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NL-339 (r. 82/08)
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF KENYA AND TANZANIA:
THE IMPACT OF DEPENDENCE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

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Thesis submitted at Dalhousie University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
December 1981
FOREIGN POLICY IN KENYA AND TANZANIA:
THE IMPACT OF DEPENDENCE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the foreign policies of two neighbouring East African states: Kenya and Tanzania. It analyses and compares their external policies and behavioural responses as they attempt to cope with, and at times to confront, inherited structures of dependence and underdevelopment. The central argument presented is that although they display different strategies and styles of dealing with and adjusting to their operational environments, thus far, each has failed to transform inherited social and economic structures. Their political economies, like those of most countries in post-colonial Africa, are still characterized by dependence and underdevelopment, albeit in different degrees and forms.

The historical empirical analysis is informed by the extant literature on dependency theory and on African foreign policies. Hence the thesis begins with a prefatory review of salient approaches and an introductory theoretical chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 then examine the development of structures, relations, as well as the leadership, that continue largely to determine not only the perpetuation of dependence and underdevelopment but also the diplomacy pursued by these two states. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania from independence to the end of the 1970's decade. They concentrate on the diplomatic relations and policies of the two states towards the major powers and/or countries and institutions on which they are dependent. Salient international issues and events to which they have responded are also examined. The final chapter review central findings and arrives at some summaries that largely support the hypotheses proposed. A series of projections and prescriptions for the political economies and foreign policies of Africa in general, and Kenya and Tanzania in particular, are provided in way of conclusion.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARB</td>
<td>Africa Research Bulletin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>Africa Contemporary Record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADEA</td>
<td>Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa</td>
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<td>BMN</td>
<td>Basic Human Needs</td>
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<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COTU</td>
<td>Central Organisation of Trade Union</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Developing Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>FL8</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<td>FNIA</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<td>PRELIMO</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCA</td>
<td>Kikuyu Central Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFL</td>
<td>Kenya Federation of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPU</td>
<td>Kenya People's Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDDCS</td>
<td>Least Developed among Developing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUTA</td>
<td>National Union of Tanganyika Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>PQLI</td>
<td>Physical Quality of Life Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAZARA</td>
<td>Tanzania-Zambia Railway</td>
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<td>TFL</td>
<td>Tanganyika Federation of Labour</td>
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PREFACE
THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF AFRICAN STATES:
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A. Introduction

Since the mid 1960's, studies of African foreign policies have been developing in terms of both numbers and sophistication. Some of these have taken the form of case studies of one or several African States' foreign policies, while others have tended to generalise about the foreign policies of Africa as a whole, using aggregate data. Studies employing the comparative method, historical and/or narrative approaches are now abundant in the literature on African foreign policies. Although there is no consensus on the crucial factors that shape foreign policies on the continent, various types of determinants have been identified and analysed with varying degrees of rigour.

However, some of the existing studies on African foreign policies tend to focus on internal determinants and to ignore external factors. Some indigenous scholars have gone as far as to assert that there is nothing in the foreign policy of any given African country that is due to external factors. While there are aspects of African regional foreign policies that may be explained largely by domestic variables, it would be unrealistic to reject the possibility of at least some external influence.

It is my view that any study of African foreign policies should at least take note of internal and international linkages within the world.
The peripheral dependent position that most African countries occupy in global relations would seem to affect (at least in some ways) how they relate to states and entities on whom they are dependent. Although some scholars have begun to recognize the importance of external dependency as one of several factors that influence the foreign policies of African States, few comprehensive attempts have so far been made to examine the explanatory relevance or potency of dependency. To support this assertion, some of the major works on African foreign policies have been critically reviewed below.

Since it is impossible to cover every existing study, only some major works are examined in this prefatory review. The choice of those studies to be reviewed is somewhat arbitrary. It is based primarily on the studies' availability and familiarity, as well as on their contribution to the analysis of African foreign policies in general and to this study in particular. For organizational and analytical purposes, the selected studies have been categorized into either "macro-studies" — if their approach generalizes about the foreign policies of Africa as a whole — or "micro-studies" — if the "case-study approach" is used.

B. Macro-Studies

Only a few scholars have so far attempted to compare several case studies in one volume or essay and/or to propose, contrast, and synthesize various determinants that could largely explain the foreign policies of most African states. In this section, seven representative works are examined, as part of the analytic background to the present thesis.
First, the most recent and also perhaps the most notable, is the 1977 volume edited by Olajide Aluko *The Foreign Policies of African States.* This collection examines the concept of "African" foreign policy in a continent where there seems to be as many foreign policy types as there are countries. Aluko recognises the fact that it is difficult to identify all the factors that shape "African" foreign policy behaviour; he nevertheless tries to do so in his volume. His introductory chapter identifies and discusses eight major determining factors found in the seven case studies.

Although the editor's introductory chapter identifies internal and external variables in comparative analysis, no attempt is made to examine systematically their relevance or validity in the case studies. In effect, Aluko's book consists of eleven separate cases conveniently brought together yet without an explicit attempt to analyse and synthesise findings. Clearly, Aluko's study could have been improved greatly by a concluding chapter assessing the relevance/validity of the variables identified and the contribution of each case to the general understanding of African foreign policies.

Hence, although Aluko identifies some determinants for comparative foreign policy analysis, his volume is not in itself comparative; it is more a juxtaposition of the foreign policy behaviours of several African states with no systematic identification, explanation or comparison of similarities and/or differences. His study is, then, more of a compilation rather than a comparative assessment.
Second and third, Aluko's book joins two earlier works — Doudou Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States (1965) and Vernon McKay (ed.), African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy (1966) — that focus on the continent's foreign relations. Like Aluko, Thiam and McKay attempt to identify key variables that explain most if not all of the foreign policies of Africa.

In his pioneering study, Thiam distinguished between the ideological foundations of African foreign policies (nationalism and socialism) and their realities (keeping and strengthening independence); and he discussed political and economic aspects of links with extra-African powers. McKay's volume consisted of a collection of essays proposing and synthesising various determinants of African foreign policies. Each of the contributors examined one of the foreign policy determinants identified, namely national interest and ideology, economic determinants, military influence, cultural and psychological factors, political determinants and external political pressures.

Thiam's and McKay's studies represent some of the early attempts at comparative foreign policy analysis for Africa. Both identify variables and suggest a number of hypotheses that could be replicated and examined in subsequent studies. However, both works are now dated in style as well as content. Like Aluko's study, they employ the 'traditional' rather than the 'behavioural' approach; but unlike Aluko, Thiam and McKay do attempt to be analytical in their treatment of foreign policy determinants. Their works could, however, be much improved by a more rigorous employment of the comparative method.
Fourth, John Okumu's early article, on "The Place of African states in International Relations" (1973) also adopts a "continental perspective". Okumu generalises about African states' external behaviour without any specific reference to one or several cases. Unlike the three works already mentioned, Okumu focuses specifically on the impact of colonialism and external dependence on the foreign policies of African states. His work is therefore of direct relevance to my study whose focus is on the impact of dependence and underdevelopment on the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania. However, Okumu's focuses only on "colonial dependency" and ignores the more complex aspects of contemporary dependency, characterised by transnational linkages between "classes" rather than simply between countries. Furthermore, the relationships between "colonial dependency" and foreign policy is not sufficiently analysed. Despite these deficiencies, Okumu's article provides some basis for constructing testable hypotheses on the impact of dependence on African state's foreign policies.

Fifth, unlike the previous four works, the article by P.J. McGowan and K.P. Gottwald "Small State Foreign Policies: A Comparative Study of Participation Conflict and Political and Economic Dependence in Black Africa" (1975), is quantitative rather than qualitative in approach. It employs the comparative method in a more rigorous and systemic fashion than do the studies by Aluko, Thiam, McKay or Okumu. McGowan and Gottwald attempt to compare the behaviour of 30 "Black African" states in the mid 1960s. They present a typology of states and foreign
patterns that permits testable hypotheses to be made about comparative behaviour. These hypotheses relate size, level of modernisation and "inner or other directedness" to four patterns of foreign policy output — participation, conflict, political and economic dependence. This particular study is one of the few that attempt to explain African foreign policies using quantitative data alone. In this respect, it can be seen to advance, improve and complement the more "traditional" qualitative approaches.

Sixth, the work by W.A.E. Skurnik Sub-Saharan Africa (1977) is one of two current International relations bibliographic guides with an African focus. It covers, in summary form, the International relations and foreign policy behaviour of Sub-Saharan African countries. Skurnik briefly examines the various perspectives and methodological concerns in the field. His volume is a useful and convenient aid to research since it contains annotated bibliographies. However, these are not comprehensive since they only cover the literature available in American public or University libraries. Hence the book is of limited utility to those students of African International Relations either engaged in specialised research in North America or engaged in general research in Africa.

Seventh, and finally, the most recent macro-study of African foreign policies is that by G.A. Nweke, Harmonisation of African Foreign Policies, 1955-1975: The Political Economy of African Diplomacy (1980). This Nigerian author attempts to examine in what manner and with what results African states have dealt with the problem of harmonising their foreign policies at international conferences, in order to maximise their collective goals.
Nweke's basic arguments are i) that there has existed and still exists some degree of harmonisation of policies at least on issues of decolonisation, economic development and conflict resolution; and ii) that the most important variables which tend to promote harmonisation are bureaucratic organisation, the ideology of political and economic independence and the interdependent nature of national interests.

However, he acknowledges that there are factors that stand in the way of policy harmonisation in Africa. Nweke identifies such internal factors as geographical separation; ideological, linguistic and cultural differences; different levels of economic development; and preoccupation with consolidating national independence. However, he views "external interference" in African politics as the most important single factor that acts as an obstacle to effective harmonisation.

Compared with the six works already reviewed, Nweke's study is a substantive contribution to the literature on African foreign policies, at least on the issue areas identified. Given the monumental task of analysing African foreign policies at this macro-level, he has attempted to employ the comparative approach much more rigorously than previous studies and has gone further than his predecessors in systematising and "harmonising" diverse sets of data.

Nweke's work then, shares with the present thesis not only the employment of the comparative approach but also the perspective that, the most important single factor that influences African foreign policies is external rather than internal. Yet, Nweke does not sufficiently deal with the issue of external dependence; indeed he only refers to it
in his concluding pages. Even then he does not mention dependency as such; rather he writes in vague and general terms about "external interference". Nevertheless, Nweke's work is an important and timely contribution to the comparative analysis of African foreign policies at the macro-level, particularly in the current era when the collective bargaining of the poor states with the rich ones has become imperative, thus making policy harmonisation a necessity.

It would seem from the above review that, although most of the current macro-studies have made some contribution to the literature on the foreign policies of African states, they are either dated, of limited rather than general relevance and/or do not employ dependency/adaptive framework. These salient factors are largely shared by the micro-studies reviewed in the next section.

C. Micro-Studies

There are far more micro- than macro-studies of African foreign policies, a reflection of scholars' preference for single cases. Similarly, most of these country studies tend to concentrate on just a few states on the continent, such as Nigeria in West Africa and Tanzania, and Zambia in East and Southern Africa. This latter tendency is perhaps partly due to the geopolitical importance of these states within their respective regions and partly due to the availability of foreign policy data on them.

Among the many studies on the foreign policy of Nigeria (and that of other states within the region) Olajide Aluko's, Ghana and Nigeria 1957-1970: A Study in Inter-African Discord (1976) is an important
comparative contribution in the micro-tradition. Its focus is on bilateral interstate relations rather than on multilateral international relations and its mode of analysis is qualitative rather than quantitative.

Aluko focuses primarily on internal rather than on external factors in explaining bilateral relations between Ghana and Nigeria. He therefore eschews notions of "dependence" and "adaptation". Rather, he maintains that the two states' policies owe little to external factors but are mainly due to different internal factors. Hence he deals with the role of leaderships, parties, economic opportunities and media, rather than with political economies and/or linkages within the global economy. However, Aluko does recognise that attitudes to and interactions of Ghana and Nigeria with the great powers have affected their foreign policy "choices" in terms of ideology and interaction in Africa and elsewhere.

At one level, Aluko's study is of limited utility to this thesis, in that i) it focuses on bilateral relations in Africa while I focus on global relations, and ii) it emphasises internal determinants while I emphasise external determinants. At another level, however, Aluko's work is instructive as an example of how to compare and explain the foreign policies of two African countries who pursue divergent strategies, as do Kenya and Tanzania. Unlike Aluko, however, I do not attribute such divergences to leadership and ideology alone but also include systematic and linkage factors.

W.A.E. Skurnik's study, The Foreign Policy of Senegal (1972) is also of some relevance to this thesis. Skurnik's work is instructive
in that it applies some of the concepts of Rosenau's "pre-theory" and suggests their modification for the study of foreign policy behaviour in the Third World. Although I do not employ Rosenau's pre-theory here, I do use his "adaptive" approach, which is largely a refinement of the earlier "pre-theory". Further, Skurnik's work shares with mine a focus on pre- and post-independence continuities, on internal and external determinants, and on economic components and non-alignment.

Skurnik's book purports to be a contribution to the comparative study of African foreign policies. According to him, Senegalese foreign policy "is fairly typical of that of many other African states which tend to react in similar ways to like problems"; hence he views the analysis of Senegal as forming a "useful ingredient in the comparative study of African foreign relations".16

In my view, however, Skurnik's argument, is misleading and misses an important point about comparative analysis -- that similar types of situations do not necessarily produce similar types of responses. Despite this misleading argument, Skurnik's study is an important contribution to the rather scarce literature on comparative foreign policies of African states. Indeed, it is one of the few book-length studies that have made a substantial contribution to this literature. Others in this category, focusing on Zambia, Tanzania and/or Kenya, are examined next.

As mentioned earlier, within Eastern and Southern Africa, studies that focus on Tanzania's and Zambia's foreign policies far outnumber those on other states within the region. Three of these compare and contrast the foreign policies of Tanzania and Zambia -- John Hatch,
Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania (1976)\textsuperscript{17},

Martin Bailey, Freedom Railway: China and Tanzania -- Zambia Link (1976)\textsuperscript{18}

and Richard Hall and Hugh Peyman, The Great Uhuru Railway: China's

'Showpiece in Africa' (1976).\textsuperscript{19}

Hatch's work focuses primarily on the role of the leadership (President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda of Zambia) in shaping their respective domestic foreign policies. Strictly speaking, this work does not focus on foreign policy per se. It is primarily a comparative analysis of the actions and attitudes of two dominant personalities -- Nyerere and Kaunda -- and of the impact of their individual philosophies and preferences on the political economies of their respective states. Hence while Hatch's work could be viewed as a general contribution to comparative analysis, particularly of diplomacy and leadership, its utility for comparative foreign policy is marginal.

The work of Bailey as well as that of Hall and Peyman focuses on the foreign policies of Tanzania and Zambia towards one other country -- China. Bailey explains how the development of close ties between these two African states and China was primarily influenced by an economic imperative -- the need for money to fund the railway project to link Dar-es-Salaam and the Zambian copperbelt. He examines China's relationship with Tanzania and Zambia, particularly China's "cooperative interaction" with them in their attempt to reduce the effects of dependence and underdevelopment.

The two studies taken together, show how two dependent countries (Tanzania and Zambia) utilised limited options after the West and the
Soviet Union declined to fund the rail project to attain a given objective. This point is of particular relevance to my study of Kenya and Tanzania in that I attempt to analyse and compare how they have employed the foreign policy options open to them, given their general and common situation of dependence and underdevelopment.

The foreign policies of Tanzania and Zambia have also been examined in separate case studies. Numerous articles and several books focusing on foreign policy of each now exist. Two scholars -- Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw -- both of whom have written extensively on foreign policy have recently produced Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in diplomacy and dependence (1979) which is of some relevance to this thesis.

Although this focuses on Zambia's diplomacy and dependence, it does cover a wide range of issue areas and levels of analysis; also, it employs several analytical approaches which include events data and dependency. It uses both quantitative (events data) and qualitative data and examines Zambia's diplomatic and other foreign relations at the regional, continental and global levels. Its combination of a variety of techniques, approaches, levels of analysis and issue areas, makes this study an important contribution to foreign policy analysis in general and to that of African states in particular.

However, as its two authors have admitted, given the wide range of issues covered, the diversity of techniques employed and their own divergence of views, this study is not "strictly consistent" in its interpretation. Nevertheless, it is a balanced and rigorous analysis...
of Zambia's foreign policy behaviour, not only within the Southern African region but also in the continent generally and in the global system, although to a lesser extent.

Anglin and Shaw's work has been particularly instructive to the present thesis in two important ways. First, it employs dependency in explaining the foreign policy of Zambia at the global level. And second, it draws on issues (e.g., dependence and political economy, institutions and ideology and diplomatic initiatives in the search for external support) that find parallels in both Kenya and Tanzania.

For instance, Zambia's colonial heritage and class structure remain very similar to those of Kenya and Tanzania. This also applies to its ideology of "humanism", which finds many parallels in Tanzania's "Ujamaa" ideology, at least in theory. So this joint study by Anglin and Shaw is clearly an important contribution to understanding the overall foreign policy of one African state, as well as advancing foreign policy analysis on continental and global levels.

Catherine Hoskyn's essay, "Africa Foreign Relations: The Case of Tanzania" (1968) is one of the early studies that attempted to explain and analyse Africa's foreign relations through a single case. In this innovative piece, Hoskyns recognises and critically analyses the structural dependence and constraints within which African foreign policies are situated. She distinguishes between two types of development and foreign policy strategies: i) breaking at least some ties with the West; and ii) sacrificing immediate independence in the hope that, if certain concessions are made, western capital will produce a quicker rate of
economic 'development' and/or growth which will ultimately lead to greater independence. Her study shows that Tanzania chose the first strategy.

Although not stated explicitly, Hoskyn's two types of foreign policy strategy correspond to some extent to those suggested for Kenya and Tanzania in this thesis. Hoskyn's shows how Tanzania abandons its early post-colonial strategy of heavy dependence on foreign aid from western sources, and adopts a self-reliant strategy aimed at maximising its capability to make more independent development and foreign policy decisions. Her work is, then, an important contribution both to my study as well as to the overall effort of advancing comparative analysis of African foreign policies.

Shaw's paper, "African States and International Stratification: the adaptive foreign policy of Tanzania" (1974) is another important contribution to the understanding of the Tanzania case as well as to the comparative analysis of African foreign policies. His essay is perhaps one of two studies thus far (the other one is Skurnik on Senegal (1972) already described) that have attempted to apply Rosenau's adaptive approach to African cases. Shaw attempts to construct a synthetic model based on the concepts of "subsystem" and "adaptation". Using this model, he critically analyses Tanzania's foreign policy, examining and explaining the impact of international stratification on it. His primary propositions are that i) the mode of adaptive politics varies according to the level of interaction (regional, continental or global) and ii) the primary issue areas vary between these levels as well.
Shaw's adaptive framework has been particularly instructive in constructing the theoretical framework for this thesis. While his adaptive framework is itself a revised version of Rosenau's original one, I have further revised it to fit in with the overall framework of analysis for my two cases. Clearly, then, Shaw's case study is an important contribution that could be usefully replicated in revised form in comparative studies of other new states' international behaviour.

Okwudiba Nnoli's, *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania* (1978) is one of the few book-length studies that have focussed exclusively on Tanzania's foreign policy. It covers the first decade following independence in 1961. Nnoli's point of departure from earlier studies, such as Hoskyns (1968) and Niblock (1971), is that other authors mistake the turning point in Tanzania's foreign policy: it was not in 1964 but rather in 1967, following the publication of the Arusha Declaration. Thus, between 1961 and 1971 Nnoli delineates two phases in Tanzania's diplomacy: 1961-1966 and 1967-1971. The publication of the 1971 T.A.N.U. guidelines marked the end of the second, and presumably the beginning of a third phase.

Although Nnoli's work relied largely on qualitative data, supplemented by some statistical information, his analysis is rigorous and systematic. Furthermore, despite the fact that he does not employ a dependency framework, his work is instructive in that it identifies and analyses the impact of both internal and external factors on the foreign policy of Tanzania. However, Nnoli, like many students of Tanzania's foreign relations, tends to overplay the impacts of Mwalimu Nyerere's leadership role and the ideology of socialism and self-reliance on foreign
policy. Indeed, he perhaps displays too much optimism about the prospects for national power and the future of self-reliance. He seems to overlook the facts that 1) the Arusha Declaration and Mwongozo did not alter Tanzania's structural links with the international capitalist economy and, 2) as a result, Mwalimu Nyerere's political will and commitment cannot alone transform Tanzania into a self-reliant autonomous state. Consequently, the prospects of national power needed to implement the declared policy objectives remain elusive in Tanzania as elsewhere.

By contrast to Tanzania, there are lamentably very few scholarly attempts that have been made to analyse Kenya's foreign policy per se. There are presently only two published essays which have attempted this — John Howell, "Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy" (1968) and John Okumu, "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy" (1973).

On the one hand, the main contention of Howell's study is that Kenya's foreign policy is characterised by a "radical stance" in inter-African affairs outside East Africa and "cautious conservatism" within East Africa. This categorisation of foreign policy characteristics would seem to resemble different modes of "adaptation" at different levels of interaction. John Okumu, on the other hand, describes the entire foreign policy of Kenya as "extremely moderate and cautious". He disagrees with Howell's contention that Kenya adopts a radical stand in the international arena outside of East Africa. Okumu maintains that Kenya's foreign policy (at both regional and global levels) has been cautious, although active, from the day it gained its formal independence to the present.
The difference in these two scholars' conclusions is perhaps one of degree rather than kind, based mainly on their distinctive perceptions and approaches. For example, while Howell uses the concepts "radical" and "active" (in reference to foreign policy) interchangeably, Okumu makes a clear distinction between them. Further, while Howell delineates different modes of adaptation at different levels of interaction, Okumu views foreign policy as a continuous phenomenon with one or several underlying determinants. Of these two essays, Okumu's is clearly the more critical and rigorous; however, both are insufficient descriptions of Kenya's foreign policy. Howell's essay, in particular, and Okumu's to a lesser extent, is dated; its contents reveal inadequate research into and only superficial analysis of the issues treated.

Susan Gitelson's "Policy Options for Small States: Kenya and Tanzania, Reconsidered" (1977) is one of two thus far that have attempted to directly compare the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania. Gitelson attempts to analyse whether non-aligned foreign policies can be implemented given the dependence of most African countries on the global economy. To attain this goal, she compares these two foreign policies at the global level suggesting five general propositions.

Gitelson operationalises non-alignment in terms of the extent of dependent or diversified relationships. She concludes that the most important factors shaping the possibilities for pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy in these two cases are: i) the international environment at both the global and regional levels and ii) the leaders' perceptions of the advantages of non-alignment.
leaders of small and middle states declare non-alignment to be their preferred foreign policy strategy they do not and actually cannot always put it into practice because the international environment is not conducive.

In the case of Kenya and Tanzania Gitelson observes that the tension between non-alignment and dependence has significantly affected their foreign policies. She further argues that as a result of actual experiences in the 1960's and the growing awareness that "economic development" is necessary for maintaining political independence, "both Kenya and Tanzania have evolved somewhat similar, though obverse, foreign policy patterns in the 70's". Hence Kenya has maintained its strong traditional ties with Britain and the United States while Tanzania has become more dependent on China.

Gitelson's observation that Kenya and Tanzania have evolved somewhat similar foreign policy patterns in the 1970's, obscures the different modes of adaptation that they have displayed in their foreign policy responses. It is thus misleading to state that they have evolved similar patterns. Furthermore, although they are both depehdent on the international capitalist economy, their responses to dependence varies: while Tanzania adopts strategies aimed at disengaging or reducing the effects of dependency, Kenya does not take similar steps. Besides, Tanzania cannot, strictly speaking be said to be "dependent" on China to the same degree that Kenya is dependent on Britain and the United States. Gitelson also introduces a contradiction in her argument by saying on the one hand that both Kenya and Tanzania are unable to implement a

...
non-aligned foreign policy because of their dependence and on the other hand that they have maintained as much manoeuvrability as possible by developing a wide range of diplomatic trade and aid relationships.

Misleading assertions and contradictory statements notwithstanding, her work is nevertheless an important contribution to comparative foreign policy in Africa, particularly in East Africa.

Gitelson's piece has recently been joined by a book-length study, edited by J.D. Barkan with J.J. Okumu, on Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania (1979): an important and timely contribution to the comparative analysis of African development and foreign policies. This volume compares politics and public policy in Kenya and Tanzania covering a diverse range of subjects, from political institutions and processes (parties legislators, elections and bureaucracy) to ideology (class structure, urban and education policies and systems).

Although most of the contributing authors are generally critical and analytical they vary greatly in their opinions on developmental and policy processes. Hence their assessments of the extent to which Kenya and Tanzania have moved toward their respective development objectives display divergent viewpoints. Nor is there a consensus about what constitutes the major obstacle to development that each country must overcome, though all share a concern for the common problem of underdevelopment.

Most of the topics included in this volume focus on development rather than on foreign policy. Indeed, only one chapter focuses directly on foreign relations. Furthermore, this chapter concentrates on the two states' regional diplomacy and technical cooperation rather than on
their global and transnational linkages. The overall volume is, however, instructive for my work not only because it focuses on Kenya and Tanzania, but also because it serves as an example of how to compare and analyse divergent development and foreign policy strategies, albeit analysed from perspectives that do not employ dependency.

D. Conclusion

This prefatory review clearly indicates that, while there are presently numerous studies on African foreign policies, few of them employ the comparative and/or the dependency approach. Analysis in some of them does not move beyond the particular case to higher levels of generalisation. Furthermore, some of them tend to put undue emphasis on the importance of internal factors (particularly leadership and ideology) while little or no attention is accorded to the possible impact of dependence and underdevelopment. Some have acknowledged but not analysed the potential impact of dependence and underdevelopment. However, others (e.g. Skurnik (1972), Shaw (1974), Gitelson (1977), and Anglin and Shaw (1979)) have in various ways been suggestive and instructive for my work on Kenya and Tanzania in particular and for the advancement of comparative studies of African foreign policies in general.

More important, perhaps, is the lamentable paucity of studies focusing on either the foreign policies of Kenya since 1963 or of Tanzania since 1971. On the one hand, in regard to Kenya, as was shown above there exists only two articles published in the English language. 40 Tanzania's foreign policy, on the other hand, although blessed with a substantial number of studies that cover the post-independence period
up to 1971, has seen few studies that go beyond that period. Furthermore, there are currently only two article-length studies published in English which employ a comparative approach to the analysis of these two states' foreign policies. Clearly, then, there seems to be a crucial need for more substantive work on these two states' foreign policies.

The following thesis hopes to contribute to the correction of the inadequacies and imbalances presently existing in the literature on African foreign policies. The need to correct these was not the only reason that prompted the choice of Kenya and Tanzania for this study. Apart from their contiguity, common colonial background, and historical links within the now-defunct East African community, Kenya and Tanzania have displayed some striking differences as well as similarities in their post-independence development and foreign policy strategies and styles. For instance, in a continent characterised mostly by "instability" in political life and discontinuity in foreign policy, Kenya and Tanzania in relative terms, i) have maintained a considerable consistency and continuity in their foreign policies and ii) have displayed no major changes in their ruling elite. And yet a marked divergence in their development and foreign policy strategies and styles seems to have emerged since 1967 when Tanzania adopted a socialist-self-reliant policy. These characteristics thus provide an appropriate basis for comparing and analysing the respective foreign policy options and strategies each has employed in coping with both internal and external operational environment.
By employing the comparative method in analysing the impact of dependence and underdevelopment on the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania, this study is intended to be a modest contribution to comparative foreign policy analysis in general and to that of African states in particular.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally the discipline of international relations has been concerned mostly with explaining the role of great powers in the international system; with the "high politics" of crises rather than the "low politics" of routine interactions. However, since the beginning of the 1960s some scholars have demonstrated an interest in i) the specific roles played by "small" states and ii) in the socio-economic structures as well as the ideological considerations that largely determine the policy options available to such states. This interest is reflected in the growing number of theoretical and empirical studies focusing more directly on the foreign policies of "small" states, a category into which most African states fall.

As will be shown later in this chapter the analysis of dependence and underdevelopment has also in recent years found a growing acceptance in the literature on Africa's political economy; however, many of the existing studies do not analyse the impact of dependence and underdevelopment on the foreign policy behaviour of African states per se. Most analysts have (operating in different analytic traditions) been content with providing historical accounts of the "roots" of dependence, its apparent relationships to underdevelopment in Africa and to development in Europe, and its continuing role (in post-independence Africa) in perpetuating underdevelopment. What is needed now are more empirical
studies that would examine and evaluate these and other assertions made by dependency theorists. In particular more comparative work should be conducted to "test" the relevance and applicability of dependency to the analysis of the foreign policies of African states.

The present study is, then, as stated in the preface, a response to the need for more comparative and analytic work focusing on the impact of dependence and underdevelopment on the foreign policies of African states. The central hypothesis of this work is that the foreign policies of African states operate in an environment constrained by both their external dependence on and linkage to the international capitalist economy; this relationship has had and continues to have a profound influence on these states' foreign policies.

In this study I intend to demonstrate the validity of this central thesis through a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania. In the discussion that follows, I will briefly examine the scope as well as the theoretical framework and methodology to be employed, the basic concepts to be utilised and the data collection techniques chosen for this study.

A. Scope of Study

Broadly speaking, this thesis is a study in comparative foreign policy. However, its particular concern, as noted in the preface, is with the foreign policies of two neighbouring East African states: Kenya and Tanzania.

So this study compares and analyses these two states' respective policies and behavioural responses as they attempt to cope with, and at
times confront, inherited structures of dependence. My central argument is that although Kenya and Tanzania display different strategies and styles of dealing with and adjusting to their operational environments, each has failed thus far to transform their inherited social and economic structures. Their political economies, like those of most countries in post-colonial Africa, are still characterised by dependence and underdevelopment—albeit in different degrees and forms.

My theme is based on the premise of dependency theory, which posits that, political decolonisation by itself did not change Africa's status at the periphery of the global economy. Indeed, the recovery of "independence" in Africa can be viewed as a further step in the "globalisation" of centre-periphery relations that had existed during colonialism. The formal decolonisation of Africa had the virtue, in effect, of accelerating economic access. Thus, direct political control and economic domination in many cases passed from European colonial powers to such international capitalist interests as multinational corporations, based primarily in the United States and other advanced industrialised capitalist states.

The new forms of dependency thus created, had, in most cases the effect of blunting economic nationalism which in turn rendered militant developmental and foreign policies impossible; at least at any level other than that of rhetoric.

African leaders have partially contributed to the creation of conditions leading to entrenched dependency and to the "development of underdevelopment" on the continent. Having attained political power, these leaders spent several years trying to consolidate their weak domestic power bases while paying lip service to inherited problems.
In the meantime, external forces continued to consolidate their already entrenched economic positions in African economies. Unable or unwilling to undertake the task of dislodging these forces, most African regimes opted for a strategy of collaboration rather than confrontation with external interests. The new class in Africa has in many cases adopted foreign incomes and tastes while most of the population has been largely forgotten and impoverished.

Thus, the perpetuation and growth of internal inequalities in Africa and international inequalities at the global level are related not only to unequal exchange, unequal terms of trade and costs of technology, but also to the collaborative relationship between Africans and multinational corporations.

These transnational "partnerships" tend to reinforce the structures of inequality and dependency. The aspiring African "bourgeoisie" may serve as directors or managers of local branches of multinational corporations and be paid handsomely for it, but they have no real power or control over important decision making. The centres for decisions and control are often located in one or another of the advanced industrial countries. African leaders, then, do not grow (like their counterparts in the advanced industrial countries) into a more independent bourgeoisie, because they cannot do so. As Basil Davidson points out,

They remain the junior partners of an external system upon which at all decisive points they must continue to depend.9

This dependence on external associations rather than on a domestic constituency "leads characteristically to a foreign policy of compromise"
and a domestic regime of repression. So it would seem from the above that to understand the political economies and foreign policies of African states it is necessary to analyse the strategies of collaboration and/or confrontation adopted by African regimes in coping with their multiple and interrelated development problems.

This analysis will be divided into two major themes: namely, the role of internal forces (such as the political economy and the national leadership), and the impact of external factors (mainly trade, aid, investment, political and military links, as well as communication and cultural ties). From this investigation an assessment will be made of the extent of confrontation and/or collaboration between internal decision-making elites and the international capitalist economy, in order to determine the impact of dependence and underdevelopment on the foreign policies of these two states.

B. Theoretical Framework

This study proposes to develop a theoretical framework based on the concepts of "dependence" and "adaptation". This perspective has been adopted largely because of its apparent appropriateness for the comparative foreign policy analysis of "small" underdeveloped states. Furthermore, these two concepts complement each other. While "dependence" provides a framework for analysing and explaining the environmental constraints that limit the two states' foreign policy options, the concept of "adaptation" provides a basis for categorising the various types of foreign policy outputs and responses displayed by the two states. Thus by adopting this approach, I hope to explain two aspects of the
foreign policy of Kenya and Tanzania -- 1) the constraints and limitations that dependence and underdevelopment impose on their foreign policy options and 11) the strategies and models of adaptation each has chosen in coping with the problems of dependence and underdevelopment.

However, since "non-alignment" forms the foundation of the declared foreign policies of both I shall briefly examine it here, focusing particularly on its theoretical conceptualisation and its practical relevance. This analysis is followed by a similar one examining the concepts, "dependence" and "underdevelopment" as well as "adaptation".

The Foreign Policy of Non-Alignment

Practically all Afro-Asian states are members of the non-aligned movement and all claim to pursue a foreign policy of non-alignment.

In this regard, Kenya and Tanzania are no exceptions. Non-alignment forms the cornerstone of the declared foreign policies of both. However, in practice, they, like other Afro-Asian states, have differed in their interpretation and application of the policy. Furthermore, the focus of non-alignment foreign policy has undergone change since its first articulation in the mid '50s.

Given the centrality of non-alignment to the declared foreign policies of both states it is important to examine and analyse the concept, its origins and its changing focus, as a basis for later analysis of its application within the context of these two states' foreign policies.

The formation of the non-aligned movement can be viewed as an adaptive response by the newly emerging ex-colonial nations of Africa and Asia to
an international system that was already dominated by the major powers of the first and second worlds. The new Afro-Asian states entered a global political system that had already developed its own set of rules and regulations; the terms of international law and the bases on which international organisations were to function had long been determined by the major powers. Furthermore, the emergence of these new states coincided with the era of East-West Cold War in the '50s and early '60s. Given the state of the international system and the fact that these new states were emerging from an era of colonial subordination and exploitation, they were naturally anxious to safeguard their newly acquired "independence". Furthermore, as new members of the system, they viewed themselves as innocent of the 'vices' the older members had acquired; hence they could act as moral arbiters in great power conflicts.

Non-alignment, then, initially developed as a policy position that enabled its advocates to remain independent in the event of an ideological and/or military conflict between the two power blocs. Non-alignment thus meant the preservation of autonomy in world politics and non-commitment to the world's dominant ideological blocs: the West clustering around the United States and the East spearheaded by the Soviet Union.

However, non-alignment did not mean non-commitment on all issues. What the non-aligned nations claim is the right and ability to judge world issues on their own merit. This conceptualisation of non-alignment was of course initially a reaction to cold war alignments. However, the objectives of non-alignment policy go beyond being non-partisan in
world conflicts. In this connection, the late President Jawaharlal Nehru of India, who was one of the founding fathers of the movement, observed that the main objectives of non-alignment are:

"the pursuit of peace not through alignments with any major power or group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of the subject peoples; the maintenance of peace and freedom both national and individual, the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, which affect the greater part of the world's population".  

Thus the most important global objective of the non-aligned movement was to challenge and attempt to transform the existing system of international relations. At the national level, non-alignment is also important as an expression of each state's desire to have independence and sovereign equality with other states recognised; hence the anxiety of the Afro-Asian states to establish a position separate from and, implicitly, morally superior to that of the major power blocs. As Ali Mazrui has observed:

"Non-alignment reflected an emotional desire for equal dignity and for the right to be one's own policeman".

The criteria for non-aligned members and the principles to be pursued by non-aligned states were for the first time spelt out in June 1961, at the Cairo Preparatory Conference for the Belgrade non-aligned meeting. It was at this conference that the five criteria of a "non-aligned" state were formulated.
These criteria were drawn in general terms which left room for flexibility in interpretation. Their generality has resulted, as mentioned earlier, in a wide diversity of interpretations.

The non-alignment movement which began as a broad anti-colonialist movement seeking world peace and emphasising non-commitment in great power conflicts had, by the early 1970s, become an advocate of a new political and economic order at the global level. Thus, in contrast to the first and second non-aligned summits where economic questions were raised but were not emphasised, at the third summit, held in Lusaka in 1970, economic issues dominated. Indeed, by April 1970, President Nyerere of Tanzania, the host to the Preparatory meeting for the third summit, made economic issues the centre of his speech:

"The real and urgent threat to the independence of almost all non-aligned states thus comes not from the military but from the economic power of the big states. It is poverty which constitutes our greatest danger and to a greater or less extent, we are all poor ... it is important that our next non-aligned Conference should consider the question of how we can help to strengthen non-alignment by economic cooperation. This is the field in which we can really effect changes in our vulnerability to outside pressure." 17

The third summit itself reiterated Nyerere's call for an added emphasis on economic issues. According to Baghat Korany's calculation, the number of words devoted to economic issues at this summit attained
the 2158 mark, a net increase of 133.8 percent from the second summit and of 636.5 percent from the first. The non-alignment movement has since then been used by its members as a platform from which to make demands, not only for greater equality in the political arena but also for a greater share of the world's wealth and for a rectification of the existing system of unequal exchange and distribution for global resources. The latter economic situation has resulted in the economic betterment of those living in the centre of world capitalism and the impoverishment of those living at its periphery.

Contrary to Robert Rothstein's assertion that the non-alignment movement began to decline in importance in the mid '60s following the advent of detente between the two super-powers, it has acquired added importance in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, one could argue, as W.A.E. Skurnik has done that non-alignment grew in importance as bipolarity declined; not because of a decline in bipolarity as he suggests, but in spite of it. The cold war's decline just happened to coincide with a period when there was increasing awareness and realisation among the ex-colonial states of the elusiveness of formal independence in the absence of economic liberation. Furthermore, as pointed out above, non-alignment has since its inception had other roles to play besides acting as a moral force in great power conflicts. The latter role, as President Nyerere has remarked, "can be an honourable one; but it is not the major role of non-aligned states. Our role arises from the fact that we have very definite policies of our own, but ones which are separate from, and independent of, those of
either of the power blocs". Besides, the end of the cold war did not bring to an end great power competition and conflict. For as Okwudiba Nnoli has asserted:

"In a world dominated by nuclear arms, strategic calculations, conflicts of ideological and traditional interests, pervasive oppression and poverty, there is still a need to guard world peace, oppose injustice and mediate international disputes".

In theory, then, non-alignment has become an important policy guide for the poor Third World countries in their attempts to safeguard their independence and overcome their dependence and underdevelopment. Its survival as a movement and policy guide in spite of the changed international environment is a manifestation of its adaptability to a fluid international system. It is also an indication that non-aligned states are determined to tackle their common problem of poverty using a common foreign policy approach which is distinct from the "power" approach of aligned states.

In spite of weaknesses in the original conceptualisation of non-alignment, subsequently some attempts have been made to define and measure it in practical terms. Susan Gitelson, for example, has defined practical non-alignment in terms of dependent or diversified international relationships. Thus, according to Gitelson, a dependent state that is not truly non-aligned is one that "received at least half of its military and economic aid from one source (country or group) and carries out the majority of its trade with that source; it
will tend to have a fairly restricted network of diplomatic relations". On the other hand, "a truly non-aligned state will indicate greater diversity and balance in its military and economic aid sources. It is also likely to have a varied range of trading partners. It will probably pursue an active foreign policy in terms of diplomatic missions and interactions".

The practical non-alignment behaviour of African states may also be conceptualised outside the framework of external dependency. Skurnik for example, prefers to view non-alignment as goal-oriented behaviour rather than as a goal in itself, contrary to Gitelson. According to him, practical non-alignment behaviour may be seen to take place along a spectrum whose extreme positions are "conservative" and "revolutionary". The place of a country's foreign policy on this spectrum will then vary according to each issue, with most states close to the "revolutionary" pole with respect to external exploitation in general, and near the "conservative" pole with respect to more concrete and immediate needs related to national economic survival and security.

However, it would seem to me that the main distinction between "theoretical" and "practical" non-alignment is that the former exists at the level of declarations -- statements of intent and/or expressions of commitment to a non-aligned foreign policy -- while the latter exists at the level of implementation and/or the translation of statements of intent and desired goals into practice. The gap between the theory and practice of non-alignment is wide, a clear reflection of the gap
between the psychological world of desires and aspirations and the external operational environment. Thus, while the non-aligned states may seek to use non-alignment to safeguard their national independence as well as to challenge the existing inequitable world order, their success may be at best minimal, given domestic constraints of underdevelopment and systemic constraints of dependence.

That there are various interpretations and applications of the policy of non-alignment in individual cases, should provide the foreign policy scholar with a potentially useful basis for comparative analysis. This could take the form of comparing and contrasting the differences and/or similarities in interpretation and application by two or more "non-aligned" states, with the aim of elucidating the various purposes that such a policy can be made to serve, depending on particular national circumstances (internal and external). Therefore, some of the difficulties associated with the practice of non-alignment may be explained, as this study attempts to do, by constraints that prevail within the operational environment of decision-makers. Furthermore, if non-alignment is viewed as both an objective in itself as well as a means to promote other goals it becomes easier to explain why states may employ non-alignment differently, depending on the way goals are perceived and strategies defined.

This thesis employs the cases of Kenya and Tanzania -- two examples of states that lay claim to non-alignment -- to conduct an informal "test" of the impact of dependence and underdevelopment on i) the foreign policy of non-alignment and ii) on the other foreign policy goals that this policy seeks to promote.
A brief overview of the literature on and conceptualisations of dependency theory is presented next.

Dependence and Underdevelopment: An Overview

One of the most important developments in the study of underdevelopment in the "Third World" has been the emergence of what has come to be termed "dependency theory". This approach, developed mostly by Latin American scholars, has recently come to be widely accepted by radical scholars outside as well as inside Latin America. The analysis of dependence and underdevelopment in Africa, in particular, has been advanced by a number of leading scholars of Africa's political economy — Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Amilcar Cabral, Basil Davidson, Rene Dumont, Frantz Fanon, Colin Leys, Kwame Nkrumah, Ann Seidman, John Saul and Immanuel Wallerstein. Their original formulations have further been developed by a new generation of more critical scholars — Robin Cohen, Steve Langdon, Richard Sandbrook and Issa Shivji.

There have been criticisms of this "theory" as well as disagreements among dependency theorists over its interpretation and application. However, in spite of these, and the fact that the approach itself is not yet fully developed, an attempt is made here to identify some of the basic ideas and major thrusts that have emerged in the ever-expanding dependency literature, especially as it relates to African foreign policy.

In general, dependency "theory" can be viewed as both method and explanation of the failure of Third World countries to develop. Dependency focuses primarily on the problem of foreign penetration in
The political economies of the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The approach offers an explanation of underdevelopment as a consequence of outside economic and political influences. More specifically, the economies of underdeveloped countries are considered to be conditioned by their relationship to another economy which is dominant and capable of expanding. The "interdependence" of such economies assumes contrasting forms of dominance and dependence so that dependent nations tend to grow as a reflection of the expansion of dominant nations or to underdevelop as a consequence of their subjective position.

It is generally accepted among dependency theorists that development and underdevelopment are two faces of the same historical process, namely the evolution of the world economy. According to Andre Gunder Frank,

"... underdevelopment developed in intimate relationship with the development of the now-developed countries as simultaneous results of the historical process of capitalist development ..."

Sunkel and Paz also share the view that development and underdevelopment occur simultaneously and they are linked functionally, that is, they interact and mutually influence each other. The concrete geographical expression of this relationship can be observed in two great dualisms; on the one hand, the division of the world between advanced developed and industrialised centre states and underdeveloped
backward, poor, peripheral dependent states; and on the other hand the division within states in regions, social groups, and activities which are modern and advanced and regions, groups and activities which are backward, primitive and dependent.\(^{34}\)

As the above indicate, there are several aspects to be considered when dealing with the concept dependency. One aspect involves the inter-national relations between advanced and underdeveloped countries. Another aspect concerns intra-national relations between different classes and regions within the underdeveloped countries themselves. Cutting across these centre-periphery divisions are the economic, political and cultural aspects of both inter-national and the intra-national linkages.

**Conceptualisations of Dependency**

It is disappointing to note that most of the empirical and theoretical work so far tends to emphasise only one aspect of dependency and to disregard other aspects. For example, there has been more emphasis on internal rather than external aspects. Very few studies have attempted to offer a synthesis of the various theoretical directions and ideological positions taken by dependency theorists.\(^{35}\) Instead what has emerged is a number of conceptualisations each of which is identified with one of more leading scholars of dependency. To illustrate this, three of these various conceptualisations will be briefly examined below.
First, one major conceptualisation of dependency is closely tied to imperialism, it is mainly identified with the work of Marx and Lenin on international capitalism in general and on imperialism in particular. Both dependency and imperialism deal with relations between centre and periphery and both attempt to explain underdevelopment. The problem with this conceptualisation is that it views dependency as a temporary phase that would supposedly come to an end with the breakdown and transcendence of the imperialist system. According to Lenin, the struggle of the great powers for the economic and political division of the world, gives rise to a number of transitional forms of state dependence of dependent countries which, politically are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependency.

Second, Frank represents another conceptualisation of dependency. His views are closely related to those of some non-Latin American scholars such as Samir Amin and the late Walter Rodney. In one of his early works Frank affirms that it is capitalism, both world and national which produced underdevelopment in the past and which still generates underdevelopment in the present. His analysis centres on the metropolis-satellite structure of the capitalist system as he traces the development of underdevelopment throughout the history of certain countries. He focuses on these
contradictions of capitalism, arguing that capitalism has generated underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surplus was expropriated while generating economic development in the metropolitan centres. Frank concentrates on exploitation, thereby turning attention to the internal consequences of nations caught up in industrial dependence.

Third, Theotonio Dos Santos represents a conceptualisation that has come to be known as new dependency. It is "new" in the sense that it offers a further refinement of other conceptualisations. It also differs from "colonial dependency" (as presented by Lenin) and from "financial industrial dependence" (characterised by the domination of big capital in the hegemonic centres at the beginning of the nineteenth century). The "new dependency" is a relatively recent phenomenon based on multinational corporations which after the Second World War began to invest in industries geared to the internal markets of underdeveloped countries. Dos Santos characterizes this as "technological-industrial dependence", a conceptualisation also shared by Amin in one of his later works. It suggests that the contemporary pattern of underdevelopment and development has been altered in such a way that the unequal international division of labour is no longer marked principally by a dichotomy between primary producers and industrial economies but rather by technological and managerial domination, one which the multinationals are best able to exploit because of their size.

An offshoot of this "new" dependency pushes the argument a little further to develop what some have termed a "transnationalisation thesis", which posits that, the governing elite in most peripheral
states have established transnational links with international capitalism, whereby the latter provides technology, capital and managerial expertise for import-substitution industrialisation, and the former, through control over the state machinery provides a "favourable climate" for profit making and expropriation. This partnership, which one scholar has appropriately termed "state-MNC symbiosis", goes beyond the mere conceptualisation of the 'core' countries exploiting 'peripheral' ones, to a level where a mutually beneficial partnership (however unequal) between the peripheral state managers and the MNCs has developed, thus ensuring the perpetuation of the dependency syndrome.

Summary

The various conceptualisations discussed above, clearly indicate that i) there is a wide diversity of conceptions in the dependency literature; ii) the proponents of the approach work at various levels of analysis; and iii) there are limitations on the formulation of a comprehensive theory of dependency.

Although the above discussion covered only three viewpoints it did touch on some of the basic assumptions upon which most dependency theorists seem to be agreed: i) that dependency provides a framework for explaining the interrelatedness and uneveness of underdevelopment and development. Dependency scholars view underdevelopment not as an original condition but instead assume that many nations may have once been undeveloped but never underdeveloped and that the contemporary underdevelopment of many parts of the Third World was created by the same process that brought development to the industrialised nations.
and ii) (implied but rarely stated explicitly), dependency "theory" offers a foundation for the analysis of class struggle and points to strategies to overcome class tensions with the aim of resolving the problem of societal contradictions created by dependent capitalism. Dependency also assumes that, for any group of countries, the most dependent nations are also the least developed.

Dependency Approach and Empirical Studies

There have been few empirical studies thus far that have attempted to verify the assumptions or assertions made by dependency analysts. Most of the attempts to apply dependency have appeared in the form of case studies usually supported by historical data and descriptive analysis. The paucity of empirical "tests" of dependency theory is indicative of its inherent weakness. This weakness would seem to stem primarily from i) the eclectic nature of the approach; ii) the lack of an agreed upon operational definition of the concept; and, iii) the absence of a commonly accepted conceptual framework.

Patrick McGowan's attempt to test the applicability of dependency "theory" to the economic performance of black African states seems to encounter some of these problems. However, as Sheila Smith points out, McGowan's failure to find a positive correlation between economic performance and dependence cannot be attributed solely to the deficiencies of the theory. In fact, as Smith argues, even if McGowan's results had conformed to his hypotheses, they would not necessarily have told us anything about dependence, "Since the results are based upon aggregated information for 30 countries mixed without regard to the actual circumstances prevailing in any particular case." However, McGowan does
make an important observation in his study; namely that there is need for the specialist in African international relations to "build bridges between the dependency theory and international relations theory in general, particularly with the linkage politics literature". 47

This need is particularly urgent in the field of African foreign policies which, as I noted earlier, has presently few, comprehensive studies that focus on the impact of dependence. 48 There seems to be an apparent reluctance among established international relations scholars to utilise this approach to account for the external behaviour of underdeveloped and dependent states. This is perhaps a reflection on the original purpose for which dependency was initially developed; namely to explain underdevelopment in most Third World countries rather than to explain foreign policy.

For my purpose however, dependency is not only useful as a method of explaining the "development of underdevelopment" in the Third World. It is also a potentially important model for analysing the foreign policies of African states as will be demonstrated later in this thesis.

However, as already recognised, the dependency approach has its limitations. Thus while it can explain the inability of most African states to implement many of their declared foreign policy goals, it fails to explain diversity in African foreign policy styles and development strategies -- in spite of the fact that they are all underdeveloped and dependent. It is in this respect that the adaptive approach complements dependency "theory", as is shown below.
James N. Rosenau, who introduced the adaptive approach to comparative foreign policy analysis, suggests that adaptation is based on the premise that all nations are adapting entities with similar problems that arise out of the need to cope with their environments. According to Rosenau, every society consists of "essential structures" which within "acceptable limits" can adapt to changes in its environment. However, if these limits are surpassed as a consequence of internal and external pressures then a fundamental transformation or breakdown takes place, resulting in a different mode of adaptation (if transformation takes place) or in maladaptation (if the change in essential structures goes beyond "acceptable limits").

Rosenau posited that depending on how foreign affairs officials "typically" respond to demands and changes emanating from their international and domestic environments, there are four possible types of adaptive foreign policy behaviour:

1) **Acquiescent**, in which internationally-originated demands and changes are mainly responded to and domestic structures are modified to agree with external demands;

2) **Intransigent**, where demands and changes of domestic origin are mainly responded to and attempts are made to change the external environment to agree with domestic structures.

3) **Promotive**, wherein most changes and demands from both environments may be ignored because they cancel each other out or attempts may be made to change both environments so as to achieve a new equilibrium between domestic and international demands; and
iv) Preservative, where demands and changes emanating from both the domestic and international environments are responded to in making foreign policy but where the existing equilibrium between the two environments is preserved by aiming at no international or domestic change.

These four types of foreign policy adaptation should perhaps be viewed as ideal types rather than as representations of actual behaviour. This is because these modes of adaptation are not used to characterise specific decisions but to describe the general character of foreign policy over a certain period of time. As Rosenau has pointed out,

"this four-fold breakdown refers to enduring patterns of adaptation and not to particular external behaviours -- to the 'eras' in a society's foreign policy and not to the specific situations in which it becomes involved."\(^{53}\)

It would seem, then, that the adaptive approach in its original form is of doubtful empirical relevance. However, a few scholars have demonstrated that this approach can be usefully employed in modified form. Peter Hansen, for example,\(^{54}\) relates Rosenau's four types of adaptation to two main independent variables: "influence capability" and "stress sensitivity". Hansen's model has, with minor changes, been used by McGowan and Gottwald in their comparative study of thirty African states.\(^{55}\) Shaw has also employed a revised form of Rosenau's adaptive framework in his case study of Tanzania's foreign policy.\(^{56}\) As noted in the preface, his revision of Rosenau distinguished between levels of interaction and also modified the ranking of independent variables to fit his case's data.
The Structure of Kenyan and Tanzanian Foreign Policy

This study employs a revised form of Rosenau's framework, in some ways similar to that employed by Shaw. However, while the general format is similar to that of Shaw, my analytical framework only includes one level of interaction, namely the global level. The choice of this level of analysis is somewhat arbitrary and is based primarily on its relevance to the investigation of the impact of dependence and under-development on the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania. While the external policies of these two states could be analysed at any or all levels of interaction (regional, continental and global), dependency is perhaps most relevant in analysing foreign policies at a level that deals with national and international linkages rather than those dealing with regional or subregional relations.

Given the dependence of Kenya and Tanzania on the global capitalist economy, the systemic variable is likely to be the more powerful force influencing the two states' mode of adaptation. However, my study suggests that the leadership variable in Kenya and Tanzania, as in other African states, is also an important factor.

The role of the leadership, in particular that of President Nyerere, is generally recognised as being significant in maximising Tanzania's policy options, given the constraining role of external penetration and dependence on the global economy. The leadership's perception of Tanzania's systemic role as being of vital importance has caused the state to be "promotive" in its global relations. Hence Tanzania has emphasised freedom and self-reliance. Furthermore, it has sought to establish a new relationship between its domestic structures and the
global environment. Thus, the state's shift to a vigorous policy of non-alignment and self-reliance could be viewed as being influenced by both systemic and idiosyncratic variables. In global terms this shift could be viewed as a response to the failure of international institutions and donor states to respond adequately to Tanzania's urgent need for development assistance. At the same time, this change in policy could be viewed as being partly influenced by a radical leadership that rejects the constraints of dependence (i.e. preparedness to take risks) and instead attempts to disengage.

Tanzania's leadership is committed to a foreign policy that aims at producing a wider range of choices in order to establish a new relation between domestic structure and the external environment. Viewed from this perspective, Tanzania's policy of international self-reliance is a function of both the inadequate flow of external assistance as well as the determination of its leadership to diversify international relations.

Kenya, on the other hand, is generally "acquiescent" towards the existing global power structure; its ruling elite continues to allow domestic state structures to be largely determined by changes and demands emanating from the external environment. The kind of policy positions displayed by Kenya on various international issues have sometimes been identified with conservative regimes or those African governments that accept a dependent "neo-colonial" relationship with metropolitan centres. As Colin Leys has observed:

"the impact of colonial settlement on the (Kenyan) economy and society set up a highly visible framework.
for a neo-colonial pattern of development (or 'development of underdevelopment') which has been followed with singular consistency since 1963. As is shown in Chapter 3, Kenya has continued to support and to ally itself with international capitalist interests and has not made any meaningful effort to reduce the effects of dependence on its political economy. It is also suggested that the apparent reluctance to undertake measures aimed at reducing the effects of dependence is partly due to the fact that the Kenyan state shares (albeit disproportionately) with foreign interests the benefits derived from a dependency relationship.

As suggested above, Nyerere is the central figure in the formulation and implementation of Tanzanian foreign policy. By contrast, Kenyatta delegated most of his decision-making authority to a small group of advisors comprised of a few ministers, high-ranking civil servants, close relatives and friends (mostly members of his Kikuyu ethnic group). This became much more the case in the 1970s as a result of Kenyatta's gradual withdrawal (primarily due to old age and deteriorating health) from personal involvement in the political process. Thus, by the time he died in August 1978, the operation and management of Kenya's political establishment had passed to the "innermost circle" of advisors: Kenyatta's political role had become more symbolic and less effective as he approached his death. The Kenyan and Tanzanian leadership roles and ideologies are examined in greater details in the next chapter.

As shown in subsequent chapters, there are marked differences in the leadership styles and strategies of Kenya and Tanzania. The significance of these differences and the extent to which they affect the outcome of the foreign policies of the two states will be analysed later in the thesis.
However, on the basis of my theoretical framework (combining the concepts of "dependence" and "adaptation") and given the particular characteristics of Kenya and Tanzania already pointed out, the following observation about their foreign policies can be made: In general, it seems reasonable to expect both external systemic and idiosyncratic variables to have (in varying degrees) some influence on foreign policy behaviour. Table 1:1 below represents a conceptualisation of the broad structure of the two states' global policies as presently conceived by this writer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Issue area</th>
<th>Type of Adaptation</th>
<th>More Powerful Independent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Economic/Political</td>
<td>Acquiescent</td>
<td>Systemic and Idiosyncratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Political/Economic</td>
<td>Promotive</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic and Systemic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the dependence and underdevelopment of Kenya and Tanzania does it make any difference (in terms of policy outcome) whether a promotive foreign policy strategy or an acquiescent strategy is adopted? More specifically, is one strategy more effective than the other in promoting (at the global level) foreign policy goals of self-reliance, non-alignment and reduction of the effects of dependence? These are but a few examples
of the type of questions to be raised and examined in this thesis, in order to determine the impact of dependence and underdevelopment.

The basic hypotheses proposed for this study based on the extant literature are as follows:

1) For small, underdeveloped, dependent states such as Kenya and Tanzania, the major factors that influence foreign policy at the global level of interaction are systemic and idiosyncratic variables;

ii) Given the underdevelopment and dependence of Kenya and Tanzania, it is expected that the systemic variable will exert most influence on the foreign policies of these two states at the global level, while the idiosyncratic variable will act as an important intervening variable;

iii) Given the systemic constraints and/or influence on the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania, it is expected that neither country will be able to practice fully its declared foreign policy of non-alignment. However, everything else being equal, it is expected that Tanzania will make greater attempts at pursuing a foreign policy of non-alignment than Kenya, because of the nature of its leadership; and

iv) Proceeding from the premise that the external behaviour of African states, can best be understood and explained from a perspective that treats foreign policy as a form of adaptive behaviour, the modes of adaptation that are expected to be salient in the foreign policy behaviour of Kenya and Tanzania are 'acquiescent' and 'promotive' respectively.
C. Methodology

The comparative method as employed in the study of foreign policy, is, like any other approach, more useful for certain purposes and less relevant for others. For example, if the researcher is concerned with policy process of a single system, the comparative method may not be as valuable as a case history. On the other hand, the comparative method is most useful in respect to the generation and testing of propositions about foreign policy behaviour that apply to two or more political systems. It is in this respect that the approach is of relevance to the present study. Furthermore, the comparative method draws attention to variables which may explain differences as well as similarities in the external behaviour of more than one nation, with the result that the analysis moves beyond particular cases to higher levels of generalisation.

The relevance and appropriateness of this method to my study is further underlined by my choice of the adaptive approach, which itself implies the use of the comparative method. This is clearly stated by Rosenau when he remarks that:

"the adaptive perspective seeks understanding not in unique factors but in common factors; not through the case study but through the comparative assessment not through the applied inquiry but through the theoretical formulation that tests hypotheses and establishes general principles". (emphasis added)
Hence the comparative method allows us systematically to compare the different strategies and styles that Kenya and Tanzania have employed in dealing with and adjusting to their respective internal and external environments. Such comparisons are important because of the need to enhance knowledge and to provide a better explanation of the adaptive political process that operates in the foreign and development policies of African states.

Using the combination of approaches discussed above, I propose to conduct a systematic investigation that will examine and analyse the following areas among others:

i) **Colonial political economies.** The analysis focuses on the differences as well as similarities in the socio-economic and political structure that developed in the two states during the colonial era.

ii) **The nature and role of the leadership in both Kenya and Tanzania.** Particular emphasis will be placed on the personalities of Kenyatta and Nyerere, along with the impact of colonialism in moulding post-independence leaderships through colonial education and civil service training.

iii) **Post-colonial political economies.** The focus here is on the post-independence continuities and changes in the political economies of the two states. The emphasis is placed on the foreign economic relations that have developed between the two East African States and the global economy. And,

iv) **The Kenyan and Tanzanian foreign policies up to the end of the 1970 decade.** The focus is on the two states' adaptive politics at
the global level -- the clear desire by Tanzania to eradicate its dependence and subordination to the global economy and the "good boy" image of Kenya in the Western world, involving its acceptance of the status quo. The "informal alliances" between Tanzania and China on the one hand and between Kenya and Britain and the United States on the other hand, are also examined.

D. Data Collection Techniques and Problems

There are only three methods of obtaining data in social research: i) asking people questions (through interviews and/or questionnaires); ii) observing directly the behaviour of the people, groups and organisations being investigated; and/or iii) utilising records or data already gathered for other purposes. However, as one scholar has observed, "decision-makers are seldom willing to be interviewed and international conduct is seldom open to direct observation, (hence) the only apparent alternative for students of foreign policy is to rely on existing public documents". But even this latter source has its problems. As McClelland and Hoggard have noted, most of such information is either classified, unavailable for public inspection or unrecorded; hence "unless we are prepared to wait for extended periods of time until state papers and compilations of documents of international relations are released by governments, we have no real alternative but to base our knowledge of contemporary world affairs mostly on day to day reporting
of the wire services, newspapers and other mass media agencies.\textsuperscript{68}

Although the problems outlined above are of general relevance to most areas of political science research, they are of particular importance to such research in Africa as indicated below.

The problem of inaccessibility of relevant information is particularly important. Its root cause seems to lie in political sensitivity towards the work of the political scientist, no matter what area of study is involved. As Henry Bretton has observed,

\begin{quote}
the sensitivity surrounding the work of the political scientist, no matter what he searches for, has influenced the style and method of research, generally working to restrict his opportunities.\textsuperscript{69}
\end{quote}

Many African governments control and check on all research being conducted in their countries. The reasons normally given for the need for such checks and controls include:

i) the possibility that confidential intelligence information might be gathered under the guise of research;

ii) the possibility that, unwittingly, such confidential information might be published in research papers; and

iii) the possibility that the investigations of research workers might be misunderstood and produce local disturbances or local expectations which cannot be met.\textsuperscript{70}

A related problem to that discussed above is that key government documents are often unpublished and are unavailable for public viewing. In the majority of African countries most post-independence government
records in the national archives are still classified. This is unfortunate for students conducting research on the post-independence politics of these countries. This is particularly the case for students of African foreign policies (such as this researcher) who are forced by these circumstances to rely primarily on more readily available published documentary sources, informal interviews, and observation data.

Regrettably, I encountered all the problems discussed above. The worst of all was the denial of research clearance by both the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments on grounds of the political sensitivity of the proposed study. The denial of research clearance reduced research in Kenya and Tanzania to reliance on public materials -- mainly reports in national newspapers and government documents from the two countries as well as information readily available in United Nations publications, non-East African newspapers, journals and magazines. Attempts were made to gather information through informal interviews. This method proved unreliable since most of the interviewees were sensitive to the fact that the interviewer had no formal research clearance.

The people interviewed include former university colleagues, who now hold key positions in government ministries, a few diplomats and a substantial number of academics whose expertise in the area of African political economy and/or African foreign policy is widely recognised. A lot of ideas derived from the existing literature on foreign policy and dependency theory proved very useful in the formulation of the theoretical framework on which this study is based.
The data employed in analysing the propositions posited by this study take the form of events and issues derived from the relevant public and other documents of the two countries. Information derived from this public material has been supplemented, wherever possible, by data derived through informal interviews and observations.

The information contained in this study is based on field research conducted during the period 1978-80. The thesis, then, uses the post-independence records of the two countries, up to 1980. However, historical (pre-independence) data are utilised wherever they assist in analysing foreign policy behaviour since formal independence.

E. Problems of Validation

It is generally agreed that the products of social science research on Africa are often laden with problems of missing data or data whose accuracy in terms of what the research actually observed cannot be established. Therefore, the extent to which the results accurately reflect social reality cannot be ascertained; hence the problem of validating or falsifying given research findings.

Recognising this general problem, the study attempts through the use of the methods described above to describe and analyse the data gathered, whether or not they support or falsify the general propositions posited. It should thus be possible to determine whether or not the evidence available supports my contention that dependence and under-development effectively influence Kenya's and Tanzania's policies at the global level.
CHAPTER 2

COLONIAL POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF KENYA AND TANZANIA

PART 1 - DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

A. Introduction

It was suggested in Chapter I of this thesis that the political economies of Kenya and Tanzania are both characterised by dependence and underdevelopment. It was also noted that in their post-colonial policies the two countries have displayed divergent approaches to these inherited problems of dependence and underdevelopment.

In the analysis that follows, I will examine the political economies of these two countries during the colonial period, concentrating on the differences as well as the similarities in the socio-economic and political structures developed during the colonial era. An attempt will also be made to show how Kenya and Tanzania both became integrated into the periphery of the capitalist world economy.

I identify those forces and structures created during this period which have been retained and multiplied in the post-colonial period. In this respect, I shall pay special attention to the colonial economy and its educational system, both of which combined to produce the first generation of post-colonial African leaders. I also examine the process of transition from colonialism to "Uhuru", in order to show how the various interest groups (both national and foreign) bargained and compromised to ensure that political independence would not alter the essential socio-economic structures created and nurtured during colonialism.
B. Colonial Economic Structures of Kenya and Tanzania

1) Cash-Crop Export Oriented Economy

In Kenya and Tanzania, as in other parts of the colonised world, colonial rule led to the establishment of new economic structures and institutions. Prior to their conquest by imperial powers, the economies of Kenya and Tanzania were characterised by subsistence production and consumption with a very limited internal exchange of goods and services.

The introduction of colonial rule resulted in the emergence and growth of a cash economy whose export-orientation had the inevitable consequence of linking the economies of the two states to the international capitalist economy. This type of export-oriented economy was based on three distinct but interrelated forms of production:

1) the growth of cash crops by African peasant farmers for export;
2) the development of agricultural and mineral products for export by European plantation and mining companies; and
3) the creation of an import-substitution industrial and commercial sector by European and Asian migrant communities.

Although most parts of East Africa experienced all three types of production relations, the dominant path of economic expansion took different forms in different countries. Thus in Kenya, on the one hand, at the height of colonialism, virtually the entire agricultural cash production was monopolised by European farmers and planters. Tanzania, on the other hand, had a more balanced mix of African peasant and European settler and plantation production of cash crops. In non-agricultural sectors—transportation, construction, commerce and industry—the ownership and management of enterprises was in both
countries exclusively in the hands of Europeans and Asians. However, as shown in Table 2:1 below, these non-agricultural sectors tended to be larger and more concentrated in Kenya than Tanzania, due to the relatively greater degree of capitalist penetration in the former than the latter.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>% of Total GDP</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>% of Total GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Processing</td>
<td>20,520</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>6,826</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communication</td>
<td>17,560</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>11,094</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution and Commerce</td>
<td>26,390</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>7,871</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8,380</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6,090</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>72,850</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>31,881</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


African participation in the modern economy, with the exception of export production in Tanzania (and Kenya after World War II) largely took the form of providing unskilled wage labour in the urban areas or manual labour in the European owned plantations.
Since the colonial economy in both Kenya and Tanzania was primarily dependent on agricultural production, it necessitated, right from the beginning, 1) the alienation of some of the best pieces of community land for white settlement, as well as 11) the recruitment of African labour to man the plantations. Labour "reserves" were then created for those indigenous citizens evicted from their best lands. Apart from land alienation, various other methods were employed in an attempt to "proletarianise" Africans. These included coercion and the introduction of a hut and poll tax, whose main object was to, "Oblige Africans to accept paid labour and accustom themselves to European administrative discipline."

The story of land alienation and the proletarianisation of dispossessed Africans has been amply discussed in the literature on the colonial political economies of Kenya and Tanzania; hence it will not be discussed further in this study. However, it should be emphasised that the impact of land alienation, particularly in the Kenyan context, has had important implications for post-colonial politics and policies as will be shown in Chapter 3. In the Tanzanian context, Rweyemamu has shown that the cheap labour system pursued during the colonial period did not improve the quality of the local factors of production as would be expected. He argues instead that not only did colonial labour policy retard the industrialisation process but:

"that the major cause of absenteeism, lack of initiative, and low productivity of African labour was the nature of the plantation system itself rather than the nature of traditional society .... the system of migrant labour"
a vicious circle was built up with poverty compelling migration and migration in turn hindering the alleviation of poverty.  

While land dispossession and the creation of labour reserves had the effect of distorting and retarding the indigenous subsistence economy, the introduction of a narrow range of cash-crops for export had the effect of not only fostering class differences, which went hand-in-hand with uneven development, but of linking the economies of these two states into the periphery of the international capitalist economy. The five major cash crops introduced were coffee, sisal, tea, cotton and pyrethrum, which have continued, as shown in Chapter 3, to be among the leading foreign exchange earners in post-colonial Kenya and Tanzania.

Dependence on a few export-oriented raw materials to support a whole economy led not only to a deemphasis on food production and an overemphasis on cash crop production, but led Kenya and Tanzania (like most other 'single commodity' producers) into vulnerability to fluctuations in international prices over which they have no control. Thus, for example, between 1958 and 1961, tea and sisal respectively, were among the leading commodities in world price fluctuations (see Table 2:2). Furthermore, since these export commodities were so dependent on external inputs (in the form of capital, management, etc) and since the plantations themselves were foreign-owned, much of the saving and investment potential was depleted by the outflow in the form of interest and other payments to metropolitan financiers. Further, because these cash crops were introduced to satisfy metropolitan interests, perceptions
TABLE 2:2: AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE FLUCTUATIONS IN WORLD PRICES OF COTTON, COFFEE, SISAL, TEA AND OTHER COMMODITIES, 1958 TO 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>% Fluctuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


of investment opportunities became biased in favour of complementing metropolitan rather than colonial economies. Thus what was grown, how it was grown and where it was grown were determined by the needs of the metropole. This led to very little agricultural diversification as well as to the retardation of technological change in the colonies. In this connection, Rweyemamu has observed of the plantation system in Tanzania that

"By importing all the capital goods requirements, it failed to develop the technological base of skills, knowledge, facilities and organization upon which further technical progress so largely depends. Moreover, because of the political power the sector wielded, research was concentrated in the crops which
they were growing. Consequently very little technical knowledge concerning production of other crops (especially food crops for the internal market) was acquired.  

(emphasis added).

A clear indication that these export commodities were introduced with the aim of complementing the metropolitan economies is evident from the fact the destination of the bulk of them was Britain, (and Germany in the case of Tanzania prior to World War I). Tables 2:3, to 2:6 represent an attempt to illustrate this point. The years shown are randomly chosen and are assumed to be typical of a particular period. Thus Table 2:3 is assumed to be typical of the German period in Tanzania prior to World War I; Tables 2:4, 2:5 and 2:6 are assumed to be typical of the post World War II period in Kenya and Tanzania, prior to the latter's 1967 'Arusha Declaration.'

The colonial economy, though primarily dependent on the production and exportation of a few strategic agricultural commodities, was also sustained by the institutional structures that developed to facilitate trade as well as to promote a commercial and industrial sector within these two East African colonies. This aspect of the colonial economy will be the subject of the discussion that follows.

ii) Institutional Dependence: Finance & Trade

Under the protective umbrella of the British colonial administration, a vast partially interlinked institutional structure of private interests emerged which both helped to shape and become an integral feature of the economies of the two states. Its main base was centred
TABLE 2:3 - TANZANIA: TOTAL EXPORTS AND EXPORTS SENT TO GERMANY, 1911

(IN '000 OF MARKS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total Exports</th>
<th>Exports To Germany</th>
<th>To Germany**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-plantation rubber</td>
<td>4781</td>
<td>3511*+</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation rubber</td>
<td>3610</td>
<td>2539*+</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal Fibre</td>
<td>4532</td>
<td>4423*</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1332</td>
<td>1267*</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>1013*</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beeswax</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesame</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mica</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>348*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Asterisks indicate strategic raw materials exported to Germany.

**Percentage sent to Germany worked out to the nearest 'round' figure.


+ Rubber, the most important export in pre-World War I period, declined in importance after World War I, due to the collapse of its German market.
#### TABLE 2:4: MARKETS FOR KENYAN AND TANZANIAN SISAL, 1956 -1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destinations</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'000 Tons</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>'000 Tons</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>'000 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other E.F.T.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries*</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.E.C.**</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining numbers</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Quantity</td>
<td>220.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>221.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>240.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*E.F.T.A. = European Free Trade Association; members: United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal (Associate Member: Finland).

**E.E.C. = European Economic Community: Belgium, France, Western Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, United Kingdom (Associate Members: Greece and A.C.P. Countries).

### TABLE 2:5: ANNUAL EXPORTS OF EAST AFRICAN COFFEE, 1949-1967

(‘000 cwt)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>1,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 486 888 12,791 2,264 3,189


*Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania combined.

### TABLE 2:6: ANNUAL EXPORTS OF EAST AFRICAN TEA, 1953-1965 (million lbs.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals** 12 33 24 32 44

in Nairobi (Kenya) where, in cooperation with the settlers, it could pressure the colonial administration to adopt policies conducive to its continued growth.  

The export-import sector — which was the dominant feature of the colonial economy — was controlled by a few oligopolistic trading firms, most of which were subsidiaries of manufacturers, steamship companies, insurance firms, banks, and merchandisers of metropolitan countries based in the U.K. They usually had branch offices in East Africa, more often located in Nairobi than in Kampala or Dar-es-Salaam. Kenya's coffee for example, was sold at auctions in Nairobi and shipped out of the country by foreign firms, the largest being Tchibo Trading Co. Ltd., A. Baumann Ltd. and Kenna Coffee Ltd. The biggest sisal buyers for both Kenya and Tanzania, were Ralli Brothers (Kenya) Ltd., a subsidiary of the British firm of Ralli Brothers, with some 35 other subsidiaries. Similarly, Kenya and Tanzania pyrethrum was sold to Mitchell Cotts (Pyrethrum) Ltd., a British firm that controlled the only processing factories in both countries. The main buyer of all the tobacco was British American Tobacco Company (B.A.T.). Tanzania's coffee and cotton was also sold by auction to such large foreign buyers as Tancot (Tanganyika cotton) Ltd. and Brooke Bond. During German colonialism, a German Company — Deutsche Ostafrika Gesellschaft — had the monopoly of sisal, cotton and other strategic products such as rubber.  

In all these cases, the producer was at the mercy of the monopolistic power of these export firms. The small farmer/peasant in particular lacked any form of countervailing power to defend his interests. Moreover, the firms that handled exports were invariably involved in the
import trade. Besides those firms identified above other prominent firms in international trade were: Mackenzie Dulgety Ltd., Unilever, Lonrho, Twentsche Overseas Trading Co. (E.A.) Ltd., James Finlay and the United Textile Industries (Kenya) and (Tanganyika) Ltd.

Besides the external orientation and foreign domination of these trading institutions during the colonial era, a variety of institutions emerged that facilitated and reinforced foreign control. The most important of these were the banks and related financial institutions. Until 1966, one of these institutions -- the East African Currency Board -- was the central monetary authority that controlled the currency supply for the three East African States. As members of the sterling zone centred in London, these countries used the British pound as the basis of their currency. As such, the local money supply could only increase through the investment of an equivalent amount of sterling in London, contributed largely through export earnings. This monetary arrangement clearly enhanced the dependent relationship between Britain and East Africa. It not only eased the flow of trade between Britain and East Africa, it also facilitated the commercial activities of the foreign-owned banks (mostly British) by removing any foreign exchange risks.

The regional banking system was dominated by three British commercial banks: Barclays, Standard and National and Grindlays. Initially these banks were established for the purpose of providing credit for financing imports. However, in using their power to make loans, they could decide, based on their own profit criteria, where to lend funds, thus determining in large part the kinds of investments to be made. Furthermore, since these banks invested 2/3 of their profits
outside East Africa, the result was that they became involved in a process of exporting capital from East Africa to London:

The financial institutions developed during the colonial period, then, reinforced the external orientation and dependence of the economies of Kenya and Tanzania on the international capitalist economy. By directing their loans and advances to the export-import trade, the commercial banks reinforced the export enclave character of the colonial economy. More importantly, the monetary arrangement ensured continued exploitation of Kenya and Tanzania by the metropole, through the trading and commercial activities of British banking institutions.

**Conclusion**

The colonial pattern of economic activities effectively integrated Kenya and Tanzania into the metropolitan economy in particular and the global community of capitalist societies in general, but only as dependent and peripheral units. More directly linked was the import and export sector, with its supporting commercial activities. This is the sector which, in the post-colonial period, has been most resistant to change. This point will be pursued further in Chapter 3.

In the discussion that follows, I shall examine some of the significant differences, in the nature and extent of capitalist penetration in Kenya and Tanzania.

**i.ii. The nature and Extent of Capitalist Penetration in Kenya and Tanzania**

Relatively speaking, colonial capitalist penetration occurred to a much greater extent in Kenya than Tanzania with the result that the
former experienced a higher level of 'development' than the latter. Various factors contributed to these different levels of capitalist penetration. Overall, discontinuity in Tanzania's colonial history and, by contrast, continuity in Kenya's colonial experience clearly affected the degree of settler dominance as well as the extent of metropolitan investment. In turn, as will be shown below, settler dominance and foreign investment to a large extent influenced the nature and rate of growth in the two colonies.

In this connection, Tanzania's relatively disadvantaged position within East Africa can be traced to its mixed colonial background which discouraged immigrant settlement and private investment. British rule, Tanzania's mandate status under the League of Nations (later the UN) and a resultant "open door" policy to settlers of non-British nationality, along with a general uncertainty about the future of the colony after the expulsion of the Germans from that country during the first World War, all inhibited further settlement. Furthermore, the end of German rule resulted in reluctance among German financiers to continue with their earlier pattern of investment. At the same time, British financiers were not certain about the new political status of the country under a League of Nations mandate and hence preferred to invest in Kenya rather than in Tanzania.

Settler Dominance

Besides the fact that Kenya's European and Asian population continued to be higher than that of Tanzania after the first World War (see Table 2), Britain's "open door" policy to settlers in Tanzania, resulted in a heterogeneous mix of nationalities. Thus of the 1,666
expatriates in Tanzania holding long-term leases on land as of 31 December 1960, only 470 (28 percent) were British and 197 (6 percent) South African. Other major groups included Greeks - 279 (19 percent), Asians - 287 (17 percent), and Germans - 45 (3 percent). This heterogeneous nature of Tanzanian immigrants can be observed from the distribution of sisal plantations in 1964. This indicates that the position of Tanzanian settlers was never strong enough to impose a total ban on African peasant production of export crops as was the case in Kenya prior to the post-World War II change in British agricultural policy in the colonies. Tables 2:7 and 2:8 below provide some evidence of the settler and/or immigrant position in Kenya and Tanzania.

**TABLE 2:7: EUROPEAN AND ASIAN POPULATION IN KENYA AND TANZANIA - SELECTED YEARS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kenya European</th>
<th>Kenya Asian</th>
<th>Tanzania European</th>
<th>Tanzania Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>3,175</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>5,336</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>9,651</td>
<td>25,253</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>14,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>29,660</td>
<td>97,687</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>47,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>55,759</td>
<td>176,613</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>88,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>192,000</td>
<td>16,861</td>
<td>74,972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2.8: DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP OF SISAL PRODUCTION IN TANZANIA

- 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>62,250</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>57,600</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>15,750</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 229,800 100.0


On the one hand, the heterogeneous nature of Tanzanian settlers, by contrast to their counterparts in Kenya who were largely of British origin, limited their cohesiveness as an interest group and hence their capability to lobby effectively with the colonial administration for the allocation of capital investment to Tanzania. The Kenya settlers, on the other hand, whose dominance was not just confined to the economic sector, but rather extended to the social and political arenas, clearly took advantage of the weak position of Tanzania's immigrant population. This was particularly so after 1923, the year Tanzania joined the regional common market which had existed between Kenya and Uganda from the start of British colonial administration.
The lobbying power of the Kenya settlers had already been demonstrated the year prior to Tanzania joining the common market (i.e. 1922), when they successfully persuaded the colonial administration to accept a policy of protection for their locally produced consumer goods.\(^{15}\)

Furthermore, shortly after Tanzania joined the common market, the Kenya settlers once again managed to pressure the colonial administration into an agreement that allowed for free interchange of local as well as imported products between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.\(^{16}\) It is now generally agreed that this common market worked to the disadvantage of Tanzania and to the advantage of Kenya.\(^{17}\) According to Leubuscher, it was "prejudicial to the interests of Tanzania because in drawing up the tariff and fixing the rates of import duties at a high level, the interests of Kenya were paramount. The free interchange of local goods between the three territories also favoured the two other partners at the expense of Tanzania."\(^{18}\)

Leubuscher has, for example, calculated that in 1931 alone Tanzania suffered a loss in revenue of over £58,000 owing to the free imports from Kenya and Uganda of the principal protected articles.\(^{19}\) Ghai arrived at a similar conclusion when he asserted that, "From our analysis of the territorial distribution of benefits and costs of the East African common market, it appears that Kenya has been the greatest net beneficiary, that Uganda has on balance gained rather than lost, and that Tanganyika has suffered a substantial net loss."\(^{20}\)
Tanzania's "periphery of the periphery" position within East Africa was particularly evident in regional trade; this tended to favour Kenya, with Uganda being able to maintain some advantage but with Tanzania clearly losing. Tables 2:9a)-c) below illustrate this divergent relationship between the three East African States prior to World War II.

**TABLE 2:9a): -- TANZANIA: TRADE WITH KENYA AND UGANDA - SELECTED YEARS**

(£'000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports From</th>
<th>Exports to</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>-94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2:9b): -- TANZANIA: TRADE WITH KENYA AND UGANDA IN PROTECTED GOODS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports From</th>
<th>Exports to</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>-36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2:9c): -- TANZANIA: TRADE WITH KENYA AND UGANDA IN LOCALLY PROCESSED GOODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports From</th>
<th>Exports To</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It was not only in the area of trade that the Kenya settlers managed to maintain an advantage over those of Tanzania. Several studies have shown that the neglect of infrastructural and agricultural development under the British administration of Tanzania was primarily due to pressure and opposition from the Kenya settlers and local colonial administration. According to Sahú, during the German colonial administration Tanzania's infrastructural and agricultural expansion were as advanced as in Kenya; they only began to regress under British mandated rule.

A related factor that further enhanced settler dominance and influence within Kenya was their virtual monopoly (in conjunction with plantation-owning foreign companies) over the production of cash crops, by contrast to their Tanzanian counterparts who shared cash crop production with African peasants. Thus, unlike the Tanzanian economy, the Kenyan one, as Colin Leys has observed,
"rested on monopolies, to an extent not found in all other African colonies ... Europeans had almost exclusive control over all the significant economic resources: land, labour, capital, technology and markets."

The absence of monopoly in Tanzania is partially a result of German colonial policy in Tanzania and partially due to the nature of the settler population that emerged after the first World War. As explained earlier, the heterogenous nature of Tanzania's post World War I settler community weakened the latter's capability to exercise complete control over the economy. Furthermore, this immigrant community remained smaller than that of Kenya. In addition, whereas the European farmers in Kenya occupied 7.3 million acres of land, their counterparts in Tanzania occupied only 2.5 million acres of alienated land.

**Metropolitan Investment**

It would be a gross exaggeration (and perhaps an oversimplification of the laws of capitalism) to attribute Kenya's 'development' as the centre of the East African periphery entirely to settler dominance and hence to their influence on the metropolitan government and private investor. This is particularly so given the fact that, during the post-World War II colonial period, the British colonial administration, literally ignored settler interests in favour of metropolitan interests in Kenya; a clear demonstration that the colonists owed their "power" to the coloniser rather than vice versa. It would seem, then, that up to the Second World War the British colonial administration needed the Kenya settlers and hence was willing to give in to settler pressure. But by
the end of the Second World War, this immigrant community had become too burdensome and hence dispensable. Furthermore, other more dominant interests had emerged in Kenya, whose interests conflicted with those of the settlers.

Even prior to the Second World War, other factors related to Tanzania's colonial status, contributed to the concentration of 'development' in Kenya and to the relative neglect of Tanzania. As mentioned earlier, Tanzania's mandate status after World War I created uncertainty about its future. Consequently, both the British administration and private investors, were hesitant to invest in a colony whose status was shaky. Furthermore, it made more economic sense to a foreign investor to 'serve' the East African market from Kenya, where European and Asian populations were larger than those in Tanzania, since it was these two immigrant communities that formed the basis of the market for import-substituting industries. The overall effect was that Kenya received more official and unofficial aid from Britain than did Tanzania, despite Tanzania's larger population and need.

When in 1946 the political status of Tanzania as a U.N. mandate territory administered by Britain was stabilized and clarified, Tanzania began finally to attract some external private investment. However, this resumption of foreign investment did not alter Tanzania's already disadvantaged peripheral position both within East Africa and the world economy. Tanzania continued to experience a much lower rate of development both social and economic. It still had a relatively insignificant manufacturing sector especially when compared with similar developments in Kenya. Thus, during the first few years of formal
independence, when both countries were still pursuing similar paths of 'development', a higher degree of capitalist penetration in Kenya than in Tanzania was clearly evident. For example, the manufacturing and industrial sectors of the economies were by 1961 contributing only 3 percent to Tanzania's Gross National Product as compared to 12 percent in Kenya. Judging by the number of companies (both local and foreign) registered in both Kenya and Tanzania and the nominal capital that these companies invested in the two economies between 1961–1966, it would seem that Tanzania's disadvantaged position in manufacturing vis-à-vis Kenya did not alter significantly during the pre-Arusha post-colonial period (see Table 2:10).

Similarly, average per capita income and Gross Domestic Product remained much higher in Kenya than in Tanzania during the same period, as is clearly evident from Table 2:11. As well, in the field of education, Tanzania's record reflects more colonial neglect than that of Kenya. As Table 2:12 indicates, Tanzania continued to lag behind Kenya in terms of the actual numbers of students attending school at all levels. For example, in 1962, whereas Kenya had 840,677 African students or 10 percent of the population in primary school, only 518,663 students in Tanzania, or 5.5 percent of the population were attending primary school.

In the field of infrastructural development the same pattern of greater colonial neglect in Tanzania is apparent. Thus, for example, in 1964 there were 1,125 miles of bituminised roads in Kenya whereas Tanzania, which is much larger, had only 782 miles. As for the railways,
### TABLE 2:10: COMPANY REGISTRATIONS IN TANZANIA AND KENYA, 1961-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Local Companies Registered</th>
<th>Nominal Capital (million)</th>
<th>Foreign Companies Registered</th>
<th>Local Companies Registered</th>
<th>Nominal Capital (million)</th>
<th>Foreign Companies Registered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4,279</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>4,433</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4,714</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4,990</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5,321</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:**
TABLE 2:11: -- GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND AVERAGE PER CAPITA INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>209.4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>227.3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.85</td>
<td>304.67</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>241.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>331.35</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>244.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>330.49</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>272.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>385.03</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2:12: -- EDUCATION IN KENYA AND TANZANIA (in actual numbers)

A. TANZANIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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B. KENYA

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whereas the Germans had constructed a 996 mile railway line before
1914, the British administration added only 350 miles. 29

Growth Without Development

It needs to be emphasised, however, that although Kenya emerges from
the above comparison as the favoured colony in terms of infrastructural
development, social services and industrialisation the distribution of
these goods was uneven, since they were largely concentrated within the
European dominated export enclave and the few urban centres, particularly
Nairobi, which became the regional headquarters for international
capitalist interests. In other words, Kenya experienced growth not de-vel-
opment. The cosmopolitan facilities and conveniences created in Kenya
were not intended to meet the needs of the indigenous people but rather
to facilitate capitalist penetration and exploitation of exportable raw
materials within Kenya and the rest of the East African region.

In essence, the above comparison has served to underscore the fact
that colonial capitalist penetration in Kenya was considerably more
advanced than in Tanzania which, by implication, would mean that Kenya
was more integrated and incorporated in the international capitalist
economy than Tanzania.

The point to be underlined in the above analysis is that the process
of capitalist penetration and peripherisation of the East African economies
during the colonial period had the effect of duplicating structural
inequalities from the international level to the regional level. Tanzania
became the periphery within the periphery, while Kenya became the centre
of the periphery, with Uganda acting as a 'buffer,' albeit inclined
towards the direction of Kenya.
That Tanzania did not do as well as Kenya in regard to international capitalism prior to 1945, is important in terms of analysing and explaining the social and political structures that developed in both countries, as well as the process and form of decolonisation that occurred in these two East African countries after 1945. The rest of this chapter, then, will be devoted to analysing the colonial social and political structures and forces as well as the processes of decolonisation in both Kenya and Tanzania inorder to determine the role of colonialism in the institutionalisation of dependence and underdevelopment in these two East African states.

C. Colonial Social Structures of Kenya and Tanzania

In this analysis of the social structure, I intend to focus particularly on class formation and ethnicity. In this connection, I will examine the role of the colonial economic and educational systems in shaping class and ethnic formations as well as in creating cultural dependency, these factors are important in understanding the role of African leaders in perpetuating dependence and underdevelopment in the post-colonial period.

i) Class Structure

Broadly speaking, the structure of the economies of Kenya and Tanzania paralleled the organisation of society along racial lines with its hierarchical division of skills, lines of responsibility and levels of income. The overwhelming majority of Africans survived at subsistence levels; their main source of income being either small family farms, using low productivity techniques of production, or unskilled wage
employment in farms, factories, shops and government service.

The only exception to this generalisation in the context of both
countries was a handful of prosperous farmers in the Kilimanjaro and
lake districts of Tanzania who took advantage of access to the
transportation network to get involved in cash crop production. This
was in contrast to Kenya, where, until after the Second World War,
Africans were prohibited by legislation from growing cash crops; hence
no comparable group of "Kulak" (rich) farmers emerged there. Never-
theless, few Africans did obtain employment as clerks, teachers, and
nurses in the public services or in the lower supervisory and junior
technical grades in private commerce and industry. This latter group
belonged to the category of artisans and thus earned comparatively more
than most African labour in unskilled and semi-skilled categories.

Because wage employment for Africans was generally insufficient
to support the labourer's family and himself, the worker was also
dependent upon the agricultural production of his relatives, thus tying
him integrally into the peasant sector. As Mahmoud Mamdani has argued,
the very act of employing Africans involved the extraction of value
from peasantry, for the employee had to be subsidised by his family.

The African was driven to work for low wages by the colonial imposition
of cash taxes and by oligopolistic European control over the labour
market. These kept wages depressed.

Besides the semi-proletarianised working class the smaller, but by
no means less important, "class" to emerge during colonisation, was the
African "petty bourgeoisie." This class had three different economic
bases -- Kulak (or petty capitalist) agriculture, small trade and clerical,
or teaching employment. It is worth noting that the fact that the African petty "bourgeoisie" had different economic bases meant that it was not a single cohesive class. Furthermore, the fact that certain strata of this class maintained an economic base in agriculture and small trade meant that, as a group, the petty African bourgeoisie had not completely severed links with the peasants and workers. During colonialism, then, the petty bourgeoisie's links to their different economic bases were provided by the particular sociological patterns of mobility and investment. The ties between the African trader and the Kulak was particularly strong. The small African trader often acquired his initial capital in peasant farming and usually worked simultaneously as a Kulak farmer.

The ties between clerical employees (usually junior civil servants) and teachers with other elements of the African bourgeoisie were weaker than those linking the Kulaks and traders, although they were still significant. Unlike the other two petty bourgeoisie strata the clerks and teachers had the distinction of having attained a certain amount of colonial or missionary education that was only available to a select few who could afford both the money and the time to acquire it. Its scarcity and its lack of relevance to the African traditional way of life meant that those who acquired it became part of the urbanised and salaried work force whose links with the rural traditional society were weakened by exposure to the individualistic values of colonial education.

Apart from this educational distinction, there were some significant links that tied the salaried stratum to the rest of the petty bourgeoisie. First, many of the fathers of the African salaried group were Kulaks.
Second, many of the salaried Africans invested in agriculture and became simultaneously petty capitalist farmers. Thus, although it was the salaried stratum of the African petty bourgeoisie that articulated anti-colonial consciousness, it got support from the other strata of the African petty bourgeoisie as well as from the peasant/worker class.

The alliance of all African classes in their opposition to colonialism was indicative of the fact that the contradictions between the peasant/worker and the African petty bourgeoisie were minor compared to those with the other classes in the colonial society. Indeed, social differentiation among the African population was just one tier of a broader pattern of racial stratification. More so in Kenya than Tanzania, the rural and urban European bourgeoisie (owners of capital in the plantation sector, industry and commerce, respectively) and the British professional personnel in the civil service formed the top stratum of society, with power, prestige and wealth — the hallmarks of a ruling class. Middle level manpower in the public services and in commerce and industry was supplied by Asians, who also monopolised small-scale commerce and industry. Only a tiny percentage of the Asian population was able to rise to high levels of affluence through income from large-scale industry, commerce and agriculture or from property and successful practice in the professions — law, medicine, engineering and architecture. The Asians also lacked political power. At the bottom of this racial ladder were the Africans, stripped of power, prestige, status and wealth.
These class-type divisions were reinforced by economic, social and political discrimination and segregation. There were separate residential areas for the various racial communities, segregated schools, hospitals, clubs, etc. This separation was intended to minimize contact and hence to reduce competition and potential conflict among the races and so, by implication, maintain racial harmony. On the economic level, the compartmentalisation was reinforced by a racial salary structure in the public sector, and imitatively, in the private sector, as well as by wide disparities in both the quality and quantity of social and economic services funded by the government for different races. This racial stratification, particularly in differential wage structures, was supported by the colonial administration on the grounds that:

"the European surpasses the Asian in such matters as sense of public service, judgement and readiness to take responsibility, and subject to individual exception, the African is at present time markedly inferior to the Asian in the same educational qualifications, in such matters as sense of responsibility, judgement, application to duty and output of work." 

It was against this background of racial segregation and discrimination that the 'Uhuru' struggle was waged by the Africans, in an attempt to achieve political autonomy and freedom for self-improvement. But before analysing the transition to formal independence, the ethnic aspect of colonial society and the political structures developed during this period need to be examined as well.
11) **Ethnic Class Structure**

The ethnic character of both Kenya's and Tanzania's African population has to be viewed within a framework of uneven capitalist development as well as the geographical distribution of their populations. Leys has amply discussed the role of colonialism in fostering ethnic consciousness. One could go further and condemn colonialism for allowing only ethnic-based political organisations (district associations) until the eve of formal independence, particularly in Kenya. However my purpose here is not to condemn colonialism for creating ethnic rivalries but rather to examine the particular character that ethnicity took in the two countries and its impact on post-colonial politics and policies.

The ethnic distribution of Kenya's African population displays some important differences from that of Tanzania. There are about 30 ethnic groups in Kenya compared to about 130 ethnic groups in Tanzania. In Kenya, the four main ethnic/linguistic groups, constituting about 60 percent of the population, are: Kikuyu (about 20 percent), Luo (about 14 percent), Luhya (about 13 percent) and Kamba (about 12 percent). These four major ethnic/linguistic groups are concentrated in three provinces: Central, Western and Nyanza. It is also in these three areas where almost all of the agricultural land classified as "high potential" is concentrated, particularly the former "White Highlands" reserved for white settlement. Thus, it was these ethnic groups, because of their geographic location that became the first "beneficiaries" of colonial and missionary education and of salaried employment in the major urban areas. In Tanzania, on the other hand, most of the ethnic
groups, due to the geography of the country, were scattered around its borders rather than clustered in the centre as in Kenya.

Although each of the main ethnic groups in Kenya suffered dispossession of land, forced labour and containment in "Reserves" (from which migrant labour was extracted), their impact was felt mostly by the Kikuyu, the largest ethnic/linguistic group in the country. Their closer proximity to European settlement compared to the other ethnic groups, made them the immediate victims of land alienation and forced labour. One estimate suggests that by 1948 a quarter of the then one million Kikuyu were living as labourers or squatters outside the confines of their inefficient reserves, while those in the city of Nairobi made up 60 percent of the city's African population.

Because of their relatively greater economic deprivation and exposure to colonial exploitation, the Kikuyu became politicised much earlier than other ethnic groups. Their early access to missionary education and urbanisation also helped to increase their political consciousness. Thus by the 1920s; the first generation of Kikuyu political leaders had already emerged in opposition to colonial rule and land alienation. With a long historical background of political involvement, it does not come as a surprise that it was largely the Kikuyu who spearheaded the anti-colonial struggle. They also provided the bulk of the first generation of national leadership in post-colonial Kenya.

In Tanzania, on the other hand, the spectre of a single ethnic group assuming dominance -- because of its relative size, economic or educational opportunities and/or its strategic location -- was
precluded. The largest — the Sukuma, living south of Lake Victoria and hence too far removed from the capital (Dar-es-Salaam) — are only mildly prosperous and are somewhat introspective politically and culturally. The most prosperous groups — the coffee growing Haya, Chagga and Nyakyusa are relatively small and located on the borders; they never formed a single state system. Moreover, the Zaramo and related coastal people, who form the biggest single component of Dar-es-Salaam's population have not had the leadership or size which might make them appear to be a potentially dominating group. Thus, Dar-es-Salaam is characterised by a mixed ethnic composition where no single group, apart from the Zaramo, claims more than 5 percent of the city's population. This is in marked contrast to Nairobi, where one ethnic group is predominant.

Thus, although Tanzania had more ethnic groups than Kenya, the circumstances of colonial penetration, and geographic and demographic distribution combined to produce a more homogenous people with fewer ethnic differences than in Kenya.

It would seem, then, that as Kenya and Tanzania emerged from colonialism, the former had a more developed and/or conflictual social structure and potentially more diverse range of interest groups that could influence policy making than the latter. This point will be pursued further in this thesis, in the process of analysing the leadership role in shaping the post-colonial policies of the two states.

D. Colonial Political Structures of Kenya and Tanzania

"A colonial power must control populations with very different social systems from its own, which are
distributed at great distances from the metropolitan and territorial capitals and in which in the African case often manifested very low levels of social and economic differentiation. It has to overcome the problems of authority, distance and cost -- to persuade subject peoples to accept both its version of law and order and its control over their dominant social institutions; to create an organizational capacity capable of transmitting orders from the centre and enforcing them on the periphery and to do all this without incurring costs which are so high that they render the whole exercise valueless. 44

The above quotation summarises some of the major considerations upon which British colonial political structures and processes were based. The pattern of political and governmental activities in the post-colonial period is better understood if viewed against this background of structures laid down and the processes set in motion during the colonial period. I have already noted that the primary motive of colonialism was economic. 45 However, the establishment and maintenance of the economic infrastructure demanded an extensive and positive role for the colonial state as a whole: the establishment of a sizeable expatriate community at the local level and sufficient restructuring of indigenous African political institutions to make possible the move from production for local use to production for the international market.
The tension between the desire to limit social/political costs in the colonies and the need to create a new export-oriented colonial economy made it very difficult for viable institutions of political control to be set up and sustained for long. Nevertheless, it was widely believed that this contradiction could be resolved through the devolution of power to effectively decentralised political and administrative structures: that colonies could be quickly equipped with the basic administrative and economic infrastructure and thereafter meet their own costs from internal resources. Local structures — administrators, legislative councils and chiefs — were thus expected to perform their duties with only minimal recourse to the metropolitan centre.

In both Kenya and Tanzania, four sets of political institutions were set up. First, the colonial service was created to provide the administrative apparatus. Second, local legislative and executive councils were set up to represent the interests of the expatriate community. Third, the colonial office in London was set up to integrate colonial affairs into the wider system of British political affairs. Finally, fourth, the system of indirect rule was institutionalised through chieftaincies and native councils to regulate the affairs of the indigenous people.

The administrative backbone of colonial control stretched from the colonial secretary of state in London through the local governors in the colonies and down to village headman or chief via national secretariats and Provincial and District Administrations. But despite the theoretical commitment to decentralisation, in practice formal
authority was very hierarchical and centralised. Lines of command and communication could not be broken, making each subordinate heavily dependent upon his superior and giving the Governor a great deal of power within the colony.

Expatriate interests were represented at the local level on legislative councils which were set up in Kenya before the first World War and in Tanzania in 1926. Although the proportions differed, each contained representatives of the main interest groups which existed in the local white communities -- essentially for agriculture, commerce and the missions -- together with the heads of the governmental departments. African interests were "indirectly represented" if at all, through Europeans, usually missionaries. It was generally assumed that the "tribal" nature of the African consciousness ruled out the possibility of their representing their own interests at the centre of colonial politics. They were to be represented only on local councils whose boundaries were coterminous with the limits of the pre-colonial tribal political authorities, hence reinforcing ethnicity.

As long as the African population could be persuaded not to question the basic assumptions of the colonial economy, Kenyan and Tanzanian politics at the national level remained a monopoly of the European settler/expatriate, with its primary focus located in the metropolitan centre. As Brett has rightly observed,

"Overall the colonial power structure represented the interests of those who were rich and white far more completely than those who were poor and black. Access
did not depend on the size of the group but upon its economic indispensability.\footnote{48}

To say that the Africans had little representation and expatriates a great deal, is not to say that the latter were able to control easily or effectively the historical process and the contradictions within the colonial political economy. Indeed, the eventual failure of colonialism to contain the social and economic interests and forces that it generated, clearly indicated the limits of British power — metropolitan and settler — in this regard. In particular, the colonial system generated among the colonised new interests which could not be effectively managed within the restricted colonial political framework.

In the discussion that follows, I shall examine and analyse the emergence of these indigenous forces, their role in the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism, and their continuing role in the post-colonial period, particularly in the area of foreign policy.

E. African Nationalism and the Transition to Neo-Colonialism

Introduction

As pointed out above, contradictions within the colonial system created the group which was to be responsible for the organization of the movement which led to its replacement by another system. They also created popular hostility among all other sectors of the African population, which enabled the emerging African petty bourgeoisie to mobilise a wide range of the population behind nationalist demands for political independence. The rise of African nationalism was a function of contact
with colonialism and not of distance from its effects. Thus it was those Africans who had either acquired colonial education or who were closely involved in the colonial economy that spearheaded the nationalist movements. Although education of Africans was intended to create literate manpower to occupy lower-level positions in the clerical grades of the colonial administration, ironically it was ultimately to produce people who chose to go not into administrative service but into nationalist politics instead. 

Despite the limits of the colonial system, some opportunities for petty trade did exist for Africans, particularly after the post World War II change in British colonial policy. In any case, limits on trade led to the emergence in many areas of African cooperatives. Organisational experience gained there was subsequently transferred to nationalistic purpose. In the urban areas African workers were allowed to form trade Unions which served the same functions as the cooperatives did in the countryside. From these various groups emerged an African group (the direct product of the changes induced by the colonial system) who had acquired the skills necessary to organise and lead a nationalist movement.

Consequently, in Kenya and Tanzania, as was the case in most of colonial Africa, the nationalist movement was born among and led by the emerging African petty bourgeoisie. Their knowledge of the colonial system (through attending colonial schools and working in the colonial civil service) gave them a leadership edge over other segments of the African population. In the analysis below, I examine in greater detail the transition from colonialism to formal independence in Kenya and
Tanzania, respectively.

ii) Kenya: Transition to Formal Independence

Political Protest Movements

In Kenya, political organisation among the Africans, as pointed out above, dates back to the 1920s, when the first political protest movement was formed by the first generation of educated Kikuyu. This movement — the Kikuyu Central Association (K.C.A.) formed in 1924 — was therefore a regional rather than a nationally-based movement. It articulated common African grievances regarding land dispossession and the oppressive nature of the colonial system. The demand for the return of "stolen" land and for an end to colonial rule became a consistent demand for all the political and semi-political African organisations that succeeded the K.C.A., which was banned by the colonial administration in 1940. 51

However, this organisation was replaced by a more nationally based political organisation — the Kenya African Union (K.A.U.) — that was headed by Jomo Kenyatta (the late president of Kenya) after his return from Britain in 1946. K.A.U., which aimed at becoming a mass political organisation capable of securing reforms by constitutional means, had grown out of a study group formed to support the first African member of the colonial legislative council of 1944. 52 An organisation that sought reforms by constitutional means could hardly be termed radical. During its short-lived existence, K.A.U. was often overshadowed by the relatively more radical trade unions that emerged during the same period. 53 One of these — the African Workers Federation (A.W.F.) —
was formed in January 1947 but was soon destroyed by the colonial administration because of its alleged radicalism. Unlike the leaders of K.A.U., the leaders of A.W.F. were relatively uneducated close to the ordinary workers. A.W.F. was succeeded in 1949 by the East African Trade Union Congress (E.A.T.U.C.) under the leadership of two radical unionists -- Markan Singh and Fred Kubai. By 1950, the E.A.T.U.C. had become the chief rallying point for mass discontent. Consequently, this union was also banned and its leaders detained.

The political vacuum left by the banning of trade unions was temporarily filled by the "Forty Group", named after the 1940 Kikuyu age group which was, like the trade unions before it, led by largely uneducated but talented and experienced Nairobi city-dwellers. It was the clandestine political activities of this group, particularly their political assassinations in and around Nairobi, which finally precipitated the colonial government's declaration of a state of emergency in 1952, in response to what came to be termed the "Mau Mau" resistance. This "Forty Group" protest movement lasted only up to 1954, when the colonial administration purged Nairobi of nearly all its adult male Kikuyu, thus bringing to an end a period of populist movements in Kenya, that had begun in 1946. As Furedi has pointed out,

"This period 1946-1954 was one of the most intense periods of radical activity in Kenya's history. This was due to the fact there existed an organised popular movement led by a group of people who expressed the interests of Nairobi's African people."
After the "Mau Mau" revolt was suppressed, electoral politics that had previously been denied the African population were opened up in 1960. The new political leaders who were able to take advantage of this particular style of politics were naturally persons who had good education and who had not been in detention. However, as the older generation of leaders was released from detention, conflicts and an uneasy changing of alliances among new and old leaders developed in the scramble for control of the post-colonial state.

Among the Kikuyu, the Mau Mau uprising had exposed class differences between, on the one hand, the landless uneducated squatters as well as the Nairobi "crowd" who supplied most of the forest fighters and, on the other hand, the landed often educated Kikuyu who acted as "loyalists" and the "homeguard" units who supported the colonial suppression that caused the death of 13,000 Africans. It was from these 'loyalist' group that the colonial government recruited the Kenyans who had to become collaborators in the neo-colonial strategy examined below.

The Neo-colonial strategy in the Kenyan Context

Introduction

Towards the end of his post independence administration in Ghana, the late Kwame Nkrumah accurately described neo-colonialism as a condition whereby a state possesses all the outward trappings of international sovereignty, but in reality its economy, and consequently its political policies, are controlled and directed by external capitalist forces working in close collaboration with internal elites, especially
those in control of the state apparatus. Nkrumah, who is known for his rather classic statement "seek ye first the political kingdom and everything else shall be added unto you," seems to have learned the hard way after the initial excitement over the recovery of independence had passed, that political change alone does not alter inherited patterns of dependent economic relationships. Indeed, the coexistence of nominal political independence and economic dependence is undoubtedly one of the most profound contradictions characterising the post-colonial state in Africa. In this regard, Kenya is the classic case of an African state where the decolonisation process was tailored in a manner that ensured that political power was handed over to a collaborative African petty bourgeoisie, known for its moderation and hence unlikely to upset the status quo. As one scholar has rightly pointed out, "moderate, "reasonable" regimes have never been known to indulge in policies aimed at an equitable redistribution of national wealth; neither do they champion the cause of socio-economic revolution. Indeed their principal source of strength derives from active collaboration with foreign economic interests."

Thus in Kenya between 1954 and 1960, while the more "revolutionary" African nationalists were fighting in the forest or were behind bars, society was being prepared for decolonisation. The colonial/settler strategy was to hand over political power to a "moderate" nationalist leadership that would be willing to collaborate with European capitalist interests in making a transition to political independence without any
radical change in colonial economic and social structures. This strategy required the creation of a landed African "middle class" and/or an African "bureaucratic class", whose stake in the political economy, would be sizable enough at independence for it to want to maintain the new 'status quo.'

Economic Strategy -- Kenya

The watershed year for the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism in Kenya was 1954, when three major policy documents were published by the colonial administration, spelling out the imperial strategy for decolonisation. The first and most important of these reports, better known as the Swynnerton Plan, involved consolidating land fragments into single holdings and issuing registered freehold titles to individuals. Large leaseholders would then be able to borrow from the commercial banks or from the government on the security of their titles. The political implications of the swynnerton plan were quite explicit:

"Former government policy will be reversed and able, energetic or rich Africans will be able to acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less, creating a landed and a landless class. This is a normal step in the evolution of a country." (emphasis added)

Clearly, this report advocated the creation of a landed African middle class for whom landless Africans would provide a labour force. The plan was put into practice immediately in the Kikuyu-dominated Central Province where the "land question" was much more of a burning political issue. Given the dominance of the Kikuyu in African politics in Kenya
and the fact that they were most affected by land alienation, the success of the neo-colonial strategy meant that the colonial administration had to promote a cooptive class among the Kikuyu. This class was to act as a moderating force and thus inhibit the emergence of a militant nationalist movement demanding the return of "lost lands." Hence, it was Kikuyu "loyalists" -- those who had supported the colonial government during the Mau Mau "insurgency" -- who were well-rewarded through the programme of land consolidation and registration. They were the main beneficiaries of the economic reforms initiated by the colonial government. By 1960, 900,000 acres, mainly in Central Province, had been consolidated and registered as private African property; and by 1966 over two million acres from all the agricultural areas of Kenya had been so registered.

The Carpenter Report, the second major policy document produced by the colonial government, advocated a rapid rise in wage levels for African urban workers so that they could afford to bring and sustain their families in the cities. The report was thus consciously advocating the creation of an urban proletariat.

Finally, the third report, The East African Royal Commission published in 1955, was the first major report to consider the three East African colonies as a whole. It represented a significant shift in colonial capitalist ideology, from operating within the restrictive framework of white settler dominance in the colonies to advocating free enterprise, the removal of economic restrictions and, in particular the dismantling of the structures of racial and ethnic privilege. Thus this report argued for a major expansion in the use of all the resources within the
The three reports taken together formed the political or administrative framework within which most of the economic manoeuvres and manipulations were conducted during the transition to Uhuru. There were also a set of comparable changes within the private sector.

While an African landed middle class and a stable proletarianised labour force was being created, an African commercial class was also in the making. Thus, during this period, the colonial regime encouraged African participation in commerce, transportation and small scale industries. The strategy of cooptation of potential African leaders was also employed by some far-sighted local European industrialists and businessmen who set up a committee for the development of African entrepreneurship with an initial capital of £75,000. For the first time in 1958, as a result of these and other developments, African businesses accounted for 6 percent of all registered industrial companies. Furthermore, the large multinational companies began recruiting prominent Africans into executive positions. The official and private encouragement to Africans to buy shares in public corporations was now backed by loans. The rapid expansion in the ranks of African businessmen could be observed by the steady rise in bank accounts held by Africans.

In the sphere of industrial relations, the colonial administration took steps to harmonise worker-employer relations. As noted earlier, the colonial administration had initially resolved the problem of increasing urban worker militancy by banning trade unions and detaining
radical leaders. Now, under the new strategy, it was recognised that
the policy of suppressing political unions could not work unless
employers were ready to recognise non-political industrial unions. Thus, the colonial authorities began to encourage moderates to form
staff associations and workers committees as alternative forms of
employee representation.

It was within this context of 'moderation' (particularly keeping
out of politics) that the colonial government supported the formation of
the Kenya Federation of Labour (K.F.L.) headed by Tom Mboya, a young
but dynamic Luo, who was then sanitary inspector for the Nairobi City
council and Secretary of the Kenya Local Government's Workers' Union.
While K.F.L. did not always keep within its official "non-political" role
it nevertheless maintained a moderate stance on political issues. Hence,
it did not call for a radical reconstruction of society. Thus while
K.F.L. protested to the state over emergency policies, including
detention without trial, collective punishments, and screening practices
and conditions in the detention camps, it did not call for a dismantling
of the colonial coercive state apparatus that supported and sustained
these oppressive policies.

In the absence of a radical trade union movement and given the
fact that all African political activities had been suspended and
radical leaders detained during the period 1952-1960, this constituted
an opportune time for the metropole to choose and negotiate a neo-
colonial deal with the moderates among the newly-emerging western-educated
Africans. To demonstrate this, I will briefly examine below how the
British administration ensured continuity in the essentials of the colonial state apparatus into the post-colonial period.

**Neo-Colonial Political Strategy in Kenya**

Just as much as the colonial administration was concerned with creating an African "propertied" class that could be trusted to maintain the economic status quo, so it had a similar concern for the continuity of the state apparatus itself. In particular, it was concerned that the nationalist politicians gaining access to political positions would not seek to make radical changes in the institutions of the state or in the political economy they supported. This required a joint process both of 1) convincing the African politicians of the indispensability of the state apparatus for political stability and economic growth, and of 2) limiting their freedom of action with institutional devices that they could not afford to ignore.

Internally, the aim was to strengthen the colonially-structured bureaucracy examined earlier, while deliberately keeping populist political organisations weak and ineffective. In this latter connection, it was noted above that the colonial government suspended all African political organisations at the national level almost up to the eve of "independence." For example, the 1954 Lyttleton plan and the Lennox Boyd constitution only allowed for limited African participation in the colonial legislative council. Furthermore, the authorities encouraged Africans to organise district-based parties with ethnic rather than national class outlooks. Given this "divide and rule" strategy, it came as no surprise that, when in 1960 the colonial government approved the formation of nationwide African political parties, the
new leaders failed to organise one united political party. Personality
conflicts, different class interests and fear among small ethnic groups
of being dominated by the larger ones — all were factors that had been
fostered and nurtured by colonialism.

The organisational weakness and inexperience of the political
leaders that emerged during this period is clearly evident from the
"political constitutionalism" that took place between 1960 and 1963,
when formal independence was granted. However, the events of this
period have been amply and well documented by others and hence will
not be repeated here. But it is important to underscore, the point
that the period allowed to African nationalists to engage in national
— rather than ethnic — based politics before formal independence
was very brief. It provided inadequate time for raising let alone
debating socio-economic issues that were germane to changing colonial
social and economic structures, not just its politics.

In the meantime, a strong, efficient bureaucratic state structure
had been created. But at all senior levels metropolitan officials
remained in control until the very moment of independence. Furthermore,
when a belated start (between 1960-1963) was finally made to
train and promote Africans to senior posts in the Provincial Administra-
tion and Central Government, the bulk of the new recruits were drawn
from loyalist Africans who first got into government service during
the 'Mau Mau' emergency. In addition, given the inexperience of the
new African senior bureaucrats, many key senior colonial officials stayed
on after formal independence as "advisers" in their old departments,
while a few, such as Bruce McKenzie, were appointed to ministerial or other positions within the new African government. Thus, as the nationalist politicians moved into ministerial and other government posts, they found that they had to rely on these colonially recruited officials in the bureaucracy, who, as one scholar has observed, "found they could exert considerable influence over politician ministers who had little knowledge or expertise in many of the areas of policy under their control and were, in any event, more committed to the maintenance of the existing political and economic structures than British officials anticipated. Indeed, once the nationalists entered the government, they showed an increasing tendency to rely not on their own political organisations but on the state, particularly the bureaucracy."

Furthermore, the new senior African bureaucrats felt like "graduates" of the colonial civil service in which they had previously held low status positions. They were now determined to emulate the life styles as well as the manner of governing followed by their predecessors. Cherry Gertzel has described this phenomena in the following terms:

"They (African Civil Servants) had all graduated slowly, the hard way, from District Assistant to District Officer, and then, after considerable difficulty, to District Commissioner. They had all therefore experienced the sense of frustration provoked by a situation
where, as Africans, they could not reach the top ranks

... Much more important, however, was the fact that
they had learned how the administrative machinery
worked from the bottom to the top, and they were con-
vinced of their ability, to run it themselves.\(^\text{80}\)

Besides creating internal structures and forces supportive of
the status quo, the British government found it necessary to recruit
additional external forces that would act as a stabilising factor in
the preservation of the established political economy. The major
'recruit' in this regard, was the World Bank, which provided the agricul-
tural and development programmes. According to one source, an under-
secretary in the colonial office is quoted as having stated in 1961:

"... there is no Government in the world which has yet
dared to offend this institution (the World Bank) and,
therefore, it is most important that with Independence
on the way, the Bank should be linked with Kenya's
development. It would constitute a most potent
stabilising factor.\(^\text{81}\)

It would seem, then, that the colonial administration ensured that
the political economy of Kenya would remain structurally linked to
the international capitalist one. Furthermore the African leadership
that did emerge as a product of the historical process discussed was
unlikely in the post-colonial period to opt for an autonomous rather
than for a neo-colonial/dependent developmental strategy. This point
will be examined further in the next chapter. But at this point I turn
to a comparative examination and analysis of the transition to formal independence in Tanzania.

ii) Tanzania: Transition to Formal Independence

Protest Political Movements

The transition to formal independence in Tanzania generally took the same pattern as it did in Kenya, although the nationalist struggle and the social forces generated during this period were in some ways different.

The leadership of the nationalist movement, as in Kenya, was provided by educated, urbanised Africans. In the 1920s and 1930s, the first generation of educated Africans organised clubs and meeting places for Africans, attempted to start businesses, ran newspapers and established the early cooperatives. In the 1940s, they learnt the conventions of "collective bargaining" and founded the first stable trade unions. Illife has observed that the common element in these various activities during the 1940s was a concern for self-improvement. Pratt makes a similar observation. He notes that a small number of Africans had emerged "by the late 1940s who were seeking to win for themselves greater wealth and higher status than they could secure either from farming or from advancement within the Native Authorities." Pratt has further observed that although the search for self-improvement led these early nationalists to criticise colonial rule, their aspirations and specific objectives were local rather than national.
The second generation of nationalists — of young, highly educated men — emerged in the 1950s. The founder of the Tanganyika African National Union (T.A.N.U.), Julius Nyerere, and Oscar Kambona, its first Secretary-General, were nationalists of this second type. From its foundation on 7 July 1954, T.A.N.U.'s objective was independence under majority rule. By the late 1950s, T.A.N.U. had extended its influence throughout the whole of the country and commanded the near-universal support of Africans. The speed with which African nationalism spread throughout Tanzania was, as will be shown below, not only a consequence of socio-economic changes that were rapidly transforming Tanzanian society but also a reflection of the contradictions pertaining to the neo-colonial strategy of decolonisation.

But first it needs to be pointed out, that the nationalist struggle in Tanzania did not take the violent form that it did in Kenya. This is understandable if historical differences in the colonial situation in the two countries are taken into account which, in the case of Kenya, produced a settler-dominated political economy and a great mass of landless Africans. Similar socioeconomic forces were not sufficiently developed in Tanzania in the 1950s to the point of exploding into a violent struggle. Furthermore, the development of these forces along Kenyan lines was preempted when in the late 1950s the British conceded the need to grant independence to Tanzania.

It would seem that the 'Mau Mau' revolt in Kenya had led the British government to realise that the cost of putting down a nationalist struggle by force was too prohibitive to risk in any other African colony. More importantly, perhaps, was the realisation that a
neo-colonial strategy could be effected in Tanzania without violent struggle. This realisation, however, seems to have been the culmination of a political struggle related to the decolonisation process, in which the nationalists seemed to have been gaining the upperhand. A brief examination of the neo-colonial strategy in the context of Tanzania is provided next.

The Neo-Colonial Strategy in the Tanzanian Context

Economic Strategy

As in Kenya, the main agricultural policy after 1945 became one of accelerating African agricultural production and of encouraging the emergence of an African middle class. However, the means adopted in Tanzania to achieve these two goals were rather different from those employed in Kenya. The result was that agricultural production did not increase as rapidly as in Kenya neither did the colonial administration succeed in creating a significant middle class to the same extent as Kenya.

In Tanzania, the colonial government chose to promote agricultural development through legal compulsion, exercised through Native Authorities (African Chiefs). However, almost all the attempts at promoting agricultural development through coercion failed. This was so not only because of peasant resentment of "education through compulsion" but also because in many cases the rules involved very heavy new impositions upon peasant farmers who were in any case conservative in agricultural matters and hence suspicious of new and unfamiliar methods of agriculture.
Be it as it may, by 1958 the colonial government decided to abandon throughout Tanzania its efforts to secure agricultural production through legal compulsion.

Furthermore, unlike Kenya, where the attempt was made to create a landed middle class through land consolidation and registration, in Tanzania the typical pattern, even in the economically-productive districts, was that of peasant farmers growing cash crops on land which they held under customary law. Individual freehold titles to land had not been introduced and so "successful" African farmers could not easily, without a secure title, accumulate large areas of land. Thus, unlike Kenya, where the process of creating a landed African middle class was almost complete by 1958, in Tanzania it was in that very year that the colonial government published its white paper proposing individualisation of the customary land tenure. By that time, T.A.N.U. had become an important political force, strong enough to resist the creation of a landed African middle class. In his capacity as the President of T.A.N.U., Nyerere expressed his opposition to the intended individualisation of land in the following words:

"If people are given land to use as their property, then they have the right to sell it. It will not be difficult to predict who, in fifty years' time will be the landlords and who the tenants. In a country such as this where generally speaking the Africans are poor and the foreigners rich, it is quite possible that within eighty or a hundred years, if the poor African were allowed to sell his land,
all the land in Tanganyika would belong to wealthy immigrants, and the local people would be tenants.

But even if there were no rich foreigners in this country, there would emerge rich and clever Tanganyikans." 86

Nyerere was arguing against the rise of an African landed bourgeoisie, although not necessarily against capitalism. 87 Hence, although he helped to preempt the emergence of a landed middle class in Tanzania, he did not necessarily preempt the development of classes with different economic bases, as became apparent in the post-colonial period.

An African middle class hardly existed in Tanzania at independence. Outside the field of agriculture, Tanzania had one of the lowest figures of high-level manpower encountered in any country even the least industrially developed. Similarly, there were very few African commercial or manufacturing entrepreneurs. And, for reasons examined above, cash-crop farming though extensive had as yet produced very few substantial African commercial farmers. The overall effect, then, of colonial neglect in Tanzania relative to Kenya, was to retard class formation, at least until the 1960s. The near absence of well-developed class interests, and hence the relatively benign 'class politics' that characterised Tanzania at independence, may have provided greater options for Nyerere in shaping the nature and direction of his country's development and foreign policies.

Despite the British government's failure to foster class formation in Tanzania, it had, as was explained earlier, created structures and
and institutions that ensured a continuation of the external orienta-
tion of the economy.

Political Strategy

As in the case of Kenya, the colonial government begrudgingly granted
formal independence, and even then only after ensuring that the political
"kingdom" was to be handed over to "moderate" Africans who could be
trusted to uphold the established economic status quo.

In Tanzania, as in Kenya, the colonial administration initially
attempted to impose a multi-racial pattern of constitutional development,
which was much more concerned with protecting the interests of racial
minorities than with preparing the African majority for self-government.
The view of the local colonial administration was that the future of
Tanzania required an acceptance by the African majority of the Asian
and European minorities as (senior) partner communities within Tanzania.
This view was similar to the one stipulated in the Lyttelton and Boyd
constitutional plans for Kenya. Thus between 1949 and 1958 the British
continued to pursue multi-racial strategy in Tanzania despite growing
African nationalism. As in Kenya, Tanzanian Africans were only accorded
limited representation in national political bodies such as the legis-
lative council; and they were discouraged from forming political
organisation that called for African majority rule.

T.A.N.U., which from its formation had advocated African majority
rule, was thus constantly harassed by the colonial authorities who
introduced a series of constitutional amendments and ordinances all
aimed at curbing and/or prohibiting T.A.N.U.'s political activities.
Moreover, in its attempt to divert support away from T.A.N.U. and to
foster multi-racialism, the colonial administration also began to persuade native authorities to become multi-racial councils. In addition, a rival multi-racial party — United Tanganyika Party (U.T.P.) — was formed in 1956. However, by 1958 T.A.N.U. had already won countrywide support among the Africans. Ironically, opposition to multi-racialism became the major single cause that united all Africans, regardless of their social and economic position. This issue cut across all other differences among the Africans since it aroused deep seated fear and resentment of foreign domination which multi-racialism was deemed to represent.

The multi-racial strategy was abandoned in October 1958 in favour of an African majority rule strategy. This was not only because the former strategy had proved unpopular and hence unworkable, but also because the metropolitan government had come to realise that multi-racialism was not necessary for preserving the established political economy in Tanzania.

First, the colonial administration had come to believe that Julius Nyerere and his colleagues within T.A.N.U. were generally "moderate" men and hence were unlikely to change drastically the established status quo. And second, the British government had come to recognise that Tanzania lacked trained local manpower; so if independence was to await the development of adequate supply of locals to staff the public services, then there would have to be a further long period of colonial rule. The British government calculated that there would be no significant advantage to be derived from such long-term direct colonial involvement. On the other hand, if independence was granted to Tanzania without much delay, then
the British stood a good chance of maintaining friendly and cooperative links with the former colony. More importantly, Tanzania would for a long time to come continue to need and hence to depend on British technical and other types of economic assistance.

Hence a combination of a moderate, friendly leadership and an underdeveloped economy seemed to be the perfect recipe for a neo-colonial strategy aimed at perpetuating dependence. Pratt has accurately summarised this basic premise that underlay the British decision to grant independence to Tanzania in 1961:

"the British strategy rested on the assumption that they were handing over to nationalists who would make few changes to the major economic and social policies of the colonial government. They hoped that the energies that had been released by T.A.N.U. would be channelled by T.A.N.U. into support for the government's development policies. T.A.N.U.'s main contribution would thus be to mobilise support for a government that would still be largely run by British officers and to control the more radical and racist elements within the African community. They assumed that Nyerere would accept the need to retain as many British officers as possible and would rely upon them to shape the economic and social policies the country needed. In the long run these officers would be replaced by Africans but only as fast as there were fully qualified Tanganyikans to replace them."
Although the British strategy did not quite work to the latter's favour as anticipated, it nevertheless ensured Tanzania's continued dependence on the outside world. As will be shown in the next chapter the impact of colonial underdevelopment and structural dependence on international capitalist economy have continued to plague Tanzania in the post-colonial period -- albeit in different forms and in greater intensity.

Conclusion

In the above comparative analysis of the colonial political economy of Kenya and Tanzania, I have identified and examined the economic, social and political structures that were laid down during the colonial era. I have focussed on the forces generated by colonialism and the contradictions inherent in the colonial system that eventually led to its demise. Finally, I have examined the process of decolonisation in both states, looking in particular at how the neo-colonial-dependency pact was "signed, sealed and delivered" to "moderate-cooperative" African leaders. In so doing, I have identified differences as well as similarities between Kenya's and Tanzania's colonial structures, forces and processes.

Broadly speaking, this analysis has shown that both Kenya and Tanzania emerged from colonialism, underdeveloped and dependent on the metropolitan economy, albeit in different degrees. Furthermore, the forces that seized the reins of power in both countries derived primarily from the urban based, educated stratum of the African population. This emergent ruling class has variously been labelled as a "National Bourgeoisie", "Comprador Bourgeoisie" of "Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie".
The debate over terminology as well as over the extent of autonomy or non-autonomy of the African ruling class vis-a-vis international capitalist interests is a current and continuing one among students of African political economy and foreign policy. However, due to the limited scope of this thesis, I will not venture into the debate regarding these terminologies. However, on the issue of autonomy or non-autonomy, I can assert, based on my analysis of the colonial political economy, that a really independent national bourgeoisie was unlikely to develop given the overwhelming domination of the economy by external, international capital.

Furthermore, the emerging African ruling class lacked a strong economic base to challenge this dominance. Given the bourgeois values of the African elite, it would be more likely to collaborate in rather than seek to disengage from established economic dependence. This tendency seems evident from the limited nature of the demands made by the nationalist leaders and by their apparent willingness to settle for only formal political independence. The implications of this point will be examined in the next Chapter in which post-independence politics and policies in Kenya and Tanzania are analysed.

However, it seems timely at this point to examine in greater detail the socio-economic origins (and to some extent the personality and ideologies) of the two key leaders that took the reigns of power at Independence in Kenya and Tanzania. This kind of analysis is important and necessary in terms of explaining why, in spite of the largely similar constraints of dependence and underdevelopment, the two states have
tended to adopt divergent approaches in their development and foreign policies.

This is not to suggest that the leadership factor is the key one in understanding the foreign policies of the two countries. Rather it is to underscore the point that, regardless of internal and external constraints, the key leader either alone or in consultation with trusted advisers, formulates policy options. Even when he delegates this role to others, as will be shown to be the case in the Kenyan context, he would still have to give the final "blessing" to a particular option(s) before it is passed on for implementation.

Furthermore, the way decision-makers perceive their external and internal environments of decision-making may have important consequences for the way they respond to foreign policy issues and events. It is therefore important to recognise and distinguish between what Frankel calls the "psychological" and "operational" environments of decision-makers. Any examination of a leader's personality ideology, socialisation, etc. is an attempt to understand the psychological environment that influences his/her perceptions and attitudes towards foreign policy issues and events. For my purposes, the late Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, are the two leaders for comparison. However, since as leaders they are only representatives of each national ruling class, references to other members of the same class in each state, will be made wherever necessary.
F. Leadership and Ideology in Kenya and Tanzania

1) Intellectual and Personality Traits

**Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya**

Born Johnston Kamau, Kenyatta grew up in the Kenya of early colonialism. He attended the first mission schools, saw the first settlers dispossess both the Masai and the Kikuyu of their land, and led some of the first struggles against settlerdom in the early 1920s.

As one of the first literates among his people, the Kikuyu, Kenyatta became a "natural leader" in their struggles to regain their land alienated for white settlement. Thus, after a period of government service in Nairobi, Kenyatta was sent to London by the K.C.A. (of which he was Secretary General) in 1929 to argue against land alienation in Kenya. Although he visited Kenya briefly, Kenyatta returned to England in 1931 where he was to be until 1946, when he returned to Kenya to head the first African nationalist movement, K.A.U. During his sojourn in England he travelled widely and even visited Moscow.

Although Kenyatta, unlike Nyerere, was neither an intellectual nor a literary figure, he studied some anthropology at the University of London and put out a few publications. The culmination of his anthropological studies was a book entitled, *Fading Mount Kenya*, which first appeared in 1938. In it, Kenyatta's principal purpose was to explain and defend Kikuyu traditions which were being tampered...
with by the missionaries, the settlers and the colonial government. This book reveals Kenyatta's strong Kikuyu value system. In this respect again he is somewhat different from Nyerere, as will be shown later. After *Facing Mount Kenya*, in the post-colonial period, Kenyatta put out three more publications. The first of these — *Harambee* — published shortly after 'independence' (1964), is a collection of his speeches between 1963 and 1964; it is the only one of his works to devote any chapter(s) to extra-Kenyan affairs. His two other collections — *Suffering Without Bitterness* (1968) and *The Challenge of Uhuru: The Progress of Kenya 1969-1970* (1971) — primarily address themselves to domestic issues, without any attempt being made to relate these to the external environment. Indeed, throughout Kenyatta's rule in Kenya, international affairs in general and foreign policy in particular were never among his major concerns, except insofar as they affected Kenya's economic growth, security and stability of the regime. This attitude to foreign policy, besides being reflective of Kenyatta's personality, was compatible with the general perception held by the nationalist leadership of what role Kenya should play in international politics. This point will be pursued further in later chapters.

Although in his younger days, particularly when he was in England, Kenyatta was known for his role in panafricanism, in later life, particularly in the late 1960s and 1970s, he devoted all his energies to domestic affairs. He was only indirectly concerned with foreign affairs, as he delegated foreign affairs functions to members of his inner circle. The few occasions on which Kenyatta got directly involved in the conduct of foreign affairs -- his abortive mediation for the
lives of European and American hostages held by Congolese forces in Stanleyville in the then (1964) Congo and, in 1975, his unsuccessful attempt to mediate between the warring factions in the Angolan Civil War -- did not provide him with any evidence that there was much to be gained by getting involved personally in foreign affairs unless Kenya was directly threatened. Indeed, shortly after Kenyatta's death, Nyerere made the following observation:

"President Kenyatta in his later years became more and more a Kenyan or even parochial."  

The political orientation of Kenyatta and indeed that of most other Kikuyu leaders of his generation, tended to be almost the opposite of Nyerere's. To be sure, there have been some leaders in Kenya who have wanted to see Kenya play a greater, more dynamic role in Pan-African and world affairs, notably Tom Mboya during the 1960s and Munyua Waiyaki during the 1970s. In general, however Kenya's leadership has tended to be less pan-african and more ethnocentric and/or nationalistic in political orientation than Tanzania's. This divergence in political orientation can largely be attributed to the differences examined earlier -- the two states' ethnic composition -- as well as the nature and extent of colonial capitalist penetration. In the Kikuyu case, however, their orientation can partly be attributed to their strong attachment to land ownership. Kenyatta especially was a man of the land who preferred to reside in his "Gatundu home" located in the heart of Kikuyu land than in State House, Nairobi. In Facing Mount Kenya, Kenyatta expressed his attitude (and that of the Kikuyu
in general) toward the land in a manner that reveals fierce attachment to it:

"The Gikuyu" consider the earth as the 'mother' of the tribe. It is the soil that feeds the child through lifetime; and again after death it is the soil that nurses the spirits of the dead for eternity. Thus the earth is the most sacred thing above all that dwell in or on it ...." 106

Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania

Like Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Nyerere spearheaded the nationalist struggle for formal political independence in Tanzania. But unlike Kenya which had gone through three generations of nationalist leadership (beginning in the 1920), nationalism in Tanzania literally waited for Nyerere to give it expression. The lack of any national political contention made it possible for Nyerere to construct an ideological framework to justify the domestic practices and policies that were emerging from his leadership. Nyerere the leader and the intellectual, was thence also to play the role of a "philosopher king", spelling out the ideological path that Tanzania was to follow. By 1963, he was in such a pre-eminent position that his leadership was accepted in Tanzania almost without question.

Unlike Kenyatta, Nyerere belongs to one of the smallest ethnic groups in Tanzania -- the Zanaki. His life history does not indicate any attachment to his ethnic group. If anything, all of Nyerere's adult life indicates that his concerns are often transnational as well as
national but neither tribal nor parochial. His literary work in particular reflects this outlook.

Nyerere's literary ideas began to take shape between 1949 and 1952 during his university education in Edinburgh, where he spent much time reading and developing his philosophical thoughts. His conversion to Catholicism contributed to his strong religious, ascetic sense. Christian Liberalism reinforced his innate concern about civil liberties and social justice. But what motivated Nyerere during those early years was a deep feeling of humiliation at the deprivation of human dignity and racial bondage. In this respect, Nyerere did not differ from other African nationalists, whom one scholar accurately labels, "humanists". According to David Chanaiwa, African nationalists were humanists

"Because of their apparently overwhelming commitment to the ideology of individual dignity, non-racialism, and the brotherhood of mankind, which was not merely a philosophy of life, but a moralist crusade against evil, ignorance, and racism. The elites acquired this humanism from their Christian upbringing and education and from personal friendships and joint crusading with missionaries, white liberals, and aboriginists."

This ideology of non-racialism and universalism was also shared by Kenyatta who, in spite of his parochial attitude, expressed his willingness shortly after Kenya attained formal independence to "forgive and forget" colonial oppression in the spirit of non-racialism. Perhaps what distinguished Nyerere from the Kenyatta type of African nationalists...
was his intellectual skill and hence his ability to diagnose the special psychological impact colonialism had on the colonised, an impact that cannot be universalised. Thus, according to Nyerere,

"... years of European domination had caused our people to have grave doubts about their own abilities .... the biggest crime of oppression and foreign domination in Tanganyika and elsewhere, is the psychological effect it has on the people who experience it".

Nyerere's intellectual tools and his philosophical outlook have not remained static but have been evolving over the years. As explained above, his philosophical outlook in the late 40s and early 50s was not very different from that of other African nationalists who advocated human dignity and racial justice. This outlook is particularly evident from an essay Nyerere wrote in 1952, entitled "The Race Problem in East Africa", in which he was arguing for an end to colonialism, racism and the restoration of human equality, which he strongly believed to be the rights of all citizens whatever their race.

Although the impact of colonial education, Christian values and Western Liberalism have over the years continued to have a profound influence on Nyerere's political thought, it has certainly been less evident in more recent years, particularly since the mid-1960s. Nyerere had by that time come to recognise the contradictions and divergence between the theoretical world of Western Liberal, moralistic philosophy and the real world of international capitalism. This recognition led 'Mwalimu' to lay more emphasis and to adopt a more militant approach
on issues of political liberation and economic plight among poor Third World countries. He was no longer appealing to Western "good faith". Nyerere was calling upon his fellow Third World countries to form a "trade union of the poor" to use the non-aligned movement as a platform for making joint demands on the rich industrialised nations for a restructuring of the world economic system in favour of the underdeveloped. Hence, while Nyerere has maintained his transnational approach and outlook, his view of the world, and hence his conceptualisation of the strategies to overcome such basic problems as oppression and poverty, have changed considerably over the years. Kenyatta, as was shown earlier, moved in the opposite direction of parochialism and continued to become more conservative as he approached his death.

Another distinction between Nyerere and Kenyatta is that while the latter was basically a pragmatist the former has basically been principled in his political behaviour. Even prior to Tanzania's independence Nyerere had already demonstrated his unswerving commitment and unwillingness to compromise on international issues that he viewed as matters of principle. This side of his personality was revealed in March 1961 when he categorically made it known to the Commonwealth Conference, then meeting in London, that Tanzania, which was due to attain formal independence on 9 December 1961, would not become a member if South Africa was also readmitted as a Republic. Nyerere's argument was that

"... the principles of the Commonwealth would be betrayed by an affirmative answer to South Africa's application for readmission as a Republic." 113

South Africa's racist policies were seen to be in direct violation of the
human dignity and social justice that Nyerere so much cherished.

So even before Nyerere appeared on the Commonwealth scene, it was clear to the other members that by force of character if nothing else, he would have a strong impact on the Commonwealth. To an even wider audience, it meant that his determination, his willingness to take a stand, and his sense of justice as well as commitment to principles would have an international impact. Tanzania's influence would be felt on the world stage precisely because of its leader and not because of the resources that the country did or did not have.

The above comparison between Nyerere and Kenyatta, reveals a marked contrast in the two leader's personal and intellectual characteristics and consequently in their rather divergent political styles, particularly in foreign affairs. The analysis to come in Chapters 4 and 5 reinforces this point.

ii) Economic Philosophies of Nyerere and Kenyatta

One further comparison that needs to be made is in regard to the views of Kenyatta and Nyerere on the economic organisation of their respective societies, particularly on the distribution and use of wealth. This comparison is necessary in explaining, at least in part, why Kenya and Tanzania have pursued rather divergent paths of economic development since 1967.

Nyerere's Economic Philosophy

Nyerere's belief in equality in the political arena is closely linked to his belief in equality in the distribution of wealth. He has argued that wealth exists to provide for human needs and that no social and economic system is just which either encourages selfishness or permits
severe inequalities in wealth. Nyerere believes in the elimination of private profit and in the establishment of cooperative methods of sharing the rewards of any enterprise. He has then always been opposed to a capitalist economic system and in favour of a socialist one. However, the socialism in which Nyerere believes owes little to Marxism or to European democratic socialism, although there are some parallels between his ideas and those of certain social democrats.

Nyerere's initial view of socialism, expressed in a pamphlet issued in 1962 entitled Ujamaa - The Basis of African Socialism, is rather naive; indeed it does not differ significantly from the general rhetoric of socialism adopted by many newly independent African governments at the time. In it, Nyerere argues that

"socialism -- like democracy -- is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare."

Nyerere's view of socialism at this stage did not take into account the need for an institutional framework to achieve the desired attitude of mind or mode of behaviour. Simultaneously, Nyerere also introduced his rather controversial view that African society prior to European colonisation was essentially socialistic and,

"Our first step, therefore, must be to re-educate ourselves; to regain our former attitude of mind."
Inspite of this naive view of socialism, Nyerere did articulate a theme that has become basic to all his later writings on socialism—equality in the distribution of wealth. Thus at the early stage in the development of his socialist thought, Nyerere stressed that,

"The basic difference between a socialist society and a capitalist society does not lie in their methods of producing wealth, but in the way that wealth is distributed." 117

In this respect, then, the basis of Nyerere's commitment to socialism has not altered over the years. What has changed, however, is the view that Tanzania could move towards increasing equality and development ("restoration") of a socialist state of mind without at the same time attempting to alter the inherited political economy. The 1967 Arusha Declaration and subsequent socialist documents testify to the increasing refinement in Nyerere's socialist thinking.

Now, fourteen years since the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania has encountered more disappointments/failures than successes in the attempt to become a socialist society. Both internal and external factors (to be examined later), have contributed to the failure to make significant advances on the road to socialism. Nevertheless, some modest achievements have been recorded, particularly in the area of reducing glaring inequalities of wealth, which are a common feature in so many other African countries.

Nyerere's brand of socialism has many supporters as well as critics. Nevertheless, most analysts are agreed that Nyerere is a man with strong 'moral convictions, deep sense of humility, sensitivity to human
suffering, strong dedication to humanitarian principles, indomitable will to persevere and succeed, utter disdain for the naked pursuit of material interests and the unrestrained use of power and abhorrence of the anti-social effects of wealth and power." Indeed, some of his critics have found it appropriate to nickname him "St. Julius."

Kenyatta's Economic Philosophy

Kenyatta's economic and political views differ markedly from those of Nyerere. Indeed any attempt to analyse Kenyatta's economic "ideology" within a socialist framework, as I have done above in the case of Nyerere, would ultimately meet with failure; for neither Kenyatta nor the forces he represented were socialist. Rather, his economic policies can only be meaningfully understood if viewed within a capitalist/traditionalist framework. For Kenyatta believed in individual ownership of property and individual self-advancement. This belief was well summarised by a Kenyan scholar, shortly after Kenyatta's death in August 1978:

"Kenyatta was a firm believer in the progressive nature of free enterprise, and saw the free interplay of economic and market forces as having none other than beneficial results upon all social classes in society. That is, while such a system served the propertied classes best, it nevertheless also creates greater wealth for the masses than is possible under socialism. Free enterprise in his view was built upon the propertied individual who husbanded his property judiciously and intelligently for his own
private gain, but who in the process, increased the wealth of the whole nation.”

Whether or not Kenyatta was actually a believer in the liberal tradition of Adam Smith, his justification for private property fits into that tradition. Kenyatta attached great importance to the individual property owner, as the foundation of a liberal democratic society. His belief in free enterprise and the propertied individual derived from both his class position in Kenyan society as well as from his ethnic cultural background. As mentioned earlier, the Kikuyu, into which Kenyatta was born and bred, more than any other ethnic group in Kenya strongly believes in individual land ownership.

It was primarily this belief that drove Kikuyu nationalists into direct confrontation with white settler farmers. In essence, the Kikuyu were opposed to "apartheid capitalism", built upon a racially defined set of individual opportunities. In other words, the Kikuyu in general, and Kenyatta in particular, were not opposed to a capitalist economic system but rather to their exclusion from successful participation in that system. Thus, the Kenyan nationalist movement, which was spearheaded by the Kikuyu, aimed not only at achieving political freedom but also, "freedom at the market place through the overthrow of all settler inhibitions and racist fetters to the economic development of the country." The change in British colonial economic policy after World War II, could therefore be viewed as a triumph for the Kikuyu; at least for those in the ranks of the landed African middle class, and others who were able to take advantage of the free enterprise system.
After formal political independence in 1963 land, which had been vacated by some of the departing white settlers, became a commodity to be disposed of according to the dictates of the market place — of "willing buyer and willing seller." The only concern for Kenyatta in this free wheeling and dealing exercise was that no land should remain unutilized and/or underutilized. Disparities in ownership and usage did not seem to bother him. Thus unlike Nyerere, whose basic concern is with equality in distribution of wealth, Kenyatta's basic emphasis was on maximum productivity; on economic growth rather than development. Indeed, using this rationalisation, Kenyatta encouraged white settler farmers to stay and keep on farming in Kenya, as long as they did not waste land:

"We want you to stay and farm well in this country; that is the policy of this Government .... What the Government needs is experience, and I don't care where it comes from: I will take it with both hands ... continue to farm your land well, and you will get all the encouragement and protection of the government. The only thing I will not tolerate is wasted land ...." 123

His belief in free enterprise certainly benefited himself, his family, the ruling elite and others who have had the money and/or the necessary "connections" to take advantage of the economic resources (particularly land) that became available after independence. The extent to which Kenyatta and his immediate family have benefited from the free enterprise system — that was developed in post-colonial Kenya,
was revealed in a well documented report published by the London
According to the *Sunday Times*, Kenyatta and his fourth wife alone
owned at least 45,000 acres of land in some of the most fertile
parts of Kenya, thus making them among the largest private landowners
in a country where the average peasant land-holding is still about two
acres. Besides land ownership, the Kenyatta family was and has remained
deeply involved in different types of commercial and industrial activi-
ties often in partnership with multinational firms operating in Kenya.

Clearly, the glaring disparities in the distribution of wealth
in part is, in Kenya as elsewhere in Africa, a colonial legacy. But
Kenyatta's philosophy of unbridled free enterprise not only served to
increase these colonially generated disparities but also made possible
some conflict with international capitalism. Indeed, for Kenyatta, his
affluent family and close colleagues, the acquisition of private property
and the amassing of wealth had by the time of his death in 1978, liter-
ally turned into a hobby.

In spite of the obvious national-transnational capitalist orienta-
tion of his economic policy, Kenyatta, particularly in the 1960s, found
it politically expedient to pay lip service to socialism. The Kenyatta
regime went as far as to publish a document with a socialist label
which was supposed to act as a theoretical guide to planning and
development in Kenya. The document itself, as one Kenyan scholar has
correctly observed, "is neither African nor Socialist". Other critics
have speculated that the author of this document was neither "African"
nor "Socialist". The document is full of inconsistencies and
contradictions which clearly seem to support the above criticisms. Kenyatta's own references to African socialism are half-hearted and reveal that his socialist claims were simply a form of populism, sugar-coated with socialist sentiments, but not grounded in any socialist beliefs. A typical example of his references to Socialism is the following viewpoint:

"We in Kenya, have played our part in the past and we shall continue to play our part in accelerating capital accumulation. And we are also determined to accelerate economic growth within the context of African socialism, meaning that both government and private enterprise will have a contribution .... We consider that nationalisation will not serve to advance the cause of African Socialism." 132

Kenyatta also often talked about his belief in what he termed "democratic African Socialism" -- populist Capitalism -- but which, in the context of Kenya, meant the creation of "a society in which people have abundant opportunities for personal advancement." 133

The above analysis demonstrates that although Kenyatta occasionally talked about socialism, his conception of it hardly reflected any grounding in socialist theory, whether African or otherwise. If anything, his conception of socialism served to reaffirm his belief in individualism which is so central to capitalist ideology. Kenyatta's belief in free enterprise and private property, as mentioned earlier, owed a lot to his Kikuyu background who, as one observer has pointed out,
"are among Africa's most commercially minded tribes and lived with inequalities long before they met Europeans." It is not surprising, then, that Kenyatta seemed to view economic inequalities as a necessary and natural prerequisite for economic growth. This economic outlook, coupled with the impact of colonial and settler penetration in Kenya, combined to produce a perverse type of capitalism: of growth without development.

Conclusion

In the preceding discussion I have attempted to show how the situational, environmental and individual personality factors combined to shape the ideological outlooks of both Nyerere and Kenyatta in their respective domains. What perhaps remains to be examined, is the seemingly dominant role of the incumbent President (in the case of Tanzania) and the institutionalised Presidency (in the case of Kenya) in foreign relations. In this connection therefore, an attempt will be made to explain why other social/political forces (such as parliament, political parties, the press and the military) play, seemingly, insignificant roles in foreign affairs compared to that of either the President or the Presidency.

G. Presidential Role in Tanzanian and Kenyan foreign policies

1) The Presidential Role in Tanzania's Foreign Policy

Like most African presidents, Nyerere's formal roles reflect his pervasive power. He is at one and the same time the Head of State, Head of Government, Commander in Chief of the Tanzanian People's Defence forces (T.P.D.F.) and President of T.A.N.U. Furthermore, for a period
during the 1960s, he was also the Minister of foreign affairs. Similar
titles adorned President Kenyatta of Kenya, although the latter was
never Minister of foreign affairs.

The predominant role of Nyerere in Tanzania's foreign policy does
not, however, derive primarily from his formal constitutional powers,
but rather from his personality (already discussed above) and the
historical circumstances in which he found himself at Tanzania's
formal independence as a leader of a new, underdeveloped state.

At independence in Tanzania there were few who had the knowledge
and/or interest in foreign affairs sufficient to influence or contribute
to foreign policy-making. Nyerere was perhaps the only one in the
country who was deeply interested in foreign affairs and who had thought
through questions and issues regarding Tanzania's foreign policy.
Nyerere's interest in national and international affairs combined with
his intellectual prowess gave him a head start in a country that was
suffering from intellectual underdevelopment. The acute
shortage of indigenous Tanzanians who had received sufficient formal
education and training to occupy public service positions in the new
nation was a clear indication of this intellectual bankruptcy. This
factor, along with the financial cost involved in establishing new diplo-
matic missions, largely explain why Tanzania established only few overseas
representatives during the first few years after formal independence
[see Table 2:13a].

The shortage of well-educated Tanzanians, along with the fact that
most members of Nyerere's government had no particular interest in
foreign affairs led to an overdependence on Mwalimu as the 'think-tank'
for all Tanzanians, including his colleagues. In this connection, Raymond Hopkins, who has conducted interviews in Tanzania on the role of the President, made the following observation:

"The interviews revealed considerable affection for and trust in Nyerere among most of the elite .... The trust sometimes extended to dependency on Nyerere's interpretations of events and ideas; one respondent remarked with respect to African Socialism, 'I am not really sure about this notion but whatever Nyerere does about it, will be right' .... He has become a man whom people trust in power, who is credited with the ability to make the right decision, and whose opinion is looked upon as a source of wisdom." 136

Nyerere's "philosopher king" position has also been acknowledged elsewhere. For example, he has been described as endowed with,

"an acute intelligence (that puts him) head and shoulders above all other African politicians both in intellect and in political skill." 137

Nyerere's unique position has also been acknowledged by a Tanzanian regional commissioner, who once candidly admitted that while he and other members of the government "all grow fatter and fatter and enjoy good life, -- Mwalimu -- grows thinner and thinner, greyer and greyer. That is because he does all our thinking for us." 138 Another Tanzanian — Jenerali Ulimwengu in an article for the Tanzania's Daily News, expressed a similar view:
"The whole of this country relies on one person basically — Mwalimu Nyerere."  

Even Nyerere once referred to himself as "the voice of the nation."  

Nyerere has demonstrated his predominance over his country's foreign affairs by taking unilateral decisions in times of crisis. A case in point was the decision to sever diplomatic relations with Britain over U.D.I. in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), which was taken on his own initiative without consulting his Cabinet. However, on non-crisis foreign policy issues Nyerere consults his Cabinet colleagues, the National Assembly, foreign ministry officials and other officials whose expertise may be useful in certain matters, particularly economic ones. Furthermore, although Nyerere dominates foreign policy-formation, he delegates responsibility for execution/implementation to his foreign affairs ministry. The President however remains primarily responsible for Tanzania's ideology and foreign policy orientation and style.

Besides Nyerere's intellectual and other personality traits that contributed to his prominence in foreign affairs, other factors have also facilitated his predominance in Tanzania's politics and policies. For instance, the absence of influential pressure groups on foreign affairs at independence (noted above) was another feature that enhanced Nyerere's prominence.

The ruling party -- T.A.N.U. -- could hardly be an effective pressure group, given the fact it was itself the government. Furthermore, the party cadres, the Cabinet, the National Assembly, and the National Executive Committee of T.A.N.U. had overlapping memberships with each other and/or were affiliated with T.A.N.U. (now C.C.M.). So it was
rather difficult for them to criticise the regime of which they were apart. In regard to the role of this group Okwudiba Nnoli has concluded that:

"the absence of any concrete vested interests in the external environment on the part of the various groups, their attitude to foreign affairs lacked specificity, clarity, and commitment to concrete interests. Their pressure on foreign policy was, therefore weak." 142

While this lack of interest in foreign affairs may have been true of the first few years of independence, it perhaps is not so accurate a representation of more recent years. President Nyerere, inspite of his impeccable reputation, is not immune to a "disease" that seems to have afflicted all African heads of state — insecurity and hence sensitivity to criticism which often leads to authoritarianism. Thus, as one scholar has observed, those members of Nyerere's government who became critical or consistently opposed the government had their political careers shortened or were coopted into the government, by giving them ministerial responsibilities, if they were previously backbenchers. 143

For example, three M.P.'s who were initially quite critical -- Mtaki, Wambura and Mponji -- were made junior ministers and hence forced to defend rather than criticise the government. This reaction is not unlike that employed by President Kenyatta in dealing with critical M.P.'s within his government -- J.M. Kariuki and M. Shikuku, both outspoken and critical members in the Kenyan parliament, were initially made assistant ministers in an attempt to force them to defend rather than
criticise the regime. When they insisted on criticising the government from the front bench, the former was assassinated, while the latter was jailed.

Similar methods of silencing politicians who resist cooptation and insist on criticising government policies have increasingly been employed in Tanzania. For example, it is now an undisputed fact that Oscar Kambona, a former Minister in Nyerere's cabinet who fled the country in 1967 and took refuge in Britain, was highly critical of Nyerere's policies and was increasingly dissatisfied with the fact that after the 1964 mutiny, Nyerere took away from him the foreign affairs and defence portfolios. Similarly, the 1979 resignation of Tanzania Finance and Planning Minister, Edwin Mutei, was not entirely due to alleged ill-health. Although it is difficult to verify the precise reason for his resignation, available information would seem to suggest that Mutei was increasingly getting frustrated by Nyerere's rejection of his economic policy recommendations in favour of those offered by Mwalimu's closest political associates and friends some of whom were not members of the government. Mutei was particularly critical of the country's increasing low productivity which he blamed on Nyerere's policies, while the latter blamed it on the present international economic order which favours developed countries against those in the third world.

Not all political critics of Nyerere's policies are simply allowed to retire or to resign from active political life. Some, it would seem, end up in preventive detention. According to one report, verified by a Tanzanian ex-detainee interviewed by this writer, Tanzania's prisons are
congested with political detainees, with 6 or more prisoners occupying one cell! Thus for example, Tanzania's prison population increased from 12,000 prisoners on the eve of independence to 36,000 prisoners in 1976. According to the report referred to above, the reason why most prisoners in Tanzania are political is,

"because the laws that most of them are accused of violating are essentially Nyerere's edicts." 149

What is perhaps unique about Nyerere's victims is their cosmopolitan composition, which is said to include detainees from Mozambique, South Africa (blacks), Malawi, Zaire, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda and the U.S.A. (blacks). 150

It would seem then that Nyerere has over-used his presidential powers, particularly his preventive detention powers. Furthermore, by elevating the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi into a supreme position under his direct control, Nyerere has relegated all other political institutions and social forces in Tanzania to a position of powerlessness. One of these institutions -- the national assembly -- has according to one source, become

"a talk-shop for figures from all corners of the country to discuss the fine print and parochial aspects of legislation already laid down by the party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi." 151

All other institutions in the country are relegated to the ruling party and are expected to acknowledge party supremacy. The press which, broadly conceived, includes newspapers, radio, television and magazines
is one such institution. In Tanzania, the press has always been under-developed and hence it has never played an influential role in foreign policy making. Indeed at independence, the three major newspapers -- The Standard, The Nationalist and Uhuru -- were the only significant components of the press. Whatever potential they held for becoming a critical source of ideas on foreign affairs was nipped in the bud by nationalisation that ensured that they would not unduly criticise government policies. Nnoli has observed of these newspapers that:

"virtually all supported the government policies or, as in the case of The Standard avoided severe criticism of them." 152

A similar viewpoint has been expressed in regard to the Daily News, which, "is virtually a government broadsheet, with a correspondents' page airing a few parochial grievances. Editorials are sometimes actually written in State House." 153

Tanzania is by no means unique in the control it exercises over the press. Indeed, even in those countries of the third world (such as Kenya) where newspapers are not officially state owned, the government still continues to exercise considerable indirect control over the national newspapers. Furthermore as one prominent Kenyan journalist has observed:

"in virtually every third world country the new rulers who took over from colonial masters made sure that the most potent instrument of propaganda -- radio -- was invariably controlled by the state." 154
Government control over the machinery of state ensures its control over the press, thus restricting critical reporting. As Hilary Ng'weno has put it,

"In most (third world) countries investigative reporting is looked upon as a sign of disloyalty, anti-statism, dissidence or even treason and it is a foolhardy editor indeed who will encourage investigative reporting by his reporters if the newspaper of which he is editor is owned, and therefore controlled by the state."^{155}

Furthermore, given the high rate of illiteracy in Tanzania as in most African countries and the problem of distribution of newspapers, the latter can hardly rival the radio as a medium of communication. The radio, as one journalist has observed is the "voice of authority":

"What Africa hears may not be the voice of truth but it is most definitely the voice of authority .... Unlike the Western World, the radio is used in Africa for developmental purposes. Governments use it not to inform the people directly, but to tell them what the government thinks is good for them to know."^{156}

Besides the media, the intelligentsia is the other potential pressure group which has also failed to be an effective foreign policy resource in Tanzania. Although Nyerere is himself an intellectual and generally encourages discussions and exchanges, the contradictions between Nyerere the intellectual and Nyerere the President often surface in the form of intolerance to criticism emanating from the 'radicals'
within the university community. A good case in point was the 1978 expulsion of 350 University of Dar es Salaam students who were protesting against a 100 percent salary increase and other benefits that had been granted M.P.s, Ministers and party leaders. The students were accused by the government of holding an "unlawful" demonstration. Although most of the expelled students were later reinstated in the university, the case demonstrated the government's intolerance of criticism which was clearly attempting to expose a contradiction between its declared egalitarian policies and an obvious case of promoting elitism and existing inequalities in Tanzania.

Similarly, although Nyerere has identified himself with the interests of the workers and peasants, he has also demonstrated a characteristic tendency found in Africa, of reducing such class effectiveness as pressure groups. For example, early in the post-colonial period, Nyerere effectively muzzled worker's effectiveness by amalgamating the eleven member trade unions of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (T.F.L.) into one central union, National Union of Tanganyika Workers (N.U.T.A.), whose general secretary and Deputy were and continue to be appointed by Nyerere himself. From its inception, N.U.T.A. virtually came under the control of the government, and also came to be affiliated with the ruling party. Furthermore, its general secretary has almost always been the minister of labour.

From the above analysis, it becomes clear that, while Nyerere's initial prominence in foreign affairs derived almost entirely from his unsurpassed intellectual capacity, underdeveloped foreign affairs institutions and virtual absence of meaningful pressure groups,
increasingly he began to employ other means to maintain this prominence; means that have involved the suppression of critics within the government and the neutralisation of potential sources of opposition, such as the press, trade unions, and the radicals among the intellectual community. As will be shown below, similar means have been employed in Kenya to centralise and monopolise policy-making role in the President's office, perhaps, even to a higher degree than in Tanzania.

ii) The Presidency and Foreign Policy in Kenya

Unlike Tanzania, where Nyerere's predominance was a function of the absence of competition from interest or pressure groups, in Kenya it was the reverse. At independence in 1963, Kenya already had an abundance of leaders who had developed strong local bases of support in the 1950s but who were too much at odds among themselves to bring about a unified country. It was under these circumstances that Kenyatta was cast in the role of leading the country; not because he was the most qualified man for the job, but because he was the only one who, by sheer accident of history, was known and acceptable in all parts of the country.

Kenyatta's arrest and detention by the colonial government for supposedly having organised Mau Mau, had made him a national symbol of martyrdom. His virtual absence from Kenya's political scene between 1952 and 1961, had kept him out of personal and factional rivalries, factors that qualified him as the only person who could command the loyalty of a rising number of diverse and contending leaders. On the other hand, Kenyatta's absence from Kenya's political scene meant that he was out of touch with contemporary political realities and
developments, thus raising the central issue of the effectiveness of his leadership. Furthermore, the contending leaders and interest groups he was expected to unite were not from his own second generation but from a third generation, and had already developed their own views on world affairs. This was particularly true of such personalities as Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga, who had already established their own international connections in both the Western and Eastern blocs. Similar personalities, other than Nyerere, did not exist in Tanzania at independence.

Thus, in Kenya foreign policy making could not be centralised in the person of the President but only in the office of the President. Hence, the locus of decision-making in general, and foreign policy in particular, did not reside in Kenyatta as a person but in the elaborate power structure which had been built around him to perpetuate the myth of his power and authority.

Besides these contending political leaders, Kenya at independence, because of its more capitalist/pluralist system than Tanzania, had a number of interest groups outside of government that had concerns relating to foreign policy. These interest groups included business, workers and farmer's associations and/or unions. Such pluralistic tendencies were almost non-existent in Tanzania.

Under these circumstances, Kenyatta had one of two choices; either 1) to use his presidential powers to suppress or coopt the various contending groups and hence establish himself as the sole policy maker, or 2) accept shared leadership and establish a government that tolerated and accommodated opposing views. Kenyatta chose the first alternative.
However, instead of centralising the foreign policy-making role upon himself, he chose to locate it within the presidency; meaning that although he still held the prerogative of policy- and decision-making, he brought into the process a small group of "palace advisers" comprised of ministers, high-ranking civil servants, relatives and friends, most of whom were also Kikuyu. This "kitchen cabinet" was referred to as "Inner Cabinet" — to distinguish it from the formal cabinet, as well as to convey the idea that, as an "inner circle" composed of trusted people having direct access to the President, it performed functions that would normally be done by the formal cabinet.

In the 1960s, the leaders that had an influential input into decision-making tended to include: 1) trusted Kikuyu ministers (Mbiyu Koinange, James Gichuru, Njoroge Mungai, Charles Njonjo, Mwai Kibaki and Julius Kiano); 2) trusted non-Kikuyu ministers (Tom Mboya, Daniel Arap Moi, Joseph Murumbi, Oginga Odinga and Bruce McKenzie) and 3) trusted non-ministers. The latter category ranged from Geoffrey Kariithi (then Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service), to Malcolm Macdonald (the first British High Commissioner to Kenya after formal independence). By early 1970s, the inner circle had become even smaller, an indication that Kenyatta increasingly was losing much of his original control and hence had to depend almost entirely on an inner circle to perform the decision-making role on his behalf. Already in 1968, it had been suggested that some of Kenyatta's closest advisers were originating policy, often making decisions without consulting ministers or even Kenyatta. This trend seems to have gathered momentum.
in the mid- and late-1970s as a result of Kenyatta's gradual withdrawal.

In the early 1970s, then, the inner circle had narrowed down to a few key individuals, whose positions in the government were perceived to be critical, apart from being trusted friends of the President. These consisted of: 1) the Attorney General (Charles Njonjo), 2) Minister of State in the Office of the President (Mbiyu Koinange), 3) Minister of Foreign Affairs (until 1975) and the President's personal physician (Njoroge Mungai), 4) the Vice-President and Minister of Home Affairs (Daniel Arap Moi) and 5) Secretary to Cabinet and Head of Civil Service (Geoffrey Kariithi). It is these members of the inner circle who, during Kenyatta's regime, shared the Presidential prerogative through informal processes of decision-making and manipulation. This underscores the fact that the presidency more than the person of the President, must be viewed as the basis for the centralisation of executive power in Kenya with attendant effects on foreign policy decision-making.

Kenyatta was never tolerant of opposition whether from members of his government or from non-governmental groups. Thus in a public speech in 1974, the late President reminded his ministers that he had appointed them and warned them that "should any of them become disobedient, I will kick them out." Because of his reliance on a hand-picked inner circle, the cabinet remained ineffectual as a decision-making body. This also applied to Parliament which, although theoretically the supreme legislative branch of government, was in practice subordinate to the executive. Members of parliament could discuss openly any issues in parliament as long as they did not criticise the government. In any case, most
parliamentarians never had any great interest in foreign policy matters as opposed to domestic issues. As shown earlier, a similar situation also prevailed in Tanzania.

Political parties as pressure groups were never strong enough to influence policy-making in Kenya. In the first instance, the governing elite consistently banned any opposition parties,\textsuperscript{163} that emerged in the sixties. In the seventies the ruling party -- K.A.N.U. -- remained the only legal party. As a mass coalition, formed shortly before independence (1960), K.A.N.U. has always had an extremely weak organisational and ideological base, and no one, including Kenyatta, ever took it seriously, except during the election year.\textsuperscript{164} Even in this latter respect, Kenyatta did not have much use for K.A.N.U., since his re-election was always automatic; he was always returned unopposed. However, its importance lay in its mythical/symbolic representation of Kenya as a democratic state, in a similar manner that Tanzania’s C.C.M. is used to give the seemings of democracy and harmony, where neither exists.

The trade union movement, another potential pressure group, was and remains neutralised by the holders of power in Kenya. During the 1950s for example Tom Mboya made use of his position in the Movement to promote his political career. The K.F.L. of which he was Secretary General was, as explained earlier, never a radical union. It was concerned more with "bread and butter" issues of members rather than with those of the population as a whole. In this respect, K.F.L. represented no serious threat to the regime as its members could easily be coopted -- not an atypical situation in a continent where "labour aristocracies"\textsuperscript{165}
have become a common feature. Furthermore, any attempt to use a trade union for political ends have in the past been effectively muzzled and/or curtailed. In this connection, Mboya's threat to leave K.A.N.U. and use K.F.L. as the organisational base for an opposition party may have contributed to his assassination in 1969. Even prior to Mboya's assassination, the government had already taken measures to neutralise radicals within the movement, by forcing them in September 1965 to amalgamate into one central organisation -- Central Organisation of Trade Unions (C.O.T.U.).

The Kenyan press has never been an effective focus of opposition and/or criticism of the government. Inspite of the much talked about "freedom of the press" in Kenya -- which is supposed to be greater than in Tanzania where the local press is government-owned -- in practice, the Kenyan local press acts as a mouthpiece of the government. It has at times had to apologise and pledge loyalty to the government for making certain remarks critical of the regime. Typical of such statements of apologies and/or pledge of loyalty was one published by one of the two major daily English newspapers -- The Standard -- on May 27, 1975:

"The Standard wishes to apologise most sincerely to President Kenyatta for inferences which were drawn from yesterday's editorial. It is deeply regretted that sections of the article may have resulted in considerable embarrassment which was genuinely not intended. We would like to point out that this newspaper is fully in support of the Government's tremendous efforts to promote Kenya's development ... The Standard
recognises the great efforts the President and his Government have made in providing every Kenyan with an equal opportunity to gather the fruits of independence. The country's advancement since Uhuru has been second to none and a shining example to nations throughout the world ....

It is clear from this that the *Standard* was retracting an obviously critical statement it had published about the regime. Given the government's history of press harassment and even detentions without trial, it is most likely that the apology offered by the *Standard* was given under duress and threat of coercive measures. Thus, although the local press has on various occasions attempted to provide constructive criticism to Kenyan policy-makers, it has been effectively silenced, as in the case cited above, by being accused of "irresponsible journalism" or of misquoting an "honourable" minister of the government and hence forced to retract.

Finally, critical elements among the intelligentsia, particularly within the University staff and student communities, have been the other potential source of influence on decision-making. However, although this is the only pressure group that seems to wage a sustained struggle against government's attempts to silence it, organisational weakness and lack of a clearly unifying ideology have so far made it ineffective and vulnerable when confronted with governmental coercion. With the current Moi regime being even more repressive and intolerant/sensitive to criticism (particularly that emanating from the University) than the
Kenya's regime that preceded it, the radical/progressive elements within the "institution of higher learning" may have to devise a more effective strategy of sustaining their struggle against official efforts to muzzle it.

From the above, it becomes clear that Kenyatta and his inner circle secured control over policy-making by silencing other centres of opposition within the country. Thus, after muzzling pluralist dissent, Kenyatta's presidency became his own presidency.

II. The Position of Foreign Policy in Kenya and Tanzania

In the above discussion, I have attempted to demonstrate that foreign policy structures in Kenya and Tanzania display some differences as well as similarities. While the President is important as the final authority in foreign affairs in Tanzania, the person of the president plays a more critical role than the office of the President. In Kenya, the reverse situation seems to prevail. Furthermore, factors that have led to the predominance of the President (in the case of Tanzania) and the Presidency (in the case of Kenya) in foreign relations are similar only up to a point — that is, in as far as their predominance derives from the pervasive constitutional and non-constitutional powers with which an African president is endowed. Beyond that, Nyerere's dominant role in Tanzania's foreign policy derives from his own personality, the historical role in which he found himself cast at independence, particularly the virtual absence of internal and external challenges to his domination of foreign policy. Conversely, the prominent role of the presidency in Kenya's foreign policy seems to have been brought about
primarily through a process of muzzling and/or neutralising existing pressure groups that were attempting to challenge this dominance. However, as in Tanzania, weaknesses in colonially-inherited governmental institutions facilitated the process of silencing and/or cooptation.

A further difference that will be demonstrated in more detail later is the varying degree of concern that the two states have shown in foreign affairs. It is paradoxical that Kenya, whose transnational linkage and incorporation into the world system is greater than that of Tanzania, has shown less enthusiasm about foreign policy matters than the latter. For example, whereas Tanzania in 1961 was sacrificing its scarce educated manpower to establish diplomatic missions abroad Kenya, which was relatively better off in terms of highly trained indigenous people at independence was, according to Kirk-Greene, not following the general pattern of foreign representation apparent in other African countries:

"We find in Kenya a much slower growth rate and unexpectedly, at one time an actual cutback in the numbers of approved posts between 1963-1970." 173 Tables 2:13a) and 2:13b) below indicate that Tanzania has continued to maintain a lead over Kenya in the size of its foreign service. Besides simple expansion of personnel, Nyerere has always shown concern with the quality of the foreign affairs cadre. It was thus a clear demonstration of the importance Nyerere attached to foreign affairs that he selected the first seven Africans who were to form the core of Tanzania's foreign service from among the most highly educated Tanzanians at independence, in the face of an acute shortage of such manpower to serve
### TABLE 2:13a: -- THE EXPANSION OF TANZANIAN FOREIGN MISSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2:13b: -- THE EXPANSION OF KENYAN FOREIGN MISSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
within Tanzania. When challenged by the national assembly to justify why he had allocated the best human resources to foreign service, Nyerere's response clearly demonstrated the importance he attached to diplomacy:

"This House is aware Sir, of the shortage of trained and qualified local men which confronts us in many branches of the public service. One of the most difficult tasks of the government is to decide on priorities in making the best use of the men we have got. It will, I think be clear that we must have African Officers to represent Tanganyika overseas, and that they must be selected from among the best men that we have, since it falls to them to interpret the policies of this government to other friendly governments. Wherever we get such men, some other branch of the public service is bound to be the looser ...." 

Besides foreign service deployment, the expenditure of the two states on their foreign ministries as a percentage of government expenditures, clearly indicates that Tanzania has consistently spent more on the development of its foreign ministry than has Kenya (See Table 2:14). This can be taken to be an indication of the Tanzanian leadership's greater interest in foreign affairs than in Kenya. This point can be better appreciated perhaps if consideration is given to the financial cost involved in establishing new missions and hence the material sacrifice required to establish new diplomatic missions. In this connection,
# TABLE 2:14 - FOREIGN MINISTRIES: EXPENDITURES (£ thousands)

## A. TANZANIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>% of Total Govt. Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>255.8</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>517.5</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>840.5</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>752.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>806.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>5,800.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>5,700.8</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>4,900.7</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>5,700.9</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## B. KENYA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>% of Total Govt. Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>141.1</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>584.3</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>644.3</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>679.5</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>2,000.35</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>2,000.7</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>2,001.0</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>4,000.7</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

Kirk Greene, writing about the costs of diplomacy for African states has observed that:

"Diplomatic representation can be costly. It is inevitably so at the outset, when a residence has to be bought (or leased) that is in keeping with the dignity of the new African nation; when adequate and sufficiently prepossessing office accommodation has to be found for the Chancery and, in big missions such as those of London and Washington, for the student information and visa sections." 175

Furthermore, even the diplomatic practice of sending cables can be quite costly for a poor country such as Tanzania.

The point to be emphasised at this point is that, despite the relatively greater shortage of human and material resources in Tanzania than in Kenya, the former has demonstrated a higher degree of interest in establishing diplomatic links than the latter. Clearly, both countries have had an economic motivation in establishing diplomatic links. However, while Tanzania's motivation in the majority of cases has been both economic as well as political, Kenya's motivation has been primarily economic. This, along with the Tanzanian leadership's transnational outlook as opposed to Kenyan leadership's national/parochial outlook, have resulted in the greater involvement in foreign affairs of the former than the latter.
I. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have identified and analysed colonial factors that form the background to the formulation of post-colonial policies in Kenya and Tanzania. I sought to establish the role of colonialism in underdeveloping and integrating Kenya and Tanzania at the periphery of the world capitalist system. I also showed the colonial and social origins of the leaderships that emerged at independence. I further examined the personal ideologies of these leaders and established that their ideas have been a function of both an acquired Western value system, as well as their African traditional background. The extent of their interest in foreign affairs remained primarily a function of their personalities as well as of individual experiences. Their predominant roles in foreign affairs were both a reflection of the pervasive powers of the President and the Presidency in Africa, as well as of their divergent political economies. The latter have shaped the nature of the political institutions inherited from colonialism and the social forces that have developed in both countries.

In the next chapter, I shall examine and analyse the changes and/or continuities that have taken place in the post-colonial political economies of the two countries, with particular emphasis on those aspects which are of relevance in analysing the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania.
CHAPTER 3

POST-COLONIAL POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF KENYA AND TANZANIA: CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES

A. Introduction

When Tanzania and Kenya became nominally independent on 9 December 1961 and 12 December 1963, respectively, they inherited characteristic/essential positions at the periphery of the international capitalist economy. As was suggested in the previous Chapter, the departing colonial power, acting on behalf of the metropolitan bourgeoisie in particular and international capitalism in general, took precautionary measures to ensure continuity in the structural dependency linkage between the periphery (ex-colonies) and the centre (the metropole). In particular, the British government ensured that the machinery of the states were handed over to those Africans who could be expected to adopt rather than to dismantle the existing order.

Thus the process of decolonisation, as shown in Chapter two, was characterised by the substitution of foreign by African personnel who had acquired a relatively high level of western education and who had gained some experience working in the colonial state bureaucracy, albeit as junior 'officers'. These were the Africans who could be expected to perform, in the "new" state the functions of their predecessors in a manner conducive to continued international capitalist exploitation of the post-colonial economies. It was also indicated in Chapter two that
the role of the colonial state bureaucracy was important in terms of the regulation of conflicting social and economic interests, the facilitation of the exploitation of the local economies and the manipulation of the colonial system for the benefit of the metropolitan economy in general and the metropolitan bourgeoisie in particular.

Since the basic structural socio-economic links were not broken at independence, the metropolitan bourgeoisie -- through public and private investment and multinational corporations as well as major lending capitalist financial institutions (mainly the World Bank and the IMF) -- has maintained and even increased its control over the post-colonial economies of Tanzania and Kenya. The increased incorporation of the post-colonial economies of these two states has been to a large extent facilitated by the African leader's willingness to establish transnational partnerships with external capitalist interests, albeit to a lesser extent in Tanzania than Kenya. As will be shown later, unlike Kenya, Tanzania has at least begun to make some attempts to disengage its national political economy from the international capitalist one. But in general radical change in both countries continues to be impeded by the colonially inherited political, social and economic structures and institutions.

One such institution is the bureaucracy which has maintained its British character -- with its emphasis on rules, formal qualifications and hierarchical relations. Furthermore, most of the Tanzanians and Kenyans who man the senior positions in this traditional British-type bureaucracy were themselves raised in the British colonial system. Hence they acquired colonial (western) ideas, consumption tastes and lifestyles
that hardly reflect the realities of the environment in which they live. The psychological impact of colonial socialisation in general and colonial education in particular, largely explains the external orientation and willingness of most leaders in post-colonial Africa to cooperate and enter into transnational partnerships with the metropolitan bourgeoisie and other transnational capitalist interests. Given the colonial background of African leaders in general, and those of Kenya and Tanzania in particular, it would be unrealistic to expect them to lead a revolution. Indeed, the colonial administration's "middle-class solution" ensured that the interests of these indigenous leaders would be tied to the maintenance of the status quo.

In spite of the continuing debate on the nature and role of post-colonial state in Africa, it is generally agreed now that various elements in the African 'bourgeoisie' have employed the state structure as the main instrument for consolidating their (political) power positions, for accumulating personal wealth and for imposing compliance on the subordinated majority classes. Lacking a strong national power base, the ruling classes in Africa have come to rely on support and associations externally, as well as on coercion and/or patronage internally, as means of maintaining their privileged position and control over dependant, underdeveloped political economies.

The African ruling class is, then, characterised by insecurity and vulnerability. Its insecurity derives from its lack of established social and political authority, a factor which makes the ruling regimes intolerant of dissenting views and political disagreements. Their lack
of control over the means of production in their own economies makes these leaders vulnerable to external demands and dictates from the transnationals that continue to dominate their political economies. Thus in general African leaders have responded to growing internal inequalities and demands by using the state machinery to suppress and/or coopt dissenting groups, while they have responded to external demands by compromise and/or collaboration -- a situation that has led to "foreign policies of compromise and domestic regimes of oppression."

The foreign relations of African states largely reflect, then, these internal-external linkages, which according to one scholar have, "Consistently forced them to adopt a definite stand that emphasises certain universal human conditions -- human equality, and hence their unswerving support for the United Nations Organisation irrespective of their actual weakness in terms of substantive power; their preference for multilateral aid although most of their external aid is gained through bilateral arrangements with all their attendant strings; emotional devotion to concepts such as non-alignment and neutralism at the same time as they recognise their inability to effect them."

The conceived powerlessness of most African states has, as will be shown in Chapters four and five, led them to adopt a modest foreign policy, such as is pursued in Kenya, that often compromises the genuine national interests of these states.
As most African leaders quickly realised, repression had to be balanced with a certain amount of economic growth and a popular ideology that would serve to appease, at least temporarily, the disgruntled and impoverished masses into believing that development was indeed taking place -- if only slowly. Some version of "African Socialism" became the new unifying ideology, which in theory rejected western values and ideas in favour of African ones and advocated indigenisation and/or Africanisation of national resources. In addition, the ruling class needed to recruit supportive elements from among the various groups of the landed peasantry, the entrepreneurs and the workers, as a way of curtailing and bringing under state control those whose potential power as the direct producers of national wealth posed the main internal threat to the regimes.

The ability of these new indigenous regimes to manipulate their neo-colonial systems in the manner described above, depended largely on their external associates providing the much-needed capital investment for i) economic growth, ii) expansion of the state apparatus and iii) improvement and extension of services, particularly in the urban areas. The degree of metropolitan capitalist involvement obviously depends to a large extent on the ability of the state to guarantee the expected return on investment and therefore on the willingness and/or ability of the recipient state to intervene in the economy to keep the producers under control.

It is through this process that the African ruling classes have become agents of international capitalism, facilitating the inflow of capital investment and the outflow of profits made from the exploitation
of the local economy. Furthermore, transnational capitalist interests through their control over capital and technology have increased their power to determine what economic and social development takes place in the peripheries.

The above is an overview of the nature of the dependency relationship that characterises post-colonial economies, not only in Africa, but throughout most of the Third World. Its particular importance in the case of Kenya and Tanzania is in providing a basis for explaining the post-colonial development and foreign policies of the two states. My view, as stated in Chapter I, is that while Kenya and Tanzania have tended to employ different strategies and approaches in their post-colonial 'development', neither has moved away from the chains of external dependence and internal underdevelopment, although these phenomena exist in different degrees and forms in the two cases. Indeed, it would seem that both of them, though in varying degrees, are getting more entrenched in the dependency syndrome as their ruling classes develop more intimate links with transnational corporations, international lending institutions, particularly the World Bank and the I.M.F., and the major capitalist states.

To illustrate this assertion, I shall briefly examine and analyse the role of the post-colonial state in both countries, the types of issues that have preoccupied the ruling classes, and the methods that have been employed to deal with these issues. In this connection, an attempt will be made to show that the state leadership depends to a large extent on foreign aid, trade, technology and investment to maintain the internal status quo.
B. Tanzania: Consolidation of the Ruling Class

In Tanzania, as in Kenya, the first order of business after formal independence was the consolidation of the weak power position of the ruling section of the African petty bourgeoisie, in an attempt to maintain and enhance the acceptability and/or allegiance from the whole society gained during the "struggle" for independence. In this respect, Tanzania's ruling class had a relatively easier task than did its Kenyan counterpart due to the relative weakness of the African petty bourgeoisie in the former than in the latter. This situation allowed for the development of a strong and powerful ruling class in Tanzania — which Shivji terms a 'Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie' — before other elements of the petty bourgeoisie (Kulaks, entrepreneurs, etc.) had time to develop. Kenya on the other hand, Shivji points out, had at formal independence developed, "important sections of the petty bourgeoisie — yeoman farmers and traders, for example — besides the urban based intelligentsia, which had developed significant 'independent' roots in the colonial economy. Thus the petty bourgeoisie as a class was itself strong and different sections within it were more or less at par. This considerably reduced the power of the 'ruling clique' irrespective of its immediate possession of state apparatus and kept it 'tied' to its class base — the petty bourgeoisie." Although, as Shivji has shown, class formation was more advanced in Kenya than in Tanzania at independence, this should not be taken to mean that Tanzania's ruling class was entirely unchallenged. Indeed, during the
first few years of independence Tanzania, like Kenya, had to woo supportive elements, neutralise centres of opposition and, at the same time, maintain a credible economic growth rate. In this process of consolidating power, the African ruling class had the tacit support of external mentors who were determined to see "the divorce between the petite bourgeoisie and the populace ... widen and solidify", in order that the latter may "better hinder or sabotage any moves to expropriate the European bourgeoisie." 10

In Tanzania the leadership had to cope with a largely peasant population which was resistant to bureaucratic control and disinclined to produce a larger surplus of export crops, essential for maintaining a high rate of economic growth. The working class, though small, had a well-organised trade union movement and hence could make "unreasonable" demands for higher wages under threat of striking. The bureaucratic-ruling wing of the petty bourgeoisie wanted more rapid Africanisation of the top positions in government still held by European expatriates.

In regard to the workers, the Tanzanian ruling class found it necessary to curtail their potential power by neutralising and emasculating the trade union movement. 11 This goal was realised through:

1) The Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act, No. 43 of 1962 which made strikes virtually impossible (by introducing conciliation and arbitration procedures which would have to be followed before strike action could be taken), and, 2) the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (establishment) Act, No. 18 of 1964, which came in the wake of the 1964 Army Mutiny of which some trade union leaders had tried to take advantage. This Act banned the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (T.F.L.) and its eleven member
unions and established in its place one central union -- N.U.T.A. -- which as explained in chapter two, came under direct government control.

Nyerere's rationalisation for control over the trade union movement was that there was need to 'harmonise' the various institutions of society:

'We believe that the institutions of society must bring into harmony all the different interests of man, and we do not understand how it helps a worker if the Trade Union he belongs to regards itself as independent from, and in conflict with, the political movement he himself helps to control.'

After neutralising the trade union movement the ruling class attempted to coopt the workers through wage increases and welfare benefits. Thus between 1961 and 1966 the workers secured an 80 percent wage increase, in addition to such benefits as severance pay, employment security provisions, fringe benefits, annual benefits and national provident fund contributions. These increases in real income, however, tended to favour the urban workers, particularly those located in the capital, Dar-es-Salama. In other words, there were increasing income discrepancies among workers in various regions as well as in various economic sectors. Thus urban workers generally received higher wages than rural-agricultural workers.

In the meantime, the major producers of national wealth -- the peasants -- were not faring so well. By 1967 the rural per capita purchasing power of the average peasant farmer had only increased by 5 percent since 1961. Even this modest increase was seriously offset
by tax increases. On average, therefore, peasant disposable income did not increase at all during the first six years of "Uhuru."\textsuperscript{16} Although the 1967 Arusha Declaration and subsequent socialist documents in theory laid down policies that were aimed at eliminating disparities in the distribution of wealth in general and, in particular, at improving the economic well-being of poor peasant farmers, in practice they have only served the political purpose of legitimising the ruling regime.

Indeed the economic position of the peasant has deteriorated, particularly since the mid 1970s, when various internal and external crises brought the whole economy almost to a halt. Along with the attendant negative effects of drought, commodity price fluctuations, etc. the crises were felt most by peasant farmers, who unlike workers or bureaucrats who have a fixed income, have a livelihood which is completely dependent on the vagaries of the weather and the whims of the International capitalist market. Furthermore, various studies\textsuperscript{17} have shown that, the Tanzanian state in alliance with foreign capital, acts as the main stumbling block to the advancement of the peasant's welfare, as well as the socialist course in general. In this connection, James Mittleman has noted that:

"State intervention in the economy contributed to the destruction of remnants of precapitalist modes of production and to the transition to commodity production ... Yet because of its content, the state had no coherent program for primitive socialist accumulation, with its own special laws, nor a strategy for disengagement from powerful capitalist economies. In the post-1967 period,
private British Capital which had realized interest income in the form of loans, taxes, and inflation, was replaced by public international finance capital .... The money owners have subordinated the peasantry, and the door to debt bondage is now open: To meet their subsistence needs, poor peasants often manage crops, pay exorbitant rents for a plot of land, or sell food crops after harvest for cash before buying back equivalents at higher prices."\(^{18}\)

According to Mittleman then, "since the Arusha Declaration the Tanzanian petty bourgeoisie and international monetary institutions have joined forces. Together, they have sought to capitalize agriculture"\(^ {19}\) at the expense of the peasant farmer.

The Africanisation programme aimed primarily at meeting the demands of the bureaucratic wing of the petty bourgeoisie. As expected, this wing came to occupy the most senior positions within the civil service as well as managerial positions in industry along with the established European salary structure.\(^ {20}\) In addition the members of the ruling class had easy access to credit facilities and technical advice which enabled them to enter into property earning activities and hence to accumulate wealth. These factors fostered the inherited income inequalities, especially in relation to wage workers, who could not obtain similar credit facilities.\(^ {21}\)

Prior to 1967, the Africanisation programme did not significantly affect foreign enterprises (Asian and European owned) partly because most of the likely African candidates were absorbed by the government
and partly because of the general weakness of the commercial wing of the African petty bourgeoisie, which lacked sufficient capital and/or experience to handle large commercial or industrial enterprises. Furthermore, the development of an African commercial class was to be discouraged rather than encouraged, given the threat it would pose on the ruling bureaucratic stratum. Hence, monopoly of power favoured "state socialism" rather than "state capitalism."

In spite of attempts by the regime i) to avert the development of classes in Tanzania and ii) to raise peasant and worker's productivity, by the end of 1966 little or no success had been achieved. The villagisation of the peasantry had proved to be unsuccessful while peasant farmers were vigorously complaining of being deprived of all the blessings of 'Uhuru'. The workers, inspite of the government's attempts to appease and coopt them were continuing with their demands for wage increases. Furthermore, different sections of the petty bourgeoisie, were also disgruntled: the soldiers had openly demonstrated their grievances in the 1964 Army Mutiny, as will be shown in Chapter 4; and the University students had opposed the National Service Scheme in October 1966.

More importantly, perhaps, was the fact that the expected economic growth had encountered some major setbacks. These setbacks were primarily a reflection of the ruling class' high expectation of foreign capital to finance the budgeted expenditure of Tanzania's First Five Year Development Plan (1964-1969). This plan stipulated that 78 percent of the total budgeted expenditure would be financed by foreign governmental and private capital. Nyerere certainly had not foreseen the fact that, although
capitalists expected to continue reaping profits out of their original (colonial) capital in Tanzania, they were not necessarily interested in bringing in new investments, particularly in the light of the ideological militancy that Nyerere's regime had demonstrated in the 1964-1965 diplomatic quarrels with major western countries. Besides severing designated aid to Tanzania, these countries (U.S., U.K. and West Germany) may have dissuaded the major corporations based in their respective countries from investing in Tanzania. Furthermore, as will be shown in Chapter 4, the Sino-Tanzania military links that came in the wake of the 1964 army mutiny, closely followed by the 1965 Sino-Tanzania 'Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation', must have scared away western investors, who, like the western bloc in general, seemed to be paranoid about associating with countries perceived to be leaning towards the "communist" bloc. Thus, of the $222.7 m. expected as the total contribution to development expenditure from external sources, only $33 m. was actually obtained during the first half of the plan period.

Besides the loss in foreign governmental and private capital, Tanzania experienced another loss on the projected income from the sale of sisal at the international market. Thus, the price of sisal dropped from £105 per ton in 1964 to 68 per ton in 1967, a decline of 34 percent. This fall had a devastating impact on the overall economy. In particular, it precipitated mass lay-offs of wage-workers in the sisal industry who could not be absorbed readily into the constrained government employment sector.
From the foregoing, it would seem self-evident that by the end of 1966, the ruling class was faced with a national crisis that threatened its own existence. There was class formation and class conflict that had to be dealt with; there was an economic crisis that had to be averted; and a major rebuff from the international capitalist system called for a readjustment in external relations. It is against this background that Tanzania lost its "innocence" and initiated the policy changes that began with the Arusha Declaration.

The Arusha Declaration was, then, a response to the difficulties that the ruling class had encountered in consolidating and establishing its supremacy over the Tanzanian state. Whereas the pre-Arusha strategy was capitalist oriented, the Declaration and subsequent policy documents — T.A.N.U. guidelines (1977), The Rational Choice (1973), The Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After (1977) and C.C.M. Constitution (1977) — proposed an essentially socialist strategy for achieving 'development' in Tanzania. Thus it was the Arusha Declaration, rather than formal independence, which marked the beginning of change in Tanzania's relations with the global political economy.

The "move to the left" under the banner of a socialist ideology was the only "rational choice" that the Tanzanian leadership could have made given the objective realities of the period. The proclamation of socialism in 1967 was necessary to mobilise mass support and to legitimise a regime under the threat of economic collapse. The rhetoric against inequality and exploitation was bound to appeal to peasants and workers who had scarcely any property to lose but everything to gain by the more equitable distribution of wealth proposed in the Arusha
Declaration. There was the additional advantage that, insofar as
the socialist ideology made the peasant and workers more favourably
disposed towards their leaders, it was easier for the leadership to get
more effort from the 'masses' (peasants and workers) to facilitate
'development'. This would, in turn, reinforce the legitimacy of the
regime. Furthermore the ruling class of Tanzania had little (if anything)
to lose and potentially a lot to gain by such a move. In Mittleman's
words:

"The petty bourgeoisie, Tanzanian civil servants and
junior bank managers, viewed nationalization as an
opportunity for rapid promotion .... Having been
discriminated against by the overseas banks -- not
one of the acquired banks had a Tanzanian manager
in 1967 -- the petty bourgeoisie had no love for
their former employers. This was true for Asians
as well as for Africans." 31

As was explained earlier, the Tanzanian ruling class and indeed;
the whole of the "petty bourgeoisie" class, had emerged from colonialism
with a very weak economic base. The whole national economy was more
underdeveloped than that of Kenya, a fact related to the distinctive
characters of colonialism in Tanzania and Kenya. Nevertheless, the
little there was in the way of national resources was owned by a
foreign bourgeoisie and a local commercial (but largely Asian) bourgeoisie.
Enterprises such as banks, plantations and large industrial firms
were mainly European-owned, while the 'commercial bourgeoisie monopolised
export-import and wholesale trade, milling, textile and other light industries. Under these circumstances, the "move to the left" was an excellent opportunity for the ruling petty bourgeoisie to consolidate its political power as well as to strengthen its material base, through the expansion of state control that followed the Arusha Declaration. This expansion increased dramatically the economic resources placed under government control. The Arusha nationalisations as Shivji has pointed out, "constituted the first open attempt on the part of the bureaucratic sector of the petty bourgeoisie to carve out an economic base for itself."  

It should be pointed out that the basic ideas contained in the Arusha Declaration and subsequent documents referred to above, owe much to President Nyerere, whose personal commitment to achieving an egalitarian society in Tanzania is generally recognised. However, this commitment is not shared by all within the ruling class. Furthermore Nyerere's ideas, though genuine, often fall far short of what is required for attaining a socialist society. Perhaps the most fundamental shortcomings in Nyerere's socialist thinking are: i) his insistence that socialism is an attitude of mind; ii) his belief in an evolutionary rather than in a revolutionary approach to socialism; and iii) his repudiation of the existence of classes in Tanzania. Furthermore, he seems to think that somehow socialism can be built upon capitalist structures; hence his willingness to accept capitalist money, expertise and technology to build socialism. These ambiguities and contradictions in Nyerere's political thought have been, and continue to be, the subject of a debate among 'radical' scholars.
Clearly, Nyerere's ideas and his own philosophical framework reflect his socio-economic-political origins. His ideology is not really socialist in the Marxist/Scientific sense. Rather, it seems to fit more with the petty-bourgeois ideology of social democracy whose characteristics have been well described by Marx:

"The peculiar character of Social-Democracy is epitomised in the fact that democratic-republican institutions are demanded as a means, not of doing away with two extremes, capital and wage labour, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony .... (the petty bourgeoisie) believes that the special conditions of its emancipation are the general conditions within the frame of which alone modern society can be saved and the class struggle avoided."  

A similar view is expressed by Von-Freyhold, in her assessment of the ideology of the intellectual wing (that includes Nyerere) of the Tanzania ruling class:

"most of these intellectuals were imbued with a harmonistic dream of society in which interests of their class might be reconciled with the interests of all other non-capitalist classes, and the more enlightened sectors of the metropolitan bourgeoisie."  

Similarly, Mittleman concluded from his 1975 interviews of Tanzanian government officials that:

"the nationalism of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is fervently anti-imperialist, but not anti-capitalist; it does not spring from a dialectical class analysis."
In effect, invoking the gains of the state as a victory of the entire nation masks the underlying class struggle.  

Whatever the intention of Nyerere and other intellectuals that may have contributed to the formulation of the Arusha Declaration and subsequent 'socialist' documents, the fact of the matter is that these statements have been used by the ruling class in general to legitimise the expansion of state and bureaucratic 'control' over the economy. The nationalisation of the "commanding heights" (banks, plantations, etc.) really meant the replacement of the foreign capitalist class by members of the state bureaucracy, who became managers of the now state-owned enterprises. In this connection, Shivji has, rightly observed that since the Arusha Declaration the ruling class has combined both political and economic power as the state and state institutions (including parastatals) have become the dominant factor in the economy:

"Political power and control over property had now come to rest in the same class."  

However, this "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" is not an independent class:

"Insofar as the economy remains structurally linked with the capitalist world and within the world capitalist system, the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is a dependent Bourgeoisie -- dependent on the international Bourgeoisie."  

Thus what has developed in Tanzania is not scientific socialism of the Marxist type but a mild type of 'socialism'. This may be termed 'state
socialism' -- (for lack of a better term) whereby the state has taken
control over major economic assets but continues to rely to a large
extent on expertise, capital and technology from foreign investors and
financial institutions.

Indeed, ironically, foreign investors and aid donors have become
more interested in investing in Tanzania since the Arusha Declaration
for a variety of interrelated reasons. First, the Declaration's emphasis
on rural development coincided with the period (1968) in which the
World Bank's attitude towards agriculture was changing in favour of
aiding small-scale as opposed to large-scale farming. The idea, according
to one source, was to turn the peasants into a "strong class of
capitalist farmers capable of defending their class interests." Writing
about the World Bank's experimentation with its new agricultural policy
in Nigeria, John P. Olinger concludes:

"by the end of the 1960s, the Bank was willing to give
short term credit and it began 'integrated small-holder
development' programmes, which centre either on the
production of a single cash crop or on the overall
improvement of a particular region. The new emphasis
on agriculture should not, however, conceal the funda-
mental continuity in Bank policy which has been to
support capital-intensive imports, for all these programmes
rely heavily on imports of equipment, seed fertiliser and
expertise."39 (emphasis added)
This change in World Bank policy in favour of rural agriculture facilitated its penetration of incipient Ujamaa projects that Tanzania was initiating in the countryside. Indeed, as James Mittleman has argued, rural development projects in Tanzania are largely sponsored by the World Bank:

"... the World Bank group, allocates more funds to Africa than to any other continent; and more to Tanzania than to any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa. The bank has been pumping over $100 million per year into Tanzania since 1974, and as much as $140 million in 1978."  

Besides the World Bank, other aid donors and investors were attracted to Tanzania’s doctrine of self-reliance and rural socialism. As Clark has explained, the socialist overtones of the Arusha Declaration, "... far from repelling Western donors, attracted them. Tanzanian socialism was not so strong (at least at this stage) that it challenged the interests of western capitalism. What it meant to most donors was that the elite in Tanzania, because of the leadership code, would not enrich themselves on foreign aid, and would in fact strive to enact programmes to better the mass of the population. The Nordic countries, Canada, and the World Bank all found this a striking contrast to the situation in most of the Third World."  

Furthermore, new and old investors came to recognise they stood to benefit from the nationalisation measures introduced by Arusha. This is because
the "semi-nationalisation" of foreign companies in most cases meant
that the Tanzanian state had at least a 51 percent share yet the foreign
company could still continue to control the same branch through its
minority share. This type of "partnership" has been shown to allow the
multinational corporations to serve the old ends of exploitation
through new (and safer) strategies.

From the above analysis, it would seem then that the ruling -
'bureaucratic' petty bourgeoisie had, at least temporarily, managed to
consolidate its power position and establish its supremacy over other
classes within Tanzania by the end of the 1960s decade. The political
and economic trends in Tanzania in the 1970s and 1980s as will be shown
later, reflect bureaucratic dominance over the state, increased
penetration of the political economy by multinational aid agencies
and a continuation of external orientation of the economy.

Admittedly, the progressive wing of the ruling class (led by Nyerere)
has since the Arusha Declaration made significant attempts at changing
the political economy of Tanzania in the direction of socialism and
self-reliance. The genuineness of Nyerere's commitment to attaining
these goals is beyond question. However, what remains debatable is
whether indeed Tanzania has taken "some very important steps" as Nyerere
claimed at the end of the first decade after Arusha. The discussion
below examines and analyses the achievements (if any) of Post-Arusha
Tanzania, particularly in its attempts to attain socialism and self-
reliance and to disengage from the international capitalist system — and
by extension, enhance its ability to practice its non-alignment policy.
C. Tanzania: Beyond Arusha - Disengagement or Diversification of Dependence?

i) Introduction

The official view has been, and remains, that since the 1967 Arusha Declaration, Tanzania has been steadily moving on the road to self-reliance and socialism, albeit with setbacks along the way. While President Nyerere admits that neither of these two interrelated goals are as yet in sight, he is at the same time convinced that Tanzania is still on a socialist path and has indeed made some "fundamental achievements" which "are generally taken for granted." Nwalimu then goes on to list the achievements scored in the first decade since Arusha:

"First and foremost, we in Tanzania have stopped, and reversed, a national drift towards the growth of a class society based on ever-increasing inequality and the exploitation of the majority for the benefit of the few. We have changed the direction of our national development, so that our national resources are now being deliberately directed towards the needs of this nation and its people." 43

Nyerere then lists a number of other achievements that he feels Tanzania has attained ten years after Arusha: i) "some of the attitudes necessary to the development of socialism"; ii) institutions and strategies necessary for socialist advance; iii) "basic health, education, and transportation facilities for all the people of the country"; and iv) continued contribution to the freedom struggle in Africa." 44
As pointed out above, while most scholars recognise Mwalimu's genuine commitment to attaining socialism a number are critical of the strategy being pursued and are doubtful of the possibility of ever achieving socialism in Tanzania under the current strategy. \(^45\) There are some, however, such as Cranford Pratt, \(^46\) Okwudiba Nnoli \(^47\) and Edmund Clark \(^48\) who share Nyerere's viewpoint regarding the importance of post-Arusha achievements.

Nnoli, for example, argues that for Tanzania to achieve self-reliance and socialism, it should not aim at disengaging itself completely from the global political economy but just at reducing its dependence sufficiently to be able to exercise greater control over its national resources:

"... it is unrealistic for the country to aspire to autarchy or isolationism. Self-reliance merely seeks to control, rather than to eliminate the interaction between Tanzania and other states in such a way as to increase the benefits and reduce the cost of external resource procurement." \(^49\)

Such a reading of Tanzanian self-reliance is clearly an endorsement of Nyerere's view that:

"Self-reliance does not imply isolationism ... it is not the same thing as saying we shall not trade with other people." \(^50\)

Nyerere has rationalized this perception within the Tanzanian context by arguing that for a small, poor country such as Tanzania the attainment
of socialism initially offers no alternative but to "make compromises with capitalist money and skill": 51

"We have no alternative. The world supply of disinterested altruists and unconditional aid is very small indeed and however self-reliant we try to be in our economies and our development we are up against the fact that progress out of poverty has everywhere throughout history required some injection of capital and expertise. Even the largest states of the world have used outside resources; small ones have to use more. It becomes a question of how far we will go and what kind of compromises we will make. We cannot refuse to make any. For our own people will refuse to accept poverty without hope of change. We must have economic development or we have no political stability, and without political stability we have no political independence either, but become playthings of any other nation which desires to intervene in our affairs." 52 (emphasis added)

Nnoli has also correctly identified an external dimension to Tanzania's self-reliance, a dimension in which more success would seem to have been achieved than in the internal situation. Nnoli is also correct in his emphasis on the interrelatedness between the external and the internal dimensions of Tanzania's policy:

"Tanzania's policy of national self-reliance has internal and external dimensions. It unites domestic and foreign policies in the pursuit of development. It gives them
cohesion in a common strategy for reorganising the country's domestic and international relations to meet the challenge posed by a hostile external environment, correct the adverse effects of that environment consequent on the country's colonial heritage and minimise the benefits of external resources to the country. It seeks to maximise independence promote economic development and insure sociopolitical stability in a way that enhances national power."^53

As will be shown later, the policy of self-reliance has, as Nnoli asserts facilitated the reorganisation of Tanzania's domestic and international relations. In particular, it has given Tanzania a greater margin of manoeuvrability and hence ability to participate more effectively in regional and global affairs. In this regard, Tanzania has been particularly active in political liberation (especially in Southern Africa, but also in Biafra, Uganda and Angola), as well as in economic liberation (through its participation in the North-South Dialogue and its advocacy of South-South linkages and greater regional - Third World cooperation and coordination. This point will be discussed further in Chapters five and six.

Like Nnoli, Clark is critical but also sympathetic about attempts being made to build a socialist self-reliant society in Tanzania. But he cautions, however, that

"While the period since independence has not been easy, Tanzania has not suffered from great internal conflict. Many of the advances -- the nationalisations, the leadership
ode, the better distribution of social services — could be made without making many people worse off, or at least without making many Africans worse off. This is no longer true. In future ... the possibility of a bureaucratic socialism backed by the force of the army is very real .... The rhetoric (of socialism) will grow louder and more extreme, but the society will be controlled by a small urban elite which will direct development in a way which serves its interests, not the interests of the people."^4

And yet inspite of his pessimistic projection of the future of Socialism in Tanzania, Clark is of the opinion that external dependence has decreased rather increased since Arusha:

"External dependence to-day is certainly no more but probably somewhat less in Tanzania than it was in the First Five Year Plan .... Any discussion of external dependence should not ignore the important structural changes which have occurred in the economy. While one can make many criticisms about the parastatal sector, the creation of that sector signifies a major increase in the degree to which Tanzanians now control their own economy."^5

Clark's thesis is, however, not shared by Nyerere's critics who, though differing on details, share the view that the major difficulty to Tanzania attaining socialism is its continuing and
increasing dependence on the international capitalist system. This school of thought, of which the present study is a part, argues that the success of socialism in Tanzania (and indeed in other former colonies) should involve first, the dismantling of the distortive structures of colonial and early post-colonial peripheral capitalism and second, the restructuring of the national political economy away from global capitalist institutions and industrialized nations. Shivji, who is highly critical of Post-Arusha Tanzania has argued:

"nationalisation was a step forward insofar as it is a prerequisite for building socialism. But by nationalisation, ... the country did not cease to be a neo-colony. Neither did it become a worker's state. Nor does state ownership alone mean socialism". 57

At the same time, Shivji sees nationalisation as having provided the opportunity for the ruling-bureaucratic bourgeoisie to consolidate its political -- and now economic -- power in partnership with the metropolitan bourgeoisie, on whom the former remain dependent. Of the existence of transnational links, he has argued that:

"nationalisation does not necessarily mean socialisation of the economy. In fact, it did not even loosen the grip of the multinational corporations, for the National Development Corporation (N.D.C.) immediately went into a variety of partnership arrangements with them. Thus they continued to manage their former companies". 58

Saul is another scholar who, like Shivji sees continued integration into the capitalist world as leading to what Rweyemamu would term
"perverse capitalist development"; in the long run this cannot be self-sustaining and is certainly a drawback on any attempts to initiate socialist development. However, Arrighi and Saul, do not share Shivji's view that disengagement from international capitalism would alone advance socialism:

'It does not follow, however that disengagement from international capitalism, is a sufficient condition for development ... the emergence of a labour aristocracy with considerable political power was brought about not only by the pattern of foreign investment but also by the acceptance of a colonial salary structure on the part of independent African governments. The labour aristocracy will therefore continue to use its power in a state-controlled modern sector in order to appropriate a considerable share of the surplus in the form of increasing discretionary consumption. Under these conditions, 'perverse growth' would continue notwithstanding state ownership of the means of production. In order to achieve 'real' long term development disengagement from international capitalism will have to be accompanied by a change in the power base for African government'.

The above selections from the debate represent, in a broad way, some of the assessments and viewpoints that have been expressed regarding Tanzania's post-Arusha attempts to design and attain its own version of socialism and self-reliance. In the discussion that follows I will attempt to provide quantitative as well as qualitative data which may
or may not corroborate these viewpoints, but whose primary purpose is to determine the extent of Tanzania's dependence on and/or disengagement from the global political economy since Arusha. In this connection, I shall mainly examine and analyse data on foreign aid, trade and investment flows, as well as the role of Multinational Corporations and other foreign economic institutions and/or organisations.

11) Tanzania: Foreign Investment Dependence

"The pattern of imports represents the familiar picture of a former colony, becoming independent and indulging in a spate of import-content, -- not to mention the high costs of production it is soon discovered that this type of activity does not help even to save foreign exchange. The next stage usually is to try and stimulate exports again to earn foreign exchange. But the manufactured exports from the "third-world" countries fail to penetrate the markets of the developed countries: they are not competitive and in any case are kept out by the high tariffs that the developed countries impose on manufactured goods from the underdeveloped countries. Failing both, temporary reliefs are sought in loans and aid from the capitalist countries and the World Bank only to be burdened with debt servicing and repayments. The vicious circle is complete and continues to be worse." 60

In Tanzania, Kenya and indeed all former colonies, multinational corporations originally invested in resource-based production, such as raw material production, for export to their home markets. In the
post-colonial era, foreign investment began to assume entirely different character -- albeit serving the same end of exploiting ex-colonial economies -- that of import-substitution and, more recently, export-manufacturing. The adverse effects of Multinational Corporation (M.N.C.s) - led industrialisation as summarised above are, in varying degrees and forms, to be observed in the political economies of Kenya and Tanzania.

Prior to the Arusha Declaration, foreign investment policy in Tanzania was broadly similar to that of Kenya, in that it welcomed foreign private investment and expatriation of profits with minimum of restrictions. Ironically, as I showed earlier, Tanzania did not have much luck in attracting foreign capital prior to Arusha despite its then 'liberal' investment policy.

After Arusha, the government continued in principle to welcome foreign investment but under more strict conditions, at least in theory. These included greater government control and scrutiny of the inflow and outflow of foreign capital and the acquisition of majority ownership in the foreign owned subsidiaries of M.N.C.s. These Post-Arusha measures, though aimed at giving the government more control, were largely unsuccessful, particularly in the field of foreign investment. A number of studies focusing on Tanzania's industrial and investment performance have arrived at similar conclusions regarding the dismal performance of its industrial sector, which involves partnership between state-owned, public corporations and M.N.C.s. The basic problem, which also seems to prevail in Kenya is, on the one hand, one of M.N.C. control and monopoly over capital and technology and, on the other hand, one of the
"bureaucratic bourgeoisie's" external orientation in their consumer tastes, values and lifestyles.

In the Tanzania case, nationalisation of major foreign companies meant that the publicly-owned corporation — National Development Corporation (N.D.C.) — entered into partnership arrangements with the semi-nationalised subsidiaries of foreign firms; the former owned the large percentage of the equity and the latter anything from 10-45 percent of the equity. However, the foreign partner maintained control over technology and capital as well as management of their former companies. In this kind of arrangement, as the studies referred to earlier have shown, it is not the partner who owns the larger share of the equity who stands to reap the larger share of the benefit and/or profit, but the one who manages and controls the means of production:

"Besides being the supplier of machinery or raw materials, patent or trade marks, or a marketing agent and probably a substantial lender as well, the foreign partner is in an overwhelmingly strong bargaining position .... All in all, association with M.N.C.s plays a decisively influential role in structuring the pattern of investment, i.e. the mode of utilisation of the economic surplus -- thereby deciding the direction of development ... whatever "development" that takes place is in fact the development of underdevelopment" 63

In capitalist-oriented countries such as Kenya, foreign capital can distort investment choices by developing the "wrong" types of product -- particularly high income consumption goods -- and so pre-empt the
development of local industries. In countries such as Tanzania, such distortive effects are minimised by public ownership and the fact that foreign investors only enter the economy with the agreement and encouragement of government. Nevertheless, foreign firms still advance projects with high import content, geared to service the Western-oriented consumption patterns of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In this connection, Clark has observed for Tanzania that,

"When N.D.C. is faced with a choice of either trying to develop small-scale industries, or build a detergent factory, it has traditionally chosen to push the detergent factory." 64

Indeed, although Clark is generally sympathetic to the difficulties of implementing socialism in Tanzania, he has concluded from his analysis and data that the manufacturing parastatals have continued to be externally-oriented, thus retarding the prospect of greater autonomy:

"Import-intensive firms tend to be more capital intensive, have a higher capital value added ratio, and tend to be larger. Because they rely on imported raw materials, such industries must be located on the coast, or in towns with good transportation connections. As a result, they tend to be located in the towns and regions which are already most developed. They are often industries developed by foreign personnel and dependent upon foreign technology. This dependence helps to explain their often excessive use of foreign materials." 65
Consequently, although the level of consumer imports as a percentage of total imports has fallen since Arusha (see table 3:1), this has primarily been due to import-substitution in such areas as textiles, beverages and tobacco. On the other hand, imports of such non-consumer goods as mineral fuel, lubricants and transport equipment have soared (see table 3:2). The importation of cars and other transport equipment, for example, rocketed from Tsh 327 million in 1965 to Tsh 1,753 million in 1975, as did the importation of consumer goods, mainly food, during the 1974-75 food crisis.

TABLE 3:1 TANZANIAN COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS, 1966-1972 (in %) (Tsh million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Item</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i) Consumer goods</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Intermediate goods</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii) Capital goods</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3:2 COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS, 1965-1975 (Tsh million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Item</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i) Food, Beverages, Tobacco</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>1,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Oils, Lubricants, etc.</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii) Chemicals &amp; Fertilizers</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>1,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv) Manufactured goods</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v) Machinery and Transport Equipment</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The food shortages which have characterised Tanzania's economy since the mid 1970s affected, among other food products, maize, in which Tanzania was not only self-sufficient up to 1968, but was a net exporter. By 1971, however, Tanzania had become a net importer (as shown in table 3:3) and it has continued to be ever since.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>183.6</td>
<td>317.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Such food problems are not unique to Tanzania. Indeed, most African countries, including its relatively more affluent neighbour, have been hit with a food crisis particularly since the late 1970s and have had to import most of their food. The reason for food shortages in Africa are many but the basic and perhaps more relevant ones relate to the structural, external orientation of the continent's political economy. This is dominated by international capitalist interests that continue to determine what is produced, how it is produced, and the value of what is produced. Thus, just as the M.N.C.s monopolise capital and technology in the region, they, along with their home states, dominate the international market where they ensure the perpetuation of the system of
unequal exchange. This situation is clearly apparent in Tanzania's (and Kenya's) trade relations discussed next.

iii) Tanzania: Foreign Trade Dependence

In general, trade and other exchanges between unequal partners are inherently exploitative in favour of the dominant partner. This is especially so for an underdeveloped country like Tanzania that ranks among the 29 Least Developed Countries (L.D.C.s).

Although Tanzania has since Arusha adopted a policy of self-reliance and disengagement from the international capitalist economy thus far, no significant change has occurred in the arena of foreign trade. Diversification of trading partners has taken place, but it has largely been within the Western bloc. Indeed the three major Western countries -- U.S., U.K. and West Germany -- continue to be Tanzania's principal trading partners (see Tables 3:4a) and 3:4b). Table 3:4b) indicates that by 1971, imports from China had exceeded those from Britain which had previously been Tanzania's leading source of imports. This dramatic switch, though temporary, reflected Tanzania's need to raise its imports from China in order to repay China's loan for the construction costs of TAZARA - Tanzania-Zambia Railway, as well as an overall gradual decline in Britain's ability to maintain its share of world trade. The apparent failure to restructure the inherited foreign trading links is a reflection of a general pattern of structural continuities and linkages of Tanzania's political economy to the global one -- despite the Arusha Declaration.
### TABLE 3:4a) - VALUE OF TANZANIAN EXPORTS TO PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS (AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS) (value in Tsh million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Value**

| (Tsh Millions) | 1,012 | 1,428.4 | 1,698.1 | 1,704 | 2,411 | 3,846 |

*Source: U.N., Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (Various Years).*
TABLE 3:4b) VALUE OF TANZANIAN IMPORTS FROM PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS

(AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS) (value in Tsh million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Value: 794 879.4 1,359.5 1,939.2 3,141.2 4,738.8 (Tsh Millions)

Source, U.N., Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (Various Years).
Tanzania's changing ratio of export to G.D.P., displayed in Table 3:5 however, would seem to suggest that Tanzania has succeeded in reducing its reliance on export receipts in its national income. It should however be noted that the decline in the ratio of exports to G.D.P. began prior to Arusha and even increased slightly in 1972. Moreover the downward trend that is apparent after 1974 may not have been due to Tanzania's deliberate policy, but rather to the global recession that reduced Tanzanian export to G.D.P. ratio. Nevertheless the fact that G.D.P. grew at a rate faster than export revenues some years prior to 1974 would seem to suggest that Tanzania was beginning to reduce its reliance on exports.

However, as I noted above, Tanzania has not done so well in altering the composition of imports which have continued to range from luxury goods (consumer and non-consumer) to non-luxury goods as well as food. Although Tanzania has relatively been much more successful than neighbouring Kenya in curbing the importation of certain consumer luxury items, such as televisions, it has not been entirely so. One study has, for example, produced data to show that Tanzania's luxury textile imports have increased as a percentage of total textile imports from 25% in 1961 to 80% in 1975. This again is a reflection of M.N.C.-led export manufacturing which promotes the production of synthetic fabric with a high import content rather than utilize locally-produced cotton to promote cotton textile goods. The latter would be cheaper and would cater to mass consumption.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Exports (in Tsh million)</th>
<th>GDP (in Tsh million)</th>
<th>Exports as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>10,120.0</td>
<td>4,102</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,428.4</td>
<td>6,030</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,698.1</td>
<td>7,874</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,704.0</td>
<td>9,173</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,411.0</td>
<td>13,103</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3,846.0</td>
<td>23,139</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4,519.0</td>
<td>28,270</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, Tanzania has not been successful in its attempt to attain self-sufficiency in food production and hence eliminate imports. Table 3:6 shows that food importation since formal independence and possibly even earlier, has constituted a significant percentage of total imports, although the most dramatic increase occurred in 1974/75. This would lend credence then to the view that factors other than vagaries in the weather have contributed to Tanzania's inability to attain food self-sufficiency. One such view has been persuasively presented by Yash Tandon in a study that focuses on the 1974/75 food crisis. In that, Tandon rejects the conventional view that the crisis was caused by a combination of drought and lack of prior planning. Rather, he argues that, in the first instance, Tanzania is no way able to plan "its" economy independently of financial capital -- since the economy is merely a link in the chain of the global economy dominated by foreign finance capital. Tandon points out that since 1974 the World Bank's influence has determined rural development policies as well as overall national development plans. In particular, he points out that it was the World Bank that designed the new post-1975 strategy for achieving national food self-sufficiency by 1980.

Tandon's contention, then, is that the Tanzanian food crisis of 1974/75 was not of national origin. Instead it was a crisis created by "imperialism" itself which took the form of a "national" crisis for Tanzania. Thus the objective of the World Bank Food Strategy is not the achievement of national food self-sufficiency, though domestic requirements of food might be incidentally fulfilled in the process, but rather
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Imports</th>
<th>Food Imports</th>
<th>as % of Total Imports</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Food Import as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>903.2</td>
<td>120.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>4,102</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>952.9</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6,030</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,360.0</td>
<td>121.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7,343</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,939.2</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9,173</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3,141.2</td>
<td>197.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13,103</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5,429.3</td>
<td>990.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15,994</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4,738.8</td>
<td>334.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>23,139</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.N., Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (various years).
to produce food for the world market. In these terms, the Tanzania market, is merely serving imperialist monopolies, whose objective is to cheapen the cost of production for themselves and seek openings for the export of capital.

Whether or not Tandon's analysis can be accepted, one fact which cannot be disputed is that the capitalist lending institutions, particularly the World Bank and I.M.F., have taken advantage of the worsening economic position of many poor countries such as Tanzania. Through their control of the "aid purse" they have come to exercise considerable influence over the development policies of aid recipients. I return to this point in the analysis of Tanzania's foreign aid dependence.

But before doing so, it should be noted that Tanzania's balance of trade has also been adversely affected by its continuing dependence on a few commodity exports -- coffee, sisal, cotton, cashew nuts and cloves, all of which were introduced during the colonial period -- and which have continued to constitute over 60% of the value of exports as indicated in table 3:7. However, relatively speaking, Tanzania is less commodity dependent than Kenya which relies on just two commodities -- coffee and tea -- for up to 50% of its exports. Nevertheless, Tanzania's export commodities have been subjected to just as many world market price fluctuations with all their attendant adverse effects, as those of Kenya. For example, sisal has dropped from its leading position in the early 1960s to being third in the 1970s, owing to a drastic decline in its world market price. And, as pointed out earlier, the volume of these cash crops, has continued to decline, a factor that may or may
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloves</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashew-Nuts</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Products</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Products</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,506.5</td>
<td>1,715.8</td>
<td>1,649.0</td>
<td>2,410.8</td>
<td>3,852.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Tsh million)
not be an indication that Tanzania is steadily becoming more self-reliant.

From the above it would seem that although Tanzania has made some attempt at reducing the adverse effects of trade dependence, it has not thus far registered significant success. Although the importation of a few luxury consumer goods has been reduced, the imports of others such as textiles has increased. Food imports have not changed significantly since Arusha while the export commodities have remained basically the same as they were in the colonial period; only their order of importance has shifted because of fluctuations in the world market.

Tanzania's trade relations are clearly limited by structural constraints within the international system. These make it difficult, for example, for Tanzania to trade with underdeveloped countries since most of them produce identical products. Thus, Tanzania will continue to have difficulty expanding its trade with other Third World countries as long as its major exports consist of coffee, cotton and sisal. As one scholar has observed:

"south-south trade may be non-exploitative, but in effect there is often very little trade." 70

iv) Tanzania: Foreign Aid Dependence

Foreign aid dependence is closely related to foreign investment and trade dependence. Whether in form of loans or grants, foreign aid is intended to supply recipients with an ability to pay for imports that they cannot afford solely on the basis of export earnings. 71 Donor countries generally place conditions for making aid available to the
recipient, such as tying the 'assistance' to imports from themselves. Even multilateral aid from an international organisation is not immune from the wishes of the large industrial countries — that pledge the largest proportions of such aid. Indeed, some radical critics of foreign aid have argued that multilateral agencies are even more pernicious agents of international economic dependence than their bilateral counterparts. 72

Such an argument is based on two main premises. First, the few countries that provide most of the operating capital for multilateral lenders such as the I.M.F. and World Bank have great influence over the agencies' lending decisions deriving from weighted voting arrangements; these allot voting strength in rough proportion to pledges of capital. This explains why wealthy nations such as the U.S. have decisive control over the I.M.F. and the World Bank; for example, a U.S. citizen has always served as president of the Bank. And second, multilateral aid agencies encourage "reform" or "monetary stabilisation" in recipient economies which make the latter more dependent than otherwise would be the case.

The World Bank and the I.M.F., as the major multilateral aid agencies have, as pointed out earlier, taken advantage of the worsening economic problems of African countries, to place stringent conditions for making capital available to recipients. In particular, the I.M.F. is well-known for its policy of economic orthodoxy. It links its credit to the implementation of a set of measures by national governments. Since the majority of underdeveloped countries are permanently short of capital, their margin of choice is very limited. They thus have to accept
the "advice" of the I.M.F. Payer has summarised the I.M.F.'s preeminent position among lenders when she wrote:

"The I.M.F. must be seen as the keystone of a total system, its power is made possible not only by enormous resources it controls ... but more significantly as a result of its function as an international credit agency. All of the major sources of credit in the developed capitalist world, whether private lenders, governments, or multilateral institutions will not continue to lend to a country which persists in defying I.M.F. 'advice.' The real importance of the I.M.F. lies in the authority delegated to it by the governments and capital markets of the entire capitalist world." 73

Given the pervasive monetary power of the I.M.F., most recipients have limited choice and a small margin of manoeuvrability. Even the most dedicated of African leaders such as Nyerere have had to succumb to I.M.F. "advice", as will be shown below.

At independence Tanzania was, like Kenya, highly dependent on Western, particularly British, assistance. But following the 1964/65 diplomatic crisis, Tanzania quickly diversified its aid sources. However, the diversification of sources was not accompanied by the reduction of aid dependence. Indeed to date, almost 15 years after this East African state ventured on the road towards self-reliance, it remains highly dependent on foreign aid.
For example, whereas in 1972, the foreign aid ratio to the total
development budget worked out at 34 percent, by 1977 60 percent of
the development budget was met through aid. Indeed Tanzania had
by 1976 become one of the major recipients of aid among the countries
of Sub-Saharan Africa. According to one report, between 1973 and 1976
Tanzania received $944 million from Development Assistance Committee
(D.A.C.) countries and multilateral agencies, a figure which though
not as high as Zaire's $2,101 million, was nevertheless slightly
higher than that received by "capitalist" African states such as Kenya
($905 million), Ivory Coast ($905 million) and Sudan ($907 million).
However, these differences may be insignificant given the fact that
i) Tanzania is a poorer state than the other four and ii) other sources
of income (e.g. foreign capital investment, export receipts) are probably
higher in the other four.

However, the point still stands that a dramatic rise in foreign
aid has occurred in Tanzania since the Arusha Declaration. The post-Arusha
increase in foreign aid is revealed in table 3:8a) with the Netherlands,
West Germany and the United States joining Canada, Scandinavia and
I.D.A./U.N.D.P. as major donors. Most of the Chinese aid was, during
that period primarily for the construction of Tazara railroad. As
pointed out earlier, the World Bank and its affiliates have become major
sources particularly since 1974 when the Bank literally took over the
running of rural development in Tanzania, which became the major recipient
of the Bank's aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The increasing aid dependence notwithstanding, the pattern of
bilateral foreign assistance sources, unlike that of trade, reveals a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAC Bilateral Total</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>144.1</td>
<td>239.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Which: Canada</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Which: EEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Bilateral Total</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Which: U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Europe</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>201.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Total</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Which: I.D.A.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.D.P.</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

trend, towards diversification away from the major industrial powers and closer to ‘middle’ and ‘small’ countries. But as in trade, this diversification has taken place within the Western bloc. As Table 3:8b) indicates, Britain has moved from its leading position as a source of economic aid to Tanzania at independence, to twelfth position between 1970 and 1974. This trend reflects a general decline in British official aid disbursements, as well as the diplomatic sever with Tanzania in 1965, which led Britain to cut its aid programme to that country. The resumption of British aid programme in 1974, is reflected in the sudden increase from $3.5 million in 1974 to $9 million in 1975 (see table 3:8a)).

Although most of Tanzania’s foreign aid continues to flow from Western countries and institutions — particularly the World Bank group — it is significant that most of its bilateral assistance comes from small Western countries — Scandinavian countries and Canada — whose foreign policies unlike those of the major West and East bloc powers do not contain an overt interest in establishing specific spheres of influence or in engaging in power politics. Similarly, most of the assistance Tanzania has received from socialist countries comes from Yugoslavia and China — which are not part of the Soviet bloc. The significance of this point becomes clear if viewed in the context of Tanzania’s foreign policy of non-alignment, which is examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

Tanzania has nevertheless, become a major recipient among all African countries receiving aid from the major donors listed on
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount (millions of U.S. $)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBRD/IDA (World Bank Group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>298.60</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>274.90</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>102.94</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>79.21</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>69.63</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>66.66</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>54.82</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>415.55</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>37.59</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP/FAO</td>
<td>27.01</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>26.82</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>26.40</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>14.59</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14.34</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab League's Oil Assistance Fund</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>.3</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>.2</td>
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<td>U.N. Capital Development Fund</td>
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<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Development Corporation</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,168.02</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, according to one report, six Western countries—Canada, West Germany, Holland and the three Scandinavian states (Sweden, Norway and Denmark)—have since the 1970s provided more foreign aid to Tanzania than to any other African country. For example, in the period 1970 to 1976, Tanzania was one of seven commonwealth countries which were major recipients of Canadian Aid. Tanzania has also been the leading recipient of Scandinavian and Dutch aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. These countries however, concentrate most of their aid donations in both Kenya and Tanzania (see table 3:9).

Table 3:9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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The same report also points out that by 1976 Tanzania had become the third largest recipient of technical assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed Tanzanian dependence on such assistance appears to be likely to continue and even increase in the foreseeable future, as the rising figures of expatriate manpower indicate. For example, whereas in the mid-1970s there were some 5,000 expatriates in Tanzania under various aid schemes, this figure was expected to rise to 8,000 by 1980.

Paradoxically then, despite Tanzania's proclaimed determination to rely primarily on its own resources, its employment of foreign economic resources has increased rather than decreased since Arusha. As Mittleman has observed:

"Ironically, since adopting a policy of self-reliance in 1967, Tanzania has become increasingly dependent on international loans to the point that economists puzzle over how the country will pay for its expensive borrowing habit. In 1978, Tanzania received between $450 million and $500 million in foreign assistance. ... Tanzania in the same year obtained $140 million from the World Bank Group, more than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa."

Furthermore most of the economic 'aid' continues to flow from the same international capitalist sources from which Tanzania avowedly intends to disengage itself. As pointed out earlier, President Nyerere, unlike his critics, does not see anything contradictory about attempting to build socialism based on capitalist structural relations and resources.
At least he does not think Tanzania has any other choice, readily available.

Perhaps the more pertinent concern for the purpose of this study is not so much the amounts or the sources of Tanzania's external economic assistance, but rather whether it has contributed to development and greater control over Tanzania's resources or over its own development policies. In particular, have the borrowed funds been utilised to satisfy "Basic Human Needs" of Tanzanians or to achieve some preconceived objective(s) of the donor and/or the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'?

Many are agreed that the Basic Human Needs of the predominantly rural Tanzanians are being met more adequately than prior to Arusha. These needs include food, shelter, health and educational facilities. To these, Nyerere would also add freedom, dignity and self-respect. The satisfaction of basic needs should, according to Nyerere be the measure of a country's wealth, rather than Gross National Product (G.N.P.) figures which, he argues, is the basic measure of capitalist development. Interestingly however, data that have employed Nyerere's criteria of development, show capitalist Kenya to be ahead of Tanzania during the mid-1970s (see table 3:10). The Physical Quality of Life Index (P.Q.L.I.) however does not measure the many other social and psychological characteristics suggested by the term "quality of life" -- justice, political freedom or a sense of participation -- all of which figure prominently in Nyerere's conception of development.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Per 1,000 Life Births</th>
<th>(%) Literacy</th>
<th>Public Education Expenditure, Per Capita</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>20-25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>10-15</td>
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*PQLI = Physical Quality of Life Index, based on an average of ratings for life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy.
I have already mentioned that Tanzania has as yet to attain self-sufficiency in food. Indeed it has been experiencing periodical food shortages prior to and during the post Arusha era, particularly since 1974. In 1981, for example, Tanzania was said to be experiencing "its worst economic crisis since gaining independence from Britain 20 years ago ... with acute famine, severe food shortages and lacking any foreign reserves ... to import enough food to avert famine." 79

Many reasons, some external as well as internal can be suggested for Tanzania's economic problems. Externally, these include such external factors as the energy crisis of 1974-76 that forced it to spend up to 45% of its export earnings on oil imports; the cost of the war to topple Idi Amin of Uganda that was estimated at £1,000 million; and, in the early 1970s, the high cost of constructing the Dar-es-Salaam-Ndola Oil pipeline, the Dar-Copperbelt road and the Dar-Kapiri Mposhi Tazara railway, all of which diverted foreign aid, local resources and government attention away from other national problems. Furthermore, Tazara also involved the importation of Chinese manufactured and other goods to cover local construction costs. 80

Internally, causal factors include the 1973-74 drought which precipitated a food crisis that diverted attention from long-term to short-term crisis management to avert famine, the 'forced' villagisation programme that was being implemented during this period caused a slow-down in agricultural production which partly explains the decline in cash and food crop production between 1973 and 1977; and finally, an expanding, cumbersome and ubiquitous bureaucracy of state parastatals.
and politicians who, though consuming an increasingly larger share of wealth, do not directly contribute to production. Nyerere himself in his review of Tanzania's ten year performance since Arusha notes with concern that,

"Government-state bureaucracy and politicians, have been the fastest growing sector of the economy. In 1967, it accounted for 10.9 percent of national income; in 1975, it was 16 percent." The president therefore recommends that "some costs of government could be reduced if we helped the people in the villages and towns do more for themselves." 

As supposed agents of socialist development, Tanzanian bureaucrats have often been singled out as responsible for the slow-down in productivity and efficiency of the political economy. And yet such criticism often ignores the fact that behind these bureaucrats, there are often foreign 'advisers' and 'experts' accompanying the many aid programmes.

This brings me to the point posed earlier of the possibility of aid donors, particularly multilateral ones, using their economic clout to distort economic programmes of genuinely needy Third World governments, such as Tanzania's. I have already cited the World Bank's domination of rural development policies of Tanzania since the mid-1970s.

In general, 'aid' programmes from the industrialised countries, the I.M.F., the World Bank and its affiliates are aimed at creating favourable conditions for the penetration of overseas private capital
into those sectors of the economies of African states where it can produce maximum profit. Since most African countries are raw material producers, largely based in the rural regions where infrastructural development is low or non-existent, much of the aid goes to finance the construction of highways, bridges, ports and power stations, to facilitate the transportation of export-primary goods from the rural areas to the metropolitan centers, rather than to improve the infrastructure for its own sake. Viewed in this context, World Bank interest in rural 'development' in Tanzania is not based on socialist principles or on egalitarian concerns, but rather on the fact that whatever natural wealth Tanzania has (both human and material) is located predominantly in the countryside. As Tandon has suggested the World Bank's major concern is production for the world market and only incidentally fulfillment of Tanzania's food requirements. Furthermore, the major emphasis of this and other donors is on cash crop, export-oriented production rather than food production for local consumption. This bias is evident from the type of projects to which aid is tied. A good example is the recent offer from a Bank affiliate -- the International Development Association (I.D.A.) -- which consisted of two separate 'donations.' One was a $10 million credit for a project to increase the production of pyrethrum in the highlands of Mbeya and Iringa regions in Southern Tanzania and the other was a $14 million credit to help consolidate the operations of the Tanzania Tea Authority.
What is significant about this package is that it came at a time when Tanzania was appealing for food aid to avert famine not for infrastructural development aimed at promoting production of a beverage commodity (tea) or a chemical commodity (pyrethrum). In the meantime, the World Bank has promised Tanzania fifty million dollars a year over five years for foreign exchange support, to come into effect September 1981,

"depending on whether Tanzanian finance Minister, Amir Jamal can submit an acceptable plan (to the World Bank) for the country's economic recovery." (emphasis added)

This kind of "arm-twisting" behaviour of the Bank, and the I.M.F., as I shall explain next, has been employed in most other African countries, during periods of economic crisis when emergency relief funds could not be readily obtained from any other source.

This was Tanzania's experience, for example in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when it had to go shopping for emergency food aid and balance of payments support. In 1978, the I.M.F. responded to Tanzania's S.O.S., and agreed to offer $260 million in 'aid' on condition that Tanzania devalued its currency, cut back government expenditure on social services and lifted most price controls. Initially, Nyerere rejected these conditions on the grounds that they were contrary to Tanzania's socialist policies; he found them "strange and repugnant and unacceptable interference in Tanzania's internal affairs." Tanzania's leader repeated these accusations at a meeting held in Arusha in July 1980 by non-oil producing Third World countries to discuss,
among other things, their maltreatment by the I.M.F. However, when they were through voicing their complaints against the I.M.F. they had accomplished little either in terms of reducing dependence on this monetary institution or on prevailing upon its stringent terms and operational rules. One source has described the latter as

"a straightforward banker's approach which gives priority to balancing the books." 

Given these circumstances, Nyerere inspite of his characteristic principledness, was forced, by the end of 1980 to succumb to I.M.F. pre-conditions in return for a $260 million aid package, which did not do a great deal to diminish Tanzania's financial difficulties. Rather, it was yet another debt to add on to the already mounting debt service obligations. As a Ghanaian finance minister once put it on the occasion of his reluctant agreement to another I.M.F. loan,

"the agreement we are signing ... threatens to sanctify, with concurrence of our government, the principle of relieving debts by increasing them."

In general, it can be said that since foreign aid tends to be 'tied' to projects, to imports from donor countries, and to high interest rates, it is unlikely to benefit the recipient significantly. Furthermore, because of the tendency of the donor to use aid as an instrument to influence the recipient's development and foreign policies, its utility as a means of bringing about autonomous development becomes highly suspect. I shall examine this issue in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5, when analysing specific linkages between external dependence and the foreign policy of Kenya and Tanzania.
D. Tanzania's post-colonial Political-Economy: Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of Tanzania's contemporary political economy has clearly demonstrated that despite the socialist strategy pursued since 1967 no fundamental restructuring has taken place. The data examined and analysed above on foreign investment, trade and aid, have shown the extent of Tanzania's continued dependence on the world capitalist economy. Indeed, it would seem that these external links have served to perpetuate and intensify colonially-inherited problems rather than to alleviate them.

The apparent inability of Tanzania to translate self-reliance from theory into practice illustrates both the limitations of its specific policy measures as well as the inherent limitations associated with a single country attempting to restructure its relations with the rest of the global economy unilaterally. There is also the additional problem of a self-centred externally-oriented "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" that tends to contribute to the intensification of external dependence, with the exception, perhaps, of Mwalimu Nyerere who, despite his authoritarian tendencies and ideological shortcomings has demonstrated a genuine commitment to the attainment of meaningful development in Tanzania.

In the discussion that follows, I shall examine Kenya's performance in the post-colonial era, followed by a concluding comparison between the two states' political economies since formal independence.
E. Kenya: Consolidation of the Ruling Class

Introduction

Compared with Tanzania, Kenya's economic experience during the first few years of 'Uhuru' was, at least in aggregate terms, much more favourable. Kenya was, for example, able to achieve the targeted annual increase in G.D.P. during the first development plan period, an increase in average per capita product of over 3 percent. Agricultural expansion barely fell short of the plan target and then only because of coffee berry disease, which reduced coffee production between 1967 and 1968. However, small peasant farmer gross income grew at an average of about 10 percent per annum. Furthermore, despite an unprecedented fall in the level of foreign investment, the targets for national production, for per capita real consumption, for employment opportunities and for higher average wages were all achieved during the plan period.

Given such an "impressive" record of economic growth, the Kenyatta government had no reason to "turn to the left." Conversely, it could enhance its legitimacy further by appealing to its "success" thus far in realising the "fruits of Uhuru." What was needed, it was argued, was just continuity with further hard work and foreign investment. "Harambee" became as much the Kenyan developmental catchphrase as "Ujamaa" had become in Tanzania.

However, the process of class formation, which was already more advanced than in Tanzania at independence, also developed rapidly during the first few years of 'Uhuru.' Through the land settlement
scheme — the 'transfer' of former European farms to Africans — the Africanisation programme and the expansion of foreign multinational enterprises and other types of foreign investment, there emerged several African formations: i) a petty bourgeois class whose interests were tied to international capitalism; ii) a landed middle class of rich peasants; iii) a commercial class of African businessmen; iv) urban and rural workers; v) poor peasantry; and vi) landless and unemployed. Amidst these distinct African classes, there were local Asian and former settler capitalist interests as well as a foreign bourgeoisie which owned and controlled most of the industrial and other large enterprises. Unlike Tanzania, where such enterprises were at least semi-nationalised with the full "blessing" of the African petty bourgeoisie, in Kenya the few Africans who had prospered from the land transfer scheme and business opportunities which favoured the new African landed middle class were violently opposed to any type of nationalisation. This was particularly so for those members of the African petty bourgeoisie who had entered into partnerships with foreign enterprises or had benefited from the various funds that had been made available by the government for establishing such "new" enterprises.

Thus in Kenya six years after independence, the processes of embourgeoisment and class formation had reached a point where if any policies similar to those of the Arusha Declaration had been even proposed, let alone adopted, there would have been a lot of resistance. The African petty bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists had begun to have a lot to lose.
Nevertheless, in Kenya, as in Tanzania, the primary and most immediate goal of the ruling class was to consolidate power and economic position, through the expansion and strengthening of the machinery of state and its manipulation to gain legitimacy and personal wealth. Unlike Tanzania, where the African petty bourgeoisie as a whole was weak and unable to challenge the political dominance of one of its stratum -- the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" -- in Kenya, the petty bourgeoisie as a whole was not only relatively strong; it was also experiencing a fierce struggle within itself.

This struggle divided the African petty bourgeoisie in Kenya into two main "fractions." For convenience, I will term one stratum the "comprador fraction" and the other the "indigenous fraction." Broadly speaking, the comprador fraction would correspond to Tanzania's 'Bureaucratic bourgeoisie' while the other stratum would roughly correspond to an "indigenous" bourgeoisie. In any case, the struggle in the Kenyan context between these two fractions of the African petty bourgeoisie has normally taken ideological and sometimes personal overtones. But in reality it is a battle over who should control the state, for purposes of personal as well as collective accumulation. The ideological overtones are primarily a reflection of the different experiences that the respective fractions of the Kenyan petty bourgeoisie had with colonialism.

**Comprador fraction**

The "comprador" fraction of the petty bourgeoisie was that one which was relatively more subjected to colonial ideological pressures,
more exposed to colonial institutions (educational and bureaucratic)
and felt more excluded from entrepreneurial activities. Just prior
to independence the members of this group were recruited into the
management of large foreign enterprises and promoted to senior posi­
tions in the bureaucracy, army, police and academe. They composed a
high-salary group who had entrepreneurial decisions made for them.
Their ideology was influenced, like that of their Tanzanian counterparts,
by the ideals of Western liberal democracy and free enterprise. It
was from this "comprador" fraction that the key members of the ruling
alliance were recruited since their interests were "ideologically"
linked to those of international capitalism. In the early 1960s, the
leadership of the "comprador" fraction included President Kenyatta,
Tom Mboya, Charles Njonjo, Daniel Arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki, Mbiyu Koinange
and Paul Ngei, among others.

As the dominant fraction of the ruling class this 'comprador
bourgeoisie' had to attempt to legitimise its rule over as large a
cross-section of the population as possible. Hence an ideology that
appealed to the rural majority (who were and still are very much tied
to African traditional way of life) was necessary. So the Kenyatta
government coined its own version of "African Socialism." This is
conceptually similar to Nyerere's "Ujamaa" in the sense that it appeals
to a pre-colonial socialistic attitude of mind that supposedly
characterised traditional African social life. Beyond this apparent
similarity, however, the Kenyan brand of African Socialism emphasises
private ownership which makes it quite different from the Tanzanian
version.
The ruling class in Kenya has used the 'ideology' of African socialism to legitimise its private acquisition of wealth and the role of foreign private capital. It is argued that traditional African society did not exclude the private ownership of capital. Consequently, Kenya should continue to encourage local and foreign private investment for rapid economic growth. This capital should be used in the interest of society's general welfare in the spirit of traditional communalism. Such property should never be nationalised except under certain special circumstances; in which event such expropriated property should be fully compensated. Class formation could be prevented by means other than changing ownership of capital. The implementation of "traditional political democracy" would successfully reintroduce the egalitarian nature of society which had been socially stratified during the colonial interlude.

This was the basic argument presented in the 1965 government white paper on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. Its ideological outlook found support among the rich peasantry and landed middle class who would loose from any land nationalisation. Thus an alliance was formed between the compradors and the rich and middle peasantry which was supported by foreign capital.

**Indigenous fraction**

The "indigenous fraction" of the African bourgeoisie was less subjected to colonial ideology and did engage in entrepreneurial activities within the confines of colonial economic restrictions and well-established immigrant groups. This stratum was therefore
fundamentally opposed to the economic privileges enjoyed by settler immigrants. The colonial experience contributed towards the post-independence call from this group for nationalisation of certain foreign enterprises such as the banks, which had discriminated against African businessmen. The indigenous fraction wanted to become the national bourgeoisie and replace the foreign bourgeoisie. It demanded the nationalisation not only of banks but also of key industries, insurance companies, foreign owned plantations and the import-export-trade. This group, led by three 'radical' political figures — Oginga Odinga, Achieng Oneko and Bildad Kaggia — rationalised their demands as being essentially patriotic and beneficial to all the indigenous citizens as opposed to foreigners. They were opposed for example, to the Foreign Investments Protection Act of 1964 because, as Kaggia argued, it "gives foreign investors a free license to transfer all their profits and everything they get from this country to their country... This means we are not getting investment in this country for our own benefit, but we are only becoming some economic colony for America and Britain... I believe that the government should always see that every investment that comes to this country is benefiting the people." They were also opposed to the comprador policy on land resettlement, since it placed no ceiling on the size of individual land holding. To express their dissatisfaction with government policy on land ownership, this group, sponsored a motion in Parliament which read:
"This House notes with great concern the attitude of a few money possessors who are buying as much land as possible in the former scheduled areas, and urges the Kenya government to set up a committee to recommend the maximum acreage an individual or a group of individuals may be allowed to buy and own ...." 98

They further demanded the re-incorporation of the dislocated peasant landless through the establishment of state farms or cooperatives. Their proposed solution to the problem of inequality and income differentials was essentially to establish a form of welfare state. This "indigenous bourgeoisie" found support among the poor peasants, workers and displaced "minorities" who could not successfully compete with the Kikuyu-dominated comprador fraction.

Kenya: The triumph of the Comprador Bourgeoisie

As will be shown in Chapter 4, Kenya's foreign policy in the early 1960s reflected the conflict between the 'indigenous' and the 'comprador' fractions of the Kenyan bourgeoisie as the latter was attempting to consolidate its hold over the state apparatus. The compradors had, right from the beginning, the advantage of being backed by foreign capital as well as by the Head of State -- President Jomo Kenyatta -- who used his presidential powers to help to consolidate this group's class position.

Consequently, between 1964 and 1966, the compradors, through a series of manoeuvres, harassment and manipulation of the state machinery,
successfully consolidated their hold over the state apparatus and effectively demobilised the indigenous bourgeoisie, whose leaders were finally removed from the political limelight by the end of 1969. The strategies employed and the whole process by which the compradors 'eliminated' their political opponents are well-documented elsewhere and will not be discussed here. However, for the purposes of this study it needs to be emphasised that the internal class struggle that was taking place in Kenya during this period had an external dimension; it contained important implications for the development and foreign policies that have been pursued in Kenya. The triumph of the comprador fraction was by implication the triumph of transnational capitalist interests whose penetration of the Kenyan economy increased rapidly after 1966. Leys, for example, has calculated that by 1970 the annual level of foreign investment had increased by 100 percent since the mid-1960s: 

"... After an initial period of corporate planning and assessment of the longer-term investment climate, a substantial new inflow of foreign capital began: for the four years 1967 to 1970, the average annual rate of inflow was £10.3 million, a total of £41.3 million." 

Most of this investment was by new multinational firms originating in western Europe, the United States and Japan. The increase in foreign capital was largely responsible for Kenya's "excellent" economic performance (i.e. growth rate) registered by the end of the decade of the 1960s. This economic performance, as will be shown later, served to further convince the comprador-ruling class to continue with the
same development and foreign policies that had been pursued during
the first seven years of Uhuru.

Having demobilised the indigenous wing of the petty bourgeoisie,
the compradors had also to insure themselves against any possible threat
to their position from other social forces in the country. The trade
Union Movement was one such force which had to be neutralised. As in
Tanzania, this neutralisation was effected initially through a series
of legislations restricting their activities and finally through an
amalgamation that brought all trade unions into a single Central
Organisation of Trade Unions (C.O.T.U.). And as in Tanzania, the
constitution of the new amalgamated union gave the state President
the authority to appoint officials.

The demise of Parliament along with the 'ruling' party and the
redirection of power to the presidency was effectively achieved follow-
ing i) the 6th amendment Act of 1966 that enlarged the government's
emergency powers and eliminated parliamentary controls over emergency
legislation and ii) the 7th amendment Act of 1966 which dissolved
the senate. As suggested in Chapter 2, the Presidency has through
these constitutional powers come to dominate development and foreign
policy making functions. Thus, although Parliament is theoretically
the supreme body in the country, in practice the presidency, as one
Kenyan political analyst has observed, "in the eyes of both politicians
and public, wields a lot more power than Parliament."

The reliability of coercive elements within the state apparatus
(i.e. the army, police and paramilitary forces) was achieved with British
assistance following the 1964 army mutiny, to be discussed in the next chapter. The British government continues to train Kenya's security forces in its military academies and also provides British advisers who are seconded to the ministry of defence (in the case of the army, navy and air force) and to the ministry of home affairs (in the case of the police and paramilitary police). Indeed, within the whole bureaucracy, the security forces are perhaps the most overt remnants of colonialism in Kenya. They have undergone minimal socio-political transformation. Contacts and an Anglo-colonial character are also maintained through a defence pact that allows for "joint military exercises" and training programmes. The observation of one scholar accurately summarises the metropolitan orientation of the Kenyan army:

"Independent Kenya inherited from the British the well-trained and disciplined battalions of the King's African Rifles, a small but compact military force nurtured on the British tradition of subordinating the military to the civil government. The government of Kenya made efforts to preserve the healthy character of the army by adopting a policy of slow and gradual Africanisation of the officer corps and by maintaining British influence... Kenyan officers continue to train in British military academies." 105.

The armed forces, then continue to reinforce the transnational links between the comprador-ruling class with metropolitan capitalist interests. On the other hand the paramilitary force -- the General
Service Unit (G.S.U.) established in the late 1960s — has been effectively used in controlling striking university students, civilian demonstrators, etc. Politically the G.S.U. operates as the praetorian guard of the ruling class.

The comprador fraction has therefore taken considerable care to prevent the consolidation of organisations, groups and leaders that could articulate the grievances of the masses and channel their growing discontent into the political arena. The government’s harsh treatment of militant students and other members of the intellectual community (discussed in Chapter 2) was primarily motivated by such consideration.

The populist ideology of 'Harambee' (self-help) has also been employed to foster anti-revolutionary tendencies among the poor peasantry who form the majority of rural dwellers. Various studies have shown that although officially the 'self-help' programme (like Tanzania’s ‘Ujamaa’) is supposed to advance the peasant’s welfare and participation in the developmental process, in reality it serves the interests of bureaucrats and politicians, who through their monetary contributions to the 'self-help' projects, establish a patron-client relationship with the peasantry, thus enhancing the latter’s dependent-linkage to the state and thereby curtailing the revolutionary potential of the peasant.

One further method that has been employed to keep down mass discontent, particularly of the unemployed, underemployed and the landless, was the creation of land settlement schemes. Under these, government
periodically "resettles" several thousand landless families. It also awards occasional increases in worker's wages and through constant expansion of the public sector seeks to accommodate the ever increasing multitude of unemployed. The problems of unemployment and landlessness have nevertheless persisted as one of the major manifestations of the lopsidedness of Kenyan social and economic 'development.'

F. The Development of Dependent Peripheral Capitalism in Post-Colonial Kenya

i) Introduction

Unlike Tanzania, where the scholarly debate centres on whether Nyerere's socialist strategy is either adequate or appropriate for achieving socialism and self-reliance, in Kenya the debate centres on whether Kenya is developing into a full-fledged capitalist state independent of international capitalism or whether it will continue to be a dependent peripheral capitalist satellite. In spite of its early socialist pretensions, it seems to be beyond debate that Kenya has been moving steadily and consistently along a capitalist rather than a socialist path.

The debate on Kenya, then, centres particularly around whether or not an independent (national/indigenous) bourgeoisie is developing, as opposed to the "compradors" allied to foreign capital. This debate began in the early 1970s and is still continuing. There are those scholars like Swainson, Cowen, Zwanenberg and a recent 'convert' -- Leys -- who basically reject the dependency approach and argue
that an independent national bourgeoisie now exists in Kenya. The dependency school which challenges that of Cowen-Swainson-Leys, argues instead that industrial development in small peripheral economies is conditioned and limited by the global economy. The latter is the perspective adopted in this study; it is shared by Steven Langdon and Ralph Kaplinsky among others.

These two scholars have recently produced well-documented studies that clearly and persuasively demonstrate that an independent-national bourgeoisie hardly exists in Kenya. Kaplinsky, for example, has provided evidence which shows that, although African capital ownership in Kenya increased significantly between 1966 and 1976, foreign control of the semi-'indigenised' firms increased rather than decreased (see table 3:11). He explains that the main reason why the overall share of foreign ownership declined between 1966 and 1976 was because "there was a very marked tendency of the wholly owned foreign subsidiaries to sell off their shares to local residents ... . However these firms seldom sold off more than fifty percent of their shares so that they have been able to keep control over their subsidiaries, despite the respectability gained by selling off shares to local residents."114

The 'indigenisation' of the Kenyan political economy is a politically expedient and necessary exercise, which ensures the continuation of comprador dominance over other social classes in the country, as well as reducing the area of conflict between foreign capital and local petty bourgeois capitalist interests; Thus, inspite
of the comprador's alliance with foreign capital, the strategy encourages the development of an African capitalism consistent with the official economic policy spelled out by Kenyatta in September 1964:

"Our aim is to establish a mixed economy. By this we mean that we shall work to a situation in which the role of private enterprise and that of the Government are complimentary to each other .... We are determined that the development of African businesses and industries should be carried out without damaging the existing fabric of the economy." 115

The government's economic policy, then, has consciously encouraged the growth of an African middle class (and even an 'upper' class) which benefits from the system and provides the compradors with a relatively wide and solid social base. This is clearly a continuation of the process, set in motion in the 1950s by the British colonial administration of encouraging the emergence of an African middle class. Indeed, Kenyatta looked spitefully at those among his colleagues who did not take advantage of the free enterprise system to accumulate personal wealth. For example, he denounced Kaggia publicly in 1968 for his failure to accumulate personal wealth:

"But we were together with Paul Ngei in jail. If you go to Ngei's home, he has planted coffee and other crops -- What have you done for yourself? If you go to Kubai's house, he has a big house and a nice shamba -- Kaggia what have done for yourself?"
"We were together with Kungu Karumba in jail; now he is running his own buses, what have you done for yourself?"¹¹⁶

Unlike Tanzania, where the leadership code placed limits on how much personal wealth the bureaucratic and other fractions of the petty bourgeoisie could accumulate, the absence of such a code in Kenya has led to a situation of "capitalism unlimited." In theory anyone in Kenya who has the means and the inclination can join the ranks of the new "Kenyan petty bourgeoisie", which one scholar has defined as,

"a composite of segments or elements, which include administrative, managerial, commercial, industrial intellectual and other sections ... small scale clerk at one end and the professor and top civil servant at the other, who surely represent major differences in wealth (but) in style and consciousness, there remains a remarkable similarity. The Kenyan petty bourgeoisie are conspicuous for their patterns of consumption.

Consumption of Western non-African products appear to be highly valued .... Prestige is accorded to those who can consume and be seen to consume on a grand scale."¹¹⁷

The consumption tastes of this class clearly place considerable financial constraints on many of its members and contradict their need for accumulation, if they intend to 'graduate' from being 'petty' to being an 'independent' bourgeoisie. More important perhaps is the fact that their espousal of Western customs and consumption habits has
facilitated the development of import-substitution industrialisation with its attendant problems of reinforcing external dependence and transnational control over Kenya's political economy.

Langdon for example has shown in some of his studies on Kenya how import-substitution industrialisation has developed from the taste-transfer role of trade and the redefinition of basic needs into desires for particular branded goods; eg. "the translation of thirst into the need for a coke" and, no doubt, the translation of hunger into the need for Kentucky Fried Chicken! The point is that once such tastes have been acquired by Kenyan consumers, import substitution has become import reproduction; namely, the production locally of goods as indistinguishable as possible from those that were previously imported. Multinational firms have consequently become important in initiating and controlling such taste-transfer industrialisation, thus placing a severe blockage on the development of local industry. Langdon has further shown that the Kenyan state (controlled by the compradors) has facilitated this taste-transfer process by forging close partnerships (institutional and personal) with M.N.C.s — what he terms a "state-subsidiary symbiosis" — which though mutually beneficial is definitely unequal. Besides blocking the development of locally-oriented industries, import-substitution aggravates the problem of unemployment because of its capital intensive (as opposed to labour intensive) nature. Furthermore, the tendency to pay higher wages than the public sector, reinforces existing income inequalities. At the same time it creates a 'labour aristocracy', whose consumption tastes become external and Western in orientation.
"This increasingly skewed income distribution both generates a new ally in the multinational-state symbiosis (a 'labour aristocracy'), and also buttresses market demand for multinational-type products — as part of an ongoing self-justifying cycle. At the same time, the market power of the (protected) multinational brings it large profits, and generates consequent dividends abroad, requiring continuing multinational capital inflows to offset the outflows — and thereby strengthening multinational bargaining power in the state-subsidiary symbiosis."

And yet despite the rather obvious adverse effects on the political economy that collaboration between the Kenyan state and M.N.C.s produces, state functionaries in conjunction with other supportive groups still continue to maintain and to expand these transnational links. Clearly there are those in the ranks of the Kenyan ruling bourgeoisie who have gone beyond satisfying their Western consumption habits to acquiring a sizable stake in the economic status quo. Furthermore, it has always been the Kenya government's belief and policy that foreign investment is necessary for the country's economic development and hence all relevant measures should be taken to encourage it. It was this type of reasoning that promoted the constitutional guarantees for safeguarding private property and foreign investment, contained in the Foreign Investment Protection Act of 1964. Since then, the Kenyan government has periodically reaffirmed these constitutional guarantees.
The development of this group of Kenyans who have acquired a sizable stake in the status quo was a direct result of the confidence and "partnership in development" which was forged between the Kenyatta regime and M.N.C.s after the former had provided legal guarantees to the latter's investments. "In return, the foreign companies began to allow indigenous Kenyans to buy shares in their companies. This of course meant those Kenyans who had the money to buy those shares or who were in a politically-influential position to benefit from loan schemes for Africans run by the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (I.C.D.C.) -- invariably, most of the Africans that came to benefit from the loan schemes were already well established members of the African petty bourgeoisie, particularly senior bureaucrats, the landed middle class and politicians. These are the Kenyans who came to occupy managerial and directorship positions in the "Kenyanised" foreign companies.

This "indigenisation" of personnel in foreign companies helped to forge the link between the comprador bourgeoisie and foreign capital and ensured the former's dominance vis-a-vis the "indigenous" bourgeoisie and other social strata. Foreign capitalists also benefit from this partnership because they can be sure to make and transfer their profits under the guarantees provided by the government and ii) through their ability to short-circuit restrictions such as tariffs, import bans, etc. The compradors on their part accumulate personal wealth through joint ventures and through holding senior executive positions in 'Kenyanised' subsidiaries. The occupation of such executive positions
gives "qualified" Africans access to expatriate type salaries (as well as free house and car in most cases) that are beyond what an executive in public employment earns. High salaries in foreign owned firms have become an important source of income for senior government officials who normally need more than one source of income to maintain their expensive lifestyles.

Swainson, Langdon, Leys and Kaplinsky among others, despite their disagreements on the nature of the Kenyan bourgeoisie, have produced evidence that clearly demonstrates that most Kenyan politicians and bureaucrats, along with their relatives and friends, hold prominent positions in multinational firms as managers or directors; and in some cases they are shareholders in or partners with the foreign companies. Langdon for example, observed this to be the case in one M.N.C. subsidiary, B.A.T. Kenya Ltd., that manufactures cigarettes. Among its 1972 shareholders he noted the names of the then Foreign Minister, Minister of Housing, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Minister of State in the President's Office, the Attorney General and the head of the Central Bank.

Swainson has also shown how the M.N.C.s maintain informal links with the Kenyan state, mainly by making opportunities in the companies available to key members or relatives of the ruling class. She cites the case of Lonrho, the British based M.N.C., which managed to forge links that gave it access to President Kenyatta himself. First, Lonrho appointed President Kenyatta's son-in-law, Udi Gechaga, as Chairman of Lonrho East Africa and then Ngangi Ruigai (President Kenyatta's nephew)
as Chairman of Mackenzie Dalgety, a Lonrho subsidiary. These two (Gechaga and Muigai) proceeded to become major shareholders of Mackenzie Dalgety. Through this connection with Lonrho, Gechaga had by 1974 become the third on the list of Kenya's top directors with 36 directorships in addition to other investments, large scale farming, import-export business, etc.124 There are quite a few similar cases of Kenyan Africans who have prospered through their connections with both the state and M.N.C.s, thus serving to reinforce further the strength of the comprador fraction.

The Kenyan state itself has also in some ways benefited from this partnership with M.N.C.s, particularly in the form of excise and consumption taxes levied on subsidiaries. For example, between 1971 and 1972 B.A.T. contributed taxes equal to 4.6 percent of the state's revenue.125 These 'benefits', though not substantial in aggregate terms, give the state per se a stake in M.N.C. 'privileges'. To the extent that economic opportunities and access to resources for the African ruling class are created in the political economy, the partnership with the M.N.C. sector is further confirmed.

In general, then, "transnational" relationships between the Kenya government and M.N.C. subsidiaries are close and friendly -- a factor that may, at least partially, explain the rather close and friendly "interstate" relations between Kenya and the major Western countries from where most of these companies originate. This point will be pursued further in Chapters 4 and 5. However, these ties should not be taken to mean that there are no areas of conflict between foreign capitalists
and government, since the latter has to play the delicate role of balancing its responses to external (foreign capitalist interests) demands, as well as to internal (Kenyan capitalist interests) demands. Foreign and local capitalist interests as Swainson has laboured to demonstrate in her various studies on Kenya, are often in conflict; hence the need for the state to play a mediatory role. In some cases, top conflict may arise between Comprador and Foreign Capital, as was the case in January 1974 when the American managing director of an oil company threatened to cut off President Kenyatta's supplies unless an outstanding oil bill was paid. The director was summarily expelled. A similar fate befell an American geologist in June of the same year, following a dispute with key members of the comprador fraction over ownership of ruby deposits the former had discovered in the Tsavo Park area of Kenya. Such disputes do not however affect significantly the basic partnership or place serious constraints on multinational activities.

Although the relationship discussed above does not lend itself readily to either operationalisation or falsification, through aggregate measures it nevertheless throws light on an important aspect of dependency that can help to explain the foreign and development policy choices made by the Kenyan ruling class. In particular, it clarifies the cultural and technological dependence of the Comprador element which has permeated throughout the society, albeit in various degrees and which reinforces the Kenyan political economy's external orientation towards and incorporation into the global economy. The
attendant adverse effects of such incorporation are further discussed, below.

TABLE 3:11 COMPANIES IN KENYA: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, 1966-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Owned, Kenya Controlled</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Owned, Foreign Controlled</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>.33.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Owned, Kenya Controlled</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Owned, Foreign Controlled</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Adverse Effects of Foreign Investment on the Political Economy of Kenya

It was suggested above that i) the 'partnership' between the Kenyan state and the M.N.C.s is hardly one between equals and ii) although it benefits a few individuals within Kenya, it has a detrimental effect on the overall economy. In particular, I identified import-substitution industrialisation as reinforcing existing inequalities, aggravating the unemployment problem and enhancing the external orientation and incorporation of the Kenyan political economy in the international capitalist one.

In his earlier work on Kenya, Leys has also shown how foreign investment has contributed to the underdevelopment of the Kenyan economy.
through profit-making, transfer of surplus, capital intensive production and general political and social influence on the government and society. For example, his study showed that, in the years 1964 to 1970, there was more private capital leaving the country than was flowing in or being reinvested. Table 3:12b illustrates this position.

Further evidence of M.N.C. transfers of profits that exceed by far the inflow of new investment, has been provided by Kaplinsky. He has shown that between 1977 and 1978 alone M.N.C. surplus outflows from Kenya in the form of dividends, rentals, royalties, technical/management/consultancy/professional fees, etc. exceeded the inflow of new investment by 67%. The largest proportion of foreign investment seeps back into metropolitan centres, thus raising doubts as to its profitability for the periphery (see table 3:12a).

Furthermore, most M.N.C. investment is concentrated in the import-substitution, industrial sector which, though expanding faster than some other sectors of the economy, involves adverse effects arising primarily from its capital intensive-high import content. For example, a 1973 World Bank mission report showed that in 1970, although only 28 percent of consumption was supplied by imports, there was a high reliance on imports for intermediate and capital goods to the extent of 61 percent in the case of the former and 66 percent in the case of the latter. As I showed earlier a similar characteristic of import-intensive orientation prevails in Tanzania's manufacturing parastatals, albeit to a lesser extent than in Kenya. Import-substitution
### TABLE 3:12a) - INVISIBLE TRANSACTIONS IN KENYA, INCLUDING SURPLUS

**OUTFLOWS AND INFLOWS, 1977-78**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Transport</td>
<td>9,079,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dividends</td>
<td>17,664,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interest</td>
<td>13,696,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rentals</td>
<td>13,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Royalties</td>
<td>1,003,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Technical/Management/Consultancy/Professional fees</td>
<td>12,129,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Directors/Head Office expenses</td>
<td>3,027,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Commission/Commitment Agents Fees</td>
<td>3,576,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Intercompany accounts</td>
<td>24,394,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Loan repayments and capital repatriation</td>
<td>32,157,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Capital Outflow** 116,742,965

**Inflow of new equity capital** 10,579,671

Source: Kaplinsky, "Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery - The Kenyan Case", p. 88.

### TABLE 3:12b) - RECORDED INFLOWS (+) AND OUTFLOWS (-) OF PRIVATE CAPITAL

**IN KENYA, 1964-1970 (£ m)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International investment income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits from abroad</td>
<td>-9.8</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
<td>-14.1</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private transfer payments</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private foreign investment in Kenya including reinvestment of local profits</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
<td>+9.1</td>
<td>+11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>-17.9</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, p. 137.
industrialisation does not and has not, at least in Kenyan and Tanzanian cases, reduced import dependence. Rather it has replaced dependence on imported consumer goods by dependence on imported intermediate and capital goods.

The problem for Kenya is not simply imports of goods for import-substitution industry but also imports of luxury manufactured goods that are either unnecessary or could be produced locally, a clear reflection of the Western oriented consumption habit and lifestyle that has come to characterise the Kenyan 'bourgeoisie.' These luxury commodities range from cosmetics and wines and spirits to expensive cars. According to one report on luxury imports, it was observed that "there is probably a greater variety of cars on Kenya roads than is to be found in any other part of black Africa ... a considerable number are large cars which are unnecessary except for boosting the egos of their owners. Kenya could have saved more than Ksh. 70 million in 1974 in foreign exchange and Ksh. 40 million in 1975 by banning the importation of cars with an engine capacity of 1750 cc and above." 131

And as Table 3:13 indicates, in spite of the expansion of import-substitution industrialisation, Kenya continues to import a substantial amount of consumer goods.

The ruling class, being the major consumer of luxuries, is naturally anxious to defend such importation. Thus, the Kenya government does not see anything basically wrong with allowing luxury imports into the

(in K £ '000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Food and Beverages</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industrial Supplies (Non-Food)</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fuels and Lubricants</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Machinery and Other Capital Equipment</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport Equipment</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Consumer Goods not elsewhere specified</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Goods not elsewhere specified</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

country. Moreover, it is argued, through high duty charges on luxury items the government raises much needed revenue from the public.

But the question which needs to be asked is what is better: to save the amount of foreign exchange spent on luxury imports and lose duty revenue or spend it on foreign imports and recover it in duty? For a country with scarce foreign exchange savings, it would seem that the former is preferable to the former. In any case, the government has other ways of generating internal revenue if need be, by raising taxation in a number of other areas. Kenya’s high import dependence as well as the heavy outflow of surplus arising from M.N.C.s has contributed to its balance of payments difficulties which are apparent from its imbalance of trade, which consistently showed a deficit between 1966 and 1978, as Table 3:14 indicates.

**TABLE 3:14 KENYA’S BALANCE OF TRADE IN PHYSICAL GOODS, 1966-1978 (£ m)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>114.8</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>369.4</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>723.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>170.1</td>
<td>312.1</td>
<td>366.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>-51.8</td>
<td>-64.6</td>
<td>-88.5</td>
<td>-199.3</td>
<td>-77.3</td>
<td>-356.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The dependence of the manufacturing sector of the economy on imports has meant a continuing indebtedness to and domination by the foreign investor. Furthermore, as shown earlier, the foreign investor
takes more out of the economy than is put in. However, in the judgement of the World Bank, although

"past investments in Kenya have not really benefited the country, she will continue to need a steady flow of private investment, both to supply the capital and to provide entrepreneurial ability and technical know-how. The issue we see is not whether foreign investment is desirable; rather whether Kenya can continue to attract foreign private investment and whether she can learn to use foreign investment more effectively for the benefit of the country". (emphasis added)

The World Bank sees the problem as simply one of lack of efficiency and not as a more fundamental structural problem whereby Kenya does not have much control over the type of investments and projects received. Furthermore, the Bank seems to ignore the fact that Kenya's leadership consists of a self-interested comprador ruling class which has prospered in partnership with multinationals, who in turn have also benefited. Thus as long as there is this perceived mutual advantage, the World Bank need not worry over whether Kenya will continue to attract foreign investment.

The problems associated with M.N.C.-led import substitution industrialisation in Kenya have also manifested themselves in the industrial strategy adopted in 1973 of M.N.C.-based export-manufacturing. This strategy, adopted at the recommendation of the 1972 I.L.O. Report, was aimed at alleviating the problems and/or deficiencies of the earlier
strategy of import-substitution. The export manufacturing strategy, involving primarily the production of chemicals, foodstuffs and textiles for export from Kenya, has already been shown to have failed. A well-documented 1980 study that has examined the performance of the textile industry in Kenya, empirically confirms this (see tables 3.15 and 3.16). The overall performance of the manufacturing sector under the export strategy over the 1972-79 period indicates dismal performance:

"total exports were marginally higher by the end of this period (1972-79) ... manufactured exports had significantly declined .... by 1979 all manufactured export categories were at less than two thirds of 1972 quantities .... the failure of export manufacturing in Kenya is evident in lower values by the 1977-78 period."¹³⁶

The major reason behind the failure of the export manufacturing strategy is basically the same one that caused the failure of the earlier import-substitution approach -- namely Kenya's dependence on M.N.C.'s to promote industrialisation. The state -- M.N.C. "symbiosis" (to borrow Langdon's term) remains a major obstacle to development in Kenya. In respect to export-oriented production for example, the Comprador-led state prefers to encourage and to provide assistance to foreign projects rather than to those controlled by Kenyans. The latter, as Langdon has noted in his study,

"have traditionally been bypassed in Kenyan state policy, in favour of joint ventures that gave the M.N.C.'s
TABLE 3:15 - MANUFACTURED EXPORTS FROM KENYA, 1972-1979
(Quantum Index, 1972 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chemicals</th>
<th>Manufactured Goods</th>
<th>Machinery and Transport Equipment</th>
<th>Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles</th>
<th>Total Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>77*</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile yarns &amp; Fabric</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glassware</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper products</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel doors &amp; windows</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium ware</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal containers</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printed matter</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinned pineapple</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

investment privileges, and generates senior managerial positions for Africans within the resulting subsidiaries.

In the same sectors this symbiosis has been extended to shared M.N.C. and private African shareholdings in combination with the state. 137

The persistent commitment of Kenyan policymakers to an M.N.C.-led industrialisation strategy, in spite of the latter's consistent failure to foster the desired growth and/or development, is a clear indication of the continuing external dependency of the Kenyan ruling fraction. In this connection, Langdon has noted with concern the implication of the state's continuing commitment to an M.N.C.-led export strategy for the wider Kenyan economic policy:

"Despite the deplorable record of M.N.C.-led textile exporting, official policies in Kenya are still built around the new orthodoxy; key policymakers insist that they are more likely to expand manufactured exports through new M.N.C.-led projects than by building on existing firms in Kenya, and are therefore encouraging less-regulated M.N.C. investment in Kenya .... These attitudes would make such policymakers sceptical of a textile recovery strategy promising more exports, which was based on independent Kenyan firms rather than on subsidiaries." 138
iii) Kenya's Foreign Trade Dependence

Kenya, like Tanzania, has been highly dependent on trade. And like Tanzania, it has since independence diversified its trading partners -- primarily within the Western bloc -- with Britain continuing to be the main trading partner. However, as Table 3:17 indicates, Britain's position as Kenya's trading partner has declined particularly since the 1970s, almost at the same rate and to the same extent as in the case of Tanzania (See Tables 3:4a) and 3:4b). The reduction of trade with U.K. is, as mentioned earlier, largely a function of Britain's own diminishing position in the world economy.

As shown above, import dependence has had a backlash effect on Kenya's balance of trade, which has consistently registered a large deficit since formal independence. Kenya's balance has also been highly susceptible to fluctuations in the world market prices of its two major exports: coffee and tea. This is illustrated for the years 1975 and 1978 by the data presented in tables 3:18 and 3:19. Due to a dramatic hike in international coffee prices in 1977, and subsequently in the tea price as well, Kenya's trade deficit declined significantly; the export values of these two commodities more than tripled during the years 1976 and 1977. So Kenya's trade deficit declined from K £ 124.6 million in 1975 to K £ 61.8 million in 1976. As the most dramatic increase in world commodity prices affected coffee, in 1977, this crop injected K £ 200 million into "the economy." However by the beginning of 1978, the honeymoon was over when coffee prices began to fall down as fast as they had risen. In turn, Kenya's trade deficit jumped from K £ 22.7 in 1977 to K £ 145.3 million in 1978. Coffee prices in 1978
TABLE 3.17 - KENYA'S TRADE WITH PRINCIPAL PARTNERS SINCE INDEPENDENCE % OF TOTAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 1963-1977 (Total trade in millions of U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western industrialised countries</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other E.E.C.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States and Canada</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Countries</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of total exports</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>649</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Western industrialised countries | 69   | 69   | 72   | 65   | 69   | 71   | 60   | 64   |
| United Kingdom                | 31   | 28   | 33   | 28   | 28   | 24   | 20   | 14   |
| West Germany                  | 6    | 7    | 10   | 7    | 8    | 9    | 8    | 10   |
| Other E.E.C.                  | 11   | 11   | 12   | 41   | 40   | 37   | 31   | 31   |
| United States and Canada      | 5    | 10   | 8    | 7    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 5    |
| Japan                        | 13   | 10   | 6    | 7    | 10   | 12   | 9    | 13   |
| Socialist Countries           | .4   | 2    | 2    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 1    | 2    |
| Africa                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Tanzania                     | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 3    | 4    | 4    | 3    | 1    |
| Uganda                       | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 6    | 4    | 2    | 1    | --   |
| Value of total imports       | 270  | 249  | 299  | 362  | 560  | 616  | 945  | 594  |

Note: n.a. indicates data not available; dash indicates less than .4%.

### TABLE 3:18 - EXPORT VALUE OF COFFEE AND TEA IN KENYA (K £ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coffee</th>
<th>Tea</th>
<th>Total Exports</th>
<th>% Coffee and Tea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>122.6</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>168.9</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>268.8</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>204.4</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>480.3</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>124.8</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>370.1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages for Tea and Coffee are calculated to the nearest round figure.


### TABLE 3:19 - KENYA'S BALANCE OF TRADE (in million K shillings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4,306</td>
<td>7,328</td>
<td>-3,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4,463</td>
<td>6,947</td>
<td>-2,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>6,224</td>
<td>8,158</td>
<td>-1,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9,418</td>
<td>10,702</td>
<td>-1,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7,915</td>
<td>13,223</td>
<td>-5,308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

were 37 percent below those of the previous year, while tea prices went down at a time when Kenya's tea production had greatly increased.

The above is an indication of Kenya's economic vulnerability to fluctuations in international market prices. This vulnerability is a common feature of those underdeveloped countries like Kenya and Tanzania which are highly dependent on one or two export commodities for up to 50 percent or more of their total value of exports. This represents a continuation in the colonial mode of production which was not aimed at the local but at the international market.

The total effect of the absence of commodity diversification is that when the price of one or two of the major products goes down, the whole economy declines. This has been Kenya's experience since 1978 as indicated by i) the current critical shortages of even basic food commodities; ii) governmental restrictions on foreign travel in an attempt to save the dwindling foreign exchange reserves; and iii) the "pilgrimages" that President Moi has been making to China, Europe and America "shopping" for foreign aid to keep the economy afloat.

Clearly there are other internal and external factors such as the periodical hike of oil prices, drought, etc., that have contributed to this trade imbalance. But the point being emphasised here is that dependence on the revenues raised from the sale of one or two commodities (in a market characterised by unequal exchange) to sustain a whole economy, serves to reinforce inherited structural problems and to make the economy much more vulnerable to the vagaries of both the weather and the international system.
Furthermore, given the fact that the two key export commodities are produced by peasant farmers, who constitute a large proportion of the 90-95% rural population, the linkage effect of rural areas to the world market has important implications in reinforcing comprador dominance and alliance with international capital. The consumption tastes discussed in connection with the petty bourgeoisie, filter into the rural export crop producers, who tend to engage in conspicuous consumption during those periods of price hikes for coffee and/or tea, when they suddenly find themselves with substantially larger cash incomes than those to which they are accustomed.

This infiltration of Western consumer tastes into rural Kenya has led many peasants to abandon food production and to devote their small acreage of land entirely to cash-crop export-oriented production. Besides the integration of the rural economy to the international capitalist one, this orientation has contributed to food shortages and even famine, not to mention the fostering of inequalities arising from unequal distribution of incomes arising from cash crop sale.

Thus, in Kenya as in Tanzania, there has been no significant change either in the direction or the composition of external trade. The continuity of this pattern of external trade dependence seems inevitable as long as a similar pattern of dependence on foreign investment and aid persists. In large part the three types of dependence -- on foreign trade, investment and aid -- are interrelated and feed into each other. The latter is next examined within the Kenyan context.
iv) Kenya: Foreign Aid Dependence

Kenya like Tanzania is highly dependent on external economic aid, most of which continues to originate from Western donors and institutions. Kenya has, for example, been receiving "food aid" in the form of maize and wheat, particularly from the United States since the early sixties, but especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Kenya has also been the recipient of much aid in the form of loans, grants and technical assistance, much of it from Britain.

Taking the four years 1973–1976 together, Kenya was seventh among the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in the recorded net flow of resources from D.A.C. countries and multilateral agencies, receiving $905 million, slightly less than Tanzania's share of $944 million.

As tables 3.20a) and 3.20b) show, Kenya, like Tanzania, is indebted to a large number of aid donors, both bilateral and multilateral. Although Kenya has diversified its sources since independence, this has been done within the Western bloc. Britain, which remains the major bilateral aid donor, had by 1977 been overtaken by the World Bank. The Bank has since assumed the role of the largest donor, accounting for about one third of Kenya's aid, while Britain now accounts for less than a quarter of all disbursements; a dramatic drop from 1964, when it accounted for 80% of all aid to Kenya.

It should also be noted that most of the so-called 'aid' that Kenya received from official British sources particularly during the 1960s, was to aid the land transfer programme from European settlers to indigenous Kenyans. In other words, the Kenya government assumed
TABLE 3:20a) - KENYA'S EXTERNAL DEBT, 1973-1978 (K £'000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>48,014</td>
<td>43,825</td>
<td>37,164</td>
<td>36,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>13,611</td>
<td>15,902</td>
<td>19,868</td>
<td>14,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>4,869</td>
<td>14,223</td>
<td>20,530</td>
<td>29,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>11,384</td>
<td>14,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2,954</td>
<td>10,004</td>
<td>12,245</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>5,157</td>
<td>6,134</td>
<td>9,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td>3,948</td>
<td>7,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6,766</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4,091</td>
<td>5,124</td>
<td>3,722</td>
<td>20,910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Total: 76,605 99,009 121,761 134,060

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ii) International Organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.B.R.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.D.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.M.F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.E.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.P.E.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Total: 28,681 47,291 87,535 105,491

Total for i) and ii): 105,286 146,300 209,296 239,541

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount in millions of U.S.$</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBRD/IDA (World Bank Group)</td>
<td>336.81</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>180.18</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>95.47</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>90.79</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td>41.80</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>31.18</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>27.66</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>26.78</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Development Corporation</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>21.43</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>16.30</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>925.15</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a debt burden to reclaim, at a price, land that had originally been expropriated at no cost to the British colonial administration. The reasoning of the Kenya government in accepting this raw deal was that the good reputation derived from accepting the debt burden would result in benefits to Kenya that greatly outweighed the burden.\textsuperscript{143}

Kenya's pattern of external foreign assistance demonstrates much less diversity than Tanzania. As Table 3:20b) indicates, in 1974, approximately 99 percent of Kenya's aid was coming from Western sources. This pattern has persisted throughout the period under study as Kenya has continued to be heavily dependent on international capitalist assistance. Despite its economic difficulties Britain has continued to be the largest single bilateral source of aid accounting for almost one third of bilateral assistance to Kenya in the 1970-1974 period, and one fifth of all assistance. West Germany was next accounting for 10.3 percent of all aid. U.S. official aid to Kenya has also increased in the 1970s, particularly since 1976, when the former became the next most important supplier of arms to Kenya, after the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{144} Canada and the Scandinavian countries are relatively less important to Kenya as sources of foreign assistance than they are to Tanzania.

In discussing Tanzania's political economy I have identified the adverse effects of aid, in particular, the employment by large aid donors, such as the I.M.F. and the World Bank, of aid as an instrument for influencing and/or distorting the recipient's development. In this connection, Kenya has been subjected to a similar experience by the
I.M.F. as Tanzania. A good example is Kenya's confrontation with the I.M.F. which took place in early 1981 when the political economy was in a similar state of crisis to that of Tanzania. The I.M.F. requested the Kenyan government (again as it did in Tanzania) to devalue its currency — the shilling — as a condition for further financial assistance which was badly needed to bolster dwindling foreign exchange reserves. After stalling for a while, Kenya finally conceded to the I.M.F. request and devalued the shilling on 3 February 1981. The similarity between this Kenyan example and the Tanzanian one is striking and reflects the pattern of vulnerability of most poor underdeveloped states to influence by international capitalist institutions.

This serves to confirm the point made earlier that Tanzania, Kenya or any other underdeveloped, dependent country could never hope to make autonomous national decisions as long as the survival of their economies and ruling classes continues to be closely dependent on the benevolence of international finance capital.

v) Kenya's Post-Colonial Political Economy: Conclusion

"Since independence, economic growth has largely continued on the lines set by the earlier colonial structure. Kenyanisation has radically changed the racial composition of the group of people in the centre of power and many of its policies but has had only a limited effect on the mechanisms which maintain its dominance — the pattern of government income and expenditure, the freedom of foreign firms to locate their offices and plants in Nairobi and the
narrow stratum of expenditure by a high income elite
super-imposed on a base of limited mass consumption. 147

The continuation of Kenya's external dependence as shown in this
analysis of foreign investment, trade and aid, is as much a reflection
of the acquiescence of the Comprador ruling class towards external
economic dependence as it is a reflection of colonially inherited
structural problems which have intensified since formal independence.
The contradictions arising from peripheral capitalism in Kenya have
been manifested by worsening economic crisis-chronic unemployment, food
shortages, etc. To deal with these the I.M.F., the World Bank and
I.L.O. have all proposed various types of reformist strategies rather
than more revolutionary measures that would involve the altering of
inherited structures.

The 1972 I.L.O. mission, for instance, correctly identified severe
income and social inequalities as a continuation of the colonial
pattern of exploitation but proposed solutions that were reformist in
nature. The I.L.O. recommended "redistribution from growth" which would
involve income cuts for the higher salary earners (who are mainly the
ruling class) and progressive reduction in foreign monopoly profits
through taxation, which would be used to raise income levels for the
working poor and create employment for the unemployed. As one scholar
has remarked in reaction to the I.L.O. report, "the contradictions of
monopoly capitalism as they are experienced at the periphery of the
system cannot be so easily resolved." 148
This is so for two reasons: first, as shown in the above analysis, comprador interests are inseparably bound up with the dominance of foreign capital. To speak of reducing the profits of foreign capital through the agency of the Comprador regime is naive. And second, the higher income earners to which the I.L.O. report refers, are largely members of the ruling alliance who, having fought their way into positions of power and wealth, are unlikely now to agree voluntarily to surrender a significant part of the advantage they have gained for themselves and their families.

The mission's report seems to ignore the fundamental fact that the economic and social problems of poverty and unemployment -- which it recognised as being connected with income inequality and with the role of foreign capital -- are themselves integral parts of a larger whole. The international capitalist system on the one hand and the system of political power in Kenya on the other hand, are also integral parts of this whole.

Given the fact that the "Kenyan bourgeoisie" does not intend to commit "class suicide" by acting against its own interests and in favour of the impoverished majority classes, it tends to adopt limited reformist policies and measures that do not alter fundamentally the status quo. Comprador dominance over other social groups and its continuing dependence on a partnership with M.N.C.s for individual and state accumulation have implications for foreign policy which is bound to reflect these dominant internal and external interests. This point will be pursued in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
G. Post-Colonial Economies of Kenya and Tanzania: a balance sheet

This chapter has attempted to confirm the view fundamental to the dependency approach that peripheral economies continue to be characterised by dependence and underdevelopment, even after formal independence. I have attempted to show that both Tanzania's and Kenya's economies continue to experience the impact of colonial-type incorporation into the international exchange system. I have shown how the metropolis-periphery linkage in the post-colonial era has been associated with economic polarisation, social stratification and ruling-class orientation to the international capitalist system rather than to internal restructuring. In particular, the increasing role of the M.N.C.s and international finance institutions such as the I.M.F. and the World Bank in the political economies of the two states, have enhanced the metropolis-periphery linkage. The transnational alliance between the ruling classes of these two states and metropolitan capital explains, at least in part, the persistence and continuity of structural dependence and underdevelopment.

The above analysis has revealed that the ruling classes of Kenya and Tanzania are equally concerned with consolidating their power and economic positions and are doing it in a rather similar manner despite their ideological differences. Control of the powerful state apparatuses gave each ruling class the means to attain their class ambitions. In Kenya, where class formation was much more advanced than in Tanzania at independence, the struggle for state control has been much more complex. Nevertheless through the effective deployment of state
instruments and support from the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the dominant fraction of the Kenyan ruling class has triumphed and consolidated its power position. Using the ideology of free enterprise, sugar-coated with "African Socialism", the ruling class has prospered in partnership with foreign capital. Theoretically, every enterprising Kenyan should have benefited from such a liberal policy of self-advancement. In Tanzania the bureaucratic bourgeoisie consolidated its political power position with relative ease due to the absence of a strong middle or commercial class that could effectively compete for control over the state. In any case, whatever the potential for such a contending group, its emergence was precluded by the Arusha Declaration that greatly increased state control through the combination of economic and political power in the same hands. In other words, the state take-over of the means of production served to institutionalise state 'control' over the political economy. Thus, the Tanzanian bureaucrats-cum-politicians, can now accumulate wealth collectively through the state in the same manner as the Kenyan ruling class accumulates personal wealth individually.

Nationalisation and state ownership of the means of production in Tanzania did not change the existing capitalist structures. First, the character of the state did not undergo any radical change, except insofar as it became an instrument for the economic advancement of the ruling Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie. Even as recently as 1975 nearly 60% of the employees in commerce in Tanzania were in the private sector. Furthermore, although the Ujamaa policy has succeeded in moving the
majority of rural Tanzanians into villages, it has not managed to abolish the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, by 1978, there were only two "Ujamaa" villages in Tanzania, that produced about 50 percent of their agricultural commodities collectively. Thus, although Kenya has institutionalised private land ownership system and in Tanzania land is state-owned, the mode of production in both is capitalistic in orientation. Further, because of the external orientation of their economies, both countries have failed to either reduce food imports or alter the composition of their major exports since independence.

In spite of its policy of self-reliance and its principle of state control over the means of production, Tanzania is no less dependent on or less vulnerable to the effects of foreign aid, foreign trade and foreign investment than Kenya, whose leadership openly welcomes external assistance and partnership. Partial nationalisation in Tanzania and the unwillingness of state institutions to control the private sector, have facilitated the continuation of luxury consumer imports to cater for the Westernised consumer tastes of the ruling class. The only difference between Kenya and Tanzania in this respect is that the Kenyan ruling class condones and defends luxury-type imports, while the Tanzanian leadership does not.

Theoretically, Kenya supports private industrial growth, with or without state participation, whereas Tanzania supports public industrial growth with a controlling share held by the state. However both countries continue to rely heavily on M.N.C.'s for capital, technology and even management, which the latter monopolise. The end result for
both countries is, in practice, similar -- M.N.C.-led industrialisation, with a high import-content and capital-intensive techniques, hence intensifying external dependency.

Both countries have, particularly since the 1970s, come to rely heavily on foreign aid from international capitalist organisations particularly from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Both these organisations and other bilateral aid donors place very stringent conditions on their aid, whose instrumental objective is often to influence economic and other policies of these two East African countries.

Class formation and political consciousness has advanced rapidly in both countries in spite of the government's attempts to contain them. Notwithstanding rhetoric about the classlessness of the traditional African society, class struggles and inequalities in both countries have been publicly exposed by the news media, scholars and, to a limited extent, by international bodies such as the International Labour Organisation and the World Bank. In the meantime, the ruling classes of both countries have become more conservative and more determined to maintain the status quo. In Tanzania, the ruling class, which welcomed the Arusha Declaration and its "defensive radicalism" because they had nothing to lose at the time, have now become conservative because Arusha policy measures have given them more to lose. The Kenyan ruling class and its supportive classes is relatively more affluent than Tanzania's, due to superior opportunities for capital accumulation. Hence the Kenyan leadership can be said to have even more to lose than its Tanzanian counterpart. It has increasingly joined
Tanzania in engaging in "defensive radicalism." In the 1970s this tendency became more noticeable as government policy statements and national development plans became more "radicalised." Official development priorities are now spelled out in terms of achieving equality through a better distribution of the national surplus and a greater concentration on rural production. Given the fact that Kenya's largest single aid donor — the World Bank — shares this rural-oriented ideology, the Comprador government is trying to meet World Bank conditions for aid and, at the same time, gain popular support.

The current five year Development Plan (1979-1983), for instance, has as its top priority the noble goal of alleviating poverty throughout Kenya by implementing a "basic needs" programme. This according to the current plan, involves encouraging balanced development between rural and urban areas with the bulk of the resources being channelled into the former. The plan also seeks to narrow salary differentials by means of a reduction of industrial protection which will encourage management to resist non-essential wage and salary increases for high- and middle-level manpower. This declared commitment to the alleviation of poverty and the attainment of equality may never be implemented. Nevertheless, it remains significant in the sense that its socialist-type appeal may temporarily gain the leadership support from desperately poor Kenyans while a more permanent strategy of coping with gross inequalities is being devised.

It would seem safe to conclude that the problems of inequalities in underdeveloped dependent political economies such as those of Kenya and Tanzania will persist as long as their structural relationship with
the world economy remains. Furthermore, no matter how genuinely committed individual leaders may be towards development, no meaningful change can be effected when the power of economic decision-making in Kenya as well as in Tanzania is largely exercised externally. Nyerere must have been speaking from bitter experience when he told his audience in Ibadan, Nigeria:

"The reality of neo-colonialism quickly becomes obvious to a new African government which tries to act on economic matters in the interest of national development, and for the betterment of its own masses. For such a government immediately discovers that it inherited the power to make laws, to direct the civil service, to treat with foreign governments, and so on, but that it did not inherit effective power over economic developments in its own country. Indeed, it often discovers that there is no such a thing as a national economy at all. Neo-colonialism is very real." 154 (emphasis added)

In the succeeding chapters, I shall consider whether indeed Tanzania and Kenya have any power "to treat with foreign governments." The foregoing analysis has suggested that neither country has enough political or economic power to withstand external control over domestic decision-making. Given the objective conditions of underdevelopment and the external dependence of both states, their ability to chart independent-minded foreign policies or to implement declared foreign policy objectives is likely to be highly constrained. In this respect, Kenya and Tanzania do not differ from other underdeveloped countries of the Third World in their crucial linkages with the international system.
A. Introduction

In chapters two and three I identified and discussed the salient background factors for analysing and explaining the foreign policy of Kenya and Tanzania. The factors identified -- social, economic and political -- were analysed within the theoretical framework of dependence and underdevelopment. Structural underdevelopment of their political economies was seen to be closely linked to and reinforced by the existing dependency relationship of these two states to the international capitalist system. I noted their apparent inability to resist the influence of foreign aid donors and investors on their "domestic" development policies.

Given the basic "powerlessness" (defined in terms of dependence and underdevelopment) of Kenya and Tanzania even within their own domestic arenas, they are much less likely to be influential in an global system that they found at independence to be already structured and dominated by major powers, interests and institutions. It is the assumption of this study, then, that in foreign policy, as in domestic affairs, dependence and underdevelopment set the limits to which the two states can translate their desired foreign policy objectives into practice.
However, the foreign policy choices and strategies chosen to implement given foreign policy objectives, are likely to vary, as a reflection of certain differences (of degree rather than kind) in the social, economic and political conditions of the two states at independence. These differences were discussed in chapter two and hence I will only show here how they may have affected the initial definition of foreign policy in both states.

At independence, there was relatively less external capitalist penetration in Tanzania than in Kenya. The significance of this for foreign policy is that outside powers and institutions were less likely to intervene in Tanzania whatever policy was adopted, whereas in Kenya such intervention was more likely due to the relatively large stake of western interests.

On social and political levels, Tanzania was characterised by a more homogenous population, less advanced class formation and relative absence of foreign affairs interest groups than Kenya, where ethnic and class conflicts and attentive interest groups were already in existence at independence. The overall effect of these contrasting socio-political settings was that in Tanzania, government policy in foreign affairs was likely to be accepted internally without much dispute since there were no strongly articulated group interests which demanded one policy orientation rather than another. In contrast, in Kenya, existing interest groups were likely to challenge any foreign policy orientation that threatened to affect their interests adversely.
It would seem, then, notwithstanding shared dependence and underdevelopment, that Tanzania was better placed than Kenya at independence, to develop an independent-minded foreign policy, more consistent with its national aspirations. Indeed, as is shown in this and the succeeding chapter, since Uhuru the two states have displayed different styles and strategies in the pursuit of their respective foreign policy objectives -- a display that may be partially attributed to differences in their socio-politico-economic settings. The extent to which these initial differences are important in explaining their foreign policies will be ascertained in the course of examining and analysing their actual foreign policies.

This chapter examines and analyses salient foreign policy events and actions from Uhuru to 1969 in which Kenya and Tanzania participated, particularly relations with the major powers on whom they are dependent and with the two super-power blocs who represent the real challenge to non-alignment. It then attempts to appraise the differential impact of dependence and underdevelopment on the foreign policy of Kenya and Tanzania.

This chapter is thus broken down into two broad themes: i) an overview of the two states' foreign policies up to 1969 and ii) a comparative assessment of their foreign policies during the same period.

B. Tanzania's Foreign Policy: 1961-1969

Even prior to formal independence, Prime Minister Nyerere had already laid down the basis for an independent-minded foreign policy for Tanzania. He had, for instance, made it clear in The Observer (London)
on 12 March 1961 that Tanzania would not be able to join the Commonwealth if South Africa remained a member. No other Commonwealth leader had taken so unequivocal a stand at this stage. Nyerere had also condemned French atomic tests in the Sahara and proposed that African states should break their links with France over the issue. Mwalimu also made it clear during independence negotiations with Britain that Tanzania would not automatically accept all treaty commitments which had been made on its behalf prior to independence; instead he insisted that Tanzania reserved the right to decide for itself which treaties should be accepted and which should be rejected or renegotiated. Nyerere's intransigence towards Portugal and his active commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa was further revealed by his insistence during the independence negotiations, that the British government should withdraw the Exequatuer of the Portuguese Consul in Dar-es-Salaam.

Predictably, after formal independence, Tanzania's opposition to colonialism in Africa continued. So in February 1962, Belgium was requested to withdraw from the Belbase arrangements (British-negotiated free port facilities) in Dar-es-Salaam and in June 1962 a boycott of South African goods came into force. That Nyerere intended to play an active and perhaps leading role in the non-aligned movement was signalled early in the post-independence period by Tanzania hosting the Afro-Asian Solidarity conference at Moshi in February 1963. Non-alignment, as noted in chapter one, is the official cornerstone of the foreign policies of most nations of Africa and Asia. However, while non-alignment is the policy guide at the global level, it does
not for Tanzania and other member states guide behaviour at the regional or continental levels. Consequently, the overall foreign policy of Tanzania operates on the basis of several guidelines rather than just one. These guidelines were first spelled out shortly after independence, when Nyerere was making his first address, as Tanzania's Prime Minister to the United Nations on 14 December 1961. There he outlined the basic foreign policy goals of Tanzania, which have basically remained unchanged (except for shifts in emphasis) throughout constitutional and other changes:

i) to establish world peace -- hence Tanzania's recognition of the fundamental importance of the U.N.;

ii) to continue opposition to colonialism anywhere in the continent or elsewhere;

iii) to attain African unity which depends on the complete freedom of the continent; and

iv) to keep Tanzania out of involvement in great power ideological and other quarrels, by following a policy of non-alignment and non-commitment to great power alliances.

This statement was repeated in October 1967 in more or less the same form, thus indicating that Tanzania's basic foreign policy orientation had not altered between 1961 and 1967. Indeed it has not undergone any fundamental change during the whole period under study.

However, up until 1964, there was nothing particularly distinctive about Tanzania's foreign policy. Indeed, its foreign policy as well as development strategy was, like Kenya's, very much oriented towards the
West. In other words, in spite of the leader's rhetoric of non-alignment, Tanzania had not yet altered the basic lines of external interaction established during the colonial period. On the diplomatic level, for example, no representation was established with Eastern bloc countries until 1964 (see Table 4:1), although an agreement on cultural cooperation had been signed with China in December 1962, following a Chinese cultural mission to Tanzania. In the meantime, Tanzania had joined the Commonwealth soon after independence, and had established diplomatic relations with three Western bloc countries -- U.K., U.S., and West Germany. And in July 1963 President Nyerere visited Britain, the United States and Canada. Table 4:1 indicates that even after 1964 Tanzania was slow in developing diplomatic representation with socialist countries. Indeed, Tanzania's pattern of diplomatic exchange to the end of the 1960s reveals a similar bias as Kenya's towards Western countries.

On the economic level, as explained in Chapter 3, Tanzania demonstrated a similar pattern of interaction with and attitude towards Western countries, essentially an extension of the colonial period. Tanzania's economic and cultural dependence on Western countries, particularly Britain, up to 1964 has been succinctly summarized by Pratt:

"the sources from which Tanzania expected to draw the great bulk of her foreign assistance, the countries from which she recruited her still numerous staff, the orientation of her educational system and of her army all demonstrated that in 1964 Tanzania still turned primarily to Britain"
TABLE 4.1 - KENYA AND TANZANIA: DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ABROAD, 1961-1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West (NATO)</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>Other European</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Other Non-aligned</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 1961</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 1964</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 1969</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya 1963</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya 1964</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya 1969</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


and to other major Western powers for assistance and example. 11

However, events, both external and internal, that took place between 1964 and 1965 compelled Tanzania's leaders, particularly Mwalimu Nyerere, to change perceptions and expectations of the international environment. Indeed by 1967 Nyerere had come to realise i) that Tanzania had little influence in international affairs and ii) that Western "allies" such as Britain and the United States felt no moral obligation to assist Tanzania in its development and foreign policy objectives. It was in recognition of these harsh realities of international politics that Tanzania formally announced its intention to embark on a socialist, self-reliant approach by publishing the 1967 Arusha Declaration.
A debate, however, exists over which year in Tanzania's diplomatic history makes the transition in its foreign policy. One group of scholars views 1964 as the turning point, while another group identifies 1967 as the watershed. The former picks 1964 since it was in that and the following year that Tanzania experienced a series of diplomatic crises; these forced the leadership to alter its attitude towards the international environment as well as to diversify diplomatic, economic and military links towards the Eastern bloc countries, particularly China. The latter identifies 1967 as the turning point since it was in that year that Tanzania produced its "socialist" document -- the Arusha Declaration.

The policy of Socialism and Self-reliance -- which is the central theme of the declaration, has a domestic as well as an international aspect. Mwoli, a proponent of the latter (1967) viewpoint, argues that whereas prior to Arusha changes in Tanzania's foreign policy were confined to the political arena, after the Declaration Tanzania's international economic relations began to be restructured; this was essential for the attainment of foreign policy objectives. According to Mwoli then:

"Between 1961 and 1966, Tanzania's diplomatic drive to create a credible non-aligned posture in order to secure its independence, promote a viable world opinion against oppression, set up a working relationship with Western nations against racism in Africa, procure vast quantities of economic resources and promote African unity met with only limited success."
While I share Nnoli's view that no significant changes in Tanzania's foreign policy occurred during the period 1961-1966, I would maintain that the Arusha Declaration and the "loss of innocence" in foreign affairs that accompanied it, owe much to the experience gained and the lessons learnt from the 1964-1965 diplomatic crises with Britain and other Western countries. Furthermore, these crises demonstrated Tanzania's leadership commitment to non-alignment. They also reinforced its determination to exercise autonomy in national decision-making and to overcome its inability to bring its will to bear on the major powers.

For these reasons, the analysis below focuses on Tanzania's relations with the major Western and Eastern bloc countries, with a particular emphasis on the major events and issues that constituted the diplomatic crises in its relationship with these states. The analysis also includes two continental crises that occurred after 1965 -- the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the Biafran War -- which are also significant in explaining Tanzania's foreign policy in the 1960s. The events and issues examined have been selected not only because of their importance in explaining Tanzania's foreign policy but also because of their relevance to comparison with similar events in the Kenyan case.

II Tanzania's Army Mutiny

The mutiny in the First Battalion of Tanganyika Rifles which broke out on 20 January 1964 started a chain of events which were to have significant effects on Tanzania in particular and on East Africa in general. The mutineers had two grievances: low pay and slow rate of Africanization of the officer corps. Detailed accounts of the mutiny
have been sufficiently documented elsewhere and hence only those events of relevance to this study will be raised here. 16

It is worth noting, for example, that it was only on the fifth day of the mutiny, when it became obvious that the uprising was threatening to change into a coup d'état, that President Nyerere felt compelled to request the British government to help maintain law and order. The reluctance with which Nyerere accepted British military assistance was evident from his broadcast to the nation during which he explained that the only reason he turned to Britain for assistance was because there was no one else at the time with sufficient military forces in the area to carry out the type of operation required to put down the mutiny. At the same time, he apologetically admitted that the request for foreign-colonialist troops was not only a humiliation to the country, but also to Africa. 17 Indeed, as soon as an alternative was found, Nyerere replaced British troops with units from the Nigerian army acting in unison with the Ethiopian air force. 18 Furthermore, a British offer to help in training and reforming the army, which was subsequently disbanded, was rejected. 19 Nyerere explained that his government wished to have its armed forces trained within Tanzania and any external military assistance that might be required would be sought from appropriate sources. 20

The mutiny clearly exposed the elusiveness of formal independence and the harsh reality of military weakness and dependence on the former colonial power. Given these circumstances, Tanzania decided to turn dependence from disadvantage to advantage by ending military dependence
on Britain and opting for a diversification in its sources of military assistance.

Consequently, Canada and Sweden were invited to supply training missions for the new army, West Germany to take over pilot's training, while China was requested to provide military equipment and instructors. 21 At first, Canada declined the request, preferring to train Tanzanian officers in Canada, and Sweden would only undertake the necessary training under U.N. auspices. 23 However, when Tanzania and China signed a military agreement in June 1964, 24 West Germany agreed to train the Tanzanian airforce and supply trainer aircraft and Britain and the U.S. convinced Canada to supply the requested military mission. 25

Clearly, the sudden willingness (after initial reluctance) of Western powers to provide military assistance to Tanzania was not prompted by any desire to help Tanzania practice non-alignment. Rather it was a pre-emptive measure aimed at keeping Chinese -- "communism" out of a Western "sphere of interest" -- Tanzania.

Nyerere still held a very naive view about the realities of power and influence within the international system. Hence he failed to appreciate that Tanzania's policy of non-alignment ran contrary to dominant interests in a bipolar global situation. Thus, for Tanzania the acceptance of Chinese military aid was no more than "a little attempt to be non-aligned", 26 and was just part of a larger plan to seek military assistance from a variety of sources -- some Western, some "communist" and some non-aligned. 27 Nyerere could therefore not understand Western paranoia over what was seen as a communist menace descending
over Eastern Africa via Tanzania. For Mwalimu, hostile Western reactions to the 1964 Sino-Tanzania military agreement, reflected an "inferiority complex", in the West. 

Predictably, Nyerere reacted angrily to what he perceived as Western hostility and attempts to influence Tanzania's decision-making. In a typical outburst, which The Times of London described as one of "great vehemence", Mwalimu left no doubt of his feelings: 

"... I am protesting. I do not expect other people to take decisions for this government. I am completely capable of looking after this country ... I do not like pressures." 

The question remains, however, whether Nyerere's protests and his determination to prevent external interests from exerting pressures are effective, given continuing structural dependence and underdevelopment. The tension between dependence and non-alignment clearly places limits on the practice of the latter.

This case then demonstrates the dilemma of Tanzania, as a weak dependent state attempting to advance its own development and foreign policy objectives in a global situation dominated by bipolarity. Thus, while on the one hand, the mutiny afforded the leadership the opportunity to diversify its military dependence, it also exposed the vulnerability and susceptibility to external influence of underdeveloped, dependent states such as Tanzania.
This conflict closely followed the union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika to form Tanzania in April 1964; it arose over the issue of whether or not East Germany should be accorded diplomatic recognition in mainland Tanzania. The union called for a different policy towards the two Germanies from that which Tanganyika and Zanzibar had pursued previously, when the two states had established close but mutually exclusive relations with West Germany and East Germany respectively.

After the amalgamation, foreign policy became a "union matter": hence the need to harmonise the policies pursued by the two parties. The first harmonisation problem was over diplomatic recognition of the two Germanies under the union government. Nyerere was faced with a real dilemma over how to arrive at a compromise position that was acceptable both to the Zanzibaris and to the Germans. On the one hand, he could not expect the Zanzibaris to expel the East Germans whom they regarded as close friends; on the other hand, the West Germans, who had provided substantial foreign aid to the mainland (see Table 4:2) objected to East German diplomatic representation in Tanzania.

The desire for a common "union" policy on Germany led to protracted negotiations with the two German states in search of a compromise. In the end, on 19 February 1965, Tanzania decided to maintain the West Germany embassy in Dar-es-Salaam and limit East German representation to that of an "unofficial" Consulate General. The West Germany government objected to this formula insisting that East German representation should be confined to Zanzibar.
TABLE 4.2 - WEST GERMAN AID TO SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES 1960-1967

(IN MILLION SHILLINGS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.86</td>
<td>63.56</td>
<td>107.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>31.08</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>63.98</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>445.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Tanzanian government did not accede to this West German demand, which led the latter to invoke the Hallstein doctrine against the former: military assistance was to be withdrawn immediately followed by economic assistance, unless Tanzania accepted West German conditions. Thus, on 27 February 1965, one day after this decision was communicated to Nyerere, all West German airforce and marine advisers were "shipped" back to Germany.

These events, occurring shortly after Western hostilities and pressures over the Chinese "presence" in Tanzania, were interpreted by the leadership as another attempt by a Western power to influence Tanzania's policies through economic pressure. Under these circumstances, Nyerere's response to West Germany was characteristically militant, reflecting his fierce determination to protect Tanzania's non-alignment and autonomy in decision-making. Thus, to demonstrate that Tanzanian foreign policy was not subject to influence by pressures from aid donors,
Nyerere informed the West Germany government on 1 March 1965, that his government was no longer prepared to accept its aid. Again, the reality of structural constraints is evident from Table 4:2 — by 1967, Tanzania was again the leading recipient of West Germany bilateral assistance in Africa South of the Sahara.

This case, like the earlier one of the mutiny, demonstrated Tanzania's attempt to pursue a credible non-aligned foreign policy, against a background of serious constraints deriving from its underdevelopment and external dependence, in addition to the bipolar global situation.

iii) Tanzania's Conflict with U.S. Over Expulsion of two diplomats, 1965

The second issue on which allowance made for Zanzibari opinions within the Union affected relations with the West, particularly the United States, was over the expulsion of two of its diplomats in January 1965. They had been accused by the island government of conspiring to overthrow the new revolutionary regime.

As in the case of the conflict with West Germany, Nyerere was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, he was concerned with preserving the very delicate unity he had achieved with the Zanzibaris, and hence was anxious to avoid any conflict between the mainland and the island. On the other hand, he was anxious to prevent the expulsion of the two diplomats from hurting Tanzania's relationship with the U.S. Thus while he declined to provide the U.S. government with the evidence of the alleged subversion, he stressed, nevertheless, that the two diplomats had acted in their personal capacities and not as representatives.
of the U.S. However, when it became obvious that Tanzania would not
yield to the U.S. demand for evidence the latter retaliated by recalling
its Ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam and expelling Tanzania's counsellor
in Washington.

As in the two cases examined earlier, Nyerere's reaction was
characteristically militant and patriotic. This was evident in his
response to the U.S. threat to expel Tanzania's counsellor:

"The president and government of United Republic of
Tanzania do not give way to threats nor to ultimata.
We in this country fought for our independence and
won that fight. We are a small country, but we are
as much a sovereign state as the U.S. is .... we are
not a vassal state nor do we intend to become one.
We do not bully and we do not like being bullied."

In this case as in the previous one of the two Germanies, President
Nyerere was concerned with maintaining friendly relations with the
countries in question, even though the end result in each case gave
the opposite impression. In both instances, he chose to end (at least
temporarily) friendly relations between Tanzania and the particular
western power, rather than succumb to what he saw as an attempt to
influence his country's decision-making.


Domestic and international events around 1964-1965 resulted in
conflict between Tanzania and certain Western countries who seemed to be
bent on tampering with and compromising its newly won independence and
union. As a result, Tanzania had come to develop a sense of insecurity brought about by a perception of constant external threat. The 1964-1965 Congo crisis strengthened this growing feeling of insecurity indicating as it did the willingness and ability of great powers and outside interests to intervene in African affairs when and where they so desired.

This general international problem began when Moise Tshombe became Prime Minister of the Congo in early 1964. Many African politicians believed that Tshombe's appointment was brought about by the intrigue and manoeuvring of Western governmental and financial interests. When Tshombe began large-scale recruitment of white mercenaries, many of whom were South African, to put down a rebellion in Eastern Congo, opposition to him from radical African governments became more determined.

At the end of November 1964 however, the situation in the Congo altered dramatically, following the seizure of European hostages by those who were contesting the central Congolese authority, derogatorily referred to as "the rebels". The latter then announced their intention not to release the hostages until the Congolese army and the white mercenaries stopped their advance and until U.S. military assistance was withdrawn. While negotiations for a ceasefire and release of the hostages were still in progress, Belgian paratroops were airlifted by U.S. planes into Eastern Congo to rescue the hostages, using the British island of St. Helena as a staging post.
Tanzania's relations with the West, which were already strained at this point, were not helped by the leadership's angry condemnation of the West in general and the U.S. in particular, for this intervention. Furthermore, the fact that from early to mid 1965 Tanzania permitted arms to pass through Tanzania to strengthen the rebellion in the Congo, which the U.S. was helping to suppress, may have worsened the already strained relations which originated in the expulsion of two American diplomats from Tanzania.

v) Tanzania's Conflict with Britain over Rhodesia's U.D.I., 1965

Prior to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.) by the white minority in Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia), Tanzania, as well as other African countries, had individually and collectively, expressed great concern over the colonial situation in that country. This concern intensified following U.D.I. Hence, when it became obvious that Britain did not intend to subdue the illegal white minority regime, O.A.U. members resolved to break diplomatic relations with Britain, unless U.D.I. had been brought to an end by 15 December 1965. President Nyerere was the first African head of state to publicly express his approval of this O.A.U. resolution. Furthermore, Tanzania was one of the ten who stood by the resolution -- by breaking diplomatic relations with Britain on 16 December 1965.

For the Tanzania government the severing of diplomatic ties with Britain was a demonstration of its commitment to majority rule and non-racialism. Furthermore, Tanzania felt obliged to honour the resolution as a matter of principle. Ignoring the O.A.U. call for a diplomatic
rupture with Britain would not only "emasculate the honour and dignity of African leaders as champions of the liberation cause in Southern Africa, but would also damage Tanzania's credibility in other international organisations. And since Tanzania is responsible for its own actions, it could not go back on its commitment just because others had done so." 47

This bold and principled stand on the Zimbabwean issue cost Tanzania both British friendship as well as capital. The British government froze most of its aid to Tanzania (see Tables 4:3 and 4:4) which included a Tshs. 150 million interest free-loan it had offered earlier in 1965, and a Tsh. 7 million grant to Tanzania's land Bank. 48 Thus, whereas in 1965 Britain contributed 44.5% of total aid to Tanzania, by 1966, its share dropped to 4% and by 1967 to 2% (see Table 4:3 and c.f. with Table 4:4).

**TABLE 4:3** - BRITISH AID AS % OF TOTAL AID TO TANZANIA, 1961-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Loan</th>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>35.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Knoll, Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania, p. 121.
TABLE 4:4 - BRITISH AID TO EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS % OF TOTAL AID FROM D.A.C. COUNTRIES, 1962-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Streeten, Aid to Africa, pp. 18-19.

Again, this bilateral conflict with Britain, like those discussed above, revealed Tanzania's consistent commitment to principles and determination to pursue an independent-minded foreign policy, even at the expense of losing economic assistance.

vi) The Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), 1965-1976

Although the idea of a rail link from Tanzania (and East Africa) to Zambia dates back to the colonial era, the possible implementation of the project was not seriously considered until the early 1960s, following the independence of Tanzania and Zambia. Indeed, the impetus for actual construction of the railway developed in 1965 following U.D.I., which was perceived as a threat to Zambia's political and economic existence. From Tanzania's viewpoint, TAZARA was to play an important role in promoting liberation as well as in advancing the economic development of both Tanzania and Zambia. 49

Tanzania and Zambia approached Britain, the United States, West Germany, France, Japan and the Soviet Union as well as Lonrho and the
World Bank for assistance in building the railway. Numerous reports and surveys were commissioned, but all requests for offers to finance the railway were rejected. This was hardly surprising given the strained state of Tanzania's relations with the major Western powers during this period, as indicated above.

As in 1964 when the West rejected Tanzania's appeal for military assistance, Tanzania and Zambia decided to accept a standing Chinese offer to build the railway. This joint decision provoked, once again, a similar reaction from the West to that of 1964 following Tanzania's acceptance of Chinese military assistance. China's involvement was again viewed in the West in bipolar terms, as paving the way for Chinese ideological and political predominance in the region.

Consequently, by 1968 initial Western indifference had turned into active interest and into a willingness to build the railway so as to prevent the Chinese from gaining a foothold in Tanzania and Zambia. This belated offer to build TAZARA did not prevent Tanzania and Zambia from concluding a final agreement with China for the construction of the railway on 12 July 1970. The 1,060 mile TAZARA, built at a cost of $401 million, became the largest aid project that China has ever (or since) undertaken. However, determined not to be outdone by the Chinese, the West financed the building of the Tanzam road. Though a duplicative communication link, it demonstrates not only Tanzania's political magnetism but also Western bloc interest at the time in neutralizing Chinese influence in the region in general, and in Tanzania in particular.
Despite Western pressures and propaganda activity seeking to discredit China's ability to build the railway, TAZARA started to be built on time and was successfully completed in 1976, more than a year ahead of schedule.\textsuperscript{53}

The present cost of and conflicts over the maintenance of the TAZARA notwithstanding,\textsuperscript{54} the persistence and successful completion of the project in spite of economic and political pressures from the major capitalist states, indicates Tanzania's long-suffering attempts to enhance its national development and foreign policy independence.

In addition to the above six issues of 1965-1966 period, two subsequent crises — the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the Biafran War — are examined next. These two crises as noted earlier, are particularly important for the purpose of comparing Tanzania's and Kenya's response to them.

vii) The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Tanzania's position

Tanzania's position on the 1967 Arab-Israeli Conflict was reflective of the general O.A.U. stance which was confined to condemning Israel (and its Western supporters) for its aggressive activities in the Middle East, while maintaining the position that "we recognise Israel and wish to be friendly with her as well as with the Arab Nations,"\textsuperscript{55} A rather different response to the 1973 Ramadhan War was evoked from African countries, as is shown in the next chapter.

Perhaps because of alleged U.S. and British involvement in this war on the side of Israel, Tanzania found it necessary to explain that its Pro-Arab stand in this case should not be interpreted as alignment
with the latter but rather as an anti-aggression posture, regardless of the country involved:

"non-alignment must not be based on hypocrisy. In particular, ... the conviction of the Tanzanian government is that aggression is never excusable and there can be no support for territorial aggrandisement through victorious wars .... It is a terrible irony of history that Israel should cooperate with the former persecutors of the Jews." 56

Thus, while Tanzania recognised the state of Israel because of "the enormity of the inhumanity of Europe and Christianity towards the Jewish people", it "will not recognise the state of Israel's incorporation of the territories occupied in the aggression of 1956 or in the current (June 1967) hostilities." 57

It seems strange that Tanzania found it necessary to defend its non-alignment, particularly on an issue involving an African country (Egypt) which is also a member of the O.A.U. Clearly, Tanzania cannot expect to practice its non-alignment in its relations with other African countries. Its policy of "good-neighbourliness" in the region testifies to that. Nevertheless, Tanzania's reaction though seemingly strange, reveals the importance that the leadership attaches to the pursuit of the policy of non-alignment. Similar importance seems to be attached to the principle of human dignity, as was demonstrated by Nyerere's response to the Biafran crisis, which is examined next.

The Biafran War was another continental issue that Tanzania responded to and took a definite position in the late sixties. This response became known on 13 April 1968 when Tanzania recognised Biafra (South Eastern Nigeria) as a separate state from the rest of Nigeria. In taking this action, Tanzania was rejecting the argument by the Federal authorities for the preservation of Nigerian unity. Tanzania countered this legalistic argument with a moralistic-humanistic one:

"Surely when a whole people is rejected by the majority of the state in which they live, they must have the right to life under a different kind of arrangement which does secure their existence ... when the machinery of the state and the powers of government are turned against a whole group of the society ... then the victims have the right to take back the powers they have surrendered and defend themselves." 58

Tanzanian recognition was also a protest against foreign intervention in the crisis, particularly what it viewed as British hypocrisy in pretending to champion Nigerian Unity while using its diplomatic and propaganda apparatus to portray the Biafrans as obstructing a settlement, as well as the flow of relief to their suffering population, while U.K.'s real motive was the defense of its vast economic interests which it felt threatened by the existence of Biafra. 59

In recognising Biafra which had declared its independence from the rest of Nigeria on 30 May 1967, Tanzania was expressing its belief in
human dignity and the right to physical security and well-being. The extent of humanitarianism involved in recognising Biafra is best appreciated if one takes into account that Tanzania was acting against its own best interests, politically and economically. At the political level, Tanzania found itself in the same camp as diehard racist and colonialist states (Portugal and South Africa) and anti-federalist African states (Ivory Coast and Gabon) who also recognised Biafra. At the economic level, Tanzania was risking the withdrawal of Federal Nigerian technical assistance. Furthermore, Tanzania was indebted to Nigeria for bailing it out of the security problem created by the 1964 army mutiny.

Tanzania’s recognition of Biafra while most other African countries were supporting Federal Nigeria, demonstrated considerable moral courage. As in the 1979 intervention in Uganda in support of the victims of Amin’s brutal regime, Tanzania was acting in defiance of abstract legal concepts, such as the O.A.U. thesis on territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other independent African states.

Clearly, Tanzania was not only contradicting the O.A.U. position but its own policies of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states as well as the promotion of African Unity. However, the Biafran stance did set a policy precedent which Tanzania has consistently pursued since: if a choice has to be made in a case of human suffering, Tanzania will reject legalistic in favour of humanistic interpretations.
The Biafran case fits into Tanzania's general identification with those it views as victims or outcasts. For instance, Tanzania identified with North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba as small socialist states threatened by both Western and Eastern "imperialists". It was also out of a similar sentiment that Tanzania allowed the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam to open a diplomatic mission in Dar-es-Salaam in 1968. Similarly, Tanzania's friendship with China partly developed out of the belief that China was an outcast from (and like Tanzania, a victim of) U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. power monopoly.

Following the end of the Biafran war and the restoration of one Nigeria, Tanzania has since reconciled itself with the Federal government, thus demonstrating that its original act of recognising Biafra was not anti-federalist but anti-persecution of one people by another.

The Biafran case is significant in that, it not only demonstrates Tanzania's commitment to the principle of human dignity but more importantly, the leadership ability to adopt an independent position on an issue and stick to it, regardless of a divergent position(s) taken by other states. The independent approach displayed in response to the Biafran crisis is consistent with Tanzania's "Arusha Declaration" of 1967, which asserts that "Independence means Self-Reliance". But how self-reliant is Tanzania's foreign policy outside the continent? The discussion below examines this very question.

ix) The 1967 Arusha Declaration: A Self-Reliant Foreign Policy?

As noted earlier in this chapter, between 1961 and 1966 Nyerere had wrongly assumed that Tanzania could pursue its national and foreign policy
objectives without offending other vested interests in the international system. Furthermore, it was wrongly assumed that Tanzania could advance its objectives through appeals to reason and humanitarian sentiment alone without recourse to material or military resources. This attitude was reinforced by an equally misconceived view that the procurement of external resources would promote economic growth and/or development within the framework of the inherited colonial structures.

The combined effect of the national economic difficulties (discussed in chapter 3) and diplomatic crises (discussed in this chapter) brought home the bitter truth of the inseparability of development and foreign policy for a poor weak state such as Tanzania. At the same time, these crises acted as an eye opener to the brutal reality of international politics, dominated by vested interests that were not congruent (as previously imagined) with Tanzania's own interests. This realisation triggered off a reassessment of both development and foreign policies that began with the 1967 Arusha Declaration. Pratt has noted,

"By 1967, Nyerere saw the world of international politics in a harsher and more sober light. By that date he had abandoned his earlier idealistic view of what might be expected of British policy in Africa .... He realised how little influence Tanzania itself had in international affairs and how vulnerable she was. Nyerere's changing perception of these questions was a major factor contributing to his conviction by the end of 1966 that a very high priority must be given to the achievement in Tanzania of a democratic and socialist society."
However, as suggested in the previous chapter, while the Arusha Declaration was clearly a commendable statement of Tanzania's intention to pursue a self-reliant development and foreign policy strategy, it has largely remained unimplemented. Tanzania's political economy continues to be structurally linked to international capitalism—albeit to a lesser extent than that of neighbouring Kenya. The continuity of structural dependence, in spite of the Arusha and subsequent socialist policies, is both a function of the deficiencies of the guidelines themselves as well as of the pervasiveness of an increasingly complex international system.

Consequently, despite the "loss of innocence" in foreign affairs, attempts to pursue desired foreign policy objectives continue to be constrained by the combined effects of internal underdevelopment and external dependence. Nevertheless, a better balance between idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy has been achieved since Arusha. Furthermore, a self-reliant approach in foreign policy is more appropriate in advancing Tanzania's interests in an era where the bipolarity of the early- to mid-1960s has been replaced by an era of multipolarity.

Perhaps the primary distinction between Tanzania's policy before and after Arusha is that in the pre-Arusha era, foreign policy was constrained both by the inherited political economy as well as by the leadership's tacit acceptance of the inheritance; but in the post-Arusha era, the rejection of such passive relationships has at least afforded the leadership a more positive role of maximising foreign policy choices, given the country's continuing subordinate position in a stratified global economy.
Tanzania's foreign policy towards Individual countries

Introduction

The above analysis of Tanzania's foreign policy has focussed primarily on the most significant issues and events that predominated and shaped foreign policy during the 1960s. In examining Tanzania's responses to these issues and events, I have concentrated on the manner in which Tanzania has chosen i) to implement its declared foreign policy goals and ii) to adapt to a fluid international system. At the risk of a certain amount of repetition I now briefly examine Tanzania's foreign policy towards key individual countries with which it had to deal with during the sixties; namely, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Germanies, the Soviet Union and China. The foreign economic relations of Tanzania (and Kenya) are examined in chapter 3 and will not be discussed here, except as they relate to diplomacy towards the countries listed above. However, in chapter 5, an examination of the two states' policy attitudes towards M.N.C.s is made, with a particular focus on Lonrho, one of the best examples of the penetration and influence of foreign capitalist investors on these two political economies.

Tanzania and the United Kingdom, 1961-1969

As was shown earlier, Tanzania's relations with the United Kingdom were normal and cordial until 1964, when a series of events and issues began to affect them adversely. Uncertainty following the mutiny and the change away from British towards Chinese military assistance caused difficulties in Anglo-Tanzania relations during 1964. The general
question of Southern-Africa liberation and the specific issue of U.D.I. led to the deepest and most serious differences of all, culminating in the rupture of diplomatic links between 1965 and 1968. The two countries were also at odds on the Vietnam issue, the acceptance of the Chinese offer to build the Tanzam railway and the Israel-Arab Conflict. Britain was also strongly criticised by Tanzania for permitting St. Helena to be used as a staging post for the Belgian-American intervention in the Congo. Furthermore, on the Biafran issue, the British and the Tanzanian governments found themselves on opposite sides. The latter publicly expressed its opposition to what it viewed as ill-intentioned "Anglo-Soviet Collusion" in the Nigerian civil war.

Despite this background of conflict, rupture of diplomatic links and suspension of economic assistance, there was much structural continuity which was particularly evident in the fact that the U.K. continued to rank first among Tanzania's major trading partners. However, although President Nyerere continued to express his country's desire for friendship and cooperation with Britain, diplomatic relations were not resumed until July 1968. The main reasons for the resumption of relations at that date seem to have been that the British government had by then accepted the principle of No Independence Before Majority African Rule (N.I.B.M.A.R.) in Zimbabwe; some of the sanctions against the white minority regime had been made mandatory through the U.N.; and the liberation course was now viewed as best advanced by reopening diplomatic channels, using them to put further pressure on Britain.

The timing of the resumption is significant in that it followed Tanzania's unilateral rejection of responsibility for pension payments
to British personnel, relating to service before 1 July 1961, and
ii) British retaliation by cutting bilateral aid completely. Tanzania
was thus demonstrating that it could maintain cooperative relations
with Britain on the diplomatic-political level while conflictual
relations continued at the economic level. Once again, Tanzania
put political objectives above short-term economic gains.

Tanzania and the United States, 1961-1969

Given the "alliance" of the Western bloc on bipolar issues, it
is not surprising that those factors that caused strains with Britain
also generated strains between Tanzania and the U.S. beginning in 1964.
These included Tanzania's acceptance of Chinese military assistance
in 1964, its condemnation of U.S. aggression in the Congo in 1964, and
the expulsion of the two American diplomats in February 1965, which
resulted in the temporary suspension of ambassadorial relations and
aid negotiations. In the course of the next three years, other differ-
ences between the two persisted, particularly on Vietnam and China's
representation at the U.N., on U.S. intervention in the Dominican
Republic and on Sino-Tanzania cooperation.

Apart from these actual points of conflict, Tanzania generally
viewed the U.S. intentions in Africa with suspicion. Being the height
of the Cold War, Tanzania felt vulnerable to and threatened by super
power interest or involvement in its internal affairs, particularly
because of its close relations with China. This feeling of suspicion,
which also characterised relations with the U.S.S.R., was responsible
for some of the conflicts that developed between the two during
the 1960s — Apart from the incident that led to the expulsion of the two diplomats, an allegation of a U.S. plot to overthrow the Tanzanian government was made in November 1964. Similar suspicions also led to the termination of the Peace Corps programme in November 1969, on the grounds that they were not genuine volunteers but were spies working for the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.). This last charge constituted the last straw in bilateral political relations in the 1960s, which reached an all-time low.

As in all relations with the major powers, Tanzania’s relations with the U.S. demonstrate a consistent and persistent attempt to defend its independence and practice non-alignment, albeit from a position of weakness deriving from a subordinate status within the global economy.

Tanzania and the Germanies, 1961-1969

Throughout the sixties, the nature of the relationships which Tanzania should adopt with East Germany dominated relations with both East and West Germany. While the former continued to press for diplomatic recognition, the latter continued to exert pressure on Tanzania to deny such recognition. Despite West German resumption of aid by 1967, Tanzania continued to hold on to the position originally taken on the recognition issue, thus demonstrating its determination to exercise a certain amount of independence and to resist external influence in foreign policy decision-making — albeit at the risk of losing short term economic benefits.
In general, relations between Tanzania and the Soviet Union remained cool and "correct" throughout the sixties. Although Tanzania acknowledged and spoke in praise of the Soviet Union as a "supporter of African freedom and liberation", it was as sceptical of the U.S.S.R. as of the U.S. As noted earlier, in an era of cold war politics, Tanzania recognised that the two super-powers shared a mutual interest in establishing spheres of influence around the world. Thus, the Soviet Union was as much a threat to Tanzania's newly acquired 'independence' as the U.S. So Nyerere never hesitated to denounce the U.S.S.R. along with the U.S., particularly in espousing Tanzania's policy of non-alignment. But the articulation of this position portrays a naive idealism which could be viewed as a form of "defensive radicalism". A typical expression of Tanzania's non-bloc position appeared in August 1968 in The Nationalist:

"No one should remain under the impression that we are afraid to add to the number of countries with which we have disagreements. We do not like quarrels; but we shall not allow the Eastern bloc nations to interfere in Tanzania just because our relations with some Western bloc countries are strained. We will quarrel with any and every country which tries to interfere with our internal affairs or tries to put pressure on us about our external policies .... We did not fight against Western colonialists in order to become the plaything..."
of any Eastern country .... Let those Eastern bloc countries who think they can do as they like in Tanzania take note of the fact that this is a free and independent nation and is determined to remain so. "71

This statement, coming shortly after Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, reveals an underlying fear of such interference taking place in Tanzania. Lacking material resources to defend itself, Tanzania like other small weak states seems to find psychological refuge in engaging in verbal defensive radicalism.

Be this as it may, Tanzania's suspicious attitude towards the U.S.S.R. was reinforced by the latter's supply of arms to Nigerian federal government during the Biafran war. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was strongly condemned by Tanzania and led the President to cancel a visit to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Tanzania's friendly relations with China and its stand on nuclear non-proliferation put the country in opposition to the Soviet Union as well as to the major Western powers.

**Tanzania and China, 1961-1969**

Although by virtue of size and population China qualifies as a major power, Nyerere does not seem to include it in this category. Rather, Tanzania views China as an outcast in the bilateral super-power monopoly and shares Third World fears of a future world order dominated by American imperialism and Russian revisionism. Tanzania and other Third World states have come to see China as not only an alternative to the
"bipolar" states and their allies, but also as a non-European great power which identifies itself unequivocally with the interests of Afro-Asian-Latin American countries. Furthermore, China as a developing socialist country was felt to have more to teach Tanzania than a developed industrialised country like the Soviet Union. Bilateral relations also benefited from the curiosity and fascination which China seems to have excited in Nyerere; probably the reverse is so as well. Finally, Nyerere's desire to reduce his country's dependence on the West in general and Britain in particular contributed to the development of a Sino-Tanzanian cooperative relationship.

This bilateral relationship developed from 1964 onwards particularly after the 1964 military assistance agreement, which was followed by other forms of Chinese aid, the largest being an interest-free loan to build TAZARA. The friendship between the two states was formally consumated in February 1965 by the conclusion of a Treaty of friendship and cooperation. Some have interpreted this as marking the beginning of a "partial informal alliance" between Tanzania and China.

Nyerere, who, as suggested earlier, viewed Tanzania's cooperation with China as part of an attempt to practice non-alignment, was obviously anxious to let it be known, both to the Chinese and the West that this friendship did not mean an alliance — "partial", "informal" or otherwise. He remained consistent in his position that Tanzania, as a non-aligned state, had the right to make friends with countries from both blocs without either side questioning that friendship. Thus to the Chinese Nyerere made his country's position unequivocally clear during Chou-en-Lai's visit to Tanzania in 1965:
"Neither our principles, our country, nor our freedom to determine our own future are for sale." To constant, western pestering and warning about Sino-Tanzania friendship, Nyerere's response was firm:

"We would not allow our friends to choose our enemies for us." He later declared publicly that he was "tired of being questioned about the Chinese."

The official position on Sino-Tanzania friendship notwithstanding, the question remains as to whether it compromises Tanzania. In spite of Nyerere's seemingly genuine commitment to non-alignment and his desire to ensure that Tanzania's political and economic relations with China did not influence the former's foreign policy, it is doubtful whether in practice, this is always possible, particularly if a major clash developed between the two states. However, by the end of the 1960s, no such conflict had emerged. And indeed there seemed to be no evidence that Chinese aid had influenced Tanzania's development and foreign policies in a way that Nyerere would not have wished. In other words, the coincidence of interests shrouded any influence that may have occurred. Furthermore, sensing the long term danger of over-dependence on any single aid donor, with the 1967 Arusha Declaration the government initiated measures aimed at diversifying external economic links. At the beginning of the 1970s, Tanzania publicly declared that no more economic aid from China was to be accepted until the completion of TAZARA.
The effectiveness of this precautionary measure and Tanzania's ability to continue to resist influence on its foreign policy will be assessed in the next chapter which examines that country's foreign policy in the 1970s. But for now, however, it should be noted that to rationalise Tanzania's friendship with China Nyerere emphasises the right to choose friends and enemies, aspect of non-alignment as opposed to the non-alliance element of the movement. A similar rationalisation is apparent in Kenya's foreign policy, which is examined next.

C. Kenya's Foreign Policy: 1963-1969

1) Introduction

Kenya was similar to Tanzania in enunciating foreign policy goals at independence. Prime Minister Kenyatta expected independence to establish Kenya's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security. Foreign policy was to rest on four pillars: 1) non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; 2) promotion of African Unity and liberation; 3) pursuit of non-alignment and justice in relation among states and 4) promotion of international peace and understanding through bilateral relations, the United Nations and other international bodies. However, these idealised pronouncements, typical of most African states, bore little relationship to the practical diplomacy, or the developmental thrust of Kenya's foreign policy.

The true goals of Kenya have remained pragmatic: 1) the maintenance of territorial integrity; 2) the preservation of the stability of the
state and 3) "development" — mainly economic growth. Except where domestic interests and security were threatened, Kenya confined its participation in international affairs to the obligatory minimum and judiciously avoided strong commitments in the political frays which broke out in the immediate region. Although recently there have been slight adjustments initiated by the incumbent President, the fundamental orientation of Kenya's foreign policy has remained unchanged.

Within Africa, Kenya has demonstrated little concern over issues that did not directly affect it; it has confined its concern mainly to rhetorical support for liberation and denunciation of colonialism and apartheid at the O.A.U. and the U.N. However, within Eastern Africa, Kenya has showed a much greater and active interest. For economic and geopolitical reasons, Kenya could not afford to ignore Uganda and Tanzania, with whom it shares common borders and has had economic links dating back from the colonial times, although these have greatly diminished since the demise of the East African Community in 1977. Kenya's interest in the Horn of Africa, its other region of interaction, had always been directly related to its concern for maintaining territorial integrity and stability. Because of Somalia's long-standing claims (beginning well before independence) over Kenya's North-Eastern province — which resulted in armed conflict between 1963-1967 and sporadic "shifta" (bandit) incursions since — the 'Horn' along with East Africa has remained one of Kenya's principal foreign policy concerns.

Although the fundamental content and practice of Kenya's foreign policy have, like Tanzania's remained fairly consistent since formal independence, the style and approach have varied greatly from one diplomatic phase to the next. Unlike Tanzania, however, where the various phases have tended to reflect contemporary issues and events Kenya's diplomatic phases have tended to begin and end, not only with particular issues, but as reflections of occupants in the foreign office and of other dominant national personalities at any one time.

As noted in chapter two, unlike Nyerere, Kenyatta rarely got personally involved in the conduct of Kenya's foreign policy; hence the existence of more actors in Kenya's foreign policy than in Tanzania's. The two times that Kenyatta got personally involved — the Congo in 1964 and Angola in 1975 — his diplomatic failure in mediation left him disillusioned; so he retreated back to his area of major interest and "success" — domestic politics. Furthermore, because of his lack of enthusiasm in foreign policy matters coupled with his old age, Kenyatta did not make regular personal contacts with world leaders. He delegated that role to the Vice-President, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to other senior cabinet ministers. Thus, throughout his term as president, Kenyatta only attended one overseas conference — the Commonwealth Conference held in London in July 1964 — and made only one state visit — to Ethiopia in 1967. This is quite a contrast to Nyerere's constant "globe-trotting".
Thus, unlike Tanzania, whose foreign policy bears the distinctive personal mark of Nyerere, the image of Kenya had come to be cast during Kenyatta's era by the style of the foreign minister and other dominant personalities. The initial phase of Kenya's diplomacy was particularly complex since there were several self-appointed foreign policy spokesmen, whose conflicting views reflected the underlying intra-class conflict of the Kenyan ruling "bourgeoisie" as well as the cold war politics of this era. To illustrate this a brief review of Kenya's diplomatic history seen in the context of the key actors during this period follows.

The initial phase of, roughly between 1963 and 1966, was dominated by the "indigenous" fraction of the ruling "bourgeoisie", whose leaders occupied key positions in Kenyatta's government. There was Oginga Odinga, whose pro-Eastern bloc inclinations were a source of great controversy in Kenya. He then held the positions of Vice-President and Minister of Home Affairs. Achieng Oneko who was Minister of Information and Broadcasting, also shared similar sentiments. Joseph Murumbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also associated with Oginga's "radicalism". As Foreign Minister, he had established close personal contacts with all the "radical" African statesmen of the early 1960s -- Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo -- Leopoldville (now Zaire), Sekou Toure of Guinea, Modibo Keita of Mali, Gamal Nasser of Egypt and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria. Others identified with this "indigenous" fraction included: Bildad Kaggia and Tom Okello Odongo, both of whom were parliamentary secretaries, J.D. Kali, the Chief Whip, Gio Gama Pinto, the Goan M.P. assassinated in 1965, and Mung‘ba Waiyaki who
was then Odinga's Assistant Minister and later (in 1974) became Kenya's foreign minister.

As shown below, the Comprador, Kenyatta-led fraction of the ruling class, spent the first few years of independence struggling to neutralise and/or eliminate the indigenous fraction whose "communist"-oriented ideology ran contrary to the "African Socialism" espoused by the former. Clearly, as was shown in the previous chapter, the basic conflict between the two fractions was not so much over ideology or strategy but over who should control the state and hence the political economy. However to mobilise popular support, both fractions found it necessary to advance their interests in ideological terms. It is within such a framework that conflict on foreign policy between these two groups can be viewed. The Compradors, deriving their economic and political support from the West, were naturally opposed to the Eastern bloc that gave support to their "indigenous" opponents within the government and society.

The indigenous fraction came to form an informal opposition group within the government, highly critical of Kenya's foreign policy, among other things. In particular, it was critical of what it viewed as a pretentious claim to pursue a policy of non-alignment when every indication was that Kenya's economic structures and relations with the Western World, particularly with Western companies, were too well-established to allow Kenya to be non-aligned. These critical members of government suggested that for Kenya to be truly non-aligned it was necessary for it to "lean a little more to the East". Although this was rejected
by the Comprador-dominated regime, Kenya did exchange diplomatic representatives with both the Soviet Union and China as early as 1964. And to reduce this type of criticism, Kenyatta, in spite of his pro-Western inclinations, praised the Soviet Union as having "been at the head of the struggle against colonial oppression ... an outstanding fighter for the rights of the peoples of South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Portuguese Guinea and the Spanish Colonies in Africa which are carrying on unabated the struggle against the remnants of colonialism and fascist dictatorships which are encouraged by certain imperialist countries". 84

Whether or not Kenyatta was genuine in this rather rare praise of the U.S.S.R., is debatable, however. Nevertheless, the statement did serve the purpose of pre-emptive diplomacy directed at the critics of Kenya's policy.

Given the "ideological" conflict within the government, it is hardly surprising that the then foreign minister -- Joseph Murumbi -- at times articulated Kenya's foreign policy in a manner that did not reflect Kenyatta's position. Hence, on a number of occasions, Murumbi was forced by the president to retract a statement or position. One such occasion took place in December 1965 after Murumbi, without consulting with Kenyatta, voted with other foreign ministers in favour of Kenya and all other African states, severing diplomatic relations with the U.K. over U.D.I. As shown earlier, Nyerere was the first head of state to publicly accept this O.A.U. resolution. Kenyatta, on
the other hand, forced Murumbi to retract his position and to acknowledge the fact i) that Kenyatta was right (in rejecting the idea of severing of diplomatic relations with U.K.) and ii) that the President had taken this statesmanlike position in the best interests of Kenya.

A second and similar incident took place in October 1965 when Murumbi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, accused the United States of using Vietnam as "a testing ground for newly devised weapons of destruction and of talking hypocritically of peace while engaged in aggressive military action, which was the "greatest menace to international peace and security." This speech not only contradicted an earlier one by Kenyatta to the diplomatic corps in Nairobi -- in which he praised President Johnson's initiative in bringing the Vietnam issue before the U.N. -- but aroused protest from the American government. Murumbi was consequently instructed by Kenyatta to call on U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and "clarify" Kenya's official policy.

These incidents indicate that although Kenyatta remained as the final arbiter of foreign policy during this period, Murumbi's unorthodox approach, coupled with Oginga Odinga's semi-official close outside contacts with the Eastern bloc and in the other critics of Kenya's policy inside the government, all combined to create a sense of urgency within the Comprador-led regime and its Western allies (particularly the U.K. and the U.S.) of the need to eradicate "Communism" from Kenya. Again, as indicated in Tanzania's case, the cold war politics of the time transformed the struggle over the control of the state and the political economy into a bipolar ideological conflict.
Thus between 1964 and 1966 all the "Pro-East" elements within the government were gradually isolated; by 1969 they had been completely removed from any active political participation. The assassination of Gio Gama Pinto in 1965 was closely followed by the 1966 political crisis which resulted in Odinga resigning from the ruling party, K.A.N.U., to form his opposition party, Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.). He was consequently joined by other radicals. Munyua Waiyaki was one of the few Odinga followers who did not join him in K.P.U. However, Waiyaki did resign from his ministerial position to become an ordinary back-bencher. Murumbi was relieved of his foreign Minister's position, to take Odinga's largely ceremonial post of Vice President; while the foreign ministry was downgraded to a ministry of State within the President's office.

In Tanzania on the other hand, as already explained in chapter two, circumstances led to Nyerere becoming the undisputed authority in foreign affairs, so making it difficult in subsequent years for other members of government to manipulate external policy to the same degree as in Kenya. With the exception of Oscar Kambona, who during his time as Minister for external affairs was said to have deviated from his brief in presenting Tanzania's case before a meeting of O.A.U. Foreign Ministers, the great majority of M.P.s as well as T.A.N.U. officials and members solidly supported Nyerere's position on foreign policy.

In Kenya, then, as is shown later in this chapter, the prevailing internal conflicts that often bore highly charged ideological overtones poured over into strains and stresses in relations with the Eastern bloc and in associations with
Western bloc. Hence, during most of the sixties the Comprador-led government, with the political, economic and military support of its Western allies, systematically weeded out "communist" elements within the country and reduced Soviet and Chinese diplomatic relations to a mere formality, just short of severing ties altogether. Under such circumstances, it was almost impossible to draw a demarcation line between Kenya's domestic and foreign relations. Thus just as Nyerere viewed Western imperialism and super-power interventionism as the major enemies to Tanzania's development and foreign policies, Kenyatta and his supporters viewed "Communism" with similar aversion, as will be shown in the analysis that follows.


As a culmination to a long-growing series of "shifita" attacks which Somali separatists were supporting, Kenya declared a state of emergency in the North Eastern Region on Christmas Day 1963, barely two weeks after formal independence. For the next three years, Kenya and Somalia engaged in a war of attrition over the former's North-Eastern province to which the latter also laid claim. After June 1967, two factors worked against continuing the dispute. First, the Arab-Israeli War in June closed the Suez Canal, shutting off the sale of Somali bananas to Italy — the main source of revenue. And second, Mohamed Egal who became Somalia's Prime Minister the same year, had an entirely different approach to international relations from the extreme attitude adopted by his predecessor, Abderizak Haji Hussein.
Thus a combination of new leadership and reduced revenue in Somalia made it difficult to supply men and materials for sustained combat. This led to the temporary ending of hostilities and to the signing of a peace agreement at Arusha Tanzania, by President Kenyatta and Prime Minister Egal on 27 October 1967.

In the meantime Kenya, unable to sustain militarily the war on its own, had turned to Britain for military assistance. This was provided not only in the form of equipment but also in the form of British troops who fought Somalis alongside Kenyan troops. This, unlike Tanzania, where British troops were invited briefly to put down the mutiny and then discharged in Kenya, the mutiny marked the beginning of a military "alliance" between Kenya and Britain. This point will be pursued further in examining the Kenyan mutiny.

The border conflict with Somalia had then both short- and long-term political and economic effects for Kenya. Economically, it cost the government $70 million in unplanned military expenditure (not to mention other indirect costs) in the early years of independence. And politically, it pushed Kenya towards greater cooperation with and dependence upon Britain and the United States as secure sources of material and other support.

Furthermore, two years later, in 1969, a military coup replaced the civilian government of Egal, with one that immediately announced its intention to develop Somalia on Socialist lines and to realise a "Greater Somalia" (which includes the North Eastern province of Kenya). The military regime in Somalia immediately established cordial relations with Tanzania, with which it shared a socialist ideology. Then in
early 1970, President Milton Obote of Uganda published his "Move to the Left" document — the Common Man's Charter — which proposed to "develop" Uganda's political economy along socialist lines as well.

All these developments made Kenya feel threatened by "socialist encirclement" within Eastern Africa. Consequently relations with pre-revolutionary Ethiopia which had always been close, became even closer during this period, and even closer still to the major Western powers, their main source of military assistance. However, the continuity in close ties between Kenya and post-revolutionary Ethiopia in the 1970s is a clear indication that Kenya places greater importance on security rather than ideological issues — except where ideological conflicts threaten security.


Following, the outbreak of the Kenya-Somalia War, the second major threat to Kenyatta's government arose in January 1964, with the series of mutinies which swept over East Africa on the heels of the Zanzibar revolution. That in Tanzania, as already shown, was the first followed by army mutinies in Uganda and finally in Kenya.

The mutiny in Kenya broke out when a group of soldiers of the 11th Battalion Kenya Rifles stationed at Lanet army camp, about 200 miles from Nairobi, broke into the armoury and seized 120 weapons and several boxes of ammunition. As in Tanzania, their major grievances were over low wages and the slow rate of Africanisation. However, unlike Nyerere, Kenyatta did not hesitate to call immediately upon the British
forces still stationed in Kenya (at the Kahawa base about 20 miles from Nairobi) to put down the mutiny, which lasted only 17 hours, as compared to almost a week in Tanzania.

The Prime Minister in a statement on 25 January, described "the action of these soldiers as a grave betrayal of the trust and confidence given to them by the people of Kenya". He said that those who took part would be dealt with according to military law without any compromise. And, indeed, Kenyatta stuck to his stern, unyielding position. Hence, unlike Nyerere who entered into negotiations and compromised with the mutineers over Africanisation and wage increases, Kenyatta resorted to punitive measures. Thus, on 5 May 1964, 16 of the participants were found guilty of mutiny with violence; 11 were sentenced to 14 years imprisonment, 3 to 11 years and 2 to 5 years.

In the meantime, Kenya had not only expressed its gratitude to the British government for the latter's assistance in putting down the mutiny, but had established closer military ties with Britain. For example, those British forces which were still in Kenya were to stay on to recruit and train an indigenous army, navy and airforce. Thus, in a joint communiqué issued by Prime Minister Kenyatta and British Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys, it was announced that, "Britain would cooperate with Kenya in plans to expand the country's army and airforce and to set up a small naval force for coastal defence. It was also agreed that the British Service personnel and British troops would continue to play an important part for some time".
to come in the training and development of Kenya's armed forces.  

In return for this "generous" British military assistance, Kenyatta agreed that, subject to normal clearance,

"the (British) Royal Air Force would be accorded 'facilities' for overflying and staging in Kenya, and that the British government would from time to time send units for training in Kenya on joint exercises with Kenya army. British naval vessels would be permitted to carry out maintenance in Mombasa." 

Right from independence then, Kenya moved to continued military dependence on Britain. Indeed, throughout the sixties Kenya was almost entirely dependent on Britain for military supplies. This situation has altered slightly since the 1970s as shown in the next chapter. Hence, while Tanzania moved away from Britain to establish close military links with China, Kenya opted for continuity rather than change. Perhaps the only difference between these two types of military dependence is that Britain belongs to the N.A.T.O. alliance while China does not belong to any such alliance. Hence, China is technically not a threat to the pursuit of non-alignment. Furthermore, while Kenya offered Britain military "facilities", Tanzania does not seem to have provided China with similar facilities in Dar-es-Salaam. Whether or not these differences in the technicalities of military dependence can be interpreted to mean that Kenya is far more open to British influence than Tanzania is to China's, is subject to debate.
The 1964 Congo Fiasco: Kenya's Response

The 1964 Congo Crisis has already been discussed in the context of Tanzania's role. Here I shall confine my analysis to the particular role played by Kenya: its leadership attitudes and reactions to the crisis.

Kenya, unlike Tanzania, was placed in a position where it had to play a more participatory role in the Congo affair, primarily because Kenyatta was appointed by the O.A.U. to be the Chairman of the Commission established to mediate between the warring factions in the conflict. This appointment, which he accepted on 15 September 1964, came about for two main reasons. First, as a new nation which had been independent for approximately nine months, Kenya had not been involved in the old quarrels and ideological divisions in the O.A.U. between the "radical" panafricanists headed by the late President Nkrumah of Ghana and the "gradualists" led by the late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria. Furthermore, Ghana and Nigeria had been directly involved in an earlier military involvement in the Congo. Kenya, therefore, presented a neutral factor with no prior diplomatic involvement. Second, Kenyatta, one of the founding fathers of the Pan-Africanist movement, was thought capable of bringing the quarrelling sides together. All in all, Kenyatta was regarded as the most suitable (i.e. "reasonable") choice for this mediatory role. Hence, in accepting this role, Kenyatta felt honoured to be chosen to play senior statesman, and he was genuinely interested in seeing the situation in the Congo peacefully settled. But this was not to be the case as already seen in examining Tanzania's position.
The picture that emerges from a reconstruction of the information available on Kenya's role in the Congo during this period is that Kenyatta was faced with two interrelated problems: 1) lack of credible and balanced information to be able to judge the merits and demerits of the case presented by the two warring groups — the established government in Leopoldville and the "rebel" government in Stanleyville; and ii) Kenyatta's own paradoxical position, as a "panafricanist" on the one hand, and a Western bloc "ally" on the other. While he was finding it difficult to decipher the contradictory information from participants and supporters of the two sides to the conflict he was also facing a personal problem in maintaining credibility as a pan-africanist while at the same time making sure not to antagonise American and by extension Western "friends".

To play a balanced role, given these two basic problems, proved to be no small task. Indeed the contradictions in Kenyatta's mediatory role clearly emerge from the candid and very revealing account by William Attwood, who was then American Ambassador to Kenya and who was also a personal friend of the president. From this account, which is largely corroborated by the only major local English newspaper during this period, it becomes clear that all the anti-American and anti-Tshombe statements hostile denunciations and demonstrations emerging from Kenya, did not have the support of Kenyatta. Rather they were engineered and propagated primarily by the key members of the "indigenous" fraction of the government. Because of the official positions by these individuals, Kenyatta seemed to be unable to control their activities.
Nevertheless, Kenyatta's good intentions towards the United States were not lost on the Americans as Attwood clearly demonstrates. Attwood seemed to sense and understand Kenyatta's dilemma and was anxious to point out that, on those occasions during the 1964 Congo Crisis when Kenyatta appeared to be anti-American, he was doing so under pressure from the "radicals" who supported the "rebels" in Stanleyville.

Attwood recounts, for example, one occasion as negotiations for the release of the white hostages were still in progress, when he observed what he interpreted as mounting anti-American pressure upon Kenyatta:

"Murumbi broke in with an emotional attack on American policy, which he said was dictated by our financial interests in the Congo. Kenyatta cut him off and told me (Attwood) that he opposed all foreign interference in the Congo and that the Africans would take care of the Chinese; but he (Kenyatta) did need our (U.S.) cooperation in grounding our planes and hoped we could work together to stop the killings. As I walked out, (Soviet) Ambassador Lavrov was waiting to come in: "the campaign to confuse and capture Kenyatta was really in high gear". (emphasis added).

An incident which clearly demonstrated that Kenyatta did not share anti-American sentiments during this period occurred on 26 September 1964, when a group of demonstrators in Nairobi — who according to Attwood claimed to represent K.A.N.U. but were indeed hired by the Ghanaian
High Commission — carried a banner with the sign 'Hang Johnson'.

Kenyatta found this so offensive that he had K.A.N.U. issue a statement repudiating and denouncing the demonstrators. According to Attwood, Kenyatta had come to realise that,

"Kenya was more important than the Congo and that he was risking failure and humiliation by not meeting us (Americans) halfway and by allowing Odinga to entice him into the left field ... Kenyatta was above all a politician, to whom Odinga was more of a threat than Tshombe. He now wishes he had never gotten into this O.A.U. thing".  

Indeed, Kenyatta did seem to have been swayed by the Americans and their supporters in Kenya, to the point where he changed from his original position of calling for a ceasefire while negotiating for the release of the hostages, to one where he accepted the American position for the evacuation of the hostages to be given priority over a ceasefire. Furthermore, although Kenyatta knew of the existence of the paratroopers on Ascension Island, and indeed was informed by Ambassador Attwood that the paratroopers could be dropped in Stanleyville any time after the breakdown of the talks, he did not bother to warn the revolutionaries in Stanleyville, if only to pre-empt the surprise aspect of the "air drop". Indeed, while most of independent Africa was reacting angrily and denouncing American aggression in the Congo, Kenyatta's reaction was described by Attwood as "sober and without emotion". According to the latter, who was in the audience during Kenyatta's address to the O.A.U. Ad hoc Commission in Nairobi on 27 November 1964:
"Kenyatta referred to the hostages as hostages and not 'prisoners of war'.... There was no implication of duplicity and no mention of aggression.... When the Ethiopian Ambassador later referred to (Americans) as 'international bandits', I shrugged it off; he was just another rider on the emotional bandwagon. But the key man, Kenyatta seemed to be putting on the brakes".  

(emphasis added).

In these circumstances, Attwood clearly had every reason to brag about what he obviously saw as an American victory on the Congo issue as well as over the final defeat of the Kenyan "radicals" who had been trying to instil anti-American attitudes in Kenyatta. Hence, in spite of the pressure from those such as Odinga who demanded that Attwood be expelled from Kenya and diplomatic relations broken with the U.S., Belgium and U.K., Kenyatta managed to resist these "radicals".  

According to Attwood, Kenyatta and his inner circle of advisers were now

"more concerned about whether our (U.S.) emotions had been stirred up to the point that we had lost interest in helping Kenya's development".  

In similar circumstances, as shown above, Nyerere would have refused to consider aid over principle. For Kenya on the other hand, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states was sacrificed at the alter of short-term economic benefits. Hence, while Nyerere and other African patriots were still decrying and denouncing
"imperialist aggression" in the Congo, Kenyatta and his advisors were already trying to mend fences with the Americans. As Attwood gleefully points out:

"Kenyatta was back on a Kenyan wavelength, warning his audience against subversion and taking bribes from foreigners".

For Kenya, this incident demonstrated the extent to which the government was open to influence from those Western countries on which it was dependent. It also revealed a naive attitude to international politics. Kenyatta, like Nyerere during the same period, had assumed that his interests on the Congo issue were similar to those of the Americans. Like Nyerere, he had hoped to resolve the Congo issue peacefully through appeal to reason. In this respect he was both disappointed by his diplomatic failure to resolve the Congo issue peacefully; and he also felt personally betrayed by the Americans whom he had naively trusted as friends with whom he could cooperate. Unlike Nyerere, however, Kenyatta, because of his preference for economic gains over principles, succumbed to American pressure, whereas the former would have resisted.

For Kenyatta, as for Nyerere and other African leaders, this incident shattered any illusions, about either the power of African countries; or their ability to effect foreign policy goals that conflict with those of a major power. Their powerlessness in the Congo was summarised rather cynically, yet aptly by Attwood:
"In a matter of weeks, two hundred swaggering white
mercenaries had driven through an area of the size of
France, scattered the Simbas ('rebels') and captured
their capital; and in a matter of hours, 545 Belgian
and American planes had defied the O.A.U., jumped into
the heart of Africa and taken out nearly two thousand
people -- with the loss of (only) one paratrooper ...
the white man with a gun, the old plunderer who had
enslaved (Africa's) ancestors, was back again, doing
what he pleased, when he pleased, where he pleased.
And there wasn't a damn thing Africa could do about
it except yell rape".  

Kenyatta did not even yell "rape" as Nyerere did. The latter's "loss
of innocence" as shown earlier led him to 'move to the Left'. The
former did just the opposite. He seemed to have followed religiously
Attwood's suggestion that he should avoid meddling in international
issues that were not of direct interest to Kenya. Thus he withdrew
from any further personal involvement in international affairs, while
Kenya's foreign policy became more cautious, conservative and pro-Western.

Kenya's response to Rhodesia's U.D.I., 1965

The Kenyan approach to the crisis over U.D.I., was markedly
different from that of Tanzania. The two governments came down on pre-
cisely opposite sides of the fence, starting with the two presidents'
divergent reactions to the O.A.U. Foreign Minister's resolution to
sever relations with the U.K. if the 15 December ultimatum was not met.
Unlike Nyerere, not only did Kenyatta dissociate Kenya from this resolution but he reprimanded Murumbi for voting in favour of it. Indeed Kenya was not among the ten African states which actually severed relations with U.K. over U.D.I. Addressing Parliament on 10 December, Kenyatta explained that government had decided to consult more fully with East African neighbours (including Zambia) and other African states to determine the best action to take:

"We feel that unilateral action by any African states would not meet the situation. Since the O.A.U. resolution had been announced, there had been conflicting reactions by various African states. This means that action taken would not be effective and could, in fact be abortive. We are particularly concerned that the Zambian government had expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of breaking diplomatic relations with Britain."

This statement portrays a typical "wait and see what others do" attitude which characterise Kenya's responses to foreign policy issues that did not affect it directly. Thus, even if Zambia had broken relations with U.K. over U.D.I., Kenya would still have been one of the last to follow suit, as was demonstrated in its slowness to break with Israel in 1973, to be discussed in the following chapter. On U.D.I., Kenya was probably more concerned about retaining good relations with the U.K. than with upholding the principle of majority rule.
The Biafran Crisis: Kenya's Response

The only other continental event in the 1960s over which the Kenyan government felt obliged to voice its position was Biafra. It will be recalled that Tanzania, on humanitarian grounds recognised Biafra. Pressed to do likewise by members of the short-lived K.P.U. opposition in support of the Tanzanian position, the government's response displayed caution and restraint, typical of its reaction to international issues that are deemed inconsequential:

"Kenya would not make a decision on an international issue just because 'a good neighbour' has done so. The situation in Biafra is delicate and difficult and it should be realised that efforts are being made all over the world to find a solution. Discussion of the Nigerian situation in this House is not likely to help all concerned in finding an amicable solution to this delicate issue."[117]

The 'delicacy' of this issue obviously was convenient for the government, which generally preferred to 'sit on the fence' on such issues, rather than take a stand like Tanzania.

The 1967-Arab-Israeli War: Kenya's Response

As seen in the examination of Tanzania's attitude to the Arab-Israeli dispute, most independent African states' response to the outbreak of the 6-day-war was to condemn Israel's aggression and to call for the withdrawal of its troops from occupied Arab territory to the position they held before hostilities.
Significantly, as in the 1964 Congo Crisis, Kenya did not join in this condemnation of Israel. Indeed, it abstained from voting on the resolution taken at the U.N. General Assembly debate. By abstaining, Kenya suddenly found itself in the 'imperialist' camp of abstainers who included the United States, South Africa and Portugal. Referring directly to the few African countries (including Kenya) that had abstained from voting, the Algerian government lamented:

"American imperialism is still dominant over the world's reactionary and ancient regimes ... Abstention from voting amounts to enabling the traitors, imperialism and the agents of Israel to achieve their colonial aims."

Clearly, it was relatively easy and advantageous for Kenya at this stage in the Arab-Israeli conflict to maintain its typical middle of the road position, since most of black Africa was still ambivalent on the Arab-Israeli question and also because it was prior to the O.P.E.C. use of the oil weapon in the early-to-mid 1970s. Consequently, with the change in global situation as is shown in chapter 5, Kenya's response to the 1973 Ramadhan War and its subsequent relations with the Arabs portray a number of contradictions and inconsistencies. These can be seen to arise out of a lack of a clearly defined policy towards the Middle East and Kenya's pro-Israel position.

ix) Internal Conflict and Foreign Policy: 1964-1966

The concern of Kenya's Comprador-led government with domestic stability and territorial integrity has always been necessitated by the felt-need to keep the confidence of the foreigners, particularly foreign
investors, tourists and governments that are viewed as essential sources of Kenya's "development" assistance. Transnational links between Kenyan Compradors and the MNCs have already been discussed in chapter 3. What remains to be shown is the link between foreign policy on the one hand and, on the other, relations between the indigenous fraction and the Compradors, as well as West-East involvement in this network.

Dissension within government and conflict over foreign policy, first became apparent five months after formal independence, when Odinga, then Minister of Home Affairs, began to take independent action without consulting the Cabinet and/or the Prime Minister. In May 1964, for instance, he headed a mission to Moscow and Peking, where economic and technical aid agreements were negotiated and signed without the full knowledge or agreement of the rest of the Cabinet, including the Minister of Finance James Gichuru. Thus, in response to information that China had offered to lend Kenya £5 million interest free, and to make an outright grant of £1 million, the Minister seemed to have been caught off guard when he stated:

"I think our position is that we cannot comment on this as the whole question of the agreement will have to go before the Cabinet, and as the Cabinet has not yet met since Mr. Odinga came back, it would be unwise of us to comment. Once the Cabinet has met and reached a decision, the whole matter will almost certainly be turned over to my Ministry ...."120
Odina's personal contacts with socialist leaders, particularly those in the Soviet Union and China, were well known to Kenyatta. It was Odina who had negotiated with the U.S.S.R. for an ideological party school -- the Lumumba Institute -- built on the outskirts of Nairobi, and manned by two Soviet instructors. Odina was also alleged to have been receiving Soviet armaments for the purpose of overthrowing Kenyatta. Thus, during Kenyatta's absence in July 1964 while attending the Commonwealth Conference in London, it was strongly rumoured that Odina was preparing a coup d'état.

When Kenyatta returned from London at the end of July, he referred to the rumour without alluding to anyone in particular warning "those who received foreign money to 'spoil' Kenya. Together with their foreign agents, they should stop their intrigues and yesterday was their last day for playing this game .... If people started intrigues, innuendos and conspiracies to incite the workless to revolt, Kenya's newly-won reputation would disappear ... if people tried to undermine the government they would be detained".

Odina did not do much to dispel Kenyatta's suspicions. Besides his personal contacts with the Soviets and the Chinese, he openly 'flirted' with and defended Orthodox, Marxian socialism -- thus taking advantage of the ease of dealing with a super-power in a bipolar situation. One such occasion occurred in early September 1964, when he allowed several Russians to address a large K.A.N.U. rally. In his own speech Oginga defended the
Soviets and subtly suggested the existence of Imperialism in Kenya:

"People had been deceived and given the wrong impression of the Soviet Union and the Russian people ... upon Kenya becoming a republic on 12 December 1964, there would be a lot of changes for the better. Imperialists would be swept away completely". 124

Furthermore, Odinga was also alleged to have sent 18 Kenyans to China on a one-year course in guerrilla warfare. 125

In the meantime charges were still being made that certain "leaders of government including an unnamed Minister, were receiving money from foreign blocs". To rationalise these charges an alternative definition of non-alignment -- involving an internal spectrum -- was introduced, one with some implications for domestic factions:

"There could be no policy of non-alignment as long as leaders in the government continue to receive money from certain foreign powers. It is impossible to believe that a foreign government would give money to people without expecting something for it". 126

It was not only "foreign" money that was viewed as compromising Kenya's non-alignment: 'foreign' (socialist) ideology was also 'thrown' in, for good measure:

"... There are those foreign powers seeking to confuse our country and have succeeded in confusing a few of our people with a meaningless phrase ... scientific socialism .... To say we must have scientific socialism
is meaningless unless the promoters of such ideas have
a particular country in mind which they want us to
copy." 127

Nevertheless, these various interpretations of non-alignment could
not always conceal the obvious Pro-Western bias of the Comprador fraction.
This was revealed clearly in a speech delivered by Tom Mboya to a K.A.N.U.
conference:

"Kenya cannot be duped into thinking that the only evil
that can come to the country can come from the West,
merely because our former colonial masters and imperialists
of the past have come from the West. Nor can anyone deceive
us into believing that there is no basis for good and
genuine friendship with the nations of the West. Much lip
service has been paid in some communist quarters to the
idea of giving economic assistance to Kenya but, in fact,
most of our present day development and the measures we
are taking for our economy and reconstruction are being
greatly assisted through the friendly cooperation and
understanding of some nations of the West, such as Britain,
West Germany and the United States .... It must be made
clear that merely because Eastern countries have never
had a colony in Africa, this does not mean that they have
no cold war designs upon Africa. In any case, we have
made it clear that we reject the ideology of communism". 128

(emphasis added).
This statement, which was supported by Kenyatta in his Madaraka Day speech on 1 June 1965, not only demonstrates Kenya's pro-western bias in foreign policy but also a rather sophisticated manipulation of the notion of non-alignment to fit in with government's economic objectives. Kenyatta's own speech portrayed a similar reinterpretation of non-alignment designed to outmanoeuvre the radical nationalist fraction:

"If we are truly non-aligned, we must not avoid making friends with those Western countries who extend an honest hand in the field of cooperation and trade".

Non-alignment, then, was used by the Compradors not only to justify the continuation of alignment but also to discredit Odinga and others who allegedly had attempted to introduce "communism" in Kenya as well as overthrow Kenyatta's government. The move to weed out "communism", intensified in 1965, was increasingly directed at the Chinese and the Soviets, as a demonstration of the Kenyan government's disgust with external as well as internal "interference".

The determination to keep out Russian influence was demonstrated on 29 April 1965 when the government refused to accept Soviet arms that had arrived in Mombasa earlier in the month. Significantly, when the consignment first arrived, Kenya's Minister of Defense, Njoroge Mungai, acknowledged it as a gift from the Soviet to the Kenyan government, adding that it would be used to modernise certain sections of the Kenya army. However, in what came as a dramatic turnabout, Kenyatta then announced that government had rejected the consignment of arms because they were old and second-hand.
"The Kenya government has carefully examined the consignment of arms recently sent to Kenya by the government of U.S.S.R. The government has come to the conclusion that all the arms are too old, second-hand and would be of no use to the modern army of Kenya. The government has therefore today rejected and sent back these arms". 133

It could be argued that by declining to accept Soviet military aid, Kenya was exercising its right to pick and choose, just as Tanzania had done in 1964 when it rejected British military aid. However, to reject a "gift" of arms on the grounds that it was too old is hardly convincing, given the fact that the military hardware Kenya was receiving from Britain was neither new nor modern. It would seem more credible that between 14 and 29 April the British government, with which Kenya had established formal military agreements, had pressured the latter into rejecting Russian arms. Although one cannot draw a generalisation based on one case alone, it would seem that, at least in this particular incident, Kenya's military dependence on Britain made it vulnerable to British influence and unable to exercise its claimed non-aligned policy.

The process of weeding out "communism" was also marked by the banning of all "communist literature", the last of which was a quarterly magazine called Revolution in Africa. 134 The Lukumba Institute, which was alleged to be training communists, was taken over by the government on 30 April 1965 and put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. 135
Eventually, the pro-East-indigenous fraction was almost completely outmanoeuvred. A vote of no-confidence in Kaggia's leadership was passed by the predominantly Comprador parliamentarians on 2 May 1965, while the following day certain members of Parliament called for Odinga's resignation, on the grounds that he was "embarrassing the government by singing the communist tune". In retaliation, Odinga accused Western "imperialists" of continuing to work hard to divide the leaders and give advice on who should be the leaders in Kenya ... their (imperialist) agents still used weak politicians for their ends and their only aim was to continue with their economic domination of Kenya. Odinga was clearly referring to transnational linkages between the Comprador and Metropolitan bourgeoisies, discussed in chapter 3. He specifically referred to the British and the Americans as being responsible for "creating tension in Kenya" alleging that the British High Commissioner and the American Ambassador went to Kenyatta everyday telling him the Americans and the British were the only people friendly to Kenya. Odinga's allegations did not however improve his position in Kenyatta's government out of which he was gradually being phased. The final blow came when Kenyatta decided to oust him as Chairman of the influential Parliamentary Group on 25 June 1965. Soon after, Odinga's supporters in Parliament were systematically eliminated from other influential positions.
"Communism" like "non-alignment" had by the end of 1966 been conveniently and successfully employed as a cloak for eliminating opposition within the country, as well as an instrument for creating estranged relations with the Soviet Union and China; thus facilitating the development of closer (albeit more dependent) relationships with the Americans and the British, whose assistance -- material and informational -- had proved invaluable in the eradication of the "enemies" of foreign-dominated, free enterprise system in Kenya.

It is within this context of internal fractional strife and external cold war competition, that Kenya's relations with leading representatives of both blocs during the sixties should be viewed. An analysis of these relations follows next.

x) Kenya's Foreign Policy towards Individual Countries

Kenya and the West -- U.K., U.S. and West Germany

It is evident from the present and the previous chapter that Kenya's official and transnational relations with the West throughout the sixties were warm and friendly; i.e. with the exception of the 'indigenous' fraction of the Kenyan ruling 'class'. This fraction, as shown above, was outmanoeuvred by the dominant comprador group by the end of 1966.

Kenya's close relations with the West during this period, were largely a reflection of its colonial and post-colonial political economy as well as related values and attitudes acquired through the colonial socialisation process. I have shown in chapters two and three the persistence of underdevelopment and structural dependence of Kenya's political economy on the international capitalist one. The Kenyan
leadership, unlike its Tanzanian counterpart has not even attempted to
disengage but has instead adopted an acquiescent attitude. This
acquiescence towards inherited structural linkages with the world
economy has been maintained at the expense, for instance, of diversifying
Kenya's international economic relations away from traditional principal
trading partners, all of whom are major Western-capitalist countries.
Such structural continuities as well as the expansion of new transnational
linkages between the Kenyan state and foreign capitalist states and
institutions, largely explain the strong pro-western bias that charac-
terise Kenya's foreign policy.

The development of transnational links between Kenyan leaders and
Western capitalists was facilitated by the former's cultural dependence
on the latter. As explained earlier, Western education and colonial
socialisation moulded most African recipients to aspire to and to prefer
things Western -- consumption tastes and lifestyle -- rather than indi-
genous one. Shared values with the West held by most African leaders
and the related history of association, may explain, at least partially,
why Kenyan Compradors found it easier to trust and hence to depend
on the West rather than on the East. In this respect, then, it would
seem that Nyerere of Tanzania, is the exception rather than the rule,
among those African leaders who have to some significant extent overcome
the cultural/psychological bond with former colonisers and mentors.

It would seem then that the nature of the national political economy
and the leadership's colonial mentality help to explain why the Kenyan
government adopted an anti-socialist and pro-capitalist orientation.
Thus, the government's pathological "fear" of and aversion to "communism" (real or imagined) portrayed in the 1960s and the view of the British and the Americans as its most natural allies, is largely a reflection of its colonial socialisation and inherited political economy.

Throughout the sixties the government of Kenya, in words and in deeds, demonstrated its determination to maintain close relations with the West, particularly with Britain, the United States and West Germany, who remained major trading partners and sources of foreign public and private capital. Various incidents can be drawn from the foregoing analysis to illustrate this point. Kenyatta's ambivalent attitude during his mediatory role in the Congo and his eventual reconciliatory attitude towards the Americans is one case in point. Other cases include Kenya's refusal to break relations with Britain over U.D.I., abstention from U.N. voting on the Arab-Israeli issue, granting Pan-American Airways air traffic rights while denying similar rights to Aeroflot, granting military facilities to the United Kingdom and, of course, repeated references to the United States, Britain and West Germany as Kenya's "best friends".

Although at one level the examples provided above would portray its foreign policy as "aligned" to the West, from Kenya's point of view this is not the case. Indeed, Kenya (and Tanzania as well) seems to have taken advantage of the ambiguities of the concept of non-alignment and hence its susceptibility to a variety of interpretations. For Kenya the right to choose friends and enemies seems to be central to its definition. While such a definition is acceptable, there is still the question of whether the right
is necessarily accompanied by the ability or intention to choose and judge world issues on their merits rather than through the lenses or pressures of others.

In my view, there is much in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour that portrays a skillful exercise of the right to choose economic and other partners but not necessarily the ability to judge world issues independent of its external associates. This point is pursued further in chapters 5 and 6.

Kenya and the U.S.S.R.

As explained earlier in this chapter, Kenya's aversion to "communism" was largely translated into resentment and suspicion of Soviet and Chinese intentions. Except for Odinga and his supporters, for whom the U.S.S.R. was a misunderstood friendly nation, most of the Comprador ministers in the government, viewed the Soviet Union as being constantly armed with communist ideology and ammunition aimed at overthrowing them.

By rejecting the Russian 'gift' package of armaments, Kenya had demonstrated (whether unilaterally or through Western pressure) that it did not want to develop military links with the U.S.S.R. Furthermore in February 1966, Kenya rejected another aid package from the U.S.S.R. on the grounds that its terms were not acceptable.

This latter package consisted of two "gift" projects -- a 200 bed hospital to be built at Kisumu, a 1,000-student college and seven credit agreements. To finance these projects the U.S.S.R. proposed exporting goods to Kenya which would be sold on the open market, the funds thereby generated being used for project expenses. This was in some
ways similar to the agreement reached between China-Tanzania-Zambia for the repayment of local expenses incurred in building TAZARA. However, unlike Tanzania and Zambia, Kenya rejected the Russian proposal and hence the aid program collapsed on 18 February 1966. The government made a statement to announce and provide reasons for this collapse:

"The Kenya government has decided against the financing of the scheme through a commodity credit arrangement. Such an arrangement would take too long, as it depends on the successful sale of goods from the Soviet Union. We are not even in a position to guarantee that such a sale will generate enough currency." 145

Significantly, in spite of this categorical rejection of the whole package, the hospital project, located in Odinga's home town -- Kisumu -- was somehow salvaged and completed in 1969.

Kenya's reluctance to establish close relations with the Soviet Union had earlier been displayed in June 1965, 146 when it was announced that air traffic rights had been granted to the U.S. government, to be exercised by Pan American Airways. Although seemingly innocuous and routine, this announcement was significant in that there had been an understanding among the three East African countries to the effect that, to emphasise their adherence to non-alignment, they would next grant air traffic rights to a socialist state -- the U.S.S.R. -- Aeroflot, since British Airways and Air France were already operating in East Africa. But on reconsideration, Kenya could see no "economic advantage" in having Aeroflot land in Nairobi. On the other hand, PanAm, which
had agreed to build an "international-standard" hotel in Nairobi, offered more economic advantage, particularly since East African Airways would achieve reciprocal rights in New York.

Again, the argument for economic advantage deriving from doing business with capitalists rather than socialists seems logical for Kenya, given the fact that its political economy is dominated by M.N.C.s whose own 'roots' are in Western Europe and the U.S. and not in socialist states. The main issue here, however, is whether the government's decision to deny Aeroflot landing rights was made independently or in collusion with or as a result of pressure from Western interests. Viewed from a transnational-dependency perspective, it is most likely that a combination of collusion and pressure produced the decision.

Apart from Kenya's reluctance to develop close economic relations with the Soviet Union, it also disliked the latter's socialist ideology. Thus part of the campaign to eradicate "communism" from Kenya was directed at the Soviet (and other socialist) governments and peoples, particularly those resident in Nairobi. As part of this exercise, three Soviet journalists, along with three others from Czechoslovakia and China, were expelled from Kenya for allegedly seeking to sabotage the Kenyatta government.

The Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 gave government a perfect opportunity to denounce and condemn what was termed "a naked and brutal manifestation of the worst form of imperialism" as if to suggest that there are better forms of imperialism presumably Western imperialism, which Kenya had consistently refrained from
condemning. In any event, this issue was heralded for several weeks in the press and on radio, as a graphic illustration of the Soviet Union's crude 'imperialist' actions. As shown earlier, Tanzania's response to this invasion was similar to Kenya's, but for somewhat different reasons, which are examined later in this chapter. Furthermore, Tanzania did not in general display as much hostility towards the Soviet Union as did Kenya.

Nevertheless, in spite of the bilateral conflicts examined above, Kenya's relations with the Soviet Union did not hit rock bottom as those with China, as is shown in the analysis that follows next.

Kenya and China

Relations between Kenya and China had from the start been "cool" due to the fact that China provided arms to Somalia, with whom, as I have already shown, Kenya was involved in a border dispute. Furthermore, Chinese Premier, Chou-En-Lai's statement in Mogadishu Somalia, on 3 February 1964 that "Revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout Africa", did not go down too well with the largely anti-revolutionary elements in Kenyatta's government. Quite apart from their differences with Somalia, they considered the "revolution" to have already been accomplished in Kenya and did not care to hear anyone suggest otherwise. Consequently, Chou-En-Lai's intended visit to Kenya was quietly postponed.

A further demonstration of anti-revolutionary sentiment in Kenya came the following year, 1965, when during a state visit to Tanzania
Chou-En-Lai made a similar statement: "an exceedingly favourable situation for revolution prevails in Africa". This time the Kenya government felt compelled to respond and to make its position clear:

"The Kenya government wishes it to be known that Kenya intends to avert all revolutions irrespective of their origin or whether they come from inside or are influenced from outside .... Finally the government wishes to reaffirm its stand by the declared policy of non-alignment in world power politics".

It is interesting that the statement ends with a reaffirmation of the government's "dedication" to non-alignment -- a convenient foil to disguise the anti-Socialist bias apparent in the earlier part of the statement.

Dislike for Chinese revolutionary calls, coupled with the generally-held suspicion that the Chinese, along with the Russians, were assisting the Odinga group in its attempt to overthrow the government, contributed to the strain in relations between Kenya and China during much of the sixties. Furthermore, the Chinese like the Russians were not important as sources of aid, investment and/or trading partners. Indeed, as shown earlier, the Kenyan government had subtly discouraged close relations -- whether economic, political or cultural -- with Eastern countries in general, and China and Soviet Union in particular.

Again, given the cold war politics of this period, as well as the domination of Kenyan political economy by Western capitalist interests, it is hardly
surprising that foreign policy towards the East was characterised more by conflict than by cooperation.

Consequently, relations with the Eastern bloc states were from almost the beginning allowed to deteriorate. Indeed, after Somalia, Eastern countries came to be viewed as next in line on the list of sources of threat to Kenya's security and 'stability' — in almost the same way that Tanzania had come to view 'imperialism' in general and Western imperialism in particular.

Under these circumstances, Sino-Kenya relations began to deteriorate in late 1964 when some members of the government called for the expulsion of the Chinese from Kenya. The charge was that they were interfering in internal affairs. In particular they were accused of training Kenyans in China in guerilla warfare and of issuing statements to the Kenyan press denouncing Tshombe's Congo and the American intervention. These allegations were followed as already noted by the expulsion of Chinese (as well as Russian and Czech) diplomats and journalists on charges of engaging in subversive activities in Kenya. According to Attwood, all the expelled diplomats and journalists "happened to be intelligence agents with records of close association with Odinga and his lieutenants". But what Attwood did not say was that there were as many (if not more) agents attached to Western embassies in Nairobi who were not expelled. However, Attwood does admit that in its anti-communist campaign, the government came to depend on British and American intelligence information — which is really another way of saying that government was helping Western intelligence
agents to eliminate their Eastern rivals from Kenya. Be it as it may, it is significant to note that the expulsion of the journalists occurred just prior to the Anglo-American sponsored K.A.N.U. party conference at Limuru on 10 March 1966. It was this conference that marked the final isolation of Odinga and other "leftist" politicians, from the regime.

As was to be expected, the Chinese reaction to Kenya's accusations and expulsion of its journalists was not conciliatory. Indeed the diplomatic 'crisis' that followed was in some ways similar to that between Tanzania and U.K./U.S./West Germany in 1964-1965. The only difference perhaps was that Kenya did not suffer loss of economic assistance as had Tanzania. Furthermore, the Kenyatta regime had almost intentionally brought about the strains in its relations with China, while Tanzania's diplomatic ruptures were partially circumstantial and partially a reflection of Nyerere's principledness.

The first official reaction from China came not after the expulsion of its journalists, but after the expulsion of its Charge d'affaires in late June 1966, following an allegation that its Embassy had made "unwarranted attacks on the Kenya government and other foreign countries with which the Kenya government has diplomatic relations". Referring to the expulsion of the Charge d'affaires, Radio Peking said that it was "an exceedingly grave step taken by Kenya government of wilfully sabotaging relations between China and Kenya". China particularly blamed Tom Mboya (well-known for his pro-Americanism) for distorting the truth:
"... Mboya has with ulterior motives, viciously slandered China in the Kenyan Assembly by putting the Peoples Republic of China which has always firmly opposed imperialism, on par with U.S. imperialism. If tailing after imperialism, the Kenya government clings to its present course and continues to sabotage the relations between the two countries it will be held responsible for the consequences arising there from."  

The consequences came in the form of the expulsion of Kenya's Charge d'Affaires in Peking on 2 July 1967, followed by a mob attack on Kenya's Peking Embassy in August. Kenya's reaction to the latter reprisal measure bore the tone of aggressiveness and self-righteousness so typical of Tanzania's reaction to incidents that were deemed humiliating. Thus, a characteristic protest note was addressed to the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi and was subsequently made public:

"The Kenya government wishes to tell the Chinese Embassy that it is not part of its function to indulge in blatant lies and trickery in order to provoke a breach of relations between the two countries. The Embassy is not supposed to start or involve itself in campaigns of virulent hatred against the leaders of the Republic of Kenya. If this state of affairs continues, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China will be held accountable for the serious consequences that may follow."
No "serious consequences" followed as diplomatic relations were not broken. Indeed the formal severing of relations was not necessary given the fact that the objective of controlling the activities of the Chinese in Kenya had been achieved. Thus, for the rest of the 1960s, Sino-Kenyan relations remained in 'Limbo' and were not significantly revived until after Mao's death, as shown in the next chapter. Before that, I conclude this one with a comparative evaluation of these two states' first decade in the international system.


In this chapter, I have examined and analysed some of the major issues and events that dominated the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania during the decade of the 1960s. From this some significant similarities and differences in the two states' foreign policies have become apparent. Most of these can be explained largely within the theoretical model that was set out in the first chapter. However, some of them may not be so easily explained. Nevertheless, an attempt is made here to bring together in comparative form the salient differences and similarities in foreign policy that have emerged thus far.

1) Similarities

For both countries, the constraints set by their dependence and underdevelopment were most apparent in the inability of their leaderships to translate declared foreign policy goals into practice. The Congo crisis in 1964 constituted a clear demonstration of the powerlessness
and inability of Kenya and Tanzania (and indeed all O.A.U. members) to prevent a major power -- the United States -- from carrying out its interventionist activities. In this case, Kenya and Tanzania were unable to translate into practice two of their four major foreign policy objectives; namely, non-interference in internal affairs and the promotion of international peace. This incident was particularly humiliating for Kenya, whose President had been entrusted with a central role in settling the crisis. It revealed that Kenya's friendship with the United States depended on Kenya toeing the American line and not vice versa; the asymmetry of dependence.

For both Kenya and Tanzania, like most "new" states, the military is an important symbol of nationhood and source of prestige. The 1964 army mutinies shattered (at least temporarily) this image and exposed the fragility and elusiveness of formal independence and authority in the absence of the necessary resources (in this case military allegiance) to maintain some semblance of "stability". Under the circumstances, neither Kenya nor Tanzania had any choice but to accept the reality of their dependence on the former coloniser.

The reality of dependence and the inability to achieve foreign policy goals can be derived from Tanzania's diplomatic crises of 1964 and 1965 and from Kenya's political/diplomatic crisis of 1964 to 1967. First, Tanzania could not prevail on the advanced countries to give up their undesirable punitive measures against it, in spite of its attempts to reason with them. In this regard, it was unable to influence West Germany and Britain against withdrawing their aid commitments or
to prevent the decline in the United States aid programme. Similarly, it was unable to halt Western hostility against it particularly after the acceptance of Chinese military aid and later economic aid for TAZARA. At the same time, Tanzania could not influence either these Western powers or other international aid donors to disburse to it the type of aid as required and when required, the TAZARA project being a case in point.

Second, on the other hand, Kenya's diplomatic crisis with the major Eastern countries and their local supporters exposed that country's weakness and vulnerability to external influence. Faced with what was viewed by the Kenyatta regime as both external aggression and internal subversion, the regime turned to the resources -- material and informational -- of the only major (Western) powers it felt possible to trust and hence to rely on. Kenya's external dependence on the West has been accompanied by a Pro-Western foreign policy stance. This leads me to suggest that Kenya's ability to exercise independent judgement on international issues as well as to pursue policies that might conflict with those of its major Western benefactors is highly constrained by this structural linkage. Hence, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, Kenya has tended to adopt i) an ambivalent and/or middle-of-the-road position on issues viewed as not important enough to take a stand and ii) a pro-West position on issues requiring the adoption of a definite stance. This point is examined further below when reviewing differences in foreign policy.
Another salient similarity is that the style, approach and options chosen by the two states reflected very much their leaderships' perception of the internal and external environments of decision-making. This personalisation of foreign policy, though typical of foreign policy decision-making in a context of underdevelopment, makes for a very interesting comparison in these two cases. This is essentially because of the rather sharp differences in personalities of the key leaders in each country, which meant that to a large extent similar issues were perceived differently. The result was that the modes of adaptation chosen in response to the various issues and events examined earlier differed markedly. This question is pursued further later in this section.

However, one significant point to note here is that in both countries, security issues and the perceptions of external threat that tended to dominate their foreign policies in the 1960s are a reflection not only of their basic fragility and newness but also of their leaderships' insecurity and lack of confidence in the conduct of international affairs. The leaders of both countries initially displayed naivete and insufficient comprehension of the reality of power and interest in a global system dominated by bipolar politics. This naivety was evident from i) Tanzania's handling of its early diplomacy — which led to the 1964-65 diplomatic crisis with the major Western powers — and ii) Kenya's handling of its 1964 Congo mediation role.

In the pursuit of their shared goal of non-alignment, more rhetoric than substance generally emerges. Again, there is a difference of degree, which will be examined later. Nevertheless, it would seem that in spite
of the attempts by both states to manipulate non-alignment to their own advantage, in most instances, it was not possible to disguise the fact that their common external dependence has acted as a constraining factor, limiting the extent to which either of them could be non-aligned, even if it so desired.

Tanzania attempted to be non-aligned by moving a little towards the Eastern bloc, a move that was unacceptable to Western countries, given their isolation of China. Consequently, though not by design, Tanzania found itself at the end of the 1960s heavily dependent on China for military and economic aid. Indeed it ran the risk of being accused of 'alignment' with China.

Kenya, on the other hand, having quarreled with and isolated itself from both the Soviet Union and China by the mid 1960s, found itself even more dependent on the Western bloc than it had been at independence; hence it was unable to pursue a credible policy of non-alignment. It is true, however, that before the end of the 1960s both countries had begun to diversify their economic relations within the West to include middle powers such as those in Scandinavia, as well as Canada. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, foreign economic relations with either these latter countries or Eastern countries, were not sufficiently developed, to enhance the non-alignment of either Tanzania or Kenya.

One further similarity between the two states is that their foreign policies demonstrated an insufficient appreciation of the various dimensions of imperialism. Indeed for both, imperialism was very narrowly defined. For Tanzania, anti-imperialism was not directed at either
capitalist organisations and institutions or the capitalist global system, but rather at the major western countries and/or super-powers. Viewed in this narrow sense Tanzania's anti-imperialism confined itself to the condemnation of colonialism, racism and super-power intervention in the internal affairs of small states. Imperialism was identified with a small number of countries. As the 'Mwongozo'—T.A.W.U. Guidelines observes:

"For Tanzania it must be understood that imperialist enemies we are confronting are British imperialism, Portuguese colonialism, the racism and apartheid of South Africa and Rhodesia". 161

This definition then excluded international capitalist institutions, some of which, such as the World Bank, were even viewed as being East African:

"We must realise that the World Bank is our institution in the sense that Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda are actually members of the World Bank; so for us to borrow from the World Bank, we are actually borrowing from our own institution to help the people of East Africa ...." 162

This view is reflected in the fact that for both Kenya and Tanzania, the Bank has come to not only supply the bulk of their foreign economic assistance; it has also been allowed to participate in charting development policies as well as running rural development programmes. This reveals that both countries do not seem to fully appreciate the close alliance and/or interrelatedness between multilateral aiding institutions and the major Western countries such as the United States, with whom
imperialism was narrowly identified. Indeed for Kenya, imperialism was at times even more narrowly conceived, by making it appear as if its Western version was more palatable than that deriving from the East. Consequently the crucial role of international institutions in reinforcing the structural linkage of the two states' political economies to the global system of capitalism was either missed or ignored. The latter seems to be most likely the case for Kenya, whose capitalist relations have been deliberately encouraged. As a result, the development and foreign policies pursued (at least in the pre-Arysha period in Tanzania as well as throughout the decade in Kenya) tended to further integrate the two political economies into the world-capitalist system.

Furthermore, the strategies chosen to advance their development and foreign policy objectives, though ideologically divergent, have proved insufficient thus far in achieving them. This point is examined further in chapter 6. Yet despite common orientations and limitations, there are also some differences in objectives and strategies.

ii) Differences

As noted above, the basic difference that emerges is divergent leadership perceptions of internal and external operational environments. This difference in perception has shaped the leaders' views and attitudes towards issues and events emanating from both environments. For Kenya, the leadership's sensitivity to criticism and opposition and the identification of 'radical' views with the imagined conspiracy of communism, combined to create an operational environment where the basic preoccupation became one of silencing internal "subversive"
elements, while isolating their alleged external communist supporters. For Kenyatta and other conservative members of his government, a basic insecurity in domestic and foreign affairs was translated into a "war" against "radicals" in government and in Eastern countries. And as shown earlier, having isolated the socialist countries, the leadership found its "natural" allies in some capitalist states with whom they shared their pathological fear of communism.

Tanzania's leadership perception of the external and internal environments was much more balanced, in the sense that the "enemy" was not viewed in ideological terms of East or West but rather in terms of super-power rivalry that could be used adversely against a small poor state. Nyerere often warned his audience that "when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers". In other words, in the cold war of the 1960s, he was constantly aware that a small weak country like Tanzania could be made a playground for super-power rivalry and competition for spheres of influence. It was this kind of sensitivity and fear of their ability to bring their power to bear upon unwilling but vulnerable small countries like Tanzania or Kenya, which led Nyerere to be critical and sceptical of super-power actions and intentions. This was clearly illustrated in the 1964 Coup plot allegation, the 1965 expulsion of two American diplomats and the 1969 expulsion of the American peace corps. Tanzania's leadership, though non-marxist by inclination, did not share the pathological fear of communism of the Kenyan leadership. If anything, Nyerere believed that Tanzania could learn something from socialist patterns of development without becoming
politically and/or ideologically 'aligned'. The Sino-Tanzania relationship partly reflected this belief. Furthermore, although Tanzania had been involved in serious disputes with major Western countries, Nyerere demonstrated on various occasions his desire to develop mutually beneficial and friendly relations with them, albeit without economic strings attached; the resumption of diplomatic relations with Britain in 1968, after the latter had terminated its aid programme in Tanzania, is a case in point. Indeed it could be argued that where Tanzania's political principle or domestic political interest had led to conflicts with Western powers, the intensity of the disputes was caused by Western overconcern about Tanzania's links with "communist" countries and not by Nyerere's determination. By overemphasising the significance of these relations and by exerting heavy pressure to prevent them, the tendency for the Tanzanian leadership to want to break away from the Western powers and to expand relations with the socialist countries had been encouraged. In this connection, then, Western countries failed, where they had succeeded in the Kenyan case, to convince Tanzania of the "evil" inherent in communism.

As pointed out earlier, the differences in the two leaders' perceptions of their external operational environment, are reflected in the modes of adaptation chosen in response to external issues and events. These can be clearly observed from a look at how the two countries responded to four common events: the army mutinies, the Congo Crisis, Rhodesia's U.D.I and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Their responses, as will be shown below, seem to correspond closely to the two modes of
adaptation identified in chapter one: i.e. "promotive" adaptation for Tanzania and "acquiescent" adaptation for Kenya.

The major difference to note in regard to their responses to the mutiny is that Kenya moved towards closer military dependence on Britain while Tanzania moved away from such dependence and began to diversify its military aid sources. Viewed within an adaptive framework, Kenya's response can be said to be acquiescent in the sense that no significant reorganisation of its internal and external military relations or structures occurred. If anything, Kenya responded by further dependence on Britain. Tanzania's response, on the other hand, was promotive in the sense that following the mutiny, Tanzania began a process of reorganisation of its internal military structure through Africanisation: the recruitment of an indigenous and locally trained and politicised army. Externally, Tanzania restructured its military relations by moving away from dependence on Britain — particularly since the mutineers were British trained — and diversifying its military sources to include small European and middle powers as well as socialist states — particularly China. The choice of these divergent modes of adaptation largely reflect the respective leader's perception of their own (national) interests.

Similarly, in the Congo Crisis, although Tanzania was not directly involved in the peace negotiations as was Kenya, the former came out more forthrightly in condemnation of U.S. aggression and even allowed arms earmarked for the 'rebels' to pass through its territory. Furthermore, it was the Congo Crisis, along with Tanzania's economic and
diplomatic crises during the 1964-1966 period, that promoted the reorganisation of its internal and international affairs that began with the Arusha Declaration. The Congo inspired Tanzania towards a more militant foreign policy: the promotive adaptation adopted in 1967. For Kenya, on the other hand, the leadership response to the U.S.-sponsored Stanleyville drop was cautious, avoiding condemnation of American intervention, in spite of the humiliation inflicted. Kenyatta's acquiescence to U.S. pressure was, at least in part, militated by the perceived economic advantage to be derived therefrom. The economic loss that might have been suffered in the event of a U.S.-Kenya conflict prevailed over the principle of non-interference.

In the Tanzanian stance, as in all other similar cases, the political principle of the matter at hand, prevailed over economics. For Tanzania, freedom to make decisions without external interference was a more important prerequisite of development; it was more valuable than "tied" economic aid that at best promoted growth but not development, while restricting national freedom. Although in practice Tanzania has not always adhered to this principle, it has acted as a general guide, particularly in response to foreign policy issues and events. The Biafran case reveals most clearly the moral principledness that characterises Tanzania's leadership's response to foreign events involving injustice and/or human suffering. This case, on the other hand, reveals characteristic Kenyan "coldness" and caution to any issue, even one of human suffering that did not directly affect Kenya's "interests".
Over Rhodesian U.D.I., as in the Congo case, Tanzania preferred to stand by its political principle and in the process lost British economic aid. Kenya placed more importance on economic links and hence did not break relations with U.K. Furthermore while the U.D.I. experience contributed to the promotive mode of adaptation displayed by Tanzania -- the 1967 Arusha Declaration and subsequent measures -- no significant policy changes resulted in Kenya. The latter's acquiescent mode of adaptation persisted for relations with the major Western countries throughout the sixties.

A similar interpretation can be given in regard to the responses of the two states to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. As in the Congo, Kenya, unlike Tanzania, neither condemned Israel for its aggression against the Arabs nor its alleged Western supporters. Kenya did not even vote on the U.N. resolution calling for Israel to stop its aggression. It could be argued that in this instance, Kenya was more concerned about retaining its then close economic relations with Israel and of course with the major Western countries who supported Israel on this issue.

Conclusion

It would seem clear from the above analysis that during the period under examination, Kenya and Tanzania displayed divergent modes of adaptation to their salient environments and issues -- largely a reflection of the respective leadership perceptions and political
economies. The question remains however as to whether it makes any difference in practice — that is in terms of attaining desired objectives — whether a country chooses a "promotive" mode or an "acquiescent" mode of adaptation. I return to this question in chapter 6, where adaptation is further examined. However, at this point, it can be said that the role of the leadership in choosing the mode of adaptation in particular and foreign policy orientation in general — style, approach, etc. — is clearly apparent. Leadership perceptions and personalities in this respect are important.

In Tanzania, Nyerere's moral values and principled personality clearly dominate foreign policy. The predominance of President Nyerere in foreign affairs as shown in chapter 2 is a reflection of a number of factors, the most central being the relatively lower level of integration of Tanzania's political economy at independence into the global one compared to that of Kenya. Consequently, although Kenyatta's conservative leadership and disinterest in foreign affairs partially contributed to foreign policy orientation, the presidency rather than the president per se, dominated policy. This reflects the more pluralist nature of Kenyan society which in turn is based on its greater integration into the international capitalist system than Tanzania.

The leadership role as an intervening variable in foreign policy has, as suggested above, been constrained by internal underdevelopment and external dependence. The choices available to both states have clearly been limited. For Tanzania's leadership, concerned with playing a more active role in international affairs, perhaps as a diversion from the frustration arising out of an inability to alleviate
greater value was placed on political principles and ideological purity than on the pursuit of economic growth without regard for principles. Thus, the degree of autonomy that Tanzania maintained in its decision-making during the 1960s, was attained at some significant economic cost to the country. The impact of this was mostly felt, not by the leaders who make the decisions, but by the majority of peasants and workers who produce the only surplus that keeps the political economy afloat. Similarly in Kenya, although the leaders chose to place economic growth above principles, the utilisation and the distribution of the resultant economic benefits tended to benefit the ruling 'bourgeoisie' and its external associates at the expense of the ordinary peasant and worker. The latter have become the subject of manipulation by the state, in partnership with M.N.C.s and international monetary institutions.

The vicious circle of powerlessness and underdevelopment does not seem to have been resolved by either of the Kenyan or the Tanzanian policy options. Foreign policy has at best served the rather narrow interests of the leaders; but in general it reveals the constraints and dilemmas posed by persistent underdevelopment and dependence.

However, while the overall results of the foreign policies of the two states had been negligible at the end of the 1960s, Tanzania had a slight edge over Kenya, in the sense that it had at least formulated a self-reliant policy which, despite its shortcomings, reflected national rather than transnational interests and aimed at disengaging its political economy from the world capitalist system and at the same
time enhance the margin of autonomy in the pursuit of desired foreign policy goals. Kenya on the other hand, continued to be permissive to the dictates of international capitalism and had yet to define a national policy guide, even as imperfect as the Arusha Declaration, which reflected national rather than transnational interests and thereby increase the chances of attaining the declared foreign policy objectives. This point is examined further in chapter 6.
CHAPTER 5
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN KENYAN AND TANZANIAN
FOREIGN POLICIES: 1970-1980

A. Introduction

In the last chapter I identified and analysed some of the major events and issues that characterised the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania during the 1960s. Although by the end of the decade the two states had only been formally independent for less than ten years, a consistent pattern of behaviour was already apparent.

In comparing the styles and approaches chosen by the respective leaderships in dealing with international issues, some significant adaptational differences were observed. Thus, while Tanzania's leadership generally responded to external demands and/or pressures in a 'promotive' fashion aimed at maximising national independence in foreign policy decision-making, Kenya's leadership generally tended to acquiesce to such external demands and pressures. Furthermore, while Tanzania's leadership generally responded to the external environment in rather principled, ideological and idealistic terms, its Kenyan counterpart tended to be cautious and pragmatic, generally refraining from active involvement in foreign policy issues deemed to be inconsequential. These established adaptational differences largely persisted through the 1970s.

In spite of these differences however, the major issues that preoccupied both countries in the first decade were found to be broadly
similar: security of the regime and/or state, domestic political 'stability' and economic development and/or growth. These concerns persisted in the 1970s. In Tanzania, the coup in Uganda in 1971 and the intensification of wars of Liberation in Southern Africa brought the question of national security to the forefront of national policies. These concerns are clearly articulated in the 1971 policy document — Mwongozo — and are apparent from increased defence expenditure and the introduction of a peoples' militia in 1971. Similarly, Kenya's concern with security was greatly enhanced in the 1970s, particularly in response to the hostility of Idi Amin's Uganda, of its traditional archy enemy — Somalia — and, to a lesser extent, of Tanzania.

Furthermore, the regional arms race that had overtaken Eastern Africa but which Kenya eschewed from joining in the early 1970s, had, by the mid 1970s, reached proportions that the latter could no longer afford to ignore; this was particularly so after the 1976 invasion threat by Amin's regime. The military build-up in the Indian Ocean by the two super-powers further compounded the question of security for these two littoral states.

Meanwhile, their external operational environment had changed dramatically by the beginning of the new decade. The cold war was already history and the character of East-West competition had changed from formal to informal control. The success of the East-West struggle for world domination was now measured by the number of small states under the 'sphere of influence' of the major powers through indirect methods, such as the supply of arms to sympathetic regimes and the acquisition of military bases or facilities from them.
At another level, Kenya's and Tanzania's external operational environment in the seventies, was characterised by growing economic crisis particularly following the 1973/74 oil crisis that hit both underdeveloped and the industrialised oil-importing countries alike. The immediate impact of the oil crisis and the subsequent recession in the West seems to have been felt more by Kenya than by Tanzania, as indicated by the sharp decline in annual G.D.P. growth rate shown in Table 5:1 below. This was perhaps largely due to the fact Kenya, has a considerably larger number of oil-consuming automobiles than Tanzania (see Table 5:2) and a larger manufacturing sector (see Table 5:3) that

| TABLE 5:1 - ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES OF GROWTH OF G.D.P. AT CONSTANT PRICES |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Kenya                     | 6.8              | 6.8              | 5.3              | 3.2              | 7.3             |
| Tanzania                  | 6.4              | 4.6              | 3.5              | 4.4              | 5.9             |

| TABLE 5:2 - NEW MOTOR VEHICLES REGISTERED IN KENYA AND TANZANIA |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Kenya                     | 21,008           | 16,474           | 15,988           | 16,322           |
| Tanzania                  | 7,203            | 7,156            | 6,058            | 4,037            |

| TABLE 5:3 - ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES OF GROWTH IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Kenya                     | 7.6              | 9.3              | 9.3              | 7.6              | 15.0            |
| Tanzania                  | 6.8              | 4.0              | 2.0              | 3.3              | 5.4             |

is highly dependent on international capitalist investment; hence it is more sensitive and vulnerable to changes in the world system. However, the long term effects of these crises have been felt as much by Tanzania as by Kenya, as indeed by most Third World oil-importing countries. Furthermore, Tanzania also simultaneously experienced two successive years (1973-1975) of severe drought and was consequently forced to import grains at a much higher level than before.

The general impact of the post-1974 crisis was to widen the economic gap between most of the underdeveloped and the industrialised countries, thus leading the former to demand a fundamental restructuring of the post-war, Bretton Woods order. The adoption by the United Nations in April 1974 of a declaration calling for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.), marked the beginning of a new type of global negotiation for a more just and equitable order — now termed "North-South, Dialogue(s)".

However, as is shown in the next chapter, North-South dialogues had not produced the expected results; neither had the alternative — South-South attempts at forming a "Trade Union of the Poor". Development and Independence in most of the Third World remained elusive throughout the 1970s. In this respect, Kenya and Tanzania were no exceptions. Like virtually every other African state both remain underdeveloped, poor and highly dependent on foreign capital to finance their development plans; hence their vulnerability to changes in world economic conditions. These conditions, as I attempt to show later in this chapter, have continued to limit the two states' capacity either
to pursue an independent course in foreign affairs or to achieve the objectives to which foreign policy is directed.

Nyerere's conception of non-alignment in the 1970s in economic rather than political terms represents an attempt to adapt Tanzania's policy to the changed international system; an adaptation that gradually became accepted by most leaders in the non-alignment movement, including Kenya. This change of focus in the use and conception of non-alignment is evident from some of Nyerere's speeches in the 1970s, as well as from the deliberations of the non-aligned conferences in the 1970s.

In terms of international economic relations as was indicated in Chapter three, by 1970 both countries had significantly diversified their trade and aid-links within the Western bloc but only marginally, outside it. However, the pattern of foreign assistance showed that, while both continued to receive the bulk of their foreign aid from Western countries and institutions in general, by contrast to Kenya, Tanzania had markedly reduced its dependence on Britain and other major Western powers. By 1974 a clear preference had emerged for deriving foreign assistance from countries and institutions -- the World Bank Group, China, Scandinavian and Nordic countries and Canada -- that were perceived to lack the interventionist tendencies associated with the great powers and to be sympathetic to Tanzania's developmental and foreign policy goals. Kenya on the other hand, continued to receive the bulk of its bilateral aid from Britain.

In this connection, behavioural analysis for the 1960s did give some indication that Tanzania's diversification of its economic links
away from the major powers may have contributed to its relatively
greater success in pursuing an independent-minded foreign policy.
However, this may have been at some short-term economic costs in the pre-
Arusha period. However, while Tanzania's diversification and other
post-Arusha policy measures may have enhanced the margin of choice and
the pursuit of its development and foreign policies without fear of
sabotage by a single donor, it did not, as was shown in Chapter four,
increase either its effectiveness or its influence in the attempt to
implement chosen goals. In this respect, both states displayed their
powerlessness arising out of persistent dependence and underdevelop-
ment.

The remainder of this chapter examines and analyses the foreign
policy behaviour of Kenya and Tanzania towards the major Western and
Eastern bloc countries in the 1970s. It also includes an analysis of
their attitudes towards two additional Western countries — Canada
and France — due to the latter's increased political and economic
links in the 1970s. Similarly, because of the accelerated penetra-
tion and expansion of foreign capital in Kenya and Tanzania in the
seventies, the analysis below also includes a brief examination of
attitudes towards M.N.C.s in general, with a focus on one British M.N.C.
in particular — Lonrho — which is perhaps the largest M.N.C. that
(up to 1978) operated in both countries.

The 'Ramadan' war and the subsequent oil crisis are two
interrelated and important events that Kenya and Tanzania responded
to in the 1970s. The adaptational response to these was evident in the
changed attitudes of most non-oil-producing countries towards the oil-producing Arabs. The analysis here focuses on the responses of Kenya and Tanzania towards these events and their subsequent attitudes towards Middle Eastern countries. Finally, as in the previous chapter, a concluding "balance sheet" compares salient differences and similarities in foreign policy behaviour.

B. Tanzania's Foreign Policy: 1970-1980

1) M.N.C.s and Tanzania's Foreign Policy: The Case of Lonrho

Lonrho is one of the largest transnational companies incorporated in the United Kingdom that does much of its business in Africa. This firm, which started its activities in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1909, moved into East Africa between 1966 and 1967 where it developed a wide range of interests in production, distribution and finance.

Lonrho's business activities in East Africa and elsewhere are well documented and hence will not be repeated here. My purpose is to briefly examine the implications of Lonrho's presence in Tanzania until 1978, given the latter's declared socialist policies and commitment to liberation in Southern Africa.

In accordance with Tanzania's socialism the major means of production and exchange are, at least in theory, owned and controlled by the state. Private enterprise plays an accepted but subsidiary role, "either as a minority partner in joint enterprises with the government, or on its own when providing economic services which are useful to the people but which the government and cooperatives are unable to provide".

The purpose then of allowing transnational companies to operate in Tanzania "is service to Tanzania and its people and the promotion of Tanzania's objectives".11 (emphasis added).

It has already been reiterated in Chapter 3 that the M.N.C.'s major investment objective is profit making and the expropriation of surplus; hence they are hardly supportive of socialist objectives. As noted earlier, it would seem contradictory to expect a basically capitalistic enterprise such as Lonrdo, to promote socialism. Similarly, Lonrdo's presence in Tanzania was not helping Tanzania promote one of its basic foreign policy objectives — the furtherance of liberation in Africa. If anything, Lonrdo's business interests in South Africa run contradictory to Tanzania's anti-apartheid policy. Nevertheless, Lonrdo is not the only transnational corporation to maintain interests in apartheid while continuing to do business in Tanzania. Indeed, as was shown in the previous chapter and later in this one, Tanzania maintains close and friendly relations with capitalist countries (such as U.S., U.K., West Germany and France) that do business with South Africa and hence hinder the cause of liberation. In this respect, Tanzania is no exception on the Continent. Indeed most African states are content with mere declarations of opposition to the apartheid regime, and with expressions of support for the liberation struggle.

Tanzania has gone further than most, not only in giving moral and material support to liberation but also in attempting to challenge those institutions and states that openly undermine this cause. As noted in the last chapter, most of the major bilateral conflicts between
U.K. and Tanzania in the 1960s were over this issue. Similarly, as is shown later most conflicts with U.K. in the 1970s were once again over Southern Africa.

In regard to Lonrho, Tanzania tolerated its business activities until May 1978, when it was summarily expelled and given three months to dispose of its assets by selling them to the government-owned parastatal -- National Development Corporation. In a statement released by the Tanzanian High Commissioner in London, two reasons were given for this expulsion:

"a) Lonrho through its Chief Executive represents itself as the friend of free Africa, and in that context does not hesitate to meddle in the politics of Southern Africa, particularly Zimbabwe.

and b) The painstaking enquiry into the affairs of Lonrho undertaken by inspectors appointed by the Department of Trade in the United Kingdom has exposed these professions of friendship as a hollow sham. It has shown that Lonrho, while posing as the friend of free Africa, has over a number of years engaged in profit-making activities in Rhodesia inconsistent with the letter and spirit of United Nations Mandatory sanctions."

The statement further emphasized that,

"one of Tanzania's basic policies on which there can be no compromise, is the furtherance of freedom of..."
in Southern Africa. Accordingly it is not possible for Tanzania to permit a business enterprise to operate in this country if it is known to have undermined the freedom struggle in Southern Africa through its activities elsewhere.  

And yet it seems strange that it took the Tanzanian government from 1967 to 1978 to discover that Lonrho was acting contrary to U.N. sanctions on Rhodesia. Indeed a report by the U.K. Department of Trade, released in March 1976 had already disclosed that the Lonrho Chief — 'Tiny' Rowland — was more closely involved in mining operations in Rhodesia "than was consistent with the terms of U.K. sanctions legislation". Perhaps the major concern that prompted the expulsion of Lonrho from Tanzania was the increasing involvement of Rowland in the power struggle among the major contenders for Zimbabwe's leadership. Apparently he was playing the role normally reserved for diplomatic envoys, but in a more dangerous manner, since he tried to woo all parties involved, with cash, air tickets, hotel accommodations and legal assistance. At the time of the expulsion from Tanzania, he was said to have given his full backing to one of the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders — Joshua Nkomo — since the latter was considered "moderate"; i.e. he could be expected to adopt a relatively "favourable attitude" towards the business community.

Lonrho's unorthodox habit of forming political alliances with key politicians was not uncommon as is shown in the case of Kenya. However, Nyerere took particular exception, as Chairman of the F.L.S,
to what he saw as "Rowland's attempt to split the armed struggle by wooing Nkomo into joining the short-lived "limited-majority rule" government in the then -- Rhodesia in which the white minority still wielded power.

The conflict that ensued following Tanzania's seizure of Lonrho's 18 companies was not resolved until after Zimbabwe achieved its "independence" in April 1980. In the meantime, Lonrho was reported to have attempted to persuade international aid donors to cut their aid to Tanzania, in order to pressure it to pay adequate compensation for seized assets. The bitter dispute over these seems to have been resolved in July 1980 when Lord Duncan Sandys, Chairman of Lonrho, visited Tanzania and talked with Nyerere. A State House Communique described this meeting as "cordial and constructive"; "a number of misunderstandings were clarified".

This brief examination has shown that although Nyerere allows M.N.C.s that have commercial links with minority regimes to operate in Tanzania, he does not hesitate to take action against even one as powerful as Lonrho if its business activities are seen to be undermining the liberation cause. By expelling Lonrho, Tanzania was risking not only possible reprisal by other transnational interests, but also a strain in its relations with the U.K. The Lonrho issue was however, not one of the major issues of conflict between these two states in the 1970s, as is shown in the following analysis. But first, an examination of Tanzania's response to the 1973 Ramadan war and its aftermath follows.
11) Tanzania's Response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and its Aftermath

Up to the mid-1960s Tanzania had maintained, as noted in the previous chapter, friendly relations with Israel and cool relations with the Arab states. Its attitude towards Israel, like that of most other black African states, was based on a U.N. decision that the Jewish state had a right to exist. From 1967, following the six-day Arab-Israeli war, Africa's stand was to support the implementation of security council resolution 242 which recognised both the illegality of Israel's occupation of Arab territory as well as the right of the Jewish state to exist within secure and guaranteed frontiers. This was the position of most black African states before the outbreak of the 1973 "Ramadhan/Yom Kippur" war.

Unlike the 1967 war, the 1973 one held a special significance for Africa, namely that this was the first time that Israeli troops crossed the Suez canal and occupied a part of it -- the Sinai province of Egypt -- an act viewed as an "invasion of African soil". So long as the fighting was confined to the Arab Middle East, it could be treated as a "foreign" problem; but the occupation by foreign troops of African territory created new circumstances that seemed to justify the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel. In addition, the Arab's claim that Israel had been aided by racist South Africa as well as by Portugal and America, further justified the severance. Even so, it is doubtful whether the diplomatic break with Israel would have been so complete had it not been for the threat of possible oil sanctions against those O.A.U. members who failed to sever relations.
However Tanzania was among the first states to break relations —
19 October 1973 — well before the Arab members of O.P.E.C. began
to use oil as a political weapon to "punish" Israel and its allies.
At first, Tanzania and other African states welcomed this move,
erroneously expecting that the Arabs would appreciate the Afro-Arab
solidarity demonstrated by the break with Israel and hence offer their
"African brothers" oil at concessionary prices and possibly also
provide economic aid to offset the burden of higher import costs from
industrialised countries.

When the oil-rich Arab states failed to respond as expected, many
African states including Tanzania began to attack the O.P.E.C. nations
for their periodical increases in oil prices. Thus, for example,
when O.P.E.C. increased oil prices by a 100 percent in September 1975,
Tanzania joined in accusing the oil producers of "appearing to turn
their backs on the developing countries; especially the least developed".
It was estimated that the 1975 increases alone would cost Tanzania
another £4.9 million at a time when it was already experiencing an
acute food crisis. Tanzania's hard line against the Arab oil producers
over their failure to match the higher cost of fuel for the poorer
nations with reciprocal aid was again evident at the March 1977 Afro-
Arab summit where it took the lead in calling for $2 billion Arab aid
for non-oil producing African countries.

In spite of Tanzania's expressed dissatisfaction with O.P.E.C.'s
indiscriminate use of the oil weapon it continued to maintain a
pro-Arab stance on the Palestinian issue as well as in opposition
to the "continued aggression of Israel against the Arab countries".

Furthermore Tanzania was not on the list of those African countries such as the Ivory Coast, Zaire Kenya, Liberia, etc., who continued to maintain discreet diplomatic and/or economic relations with Israel. Related to this is the fact that Tanzania unlike Kenya had relatively few bilateral conflicts with individual Arab states. Furthermore Tanzania came to the Arabs' side in condemning Israel's Entebbe operation in July 1976, while Kenya was alleged to have provided material support to Israel during the operation.

It was perhaps in recognition of Tanzania's 'genuine' support of the Arab cause that by 1979 it topped the list of recipients of aid from the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (B.A.D.E.A.) while Kenya was almost at the bottom (see Table 5:4 below). However

| 1. Tanzania     | 29.20   |
| 2. Mozambique   | 27.00   |
| 3. Zaire        | 26.80   |
| 4. Zambia       | 22.70   |
| 5. Ghana        | 19.40   |
| 6. Senegal      | 16.30   |
| 7. Uganda       | 16.15   |
| 8. Angola       | 13.24   |
| 9. Kenya        | 8.60    |

it should be noted that Tanzania's position on the Middle East, though it has paid some dividends, cannot be said to have been prompted simply by the hope of economic benefits.

Rather, Tanzania's position on the Arab-Israeli question is consistent with its overall foreign policy orientation. First, Tanzania and most other African states, equate Israel's Zionism with South Africa's apartheid, the eradication of which is one of Tanzania's foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, Nyerere has continued to maintain the position that while Tanzania is opposed and hostile to Israel's racism and expansionism, it still recognises the state of Israel. Hence, while Tanzania defends the right of Palestinians to their own state, it insists that they should also uphold U.N. resolutions that recognise Israel's right to an independent existence. Furthermore, the fact that Tanzania shares with the Arabs their broad concerns on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, does not exclude bilateral conflicts on other issues.

An example of such bilateral conflict occurred in March 1979, when Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi gave Nyerere one week's ultimatum in which to withdraw his troops from Uganda. When this was ignored, a direct military confrontation between Libyan and Tanzanian troops occurred within Uganda. This incident however did not affect Tanzania's relations with other Arab states, who in any case, were no longer as united as they were prior to the late Anwar Sadat's peace overtures with Israel beginning in 1978. Thus, for example, in December 1979, Nyerere paid a three day visit to Iraq, which subsequently granted Tanzania a low interest loan of $30 million.
In general, then, Tanzania’s relations with the Arabs have been characterised by both conflict and cooperation, while Israel’s racist and expansionist policies made any interaction virtually impossible. Furthermore, Israel openly sells its surplus military products to South Africa — an act that Tanzania has always been vehemently opposed to. However, as is shown later, Kenya does maintain covert relations with Israel, despite its declared anti-apartheid policy. But before this, Tanzania’s policies and attitudes towards the major Western and Eastern bloc countries are examined.

### iii) Tanzania and the United Kingdom: 1970-1980

Relations between Tanzania and the U.K., which had become strained in the mid-1960s over U.D.I., and the disputed responsibility over pension payments, did not improve for a decade — until the mid-1970s — although diplomatic relations had been resumed in 1968. Furthermore, the growing political, economic, and military links between Tanzania and China, as well as the nationalisation of British public and private property following the Arusha Declaration, continued to be sources of tension between the two.

At the beginning of the 1970s, Anglo-Tanzania relations became strained over a number of issues following the assumption of power in Britain by the Conservative Party in June 1970. The most contentious issue was the sale of arms to South Africa. Tanzania, like most African states, was vehemently opposed to such sales of arms. Its uncompromising attitude on sales was based on the view that to sell arms to South Africa is to arm the major enemy of Africa and the liberation
cause. Thus, when British Prime Minister Heath announced the intention of his government to resume arms sales, Nyerere's reaction was predictably indignant and uncompromising when he met with British leaders in October 1970. He made it quite clear, as he had done in 1961, that Tanzania would withdraw from the Commonwealth rather than compromise on matters of principle. Nyerere repeated this warning when later interviewed on this issue:

"I have said that we will leave the Commonwealth and I mean it ... I don't know how many other countries will leave the Commonwealth if the arms are sold, but Tanzania certainly will."

Nyerere further expounded his thesis on the consequences of arms sales to South Africa at the U.N. General Assembly later that October and at the Commonwealth Conference held in Singapore in January 1971. At the latter conference, Nyerere delivered one of the most critical speeches of the British government's bid to renew arms sales to South Africa. Nyerere clearly and concisely spelled out the implications this would have for Anglo-Tanzania relations:

"Tanzania and Britain have quarrelled several times over African issues; there may even be other differences in the future. But this issue is different in kind and degree from the others we anticipate. For an agreement to sell arms to South Africa would mean that Britain has chosen her side in the Southern African conflict."
The Heath government defied Tanzania's and other African states' protests and went ahead with its decision to sell arms. As was to be expected, Tanzania's reaction to this decision was characteristically militant and angry. The Nationalist declared that the British decision amounted to "yet another provocation against Africa". The newspaper further referred to the British as "arrogant", unconcerned about "the problems which confront our continent". The paper concluded that Tanzania had to continue "full speed" its political, economic and military preparations against "enemies of Africa who may soon or later impose on us the necessity to defend ourselves".

Despite his constant statements to the effect that British actions would force Tanzania to react, Nyerere did not take his country out of the Commonwealth when faced with the stark realities of power politics. He seems to have drawn a lesson from the utter failure of a similar threat over Rhodesian U.D.I. in December 1965, especially the fact that by 1968, the handful of African states (including Tanzania) which had broken-off diplomatic relations with U.K. had resumed them without any tangible success in terms of influencing British policy towards Zimbabwe. Nyerere then seems to have recognised the ineffectiveness of "acting out" threats as a diplomatic tactic for influencing major decisions of more powerful nations. Furthermore, by quitting the Commonwealth, Tanzania would have lost the Commonwealth platform from which to exert pressure. For these and perhaps other reasons, Tanzania decided to remain in the Commonwealth and hence to keep open its lines of communication with Britain.
The arms sales issue however continued to plague Anglo-Tanzanian relations and often spilled over into other issues. For example, shortly after the decision to sell arms, Tanzania introduced the Acquisition of Buildings Act of April 1971, as part of its nationalisation programme. Under this Act, the government announced that it was taking over certain categories of private property without any compensation for any property more than ten years old. Most of the private property to be expropriated belonged to Asians holding British citizenship.

In normal circumstances, given the Tories' racist attitudes— the citizens involved being of Asian origin — the Tanzanian act may not have aroused significant reaction. However this act, coming shortly after Tanzania's strong criticism of U.K.'s arms sales, prompted Britain to veto a World Bank proposal for a £ 4.3 million loan to Tanzania for peasant tea development. The British government strongly denied the "allegations" that this veto was a reprisal for Nyerere's domestic and foreign policies. It insisted that its action was based purely on a desire to ensure that the Bank observes its own rules more scrupulously. Although the British government dropped its objection within a month, the harm was already done. This obstruction hardened Nyerere's resolve to resist British pressure to change its policies in return for aid. Anglo-Tanzanian relations were further strained during this period over Oscar Kambona who, as explained earlier, had fled to the U.K. in the late sixties, and had since been accused of receiving British support to "destabilise" the Nyerere government.
Nevertheless, the first signs of improved relations became apparent in early 1974, when the British government initiated negotiations with Tanzania over the resumption of aid, terminated in the mid-1960s. This initiative was perhaps in recognition of Tanzania's growing political importance as the informal leader of the Front Line States (F.L.S.), that border on, or are in close proximity to, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Furthermore, Tanzania had always been the headquarters of the O.A.U. liberation committee and most of the liberation movements were based in Dar-es-Salaam. As such, Tanzania had, by the mid-1970s, become a country with which the United States and Britain and other major powers had to reckon when attempting to negotiate settlements to the Zimbabwean and Namibian issues. Furthermore, for Britain and other Western powers, there was the continuing need to 'neutralise' the Chinese presence in Tanzania. Whatever the real reason, Britain was concerned enough to restore normal economic relations with Tanzania, as was demonstrated by the visit to Tanzania of the then -- British Foreign Secretary -- Sir Alec Douglas Home — in February 1974.39 Home was reportedly "embarrassed at having to introduce the topic of aid during his conversation with President Nyerere, a subject that the President showed no sign of introducing on his own".40 The visit of Sir Alec was closely followed by that of the radical labour minister for Overseas Development, Judith Hart, in June 1974. It was during this visit that an £11 million aid agreement was concluded, with £10 million in capital aid and £1 million in technical aid.41 This aid agreement was followed by a
second, of £2.5 million, signed in 1975. These agreements marked the resumption of British economic aid to Tanzania for the first time since 1965.

To underline renewed friendly relations, Nyerere paid his first state visit to Britain in November 1975, thus marking the end of a decade of very frigid relations. However, it was no accident that this coincided with the resumption of power by the British Labour party, which Nyerere regarded as more sympathetic to the liberation cause, than the conservative party. Hence, his visit was timely enabling the Tanzanian President to pressurise Britain under a new regime on arms sales as well as on the Namibian and Zimbabwean issues.

Despite this normalisation of relations, Nyerere never ruled out a future recurrence of Anglo-Tanzania quarrels—he had made this quite clear in his 1970 Singapore Conference speech already examined. Thus it was hardly surprising that before the close of the decade underlying differences between Tanzania and U.K. once again manifested themselves in verbal warfare and threats.

One of the issues which troubled relations with U.K. in the latter part of the 1970s was the takeover of Lonrho's assets in 1978, as noted earlier in this chapter. Tiny Rowland, who accused Tanzania of refusing to pay its £33.3m compensation attempted to block further World Bank aid to Tanzania until compensation was received. These accusations and demands received support from some Tory M.P.s, who demanded that the government take action against Tanzania. As shown earlier, this issue was resolved in June 1980.
Perhaps the major conflict in the latter part of the 1970s occurred at the height of diplomatic manoeuvres and negotiations over Zimbabwe's independence. The conflict began when the Tories resumed power in Britain in 1979. Hostility towards Nyerere and other F.L.S. became a common feature in the British press—reminiscent of similar hostilities in the mid-to-late 1960s. Generally the press accused Nyerere of being an imperialist and a dictator even worse than Amin of Uganda, and hence undeserving of the prestigious position accorded him as F.L.S. leader. A typical attack on Nyerere read:

"President Nyerere of Tanzania, whose brand of socialism, has helped to impoverish his country while cruelly uprooting many thousands of people, seems to have nothing against tyrants as such. He has put up with one in Zanzibar for long enough. He is on friendly terms with several others in Africa and elsewhere .... There never was, then, any good reason for believing that Tanzania's invasion of Uganda was designed simply to remove a brutal dictator ... Amin provided Nyerere with the sort of excuse that any neo-imperialist would be grateful for, and an opportunity to blame the allegedly high cost of the invasion for the grim economic and social consequences of Tanzania socialism ...."

Nyerere somehow managed to overlook these hostile comments, perhaps because of the importance he attached to the Zimbabwean independence
negotiations then in progress. Hence he continued to work closely with Britain and the United States to the conclusion of the Lancaster House Agreement which led to ceasefire and general elections in Zimbabwe. He, however, took the opportunity of Queen Elizabeth's state visit to Tanzania in July 1979 to issue a diplomatically-phrased warning about the consequences of British recognition of Bishop Muzorewa's regime, which still seemed likely to accede to power in Zimbabwe at the time. 47

The most serious conflict during this period developed shortly before the general elections in Zimbabwe when the former Ian Smith security forces -- then under the control of the British appointed Governor to Zimbabwe, Lord Soames -- killed seven of Robert Mugabe's Patriotic Front guerillas who had surrendered in accordance with the Lancaster House ceasefire agreement. In one of his angriest reactions, Nyerere accused Britain of "cold-blooded murder" in Zimbabwe hinting that Tanzania would break diplomatic relations with Britain unless the latter began to carry out strictly the agreement. 48 Referring to the inhumane nature of these killings, Nyerere observed:

"The British cannot just look at their watches and say the time (for reaching assembly points) is up and kill people. This is murder. It is not in any way in accordance with the London agreement". 49

Nyerere viewed this issue as more serious than U.K. inaction over U.D.I. in 1965:
"We believe that the omission in 1965 was less a crime
than the current participation by the British in the
murder of Rhodesian people".30

Nyerere also publicly accused the British government of rigging the
elections and of tricking Commonwealth, African and Patriotic Front
leaders into believing that the elections would be free and fair.
However, when, to Nyerere's surprise, Robert Mugabe's Patriotic Front
won, all he could say was: "This is not the first time I have been
wrong and I am happy to be wrong".51

In the meantime, Anglo-Tanzania relations had sharply deteriorated
once again, with London recalling its High Commissioner to Dar-es-Salaam
and Tanzania recalling its representative in London for "consultations".
This deterioration seems to have occurred when Nyerere declined to
apologise to London for his observations on Britain's handling of the
Zimbabwe elections. The British took particular exception to a state­
ment he was said to have made on the eve of the elections to the effect
that he was "not sure that any British government has the right to
prostitute the honour of Britain as that honour is being prostituted
in Rhodesia".52

As the above examination of bilateral relations has indicated,
most of the issues that created conflict between Britain and Tanzania
in the 1970s, centred on Tanzania's domestic policies and African
liberation. The two states however conflicted on less major issues.
In 1971, for example, when the U.K. rushed to recognise the Amin
regime in Uganda while other countries were waiting for a lead from
Africa, Nyerere did not conceal his displeasure. He had already said that he would not sit with Amin in the East African community and he actively tried to persuade his African colleagues from withholding recognition. A further source of conflict arose in 1977 when Britain tried to intervene on behalf of Kenya -- its "ally" within East Africa -- demanding that Tanzania release Kenyan-registered vehicles and aircraft that were stranded in Tanzania, after the latter closed its border with Kenya. As was to be expected, Tanzania rejected the British demand which was viewed as an arrogant interference in a bilateral matter.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis clearly demonstrates consistency in Anglo-Tanzanian relations in the 1970s comparable to the 1960s. Tanzania's refusal to be pushed around in its decision-making is clearly apparent throughout the 1970 decade. As in the 1960s, Tanzania demonstrated its willingness to cooperate on issues of mutual interest such as the liberation of Southern Africa, but it was prepared to risk the wrath of Britain when it felt that there was injustice or foul play that should be publicly exposed. However, a touch of pragmatism was evident in the fact that although Tanzania threatened a number of times to quit the commonwealth or break relations with the U.K., the threats were not carried out. Tanzania had come to recognise that its diplomatic effectiveness rested with persistent pressure and/or negotiations with the adversary, rather than with withdrawal through 'acting out' threats, which ought to be confined to deterrence purposes alone.

Relations between Tanzania and the United States had never been close, for reasons examined in the previous chapter. There it was shown that Tanzania-U.S. relations came to ahead in the mid-1960s, over the issues of the expelled U.S. diplomats, the alleged coup plot and the expulsion of the Peace Corps. Bilateral relations grew even worse during the first half of the seventies due to a number of factors.

For one, Tanzania continued to upset the United States by its strong condemnation of U.S. "interference" in the internal affairs of smaller states in general and, in particular, its interventionist and imperialistic policies in Vietnam and South Korea respectively. Furthermore, Tanzania had been one of the most vocal and enthusiastic states to have campaigned for China's admission to the U.N. and for the expulsion of Taiwan. So it was hardly surprising that Tanzanian diplomats were seen dancing on the U.N. floor following China's admission to the U.N. in October 1971. U.S. reaction to this exuberance was equally predictable -- President Nixon promptly lowered the level of the American delegation to Tanzania's tenth independence anniversary celebration in 1971.

Relations between the two countries deteriorated further in August 1975 over a vote in the U.N. "Committee of 24" on Decolonisation related to Puerto Rico and South Korea. The conflict arose, when the U.S., which did not want these two issues discussed or voted on,
attempted to exert political pressure on Tanzania. Thus, in a diplomatic note delivered to Nyerere by the U.S. Ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam, the U.S. warned that:

"A vote in support of the Cuban resolution would group the government of the Republic of Tanzania with three countries with which the U.S. government has no relations (Congo, Cuba, Iraq); two of our principal communist adversaries (China and Soviet Union); and to states which unfailingly follow Moscow's foreign policy line (Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria), in supporting a resolution which constitutes to a fragrant interference in U.S. internal affairs."

Tanzania, infuriated by this attempted intimidation, retaliated by having the note published on the front page of the Daily News, with an accompanying editorial which accused the U.S. of conducting foreign policy through "the outdated policy of arm-twisting". It called the letter "rude" and as amounting to "a hidden threat". To demonstrate and emphasise its determination to pursue an independent-minded foreign policy, Tanzania went ahead and voted for an immediate debate about whether Puerto Rico was really an American colony.

In response to this action, the then U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Daniel Moynihan, publicly labelled Tanzania a "police state" adding, "where the honour of the American democracy is being attacked by a police state, we are going to attack back". The attack came in the form of a reduction of U.S. aid — an act reminiscent of counterproductive diplomacy in the 1960s.
The U.S. was also displeased by continuing attacks of its "imperialist" policies that regularly appeared in the Tanzanian press. In particular, one other front-page editorial brought a strong protest from the U.S. Ambassador:

"After failing to conquer completely the people of Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, U.S. imperialism wants to have a round in Africa ... whoever thinks that the U.S. is a friend of Africa is really mistaken."

Besides these bilateral issues, Tanzania was also critical of the U.S. role in supporting apartheid in South Africa and expanding its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which Tanzania and other littoral African states would have preferred to remain a zone of peace.

Following the 1975/76 events in Angola, the U.S. began to develop a renewed interest in Southern Africa. This concern was highlighted by the April-May 1976 tour of Africa by then U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Tanzania was high on the priority list of countries visited. Renewed interest in Africa was further displayed by the Carter administration explicitly stating that the African continent would be a major area of concern. Thus in early 1977 President Carter's U.N. representative, Andrew Young, made Tanzania the first African country he visited as Ambassador, thus underscoring the importance the new American government attached to Tanzania as a F.L.S.

President Nyerere took advantage of his influence as the Chairman of the F.L.S. to persuade the new Carter's Administration to play a more
active and positive role towards 1) the liberation of Southern Africa and 11) the economic development of the continent. To a certain extent the U.S. did heed Nyerere's plea, at least in as far as it i) accepted the principle of majority rule in Zimbabwe and ii) became actively involved in shuttle diplomacy between Whitehall, Salisbury and Dar-es-Salaam.

Nyerere, who as shown in Chapter four never had much faith in the Americans, made an exception of President Carter's leadership. Thus, in an interview in June 1978, Nyerere stated that he believed that Carter was sincere in wanting black majority rule in Southern Africa; however he expressed concern over U.S. failure to recognise the M.P.L.A. government in Angola. Tanzania also supported Carter's human rights policy but with some important reservations:

"Tanzania government welcomes this new American consciousness of the importance of human rights to the extension of peace and justice ... the recognition that support for human rights requires support for the anti-colonialist struggle in Southern Africa .... On the other hand, Tanzania believes that there are in the U.S. some reactionary forces which seek to use President Carter's commitment to human rights as an excuse for maintaining divisions of the world into rich and poor nations. They are hoping to use the human rights campaigns as a means of further strengthening their control over international economic institutions such as the World Bank and I.M.F. .... A very basic human right
is the right to live without suffering from malnutrition, ignorance and preventable disease .... The right to vote, to Freedom from arbitrary arrest, and so on are important. But they are not much use to a man dying of starvation as a result of the economic structure of the world." (emphasis added)

Thus, while Tanzania shared Carter's human rights policy in as far as it applied to anti-colonialist and anti-racist struggles, in other situations Tanzania was opposed to its political use in cases where Basic (economic) Human Needs had not yet been met. Hence, while Tanzania shared U.S. abhorrence of Idi Amin's regime and the violation of human rights in Uganda, it was critical of U.S. congressional attempt to prohibit the World Bank and the I.D.A. from lending not only to Uganda, but also to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola and Cuba.

Nevertheless, relations between Tanzania and the United States improved significantly during the Carter regime. President Nyerere's state visit to the U.S. in late 1977 was one indication of this. Another indication was the signing of an agreement in January 1979 providing for the return of the Peace Corps to Tanzania, a decade after they were summarily thrown out in November 1969. While some interpreted resumption of the Peace Corps programme as purely a political gesture of normalisation of bilateral relations, others saw it as another indication of Tanzania's regression towards the capitalist fold, a trend that had become apparent particularly during the second
half of the seventies. The fact is, however, as shown in Chapter three, that Tanzania never really left the capitalist fold, despite its close link with China.

This agreement on the Peace Corps was preceded by another with U.S. AID: $10 million for a regional planning project in the coffee-producing district in Northern Tanzania. What was significant about this was that "socialist" Tanzania had found it fit to entrust "capitalist" U.S. with the task of drawing up a development plan for one of its 22 regions. Furthermore, the U.S. was also assisting Tanzania revive its tourist industry, through an offer of two new Boeing 737 passenger jets and a $11 million loan from the World Bank. The latter institution, dominated by the U.S., had, as was shown in Chapter three, come to be the main source of economic aid for Tanzania.

Yet although relations between Tanzania and the U.S. had become closer by the end of the 1970s, this did not prevent Tanzania from taking a different stand from the U.S. regarding the 1979 "Soviet invasion" of Afghanistan. Although Tanzania joined the vast majority of nations of the world in condemning the invasion, it did not share the U.S. policy of boycotting the Moscow Olympic games in protest. The Tanzanians did not see why they should support the American-led boycott of the 1980 Olympics over "communism" while Western countries had not supported Africa's boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympics over racism. Furthermore Nyerere declined to meet Muhammad Ali, who had been sent by Carter to Tanzania and four other African countries (including Kenya) to seek African support for the proposed boycott.
officials said privately that they felt that it was an insult for Carter to send a boxer to confer with their President. Tanzania also abstained in the U.N. General Assembly vote to condemn Russia's intervention. As will be shown later, Kenya's responses to the Afghanistan invasion and the Olympic boycott were the exact opposite of Tanzania's—consistent with Kenya's general policy stance.

It would seem then that while Tanzania-U.S. links, particularly bilateral economic relations, became closer during the latter part of the seventies, Tanzania continued to resist super-power influence in its foreign policy decision-making quite effectively.

v) Tanzania and the two Germanies: 1970-1980

It was shown in Chapter four that relations between Tanzania and the Germanies had become strained from the mid-sixties primarily due to the Hallstein doctrine which made it virtually impossible to recognise East Germany without inviting the displeasure of West Germany.

Although economic relations with the Germanies had begun to improve at the beginning of the 1970s, diplomatic relations were not fully normalised until the end of 1972, following the signing of the Grundvertrag by the two Germanies on 8 November 1972, the treaty that was supposed to settle basic problems between them. The Grundvertrag, in its West German interpretation did not mark the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two states, but it clearly meant that the Federal Republic recognised the German Democratic Republic as an equal. African governments did not care
much about the subtleties of the two Germanies' diplomacy. They simply welcomed the signal from Bonn that the Hallstein doctrine was no longer applicable. Hence, as soon as Grundvertrag was signed, most African states established relations with the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.).

Tanzania was one of the first to accord East Germany formal recognition, an indication of the former's anxiety to normalise relations with both Germanies. This normalisation had positive implications for the 'Union' of the island and the mainland as well as for economic relations with the two Germanies. Thus, for example, military cooperation between Tanzania and East Germany was initiated: a group of Tanzania non-commissioned army officers completed their training in G.D.R. in October 1979, while negotiations for further G.D.R. military assistance was in progress at the end of the decade.

Meanwhile, West Germany continued to be one of Tanzania's major trading partners as well as a significant source of aid. By 1979, Tanzania had become the second largest recipient of West Germany assistance. The latter also cancelled its $250 million Tanzania debt.

No major contentious bilateral issue arose between Tanzania and the Germanies during the seventies. However, as in the 1960s, the two Germanies continued to compete for preferential treatment in Tanzania — and in Eastern and Southern Africa by extension. Thus, for example, West Germany chose Arusha in Tanzania as the venue for a January 1979 conference on "Perspectives in Afro-German Relations". The conference, whose African participants were drawn from countries
receiving substantial West German aid, was largely a self-congratulatory expose of West German performance in support of Africa's 'developmental' and foreign policy objectives. The results were disappointing for West Germany; most African states including Tanzania, were not impressed by this display of solidarity. Indeed, the Daily News hardly found it worth mentioning at all. Instead a front page story was devoted to denouncing West German nuclear cooperation with South Africa. Ironically, then, it was East Germany, because of its 'clean' record (vis-a-vis South Africa) and its active support of liberation movements and progressive regimes on the continent, that stole the limelight. The G.D.R. had indeed taken full advantage of the great importance that most African states attach to the issue of liberation to win diplomatic recognition and support in most African countries, with the result that by 1979 46 out of the 49 O.A.U. members had established diplomatic relations with East Germany.

Despite the competition between Bonn and East Berlin, Tanzania skillfully employed its policy of non-alignment to maintain close political and economic relations with both throughout the seventies.


As pointed out in the last chapter, Tanzania had always expressed opposition to French atomic tests in the Pacific. More importantly, Tanzania had consistently been opposed to France's policy of selling arms to South Africa. France, President Nyerere once observed with bitterness, does not (like other N.A.T.O. countries) even "pretend that her abysmal sale of arms to South Africa is because of an alleged Soviet
naval presence in the Indian Ocean. She sells them simply because it is good business". However, Nyerere was convinced that France and other countries who sold arms took their cue from Britain so that it was the latter who bore the most critical responsibility in dissuading other nations from selling arms. Thus, while acknowledging the fact that France had completely ignored the U.N. arms embargo, he maintained that:

"If Britain decides to supply even limited quantities of restricted type of arms because of her "national interests", the embargo will rapidly collapse altogether. Britain's position in the world partly because of the Commonwealth -- is too important for her example to go unnoticed. Other countries will soon discover their own national interests to break the embargo".

Nyerere further blamed Francophone African states for failing to support the Anglophones in exerting pressure on France:

"... Many French-speaking countries in Africa are very sensitive to criticism against France. They value their friendship with that European power and do not like to embarrass that country. But France does not seem to be equally concerned to avoid embarrassment to her African friends, or to consider their attitudes on matters affecting the African freedom and unity to which they are publicly committed".
Elsewhere Tanzania's attitude towards France was expressed more forcefully:

"... France ... has continued to demonstrate her contempt for the rights of the black man. She ... has now distinguished herself as one of the freedom fighter's most dangerous enemies". 85

Besides the sale of arms to South Africa, Tanzania was also opposed to France arming a more immediate enemy -- Amin's Uganda. Tanzania also, along with other African states, expressed displeasure of French military intervention in the Central African Republic, where French troops installed a protege of Paris to replace the disposed Emperor Bokassa, whose regime had also survived on French financial and economic assistance.

The more serious bilateral conflict in the 1970s however occurred in August 1977, following the visit to Tanzania of the then French Foreign Minister, Louis de Guiringaud. Upon his arrival at Dar-es-Salaam Airport he had been greeted by a hostile group of University students, demonstrating against French arms sales to South Africa. 86 The French Minister who felt that the students were encouraged by the government to insult him demanded an apology, which was denied. However, the Tanzania government did make a point of informing the French Minister that his American and British counterparts -- Henry Kissinger and Lord Hume -- had received similar receptions for which no apology had been made. In spite of this, de Guiringaud whose visit to Tanzania was ironically part of an "extensive public relations exercise to convince
African leaders, especially the Anglophone ones, that France was among the Continent's best friends, decided to cut short his visit to Tanzania and return to Paris.

Tanzania was hardly shaken by this diplomatic incident. Indeed, Nyerere launched a further attack on the French government's continuing arms sales during a visit to Tanzania by three prominent French trade unionists in August 1978. The attack was prompted by a remark made by one of them to the effect that it would take time to cut off France's economic ties with South Africa, because of the loss of jobs it would entail.

In July 1980 however, De Guiringuad's successor, Jean Francois-Poncet, paid a three day visit to Tanzania with the aim of improving the strained relations. In his talks with Nyerere and with his Tanzanian counterpart, Benjamin Mkapa, the French Minister agreed that "appropriate measures" should be brought to bear on South Africa to accept the U.N. independence plan for Namibia; however, the French and Tanzanian officials differed about what these should be. Nevertheless, at the end of his visit, Francois-Poncet was confident enough to say that a new page had been turned in Franco-Tanzanian relations:

"If there have been misunderstandings in the past, these misunderstandings have been dispelled and French Policy is now better understood."

A further signal for improved bilateral relations was given by the President of the French Bank for foreign investment, who was quoted by the official news agency as having said that France was exploring ways...
and means of assisting Tanzania's economy recover from the effects of high oil prices and the expense of the campaign to remove Amin from power in Uganda. 91

Thus, although at the close of the decade Tanzania had failed to dissuade France from selling arms to South Africa, it had at least succeeded in normalising bilateral relations, in establishing a framework for future negotiations on Southern Africa and other issues such as French (and other great powers) naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

vii) Tanzania and Canada: 1970-1980

"Canada is no ordinary foreign aid donor in Tanzania, especially in the eyes of the Tanzanians and their president, Julius Nyèrere. Canada is seen as one of Tanzania's oldest and most reliable friend in the Western industrialised world, and the one with the fewest vested interests." 92

Canada may not be regarded as a special Western friend by Tanzanians generally, but certainly the top leadership seems to view Canada in this light. The bilateral relationship dates back to the mid 1960s. Thus for example, it was the Canadian High Commission which looked after British interests in Tanzania during the 2½ year break with the U.K. Furthermore, when West Germany withdrew its aid unilaterally in 1965, Tanzania turned to Canada rather than to China for military assistance to replace it. Canada then took over the training and equipping of
the air force as well as giving assistance to the army. Subsequently, Tanzania opened a High Commission in Ottawa in 1966, twelve years before Kenya opened one. The opening of this mission was, as the Tanzanian Standard noted, inspired by the 1965 military aid agreement:

"If one of the older Commonwealth countries proves willing to increase her military and/or non-military assistance then it may be desirable for Tanzania to open a mission there." 93

Since then, Canadian aid to Tanzania has increased and bilateral relations have grown. However, when the 1965 military agreement expired in 1969, it was not renewed, apparently because Canada, as a N.A.T.O. member, was not viewed to be an appropriate trainer when Tanzania was virtually at war with another N.A.T.O. member (Portugal) in neighbouring Mozambique. Moreover, because the Canadian Parliament did not approve the supply of weapons, Tanzania could not obtain from Canada the military hardware, such as jet fighters, helicopters and tanks which it needed, especially as neighbouring Uganda and Somalia had access to Soviet Mig fighters. However, when Nyerere was asked in an interview why the military agreement with Canada was not renewed after its expiration in 1969, he simply stated: "You (Canadians) cannot be here forever"; but he was quick to point to the fact, that Tanzania had allowed Canada to train its troops for five years, was a clear indication of Tanzania's trust in Canada. 94 Furthermore, one of Nyerere's first overseas visits in 1970 was to Canada, where he personally thanked the government and the people for assistance in training the army. 95
Despite the lapsed military aid programme, Tanzania continued to receive other forms of assistance from Canada. Thus between 1970 and 1971, Tanzania received two separate loans totalling C $6 million from Canada: in 1970, C $2 million for electrical distribution and, in 1971, C $4 million in technical and economic assistance. In June 1977, when Canada announced that it would drop debts from "developing" countries whose per capita incomes were less than C $275, Tanzania, easily qualified. Tanzania became the major beneficiary of this cancellation since it owed Canada $84.5 million -- the largest single outstanding debt.96

Another boost in Canadian economic aid followed in July, when the Canadian International Development Agency (C.I.D.A.) gave Tanzania C $60 million in the form of goods and services to restore the country's deteriorating railway system. This was the largest single Canadian grant ever, although quantitatively smaller than the Chinese loan for TAZARA. In any case, Tanzania received in 1978, a further Canadian loan of C $25 million to provide irrigation machinery and research facilities for wheat production.97 Indeed, during the period 1970 to 1978, Tanzania was one of the major commonwealth recipients of Canadian aid. For example, Canadian aid disbursements to Tanzania for the 1977-78 fiscal year amounted to approximately 36 percent of Canada's bilateral aid to Commonwealth Africa.98

However, Tanzanian-Canadian friendship, as noted earlier, goes beyond aid, which in quantitative terms is smaller than that received from China, Yugoslavia or Sweden. There seems to be a shared philosophy
and/or world view between the two leaders -- Julius Nyerere and Pierre Trudeau -- who have worked closely together, particularly at Commonwealth and North-South conferences in pursuit of a new and more equitable order. Reflective of this personal friendship, was the special treatment accorded to Trudeau when he visited Tanzania in August 1981, in marked contrast to "the scolding about Southern Africa that Joe Clark received when he visited there in 1979". 99

Thus, apart from the fact that Canadian aid is viewed as having fewer strings than that from other Western nations, the shared world view, and mutual respect of Nyerere and Trudeau contributed to cordial bilateral relations:

"Both have international reputations that go beyond their domestic image. Both see each other as outstanding surrogates for the sectors of the world they come from. And both may be out of touch with the people they lead". 100

viii) Tanzania and the West in the 1970s: Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of Tanzania's relations with individual Western countries in the 1970s has revealed much continuity as well as some changes. Overall, Tanzania's major confrontations in the 1970s were concentrated on the United Kingdom, primarily over the liberation of Southern Africa. Although there were threats to break relations with Britain over certain issues, no such rupture occurred during the decade. Indeed Tanzania demonstrated a more conciliatory attitude and a willingness to mend those fences broken during the 1960s. However, most of the initiative for this seemed to originate in Britain.
Although there was relatively less condemnation of the West as a bloc, nevertheless there were a few important occasions when Nyerere felt it necessary to condemn it. One such occasion was in June 1978 when he reacted strongly to reports that West European countries were planning a "Pan-African Defence Force" to help bolster African regimes whose security was threatened. In a statement made to foreign diplomats accredited to Tanzania, the President made it known that Tanzania would strongly resist any attempts to reassert and strengthen the domination of Africa under the pretence of defending the continent. He deplored the habit of Africa being regarded as a mere appendage of Europe and said this was why the West considered Africa to be within its sphere of influence. Nyerere declared that the people of Africa had as much right to change corrupt governments as the British, French, Russian, and Chinese people had to overthrow similar regimes. He described the proposal for setting up a "Pan-African Defence Force" as "an insult to Africa and a derogation of African freedom", he exhorted African government to think carefully before becoming more closely involved in the proposed force.

On a different occasion, Nyerere set out his reasons for feeling less immediately threatened by the Soviet bloc than by the West:

"Africa, to-day, has a formal relationship with the European community. We are like appendages to the E.E.C. We are to Western Europe what Latin America is to the U.S. So for those Africans who feel they need to enlarge their area of freedom, the problem is
not the Soviet Union. It is Western Europe ... we
are dependent on Western Europe and I know that I do
not want to be dependent on any one else, the Soviet
Union included. 102

Nevertheless, in spite of Nyerere's lamentation over dependence
on the E.E.C., he took the opportunity of a March 1980 aid 103 -- shopping
trip to Europe to condemn both the Western and Eastern countries for
their lack of concern for 'developing' countries. He attacked "the
growing tendency of Western governments to tie political strings to
their bilateral aid" and hinted that the U.S. was threatening to review
its aid policies, according to each country's stand on Afghanistan. 104
Tanzania had every reason to be concerned on the latter issue, since it
did not support the U.S. on Afghanistan or the Olympic boycott. On
the other hand, Nyerere said that he saw "no difference in the Eastern
bloc's attitude that poverty in the 'developing' countries has nothing
to do with them although they benefit from the discriminatory world
trade system." 105 The discussion that follows -- of Tanzania's relations
with the U.S.S.R. and China -- further reveals Nyerere's attitudes
towards the socialist countries, individually and collectively.


In contrast to China, relations with the Soviet Union remained
generally "correct", even though Nyerere did visit Moscow in early
1970 to improve ties. In return, the Soviet Vice President visited
Tanzania in April 1970 to attend Union Day Celebrations. As explained
in the previous chapter, Tanzania had always held the Soviet Union at arms length and was as suspicious of Russia's intentions in Africa as it was of America's. The Russians on the other hand were, like some of the major Western countries, undoubtedly upset by the fact that the Chinese had secured an important ideological and strategic position in Tanzania. These attitudes did not alter significantly in the 1970s, because of continued Sino-Soviet conflict.

An additional factor contributing to the coolness of relations between the two states in the 1970s, was the Russian supply of armaments to Amin's Uganda. During 1975, the Russians sent a diplomatic mission to Tanzania to try and reassure Nyerere that they had a guarantee from Amin that these arms would only be used for defence and not for any offense against neighbouring states. Given Amin's expressed desire to conquer the Tanzanian port of Tanga to secure an outlet to the sea, as well as the presence of then ex-President Obote in Tanzania, Nyerere did not find the Russian guarantee very reassuring.

While the Tanzanians were critical of military assistance to Amin's Uganda, the Russians were critical of Tanzania's cooperation with the Ford and Carter administrations in the diplomatic shuttle in Southern Africa. They were particularly upset by the F.L.S. decision that only Chinese military instructors should remain in the Zimbabwe Liberation army camps in Tanzania. The latter insisted that while Russian arms for Zimbabwe forces were welcome and necessary, these should be channelled through the O.A.U. liberation committee in Dar-es-Salaam. In this case Tanzania demonstrated its preference
for a Chinese military presence in Tanzania as opposed to a Russian
one, a reflection of its general suspicion of the two super-powers
and their interventionist tendencies.

Significantly, while Tanzania praised the Cuban role in Angola in
1975/76 as a demonstration of Cuba's belief in its "internationalist
duty in assisting the revolution of African peoples", it had no
such words of praise for Cuba's "ally" -- U.S.S.R. Indeed,
Nyerere interpreted Russian support for M.P.L.A. as an
aspect of bilateral Sino-Soviet conflict; hence it was purely coinciden-
tal that the Soviet Union happened to be on the same side as most
African states. Nyerere saw Cuba first and foremost as a Third
World member of the non-aligned movement one that had demonstrated
its identification with African goals and aspirations, and only
secondarily as a Russian "ally"; and then in a similar way to Tanzania's
association with China.

Given these attitudes, Tanzania's receptions of Cuban President
Castro and Soviet President Podgorny during their March 1977 visits to
Tanzania were markedly different. Whereas Fidel Castro received "the
biggest reception ever accorded a state guest", Nyerere took advan-
tage of the Soviet President's visit to criticise Russian aid to
Africa as being insufficient. In a further reference to the U.S.S.R.,
Nyerere remarked that "some socialist countries do not seem to understand
the need for a new economic order".

In general, then, despite the close ties between the Soviet Union
and Cuba, Tanzania has chosen to develop links with the latter while
discouraging those with the former. This attitude falls within Tanzania's general preference for and attempts to seek close cooperation with 'middle' and 'small' powers and/or third world countries, while keeping such cooperation with the major powers to a minimum. China is not an exception to this preference, since it has never acted towards Tanzania with the self-centred attitude of assertive, interventionist superiority associated with the two super-powers.

However, despite significant political, technical and cultural links with Cuba, Tanzania has objected to the latter's interpretation of non-alignment in a manner aimed at giving the Russian led-socialist bloc a special position within the movement. This objection was clearly demonstrated by Nyerere at the September 1979 conference held in Havana. In his opening speech, Castro had suggested that, since both the non-aligned nations and the socialist nations are anti-imperialist anti-colonialist, anti-neocolonialist, etc., both camps were "natural allies". Nyerere's rejoinder to this suggestion was clear and unequivocal:

"I am not quite sure that this movement has permanent enemies and permanent friends, let alone natural ones. But I am sure it has permanent interests .... There are nations here that are socialist but we are not a socialist movement. If this movement tries to be a power bloc or is allied with a power bloc, it will cease to be an influence on the world and fall apart".
It is clear from this that Nyerere did not regard the Soviet or Socialist bloc as entitled to any preferential treatment by the non-aligned. This undoubtedly displeased the Soviet Union that always likes to be viewed as a better friend of the Third World than the United States.

In spite of the underlying coolness in Soviet-Tanzania relations, there was a slight improvement in 1978 when Russia withdrew its military instructors from Uganda and suspended arms supplies to Amin after the latter's invasion of Tanzania. The promptness of Moscow's response and its subsequent silence over Tanzania's role in overthrowing Amin was viewed favourably in Dar-es-Salaam. However, when Tanzania's Minister for Defence visited Moscow in March 1979 to request the delivery of weapons that had been promised he was not even received by the appropriate Russian Minister—hardly a sign of close relations.


While Tanzania made remarkable efforts to be truly non-aligned during the 1960s, it became more closely 'allied', even if informally so, with China by 1970. Thus, as was shown in chapter three, by 1971, China had: i) replaced Britain as the major source of imports, ii) replaced Canada and other Western countries as the major source of military assistance, and iii) had become second only to the World Bank as the major source of economic aid. And as shown in the previous chapter, Tanzania's attempt at being non-aligned, Western hostility over its association with China, ambivalence towards U.S.S.R., and its
socialist policies after 1967, all combined to push Tanzania still closer towards China. Furthermore, China's model of development, its support for the liberation of Southern Africa, and its generous aid terms, all appealed to the leadership.

The close bilateral relations in the military, political and economic fields that developed in the sixties did not diminish. However imports from China decreased after the completion of the Tanzanian section of TAZARA (see Table 5:5). Furthermore, Tanzania declined to receive any further economic aid from China until its section of the TAZARA was completed. It was thus not until Mwalimu's third visit to Peking in 1974 that additional aid from China was accepted. This aid package consisted of an interest-free loan of £31 million for the construction of a branch railway line in Southern Tanzania's iron-ore and coal deposits region. This could provide the basic infrastructure for a coal and steel industry.

TABLE 5:5 - SINO-TANZANIAN TRADE: 1972-1979

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<tr>
<td>Exports to China</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports from China</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
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Tanzania's President, who was warmly received by Chou-En-Lai during his 1974 visit, indicated that his main reason for going to China (as in 1965 and 1968), was to learn more about the Chinese model of Socialism:

"I want to learn more. When I first came to China, I was impressed by your discipline, the selflessness of the people and the people's cadres and the way in which you were using your own resources for the benefit of the masses rather than the enrichment of a few individuals. In 1968, I saw that the Chinese people themselves had still been dissatisfied with the progress which had so much impressed my colleagues and myself. The cultural revolution represented that dissatisfaction .... Now we have come to learn of the further progress which you have been making .... I hope we shall be good pupils who learn and apply their lessons to their own situation". 116

The above statement clearly reveals that it is not China that has tried to impose its development policies on Tanzania, but the Tanzanian leadership that has chosen to adapt the Chinese 'model' to its situation. Furthermore Nyerere continues to view China as a developing nation that i) shares some of Tanzania's goals and aspirations, and ii) unlike the two super-powers, has maintained a reputation for non-interference in the domestic affairs of Africa. China's continuing support for liberation and its apparent commitment for a N.I.E.O. that would favour
poorer rather than richer states, has served to strengthen its friendship with Tanzania.

In the political field, the regular exchange of visits by high ranking officials have ensured the maintenance of close ties. Thus, for example, in September 1978 the then Prime Minister Edward Sokoine visited Peking. His visit was closely followed a month later by that of the then Minister of Defence, Rashidi Kawawa, heading a C.C.M. party delegation. In return, Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien Nieu also made a good-will visit to Dar-es-Salaam in January 1979. The Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua followed up with a two-day visit in April 1980 on his way to attend the Zimbabwe Independence celebrations in Salisbury. During this visit he held talks with Nyerere and Benjamin Mkapa. On this occasion, the Tanzanian leaders praised China for supporting the group of "77." in its efforts to bring about a N.I.E.O. The month before Hua's visit, China had agreed to construct the C.C.M.'s new party headquarters in Dodoma — the site of the new capital — providing engineering skills as well as building materials and equipment.

In the military field, China continued to provide most of Tanzania's military supplies throughout the seventies. Assistance included the building of the Party's college for military training at Munduli which was formally opened in September 1976. This provides a nine month advanced course for army personnel and T.A.N.U. officials. Chinese military instructors have also trained the Tanzanian people's militia in the use of firearms, most of which have come from China. The Chinese also helped to set up a small jet air force and train units of marine,
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, Tanzania's military expenditure and build up increased dramatically in the seventies, particularly after the outbreak of warfare with Amin's Uganda in 1978, which was well armed with Soviet Migs. Thus whereas in 1973, Tanzania's armed forces numbered 11,600 with a defence expenditure of about $45 million, in 1979 the armed forces numbered 51,850, with an expenditure of $303 million. East African conflict increased Tanzania's search for security and a steady supply of arms (particularly in the latter part of the seventies), mostly from China. Increased reliance on Chinese military assistance is evident, at least in part, from frequent Tanzanian military delegations to China during the period. Thus for example, in late 1979 and early 1980, two separate military delegations visited China. The first was led by Tanzania's junior defence minister, Col. Seif Bakari Omari, and the second by Senior Defence Minister, Rashidi Kawawa.

On the economic level, the Chinese continued to make a considerable impact on Tanzania's development efforts, because of the generosity and appropriateness of their aid and Tanzania's difficulties in securing what it considered necessary from other sources. The Chinese in particular made a great impact by committing themselves to and actually completing TAZARA. President Nyerere personally expressed his gratitude for this during his 1974 visit. He praised China for building the railway and said that although he did not expect to benefit China in the same way he hoped that,
"We shall be able to express our appreciation by our success in guarding and extending the people's revolution in Africa". Similar sentiments were expressed in July 1976 at the formal opening of TAZARA. In thanking China's Vice Premier, Sun Chien, at the handing-over ceremony of the "Uhuru" railway, Mwalimu observed that: "The Chinese people have made this railway possible. In this as in so many other ways, they have contributed to our freedom struggle".

A pointer to the close relations between Tanzania and China, was the former's response to Chairman Mao's death in September 1976. Besides Nyerere's message of condolence, the students and staff of Dar-es-Salaam University cancelled all examinations and classes and marched from campus to the home of the Chinese Ambassador in an exceptional mark of respect for Mao. The Daily News, in a special tribute noted that, "Mao more than any other man aroused China from its centuries of sleep and built it into a powerful and reliable base for peoples fighting for their liberation".

Kenya's response to Mao's death was markedly different, as is shown below.

An additional indication of the continuing friendship between Tanzania and China, was evident from the fact that when the 1965 Sino-Tanzania treaty of friendship expired in 1975, it was automatically
prolonged for another decade, since neither of the Contracting Parties expressed a desire to terminate it. Furthermore, during the fifteenth anniversary of the treaty, Prime Minister Sokone visited Peking, where he was the guest of honour at an anniversary celebration.

It has often been said that the close relationship between Tanzania and China raises doubts as to the former's ability to pursue an independent foreign policy not influenced by the latter. Although one case is hardly enough on which to base a generalisation, it is nevertheless worth pointing out as an example, one incident where Tanzania's claim was put to test. The case in point was Tanzania's stand -- which ran counter to that of China -- in the 1975/76 Angolan conflict. Whereas Tanzania supported and recognised the "Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola" (M.P.L.A.) government, China supported the "National Liberation Front of Angola" (F.N.L.A.) -- "National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola" (U.N.I.T.A.) coalition. When Nyerere was interviewed on this, his response was candid and concise:

"You know we are friendly with the Chinese. It does happen that on this matter of Angola we do not see eye to eye. We do not take the same position, because we cannot see this Angolan issue from the Chinese point of view. We have got to look at the Angolan issue from the African point of view." The Tanzanian leader demonstrated in this statement his ability i) to recognise areas where Tanzanian and Chinese viewpoints conflict and
to maintain his country's position despite divergence from a close friend. In other words, while Tanzania viewed the Angolan issue in terms of what seemed to be in the best interests of the Angolan people, China saw the issue primarily within the context of Sino-Soviet rivalry. Hence, China's divergent position on this issue was hardly based on any genuine concern for Angola. Nyerere interpreted the pro-M.P.L.A. stand of the U.S.S.R. and U.S. ambivalence in a similar manner.

This Angolan issue, then, constitutes a modest reaffirmation of a statement made by Nyerere in 1968 in defence of Sino-Tanzanian friendship:

"the friendship between China and Tanzania is based on the principles of respect and equality .... When we feel able to cooperate, we do so, if either of us feels reluctant, then we move to some other matter .... I therefore have no reason to believe that friendship between Tanzania and China will not continue indefinitely, and grow strong as time passes". 132

Indeed, the Angolan disagreement had no apparent effect on the ties between the two states which continued to be close, unlike those with other major powers which tended to be characterised by more conflict than cooperation. The latter's attempts to influence and/or undermine Tanzania's decision-making and attempts at implementing its policy goals, were often the cause of the conflicts that developed.

However, as is shown in the following analysis, Kenya reacted differently and adopted divergent attitudes from Tanzania in its
interaction with and in response to the major powers in particular and
the external environment in general. Consequently, it has displayed
a different pattern of cooperation and conflict from that of Tanzania.


i) Introduction: The Changing Styles and Actors in Kenya's Foreign
Policy, 1970-1980

As noted in the previous chapter, following the 1964-1966
domestic/diplomatic crisis, Kenya's foreign ministry was downgraded
into a department within the President's Office. It remained largely
inactive as the leadership switched its attention to the forging of
closer economic links with the major Western countries and institutions
and the consolidation of its power position in the country.

Thus by the beginning of the 1970s Kenya had gained an image
in the Western press of being moderate and pro-Western; an image that
had done much to attract foreign capital in the latter part of the
sixties, unlike the first phase following independence when Kenya
experienced a remarkably high outflow rather than an inflow, of foreign
capital investment. Njoroge Mungai, who was appointed in 1969 as
minister in the now-autonomous ministry of foreign affairs, had no
intention of changing an image that had been so 'beneficial' to Kenya.
If anything, his role as foreign minister was to be one of fostering
that image further by trying to impress Kenya's political stability
upon the world community and hence its suitability for foreign investment
and as a centre for International discourse.
Indeed, Mungai viewed the siting of the U.N. Environment programme Secretariat in Nairobi in 1973 as his major achievement in international diplomacy, particularly since this was the first time that the headquarters of a major U.N. agency was located in Africa. Furthermore Kenya was, concurrent with being chosen as the site of U.N.E.P., elected to the Security Council. These events were interpreted in diplomatic rather than structural terms. The Kenyatta government viewed them not only as indications of Kenya's diplomatic successes but also of the high regard in which the country's "unity and stability" were held in the eyes of the world. 136

For Mungai, this was another indication of the successes accruing to Kenya's cautious, pragmatic approach. Indeed in a major foreign policy statement in 1971, he spoke favourably of Kenya's moderate approach, as opposed to more radical states, such as Tanzania, who had not scored similar diplomatic and economic successes. 137 Yet in spite of Mungai's "success" in maintaining a moderate image of Kenya at the international level, he failed to retain his parliamentary seat during the 1974 general elections -- thus demonstrating that his constituents were more concerned with bread and butter issues rather than with the number of U.N. agencies that were sited in Nairobi.

Munyua Waiyaki who succeeded Mungai as Minister introduced a new style in foreign policy that was viewed by most observers as quite "radical" by Kenyan standards. Indeed some went as far as to suggest that Kenya's foreign policy was changing. 138 Two events in particular prompted this perspective..
The first of these events occurred in April 1975 when Waiyaki, delivered a speech at a special O.A.U. Foreign Minister's Council meeting on the future of Southern Africa, which, by its sheer force of logic and ideological content, placed Kenya among the radical African states who did not want dialogue with South Africa. Coming as it did after years of a cultivated international image of moderation, its significance was perhaps a little overplayed. Nevertheless, observers could not help but notice that Tanzania, which is generally associated with radicalism in East Africa, was aligned with the moderates in voting for dialogue, while Kenya, the traditional moderate, voted with the 'radicals' against dialogue.

The second event occurred a few months later in August 1975 when Waiyaki recalled Kenya's Ambassadors and High Commissioners for a review of foreign policy. Waiyaki felt that there was need to update Kenya's approach to accommodate new circumstances, such as the New International Economic Order, the energy crisis, the diminishing role and presence of the U.S. in the Far East and the detente between the two superpowers. However as subsequent actions have demonstrated, this review exercise did not result in any radical realignment and/or substantive change in foreign policy. The review session did, however, reflect on Waiyaki's initiative and determination to see Kenya play a more active role in international affairs.

Waiyaki's style displayed independent mindedness and forcefulness in the articulation of Kenya's foreign policy particularly on issues of Southern African liberation. He made no secret about his personal
of apartheid and hence of any dialogue. It was his strong conviction which led him into direct confrontation with the then Attorney General Charles Njonjo in 1978; the latter had suggested publicly that African countries should open a dialogue and send ambassadors to Pretoria. In an angry rebuttal, Waiyaki, hit out at the Attorney General for interfering in the affairs of his ministry. He warned that if Kenya opened a dialogue with South Africa he would resign as foreign minister.

But Waiyaki was never given a chance to carry out his threat — if he really meant it — for following the death of Kenyatta, the new President — Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi — relieved him of his portfolio and appointed him to head a newly-created ministry of Energy. Robert Ouko, a former minister to the defunct East African community, was appointed to head the foreign office.

This diplomatic switch was inevitable because: i) Waiyaki's opposition to Kenya's foreign policy was not always in keeping with the sentiments of one of the most powerful men in Moi's government — Njonjo and ii) Kenya's economy had since the mid-1970s been beset with acute problems. The latter factor pushed Moi's administration, more than that of Kenyatta, to place a high priority on forging even closer economic relations with countries which the leadership felt could assist in its 'development' efforts.

Viewed from this perspective, the appointments of Waiyaki and Ouko to their respective posts underscored the second concern. Ouko's long experience in economic affairs and his ability to get along with
many Western countries was just what Moi needed to advance economic relations with Western Europe. Similarly Waiyaki as the "energy czar", quite apart from keeping his "radicalism" out of Kenya's foreign policy, was well-suited to negotiate better deals with the oil rich Arab nations, since during his term as foreign Minister he had established cordial relations with them.

Nevertheless, the appointment of Ouko as the new Minister led to speculation about a possible shift in Kenya's foreign policy. Ouko insisted, however, that he would adhere strictly to the non-alignment policy followed by the previous government and Minister. However, subsequent Presidential actions indicated that whereas the government officially maintained a non-aligned stance towards the superpowers, in fact it continued to lean much more towards the U.S. and the West, as demonstrated later in this chapter.

It should nevertheless be noted that the death of Kenyatta marked the end of an era in which foreign policy was often dominated by the ministry of foreign affairs, to one where the President now takes a personal and active interest not just in its making but also in its execution. Thus, although President Moi did not change the substance of Kenya's foreign policy, his style is somewhat different from that of his predecessor: he tends to avoid equivocation where Kenyatta would have opted for silence or caution. Overall, Moi seems determined to put his personal mark on Kenya's foreign policy, while making no fundamental change to its basic orientation.
In the discussion that follows, I examine some of the more substantive issues that characterised Kenya's foreign policy in the 1970s, particularly in its relationship with major Western and Eastern bloc countries and institutions.

ii) The M.N.C.s and Kenya's Foreign Policy: The Case of Lonrho

As shown in chapter 3, Kenya actively and openly encourages private foreign capital and is anxious to create a hospitable climate for such investment. Consequently, Kenya has continued to attract considerably more investment than Tanzania where conditions are relatively less "hospitable".

Lonrho is perhaps the best-known example of a private foreign investor in Kenya that has cultivated a close political alliance with the dominant fraction of the ruling class as a strategy for ensuring its continued domination and expansion within the economy. This transnational relationship however, did not escape the disapproval of certain members of the government. Indeed as far back as 1969, there was already criticism from the "indigenous" fraction of the ruling class condemning "those Africans who were appointed company directors some of whom have 10, 12 and even 30 directorships". The same group also criticised the Kenyatta government for allowing a company with South African connections to take-over the management and ownership of the East African Standard newspaper.
As was to be expected, attacks on Lonrho in the 1960s were ignored by Kenyatta. Indeed, by 1973, the alliance between Lonrho, the Kenyatta "royal" family and certain sections of the ruling class became formally cemented, when Udii Gecaga — son-in-law of the President — was appointed to the London board of Lonrho and promoted from managing director to Chairman of the local firm.

Criticism of Lonrho activities however, continues to emerge from the 'indigenous' fraction that had consistently expressed opposition to 'Comprador' fraction partnerships and permissiveness towards foreign enterprises, as shown in chapter three. It was perhaps Lonrho's overt political alliances that contributed to its being singled out for attack. For example, it was accused of racial discrimination in differentiating between the salaries of African and European employees and in removing "some Africans in top positions because they did not happen to toe the line and replaced them with those Africans who support the policy of certain individuals". These "certain individuals" were none other than the Kenyatta-led fraction of the ruling class. These and other attacks and allegations gave rise to a concern within the government to reassure Lonrho and other British foreign investors of the still "stable and hospitable" climate for continued investment in Kenya. This reassurance was articulated by the High Commissioner in London:

"The Kenyan Government has not found it necessary to pronounce itself on the Lonrho affair despite the fact that the Lonrho group has considerable interests in
Kenya. In spite of this non-committal attitude, Kenya's name has been dragged into the Lonrho affair by the mass media insinuating a particular stand. This has inevitably created a certain amount of anxiety in financial and commercial circles on broader issues concerning Kenya's investment policy.... It remains the cardinal principle of the Kenya government's policy to attract foreign capital and expertise in developing the country.147

This type of reassurance to foreign investors is periodically repeated by either the President or other senior officials. The government has judiciously avoided the issue of Lonrho's connections with South Africa and its general role of sabotaging the liberation of Southern Africa. Thus for example, while the expulsion of Lonrho from Tanzania was reported in Kenyan newspapers,148 there was no official comment or reaction to the move.

Given the importance which the government attaches to foreign investment and to relations with Britain, it is most unlikely that the Kenyan ruling class would expel Lonrho or any other investor over the Liberation issue. For the Kenyan bourgeoisie, its own immediate economic interests have always taken precedence over other considerations, including Southern Africa. This attitude is also apparent in many of its bilateral relations which are discussed next.
iii) Kenya's response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and its aftermath

During the 1960s and the early 1970s, Kenya had maintained a close set of relations with Israel which ranged from trade, investment, technical assistance, agriculture, cooperatives and trade union affairs. Conversely, few links had been established with the Arab states for a number of reasons; these included the government's belief that Arab states tended to support 1) "radical" elements within Kenya and 11) Kenya's regional enemies -- Somalia and Uganda. Furthermore, it made more sense for Kenya to identify and cooperate with a fellow Western 'ally' -- Israel -- than with the Arabs who had been relatively unimportant to the West until the 1973 use of the oil weapon. Indeed, as noted earlier, although Kenya severed formal diplomatic links with Israel on 1 November, 1973, informal economic relations have been maintained. For example, Israel's airline El-Al continued to use Nairobi Airport. Kenya is also said to have allowed Israeli transport planes to refuel at Nairobi on their way to Entebbe Airport to rescue the hostages held there in July 1976.

Furthermore, unlike Tanzania, Kenya was one of the last African countries to break with Israel; and then only when it became obvious that Kenya might end up as the odd one out on the continent and risk the oil weapon being used against it. Ironically, although Kenya, was one of the last to break relations with Israel, it became one of the more outspoken campaigners for concessionary oil prices and Arab economic aid. Kenya even went further to suggest that Arab oil
producers should sell crude oil directly to African countries rather through Western institutions and ii) should, as a matter of necessity, build oil refineries for those African countries that lacked them.  The Arab failure to heed such demands led a prominent Kenyan politician, then Attorney General -- Charles Njonjo -- to suggest that Kenya should use its "charcoal weapon" against Arab oil producing countries whose pricing policies were damaging Kenya's economy:  

"The Arabs are milking the people of the developing countries, yet we send them charcoal at the expense of converting our country into a desert -- a desert without oil. Let us wake up and tell the Arabs we are not prepared to send them our charcoal. This is one of our major exports (to the Middle East) and we can use it as a weapon."

The "charcoal weapon" was of course never used. Indeed such tough talk was soon replaced by characteristic pragmatism. By November 1975 Foreign Minister Waiyaki was on a good-will tour of the Middle East -- Kuwait, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates -- in an attempt to forge closer economic cooperation with these countries. Furthermore, the Kenya government also began to caution the local press to refrain from publishing anti-Arab opinions:  

"We have already started to make an impact on the Arab world but this could come to naught if we continue to mount vicious newspaper and Press campaign against the Arabs, sometimes going to the ridiculous extent of
calling for exchange of a barrel of our water for a barrel of their oil. 154

Despite the Kenya government's attempts at establishing close economic links with Arab states, its ambivalence on the Arab-Israeli conflict -- particularly its covert interaction with Israel -- and its support of Ethiopia in the 1976-77 Somali-Ethiopia Ogaden war continued to hinder such links. Indeed, by the end of the 1970s, Kenya had gotten into conflicts with most of the key Arab states on one or the other of these two issues. For example it was over the Ogaden war that a diplomatic rupture occurred in February 1978, following Waiyaki's statement that the Shah of Iran should stay out of African affairs, particularly since he was not an African. 155 Relations with Egypt also became (temporarily) strained over the same issue following Kenya's impounding of an Egyptian cargo plane bound for Mogadishu to deliver ammunition. 156 The issue of Israel was also the cause of the conflict that occurred in November 1979 when the Central Boycott office of the Arab league in Damascus blacklisted twenty-four Kenyan companies that were alleged to be trading with Israel. 157 Kenya did not deny the allegation but rather warned that it would trade with whatever country it wished and would not be dictated to. In reaction to the Arab move, Kenya de-registered the Kenya Arab Friendship Association which had been formed to foster closer Arab links. Again, the Arab-Israeli issue lay at the source of the conflict with Libya which followed the bombing incident of one of Kenya's major
tourist hotels -- The Norfolk Hotel -- on New Year's eve 1980. 158

A Libyan owned newspaper then published in Nairobi -- The Voice of Africa -- accused the Kenya government of lying about the bombing incident and suggested that the bomb had been planted by the Israeli intelligence network as "revenge against Kenya in strengthening diplomatic relations between her and the Arab world". 159

Although President Moi visited the Middle East in late 1979 160 in an attempt to mend fences with at least the key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, it seemed evident at the close of the 1970s that Kenya's relations with most Arab states would continue to be conflictual as long as i) the Arabs maintained their islamic solidarity with Somalia, and ii) the Kenyans maintained their overt dealings with Israel. Clearly, Kenya faced the dilemma of a person who wants to eat his cake and keep it at the same time: a real test for the limits of pragmatism.

Nevertheless, Kenya did not seem to experience a similar dilemma in its relation with the major Western and Eastern countries, which are examined next.


Relations between Kenya and Britain continued to be as close in the 1970s as they were in the 1960s largely a reflection of the position that Britain has continued to hold as Kenya's leading trading partner, and source of foreign aid and capital investment both public and private. Kenya has been careful to avoid, unlike Tanzania, any major confrontation
with Britain. Criticism when articulated has generally been moderate and restrained.

Thus, while Kenya, like Tanzania, joined the majority of African states in speaking against the Heath government's intended resumption of arms sales to South Africa, unlike Tanzania (that went to the extent of threatening to sever relations with Britain), Kenya settled for a mild appeal to Britain's "traditional respect for the rule of law, democracy and fair play" and a call to "all Commonwealth countries and all member states of the U.N. to ... appeal to the British government to prevent her from supplying arms to these unrepresentative orders in South Africa". Unlike Tanzania's criticism that brought reprisals from Britain, Kenya's remarks hardly affected cordial bilateral relations. Indeed, outside issues of general African concerns such as apartheid, Kenya has judiciously avoided any confrontation, sometimes even on issues that directly affected it.

Between 1974 and 1976, for example, certain sections of the British Press published some very defamatory reports exposing the excesses of Kenyatta and his family in expanding their economic "empire". Although these reports were largely accurate, they were obviously damaging to the President's image both at home and abroad, yet his protest to the British government was highly restrained. Furthermore, he readily accepted a mere expression of regret by the then Commonwealth Secretary, James Callaghan, when he visited Kenya in 1975.
Another potential trouble spot has been those Asians in Kenya holding British citizenship. Unlike Amin's Uganda where Asians were summarily expelled, Kenya has been much more cautious and restrained, in spite of domestic pressure for Africanisation and the fact that, as shown in Chapter two, it has the largest population of Asians (most of them British citizens) in East Africa. Kenya's policy towards British Asians has always consisted of a balancing act between heeding populist and nationalist anti-Asian feelings, while accommodating the British preference for a gradual transfer of Asians to the United Kingdom and/or India. That the government has resisted the immense popular pressure for expelling British Asians Amin-style, is a measure of the economic benefits accruing to the Compradors' association with Britain through the intermediary of British "commercial interests" (Asians and Caucasian Britons), as well as direct Asian participation in such transnational links. 164

A further event that clearly indicated Britain's continuing influence on Kenya occurred in 1977, when Kenya decided to award a railways contract to a British company instead of, as originally agreed, to a Canadian company — Hawker Siddeley. 165 According to one source, during the period starting from when the contract was granted to Hawker Siddeley (June 1976) to the time when it was revoked (September 1976),

"... the U.K. railway Lobby, i.e. manufacturers, trade unionists and local M.P.s, protested to Whitehall with crude precision: Britain pays the aid piper and should call the Kenya contracts tune". 166
There seems to be no other reasonable explanation as to why Kenya reversed its original decision, except that British governmental and transnational interests pressured it to award them to a British Company. This case also demonstrates that Kenya's extreme dependence on Britain has greatly reduced its capacity to make its own decisions independently and to stand by them.

Kenya's good behaviour towards Britain has been rewarded handsomely in that, despite the decline of Britain's share in the global economy, it remains Kenya's largest aid donor, and Kenya is the second largest recipient (after India), of such aid. However, between 1964 and 1976 most official commitments were to finance the land-transfer programme of buying out British-owned farms in Kenya [see Table 5:6 below]. Unlike Tanzania's case, where Britain insisted on the former to pay pensions owed to colonial officials, in the case of Kenya, Britain took over the responsibility for pensions;167 hardly a favour given the fact that Kenya was paying to reclaim its land which had been appropriated at minimum or no cost either to the British government or to white settler farmers.

**TABLE 5:6 - BRITISH OFFICIAL CAPITAL AID COMMITMENTS TO KENYA:**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Transfer</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aid</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% for Land Transfer</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kenya was also one of the major beneficiaries of Britain's 1978 waiver of debts of 22 underdeveloped countries. Kenya, whose official debt to the U.K. was only rivaled by that of India (£ 600m) and Pakistan (£ 110m), was reduced by £ 75 million. This debt cancellation was also quantitatively higher than the largest Canadian debt cancellation: that for Tanzania of about £ 42 million.

Although Britain was just one of several industrialised nations that waived their debts to the least developed, the Kenyan press singled out Britain for special praise. In an editorial in the Standard, it was stated:

"Of the former colonial powers, Britain stands out as the benevolent country which has established continuity of relations and intimacy with many of her former colonies. This image is even more enhanced in view of Britain's present economic situation ... Kenya is among the countries which can vouch for British generosity .... The concrete and highly valuable projects which Britain assisted in Kenya ... will forever remain monuments to the friendship existing between our two countries. Indeed Britain's record of generosity in many developing countries gives her a right to stand for them". (emphasis added)

Bilateral military cooperation in the seventies also, remained close as in the 1960s. This was demonstrated at the height of the confrontation between Kenya and Uganda in July 1976 when Britain speeded up its arms
Furthermore, despite U.S. military and non-military assistance to Kenya since the mid seventies, the Royal Air Force continued to train the Kenyan Air Force. Britain also retained the right to send troops to the North East of Kenya for military exercises. And it was accorded naval facilities at Mombasa.

However, as shown in the analysis that follows, the U.S. military presence in Kenya was threatening to overtake that of Britain by the end of the 1970s.


The U.S. is the one super-power with which Kenya had maintained cordial relations since independence. Unlike Tanzania that was suspicious of both super-powers, the Kenya government viewed the world in terms of Eastern Communism versus Western "liberal democracy", with the latter being given preference. Given this viewpoint, the close ties that were established in the 1960s during the crackdown against national 'communist' elements was further cemented in the 1970s, as economic and military cooperation increased.

The general U.S. presence in Kenya grew greatly in the 1970s as such U.S.-based M.N.C.s as I.B.M., Firestone, General Motors, Union Carbide, Del Monte, American Life Insurance, N-Ren and Pfizer entered the Kenyan private sector along with several major U.S. Banks including First National City Bank of New York, First National City Bank of Chicago, Continental Illinois Bank and Bank of America. This foreign investment is particularly important for maintaining the viability of
Kenya's tourist industry, the country's second largest earner (after coffee) of foreign exchange. The Nairobi Hilton and Inter-Continental hotels are examples of such American investment. American firms are also involved in Kenya's extractive industries, particularly in oil refining and distribution; these include: Texas Pacific, Chevron and Esso. 171

Unlike Tanzania which in the past did express dissatisfaction with peace corps volunteers, Kenya consistently welcomed them. The fact that Kenya supports over 25% of the operational expenses for maintaining the volunteers, 172 is an illustration of the value the government places on them. Most of them are involved in teaching. Thus for example, of the 250 U.S. volunteers in Kenya, in 1976, 60 percent were teaching in secondary schools.

Besides economic links, bilateral relations have been further strengthened by a number of interrelated factors: i) growing Soviet-American competition in the Indian Ocean and hence the strategic importance of Kenya as a pro-Western 'ally', ii) arms race within Eastern Africa, iii) the 1976 Ugandan invasion scare, and iv) Kenya's economic crisis particularly food shortages in the latter part of the seventies. All these factors combined to bring Kenya into a closer, dependent relationship with the U.S. in particular and the West in general.

In the military arena, Kenya had until the mid-1970s relied almost exclusively on Britain for its arms supplies. Furthermore, until then it had given a low priority to military 'development' and a high priority
on the growth of free enterprise. Thus up to 1976, Kenya had spent only about 8 percent of its budget on defence, compared with 40 percent on education. This left Kenya with essentially the same 6,500 man army that it had at independence, as compared to Tanzania's 13,000, Uganda's 20,000, Somalia's 20,000 and Ethiopia's 41,000. Furthermore, Kenya was the only Eastern African state that did not possess sophisticated weaponry such as tanks. (See Appendix 1.) As noted earlier, Kenya had by the mid-1970s begun to experience the growing hostility of and isolation by its better armed neighbours: Uganda, Somalia and, increasingly, Tanzania. Hence Kenya was no longer able to enjoy the luxury of a modest military establishment.

It was thus the growing sense of insecurity within the region that pushed Kenya to greater dependence on its Western allies. Given U.S. strategic interests in Kenya, it was the first Western country to provide military assistance for modernising as well as increasing Kenya's defence capability. The first military aid package consisted of a $5 million grant for Kenya to buy equipment. This was closely followed by another bilateral military agreement concluded in June 1976 under which the U.S. would provide Kenya with 12 Northrop F-5 jet fighters worth $75 million.

The first U.S. display of its military 'solidarity' with Kenya occurred in July 1976, when Idi Amin, who was still in a smouldering rage over what he insisted was Nairobi's collaboration with the Israelis in rescuing the hostages held at Entebbe, threatened to invade
Kenya in revenge. In a military show of support for the Kenya government, the American government put its military forces stationed at its base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia in readiness to defend Kenya in the event of the threatened invasion. 175

Another symbolic demonstration of newly-found 'solidarity' in military relations, occurred on Kenya's independence day on 12 December 1976; when a U.S. aircraft carrier anchored in Mombasa, dispatched planes that overflew Nairobi in formation, as a tribute to Kenyatta. 176

As noted above U.S.-Soviet competition for bases and 'facilities' in the Indian Ocean during the 1970s, gave Kenya an enhanced strategic importance to the United States. 177 Previously the Kenya government had welcomed U.S. naval ships at Mombasa -- a gesture that was extended to all foreign countries that were deemed "friendly" to Kenya. However, Kenyatta had astutely eschewed any formal military 'facility' agreements -- with the exception of those with Britain. However, this position was not adhered to for long after Kenyatta's death in 1978. Kenya's grave economic situation, particularly the acute crisis in the supply and price of food in the latter part of the seventies, coupled with an increased sense of isolation and insecurity in the region, to a large extent explain the apparent willingness of Moi's administration to cooperate with the U.S. on political, economic and military issues; some of which are examined below.

A pointer to Kenya's desire to cultivate closer relations with the U.S. was demonstrated in December 1979, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Kenya announced its intention to boycott the
Moscow Olympics long before the Supreme Council of Sports in Africa had arrived at an African position (as was the Montreal case in 1976) and before most of European states had taken a stand on this issue. It was hardly a coincidence that Kenya, which had previously adopted an attitude of "wait and see what position other's take", was one of the first African countries to take a stand on the Olympics; and then only on the eve of Moi's visit to the United States. Furthermore, this decision was announced even before Muhammad Ali arrived in Nairobi as President's Carter's special envoy to persuade Third World countries to boycott. In addition, it was only in Kenya and Liberia that Carter's "diplomatic envoy" found anything approaching a warm official welcome. Kenya was also the only African country that set aside a special day in December 1979 to pray for the American hostages in Iran.

Given these acts of friendship, the stage seemed to have been well set for Moi's state visit to Washington in February 1980. During the visit Moi formalised Kenya's military ties with the U.S. The bilateral military agreement called not only for the supply of military hardware to Kenya, but also for the building of American military "facilities" in Kenya and for American use of existing naval "facilities".

Given the "good boy" image that Kenya had created for itself in the eyes of the U.S. prior to and during the 1980 state visit, the sudden doubling of aid to Kenya announced as Moi was about to depart, came as no surprise. However, the Moi and Carter administrations took the trouble to deny that the agreement was in any way linked to the
sudden decision to increase Kenya's aid from $21 million a year to $40 million. When Moi was asked what Kenya was getting in return for its military cooperation, he replied:

"We gain friendship, when a friend is in need of something, you don't have to deny it." 181

However, this statement omitted an important qualifier — when a friend is in need of something like military bases, you can either accede to or reject the request. Obviously, Moi never gave much thought to a rejection, although by refusing to grant a base, Kenya may not have necessarily lost its so-called "friendship" with the U.S. On the other hand, this "friendship" may have cost or at least raised doubts about its credibility as a member of the non-aligned movement and O.A.U., both of which are in principle opposed to any foreign military presence in Africa. For example the *Weekly Review* quoted Nyerere as saying that "Kenya's move to give military facilities to the U.S. was contrary to the principles of non-alignment and the O.A.U." He further observed that while the O.A.U. had greatly helped to sustain non-alignment,

"Some of us still do agree to be used by big powers and some even break a basic precept of our organisation by allowing big powers to have bases on their territory .... Gradually these brothers of ours will recognise that by so doing they reduce rather than increase the respect of their country." 182

However, Kenya did eventually overcome this type of criticism by emphasising that it had offered the U.S. "facilities" but not a "Base". 183
Nevertheless, the above analysis does provide some indications of the correlation between Kenya's pro-American, pro-West foreign policy and its increasing dependence on the U.S. in both the economic and military sense. The transnational links that have developed between the Kenyan state and transnational firms have further ensured the continuation of close ties between the government and the U.S.


Unlike Tanzania which quarrelled with West Germany in the 1960s over the status to be accorded East Germany, Kenya was careful not to antagonise West Germany. Indeed, even after relations were normalised between the two Germanies in November 1972, Kenya did not, like most other African countries such as Tanzania, accord diplomatic recognition to East Germany. Indeed neither Kenya nor East Germany have as yet established diplomatic representation in each other's capitals.

West Germany, on the other hand, continued to occupy the second most important position (after U.K.) as a source of bilateral foreign aid and as a trading partner. It has, for example, continued since the 1960s, to be one of the major importers of coffee, which is Kenya's chief foreign exchange earner, while Kenya ranks second, after Nigeria, as the major African importer of Western German goods. Furthermore, West Germany continued to hold an important position as a source of foreign investment. In 1972 for example, it ranked third after U.K. and U.S. in terms of the book value of foreign investment (see Table 5.7 below). The West Germans have in recent years also established a branch of a major bank — Deutsche Bank — in Nairobi, an indication of increasing German capital penetration of the Kenyan economy. The
TABLE 5.7 - ESTIMATED BOOK VALUE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN KENYA, 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>K £ million</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 130 100


Germans, by their own admission took full advantage of Kenya's open door policy to foreign investment:

"We in West Germany have always appreciated the favourable financial policy of the Kenya Government... Kenya's model continues to demand our strongest support".

Thus, although Kenya did not qualify for West Germany's debt cancellation for the 30 L.D.C.s, it was compensated by an increase in foreign aid of about $100 million for the current 1979-1983 Kenyan development plan period.

Besides economic relations, Kenya maintains cultural links with West Germany. The Goethe Institute in Nairobi and the teaching of the German language at both high school and university levels in Kenya are indicators of these. Furthermore, as a demonstration of Kenya's important position as a centre for German cultural relations, Nairobi was picked as the venue for a conference of cultural attaches.
from the Federal Republic's embassies in Africa, held in May 1980. West Germany Minister of State in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Hildegard Hamm Bruecher, who was then visiting Kenya, said in an interview that the reason why Nairobi was chosen as the venue was because it represented West German's "most developed and successful experience of cooperation":

"That was the main reason we chose your capital because we could show other cultural attaches and demonstrate the way we think exemplifies the cooperation between Federal Republic and this East African Nation. So here we have models; we have the Goethe Institute -- we have all kinds of projects we would like to recommend to our cultural attaches in other countries". 188

It should be noted however that, while the existing cultural links between Kenya and West Germany are symbolically important, in reality, German cultural influence in Kenya is minimal, when compared with that of Britain (and the Anglophone states in general) which through colonialism, became pervasive in Kenyan society. Given the fact that the English language is the major medium of communication in almost all sectors of life, it is not surprising that Kenya maintains extensive cultural links with the major English-speaking Western countries -- U.K. and U.S. -- both of whom provide most of Kenya's foreign technical assistance. In 1977 for example, there were 1,430 Kenyan students under training in the U.S., 902 in U.K. and just 35 in West Germany. 189
Kenya's attitude towards the Germanies is consistent with its pro-Western Foreign policy, which is dictated by economic considerations. Hence, due to Kenya's concern over maintaining established economic links with West Germany, it forego the establishment of ties with East Germany, at least up to the end of the seventies. But the fact that Tanzania maintains ties with East Germany and yet has economic links with West Germany, may in future prompt Kenya to reconsider its position vis-a-vis the two Germanies.


In the 1960s, Franco-Kenyan interaction was minimal due primarily to the fact that French interests lay in its former colonies, in much the same way that British concerns were concentrated in its former colonies, including Kenya. Hence, Franco-Kenyan cooperation had been limited to the teaching of the French language in a few Kenyan High Schools and to a small French teacher training programme at the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University College. However, in the early 1970s Franco-Kenyan cooperation was strengthened following the signing of a cultural and technical agreement in September 1971. Consequently, French programmes expanded in the seventies although, as in the West German case, not to the same extent as similar British or American assistance. Indeed there were slightly fewer Kenyan students (31) in France in 1977 than in West Germany (35). French technical assistance has however expanded into other sectors and into projects outside educational institutions; for example into water development and road building.
Furthermore, since Moi became President, he has demonstrated a greater interest than his predecessor in close links with France. A pointer in that direction is the fact that Moi made France the venue of his first overseas visit after becoming President. Furthermore, Munyua Waiyaki, then Kenya's foreign minister admitted in January 1979:

"We are approaching a new relationship with France and we are strengthening our relationship with the E.E.C. countries individually and collectively". 192

When asked in an interview why Kenya was seeking closer links with France, Waiyaki gave two reasons:

"i) We are concerned that we should get closer to French-speaking African countries;

ii) We are concerned that we should have joint ventures with the French in this country because we feel we can benefit from their technical know-how". 193

Waiyaki however denied that Kenya was risking having its commitment to liberation compromised by being closely linked to Paris. Instead he argued that:

"We have found that by keeping away from the French we were not making too much difference to the way things are. But if we joined the French-speaking African countries to pressurise the French to keep away from South Africa, we might succeed". 194
It is doubtful whether Kenya can effectively pressure Francophone African states. As noted above in examining Franco-Tanzania relations, Francophone African states are generally sensitive to any criticism of France. Furthermore, Kenya unlike Tanzania had never been known for being overly critical of French policy in Africa—particularly its sale of arms to South Africa and its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Perhaps the more convincing reason for Kenya's decisions to forge closer links with France was potential economic benefit within the broader E.E.C. links. Political considerations, though important, are secondary rather than primary.

A further indication of the growing Franco-Kenyan links was the visit to Kenya in August 1980 of the French Deputy Foreign Minister Oliver Stirn, whose talks with President Moi and Foreign Minister Ouko centred on bilateral relations. Unlike Tanzania where a similar visit had prompted student demonstrations denouncing French arms sales, no such incident was evident in Nairobi.

Thus, at the close of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s every indication pointed in the direction of increasing Franco-Kenyan cooperative interaction rather than conflict—another indication of Kenya's adaptation of its foreign policy to perceived economic needs.


Kenya's bilateral relations with Canada during the 1960s were overshadowed by those with U.S. and U.K., in the O.E.C.D. nexus. Thus although Kenya has had diplomatic relations with Canada since
independence, it had no diplomatic representation in Ottawa until late 1978. Up to that date, Kenya's interaction with Canada was coordinated by the Canadian High Commission in Nairobi and Kenya's Embassy in New York.

Although Kenya-Canada relations, have generally been cordial, one event in 1977 resulted in conflict and clearly revealed that if Kenya had to choose between Britain and Canada, it would choose the former. The Canada-Kenya row which arose over the Hawker Siddeley rail contracts case cited earlier, had a short-term negative effect on the bilateral relationship. The Canadian government's anger was barely concealed by diplomatic restraint in the official response:

"It is the understanding of the Canadian government that the bid made at the original tender by Hawker Siddeley was chosen by the government of Kenya on the basis of price, financing, ability to meet specifications and ability to conform to the urgent delivery schedule required by the Government of Kenya. Accordingly the Government of Canada and the Company are at a loss to understand why the Canadian Company has been treated in this manner."

This conflict, while it served to demonstrate the extent of British influence in Kenya, had no long-term effect on bilateral relations. Indeed, when Moi came to power in 1978 he initiated a process of diversifying external relations, which in Canada's case meant the establishment of a High Commission in Ottawa. This move was perhaps
in recognition of the steadily growing importance of Canada as a source of foreign aid to Kenya. \(^{197}\) Furthermore since 1978 Canada has diversified its commitments to Kenya to include a new field — that of energy development. For example in 1978 Canada committed itself to finance a 420-kilometre power line. \(^{198}\) Nairobi also serves as the regional centre for the Canadian-funded International Development Research Centre in Eastern Africa.

Nevertheless, while the 1978 establishment of a Kenyan High Commission in Ottawa may have augured well for future Kenya-Canada relations, it would seem appropriate to conclude, as one observer did recently, that:

"While Canada has had a substantial aid programme in Kenya and has always had friendly relations with its Government, (Canada is) only one of many Western countries involved there. Kenya's window on the Western, northern, industrialised world has been, and continues to be Britain". \(^{199}\)

Kenya and Western Bloc Countries in the 1970s: Conclusion

The above analysis has shown that Kenya's relations with the West followed a similar pattern in the 1970s to that of the 1960s. However, unlike the 1960s when Kenya maintained close relations with its three traditional aid donors and trading partners — Britain, West Germany and the United States — in the 1970s relations were developed with other Western countries who had also become important sources of aid.
These included France and Canada (examined above) as well as Japan and the Scandinavian countries (not examined here).

This analysis has also revealed the country's pragmatic adaptation of its diplomatic and foreign policies to its economic needs. Indeed Kenya's diversification of economic relations in the 1970s, was followed by adjustment in its foreign policy. This was particularly evident in the late seventies. For example new diplomatic missions and appointments in 1978 were an indication of this tendency.\textsuperscript{200} The establishment of a High Commission in Canada, as already shown, was in recognition of the growing importance of Canada as a source of technical aid.

Kenya also opened an embassy in Japan, which is increasingly becoming not only an important trading partner and source of foreign investment but also a booster to Kenya's tourist industry. An embassy was also opened in Brussels, headquarters of the E.E.C., whose members, collectively and individually, are important sources of foreign aid and trade. It is significant in this respect, that Moi made Brussels the second place he visited during his first overseas visit on becoming President.

The reopening of Kenya's embassy in Peking during the same year (1978) was a further indication of Kenya's pragmatic adaptation as well as a recognition of changed circumstances in China itself and in Kenya's Western allies' attitudes towards China.

In general then, while Kenya's foreign policy towards the West in the 1970s reflected its anxiety to cooperate and to enhance economic links with traditional foreign aid sources and trading partners, the
policy also indicated pragmatic adaptation to changed international circumstances which made 'ideological' biases in economic relations, a luxury which even Kenya could not afford.


Kenya continued to maintain at least 'correct' relations with the Soviet Union during the seventies. In spite of the fact that the U.S.S.R. was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic representation in Kenya, economic and cultural relations have remained minimal, while no military cooperation has ever existed.

The only projects financed and successfully completed by the Russians are the Kisumu Hospital and the Lumumba Institute, which as shown in chapter four, was originally intended to be a training institute for K.A.N.U. cadres but was later "demobilised" when it was alleged to be training 'communists' instead of "African socialists". The hospital however continues to receive Russian technical and economic support. A limited number of students and Kenyan professionals continue to undertake training in the U.S.S.R. Thus for example, in the 1976-77 fiscal year under a new cultural agreement the Soviet Union raised the number of scholarships offered to Kenya from 30 to 54.

Outside these minimal interactions, Soviet-Kenyan relations have at best been 'cool'. Both Kenya and the U.S.S.R. have been hostile to each other for various reasons. Kenya has always been critical of the Soviet presence in Africa in particular and its interventionist policies in general. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been
critical of Kenya's capitalist oriented development strategy. A typical criticism by Moscow of Kenya's free enterprise system was communicated by Radio Moscow on 28 June 1978, which observed that Kenya's continued dependence on the West was hampering efforts to put its house in order. Radio Moscow added:

"While this dependence exists, there will be growing and flourishing in Kenya the special strata which scholars call "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" and the people simply call the Wabenzi tribe". 202

A similar criticism was voiced in early 1979, five months after Mbi became President:

"the new government in Kenya has not abandoned the old procedures in matters pertaining to the economy ... the government of Kenya seems to be searching for ways to overcome pressing but long standing problems which result from free enterprise ... approaches to economic problems chosen by Kenya will fail to resolve the prevailing problems, be they economic or social". 203

On the other hand Kenya has consistently expressed opposition to Russia's "Communist" ideology. Thus for example, when in 1980 leaflets were distributed at the University of Nairobi criticising government's 'capitalist' policies and recommending socialist policies of the Soviet-Cuban type, Vice President Kibaki made a strong attack on what he called 'foreign ideologies', particularly 'Marxism', which he
said were not wanted in Kenya. He stressed that Kenya's Nyayo philosophy was based on 'Godliness' and warned 'Marxist' countries and those propagating 'communism' in Kenya to either stop their propagation or migrate to those countries practicing this ideology.

Kenya, like Tanzania, is also opposed to Russia's military presence and intervention in Africa. Kenya took particular exception to the U.S.S.R. supplying arms to its hostile neighbours — Amin's Uganda and Somalia. Although the Soviet Union is no longer supplying arms to either, Kenya still disapproves of and is uneasy with what it perceives as growing Soviet influence in Eastern and Central Africa. This uneasiness was expressed by the Kenyan press following a report which suggested that Russia was contemplating advances in the region.

Kenya has never minced words when an opportunity arose for condemning "Soviet aggression", as was the case following the 'Soviet invasion' of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Similarly, when the U.S.S.R. 'invaded' Afghanistan in December 1979, Kenya was one of the loudest in its condemnation. This issue received extensive coverage in Kenya's mass media, particularly between January and May 1980. The message was one of condemnation and denunciation of the 'Soviet act', which was likened by the Sunday Nation to Hitler's massacre of the Jews:

"What the Russians are doing to the people of Afghanistan is exactly the same as what Hitler did to the Jews."
More significantly, as already shown, Kenya went beyond mere denunciation, by joining the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. This incident, while it brought Kenya and the U.S. closer together, pushed Kenya and the U.S.S.R. farther apart. Nevertheless, despite Kenya's strong stand against Russia's role in Afghanistan and the two states' hostile attitude towards each other's economic and social policies, official links were not affected, and diplomatic relations continue to be maintained.

It is significant to note however, the continuity in Kenya's attitude towards the U.S.S.R., particularly the inconsistency in its position on super-power interventionist tendencies. While Kenya is overly anxious to condemn the "Soviet aggression" and presence in Africa, it has consistently avoided condemning similar acts by the U.S. Again, such an attitude serves to support the view that Kenya's foreign policy is generally pro-West and anti-East.


Relations between Kenya and China virtually went into Limbo at the start of the cultural revolution in China in 1966, when, following a series of serious conflicts between the two countries, Kenya decided to recall all its diplomatic staff from Peking and technically close down its embassy there.

In spite of the coolness in bilateral relations, Kenya continued to join other African states at the U.N. in calling for China's admission. However, Kenya was not as enthusiastic as Tanzania in this
regard, neither did its delegation display the kind of exuberance shown by Tanzania following admission. Nevertheless, during the visit to Nairobi of Chinese Minister for Economic Development Fang Yi, at the time of inaugurating the Tanzam railway, Foreign Minister Mungai took the opportunity to declare that Kenya was looking forward to the day when China took "her rightful place at the U.N." This declaration was a non-controversial Third World position on admission and did not necessarily reflect Kenya's real attitude towards China.

Unlike Tanzania, where there was a clear indication of mourning after Chairman Mao's death in September 1976, no such mourning was observed in Kenya. Instead, the Kenyan press took the opportunity afforded by this death to criticise the Chinese model of development. In this connection, the Daily Nation published an article that was highly critical of Mao's regime:

"The creation of a Min Kuo or Peoples Republic implied the Great Revolution, involving the arbitrary movement of millions of people, destruction of the sanctity of family and the subordination of all values to the dictates of the Communist Party. The end result regrettably is that the Mao era has ended with Min Kuo which is a good society for the elite and a nasty and brutish society for the masses of workers who have not been allowed to think for themselves or even to have privacy in their homes. For the majority of the Chinese Min Kuo and the good society are still to come and the
rest of the world will hope that they will not be
promised another millenium by a Maoist. Mao is
dead and so should be Maoism be too. 209

The first indication that Kenya would in future reopen its embassy
in Peking, which had been closed in 1967, came in August 1975 when
the new Foreign Minister, Waiyaki, spoke to the Chinese Ambassador
in Nairobi, on the need for closer relations.

It was not, however, until the end of 1978, that the embassy was
reopened in Peking. This action was interpreted by the Nairobi
Weekly Review as "an indication of Kenya's concern to leave itself
some leverage in dealing with the increasing Soviet influence in
Africa". 210 Clearly, the situation (both inside and outside China)
had changed sufficiently to make such a move politically expedient.
For one, U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente had greatly increased contact and
cooperation between East and West. This was particularly so after
China's admission to the U.N. Furthermore, the death of Mao, brought
into power in China a leadership that was more pragmatic and less
inclined to preach world revolution.

It is significant that the reopening of Kenya's embassy coincided
with America's establishment of full diplomatic relations with China
in December 1978. 211 Given Kenya's Pro-West stance and the close
links that have been forged between itself and Washington, it is most
likely that Kenya was following the U.S. lead. As Kenya's foreign
Minister Waiyaki admitted in an interview:
"We can see that there is a great deal of cooperation between the West and the East far away from Kenya. This trend is being observed by Africa. We in Kenya certainly know which side our bread is buttered on, perhaps more so than most." (emphasis added)

The Kenyan leadership indeed is quick to identify which side its "bread is buttered" in world affairs. This pragmatism seems to be the only reasonable explanation for the dramatic change in Sino-Kenyan relations within a space of less than three years. It is of course true that during this period a new President emerged in Kenya. But more importantly Kenya was responding to changed conditions and alignments at the global level. The government must have noticed the increasing rapprochement in Sino-American relations and the continuing Sino-Soviet conflict. Given the fact that i) Kenya's 'alignments' tend to take a similar pattern to that of the U.S. and ii) its fast growing need for more external economic assistance, cooperation with China was both politically and economically expedient.

Thus following the reopening of Kenya's embassy in Peking, a seasoned diplomat, Joshua Odanga, was appointed Ambassador to initiate the rapprochement. In the meantime, China's premier invited President Moi to visit. Apparently over the next two years the groundwork was being laid for the visit. Indeed, it was not until August 1980 during the visit of the Chinese Vice-Premier Ji Pengfei to Kenya, that Moi announced that he would be paying a state visit to China the following month.
The President's five-day visit to China in September 1980, was calculated and pragmatic. For one, it had immediate economic gains. As an outcome of the visit, China wrote off a $1,000 debt that Kenya had owed since the heady days of 1964-1966. In addition, China offered Kenya a K Sh. 350 million interest-free loan repayable after 10 years. This was earmarked for the building of a sports complex in Nairobi, the improvement of cotton and rice production and the construction of a modern brick and tile industry.

On the political level, the visit to China, boosted Kenya's image as a non-aligned country, an image it was anxious to restore particularly since the offer of military "facilities" to the United States. The Kenyan press went out of its way to publicise and underline the importance of the visit in terms of proving Kenya's 'genuine' commitment to non-alignment.

For China, which already enjoys close relations with Tanzania, the new Kenya-Sino relationship has given it an added strategic advantage in a region that is increasingly becoming the centre of great power competition. Furthermore, China also stands to benefit from improved trading links with Kenya. However, given the bilateral ideological conflict between Kenya and Tanzania it is doubtful as to whether China can manage to "play on both sides of the street" in East Africa in the long-term.
D. Kenya's and Tanzania's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Balance

In this chapter, I have attempted to examine, analyse and compare the foreign policies of Tanzania and Kenya during the decade of the 1970s. The analysis has revealed much continuity and little change from the 1960s in the major issues of concern as well as in the styles and approaches to those issues. What seems to have altered rather, is the emphasis placed on various issues. In the preceding analysis I have identified economic and security issues as dominating the foreign policy of both states. Concern with the economy and with security has led to increased dependence of the two political economies on their respective major economic and military aid donors.

Adaptive Foreign Policy Behaviour

The theoretical framework of this study, as indicated in Chapter one, is based on the premise that external dependence acts as a constraint on an independent foreign policy. The same framework also suggests that depending on the adaptive approach chosen by the key decision-makers, political independence can be upheld or reduced, while the chances of future economic independence can either be improved or minimised. In the last chapter, it was shown that Tanzania's particular adaptive approach -- "promotive" -- allowed greater independence in foreign policy decision-making than that of Kenya which is "acquiescent" to demands of Western powers and institutions. In the present chapter, similar distinctive patterns of foreign
policy behaviour have been observed in Kenya's and Tanzania's relations towards some of the major countries on whom both are dependent for economic and military aid. And the two leaderships have continued to constitute an important intervening variable, particularly in choosing and interpreting the mode of adaptation and national ideology.

An attempt is made here to show, in a comparative manner, that i) the differences in foreign policy behaviour, are a reflection of the two countries' variant adaptive approaches and that ii) the similarities largely reflect their rather similar small and weak political economies, despite the different extent of capitalist penetration.

For example, while both countries are to varying degrees economically dependent on Britain, their foreign policies towards that country have tended to differ: Kenya has generally acquiesced to British demands and interests while Tanzania has generally been non-acquiescent; instead it has been promotive in this bilateral relationship. A number of other examples from the preceding analysis would seem to support this general position. On the issue of arms sales to South Africa, it was the Tanzanian leader who came out more strongly in his attack on the British position than his Kenyan counterpart. Indeed, as shown earlier, Kenya's presentation at the Singapore conference was more an appeal to time-honoured British 'goodwill' than an attack or threat.

On the issue of Southern Africa liberation in general and that of Zimbabwe in particular, it is Tanzania that clearly played a more
active role than Kenya. Although geopolitically Tanzania was better placed than Kenya for involvement in Southern Africa, the extent of its commitment to liberation went well beyond geopolitics. The two states' attitudes towards Britain vis-a-vis the liberation of Zimbabwe is a good measure of the extent of their commitment to the promotion of majority rule. On balance, Tanzania clearly emerges as the one that has taken a harder line on Britain in attempting to get it to bring about majority rule in Zimbabwe. This is evident from the number of bilateral conflicts that Tanzania had with the U.K. during the decade of the 1970s while Kenya had no serious direct confrontation with Britain over Zimbabwe's liberation. Instead, Kenya generally demonstrated acquiescent attitude towards Britain. Tanzania on the other hand demonstrated its refusal to acquiesce in British demands when its President rejected a request made of him to apologise to the British government for his comments on Britain's handling of the transition to independence in Zimbabwe. Another demonstration of Tanzania's uncompromising attitude on liberation was the 1978 expulsion of the British M.N.C. -- Lonrho -- from Tanzania for undermining the struggle for Zimbabwe's independence. As noted earlier, Kenya remained supportive rather than critical of Lonrho's detrimental role in Southern Africa, and continued to maintain a close 'partnership' with the firm. Furthermore, as noted above, even on non-liberation issues, Kenya displayed an acquiescent attitude towards the British government and its institutions. An indication of this attitude, was for example demonstrated when Kenya awarded railway contracts to a British firm.
rather than to the originally-selected Canadian one. Similarly, Kenya was willing to jeopardise its declared policy of Africanisation and to acquiesce in the British preference for a gradual process of admitting British Asians into the U.K. Tanzania on the other hand, had demonstrated — through its nationalisation of British assets — its determination to promote its own development policies, even when they were in conflict with Britain's preferences.

A similar pattern of 'acquiescent' versus 'promotive' adaptation emerges when comparing their foreign policies towards the U.S., although again, both are in varying degrees dependent on that country. While Tanzania demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in promoting the liberation of Southern Africa, repeatedly during the 1970s, it also demonstrated its unwillingness to acquiesce in U.S. demands or preferences. Almost the opposite foreign policy behaviour was displayed by Kenya during the same period. A few examples can be cited to support this generalisation.

On the issue of decolonisation of Puerto Rico and South Korea, where the U.S. tried to pressurise Tanzania into adopting a supportive position, Tanzania demonstrated its determination not to be acquiescent. This incident also demonstrates Tanzania's desire to promote the cause of liberation in general. Another case where Kenya's and Tanzania's foreign policy behaviour towards the U.S. can be easily compared is their divergent positions on the American-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. While Tanzania like Kenya, condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it refused to acquiesce in U.S. requests for
support for the boycott. Indeed, Nyerere did not even give an audience to Carter's "special envoy" who went to Tanzania to solicit support for the boycott. To Tanzania, the American boycott was not promotive of the genuine interests of the Afghan people, but rather it was another manifestation of U.S.-Soviet competition for world influence. Kenya, on the other hand, even acted out of character, by becoming one of the first to come out in support of the U.S. call to boycott. Furthermore, Kenya was one of only two African states where the "special envoy" was well treated and was given an audience by the president. In addition, Kenya's acquiescence in American policy led it to compromise its declared non-alignment by offering military "facilities" to the United States.

The two states' foreign policies towards other Western powers reveal a similar divergent pattern. For example, Tanzania's relationship with France is determined largely by the former's concern with Southern Africa. The hostile reception that the French minister encountered in Tanzania was reflective of opposition to any country that arms apartheid and hence retards the process of liberation. In spite of French overtures of friendliness in the late 1970s, Tanzania still continued to condemn French arms policy, since it was detrimental rather than promotive of liberation. Kenya, on the other hand, in its concern to promote its own interests has, particularly in recent years, forged close links with France for an economic purpose, rather than over Southern Africa.
Likewise, in their relations with the two Germanies, it is Tanzania that has demonstrated an impartial attitude towards them since the 1960s while Kenya has always shown partiality towards West Germany. This is particularly evident in the 1970s, when it was no longer necessary (as in the 1960s) to maintain relations with just one or the other. In spite of the rapprochement reached by the two Germanies themselves in the early 1970s, Kenya continued to show partiality to the West which remained one of its major sources of economic aid as well as an important trading partner. This partiality reduced Kenya’s ability to take a non-aligned position in future conflicts between the two Germanies. Tanzania, on the other hand, because of its balanced attitude towards them, stands a better chance of adopting a non-aligned posture in the event of conflict between the two Germanies.

As the last two chapters have shown, Tanzania and Kenya started off on different sides in their foreign policy behaviour towards China but came to be on the same side by the end of the 1970s. Of the two, it is Tanzania that remained consistent in its foreign policy attitudes towards China, while Kenya’s policy underwent some adjustments in response to changes in China itself and in the international environment.

This chapter and the previous one have shown that Tanzania cooperated with China on matters of mutual interest, mainly on economic and security issues. But on political issues, they differed at times and “agreed to disagree”. One such example is their different policy
positions in Angola in 1975/76, where Tanzania demonstrated that although it was militarily and economically linked to China, it could still promote its chosen goals even when they differed with those of a major aid donor. Kenya's foreign policy towards China followed a cyclical pattern like that of its Western 'allies'. Thus in the early 1970s, when the U.S. and other Western countries were still deciding on what attitude to adopt towards China, Kenya tagged along with them. Indeed, up to 1976 Kenya was still displaying hostility towards China, as its response to Mao's death indicates. The dramatic change in attitude in the latter part of the 1970s, had as much to do with the changed situation in China as with the fact that Kenya's friends in the West, particularly the U.S., had also changed attitude.

The Soviet Union is the one super-power over whom Kenya's and Tanzania's attitudes have seemed to coincide, but for different reasons. The coolness of the latter's relations with the Soviet Union has primarily been due to its general suspicion of both super-powers' intentions in their global competition for world hegemony; hence the need to maintain a distance from both. As the above analysis indicates, Tanzania has in general tended to increase contact and cooperation with small and middle powers while reducing them with the major powers. This orientation is in recognition of Tanzania's powerlessness and vulnerability to super-power influence.

Kenya's attitude toward the Soviet Union cannot be explained in a similar manner because it has maintained very close links with the U.S. Indeed, given Kenya's pro-West foreign policy, its hesitant and
at times hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union, can be said to be primarily motivated by the desire to preserve its close ties with the U.S. and the West. Kenya's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its support of the American-led boycott of the Olympics demonstrated this.

In the Middle East, Tanzania separated its attitudes towards individual Arab states and towards the cause of the Palestinian peoples; its apparent pro-Arab position was really a pro-Palestinian position. The latter concern falls within Tanzania's general policy on liberation of oppressed peoples and its abhorrence of racism whether in the form of Zionism or of apartheid. However, Tanzania's pro-Palestinian policy does not mean that it always agrees with the Arab states. Indeed in the decade of the seventies, Tanzania was one of the most vocal critics of the manner in which the Arabs have employed the oil weapon. Furthermore, in spite of Tanzania's dependence on them for energy, it has demonstrated its determination to promote chosen goals, even in the face of open threat by an oil-rich Afro-Arab state. This was evident when in 1979, at the height of the Tanzanian-Uganda war, Libya's Gaddafi gave Nyerere an ultimatum of one week to withdraw his troops from Uganda. In spite of Libya's greater military strength and oil wealth, Tanzania refused to acquiesce in the demand and instead continued with support for anti-Amin forces.

Kenya's policy in the Middle East, on the other hand, has been quite inconsistent, primarily because of its divided loyalties between the Arabs and the Israelis. Apparently, Kenya has found it difficult
to abandon an old friend in favour of a new one. Furthermore, basic
conflicts between Kenya and the Arabs have persisted, thus making
the marriage of convenience largely unworkable. However, when conflicts
arose, it was Kenya rather than the Arabs that bowed to the latter's demands.
Kenya's ambivalent foreign policy in the Middle East is an indication
of its lack of resolve where the gains accruing from siding with one
group against another balance each other out.

The Impact of Dependence and Underdevelopment

Differences in modes of adaptation aside, the foreign policy
objectives and concerns of these two states have been constrained by
their continuing dependence and underdevelopment. The goal of economic
development for both was still not in sight at the end of the 1970s
decade; meanwhile the continuing search for security had led to even
greater military dependence. In both these two issue areas, then,
success was increasingly elusive. Furthermore the two countries
remained impotent to curtail the super-powers' military build-up
in the Indian Ocean, which makes a mockery of the desire of Kenya,
Tanzania and other non-aligned states to have it declared a zone
of peace.

For Tanzania, while it had managed to maintain its independence
in pursuing its chosen goals, most of its desired policy objectives
remained a mirage. Self-reliance and socialism were not yet in sight.
However, almost despite itself, the goal of liberation in Southern
Africa had been advanced. Nevertheless it had been unable to dissuade
such countries as Britain and France from selling strategic goods to
South Africa.
Similarly, Kenya, despite its capitalistic, pro-Western foreign policy, did not sustain the desired economic growth rate envisaged in the 1970s. Indeed, the Kenyan economy was, in the last years of the 1970s, in sharp decline, facing acute food shortages and a nearly complete drain of foreign exchange reserves. This poor economic performance led to increased economic dependence, thus making the prospects of sustaining a high rate of growth, let alone development, grim. On the level of security, Kenya's acquiescence in America's desire for a strategic presence in the Indian Ocean, did not dissuade the U.S. from arming Kenya's arch-enemy — Somalia — which had also offered the U.S. a base at Berbera, formerly controlled by the U.S.S.R. Kenya's inability to prevail upon the U.S. to stay out of Somalia is an indication of the constraints that arise out of dependence.

In the short-term, given the impotence of both states to translate their desired goals into practice, the mode of adaptation employed did not seem to make much difference to the objective situation; hence it could be considered rather inconsequential. Similarly, it could be argued that given the elusiveness of development in both countries, neither Tanzania's socialist/self-reliant strategy nor Kenya's 'capitalist' strategy offer a solution to the problems of dependence and underdevelopment. However, in the longer-run, given the fact that the 'promotive' mode of adaptation as well as a socialist/self-reliant strategy involve an attempt to disengage from inherited
dependence while the acquiescent/capitalist strategy does not, it would seem that Tanzania rather than Kenya, stands a better chance of reducing dependence and of achieving development, thereby increasing its chances of attaining some foreign policy objectives. Such a projection is, of course, based on the dependency perspective employed in this study which suggests that at least partial delinkage and autocentricity are prerequisites for successful development and diplomacy. This point is examined further in the concluding chapter, which follows next.
CHAPTER 6

THE IMPACT OF DEPENDENCE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT ON
THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF KENYA AND TANZANIA: SOME
CONCLUSIONS, PROJECTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS

A. Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I have analysed the development of underdevelopment and external dependence in Kenya and Tanzania during the colonial period and how these two interrelated phenomena have been reproduced, reformed and expanded in the post-colonial period. I have also, in the last two chapters, attempted to analyse the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania from formal independence to the end of the 1970s decade. In particular, I have tried to show how the foreign policy behaviours of these two East African states have been constrained and/or shaped by their operational environments. In this connection the analysis has focussed on their behaviours vis-a-vis the major powers and those countries with which they have conducted most of their external economic transactions.

In this concluding chapter an attempt will be made to synthesise and assess the findings of this thesis so as to arrive at some estimate about the relevance of the dependency-adaptive framework in analysing the foreign policies of small underdeveloped states. This attempt begins with a restatement of the basic hypotheses proposed at the beginning, followed by an assessment of the validity of each of them, basing such
facts on the findings of this work and the extant literature. Finally, some prescriptions and projections are provided by way of conclusion.

Hypotheses Restated

The hypotheses proposed in the introductory chapter were as follows:

i) For small, underdeveloped and dependent states such as Kenya and Tanzania the major factors that influence foreign policy at the global level of interaction are systemic and idiosyncratic variables.

ii) Given the underdevelopment and dependance of Kenya and Tanzania, it is expected that the systemic variable will exert most influence on their foreign policies at this global level, while the idiosyncratic variable will act as an important intervening variable.

iii) Given systemic constraints and/or influence on the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania, it is expected that neither country will be able to practice fully its declared foreign policy of non-alignment. However, all else being equal, it is expected that Tanzania will make greater attempts at pursuing a foreign policy of non-alignment than Kenya.

iv) Proceeding from the premise that the external behaviour of African states, like that of all states, can best be understood and explained from a perspective that treats foreign policy as a form of adaptive behaviour, the modes of adaptation that are expected to be salient in the foreign policy behaviour of Kenya and Tanzania are "acquiescent" and "promotive" respectively.
B. Validation and/or Nullification of Hypotheses

Hypotheses (i) and (ii)

These two hypotheses will be examined together because they are closely interrelated. Furthermore, when combined they form the core of the underlying argument in this thesis. In other words, this study has attempted to demonstrate that the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania at the global level of interaction have been largely influenced by systemic factors -- dependency and underdevelopment -- while the leadership in both countries has acted as an important intervening variable.

The thesis has largely confirmed this argument. It has been observed that both countries have attempted to use foreign policy to promote broadly similar national and international goals. Their primary national goals are economic development and/or growth, security of the state and the preservation of independence, while their major international goals are decolonisation and/or liberation, the realisation of a new International Economic Order and the promotion of World Peace and Justice under U.N. auspices. Perhaps due to the urgency of national development and the felt need to safeguard and consolidate newly acquired "independence", both have devoted significant amounts of their meagre resources to national security matters. Relatively less attention has been paid to the pursuance of international goals, except at the level of rhetoric and/or policy statements.
More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that neither country has as yet managed to achieve, to any significant degree any of its desired objectives. Furthermore, non-alignment, which is their declared policy guide in foreign affairs has been of limited utility due to systemic constraints.

Within this operational environment of dependence and underdevelopment the leadership's perception of the importance and/or priority of certain objectives in relation to others, and the country's ability to promote given goals, have greatly affected the way Kenya and Tanzania have rank ordered the above goals and the strategies employed in pursuing them. Thus the Kenyan leadership has placed its priority on economic growth (defined as economic development) along with national security and/or political "stability", while political independence ranks a poor third among national priorities. The assumption in this rank ordering is that economic "development" and national security are necessary prerequisites for maintaining political independence, while political "stability" is a necessary prerequisite for attracting more economic aid and foreign investment for economic growth.

Thus, the Kenyan leadership has consequently come to measure development in terms of the amounts of foreign aid and investment received rather than in terms of the improvement of the quality of life and well-being of the Kenyan people. To maintain this image of development, Kenya has had to create a hospitable climate for foreign investment in urban centres in general and in particular the city of
Nairobi, which the leadership has striven to bring up to the standards of large Western cities. In the words of the late Tom Mboya, then Minister of Finance and Economic planning, there is "need for business management in Nairobi to be as up-to-date as in London and New York, to compete in world markets".1

This type of attitude is a clear demonstration of the Kenyan-comprador leadership's acceptance of Western capitalist values and ideas about development.

On international issues that are perceived to be of no direct consequence to the nation, the leadership has maintained a low profile, while on those issues that Kenya has had to take a stand, the position taken has been one that would not affect adversely what were deemed to be Kenya's economic and security interests. Thus for example, it was Kenya's preference to maintain close economic and military ties with Britain that dictated its reactions to the army mutiny of 1964 and its reluctance to break diplomatic relations over Rhodesia. For Kenya, then, economic considerations loom larger than commitment to liberation. Kenya, as Okumu has put it, is the "classic case where the former colonial power, despite the sharp decline of its neo-colonial market, remains the main source of private foreign investment, the main donor of bilateral assistance and until now (then, the mid 1970s) the main supplier of military assistance".2
This continuity in colonial ties combined with increasing economic and military links with one of the superpowers — the United States — has clearly limited Kenya's ability to pursue an independent course in foreign affairs. Furthermore, Kenya's growing dependence on the West for economic and military assistance and its open door policy to foreign investment, make its economy very vulnerable should any one of its major donors or investors decide to withdraw.

The partiality shown towards Western states and institutions and the apparent willingness of the ruling elite to collaborate with external capitalist interests is largely a reflection of the transnational linkages which the Kenyan "bourgeoisie" have established with their counterparts at the centres of the global economy. As this study has demonstrated, many in the Kenyan leadership have used the machinery of state to acquire personal wealth often in joint partnership with Multinational Corporations.

The point to be emphasised here is that Kenya, as well as Tanzania and any other small, underdeveloped and dependent country, is not merely a helpless victim of structural systemic conditions. In other words, even within a difficult environment, where constraints far outweigh choices, decision-makers still retain the option to adopt policy strategies that maximise the chances of reducing dependence and underdevelopment and pursuing an independent foreign policy. In the case of Kenya, as already shown, the ruling class would seem to have made the choice to emphasise short-term economic gains over longer-term independence and development, thus leaving the demyssing
or recapturing of the political economy from the international capitalist system to posterity.

So, in the context of Kenya, leadership is an important intervening variable in the sense that its perception of the goals to be achieved and the choices available given systemic constraints, has largely determined the style, strategy and approach pursued in foreign policy.

As stated above, although Kenya and Tanzania have pursued broadly similar goals, leadership preferences and interpretations, and hence their rank ordering of these goals have been quite different. Hence, unlike Kenya, whose leadership has placed a high premium on economic growth, Tanzania's has placed more importance on independence over other goals. According to President Nyerere:

"the first responsibility of the Government -- its first principle -- is the protection of Tanzania's independence and its freedom to determine its own policies, both internal and external".  

While Nyerere maintains that freedom is a prerequisite of development, he nevertheless recognises that the latter must accompany the former:

"Freedom and development are as completely linked together as are chickens and eggs! Without chickens you get no eggs; and without eggs, you soon have no chickens. Similarly, without freedom, you get no development and without development you very soon loose your freedom".
As this study has shown, during the initial diplomatic phase (roughly from independence to the mid-1960s), Tanzania's leadership, President Nyerere in particular, had placed far greater value on Tanzania's freedom to determine its own foreign policy than on development. The diplomatic crisis and the economic difficulties experienced during this early period forced the leadership to devise a strategy that would safeguard independence, promote development and reduce excessive dependence on any single aid donor. To achieve these, the leadership opted for a socialist, self-reliant strategy, while diversification in trade partners and aid sources reduced excessive dependence on any single power.

Employing a post-Arusha self-reliant strategy Tanzania has had a freer hand than Kenya in pursuing and promoting some of its desired foreign and domestic policy goals, particularly in respect to the Liberation of Southern Africa, non-alignment and the internal reorganisation of its economy. However, on the more immediate and urgent goal of economic development, Tanzania, like Kenya, has not as yet registered significant success. Its policy of self-reliance has not enabled it to reduce dependence on foreign aid which, as this study has shown, is greater now than before Arusha. Nevertheless, Tanzania's adoption of a socialist-self-reliant strategy, has demonstrated its leadership's determination to safeguard independence as well as to develop and disengage the economy from dependence links with the international capitalist system.
That Kenya and Tanzania have pursued distinctly different strategies in responding to and coping with broadly similar operational environments, is in itself a clear indication and an affirmation of the proposition that the idiosyncratic variable is an important intervening one, at least in explaining why these two countries have opted for divergent approaches in dealing with a similar phenomenon. However, the idiosyncratic variable, being only intervening, is hardly a sufficient explanatory factor of all the "whys" and "why nots" of the chosen strategies. Furthermore, the systemic variable, being the key independent variable, may have, perhaps, exerted more influence not only on the policy outcomes but also on the policies and strategies chosen.

Operating on this assumption, I shall employ, as a guide to further assessment of the impact of the systemic variable on the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania, the following questions:

i) Did Tanzania and Kenya make deliberate, independent choices to pursue their current economic and foreign policies? What have been their areas of choice and their areas of constraints?

ii) Have the differences in ideological orientation of the two states significantly affected the achievement or non-achievement of desired goals in each country?

iii) Has the nature of the leadership significantly affected the observed differences or similarities in foreign policy? And,

iv) Viewing "non-alignment as a foreign policy guide and/or means to achieve other goals, such as economic development and security, what
has been the performance of Kenya and Tanzania in terms of policy outcome?

In order to provide a full assessment for the above questions it is necessary first to examine and analyse the remaining two hypotheses, since they are interrelated with the first two propositions.

Hypothesis (iii)

As explained in the preceding chapter, Kenya's pattern of external trade and sources of foreign aid and investment would seem to suggest a definite Western capitalist orientation, which raises doubts about its claims to a foreign policy of non-alignment. On the other hand, Tanzania's greater diversification in external trade and aid sources, coupled with its economic policy of self-reliance, would seem to suggest a more genuine attempt at pursuing non-alignment. However, as one African scholar has noted,

"figures on patterns of trade and aid may not be very reliable indicators of essential policy choices, or of ideological orientation. Nor do they explain why particular policy decisions to diversify or not to diversify one's trade and aid relationships are made". 5 (emphasis added)

In other words, figures on trade, aid and investment are, on their own, mere indicators of a pattern of external dependence; they do not necessarily typify or represent the actual foreign policy pursued by a given state. It is perhaps in recognition of the possibility of
representation that Nyerere insists that:

"Any real discussion of the non-alignment of Tanzania's foreign policy should be based on an examination of what we do, more than what is said publicly." 6

The real test of non-alignment, as Gitelson has rightly pointed out, "comes when the major power advocates a non-congenial policy on regional and global issues. How far will the small state then go in opposing it?" 7

This study has provided a number of examples of incidents where both Kenyan and Tanzanian claims to non-alignment were tested; with available evidence favouring Tanzania as the more determined of the two in pursuing an independent foreign policy.

To cite a few examples: Kenya's reaction to the army mutiny of 1964, its ambivalent policy in the Congo crisis during the same year, its reluctance to break relations with Britain over U.D.I. in 1965, its support of the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and its offer of naval facilities to the U.S. are all indicators of Kenya's alignment or its violation of the principles of non-alignment.

In contrast, Tanzania, in similar circumstances to Kenya, attempted to pursue a more truly non-aligned policy. Tanzania's diplomatic conflicts, with the U.S., West Germany and Britain resulted in the loss of aid due to its determination to maintain independence and pursue
non-alignment. Furthermore, Tanzania's reaction to the 1964 army mutinies was markedly different from that of Kenya. While the latter increased its military dependence on Britain, the former reduced such military links and established a more diversified pattern of military aid sources.

The above perspective clearly views non-alignment as a goal to be pursued and/or as an end in itself. However, as I explained in the introduction, non-alignment can also be used as a means to achieve other desired goals. Viewed in this latter context, the success or failure of the policy is measured by its ability to promote the goals to which a country aspires. Both Kenya and Tanzania have used non-alignment as an instrument of promoting their preferred objectives.

As explained above, in its foreign policy behaviour, Kenya has placed a higher value on economic and security issues than on freedom in decision-making, while the reverse order applies in the case of Tanzania. Furthermore, although Kenya has tended to be pragmatic and cautious in its foreign policy approach, Tanzania has tended to be principled and radical. Consequently, the way non-alignment-policy has been employed in each has tended to reflect their goal preferences and foreign policy approaches.

Kenya's employment of non-alignment though unorthodox, has been consistent and compatible with its pragmatic approach in pursuing chosen goals. In the 1960s, for example, the Kenyatta government used the guise of non-alignment to justify hostility towards the Soviet Union and China as well as to defend its partiality and friendship with
Western powers. As this study has shown, it was viewed, by the Kenyatta government, as an economic necessity for Kenya to maintain and nurture economic (as well as military, political and cultural) ties already developed with the Western bloc during the colonial period, rather than risk economic setbacks in any attempt to break with the past or develop new ties with a bloc (the East) that was at loggerheads with the West. Indeed, Munyua Waiyaki, then Minister of foreign Affairs, admitted in an interview that Kenya had on several occasions in the 1960s, turned down offers of aid from Eastern countries. His explanation for this rejection is similar to that summarised above:

"At the time of independence, Kenya was very tied up with the West and there was so much antagonism on the part of the rulers toward the East that Kenya did not wish to break suddenly with the West and forego the cooperation that came along with it."

Given the perceived necessity to maintain close ties with the West, the Kenyan government used the guise of non-alignment to accuse the Eastern countries, particularly the Chinese and the Russians, of undermining its attempts to practice non-alignment. As explained in Chapter four, the Russians and the Chinese were accused of trying to influence foreign policy through opponents within Kenyatta's government. Significantly, no similar accusation was directed at the American government, which, as Ambassador Attwood has disclosed in his memoirs, had direct access to and influence on the policymaking at the
time. In other words, the justification used for hostility towards the East was similarly employed to justify friendship with the West. It was argued that Western nations were genuinely interested in assisting Kenya to attain its national goals of security and development and were not, unlike Eastern nations, attempting to import foreign ideologies or support dissident groups. According to Kenyatta, "if we are truly non-aligned, we must not shrink from making friends with those Western countries which extend an honest hand of cooperation and trade".

Consistent with its pragmatism, when in the late 1970s it became "safe" and hence expedient to establish closer economic ties with the East, particularly with China, the Kenyan government again seized upon non-alignment to explain away its changed attitude. Similarly, President Moi used non-alignment to explain why Kenya was one of the first African countries to announce its decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The actual argument used was that Kenya was exercising its right to judge world issues on their own merit, as all non-aligned states ought to do. But as this study has shown, it was economic and security considerations that dictated Kenya's stand on the 1980 Olympics. The same considerations also dictated Kenya's agreement to offer the U.S. a naval base, thus breaking one of the cardinal principles of the non-aligned "commandments". Having realised, rather belatedly, that it risked isolation within the O.A.U. and the non-aligned
Movement, Kenya has been at pains to explain that it offered the U.S. naval "facilities" and not a base — although in practice, the difference between the two is quite insignificant.

The Kenyan leadership has, then, used non-alignment skilfully to promote desired goals: to the extent that these goals have been achieved or seen to be achieved, so the leadership has confidently used this as a measure of success in Kenya's foreign policy. In the words of a former foreign Minister, Njoroge Mungai:

"The success of Kenya's foreign policy can be measured by the very favourable and progressive image Kenya has built through the world. It is evidenced in the increase of Kenya's foreign trade, in heavy foreign investments, in our healthy position in foreign reserve holdings and in the spectacular economic growth that is taking place throughout the length and breadth of the Republic."  

This statement, made a decade ago, long before the oil crisis, hardly reflects the reality of Kenya to-day where, for example, foreign reserve holdings are far from healthy and the economic growth rate is no longer so "spectacular". Furthermore, as Okumu has pointed out, although

"Kenya's rather unbridled pragmatism in foreign affairs has paid some dividends in attracting large quantities of Western public and private capital, its overall effect has still to be fully assessed, especially in view of the dominant role of multinational firms in its economy."
Like Kenya, Tanzania has used non-alignment to justify and promote preferred national and foreign policy goals. However, Tanzania, unlike Kenya, realised quite early in its post-colonial history, that diversification in its external dependence was necessary for the country's economic (and political) survival. This realisation was brought about, as explained in Chapters two and three, by the problems Tanzania was experiencing in attracting foreign capital aid and investment, a problem, it will be remembered, that dated back to the colonial period. Tanzania, with its mixed colonial background, comparatively smaller settler population, and no significant manufacturing sector, had never attracted international capitalism which preferred to "serve" the East African market from Kenya. Tanzania's failure to attract sufficient foreign aid and capital investment, coupled with the mid-1960s diplomatic crisis that resulted in the loss of much needed aid, convinced its leadership of the urgent need to diversify economic links, not only to avoid future economic sabotage, but also because foreign capital inflow from the West was simply not available; and when available it was either insufficient or offered on a short-term basis. Thus, although President Nyerere explained the establishment of economic and military links with China as Tanzania's "little attempt at being non-aligned", the relationship was primarily dictated by economic imperatives. Invoking non-alignment in such circumstances, served to bolster Tanzania's image as a truly non-aligned state, as well as to convince the Western
countries (whom Tanzania still needed as alternative markets and sources of aid) that it was not entering into an alliance with a "communist" country. Indeed, China's major aid offer to Tanzania -- the building of TAZARA -- was accepted only after the West's rejection of Tanzania's and Zambia's request for aid. Thus, Tanzania's links with China were primarily out of economic necessity, and only secondarily out of any real or imagined need to practice non-alignment or to learn from China.

Similarly, Nyerere has used non-alignment to popularise and legitimise his country's policy of self-reliance. Thus, through persuasive speeches to non-aligned conferences, Nyerere has, particularly since the 1970s, called upon its members to adopt collective self-reliance as a strategy for overcoming poverty and underdevelopment. The growing use among the non-aligned of the term "collective self-reliance" has served to enhance Nyerere's prominence among them as well as to increase the credibility of the policy within Tanzania. As already shown, the adoption of a socialist-self-reliant strategy, like the decision to diversify external dependence, was an adaptive response to Tanzania's failure to attract foreign aid, and hence the need to rely primarily on its own resources.

Indeed, as has been argued earlier, Tanzania's adoption of a socialist ideology in 1967 was its "only rational choice" given prevailing circumstances -- a faltering economy and a poverty-stricken populace. Since the socialist/self-reliant policy called for an end to exploitation and inequality, for the equitable distribution of wealth and for the state ownership of the means of production, it
appealed to the peasants, workers and the ruling class of Tanzania, all of whom had scarcely any property to lose but something to gain from the proposed programme. Thus, Tanzania's leadership has used non-alignment to legitimise its foreign policy and the self-reliant policy to legitimise Nyerere's regime which was under threat of economic collapse.

Tanzania has also employed non-alignment to promote other policy goals, particularly in regard to Southern Africa's Liberation. Under the guise of practising non-alignment, it has used ties with Eastern bloc countries to secure support (both material and moral) for the liberation movements, most of whom have been based in Dar-es-Salaam. In a sense, Tanzania can be said to have exploited the socialist countries' ideologically-based sentiments and sympathies for the liberation movements, to suit its desire to bring to an end racist and colonial regimes in Southern Africa. Tanzania has also used its right as a non-aligned state to judge issues on their own merits, as a justification for repeated denunciation and condemnation of Western powers for supporting apartheid through the sale of arms to South Africa, thus delaying the liberation of the whole of the African continent.

From the above, it would seem that Tanzania has not only used non-alignment to promote its national goals of development and security but also to enhance its freedom and ability to attain other foreign policy targets. Furthermore, unlike Kenya, for whom non-alignment has remained at the level of rhetoric, Tanzania has demonstrated its determination to be genuinely non-aligned.
Clearly, the 1964-65 diplomatic "war" between Tanzania and the major Western powers, was fought over its determination to pursue an independent non-aligned foreign policy. Nyerere has demonstrated his country's commitment to non-alignment on a number of other occasions which have been examined in preceding chapters and hence need not be repeated here. However, perhaps I need to reemphasize that, in spite of the so-called Sino-Tanzania "partial alliance",\textsuperscript{19} this study has found no evidence to the effect that this bilateral relationship has thus far compromised Tanzania's non-alignment.

On the contrary, Tanzania has made it clear to the Chinese, by both its words and actions, that friendship with any state does not give licence to any other nation to choose friends or enemies for Tanzania. Nevertheless, viewed from the perspective of Sino-Soviet and super power competition in the Indian Ocean and Eastern African, China's presence in Tanzania may in future compromise the latter's ability to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy, particularly if a less principled and/or determined President takes over after Nyerere.

Although Tanzania has made greater attempts than Kenya to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy, in terms of policy outcomes, Tanzania's efforts have achieved limited results. In other words, although Tanzania has registered some success in resisting external influence and in its persistence in pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy, it has not been successful in using the latter to dissuade the major powers from sabotaging its attempts at achieving other objectives. For example, despite Tanzania's success in resisting Western influence in
its foreign policy during the 1964-65 diplomatic crisis, it could not dissuade these powers from undermining its economy. This is a clear indication of the constraining impact of dependence and underdevelopment on Tanzania's foreign policy. Similarly, in regard to Southern African liberation, it has been unable to gain major Western power support and/or cooperation to bring an end to apartheid and colonialism. On the contrary, these powers continue to sell arms to the apartheid regime, despite its pleas, denunciations and verbal threats. Furthermore in spite of Tanzania's (and Kenya's) desire that the Indian Ocean be declared a Zone of Peace, super power competition and military presence has increased rather than decreased over the years.

The two East African states have been even less effective in promoting international peace and justice beyond verbal gymnastics at the United Nations and other international conferences. Even their collective campaign, along with other non-aligned states, for a New International Economic Order has thus far met with minimal success.

In sum, then, Tanzania's and Kenya's non-aligned policies have produced a mixed bag of successes and failures, depending on the various purposes they have been designed to serve, the degree of ideological commitment or lack of it and the constraints within their internal and external operational environments. Thus for Kenya, whose primary concerns are economic growth, security and political stability respectively, non-alignment has been skillfully employed to advance these goals. Although some short-term economic
gains and a false image of security and political stability have been attained, long-term goals, given the leadership's permissiveness to external penetration and control over the political economy, remain in doubt. Furthermore, Kenya's lip-service to non-alignment reduces its long-term effectiveness as a means of promoting other national and foreign policy objectives.

For Tanzania, non-alignment has been successfully employed to enhance decision-making freedom and ability to pursue an independent course in foreign affairs, as well as to give legitimacy, prominence, and prestige to the leadership both at home and abroad. The pursuit of non-alignment has also enabled Tanzania to promote such goals as the liberation of Southern Africa, although success has been limited by external and internal constraints. Other national goals, such as economic development security etc., have yet to be achieved.

However, unlike Kenya, Tanzania's socialist, self-reliant strategy of development, although it has not enabled the latter to eliminate its dependence and underdevelopment, it has nevertheless enabled Tanzania to play a more independent role in foreign affairs without the fear of economic sabotage by any single foreign aid donor or capital investor. Nyerere's ideological clarity, political will and commitment to principles, have been the key motive force behind Tanzania's greater attempts to pursue non-alignment than Kenya, where no similar leadership sentiments exist.

It would seem, then, that viewed from the above perspective, hypothesis (iii) cited above is valid in the context of this study.
This conclusion finds corroboration in studies conducted by McGowan (and Gottwald) and Gitelson. In her study, Gitelson proposes that African leaders wishing to follow an active foreign policy and to be prominent within global and regional systems will be more non-aligned in practice than those wishing to concentrate on domestic affairs. She further proposes that the former type of leaders would tend to emphasise political independence above economic development in their national priorities and would try either to act or to appear to be more non-aligned in foreign policy than the latter type who emphasise development above independence.

McGowan and Gottwald arrive at a similar conclusion as Gitelson, although unlike her, they categorise African foreign policy behaviour as being either 'promotive' or 'acquiescent'. They expect that:

"Promotive-type states will reject political and economic dependence, as their aim is to enhance decision-making freedom in order to establish a new set of relationships between domestic structures and the external environment. On the other hand, the most salient characteristic of a post-colonial state that follows an acquiescent foreign policy is the perpetuation of inherited ties of economic and political dependence with former metropolitan powers".

According to my first proposition [Hypothesis iv] to be assessed below, the foreign policy behaviours of Kenya and Tanzania are categorised as "acquiescent" and "promotive" respectively.
My findings in regard to Tanzania's and Kenya's non-alignment can also be explained within Skurnik's conceptualisation of "practical" non-alignment. Viewed within Skurnik's spectrum, Kenya's non-alignment behaviour can be said to concentrate on the short-term goals of economic survival and security that are located at the "conservative" end of the practical non-alignment spectrum, while the long-term goals, located at the 'revolutionary' end of the continuum have hardly been given much thought. In the case of Tanzania, Skurnik would argue that the foreign policy maker's ideological commitment and intent to transform the international environment have dictated that short-term goals must be subordinated and sacrificed to such long-range benefits as the end of external exploitation, total decolonisation, and freedom to pursue an independent course in foreign affairs.

Using Skurnik's conceptual distinction, I can venture a generalisation, based on the findings of these two cases, to the effect that the gap between theoretical and practical non-alignment is wide: a clear reflection of the gap between the psychological decision-maker's world of desires and aspirations and the external operational environment, in which constraints clearly outweigh choices.

Hypothesis (iv) - Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behaviour

The basic contention of this fourth and final hypothesis is that though the systemic constraints are similar for both Kenya and Tanzania, they have been perceived and responded to differently, thus producing "acquiescent" foreign policy behaviour in the former and "promotive" foreign policy behaviour in the latter.
Since foreign policy behaviour is goal-oriented, there is a need to examine the aim of each of these two types of adaptation as well as the objects or targets in respect to which Kenya and Tanzania have had to adopt. According to McGowan and Gottwald, "acquiescent policies aim to modify domestic structures to agree with external demands and changes" while "promotive policies aim at a new equilibrium between domestic and international demands by changing both environments".

Using this interpretation, Kenya can be said to have adapted acquiescent policies towards major Western powers and institutions. As this study has shown, Kenya has gone out of its way to create a hospitable climate for foreign capital investment and has in general pursued a pro-West policy. However, Kenya's behaviour towards the major Eastern nations has been markedly different, a clear indication that to some extent the Kenyan leadership has deliberately chosen to be acquiescent in response to specific external influence.

The point to be emphasised here is that Kenya, despite being a small, weak state, has not acquiesced indiscriminately in all external demands and changes. Furthermore, Kenya's acquiescence is not passive, as it represents the decision-maker's choice of one among several types of adaptation in foreign policy. It therefore largely reflects calculated benefits expected to be achieved through one type of adaptation rather than another. Thus, as explained earlier, Kenya's major goals of economic growth and security are viewed by the leadership to be best promoted and achieved, through cooperation with the West, which
is deemed to be reliable and genuinely interested in promoting Kenya's 'development'. The leadership's willingness to limit Kenya's sovereignty through cooperation and agreements with Western powers and adoption of investment codes designed to meet the requirements of foreign capital investors, is viewed as a short-term necessity for material rewards that will supposedly ensure and sustain long-term autonomy.

In sum then, the proposition that Kenya's adaptive foreign policy behaviour at the global level of interaction is acquiescent needs to be qualified. In other words, although Kenya has generally been acquiescent in its bilateral relations with the major Western countries and institutions, it has also manifested non-acquiescent -- albeit non-promotive -- behaviour in its bilateral relations with major socialist states.

Tanzania on the other hand, can be said to have adopted promotive behaviour since the mid-1960s, when, following the failure of international capitalist states and institutions to respond adequately to its developmental needs, a more self-reliant non-aligned foreign policy was initiated. The adoption of a socialist, self-reliant policy in domestic affairs and a collective self-reliant approach to international issues, particularly in the demand for a N.I.E.O. are indications of Nyerere's attempts to create a new equilibrium between Tanzania's domestic and international environments. Although the leadership has persisted in its pursuit of promotive adaptation, it has met with both domestic and international resistance to change.
Indeed, as was shown above, neither Kenya nor Tanzania have attained, to any significant degree, any of the objectives they have sought to promote using their divergent paths; a reflection of the systemic constraints that are at work in both countries. It would seem appropriate, then, at this point to turn to the questions posed earlier in this chapter regarding the impact of the systemic variable on these two foreign policies.

C. The Impact of Dependence and Underdevelopment on the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania: Some Conclusions

In the assessment of the validity of the various hypotheses proposed, it has become evident that no matter what aspect of the two states' foreign policies was being examined, the systemic factor loomed large. By way of concluding this section, an attempt will be made using the questions posed earlier as a guide to arrive at some tentative conclusions regarding the impact of dependence and underdevelopment on the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania.

Q. I. Constraints and Choices in the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania

Clearly, given the evidence in this study, which is largely qualitative, it would be a futile and perhaps misleading exercise to attempt to provide precise, exact measurements of the degrees of constraints and choices in the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania. At best, approximations can be made of the extent to which decisions or positions have involved various degrees of choice and/or constraint.
As shown in Chapter 3, capitalist penetration and class formation at formal independence was far more advanced in Kenya than in Tanzania. Furthermore at the time, Kenya had various factions and groups competing for political leadership while in Tanzania, Nyerere was hardly challenged. These circumstances, in addition to the Kenya-border war with Somalia, may perhaps partly explain why the leadership spent most of the 1960s decade consolidating its power and its security. In the meantime, external forces and interests continued to consolidate their already entrenched economic position in the country, making future disengagement of the political economy from its dependent linkage to the international capitalist one even more difficult.

In other words, it could be argued that given the comparatively greater extent of capitalist penetration and class formation in Kenya than in Tanzania at independence, the former leadership encountered a relatively higher degree of internal and external constraints than the latter. To this extent, it could be further argued that the Tanzanian leadership had a comparatively wider margin of choice and/or autonomy to attempt to alter and initiate changes in the inherited colonial capitalist economy than its Kenyan counterpart. Viewed from this perspective the Kenyan leadership's failure to challenge or initiate change in the inherited political economy could easily be blamed on its smaller margin of choice than Tanzania's, while the latter's adoption of a socialist self-reliant strategy to development could be attributed to its comparatively larger margin of choice. Conversely, it could also be argued that in 1967 Tanzania did not have much choice
but to change its development and foreign policy orientation, given
the internal and external constraints it was then experiencing,
while Kenya was not under similar pressure.

In sum, then, it would seem that it is not so much the range
of choices each of the two states have had but rather the lack of
them that largely dictated, at least in part, the strategies and
approaches chosen in their development and foreign policies.

Q. 2 & Q. 3 - Ideological Orientation and Nature of Leadership

It would be insufficient, and perhaps misleading, to explain
away the differences in policy strategies and/or approaches chosen by
merely looking at the various degrees of systemic constraints. As
this study has emphasised, the intervening role of leadership cannot
be dispensed with in explaining the choice of strategies and styles in
foreign policy. As Korany has rightly put it:

"Decision-makers are intermediaries, intervening
variables, but not in a passive sense; that is, not
as mere communicators or bridges. They are inter­
mediaries in a positive sense, as active synthesisers
of the myriad factors working on foreign policy". 27

Clearly, as this study of Kenya and Tanzania has shown, the
leaderships' perception of their states' capability or incapability
to challenge underdevelopment and dependance and the calculation of
their own power and interests have to a large extent determined the
goals promoted and the methods employed. In other words, all else
being equal, the Kenyan leaders have chosen to promote their declared objectives using a capitalist strategy; hence their preference for Western Capitalist economic assistance and association. On the other hand, the Tanzanian leaders, in general, and Nyerere in particular, seem genuinely to prefer to promote development and foreign policy using a socialist self-reliant strategy; hence the preference for socialist and in particular for Chinese economic and military assistance.

Similarly, commitment to principles, freedom and non-alignment, which have characterised Tanzania's external behaviour, can largely be attributed to the nature of the leadership and in particular to Nyerere, who has taken a personal responsibility for his country's foreign policy making and has participated quite actively in international affairs. By the same token, Kenya's cautious, moderate and pragmatic behaviour can also in part be attributed to the nature and perceptions of the leadership and, in particular, to Kenyatta, whose 'traditional' modest interest in foreign affairs became even more cautious after his diplomatic failures in the 1964 Congo Crisis and the 1976 Angolan liberation Conflict. Furthermore, unlike President Nyerere, whose moralistic principled view of the world seems to have given him a sense of mission and hence the desire to play a messianic role in world affairs, neither Kenyatta, nor his successor, have held such views of the world. Consequently, although Moi, unlike his predecessor, has tended to be somewhat less cautious in his foreign policy style, the basic pragmatic orientation of Kenya's foreign policy has persisted. In other words, Kenyan leaders are hardly concerned with
changing the world but rather in using the opportunities offered by participation in international affairs to their own advantage.

Clearly, leadership perceptions of the advantages or disadvantages of pursuing a particular foreign policy goal in part explain the differences in external behaviour. However, it is doubtful, at least in the short-term, whether differences in ideological orientation have significantly affected the achievement or non-achievement of desired goals.

In the case of Tanzania, its socialist self-reliant strategy may have enhanced its ability to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy but has not reduced its underdevelopment and dependence. Indeed Tanzania is currently more indebted to foreign institutions than it was prior to adopting a more socialist ideology. In spite of the apparent short-term failure of Ujamaa to bring expected benefits, it is still too early to blame Tanzania's problems, as Nyerere's critics have done, entirely on the latter's version of socialism. Clearly, other factors, both external and internal, have contributed to the apparent failure of Tanzanian socialism.

Similarly, Kenya, by adopting a capitalist ideology, has managed to attract Western capitalist aid and investment and has even acquired for itself a favourable image in Western circles; but like Tanzania, it has not yet achieved its primary national goals of development and security. Kenya's high growth rate in the 1960s which was its source of pride in the early 1970s, had dropped dramatically ever since. Furthermore, rising expenditures on armaments in both Kenya and
Tanzania, are a clear indication of the leaders' perception of insecurity internally and threat externally.

Differences in the ideological orientations of Kenya and Tanzania do not seem, from available evidence, to have had a significant effect on policy outcomes. However, in the long-run, Tanzania's socialist orientation may stand a better chance of reducing the underlying problems of underdevelopment and dependence than Kenya's capitalist approach. As argued earlier, although Tanzania has not gone far enough in challenging its underdevelopment and dependence, it has at least begun to make attempts in that direction. Kenya, on the other hand, because of its continuing commitment to capitalist oriented development, has not even contemplated disengaging itself from its dependent position, since the Kenyan leaders have acquired a vested interest in the international capitalist system through their transnational links. The long-term implications of this situation are discussed later in this chapter.

Q. 4 - Non-alignment and foreign policy outcome

It should already be apparent from the foregoing analysis, that the gap between the two states' policy declarations and aspirations on the one hand, and their foreign policy outcomes on the other hand, is enormous. This situation is hardly surprising, given the two states' powerlessness, in an international system dominated by a few major powers. They have clearly attempted to employ non-alignment as skillfully as possible in promoting their national and foreign policy goals. However, as this study has shown, success for both has been limited, no matter what approach or mode of adaptation has been employed.
Foreign policy for both then, has largely remained at the level of declarations, denunciations and, at best, stubborn refusal to comply with the demands of the major powers and institutions, as Tanzania has done on various occasions. However, underlying underdevelopment and external dependence dictate that, such resistance to external influence cannot be sustained for long. As has been shown, Tanzania's growing need for economic assistance eventually led Nyerere to succumb to the conditions demanded by the I.M.F. and the World Bank. Similarly, Kenya's growing need for economic and military assistance, has led it to risk lose the last shred of credibility as a non-aligned state, by offering the U.S. a naval base. More significant and ironical perhaps is the fact that, in spite of Kenya's agreement to compromise its non-alignment in favour of economic and security benefits, the U.S. has undermined the latter by arming Kenya's key enemy in the region -- Somalia. That Kenya has been unable to dissuade the U.S. from supplying arms to Somalia, is, as pointed out in the previous chapter, a clear indication of Kenya's weakness.

Conclusion

As noted earlier, the conclusions drawn in the analysis above, are based on the findings of this study, as well as the extant literature. Indeed, in spite of the fact that most of the studies reviewed in the preface employ divergent approaches from mine, they nevertheless arrive at similar conclusions on some of the key issues investigated in this study. For example, in regard to the role of the leadership
in foreign policy making, there seems to be a general consensus on its importance; either as an intervening or an independent variable. In this connection, one scholar writing on the foreign policy of Zaire has observed:

"The nature and the psychological traits of the ruling elites in Africa cannot be overlooked in any proper study of their countries' external behaviour. Frequently the foreign policy of these various states is not decided by the government or by the masses, but is determined by the leader in power." 28

Speculating about the future of Africa, the same scholar has observed:

"The future of Africa does not, for the time being, depend so much on the millions of Africans who constitute its masses, but it rests largely in the hands of those who govern the African states, some with the consent of the people, others without that consent." 29

In regard to policy attitudes towards Great Powers, a similar consensus seems to run through the literature. Aluko for example has concluded that,

"Broadly speaking, in their relationships with the Great Powers, African countries led by radical, socialist leaders tend to work closely with the Eastern European Powers and China, while those led by conservative or moderate leaders prefer to be close to Western Powers." 30
Obviously, the actual relationships with the Great Powers are not that simple or clear cut, as I have shown in this study. However, most extant studies on African foreign policies suggest that states of Tanzanian ('socialist')-type tend to place national independence above economic considerations and display greater determination and commitment to the pursuit of the policy of non-alignment than the Kenyan ('capitalist')-type states. For example, Guinea which shares a similar socialist ideology with Tanzania, has been shown to exhibit a similar foreign policy orientation. One study that has examined Guinea's foreign policy has concluded that,

"Guinea's political ideology emphasises national independence and this factor has consistently been a major determinant of the country's foreign policy decisions since independence. The overall consistency with which the policy of positive neutrality was pursued was largely due to this factor." \(^{31}\)

The leadership foreign policy style in the pursuit of non-alignment is also very similar:

"Guinean leaders attach considerable importance to the spectacular and dramatic demonstration of their neutrality ... President Toure believes that the new states can best demonstrate their independence when they are able to stand up to the representatives of the big powers. Thus, in 1958, Toure spoke defiantly before President de Gaulle of France; in 1961
he acted defiantly vis-à-vis Russia; and in 1966, he spoke in defiant terms to the United States.

... Perhaps the most well-known feature of Toure style is the regularity with which he speaks on the subject of neutrality both at home and abroad.\(^\text{32}\)

However, like Tanzania, Guinea has experienced constraints on its foreign policy:

"Because Guinea was unable to do without the important economic and technical assistance she was receiving from West Germany, she was obliged to discontinue her arrangements for establishing diplomatic relations with East Germany."\(^\text{33}\)

Similarly, the Kenyan-type African states such as the Ivory Coast, pre-revolutionary Ethiopia and Nigeria, particularly under Tafawa Balewa, have displayed some resemblance in their foreign policy orientations and styles. For example, one study that has examined Nigerian foreign policy under Balewa has made an observation reminiscent of Kenya's foreign policy orientation:

"While the Balewa Government remained very close to the Western Powers, especially Britain and the United States, it maintained a cool and often hostile attitude to the Communist powers .... Indeed, on most cold war issues .... Nigeria under Balewa had given support to the Western powers — the Balewa
government did not interpret the doctrine of non-alignment as implying the reduction of its dependence on the Western Powers and diversifying its external links. 34

The Ivory Coast, which like Kenya maintains close relations with its former 'mother' country -- France -- as well as other Western countries, has also eschewed close relations with the Eastern bloc. Instead, as one study has noted, "relations of the Ivory Coast with socialist countries have been somehow strained. It has no contact with China, considered by Houphouet-Boigny as a revolutionary state trying to export its economic and political systems. 35

However, as noted in the preface, despite the general consensus on the importance of idiosyncratic and other internal variables in explaining African foreign policies, very few studies have emphasised systemic forces. Furthermore, the few that have, such as Skurnik's work on Senegalese foreign policy, tended to downplay the idiosyncratic variable. Nevertheless, most of the studies reviewed in the preface, do acknowledge the powerlessness of individual African states in an international system dominated by the major powers. Furthermore, most Third World countries themselves seem to have begun to recognise their individual weakness.

It is perhaps out of awareness and acceptance of their individual powerlessness, that Kenya and Tanzania, along with other third world
countries experiencing similar problems of dependence and underdevelopment, have come to lay greater emphasis on collective bargaining under the umbrella of such institutions as the 'Group of 77'. The Lomé Conventions signed between the E.E.C. and the A.C.P. countries are a further indication of this collective approach. In the short-term however, the Third World's belief that acting as a group (e.g. the A.C.P.) and speaking as one, it could demand and force a reconstruction of the old world order has not yielded positive results. Indeed, various projections of the future of Africa in the 1980s and beyond, point a gloomy picture of the prospects for either development and/or disengagement from the periphery of international capitalist system.

It is with this idea, of possible futures for Africa as a whole, and for Kenya and Tanzania in particular, that I will conclude this thesis, by making some tentative projections and prescriptions.

D. Projections and Prescriptions

1) Disengagement: Dependence, Interdependence or Independence?

"As two underdeveloped societies with small populations and a limited range of natural resources, both Kenya and Tanzania operate in an interdependent world, and more specifically within the institutional web of international capitalism, from which neither can withdraw. Both need to import commodities from other countries, especially the industrial societies of the West, to operate and develop their economies. Both in turn need to export their
products abroad to pay for these imports .... As a result, the relevant question for both countries is not whether and how they can become truly independent entities in the international arena, for such an objective is an unfeasible one. Rather, the question is whether these countries can reduce their level of dependence to the point where they will be able to pursue long-term strategies ... to achieve their respective conceptions of development, without being subject to extreme external pressures, such as wars or another rise in the price of oil, that make the pursuit of such strategies impossible". 37 (emphasis added)

"If state capitalism has been advanced through the Lome conventions then state socialism has been advocated by the Lagos Declaration. The latter reflects a growing interest in transcending an unpromising inheritance of dependence and underdevelopment, particularly given the growth of protectionist pressures in the North. In these circumstances, most of the states of Africa may have little choice but to disengage; hence the emphasis on psychological and political, as well as structural and economic independence". 38 (emphasis added)
The above two statements represent the two major perspectives of the alternative prospects and/or possibilities for African states, given their dependence and underdevelopment. The first perspective represents the mainstream thinking of the '60s and early '70s, when a peripheral growth strategy was still viewed by some as a viable alternative for attaining economic development in at least some third world countries. The second perspective reflects the thinking of the late '70s and early '80s when:

"Given the elusiveness of development, the inappropriateness of much policy and the cautions contained in various projections, Africa has begun to discern and design an alternative strategy, a concern accelerated by the economic crisis of the mid-seventies onwards". 39

Viewed in the context of Kenya and Tanzania, these two perspectives offer two alternative ways of projecting their future possibilities and prospects in their continuing attempts to attain development and other desired foreign policy goals. The first perspective offers the alternative of accepting the two states' divergent strategies as both relevant and viable within the context of each of their different definitions of development. Within this perspective, then, the concern would be only with suggesting ways and means of reducing dependence on the international capitalist system, yet within the confines of their respective conceptions of development. On the other hand, the second perspective offers the alternative of rejecting
Kenya's state capitalist approach to development as unviable and of advocating Tanzania's state socialist approach as more viable, an approach that would facilitate disengagement and provide the only chance of survival in a world/system characterised by increasing economic crisis and protectionism.

Clearly, as this study has already suggested, and as I will attempt to demonstrate further in this section, the second perspective reflects the current reality not only in Kenya and Tanzania, but also in the rest of the continent and the world system.

It is, however, the case that, in some recent analyses, Kenya has been identified as an example of relatively successful economic growth and capital accumulation despite its peripheral position. Such analyses have stressed the role in Kenya of an increasingly powerful indigenous capitalist class, in effective control of the Kenyan state, and leading a relatively dynamic capitalist transformation of the country, all resulting in faster expansion of production at a lower social cost than any possible alternative pattern or strategy.

On the other hand, contending analysis, operating within the dependency framework, has stressed that Kenya's apparent post-colonial economic growth, has been retrogressive in that it has widened inequalities and structural segmentation. Furthermore, such growth cannot be sustained in the long-term, given the continued vulnerability and limitation imposed on the Kenyan economy by its peripheral place within the world economy. One such recent study has provided extensive
evidence and detailed analysis, leading to the conclusion that:

"Despite industrial growth and the emergence of important African industrialists ... Kenya is not experiencing dynamic capitalist development; the country is seen to be dependent on external changes in the world capitalist economy and in the strategies of transnational corporations; and the result is an economic crisis in Kenya, that mirrors that at the world level, and is leading to an internal political crisis that could reshape the country". 43

The debate on the prospects of Tanzania's socialist, self-reliant strategy is as contentious as that on Kenya's peripheral capitalist strategy. The central criticism levelled at the Tanzanian approach is that it is insufficiently related to reality. However, in their interpretation, the critics are divided into those to the right of the Nyerere government and those to the left. The right-wing critics argue that the most important factor for Tanzania's development lies in the acquisition of external resources which should be central rather than supplementary to domestic resources. Tanzania's self-reliant strategy is consequently viewed as unrealistic because it expects "that people will willingly forego material benefits for some amorphous psychological gains (while) the real basis of psychological security is security in material benefits. Unless the state makes rapid economic progress it cannot hope to satisfy the other aspirations of its population and therefore cannot hope to maintain the stability of the regime in power". 44
This right-wing perspective is retrogressive in that it would seem to suggest a return to the pre-Arusha status quo. It is hence of little or no relevance to a study such as this that is concerned with strategies for overcoming dependence and underdevelopment and hence increasing capability to promote international and national goals more effectively. The left-wing critics, on the other hand, offer a more relevant perspective for evaluating Tanzania's present performance and future prospects. Dominated by radical socialist-leaning scholars, they endorse the strategy of self-reliance and support the general direction of Tanzania's socialist development. However, their basic criticism is that Nyerere's strategy, as spelled out in the 1967 Arusha Declaration and subsequent documents, is not only inadequate for transforming the economy and building socialism; but the pace of implementation of declared goals is painfully and unrealistically slow. Therefore, these scholars recommend 1) a revolutionary change in the nature of the elite, which is seen as the major internal factor deterring socialist progress, and 2) an immediate and total disengagement from the dependency relationship with international capitalism, as the key to development. In their view a viable socialist strategy for development involves undoing the distortive effects of early peripheral capitalist development and avoiding the pattern of growth fostered by further capitalist growth.
The criticisms and the alternative strategies suggested by the various analysts of the political economies of Kenya and Tanzania would seem to boil down to a choice between 1) continuing with current strategies and hence moving deeper into internal underdevelopment and external dependence with attendant socio-economic and political costs, or ii) abandoning or transforming current strategies and hence disengaging from the international capitalist system, so laying the foundations for an enduring self-sustaining and internally-generated process of socio-economic and political development.

Given current trends both in Africa and the world system, the choice seems to be weighed in favour of disengagement. Projections on the futures of Africa within the world system clearly point to the fact that Africa's position at the periphery of that system will deteriorate rather than improve. As John Ravenhill argues: "There seems to be little potential for future cartelisation of producers of most of Africa's raw material exports. Oil seems destined to remain the exception with a few minor products ... uranium, bauxite ... with the potential to prove the rule. Neither can African governments anticipate significant benefits from international commodity agreements ... Western governments are unlikely to provide the resources necessary to sustain a meaningful common fund; other potential donors with the necessary resources appear equally unwilling to make a commitment". 47
Shaw makes a similar projection about Africa's futures. He argues that "since the major shifts in the global economy from the mid-seventies onwards, the prospects for an increase in either aid or trade have receded even further". Furthermore, the aid received and the trade that has taken place have left Africa heavily indebted to the outside and, in general, worse off than before.

The economic crisis of the mid-seventies and since has adversely effected all African economies including those, such as Kenya's, that had exhibited rapid growth in G.N.P. relative to other countries. As Shaw has pointed out, the strategy pursued by such states as Kenya, of

"import-substitution and export-led growth -- is being eroded for three reasons. First, the benefits of import-substitution and mineral exportation tend to be short-lived. Second, any benefits tend to flow only to a few people and regions rather than to the country as a whole. And third, external demand is decreasing in a period of recession and protection".

Similarly, Langdon's findings in his study of "Industry and Capitalism in Kenya" lead him to assert that:

"the detailed evidence of national economic indicators from the 1970's questions the potential to sustain capital accumulation in Kenya. A built-in structural constraint appears to choke off growth through the mechanism of large foreign exchange outflows ..."
serious problems are evident in agricultural production ...

... And the endurance of import-reproduction industrialisation (now benefitting both transnationals and large scale African capital) has guaranteed the failure of Kenya's export manufacturing strategy. Throughout the '70s that strategy relied on European transnationals to set up new export facilities to serve E.E.C. markets, but the restructuring strategies of those firms in Europe pushed them elsewhere. By 1980, then, Kenya was experiencing decreases in per capita income, serious foreign exchange gaps, forced cutbacks (of major dimensions) in government development expenditures, and dim prospects for any kind of sustained capital accumulations". 50

As a result of the apparent failure of its transnational export-manufacturing strategy, Kenya has become increasingly dependent on external factors (price increases for its two major exports of coffee and tea and international finance such as the I.M.F. and the World Bank) to determine its capacity to accumulate in the face of foreign exchange pressures.

The implication of Kenya's economic and attendant political crises, is a clear indication that the dependent capitalist strategy that has been employed thus far is no longer capable either of sustaining rapid economic growth or of containing the growing social and political crisis, which have been occurring with greater frequency since the opening of the 1980s decade.
However, given the transnational links that the Kenyan bourgeoisie has developed with transnational institutions and states--and hence its vested interest in maintaining such links--it is most unlikely that the current generation of leaders will abandon dependent capitalism in favour of disengagement. While it will theoretically remain supportive of demands for a New International Economic Order--and the new yet related call by radical African states for collective self-reliance as contained in the 1980 Lagos Declaration--Kenya will most likely remain dependent on change at the international level in commodity prices and corporate strategies. The ruling class--and other supportive groups whose interests this strategy serves--will of necessity continue to tighten control over the state, particularly over repressive machinery that is essential for suppressing opposition and thus for maintaining the crucial facade of stability. As in the past, reforms would be introduced from time to time to cope with demands of urban workers and small-scale entrepreneurs, and with the growing number of landless and unemployed in Kenya. While such reforms do not resolve the increasing contradictions within the Kenyan political economy, they do assist the ruling class in buying time, while devising further reformist tactics to deal with the next crisis. This seems to be the trend in Kenya. That the ruling Kenyan elite has no intention of breaking transnational links was clearly spelled out in April 1981, by Vice president and Minister of Finance, Mwai Kibaki. He gave the overall impression that underdeveloped countries in general, and Kenya in
particular, cannot move forward without the financial and human resources provided by multinational corporations. Furthermore, he suggested that underdeveloped countries, including Kenya, are almost powerless to influence the behaviour of such multinationals. Given their pervasive power, particularly their monopoly over material and human resources which underdeveloped countries such as Kenya need, the only solution that holds promise for developing countries, Kibaki felt, is to strike up partnerships with them.

A more revealing example of the Kenyan ruling class' permissiveness towards capitalism was evident during a recent debate on socialism in Parliament. Not only did the exchange portray their ignorance, whether deliberate or otherwise, of what a socialist philosophy would entail; it was also quite obvious from the comments of one leading member of the incumbent government that he fully endorsed capitalist values. Asked by other members whether he was a socialist or a communist, the Minister for Home and Constitutional affairs, Charles Njonjo, replied:

"I do not know what the Hon. members are worried about! They just have to look at me! I do not even have to explain what I am! In fact, I do not have to answer a question like that one! I have got a three-piece suit! Does it not explain what I am?"

Unlike Kenya, Tanzania has, at least adopted a strategy that should lead towards disengagement and independent development. However, the reality as this study has shown is quite different. Despite Tanzania's
early success at mitigating some of the negative consequences of dependency, it has become more, rather than less dependent on the international capitalist system since the Arusha Declaration. Most of the radical critics as noted earlier are unanimous in condemning its continuing links to international capitalism via foreign aid, investment and international trade. It is these links, it is argued, which perpetuate the structural dependence of the economy and the lack of an independent development base.

President Nyerere, while maintaining that the primary emphasis must be on self-reliance, rejects the notion that Tanzania should or could develop without external assistance. According to him, "the doctrine of self-reliance does not imply isolationism, either politically or economically. It means that we shall depend on ourselves, not on others. But this is not the same thing as saying we shall not trade with other people or cooperate with them when it is to mutual benefit .... We shall have to continue to sell enough of our goods abroad to pay for the things we have to acquire .... We shall continue to seek capital from abroad for particular projects or as a contribution to general development." 55

Furthermore, Nyerere does not share the view of his critics that economic interaction should be confined to socialist-oriented states. As this study has shown, Tanzania's diversification of its dependence was aimed not only at safeguarding the economy against sabotage by a
single donor or investor, but also at enhancing the country's autonomy to practice non-alignment.

Bienefeld, one of those scholars critical of Tanzania's continuing integration within the international capitalist system, has argued that trade with socialist countries could confer special benefits on Third World trading partners if it ceased to be a mere exchange of commodities and became one element in planned economic integration: In the case of Tanzania, he suggests that trade with socialist countries, with the possible exception of China, conferred no particular benefits on the former other than gaining access to additional export markets. He argues that this is the inevitable result of Tanzania's unwillingness to make a commitment to socialist development, a commitment which would require the abandonment of Tanzania's foreign policy of non-alignment. According to Bienefeld, Tanzania's policy of non-alignment may be the perfect recipe for 'falling between two stools': preventing one from taking advantage of the real, but distorted and ambiguous benefits of 'capitalist development', but also preventing one from espousing the equally real benefits derivable from a socialist international division of labour ... a true policy of non-alignment ... could lead to a set of pressures so diverse as to virtually paralyse actions on domestic economic policies and make it impossible to construct a fully coherent set of policies ... under such circumstances, one stands
condemned to remain a marginal trading partner of the socialist bloc ... while also being a small protagonist in the 'free' international market, totally exposed to the violent fluctuations of that market ...."^{57}

The importance of the elite in derailing attempts at radical change in Tanzania has also been emphasised by, among others, John Saul who has asserted that:

"... by and large, the elite has yet to engage itself fully and effectively in the task of socialist construction; its continuing lack of a realised capacity for socialist creativity remains a major constraint in Tanzania. The ideological bent of much of the elite is particularly patent, a clear triumph for colonialism (and neo-colonialism) in the cultural sphere, and crystalises around such truisms as the 'necessity' of aid, the (unequivocal and neutral) 'superiority' of Western technology and management systems, the priority of "efficiency", narrowly and technocratically conceived .... Since these attributes ... tend to be inimical to socialism, it remains a fact that the members of Tanzania's ruling petty bourgeoisie too often act as saboteurs (whether conscious or unconscious) of socialist effort at precisely the point where the task of socialist development presents its most subtle and intricate challenges".^{58}
A similar criticism of Tanzania's ruling class has been articulated by Nnoli, who has noted that the most significant problem of Tanzania's "parastatals arise from the cultural and psychological dependence of their personnel consequent on the colonial heritage. The intellectual tools with which they approach their economic problems are mere imitations of those of the advanced capitalist states". He has thus warned that "unless the economic orientations of the Tanzanian bureaucrats change radically in the direction of a revolutionary approach to the society's economic transformation, it will remain difficult to achieve convergence of domestic production and domestic consumption. The country will continue to produce what it does not consume and to consume what it does not produce and therefore unable to achieve self-sustained growth in material production.

However, Nnoli, unlike the more radical and critical scholars who point to Russia, China, North Korea and Cuba as examples of what Tanzania ought to be, allows for the fact that the objective conditions for the socialist reorganisation of the former group of countries, were different from those prevailing in Tanzania. He argues that since Tanzania's leaders did not achieve state power through a revolutionary overthrow of the pre-existing status quo, and hence their struggle for control of state power was not motivated by any working
class consciousness or ideology, their path to disengagement is bound
to be different from that of revolutionary countries. Given the
objective conditions in Tanzania, he recommends that the progressive
wing of the Tanzanian ruling class in its opposition to continued
dependence should take up the responsibility of bringing about
socialist transformation, while gradually weeding out those in the
ruling group that favour the prevailing condition of neo-colonial-like
dependence. However, Nnoli warns against a process of disengagement
that lays too much emphasis on doctrinal purity and excessive
enthusiasm in the protection of national independence:

"Many an African state has foundered on the rocks of
unfulfilled economic goals and ambitions, as the
masses of the people make it clear that the political
kingdom is neither enough benefit nor an adequate
substitute for economic welfare, and are unwilling
to wait for an unduly long time for the material of
independence". 62

According to Nnoli:

"socialist reorganisation in the Tanzanian context is
not a simple overnight action of a revolutionary
vanguard party of workers and peasants seizing political
power, nor does it necessarily imply the severing of
all links with the Western capitalist countries. How
much of the links are severed must depend on the hostility
of the external environment, the domestic resources extractable and the growth of the domestic productive forces".63

In the economic sphere, there is no universal agreement among socialists as to the "correct" path or strategy to development. Hence, the divergent and alternative paths advocated by various schools of radical scholars. But, broadly speaking, these scholars fall into two categories: i) those, such as Barkan, Clark and Nnoli who hold the view that Tanzania can attain socialism and self-reliance within the web of international capitalism and ii) those, such as Bienefeld, Babu, Rwemamu, Shivji and Thomas who would insist on complete disengagement from dependency links with international capitalism as a prerequisite for socialist development.

Clearly, each of these perspectives is, at least in theory, a possible strategy for achieving development. But in practice neither offers an easy solution to attaining socialism and self-reliance. The gradual disengagement approach is similar in some ways to the approach being pursued by the Nyerere's regime. Indeed, the main criticism of gradualism is that the Tanzanian government has promised more than it has been able to deliver;64 that what is important now is i) to hasten the speed of implementation of the declared socialist goals and in particular ii) to create a balance between the goals of equality and national independence (which have so far been emphasised) and the goal of economic growth which so far has been unsuccessful partially due to incompetent and/or externally oriented leaders.
Though gradualism offers some useful suggestions for socialist construction, it suffers from some key weaknesses. First, it seems contradictory to expect a country at the periphery of international capitalism to achieve socialism while operating within that system. Evidence from Tanzania and other third world underdeveloped states who have attempted to pursue socialism at the capitalist periphery has shown that they have been undermined by that system; in many cases, they have given-up the socialist experiment. Indeed, it is to the credit of Tanzania, and in particular of its top leadership, that it has managed for this long to persist in its attempt to pursue self-reliance and socialism, despite the hostility and attempts of sabotage emanating from the international capitalist system. It is hence doubtful whether, without the political will and commitment of this leadership, the persistence and continuity that Tanzania's socialist experiment has demonstrated to date, would have been attained; it is, consequently, equally doubtful whether the attempts made thus far, would be sustained in the event of President Nyerere relinquishing his leadership position as he continues to threaten.

On the other hand, the alternative of total disengagement, though ideally and theoretically consistent with socialism, does not provide obvious guarantees of success in Tanzania's socialist experiment. Given Tanzania's underdevelopment, it would still require massive amounts of aid until it has sufficiently developed a strong economic base. There is no guarantee that socialist countries would become more generous than they are now to make up for the aid that would
be lost by severing links with capitalist countries and institutions. Similarly in the field of trade, there is no guarantee that the socialist international division of labour would be any less exploitative of peripheral states such as Tanzania, than its capitalist counterpart. Furthermore, for a committed non-aligned country like Tanzania, total association with the socialist bloc would isolate it within the non-aligned movement. As this study has shown, Tanzania has on a number of occasions demonstrated its determination to defend its non-alignment even at the expense of loss of economic gains.

Clearly, there is no easy solution to either the Tanzanian or the Kenyan dependence and underdevelopment situation. In the case of Kenya, though ideally the solution would be to dismantle the institutionalised but perverse capitalist social, economic and political structures and replace them with others suited not only to sustained economic growth but also to comprehensive national development, in practice, such a solution is unlikely to be attempted, at least in the short term, given entrenched internal and external interests. To a lesser degree, as shown above, Tanzania's case presents similar problems for disengagement. Tanzania's practice of socialism is clearly limited and constrained by established class, bureaucratic, and transnational interests which dominate the economy and are unwilling and/or unable to change it. As one keen observer of contemporary African politics has remarked:

"Since mass development is such a monumental task in the best of conditions, and since it is even more
difficult against the wishes of the dominant capitalists, these alienated (African), westernized elites are motivated to repress the spread of development in their society and thus to maintain themselves in power as a political class. The end result is that national development is impossible: foreign predominance is maintained by the coopted elites, a neo-colonial pact as firm as its colonial predecessor was in its time. 65

However, even with internally-oriented elites, structural and social changes at the international level would also be a necessary prerequisite for any development effort to succeed in either Kenya or Tanzania. In this connection, Kaduma, writing about Tanzania's attempts at self-reliance has argued that:

"The international community can easily frustrate Tanzanian efforts towards self-reliance by dictating poor commodity prices for her products while their own technology, manufactures and raw materials are sold to the highest bidder." 66

Nyerere himself has been one of the bitterest critics of the present economic order and has been at the forefront of those third world countries demanding a New International Economic Order and collective self-reliance. 67

Clearly, greater cooperation, both in trade and in production among the underdeveloped nations, would seem to be one of the few
options that poor states have of escaping from their subordinate and exploited position within the world economy. Indeed, South-South links are now an imperative given changes in the First World, which is increasingly becoming more hostile and resistant to third world demands for equitable distribution of global resources. Nyerere who is an advocate of a "Trade Union of the Poor" has even suggested, as a last resort, direct confrontation between rich and poor:

"Confrontation is not a desired strategy of the weak; but if reason, justice, and dialogue all fail to bring international changes needed to win the war against world poverty, the economic conflict is bound to follow. The roots of O.P.E.C. were nourished by decades of gross exploitation and price-fixing by the major oil companies; its fruit jolted the whole world." 68

However, Nyerere did not mention the fact that, despite the pressures that O.P.E.C. has been able to mount in its own interests, it has otherwise joined the old economic order, at least in terms of its relations with African states, who have come to regard O.P.E.C. as one more group of countries that may or may not hand out some form of aid to Africa while, for their part, the old donors of the West have adopted the attitude of blaming the world economic crisis on O.P.E.C. and hence the implied duty of the latter to aid the non-oil producing underdeveloped countries.
In spite of internal and external constraints on both Kenya and Tanzania, there does exist a general consensus among both critics and admirers of the two states' attempts to achieve development that, "the task confronting policy makers committed to achieving development within a socialist framework is obviously far more difficult than the task confronting policy makers committed to achieving capitalism". 69

To the extent that this writer holds the view that disengagement is a prerequisite for genuine development for both countries, such development is unlikely to occur, at least in the foreseeable future, given the established patterns of domestic and transnational relations. This is likely to be more so for the case for Kenya than Tanzania, given its greater permissiveness and the association of its ruling class with transnational interests. Leys' prediction, made almost a decade ago, is perhaps as relevant to-day as it was then. In his study on the political economy of Kenya, he argued that, despite the trend to monopoly and conflict in the political economy of capitalist-oriented African states,

"it would be dogmatic and mechanical to assert that neocolonialism and underdevelopment must inevitably lead to revolutionary change in Kenya as a result of inevitable social and economic crisis". 70

Furthermore, as Shaw and Grieve have pointed out, "even if a group of African leaders or workers successfully overcame their inheritance of political, economic
and social dependence, the logic of contemporary international exchange mitigates against autonomy and self-reliance ... given the impossibility of autarky in the present world order, the goal of most African states is the limited one of balanced interdependence rather than an unequal dependence". 71

It would seem then that, given the configuration of power and interest as well as the structural links between Kenya, Tanzania and the world system, it is unlikely that these two states can or will ever completely disengage from the international system. However, given enlightened, dedicated and internally oriented leadership, the two states' political economies could be developed sufficiently to the extent that they could become interdependent rather than dependent members of the global economy.

However, to arrive at the stage of interdependence, some essential conditions would first have to be met. These would involve a partial disengagement from the international economic system, accompanied by a deliberate restructuring of domestic and international relationships. The disengagement and restructuring process should be based on a clearly defined policy aimed at reducing dependence and promoting development.

At the international level, the process of restructuring would entail some changes in the existing foreign trade, investment and aid relationships. These changes would involve the erection of trade barriers (to reduce the negative effects of unequal exchange and
indiscriminate inflow of foreign goods), as well as restrictions on the types and amounts of foreign investment and aid received from industrialised capitalist states and institutions. At the same time, increased cooperation and exchange of commodities and skills with other Third World countries would need to be encouraged and even institutionalised.

At the domestic level, the process of restructuring basic relationships and values would be induced by a restructuring of international relationships and linkages. For example, disengagement from trade and investment linkages with industrialised states and institutions, would undermine the basis of operation for comprador fractions engaged in transnational activities that facilitate corporate access to the domestic market. Furthermore, the international restructuring of trade, investment and aid relations, would also provide the basis for domestic production which in turn would not only alter the domestic class structure but also provide locally manufactured products better suited to domestic markets and tastes. However, although international restructuring would induce internal restructuring, state intervention at all levels of the political economy would also be necessary to alter existing class structures, consumption patterns and values and hence create the basis for the development of an integrated national economy and society capable of providing the basic needs of its population.

But as noted earlier, effective domestic and international restructuring of existing situations and relations, would only be
achieved if internally oriented, dedicated Third World leaderships, armed with clearly defined national development policies, emerged. Furthermore, a substantial amount of structural change in the global economy itself would be essential for the attainment of interdependence.

**Alternative Futures for Africa in the Tanzanian and Kenyan Context**

The conclusions reached here reflect those of current studies on the futures of Africa. As noted, various projections and forecasts on the futures of the continent during the 1980s and beyond, have made dire predictions, particularly in view of the trends towards i) increasing recession and protectionism in the industrialised countries and ii) continuing underdevelopment and dependence of African states on the world economy. Although various scenarios have been projected, the supposedly alternative futures for Africa do not seem bright regardless of what option is adopted. As Thomas Kanza has argued, "There are only two choices for Africa: survival or suicide". Nevertheless, despite the grim prospects for most African states, there is a growing consensus that the projected unpromising future can be averted if only policies and economic strategies aimed at promoting national and collective self-reliance are adopted.

However, this solution as shown in the case of Kenya and Tanzania, has encountered several obstacles, which range from political leadership to inherited underdevelopment and dependence.

Perhaps the major obstacle that needs to be overcome before any meaningful restructuring of African political economies can be
initiated — and before unpromising projections are successfully avoided — is the psychological dependence of the leadership, and by extension, that of the people they lead. As Shaw has noted, "Psychological liberation and self-reliance are intrinsically related, then, to liberation and self-reliance in political economy". 73

Adebayo Adedeji has made a similar observation:

"The development of a sense of self-confidence in the population is closely linked with self-reliance and self-sustainment .... Therefore, one of the essential requirements of a uniquely African approach to development is that it must embark vigorously on a process of ... liberation from all inhibitions derived from the structure and superstructure of society that thus dehumanise its broad masses and prevent them from consummating their full potentials". 74

In particular, there is an urgent need to overcome the colonially-inherited notion that national development cannot be advanced without direction and support from industrialised countries and transnational corporations.

Any projections about Africa's futures, however, should be treated with great caution as they are based on scarce data and on an assumption that the past and current trends in Africa and the world system will continue. This assumption is open to several kinds of criticism and reservation.
Despite this caution, it would seem safe to assert that given the unsalutary nature of the world economic system, the absence of an internally-oriented leadership in Kenya and its scarcity in Tanzania, the impact of dependence and underdevelopment on the foreign policies of these two East African states may be with them for a long time to come, as suggested in the concluding discussion below.

ii) The Foreign Policies of Kenya and Tanzania to the year 2000

Before turning to speculation about the future direction of the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania -- and so relating these two cases to the general literature on continental and global futures -- it may be useful to review briefly the broad trends noted in the earlier analysis of the policies during the 1960s and 1970s. These constitute almost ideal-type cases of alternative policies and projections.

Overall, the declared foreign policy objectives for both states have remained broadly similar, although the rank order and degree of commitment to implementation have tended to differ. In particular, Tanzania more than Kenya has demonstrated a consistently high concern with the liberation of Southern Africa, perhaps because of its geographical location on the border of the unliberated areas of Southern Africa, the location of liberation movements' headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam and Nyerere's chairmanship of the F.L.S. However, Tanzania's concern with liberation has extended beyond this region to Biafra, Uganda, Korea, Vietnam and other colonised or oppressed areas.
On the other hand, Kenya, consistent with its general foreign policy behaviour of maintaining a low profile on issues that do not directly affect its economic and security interests, demonstrated minimal concern with decolonisation issue, except at the level of rhetoric. Even at that level, it generally phrased its statements cautiously and avoided the radical aggressiveness of Tanzania. This cautious approach was for example apparent in its reaction to the 1964 Congo Crisis, the 1965 U.D.I., and the 1970 British arms sales to South Africa. However, this guarded, moderate approach was only typical of its reaction to issues that involved the major western powers, who are obviously important as sources of aid and investment as well as being trading partners. Thus the absence of similar economic considerations in Kenya's relations with socialist states perhaps explains its blatantly critical and at times hostile attitude in its diplomatic relations with them and particularly with the Soviet Union and China.

Perhaps, due to Tanzania's greater concern with maintaining a genuinely non-aligned posture in international affairs, it has made greater attempts to be impartial in its relations with both capitalist and socialist states. Indeed, Tanzania deserves diplomatic credit for its persistence in pursuing an independent non-aligned foreign policy in spite of its socialist ideology, close links with China and general Western hostility to its policies. Perhaps the major lesson of Tanzania's diplomatic experience during the period covered is that given a leadership with strong political will and
dedication to principles, a Third World country can exercise a margin of autonomy in its policies in spite of its lack of national power.

Although Kenya has demonstrated less real commitment to pursuing non-alignment as a goal, it has nevertheless used this posture as a means to achieve its other national goals of economic development, security and national independence. Earlier analysis has shown the extent of success and failure in this regard. Similarly, I have examined the way Tanzania has employed non-alignment, in particular, how it tended in the 1960s, to emphasise national independence to the point of sacrificing other national goals, particularly economic-development. In the 1970s, however, with an increasing economic crisis both inside and external to Tanzania and Kenya, both states began to lay heavy emphasis on economic issues. The problem for Tanzania has been one of balancing continued concern for national independence with the urgent need for economic development. Kenya, on the other hand, continued as in the 1960s to sacrifice national decision-making freedom at the altar of economic gains. Both states have recently shown greater concern with security matters than they had in the 1960s as a response to regional political instabilities and conflicts that began to threaten their own "stability". Consequently, Kenya became more militarily dependent on the West, particularly Britain and the United States, while Tanzania's dependence on socialist countries, particularly China, increased.

The overall impact of the two states' external dependence seems to have had greater impact on Kenya's foreign policy than on Tanzania's.
The latter, by reducing its economic interactions with the super-powers and the major Western countries, to some extent has insulated itself against major power influences on its policies. Thus while it lacked the power, because of its underdevelopment, to force compliance from the major powers in the pursuit of its desired goals, Tanzania at least managed to safeguard its decision-making freedom and to maintain its non-aligned posture. Kenya, on the other hand, by getting too close to the West, particularly to Britain and the United States, sacrificed independence in foreign affairs in exchange for some short-term economic benefits. As one scholar has rightly observed: "Kenya has purchased a measure of economic health ... by surrendering a measure of its political and cultural sovereignty while Tanzania has done the reverse ...." 75

In terms of learning the art of diplomacy, both countries have moved a long way from the early 1960s, when they were overly sensitive and almost paranoid about their vulnerability to external sabotage of their newly acquired independence. While their basic foreign policy orientations have remained consistent over time, the attitudes of both states have become more tolerant and less suspicious of the major powers. This change in attitude has of course been influenced by changes in the international system: detente which replaced the East-West cold war of the 1950s and 1960s did not bring an end to great power conflict and competition for world influence. Indeed, the shift of great power conflict and competition to the Indian Ocean and littoral countries, means that Kenya and Tanzania are much more
exposed to this bipolar rivalry than they were during the cold war itself, which was largely confined to Europe. That the two have learned to cope with the great powers is an indication of their relative political maturity and their acceptance of their inability to decisively influence these giants.

While internal underdevelopment and external dependence have continued to exert most influence on the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania, the leadership of both has remained an important intervening variable. Due to the domination of foreign policy by one individual, President Nyerere, Tanzania's foreign policy style has shown much continuity and little change throughout the 1960s and 1970s decades. Kenya, on the other hand, has displayed a variety of styles in foreign policy over time, reflecting the pluralistic nature of and wider group of participants in its foreign policy making and articulation.

It does not seem that the objectives and general orientation of the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania will undergo any dramatic change in the near future. The two states' enormous dependence on the outside world, their underdevelopment and their attachment to those nations perceived to be most able and willing to provide security and economic assistance, militate against any drastic departure from current trends in foreign policy.

Furthermore, given changes in the world system, particularly recession and protectionism in industrialised countries and competition for scarce resources; these are likely to force Kenya to make
more compromises in its foreign policy in the near future than in the past, concurrent with greater incorporation into the world system. Tanzania on the other hand, is likely to continue with its current self-reliance approach, perhaps even more vigorously in the future. However, as in the past, Nyerere's attempt to change the world system in Tanzania's (and the Third World's) favour, may not meet with success. Nevertheless, such an attempt would have served, as in the past, to enhance the leadership's image and prestige among the World's poor majority and also divert attention from the real problems of underdevelopment and dependence that it has so far failed to resolve. Ironically, then, foreign policy becomes, as Shaw has observed:

"a form of escape from (as well as sometimes a response to) the very dependence that unequal external exchange produces. African leaders seek to transcend the constraints by participating in a world system that is, in fact, the primary conditioner of their own political economies. Hence the dilemmas of demanding a New International Economic Order while already being firmly integrated into global transnational networks". 76

Hence, the leadership factor, as well as varying degrees of incorporation into the world economy, are likely to continue to lead to greater divergence rather than convergence in the development and foreign policy approaches of the two states. So current modes of adaptation are likely to remain unchanged to the year 2,000, if present trends and conditions in the two states and the world system persist. Thus,
as noted earlier, Tanzania is likely to remain 'promotive' in its foreign policy adaptation, in the hope of 'promoting' change in the international system. On the other hand, Kenya is likely to remain 'acquiescent' in its foreign policy adaptation since it has no need to change an international system from which its dominant classes continue to derive benefits.

Those changes in foreign policy which may take place are then likely to be changes of style rather than of substance. In Kenya for example, although many "prophets" had predicted that there would be dramatic changes in domestic and foreign policies following the departure of President Kenyatta, none occurred after August 1978. Indeed, one of the first major pronouncements of his successor was that he would follow in Kenyatta's footsteps. Moi even coined a slogan, "Nyayo" (which is a Swahili term that means "footsteps"), to show that he meant to continue Kenyatta's policies. Ironically, the "Nyayo" slogan has now almost replaced Kenyatta's "Harambee" (meaning, 'lets pull together').

Be it as it may, no substantive structural changes in Kenya's political economy have taken place during Moi's term of office and none seem likely. Those which have occurred have mainly been cosmetic and politically and economically expedient for the survival of the new regime and its transnational associates. Thus, at the domestic level, subtle reshuffles and removals within the government and the economy have occurred to allow for the inclusion of friends of the new President and to exclude those that were considered a threat to
the new regime. At the international level, existing relations with Western and Eastern countries were strengthened, through presidential visits, and through establishing or reopening embassies in the capitals of these countries. Outside these internal and external adjustments, the change in Kenya's foreign policy has simply been one of style, with Moi being less cautious and more personally involved in foreign affairs than Kenyatta.

If Kenya's smooth transition from Kenyatta to Moi surprised those that had expected dramatic change, Tanzania may even have more surprises in store in the event of Nyerere relinquishing his position. This is because, unlike Kenya, where Kenyatta had for all practical purposes delegated foreign affairs to the foreign minister and other trusted colleagues, in Tanzania, Nyerere has clearly dominated foreign relations. Depending on who succeeds Nyerere, the change may not be merely one of style alone but one of substance as well. A leader who does not share Nyerere's socialist philosophy and his dedication to principles, may want to minimise ties with socialist countries, encourage closer links with the Western major powers, and in general pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy. On the other hand, if Nyerere's successor is to the left of Nyerere in his preference for socialism, he may want to go further than Nyerere in reducing links with Western capitalist states and institutions and in expanding and intensifying links with socialist states. It is also conceivable that Nyerere's successor may be Nyerere's own chosen 'heir', very much in the style of Senghor's successor in Senegal, and hence he would
maintain continuity with the foreign policy course already set by Mwalimu.

However, regardless of who takes over, in Tanzania it is quite unlikely that fundamental changes in the basic foreign policy orientation would occur, at least in the short-term, given the external and internal constraints, already discussed. In the meantime, Nyerere does not seem to be in a hurry to relinquish his leadership position, in spite of the fact that he has announced on several occasions his intention to step down. He seems to have convinced himself that Tanzania's problems cannot be resolved without him at the helm; hence his decision to stay on until those problems, at least the major ones, are resolved. In his words: "Changing the ship's captain is not a bad thing to do, but if that change is not essential, it is not bad either to postpone it until the storm has passed".79

To sum up then, the foreign policies of Kenya and Tanzania will most likely continue to be greatly influenced, at least at the global level of interaction, by internal underdevelopment, and external dependence, although the leadership will continue to play an important if secondary role in defining the strategies to be employed and the styles to be adapted in foreign policy behaviour.
REFERENCES

1. Most of these studies are either cited in the preface itself or appear as part of the Bibliography to this thesis.

2. See, the section on "Macro Studies" in this Prefatory review.

3. Same as footnote 1, above.


9. For a good concise discussion of this latter type of dependency, see, T.M. Shaw, "Beyond Neo-colonialism: Varieties of Corporatism in Africa", Centre for African Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1 October 1981.


16. Ibid., p. xvii.


21. Ibid., p. xvii.


24. Ibid., p. 213.


26. See note 22.


28. Ibid., pp. 3-5.


32. Okumu, "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy", p. 266.
33. Ibid.
35. See note 40.
36. Ibid., p. 33.
37. Ibid., p. 51.
38. Ibid.
40. The two articles referred to here are Howell, "The Analysis of Kenya's foreign policy" and Okumu, "Some Thoughts on Kenya's foreign policy". The deficiencies of these have already been explained in the text.
43. Like most states in Africa, Kenya and Tanzania have had their share of the instabilities that characterise the continent's politics. Each of them has had to deal with an army mutiny and, at various times, with student and labour unrest and protest marches.
Anti-establishment elements have also been assassinated, imprisoned or barred from active political participation. However, what distinguishes Kenya and Tanzania from most African countries is the ingenious ability of their respective leaders to weather the storms of political crises and to restore "peace and stability" before things get out of hand. It is indeed a great mark of statesmanship and ability to deal with opponents that the first generation of senior post-independence leaders have managed to remain in office so long. Kenyatta, who died in August 1978 from old age, was for all practical purposes Kenya's "life president". Although Nyerere has often expressed his intention to retire after each of his current terms in office, he has become almost an institution in his own right; so much so that, for many observers, it is difficult to imagine a socialist Tanzania without Nyerere's socialist philosophy guiding it.
1. In the literature on "small states", no satisfactory definition of "small" has yet been agreed upon. In fact, some authors such as Annette Baker Fox and David Vital have avoided the problem of definition altogether. This problem seems to revolve around the question of "size" which is so complex and vague that it easily lends itself to different interpretations. However, the attempts that have been made to define "small state" have tended to concentrate on distinguishing "small" from "greater" (states in "power" terms). Clearly such a definition would need to take into account the psychological as well as the material distinction between "great" and "small" powers, although most definitions tend to emphasize the latter.


3. While there are some exceptions, the average size of all African states is about 27,000 square miles, while the average population in 1972 was about 7 million. Of the 41 independent African states in 1972, only one had a population of over 50 million; 8 had a population of over 10 million, 10 had about 4 million; and 15 had a population of under 2 million.

4. Needless to say that there are numerous definitions of foreign policy in existence. Foreign policy in this study is treated as a dependent variable — the result of an interplay of internal and external factors and forces, and their perception and interpretation by the decision-makers of the states involved. This study takes a broad definition that treats foreign policy as: 1) purposive actions of governments in pursuit of what is perceived as "national interest" and 2) adaptive behaviour, in the sense that it also involves adjustment to and/or coping with the salient issues and events of the external environment.


6. The name "Tanzania" came into being in 1964, following the political merger of mainland Tanganyika with the neighbouring island of Zanzibar. Except for quoted information, this study will employ the name "Tanzania" to refer only to the former "Tanganyika", since the analysis centres primarily on events and issues pertaining to the mainland. For any reference to relevant events taking place on the island, the name "Zanzibar" will be employed.

7. The phrase, "development of underdevelopment" summarised the view held by underdevelopment and dependency theorists that the social, economic and political conditions of underdevelopment prevailing throughout today's "third world" are the result of the same world historical process in which the "first world" became "developed".


11. The assumption here is that the linkage between "international" and "domestic" politics of the two states is central to the analysis of the impact of dependence and underdevelopment on their foreign policies. Thus it is important for example to examine and compare the respective leadership (internal factor) strategies of utilising the policy options available to them given the fundamental subordination of their economies to the international capitalist one (external factor).

12. Complementarity notwithstanding, the dependency approach is treated here as the central organising framework of this study. Thus, while the adaptation approach assists in tightening the theoretical framework, its importance to the thrust of the overall thesis is supportive or secondary rather than central.

13. The literature on non-alignment is voluminous and covers various aspects of this subject, both as a movement and as a foreign policy orientation. Some of the more recent and best pieces include: A.J.W. Singhem (ed.) The Non-aligned Movement in World Politics (Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1977), B. Korany, Afro-Asian Non-alignment in the Contemporary International System: A Pre-theory (Geneva:


15. The five criteria were: 1) Pursuit of an independent, non-committed foreign policy, 2) Support of national liberation movements, 3) Not be a member of multilateral or 4) bilateral military pact in the context of East-West struggle and 5) not grant military bases to foreign powers. See G.M. Jansen, Non-alignment and the Afro-Asian States. (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 285-286.

16. For detailed and analytical accounts of this economic emphasis of non-alignment, see for example, Singham, Non-aligned Movement in World Politics and Korany, Afro-Asian Non-alignment in the Contemporary International System.


21. Ibid.


25. Ibid.

27. The phenomenon discussed under the rubric of dependency theory in the Latin American context has usually been called until recently, neo-colonialism with reference to Africa.


31. The concept of "development" is as elusive as that of "underdevelopment". Traditionally, economic development has been equated with growth (i.e. development as increasing capacity); more recently, with the emergence of dependency and neo-marxist theories, distribution has been identified as an equally important aspect of economic development (i.e. development as increasing equality for some combination of capacity and equality). Thus the "failure to develop" may mean the mere lack of growth for some countries; for others it means distorted growth such that GDP increases rapidly but the increase is shared by only a small percentage of the population. The latter phenomenon has been termed "dependent development" by dependency theorists.


38. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.


44. Langdon has employed this term in all of his studies on Kenya's political economy, 'two of which are cited under footnote 43. According to him, state-MNC symbiosis implies a relationship whereby the African state enters into close partnerships (institutional and personal) with MNC subsidiaries, marked on the one side by Africanisation of MNC executive levels and sharing of gains from corruption and, on the other side, by subsidiaries' ability to avoid
state constraints and to persuade government to shape out multinational market privileges, see, Godfrey and Langdon, "Partners in Underdevelopment", p. 49.


48. The few attempts that have been made to relate dependency and underdevelopment to African foreign policies — McGowan and Gottwald, "Small State Foreign Policies", Okumu, "The Place of African States in Internal Relations" and Gitelson, "Policy Options for Small States", all fall short of being comprehensive studies of this relationship: Anglin's and Shaw's, Zambia's Foreign Policy, though comprehensive, employs the dependency approach as just one among several other techniques utilised to analyse Zambia's foreign policy.


50. By "essential structures" Rosenau means "Those interaction patterns that constitute the basic political, economic and social life of a national society".

51. By "acceptable limits" Rosenau means "Those points on a continuum between which the fluctuations in essential structures do not prevent the society from maintaining its basic patterns or altering these patterns through its own choices and procedures.


53. Ibid., p. 3.


55. McGowan and Gottwald, "Small State Foreign Policies".

56. Shaw, "African States and International Stratification".
57. Most scholars of Tanzania's foreign policy have recognised the role of President Nyerere in shaping the development and foreign policies of Tanzania. For further details, see Chapter 2, section entitled, "Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania".


59. This shift in policy is examined and analysed in Chapters three and four.

60. See Chapters four, five and six for details.

61. Rosenau, Adaptation of National Societies, p. 4.


63. Kenyatta was the executive President of Kenya from 1964 to August 1978 when he died. It is still too early to make a critical analysis of Kenyatta's successor, President Moi. Thus, this study will largely concern itself with Kenyatta's leadership (role, style, and personality) up to August 1978.


70. Bretton, "Political Science Field Research in Africa", p. 419.

71. Ibid., p. 430.
CHAPTER 2

1. 'Uhuru' is a Swahili word widely used in East Africa to refer to freedom and/or independence, whether real or apparent.

2. Growth of cash crops by African peasant farmers existed in Tanzania from the beginning of the colonial period while it was effectively barred in Kenya until after the World War. However, even in pre-World War II Tanzania, European plantation agriculture was always given priority over the African one.


6. Ibid., p. 25.


9. Rubber was only of strategic importance to Germany. After the German defeat in the first World War and its subsequent relinquishing of its East African colony (Tanzania) the rubber market in Germany collapsed.

10. This and other information on the pre-1914 period in Tanzania, is derived primarily from Illiffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule.


16. The latter agreement was reached in 1927, when a full customs union was established between the three East African states.


Since 1967 however, Tanzania has made significant progress in its educational development. For example, 95% of all school-age children have now begun receiving a minimum of seven years of education. Furthermore, Tanzania had by 1978 surpassed Kenya in its adult literacy rate, which had risen from a low of 33% in 1967 to a high of 73% in 1978. By comparison, Kenya's adult literacy was only 40%; see, New African, February 1981, p. 30.


30. African farmers around Kilimanjaro engaged mainly in coffee production, while those around Lake Victoria engaged in cotton production (Mwanza) and coffee production (Bukoba).

31. The term 'Kulak' is derived from Russian revolutionary literature and is widely used in Tanzanian social science to refer to those farmers who have transcended a purely peasant status by acquiring above average amounts of land and who are 'rich' enough to afford to employ labour. However, they cannot be called full capitalist farmers for their enterprises are not large and they usually engage in agricultural labour themselves rather than solely managing the labour of others.
32. In both Kenya and Tanzania, the wage rates of African workers ranged between 10-60 shillings per month, depending on the category of the workers -- skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, and whether the worker was employed in the rural or urban areas. These low wages were hardly enough to support the worker himself, let alone his family.


34. This term, "African petty bourgeoisie" is a misnomer as its economic base is somewhat different from that of its West European Counterpart. However, there are enough parallels (in behaviour if not in ownership) between the African and the European petty bourgeoisies to justify its use in the African context.


37. Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in Tanzania, pp. 29-30.

38. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, p. 177.


40. Ibid., p. 31.


43. These early nationalists included: Senior Chiefs Koinange and Njonjo and later Harry Thuku, who was the last of this first generation of Kikuyu nationalists.

44. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, p. 53.

45. Besides the economic motive, other factors behind colonialism include: i) geo-political and strategic considerations (especially for Britain), ii) the politics of grandeur (especially for France), iii) political economy of space (especially for Germany), and iv) playing off European rivalries away from Europe itself and in the 'colonial reservoirs.' For recent literature on this topic, see for example,

47. European monopoly has already been discussed earlier in this chapter. It should however be pointed out here that although Europeans were not as dominant in Tanzania as they were in Kenya, they were in varying degrees dominant over Africans in both countries.


51. The reason given for banning the Kikuyu Central Association (K.C.A.) was that it was a subversive organisation.

52. The first African member of the colonial legislative council was a Kikuyu by the name of Eliud Mathu.


54. Ibid.

Among the new generation of leaders that emerged in the late 1950s were men like the late Tom Mboya, a young dynamic Luo with a Nairobi Trade Union base who became Secretary General of K.F.L.; the older and more traditional but yet relatively 'radical' Lup, Oginga Odinga; Daniel Arap Moi, Kalenjin -- born school teacher who rose to be vice-president in Kenyatta's government and is currently Kenya's president; and the late Ronald Ngala from the coast province who became leader of the first opposition party -- K.A.D.U. -- and after its demise became a cabinet minister in the K.A.N.U. government. This group was soon joined by a new more educated group of predominantly Kikuyu University graduates, such Mwai Kibaki (London School of Economics) and Gikonyo Kiano (Syracuse University).

"Squatters" were (and still are) people living on and cultivating land that does not belong to them. In some cases they were the original inhabitants of the land which had been appropriated by the colonial administration for European settler farming. Having been deprived of their land, they were converted into resident wage labour by the white settlers in return for a portion of land, leased from the settler employer.


65. The plan became identified with its author. See above footnote for full title.


68. Wasserman, Politics of Decolonisation, p. 42.

69. Rana, "Class Formation and Social Conflict", p. 35.


71. Rana, "Class Formation and Social Conflict", p. 36.

72. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, p. 54.


74. The Lyttleton Constitution, named after the then colonial Secretary of State — Oliver Lyttleton, established multiracial participation in the Kenyan Legislative Council, thus allowing for African representation for the first time in Kenya's colonial history.

75. Sixteen ethnic based associations were formed. These included, Kalenjin Political Alliance, Abaluhya People's Party and Somali United Front, among others.

76. The two parties, K.A.D.U. and K.A.N.U. that initially emerged at formal independence reflect these cleavages.


78. Bruce McKenzie, was until his retirement in 1974, the only white member of Kenyatta’s cabinet. He had throughout the first decade (1963-1973) served as Minister of Agriculture. A former settler farmer with class ties both to the African petty bourgeoisie and to international capital, he maintained close ties with the Kenyatta regime until his death in 1976.


82. See, Coulson, “A Simplified Political Economy of Tanzania”, p. 27.


84. Ibid.

85. The paper was entitled Review of Land Tenure Policy, Government Paper No. 6 of 1958.


87. For more details on this point of view, see I.G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 50-51.


89. Ibid., p. 59.


92. See for example, Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, Chapters 7 and 8.


98. J. Kenyatta, Suffering without Bitterness. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968). Although Kenyatta is supposedly the author of this book, the narration through the main part is in the third person, which suggests that it was authored by someone other than Kenyatta.


100. Kenyatta died of a heart attack in August 1978. He is believed to have been somewhere between 85-90 years old. But no one (including himself) knew his exact age as birth records and certificates did not exist when he was born. Kenyatta had been Kenya's President since formal independence in December 1963. He was succeeded by Daniel Arap Moi who was until then Kenya's Vice-President.
101. This was particularly the case during his sojourn in England. He was one of the few African nationalists (Nkrumah, Azikiwe, etc.) who attended the Fifth Panafriean Conference held in Manchester in 1945.


104. Tom Mboya was assassinated on a Nairobi street in July 1969. He had been very vocal on trade union and world affairs. At the time of his assassination he was widely considered to be the most able member of Kenyatta's Cabinet and hence the man best qualified to be Mzee's successor -- a factor that may have been, at least in part, the motive behind his assassination. See for example, J. Murray, "Succession Prospects in Kenya", Africa Report, New York, November 1968, pp. 44-48.

105. This was particularly the case during the period (1974-1979) when Mbusa Waiyaki was Kenya's foreign minister. He gave his own personal mark to Kenya's foreign policy and a certain amount of dynamism that was previously lacking. One Kenyan political scientist has accurately described him as "the ablest and most articulate foreign minister the country has had so far" (see, The Guardian, London, June 11, 1979, p. 13).


109. Ibid.

110. See for example, Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness, passim, and Memehes, p. 108.

111. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 3.

112. The gradual and progressive transformation of Nyerere's political thought is apparent from his speeches and writings recorded in several volumes: Freedom and Unity, Freedom and Socialism. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966a); Digest: Essays on Socialism. (Dar-es-Salam: Oxford University Press, 1966a) and Freedom and Development (Dar-es-Salam: Oxford University Press, 1973). See also his, "Destroying
LEAF 557 OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING.


116. Ibid., p. 7.

117. Ibid., p. 2.

118. Nnoli, Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania, p. 38.


126. Mama Ngina was the fourth and the youngest of Kenyatta's wives. She was also the first lady.


For example, it asserts that "political equality, social justice and human dignity will not be sacrificed to achieve more materials ends more quickly", and then continues to say that welfare services will be provided and increased only when it can be done without undue interference in private consumption of wealth.


134. Ibid., p. 21.


140. The Reporter (Nairobi), 11 December 1965.


143. Hopkins, Political Roles in a New State, p. 146.

144. See for example, Smith, Nyerere of Tanzania, pp. 259-272 and Hopkins, Political Roles in a New State, p. 148.

145. See for example, "What Caused Mutei's Resignation?", Sunday Standard (Nairobi) 11 November 1979, p. 21.

146. Nyerere's immediate, closest political associates and friends are said to include the following: Simon Mbilinyi, Economic Adviser; Reginald Green seconded to the treasury from the Institute for Development Studies at Sussex; and Joan Wicken, English-born Personal Secretary to the President.

147. "What caused Mutei's resignation".

131. For example, it asserts that "political equality, social justice and human dignity will not be sacrificed to achieve more material ends more quickly", and then continues to say that welfare services will be provided and increased only when it can be done without undue interference in private consumption of wealth.


134. Ibid., p. 21.


140. The Reporter (Nairobi), 11 December 1965.


143. Hopkins, Political Roles in a New State, p. 146.

144. See for example, Smith, Nyere of Tanzania, pp. 259-272 and Hopkins, Political Roles in a New State, p. 148.

145. See for example, "What Caused Mutei's Resignation?", Sunday Standard (Nairobi) 11 November 1979, p. 21.

146. Nyere's immediate, closest political associates and friends are said to include the following: Simon Mbilinyi, Economic Adviser; Reginald Green seconded to the treasury from the Institute for Development Studies at Sussex; and Joan Wicken, English-born personal secretary to the President.

147. The ex-detainee interviewed — Abdurrahman M. Babu — who was until 1971 the minister for Economic Affairs and Development planning in Tanzania, was highly critical of the direction Tanzania was taking. The official reason for his detention was that he was part of the assassination plot against Karume.
148. "What caused Mutei's resignation".


150. Ibid.


155. Ibid.


158. Ibid.

159. For more details on Mboya's and Odinga's political views and inclinations, see their writings: T. Mboya, Freedom and After (London: Andre-Deutsch, 1963) and The Challenge of Nationhood (New York: Praeger, 1970), and O. Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru.


163. The first opposition party — K.A.D.U. — lasted for only a year (1963-1964) while the second one lasted just about three years (1966-1969). The latter party — K.F.U. — banned in 1969, was the last opposition party in Kenya.

164. See for example, "Kanu is Active only Around Election Time", Daily Nation (Nairobi) 28 June 1978.


See for example, "The Third World Dilemma: Can a State Press be Free?", pp. 32-33.


A recent example is the Kenya government's arrest of the top management of the Nation Group of Newspapers. For more details, see *The Weekly Review*, 29 May 1981, p. 34.

A hidden threat was apparent from the statement made by the minister of information and broadcasting, particularly when he quipped, "We are closely watching their (The Standard journalists) performance and cannot allow them to overdramatise on rumours, speculations or what they call investigative journalism" (see *The Standard*, 27 May 1975).

More frequent and longer closures of the University of Nairobi following student demonstrations have become apparent since Moi took over from Kenyatta. For example between 1979-1981 the University has been closed at least four times while in session, for an average of 2 months each time! Furthermore, harassment of critical members of the teaching staff at the university has significantly increased over the last few years.

For example the first seven Tanzanians that were appointed to diplomatic positions were among the very few University graduates that Tanzania had at independence — when the total output of indigenous Tanzanians graduating from the University College in East Africa — Makerere University College, Uganda and the Royal College, Nairobi — was an average of 15 annually.


Nnoli, *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania*, p. 35.

Kirk-Greene, "Diplomacy and Diplomats", p. 293.
CHAPTER 3


3. On the debate of Post-Colonial state in Africa, see the literature cited in Chapter two, footnote 61.


6. I have used the term "African Petty Bourgeoisie" here in the broad sense which is employed by Shivji, to refer to three socially but not necessarily homogenous fractions to be found in most African countries, at independence:

   i) Upper layer -- intellectuals, teachers, higher civil servants, prosperous traders, farmers, professionals, higher military and police officers
   
   ii) Middle layer -- middle government salariat, junior clerks, soldiers, etc.

   iii) Lower layer -- shopkeepers, lower salariat in the services sector, and generally lowest grades of the salariat.

   Perhaps the main unifying features of these social groups is that they mostly held urban-based occupations and had acquired a certain amount of colonial education. For more details, see, Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, pp. 48-50.
7. As I explained in Chapter 2, class formation was less advanced in Tanzania than Kenya, due to differences in the degree of colonial capitalist penetration in the two states. Thus, in Kenya, the various fractions of the African petty bourgeoisie had at independence acquired a considerable stake in the colonial political economy and hence were relatively strong as a class and as fractions with different accumulation bases. Consequently, at independence in Kenya, there were at least two major fractions of the African petty bourgeoisie seeking to gain access to state control and by extension, the political economy. In Tanzania on the other hand the African petty bourgeoisie had not as yet developed strong roots in the colonial political economy and hence was relatively weaker than its Kenyan counterpart. As a result, the bureaucratic fraction that came to possess the instruments of state at independence were, unlike the Kenyan Compradors, hardly challenged by the other fractions and hence was able to consolidate its power position with more ease than its Kenyan counterpart.

8. See, I.G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 63-80. The present study employs the term 'Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie' as Shivji has done to refer to the ruling (bureaucrats and politicians) class in Tanzania.


20. However, Nyerere took various measures to revise the European salary structure to make it consonant with the general economic circumstances of the country. The earliest of these efforts was the A.L. Adu Salaries Commission, which unfortunately rejected any cut in the higher salary scales. The next attempt was the salary cuts that accompanied the Arusha Declaration.


32. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, p. 79.


36. Mittleman, Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism, p. 240.


38. Ibid.


42. See, Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After, p. 2.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

45. Although most of the scholars quoted in Footnote 33 are in varying degrees critical of Nyerere's socialist strategy, the most critical are perhaps Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, Von-Freyhold "The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version", and Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in Tanzania.


55. Ibid., p. 216.

56. These critics have already been referred to in footnotes 33 and 45.


60. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, p. 159.

61. For the role of multinational corporations in Africa, see for example, C. Widstrand (ed.), *Multinational Firms in Africa* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1975).


65. Ibid., p. 129.


72. See for example, Payer, *The Debt Trap* and Hayter, *Aid as Imperialism*.

73. Payer, *The Debt Trap*, pp. ix-x.


78. Ibid.


83. Ibid., p. 39.

84. Tandon, "The Food Question in East Africa".


89. See, "Why Third World Debtors Hate the I.M.F.", Sunday Nation, (Nairobi), 20 July 1980, p. 28.

90. Ibid.


93. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

94. The term 'fraction' is used here to distinguish between various social groups or forces in the bourgeoisie seeking hegemony.

95. N. Swainson, in a study appropriately titled "Against the Notion of a Comprador Class", criticises the concept 'Comprador', on the grounds that such a notion places too much emphasis on external dependence of the African 'bourgeoisie', whom she regards as an independent national class. My study, as already pointed out, does not share Swainson's view in this respect.


98. Ibid., p. 132.

99. The literature that covers this topic is cited in Chapter 2, footnote 76.


101. These pieces of legislation included the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act of 1964 and the Trade Disputes Act of 1965. These two acts gave the government extensive powers to control strike action.


105. Ibid., p. 300.


R. Kaplinsky, "Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery -- The Kenyan Case Re-examined".


118. See, for example, S. Langdon, "Industrial Dependence and Export Manufacturing in Kenya", Conference on Alternative Futures for Africa, Dalhousie University, Halifax, May 1981, and "Industry and Capitalism in Kenya."


121. The Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (I.C.D.C.), like Tanzania's National Development Corporation (N.D.C.), is the government's main parastatal instrument for 'restructuring' the economy to give Africans more access to economic opportunities and benefits, particularly those in competition with Asian businessmen. In recent years, I.C.D.C. partnerships with new and old multinational firms have given it access to a certain amount of surplus which is appropriated by the state.

122. For instance, whereas the starting salary of a Senior African manager in a foreign company in Nairobi may be up to £5,500 per annum, the starting salary of a University of Nairobi Lecturer adds up to an average of £1,800 per annum.


126. For more details, see The Sunday Times, (London), September 29, 1974.

127. Ibid.

128. See for example, Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya.
129. Ibid., pp. 135-146.

130. A report that was published by Africa, (London), No 112, December 1980 stated that Kenya's import substitution industry had grown, by 1980, to become the second most important sector (after agriculture) in the economy, with an annual growth rate of 11.3%, much higher than the annual target of 10.2%, envisaged in the 1974-78 Development plan.


132. Ibid., p. 15.


135. Inguna, "Industrial Dependence And Export Manufacturing in Kenya".

136. Ibid., p. 11.

137. Ibid., p. 66.

138. Ibid., p. 68.

139. The fall in coffee revenues resulted in the black marketeering and smuggling to neighbouring countries of food crops such as maize, wheat and rice in search of better prices than the government offered. This has been another (though marginal) cause of food shortages within the country.

140. The rules on air and sea travel were announced by the Vice President and Minister of Finance, Mwai Kibaki at the end of 1978 and came into effect on January 2, 1979. They require that any resident of Kenya leaving the country by air or sea must pay a fee of Sh. 2,000 or Sh. 1,000 respectively. The large size of this fee was intended to discourage travelling abroad, as well as to earn the government some revenue.

141. Among his overseas trips in 1980, President Moi visited West Germany, Britain, the United States and China. These visits coincided with an acute food shortage that had reached crisis proportions by the time the President left. Moi's visit to the United States was primarily to negotiate for maize and wheat, which he received, in return for offering naval "facilities" in Mombasa.

143. Ibid., p. 123.

144. For further details on Kenya -- U.S./U.K. military links, see sections in Chapters 4 and 5 that examine Kenya's foreign relations with the two countries.

145. Since the end of the 1976-77 coffee "boom" Kenya's foreign exchange reserves have been declining to the point where, at the beginning of 1979, they were said to have been down to only two months' worth of imports. See, Weekly Review, January 12, 1979, p. 21.

146. See, Standard and Daily Nation, 3 February, 1981:


CHAPTER 4

1. See President Nyerere's article, "South Africa or Us" in The Observer (London), 12 March 1961.


3. See President Nyerere's speech in the National Assembly, 30 November 1961.


5. Belbase was a Belgian-built free port facility in Dar-es-Salaam, granted by the British for an annual rental and used for the movement of goods to and from Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Congo.


8. See President Nyerere's address to the U.N. General Assembly, 14 December 1961.


14. Nnoli, Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania, p. 11.

15. See *Tanganyika Standard* (Dar-es-Salaam), 21 January 1964, p. 1. At the time of the mutiny the army still was, as at independence, mainly officered by personnel seconded from Britain. Only 40% of the 63 commissioned officers above the rank of warrant officer were Tanzanian, and no Tanzanian held a rank higher than that of captain. In the lowest ranks the pay for Tanzanian soldiers was Tsh 105 ($15) a month. The latter were now demanding that i) this pay be increased from Tsh 105 to Tsh 260 ($37) a month plus rations and ii) all expatriate officers be removed from the Tanganyika Rifles.


19. The military assistance offer was made by the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth affairs, Duncan Sandys during a visit to Tanzania in March 1964. See *Tanzania Government Press Release* (T.G.P.R.), March 7, 1964.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. The request for Chinese military assistance was made at the beginning of Oscar Kambona's visit to China in June 1964 and agreement was concluded by the end of the visit which lasted from 9 to 18 June 1964. The agreement was not made public until the end of August 1964.


27. Ibid.


31. Indeed the Zanzibari premier -- Aboud Karume -- had publicly asserted, less than two weeks after the merger, that "the deep-rooted friendship between Zanzibar and East Germany was on a firm basis that nobody could destroy", thus dispelling any doubt that Nyerere or any one else had about how strongly Zanzibaris cherished East German friendship. See Tanganyika Standard, 7 May 1964, p. 1.

32. See, for example, Niblock, "Aid and Foreign Policy in Tanzania", pp. 215-262.

33. The Hallstein Doctrine was applied to countries which offered diplomatic recognition to East Germany as a separate state. It called for economic and other measures by West Germany against such countries; sometimes even involving a severing of diplomatic links.

34. Mnoli, *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania*, p. 115.


36. President Nyerere declined to provide the 'evidence' on the grounds that revealing the source of the information would be prejudicial to Tanzania's security arrangements.


39. Ibid., 14 February 1965.

40. President Nyerere, for example, in a press conference held on 31 August 1964, made clear his belief that the motivation of Tshombe's appointment as Prime Minister came from outside and not from within the Congo; see Tanganyika Standard, 1 September 1964.

41. It was due to this opposition that the Congolese Prime Minister was not permitted to attend the O.A.U. summit held at Cairo in July 1964.
42. See, for example, *The Standard*, 26 November 1964, 10 December 1964 and 5 March 1965.


44. See President Nyerere's Speech to the National Assembly on 14 December 1965, in *Tanzania Parliamentary Debates*, 2nd session, 2nd meeting, cols. 84-98.

45. The approval was expressed in *T.G.P.R.*, 14 December 1965.

46. The others who honoured the O.A.U. resolution were: Algeria, Congo Brazzaville, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and the Sudan.

47. President Nyerere's Speech to the National Assembly, 14 December 1965, op.cit.


50. In the words of a World Bank Mission "urgent need for investments in other parts of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Tanganyika and in other sectors of the economy raise doubts about the feasibility of concentrating such a large amount of money on a single project at this time". Quoted in, Charles Elliott (ed.), *Economic Development of Zambia* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971), p. 367. The Mission suggested improved roads as an alternative to the rail link.

51. This offer was made during Nyerere's first visit to China in February 1965. It was mentioned in *The Standard*, 14 July 1970.


54. The normally close relations between Tanzania and Zambia underwent a sharp change in 1978 for a number of reasons; the most important being arguments over the transport of Zambia's freight through the port of Dar-es-Salaam on Tazara and Zambia's decision to reopen its Southern border with the then white-ruled Zimbabwe. Nyerere was also strongly opposed to the role played by Kaunda, as well as by the Nigerians, in arranging a meeting between Joshua Nkomo and Ian Smith. Another source of contention was Zambia's decision to expel 1,000 Tanzanians as part of an operation to purge the country of smugglers, criminals and illegal workers. For more details, see sections on Zambia and United Republic of Tanzania in Colin Legum ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1978-1979, Volume II (London: Rex Colling, 1979), pp. B406 and B457-459.


57. Ibid.


60. In the event of Tanzania's recognition of Biafra, the Nigerian Federal government withdrew these personnel, although the pro-Biafran members of the technical assistance team opted to continue their services in Tanzania, since it was safer than going back to Nigeria.

61. See, for example, "Tanzania pays high price -- gladly -- to oust Amin", The Christian Science Monitor (New York), 3 April 1979.


63. Tanzania refused to accept the proposed Commonwealth Peace Mission to Vietnam on the grounds that it was neither practical nor genuine. See "Principles and Development", in Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 203.

64. Ibid.

65. See President Nyerere's Republic Day Speech on 9 December 1964.

66. This view was expressed in an editorial entitled "Anglo-Soviet Collusion" which appeared in The Nationalist, 16 March 1964, p. 4.
In April 1964 Nyerere presented a memorandum to the East and Central African Heads of State meeting in Nairobi in which he proposed a strategy whereby all avenues of influence could be used to persuade the British government, firstly, to commit itself to the principle of "No Independence Before Majority African Rule" (N.I.B.M.A.R.), and, secondly, to extend and tighten sanctions on the minority regime.

See the speech made by Tanzania delegate to the U.N. General Assembly, 20th Session, 1st Committee, 1407, 8 December 1965.

The coup plot charge was based on three documents which had been handed over to the Tanzanian Ambassador in the Congo, who subsequently passed them on to President Nyerere. For further details on this incident see Tanganyika Standard, 17 November 1964, p. 1.


George T. Yu, for example, repeatedly calls Tanzania a "partial ally" of China in all his writings pertaining to Tanzania and China.

Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 34.


This conclusion is based on my own assessment of Sino-Tanzanian relations. Scholars who have done extensive work on Tanzania's foreign relations in general and/or Sino-Tanzania relations in particular corroborate this assessment. See, for example, Martin Bailey "Tanzania and China", African Affairs, vol. 74, no. 294, January 1975, p. 50, Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania, p. 166 and Yu, China's Africa Policy, passim.

The Times, 18 October 1972.


The East African Community, which came into being in 1967, was throughout its existence beset with problems which reflected its structural weakness and its penetration by international capitalism. Kenya, as the centre within East Africa, tended to hold a dominant
economic position and hence to benefit more from the community at the expense of its two neighbours. In one sense, then, the fissures that eventually led to the demise of the Community were caused primarily by its neighbours' resentment of Kenya's dominant position. There were, of course, other related reasons such as ideological differences (between Kenya and Tanzania) and personality differences (between Nyerere of Tanzania and Idi Amin of Uganda).


80. As has repeatedly been stated in the thesis, this early post independence period in Kenya (and in Tanzania as well) coincided with the height of the cold war. In Kenya, the West in general, and the British and the Americans in particular, seem to have managed (in their bipolar competition with the Eastern bloc) to sell the idea to the majority of Kenyan politicians that there was something inherently hideous and evil about "communism" and, by implication, the Eastern bloc countries. It is in this context that Oginga Odinga, who made no secret about his association with the Soviets and the Chinese, was viewed as an agent of 'evil' ('communism') and a threat to many politicians who were paranoid about the prospects of a communist takeover of the incumbent government. For further insights into the "communist" paranoia that characterised this period, see Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya: 1963-1968 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970), passim; William Attwood, The Red and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper & Row; 1965), pp. 237-270 and Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (London: Heinemann, 1969), passim.

81. Joseph Murumbi, though ideologically leaning heavily in Odinga's direction, lacked a political base (he is half-Masai and half-Gowan); hence he represented no direct threat to the Kenyatta government unlike Odinga.

82. Pio Gama Pinto was identified as a "communist" by the British even before the Mau Mau revolt and hence was one of those detained during the emergency. He held a specially elected seat in parliament and was active in labour-union affairs. His political assassination in February 1965 sent a tremor of fear through the government far exceeding that produced by the 1964 mutiny.


85. Attwood, The Reds and The Blacks, p. 263.

86. Ibid., pp. 263-264.

87. See Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, p. 179. It would seem that relations between Nyerere and Kambona (who had at one time been the Minister of External Affairs and Defence as well as the Secretary-General of T.A.N.U.) began to deteriorate in June 1967 when Kambopa was shifted from being Minister of Regional Administration to Minister of Local Government which, to him, was a demotion. Consequently he resigned on grounds of ill-health and shortly after defected to London. It later became public knowledge that Kambona was involved in an attempt to create an opposition group aimed at overthrowing the incumbent government.


89. See The Times (London), 7 March 1964.


92. Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have always been cordial because they share a common enemy: Somalia. One of the first treaties independent Kenya signed was a mutual defence agreement with Ethiopia specifying that if one were attacked by Somalia, the other would go to its aid. When "socialist encirclement" became a serious concern, relations between Kenya and Ethiopia grew not only closer but also provided the kind of atmosphere that enabled Kenya to sign a further defence treaty with Ethiopia.


95. See Tanganyika Standard, 6 May 1964.


98. See Kenya News Agency (Nairobi), 15 September 1964.

99. From its inception, the O.A.U. was split into two ideological camps which differed on two basic questions regarding African Unity: i) how quickly and in what form a pan-African union should be established and ii) whether an African High Command should be set up. Depending on approach to these questions, African states grouped themselves into either "radical" pan-Africanists led by Nkrumah (of Ghana) or "gradualist" pan-Africanists, led by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (of Nigeria) with Nyerere (of Tanzania) supporting regional integration as a first step.


101. Most of the information provided here was obtained from Attwood's account in his The Reds and the Blacks, supplemented by scarce reports in the only major local daily written in English in Kenya at the time -- East African Standard. Most of the information disclosed by Attwood was of course regarded as "confidential" and hence was not disclosed to the Press at the time. Indeed, there seems to have been a deliberate intention to conceal information on the Congo to the point where the Kenya Union of Journalists publicly protested against the government's suppression "of news of the Stanleyville paratroop landing" (see East African Standard, 26 November 1964). Furthermore, to lend credence to Attwood's account, Kenya's Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, reacting to the publication of The Reds and the Blacks openly admitted that, "if I had then known that he proposed writing such a book, I should not have been free and frank in my official position when discussing questions with Mr. Attwood ..." (see East African Standard, 8 May 1967).

Hence, given the paucity of alternative information on this period and the fact that Attwood's "inside" account is largely accurate, this section has relied primarily on it, while keeping in mind the author's pro-American bias and his tendency to defend the U.S. role in the Congo.
102. The East African Standard, see footnote 101.

103. See Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, pp. 191-236.

104. Ibid., p. 195.

105. Ibid., p. 203. This incident was also reported by The East African Standard. According to the Standard the demonstration was organised by K.A.N.U. supporters to demonstrate against American and Belgian intervention in the Congo. It was difficult to verify whether Attwood's or the newspaper's version of this event is correct.


107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., p. 214.

109. Ibid., p. 224.

110. Ibid., p. 221.

111. Ibid., p. 226.

112. Ibid., p. 229.

113. Ibid., p. 219.

114. This suggestion was made when Attwood, in his capacity as U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, was presenting President Kenyatta on 14 December 1964 with a U.S.I.S. book on farming. He told Kenyatta that the reason he was presenting the book was "so that the next time I come to 'Gatundu' (Kenyatta's countryside residence) we will remember to talk about more important things like farming instead of the Congo." The Reds and the Blacks, p. 228.

115. Apparently Murumbi had, before the vote, asked the other foreign ministers for a delay to consult with Nairobi since he had no instructions on this resolution, but his request was voted down. And in the emotional wave that followed, he voted for the resolution to sever relations with the U.K. if the December ultimatum was not met.


120. **East African Standard, 21 May 1964, p. 1.**

121. The Lumumba Institute, dedicated to the late Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, located 10 miles from Nairobi, was supposed to provide courses and arrange seminars and discussions for workers and officials of K.A.N.U. It was officially opened by President Kenyatta on 12 December 1964.

122. **East African Standard, 12 July 1964, p. 1.**


127. **Kenya News Agency, 9 April 1965.**

128. **East African Standard, 12 April 1965.**


130. **East African Standard, 21 June 1965.**


133. **Uganda Argus (Kampala), 30 April 1965.**

134. The magazine was reported to have been published in Albania. The introduction to the first issue said that the magazine would be a handbook for tacticians of revolt and would emphasise the work of the growing Marxist parties of Africa and of guerrilla fighters throughout the continent (B.B.C. Monitoring Service, 7 April 1965).

135. **East African Standard, 1 May 1965.**


138. *Ibid.*, Odinga was reported to have said that there is nothing wrong with communism and that communism was just like food. See **East African Standard, 4 May 1965.**

139. **Tanganyika Standard, 31 May 1965.**
140. For example, it was the British and the Americans who funded the expensive Limuru party conference held in March 1966 which marked the final isolation from government of Oginga Odinga and other leftist leaving politicians.

141. Attwood, for example, discloses that the Kenyan security forces were dependent on information about communism from American and other western embassy sources in Nairobi:

＞The truth is that the Kenyan police had asked us to verify their suspicions that certain people were not what they pretended to be and we obligingly checked their names against our files. Other friendly embassies had probably rendered the same service. （The Reds and The Blacks, p. 268）

142. For literature on colonial education and its impact on post-colonial African elites, see the material cited in chapter 3, footnote 1.

143. See section on "Kenya and the U.S.S.R." in this chapter.


147. See Daily Nation (Nairobi), 23 August 1968.


149. Ali Mazrui, for example, holds the view that Kenya has actually gone through a "structural revolution unaccompanied by desertion of the system" — whatever that means! See his "The Different Concepts of Revolution in East Africa", The African Review, vol. 1, no. 4, April 1972, pp. 28-51.


152. Ibid., 5 September 1964.

153. Ibid., 9 and 10 September 1964.


156. For further details on the March 1966 Limuru Conference see Gertzol, Politics of independent Kenya, pp. 70-72 and Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, pp. 297-300. Odinga describes it as taking "the pattern of a closely-stage-managed American-type political convention. The delegates were accommodated in hotels, lavishly entertained and were driven in hired transport to the conference sessions -- before the conference K.A.N.U.'s bank account was overdrawn, yet someone paid these bills" (Not Yet Uhuru, p. 299).


163. See section on "Tanzania-Canada relations", in Chapter 5.
1. **Mwongozo** — a Swahili word meaning 'Guideline' — is the Swahili version of the 1971 policy document issued by the National Executive of Tanzania's T.A.N.U. (now C.C.M.). The English version of this policy document is entitled T.A.N.U. Guidelines on Guarding and Advancing the Revolution of Tanzania, And of Africa.

   *Mwongozo* reviews the progress made by Tanzania in its attempt to implement the 1967 Arusha Declaration which initiated the country's movement towards socialism and self-reliance. *Mwongozo* evaluates progress in terms of pinpointing obstacles encountered and provides guidelines for overcoming such obstacles. In particular, *Mwongozo* reveals Tanzania's fear of external threat to its security and hence the need to increase defence expenditures and military preparedness.

2. Thus, for example, whereas in 1973 Tanzania's defence expenditure was about $41 million, by 1979, it had escalated to $303 million.


4. Although the bilateral conflict between Kenya and Somalia in the 1970s did not reach a crisis point of the same magnitude as the 1963-1967 'Shifta' war, there continued to be periodical skirmishes on the border. Furthermore, attitudes of distrust and hostility did not alter much in the 1970s, since Somalia continued to lay claim to Kenya's North-Eastern province.

5. Despite their divergent social, economic and political approaches to 'development', Kenya and Tanzania had tolerated each other as members of the East African community. However, when the Community broke down in 1977, relations between them grew so bad that their common border was closed indefinitely.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.


16. See Ibid.


19. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 25.

22. After the fighting between Egypt and Israel broke out on 6 October 1973, the following African countries broke diplomatic relations with Israel in the following order: Rwanda, Dahomey, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, Gambia, Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Botswana.

Before the war broke out, Uganda, Chad and the Congo Republic had broken relations with Israel in 1972, followed in early 1973 by Niger, Mali and Burundi and on 4 October 1973 by Zaire. Malawi and Swaziland never severed diplomatic relations with Israel.


32. Ibid., p. C29.

33. See Nationalist (Dar-es-Salaam), 24 February 1971.


35. The category of "private property" that was nationalised included farms, offices and houses rented out by their foreign owners.
36. The argument for not compensating property more than twelve years old was that the initial investment to build the property would have been recovered within the period; hence no further compensation was necessary.

37. For more details on this issue, see, the *Guardian*, 5 December 1974 and *Observer* (London), 20 January 1972.

38. See *Observer*, 20 January 1972.


40. Ibid.


43. For press coverage of this visit, see, for example, *The Weekly Review*, 24 November 1975, p. 3 and *The Financial Times* (London), 18 November 1975.


49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.


52. Ibid.


54. See *Guardian*, 10 February 1977.


36. The argument for not compensating property more than twelve years old was that the initial investment to build the property would have been recovered within the period; hence no further compensation was necessary.

37. For more details on this issue, see, the Guardian, 5 December 1974 and Observer (London), 20 January 1972.


40. Ibid.


43. For press coverage of this visit, see, for example, The Weekly Review, 24 November 1975, p. 3 and the Financial Times (London), 18 November 1975.


48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.


51. Ibid.


53. See Guardian, 10 February 1977:


60. See Daily Nation (Nairobi), 31 May 1975.


64. See Daily Nation, 12 June 1978.


69. See Washington Post, 10 January 1979.

70. Ibid.


72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

75. For more details on the West-East German rapprochement, see F. Ansprenger, "Germanies' Year in Africa" in ACR, Vol. 5, 1972-1973, pp. A71-A76.

76. Ibid., A71.


78. In 1973, for example, West Germany was the third largest source of bilateral economic aid (after Sweden and Canada).

79. The largest African recipient of West German aid in 1979 was Egypt.


85. "Statement by Hon. Israel Elinewinga, M.P.; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Tanzania Delegation to the 26th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 4 October 1971", mimeo, p. 5.

86. For more details, see, Guardian, 20 August 1977 and The Times, 19 August 1977.

87. Ibid.


90. Ibid.


94. See Macleans (Toronto), 18 October 1976.


97. Ibid.


100. Ibid.


104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.


107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.


110. See, Ngweno's Interview with President Nyerere "I find it extremely difficult to be frightened of the Soviet Union" in The Weekly Review, 13 February 1976.


112. See African Perspectives, no. 1, September-October 1977, p. 18.
113. Tanzania has established significant technical and cultural links with Cuba. For example in 1976 there were about 300 Cubans in Tanzania working on various projects, including 226 in agriculture and 52 doctors engaged in health services. In addition, Cuba and Tanzania signed an agreement in 1978 that provided for the granting of scholarships by Cuba for training Tanzanians in various skills.

114. See "Nyerere tells it like it is" and "Nyerere Warns Summit on Allies", Daily Nation (Nairobi), 7 September 1979.


117. The current Prime Minister is Cleopa Msuya. Sokoine stepped down in 1980 due to "ill health".


123. Ibid.

124. The current Tanzania defence minister is Lt. General Abdallah Twalipo. Rashidi Kawawa is currently minister without Portfolio.


129. See, Article V, of the 1965 Sino-Tanzania Treaty of friendship and cooperation. It states: "Unless either of the Contracting Parties gives to the other notice in writing to terminate the present Treaty one year before expiration of this period, the present Treaty shall be automatically prolonged for another period of ten years, and shall thereafter be renewable accordingly."


133. This point is discussed in Chapter 3 under "Foreign investment".

134. Dr. Njoroge Mungai was appointed foreign minister on 22 December 1969; as personal physician to the President and a member of the Kenyatta "Royal Family". Kenyatta had confidence in his ability to carry out his personal wishes in conducting foreign policy.


140. For a critical analysis of the voting pattern, see Ibid.

141. See Africa (London), October 1975.

142. See Daily Nation (Nairobi), 9 August 1978, pp. 1 and 8.

144. In the East African community, Dr. Ouko's ministerial role was largely economic. More importantly, Ouko played a central role in the negotiations between Kenya and the E.E.C. for associate A.C.P. membership.

145. See Daily Nation, 1 October 1969.


149. See footnote 22 above.


155. See Sunday Nation, 8 November 1979, p. 4.

156. Egypt retaliated by detaining two Kenyan passenger aircraft. However, a few day later, Kenya released the Egyptian cargo plane and allowed it to return the Russian-made arms back to Egypt.


158. For more details on the bombing incident, see January 1981 issues of the Nairobi Daily Nation and Standard. For the Kenya-Libya conflict over this incident, see Standard, 30 January and 3 February 1981.

159. See Daily Nation, 30 January 1981.

160. President Moi's visit to Saudi Arabia was viewed locally as marking a breakthrough in Arab-Kenya relations. See for example, The Standard, 15 November 1979.


169. Ibid., 21 July 1978, p. 4.


178. The Olympic issue was given wide coverage in the Kenyan press between January and February 1980, when President Moi officially announced that Kenya would not participate in the 1980 Moscow games, long before the Olympic council of Sports' position was made known. See for example, Sunday Nation, 13 January 1980, Daily Nation, 16 January 1980, The Standard, 24 January and 3 February 1980 and Sunday Nation, 3 February 1980, p. 1


180. This visit was given wide coverage in the Kenyan press and also foreign media. See for example, The Standard, 15 February 1980 and 23 February 1980, Kenya News and Africa Report (Nairobi), October 1980, and Africa (London), April 1980.

181. See Africa, April 1980.


187. See for example, "Close Cultural relations between Kenya and West Germany" in The Standard, 23 May 1980, p. 11.


193. Ibid.

194. Ibid.
195. For details on this visit, see The Weekly Review, 15 August 1980, p. 17.

196. See "Canada-Kenya Row Over Rail Contracts", op. cit.

197. For details on the various projects Canada has aided in Kenya, see for example, The Weekly Review, 31 March 1978, pp. 30-31.

198. Ibid., p. 30.


204. See "Leave Out Foreign Ideas, says Kibaki" in Daily Nation, 13 May 1980, p. 16.


209. See Daily Nation, 10 September 1976.


211. See Daily Nation, 20 December 1978.


216. For details on the theoretical framework employed in this thesis, see Chapter I.
CHAPTER 6


11. Ibid.

12. See for example, President Moi's statement, reported in Sunday Nation (Nairobi), 3 February 1980.

13. In practice, giving a base means that the recipient state acquires exclusive rights over the military use of a strategically located piece of land within the host state; a facility simply means that the host agrees to share its own existing base with a foreign power.


22. Ibid., p. 33.


29. Ibid.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 110.


39. Ibid., p. 9.


45. Among these critical scholars are the following: G. Arrighi, A.N. Babu, L. Cliffe, J.F. Rweyemamu, J.S. Saul, I. Shivji, and C. Thomas.


54. Ibid., p. 13.


57. Ibid., p. 270.


59. Nnoli, Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania, p. 308.

60. Ibid., p. 309.

61. Ibid., p. 320 & 322.

62. Ibid., p. 313.

63. Ibid., p. 320.

64. See for example, G. Hyden, "Policy Making in Tanzania: 'We Must Run While Others Walk'", in J.D. Barkan with J.J. Okumu (eds.), Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, pp. 96-103.


67. In his speech, "Destroying World Poverty", Nyerere admits that he is "one of those people who complain bitterly about the present world economic system and loudly demand that it should be changed". (p. 2).


73. Ibid., p. 13.


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EAPH - East African Publishing House  
OUP - Oxford University Press  
TPH - Tanzania Publishing House

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Abbreviations: JMAS - Journal of Modern African Studies
RAPE - Review of African Political Economy.


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Appendix I - EAST AFRICAN MILITARY BALANCE

KENYA

Army, 6,500
Air Force, 700
Navy, 350
Total Armed Forces, 7,550

Paramilitary General Service Unit, 1,800

Equipment: 3 Saladin and 10 Ferret armoured cars; 16 81mm and 8 120mm mortars; 56 84mm recoilless guns. 4 petrol boats each with 4 40mm Bofors guns. 14 combat aircraft -- 4 Hunter FGA-9 ground attack fighters; 5 BAC-167 Strikemasters and 5 Bulldog armed trainers, forming two counter-insurgency squadrons. 10 Northrop F-5A fighters reportedly on order.

SOMALIA

Army, 20,000
Navy, 300
Air Force, 2,700
Total Armed Forces, 23,000

People's Militia, 2,500
Border Guard, 500

Equipment: 175 T-34 and 100 T54/55 Russian medium tanks; 310 armoured personnel carriers; about 100 76mm and 100mm guns; 130 122mm howitzers; 150 14.5mm, 37mm, 57mm and 100mm anti-aircraft guns. Fast patrol craft fitted with missiles, 2 SOI-class submarine chasers; 14 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats and landing craft. 52 combat aircraft -- 3 MiG-15, 19 MiG-17, and 14 MiG-19 ground attack fighters; 1 transport squadron with six aircraft; 1 helicopter squadron.

UGANDA

Army, 20,000
Air Force, 1,000
Total Armed Forces, 21,000

Small lake patrol service

Equipment: 15 T54/55 and 12 M-4 medium tanks; 15 Ferret scout cars; 100 armoured personnel carriers; Sagger anti-tank guided weapons system; 122mm howitzers. 160mm mortars; anti-aircraft guns; SAM missiles. 58 PT-76 amphibious light tanks. 46 combat aircraft -- 40 MiG-15/17/21, and 5 Magister armed trainers (possibly unserviceable); 6 light transport aircraft; 11 helicopters; 20 light trainers.
Appendix I, 1976 cont’d

TANZANIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>Total Armed Forces</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Militia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Equipment: 20 Chinese T-59 medium tanks; 14 T-62 light tanks; armoured personnel carriers; 24 ex-Soviet 76mm guns, 18 ex-Chinese 122mm howitzers; 30 ex-Chinese 120mm mortars; 50 14.5mm and 37mm anti-aircraft guns.
6 ex-Chinese Shanghai-class motor torpedo boats.
20 combat aircraft -- 12 ex-Chinese MiP-17/19; 19 transport aircraft and 12 trainers.

ETHIOPIA

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Para-military commando force</td>
<td>3,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile emergency police</td>
<td>6,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frontier guards</td>
<td>1,200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Equipment: 12 M-60 medium tanks, 50 M-41 light tanks; about 50 armoured personnel carriers and 56 armoured cars; 36 75mm pack, 52 105mm and 12 155mm howitzers; 146 M-2 and M-30 mortars; 36 M-60 and M-113 mortars.
5 large ex-U.S. patrol craft; 8 other patrol or landing craft; 1 training ship and 1 coastal minesweeper.

49 combat aircraft -- 4 Canberra B-2 light bombers; 19 F-86F and F-5A and 12 F-5E fighter bombers; 1 recce squadron with 6 T-28A; 8 Saab MFI 17 counter-insurgency aircraft; 16 transport aircraft; 24 helicopters; 80 training aircraft.

KENYA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Armed Forces</td>
<td>12,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary General Service Unit</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Equipment: 30 AML-60/90 armoured cars; 15 UR-416, ten ‘Panhard’ M-3 armoured personnel carriers; eight 105mm light guns, 20 81mm, 8 120mm mortars; 56 Carl Gustaf 84mm, 120mm recoilless launchers, 8 swingfire anti-tank guide weapons, 60 Vickers, MKII medium tanks and Rapier surface-to-air missiles, 3 'Vosper' 31 metre and 4 Brooke Marine, 21 Combat aircraft.
Appendix 1, 1980 cont'd

1 fighter, ground-attack squadron with 5 BAC-T67 Strikemaster, 1 training squadron with 14 Bulldog; 2 light transport squadrons, 1 with 6 DHC-4, 1 with 7 DHC-5D, 6 Do-28D. Other aircraft include 1 Turbo Commander, 3 Narva^o and 6 Puma and 2 Bell 47G helicopters. It has a sidewinder air-to-air missile. 12 Hawk T52 trainers, 32 Hughes 500 Defender helicopters with Tow anti-tank guided weapons are on order.

SOMALIA

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Armed Forces</td>
<td>46,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>People's Militia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment:</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
| 50 T-34 and 30 T-54/55 medium tanks; BRDM-2 scout cars; 50 BTR-40/-50/-60 and 100 BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, about 100 76mm, 85mm, 80 122mm and 130mm howitzers; 81mm mortars; 100 mm anti-tank guns; 106mm recoilless launchers; Milan anti-tank guided weapons; 150 14.5mm, 37mm, 57mm and 100mm towed and ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns; SA-21-3 surface-to-air missiles, 3 ex-Soviet Osca 11 fast track attack aircraft, with styx surface-to-surface missiles; 8 ex-Soviet Poluchat large and 6 ex-Soviet Poz coastal patrol craft; 1 ex-Soviet Polnocny tank landing craft, 2 ex-Soviet T4 medium landing craft; 25 combat aircraft; 1 light bomber squadron with 3 11-28; 2 ground attack fighter squadrons with 15 MiG-21MF; 1 transport squadron with 3 An-2, 3 An-24/-26, 3 C-47, 1 G-222 and 2 Do-28; and 1 helicopter squadron with 6 Mi-4, 4 Mi-8 and 1 AB-204-4. Trainers include 6 P-148, 15 Yak-Il and 4 MiG-15UTI; AA-2 Atoll air-to-air missiles.

UGANDA

Virtually the entire Uganda armed forces, police and prison services disintegrated after Amin's overthrow. Thus in early 1980, the legal armed forces were at the early stages of reconstitution — hence the absence of reliable data on defence at present.

TANZANIA

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>Paramilitary forces</td>
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<td>Citizen's militia</td>
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<td>Equipment:</td>
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<td>20 T-59 medium and 20 type T-62 light tanks; BTR40/-152 K-63 armoured personnel carriers; 76mm guns and 122mm mortars; 122mm rocket launchers; 14.5mm and 37mm anti-aircraft guns; and SA-3/-6 surface-to-air missiles. Six Scorpion light tanks on order; 10 fast-attack craft</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 1, 1980 cont’d

with guns (7 ex-Chinese Shangai, 3 ex-GDR P6); 8 torpedo fast-attack craft (4 ex-Chinese Hu Chwan hydrofoils (under 100 tons) and 4 ex-Soviet P4, 1 ex-Soviet Poludat large patrol craft; 12 coastal patrol craft, and 2 ex-Chinese medium, mechanised landing aircraft; 20 combat aircraft, in 3 fighter squadrons 1 transport squadron with one An-2, 3 Hs-748, 12 DHC-4 and 4 DHC-5D. Training planes include 2 MiG-15UTI, 11 Cherokee and 6 Cessna 310, 2 Bell 57-G and 4 AB-206 helicopters.

ETHIOPIA

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<td>Army</td>
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<td>People's Protection Brigades</td>
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Equipment. 24 M-60, 6 M-47, 100 T-34, 500 T-54/55 medium and 5 OM-41 light tanks; BRDM-2 scout cars; BMP-1 mechanised infantry combat vehicles, C 70 M-113, 12v-150 commando, 500 BTR-40/-60/-152 armoured personnel carriers, 52 105mm, 150 122mm, 130mm, 152mm and 12 155mm self-propelled howitzers 82mm, 120mm, 280 M-2/-304.21 n mortars; BM-21 122mm rocket launchers; sagger anti-tank guided weapons; ZU-23, 37mm ZU-57 anti-aircraft guns and SA-2/3-7 surface-to-air missiles; 1 ex-Netherlands Wildervank coastal mine-sweeper; 1 ex-U.S. Barnegat frigate; 9 Large patrol craft; 2 ex-Soviet Osa 11 fast attack craft with Styx surface-to-surface missiles, 2 ex-Soviet Mol fast-attack torpedo craft; 4 Stewart 15-ton coastal patrol craft; 4 ex-U.S. medium landing craft for vehicles and personnel; and 4 utility landing craft; 100 combat aircraft in 5 fighter ground-attack squadrons; and 1 counter-insurgency squadron with 6 T-28A; 1 transport squadron with 8 An-12, 4 An-22, 2 C-54,* 6 C-119G, 3 Dove, 1 11-14, 1 DHC-3 and 3 DHC-6; 20 Safir, T-28A/D, 11 T-33A and 2 F-5B; 10 AB-204, 3 Alouette 11, 25 Mi-8, Mi-6, 10 UH-1H and 1 Puma.