evidenced
in the failure of the former to be successfully implemented in some jurisdictions and the significant re-
emergence of violence in the Boston area in the latter part of first decade of the 21st century, and, in the case of
the latter project, the ambiguous evidence for a displacement effect. Still, success has been evident too and
both projects have much significance for HRM since both types of initiatives were adopted here in 2013. A multi-
year, federally funded Chicago version of Ceasefire (known as Cure Violence) is being readied for
implementation in several HRM communities (mostly but not exclusively African Nova Scotian) and the HRPS has
just completed a modest self-financed version of the North Carolina project through its Uptown Drug
Intervention program and is weighing the option of continuing the Uptown initiative and expanding it to North
Dartmouth. The Uptown and North Dartmouth are the two most violent and heavy drug traffic areas in HRM as
is discussed in-depth elsewhere in this review where evidence will also be presented documenting the success
of the Uptown pilot project in 2013. Aside from these two significant developments, the HRM-funded Youth
Advocacy Program (YAP) has received five year federal funding for its Souls Strong project where the aim is
“With the participation of community residents, community leaders, service providers, and program partners,
the Souls Strong Project aims to prevent young men between the ages of 15 to 20 years from engaging in anti-
social and criminal behaviours”; the project will operate exclusively in North Preston, an area shown above to
have a serious and longstanding violence and drug trafficking problem. YAP brings to the project considerable
experience accumulated over the past seven years dealing with younger, mostly African Nova Scotian males and
more recently with young teenage girls (i.e., the Girls United project).

While the problems of serious violence largely embedded in the drug milieu are very significant, the above
developments generate much hope for their amelioration as clearly they are targeted appropriately and have
considerable community support as well as buy-in from the criminal justice system (especially the two police
services where their espousal of a social development approach seems well reflected in their support for the
initiatives). If such initiatives were not in place and ready for implementation they or similar policy thrusts would
have been recommended here but they are, so the key concern is to ensure those projects are integrated into
HRM policy strategy and to focus on other recommendations that complement them. The implications for
recommendations for this Review are four-fold:

1. The main challenge for HRM government will be its capacity to learn about and develop
empirically-based effective policies and programs from these larger extant projects –
projects that are essentially one-time, federally funded. Accessing information about the
processes and outcomes, meaningfully incorporating it in HRM strategic planning,
comparing it with the experience of other municipalities and prioritizing its resources and
advocacy accordingly, requires a capacity that does not exist at the moment. That need is a
prime consideration in the Review’s recommendations concerning the Public Safety Office,
the Office of the Manager of African Nova Scotian Affairs and a more strategically active
municipal involvement in areas that pertain to the roots of violence and public concern for safety.

2. It is also recommended that HRM government support the continuation, and expansion to North Dartmouth, of the Uptown Drug Intervention initiative. Some resources will have to be committed to this endeavour to provide for agency participation, modest outreach activity and appropriate evaluation.

3. As noted above, the Ceasefire approach has advanced a stick and carrot model of effecting the desired change. It is important to determine what sticks or punishments can be effective and how enforcement strategies and alternative processes and outcomes in initiatives such as Ceasefire can be mutually reinforcing. For example, are the existing legislated penalties for using guns appropriate? Are they in fact operative (successfully prosecuted, accepted by the judiciary)? How is enforcement impacted by these alternative programs? It is recommended that there be a summit along the lines noted above by the spokesperson for the HRP Association – CJS role players, provincial and HRM representatives - to consider these enforcement issues.

4. The demand for heavy drugs especially fuels the illicit drug trade and the existing projects and above recommendations do not directly deal with that demand. The low level drug dealers they target – the runners if you will – typically are not addicted though reportedly many are frequent users of “soft drugs” such as marijuana and hash. One common policy to deal with this demand has been establishing a Drug Treatment Court (DTC) restricted to addicted offenders and emphasizing treatment rather than incarceration. There are such DTCs in large number in the United States (some 2000) and ten in Canadian municipalities across Canada (all five of the largest municipalities in Ontario have a DTC), some federally funded and some operating largely on a municipal shoestring. In HRM the Mental Health Court now has a drug treatment program for its addicted mentally ill clients so there is a precedent here for a therapeutic jurisprudence approach. It is recommended that HRM call on the provincial government to establish such a court here and collaborate with the provincial and federal governments in that regard.

REFERENCES CITED

Bruce Jacobs and Richard Wright, Street Justice: Retaliation in the Criminal Underworld Cambridge University Press, 2006
David Kennedy, Don’t Shoot, One Man, A Street Fellowship and the End of Violence in Inner City America. Bloomsbury NY 2011
Benjamin Wallace-Wells, “Crews Control”, October 6, 2011, Twitter
GENDERED VIOLENCE

Gendered violence was largely omitted from the Roundtable as it focused on youth violence, gangs, swarmings, the Downtown alcohol-related assault problems, and the municipal government’s role in addressing the roots of these social concerns. Large mail-back and telephone surveys were carried out and here significant gender variation in victimization was noted, largely emerging from the different gender responses to issues of personal safety, but not reflected in the public’s agenda or in the various Roundtable focus groups or community meetings. In this Review much more attention was given to gendered violence which was much more prominent in the public’s and the justice system’s awareness and priorities; indeed, as 2013 wore on, issues of gendered violence and associated strategic social policy, especially in relation to sexual assault and sex work, dominated the justice agenda and public concern.

In this Review, Verona Singer, criminologist and the long-term manager of HRP’s creative Victim Services Unit, collaborated by preparing a paper for the Review on gendered violence – conceptualizations, analyses, and recommendations for future action by both province and municipality (HRM) – which is included in the accompanying volume, Supplemental Review Reports. Her paper deals with three dimensions of gendered violence, namely Intimate Partner Violence, Sexual Assault and Violence in Sex Work. Singer’s methodology included one-on-one interviews following an interview guide adjusted for the different dimensions, with non-profit service providers, activists, provincial government officials, police officers and others, several focus groups of key informed persons, accessing data at the federal, provincial and municipal government levels, and reviewing pertinent documents and academic and policy literature. Additional interviews and data collection were carried out and analysed by the Review’s principal investigator.

INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

The timeline data indicate that for Intimate Partner Violence the crucial year for strategic policy launching was 2010 when the provincial government’s Domestic Violence Action Plan was advanced with a variety of initiatives (e.g., proposed amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act that would help abused spouses develop housing options), the announcement of a Domestic Violence Court pilot project to be located Cape Breton, and the release of a significant report by the Nova Scotia Department of Justice, titled “A Statistical Portrait of Intimate Partner Violence: Nova Scotia and Canadian Perspectives”. There were important earlier formative steps in 2009 (e.g., launching the provincial Intimate Partner Violence Tracking project) and 2008 (e.g., collaboration of the NS Departments of Justice and Department of Community Services creating the Domestic Violence Prevention Committee); and, later in 2012, in implementation when the Domestic Violence Court actually began sitting, the
NS legislature passed new family law bills, and amendments were made to the Tenancies Act as proposed in 2010.

Table 3.1 indicates that over the period 2006 to 2013 there was a downward trend in the number of incidents of Intimate Partner Violence as recorded by HRP and overall a decline of 20% from a two year average high of 3229 in 2006-2007 to the low of 2579 in 2012-2013. Given the high level of unreported incidents that characterizes Intimate Partner Violence (and sexual assault) one has always to be wary about statistics in this field. There are several reasons however to be confident in this case, namely

a. HRP’s Victim Services over the years developed robust measures of Intimate Partner Violence extending well beyond the classic 1049 call for service categorization so its data would likely be quite inclusive;

b. Statistics Canada’s General Social Survey on self-reported victimization of violence, while limited in 2009, does indicate that at least with respect to total violent victimization, there appears to have been a sharp decline between the 2004 and 2009;

c. the 2012 Juristat article, Violence against Women, reported that in Canada “there is some evidence that the severity of spousal violence against women is decreasing” and also noted that in intimate partner violence where the victim is female, Halifax was ranked #12 in 2011 with a rate of 506 per 100,000, slightly below the Canadian average of 542.

In the case of Intimate Partner Violence then, trends in policy development and the number of incidents since the Roundtable have been positive. There are still high levels of Intimate Partner Violence – according to the General Social Services in 2009 some 6% of Nova Scotian women reported that they had been victims of spousal abuse within the past five years - and there is strong evidence that conventional court processing of a wide range of such offenses is ineffective and also costly in court resources as has generally been contended by judges, crown prosecutors and defence counsel throughout Nova Scotia. It was shown in the 2009 in-depth assessment of the Public Prosecution Service’s project to achieve an early case resolution through trading a lighter sentence recommendation for a quick guilty plea. In cases of intimate partner violence, the offer was generally rejected by the accused persons often on the advice of their counsel and the accused’s decision to delay usually resulted in the charge being withdrawn at a later time for a variety of reasons, including the victim’s decision to change her position (Clairmont, 2009).

The evidence seems clear, from a meta-study of alternative courts in other Canadian locations and from the Cape Breton experience to date, that a more effective approach to reducing intimate partner violence would be a special Domestic Violence court with specialized judges and crown prosecutors that combined tough sentencing with compulsory treatment for offenders; courts like the one in Cape Breton usually begin with low-
end cases of violence and expand to more serious incidents as the court gains experience and credibility, and as it does, there would be a place for restorative justice programming for the more minor ones. It is recommended that the municipal government advocate for such a court in HRM and do so in collaboration with agencies currently providing important services to victims of domestic violence in order to appreciate concerns they may have. Singer elaborates on these issues and offers a number of additional, useful recommendations in her attached paper, especially in the area of safe affordable transitional housing for victims of Intimate partner violence, and buttressing the existing programs for responding to Intimate partner violence (e.g., funding, training, inter-agency collaboration etc) so that they achieve their objectives more fully.

SEXUAL ASSAULT
As Singer observes “in the last few months of 2013 there has been unprecedented awareness about sexual violence”. The Timeline record from 2007 to 2013 indicates that until 2013, significant new developments pertaining to this dimension of gendered violence were few and modest, essentially initiatives by the Avalon Sexual Assault Center to publicize the problem (e.g., in 2009 establishing the Sexual Assault Awareness Month in May) and the “Sexual Assault in Nova Scotia: A Statistical Profile” report released by the NS Advisory Council on the Status of Women. Perhaps the most important development pre-2013 for the issue of sexual assault – increasing the scope and severity of the criminal justice system’s response - was the federal government’s passing the Tackling Violent Crime Act which raised the age of consent from 14 to 16, the first time the age of consent had been raised since 1892.

The alleged sexual assault, the cyber-bullying and subsequent suicide of 17 year old Rehtaeh Parsons in 2013 led to dramatic change as reflected in the many important developments for sexual assault that quickly followed her suicide. The Parsons’ story went viral in conventional social media (e.g., facebook, twitter) and other social network systems and catapulted Nova Scotia into wide notoriety. It sensitized society to the immense impact of social media, its scope for sexual assault in a less physical sense, and challenges for youth in particular. It generated huge public concern and compelled new government initiatives – new collaborative provincial government committees, conferences, funding for non-profit organizations on the front-line of dealing with victims of sexual assaults such as Avalon, new legislation on cyber-bullying and sexual assault (the Cyber Safety Act) and enhancement of the provincial Justice bureaucracy (i.e., the CyberScan investigative unit). The Parsons incident has also stimulated proposed federal legislation. These developments have been highlighted in the Timeline below and dealt with more substantially in Singer’s paper. The changes have been dramatic and have strongly reinforced earlier policy developments responding to bullying in the school system. The hurried provincial government response has been substantial and not without some controversy (e.g., specificity issues,
invasion of individual rights) but it has struck a chord with the public and within three months the cyber investigators were dealing with over 80 files. It is too soon to assess the impact on sexual assault issues. As noted in the Timeline, another event, the “Rape Chant” at Saint Mary’s University’s orientation, set off another major public storm and professional exchange about the deep cultural roots of sexual assault.

As noted above, sexual assaults have been more resistant to the decline than other violence in HRM since the Roundtable. In both HRP and RCMP jurisdictions of HRM, the number and rate of police-reported sexual assault incidents have not declined. Table 3.3 below highlights the pattern of sexual assaults in the RCMP jurisdiction where, though 2013 witnessed some decline, two year averages for the period 2008 to 2013 have steadily increased. Table 3.2 indicates that, among CMAs in Canada, HRM in 2011 ranked #3 in rate of sexual offences where the victim is female and in the rate for all sexual offences; it ranked fifth highest in the rate of sexual offences where the victim was male. In all these specific rankings, the underlying HRM rate was significantly well above the average for Canada. Table 3.4 provides the actual numbers that Statistics Canada worked with in generating its rates and rankings for HRM; there are several key points, namely:

a. there has been no evidence for a downward trend in the numbers and rates between 2007 and 2012 inclusive;

b. there have been very few level 2 (use of a weapon) or level 3 (aggravated) sexual assaults though here the good news is qualified when one appreciates that some level 1 assaults have been quite vicious as reportedly “even level 1 charges that are registered are alarmingly violent. According to Statistics Canada, victims were injured in 17% of [level 1] cases laid in 2007 and at least 2% involved a firearm, knife or blunt instrument” (Globe and Mail, “Sexual Assaults”, October 5, 2013);

c. there is a rather low proportion of the sexual assaults dealt with by the police (and much under-reporting to begin with, some reports suggesting over 90% are unreported) that result in charges being laid (at most 15% of the police-reported actual incidents according to StatsCan’s UCR data); further, the conviction rate where charges are laid is estimated to be only roughly 25% (Clairmont, 2009).

Given the under-reporting and attrition at each step in Justice’s case processing, and the evident resistance to the factors effecting downward trends in other types of violence, one has to consider whether police and crown resources are adequate and whether the criminal justice system can do more to respond to sexual assaults. This is complex given that there have been specialized roles put in place at both police and crown levels under the conventional case processing system. Singer advances some useful suggestions for consideration for enhancements in these regards. One area where the Justice system clearly can be improved is in providing more services to victims since currently there is little collaboration between federal and provincial authorities
subsequent to the court resolution of the case and this is to the detriment of victims’ dealing with the long-term harm caused by their being assaulted (Clairmont, 2011).

Beyond the Law and the Justice system, getting at the roots of sexual assaults would seem to require changing the culture of alcohol consumption (a key immediate cause of sexual assault) and changing the deep cultural supports for sexual violence. Sexual assault is increasingly seen as a cultural problem and requires activism, education and accountability among both males and females, albeit more an empowerment with females and accountability with males; as one letter to the editor in the Globe and Mail put it recently, what is needed is a resurgence of activism more than tinkering with the law”. The general approval for the Public Safety Office’s Don’t Be That Guy campaign in 2012 speaks to the latter point. Clearly the municipal government has a responsibility to do more with respect to both the alcohol issue and the cultural roots of sexual assault. The municipality, perhaps through the recommended relocated public safety office, minimally should be engaged with the on-going Provincial Strategy on Sexual Violence. And, given the impact of social media and proliferation of social network systems, more policy-oriented research on sexual knowledge, values and behaviours among HRM youth will be crucial.

VIOLENCE AND SEX WORKERS
The 2008 Roundtable Report did not include specific recommendations for the area of prostitution and violence against sex workers though there was acknowledgement of the well-documented grave risks and frequent violence that sex workers have had to contend with. There were several focus group meetings bringing together a wide range of interests – government officials, police, Stepping Stone staff – but no consensus was reached about future directions. The dominant issues for the group discussions concerned how to deal with street solicitation (e.g., sex worker safety, neighbourhood complaints), the implications of indoor sex work (e.g., zoning, municipal regulation, brothels) and the experiences of municipalities elsewhere in Europe and North America. Now in 2014 many of the issues have either been resolved or will need to be in the very near future.

The Timeline below establishes clearly that the major policy development for sex work has been at the court level. In 2007 there was a challenge to prostitution laws filed by Terri Jean Bedford and other sex work professionals on the basis that they violated sections 7 and 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In December 2013 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its decision on the Bedford case. It struck down what it described as “overblown and grossly disproportionate” current laws on prostitution dealing with street solicitation, living off the avails of prostitution, and keeping a brothel. Parliament was given one year to come up with new legislation should it choose to do so. Prostitution per se had not been a criminal act and unless the federal government comes up with new legislation, none of these specific, prostitution-related laws will be in
place in the future. Of course few people expect the federal government to simply forego new legislation, and, one way or another, governmental authorities at both the provincial and municipal levels will be engaged in serious discussion about their response to the various options and contingencies.

At the actual sex work level, there were significant changes in sex work in the past decade and especially since the Roundtable, and in some ways the court action mirrors these developments. The first big change has been the trend away from street solicitation throughout Canada. In HRM police report very few sex workers engaged any longer in this style of sex work (usually labelled the survivalist mode given the great multi-dimensional vulnerability of the sex workers involved); rarely more than a dozen sex workers, if that, regularly “do the strolls”. Sex work has gone “in-door”, greatly facilitated in that regard by the cyber technology evolution which now provides a number of on-line sites to communicate through. This change is often seen as a safer, harm-reduction approach to sex work; as Singer notes in her paper, violence is more of a factor for street sex workers than for in-call workers. How much safer and by what means are questions generating some controversy. There are many sceptics among local police and prosecutors and little research on the question. The second big change, very noticeable since the Roundtable, has been the decline in prostitution incidents and persons charged; as Singer’s data show, there were 56 persons so charged in 2007 but only 8 in 2011. Evidence from police interviews and actual incidents data indicate that the downward trend continued in 2012 and 2013. Well prior to the SCC’s 2013 decision the on-the-ground changes in the police approach had become a common practice basically following the Vancouver Police Department’s model which evolved from a zone approach to containing sex workers to a harm reduction model wherein the sex worker was seen as a survivalist, a victim with a right to her livelihood; the transition in the policing perspective was greatly hastened by the horrendous serial killings of sex workers from Vancouver’s notorious Downtown Eastside.

Virtually all the criminal justice system role players interviewed indicated that the sex work field had changed profoundly with respect to charges, police response and legal issues in recent years and expected that “it will be more wide open when the SCC position comes in on the Bedford case”. More significant changes are still to come and clearly there will be controversy. There is much diversity of views about sex work. The majority of services, advocacy, and harm-reduction programs available in HRM are targeted at the shrinking number of survival sex workers, not the ever-growing internet-based and escort services, and apparently there is very little known about the extent and prevalence of the latter types of sex work in HRM. While the dominant view is that sex work, indoor and facilitated over the Internet is safer than that which takes place on the stroll, the extent to which sex workers experience violence as they engage in their trade is unknown, as are reliable data on the size and pervasiveness of the trade in HRM as a whole. Views differ profoundly too on the exploitation of sex
workers. Research for this Review indicates that the common position of non-profit service providers and sex worker advocates in HRM, is that pimping rings are not dominant in the trade and that the majority of sex workers in HRM are not in exploitative situations. Harm-reduction has largely taken the form of legal support, and health and safety rather than “salvation” types of programs. However, police and prosecutors point to significant exploitation in the sex work business and that is a problem that cannot be overlooked, especially given long established patterns in HRM of pimps exploiting young girls (some underage as the age of consent for exploitation is 18 and sex work falls under this category), convincing them to move to Ontario and more recently to Alberta and other points for prostitution-related work, and holding them in virtual slavery.

The basis of effective policy is good reliable data on the different dimensions of the matter at hand. That information is currently unavailable for sex work in HRM and needs to be gathered. Also, there are many alternative approaches to the legal organization of sex work, one in high favour currently is the Nordic model which criminalizes the buyers of sex work and not the sellers who are seen basically victims. An alternative approach could be the New Zealand model which removes any criminal sanction from the buying and selling of sex (of course criminal law would still apply to human trafficking and to the exploitation of youth) and downloads to the municipality a primary role in the regulation of sex work (e.g., health and safety standards, zoning regulations). It will be crucial for HRM to have the capacity to discuss and strategize, concerning the implications of the federal response to the SCC decisions, with its partners both governmental and others. This is especially so since there are many issues such as zoning, housing regulations, and perhaps escort services licensing, that are squarely within even a more narrowly perceived municipal mandate. Clearly, too, the challenge underlines that the required research and deliberations go well beyond a conventional policing role while nevertheless centered around public safety concerns, so a relocated public safety office can meaningfully contribute to that capacity in HRM.
TIMELINE – SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS ON GENDERED VIOLENCE, 2007-2013

2007

- Safer Communities Act enacted allowing special provincial investigators to shut down bawdy houses that have received community complaints
- Challenge on prostitution laws filed by Terri Jean Bedford and other sex work professionals on the basis that they violated sections 7 and 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

2008

- Avalon Sexual Assault Centre receives funding to document the need to build a provincial coordinated Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) network
- Provincial standards for SANEs drafted
- Nova Scotia Ministers of Justice and Community Services create the Domestic Violence Prevention Committee (DVPC)
- The federal government passes the Tackling Violent Crime Act which raises the age of consent from 14 to 16, the first time the age of consent has been raised since 1892.

2009

- Avalon Sexual Assault Centre marks first Sexual Assault Awareness Month in May
- Report of the NS Domestic Violence Prevention Committee released
- The NS Intimate Partner Violence Tracking Project begins
- “Sexual Assault in Nova Scotia: A Statistical Profile” report released by the NS Advisory Council on the Status of Women

2010

- NS Domestic Violence Action Plan unveiled, with a number of well-received initiatives such as amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act that would enable a victim of intimate partner violence to get out of her lease, and a 3-year Domestic Violence Court Pilot Program in Cape Breton is announced.
- “A Statistical Portrait of Intimate Partner Violence: Nova Scotia and Canadian perspectives” report released by the NS Department of Justice

2011

- www.nsdomesticviolence.ca website launched
- Department of Justice’s “Family Law Reform Project” initiated
- Domestic Violence “train-the-trainer” education sessions facilitated
- Halifax ranked with 3rd highest sexual assault rate in Canada, according to Statistics Canada
- “Exploring Service Options for Youth/Survivors in HRM” report prepared for Avalon Sexual Assault Centre
- St. Mary’s University hosts first ConsentFest, a conference dealing with the “Culture of Consent”
- Stepping Stone runs “Sex Workers are People Too” public education campaign
2012

- Domestic Violence Court opens in Cape Breton
- Phase II of the “Family Law Reform Project” to review the Maintenance and Custody Act
- Four family law bills introduced and passed by the Provincial Government in the spring 2012 legislative session
  - Bill 34: Matrimonial Statutes Repeal Act (in effect May, 2012)
  - Bill 37: An Act to Amend the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act (in effect, Feb, 2013)
  - Bill 39: An Act to Amend the Maintenance and Custody Act (in effect, Feb, 2013)
  - Bill 41: Grandparents’ Rights Affirmation Act (in effect May, 2012)
- Legislative changes to Residential Tenancies Act allowing Early Termination Provisions for Domestic Violence
- 1-855-225-0220 Domestic Violence hotline started, staffed by Transition House Association professionals
- “Neighbours, Friends and Families” public education and awareness program launched; designed to help people spot signs of domestic violence
- “Parenting Journey Program” for high-risk families held at the Nova Scotia Youth Facility and Cape Breton Correctional Centre
- Department of Health and Wellness hosts a Health Equity Forum on domestic violence
- “Don’t Be That Guy” Public Education Campaign initiated by Halifax Regional Police and the Public Safety Office – the well-received initiative was fully funded by the NS Department of Justice

2013

- Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) hears Bedford Case
- Rehtaeh Parsons assault case goes “viral” on the social media
- NS Action Team on Sexual Violence and Bullying initiated by Department of Community Services in collaboration with the Advisory Council on the Status of Women, the Office of Policy and Priorities, and Communications Nova Scotia
- “Acting Together to Respond to Sexual Violence” report released by NS Government
- Nova Scotia “Cyber-Safety Act” legislation is introduced and passed in the spring and proclaimed into force in August. Among other things it allows victims to seek help in identifying anonymous perpetrators, protecting themselves against such attacks and suing the offending party.
- CyberScan investigative unit created to enforce Cyber-Safety Act
- Avalon Sexual Assault Centre receives $100,000 in emergency funding to respond to increased need for service as a result of the Rehtaeh Parsons case
- Provincial Government announces additional $1 million in sexual assault services funding province-wide
- “Sexual Assault: Safety, Help and Healing for Teens in Nova Scotia” developed and released by the Nova Scotia Advisory Council on the Status of Women
- “Bullying & Cyberbullying: What We Need to Know” developed and released by Education and Early Childhood Development
- “Police Leaders Symposium on Bullying and Cyberbullying” hosted by Department of Justice
- New fee schedule in effect for physician examination of sexual assault victims, forensic collection, and physician testimony in sexual assault prosecutions
- “Speak Up! Anti-Bullying Leadership Conference” held
• Halifax Regional School Board launches external review of Rehtaeh Parsons case, calls for review of health care system
• SMU “Rape Chant” incident at orientation reverberated throughout Canada and resulted in the December 2013 MacKay Report on strategies to effect cultural changes with respect to sexual attitudes and behaviours. The report advanced 20 recommendations including creating a team tasked with implementing the recommendations and focusing on structural and processual changes at the university
• The federal government introduces Bill C-13 entailing criminal code changes targeting social media with respect to the transmission / distribution of intimate images without consent.
• Avalon Sexual Assault Centre launches “We Believe” campaign at “Conference to Address Issues of Sexualized Violence”
• External review of Child and Adolescent Mental Health and Addiction Services in HRM prompted and released by the provincial government. The report highlighted gaps in services and called for more psychiatrists in the system.
• The SCC decision on the Bedford case is released December 2013. It strikes down what it describes as “overblown and grossly disproportionate” current laws on prostitution dealing with street solicitation, living off the avails of prostitution, and keeping a brothel. Parliament is given one year to come up with new legislation should it choose to do so
**TABLE 3.1 - INTIMATE PARTNER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INCIDENTS REPORTED TO HRP, 2006-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>3377</td>
<td>3080</td>
<td>2876</td>
<td>2557</td>
<td>2714</td>
<td>2816</td>
<td>2660</td>
<td>2497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTHLY AVERAGE</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 YR AVERAGE</td>
<td><strong>3229</strong></td>
<td><strong>2717</strong></td>
<td><strong>2765</strong></td>
<td><strong>2579</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Halifax Regional Police Victim Services, 2013*

---

**TABLE 3.2 - VICTIMS OF POLICE-REPORTED SEXUAL OFFENCES, BY SEX OF VICTIM AND CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREA (TOP 7 FEMALE VICTIMS), 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEMALE VICTIMS</th>
<th>MALE VICTIMS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>RATE</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>RATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINNIPEG</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDMONTON</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALIFAX</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASKATOON</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KELOWNA</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUELPH</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRANTFORD</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>14209</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Statistics Canada Centre for Justice Statistics, Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (Juristat 2012 article: Measuring violence against women: Statistical trends) *Rates calculated on the basis of 100,000 population
TABLE 3.3

RCMP Halifax District - All Sexual Assaults
2007 - 2013 Calendar Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cole Harbour</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Sackville</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musquodoboit Hbr.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheet Harbour</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tantallon</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3.4 – POLICE REPORTED SEXUAL ASSAULT INCIDENTS AND CHARGES, YOUTH AND ADULT,
HRM, BY YEAR 2007-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF ASSAULT</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTUAL INCIDENTS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, PERSONS CHARGED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, ADULT CHARGED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, YOUTH CHARGED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL 3, AGGRAVATED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUAL INCIDENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, PERSONS CHARGED</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, ADULT CHARGED</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, YOUTH CHARGED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL 2, WEAPON OR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BODILY HARM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUAL INCIDENTS</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, PERSONS CHARGED</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, ADULT CHARGED</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL, YOUTH CHARGED</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada. CANSIM Table 252-0051 – Incident-based crime statistics, by detailed violations, annual; Fall-2013

References Cited


THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

INTRODUCTION
In updating the data and issues concerning the social construction of violence and public safety, assessing outcomes for the 2008 Report’s recommendations, and looking forward from the current situation, a wide variety of research strategies and activities were employed. A research outline for this dimension was developed in collaboration between the principal investigator and the Professor Kimber who assumed responsibility for writing the supplemental report reproduced in Volume 2. Interviews, usually following an interview guide, were carried out with twenty key persons, stakeholders and knowledgeable, in this field. These included police officers at all rank levels, especially school liaison officers, provincial officials responsible for policy development concerning social media issues and for the CyberScan investigation unit, pertinent municipal staff, veteran reporters with the local newspapers writing extensively in the area of violence and public safety, and academic-based experts in the social media field. Pertinent information from interviews garnered for other dimensions of the Review was also available. In addition there was modest recourse to documents (e.g., minutes of the Police Board and PSO reports) and to the general literature in this field.

In the earlier Roundtable research it was found via large telephone and mail-back surveys of adults in HRM that respondents (a combined total of 3,189 persons) depended “a great deal” (60%) upon television and radio for their knowledge about crime and public safety, and 50% reported also that they depended on the daily newspapers a great deal for such knowledge. These two media were also cited, in the same rank order, as sources they relied “very much on” (55% and 35% respectively). Surprisingly, friends and relatives were not referred to as providing a great deal of that specific knowledge (just 15%) or as a source relied on very much for it (just 11%). The internet, government and police were each much less acknowledged as providing a great deal of such knowledge or being relied upon for it; for example, just 8% of the respondents stated that they obtained a great deal of information about crime and safety via the internet and only 5% said they relied a great deal on such information obtained from the internet. The Roundtable focus group (see Kimber’s paper for a description of the 2007 group) emphasized largely, and appropriately then, the role of the mainstream media in depicting issues of violence and public safety and how that depiction might be altered and what HRM and the police services could do to effect positive change. A general premise of the focus group was that the public was not mistaken in its perceptions and knowledge of serious crime in HRM (i.e., HRM by objective measures was indeed a metropolitan area with a comparatively high level of violent crime) but rather, that there was an imbalance in
media presentations (i.e., it was too negative and emphasizing violent crime) and that more should be communicated to the public by police and others to facilitate crime prevention and allay fear and anxiety.

THE 2008 ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE RESPONSE TO THEM

There were four recommendations advanced in the 2008 Roundtable on the above Social Construction theme, namely: (a) Halifax Regional Municipality needs a new communications strategy for dealing with violence and the fear of violence; (b) Halifax Regional Municipality should develop a social marketing campaign designed to positively influence community attitudes and values — respect, responsibility, accountability — around issues of violence and crime; (c) HRM should strive to achieve a better balance in media accounts by taking some responsibility for communicating the positives and (d) there should be more quality crime prevention information, well distributed to residents. There has been no significant evidence of any “violence and public safety” initiative by HRM Communications in relation to the four recommendations above. HRP’s Public Affairs / Public Relations Unit did advance a number of such initiatives as part of a Public Safety Communication Plan developed in collaboration with the HRP’s Public Safety Office and the RCMP. Beyond providing supportive activity for these two police services and carrying out its conventional public relations tasks, the Public Affairs / Public relations unit was much involved in HRP’s social media launching in 2009.

There is evidence that the police services and the Public Safety Office (PSO) did meet some of the four recommendations. A PSO Spotlight on Safety monthly report was widely circulated among designated stakeholders after 2009 and a social media initiative was inaugurated by the PSO in late 2011, essentially “A Spotlight on Safety” blog and associated Facebook and Twitter accounts which provided information and the possibilities of feedback and exchange. HRP also began to use its Youtube site to present crime prevention videos in late 2011 and made available an interactive “crime mapping site” where residents could examine crime patterns in their own and other areas of HRM. Other related PSO initiatives included the well-regarded “Don’t be that guy / Be more than a bystander” video and poster campaign carried out in collaboration with HRP Public Affairs, Avalon Centre, Byrony House and the NS Status of Women, and aimed at encouraging men to actively engage in reducing abusive attitudes and behaviours directed toward women. The PSO had limited resources within HRP (it did draw much on the voluntarism of HRP’s Public Affairs / Public Relations Unit) and could not easily tap into HRM’s resources or Public Relations expertise (one well-informed stakeholder commented that seeking resources from HRM Communications elicits the response “the PSO is 100% the responsibility of the HRPS”); accordingly, despite the Public Safety officer’s considerable activity and showing the public safety “flag” at numerous meetings and events, there was a significant shortfall with respect to the recommendations concerning communications strategy, social marketing and impacting the mainstream media. The extensive
interviewing and examination of documents in this Review clearly conveyed much consensus on that theme; the only qualification was that among the interviewees associated with the mainstream media, there was high praise for the Public Affairs / Public Relations Unit with respect to the dissemination of information such as police reports and public safety warning and for accessibility and responsiveness. Interestingly, there has been a significant stepping up of social marketing in HRM since the municipal election in the fall of 2012 but this has been apart from the HRP and the PSO and there has been little focus on violence and crime.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL MEDIA

The Timeline data below indicates that the major developments for violence and public safety concerns since the 2008 Roundtable report have focused around (a) the developments in social media, in Kaplan and Haelein’s words, “the growth of internet-based applications that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content”, social networking sites (SNSs) such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and so on; and (b) the reaction and adaptation to these developments among government leaders, Justice officials, mainstream media and the public; (c) specific developments related to the Public Safety Office.

The growth of these internet applications or social networking sites (SNSs) has been phenomenal, virtually all happening since the Roundtable ended seven years ago. Facebook has gone from a Harvard University–student-only SNS to, by March 2013, having 1.1 billion users world-wide, and, in Canada, being accessed by over 50% of all internet users. In HRM, for example, the HRP established a Facebook page and Twitter account in 2009 and by 2013 it was managing two official Facebook pages with more than 8,300 "likes" and three Twitter accounts with about 15,000 followers. The Public Safety Office embarked upon the social media trajectory in late 2011 “as a way to engage a broader audience in the public safety equation”; it maintains the Spotlight on Public Safety blog (http://spotlightonpublicsafety.com) as well as its Twitter account (twitter.com/HRMpublicsafety).

Along with this growth in social media has come “hot issues” where an incident goes viral (i.e., get widely distributed and commented upon by others’ posts locally and beyond) presumably because it touches a major societal nerve / concern, commands the attention of the mainstream media and demands response from government and Justice authorities. The Timeline illustrates the considerable attention and policy implications arising from two such incidents in HRM. The Rehtaeh Parsons’ suicide in 2013 reached the social media at a time when society was engrossed with bullying, especially among the young and in the school population, and becoming aware of the invasive power of the social media and its associated mobility which could capture incidents on smart phones and relay the images then and later to an unlimited audience; in the Parsons’ case, images of sexual activity at an alcohol-fuelled party were widely transmitted and public shaming accompanied allegations of sexual assault. The other major event, also in 2013, was the “rape chant” at Saint Mary’s
University’s Frosh orientation which was uploaded on Instagram and widely accessed; the 15-second chant discounted the significance of consent and celebrated having sex with underage girls. As the Timeline indicates, in the Parsons incident, there was quick response by the relevant authorities accompanied by new provincial legislation (the Cyber Safety Act) and a new enforcement unit established in the Department of Justice (the CyberScan Investigation Unit) as well as significant funds allocated to front-line, non-profit services and interest groups to assist their work against sexual assault and assisting its victims; the incident also led to a proposed change in criminal law on the part of the federal government, namely the introduction of Bill C-13 targeting social media with respect to the transmission / distribution of intimate images without consent. In the SMU incident, immediate corrective policies were introduced by university officials in addition to a commitment to follow through on recommendations brought forward by a council - headed by a local expert on bullying and related issues – established by the university to develop strategic plans to counter such behaviour; these recommendations, twenty in all, were delivered in a December 2013 report, just a few months after the incident.

It would be interesting to determine how significant the social media explosion has been for changing the great dependency of HRM adults on the mainstream media for obtaining information about crime and public safety and for the confidence that they place in such information. The large increase in accessing the SNSs and the increasing tendency for people, especially of course teenagers and young adults, to watch TV online and on demand, in a personalized programmed fashion would suggest there would be profound changes from the patterns found in the previous Roundtable surveys, especially much more utilization and reliance on the internet. At the same time, as Kimber and others have argued there remains a symbiotic relationship between the conventional mainstream media and the SNSs. The latter create bubbles of special interest items which the mainstream media sometimes picks up and makes more generally available, and presumably accords some greater credibility to them; if it did not pick up such items, the mainstream media would become increasingly irrelevant, so clearly there is symbiosis at work.

In the case of some internet sites, the number of “likes” and “followers” may not reflect much commitment; for example, the HRP Facebook page was “liked” by thousands and its Twitter feed was presumably followed by about 15,000 people as of October 2013, and reportedly, there were on daily average some 20 interactions from the public. The number of active users for any SNS is difficult to calculate, as one has to distinguish between different accounts, such as corporate and individual accounts, multiple and single accounts and so forth. In the case of these HRP’s internet applications, these data are unavailable but it is known that the most frequent subject matter for public interactions has focused around traffic matters. More generally, there are considerable
methodological challenges in determining the number of active social media users, challenges which often require human interface to detect and determine.

Still, there is no doubt that the growth of social media has resulted in deep societal change already and its future implications seem beyond experts’ grasp. Kimber states in his supplemental report that “we are in the middle of a continually evolving, often unsettling tectonic shift in the ways in which we understand, talk about and deal with everything, including violence and public safety.” Currie and Coughlan also contend that the social media, cyber revolution, does represent a paradigm shift from a legal perspective, enhancing conventional crimes, spawning new ones, generating a much wider net of offenders and victims, and greatly facilitating the mobilization of social pressure for quick policy and program response – appropriately worrisome for many commentators who emphasize that issues of cyber security may needlessly conflict with basic rights so more transparency is needed before they are shuffled off quickly to the “control people”. Assaults and harassments take on new features and libel and scams abound but so also do greater awareness of the issues, enhanced surveillance and criminal investigation, and greater possibilities of effective personalized crime prevention knowledge and strategies, not to speak of the many other wonderful benefits of the internet. These internet developments, perhaps on a scale comparable in societal impact to the automobile revolution, create opportunities and challenges with respect to violence and public safety and are now central to the latter’s agenda.

There is much evidence from the modest research carried out in this Review that the challenges are immense. For example, front-line school response officers (SROs), where many of the above problems seem most manifest, generally agreed that, as one SRO put it, “The internet is almost always where a problem either begins or ends”. The SROs agreed that the new technology and interactive technology are little understood by youth with regard to the legal/criminal implications and the permanency of posted materials. The internet posts were seen as generating pressures on authorities for a quickened pace of incident – response which translate into more complicated and demanding work for the SROs. Generally, the SROs noted the need for more resources (surprisingly, the number of SROs has been almost halved over the past several years) and for more training in SNSs and their implications for public safety and for police enforcement; as it is, some contended, the lack of training in the constantly evolving internet applications used by youth and the limited technology available to the SROs make it challenging indeed to confidently monitor and investigate online violence and public safety concerns. The social media challenge extends to the HRP as a whole since currently there are limited resources dedicated to the technology and development of social media use. HRP reportedly does not have any employee dedicated to social media; rather a few individuals in Public Affairs / Public Relations engage with the social
media as only a small part of their job. The Public Safety Office has limited resources at HRP for its social media thrusts and, being located in the police service, cannot draw on resources of the pertinent HRM bureaucracy. Of course as several elected HRM officials reported, social media can facilitate an incident going viral with attendant pressures on politicians to do something even when there is a dearth of data or what the politicians called a political vacuum; one senior elected official elaborated on that view commenting, “Policy then gets made on the fly since politicians hate a political vacuum”.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations of the Review, consistent with those offered by Kimber in the attached volume, are that more investment has to be made in achieving capacity in social media in HRP’s Public Affairs and PSO (if it remains where it is presently located) and in front-line policing as has been clearly demonstrated for the school response officers. The experience of the PSO from this social construction perspective clearly highlights the problems of it being located in one police service, charged with multiple responsibilities there but provided with meagre resources and unable to link up effectively with the resources and sophistication of the municipal bureaucracy exemplified in the latter’s social marketing initiatives; it is recommended that the PSO be relocated as suggested in the earlier Roundtable report and as highlighted in the section of this Review dealing with organizational changes. Responding effectively to the challenges of social media and garnering net benefit from it, requires more than an enforcement agenda; there are cultural issues to be dealt with, questions such as the advisability of what limitations on anonymity are socially acceptable, and a host of other important policy issues which impact on public safety (e.g., much of the damage of internet posts is done via anonymous “piling-on” comments or images). These are properly matters for the municipal government to consider.

References Cited:


Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haelein, Users of the world unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media. Business Horizons, Indiana University, 2010
TIMELINE - SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIOLENCE 2006-2013

2006

- Twitter, an online micro-blogging site, broadcasts its first 140-character message
- Facebook, launched in 2004 as a Harvard-student-only online social networking service, changes user policies, allowing anyone over the age of 13 with a valid email address to join the social networking site.

2007

- The first iPhone, capable of data communication, is released

2009

- First widespread use of Twitter among HRM residents during the Spryfield fires
- First widespread use of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube for political campaigning during NS provincial election
- Halifax Regional Police launch Facebook page and Twitter account. In 2013 it manages two official Facebook pages with more than 8,300 "likes" and three Twitter accounts with about 15,000 followers.

2010

- Instagram, an online photo and video sharing, social networking site, is launched

2011

- The Internet connects local activists to the global Occupy movement
- The Public Safety Office embarks upon Social Media in November as a way to engage a broader audience in the public safety equation. The Public Safety Office maintains the Spotlight on Public Safety blog (http://spotlightonpublicsafety.com) and the Public Safety Office Twitter account (twitter.com/HRMpublicsafety). In one year the blog reportedly had garnered 18,000 views.
- Halifax Regional Police launch YouTube channel with online crime prevention videos.
- Halifax Regional Police’s Public Relations Unit updates its Public Safety Communication Plan to support the Public Safety Office. The document outlines an ambitious agenda of “proposed vehicles” detailing for each the purpose, intended audience, responsibility, timeline and status. Eighteen of the thirty-three proposed vehicles were completed or on-going and fifteen were TBD (to-be-developed) or N/A (not applicable). Province appoints task force on Bullying and Cyber-Bullying

2012

- Widespread public mourning on social media after the murder of local activist Raymond Taavel goes viral; brings spotlight on Mental Health issues in the Criminal Justice System
- Report of the Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and Cyber-bullying is released.
• The PSO in collaboration with HRP Public Affairs, Avalon Centre, Byrony House and the NS Status of Women mounted the video/poster campaign “Don’t be that guy / Be more than a bystander” aimed at encouraging men to actively engage in reducing abusive attitudes and behaviours directed toward women.

2013

• Halifax Regional Police launch their public online crime-mapping tool and announce that it will become the first police service in Canada to make the police blotter public (i.e., providing information to the public on all calls for service)

• Local blogger draws attention to violence in the Downtown with a post about a violent incident he witnessed at The Carleton Nightclub where a bar staff and police were accused of using excessive force, in what has become informally known as “The Carleton Incident.” The story went viral and resulted in a review which found no wrongdoing on the part of staff or police

• The Rehtaeh Parsons assault (November 2011), attempted suicide and subsequent death (April 2013) case goes viral after her mother goes public with the story and starts a memorial Facebook page; global “hacktivism” organization Anonymous gets involved; brings spotlight on sexual assault and violence against women in Halifax

• NS Action Team on Sexual Violence and Bullying initiated by Department of Community Services in collaboration with the Advisory Council on the Status of Women, the Office of Policy and Priorities, and Communications Nova Scotia

• Avalon Sexual Assault Centre receives $100,000 in emergency funding to respond to increased need for service as a result of the online response from the Rehtaeh Parsons case

• Provincial Government announces additional $1 million in sexual assault services funding province-wide

• “Sexual Assault: safety, help and healing for teens in Nova Scotia” developed and released by the Nova Scotia Advisory Council on the Status of Women

• “Bullying & Cyberbullying: What We Need to Know” developed and released by Education and Early Childhood Development

• “Police Leaders Symposium on Bullying and Cyberbullying” hosted by Department of Justice

• New fee schedule in effect for physician examination of sexual assault victims, forensic collection, and physician testimony in sexual assault prosecutions

• “Speak Up! Anti-Bullying Leadership Conference” held

• Nova Scotia “Cyber-Safety Act” legislation is introduced and passed in the spring and proclaimed into force in August. Among other things it allows victims to seek help in identifying anonymous perpetrators, protecting themselves against such attacks and suing the offending party

• CyberScan province-wide investigative unit created to enforce Cyber-Safety Act and begins functioning in the Fall

• SMU “Rape Chant” incident goes viral via a 15 second video put on Instagram. It results in immediate actions (e.g., Presidential apology, compulsory sensitivity training for all students and resignation of the student union president). SMU set up a council headed by a local expert to develop recommendations and these, 20 in all, were delivered in a December 2013 report.
• Halifax Regional Police launch online “Re-envision Project”, surveying citizens on their thoughts about future directions of the Halifax Regional Police Service

• The federal government introduces Bill C-13 entailing criminal code changes targeting the social media with respect to the transmission / distribution of intimate images without consent

• As of March 2013, the Associated Press reports Facebook claimed 1.1 billion users worldwide and on an average day, the site has 665 million active users. The Internet World Statistics website, <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm> which gathers data from four global tracking sites reported in September 2012 that 83% of all Canadians are Internet users and that some 53% of Canadian internet users access Facebook

• As of December 2013 Twitter had over 55 million registered users with another 135,000 signing up every day. In 2013 reports (e.g., Peer Reach) conservatively indicated that Twitter was being used by 7% of all Canadian internet users while some put that penetration percentage at 15%

• Instagram now boasts more than 150 million actively monthly users and more than 16 billion photos shared
PART B: THE 2008 ROUNDTABLE DIMENSIONS UPDATED

THE MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION

INTRODUCTION

When the Roundtable was initiated in 2006, HRM had a public image as a comparatively violent metropolitan area where there were significant levels of “signal” crimes such as “swarmings” and alcohol-fueled violence and social disorder, especially in its core urban areas. That imagery actually mirrored well the high rates of such incidents in HRM compared to previous years and also when stacked up against other CMAs in Canada. In the five years preceding 2006 this pattern had become especially prominent despite the municipality having two large and well-regarded police services (i.e., the HRP and the RCMP) with quite credible records of response time and effective enforcement. Amalgamation in the mid-1990s had reduced significantly the municipalities’ mandated responsibilities in the social policy and services fields (Clairmont, 2008). This circumstance highlighted the question of what more the municipality could do to get at the roots of the violence and public safety concerns, what its mandate and policy options were, what its capacity was in these regards, and how it was and should be collaborating with other levels of government and community-based services and organizations in responding to the challenges. A major focus of the Roundtable was then not only to examine patterns of violence and public safety concerns but also to explore the above issues for the municipal government. A number of recommendations specific to organizational change and the municipal government’s role and capacity in ameliorating the root causes of violence and public safety concerns resulted from the Roundtable multi-dimensional and extensive research and consultation over a two year period (Clairmont, 2008). In this Review section the recommendations and the response to them over the past five years are examined as well as developments in policies and programs since 2008, and current initiatives and best practices from other CMAs across Canada.

In carrying out the above tasks the principal investigator worked closely with Kit Waters, former Director of Policy and Planning with the NS Department of Justice and currently consultant and part-time professor at Saint Mary’s University. Waters, who had also participated in the original Roundtable’s focus groups, took on responsibility for preparing the paper “Organizational changes in response to the Round Table Report” which is in Volume Two of the Review. The collaboration included preparing an outline of Review tasks for this dimension of the Review, developing interview guides for the interviews, joint interviews with a number of key stakeholders in municipal and provincial government, and individual interviews with a wide assortment of informed stakeholders. There were 70 different respondents interviewed, some on several occasions. Waters especially focused on kindred municipal developments in the rest of Canada and the experiences and
assessments of government bureaucrats in HRM and provincially, while the principal investigator focused on HRM’s elected officials and HRP officers; but there was significant overlap. There was always a thorough exchange of data and perspectives. Access was obtained to many documents, minutes and papers including minutes of the HRM’s Board of Police Commissioners which exercised oversight of the Public Safety office, papers and reports generated by the PSO, and other materials from diverse governmental sources in HRM and beyond (e.g., reports of HRP’s Public Affairs).

THE ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE RESPONSES
The priority recommendations of the Roundtable report, consistent with the position noted above, had to do with the role of the municipal government and the organizational changes that could enhance municipal capacity in this area of violence and public safety. There were essentially the seven recommendations presented below with capitalized capsule assessment of their realization,

1. HRM Municipality should play a greater role in dealing with violence and public safety along three dimensions – vision and leadership, capacity building in the administration, and advocating for resources. UNTIL 2013 THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF THIS OUTCOME.

2. A priority response should be the engagement of a full-time Public Safety Coordinator heading a PSO, functioning as a “business unit” (i.e., responsibilities and budget) linked to Mayor’s office and with a broadly-based advisory committee. THE PSO WAS ESTABLISHED, BUT AS PART OF THE HRP, WITHOUT A BUDGET OR AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND WITH MINIMAL CONNECTION TO THE MAYOR’S OFFICE OR MUNICIPAL BUREAUCRACY.

3. The task of the PS coordinator should initially be the development of a strategic action plan (SAP) addressing the violence and public safety concerns and encouraging the establishment of a tripartite committee (i.e., including representatives from the municipal, provincial, and federal governments) for a three year period to consider violence and public safety issues in areas such as housing and offender reintegration. AFTER AN INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS WAS DEVELOPED AND ADOPTED BY COUNCIL IN 2009, A SAP WAS DEVELOPED BY THE PSO IN 2011 BUT TO LITTLE AVAIL GIVEN ITS LIMITED OPERATIONAL VALUE AND THE APPARENT LACK OF INTEREST BY HRP, THE POLICE BOARD AND THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

4. To be an effective collaborator with the senior levels of government, the municipality must bring something to the table in terms of expertise on local public safety issues, strategic planning and commitment; “regaining” the municipal charter for the amalgamated HRM could help in this regard. THE CHARTER WAS REGAINED BUT, ASIDE FROM THE SHORT-TERM SAFER, STRONGER COMMUNITY INITIATIVE FOCUSED ON ONE PUBLIC HOUSING MILIEU, THERE WAS LITTLE COLLABORATION
WITH OTHER ORDERS OF GOVERNMENT ON ISSUES OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL DISORDER AND THE PSO WAS NOT A MECHANISM FOR SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.

5. HRM should become an active participant in the national Municipal Network on Crime Prevention and in networks among cities that are engaged in dealing with violence, fostering public safety and examining best practices. THE PSO DID ADVANCE THIS RECOMMENDATION. HRM IS A MEMBER OF THE MUNICIPAL NETWORK.

6. HRM should respond to Public Health and other provincial initiatives directed at violence and public safety (e.g., Provincial Alcohol Strategy) which have indicated a desire to form partnerships with the municipal government. THERE WAS SOME MODEST COLLABORATION FACILITATED BY THE PSO AND BY OTHER BUSINESS UNITS OF HRM.

7. The municipality should examine ways to deal more effectively and more inclusively with the African Nova Scotian population and communities, re-configuring or replacing the committee, Community and Race Relations, examining HRM staffing strategies and partnering with local Black leaders and the other levels of government to reduce the highly disproportionate rates of victimization and offending among Blacks. IN 2012 THE AFRICAN NOVA SCOTIAN AFFAIRS INTEGRATION OFFICE WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION OF HRM.

The evidence presented below and the Waters’ paper in Volume Two support the capsule assessments. The shortfall concerning realization of the priority objectives that can be linked to the PSO is largely a function of the location of the office within HRP and not attributable to the public safety officer for whom most stakeholders concerned with violence and public safety expressed praise for what was accomplished under the circumstances. Subsequent to the municipal election in 2012 there have been significant indications of the municipality adopting a much more active bent in developing partnerships with the provincial government and community organizations in matters related to the roots of violence and social disorder (e.g., race issues, homelessness and neighbourhood security).

ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES TIMELINE

The timeline data indicate that the municipal government’s focus on the Roundtable recommendations was largely confined to actions taken within a year of the Roundtable report being issued. In 2009 the HRM municipal charter was “regained” with implicit possibilities for an expansion of the municipal mandate in various areas, including those that might be important to get at the roots of violence and social disorder in HRM (e.g., housing). A public safety action plan – labeled Partnering for Public Safety - was quickly put together in February 2009 with input from the various municipal departments on any of the 64 recommendations pertinent to their respective responsibilities, and a month later the HRM Public Safety Office was in place, headed by an HRP
superintendent and located at the HRP headquarters. Subsequently, HRM’s PSO became in effect HRP’s PSO. The funding for the PS officer came (via agreement between the province and HRP) from the provincial Boots-on-the-Street program and consequently the establishment of the PSO cost the municipality nothing. No evidence could be found that the HRM public safety action plan was ever substantially implemented. No audit of the SAP was produced for the HRM Police Board by the PSO. No unambiguous reference to the action plan was found in the Board’s minutes nor was any PSO reference made to it when PSO achievements were listed. Interview materials support the Timeline data in the conclusion that the HRM bureaucracy and the PSO in HRP were rarely collaborators in initiatives and policy directed at violence and public safety. There were indications of a significant change in that pattern in 2013 as several positions publicly advanced by the mayor pointed to a more engaged Mayor and Council partnering with others in matters such as Housing and staking out a claim for more collaboration with the provincial government over a wide area of policy (see the Timeline below for details).

There were two earlier HRM actions during the post-Roundtable period that were salient for the Roundtable recommendations, namely the municipal involvement in the long-term Youth Advocate Program, targeting high-risk, young teens, which began while the Roundtable was in progress, was funded for five years on a 50-50 basis between HRM and the federal NCPC, and operated under HRM’s Community and Recreational Services. Funded solely by HRM since 2011, the program was shifted to the PSO in 2013. The other initiative was HRM’s establishment of the Manager of African Nova Scotian Affairs position in 2012 which was a consequence of HRM’s Africville Agreement but also advocated by the ad-hoc race relations subcommittee of the PSO.

The Timeline data indicates that the PSO was involved in a wide range of initiatives dealing with the roots of violence and public safety. Much involvement consisted of publicizing and lending encouragement to activities that were carried out by the essentially independent units re-deployed to its administrative umbrella (e.g., the Safe Corridor initiative in 2009 and the CFMH program in 2012, both by the HRP Community Response Team) or by other HRP Units (e.g., the Safer, Stronger Communities initiative in 2009, the Uptown Drug Intervention program and Dalhousie Restorative Justice program, both in 2012). There were several initiatives for which the PSO was largely responsible (e.g. Social Media initiatives and “Don’t Be That Guy” campaign, both in 2012), and others where its partnership was reportedly important for the activity’s implementation (e.g., the Pixels for Pistols Gun Amnesty in 2009 and Community Forum on the Culture of Alcohol in 2012). It is evident too that significant PSO activity involved meetings and committee work where important collaborative networks were advanced even while it is difficult to assess the PSO’s contribution to a specific outcome that impacted on violence and public safety (e.g., the ad-hoc committees on race relations and housing in 2009). The PSO’s
Strategic Action Plan prepared in 2011 could have been a milestone event but fell much short of providing a meaningful operational map for its future activity (see Waters’ paper in Volume Two, pp11-12 for further discussion of the plan and its impact), and, in any event, it apparently generated little attention from the HRP and the Police Board, let alone the municipal government’s bureaucracy.

The Timeline indicates too that non-governmental bodies mounted several valuable initiatives directed at violence and public safety, such as the United Way’s 2007-2010 multi-year Vibrant Neighbourhood Strategy in North Dartmouth, and the Spring Garden Road Business Association’s on-going Navigator program begun in 2007 providing needed services to ex-inmates and other high risk, often homeless persons. The provincial Department of Justice, in addition to its very significant Boots on the Street funding to HRM’s two police services, directed initiatives such as the Dalhousie RJ program in 2012 and Cure Violence in 2013 (see the Timeline entries below for details).

THREE KEY COMPONENTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

The principal components of organizational change at the municipal government level to effect less violence and more public safety in HRM, are in 2014, as in 2008, an effective PSO, a major partnership with the Black community to enhance inclusion and reduce the significant high level of victimization and offending among Blacks, and an increased municipal capacity and collaboration with the provincial and federal governments and community organizations to get at the roots of the problems. Accordingly, it is useful to examine these components in more detail.

THE PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICE

As discussed above in the examination of the implementation of the 2008 Roundtable recommendations and the analyses of Timeline data on selected developments since 2008, the PSO has clearly not been the mechanism of organizational change and strategic action planning in responding to violence and public safety as had been hoped for. Initiatives undertaken by the PSO were basically self-initiated; there was little direction or support provided; a PSO staff member explained that there was little direction from HRP or the Municipality and any interaction with “the higher-ups” focused on the here and now, an immediate incident, not the long-term or big-picture. As Waters shows in her paper (page 8), the PSO officer also did not receive any significant strategic direction from the Police Board, though here it is unclear whether such a role was expected of the Board.

A very strong consensus among the diverse stakeholders interviewed in the Review was that the PSO was not located properly and it would have been much more effective if it had been positioned within the municipal
bureaucracy as recommended in 2008. In her cross-jurisdictional research of such mechanisms in large Canadian urban areas Waters (pp 5-10) found that HRM was unique in having its PSO positioned within the municipal police service. The usual pattern was to link the PSO with overall municipal oversight, namely the CAO or an equivalent. Partnership with the police service was always considered to be critically important but, for the most part, it was to achieve an arms-length relationship with policing that led to PSOs being established in the first place.

In the interviews with HRM elected officials, most respondents acknowledged that they had little knowledge about the PSO’s activities and achievements and that the conventional constraints on the relationship between politicians and policing inhibited communications. Even those councilors serving on the HRM Police Board professed little awareness of the PSO beyond, as one stated, “the PSO being largely engaged in P.R. for HRP regarding crime prevention”. One senior elected official expressed the common views of the councilors, emphasizing the need to bring the PSO into the municipal bureaucracy, linked up with mayor and council for overall policy development and transparency but accountable to the CAO. They envisioned the PSO taking a broader perspective on public safety issues, being a repository for information and best practices on violence and public safety, and through participating and collaborating with other orders of government and the community, facilitating the involvement of other business units with a role to play in community safety. The partnership with the police services was deemed crucial but the elected officials considered the appropriate PSO role to be a step removed from direct conventional crime prevention and more one of addressing the broader social determinants of violence and public safety.

The several provincial officials in the Department of Justice who were interviewed appeared to share a similar perspective about the PSO. They observed that there had been some collaboration with the PSO but overall it has been minimal and largely confined to the PSO’s blogs and conventional police programming. There was consensus that the PSO should be positioned more in keeping with the 2008 Roundtable recommendations; as one senior official stated, the best way to proceed is for the municipality to identify specific actions and strategies and then discuss possible initiatives and costs with the province; in order to be effective at doing that, HRM would need a capacity for analyses of data and trends, exploring best practices and so forth and these should be the functions of the PSO, not managing directly or indirectly extant HRP crime prevention programs.

Perhaps surprisingly, the above perspectives were also strongly and widely shared by the police officers in the two police services and especially senior HRP officers and those involved in the PSO. Typically, they argued forcefully for the PSO being positioned outside the police service and having a high profile in the municipal bureaucracy. They usually suggested that, given the training and experience required, the PS officer should be a
civilian, having a wider and more long-term vision focused on general issues, working with the provincial and federal levels of government, community organizations and the police service. The diverse units administered under the PSO banner usually also shared the general perspective of the PSO being better positioned in the municipal bureaucracy. Most of these respondents indicated that the net value added from their being associated with the PSO was limited since the relationship with the PSO was not operational but more a paper shuffle with nominal supervision and a few informational sessions with the PSO; so the impact for them of a re-positioning of the PSO outside HRP would be minimal.

The very few respondents among elected officials and police officers who spoke in favour of the current positional context for the PSO contended that a move away from direct police administration could result in the politicization of the PSO but they usually added that if it remained with HRP, there would have to be some change in the way the Police Board provides oversight to it.

AFRICAN NOVA SCOTIAN AFFAIRS INTEGRATION OFFICE

As noted above in discussing the Roundtable recommendations and the response to them, the ANSAIO became operational in the fall of 2012, within the Government Relations and External Affairs Division of HRM. Its establishment was primarily as an outcome of the Africville Agreement but also was congruent with the Roundtable recommendation (i.e., #7 above) and with its elaboration by the PSO-coordinated, ad-hoc Consultative Committee on Race Relation in 2009-2010 (see Waters p31-32 for details). The Africville Agreement provided a general mandate for the ANSAIO (i.e., “providing leadership, strategic direction, policy advice and expertise to all parts of the [HRM] organization to strengthen the delivery of municipal services to residents and communities of African descent within HRM”). Over the past year the manager of the ANSAIO has settled into her role, engaged in community consultations with Black communities in HRM and explored issues and possible networks within the HRM bureaucracy as well as meeting with Council and senior HRM leaders (i.e., Mayor, CAO). The essential tasks have been to elaborate and specify its general mandate and determine how best they can be realized in the municipal government. A more finalized SAP is in progress.

As has been indicated in several sections of this Review – especially the section on variations in violence and victimization – the over-representation of African Nova Scotians, whether as victims or offenders of violence and public safety concerns at the individual and community levels, remains very significant as reported in the 2008 Roundtable. It has to be a priority of the PSO and the ANSAIO in collaboration (see Waters, pp 33-34). In addition to the supportive statistical data, interviews with HRM elected officials and several leaders in the HRM African Nova Scotian community have generally expressed a similar position, namely that reducing the overrepresentation in violence and enhancing public safety should be a priority while acknowledging the
broader mandate in the Africville Agreement. Among the elected officials there have been four central themes concerning the ANSAIO, namely (a) it is a work in progress; (b) its core functions need clarification; (c) there should be priority given to reducing the overrepresentation as victims and offenders; (d) there should be a strong link and collaborative relationship with the PSO.

The Black leaders interviewed, whether police officers, leaders in Public Housing complexes, or church ministers, strongly emphasized the need to focus on the reduction of violence and the over-representation of Blacks as victims and offenders. One minister commented that his biggest surprise in recently accepting a ministry in HRM was that violence in the community was so routine it did not generate the attention it would have in his home area. A long-time leader in Mulgrave Park Public Housing emphasized “the biggest issue here is safety and the biggest safety issue is violence not property crime”. Police officers and faith ministers stressed the need to draw attention to the over-representation problem. There is no doubt that getting at the roots of violence and over-representation involves dealing with housing (e.g., Blacks disproportionately live in public housing) and employment issues and minimizing the impact of the legacy effects of racism and marginalization. There may be a variety of ways for ANSAIO to bring attention to the broad mandate reflected in the Africville Agreement; one way, suggested by a veteran provincial government official, might be to liaise with an HRM African Nova Scotian Senior Staff Round Table that might be established as a forum for discussion and coordination of issues pertinent for African Nova Scotians in HRM.

THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: CAPACITY, PARTNERSHIPS AND COLLABORATION

The interviews conducted with the elected HRM officials indicated a significant change from similar interviews done for the Roundtable in 2006-2008. There was much less sense of an overarching constraint due to a limited formal mandate in conjunction with the responsibility of provincial funding. Certainly these factors (i.e., formal mandate and resources / responsibilities) were acknowledged but there was also a conviction that HRM can hardly back away when serious issues for improving the lives of its citizens are involved and thus carving out an appropriate involvement via partnership and collaboration is important. The reorganization of HRM – the smaller council, new mayor and CAO – and perhaps the “reclaimed” charter, appear to have sparked a more activist municipal government, reflected for example in the 2013 Council’s 15 to 0 decision to formally participate in a coalition attacking issues of homelessness and affordable housing. Council reportedly considered it a moral obligation to address issues such as building affordable homes, helping the working poor and also people without permanent places to live. Other members of coalition included the United Way Halifax, AHANS, private sector interests and of course the provincial government. United Way Halifax had sent a letter to the
Mayor urging HRM’s participation and the Mayor responded enthusiastically noting “housing is integral to what we do”.

Perhaps a factor in the changing ambience at City Hall is growing sensitivity to the trends in demographics and the economy that increasing mark off HRM from the other municipalities in Nova Scotia. The four tables below capture the demographic trends. While the rates of growth in both Nova Scotia and HRM were quite modest between 2008 and 2012 (every county in Nova Scotia including HRM experienced a decline in the size of the 0 to 14 age cohort over that period), the rate has been greater for HRM which now accounts for 44% of the provincial population. HRM has been garnering virtually all of recent population growth while the other areas consistently are showing declining and more rapidly aging populations. Not shown in the tables is the fact that between 2006 and 2012, all counties in Nova Scotia, save HRM (+7.5%) and Colchester (+2.2), showed population decline. Table 4.3 indicates that net migration has been negative for Nova Scotia every year between 2007 and 2011 while consistently positive (albeit modestly) for HRM. Table 4.4 indicates that HRM has over 60% of the Black population in Nova Scotia and over 80% of the visible minority population (most immigrants to Nova Scotia, increasingly Asian and Middle-Eastern, reside in HRM). The concentration of the Nova Scotia economy in HRM has increasingly spurted (now 72%). HRM is also set apart from the rest of the province in terms of its violence, gangs and what sociologists refer to as its deviance service centers (i.e., drugs, prostitution). As discussed elsewhere in the Review, HRM is the major receiving area in Nova Scotia for ex-inmates, troubled youths and the homeless because provincial services and non-profit initiatives are concentrated here; of course it is also the major receiving area for out-of-province post-secondary students and immigrants. The above socio-demographic features require an active society, gathering and processing information and contributing to the development of appropriate social policies and programs.

A large majority of the elected officials interviewed for this Review contended that the municipal government has to and can play a larger role in getting at the roots of violence and public safety concerns. Indeed there appears to be almost total consensus, with the proviso, strongly emphasized by some, that “do it without being defined as an equal funding partner”. As Waters comments in her paper (p.7), “Concern was expressed by many Councillors regarding the lack of coordination and planning among all levels of government on issues that have a bearing on community safety; such as housing, design of public spaces, recreation and programs for youth. The Councillors stated that other levels of government must be brought to the table, as responsibility for addressing some of the root causes of crime does not fall within the purview of the Municipality. Councillors noted that the Municipality must be a ‘player’ in the development of a strategy to address community safety issues, but the
challenge is to avoid being defined as an equal funding partner for specific issues outside the mandate of the Municipality and for which it has no resources”.

There is a strongly-held conviction then among the elected officials that HRM has to become more engaged in partnerships with the other levels of government and the private and non-profit sectors in order to deal with the causes and roots of violence and public safety which in addition to their intrinsic value may also be crucial for a continuing strong economy and a vibrant culture in HRM. There was a common concern about the lack of coordination and planning among all levels of government regarding issues that have a significant bearing on public safety. There appears to be much agreement with the reported comments of the Mayor (Metro September 10, 2013) “The municipality has to be at the provincial table ... greater involvement in policy making and strategic planning in the next four years is a concern that “overarches” other priorities [that he discussed with the leaders of the political parties during the provincial election campaign]”.

References Cited:

Unlike in the 2006-2008 Roundtable research, there was no review of the literature on municipal governance carried out in this Review. There was some consultation with local experts such as Professor Jack Novack of Henson College, Dalhousie University but the emphasis was on in-depth interviews with key HRM stakeholders and key informants in other Canadian municipalities. The principal investigator focused on HRM officials and political leaders, police officers at all levels with ties to the PSO, and provincial bureaucrats, while Professor Waters focused on the experiences of other municipalities, provincial authorities and members of the HRM Police Board. There was much overlap in conducting interviews and occasionally interviews were jointly carried out.
### TABLE 4.1 - POPULATION ESTIMATES* BY AGE GROUP IN NOVA SCOTIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-17</td>
<td>179685 (19%)</td>
<td>176625 (19%)</td>
<td>174331 (19%)</td>
<td>171732 (18%)</td>
<td>169199 (18%)</td>
<td>166126 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>86660 (9%)</td>
<td>87481 (9%)</td>
<td>88228 (9%)</td>
<td>88587 (9%)</td>
<td>88575 (9%)</td>
<td>86653 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-49</td>
<td>324513 (35%)</td>
<td>321222 (34%)</td>
<td>318650 (34%)</td>
<td>315004 (33%)</td>
<td>309847 (33%)</td>
<td>302817 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>202215 (22%)</td>
<td>206560 (22%)</td>
<td>211180 (22%)</td>
<td>215275 (23%)</td>
<td>216936 (23%)</td>
<td>218304 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>142792 (15%)</td>
<td>146306 (16%)</td>
<td>149684 (16%)</td>
<td>153871 (16%)</td>
<td>160504 (17%)</td>
<td>166889 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-17</td>
<td>75072</td>
<td>74289</td>
<td>73896</td>
<td>73274</td>
<td>72539</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>41158</td>
<td>42111</td>
<td>42968</td>
<td>42388</td>
<td>44264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-49</td>
<td>151718</td>
<td>152713</td>
<td>154227</td>
<td>155474</td>
<td>155787</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>77229</td>
<td>79558</td>
<td>81856</td>
<td>83906</td>
<td>85171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>47871</td>
<td>49496</td>
<td>51192</td>
<td>53220</td>
<td>55949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL AGES</td>
<td>393048</td>
<td>398167</td>
<td>404139</td>
<td>409662</td>
<td>413710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Postcensal estimates are based on the latest census counts adjusted for census net undercoverage (CNU) (including adjustment for incompletely enumerated Indian reserves (IEIR)) and the components of demographic growth that occurred since that census. Intercensal estimates are based on postcensal estimates and census counts adjusted of the censuses preceding and following the considered year. Population estimates for July 1 are final intercensal from 1996 to 2005, final postcensal from 2006 to 2009, updated postcensal for 2010 and 2011 and preliminary postcensal for 2012.

Source: Statistics Canada. Table 051-0046 - Estimates of population by census metropolitan area, sex and age group for July 1, based on the Standard Geographical Classification (SGC) 2006, annual (persons)
TABLE 4.3 - POPULATION MIGRATION MOVEMENT ESTIMATES, HRM & NS, 2007-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN-MIGRATION</td>
<td>16,461</td>
<td>11,449</td>
<td>15,618</td>
<td>11,417</td>
<td>15,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUT-MIGRATION</td>
<td>13,254</td>
<td>14,361</td>
<td>12,361</td>
<td>13,190</td>
<td>11,711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 111-0027 – Provincial and international in-, out- and net-migration estimates by provincial regions annual

TABLE 4.4 - VISIBLE MINORITY POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL POP</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
<th>OTHER VISIBLE MINORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOVA SCOTIA</td>
<td>906,175</td>
<td>858900 (94.8%)</td>
<td>20790 (2.3%)</td>
<td>26485 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALIFAX</td>
<td>384,523</td>
<td>349478 (90.8%)</td>
<td>13780 (3.6%)</td>
<td>21265 (5.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Aboriginal Identity population numbers for HRM are: 6810 (1.8%) First ethnic identity is Aboriginal; 540 (.1%) Registered or Treaty Natives; 15,827 (4.1%) claiming Aboriginal Ancestry.

Source: NS Department of Finance, Community Counts, National Household Survey

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are quite consistent with those advanced in 2008 and also congruent with those suggested by Waters in her paper in Volume Two of this Review (pp 26-34):

1. HRM Municipality should play a greater role in dealing with the causes and roots of violence and public safety along three dimensions – vision and leadership, capacity building in the administration, and partnering and collaborating with the other orders of government, the private sector and the non-profit societies.

2. The public safety office should be moved from its current location within the HRPS to the HRM municipal bureaucracy, linked with the Executive Standing Committee of Regional Council (for policy and strategy direction), and operationally responsible to the CAO. The priorities for the PSO should reflect in part the substantive recommendations of the Review and focus on strategic analyses and municipal collaboration as specified above. The PSO should be appropriately staffed with sufficient capacity to realize these objectives, See Waters’ elaboration of the specific objectives that should be assigned to the PSO (Waters, p 27).

3. The office of the manager of the ANSAIO should remain where it currently is with defined functions and a priority to respond to the continuing over-representation of blacks as offenders and victims in collaboration with the relocated PSO. The delineated responsibilities of the position should facilitate working with the other HRM business units, annually reporting to council through a standing committee and having a significant presence in the HRM bureaucracy perhaps in liaison with an HRM African Nova Scotian Senior Staff Round Table meeting quarterly or an equivalent mechanism. An advisory
committee should be considered only in relation to specific policy thrusts. The location and functions of the ANSAIO position should be reviewed after three years.
TIMELINE - SELECTED PSO AND MUNICIPAL ACTIVITIES, 2008-2013

(This timeline includes only events or policies / programs where the PSO had a principal role in an important event or a policy / program occurred directly impacting on the Roundtable recommendations or the PSO. It does not include numerous adhoc meetings or endeavors or committee work.)

Spring/Summer 2008

- The Roundtable Report is received by HRM Council
- Spring Garden Road Business Association launches its Navigator Program, a major and continuing program working with the homeless, ex-inmates, group home “grads” and others, linking them to agencies and services.

Winter/Spring 2009

- HRM Charter is regained.
- A Public Safety Action Plan in response to the Roundtable Report, developed by a working group at HRM led by the then Chief of the Halifax Regional Police, is adopted by Council. The report identified a champion, strategies, timelines and resources for each of the Roundtable recommendations.
- The Public Safety Office is created. HRP Superintendent Don Spicer is appointed HRM Public Safety Officer and the position is funded under the provincial “Boots on the Street” initiative. HRP redeploy several existing resources to the new office (School Officers, Crime Prevention Unit, Volunteer Services, Victim Services, HRM Community Response Team, Citywatch, Integrated Traffic Unit, an administrative assistant and officers seconded to the Mental Health Mobile Crisis Team).

Summer 2009

- The HRM Community Response Team leads a Safe Walking Corridor working group made up of representatives from HRM, Councillors, Dalhousie and Saint Mary’s Universities in assessing the walking corridors from the downtown core to the universities using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles. Trees were trimmed, lighting was improved and a brochure was provided to all residents along those routes.
- Monthly “Spotlight on Public Safety” reports begin to be submitted by the Public Safety Officer to the HRM Board of Police Commissioners which was designated to serve an additional role as the HRM Public Safety Committee.

Fall 2009

- The Safer, Stronger Communities partnership involving various municipal and provincial government departments aimed at reducing criminal activity and addressing root causes of crime in specific communities with community-based action plans revises its mandate to complement the HRM Public Safety Initiative. The Safer, Stronger Communities program focused on the Uniacke Public Housing complex.
- The Public Safety Office participates in an Ad-hoc Working Group on Race Relations. Regular participants were the PSO, three African Nova Scotia leaders and the author of the Roundtable Report. The group work leads to recommendations to the Mayor’s Office that included the creation of a race-
relation committee and contributed to the creation of HRM’s Office of African Nova Scotian Affairs and reparations being made regarding the long standing issues involving Africville.

- The Pixels for Pistols Gun Amnesty occurs. Through a partnership with Henry’s Camera, the program saw citizens receive a digital camera in exchange for turning in an unwanted firearm. The month-long HRM-wide program saw over 1,000 firearms and 10,000 rounds of ammunition turned into police.

- The Public Safety Office participates in an AD-Hoc Working Group on Housing. The group included the PSO, the author of the Roundtable Report, Vice-president Killam Properties, Director of CAH, representatives from DCS and HRM’s Community Development, and Phoenix House for Youths. It met several times and helped form future networks advocating for the reduction of homelessness and more affordable housing.

**Spring/Summer 2010**

- The Safer Communities Committee comprised of pastors and members from the African Nova Scotian community, HRP Chief of Police, Officer-in-Charge of Halifax District RCMP, and HRM Public Safety Officer, is established to engage the African Nova Scotian community in addressing public safety-related matters.

- Recognizing that sports can help target risk factors for anti-social behavior, HRP SportsPals is launched. This annual one-day sport camp for youth who might not otherwise have the opportunity to participate in sport serves as an important pathway for personal/social development.

- The PSO participates in an AD-Hoc Committee on Offender Reintegration which meets several times over the next year. The regular participants included the PSO, the author of the Roundtable Report, the Executive Director of the John Howard Society of Nova Scotia, a representative from provincial Corrections, a representative from the federal NCPC, the Director of the SGRBA, and Mi’kmaq and Black service providers for federal inmates.

- United Way Halifax’s Vibrant Neighbourhood Strategy, 2007-2010, in two North Dartmouth neighbourhood ends. Assessment reports stated that it contributed to the development of community capacity to deal with issues in one neighbourhood but much less so in the other.

**Fall 2010**

- In October 2010, the “Halifax Connects with the Homeless” initiative was launched aimed at the “level three” homeless. It has become an annual one day event in HRM drawing roughly 500 homeless people and a large contingent of service providers and volunteers. Hairdressers cut and style hair, portraits are taken, doctors examine feet, information is provided on extant services, and a hot lunch is served with tablecloths and silverware.

**Winter/Spring 2011**

- The Public Safety Strategic Plan is presented to HRM Board of Police Commissioners in April providing a list of events and activities for addressing public safety in our community.

**Fall 2011**

- The Public Safety Office embarks upon Social Media in November as a way to engage a broader audience in the public safety equation. The Public Safety Office maintains the Spotlight on Public Safety
blog [http://spotlightonpublicsafety.com](http://spotlightonpublicsafety.com) and the Public Safety Office Twitter account (twitter.com/HRMpublicsafety). Shortly afterwards, online crime prevention videos are also launched by Halifax Regional Police.

### Spring/Summer 2012

- The Crime Free Multi-Housing Program (CFMH) designed to help apartment owners, residents and police work together to keep illegal and nuisance activity off rental properties begins in HRM. It is the first of its kind in Nova Scotia and is a joint initiative of Halifax District RCMP, Halifax Regional Police and the Atlantic Coordinating Committee on Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Subsequently, a seniors’ residence in Northend Halifax, described as “affordable independent living” and operated by Northwood Properties, becomes the first formally credentialized such complex in Nova Scotia.

- The Don’t Be That Guy / Be More Than a Bystander Campaigns are launched to coincide with Sexual Assault Awareness Month, striving to help create a culture that stands up against abusive attitudes and behaviours directed towards women early on, before they’ve had the chance to escalate to violence. HRP partners with Avalon Centre, Bryony House, NS Advisory Council on the Status of Women, and Transition House Association of Nova Scotia on the ‘Don’t be that guy poster’ campaign, and works with influential men in our community on the video campaign to encourage men to ‘Be more than a bystander.’

- Through a partnership with Addiction Services and community partners, the HRP Public Safety Officer co-hosted a Community Forum on the Culture of Alcohol in HRM. More than 40 participants, including concerned citizens and representatives from municipal and provincial government, took part in a world café event that identified concerns and solutions for alcohol-related issues in HRM.

- The Dalhousie Restorative Justice Pilot Project is launched in September. This partnership between HRP police, NS Department of Justice and Dalhousie University provides an opportunity for students involved in Liquor Control Act and minor criminal offences to be diverted from the court system and take part in a restorative justice model that seeks to repair the harms to community and modify the students’ offending behavior.

### Fall 2012

- HRM hires a Manager for HRM African Nova Scotian Affairs to provide advice to HRM on the further establishment of what becomes the new African Nova Scotian Affairs Integration Office.

- Superintendent Spicer retires. HRP Sergeant Scott MacDonald is appointed interim HRM Public Safety Officer. Remaining HRP resources in the Public Safety Office are redeployed to various other HRP managers.

- The Uniacke Drug Market Intervention Pilot Project is launched in December. This partnership between police and many community partners gives street level drug dealers a chance to turn their lives around by entering life/job skills training instead of facing criminal charges. Four men successfully complete the program during the pilot phase.

### Winter/Spring 2013

- HRM Crime Mapping is launched as an interactive online site providing citizens with contextual and timely information about crime in HRM. The site, accessible at [www.halifax.ca/Police/PublicSafety/HRMCrimeMapping.html](http://www.halifax.ca/Police/PublicSafety/HRMCrimeMapping.html), is updated daily at 12:15 a.m. and plots
incidents of five specific crime types – robberies, assaults, break and enters, thefts of vehicles and thefts from vehicles – on a map of HRM.

- The HRM Youth Advocate Program (YAP), a neighborhood-based intervention program targeting youth between the ages of 9 to 14 years who are at risk of, or involved in, criminal activity and gangs received ongoing municipal funding since federal funding ended in 2011. In 2013 the full YAP budget is transferred to the HRM Public Safety Office under the jurisdiction of the HRM Board of Police Commissioners. HRM Community and Recreation Services staff continues to operate the program as an internal HRM service provider to the PSO and Halifax Regional Police.

- The Girls United program is launched for girls ages 12-14 who face a number of gender-based risk factors which may lead them to be more vulnerable to sexual abuse, prostitution and drug use. Coordinated by HRM’s Youth Advocate Program and funded through a provincial crime prevention grant, the program involves a series of experiential learning modules delivered by a wide range of partners and is designed to help girls develop the resiliency and self-reliance they need to succeed.

**Summer/Fall 2013**

- HRP realigns resources. Sergeant MacDonald is promoted to Staff Sergeant and most of the originally deployed HRP resources again fall under the HRM Public Safety Office (The HRP Mounted Unit is added while Traffic, administrative support and Mobile Mental Health do not return).

- HRM’s Youth Advocate Program embarks on the Souls Strong project. With National Crime Prevention Centre funding, HRM’s Youth Advocate Program will be delivering a wraparound support model to an older aged group over the next five years in the community of North Preston.

- The Public Safety Office, in conjunction with NS Department of Justice, Halifax Community Justice Society and community partners collaborates on an NCPC-supported Cure Violence (formerly Ceasefire Chicago) initiative in HRM. The model is based on a public health approach to violence prevention and is under the leadership and administrative responsibility of the NS Department of Justice.

- HRM Mayor interviewed in the course of the provincial election campaign (Metro Sept 10, 2013) is quoted as saying “the municipality has to be at the provincial table” adding that in his discussions with party leaders he emphasized a request for greater involvement in policy making and strategic planning in the next four years, a concern he stated that “overarches” other priorities for HRM.

- HRM council approves, by a vote of 15 to 0, formal participation in a coalition attacking issues of homelessness and affordable housing. Council reportedly considered it a moral obligation to address issues such as building affordable homes, helping the working poor and also people without permanent places to live. Other members of coalition included the United Way Halifax, AHANS, private sector interests and of course the provincial government. United Way Halifax had sent a letter to the Mayor urging HRM’s participation and the Mayor responded enthusiastically noting “housing is integral to what we do”. The newly announced initiative, coordinated by the United Way Halifax, aims to solve the chronic homelessness problem in 5 years.
THE DOWNTOWN

INTRODUCTION

The Downtown was a central focus of the Roundtable in 2006 to 2008. Well-publicized violence (assaults and homicides) as well as frequent “signal” crimes, such as swarmings, and social disorder incidents associated with excessive alcohol consumption, generated serious concern for public safety. Much data were gathered largely from the HRP, many interviews were conducted with a wide assortment of stakeholders and there were focus group sessions held among representatives from diverse interest groups. Professor Murphy conducted much of that research, chaired the focus group and wrote a major paper on the situation. In updating the data, examining the outcomes for the Roundtable recommendations, and exploring the issues now bearing on violence and public safety in the Downtown, a similar variety of methodologies were utilized and Professor Murphy again took responsibility for being the Lead and preparing a paper on the Downtown dimension of the Review; his paper, “Downtown HRM: Then and Now” is in Volume Two. The principal investigator and Professor Murphy collaborated closely in examining the Downtown dimension, sharing thoughts, the interviews each carried out, and the reports and data from HRP and other sources. All told, more than 40 interviews were conducted with HRP police of all ranks and diverse responsibilities for Downtown policing, HRM councilors and senior bureaucrats, provincial bureaucrats, Downtown business association representatives, bar and restaurant management and others.

THE 2008 ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND THEIR OUTCOMES

The chief recommendations of the 2008 Roundtable report were the following

- There needs to be better and stricter regulation of liquor establishments including hours of business, promotion of cheap drinks, training of staff, and in general more oversight by liquor inspectors.
- Transportation issues are pivotal (e.g., more taxi availability, a safe dedicated pick-up zone) and need to be examined given the concentration of liquor serving bars and restaurants in the Downtown and their hours of operation well into the early morning hours.
- HRM municipality should be more engaged directly where there is a clear jurisdictional mandate (e.g., transportation, taxi policy) and through advocacy and mobilization where not (e.g., LCA regulations) both immediate and long-term (e.g., changing the culture of alcohol misuse)
- HRM should establish a subcommittee devoted to public safety issues in the Downtown.
• Safety issues are a key dimension of HRM Downtown development and should be more integral to its planning; for example there needs to be more use of CCTV and CPTED strategies.

• There needs to be more police presence in the Downtown to deal with the extensive social disorder and high level of assaults and swarmings there after midnight.

• Several recommendations pertained specifically to the large post-secondary student involvement and impact on the Downtown bar and restaurant milieu, namely the creation of a Safe Walk Corridor between the Downtown and the university residences, the coordination by the recommended PSO of a metro student public safety committee and its collaboration with the Provincial Alcohol Strategy initiative.

• A restorative justice program should be established initially for university students to better address the roots of minor offences, especially LCA violations.

As will be detailed below in the Timeline data and their analyses and also documented in Professor Murphy’s paper, there has been a very significant response to the Roundtable recommendations and the outcomes overall have been as anticipated, namely much less crime and social disorder even though implementing the recommendations on some key points remains a work in progress. The most dramatic change has been the greater police presence in the Downtown which was advanced by the provincial government’s “Boots-on-the-Street” funding of more HRP and RCMP officers beginning in 2007-2008. The increased police presence has also facilitated in later years several changes in the policing approach which have directly and effectively impacted violence and social disorder in the Downtown. There have also been significant changes, again detailed below, in the LCA act and its liquor inspection activities. Since the Roundtable there has been much more collaboration between the HRP’s special LEU unit and the LCA inspectors. The key remaining issue regarding LCA regulations – a controversial one – is the closure hours for serving liquor in the Downtown bars and restaurants.

While there have been some changes in HRM policy for taxi availability in the Downtown, they have not fully come to grips with the transportation problems identified in the Roundtable. More generally, the response of the municipal government as an entity has been much more modest than recommended. The central recommendation calling for a subcommittee (i.e., standing committee of council or an advisory committee linked to a standing committee) devoted to public safety issues in the Downtown has not been acted upon; apparently, there was briefly a Downtown committee formed but it did not prove effective. Apart from HRP policing, it has been difficult to identify – despite many interviews with key people – any significant involvement of the municipal government or the PSO in advancing the Roundtable recommendations for the Downtown. There has however been an on-going development of an alcohol policy for municipally operated locales or sponsored events and the PSO partnered in a 2012 Community Forum on the Culture of Alcohol; there remains a
major alcohol misuse problem in the Downtown and a need for the municipality to respond to it in collaboration with the province (e.g., Department of Public Health, Provincial Alcohol Strategy).

The Roundtable recommendations pertaining to post-secondary students have been implemented, the Safe Corridor in 2009 and the restorative justice pilot project in 2012; the implementation has been satisfactory to date and is on-going.

Most stakeholders interviewed for this Review – police officers, provincial inspectors, municipal and provincial bureaucrats, bar management and leaders of various business associations – agreed that the Downtown has witnessed positive change since the Roundtable, especially in the last two or three years. The data analyses below on violence, liquor violations and mischief / property damage support that position. Some of the respondents (e.g., the provincial liquor inspectors) observed that in their own area of responsibility they were on track to make the very changes recommended by the Roundtable. Public opinion surveys have also suggested possibly less concern about public safety in the Downtown in recent years. These conventional surveys provide a snapshot of public opinion, presumably one heavily influenced by specific signal events. Media research for this Review identified a dozen or so incidents in 2013 where either assaults or robberies were described as Downtown incidents. A number of councilors suggested that the media’s highlighting of Downtown violence has caused a gap between reality and the public opinion such that the improvements in public safety have not been grasped by the public. However, the surveys indicate (see Murphy’s attached paper) that public opinion has also been shifting to a more positive perspective; actually a large majority of survey respondents in 2013 described the Downtown as “very or mostly safe” during the day and “only” 40% reported that they would not feel safe in the Downtown at night.

The Mayor and fourteen councilors were also interviewed for the Review on their views about the post-Roundtable trends in the Downtown. A slight majority considered that violence and social disorder have been better managed since the Roundtable and while a few suggested that the situation had not drastically changed, no one contended that it had worsened. There was a strong consensus among the elected officials that transportation problems remained unresolved (i.e., insufficient taxis or unaccommodating taxis’ strategies – basically the only commercial transport - in the early morning hours for patrons returning to residences outside the central urban core) and also that alcohol misuse was still rampant. About a third of these respondents considered that the levels of violence and social disorder were aggravated by the late closure hours of some Downtown bars.
ANALYSES OF DOWNTOWN INCIDENTS

The following presentation and analyses of Downtown incidents essentially supports the views of police officers, Downtown bar management and most HRM councillors that there have been significant, positive changes since the Roundtable. Table 5.1 shows a clear trend for LCA violations to decline from a high of 1133 in 2007 to 616 in 2013, almost 50% less. There was a huge decline in incidents of LCA violations where no SOT was issued – from a high of 824 in 2007 to but 10 and 19 in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Incidents where violations of LCA resulted in an SOT on the other hand increased sharply from 309 in 2007 to 846 in 2012. The crucial change happened in 2011 when HRP adopted a “charge as first option” approach to LCA violations in the Downtown and the OIC was subsequently required, at least on occasion, to provide in writing an explanation if an SOT was not issued to someone arrested for an LCA violation. In 2011 the number of such incidents (i.e., arrest but no charge) dropped by 300 from 479 in 2010 to 143 in 2011 while the number of incidents where an SOT was given rose by roughly 300 from 414 in 2010 to 708 in 2011. The change in policy not only led to more LCA SOTs but also has ultimately sharply reduced the total number of incidents of LCA violation. The table also indicates that

- Incidents of threats and mischief / property damage declined consistently over the years 2006 to 2013. Using 2 year averages, threats went from 27 to 23, 18, and 12 respectively. Mischief / property damage steadily declined from 122 in 2006-2007 to 72 in 2012-2013.
- Not shown in the table, robberies in the Downtown (i.e., reporting area atom C401) did not change between the two year average for 2007 and 2008 and the 2 year average for 2012 and 2013 - both had 8 incidents. Robbery in the years preceding the Roundtable was much more common, reportedly at least 40 per year (the data are difficult to sort out since the area of record for the earlier Downtown district was much broader and robberies in it were in the 80s range). The current low level of robberies indicates that “swarmings” also have been much reduced in the Downtown.

Assaults are seen as an important barometer of change in the Downtown since their high level was in large part responsible for the concerns that led to the Mayor Roundtable in 2006. Table 5.2 provides the data on assaults and the following are the key patterns

- Total assaults have varied over the past 8 years with no clear pattern of growth or decline but calculating 2 year averages, the totals were highest in 2006-2007 (218) and lowest in 2012 and 2013 (148), the difference representing a decline of 30%.
• Sexual assaults generally have been much fewer in the Downtown, surprisingly so given the culture of alcohol misuse that has characterized drinking patterns there. Still, it exhibits the same pattern as total assaults where the lowest 2 year average was 4 incidents in 2012-2013 compared with 10, 7 and 11 for the three previous 2 year periods.

• Common assault (i.e., assault level one) exhibits the same general pattern as for total assaults, namely some variation by year but largely being a stable pattern with the last 2 years seeing the significant decline; in 2012-2013 there were 112 incidents, a 20% decline from the 137 in 2007-2008.

• More serious assaults – assault with a weapon and aggravated assault – have shown the same pattern, namely no clear trend of increase or decrease but a quite sharp decline in 2012 and 2013, falling to the two year average there of 24 incidents, fully 50% less than the 2 year average of 53 in 2006 and 2007.

Overall, Tables 5.1 and 5.2 point to three basic patterns: (a) LCA violations have been policed differently as of 2011 and are sharply down; (b) threats and mischief have been consistently declining; (b) all types of assaults had a common pattern, namely no clear trend over the 8 years save a significant decline in 2012 and 2013. Will these 2012-2013 features hold? Are they the start of new trend?

HOURS AND INCIDENTS

For several years a major controversy has focused on the late closure hours for serving alcohol in the Downtown bars and restaurants. A Roundtable recommendation was that the existing closure policy – especially the 3.30am closure for the cabarets – be reconsidered. Most councilors in 2007 and again when interviewed in 2013 have favoured a change to much earlier post-midnight hours. The HRP leaders have contended strongly in recent years that current closure hours should be shortened and have prepared position papers with data supporting that perspective for municipal and provincial authorities (the hours are set under the provincial LCA). A paper prepared by Sgt. Gillett, OIC for the department’s LEU, examined perspectives and data on closing regulations from other Canadian urban areas as well as in the USA and Europe. He reported that HRM is uncommon in its late closure policy and that most jurisdictions that have examined the costs and benefits of late closure have come out strongly against such a practice. The common finding has been that an increase in the hours of licensed service has led to increased crime, violence and social disorder while a decrease has resulted in a diminution of all three types of incidents (Gillett, 2012). The HRP data are presented and analysed below.

Table 5.3 shows the number of actual incidents in the Downtown during the period midnight to 6am and their percentage of the total Downtown incidents in the representative years 2009, 2011 and 2013. It indicates
Overall incidents (i.e., offences / violations) during the 12am to 6am hours declined appreciably over the 5 year period, going from 1463 in 2009 to 1006 in 2013 and accounted for a declining percentage (from 58% to 51%) of the total Downtown incidents. The most significant decline occurred in 2012 and 2013.

- Roughly 65% of the 12am to 6am incidents consistently occurred between 2am and 6am.

- Incidents entailing LCA SOTs between 12am and 6am exhibited no clear pattern over the years, ranging from 446 in 2009 to 586 in 2011 (when the new policing policy of laying charges as the first option was put into effect) and dropping to 496 in 2013. The 12am to 6am LCA SOTs in each year accounted for 83% of total Downtown LCA SOTs.

- LCA SOTS occurring in the later hours, 2am to 6am, consistently accounted for 66% of the 12am to 6am LCA SOTs.

- Turning to assaults, 12am to 6am incidents exhibited no consistent pattern over the years but were at their smallest level in 2013, namely 106 incidents. Assaults in the post-midnight hours consistently have accounted for about 80% of the total Downtown assaults.

- Of the 12am to 6am assault incidents, those occurring in the 2am to 6am hours declined sharply from 121 in 2009 to 69 in 2013 (i.e., close to a 50% decline) and accounted for a reduced proportion of all 12am to 6am assault incidents in 2012 and 2013 (65% compared to roughly 75% in earlier years), evidence it would appear that the HRP’s proactive approach – the assault strategy of 2012 – has been effective.

- Mischief incidents between 12am and 6am declined consistently from 64 to 48 to 30 over the 2009-2013 time span but always remained roughly 55% of the total Downtown mischief incidents. Similarly, there was a sharp decline in mischief incidents between 2am and 6am, just 18 such incidents in 2013. Still, incidents in that 2am to 6am time period were consistently 58% of the total 12am to 6am incidents.

Table 5.4 simply underlines the above trends showing the proportionate consistency by year of the hours when the different offences occur. The key findings are

- There has been only modest variation in the annual proportion of each type of incident that occurred between 12am and 6am over the years from 2006 to 2013. Roughly 85% of the LCA SOTs recorded in the Downtown area took place between 12am and 6am, 80% of the assaults, and 50% of the mischief incidents. The corresponding percentages for drug offences varied more, increasing to near 80% in 2012 and 2013.

- Similarly, the proportion of the 12am to 6am incidents that occurred between 2am and 6am has been more or less stable over the years. Roughly 70% of the LCA SOTS occurring after midnight regularly took place between the hours of 2am and 6am, as did roughly 60% of the mischief incidents. In the case of assault incidents, the comparable
percentage was regularly about 75% for the years 2006 to 2011 inclusive but declined to an average of 67% in the 2012-2013 years.

Overall, the analyses of the Downtown’s actual incidents over time establishes that:

- The years 2012 and 2013 have witnessed significant reduction in the proportion of Downtown incidents of virtually all types that occurred after midnight and especially after 2am.

- With respect to the issues concerning closure hours for liquor establishments, it is clear that the hours 2am to 6am are the ones where liquor act violations, assaults and acts of mischief and property damage are most likely to take place.

- Alcohol abuse and assaults are highly correlated time-wise, with approximately 75% of the post-midnight incidents of each occurring in the hours 2am to 6am, though there has been a decline in assaults to an average of 67% in 2012 and 2013.

The violence and social disorder in the Downtown, a key factor in the establishment of the Mayor’s Roundtable 2006-2008, has been significantly reduced, basically through the combination of greater police presence, effective police strategies, the collaboration with liquor inspectors from Alcohol and Gaming, and the policies and practices of bar proprietors and their staffs. The evidence also underlines that the decline in the salient offences has to a large extent occurred in the last two years, 2012 and 2013. A central question is whether 2012 and 2013 have generated a sustainable and increasingly positive trend. Some underlying roots of Downtown violence and public safety concern have still to be effectively responded to, especially the culture of alcohol misuse and the concentration of large numbers of young adults in a Downtown milieu densely packed with bars and restaurants. There are issues too around specific policies (e.g., closure hours, transportation) that reinforce these root factors.
**TABLE 5.1 - SELECTED CRIME TRENDS IN DOWNTOWN HALIFAX (C401), 2006-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total LCA files</strong></td>
<td>743</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>938</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LCA (No SOT Issued)</strong></td>
<td>143</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>484</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LCA SOTs</strong></td>
<td>600</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>455</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assaults</strong></td>
<td>229</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threats</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drug Incidents</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mischief/Property Damage</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Halifax Regional Police Service, 2014*

---

**TABLE 5.2 - SELECTED TRENDS IN DOWNTOWN HALIFAX (C401) ASSAULTS, 2006-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Assaults</strong></td>
<td>229</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sexual Assaults</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1 Assaults</strong></td>
<td>146</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>137</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assault with Weapon/Aggravated Assault</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assault police/other peace officer</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Year Average</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Halifax Regional Police Service, 2014*
TABLE 5.3 - AFTER HOURS POLICE-REPORTED INCIDENTS IN DOWNTOWN HALIFAX BY SELECTED TYPE AND YEAR IN ATOM (C401)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th></th>
<th>2011</th>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12AM-6AM</td>
<td>2AM-6AM</td>
<td>12AM-6AM</td>
<td>2AM-6AM</td>
<td>12AM-6AM</td>
<td>2AM-6AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1463</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>1398</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCA SOT</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>446</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSAULTS</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>159</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCHIEF</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
<td>#1</td>
<td>%2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Total calls in designated time period; 2. % of all C401 incidents; 3. % of all after hours incidents

Source: Halifax Regional Police Service, 2014

TABLE 5.4 - DOWNTOWN INCIDENTS, % OF TOTAL CALLS OCCURRING MIDNIGHT TO 05:59AM, BY TYPE, YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCA SOT</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSAULTS</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTTERING THREATS</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUGS</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCHIEF</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Halifax Regional Police Service, 2014

DOWNTOWN INCIDENTS, % OF MIDNIGHT TO 05:59AM CALLS THAT OCCUR AFTER 2:00AM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCA SOT</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSAULTS</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTTERING THREATS</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUGS</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCHIEF</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Halifax Regional Police Service, 2014

ANALYSIS OF TIMELINE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOWNTOWN

Timeline data presented below map out the developments which have shaped the Downtown since 2008 with respect to violence and public safety. An overview of those developments is given here (the details of which are
described in the Timeline) and an elaboration and informative context can be found in the thorough analyses provided by Professor Murphy in his “Downtown HRM: Then and Now” in Volume Two of the Review. The two most significant developments since the Roundtable arguably have been (a) the provincial “Boots on the Street” initiative providing funding for HRM (and other areas in Nova Scotia) to engage more police officers in trouble spots and provide what was labeled in the Roundtable report as “reassurance policing”; (b) the response of the provincial Alcohol and Gaming’s LCA inspectors in refocusing their priorities for inspection (targeting the high risk bars and cabarets) and collaborating more closely with the HRP’s LEU. These developments were essentially implemented in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. The Boots on the Street program generated a very significant police presence in the Downtown especially in the Thursday to Sunday late evening and early morning hours, while the more aggressive and targeted LCA monitoring was effected in concert with new regulations about liquor prices and training of the bars’ staff.

These early developments could be deemed “infrastructural” in that they set the stage for the major initiatives that occurred in the years 2011 and 2012 and directly impacted on the level of violence and social disorder in the Downtown. These included the 2011 change in the police response to LCA violations and HRP’s 2012 proactive Assault Strategy which also featured significant collaboration with the provincial liquor inspectors. In 2011 there were important amendments to the NS Securities Act regarding property liability and insurance for the bars. Subsequent to these changes, if an incident occurred on site it could lead to insurance increases and perhaps affect credit rating. Also among the changes advanced were some dealing with the training and actions of the bars’ door staff (e.g., bouncers).

The private business interests owning and managing the Downtown liquor serving establishments also contributed to the “taming” of the Downtown milieu in this two year period. In 2011 a Safe Bars Association was created to improve safety and security in the Downtown, and subsequently a “Patron Accountability, Safety and Service” program (PASS) piloted by the umbrella Restaurant Association of Nova Scotia was developed to encourage and promote a safe and comfortable environment for staff and patrons frequenting licensed establishments. Persons placed on the PASS list for any of a variety of reasons – largely underage drinking, false identification and fighting – are barred for a certain time length from being served at any of the participating bars. The initial membership of 12 participating bars soon reached a total of 25. After six months, 170 people reportedly had been placed on PASS for different lengths of time. A central figure in the business association Downtown, in discussing these
developments in 2011 and 2012. stated “there has been more change in the last two years than in the previous twenty”.

Two other developments are highlighted in the Timeline. Roundtable recommendations, addressing the victimization of students going to and returning from the Downtown, and their own misuse of alcohol, were acted upon. In 2009 the HRM Community Response Team implemented a Safe Corridor strategy based on CPTED principles; and, in 2012, a restorative justice program representing a unique collaboration among the provincial government, HRP and Dalhousie University was implemented, focusing on students’ misuse of alcohol. The Timeline also identified several changes in the business economy of the Downtown bars in 2013 that suggested the need for bars and licensed restaurants there to transcend marketing directly solely at the young adult heavy drinking clientele.

KEY THEMES IN DOWNTOWN VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

This Review analyses, HRP incident data, and views and the related experiences of a wide-range of informed respondents, indicate that there has been a very significant decline in violence and public safety issues in the Downtown district since the Roundtable report. There has been a variety of positive policies and practices implemented, partly in response to the earlier Roundtable publicity and recommendations, that have resulted in a new situation Downtown, one where, when combined with on-going demographic and socio-economic developments, is creating the basis for a Downtown which accommodates a variety of interests and lifestyles, enhances its vibrancy as a place to live and visit, and remains a crucial engine for HRM’s and Nova Scotia’s economic prosperity.

The most significant changes in reducing crime and social disorder have occurred in the last two years, 2012 and 2013, and, while positive, the rates of such offences are still quite high in comparison with those of other metropolitan areas. It is important to continue to focus on the factors that threaten the changes and act as barriers to the further diminution of offending behaviour. And, as well, it is important to take advantage of current socio-economic developments in the Downtown that could facilitate these positive prospects.

The two key factors that can facilitate the continuance of the positive effects realized in 2012 and 2013 are, by consensus, dealing with the late night and after-hours transportation problems in the Downtown, and making gains in reducing the impact of the culture of alcohol misuse. The transportation issues as described above (see also the analysis by Professor Murphy in his companion paper) persist despite the municipal action in 2012 whereby taxi zone exemptions were made between the hours of 12am and 5am Thursday to Sunday such that “a taxi driver may pick up and drop off passengers or parcels within a zone for which the taxi is not licensed”.


According to all reports there are still problems in Downtown patrons’ safely securing taxis, not to mention the absence of buses or their functional equivalents after-hours. An authoritative external consultant might well be engaged to assess the situation and provide recommendations to significantly reduce the transportation problem.

Alcohol misuse remains a major immediate cause of violence and social order; for example, LEU officers claim that excessive alcohol consumption is associated with virtually 100% of the assault incidents in the Downtown. Key stakeholders interviewed in this Review highlighted not only the significant level of under-aged drinking, especially but not only among university student patrons, and a continuing if lessened issue of over-service in some Downtown establishments, but also identified “culture of alcohol” patterns such as the practice of Downtown patrons drinking “to get a buzz on before they go Downtown” and excessive drinking patterns such as, among some university students a striving to get “BOD” (black out drunk) in their extreme partying behaviour. The large student population in Metro is a major contributor to HRM having one of the highest percentages of young adults among Canadian CMAs and that demographic seems particularly vulnerable to the misuse of alcohol. Clearly, the municipality has to be more engaged with the provincial efforts to re-configure alcohol consumption in HRM.

Both these factors may be enhanced by the late closure hours for some liquor establishments Downtown. As noted in the analyses of HRP incident data for the years 2006 to 2013, there is little doubt that the hours 2am to 6am generate a disproportionate level of incidents and offences. Earlier closing times for the serving of alcohol would reduce the number of such incidents. On the other hand, stricter enforcement of LCA regulations for cabarets (e.g., live entertainment) and for over-service and resolving transportation issues might also be effective and less intrusive; and if the decline in the cabaret establishments is an indication of future economic trends, that would also mitigate the problem of late hour violence and social disorder.

There are certain recent trends in the economics of the Downtown that could be leading to a different type of nightlife Downtown and the municipality should ensure that these developments emphasize public safety and facilitate the positive prospects referred to above. The apparent decline of the cabaret model and the growth of sports bars and other entertainment in the Downtown that attract a more diversified clientele is occurring as the Downtown is being redeveloped with large projects such as a conference center and condominiums which will bring a different population mix to the area. Such a vibrant dynamic Downtown seems pivotal for the economic well-being of HRM and, as a key stakeholder recently commented “The Downtown really is the lifeblood of the community economically, historically, culturally; we may have to start making some tougher decisions to protect that”. There should be a strong lobbyist internal to municipal bureaucracy that can
advanced public safety issues (e.g., CPTED strategies of CCTV, appropriate lighting, perhaps open spaces) in close
collaboration with HRP, the Downtown business associations and others, in other words a PSO within the
municipal bureaucracy, representing that perspective and aware of best practices, collaborating with a
Downtown advisory committee or similar body.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The several recommendations that are advanced here flow from the key themes regarding violence and public
safety in HRM. They are intended as supplements or complements, not replacements, to the policies and actions
discussed in the Timeline analyses here. They are congruent with the more elaborated recommendations
advanced by Professor Murphy in his paper in Volume Two which should be taken into consideration. There are
5 recommendations

- The transportation issues pertinent to the Downtown late night entertainment scene
  should be examined and resolved, preferably by the municipality engaging an
  authoritative external consultant.

- The municipality should become much more engaged with the appropriate provincial
  authorities (e.g., Public Health, the Provincial Alcohol Strategy, Alcohol and Gaming),
  private sector interests (e.g., RANS, Downtown Business Association) and community
  services and organizations in developing strategies, policies and programs to reduce the
  level of alcohol abuse in general and in the Downtown Entertainment scene in
  particular.

- A holistic examination of the closure hours for liquor serving establishment in the
  Downtown should be undertaken, focusing on costs and benefits and the effectiveness
  and feasibility of alternative strategies for reducing violence and social disorder in the
  area.

- Given the crucial social and economic importance of the Downtown, there should be a
  committee established which brings together representatives of the key stakeholders
  pertinent to matters of violence and public safety in a broad sense.

- It is important to have the PSO located within the municipal bureaucracy in order to
  draw upon the municipality’s expertise and resources more fully and coordinate a public
  safety Downtown committee, especially bringing to it information about kindred
developments and best practices elsewhere.
TIMELINE - DEVELOPMENTS IN DOWNTOWN HALIFAX, 2007-2013

2007

- Christmas Eve brawl occurred at the Dome Cabaret. Immediately after, the Grafton Connor Group (owners of the Dome) eliminated $1 “cheap drinks” enticement and imposed a $2.50 drink minimum.

- The “Boots on the Street” program announced by the provincial government in 2006 began implementation in fiscal 2007-08. Boots on the Street happened in response to the Roundtable recommendations about violence, especially in the Downtown, and was extended throughout NS so every municipality was promised funding for at least one new officer. The program’s target was sustainable funding for 250 officers in increments over the four fiscal years beginning in 2007-2008 (80 were provided in 2007-08, 70 in 2009-09, 33 in 2009-10 and then the program was frozen in 2010-11). Police presence increased considerably in the Downtown and, as well, a dedicated Liquor Enforcement Unit was reinforced and there were new policing policies developed.

2008

- Minimum drink prices of $2.50 were set in amended regulations of Liquor Control Act.

- “Boots on the Street” program funds 70 new police officers across the province, with 39 new HRPS and 13 new RCMP positions allocated to the Halifax Regional Municipality.

2009

- “Boots on the Street” program funds 33 new police officers across the province

- The HRP Liquor Enforcement Unit, with three officers engaged as a result of the “Boots on the Street” provincial funding, provides enhanced policing in the Downtown, including some coordination with liquor inspectors from Nova Scotia Alcohol and Gaming and the HRM Fire Department. The O.I.C. for HRP’s LEU also supervises the special six officer complement of the Downtown beat patrol and other officers regularly seconded to the Downtown during peak activity.

- Partly as a result of the Roundtable publicity and its recommendations, the Alcohol and Gaming liquor inspection of bars and restaurants is amended, with more inspections and the adoption of a ‘high-risk model” and more targeted inspections.

- Safe Walk Corridors to and from the Downtown Bar scene and Dalhousie and Saint Mary’s universities were examined by HRM’s Community Response Team (i.e., a CPTED project) and subsequent changes were made to enhance safe walking after dark.

2010

- “Boots on the Street” program freezes. In a 2010 Police Board Report, it was noted that HRP increased complement had included 16 Downtown beat patrol officers and three for its Liquor Enforcement Unit.
2011

- A Safe Bars Association was created to improve safety and security in the Downtown
- HRP initiates a pro-charge policy for LCA violations in the Downtown
- Reflections Cabaret applies to move from Downtown to old Marquee location on Gottingen St and is denied their request to carry their cabaret licence to the new location.
- Changes were made to the NS Securities Act regarding property liability and insurance for the bars. Subsequent to these changes, if an incident occurred on site it could lead to insurance increases and perhaps affect credit rating. Among the changes advanced were some dealing with the training and actions of the bars’ door staff.

2012

- “Patron Accountability, Safety and Service” program (PASS) was piloted by Restaurant Association of Nova Scotia, in collaboration with Halifax Regional Police’s Liquor Enforcement Unit and the Alcohol and Gaming Division of Service Nova Scotia. PASS was “developed to encourage and promote a safe and comfortable environment for patrons and staff members frequenting licensed establishments”. Persons placed on the PASS list for any of a variety of reasons – largely underage drinking, false identification and fighting– are barred for a certain time length from being served at all of the participating bars. The initial membership of 12 participating bars soon reached a total of 25. After six months, 170 people reportedly had been placed on PASS for different lengths of time. In 2013 PASS was extended to other areas of Nova Scotia.
- The HRP Assault Program / Downtown Safety Strategy begins in Downtown Halifax. A central dimension of the overall Downtown Safety Strategy is the Granville strategy (i.e., a model used in the entertainment and tourist Granville area abutting the Downtown East Side in Vancouver) of having members of the LEU unit and the six assigned Downtown beat patrol walk in uniform with visibly coloured vests through the bars, sometimes with the provincial liquor inspectors, to “show the flag” between midnight and 5am. from Thursday to Sunday. Reportedly it has proved to be a valuable preventative strategy for responding to disputes and nipping violence in the bud. In the past a large proportion of assaults – reportedly as high as 50% - had occurred within the bars.
- Taxi zone exemptions made between the hours of 12am and 5am Thursday to Sunday whereby “a taxi driver may pick up and drop off passengers or parcels within a zone for which the taxi is not licensed”.
- After a year of negotiations, the Dalhousie University Restorative Justice Pilot Program begins. It represented a unique collaboration among the provincial government (NSRJ), the Halifax Regional Police Service and Dalhousie University and applied to both on and off campus behaviour of Dalhousie students. A major focus was responding to issues of inappropriate alcohol consumption of students in the Downtown and in the University neighbourhood.
- Co-hosted by the PSO, in collaboration with NS Addiction Services and community partners, there was a public forum on the culture of alcohol misuse in HRM. The 40 plus participants discussed concerns and solutions regarding alcohol-related issues in HRM.
2013

- Local blogger draws attention to violence in the Downtown with a post about a violent incident he witnessed at The Carleton Nightclub where a bar staff and police were accused of using excessive force, in what has become informally known as “The Carleton Incident.” The story went viral and resulted in a review which found no wrongdoing on the part of staff or police.

- Popular Irish bar with students, The Pogue Fado, closes citing a decline in business and sales as the main reason (i.e., owners stated that “the business plan indicated no future profitability”).

- Long-time Halifax establishment, The Palace Nightclub Cabaret closes to be reopened as a Sports Bar, citing changing demographics and business in the Downtown as the reason why; owners of the Palace have applied to have Cabaret licence transferred to an adjacent pub under the same ownership, The Alehouse.
HOUSING, VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

INTRODUCTION

In updating the data and issues concerning the housing dimension for violence and public safety, assessing outcomes for the 2008 Report’s recommendations, and looking forward from the current situation, a wide variety of research strategies and activities were employed. A research outline for this dimension was developed in collaboration between the principal investigator and Don Spicer, retired HRP superintendent who headed the PSO between the Spring of 2009 and the Fall of 2012 and currently is the Executive Director of Shelter Nova Scotia. Don Spicer assumed responsibility for writing the supplemental report reproduced in Volume 2. Interviews, equally split between Spicer and the principal investigator, usually following an interview guide, were carried out with about 25 key persons, stakeholders and knowledgeable, in this field. These included police officers at all rank levels, provincial officials responsible for policy development concerning housing and community services, non-profit service providers and advocates in the field of homelessness and affordable housing, municipal politicians and staff members, and outside experts. Pertinent information from interviews garnered for other dimensions of the Review (e.g., Offender Reintegration) was also available. In addition, there was modest recourse to documents (e.g., minutes of the Police Board and reports from local sources such as AHANS) and to the general literature in the field of homelessness and affordable housing.

ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND OUTCOMES

Housing was an emphasis in the Roundtable report. Examination of the similar Roundtables on public safety that took place during the Roundtable period in other Canadian cities such as Calgary and Surrey, found that the top priority in the strategic recommendations they advanced was “housing first”, making supportive safe housing the lynchpin for other recommendations concerning treatment, training and employment of the persons disproportionately associated with street crime and social disorder offences. In the HRM Roundtable report, “housing first” was considered crucial for achieving offender rehabilitation and reintegration; homelessness or unsafe housing was shown to be magnet for violence and lack of safety, and those experiencing homelessness were found to be frequent victims as well as offenders. In focus groups on street crime and on troubled youth and in community consultations and interviews with experts, there were reasonable recommendations made calling on the municipality to collaborate more effectively on housing issues with non-profit societies such as Community Action on Homelessness (CAH) and arms-length, voluntary associations such as the Spring Garden Road Business Association (SGRBA) who were grappling with the consequences of homelessness or unsafe housing. Partnerships with organizations such as CAH and SGRBA were seen as crucial in order to develop more safe housing stock and should be facilitated by municipal policy.
There were also recommendations calling for the municipality’s exercising more leadership on these issues within its mandate, and beyond the mandate through advocacy with the provincial government. While, as will be highlighted below, there have been very significant positive and effective policies and programs developed in these areas of housing at the federal and provincial levels, and while strong partnerships among the provincial bureaucracies, non-profit organizations and the private rental sector have emerged since the Roundtable, the municipal government has not been a major player or taken on strong commitments on these housing issues until 2013. The PSO in 2009 assisted in the creation of an ad hoc committee to improve the availability of safe affordable housing, participating with representatives of Capital District Health, Killam Properties, CAH, SGRBA and the NS Department of Community Services DCS. The ad hoc committee provided an opportunity for engaged interests to discuss ideas and possible strategies. Nothing specifically was apparently done to create more safe affordable housing by either the PSO or the municipal government but the ad hoc committee did contribute to the social mobilization that in the subsequent years did produce more safe, supervised housing rentals and significant collaboration among government, non-profit and private interests.

Two major concerns in the Roundtable and in this Review have been (a) how strong and provable is any direct connection between experiencing homelessness / unsafe housing and crime; and (b) what is the scale of homelessness / unsafe housing in HRM. Concerning (a) the crime connection, there is a deep consensus among informed persons from quite different perspectives – elected officials, police, government leaders and bureaucrats and both the non-profit and private rental sectors - that there is indeed a strong direct connection. Every person interviewed for this Review stated unequivocally that this has been the case. It has been difficult to determine the quantitative strength of the connection, from both an offending or victimization perspective, and its specificity in particular offences, in this Review’s preliminary analyses of HRP charge data for the years 2006 to 2012, though that research is continuing. As Spicer documents in his supplemental paper, calls for service have over the years frequently and very disproportionately come from shelters and other areas where homeless persons are typically found. Annual reports by the CAH on the urban core homeless population also document the extensive conflict with the law among those experiencing homelessness or unsafe housing, and Spicer cites several studies from other provinces which provide reliable data on the strong direct connection between crime and homelessness. A veteran service provider to street people, interviewed for the Review, pointed out “if you are sleeping in a public place, you’re vulnerable … definitely over the years folks have run into situations where there has been violence directed at them while they were sleeping. The cumulative effect of daily violence, threats, assaults, vulnerability has a damaging impact”. Several senior HRP police officers interviewed for this Review have linked the recent decline in property damage, social order offences and simple assaults to improved housing and related services for the homeless. Apart from the implications of experiencing
homelessness or unsafe housing, there is also the matter of public perception and experience. Homelessness and its associated behaviours, if extensive enough, presumably have a “broken windows” effect on the public, ratcheting up their fears and anxieties about public safety.

Since the Roundtable there have been many more housing units made available to those experiencing homelessness or unsafe housing as well as a proliferation of services to transition persons into safe affordable rentals and assist their remaining there. Surprisingly, these changes do not appear to have drastically altered the number of persons classified as homeless or in unsafe housing. Reports from CAH and its successor organization, AHANS, indicate that the number of persons who stayed in shelters in Halifax CMA for one or more nights was roughly 1700 in 2009, 2000 in 2011 and 1900 in 2012; presumably others in a similar housing situation may “couch-surf” among acquaintances or stay on the street. Knowledgeable persons have reported that given the challenges of securing solid reliable data, and certain changes in the policies of shelters and data collection there since 2009, these numbers may not indicate any real substantial variation.

A number of factors have been suggested to account for the high level of constancy in the numbers such as the continuing in-migration to the Halifax CMA by youths and young adults who are destitute and may suffer from multiple problems, and the general pressures on rental housing affordability despite high vacancy rates because of inadequate replacement of the appropriate housing stock (apart from high-end condominium development), competition from the large growth in the number of post-secondary students from outside the CMA, and perhaps speculation by property owners, about the coming impact of the ship-building economic boom, inflating housing prices. The evidence seems to be that the Halifax CMA is not above average for Canadian CMAs with respect to the number or rate of its homeless population. Recent articles in the Globe and Mail (October 30, 2013) reported that between 200,000 and 300,000 persons live in shelters or on the street each year in Canada; given that Halifax CMA is “one percent plus” of the Canadian population, that would suggest that the roughly 2000 homeless here would be about average for the country as a whole.

Whether average or not, many studies (e.g., John Howard Society, Making Toronto Safer, Marketwire 06/14/11) have concluded that providing transitional housing could save millions of dollars of tax-payers money while increasing community safety. While the collective efforts of those working for safe affordable units in the housing sector have had positive impact, service providers acknowledge that the present conditions are a long way from the ultimate goal of eliminating homelessness in the Halifax CMA. Shelter administrators have indicated that while there is currently enough space to provide emergency shelter services to those in immediate need, challenges remain in terms of reducing the length of stay in a shelter; as one source put it, “it takes a much longer time to transition out of the shelter system than it does to fall into it”. The Housing First
philosophy contends that once an individual has access to safe, secure and affordable housing, all other issues (such as mental health, addictions and employability) can be appropriately addressed. However, for this model to work effectively, there must be a stock of affordable housing for people to be able to access immediately, and some service providers and housing advocates contend that there is instead a serious shortage. The term, “affordable housing”, for those who have little to no income or face serious mental health issues, may itself be problematic. As one tenant-leader in a large public housing complex said when asked about the coming “affordable housing” opportunities which may be made available through a mixed housing project (e.g., the Bloomfield redevelopment), “I hate the term affordable housing... affordable for who? None of the so-called affordable housing in this city is designed for people like us living in the projects.”

ANALYSIS OF TIMELINE DATA FOR HOUSING

The Timeline data presented below map out the significant growth in dealing effectively with homelessness and safe affordable housing since the Roundtable in 2008 and Spicer's paper in the attached Supplemental Report volume provides the context and elaborates on the diverse developments. The developments have been noteworthy in three areas, namely the greater availability of rental units for those without satisfactory housing, the greater availability of services that transition such people into more adequate housing and facilitate their maintenance there, and the partnerships that have been formed among the governments, non-profits and private rental sectors. Illustrating all three factors was the partnership between Capital Health and Killam Properties in 2008 whereby homeless or inadequately housed persons on social assistance and with some mental health issues were provided subsidized rentals by Killam and regular check-up services by social workers from Capital Health’s New Beginnings program. The initiative was successful and soon Killam expanded this Independent Supportive Housing (ISH) model in similar arrangements with non-profit entities (e.g., Phoenix House), and other private rental businesses also adopted the ISH approach. Three years later, in 2011, the NS Department of Community Services in its Supportive Housing Pilot project adopted the key ISH elements, namely subsidized rental for inadequately housed clients on social assistance plus housing support workers to regularly assist them and the facilitate the transition; the provincial program was made permanent in 2013.

The increase in the housing units available is seen below in the initiatives by non-profit organizations such as, among others, Metro Non-Profit Housing (2008), Shelter Nova Scotia (2009, 2012), and Adsum House (2011). The larger numbers – not surprising since private rental accounts for 95% of the rental market in HRM - come from the arrangements with private rental managers. A 2013 report on the Housing Support Worker program indicates that for the fiscal year 2012-2013, the support workers, employed with government or specific non-profits, served 1170 people, many of whom had mental illness and/or addictions and were either homeless or
facing that prospect. Some 372 clients were helped to transition from shelters to housing and another 219 to transition from unstable living to housing; roughly 90% of the clients remained in the new housing to date. The Housing Support Worker (HSW) program is essential for assisting those making the transition from homelessness to being housed, as many individuals within the shelter system or outside it, do not have the personal agency or capacity to deal with landlords, leases and the basic tasks of daily living. All persons interviewed for this Review highlighted this provincial program, the HSW, when addressing the issue of how much has the homeless situation improved since the Roundtable. The Timeline notes the other services that have become available to the homeless or those in unstable housing arrangements such as Mobile Outreach Street Health (2009), Metro Turning Point’s change in 2009 from a night-based operation to providing 24/7 services and the annual Halifax Connects with the Homeless (2010).

The emergence of enhanced partnerships among the levels of government and with non-profit and private sectors to respond to the challenges of homelessness or unstable housing is also discussed in Spicer’s paper and itemized in the Timeline below. Building on the long-time advocacy of the CAH and its AHANS successor, new programs and initiatives by both provincial and federal governments are nurturing these partnerships, the former in its now permanent Supportive Housing Program and the latter in its Homelessness Partnership Strategy with its community entity model where substantial funding is provided for 5 years to a non-profit, credible and inclusive community-based organization (here AHANS) to allocate to and monitor valuable community initiatives to reduce homelessness. Virtually all the persons interviewed for the Review, whether or not they considered the changes since 2008 to represent a dramatic improvement in homelessness, emphasized that valuable partnerships have been put into place. In 2013 the HRM municipal government registered its collaboration with an array of partners to eliminate homelessness. HRM council approved, by a vote of 15 to 0, formal participation in a coalition attacking issues of homelessness and affordable housing. Council reportedly considered it a moral obligation to address issues such as building affordable homes, helping the working poor and also people without permanent places to live. Other members of coalition included the United Way Halifax, AHANS, private sector interests and of course the provincial government. United Way Halifax had sent a letter to the Mayor urging HRM’s participation and the Mayor responded enthusiastically noting “housing is integral to what we do”.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The overwhelming majority of the key housing knowledgeable interviewed for this Review clearly held that there have been significant improvements with respect to the challenge of homelessness and safe affordable housing. There were different views about the level of significance, where it has been occurring, and whether
HRM is on course to deal decisively with the challenge. While some interviewees referred to “lots of great moments in the past 5 years”, several non-profit service providers and advocates observed that the issues are becoming more complex – “people need more wrap-around, holistic services”. The divergence directs attention to the different types of homelessness and unstable housing arrangements. One practical typology that emerged from the interviews identified three levels of homelessness, namely

“The first level, who lost their job unexpectedly etc, simply needs some assistance to get back on their feet and don’t require much ongoing support. The next level have been homeless longer and have some issues in their life such as low literacy, addictions or mental health that will require more support to keep them housed and the third level are those who are chronically de-housed and require extensive support. We need to ensure we are providing the right amount of support at each level”.

It has been suggested by some interviewees that the percentage total persons at the different levels is 40%, 40% and 20% but that the latter category—the 20% in level three—have been least impacted by the improvements to date and may be growing in a proportionate sense. The analogy to football’s “red zone” where success becomes more difficult as one nears the opponents’ goal line may be apt. The level three homeless represent complex cases and likely are more the face of the homeless to authorities and the public at large. Several councillors, in discussing homelessness, held that the mental illness was pervasive among the homeless and the solution required supportive, supervised housing. Commenting on persons homeless and outside the shelters, one service provider noted, “it is unfortunate that some homeless may not be comfortable in the shelter setting, since the shelter is the gateway to getting services to help ...it’s a warm and safe place to sleep but it’s also a spot where we will build a case plan around each individual to determine what their needs are and help them get back into their own apartments or in the community”. The record of the Housing Support Workers in HRM and the experience of similar interventions in other areas of Canada as reported by the Mental Health Commission of Canada may hold promise for level three persons but that is uncertain as yet. Certainly though, there is a decided optimism among some politicians and activist organizational heads such as the United Way. The cited newly announced initiative in HRM, coordinated by the United Way Halifax, is on record as aiming to solve the chronic homelessness problem in 5 years and the federal minister responsible for the HPS has publicly stated that she wants to be the first minister to end homelessness in Canada.

There are a number of recommendations that should be advanced here, based on two chief premises, namely (a) HRM definitely has a role to play; as the director of the UWH reportedly said, “The federal government has the money, the provincial government has the mandate, but the city has the problem”, a viewpoint that was accepted by the majority of the elected officials; and (b) while a more expansive thrust towards affordability
and mixed-use developments is important, more holistic policy and investment in services for the level three homeless people remains the key priority in housing from a public safety perspective. The recommendations advanced here are congruent with those that bear on housing in the other dimensions of the Review, most especially Offender Reintegration, and are consistent with those advanced by Spicer in his paper which should be consulted. The key recommendations are:

1. The municipal government should follow up on its recent commitment to partner with the governmental, non-profit and private sector bodies in responding to issues related to homelessness by doing more within its mandate and resources (e.g., regulating sub-standard housing, enforcing by-laws) and effectively taking on an advocacy role beyond it in matters such as the level and kind of rent subsidies by the NS Department of Community Services).

2. The municipal government should advocate with its provincial and federal partners for wrap-around services and intensive counselling with hard-core, chronic homeless persons.

3. The municipal government should take a page from other municipalities inside and outside Canada to maintain and expand its housing stock and, as suggested recently in a brief to council by Grant Wanzel, consider the Community Land Trust approach to a land banking strategy.

4. The municipal government should encourage mixed use / mixed affordability in new developments and facilitate it through various incentives (e.g., tax incentives and density bonus options).

**TIMELINE FOR HOUSING DIMENSION IN HRM, 2008-2013**

**2008**

- The Independent Supportive Housing Initiative (ISH), a partnership between NS Capital Health’s New Beginnings Mental Health Unit and the Killam Properties, the largest private sector rental company in NS, is launched. The pilot program saw Killam provide 12 subsidized units to New Beginnings client-tenants, and New Beginnings providing weekly/monthly support services to those same client-tenants. This enables certain people on social assistance to live in safer, more adequate housing then they could otherwise afford. The ISH pilot was successful and the program has become permanent. Killam took this same ISH model to other housing agencies (e.g., Shelter Nova Scotia, Phoenix House) and now provides these partners with an additional 23 supported housing units. In September 2013 Killam officials reported having “a total of 57 units under the ISH program and it has been as high as 70”. Other investment rental operators (landlords) became engaged in the ISH model and provided placements for clients of New Beginnings and non-profit organizations. In 2010, Killam and New Beginnings won a
CMHC National Award for their independent supported housing program. By 2012 these ISH partnerships had yielded more than 100 additional affordable housing units in HRM.

- Metro Non-Profit Housing Association and Direction 180 (serving the addicted and providing methadone) collaborate to start a new program, Halifax Housing Help.
- Metro Non-Profit Housing opens a fifth housing facility namely a 20 unit supportive housing complex on Maynard Street in Central Halifax; its first site, the 16 unit Stewart House, opened in 1990.

2009

- Following a pattern that was developing across Canada, the NS House of Assembly unanimously passed An Act to Establish a Poverty Reduction Working Group in December 2007 and in 2009 launched its Provincial Poverty Reduction Strategy which had a housing strategy dimension (e.g., investment in housing)
- Mobile Outreach Street Health (MOSH) was launched, providing primary health care to the homeless and other marginalized citizens
- Nova Scotia’s first Mental Health Court (a specialized court for people with mental health issues) is launched in Dartmouth
- The HRP Public Safety officer began participating with representatives from Capital Health, Killam Properties, Phoenix House, NS Department of Community Services, the Committee for Action on Homelessness and the Spring Garden Road Business Association in an ad hoc Committee on Affordable Housing. The group met on several occasions to discuss housing issues and consider possible strategies to reduce homelessness and improve the availability of safe affordable housing. While spawning no specific housing project or program, it contributed to the social movement to improve housing in the HRM and to the mobilization of subsequent action in these regards.
- “2009 Health and Homelessness in Halifax” report released by the Community Action on Homelessness organization. It was reported that in 2008 some 1252 persons stayed on one or more occasions at one of four shelters in Halifax CMA while an undetermined number stayed at other shelters or “couch surfed” or simply slept outside.
- Metro Turning Point increases capacity from 65 to 80 beds and moves from a night-only operation to a 24/7 model with enhanced services.
- “Out of the Cold” Shelter reopens providing an additional 15 emergency beds during the coldest months of the year.

2010

- In October 2010, the “Halifax Connects with the Homeless” initiative was launched aimed at the “level three” homeless. It has become an annual one day event in HRM drawing roughly 500 homeless people and a large contingent of service providers and volunteers. Hairdressers cut and style hair, portraits are
taken, doctors examine feet, information is provided on extant services, and a hot lunch is served with tablecloths and silverware.

**2011**

- A collaboration of private Investment Rental Operators and non-profit agencies in the housing field pulled together a presentation and a proposal to the Nova Scotia Government and subsequently the Department of Community Services launched its Supportive Housing Pilot program with Housing Support Workers and rent subsidies. The program provided funds for Housing Support Workers in governmental as well as non-profit service agencies such as Tawaak Housing, Salvation Army, Phoenix House, and Byrony House; all told the funds provided for 17 or 18 such workers. The model follows the ISH approach and the Housing Support Workers, like the New Beginnings worker, provide weekly/monthly support to the Department of Community Services clients.

- Adsum Shelter for Women and Children opens The Alders, a 10 unit apartment building.

- “Housing Nova Scotians: A Fresh Look” report released by AHANS (Affordable Housing Association of Nova Scotia) subsequent to its province-wide consultations on housing, emphasized the need for collaboration and partnerships among the different levels of government, the non-profit and private sectors. It especially called for provincial government leadership given its mandate and resources but also recommended greater municipal governments’ attention to building coalitions to bring rental units up to code and more generally increasing their collaborations with non-profits and the private sector.

**2012**

- Provincial Housing Strategy consultations begin

- Provincial 211 Community Services Phone line is launched

- The federal Homelessness Partnering Strategy (HPS) moves to a community entity model where funding allocations are made at a grassroots level. In HRM, AHANS is that entity. Initial funding was renewed under the HPS providing AHANS with significant long term funding ($1.5 million annually for 5 years ending in 2019) to deliver to community-based groups who can produce valuable initiatives to reduce homelessness.

- CAH, Community Action on Homelessness, a project of the North End Community Health Centre, ends. Established in 1999 CAH essentially was replaced by AHANS.

- NS Housing and Homelessness Network is formed

- Shelter Nova Scotia opens The Rebuilding, a 19 unit transitional apartment complex for men

- Health and Homelessness in Halifax Update Report released by the NS Housing and Homelessness Network

- “2012 Halifax Report Card on Homelessness” released by the NS Housing and Homelessness Network. It was reported that in 2011 a total of 1973 persons stayed in the shelters, accounting for 70,311 shelter-nights.

- The HRM Community Response Team, moved to the administrative oversight of the PSO in 2009, launched the Crime Free Multi-Housing Program (CFMH), a well-established program in Western Canada and in the United States to eliminate crime at multi-housing complexes such as apartment buildings. Subsequently, a seniors’ residence in Northend Halifax described as “affordable independent living” and
operated by Northwood Properties becomes the first formally credentialized such complex in Nova Scotia.

2013

- Provincial Housing Strategy is launched including the creation of Housing NS, a crown corporation with its own private board, structured like the NSBI
- Federal budget extends the Homeless Partnership Strategy for 5 years. In October 2013 the responsible Federal minister in noting the renewal added that she wanted to be the first minister to end homelessness in Canada.
- HRM council approves, by a vote of 15 to 0, formal participation in a coalition attacking issues of homelessness and affordable housing. Council reportedly considered it a moral obligation to address issues such as building affordable homes, helping the working poor and also people without permanent places to live. Other members of coalition included the United Way Halifax, AHANS, private sector interests and of course the provincial government. United Way Halifax had sent a letter to the Mayor urging HRM’s participation and the Mayor responded enthusiastically noting “housing is integral to what we do”. The newly announced initiative, coordinated by the United Way Halifax, aims to solve the chronic homelessness problem in 5 years.
- The Supportive Housing Pilot program launched by the NS Government in 2011 is made permanent
- November 2013 AHANS, at a Housing and Homelessness Conference in Halifax, noted that in 2012 there were 1880 who stayed in a shelter, staying a total of 66,154 shelter nights, and that roughly 10% of the 1880 people are classified as “chronically homeless” (i.e., been relying on shelters for many years). The numbers (roughly 1800) were less but consistent with the CAH reports for recent earlier years. AHANS stressed that homelessness is merely the bottom of a housing continuum that ranges from shelters and rooming houses through social housing to high-end condos. As the entire continuum becomes more expensive there is increased homelessness and people are suffering at all levels, paying more than they should be for housing.
- AHANS reports that in 2007 there were 153 rooming houses in HRM but in 2012 there were just 25 and 5 of these were for sale. The manager of the Turning Point shelter noted that every time a rooming house closes, the shelter sees an increase in business!
INTRODUCTION

Offender reintegration, as an important dimension of HRM’s response to concerns of violence and public safety, cropped up repeatedly in the focus groups of the 2008 Roundtable and generated a handful of recommendations. Eighteen months after the PSO was established in 2009, a special ad hoc committee on the theme was formed under PSO leadership to discuss the issues, facts, and policies of offender reintegration pertinent to the PSO’s evolving strategic action planning. In updating the data and issues concerning this dimension of the Review, assessing outcomes for the 2008 Report’s recommendations and the ad hoc committee’s discussions, and looking forward from the current situation, a wide variety of research strategies and activities have been employed:

- A research outline was developed in collaboration between the principal investigator and John Peach, executive director of the John Howard Society of Nova Scotia. Peach and his team assumed responsibility for writing the supplemental report reproduced in Volume 2. Interviews, roughly equally split between the Peach team and the principal investigator, usually following an interview guide, were carried out with 22 key persons, stakeholders and knowledgeables in this field. These included police officers engaged in various roles focusing on convicted offenders, provincial officials at different ranks in Nova Scotia Correctional Services responsible for adult and youth correctional facilities, authorities responsible for federal Corrections’ management at the regional and HRM levels, provincial bureaucrats responsible for community services, housing and other provincial programs, and non-profit service providers and advocates engaged in offender reintegration activities (especially housing and employment).

- Pertinent information from interviews garnered for other dimensions of the Review (e.g., Housing, Race Relations) was also available.

- Statistical information was obtained for adult and youth provincial incarceration at the Nova Scotia Youth Facility (NSYF) and the adult Central Nova Scotia Correctional Facility (CNSCF). CSC provided data on offenders released to HRM from the five federal facilities in Atlantic Canada. The HRP supplied data on charges for the year period 2006 to 2012.

- In addition, there was modest recourse to documents (e.g., reports and papers of the Public Safety Office, provincial Corrections’ documents) and to the general research / evaluation literature concerning barriers to the successful community reintegration of offenders.
THE 2008 RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE RESPONSE

The recommendations of the 2008 Roundtable regarding offender reintegration basically centered on six themes, namely:

- a. that HRM call on the province to open a drug treatment court (DTC) for addicted persons who typically are multiple repeat offenders as regularly documented by research in HRM and elsewhere in Canada and the United States;
- b. that HRM facilitate safe, supportive housing for offenders exiting youth or adult custody;
- c. that HRM work with the appropriate provincial and federal authorities to develop a strategic action plan for offender reintegration;
- d. that HRM advocate for improved exit planning at the provincial Corrections facilities;
- e. that HRM through its PSO examine best practices elsewhere for enhancement of offender reintegration, and
- f. that particular attention be given to Black offenders who are quite over-represented at both federal prisons and provincial jails.

Overall, the recommendations were not dealt with in an effective way as the Peach team well-establishes in its detailed assessment of outcomes for the various recommendations that followed from the above themes. There was very little evidence of any engagement of HRM government for any recommendations and while, as indicated in the Timeline below, the PSO was engaged in collaborative meetings on several issues (e.g., supportive housing, reintegration initiatives for Black inmates, an innovative adult restorative justice program for minor offences, usually LCA violations, for Dalhousie University students, and gathering information on best practices elsewhere such as the Ceasefire program for violent repeat offenders in the United States), its role was a limited one, perhaps due to its location and responsibilities within the HRP. For its part, HRM did commit to a major annual investment in the Youth Advocate Program in 2012 when YAP’s federal funding ceased; the YAP program however was targeted at young teens, at-risk of becoming involved with gangs, not offender reintegration. As the Peach team elaborates upon in its accompanying paper, it has been especially disappointing that the PSO and the municipal government exercised no apparent advocacy and leverage with respect to programming and exit planning at the adult provincial jail. There was enhancement with respect to the enforcement of parole and probation conditions and monitoring dangerous repeat offenders by HRM’s two police services which undoubtedly contributed to public safety but there was little done to improve prospects for successful community reintegration of the inmates.
PATTERNS OF REPEAT OFFENDING AND INCARCERATION

Data for HRP charges over the period 2006 to 2012 showed that some 16,503 different persons were charged, among whom were 3263 (20%) who allegedly committed 4 or more offences; these latter persons, labeled multiple or repeat accused persons in the analyses (see the tables in the section below titled Variations in Violence and Victimization), accounted for 62% of the 48,548 total offences over the 2006-2012 period. Further breakdown of the data indicated that a higher proportion of youth charged was multiple or repeat accuseds than was the case among the adults; that is, 25% of all youth accused had 4 or more charges compared to 18% of all adult accused. Among Blacks there was more than double the proportion of repeat accused as among Whites; 33% of all Black accused were repeaters compared to 18% of all White persons charged. These data patterns for charges laid are also reflected in convictions, probation and incarceration tables not reproduced here.

There are 5 federal prisons in Atlantic Canada, two of which are located in Nova Scotia, namely Springhill, a medium security institution and triage centre for all adult male prisons in Atlantic Canada, and Nova, in Truro, which is the sole facility for female offenders. In HRM there are 6 half-way houses, two Community Corrections Centres operated by CSC which house the more at-risk ex-inmates and four Community Residential Centres managed by non-profit organizations on behalf of CSC. There are several adult provincial facilities in Nova Scotia but the largest by far is the CNSCF in HRM, while for youth, virtually all are incarcerated at the NSYF in Waterville. While supportive data have been difficult to track down, previous reports and the views of those interviewed for this Review, indicate that HRM typically receives more released inmates than it sends to these institutions, for many reasons (e.g., non-profit programs and advocacy are concentrated in this largest urban centre in Atlantic Canada, the anonymity of the “big city”, government policies favouring a concentration of services and so forth). Best estimates from informed sources are that:

- only 75% of the persons released to HRM from CNSCF had resided in HRM prior to their incarceration,
- that HRM residents constitute roughly 70% of the persons housed in CSC’s six half-way houses,
- that, at the least, 15% of the non-HRM youths at the NSYF come to the area upon release and
- in recent years some 66% of the youths housed in metro’s six Homebridge group homes are from beyond HRM’s border.
HRM then is the major destination point for incarcerated offenders and those “having trouble with the law”, and clearly the municipality has a major interest and stake in the adequacy of the salient enforcement and reintegration policies and practices.

On any given day there are between 175 and 200 federal parolees residing in HRM. They are monitored via an impressive array of police strategies utilized by both HRP and RCMP officers. There is a 4 person HEAT team that focuses on serious offenders and those wanted on warrant, an integrated intelligence team that focuses on gathering intelligence and exchanging it with their CSC counterparts, and an HRP officer working at CSC offices who focuses on parole / probation conditions and some basic reintegration issues (e.g., housing availability). In addition, there are some special programs operated by the separate police services; for example, the RCMP has its Operation Breach initiative which strives to be proactive by contacting high-risk persons upon their release and making them aware of their monitoring; in the last fiscal year, these RCMP officers made 350 checks on 45 persons in HRM. Overall, then, the enforcement dimension of dealing with convicted offenders, especially the more violent ones and federal ex-inmates, and contributing to public safety in that way, seems solidly in place and has been strengthened since the 2008 Roundtable. Small wonder perhaps that the Atlantic region has had in recent years the highest rate of parole revocation (34%) among the CSC regions (Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview, 2013).

Over the past ten years the number of inmates in the federal prisons has gone from roughly 12,000 to roughly 15,000, an all-time high (CBC News, posted November 25, 2013). On the day 2013-09-13, CSC authorities reported that there were 311 persons under CSC community control in Nova Scotia and that 17% of the federal parolee cases being supervised at any given time in HRM are Black persons. Blacks constitute 11% of the 1774 persons in the five federal Atlantic institutions, roughly four times their population percentage in Atlantic Canada. Interview data indicated that federal officials believed that there could be fewer revocations if ex-inmates’ needs for safe supportive housing could be better met and if bureaucratic problems (e.g., the released person’s frequent problem in quickly securing a provincial health card) could be more easily resolved by collaboration between the federal and provincial authorities, and also that more institutional programming at the CNSCF could result in greater eligibility of parole among the provincial inmates. In their view the municipality could play a significant advocacy role, leveraging its resources to achieve provincial program change. It was also noted that, unlike PEI and New Brunswick, Nova Scotia does not participate in a work release program for federal inmates.

Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 provide the patterns for the CNSCF provincial jail in Nova Scotia. Table 6.1 indicates that while total admissions have declined from 2936 in 2007-08 to 2775 in 2012-13, there is no clear pattern save the
usual number being in the vicinity of 2800 admissions (including remand and sentenced to custody). There has also been a significant and consistent rate of re-incarceration in all fiscal years from 2007-08 to 2012-13; about 63% of the persons admitted had previously been incarcerated. Females have usually constituted between 15% and 20% of the CNSCF population. A comparison of Tables 6.2 and 6.3 shows that annually there are roughly twice as many remand admissions than there are persons sentenced to custody. Generally, remand cases spend less time in CNSCF but even those sentenced to custody on average stay less than three months. The short time in custody and large proportion of persons on remand are commonly cited as major factors for the limited rehabilitative programming at the CNSCF. No data were available on the offences that led to remand or custody sentence but previous research indicated that a little over 20% of the provincial inmates are incarcerated each year for violent offences.

Table 6.2 shows that the remand cases vary but on average – save for the dip in 2009-10 and 2010-11 which is evident in all three tables - have been about 1800. Blacks have constituted roughly 18% of the remands, about 5 times their proportion in the HRM population and 9 times their provincial proportion. The Aboriginal remand cases have increased modestly in recent years. On the whole though there has been no evident numerical trend for any of the racial/ethnic groupings. Table 6.3 presents the patterns for cases where the offender has been sentenced to custody. It is a picture similar to Table 6.2 for remands, the major difference being that the sentenced to custody admissions average about only 850 (the variation over time is quite modest if two year averages are calculated). The significant overrepresentation of Blacks is again evident and at the same level (i.e., 18%) though here an upward trend is evident whereas there is no clear trend for the other racial-ethnic groupings.

The number of youths incarcerated at the NSYF has declined from usually over 100 in the pre-YCJA era to roughly 40 or so in recent years. Extrapolating from a large sample completed in 2012, 70% of the youths were either 16 or 17 years of age and mostly Caucasian (63%) with 30% linked to African Nova Scotian ethnicity/race and 7% Aboriginal. Their home residence was 48% HRM and 52% other. 26% were engaged in school work presumably beyond the basic grade 10 level. The majority of youths (56%) were in the NSYF for serious violent offences against persons; fully 52% were currently under sentences of at least 180 days in custody and only 40% had been in their current NSYF unit (2A or 3B) for 60 days or less. 26% were in their unit on a remand basis. Fully 80% of the youths had prior incarceration at NSYF and 40% had been in custody there on many different occasions.

Declining inmate numbers driven by demographics (e.g., the aging population and the small provincial population growth over the past decade) and especially the significant changes in laws (e.g., YCJA in 2003) and
sentencing policy for young offenders (e.g., court decisions have minimized the ‘step policy’ in sentencing – harsher punishment for repeat violations - save for offences clearly placing the public at risk) have created opportunity and pressures for more programming. A widespread view is that, while nowadays youths are in custody typically because of violent offences and egregious offending that do indeed place the public at risk, their small number, combined with a revulsion among policy makers at mere “warehousing”, do call for imaginative programming that may involve teaching new skills and ways of thinking that can better balance incarceration with opportunities for reintegration.

The above approach to the custodial situation of young inmates arguably has been a feature of NSYF programming in recent years. Its Centre 24/7 program, established for about twelve years, has been unique in Canada for its off-site program that brings together NSYF and community-based youths. It provides a comprehensive educational, and lifestyle support program and occasionally has held circles with family members and employed other restorative practices strategies. In addition, the NSYF has funded a biweekly restorative justice for newly received inmates for the past ten years. Within the institution, there are educational, anger management and substance abuse programs; as well, other programs have been put in place with the assistance of outside organizations for minority groups (especially African Nova Scotians and Aboriginals (e.g., regular sweats by gender are open to all interested youths)). For its approach to working with young inmates the NSYF has recently received high praise from retired Justice Merlin Nunn whose commission in 2006 produced a number of recommendations for major changes in how young offenders, responsible for serious and / or multiple repeat offences, should be dealt with by the NS justice system. In 2012 Nova Scotia Youth Facility (NSYF) launched its Restorative Practices Initiative. Staff and youths in a unit of the NSYF were trained and became regularly engaged in a far-reaching restorative practices approach which included morning circles, use of an everyday restorative relationship style, and informal, small group dispute resolution. The objectives included transforming the sub-culture of the incarceration experience, developing more positive relationships between and among the youth workers and the incarcerated youths, and facilitating the youths’ reintegration in mainstream society.

While the NSYF has mounted a number of programs aimed at rehabilitation, has designated youth workers regularly collaborating with probation officers in assisting the youths in their exit planning, and overall adopted a progressive approach to reintegration, its programming has some shortcomings (e.g. very few NSYF youths actually ever participate in the Centre 24/7 program) and the youths often do have serious personal problems as well as involvement in criminogenic social situations and relationships on the outside beyond the reach of the NSYF programming. A major challenge is how to link up positive familial and community relationships and
circumstances with what might be accomplished in the NSYF to reduce the high level of re-incarceration and facilitate successful community reintegration. And, since the majority of the NSYF youths upon release establish residence in HRM, a related challenge would be what can the municipality do to assist in that regard.

TABLE 6.1 - TOTAL NUMBER OF ADMISSIONS TO CENTRAL NOVA SCOTIA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY BY FISCAL YEAR INCLUDING PERCENTAGE WITH PREVIOUS PERIODS OF INCARCERATION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Previous incarceration (%)</th>
<th>Total Admissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>2865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A previous period of incarceration includes any type of admission to custody including sentenced, remanded, and other statuses. Rates of re-incarceration are self-reported.

Source: Justice Enterprise Information Network (JEIN), Nova Scotia Department of Justice
### Table 6.2 - Remand Admissions to Central Nova Scotia Correctional Facility by Ethnicity 2007-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Caucasian</th>
<th>Aboriginal</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>286 (16%)</td>
<td>1214 (67%)</td>
<td>76 (4%)</td>
<td>241 (13%)</td>
<td>1817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>329 (19%)</td>
<td>1180 (67%)</td>
<td>93 (5%)</td>
<td>150 (9%)</td>
<td>1752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>302 (19%)</td>
<td>1133 (71%)</td>
<td>68 (4%)</td>
<td>96 (6%)</td>
<td>1599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>318 (20%)</td>
<td>1099 (69%)</td>
<td>91 (6%)</td>
<td>84 (5%)</td>
<td>1592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>320 (18%)</td>
<td>1225 (68%)</td>
<td>123 (7%)</td>
<td>124 (7%)</td>
<td>1792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>313 (18%)</td>
<td>1255 (69%)</td>
<td>130 (7%)</td>
<td>122 (7%)</td>
<td>1820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The ethnicity of an incarcerated person is identified by Corrections staff using: (a) observation of physical characteristics and (b) information obtained from the incarcerated person during the admission process.*

Source: JEIN, NS Department of Justice, 2013

### 6.3 - Sentenced Custody Admissions to Central Nova Scotia Correctional Facility by Ethnicity 2007-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Caucasian</th>
<th>Aboriginal</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>123 (15%)</td>
<td>622 (74%)</td>
<td>28 (3%)</td>
<td>71 (8%)</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>130 (15%)</td>
<td>657 (75%)</td>
<td>35 (4%)</td>
<td>59 (7%)</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>131 (16%)</td>
<td>591 (74%)</td>
<td>28 (4%)</td>
<td>49 (6%)</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>168 (19%)</td>
<td>648 (72%)</td>
<td>45 (5%)</td>
<td>33 (4%)</td>
<td>894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>170 (20%)</td>
<td>606 (70%)</td>
<td>60 (7%)</td>
<td>29 (3%)</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>144 (18%)</td>
<td>589 (72%)</td>
<td>38 (5%)</td>
<td>51 (6%)</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JEIN, NS Department of Justice, 2013

---

**Analyses of Timeline Developments in Offender Reintegration**

The timeline below for offender reintegration highlights programs and policies that emerged in the period 2008 to 2013 inclusive. Several themes stand out. There were several developments in Corrections Services Canada (CSC) policies and programming for federal inmates while in prisons and subsequently when released back into the community. Given the high proportion of federal inmates identified by CSC as having significant mental health problems (minimally 25%), it is not surprising that programs responding to that problem were developed and honed for federal offenders in both milieus. In 2009, subsequent to preparing a Mental Health Strategy for Corrections in Canada, CSC established its Mental Unit Post-Release Program providing, through staff and contracted specialists, a mental health team to facilitate federal offenders’ reintegration.

Other supportive CSC programs, such as CORCAN in 2008, providing employment and education programs for offenders under its authority, were expanded within the institutions. In 2011 CSC’s Community Maintenance Program (CMP) was elaborated through subcontracting the handling of evening sessions in Metro Halifax to the
John Howard Society while its staff continued to be responsible for daytime sessions. The CMP evening sessions focus upon parolees who are recently released and employed. It is a community-based follow-up for all CSC core institutional programs. The CMP includes 12 weekly sessions where treatment targets are problem solving, high risk thinking, self-management skills, goal setting, healthy relationships, and emotions management. In 2013 CSC expanded on its exit planning programs by contracting with Shelter Nova Scotia in 2013 to come to the facilities and discusses the possibilities for housing with inmates soon-to-be released into HRM. CSC’s special programming for Aboriginal inmates over the past fifteen years has been quite impressive even while not reducing the considerable over-representation of Aboriginal males and females in the federal institutions (Clairmont, 2011). Some much more modest initiatives have sporadically been launched for Black and other visible minority inmates but recent internal assessment by the CSC Investigator has emphasized their inadequacy (Office of the Corrections Investigator, 2013). While no strong evidence has been gathered in this Review, aside from positive testimonials by some interviewees, to assess how effective overall the CSC programming has been in increasing the rate of successful reintegration, the recidivism rate appears to be substantially below that of the provincial correctional facilities in Nova Scotia (Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview, 2012).

The Timeline provides only modest evidence of any significant initiatives in rehabilitation programs or exit planning at the provincial level applicable to the large majority of its adult inmates. The exceptions have included programs offered to female inmates by the Elizabeth Fry Society within the jail (paralleling their work in the federal institutions) and upon release, and, much more modestly, some supportive response to Aboriginal projects attempting to bridge the gap between correctional facilities and the Mi’kmaq communities. There are indications that the time is appropriate for advocacy regarding more substantial changes that could impact the majority adult male inmates in the institutions and upon release. In 2009-2010 the province established an adult mental health court in HRM which emphasizes treatment and services (e.g., housing) rather than incarceration. In 2011 the Department of Community Services launched its Supportive Housing Pilot program featuring funding for Housing Support Workers and rent subsidies and which could be accessed by released inmates. In 2013, as the Timeline indicates, several initiatives were announced such as the provincial mental health and addictions strategy, an Employment Readiness Programs to be managed by the John Howard Society for released inmates on social assistance, and some negotiations were undertaken between CNSCF and organizations such as the 7th Step and Elizabeth Fry to engage with adult male inmates at the facility.

There have been significant developments at the NSYF, the youth facility, presumably occasioned by several factors such as a more generous societal disposition to programs aimed at young offenders’ rehabilitation, a
greater Corrections’ sensitivity to the emphasis on rehabilitation in the 2003 YCJA and its subsequent interpretations by the courts, and the deep decline in the number of youths incarcerated which permits more intensive programming. The Timeline details a number of such initiatives for young offenders, some diverting youth from the NSYF and some pertaining to the facility itself (e.g., see the items HYAC in 2007, YAP in 2008, iMOVe in 2009, Restorative Practices in 2012 and the MLSN’s Bringing in the Culture in 2013). The NSYF has developed a good reputation for its progressive programs that have complemented earlier initiatives (e.g., Centre 24/7, an off-site facility educational program, CALM, an anger management program) but the very high rate of re-incarceration there clearly establishes the importance of services and programs that link the jail and the community and counter the post-release barriers to successful reintegration.

As would be expected given the thorough assessment of outcomes for the 2008 Roundtable recommendations by Peach et al in their attached paper, there is little evidence of any significant initiative by HRM or the PSO bearing on offender reintegration. There are many references in the Timeline to community-based initiatives such as those offering services to addicted persons (e.g. Mainline Needle Exchange and Direction 180 providing methadone), mobile street health services (MOSH) and various housing-based programs, virtually all of which are funded by the province and largely operating independently of one another (Peach, p19). HRM’s PSO did coordinate several meetings on strategies for offender reintegration but there was no clear follow-up; the PSO played a modest role in the establishment of a restorative justice program for minor, essentially statutory offences, which represented an interesting collaboration of the provincial NSRJ program, HRP and Dalhousie University; and also a supportive voice for a drug intervention project which provided a community-based program alternative to incarceration for low level, non-addicted drug dealers. Both these programs may be developed more elaborately in the future with implications for effecting more successful offender reintegration.

**KEY ISSUES IN OFFENDER REINTEGRATION**

The Peach team in their appended paper has dealt in depth with the major barriers to successful offender reintegration as determined through review of the pertinent literature, interviews done in this Review, and their own considerable experience in working with released inmates. They highlight (a) employment and / or employability training, (b) release planning and programming, (c) safe appropriate housing, (d) mental health and / or substance abuse, (e) access to and continuity of income assistance programs, (f) community support and navigating systems and support services especially for adult men and, not least, services or programming within the Corrections institutions. They emphasize in particular the inadequacy of the provincial Corrections facilities in these respects and the absence of any significant engagement by the municipality and recommend significant changes in both these regards.
These observations have much salience for HRM. As discussed above, there are many serious offenders to respond to and, as well, more incarcerated persons upon release take up residence in HRM than were formerly residents here; also, there are high levels of repeat offending and re-incarceration for both youths and adults; so, from a violence and public safety perspective, HRM has to be concerned with offender reintegration and partner and advocate with the provincial authorities and other community agencies to respond to the barriers the Peach team has clearly identified. Currently the chief feature of the societal response to serious adult offenders thus far has been the emphasis on enforcement. The evidence is that a reasonably effective enforcement response has been achieved to monitor released persons and effect their re-incarceration for violations of release conditions or new offences. Within institutions, there has also usually been an emphasis on security and enforcement as indicated by Peach et al with respect to initiatives in recent years at the CNSCF.

Overall, though, there appears to be an imbalance as comparatively little attention has focused on programming in the adult facility or linking up with community resources to facilitate reintegration upon release. Arguments justifying limited internal programming based on considerations such as the remand factor or the short sentences fail the equity test since in both federal and provincial institutions there has been extensive focus on rehabilitation within and reintegrative linkages to the community for female inmates. There is also clearly a need to reduce the isolation of the Correctional facilities where possible by projects and programs that establish bridges for reintegration. New York City has recently been celebrated for its dramatic gains in reducing both crime and incarceration by emphasizing such balance where the innovation has largely been matching defendants with community-based services and supervision. The Corrections Commissioner of New York recently noted “Discharge planning and pre-release preparation are critical to reducing recidivism for both pretrial and sentenced inmates”, and the Deputy Mayor stated, “By working with communities and individuals, we are successfully preventing crime and saving thousands from a life of cycling through the criminal justice system.”. Directing more focus on the rehabilitation and reintegration for the adult offender is not an easy sell to the public and there is no adult equivalent to the YCJA legislation which can push the agenda and advocate for adult offenders but it is important in order to reduce violence and enhance public safety. Nevertheless, as noted in the discussion of Timeline events above, the last few years have witnessed a number of policies and actions that suggest that the timing is right for a concerted effort at change.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are the key recommendations advanced for this dimension. They are congruent with those emphasized by Peach et al in their paper though not as exhaustive and without the specificity of required actions that they highlight, so their recommendations should be additionally consulted.
1. There needs to be a better balance between the enforcement and offender reintegration dimensions of responding to offenders who cause violence and concerns for public safety. That balance can be achieved by emphasizing more rehabilitative programming within the institutions (especially adult facilities), more linkages to community-based services and programs, and more exit planning for incarcerated offenders. The province and the municipality should be partners in realizing that balance and work as much as possible with community services and organizations to do so.

2. The emphasis should be on the adult provincial jail within HRM namely the CNSCF where extant programs are very limited – essentially, as detailed in the Timeline, four programs namely AA, NA, WOOF and the educational program GED. The arguments of balance and equity require change and that, in turn, requires provincial action and municipal advocacy.

3. As in the 2008 Roundtable, and for the same reasons, it is recommended that the “Housing First” approach be put in place and that, as in the federal institutions, pre-exit planning should include contact with community resources such as Shelter Nova Scotia.

4. Employment is second to housing but crucial for long-run successful reintegration as indicated in the literature on that subject. Employment readiness programs and social enterprises (e.g., HRM’s Youth Live where youth is defined to include young adults) are keys to employment and should be encouraged.

5. Persons addicted to drugs are typically multiple repeat offenders, and, in the USA and in the larger CMAs in Canada, drug treatment courts have emerged to reduce crime and re-direct the addicts. In HRM the Mental Health Court has recently added a drug treatment program for its mentally ill clients. Modestly successful DTCs can accomplish both these objectives and as in the 2008 Roundtable it is recommended that HRM call on the province to establish such a DTC in HRM.

6. Community agencies and organizations in HRM which are engaged in offender reintegration whether as providing cultural linkages (e.g., Black mentorship), support services (e.g., the Navigator program of the SGRBA) or motivational strategies (e.g., 7th Step) should be facilitated by the provincial and municipal governments.

**TIMELINE - OFFENDER REINTEGRATION DIMENSION**

**2007**

- The Halifax Youth Attendance Centre opens. A recommendation of the Nunn Commission, HYAC provides programming and services to “moderate-high risk youth under court-ordered community
supervision”. There is multi-provincial departmental collaboration with the initiative administered by the Department of Justice.

2008

- Spring Garden Road Business Association launches its Navigator Program, a major and continuing program working with the homeless, ex-inmates, group home “grads” and others, linking them to agencies and services.
- Our Thyme Café, a social enterprise owned and operated by the Elizabeth Fry Society, which provides training and work experience in the food industry for females released from prison / jail, opens in Downtown Dartmouth. This initiative builds upon E. Fry’s core programs (Provincial and Federal Outreach and Pre-release Planning at CNSCF and NOVA respectively) in place since 1985.
- Metro Non-Profit Housing Authority and Direction 180 serving the addicted and providing methadone, collaborate to start Halifax Housing Help, working with those who struggle finding and keeping housing.
- Give Right Back, a youth program aimed at high risk youths, is initiated by the Educational Program Innovation Charity (EPIC)
- Corrections Services Canada permanently institutes its “Institutionalized Mental Health Initiative”.
- Corrections Services Canada (CSC) expands CORCAN employment and education programs for offenders under its authority.
- The Federal-Provincial-Territorial Working Group on Mental Health is created by the corresponding Heads of Corrections.
- Mainline Needle Exchange and Stepping Stone (a service for sex workers) collaborate to provide a mobile needle exchange service which lasted only a year
- The Mi’kmaq Native Friendship Centre received multi-year funding from the federal Aboriginal Corrections Policy Unit for its Seven Sparks Healing Path program working with Aboriginal inmates in federal correctional institutions and also, and especially, with Aboriginal ex-inmates relocating in HRM.

2009

- Holly House opens - Elizabeth Fry Society establishes its own second stage supportive housing facility in Dartmouth. Its focus is on assisting females, whether ex-inmates or not, in developing skills and achieving stability in independent living. Operating on strict rules (e.g., drug use including methadone is not permitted) occupants (up to 8) apply, pay rent, sign a lease and may stay for beyond a year.
- The Mental Health Strategy for Corrections in Canada is released by CSC.
- Correctional Services Chaplaincy begins its 5 year Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA Halifax) program funded by Crime Prevention Canada
- Mobile Outreach Street Health (MOSH) is launched, providing primary health care to the homeless and other marginalized citizens. MOSH has outreach collaborations with a number of the shelters as well as Mainline Needle Exchange and Stepping Stone.
- CSC established its Mental Unit Post-Release Program. CSC since 2009 has managed through staff and contracted specialists a mental health team to facilitate federal offenders’ reintegration (CSC data indicate that roughly one quarter of all inmates had mental health issues).
The first sitting of the Nova Scotia Mental Health court was held November 2009 in Dartmouth. It follows a therapeutic jurisprudence approach where the focus is more on long-term, in-depth treatment than punishment for offenders with proven mental health issue. In 2012 the Mental Health court added a drug treatment program.

iMOVe supported by Halifax Community Justice Society (HCJS), Nova Scotia Department of Justice and the NSYF, begins its special program for incarcerated youth, especially African Nova Scotians. The program complements a HCJS outreach initiative at the NSYF begun eight years earlier called Rites of Passage which was based on an Africentric philosophy. The iMOVe program involved the use of creative arts and diverse media whereby the youths explored their life experiences and possible futures. In 2010 iMOVe via the HCJS received multi-year funding to the end of 2013 from the federal Department of Justice Youth Fund.

The Mi’kmaq Legal Support Network launches its Bridges project linking Aboriginal communities and incarcerated Aboriginal people through meaningful involvement in release planning and reintegration of Aboriginal offenders.

2010

HRM Public Safety Office initiated an Ad Hoc Committee on Offender Reintegration (the Committee met on several occasions to discuss successful reintegration and sensitize the PSO to the various policy and program options).

The federal Truth in Sentencing Act comes into effect. This Act calls for a 1:1 ratio in sentencing for credit for time served rather the 1:1.5 (or more) which has been commonplace. The expected result will be longer sentences.

CSC hires 50 social workers and mental health professionals as part of its Community Mental Health initiative.

2011

Nova Scotia Youth Facility (NSYF) launches its Restorative Practices Initiative. Staff and youths in a unit of the NSYF were trained and became regularly engaged in a far-reaching restorative practices approach which included morning circles, use of an everyday restorative, relationship style, and informal, small group dispute resolution. The objectives included transforming the sub-culture of the incarceration experience, developing more positive relationships between and among the youth workers and the incarcerated youths, and facilitating the youths’ reintegration in mainstream society.

The Nova Scotia Department of Community Services launches its Supportive Housing Pilot program featuring funding for Housing Support Workers and rent subsidies.

CSC ‘s Community Maintenance Program (CMP) subcontracts (via Public Works Government Services Canada) evening sessions in Metro Halifax to be handled by the John Howard Society while Corrections staff handles the day-time sessions. The CMP focuses upon parolees who are recently released. It is a community-based follow-up for all CSC core institutional programs and deals with all offenders save those from the Sex Offender Programs. The CMP includes 12 weekly sessions and treatment targets are problem solving, high risk thinking, self-management skills, goal setting, healthy relationships, and emotions management.

2012

• The Uptown Drug Intervention Project, an HRPS pilot project which provides selected, low-level, arrested drug traffickers with the option of enrolling in long-term community-based programs emphasizing attitudinal and behavioural change and employment readiness or, alternatively, having their case dealt with through the regular criminal justice system processes, is launched in the Uniacke Square area of Halifax.

2013

• Direction 180 mobile methadone clinic takes to the road, providing interim methadone therapy (i.e., distributing methadone) for individuals on the waiting list for full in-house treatment.
• Shelter Nova Scotia formalizes a contract with CSC for exit planning with soon-to-be released inmates concerning exit planning for housing options.
• The Working on Our Future (WOOF) program begins at the Central Nova Correctional Facility for adult inmates, pairing inmates with dogs for training and socialization.
• The Provincial Mental Health and Addictions Strategy, Together We Can, is released with a section devoted to offender reintegration planning. While not directly focused on the latter, the strategy calls for support being provided to those released and living in the community.
• JHS’ Employment Readiness Program is initiated. It focuses on persons with a criminal record who are also on income assistance with DCS. It provides both classroom and work experience. A co-operative form of employment is a central feature of the program as the participant is placed in employment for a month or so at no cost to the employer but subsequently it is hoped (there is no formal obligation) that the employer will hire the individual. The employment is low end and often seasonal but provides a starting point. The project is funded by the provincial government.

• 7th Step Initiative is re-introduced in the Halifax area. The Seventh Step Society is an international movement self-described as follows, “7th Step is a program designed to help the incorrigible and recidivist offenders change their behavior and attitudes using a basic self-help philosophy. Its fundamental principles are realistic thinking and positive peer pressure”. The 7th Step Society operated “a street group” in the Halifax area and “an institutional group” in Springhill prison in the 1980s. It receives some funding from Public Safety Canada.

• The Mi’kmaq Legal Support Network and the Nova Scotia Department of Justice receive federal funding for a multi-year project, “Bringing Culture Inside” which focuses on Aboriginal youth incarcerated at the NSYF and involves elders and specially culturally-trained MLSN staff bringing culturally salient programming into the institution to facilitate their reintegration. The initiative complements the MLSN’s “Building a Bridge” program in place since 2009 which helps all Aboriginal inmates prepare for their release and connect with services and programs once they are back in their communities.
VARIATIONS IN VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION

INTRODUCTION

In this section, there is brief examination of three dimensions of violence and victimization focusing on (a) youth; (b) race/ethnicity and (c) neighbourhoods. They are closely inter-related as troubled youths and serious youth crime do vary significantly by race-ethnic differentials and both these are empirically correlated with neighbourhood variations in violence and victimization. Here the focus is on that inter-connectedness. In the case of race/ethnicity, the variable of most interest is the Black–White distinction. The Aboriginal population is small in HRM (the status Indian population was less than 1000 in 2011 as cited above) as there are no significant First Nations settlements here though the Shubenacadie and Millbrook FNs have reserve properties in places such as Hammonds Plains, Sheet Harbour and Cole Harbour. The Aboriginal population in HRM is also quite diverse and not concentrated residentially (Clairmont and McMillan, 2006). The Other Visible Minority population is strongly linked to immigrant groupings and is growing but research by Clairmont and Kim in 2010 indicated that there was little criminal justice involvement among them.

The inter-connectedness of these three dimensions was a major theme of the 2008 Roundtable report. In examining the responses to the Roundtable recommendations, updating the empirical patterns of violence and victimization, and identifying current issues and possible future directions, there has been significant collaboration between the principal investigator and Professor Schneider of Saint Mary’s University. Professor Schneider, a well-recognized scholar and policy advocate in these fields, was involved in the original Roundtable and wrote a significant piece there on the interconnectedness of neighbourhoods, race-ethnicity and youth crime. His paper in Volume Two for this Review captures well the inter-relationships among these key dimensions. All told some 50 individuals were interviewed by the principal investigator or Professor Schneider for this broad dimension, including a bevy of HRP and RCMP police officers of different rank and responsibility, Public Health officials (mapping assault density by area), tenant leaders in the five major public housing complexes, private sector property managers (i.e., Killam Properties and Atlantic Living), ten community leaders in the Uptown area, eight provincial officials (DCS, Halifax Housing Authority, Department of Justice), two Correctional Services Canada officials, three School Board officials, four municipal officials, six non-profit service providers, several faith leaders in the Black community and a handful of youths. Documents and data were made available by the CSC, Corrections Nova Scotia, HRP, the RCMP, Public Health, HRM Police Board, the PSO and AHANS.
YOUNG OFFENDERS: THE 2008 REPORT AND RESPONSES

There were five recommendations advanced by a knowledgeable and experienced focus group in 2007; they are presented below with a capitalized comment on the response to them

1. The issue of serious youth crime and quasi-gangs should be as a focal point for HRM and PSO activities. THE YOUTH ADVOCATE PROGRAM FOCUSED ON PRE- GANG, AT-RISK YOUTH AND JOINTLY FUNDED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND HRM BEGAN IN 2006 AND HAS CONTINUED ON AFTER THE FEDERAL FUNDING CEASED IN 2011. IT IS UNIQUE IN CANADA FOR A MUNICIPALITY TO MAKE SUCH A LARGE FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO SUCH A PROGRAM. YAP HAS RECENTLY EXPANDED ITS WORK TO YOUNG FEMALE TEENS AT-RISK. SECONDLY, PROVINCIAL FUNDING IN 2007 FOR MORE HRM OFFICERS HAS FACILITATED COLLABORATIVE PROGRAMMING FOR AFRICAN NOVA SCOTIAN YOUTHS (e.g., THE CENTERLINE MUSIC STUDIO) AND ALSO ENHANCED THE AVAILABILITY OF HRP AND RCMP COMMUNITY RESPONSE OFFICERS AND SCHOOL RESPONSE OFFICERS.

2. HRM should facilitate by advocacy a more robust restorative justice program for youths who are multiple offenders or responsible for serious offences. THERE WAS NO SPECIAL INITIATIVE LED BY HRM OR THE PSO BUT THE HCJS DID DEVELOP A PROGRAM FOR MORE SERIOUS OFFENDERS. AND IN 2012 THE NSRJ PROGRAM, HRP AND DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY COLLABORATED TO MOUNT AN RJ PILOT PROJECT FOR STUDENTS, ESPECIALLY FOCUSED ON ALCOHOL VIOLATIONS.

3. HRM should be more engaged in seeing that the homelessness problems for youth are dealt with. THERE WAS NO SPECIAL INITIATIVE BY HRM BUT THE PSO DID ADVOCATE FOR MORE SAFE SUPERVISED HOUSING AND THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN PHOENIX HOUSE (A MAJOR NON-PROFIT SERVICE ORGANIZATION FOR YOUTH) AND KILLAM PROPERTIES FOR MORE AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATE RENTALS. SUBSEQUENTLY TOO THE PROVINCIAL DCS PROVIDED FUNDS TO ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS PHOENIX HOUSE TO ENGAGE A HOUSING SUPPORT WORKER TO ASSIST THE HOMELESS.

4. There was a recommendation to reduce the disturbances and property incidents and improve the relationship between the troubled youths in designated group homes and their immediate neighbours. THERE WAS NO SPECIAL INITIATIVE UNDERTAKEN BY EITHER HRM OR THE PSO BUT THE HCJS DID LAUNCH A PILOT PROJECT TO ORIENT THE STAFFS OF GROUP HOMES IN RJ PRACTICES.

5. HRM should be advocating and developing more early intervention programs for early crime prevention especially for high-risk youths. These could be educational, recreational and so forth and pitched at the junior high level. It was considered that the municipal government could directly act on such projects if it had a PSO with a strategic action plan. APART FROM PROGRAMS SUCH AS YAP WHICH HAD A MORE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE AND THE HRP’S ANNUAL SPORTS PAL DAY, NO SPECIAL INITIATIVES WERE DEVELOPED BY EITHER HRM OR THE PSO.
THERE WERE TWO PROGRAMS THAT DID ADDRESS THIS RECOMMENDATION. THE SCHOOL BOARDS DEVELOPED IN 2008 A SCHOOLSPLUS PROGRAM WHICH FOCUSED ON ELEMENTARY AND JUNIOR STUDENTS, PROVIDING A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES IN THE EVENING AND ON SATURDAY FOR YOUTHS AND THEIR FAMILIES. IT FOLLOWED THE RECOMMENDATION OF COMMISSIONER NUNN TO DEVELOP ALTERNATIVES FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTHS AT RISK. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S LIGHTHOUSE PROGRAM, ONGOING SINCE 2009, HAS HAD SIMILAR FOCUS, PROVIDING FUNDS AS A CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY TO COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS TO MOUNT AFTER SCHOOL PROGRAMS, SUCH AS RECREATIONAL, CRAFTS, AND VOLUNTEERING, FOR AT-RISK YOUTH.

IN ADDITION A COMMUNITY-BASED PROJECT, HOPE BLOOMS, WAS PUT INTO PLACE IN 2008 AND CONTINUES. IT STARTED WITH A COMMUNITY GARDEN BUT HAS RECENTLY ESTABLISHED A SUCCESSFUL SOCIAL ENTERPRISE PROJECT, MARKETING A SALAD DRESSING FROM THE GARDEN PRODUCE. THE ENTIRE PROJECT IS MEANINGFULLY OPERATED, WITH ADULT ASSISTANCE, BY A GROUPING OF 40 INNER CITY YOUTHS AGED FROM 9 TO 15.

YOUTH CRIME PATTERNS SINCE THE ROUNDTABLE

Tables 7.1 AND 7.2 and the associated graphs describe the crime patterns for youths and the total population for Nova Scotia and HRM over the years 2008 to 2012. The data includes both HRP and RCMP jurisdictions in HRM, providing both the raw numbers of incidents and the rate per 10,000. Table 7.1, dealing with youth, indicates that in the case of violent incidents there has been no consistent change over the five year period, any variation being very modest after 2008. The rate was highest in 2008 (i.e., 241 per 10,000 and lowest in 2009 (186 per 10,000). For property crimes there was the same pattern of no consistent change after 2008 and again 2008 had the highest rate (i.e., 415 per 10,000) while 2009 had the lowest (i.e., 361 per 10,000). An interesting aside is that the rate of both violent and property crime was consistently lower among HRM youth than among the total NS youth population.

Table 7.2 presents similar data for the total HRM population (including both youths and adults). Here there is a consistently declining rate of violent crime and a mixed pattern for property offences. In the case of violent offences, the rate steadily went from 172 per 10,000 down to 115 per 10,000; in the case of property crime, the rate was at its highest in 2010 (486 per 10,000) and lowest in 2012 (i.e., 377 per 10,000). For this inclusive age population, there was no pronounced difference in the rates of violence between HRM and NS as a whole save in 2012 when HRM’s rate declined more sharply to a low of 115 while the provincial decline was less.

The graphs capture the difference between the rates for youth and the overall HRM population. The youth rates for violence have been consistently higher and do not show the pattern of a downward trend. Property crime in HRM does not follow that pattern; here the overall HRM population compared to youths has a consistently
higher rate of such offences until 2012 when the difference narrows to just 3%. The indication from these tables is that youth are more likely than adults to engage in violent offences. The differences are even greater than described in the tables and charts since youths are included in the comparison category. One issue though is whether the violence in which youths are engaged is as serious as the violence for which the adult offenders are charged. It is interesting that in the case of sexual assault, the most serious incidents, aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, are far more likely to be committed by adults; in the table presented in the section above on Gendered Violence, the ratio of adult to young offenders for these offences is 22 to 4 or minimally five times as many adults but then the number of adults in the population is much greater by a factor of eight. More research would be necessary to assess such age-related differences in the charges for violence.

HRP charge data for youths and adults over the years 2006 to 2012 shows that the number of different youths charged increased fairly consistently over these years, rising from 165 in 2006 to 273 in 2012 and representing respectively 5% and 8% of the total distinct persons charged. In the case of adults there was not a clear trend but there was a decline from 3255 distinct adults charged in 2006 to 3072 in 2012, representing 92% and 88% respectively of the total persons charged.

Table 7.3 and 7.4 present data from HRP and the RCMP for charges in HRM. Table 7.3 provides the HRP data for the combined years 2006 to 2012. Youths accounted for 6% of the total number of different persons charged while an additional 2% committed some of their later offences as adults. Calculating “repeat charged” as those accused of 4 or more charges, 7% of youth were “repeat charged” and another 8% were youths initially charged as a youth but some of their subsequent charges occurred when they were adults in the 2006 to 2012 period. Fully 25% of the youths were “repeat charged” compared to 18% among the adults. The RCMP data (Table 7.4) were limited to two years, 2012 and 2013, but essentially conveyed the same pattern. 6% of the distinct persons charged were youths and among the different individuals classified as “repeat charged” (i.e., had four or more charges) 7% were youth. 21% of all accused youths were “repeat charged” while the “repeat charged” among adults were 16%.

Overall, then, the data show that violence offences among youths in HRM, unlike in the case of their adult counterparts, have not exhibited a downward trend in their numbers or their rates per 10,000. The data also indicate that HRP charges for distinct individuals have risen in number and percentage for youths over the period 2006 to 2012 while for adults there has been no consistent trend though generally the percentages for distinct individual adults charged have declined from the earlier years. Data from both HRP and RCMP charges indicate that multiple offenders have been more common among youth than among adults. While one has to be careful in drawing implications from these analyses it seems fair to say that youth crime, and particularly violent
crime, has not declined since the Roundtable and that it may increasingly be caused by a small number of young offenders.

Generally, the interviews with police officers, community leaders and the elected HRM mayor and councilors generated a positive picture of declining youth crime since 2008. A clear majority of councilors contended that there has been less youth crime since the Roundtable though several qualified that opinion by adding that youths are still engaged in much minor crime such as theft from motor vehicles. Police interviewees typically contended that youth quasi-gangs (i.e., small numbers, based on kinship and friendship, living in the same residential area) had declined from the Roundtable era though were still visible in three public housing areas (Mulgrave Park, Uniacke Square and Greystone), as well as in North Dartmouth and Spryfield. It was a widespread police position that swarmings nowadays have more to do with rivalry among these quasi-gangs (often to steal drugs and money from one another) than with random assaults and thefts from the public. Data on youth gangs were not as accessible to the Review researchers as they had been in 2006-2008 so caution must be exercised.

It is interesting that minutes of the HRM Police Board show that discussions on youth crime, especially violence, were second only to those concerned with guns and shooting in frequency. There also was a common view expressed by officials in youth and adult provincial jails and in group homes in HRM that the youths they are responsible for are more explosive, violent and problematic than in earlier years, suggesting a smaller but more problem-ridden number of young offenders. Research conducted in other jurisdictions of Nova Scotia, such as New Glasgow and Truro, indicated that generally no more than 15 to 20 youths account for the majority of the annual docket entries for youth in these small urban areas; a comparable analysis has yet to be done for HRM but it is likely that the docket is similarly dominated by a minority of the accused youths.

YOUTHS: FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The above brief overview of youth crime and young offenders is congruent with the more elaborate assessment provided by Schneider’s paper in Volume Two which should be consulted. They are several key issues going forward, namely:

1. Violent crime among youths is still significant and there is no unambiguous evidence for a declining trend.
2. A small minority of the young offenders may be responsible for much of the violence and for clogging up the court processing of youth cases.
3. The violent, multiple repeater, young offenders likely have a number of serious personal issues along with being located in a criminogenic social environment.
4. The crime prevention and societal reintegration programming in place appear to focus heavily on youths under 16 years of age and much less on older teenagers and young adults.

There are a number of recent developments that may be valuable in dealing with the above four points. These include:

1. The Souls Strong and Cure Violence (Ceasefire) multi-year intervention programs become operational in various Black communities in 2014. Both focus on older teens and young adults, an age grouping largely neglected in societal / community reintegration programming. They complement the continuing YAP intervention which is solely a municipal program.

2. The increasing trend to restorative justice and restorative practices both in the school system (at all levels) and in the provincial youth jail.

3. The change in the HYAC approach from working with youths diverted from incarceration, in a separate context to working with them in the regular school context.

4. The increased commitment of the HRM police services to advocate and participate in a more holistic, multi-service collaboration with other services and organizations in dealing with youth at high-risk. The RCMP has launched its version of the HUB program and the HRP is advancing its Full Service Policing model, both of which appear to be similar in objectives and processes and to reflect a social development approach to policing which the police services in 2008 declared to be a key dimension of their strategic approach to policing. There are other similar intervention models such as Neighbourhood Integrated Service Team (NIST) which more explicitly also focuses on the neighbourhood and has outreach workers attached to the specific NISTs.

These major recent developments could be effective in dealing with the issues of youth crime noted above. They suggest two general recommendations:

1. The municipality requires greater capacity – presumably in part via a relocated, adequately resourced PSO - to keep abreast of the various initiatives, secure and assess information on their processes and outcomes and play an appropriate role with the provincial and federal governments and other partners in the determination of subsequent steps in crime prevention, enforcement and societal reintegration of young offenders.

2. A second recommendation is that the interventionist model adopted to respond to serious youth offending, acknowledge the complexity and requirement for a collaborative strategic approach and, in that respect, examine best practices associated with established interventions such as HUB, NIST and CURE VIOLENCE. In his companion paper Professor
Schneider advances more elaborate and specific recommendations and these should be consulted.

RACE / ETHNIC VARIATION IN VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION

There was much emphasis on variation in victimization and offending by race / ethnicity in the Roundtable report. It was deemed important to highlight not only the statistics on offending but also the victimization that occurs to Black families and communities directly as victims of crime and at risk of violence but also indirectly when family members get assaulted or come under the control of the criminal justice system. It was also crucial to recognize that the multiple repeat, serious offenders constitute a small percentage of HRM’s African Nova Scotian population and that there appears to be an increasing divide as in the United States between “inner city” Blacks often living in the “projects” or equally vulnerable low-rent private complexes, and the large majority of the Black population who reside in middle-class milieus and stable, attractive communities. The 2008 Roundtable discussed the achievements of the latter grouping with respect to professional work (e.g., lawyers, teachers and social workers) and artistic endeavours; these patterns have not been updated for this Review but there is little reason to think they have declined.

THE 2008 ROUNDTABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE RESPONSE TO THEM

There were three chief recommendations specifically grouped with respect to race relations issues in the 2008 report but a number of the other recommendations dealing with troubled youth and vulnerable neighbourhoods were also salient. Here the focus is on the three race relations recommendations, again with capitalized comments regarding the response:

1. The municipality should examine ways to deal more effectively and more inclusively with the African Nova Scotian population and communities, re-configuring or replacing the Community and Race Relations committee, examining HRM staffing strategies and partnering with local Black leaders and the other levels of government to reduce the highly disproportionate rates of victimization and offending among Blacks. IN 2012 THE AFRICAN NOVA SCOTIAN AFFAIRS INTEGRATION OFFICE WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION OF HRM.

2. The violent offending, especially the random swarmings, the gang activity (e.g., drug dealing), and the intimidation have to be confronted with both good enforcement and with social development strategies that involve community leaders, the majority Black population and others in responding to the pockets of crime, despair, offending and victimization. THE SAFER, STRONGER COMMUNITIES PROGRAM IN 2009 WAS A SIGNIFICANT COLLABORATIVE RESPONSE AMONG THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE / DCS, HRM, HRP AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS. IN 2012 THE
UPTOWN DRUG INTERVENTION PILOT PROJECT SHUTTING DOWN OPEN-AIR DRUG DEALING AND PROVIDING ALTERNATIVES TO COURT PROCESSING FOR SOME LOW LEVEL DRUG DEALERS WAS A SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION BETWEEN HRP, COMMUNITY LEADERS AND NON-PROFIT SERVICE PROVIDERS.

3. The municipality should encourage more robust restorative justice initiatives in the Black communities and effective alternatives to court processing and incarceration in order to facilitate offender reintegration. THERE WAS SOME EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY OUTREACH BY THE HCJS, AND, AS NOTED, THE UDI PILOT PROJECT IN 2012. BOTH WERE MODEST INITIATIVES. THE PSO COORDINATED A SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS ON OFFENDER REINTEGRATION AMONG THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT AND OTHER COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS BUT NO DIRECT ACTION ENSUED.

PATTERNS OF RACE / ETHNIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIMINALLY JUSTICE SYSTEM

Tables 7.3 and 7.4 below present data on charges by race/ethnicity. In 23% of the charges made by HRP over the period 2006 to 2012 (i.e., Table 7.3) the accuseds were different Black persons and, in 72%, different White persons. Since Blacks constitute at best 4% of the HRM population (and much lower in Nova Scotia as a whole), clearly they are over-represented demographically among the accused persons – roughly 5 times greater than the demographic-based expectation. The table also shows that, considering only individuals with four or more distinct charges, here labeled “repeat charged”, 33% of the Black accused persons were ‘repeat charged”, almost twice as many compared to the 18% among Whites. RCMP data (table 7.4) were only available for the combined period 2012 and 2013 but that data exhibited the same pattern. Black individuals constituted 12% of all individuals charged (i.e., 4 times the demographic expectation for the RCMP jurisdiction) and fully 30% of Blacks charged were charged on more than one occasion though the time frame was only two years.

Table 7.5 examines the race / ethnic differentials for persons (not necessarily different individuals) remanded and sentenced to the CNSCF provincial jail during the years 2007 to 2013. According to CNSCF’s records, Black persons on average accounted annually for roughly 300-plus and 18% of total remands (ranging from 16% to 20% over the six year period). The percentages were quite similar for persons sentenced to custody where the averages over two year periods were 15%, 17% and 19% respectively; the number of Black sentenced to CNSCF increased from an average of 126 in 2007-2009 to 157 in 2011-2013. Clearly, then, since the Roundtable there has been no decline but in fact a slight upward trend for Blacks to be jailed at CNSCF whether by being remanded or sentenced to custody. The level of over-representation has been approximately 4 to 5 times the demographic-based expectation.
The same pattern of a slight upward trend for both categories of incarceration status is found for Aboriginals but the raw numbers and the percentages have been lower. The number and percentage of the total remands accounted for by Aboriginal persons rose from a yearly average of 84 in 2007-2009 to 126 in 2011-2013 and the corresponding percentages of total remands rose from 4% to 7%. Aboriginals sentenced to custody increased from a yearly average of 32 in 2007-2009 to 49 in 2011-2013 and their corresponding percentages of all persons jailed at the CNSCF during those specific periods rose from 4% to 6%. There clearly is some over-representation of Aboriginals in the CNSCF but taking several factors into account (e.g., the diversity of the Aboriginal linkage, the concentration in the CNSCF of provincially incarcerated persons) the over-representation would be less than half that of Blacks.

Over the past ten years the number of inmates in the federal prisons has gone from roughly 12,000 to roughly 15,000, an all-time high (CBC News, posted November 25, 2013). On the day 2013-09-13, CSC authorities reported that there were 311 persons under CSC community control in Nova Scotia and that 17% of the federal parolee cases being supervised at any given time in HRM are Black persons. Blacks constituted 11% of the 1774 persons in the five federal Atlantic institutions, roughly 4 times their population percentage in Atlantic Canada. Again, the over-representation of Blacks in the federal prisons is quite significant. Metis aside, the over-representation is greater than among status and non-status Indians combined.

The number of youths incarcerated at the NSYF has declined from usually over 100 in the pre-YCJA era [prior to 2003] to roughly 40 or so in recent years. Extrapolating from a large sample completed in 2012, 70% of the youths were either 16 or 17 years of age and mostly Caucasian (63%) with 30% linked to African Nova Scotian ethnicity / race and 7% Aboriginal. Their home residence was 48% HRM and 52% other. The majority of youths (56%) were in the NSYF for serious violent offences against persons; fully 52% were currently under sentences of at least 180 days in custody and only 40% had been in their current NSYF unit (2A or 3B) for 60 days or less. 26% were in their unit on a remand basis. Fully 80% of the youths had prior incarceration at NSYF and 40% had been in custody there on many different occasions. The number and characteristics of youths incarcerated at the NSYF varies due to short sentences and many remanded youths but during the year 2012 the percentage of Black youths rarely dipped below 25%, clearly a huge over-representation.

Overall, then, Blacks were over-represented in charges in HRM, both RCMP and HRP jurisdiction, in both remand and sentenced incarceration status at CNSCF, in CSC’s five Atlantic Provinces’ prisons and its community control program in Nova Scotia and HRM, and in the provincial youth jail at Waterville. The over-representation exceeded the basic demographic standard minimally by a factor of 4, and was significantly greater than for those
of Aboriginal descent. There was no indication at any of these points in the criminal justice system of a declining trend in Black over-representation since the 2008 Roundtable report.

Information is not available on the views of police officers or elected HRM officials concerning trends in Black over-representation since the Roundtable. Most respondents did consider that random swarmings had declined appreciably since the Roundtable and been somewhat replaced by targeted swarmings (the HRP data does not capture such nuance without one reading the actual incident files). As discussed earlier in the section on Guns, Shootings and the Drug Culture, virtually all these respondents identified a significant over-representation of Black persons as shooters and as victims and considered guns and drugs as the most serious threat to public safety in HRM. The Black leaders interviewed, whether police officers, leaders in Public Housing complexes, or church ministers, strongly emphasized the need to focus on the reduction of violence and the over-representation of Blacks as victims and offenders. One minister commented that his biggest surprise in recently accepting a ministry in HRM was that violence in the community was so routine, it did not generate the attention it would have in his home area. A long-time leader in Mulgrave Park Public Housing emphasized “the biggest issue here is safety and the biggest safety issue is violence not property crime”. There is significant consensus that getting at the roots of violence and over-representation involves dealing with housing (e.g., Blacks disproportionately live in public housing) and employment issues and minimizing the impact of the legacy effects of racism and marginalization.

RACE – ETHNICITY: FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Clearly the over-representation in violence of Blacks as offenders and victims has not improved since the Roundtable and indeed the gun violence has been more significant than it was at that time. There have been a number of recent developments that could impact significantly on race-ethnic variations in violence and victimization, namely:

1. The 2012 Uptown Drug Intervention project, focused on the primarily Black community in the Uniacke Square neighbourhood combines enhanced enforcement and community-supported alternatives to incarceration.

2. The establishment in 2012 of the ANSAIO role in the HRM bureaucracy.

3. The 2014 launching of the Souls Strong and Cure Violence (formerly Ceasefire Chicago) multi-year projects funded by the federal NCPC; the former focuses on older teens and young adult males in a high crime Black community while the latter focuses on similarly aged primarily Black males of high-risk in four different communities / neighbourhoods.

4. The 2013 Rites of Passage project, developed by African Nova Scotian ministers targeting four Black communities.
5. The 2012 opening of an RCMP detachment in the Black community of North Preston.

6. In addition to the above recent projects there are on-going initiatives that focus primarily on African Nova Scotian youths such as YAP (and its more recent Girls United project) and iMOVe a project linked with the Centerline Music Studio project in Uniacke Square Public Housing.

It is clearly too early to know how effective the more recent developments may be but they are significantly long-term, well-funded, based on intervention models that have well-known track records, and specifically targeting the issues of violence being discussed here. It will be important for the municipal government to keep abreast of their processes and outcomes and incorporate that knowledge into its strategic planning since funding decisions may well have to be made when the federal funding ceases (i.e., as was the case when federal funding for YAP ended).

The chief recommendations here are two-fold since other recommendations made above with respect to serious youth crime and below with respect to neighbourhoods, would also be applicable. The two suggestions for future direction are:

1. The ANSAIO should have as one of its priorities working with the PSO and others (including community leaders and organizations, directors of the recent developments noted above) to determine measurable objectives for the reduced over-representation of Black youths and young adults as victims and offenders of violence.

2. HRM, principally through the PSO, should be a repository for the information and best practices on reducing violence among marginal minority persons and have a capacity to assess the value of the processes and outcomes of the projects currently underway for subsequent municipal advocacy and possible resource allocation.

VARIATION IN VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION BY VULNERABLE NEIGHBOURHOOD

There is of course variation in risk level for violence and victimization by neighbourhoods. As in 2008, the main areas of high-risk for violence and social disorder offences are in the urban core on either side of Halifax harbour, especially the areas of North Dartmouth (particularly the vicinity of Pinecrest/Albro Lake Road/Highfield Park Drive) and the Uptown (the Gottingen St. area, between Cogswell and North; Barrington to Agricola) in Central Halifax. Since 2008 there have been community-based initiatives in both areas but the problems have still to be satisfactorily resolved. Public Health mapping of crimes such as assault clearly highlight the greater risk levels in these neighbourhoods and regular HRP comstat briefings reportedly usually identify the areas as “hot spots” for violence and public safety concerns. To some extent the areas have become deviance
service centers, places to go to purchase drugs or sex. While the majority of the population in both areas is not engaged in violence or the trade for drugs or sex, they are vulnerable to intimidation and perhaps more importantly to having their offspring lured into such activities and crime more generally. Essentially the same general circumstances of victimization and violence apply to certain public housing complexes and low-cost, multiple housing private sector rental complexes in both areas.

VULNERABLE NEIGHBOURHOODS: THE 2008 RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSES

There were three recommendations in the 2008 Roundtable concerning neighbourhood violence and public safety in the urban core areas. They are presented below with capitalized comments on the response to them:

1. In collaboration with organizations such as the United Way Halifax, HRM municipal government should facilitate more collective efficacy among individuals and community organizations in these areas to secure more public safety. THERE WAS A UNITED WAY HALIFAX’S VIBRANT NEIGHBOURHOOD STRATEGY, 2007-2010, IN TWO NORTH DARTMOUTH NEIGHBOURHOODS WHICH REPORTEDLY WAS SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING GAINS IN CAPACITY FOR COLLECTIVE EFFICACY IN ONE OF THE NEIGHBOURHOODS. IN 2009 THE NOW DEFUNCT SAFER, STRONGER COMMUNITIES PARTNERSHIP INVOLVING VARIOUS MUNICIPAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS BEGAN. IT WAS AIMED AT REDUCING CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF CRIME IN SPECIFIC COMMUNITIES WITH COMMUNITY-BASED ACTION PLANS. IT FOCUSED ON THE UNIACKE SQUARE PUBLIC HOUSING COMPLEX IN THE UPTOWN AREA.

2. The municipal government should assume a higher profile in addressing the violence and victimization in these urban core areas and, especially through the proposed PSO, develop a strategic action plan for strengthening community engagement and supporting both enforcement and a more social development approach to the violence, drug dealing and other crime. ASIDE FROM THE SAFER, STRONGER COMMUNITIES INITIATIVE WHERE THEIR ROLE WAS MODEST, HRM AND THE PSO WERE NOT INVOLVED NOR WAS A SAP DEVELOPED THAT TARGETED THIS RECOMMENDATION. IN 2012 THERE WAS AN INITIATIVE THAT ENGAGED COMMUNITY LEADERS IN A SHUT DOWN OF OPEN-AIR DRUG DEALING IN THE UPTOWN. THE ONE-YEAR INITIATIVE COMBINED ENFORCEMENT AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES.

3. It was recommended that HRP should respond to the victimization experienced by residents in the two main problem neighbourhoods by committing more to “reassurance policing”, placing more officers full-time in community contexts such as the public-housing complexes with objectives to reduce crime and work with community leaders to get at the roots of the violence and social disorder. IN 2007-2008 AS PART OF THE PROVINCIAL FUNDING FOR MORE BOOTS-ON-THE-STREET, COMMUNITY RESPONSE OFFICERS WERE DEDICATED FULL-TIME TO THE PUBLIC
HOUSING COMPLEXES AND TO THE LARGER NEIGHBOURHOODS. THE INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN WELL-IMPLEMENTED AND MUCH APPRECIATED BY THE RESIDENTS.

VULNERABLE NEIGHBOURHOODS: KEY ISSUES FOR VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION

Both the Uptown and North Dartmouth areas have been identified as the major at-risk areas in metropolitan Halifax by the Roundtable on Violence and Public Safety (2008) and by the Statistics Canada’s Geo-Coding of person violence and property crime (Wallace, 2008); the latter research suggested that the key variable found in the geo-coding of census and crime statistics was the proportion of single parent (female-headed) families, significant in both areas’ population. Other common features included many low-cost rental complexes, some public and social housing, a disproportionately large poor Black population (compared to elsewhere in the HRP jurisdiction), and high levels of calls for service and frequently-cited HRP hot-spots for offences. The Public Health map below depicts the patterns of “assault density” by area in HRP jurisdiction for the period since the Roundtable, 2008 to 2012 inclusive. The red and orange colours indicate respectively the highest and second highest levels of assault density and they are exclusively found in the Uptown / Downtown and North Dartmouth neighbourhoods. The charts that follow compare the Uptown and North Dartmouth on several crime and public safety issues (for more tables and elaboration see Clairmont 2012) for the 5 month sample period November to March, 2008-2009 through 2012-2013; the comparisons show that

- North Dartmouth has had consistently larger levels of violence incidents though the differences have declined in recent years.
- Property offences have been consistently greater in North Dartmouth.
- Drugs offences have been greater in the Uptown but the difference lessened as years passed due to some decline in the Uptown numbers and an increase in North Dartmouth’s. Both areas are defined by police sources as “heavy drug areas”.
- Administration of Justice offences (e.g., breaches, failure to appear) have been consistently higher in the Uptown due in large part to the Uptown being a central site for released inmates, shelters, addicted persons and crisis services.

Since its establishment under the Safer Communities Act in 2007 as a provincial unit in the Department of Justice, the Safer Communities team has responded to complaints about houses or apartments that are locales for illicit activities (i.e., drugs, bootlegging and prostitution). Typically, where a complaint is found to be justified, the unit’s investigators attempt to resolve the problems through informal resolutions, written warnings and voluntary evictions but as a last resort can apply to the court for a community safety order which can force eviction. Over the period 2007 to the summer of 2013 there have been only 12 community safety orders (CSOs)
issued in Nova Scotia but North Dartmouth and the Uptown area have accounted for most of 8 CSOs in HRM. During that same six year period there have been 112 case files acted upon (i.e., investigators determined that there was activity to justify action) by the Safer Communities team for HRP Halifax East, primarily North Dartmouth, and 97 for HRP Halifax Central, primarily the Uptown area. In HRP Halifax West there have been 76 case files acted upon for an area that ranges from Bedford to Sambro. In the RCMP jurisdiction in HRM there were 40. The complaints usually have been initiated by police officers (50%), Housing Authorities and private rental management. Clearly these data reflect the extent to which these criminal offences and social disorder problems are concentrated in the two areas of North Dartmouth and the Uptown and generate significant victimization and poorer quality of life for their residents.

Apart from the different kind of offences characteristic of each area, the two areas also differ in the following ways:

1. The Uptown as a low-cost rental site is essentially an area of public housing and social housing while North Dartmouth’s low cost rental units are in the private sector (e.g., one of the property management firms controls some twenty two different multi-unit complexes in the general area and is cited in a tenancy board hearing (October 2012) as “always looking for opportunities in downtrodden neighbourhoods”). In both areas there is a significant level of provincial housing subsidy and a high level of complaints about the quality of the housing and its maintenance.

2. The Uptown is in the course of a long-term gentrification process as middle class single family homes and modest-sized condominiums have been increasingly established in the area because of its central location and presumably the lower purchasing prices there for land and houses to upgrade.

3. The Uptown has also become a major area for services and advocacy organizations for addicts, the homeless and others requiring special services so it is a uniquely diversified area in the municipality and has been characterized as having many bubbles of subculture and lifestyles but little integration among these sub-groupings.

4. The Uptown is apparently a more complex and changing neighbourhood than North Dartmouth. Long-time residents are ambivalent about the implications of these changes for their future accommodation and that of their offspring.

VULNERABLE NEIGHBOURHOODS: FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The two areas of HRM’s urban core are then both similar and quite different but both have significant violence and public safety concerns and these not only generate concern and victimization among the residents but also a negative public image in the municipality. There has been some positive, though modest, diminution of
offences in the last two years and some effective initiatives such as the UDI project, but it is necessary to enhance these interventions and re-commit to the recommendations set out in 2008. The Uptown areas have been impacted along those 2008 lines by the Safer, Stronger Communities program and the UDI project but these initiatives have ended. These HRM and HRP initiatives never did extend to North Dartmouth, something which continues to sustain the widespread feeling there – equally held by the HRP officers serving in that area – that North Dartmouth usually gets “the short end of the stick”.

Three chief new recommendations from this Review are:

1. Continue the successful UDI initiative in the Uptown and extend it to North Dartmouth. The drug problem exists in both areas to a significant degree and generates much violence and victimization. A UDI project ratchets up enforcement while also providing, in collaboration with the mobilized local communities, a social development approach to the roots of the drug problem.

2. The Uptown and North Dartmouth violence and victimization are neighbourhood issues and require more collaborative strategic planning and action than exists at present. It would appear to require something along the lines of the Safer, Stronger Communities collaboration by the provincial and municipal governments in 2009, perhaps drawing upon other successful strategies such as the Neighbourhood Integrated Service Teams discussed by Schneider in his paper in Volume Two.

3. HRP’s Community Response Team has sponsored a Crime Free Multiple Housing approach in HRM and has had success in certifying an Independent Supportive Housing Complex for Senior Citizens. It would be a good challenge to explore the possibilities for CFMH in the public and private sector multiple unit dwellings in the Uptown and North Dartmouth.

THE PUBLIC HOUSING COMPLEXES: KEY ISSUES

Five urban core public housing projects were briefly examined for violence and victimization, three in the Uptown and North Dartmouth areas and two beyond. They ranged in resident population from approximately 950 (Bayers-Westwood) to 225 (Scotia) and all the complexes have been in place for decades. African Nova Scotians (more broadly, persons directly linked to that race / ethnicity identity) are heavily concentrated in these public housing projects, especially in Mulgrave Park, Uniacke Square and Scotia where they reportedly make up 70% or more of the population, but they also constitute large minorities in Greystone and Bayers-Westwood; unfortunately more precise data were not available from the Housing Authority.

The charts below indicate the patterns of total police-reported incidents by public housing site over the years 2006 to 2012. The sites with the highest annual number of actual incidents – roughly 400 - were Mulgrave Park and Uniacke Square, followed by Greystone with an annual average of roughly 250; although there is no clear
trend line, all three exhibited a pattern of more incidents in later than in earlier years. Bayers–Westwood, the largest public housing complex in terms of total residents was well back with an annual average of roughly 175 incidents and it exhibited a trend of decreasing incidents. In the case of drug incidents (a proxie for drug offences) Uniacke Square accounted for approximately 50% of the total drug incidents over all five sites and, again, Mulgrave Parke, Uniacke Square and Greystone each have had more drug incidents than the larger Bayers-Westwood complex (table available upon request). There was no clear trend in any of the four largest sites with respect to violence but Bayers-Westwood annually had the least number of violent incidents and also their numbers reflected a downward trend over the period 2007 to 2012 inclusive (table available upon request). Clearly, even on the basis of simple numbers, nevermind rate basis, Bayers-Westwood has been different. A senior officer in discussing that fact commented, “Stats for the area are absolutely fantastic. We are halfway through the year and to see only 1 break and enter, 3 thefts from MV, zero robberies and only 2 assaults, is absolutely incredible. They actually live in one of the most crime free areas of Halifax. I only wished that my neighbourhood had similar stats”.

There was a tendency among the tenant leaders interviewed, as well as the Community Response officers (CROs) at each site, to contend that the violence and social disorder had diminished in recent years. Nevertheless, when asked what their priority issue was, the Mulgrave Park, Uniacke Square and Greystone representatives emphasized violence or crime or safety. The Bayers-Westwood representative, consistent with the much lower level of violence and crime there, pointed instead to issues of housing maintenance. Asked about quasi-gangs of youths, the tenant leaders typically indicated that there were gangs members residing in their complex but little gang activity occurred there; there was one exception where youth gangs were said to be a serious problem in the complex. The tenant representatives typically readily identified the need for more CPTED to enhance safety (e.g., CCTV, lighting); apparently requests have been made to the Housing Authority and to elected officials but with little result. Generally, the tenant spokespersons were very pleased with the greater protection and style of policing provided by the CROs; their only criticism was that the CROs are available only during the day (though in one case the tenant leader claimed that she could at least contact the officer almost any time).

There are four other themes that were prominent across the public housing sites, namely:

1. According to virtually all informants, inter-generational patterns of public housing residence appear to be quite common in Mulgrave Park, Uniacke Square, Greystone and Scotia. As one tenant leader commented, “There are a few new people coming in, but a great deal of it is intergenerational”. The extent of intergenerational occupancy is unclear in Bayers-Westwood where over 50% of the tenants are immigrants but reports suggest it is much
less. The concept of public housing as transitional does not appear to match up with the reality, though caution must be exercised here since data were not available from the Housing Authority.

2. Youth, especially male youths, appears to be central to the public housing lifestyle in Greystone, Mulgrave Park and Uniacke Square. The concentration by family according to some respondents generates a kind of territorialism which is linked to violence and intimidation that impacts the whole neighbourhood. Small wonder then that the modest programs / activities that are available in public housing are targeted at youths by concerned parents.

3. Three of the four largest Public Housing complexes, according to tenant leaders do not receive any support from the Housing Authority for a tenants association and the fourth one has had funded support only for the past four years. The representatives claim that the requirements for funding are too difficult for them to deal with. There are units made available for food banks and resource centers but clearly tenants lack a significant voice in suggesting and responding to changes in their complex. All tenant association leaders interviewed stated that they were volunteers, clearly reflecting an issue of limited administrative capacity.

4. Tenant representatives, while more positive about the response of the Housing Authority to emergencies, generally complained about upkeep and maintenance, the aesthetics of public housing. Tenants are offered no incentives to beautify and upgrade their units and reportedly suspect that the province does not view the property as an investment but basically as a liability. The public housing complexes do vary in their layout and attractiveness and most outsiders interviewed for this Review considered Bayers – Westwood to be at the top end.

PUBLIC HOUSING: FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Public housing complexes in HRM continue to have a generally poor public image and, whether among elected officials or police officers or otherwise, the common view is negative about life in the “projects”. With the apparent exception of Bayers–Westwood, there is not only significant public safety concern in them but also the projects’ population is concentrated by family ties, family formation type (i.e., single parents) and race-ethnic identity, and most public housing is not a transitional step in housing but reportedly more a final destination. It is a far cry in these respects from the model of affordable housing that integrates the residents with the broader community in mixed-used, mixed-housing types and mixed socio-economic arrangements. A number of housing advocates and empathetic others suggested that re-appraisals of the policies and objectives of public housing would be timely as the salient policies reportedly have not been changed for decades. There appears to be a widespread frustration concerning the absence of bold, future planning. In the latter regard, several informed
advocates cited the apparently significant change brought to Toronto’s once notorious Regent Park public housing complex. This transformation, now three years running, involved municipal leadership, in collaboration with tenants and community interests, developing a replacement mixed-housing complex that provides a good split between fully subsidized and market rate occupancy, allows for homeownership, and a CPTED design. It reportedly has been well-received by the tenants and the wider community.

In HRM, The Bayers-Westwood complex appears to be more successful, aesthetically, with less violence and public safety concerns, and reportedly providing more of a transitional housing arrangement rather than a permanent residence for generations of a family. It would be valuable to determine if this is indeed the case and whether there are strategies that can be transferred to the other complexes. Reinvigorating the tenants associations and funding them accordingly, can set the stage for more collaborative activities such as CPTED innovations and perhaps the Crime Free Multiple Housing approach. Perhaps, too, HRM leaders and provincial housing officials should explore developments such as the Regent Park transformation which provides a new model for public housing. There is much that can be done and should be done to reduce violence and victimization in these areas.

References Cited

Don Clairmont and Jane McMillan, Directions in Mi’kmaq Justice. Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2006

Don Clairmont and Ethan Kim, Immigrants and the Nova Scotia Justice System. Halifax: Dalhousie University, Atlantic Institute of Criminology 2010

Don Clairmont, An Assessment of the Uptown Drug Intervention Project. Halifax: Dalhousie University, Atlantic Institute of Criminology, 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>6,876</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>6,390</td>
<td>1,789</td>
<td>6,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIOLENT CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>1,952</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>1,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NON-VIOLENT CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>4,924</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>4,580</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>4,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROPERTY CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>3,643</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>3,432</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>3,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nova Scotia Community Counts - NS Dept. of Justice - Policy, Planning, and Research Division, Social-Crime by Youth - Youth Accused & Rate per 10,000 Youth Population - HRM Justice Police District & NS
## TABLE 7.2 - ACTUAL INCIDENTS (# AND RATE PER 10,000 POPULATION), BY YEAR AND TYPE OF CRIME, NS & HRM (HRPS/RCMP) 2008-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>65495</td>
<td>28446</td>
<td>65146</td>
<td>28471</td>
<td>65792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIOLENT CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>16024</td>
<td>6741</td>
<td>15549</td>
<td>6603</td>
<td>14766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NON-VIOLENT CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>49471</td>
<td>21705</td>
<td>49597</td>
<td>21868</td>
<td>51026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROPERTY CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>38989</td>
<td>17734</td>
<td>39265</td>
<td>18326</td>
<td>40847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accused</td>
<td>10482</td>
<td>3971</td>
<td>10332</td>
<td>3542</td>
<td>10179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nova Scotia Community Counts - NS Dept. of Justice - Policy, Planning, and Research Division; Social-Crime by Jurisdiction-Actual Incidents & Rate per 10,000 Population-HRM Justice Police District & NS

## GRAPH 7.1 - RATE OF YOUTH & TOTAL PERSONS, VIOLENT CRIME, HRM 2008-2012

![Graph showing rate of youth and total persons involved in violent crime from 2008 to 2012 in HRM. The graph compares the rates of all accused and youth accused.](image-url)
GRAPH 7.2 - RATE OF YOUTH & TOTAL PERSONS, PROPERTY CRIME, HRM 2008-2012
### TABLE 7.3 - # OF CHARGES AND PERSONS ACCUSED BY ACCUSED ETHNICITY AND REPEAT OFFENCE, HRP 2006-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006-2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL # CHARGES*</td>
<td>48,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL # OF DIFFERENT ACCUSED</td>
<td>16,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % BLACKS ACCUSED</td>
<td>2246 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF WHITES ACCUSED</td>
<td>12826 (78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF ADULTS ACCUSED</td>
<td>15221 (92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF YOUTH ACCUSED</td>
<td>955 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF YOUTH-ADULT ACCUSED</td>
<td>327 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REPEAT OFFENDERS***

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL # OF REPEAT ACCUSED</td>
<td>3263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL # OF CHARGES FOR REPEAT ACCUSED</td>
<td>30,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF BLACK REPEAT ACCUSED</td>
<td>739 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF WHITE REPEAT ACCUSED</td>
<td>2357 (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF YOUTH REPEAT ACCUSED</td>
<td>243 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF ADULT REPEAT ACCUSED</td>
<td>2764 (85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF YOUTH-ADULT REPEAT ACCUSED</td>
<td>256 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* *Youth-Adult Accused indicates the number of accused who were entered as a youth accused in one year, and as an adult accused in a subsequent year. Not captured are those who went from a youth accused to an adult accused in the same year.

Source: Halifax Regional Police Service, Summer 2013
TABLE 7.4 - # OF CHARGES AND PERSONS ACCUSED BY ACCUSED ETHNICITY, AGE AND REPEAT OFFENCE, RCMP 2012-2013 CALENDAR YEARS INCLUSIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL # CHARGES(^1)</td>
<td>3,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL # OF DIFFERENT PERSONS CHARGED</td>
<td>2,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF MALES CHARGED</td>
<td>1,747 (80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF FEMALES CHARGED</td>
<td>439 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % BLACKS CHARGED</td>
<td>260 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF WHITES CHARGED</td>
<td>1,807 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF ADULTS CHARGED</td>
<td>2,011 (92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF YOUTH CHARGED</td>
<td>175 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF YOUTH-ADULT(^2) CHARGED</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF PERSONS REPEAT CHARGED</td>
<td>121 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF CHARGES FOR REPEAT CHARGED</td>
<td>779 (25%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REPEAT CHARGED\(^3\)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF REPEAT CHARGED</td>
<td>121 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF BLACKS REPEAT CHARGED</td>
<td>24 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF WHITES REPEAT CHARGED</td>
<td>95 (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF ADULTS REPEAT CHARGED</td>
<td>112 (93%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF YOUTHS REPEAT CHARGED</td>
<td>9 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># &amp; % OF YOUTH-ADULTS REPEAT CHARGED</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% REPEAT CHARGED AMONG BLACKS ACCUSED</td>
<td>30%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% REPEAT CHARGED AMONG WHITES ACCUSED</td>
<td>23%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% REPEAT CHARGED AMONG YOUTH ACCUSED</td>
<td>21%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% REPEAT CHARGED AMONG ADULT ACCUSED</td>
<td>16%**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) this number does not reflect the number of unique incidents, as some of these incidents will involve more than one accused person, or multiple charges are attached to a single incident \(^2\)Youth-Adult Accused indicates the number of accused persons who were entered as a youth in one year, and as an adult accused in a subsequent year. Not captured are those who went from a youth accused to an adult accused in the same year \(^3\) Repeat is defined as accused of 4 or more offences

Source: RCMP Halifax District Police

**Here repeat refers to a person charged on more than one occasion within 2 years or less.

TABLE 7.5 - REMAND ADMISSIONS TO CENTRAL NOVA SCOTIA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY BY ETHNICITY 2007-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>286 (16%)</td>
<td>329 (19%)</td>
<td>302 (19%)</td>
<td>318 (20%)</td>
<td>320 (18%)</td>
<td>313 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUCASIAN</td>
<td>1214 (67%)</td>
<td>1180 (67%)</td>
<td>1133 (71%)</td>
<td>1099 (69%)</td>
<td>1225 (68%)</td>
<td>1255 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABORIGINAL</td>
<td>76 (4%)</td>
<td>93 (5%)</td>
<td>68 (4%)</td>
<td>91 (6%)</td>
<td>123 (7%)</td>
<td>130 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>241 (13%)</td>
<td>150 (9%)</td>
<td>96 (6%)</td>
<td>84 (5%)</td>
<td>124 (7%)</td>
<td>122 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1817</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>1599</td>
<td>1592</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>1820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JEIN, NS Department of Justice, 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Caucasian</th>
<th>Aboriginal</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>123 (15%)</td>
<td>622 (74%)</td>
<td>28 (3%)</td>
<td>71 (8%)</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>130 (15%)</td>
<td>657 (75%)</td>
<td>35 (4%)</td>
<td>59 (7%)</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>131 (16%)</td>
<td>591 (74%)</td>
<td>28 (4%)</td>
<td>49 (6%)</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>168 (19%)</td>
<td>648 (72%)</td>
<td>45 (5%)</td>
<td>33 (4%)</td>
<td>894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>170 (20%)</td>
<td>606 (70%)</td>
<td>60 (7%)</td>
<td>29 (3%)</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>144 (18%)</td>
<td>589 (72%)</td>
<td>38 (5%)</td>
<td>51 (6%)</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JEIN, NS Department of Justice, 2013
FIGURE 7.1 – ASSAULT DENSITY HRM, 2008-2012

GRAPH 7.3 – INCIDENTS OF VIOLENT CRIME, UPTOWN AND NORTH DARTMOUTH, 2008-2013
GRAPH 7.4 INCIDENTS OF PROPERTY CRIME, UPTOWN AND NORTH DARTMOUTH, 2008-2013

GRAPH 7.5 – INCIDENTS OF DRUG CRIME, UPTOWN AND NORTH DARTMOUTH, 2008-2013
GRAPH 7.6 – INCIDENTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, UPTOWN AND NORTH DARTMOUTH, 2008-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Uptown</th>
<th>North Dartmouth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov '08 - March '09</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov '09 - March '10</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov '10 - March '11</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov '11 - March '12</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov '12 - March '13</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- Uptown
- North Dartmouth
GRAPH 7.7 - PUBLIC HOUSING POLICING ATOMS, ACTUAL VIOLENT INCIDENTS, 2006-2012

GRAPH 7.8 - PUBLIC HOUSING POLICING ATOMS, ACTUAL DRUG INCIDENTS, 2006-2012