A number of recent writers on Quebec have suggested that twentieth century nationalist movements show liberal political thought to be deficient. The rise of ethnic, nationalist and separatist movements everywhere is seen as evidence that modern men have continued to value traditional loyalist and collective allegiances; we have not moved toward the universal and homogeneous state.

But if the fact of continuing cultural diversity leads some writers to believe liberal thought deficient, it also gives them reason to hope that ethnicity and nationality are not fundamentally incompatible with liberalism. Because collective loyalties are the choice of many individuals in modern societies, such loyalties may be compatible with a philosophy which holds, as Hobbes says, that the objects desired, feared and hoped for in each man's life, he establishes for himself. Early liberal thought may be inadequate in the bare terms of the original theorists—"Hobbes made politics a science," says Kenneth McRae, "but a science that suppresses or subordinates every major source of human variation"—however it can perhaps be revised so as to reconcile it with twentieth century facts and political choices.

In one form or another, this argument is put forward by such writers as Kenneth McRae, David Cameron and Charles Taylor. Early liberal thinkers are charged with failing to recognize the intransigence of nationalist loyalties; and so with failing to foresee the need to devise forms of liberal government to protect and promote collectivities.

In this paper the views of these recent writers are compared with the arguments of two nineteenth century political thinkers who discuss French Canada—Lord Durham (Report on the Affairs of British North America, 1839) and Alexis de Tocqueville (La Démocratie en Amérique, 1835). Since Durham and Tocqueville represent the liberalism which sees the nations and particular traditions of the modern world as necessarily tending toward unity and homogeneity, their ideas are exactly those believed inadequate by the later writers.
I shall argue nevertheless that a debate between the earlier writers and the later does less to reveal the problems of early liberal thought than to indicate difficulties in the recent arguments. We shall find in the first place that although Durham and Tocqueville predict the rapid assimilation of the French in North America—and wish to encourage it—they do not fail to see that national loyalties may sometimes continue to flourish in modern societies. They understand as well as the later writers that nationality may have political effect in a liberal regime. Durham, for example, argues repeatedly that “race” (nationality) is of continuing importance in Lower Canada. What is perplexing is that he makes this argument while at the same time confidently predicting the coming homogeneity of North America. It is usual to conclude that he is confused, or simply prejudiced. Here we shall take his argument to mean that he sees national loyalties and assimilation as increasing together in some fashion, paradoxical as this may seem. We shall find, in fact, that he thinks of nationality in modern societies as a sort of by-product of on-going assimilation, and perhaps too as one of the ways in which the process is effected, it is never seen as a counterweight to assimilation, and certainly never as a retreat to tradition.

We shall find as well that in some ways Durham’s analysis of the nature of national loyalties in a liberal society is not unlike Cameron’s and Taylor’s, for he also sees nationality as the product of individual choice. But in Durham’s case it is exactly this insight that provides the grounds for his belief that assimilation is inevitable. It is because he thinks nationality in the modern world must have this character that he believes his proposal for a measure to hasten assimilation is justified. On the basis of a rather similar argument, Cameron and Taylor on the one hand conclude that continuing diversity is possible, while Durham on the other foresees only a growing homogeneity. Durham and Tocqueville both, I shall suggest, would argue that social scientists today are mistaken if they take the nationalist and ethnic movements of the modern world to be expressions of true cultural diversity.

Much of the current debate about liberalism and nationality seems to turn on questions of this nature. There is a deeper level, however, and it is Tocqueville rather than Durham who provides the clearest picture in this case. Tocqueville suggests reasons for thinking assimilation not only the inevitable course but also the best. His argument is not original; indeed it is something of a commonplace in liberal thought—this is not to say that recent writers have always taken note of it—but because Tocqueville is writing about French Canada, his version seems to have special force today. He teaches then that the attempt to preserve truly different ways of life—insofar as any such thing is possible—must destroy liberal society. William Mathie, among social
scientists writing about nationality today, is one who has considered the matter on this level. A comparison of his ideas and Tocqueville's in the concluding section of the paper will carry us beyond the argument just outlined. But I shall suggest in the end that while Durham stresses one aspect of the liberal argument against nationality and Tocqueville another, their ideas are complementary, and that together they present a comprehensive account of the liberal argument against nationality, and a comprehensive challenge to recent writers. Durham depicts the shallow character national sentiments seem to take today; Tocqueville shows us why loyalty of a deeper quality must be regarded now as intolerable. Neither Durham nor Tocqueville would think the project of reconciling liberalism and true national sentiment likely to succeed, and both would regard the attempt as dangerous. The full scope of their combined argument, I suggest, is not considered by our contemporary authors.

Tocqueville wrote:

De nos jours . . . les peuples semblent marcher vers l'unite . . . aussi remarque-t-on aujourd'hui moins de difference entre les Européens et leur descendants du nouveau monde, malgré l'Océan qui les divise, qu'entre certaines villes du XIIIe siècle qui n'étaient séparées que par une rivière.

To be sure, David Cameron argues, liberalism has been one of the political theories of the modern world which predicted that with every advance of the doctrine, "the strength of nationalist sentiment would recede." But in fact, he goes on, "nothing of the kind has happened." He and other authors take as their premise the continuing vigor of nationalist sentiments in modern and modernizing societies, and by way of explaining the phenomenon, argue that such sentiments can be seen to supply a need in the lives of individuals. And from the idea that it is individuals who have maintained traditional social groupings and customs in these societies, often adapting them for new political purposes, they hope to conclude that such collective loyalty is compatible with liberal philosophy.

As Cameron puts it: "People who are citizens of the world in aspiration may experience a painful need to belong to a familiar community in actual fact."

A conception of well-being which was exhausted by the idea of material security and possession would miss much of what is most important in the life of man, and within Canada to neglect the importance of either the individual's personal autonomy or his reliance on cultural association for the good life would be to misconstrue the animating spirit of a great many Canadians.
In Taylor's article in the collection of essays, *Philosophers Look at Confederation*, we get a fuller idea of what "cultural associations for the good life" may sometimes mean. Taylor argues that an individual defines himself by means of, and in terms of, his linguistic or cultural community. Since his language and culture are the condition of his sense of identity, they cannot be confined to his private life alone. Rather, because "the language/culture which defines our identity must be one which can command our allegiance," that is, because "we have to see it as valuable," the language must be one "used for the whole gamut of human purposes," and the culture must reflect the aspects of public life which men value now, such as the achievements of technology, modern economics and so on. This is the more true, says Taylor, because we are unlikely to perceive as valuable a language or culture which other peoples in the world regard as backward or impoverished. Cultural associations then, or some cultural associations—those which are to serve adequately as horizons for definition—must have public or national expression. "Nations have to become states," as he says.

Because nationality, "cultural association," has been perceived by many to be one of the human goods—comparable to material security and possession—forms of nationality have persisted, according to this argument. And because it is an expression of individual decisions about the good life, we may hope to find liberal grounds for forms of government to protect and encourage it.

In recent articles Mathie sets out rather different reasons for hoping a reconciliation of liberalism and nationalism is possible. He is, all in all, less hopeful about the prospect than Taylor or Cameron. He begins, however, as they do, with the idea that nationalist sentiments flourish everywhere today; indeed he believes that "nationalism becomes more defensible as it entails the denial that the progress of human civilization is a movement toward ever wider loyalties." And he too believes that the very fact of continuing nationalism points to the deficiencies of liberal thought.

But he does not look, as the others do, at the gratification nationalist opinion provides in individual lives; rather he considers the usefulness of nationalist sentiments in promoting a sense of political obligation in the society as a whole. The rationally calculated self-interest of liberal doctrine, he argues, has not proved sufficient in itself to generate a sense of political community and the common good. Liberalism has failed to "furnish an adequate ground for commitment to the common good, or to dispense with any such commitment altogether." The appearance of nationalism in the modern world on the very heels of
liberalism seems to testify to this, he suggests. Nationalism has come along to supply what liberalism lacked so to speak. The analysis points to graver deficiencies in liberal society than anything said by Cameron or Taylor and the whole argument engages questions of the greatest importance. It may be, however, that while the articles succeed in showing us very fully how nationalism supplies what liberalism lacks—a sense of political community—we are led at last to conclude that liberalism and nationalism are not so much complementary, as completely at odds. The analysis at once provides the most profound reasons for hoping the reconciliation is possible, and shows how doubtful it is. Mathie presents liberalism and nationalism as if they were thesis and antithesis, the one developing from the other, but perhaps does not convince us the synthesis is possible.

It is Tocqueville, as I have noted, who most clearly challenges Mathie's argument by suggesting that the maintenance of a distinct way of life, strong enough to promote a sense of community, would be intolerable.

In the last section of volume one of *La démocratie*, Tocqueville writes:

> A une époque que nous pouvons dire prochaine, puisqu'il s'agit de la vie des peuples, les Anglo-Américains couvriront seuls tout l'immense espace compris entre les glaces polaires et les tropiques; ils se répandront des grèves de l'océan Atlantique jusqu'aux rivages de la mer du Sud.¹¹

Durham echoes this passage in his own conclusion, changing the mood from prediction to prescription:

> I entertain no doubts as to the national character which must be given to Lower Canada; it must be that of... the majority of the population of British America; that of the great race which must, on the lapse of no long period of time, be predominant over the whole of the North American continent.¹²

On the basis of this belief about the necessary progress of events in North America, Tocqueville counsels the French to throw in their lot with the British¹³, and Durham recommends the union of the Canadas, believing this measure to be sufficient to hasten the inevitable process.

Tocqueville's surprise and delight on first encountering the French in Canada are recorded in his journal. For a time he and Beaumont seem to have looked forward to the reestablishment of the French nation in North America; he apparently at first saw the persistence of the French national character in North America under years of British rule as a fact disproving the thesis that mankind was advancing toward unity.¹⁴ In one journal entry of this time, for example, he wondered if
nature had, in fact, given each people an indelible national character. But at some point between 1832 and 1835 Tocqueville changes his mind. Assimilation has been delayed, but it is inevitable. The fact of his earlier joy in the presence of the French surely lends force to his conclusion:

On ne peut se dissimuler que la race anglaise n'ait acquis une immense prépondérance sur toutes les autres races européennes du nouveau monde. Elle leur est très supérieure en civilisation, en industrie et en puissance. 16

And Durham copies again: “It may be said that . . . the French are not so civilized, so energetic, or so money-making a race as that by which they are surrounded . . .” 17

The whole of this passage by Durham may be considered for it is this section of the Report and this passage which shows him closest to Tocqueville. He is writing about his own proposal for assimilation:

It may be said that this is a hard measure to a conquered people . . . that the English are new comers, who have no right to demand the extinction of the nationality of a people among whom commercial enterprize has drawn them. It may be said that, if the French are not so civilized, so energetic, or so money-making a race as that by which they are surrounded, they are an amiable, a virtuous, and a contented people, possessing all the essentials of material comfort, and not to be despised or ill-used because they seek to enjoy what they have, without emulating the spirit of accumulation, which influences their neighbours. Their nationality is, after all, an inheritance; and they must be not too severely punished, because they have dreamed of maintaining on the distant banks of the St. Lawrence . . . the language, the manners, and the institutions of that great nation, that for two centuries gave the tone of thought to the European Continent.

“Not so civilized”: civilization is a term Durham uses often to describe the modern liberal state. It is, for example, the word he uses to represent the American condition: “I allude to the striking contrast which is presented between the American and the British sides of the frontier line in respect to every sign of productive industry, increasing wealth, and progressive civilization.” 18 It is no more an unambiguously laudatory expression for Durham, than for Tocqueville—or for John Stuart Mill in his essay, “Civilization.” The French, according to Durham, are not a “civilized,” that is not a money-making, people, but they are “virtuous” and “contented.” 19 Elsewhere he notes that while the French have been without the institutions which would have elevated them in “freedom and civilization,” they are “kindly, frugal, . . . and honest.” The “civilized” English settler population is without these attributes.
What Durham and Tocqueville describe then is the dominance in North America of liberal society, a society in which, alike in the United States and in the British colonies, political institutions are based on man’s self-seeking, “money-making,” character and on the individual’s ability to arrive at a self-interested, and purely prudential perception of the common good.

The note of regret evident in the passage cited surely derives from Tocqueville. (But Durham was not the only British governor of French Canada to wonder, if only briefly, if institutions promoting virtue and contentment might not be preferable to institutions founded on the spirit of money-making and accumulation.) It may seem as if the French and English have a choice—the French to maintain their dream of nationality and the English to respect this hope—but in the long run these aspirations must fail; the money-making “race” will eventually dominate, that is, all will become money-makers and so the French will no longer be distinguishable. They too will be money-makers, liberals, “English.” And this is so because given the chance all men whatever their origin naturally put their desires for power and prosperity before traditional loyalties. (“Men willingly change masters, believing to better themselves,” says Machiavelli, speaking to the prince whose ambition is to add to his empire a territory differing from his own in language, customs and laws.)

According to Peter Burroughs, the Englishmen of Durham’s time were “convinced of the inherent superiority of British institutions and traditions.” But Durham, as has been indicated, did not believe British institutions superior in enabling, for example, virtue and contentment. He did not propose British liberalism for French Canada because he was convinced of its superiority in all respects, but because he believed its dominance would be due to that fact that it is a system of government in accordance with men’s inclinations and nature. Assimilation is the “natural” course of events in a modern liberal nation.

But all this merely shows Durham and Tocqueville in their full character as early liberals. It does not appear to meet the claim of the later writers that nationalist sentiments continue unabated now. We need a fuller argument from Durham and Tocqueville and this emerges when we turn to the passages in which they discuss not the future, but the past, the passages in which Durham compares the French Canada of 1760 and before with the French Canada of the 1830s, and the passages in which Tocqueville compares the “great parties” of the American Revolution with the “small parties” of the nineteenth century.

... Lord Durham could not know as clearly in 1839 what we know today, that it is foolhardy and naive to speak of breaking down the
customs of a well-established and organized ethnic and cultural com-

Because part of the charge against Durham is that he failed to understand the importance of nationality, and that allegiance to nationality may continue in modern societies, it is surprising to open the Report and find that he begins as if he had the accusations of twentieth century critics such as Gerald Craig already in mind. He argues that while others—"most minds in England"—had failed to see the importance of nationality in Lower Canada, his analysis of the crisis and his prescription are valuable precisely because he has come to understand the character of national loyalty in the modern world, and because he has come to see that contrary to all expectations, nationality was still of consequence in the politics of Lower Canada in the 1830s.

It becomes evident as we read the Report that Durham uses the term nationality—"race"—to refer to both the old way of life as it was in Quebec at the time of the conquest and to the new sentiments he saw rising in the province in the 1830s. But he does not think the new sentiment is at all like the old. Nor does he believe the "contest of races" in the 1830s resembled the confrontation of the 1760s. The character of French Canadian allegiance to things French had been changing; assimilation had indeed advanced in the manner predicted by liberal theory. The original national feeling and loyalty to the French tradition had waned, and in their stead had come a new form of nationality compatible with the fact of assimilation.

Papineau’s party, the parti patriote, had an international reputation as a liberal and progressive reform party at this time. It was on this basis that they claimed the admiration of the British Philosophical Radical party, for example, the party of John Stuart Mill, John Arthur Roebuck, Charles Buller and others. But many Englishmen, including most of the whigs, believed that Papineau’s party was really conservative, obstructing reform motions in order to promote the traditional French Canadian way of life. Neither understanding was sufficient in Durham’s opinion. He believed that the patriote leaders were indeed concerned to protect their liberal reputation, while at the same time he was well aware, from his own experience as governor in the province, that they usually opposed liberal reforms in practice. But he did not believe their practical opposition to reform sprang from any real desire to preserve the old way of life; rather he thought that their motives at the deepest level were liberal in a very narrow sense—petty and personal. He believed the leading political figures in the French party had evoked national sentiment in order to attach the mass of the
people to the party in the legislative assembly, and so secure their own election and their own utterly personal and individual goals. At the most superficial level—that apparent to the Radicals—the party was liberal; at a deeper level it appeared conservative, maintaining the old life. But at bottom the national sentiments prevailing in the '30s, according to Durham, were artificial—a new form of nationality. The new nationality is the cause of the disorders in the province; and it is because he believes he alone has seen that national sentiments can take this new form that Durham thinks his analysis is superior and his remedy more certain.

Nationality in Lower Canada then, was the product of men attempting to achieve the goals typical of liberal society, that is, of men already assimilated to the prevailing "manners" of North America. If the nationality they fostered had something of the aura of the old nationality, because it used the old names and recalled the old emotions, it was undoubtedly stronger for that; but it was in its origins and character markedly different from the old, new wine in old bottles. The old form of nationality in French Canada had restrained men's passions and subjected individuals to the common good; the new is subject to the individual, one of the means by which he achieves personal aims. Durham is like social scientists today in using the one word to describe the two conditions; the difference is evident from his analysis. Under the old label, la nation canadienne, he believes, is a party expressing no more than the aims and ideas endorsed by liberal men in liberal societies everywhere. What purported in the 1830s to be a movement of opposition to assimilation was in reality quite the opposite.

When we compare Durham's analysis of Lower Canada with his description of Louisiana, the full picture emerges. The case of Lower Canada is atypical, although perhaps not unusual. Where government is just, that is where there is no discrimination against individuals, assimilation proceeds without the development of this new form of nationality. Louisiana was evidence of such a benign process. But where liberal government is unjust, as in the case of British rule in Lower Canada, denying prosperity to those equipped to earn it, or power to able political leaders, nationality develops in the new way accompanied often, certainly in this case, by violence and economic distress. (Thus whereas Mathie points to nationalism as an indication of the failure of contractarian liberalism as such, Durham believes it indicates the presence of an insufficiently liberal regime.)

The parallel with the account of nationalist sentiments given by Taylor and Cameron will now be clear. That nationalist sentiments are invented or created by individuals seems to be almost exactly the point Taylor and Cameron are making. Thus Taylor points out that for all
“emancipated men,” that is men of the modern period, the “political and other structures within which men are set have no inherent value.”

They are no longer seen as commanding allegiance because, say, they represent the hierarchical order of things, or the chain of being. They are only instruments set up by men to accomplish their purposes.25

And so it is too, he says, with the conditions enabling identity. It is true that Taylor does not describe nationalism as the invention of modern elites for their own political advantage, as Durham does; rather he describes it as setting the horizon within which men whatever their station may find their identity. But he is like Durham in his insistence that national allegiance is subordinate to the individual—for him, having to do with his welfare.

For Durham and Taylor both, the old loyalties, such as that the French in Canada once knew, rendered a man subject to “the hierarchical order of things”—a ruler, or deity, or natural law which could over-rule the impulses and interests of the individual. Such a loyalty, we may suppose, was once the ground or foundation of society, and the end for which it existed, whereas the new nationality is subject to the individual, a means for the gratification of his impulses and interests, or perhaps one among those interests. But while thought about the difference between the old and new forms of national allegiance leads Taylor to conclude that particular cultures will survive, it leads Durham to believe the new form, compatible as it is with the institutions typical of the modern way of life, is an expression of the very fact of assimilation. A nationality that, in Taylor’s own terms, concerns itself with the goals and programmes valued by all or most men in this modern period—with modern technology and economics, to use Taylor’s examples—can only be described as an association of assimilated individuals.26 Durham would say then that those who see nationality as one among the goals sought by modern men—as Cameron and Taylor do—are correct. But he would say too that these authors are mistaken if they think they are depicting anything other than completely assimilated men.

And where Mathie still wishes to suggest that nationalism is “partially true,” because it may “entail the denial that the progress of human civilization is a movement towards ever wider loyalties,” Durham would suggest that nationalism appears to be, not a denial of the movement towards wider loyalties, but one of the ways the movement is accomplished. For a response to Mathie’s principal argument however—that nationalist sentiments may supply a sense of political community—we must turn to Tocqueville. What, we may ask, would be the consequence of allowing within liberal society, not the new form
of nationality Durham describes, that attenuated, on-the-road-to-assimilation form, but, supposing it possible, truly distinct ways of life?

Tocqueville, like Durham, opens his account as if he had already read the later writers. He begins much as Mathie does with the suggestion that liberal democracy may be deficient, and may even fail, because it cannot generate a sense of political community. It is indeed his over-riding concern, throughout the two volumes of *La démocratie,* to find the factors or political institutions which will turn men’s thoughts from a narrow preoccupation with the self to larger programmes and national interests, in the place of extreme “individualism”—Tocqueville’s own term—common objects and common purposes.

This plea may seem the more important for our argument here because Tocqueville is not looking for a consensus in the society as a whole, but for factors which will strengthen individual voices raised in opposition to the “tyranny of the majority.” He favours diversity, regionalism, local government, federalism. He seeks to establish in a society founded on the liberal principle of equality, a counterpart to the bonds and social links of aristocracy, without reestablishing aristocracy, and without appealing to any principle superior to that of popular consent. As one commentator remarks, he tries to “solve the problem of democracy on the level of democracy.” He looks to family ties, religious affiliations, religious beliefs, voluntary associations and constitutional and political devices at the local and national levels.

But nowhere throughout the two volumes does he put forward nationality or allegiance to particular cultural traditions as a remedy to offset the tyranny of the majority and to promote political community. He is as convinced as Mathie that liberalism may “fail to furnish an adequate ground for commitment to the common good or to dispense with any such commitment altogether,” but he does not point to nationalism as evidence of this, and still less does he look to the sentiments of nationalism as a corrective. We note especially that he does not see the nationality of French Canada as something to be encouraged.

That distinct ways of life cannot be tolerated in liberal society is, as I have suggested, a standard liberal argument. We could find it in Hobbes or Locke for example. Because Hobbes and Locke couch the issue in terms of religious belief, we may not see immediately how relevant the doctrine is, since we are used to thinking of nationalities as more or less secular collectivities. However, if we have allowed Durham, let us say, to convince us that where “men and their purposes
become the only source of political value" (Taylor’s phrase), peoples will surely come to resemble each other, then the full force of the standard argument rolls in. Nationality in the new form is a vehicle for assimilation; not so, doubtless, national loyalty based on—using Taylor’s terms again—“the hierarchical order of things, or the chain of being.” But the existence of such loyalties will destroy liberal society.

Tocqueville discusses the issue in several places—perhaps most notably in the passages on great and small parties. A party, or association, which appeals beyond the sovereignty of the people within the larger nation, or the sovereignty of the governing parliament, to some transcendent or universal principle (the hierarchical order of things) can have no place in modern liberal politics. It is typical of the “great parties” to make such an appeal, and such parties, as Tocqueville notes, are changed only by revolution or civil war. These are the parties that rend and convulse society, bringing in liberal and democratic rule, or expelling it. America had a “great party” at the time of the War of Independence, but no longer. Such parties may be nobler, bolder, less obviously devoted to petty selfish interests, but they are incompatible with the principle of equality, and incompatible with popular sovereignty or parliamentary sovereignty. America today is the land of “small parties.” (Thus Durham hopes to see in the united Canadas, “only the ordinary animosities of party in a free country.”) Ordinary parties, always subject to the compromises of parliamentary debate, or the will of the people, using the appeal to principle only as rhetoric: such are the appropriate parties and associations of modern politics. A nationality must take on this character, or provoke civil war; but nationalities with this character—nationality in the new form—are the means to assimilation.

Thus Tocqueville, who thinks continuing religious belief is a factor in preserving freedom in the United States, never supposes that religious principles there should override politics. And so, in line with what we have said, he thinks the religions of America will all come in time to resemble one another; and perhaps he foresees as well a time when religion itself will fail. Most certainly he predicts a population in North America homogeneous with respect to habits, manners, mode of life.

Il arrivera donc un temps où l’on pourra voir dans l’Amérique du Nord cent quinquante millions d’hommes égaux entre eux, qui appartiennent à la même famille, qui auront le même point de départ, la même civilisation, la même langue, la même religion, les mêmes habitudes, les mêmes mœurs, et à travers lesquels la pensée circulera sous la même forme et se peindra des mêmes couleurs. Tout le reste est douteux, mais ceci est certain. Or, voici un fait entièrement nouveau dans le monde...
Durham surely agreed. The forces which most deeply divided nation from nation in the past are losing effect in the modern world. The supposition that differences of language or origin or religion are significant cleavages in modern society—as significant, for example, as the opposition between French and English in 1759—and that these differences alone will justify a separate national existence, is a measure of our ignorance of the dimension of those past differences and the character of the ways of life we have relinquished.

NOTES

* Some of the arguments given here are reproduced from my article “Liberalism and Nationality”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, XIV:3 (September, 1981). A first draft of “French Canada and the Liberal Theory of Nationality”, was presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Dalhousie University, 1981.

5. Nationalism. Self-Determination and the Quebec Question, 1.
6. ibid., 3.
7. ibid., 8.
10. ibid., 14.
11. De la démocratie, 429.
18. Report, 211.
23. Report, 14, 27.
24. Fernand Ouellet gives us a remarkably similar picture of the patriote leaders. See Lower Canada, 1791-1840 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), p. 323: “The rebellions of 1837-38 were the culmination of a nationalist movement instigated, and guided, by and for, the benefit of the French Canadian middle classes, . . .” I do not want to suggest, however, that Ouellet shares Durham’s suppositions, or draws similar theoretical conclusions. Several social scientists have argued that the nationalist sentiment of recent years in Quebec has
been the product of elites. Dale Posgate and Kenneth McRoberts in *Quebec, Social Change and Political Crisis* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), present this view, and their footnotes are a fair guide to other authors, among them Pierre Trudeau and Albert Breton, who have contributed to our understanding of nationality in these terms (the second edition of *Quebec, Social Change and Political Crisis* contains the same argument with all its original force, but at the same time puts forward other—not obviously compatible—explanations of the phenomenon of nationalist feeling).


29. *De la démocratie*, 179.


31. *De la démocratie*, 430.