WARRIOR TRADERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EARLY SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH AND ENGLISH NORTH AMERICAN TRADE AND COLONIZATION

by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines French and English trade voyages and trade colonies in North American during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and French and English relations with Native Americans. The colonies of Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc included members of previous French and English trade voyages and depended on the experience and information gained during trade voyages to formulate their economic objectives and colonial policies. French and English North American activity was intrinsically connected in this era through a plethora of amiable and competitive associations. National, transnational, and regional frameworks are all necessary in explaining Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc. French and English interaction with Native American groups during these voyages and colonies was distinctly similar, and the diverse cultures of the native Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, Powhatans, and Armouchiquois, rather than the divisions between French and English culture, were central in shaping colonist-Native relations in the seventeenth century.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED


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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In 1565 the English captain John Hawkins visited the Huguenot colony of Fort Caroline along the Florida coast. ¹ The French and English met on friendly terms and shared provisions during Hawkins’ stay. ² The French commander René Goulaine de Laudonniere and his men were desperately low on supplies, and Hawkins offered to return the colonists to France. ³ In the end Laudonniere purchased one of Hawkins’ ships and provisions for the colonists’ evacuation to France on credit, and French cannons were exchanged for two Englishmen as a mutual security. ⁴

Half a century later, in 1613 the English captain Samuel Argall attacked the French colony of Saint Sauveur in Acadia taking the Jesuit Father Biard and fourteen French captives to Jamestown. ⁵ Argall sailed north a second time in 1613 and burned the momentarily unoccupied colony of Port Royal. ⁶ When the French colonists returned to Port Royal, Argall met privately with their commander Biencourt. ⁷ A French account claims certain Frenchmen attempted to persuade the colonists to join the English, and an anonymous English account alleges Biencourt offered to operate Port Royal under the protection of the King of England. ⁸ During their meeting Argall was apologetic concerning his orders to remove the French colony and Biencourt blamed the Jesuits,

² Marc Lescarbot, Henry Percival Biggar, and W. L. Grant, History of New France, Volume I (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1907) 115
⁴ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
including Father Biard, rather than the English for his dire situation. In the end Argall left Biencourt and his colonists at Port Royal without supplies, warning Biencourt that if they were found there again they would be considered enemies.

French and English colonial relations had undergone a drastic change as the sixteenth-century cooperation between French and English Protestants gave way to imperial competition over the contested coastline of northeastern North America in the early seventeenth century. Despite this transformation, the imperial competition which marked Argall and Biencourt’s meeting remained relatively restrained, and this imperial rivalry coexisted with contention among French factions and transnational interaction between the French and English colonists. French and English North American activity remained closely linked in the time between Hawkins’ meeting with Laudonniere and Argall’s meeting with Biencourt.

In the early seventeenth century, France and England underwent a simultaneous transition from seasonal North American trade voyages to colonies intended to combine trade with territorial possession. The three colonies of Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc all included previous members of French and English trade voyages and depended on the information gained during these trade voyages to formulate their economic objectives and colonial policies. The interconnected nature of the French and English establishment of trade colonies in the early seventeenth century has been underappreciated and understudied by scholars addressing the colonies of Port Royal,

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
Jamestown, and Sagadahoc.\textsuperscript{11} The imperial competition between France and England in the early seventeenth century coexisted with transnational connections between the French and English and regional divisions within these groups. In highlighting the similarities and connections between French and English colonization efforts, this study challenges the scholarship’s divide of French and English Native-relations in these three colonies, and instead stresses the influence of Native societies and actions on forming colonist-Native relations in Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc.

Scholars using macro scopes often differentiate between Iberian and Northern European efforts to colonize the Americas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\textsuperscript{12} Spain and Portugal divided the extra-European world in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. Spain grew rich off its American silver mines of Potosí and Zacatecas in the sixteenth century, and used this vast wealth to pursue a universal monarchy in Europe.\textsuperscript{13} The rising power of Spain created anti-Spanish solidarity among England, France, and the United Providences as the Spanish monarchy claimed the Portuguese throne in 1580, defeated the French corsair fleet in 1582, attempted to squash the Protestant Dutch rebellion, and sent the Spanish Armada against England in 1588.\textsuperscript{14} The commonality of the Spanish


enemy is clear in the English, French, and United Providence’s alliance against Spain in the 1596 Treaty of The Hague.\(^\text{15}\) The Northern Europeans challenged Spanish power in the Americas through plundering Spain’s colonies and treasure fleets and attempting to repeat their discoveries of mineral wealth in the Americas.\(^\text{16}\)

The similarities between the French and English colonization efforts in the Americas in the second half of the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century were substantial. Both countries sponsored repeated attempts at colonization to challenge Iberian power in the Americas through the establishment of fortified bases. Bases such as English Roanoke and French Charles Fort, located on the coast of the Carolinas, were intended to claim land and serve as refitting and resupply bases to allow their privateer fleets to operate year round in the Caribbean against the Spanish colonies and treasure ships. These were not just superficial similarities. Protestant Huguenot merchants had a strong presence in France’s port cities, and were central to France’s American enterprises.\(^\text{17}\) These Huguenots maintained close ties to England through a mixture of mutual support and economic competition. The English and Huguenots also cooperated in North American colonization efforts.\(^\text{18}\) The English dispatched a five-ship resupply fleet to support the Huguenot colony of Charles Fort, and provided help to the


\(^\text{16}\) Ibid., 215.


beleaguered Huguenot colony of Fort Caroline.\(^\text{19}\) Despite this cooperation, England and France increasingly became direct competitors in North America due to political changes in Europe.

During the French religious civil war of 1585-1598, Queen Elizabeth became a staunch ally of Henri, the Huguenot King of Navarre and claimant to the French throne. Following the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 the English became directly involved in the French civil war in 1589, sending an army of 5,200 to relieve the port city of Dieppe in Normandy.\(^\text{20}\) In 1590 England expanded their involvement, sending 4,000 soldiers to Brittany, and launched a joint attack on the city of Rouen with Henri.\(^\text{21}\) Despite English support, the war remained a stalemate. In 1593 Henri converted to Catholicism to end this stalemate and secure the French throne.\(^\text{22}\) Henri’s conversion and the French peace agreement with Spain in 1598 would end this era of close ties between England and France. The English no longer trusted the now Catholic Henri.\(^\text{23}\) The acceptance of a former Huguenot as king and the 1598 Edict of Nantes began an era of religious coexistence in France, binding the Huguenots to the French monarchy and ending their cooperative relationship with England.\(^\text{24}\) France and England would continue

\(^{19}\) Kupperman, \textit{The Jamestown Project}, 45; Boucher, “Revisioning the ‘French Atlantic,’” 288.


\(^{21}\) Ibid., 257-260.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 264, 269.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 274

to exploit North America through trade voyages in the early seventeenth century, but increasingly as rivals.

France and England were undergoing expansion in the early seventeenth century. France had its sights on absorbing Northern Italy, and continued to focus on South American colonization with 1,300 settlers in St. Louis, Brazil in 1613. England was heavily invested in the subjugation and colonization of Ireland and commercial expansion in the Mediterranean and Far East. North America trade and colonization was a secondary focus of the French and English, but was of considerable importance in France and England’s competition with each other and in their attempts to imitate Spain’s American empire.

Beyond the contemporary importance of French and English activity in North America, France and England’s North American trade and colonization efforts in the early seventeenth century provide an important opportunity to conduct a comparative study of simultaneous colonization efforts. The French colony of Port Royal Acadia was founded in 1604, and in 1607 English colonists founded Jamestown and Sagadahoc in Virginia. These colonies mark the beginning of France and England’s continuous involvement in North American colonization; a comparative perspective of these colonies provides insight into the larger development of France and England’s North American colonies. This thesis focuses on the era beginning with the French revival of North American trade voyages in 1598 and ending with the second charter of Jamestown in

25 Ibid., 301.
27 Jones, *Gentlemen and Jesuits*, I-II.
1609. This timeframe allows for the careful consideration of the complex context of this transformative era in French and English North American activity.

Within this thesis the term North America is used as a geographic category which includes the regions of New France, Acadia, and Virginia that extended along the coast of the North American mainland from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the northern limits of Spanish Florida. Acadia and the north of Virginia were divided from Jamestown in the southern part of Virginia by the use of different transatlantic routes, but the English conceptualized Virginia as a coherent whole and the geographic overlap between northern Virginia and Acadia allows these areas to be considered jointly. This thesis uses the term colonies rather than the term settlements to refer to Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc to avoid confusion with the settlement interpretation of English colonization which stresses agriculture and large-scale migration over trade. Similarly, while this thesis will distinguish between colonies and voyages it is important to note that colonies were dependent on transatlantic resupply voyages and had a strong focus on coastal trade and exploration voyages. Trade voyages also continued to operate independently from colonies in the Caribbean and the Newfoundland fishery.

Chapters Two and Three utilize French sources in English translation. Direct quotations of French sources are presented in English within the text, and the original French text is provided in the footnotes. In each case this study consulted the original French text with the use of the University of Chicago’s French dictionary, the ARTFL Project Dictionnaires d’autrefois. This study also utilized translator’s notes and secondary literature relating to major French sources including the works of Samuel de Champlain and Marc Lescarbot. Throughout this study the many interpretive limitations relating to
using these works in translation are recognized, and no literary analysis is attempted without the support of secondary sources. Any study working in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries will encounter interpretive difficulties in the primary source record including authors’ errors and misinterpretations, biases relating to documents’ purposes, incomplete source material, and sources in French and English inevitably possess debatable meaning in certain instances.

‘Chapter Four uses European accounts to discuss Native groups including the Powhatans of Virginia and Mi’kmaq of Acadia. This study considers the context in which these sources were produced and the motivations and possible biases of the authors, but ultimately these European sources have limitations in demonstrating the perspective of Native groups. The difficulty in demonstrating Native agency through European sources is reduced through the use of a comparative scope utilizing multiple French and English sources describing colonists’ interactions with the same Native groups including the Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, and Armouchiquois. Archaeological and anthropological scholarship is consulted to help determine the culture and social structures of these Native groups. Despite these various means of circumventing the biases and limits of European sources, determining the perspectives of Native groups necessarily requires a high degree of inference. In attempting to determine Natives’ perspectives this study will fully consider the context presented by the primary source material and existing scholarly interpretations of these Natives’ actions.
In 1606, King James I of England and his ministers issued a royal charter creating the dual Virginia Companies. The First Company based in London was to establish a colony in the southern half of Virginia, while the Second Company based in Plymouth and representing the West Country interests was to establish a colony in the northern half of Virginia. The creation of the Virginia Companies represented a resumption of North American colonization after a long break following the loss of Sir Walter Raleigh’s second colony of Roanoke in 1587. The scholarship has generally interpreted the 1607 colony of Jamestown Virginia as founded on settlement, with plans for the migration of a substantial English population and the production of agricultural crops. This perspective is pervasive throughout the work of David Quinn, Nicholas Canny, Edmund Morgan, and more recently J.H. Elliott. This view of Virginia as a colony based on acquiring and settling land has fallen from favour among many scholars. Alison Games argues that the settlement model of Jamestown results from scholars’ projecting Virginia’s eventual success based on Native removal and intensive agriculture onto the colony’s initial

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29 Ibid., 192.
Many scholars now view the trade model of England’s eastern ventures including the Levant and East India Companies as the prototype for early Virginia. In *Pursuits of Happiness*, Jack Greene disputes the use of a pure settlement model in early Virginia, and maintains that failing a conquest of local Natives on the Spanish and Irish models, the London Virginia Company attempted to operate Jamestown on the model of the eastern trade posts used by the Levant, East India, and Muscovy Companies. In Greene’s work the eastern trade model is secondary to the London Company’s desire to emulate Spain’s American conquests and attempts to subdue Natives to agricultural labourers on the Irish model. Greene’s work represents an increased emphasis on the commercial nature of Virginia without a complete abandonment of the settlement model in early Virginia. Recent scholarship with an increased Mediterranean focus builds on Greene’s argument that early Virginia used a trade model based on eastern trade precedents.

Linda Colley’s *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World*, stresses the importance of the Mediterranean to England’s overseas expansion. Colley shows that the Mediterranean was the center of England’s overseas expansion, and represented the most

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34 Ibid., 8-9.
profitable market for England from 1600 to 1660. Colley argues that due to its economic importance the Mediterranean was key in English policy concerns during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In Karen Kupperman’s *The Jamestown Project*, the English Mediterranean trade becomes essential to the English colony of Jamestown. Kupperman emphasizes that English trade ventures preceded the colony of Virginia with the Levant and East India Companies. Kupperman argues that American colonization was a direct extension of these eastern trade ventures providing the Virginia Company with its original model for operation, the trading station. Alison Games’s *The Web of Empire*, builds on this work by focusing on the connections between English expansion in the Mediterranean and America. Games demonstrates that there was a forty percent investor overlap between the London Virginia Company and the eastern trading companies, and goes on to argue that the Virginia Company directly adopted the eastern ventures’ tactics and organization. This Mediterranean trade interpretation has gained the support of numerous scholars including Joyce Chaplin, Wim Klooster, and Philip Stern. This revisionist interpretation, stressing the importance of the Mediterranean trade model’s influence, conflicts with the view of Nicholas Canny, David Quinn, and Edmund Morgan who consider Virginia to be a colony based on settlement.

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37 Ibid., 69, 25.
38 Ibid., 44, 73-83.
40 Ibid., 184, 26.
41 Games, *The Web of Empire*, 83,118.
This revisionist interpretation of early Virginia sees large-scale migration and agriculture as later developments, with the early colony primarily seeking valuable trade goods. While this revisionist view of early Virginia focuses on trade rather than settlement, there is a substantial overlap between the two models including the English search for mineral wealth and a Northwest Passage to East Asia.44 This view differs from Greene’s by considering trade and eastern experiences as the primary motivation behind English colonization rather than a supporting component. Both Games and Kupperman see trade as the primary English motive from the beginning, and Kupperman largely discounts the English desire to conquer the local Native Americans, arguing that such a conflict would irreversibly damage the colony’s original trade station function.45

With the reinterpretation of Jamestown as a trade colony and the new prominence of England’s eastern trade ventures in the historiography, it is strange that the recent scholarship has so thoroughly neglected the western trade ventures of England in North America prior to 1607. There was a renewal of English voyages to North America in the early seventeenth century, with six recorded voyages between 1602 and 1606, harvesting sassafras, trading for furs, searching for fishing bases, and seeking the lost colonists of Roanoke. These voyages conformed to the larger trend of English commercial expansion, and represented the western component of this same expansion searching for new products for Mediterranean markets.46

44 Games, The Web of Empire, 118-121; Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 9-10; Quinn, Explorers and Colonies, 154-156.
45 Games, The Web of Empire, 118; Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 26, 212-14.
While these North America trade voyages were part of England’s larger commercial expansion, they were the result of alternative trade experiences largely separate from those developed in the Mediterranean. England’s early seventeenth-century North American trade voyages were the culmination of two separate American trade traditions: England’s privateer activities in the West Indies, and the Newfoundland fishing voyages. Privateer voyages to the West Indies routinely combined friendly trade with native Caribs and Arawaks, transnational privateers, and Spanish settlers with more violent attacks on Spanish shipping.\textsuperscript{47} The experience gained through English privateering against the Spanish Americas also provided the southern trade voyages with their navigational expertise and much of their personnel.\textsuperscript{48} The northern Virginia trade voyages of Gosnold, Pring, and Waymouth were direct extensions of the Newfoundland fishery in their financial backing and search for new seasonal fishing grounds along the modern New England coast.\textsuperscript{49} Using information gained through contact with Basque, Breton, and Norman fishermen, England emulated France in pursuing North American trade as early as 1580 with the voyage of the \textit{Squirrel} to the Penobscot River.\textsuperscript{50} The Virginian voyages of 1602-5 comprised a renewal of this trade, and were dependant on the navigational route and knowledge of the Newfoundland fishery.\textsuperscript{51}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{48} David B. Quinn and Alison M. Quinn, \textit{The English New England Voyages, 1602-1608} (London: Hakluyt Society, 1983), 1-2, (Hereinafter: ENEV)
\textsuperscript{49} Quinn sees the Gosnold Voyage as roughly based on the previous venture of Sir Humphrey Gilbert in 1578-83. Pring and Waymouth were funded by West Country fishing interests, see, Quinn, \textit{North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements}, 391, ENEV, 212, 248.
\textsuperscript{50} Quinn, \textit{North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements}, 387.
\textsuperscript{51} ENEV, 1-2.
\end{flushright}
David Beers Quinn discusses the English trade voyages to North America between 1602 and 1605 in numerous works, but he does not consider these voyages to be a major influence on Jamestown. Quinn sees Jamestown as a colony based on the precedents of the Roanoke colonies and ultimately designed for large-scale English settlement with the intent of producing Mediterranean agricultural products. The early seventeenth-century English trade voyages did not involve agriculture or settlement, and so Quinn does not consider these voyages to be an influence on Jamestown. Quinn sees the trade voyages as the context for renewed English interest in North America, which led to the creation of the Virginia Companies, and associates the southern trade voyages of Mace and Gilbert with the eventual choice of the Chesapeake Bay. Quinn considers the trade voyages to be an influence on the creation of the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies in 1606, but not on events in Jamestown itself. Neither Quinn nor any other scholar has studied the influences of the seasonal trade voyages between 1602 and 1605 on the development of Jamestown.

In *North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements*, Quinn addresses both Sagadahoc and Jamestown, but does not attempt a comparative analysis of the colonies, seeing them as divided in objectives and influences. Since the work of Quinn, the scholarship on England’s colonization has reduced the northern Virginia colony of Sagadahoc to a footnote, given little more than passing mention. Few historians have

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53 Ibid., 485.
heeded Quinn’s work on English North American activity in the era leading up to
colonization in 1606-7, and most relegate the English trade voyages and the colony of
Sagadahoc to minor incidents. The recent scholarship has overlooked the connections
between the 1602-1605 English trade voyages, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc despite the
insight these links can provide on the foundations of English North American
colonization.57

Scholars stressing the importance of England’s commercial involvement in the
Mediterranean consider England’s competition with Spain to be the driving force behind
this economic expansion. In “The Commercial Ideology of Colonization in Jacobean
England,” Andrew Fitzmaurice argues that the work of Giovanni Botero, a former
Milanese Jesuit writing in support of a universal Spanish monarchy, was a key influence
on the commercial nature of English expansion at the turn of the seventeenth century.
Fitzmaurice claims that Englishmen seeking to challenge Spain’s dominance in the
context of the 1604 peace used Botero’s work on commerce.58

Fitzmaurice elevates Spanish influence to a central place in explaining English
expansion in both the Mediterranean and North America. Similarly, Karen Kupperman
sees England’s commercial expansion in the Mediterranean, West Africa, and India as a
direct imitation of the Spanish empire, which included Portugal at this time.59 Kupperman

56 Kupperman considers the Sagadahoc colony, French Port Royal, and the 1602-1605 trade voyages briefly
Alison Games mentions the Sagadahoc colony, but does not discuss the 1602-5 trade voyages see,
Games, The Web of Empire, 117-120.
57 Karen Kupperman and Alison Games briefly mention Sagadahoc, but most scholars have simply omitted
both Sagadahoc and the 1602-1606 English trade voyages. See, Kupperman, The Jamestown Project,
168; Games, The Web of Empire, 117-8.
58 Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Commercial Ideology of Colonization in Jacobean England: Robert Johnson,
59 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 3.
stresses that the Iberians preceded the English in these trade markets, and argues that the English consciously used Iberian knowledge to contest their dominance.60 This interpretation allows for a powerful Spanish influence on England’s American expansion through a trade model. The recent scholarship on English expansion establishes the importance of the Mediterranean trade and Spanish influences on English colonization in the early seventeenth century. Yet, the recent scholarship has not effectively incorporated England’s longstanding connections and competition with France in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries culminating in simultaneous efforts at colonization.61

At the turn of the seventeenth century, England’s North American trade voyages overlapped with contemporary French trade voyages. In contrast to the scholarship on England’s North American colonization, the French scholarship has long accepted seasonal trade voyages as a central precursor to colonization in the early seventeenth century. Marcel Trudel’s *Histoire De La Nouvelle-France* and H.P. Biggar’s *The Early Trading Companies of New France* remain important works on the seasonal fur trade voyages to New France and the beginnings of French colonization.62 Trudel and Biggar discuss the French trade voyages and the 1604 Acadian colony of Port Royal, but do not feel it is necessary to establish the continuities between the trade voyages and trade colonies of the early seventeenth century.63 While there is a moderate amount of

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60 Ibid., 3,31,34.
61 Karen Kupperman’s recent work provides the most extensive use of French and English connections to discuss Jamestown and early seventeenth-century English colonization. Kupperman tends to incorporate these connections in a contextual way rather than through comparative analysis. See, Kupperman, *The Jamestown Project*, 79-82, 187, 190.
comparative consideration in both Trudel and Biggar’s works, including mentions of French competition with the English and Dutch, it remains peripheral.\(^{64}\)

Conrad Heidenreich and Janet Ritch’s *Samuel de Champlain before 1604* adds to Trudel and Biggar’s work with contextual essays discussing the French trade voyages to New France in 1603 and France’s competition with England.\(^{65}\) Yet, Heidenreich and Ritch do not discuss the French colony of Port Royal or the English colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc. Even within the scholarship on French colonization there is fragmentation between the early seventeenth-century trade voyages, Port Royal, and Quebec. There is a shortage of comparative studies on the French Atlantic in general. James Pritchard’s *In Search of Empire*, is the one of the only major macro studies on the French Atlantic in recent years.\(^{66}\) The scholarship on French colonization remains primarily regional in focus, with a disconnect between these regions.

Many historians of French colonization including James Axtell, W.J. Eccles, and Ian Steele give limited attention to first colony of Port Royal under Sieur de Mons from 1604-1607, seeing it as little more than a prelude to the colony of Quebec, which they associate with the beginning of Canada.\(^{67}\) This interpretation overlooks the seventeenth-century importance of the Acadian colony as a training ground where Samuel de Champlain, de Mons, and other colonists formulated the tactics used in Quebec. Naomi

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Griffiths’ *From Migrant to Acadian* discusses the founding of Port Royal. Griffith provides a concise narrative of the events in the early colony, but is more interested in later developments in Acadia and uses Port Royal as a means of establishing a background for these events. Griffith and most scholars of early Acadia give limited attention to the French trade and exploration voyages prior to 1604 and the contemporary English voyages competing with the French. John Reid helps to explain the regional focus of many studies on Acadia and Port Royal in his discussion of the importance of the colony’s 400th anniversaries in 2004. The regional importance of Port Royal as the foundation of Acadia and the early colony’s significance within the contested heritage of Acadia and modern Nova Scotia has led to a scholarly trend towards an Acadia specific scope. Reid has also produced a comparative treatment of French and English colonization in the context of a seventeenth-century regional history of Maine and Acadia. Reid provides a short discussion of the transition to colonies in Maine and Acadia, which highlights the importance of commercial exploitation in producing the colonies of Port Royal and Sagadahoc.

Quinn’s work on the North American activity of the English and French between 1580 and 1607 is the best example of a comparative framework in the scholarship on early seventeenth-century French and English colonization. Quinn sees French and

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68 Griffith discusses The colonization effort of Port Royal in a brief 22 page introduction which provides a narrative of the colony from 1604 to 1613. See, Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 3-24.
69 Griffiths mentions colonial competition with England, and trade precedents, but they are extremely brief references. Other scholars of the era such as Elizabeth Jones similarly limit English competition and previous trade voyage experiences to very brief references. See, Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 3-4; Jones, *Gentlemen and Jesuits*, 6, 10-12.
72 Ibid.
English colonization as parallel developments springing from a shared North American heritage transcending national divides, and resulting from competition over a shared sphere of trade influence. Quinn addresses Port Royal and Sagadahoc in an interwoven discussion including elements of trade voyage precedents. Quinn sees the two colonies as geographically linked, contemporary, and competing. Yet, Quinn limits the comparative analysis between the two colonies, primarily providing a narrative of events in the colonies. Quinn compares Port Royal and Sagadahoc based on their geographic locations and shared northern trade voyage heritage, but excludes Jamestown entirely as separate in its precedents, geographic location, and objectives. There is room to expand on the comparative work of Quinn using a specific and detailed comparison of the connections and similarities between the French colony of Port Royal and the English colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc.

Many scholars see hostility and violence as representative of the larger seventeenth-century trajectory of English-Native relations in North America. A substantial proportion of studies on seventeenth-century English North American colonization accept the basic premises of English hostility towards Native Americans, and the violent expulsion of Native American groups to clear land for English

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75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 443-5; Quinn, England and the Discovery of America, 483-5.
settlement. These scholars argue that English colonists’ agricultural focus led to conflict with Natives over land, and that the English possessed a militant Protestant ideology which generated xenophobia against Natives, their culture, and religion. Jamestown’s conflict with the Powhatans reflected this larger trend, and many scholars such as Alison Games see Jamestown as creating a new colonization model based on agriculture and the violent removal of Native Americans.

In contrast, most scholars of French colonization argue that seventeenth-century French relations with Native Americans in North America were based on cooperative trade alliances. These scholars see French colonization as lacking the English’s hostility and violence towards Native groups. The cooperative Native relations established by the French in the seventeenth century are generally attributed to the small number of French colonists, the French reliance on Native fur trade partners, and the French’s relative acceptance of Native culture. Scholars’ division of English and French Native

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80 Looking at the American Southeast Perdue and Green sees Virginia as reflecting the larger trend of English-Native relations rather than establishing it. Alison Games explicitly argues that Jamestown represents a break with previous English colonization efforts and marked the creation of a new agriculture based colonization model. See, Perdue and Green, *The Columbia Guide to American Indians of the Southeast,* 54; Games, *The Web of Empire,* 120, 142-3.

81 John Reid discusses the existence this general trend with the French establishing cooperative Native relations and the English having some difficulty doing the same in the regions of Acadia and Maine during the seventeenth century, but sees is as a pattern rather than a rule. Reid, “Political definitions : creating Maine and Acadia,” in Baker ed., *American Beginnings,* 176.
relations dates back to the nineteenth-century historian Francis Parkman.83 Conrad Heidenreich and Janet Ritch consider the French style of peaceful colonization utilized by Samuel de Champlain in the early seventeenth century as beyond the English and Dutch who lacked the French’s cultural flexibility.84 Similarly Gordon Sayre directly contrasts French cooperative Native relations with English coercive Native relations.85 Alfred Cave also cites the English reliance on violence and their inability to emulate French understanding and respect for Native customs.86 To Heidenreich, Ritch, Sayre, and Cave the poor relations between the English and Natives and cooperative relations between the French and Natives are the result of nebulous national characteristics which are so well established in the scholarship that these scholars do not feel a need to explain the divide.87

The similarities and connections between France and England’s colonization efforts in the early seventeenth century cast doubts on the origins of these larger seventeenth-century trends in Native relations. Rather than accepting Port Royal,

83 Francis Parkman, The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century, 44.
84 DSOD, XVII-XIX.
86 Cave, “Why Was the Sagadahoc Colony Abandoned?” 639.
87 A notable exception to this view of early seventeenth-century French policy within the scholarship is Naomi Griffiths who is more realistic in her estimation of Port Royal’s Native relations, and acknowledges that the French had no respect for Native’s political rights and saw their culture as inferior, Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 8.
Jamestown, and Sagadahoc as part of these larger English and French trends of Native relations, this study will consider the factors leading to the development of Native relations within these three colonies. In addition to considering the development of colonist-Native relations in these three colonies, this study will demonstrate the importance of Native American agency through a comparative perspective. Comparative ethnohistory is on the rise: scholars such as Amy Bushnell are using comparative ethnohistory to study the formation of the Spanish American colonies’ relations with the Natives of Central and South America, which varied from nomadic tribes to settled empires.  

Most works of comparative ethnohistory are macro studies such as Daniel Richter’s *Facing East from Indian Country* and Colin Calloway’s *New World for All*, with vast geographic and temporal scopes. The scope of these studies creates a degree of uniformity among diverse Native American groups across space and time that is not necessarily accurate. This is especially true at the turn of the seventeenth century when the degree of European disruption was still localized and somewhat limited in North America.

Chapter Two discusses the influence of early seventeenth-century English trade voyages on the trade colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc. While the leaders of the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies were closely connected to English commercial expansion in the Mediterranean they came to rely on the information provided by North American trade voyage accounts and the leadership of trade voyage veterans in the colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc. The promotional literature

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published in conjunction with the English trade voyages provided evidence of profitable 
commodities and the availability of Native trade goods, and this was the stimulus behind 
the dual Virginia Companies’ transfer of the trade station from the Mediterranean to 
North America. Trade voyage information was central in forming the tactics, perceptions, 
and objectives of the Plymouth and London Virginian Companies and trade voyage 
veterans had a substantial direct influence on developments in Jamestown and 
Sagadahoc. The scholarship has understudied and underemphasized England’s North 
American trade activity and its influence on shaping England’s early seventeenth-century 
expansion and colonization efforts.

Chapter Three explores France and England’s competition for North America 
trade and their simultaneous efforts to establish trade colonies. France and England’s 
competing claims to the northeastern coast of North America stimulated competing 
colonization efforts. These colonies functioned as trade stations and were intended to 
claim and protect territory for their prospective monarchs. The French transferred trade 
voyage information and personnel to the colony of Port Royal in Acadia. Port Royal, 
Jamestown, and Sagadahoc possessed similar economic objectives, perceptions of the 
North American climate, and views of Native Americans as a result of their shared 
sixteenth-century heritage and their seventeenth-century competition through trade 
voyages. Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc were far more interconnected than the 
scholarship has accepted, and these connections are a necessary part of understanding the 
development of French and English North American colonization. After establishing the 
connections between the French and English colonization efforts in Port Royal, 
Jamestown, and Sagadahoc, Chapter Three will address the diversity and divisions within
France and England during the early seventeenth century to demonstrate the limitations of these groups’ unity.

Scholars of sixteenth and seventeenth-century colonization commonly use the terms French and English without acknowledging the limitations of these categories. In the early seventeenth century France and England were composite monarchies with substantial cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity. English and French are umbrella terms this thesis will use to identify loyalty to common monarchs and involvement in these monarchs’ colonization efforts rather than cohesive national identities. The identifiers French and English co-existed with transnational associations and with self-identification associated with individuals’ region or city of origin. Regional loyalties shaped the internal struggles over the granting of monopolies to de Mons’ trade company in France and the London and Plymouth Companies in England. The modern nationalistic framework has caused scholars to emphasize the divisions between the French and English, but these political associations coexisted uneasily with regional competition and transnational connections which were all important in forming the early seventeenth-century colonization efforts in North America.

Chapter Four demonstrates that Port Royal and Sagadahoc developed similar Native relations which included cooperation, trade, hostility, and conflict with Native groups in northern Virginia and Acadia. The hostility and violence that characterized English-Native relations in Jamestown represented a break with the patterns of England’s North American trade voyages and the colony of Sagadahoc. The French and English colonists in these three colonies lacked clear differences in their formative experiences or objectives, and Native relations cannot be satisfactorily explained by French and English
culture and formative experiences alone. The impact of Native culture and actions must be considered as well.

Through a comparative perspective, Chapter Four examines Native American agency. The culture, formative experiences, and social and political structures of the agricultural Powhatans and Armouchiquois differed greatly from the hunter-gather Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Eastern Abenaki. The dense populations, hierarchical social structures, and limited trade experiences of the Powhatans and Armouchiquois contributed to their reoccurring conflicts with the English in Jamestown and the French in Port Royal. On the other hand the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Eastern Abenaki had dispersed settlement patterns and substantial trade experience which contributed to their establishment of cooperative trade alliances with the French and English colonists in Port Royal and Sagadahoc. Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc were far more similar in their objectives, tactics, and experiences, than the diverse Native groups they encountered. The similarities between the French and English colonies highlight the importance of Native characteristics and agency in forming the early relations between Europeans and Native Americans.

Rather than adopting the scholarship’s current use of macro-trends based on the larger trajectories of French and English colonization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this study stresses the importance of contingency in shaping the development of France and England’s North American colonies. Expansive frameworks are necessary to facilitate the creation of a coherent Atlantic discipline spanning four continents and three hundred years, but these frameworks can also cause scholars to distort historic events to fit these larger patterns. This study does not assume that the French and English
imperial rivalry in North America, the agricultural focus of English colonies and the fur trade focus of French colonies, or the varied Native relations of French and English colonies were inevitable or fully intentional developments. The French, English, Powhatans, Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, Armouchiquois, and Maliseet all possessed military experience and served as warriors fighting to protect or claim territory. Yet, these same individuals had extensive trade experience and were motivated by their trade objectives; creating complicated situations in which colonists and Natives were driven by their dual natures as warriors and traders. The interconnected nature of French and English North American voyages continued into their early seventeenth-century colonial competition, and this newly prominent national competition coexisted with regional divisions and transnational connections. In demonstrating the nuances of French, English, and Native relations this study complicates the use of both seventeenth-century and modern national frameworks, and helps to clarify the limits of French, English and Native American unity while highlighting the numerous connections among these groups.
The English revived their interest in the North American mainland in the early seventeenth century, conducting six recorded voyages between 1602 and 1606. The early seventeenth-century English trade voyages provided a wealth of contemporary information on the products, geography, climate, and Natives of North America, to be utilized by the Virginia Companies while formulating their plans for colonization in 1606-7. The promotional pamphlets of Brereton in 1603 and Rosier in 1605, published in support of the English trade voyages, helped to reinvigorate English colonization by promising a variety of profitable commodities in a fertile and pleasant North America, enticing merchant interests in London and Plymouth to invest in colonization. Trade voyage veterans such as Bartholomew Gosnold and Martin Pring campaigned for colonization in London and the West Country prior to the creation of the London and Plymouth Companies in 1606.

With the formation of the dual Virginia Companies in 1606, many of those involved in the previous seasonal trade voyages to North America became active members in both the London and Plymouth colonies. The principal investors in the dual Virginia Companies were experienced in the Mediterranean and Eastern trades, but they came to rely on American trade voyage veterans to lead their colonization efforts. The English experience gained in seasonal trade voyages was an immediate and powerful influence responsible for the formation and character of the Virginia Companies. The London and Plymouth Companies formulated their tactics, objectives, and general perceptions based on the lessons and information of these North American trade voyages. The 1602 trade voyage to northern Virginia led by Bartholomew Gosnold involved three
future Jamestown council members who would directly transfer their trade voyage experiences to the English colonization effort of 1606-7.

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English North American Trade Voyages and the Establishment of Trade Colonies

Following the return of the Gosnold voyage to northern Virginia in 1602, Richard Hakluyt the younger, Edward Hayes, and John Brereton one of the men on the voyage attempted to reinvigorate English North American colonization by publishing a promotional pamphlet.90 Walter Raleigh still held his North American monopoly at this time, and there was a conflict over the breaking of Raleigh’s monopoly by the Gosnold voyage.91 The two groups came to an agreement, and the 1602 promotional pamphlet included a short note on the 1602 Mace voyage to southern Virginia under Raleigh’s sponsorship.92

While it would be four years until the formation of the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies, these two voyages to Virginia marked the revitalization of England’s North American activity, and the 1602 promotional pamphlet helped to reinvigorate English interest in North American ventures culminating in colonization in 1606-7. In 1603 there were three recorded voyages to Virginia, two with their roots in the 1602 Gosnold voyage. The Pring voyage to northern Virginia was a direct follow up to

90 The 1602 pamphlet used the term northern Virginia to describe the coast of modern New England and southern Virginia referred to the coast from Florida to the Chesapeake Bay, ENEV, 36-7.
92 Ibid.
Gosnold’s voyage funded by Bristol interests with Raleigh’s consent. Bartholomew Gilbert, co-leader of the 1602 Gosnold voyage, and Samuel Mace conducted separate voyages to southern Virginia in 1603 under the direct sponsorship of Walter Raleigh. These trade voyages in 1603 built on the effort began in 1602 and continued to generate renewed English interest in North America.

The English North American trade voyages in 1602 and 1603 had extensive connections with the Plymouth and London Virginia Companies formed in 1606. Pring would become a member of the Plymouth Virginia Company responsible for exploring the coast of northern Virginia in 1606. Many historians have recognized the central role Bartholomew Gosnold played in promoting North American colonization in the years leading up to the creation of the London Virginia Company. John Smith acknowledged Gosnold as a central supporter of colonization in London before the creation of the Virginia Companies in 1606. Gosnold became a recruiter for the London Virginia Company and a member of the Jamestown Council during the early months of the Jamestown Colony. Gabriel Archer, the first secretary of Jamestown, and John Martin, one of Jamestown’s original council members, were also members of Gosnold’s 1602

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93 Pring sought to continue the discoveries of Gosnold in northern Virginia, exploit the local fur trade, and gather sassafras with the help of Gosnold’s pilot Robert Salterne, “Martin Pring’s Voyage to ‘North Virginia’ in 1603,” in ENEV, 229.
94 Thomas Canner, “Thomas Canner’s Account of Bartholomew Gilbert’s Voyage in search of Chesapeake Bay,” in NAW Vol. 5, 163.
voyage. The editor of Brereton’s 1602 account, Richard Hakluyt the younger, became a member of the London Virginia Company where he utilized his knowledge of North American voyages to help formulate the Company’s tactics. Edward Hayes, another contributor to the 1602 promotional pamphlet, would also be active in the events culminating in the creation of the Virginia Companies in 1606, submitting a plan for a publicly funded colony to the Earl of Salisbury. While this overlap in personnel would influence the formation and objectives of the Virginia Companies, it would be several years before the Companies’ creation in 1606. The 1604 English-Spanish peace and colonial competition with France were also primary catalysts for the formation of the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies that will be discussed in Chapter Three. The formation of the dual Virginia Companies required additional catalysts including the 1605 trade voyage of George Waymouth.

The reinvigorated English trade in North America continued in 1605 with the publication of a second promotional pamphlet based on the discoveries of George Waymouth in Virginia. The 1605 voyage was funded by a combination of Catholic court interests considering colonization and West Country merchants seeking new fishing grounds in northern Virginia. Waymouth’s expedition used the information and tactics of the previous 1602-3 voyages, but had no overlap in backers or personnel. The

100 “The first Virginia Charter of April 10, 1606,” in NAW Vol. 5, 192.
103 ENEV, 56.
Waymouth voyage was central in promoting English colonization in North American, and London’s renewed interest in Virginia following the Waymouth voyage is demonstrated by the publication of the play “Eastward Hoe,” featuring a voyage to Virginia in 1605. The 1605 promotional tract of Rosier specifically targeted London investors for future investment in colonization by using the more general term Virginia rather than North Virginia, and stressed the involvement of Thames-side sailors who could confirm the details of Rosier’s account.

There were concrete connections between the Waymouth venture and the formation of the Plymouth Virginia Company. In his 1658 memoirs, Sir Ferdinando Gorges specifically cited Waymouth’s 1605 arrival in Plymouth with five Native captives as the beginning of his interest in North American colonization. These Eastern Abenaki captives provided information on the Virginian coast, and were aboard the 1606 Challons, 1606 Hanham-Pring, and 1607 Popham-Gilbert voyages to northern Virginia as part of the Plymouth Company colonization effort. These tangible connections demonstrate the importance of the early seventeenth-century English trade voyages in initiating and shaping English colonization in 1606-7.

The formation of the dual Virginia Companies in 1606 represented a new interest in combining the existing North American trade with colonization. The 1606 royal charter creating the First and Second Companies focused on establishing some form of

104 Quinn, North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements, 435.
106 Ferdinando Gorges, A briefe narration of the original undertaking of the advancement of plantations into the parts of America, in ENEV, 340.
permanent English base in Virginia granting, “license to make habitacion, plantacion and to deduce a Colonie of sondrie of our people into that parte of America commonly called Virginia.”

Despite the scholarship’s focus on the London Company and Jamestown, the Plymouth Company sent out the first colony ship. Captain Henry Challons set sail from England in August 1606, and took the southern route via the Canary Islands and West Indies despite his destination being the St. George River in northern Virginia.

Challons and his crew assumed that their charter from King James would guarantee their safe passage through the Spanish West Indies, but when the English encountered a Spanish merchant fleet the Spanish attacked and captured the Richard. The capture of the Richard caused a minor diplomatic crisis between England and Spain, and had a powerful effect on both the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies.

Following the capture of the Richard Charles Cornwallis, the English ambassador in Spain, wrote the Earl of Salisbury to warn him that the Spanish would not yield their American monopoly, “which they behold, with noe lesse watchfull eyes, then the government of their owne wives.” The capture of the Richard was a pivotal event altering English plans for colonization.

The Richard was a ship of only 55 tons with a crew of 29 Englishmen and two Eastern Abenaki natives of northern Virginia. The second Plymouth ship sent out in 1606 under Hanham and Pring was carrying supplies rather than additional colonists, and based on its ability to reconnoitre the coast of northern Virginia it was likely a smaller

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110 Ibid., 358.
112 “Deposition of Nicholas Hind,” in ENEV, 364.
ship.\textsuperscript{113} The size of the Plymouth Company’s initial colonization effort indicates that they were planning a relatively small colony similar to the trade fort constructed but abandoned by the Gosnold voyage in 1602; rather than the much larger colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc, with over a 100 initial colonists each, sent out after the Spanish capture of the \textit{Richard} in 1606.\textsuperscript{114} Gabriel Archer oversaw the construction of a trade fort on a small island off the coast of northern Virginia in 1602 intended for perhaps twenty colonists, but the site was abandoned when it was determined that the available supplies would not sustain the small English garrison.\textsuperscript{115}

Earlier trade voyages had relied on smaller and cheaper ships of roughly 50 tons similar to the \textit{Richard} to conduct their seasonal trade voyages.\textsuperscript{116} These similarities highlight the continuities between the trade voyages and the initial plans for English colonization. The loss of the \textit{Richard} and the ship’s crew was a heavy blow to the Plymouth Company.\textsuperscript{117} It was only after this disaster that the London Company sent out their colonists in 1607, knowing the danger of Spanish attacks along the southern route to Virginia and in the Chesapeake itself.

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\item \textsuperscript{113} “A briefe relation of the discovery and plantation of New-England,” in NAW Vol.3, 420.  
\item \textsuperscript{115} Archer, “The Relation of Captaine Gosnols Voyage,” in ENEV, 127-8, 136-7.  
\item \textsuperscript{116} The Gosnold voyage of 1602 was conducted using one small bark, the voyages of Mace in 1602 used a small ship or bark, Pring’s voyage in 1603 utilized a small ship of 50 tons and a bark of 26 tons, and Waymouth’s 1605 voyage had a crew of only 29 men. See, John Brereton, “A BRIEFE AND TRVE RELATION OF THE DISCOVERIE OF THE NORTH PART OF VIRGINIA,” in ENEV, 144; “A briefe Note of the sending another barke this present yeere 1602 by the honorable knight SIR WALTER RALEGH for the searching out of his Colonie in Virginia,” in ENEV, 166; “Martin Pring’s Voyage,” in ENEV, 214-5; Rosier, “A Trve Relation,” in ENEV, 254.  
\item \textsuperscript{117} Gorges claimed a loss of 5,000 pounds with the capture of the \textit{Richard}, Gorges,“Sir Ferdinando Gorges to Henry Challons, 13 March 1607,” in NAW Vol.3, 412-3.  
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The English at Jamestown and Sagadahoc feared assaults from the Spanish in the south and the French in the north. The London Company warned the Jamestown colonists of the possibility of a Spanish attack:

That you be not Surprised as the French were in Florida by Melindus and the Spaniard in the same place by the French you shall Do Well to make this Double provision first Erect a Little Sconce at the Mouth of the River that may Lodge Some ten men …they may Come with Speed to Give You Warning.\textsuperscript{118}

The report of the Jamestown council contained this same fear, pleading for a quick resupply lest the, “deoueringe Spaniard lay his rauenous hands upon theas gold showing mountaines.”\textsuperscript{119} The fear of a possible French attack was similarly common in the Sagadahoc colony. Ferdinando Gorges, one of the leading members of the Plymouth Company, repeatedly referenced the competition with the French in northern Virginia. Describing to the early of Salisbury the strategic function of the Sagadahoc colony against French claims to Virginia in the north, Gorges argued in 1608:

the which hee [King James] shall no sooner quite, but his neighbors will enter into, and therby make themselues greate, as hee might haue do, for at this instant, the French ar in hande with the natiues, to practice vpon vs…\textsuperscript{120}

While the main supply ship of the Sagadahoc colony, the Mary and John, returned to England in October of 1607 the colony’s smaller ship, the Gifte of God, remained until December to ward off an illusionary French attack the colonists were all but certain of based on Native information.\textsuperscript{121} The capture of the Richard heightened these fears of

\textsuperscript{120} “Sir Ferdinando Gorges to the earl of Salisbury, reporting the return of the Gifte of God, 7 February 1608,” in ENEV, 456-7.
\textsuperscript{121} “Examination of Lancelot Booker, cooper, 10 June 1608,” in ENEV, 462; “Examination of John Deaman, seaman,10 June 1608,” in ENEV, 463.
Spanish and French attacks and fundamentally shaped the colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc.

In contrast to the previous trade voyages and the initial colonization effort of the Plymouth Company in 1606, Jamestown and Sagadahoc were larger, more heavily armed, and were fixated on the danger of foreign attacks. Jamestown was a tightly controlled colony of military men governed using a strict social hierarchy similar to the organization of the first colony of Roanoke. The strong military element and the hostile attitudes in Jamestown and Sagadahoc did not exist in England’s previous North American trade voyages, or eastern trade ventures which stressed a cosmopolitan accommodation of local norms and peaceful trading. Yet there was a gap of several decades between the first colony of Roanoke and the Virginia colonies of 1607, and Richard Hakluyt the younger was the only individual who was directly involved in both colonization efforts.

Roanoke’s military model likely influenced Jamestown in minor ways, but Roanoke cannot easily account for the similarly military organization of the northern Sagadahoc colony. The personnel of the Sagadahoc colony were military men like those in Jamestown, with the experienced soldier George Popham in command of the colony, and Strachey reports that the colony was armed with twelve cannons. The large size and military components of Jamestown and Sagadahoc were a reaction to the capture of the Richard, and the realization that the Spanish and French might resist English North

123 Games, The Web of Empire, 10.
American colonization with force. The Virginia Companies were both joint stock ventures seeking financial returns, and they came to depend on the expertise of trade voyage veterans in their attempts to profit from their North America colonies.

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**Trade Voyage influence on the Economic Goals of Jamestown and Sagadahoc**

The early seventeenth-century English trade voyages convinced the London and Plymouth Companies that North America colonization based on trade was viable. Karen Kupperman argues that the London Virginia Company was an extension of England’s commercial expansion in the Mediterranean providing Jamestown with its trade station organization. Alison Games demonstrates the influence of England’s Mediterranean trade ventures on the London Virginia Company using the overlap in investors between English companies, with a forty percent investor overlap between the London Virginia Company and the eastern trading companies. The leadership of the London and Plymouth Companies were deeply involved in the Mediterranean trade, but their attempts to expand into the North America trade were based on the information provided by English trade voyages.

John Brereton’s account of the 1602 Gosnold voyage emphasized the availability of a variety of furs in northern Virginia and mentions the crew spending several days trading for furs. Similarly, Rosier’s 1605 account of the Waymouth voyage discussed the fur trade opportunities in Virginia and Rosier claimed to have traded for 40 beaver, otter, and sable skins in a single trade session in return for only five shillings worth of

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126 Kupperman, *The Jamestown Project* 184, 212; Games, *The Web of Empire*, 83,118.
English merchandise.\textsuperscript{128} The published accounts describing the English trade voyages provided the London and Plymouth Companies with evidence that profitable North America trade colonies were possible. The London and Plymouth Companies utilized the Mediterranean trade model in Jamestown and Sagadahoc, but their trade colonies relied on North American trade experience to determine and exploit the profitable products of Virginia.

Gabriel Archer was responsible for writing the initial report on the Chesapeake in 1607; it would be influential in shaping the London Council’s views of the region and their tactics in attempting to profit from Virginia. Archer’s trade voyage experience shaped his views of the Chesapeake’s profitable products in his report. In his report to the London Council, Archer cited his experience on the 1602 Trade Voyage of Gosnold to northern Virginia stating, “…out of my own experience not far off to the northward…in my first voyage to Virginia.”\textsuperscript{129} Some of the main commodities Archer identified in the Chesapeake were plentiful sturgeon, with the possibility of herring and cod, ship stores, including clapboard, resin, turpentine, and Native trade products including substantial amounts of furs, tobacco, and sassafras.\textsuperscript{130}

Archer included many other possible sources of profit to make the country seem profitable to the London Company. Yet, Archer gave little attention to many possibilities which were central to the London Virginia Company’s objectives, such as mineral wealth and Mediterranean products. On the topic of minerals Archer simply stated, “extract from

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\item[129] Archer, “The Description of the now discovered River and Country of Virginia,” in NAW Vol.5, 274.
\item[130] Ibid., 274-5.
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minerall earth Iron copper &c…” Archer did not even speculate on the possibility of gold or silver in his initial report, and he was more interested in realistic and established products. Sassafras, ship stores, fish, and Native trade goods such as furs were all products Gosnold’s trade voyage to northern Virginia and other English North American trade voyages had sought and obtained in some amount.132

Sassafras was a mainstay of the English North American voyages between 1602 and 1606 and the main profit from the voyages of Gosnold, Mace, Pring, and Gilbert in 1602-3.133 Sassafras root was widely believed to have medicinal purposes including curing syphilis in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.134 Colonists at Jamestown and Sagadahoc pursued this established trade voyage product in 1607 as a possible means of funding their colonies. The Jamestown council’s initial report to the London Council argued that:

Our easiest and richest commodity being Sasafrax rootes were gathered vpp by the Sailors with losse and spoile of manie of our tooles…I beleeve they haue thereof two tones at the leaste which if they scatter abroad at their pleasure will pull downe our price for a long time.135

The search for sassafras as a marketable commodity in Jamestown and the hope that sassafras could substantially contribute to funding Jamestown was likely the result of

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131 Ibid., 275.
133 For the focus on sassafras in the 1602 Gosnold and Mace voyages. See, ENEV, 51-2; “Martin Pring’s Voyage to ‘North Virginia’ in 1603,” in ENEV, 219, 227; Brereton Estimates Sassafras prices at 3 shillings a pound, and in 1603 Raleigh estimated the price of sassafras to be 10-20 shillings a pound. Gosnold’s 1602 voyage brought back 2200 pounds of sassafras according to Raleigh and Gosnold. This would generate a profit of between 275-1600 pounds. See, Brereton, “A BRIEFE AND TRVE RELATION,” in ENEV, 160; Walter Raleigh, “Sir Walter Ralegh to Sir Robert Cecil.” in ENEV, 205-6; Bartholomew Gosnold, “Bartholomew Gosnold to Anthony Gosnold, 7 September 1602,” in ENEV, 210.
134 ENEV, 20; Archer reports sassafras as curing a poisoned man during his 1602 voyage, Archer, “The Relation of Captaine Gosnols Voyage,” in ENEV, 130.
Gosnold, Martin, and Archer’s previous experience in North American trade voyages, which depended on sassafras for a considerable portion of their profits.\textsuperscript{136}

Discussing the products of northern Virginia in 1607, the Davis Journal of the Sagadahoc colony lamented, “…and hurtes in aboudaunce only they found no Saxafras at all in the Country.”\textsuperscript{137} Martin Pring’s involvement in the Plymouth Virginia Company might explain the Sagadahoc colony’s hopes for sassafras, but the promotional literature of the 1602-5 trade voyages had also made sassafras a well-known North American commodity. The Jamestown colonists’ unrealistic hopes of satisfying the London Company with two tons of sassafras and the Sagadahoc colonists’ frustration at finding no sassafras near their colony demonstrates the direct influence North American trade voyages had on these English colonies. Similar examples of direct influence in the early records of Jamestown and Sagadahoc are minimal for many of the precedents the scholarship favours in explaining the development of these Virginia colonies, such as Mediterranean trade experience and Irish colonization.\textsuperscript{138} The Jamestown and Sagadahoc colonists’ identification of fishing as a viable means of generating profits was also the result of these colonists’ trade voyages experience.

The trade voyages of Gosnold, Pring, and Waymouth focused on codfish as a plentiful northern Virginia commodity; with West Country fishing interests financing

\textsuperscript{136} Ralegh, “Sir Walter Ralegh to Sir Robert Cecil,” in ENEV, 205-6.
\textsuperscript{137} Davis, “The Relation of a Voyage,” in ENEV, 408.
\textsuperscript{138} Andrew Hadfield argues that Irish colonization represented an important context for English expansion, but direct connections between Irish colonization and English North American colonization are difficult to find. Hadfield, “Irish Colonies and the Americas,” in Appelbaum and Sweet eds., \textit{Envisioning an English Empire}, 174, 189; Games, \textit{The Web of Empire}, 83,118; Kupperman, \textit{The Jamestown Project}, 132.
both the Pring and Waymouth voyages.\textsuperscript{139} The Davis Journal of the Sagadahoc colony mentioned small-scale fishing by the colonists and the possibility of exploiting Virginia’s coastal fishery declaring:

\textit{…hear wee fysty three howers & tooke near to hundred of Codes very great & large fyshe bigger & larger fyshe then that which coms from the bancke of the new Foundland. Hear wee might have Lodden our shipe in Lesse time then a moneth.}\textsuperscript{140}

The short-lived nature of the Sagadahoc colony precluded any attempt at combining extensive fishing with colonization, but it certainly was on the minds of the colonists as one possible source of income. After the Sagadahoc colony’s failure, Plymouth men including Gorges and Francis Popham continued to send seasonal voyages to northern Virginia to trade and fish for cod.\textsuperscript{141}

The trade voyages of Mace and Gilbert to southern Virginia did not focus on fishing, but the Jamestown personnel with experience in northern Virginia repeatedly identified fish as a profitable commodity in Jamestown. The initial report of the Jamestown council to the London Company listed sturgeon as a possible commodity, and Archer repeatedly highlighted the profitability of fishing stating, “meerly our fishing for Sturgeon cannot be less worth then 1000\textsuperscript{th} a yeare, leaving hering and codd as possibilityes.”\textsuperscript{142} Archer’s emphasis on fishing in his 1607 report reflected his experience in northern Virginia, and was representative of other veterans of northern Virginia voyages such as the Jamestown council members Gosnold and Martin. These men’s trade voyage experiences directly affected Jamestown’s economic objectives and development

\textsuperscript{139} ENEV, 212, 248.
\textsuperscript{140} Davis, “The Relation of a Voyage,” in ENEV, 419.
\textsuperscript{141} Gorges, \textit{A briefe narration}, in ENEV, 346.
\textsuperscript{142} Archer, “The Description of the now discovered River and Country of Virginia,” in NAW Vol.5, 275.
in ways that more distant influences such as the colonies of Roanoke and English trade experiences in the Mediterranean did not.

The Virginia Company heeded Archer’s advice, employing the Discovery to fish offshore of Virginia, and sending Captain Argall north from Jamestown to fish for cod near the site of the former Sagadahoc colony in 1610.¹⁴³ More than 170 fishhooks dating from 1607-1612 have been found in the vicinity of the Jamestown site, and the majority of these hooks were designed for offshore cod fishing.¹⁴⁴ The personnel and promotional literature of the English trade voyages influenced the Sagadahoc and Jamestown colonists and led the dual Virginia Companies to attempt profitably fishing in the Chesapeake and northern Virginia.

While the London and Plymouth Companies followed the colonists’ advice and attempted to exploit Virginia’s plentiful fish, for the most part company leaders remained fixated on gold and silver. The fish, ship stores, sassafras, and furs identified by the Jamestown and the Sagadahoc colonists represented established trade voyage commodities, but they would not yield the quick and substantial profits company investors hoped for in Virginia. Only the discovery of gold and silver on the examples of the Spanish in Mexico and Peru would have satisfied investors and turned Sagadahoc and Jamestown into instant financial successes. In Jamestown, the initial reports of the Jamestown council and Gabriel Archer made only vague promises of mineral wealth

without mention of any tangible evidence.\textsuperscript{145} Yet, on his return to England Captain Newport declared the discovery of gold.

Newport wrote to the Earl of Salisbury from Plymouth in July 1607 claiming, “The contrie is excellent and veire Riche in gold and Copper, of the gould wee haue brought a say…”\textsuperscript{146} This caused a short-lived sensation among the London Company leadership, but was squashed soon after when the sample was found to be worthless. Commenting on the situation in Virginia based on these initial reports, Walter Cope wrote to the Earl of Salisbury:

Thys other daye we sent you newes of golde / And thys daye, we cannot returne yow so much as Copper / Oure newe disc overy ys more Lyke to prove the Lande of Canaan then the Lande of ophir.\textsuperscript{147}

Cope’s reference to the land of Canaan, or the land of milk and honey, shows that Jamestown colonists’ recommendations for viable products such as fish, ship stores, furs, and sassafras were having some effect on Company leaders who would slowly shift their interests away from hopes of gold and silver. Scholars generally attribute the London Company’s focus on mineral wealth to the precedents of Spain in Mexico and Peru.\textsuperscript{148}

While the paramount example of Spanish conquests must have loomed large in the minds of the Virginia Companies, there were more immediate reports of mineral wealth in Virginia that tantalized the imaginations of the investors as well.

\textsuperscript{148} April Hatfield argues the English utilized Spain’s conquests as examples for the simple reason that they represented the only successful examples in light of English failures in Roanoke, Guiana, and implicitly Ireland. J.H. Elliott’s comparative analysis of Spain and English colonization reiterates these views, and features an entire chapter comparing Spain’s conquest of Mexico with English colonization in Virginia, Elliott, \textit{Empires of the Atlantic World}, 3-28; Hatfield, \textit{Atlantic Virginia}, 7-8.
The 1602 promotional pamphlet based on the trade voyage of Bartholomew Gosnold argued for the existence of mineral deposits in Virginia, and supported these assertions with a filtered amalgamation of French, Spanish, and English accounts.

Brereton’s account argued that mines must exist in the interior of northern Virginia, and Gabriel Archer repeated this claim in an unpublished account of the same voyage. The 1602 pamphlet also drew excerpts from Richard Hakluyt’s *Principal Navigations*, using the accounts of Cartier, de Soto, Laudonniere, Espeio, Xamuscado, Lane, Cabot, and Verrazano to argue for the existence of gold and silver deposits inland where they, “…cannot be farre from the great riuer that falleth into the Southwest part of the Bay of Chesepioc.” These arguments culminated in a belief that mines existed in Virginia, and directly influenced the London Virginia Company through Hakluyt, Gosnold, Martin, and Archer.

The belief that a gold mine existed somewhere in the vicinity of the Chesapeake would have been a primary factor in the London Company’s choice of the bay in 1606-7 given the investors interest in discovering gold. In arguing for the existence of mineral deposits, Hakluyt drew select pieces of evidence from a variety of French, English, and Spanish accounts written over the course of nearly 80 years and discussing regions from New Mexico to Norumbega. Thus, these sixteenth-century sources were significantly altered by Hakluyt as he filtered and combined them into an easily accessible form for use in the 1602 promotional pamphlet. Hakluyt’s *Principal Navigations*, is a enormous work, and many Englishmen would have relied on the information in the 1602

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150 Richard Hakluyt, “Certaine brifeye testimonies touching sundry rich mines of Gold, Siluer, and Copper, in part found and in part constantly heard of, in North Florida,” in ENEV, 201-3.
promotional pamphlet rather than the original sources it cites. The 1602 pamphlet and the promotional literature resulting from the early seventeenth-century English trade voyages significantly influenced the form and dissemination of sixteenth-century French, Spanish, and English accounts discussing mineral deposits in North America.

Despite the lack of clear Spanish influences in the events and documents of the Sagadahoc colony, the Plymouth Company leadership hoped to discover mineral wealth, very likely based on the information in the 1602 promotional pamphlet. In the 1602 pamphlet Hakluyt cited the existence of a copper mine in the Bay of Menan, the modern Bay of Fundy, based on information from the French explorer Bellenger.\textsuperscript{151} William Strachey, commenting on the failure of the Sagadahoc colony observed, “…and no mynes discovered nor hope thereof, being the mayne intended benefitt expected to vphold the Charge of this plantacion.”\textsuperscript{152} The Sagadahoc colony’s interest in mines cannot be directly connected to Spanish precedents, due to the lack of Spanish activity in the region, and demonstrates the direct influence of the 1602 pamphlet’s claims of mines in northern and southern Virginia. In addition to mineral wealth, the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies hoped for a Northwest Passage through the interior of North America that would provide access to China and the east, and these hopes influenced their plans for colonization.

Strangely, there was no explicit mention of a possible Northwest Passage in the narratives of the Gosnold, Mace, Pring, Gilbert, and Waymouth voyages of 1602-5.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 203.
\textsuperscript{152} Strachey, “The historie of trauaile into Virginia Britania,” in ENEV,415.
\textsuperscript{153} Captain George Waymouth conducted a separate voyage in search of the Northwest Passage in 1602, and it is likely that he had a Northwest Passage in mind while searching the northern Virginia coast, ENEV, 59.
Yet, these voyages generally focused on exploring large rivers providing access to the interior, and the search for a Northwest Passage was certainly one of their objectives. George Waymouth headed a search for a Northwest Passage through the arctic prior to his voyage to northern Virginia, and he was interested in finding a Northwest Passage through the river systems of northern Virginia.

An edited reprint of Edward Hayes’ treatise on the Northwest Passage was included in the 1602 promotional pamphlet along with descriptions of the Gosnold and Mace voyages. Hayes argued for a Northwest Passage using the logic of a watershed, with two rivers issuing from a lake and running into the Atlantic Ocean and the South Sea or Pacific Ocean. This argument assumed North America was relatively narrow with a single mountain range running down the spin of the continent, making it easier to transverse than to circumvent.

The concept of a Northwest Passage through the interior of North America was still a relatively obscure idea in 1602 and most European maps from the 1590’s still featured a wide North America with the classical depiction of the Northwest Passage lying to the north of the continent. The belief in a Northwest Passage through the

154 Rosier’s account compares the St. George River to the Thames and Rio Grande and claims to have explored 40 miles upriver, Rosier, “A Trve Relation,” in ENEV, 290.
155 ENEV, 59.
156 Edward Hayes, “A Treatise, conteining important inducements for the plating in these parts, and finding a passage that way to the South sea and China,” in ENEV, 177.
157 An excellent example of this geographic concept is provided in the 1651 map of Virginia by John Ferrar which shows the Appalachian Mountains bordering on the Sea of China. John Ferrar, Virginia, 1651 [map] in Peter Whitfield, New Found Lands: Maps in the History of Exploration (London: British Library, 1998), 77.
interior of North America coexisted and competed with the older belief in a Northwest Passage in the far north which was still actively sought in the seventeenth century by explorers such as Henry Hudson.\textsuperscript{159} Hayes drew on French sources to make his argument, and the concept of a river based Northwest Passage seems to originate in the sixteenth-century French exploration of the St. Lawrence region.\textsuperscript{160} The Hayes treatise advocated the establishment of fortified resupply bases as a necessary step in finding and protecting a Northwest Passage.\textsuperscript{161} This concept of colonies as bases to find and exploit a Northwest Passage through the interior of North America influenced the tactics of the Virginia Companies.\textsuperscript{162}

The Virginia Companies sought a Northwest Passage through the interior based on Hayes’ postulation. In their “Instructions Given by Way of Advice,” the London Company advised the Jamestown colonists to settle on the river running furthest inland and heading towards the Northwest because, “…that way shall You soonest find the Other Sea…”\textsuperscript{163} Archer’s collection of Native information on the interior of the


\textsuperscript{160} Hayes referenced works by Jacques Cartier and Jaques Noel in the St. Lawrence region. The connections between French and English North American activity will be addressed in chapter three. Hayes, “A Treatise,” in ENEV, 177.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 177.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 178-9
Chesapeake is further evidence of the London Company’s use of the Hayes treatise.\textsuperscript{164} Hayes’ treatise encouraged the use of Native informants in collecting information on the interior of North America.\textsuperscript{165} In his initial report to the London Council, Archer did not encourage hopes for gold or silver but he opened his report with a confirmation of a Hayes inspired Northwest Passage to the South Sea and China declaring:

This River…extends it self 160 myles into the mayne land betwene two fertile and fragrant bankes, two miles a mile & where it is least a quarter of a myle broad, navigable for shipping of 300 tunn 150 miles...not two dayes iourney, it hath two branches which come through a high stoney Country from certaine huge mountaine called Quirank, beyond which needs no relacion…\textsuperscript{166}

Through Gosnold, Martin, and Archer, preconceptions and objectives formed during the English trade voyages had a powerful and immediate influence in Jamestown, and Archer’s 1607 report affected the impressions of the London Virginia Company as well. The search for a Northwest Passage in the Chesapeake continued to motivate the London Company past the colony’s initial explorations with John Smith and Christopher Newport still hopefully searching the Chesapeake in 1608-9.\textsuperscript{167} This hope would be slow to fade and John Ferrar’s 1651 map of Virginia still showed the Pacific Ocean or South Sea just on the other side of the Appalachian Mountains.\textsuperscript{168}

The Sagadahoc colony’s location on a large river and Strachey’s observation that Raleigh Gilbert made many discoveries of the neighbouring rivers indicated a similar


\textsuperscript{165}Hayes, “A Treatise,” in ENEV, 177.


\textsuperscript{168}Ferrar, Virginia, 1651 [map] in Peter Whitfield, New Found Lands, 77.
interest in finding a Northwest Passage.\footnote{Davis, “The Relation of a Voyage,” in ENEV, 431, Strachey, “The historie of trauaile into Virginia Britania,” in ENEV, 414.} In 1607 President George Popham sent King James a report from the Sagadahoc colony confirming the South Sea only seven days inland from the colony based on Native reports.\footnote{George Popham, “Captain George Popham to King James I, from Fort St. George 13 December 1607,” in ENEV, 454.} Western European explorers sought the Northwest Passage throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but hopes for a Northwest Passage through the interior of North America were a more recent French and English innovation. Edward Hayes’ treatise and the individuals such as Gabriel Archer with experience in English trade voyages to North America championed the concept of a Northwest Passage through the interior and directly affected the Plymouth and London Virginia Companies’ search for a Northwest Passage.\footnote{The search for a Northwest Passage through the interior of North America also resulted from the English trade voyages’ connections and competition with the French who sought a Northwest Passage through the St. Lawrence River. These connections will be discussed in the next chapter.}

In the scholarship on England’s American expansion, the two failed colonies of Roanoke are considered central in explaining the colony of Jamestown. To David Quinn the legacy of the first colony of Roanoke was the substantial literature the colony produced.\footnote{Quinn, Set Fair for Roanoke, 416.} Richard Hakluyt compiled and printed this large body of literature in 1588, and the work had as many as a 1,000 copies circulating in 1606.\footnote{Ibid., 417-419.} Kupperman also sees Roanoke influencing early Virginia through this literature. To demonstrate this connection, Kupperman uses the Virginia Company’s purchase of Thomas Harriot’s works and the involvement of Richard Hakluyt as a member of the London Virginia Company.\footnote{Karen O. Kupperman, Roanoke: The Abandoned Colony (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1985), 81.} Both Quinn and Kupperman establish links between Roanoke and Virginia,
but there is no clear way of demonstrating the importance of this literary connection in practice.

An objective specific to the London Company was the search for Raleigh’s lost colonists of Roanoke. Up to his arrest in 1604, Raleigh maintained his North American monopoly based on the assumption that the Roanoke colonists were still alive in Virginia.\(^{175}\) Trade voyages sent to southern Virginia including Mace in 1602 and Gilbert in 1603 were also searching for these lost colonists.\(^{176}\) In addition to Hakluyt’s claims of gold near the Chesapeake Bay in the 1602 promotional pamphlet, the possibility of the lost colonists living in the Chesapeake was another incentive for the London Company to choose the bay for their colony. The recovery of the lost colonists would have added credibility to English claims to Virginia among Western Europeans based on effective occupation, and these experienced colonists would have proven invaluable in providing information on the geography and products of the Chesapeake.\(^{177}\) Thomas Canner’s account of Gilbert’s 1603 voyage clearly illustrated the perceived connection between the lost colonists and the Chesapeake as Canner stated:

…so that if the winde should stand, then we should fetch the Bay of Chesepian, which Master Gilbert so much thirsted after, to seeke out the people for Sir Walter Raleigh left neere those parts in the yeere 1587.\(^{178}\)

In 1608-9 the Jamestown colonists made an effort to find the lost colonists with Sicklemore searching Chawonock and Powell and Todkill going with the

\(^{175}\) ENEV, 35.

\(^{176}\) “A briefe Note,” in ENEV, 166, Canner, “Thomas Canner’s Account of Bartholomew Gilbert’s Voyage,” in NAW Vol. 5, 165.

\(^{177}\) For discussion of the argument for effective occupation among the French and English, and the expected benefits of find the lost colonists. See, W.J. Eccles, The French in North America, 3; Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 238.

Quiyoughquohanocks to Mangoages seeking news of the Roanoke colonists. While the search for the lost colonists of Roanoke demonstrated the influence of the Roanoke colonies on the objectives of Jamestown, it also revealed the limits of Roanoke’s power in Jamestown.

The search for the lost colonists is the only direct connection that can be established between Roanoke and Jamestown, and it was only one of many objectives in early Jamestown. Smith reported that Newport returned to Jamestown in 1608 with a private commission not to return without gold, a confirmed Northwest Passage, or Raleigh’s lost colonists. Thus the search for the lost colonists competed with many other objectives in Jamestown. In contrast, many of Jamestown’s objectives resulted from or were substantially influenced by the North American trade voyages which have been underrepresented in the scholarship in favour of precedents such as Roanoke.

*English Perceptions of the North American Climate and Native American Behaviour*

The 1602-1605 English trade voyages were central in shaping the Virginia Companies’ perceptions of the North American climate. These seasonal trade voyages would depart England in early spring taking the northern route by way of the Azores Islands, or the southern route by way of the Canary Islands and the West Indies to the

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180 Ibid., 104.
coast of North America. These voyages would generally return in summer, after spending several months on the North America coast. During seasonal trade voyages, English observers witnessed warm and pleasant springs and summers without any knowledge of the cold of North American winters, warping English perceptions of the North American climate.

Europeans did not understand the continental climate of eastern North America with its warmer summers and colder winters than those of Western Europe’s maritime climate. Bartholomew Gosnold described the climate of northern Virginia to his father in 1602 explaining:

> it is in the Latitude of 41 degrees, and one third part; which albeit it be so much to the Southward, yet it is more cold than those parts of Europe, which are scituated under the same parallell: but one thing is worth the noting, that notwithstanding the place is not so much subject to cold as England is, yet did we finde the Spring to be later there, then it is with vs here, by almost a moneth…but doubtless their Summer continues longer than ours.

Gosnold’s observation that the climate of North America was cooler than similar latitudes in Europe was an uncommon insight, but ultimately Gosnold held northern Virginia to be warmer than England based on the spring and summer timing of his voyage. The published accounts of Brereton and Rosier discussing the Gosnold and Waymouth voyages...

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183 Quinn, Explorers and Colonies, 164.

184 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 159-160.

voyages depicted northern Virginia as abundant and temperate, with Rosier claiming that the climate was very similar to England, only somewhat warmer inland.\textsuperscript{186}

While the accounts of southern Virginia trade voyages in 1602 and 1603 did not contain any substantial discussion of climate, the English gauged the climate of southern Virginia based on latitude resulting in an assumption that southern Virginia was warmer than northern Virginia and possessed a Mediterranean climate.\textsuperscript{187} The climatic phenomenon referred to as the Little Ice Age led to colder global temperatures in the early modern period and intensified the colder winters of eastern North America in the early seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{188} The Thames was reported to have frozen over completely in the winter of 1608, and the English colonists would face similarly intense winters in Jamestown and Sagadahoc.\textsuperscript{189} The London and Plymouth Companies’ perceptions of North America’s climate were shaped by the misleading experiences of seasonal English trade voyages in 1602-1605, to their detriment.

The initial reports on the Chesapeake in 1607 mirrored the previous trade voyage accounts in their overly optimistic views of the climate and agricultural productivity of the region. The Jamestown colonists arrived in the Chesapeake in late April and Captain Newport sailed for England at the end of June with the colonists’ initial reports on the country.\textsuperscript{190} The impressions of the region in these reports suffered from the same seasonal nature as the previous trade voyages, and the English had not yet experienced a winter in

\textsuperscript{187} Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 159.
\textsuperscript{188} Brian M. Fagan, The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History, 1300-1850 (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 104-5, 151. Studies of wine harvests in Southern Europe indicate that the years from 1600-1609 were relatively cold compared to the era from 1617-1650.
\textsuperscript{189} Gorges, A briefe narration, in ENEV, 345.
\textsuperscript{190} Percy, “A Discourse of the Plantation,” in NAW Vol.5, 268, 272.
North America during the seventeenth century. The most detailed and positive report
came from Gabriel Archer who described the land as:

…more fertill then canbe wel exprest it is altogether Aromaticall…It yeelds two
cropps a yeare. Being tempered and ty me taken I hould it natures nurse to all
vegetables, for I assure myself no knowne continent bringe forth any vendible
necessaryes which this by planting will not afford…

Archer’s report on the Chesapeake reiterated claims of a North American paradise similar
to his unpublished 1602 account of northern Virginia and the published accounts of
Brereton and Rosier. Archer was directly influenced by his trade voyage experience as he
made sensational claims based on a cursory inspection of the Chesapeake over a period of
less than two months. These reports had a strong impact on the London Company’s views
of the region. Various London Company members reiterated Archer’s positive view of
the region’s climate and agricultural productivity in correspondence following Newport’s
return to England in 1607.

The unrealistic optimism of the initial reports soon proved false in Jamestown as a
year of scarcity, hunger, and sickness followed the departure of Newport. The
Chesapeake did not possess the Mediterranean climate the English had expected, and the
bitter winter of 1607-1608 nearly froze over the James Rivers and gave several
Jamestown colonists frostbitten feet. The misinformation in the initial reports had
lasting effects on the colony, as the London Company repeatedly undersupplied

Dudly Carleton, “Dudly Carleton to Chamberlain, 18 August  1607,” in Barbour, The Jamestown
193 Wingfield, “replies to the charges made against him in Virginia,” in NAW Vol. 5; Percy, “A Discourse
Jamestown in the following years, expecting the plenty of the Chesapeake to feed the colonists. Despite Archer’s report on the Chesapeake’s fertility, agricultural yields in the Chesapeake would be extremely limited in the early years of Jamestown. A devastating drought struck the North America Southeast in the early seventeenth century leading to reduced crop yields. Sustained primarily by the native Powhatans’ limited foodstuffs through 1607-1609 Gabriel Archer lamented in 1609:

…Whereupon Captaine Newport and others haue beene much to blame to informe the Counsell of such plenty of victual in this Country, by which meanes they haue beene slacke in this supply to give conuenient content….if you finde not returne of Commodity so ample as you may expect, because the law of nature bids vs seeke sustenance first…

While Archer conveniently ignored his own role in misinforming the London Company, he shows the lasting effects that the colonists’ initial impressions of the Chesapeake had on Jamestown. The Jamestown colonists’ mistaken reports in 1607 were the result of their limited knowledge of the Chesapeake’s climate and their use of trade voyage experiences and literature which overstated the natural plenty and agricultural fertility of North America.

While detailed records of the events in Sagadahoc are lacking, the colony clearly suffered from similar misconceptions concerning the North American climate. In 1608 prior to the abandonment of the colony, Ferdinando Gorges claimed in a report to the Earl of Salisbury that the region had an excellent climate. Every contemporary description of the colony’s failure fixated on the extremely cold winter of 1607-8 as one of the

197 Ferdinando Gorges, “Sir Ferdinando Gorges to the earl of Salisbury reporting the dispatch of additional ships to the colony, 20 March 1608,” in ENEV, 458.
primary causes for abandoning the colony in 1608.\textsuperscript{198} The narratives of Brereton, Pring, and Rosier misinformed the Sagadahoc colony with promises of a temperate climate similar to England in northern Virginia, leaving the colonists unprepared for the cold northern Virginia winter of 1607-8 intensified by the Little Ice Age. The winter proved so severe that Sagadahoc’s leadership evacuated approximately half of the Sagadahoc colonists in December of 1607 on the \textit{Gifte of God}.\textsuperscript{199} The colony was abandoned in 1608 due to the harsh winter, the deaths of the colony’s first President George Popham, Raleigh Gilbert’s decision to return to England to claim his inheritance, and the death of the Plymouth Company’s main investor Chief Justice Popham.\textsuperscript{200} The London and Plymouth Companies’ relied on information gained in seasonal trade voyages to determine the climate of Virginia, and this led to catastrophic miscalculations in Sagadahoc and Jamestown as the colonists realized Virginia was not the paradise Brereton, Rosier, and Archer had reported.

Beyond establishing the general perception of North America’s climate among many of the Jamestown and Sagadahoc colonists and several members of the Virginia Companies, the trade voyages provided tactics for determining the healthiness of the local climate based on the Native inhabitants. In his 1602 account Brereton established a connection between the health of the English while in northern Virginia, they did not have a single sick man during the entire voyage, and the climate which was reflected in the “perfect constitution of body” seen in the local Native population.\textsuperscript{201} Gosnold, in a


\textsuperscript{199} Samuel Purchase, “North Virginia Voyages,” in ENEV, 349; Gorges, \textit{A breife narration}, in ENEV, 345.


\textsuperscript{201} Brereton, “A BRIEFE AND TRVE RELATION,” in ENEV, 159.
letter to his father, similarly associated the tall stature and well proportioned bodies of the Natives with the healthy climate of Virginia. The London Company adopted this simple tactic, judging the healthfulness of the climate based on the characteristics of the native inhabitants instructing the Jamestown colonists to:

…take Especial Care that you Choose a Seat for habitation…You shall Judge of the Good Air by the People for Some part of that Coast where the Lands are Low have their people blear Eyed and with Swollen bellies…but if the naturals be Strong and Clean made it is a true sign of a wholesome Soil.

Responding to these instructions, Archer described the Powhatan of the James Rives as, “proper lusty men very strong runners exceedingly swiftly…” and included a description of a healthy Powhatan man reported to be 110 years old.

Archer’s firsthand experience in northern Virginia with Gosnold and Brereton resulted in his initial belief in the healthfulness of the Chesapeake’s climate based on the Natives. Ferdinando Gorges wrote to the Earl of Salisbury in 1607 after Newport’s return from Virginia commenting that Newport reported the Chesapeake to be fertile with a healthy climate. Using the faulty tactics of the North American trade voyages the Jamestown colonists were overly positive on the healthiness of the Jamestown site, but these illusions would soon fade. George Percy and John Smith reported that shortly after Newport’s departure in 1607 the Jamestown colonists were struck by swelling, fever, and flux leaving only five able bodied men and killing nearly half the colony. Sickness

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would continue to afflict the Jamestown colonists, and the colony of Virginia would have high death rates for new arrivals for most of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{207} The precedents currently used by scholars to explain the events in early Jamestown, such as the literature of the Roanoke colonies, English colonization in Ireland, and England’s Mediterranean trade all lack the powerful direct influence demonstrated by the English North American trade voyages’ effects on the English colonists and Virginia Companies’ perceptions of the North American climate. Much of the information provided by the early seventeenth-century trade voyages concerned the nature and behaviour of Native Americans, and this detailed information would be central in forming the Virginia Companies’ policies.

With the creation of the dual Virginia Companies, the English government encouraged the propagation of Protestantism and was concerned with the treatment of Native Americans in Virginia. The Royal Council’s “Instructions for the Virginia Company,” charged the London and Plymouth Companies with attempting to convert the Natives using peaceful means to, “sooner drawne to the true knowledge of God and the obedience of us.”\textsuperscript{208} Yet, this command had little real weight after the enlargement of the Royal Council in March of 1607 to include fifteen members of the London Company and ten members of the Plymouth Company, effectively giving each Company control over their own affairs.\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{207} Despite the arrival of 4,000 colonists in Virginia between 1610-1624, the colony had an estimated population of 1,000 in 1624, Kupperman, \textit{The Jamestown Project}, 293.

\textsuperscript{208} “Instructions for the Virginia Company, November 20 1606,” in NAW Vol.5, 204.

\textsuperscript{209} “Enlargement of the royal council for Virginia, March 9 1607,” in NAW Vol.5, 198-199. David Quinn’s introduction to the document clarifies that this act essential left the Royal Council of Virginia, a body theoretically designed to regulate the Plymouth and London Virginia Companies, non-functional as its membership consisted of the leaders of the two Virginia Companies. Thus, the London and Plymouth Companies were essentially independent and given free rein to determine their own policies and objectives.
The London Company’s instructions to the Jamestown colonists demonstrated the Company’s mixed expectations for Native relations in Jamestown. The London Company instructed the colonists to establish their base upriver among the Natives to facilitate trade, to be careful not to let the waged sailors ruin the Company’s trade with private barter, to trade for corn to supplement their supplies, and to rely heavily on Native guides.210 The London Company anticipated trading for marketable Native goods, but it also assumed that there would be hostility and possibly violence between the colonists and the local Natives.211 The London Company’s instructions warned the colonists not to let the Natives block their access to the sea, to never let Natives hold or keep English weapons, to trade for corn before the Natives realize that the English intend to plant a fort among them, and to maintain a general appearance of strength or else risk encouraging attacks through their weakness.212

The London Company’s expectation of English-Native hostility and conflict, in addition to the threat of Spanish attacks, contributed to need for military experience among the initial members of the Jamestown Council.213 The expectations of the London Company likely had a complex heritage incorporating the examples of the Spanish in the Americas, the French attempts to colonize Florida, and the two English Roanoke colonies. Yet, the English trade voyages of 1602-1605 represent a substantial and immediate source of information on the Natives of North America gained in a trade

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210 The London Council, “Instructions given by way of advice,” in Barbour, The Jamestown Voyages, Vol. I, 50, 51, 53, 51; Karen Kupperman Also discusses the mixed nature of the initial Jamestown instructions, but does not explore the trade voyage precedents leading to the creation of these instructions, Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 215-216.
211 Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 212.
context which reflected Jamestown’s goals and was nearly absent from earlier colonization attempts.

The London Company’s mixed expectations for English-Native relations can be explained by the published accounts and firsthand knowledge of the North American trade voyages, which experienced a mixture of peaceful interaction, hostility, and violence with Native Americans, helping to shape the Company’s policies in 1606-7. The narrative of Pring’s 1603 voyage to northern Virginia provides the best example of the English ability to conduct peaceful trade with Native Americans. Martin Pring was an experienced privateer seeking furs, sassafras, and fishing bases along the northern Virginia coast. There is no recorded violence between Pring’s men and Natives of northern Virginia in their frequent contact over several months. Pring’s account sums up English interaction with the Virginia Natives explaining:

the people of the Countrey came to our men sometimes ten, twentie, fortie or threescore, and at one time one hundred and twentie at once. We vsed them kindly and gaue them diuers sorts of our meanst Merchandize. They did eat Pease and Beanes with our men...We had a youth in our company that could play vpon a gitterne, in whose homely Musick they tooke great delight, and would give him many things...and dancing twentie in a Ring, and the Gitterne in the middest of them, vsing many Sauage gestures, singing Io, Ia, Ia, Io... This vivid scene demonstrates the possibility of peaceful interaction, trade, and cooperation between the English and Natives of North America, and stands in stark contrast to the English-Native hostility and violence that would come to dominate the

[214] Quinn, North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements, 423; ENEV, 212-3.
events in Jamestown. English-Native cooperation and trade during North American trade voyages influenced the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies hopes for a profitable Native trade in Jamestown and Sagadahoc.

While the Pring voyage was successful in maintaining peaceful relations with the Natives of Virginia over the course of their expedition, the English crew often exhibited distrust, hostility, and fear towards the Natives. Upon landing on the Virginia coast the English built a barricade to keep watch and provide protection against possible Native attacks while they set to gathering sassafras.217 There are also passing references to the treacherous nature of Natives in the account which were confirmed, in Pring’s view, by a hostile standoff between four Englishmen and 140 Native warriors at the end of their stay on the coast.218 The English were prone to feeling threatened when outnumbered, and often overcompensated with force.219 Pring’s men delighted in the Natives’ fear of their two mastiffs, and used the dogs to intimidate and chase away Natives when they had the urge.220 Even the most positive encounters between the English and Natives during the early seventeenth-century trade voyages exhibited undertones of fear and hostility on the part of the English. Richard Hakluyt of the London Company was a key organizer of Pring’s voyage and edited Pring’s narrative of the voyage.221 Pring himself would become a member of the Plymouth Company. The London and Plymouth Companies were aware of the events of the Pring voyage, and likely took Pring’s claims of Native

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217 Ibid., 219.
218 Ibid., 227, 222.
220 “Martin Pring’s Voyage,” in ENEV, 221, 227.
221 ENEV, 214.
treachery into consideration when they were drafting their instructions for the Jamestown and Sagadahoc colonists.

James Rosier’s account of Waymouth’s 1605 voyage presented similarly mixed views of Native Americans, and an inconsistent record of Native-English interaction. Rosier acted as cape merchant during the Waymouth voyage, and was responsible for overseeing trade among Natives encountered along the coast of northern Virginia. Rosier was generally positive in his depiction of the Natives of Virginia. Rosier viewed the Natives as a kind and civil people, leading him to renounce his previous belief that they were inhuman heathens. Rosier’s Native interaction consisted mainly of peaceful trade accompanied by feasting and formal courtesies. Rosier went so far as to trade for unnecessary goods such as geese with the sole intent of maintaining good relations when the Natives lacked furs or other valuable trade goods.

Despite establishing a friendly trade relationship with various Native groups including several tribes of the Eastern Abenaki, the English were on their guard and Captain Waymouth was constantly wary of Native treachery. Commenting on the treacherous nature of Natives, Rosier declared:

we began to ioyne them in the ranke of other saluages, who haue beene by trauellers in most discoueries found very treacherous : neuer attempting mischief, vntill by some remisnesse, fit opportunity affoordeth them certain ability to execute the same.

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223 Ibid., 271.
224 Ibid., 280-1.
225 Ibid., 282, 288, 294-5.
226 Ibid., 283.
Rosier’s statement demonstrates that negative views of Native Americans were prevalent among the English during the early seventeenth century. While Rosier occasionally refers to the Natives of northern Virginia as treacherous he primarily sought to counter the established negative view of Native Americans. Rosier’s mixed views of Natives resonated with the London Company’s hopes for trade and fears of violence in their instructions to the Jamestown colonists in 1607.

The London and Plymouth Companies would have been well aware of Rosier’s account published as a promotional tract in 1605. The events of the Pring and Waymouth voyages help to explain the London Company’s mixed expectations for Native relations in Jamestown. The English trade voyages provided extensive information on the Natives of Virginia and gave many Jamestown and Sagadahoc colonists’ firsthand experience in both cooperative and hostile English-Native interaction. Native interaction during English trade voyages possessed practical applications for the trade colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc which were less prevalent in the more remote examples of Roanoke, Mediterranean trade experience, Irish colonization, and the Spanish American conquests.

The limited record of the Sagadahoc colony does not contain a clearly defined Native policy like the London Company’s “Instructions given by way of Advise”. The best surviving indicator of the colony’s Native policy is a comment by Ferdinando Gorges to the Earl of Salisbury in 1607 stating, “and the people tractable, (so discreet courses bee taken with them).”227 The Davis Journal and William Strachey’s history of

227 “Sir Ferdinando Gorges to the earl of Salisbury, reporting the return of a vessel from North Virginia, 1 December 1607,” in ENEV, 447.
the colony suggested that English-Eastern Abenaki relations in the northern colony were peaceful if not always amiable.228

The formation of the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies in 1606 was a complex event with a plethora of immediate causes and contextual influences including the accumulated knowledge of North America expeditions during the sixteenth century. It is difficult to disentangle these various factors, and ultimately all are necessary in explaining English colonization in 1607. Yet, factors varied in their influence and proximity to the events of 1606-7. The English trade voyages to North America in 1602-1605 were an intrinsic context for the Virginia Companies’ formation, and became central in shaping the London and Plymouth Companies’ objectives, tactics, and views through their published promotional tracts and the substantial overlap in personnel. Individuals such as Bartholomew Gosnold, Martin Pring, Gabriel Archer, John Martin, and the Eastern Abenaki captives Nahanda and Skidwarres were directly involved in trade voyages and the colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc. These leading individuals shaped the dual Virginia Companies’ views of the North American climate, Native Americans, and the commodities of Virginia. Objectives central to the aims of the London and Plymouth Companies including the search for a Northwest Passage through the interior of North America and hopes for mineral deposits were strongly influenced by the promotional literature and experiences of personnel involved in English trade voyages.

The scholarship considers Jamestown’s trade station function the result of England’s Mediterranean trade, overlooking the direct connections between North American trade voyages and the trade colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc.\(^{229}\) The English trade voyages were able to turn a profit based on Native trade and harvesting North American products, providing the London and Plymouth Companies with what seemed to be a viable model for self-sufficient American trade colonies. Many of Jamestown’s and Sagadahoc’s economic objectives such as Native trade, fishing, and the harvesting of sassafras were products of North American trade experience rather than Mediterranean trade experience. The scholarship’s recent focus on England’s late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century expansion in the Mediterranean needs to be supplemented with a western component. This western trade, originating with the Newfoundland fishery and West Indies privateers, resulted in North American trade voyages in 1602-1605. While eastern trade experiences certainly had a powerful effect on the leadership of the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies, the personnel on the ground had little experience in the eastern trade. The numerous colonists in Jamestown and Sagadahoc with trade experience had acquired it in the Americas rather than the Mediterranean.

The colony of Virginia and the early settlement of Jamestown hold a privileged place within the scholarship on England’s early expansion. Virginia was England’s first permanent North American colony, and bridges Elizabethan colonization, commercial

expansion, and literature with the many colonies established in the decades after Virginia. Yet, Jamestown was no more important in 1607-8 than the northern colony of Sagadahoc, and was simply the continuation of England’s North American trade activity, such as the Newfoundland fishery, which continued to overshadow Jamestown in scale and contemporary importance. Early Jamestown’s pivotal importance lies not in the contemporary significance of the small and unprofitable colony, but in the uncommonly large surviving primary source base the Jamestown venture produced. The documents relating to Jamestown provide key examples of early English North American colonization and English-Native interaction, compared to the limited record of Sagadahoc and the short-term English-Native interaction during trade voyages.

The mixture of imperial and economic objectives in Jamestown and Sagadahoc required the English colonists to be well versed in warfare and trade. These colonists were central in shaping the development of England’s early North American colonial empire both through their actions and their firsthand accounts which would influence the decisions of company leaders in England. There is a marked absence of references to the sixteenth-century Spanish American conquests, Irish colonization, the colony of Roanoke, and English activity in the Mediterranean within the English North American accounts dating from 1600-1609. Virtually all of Captain John Smith’s references to these various precedents originate in his works published after 1612, rather than his three

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230 Jack Greene’s 1988 *The Pursuit of Happiness*, marked a drastic shift from a New England centric view of America colonial history to a view which saw Virginia as the normative model for colonial development. While Greene did not expressly intend to create a Virginia centric view of American colonial history, his work was followed by an intensive scholarly focus on Virginia that continues today, *Jack Greene, Pursuits of Happiness*, XII-XIII.
works published from 1607-1612.\textsuperscript{231} In contrast, the writings of Gabriel Archer, the Davis Journal of Sagadahoc, and numerous incidental documents and correspondences dating from 1606-1609 contain frequent references to experiences and examples originating in the English trade voyages in North America.

The next chapter will address the transition from North American trade voyages to North American trade colonies which occurred simultaneously in Virginia and Acadia. This transition was the result of France and England’s interconnected sixteenth-century heritage of North American activity and their colonial competition in the early seventeenth century. While the seventeenth-century trade voyages, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc were all English ventures conducted under the political authority of the English monarchy, they were also part of a larger transnational trend of trade and colonization which closely linked England and France. The early seventeenth-century French North American trade voyages and the colony of Port Royal Acadia provide direct parallels to the English trade voyages and their influence on the colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc.

\textsuperscript{231} Smith’s only reference to these various Spanish and English experiences in his first three works is a brief mention of Roanoke and Ralph Lane in his \textit{Map of Virginia}. Smith’s later works contain substantial discussion of the Spanish American conquest’s and Smith’s personal experience in the Mediterranean, see, John Smith and William Symonds, \textit{A Map of Virginia. With a Description of the Covntrey, the Commodities, People, Government and Religion} (Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1973), 31; John Smith, “A Description of New England,” in James P. P. Horn. \textit{Captain John Smith: Writings With Other Narratives of Roanoke, Jamestown, and the First English Settlement of America} (New York: Library of America, 2007), 128, 136-7; John Smith, \textit{The True Travels}, in Horn. \textit{Captain John Smith}, 696-721.
CHAPTER 3: PORT ROYAL, JAMESTOWN, AND SAGADAHOOC: THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT OF FRENCH AND ENGLISH NORTH AMERICAN TRADE AND COLONIZATION 1580-1609
The French and English shared a connected sixteen-century heritage of North American fishing, trade, and colonization that included cooperation and emulation. In the early seventeenth century this relationship became one of intense competition over a shared sphere of trade in North America, called northern Virginia by the English and Acadia by the French. French and English competition for trade and a mutual fear of exclusion were central in causing the creation of trade colonies in the early seventeenth century. The French designed the colony of Port Royal Acadia to claim and defend territory against the English, using military force and functioning as a trade station. Port Royal continued the economic activities established in previous French trade voyages to North America including the fur trade. Numerous colonists in Port Royal had experience in French North America trade voyages, and the knowledge gained during these voyages was central in formulating the colony’s tactics, objectives, and perceptions.

Port Royal’s economic objectives included Native trade, fishing, searching for mineral deposits and a Northwest Passage to the South Sea. Each of these French economic goals had close parallels in the English colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc. The similarities between French and English economic objectives were the result of their shared tradition of North American trade voyages and their exchange of information through promotional literature, published documents, and personal connections. The comparable economic objectives of the French and English in the initial stages of colonization do not fit the scholarship’s strict economic divide of French fur trade colonies and English agricultural colonies. This divide only arose after the trade voyage precedents failed to support large and expensive trade colonies, forcing the French and English to adapt to local conditions and economic realities.
Port Royal also drew on trade voyage experience to determine the climate of Acadia. The seasonal nature of the French trade voyages led to an optimistic misrepresentation of the climate, which left the French unprepared for the cold of North American winters and soon led the French to question the viability of Acadian colonization. French-Native interaction during seasonal trade voyages led the French to develop mixed views of Native Americans that acknowledged the need for cooperation, but were largely distrustful, disdainful, and even hostile to Natives in general. Based on these mixed views of Native Americans, Port Royal’s initial Native policy considered the possibility of violence with Native groups, sought the submission of the Acadian Natives, but also acknowledged the French dependence on Native cooperation in the fur trade. The French approximation of North America’s climate and the formation of their Native policy based on the experiences of trade voyages closely resemble developments in the English colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc.

The interconnected nature of the trade voyages and the establishment of trade colonies by France and England in the early seventeenth century did not conform to the nationalistic divide in culture, economic objectives, or Native policy that is prominent in the scholarship on North American colonization. In emphasizing the divisions between the French and English many scholars have overlooked the regional divisions and cultural diversity within both France and England in the early seventeenth century. The royal backing and national objectives of de Mons’ trade company and the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies coexisted uneasily with these companies’ regional associations and the regional identities of their colonists.
Competitive Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century French and English Trade Voyages

Scholars studying England’s late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century commercial expansion stress English competition with Spain as the driving force behind this expansion, but these scholars have overlooked England’s contemporary competition with France in North America. This trend is the result of recent scholars’ focus on the Mediterranean and East, where the English were competing with the Spanish commercially, rather than North America where the English were competing with both Spain and France. Following the Spanish peace in 1604 competition between England and Spain shifted from open conflict to a commercial rivalry.

King James was vehemently against piracy and privateering and favoured reopening legitimate trade with Spain and the Spanish Americas. Joyce Chaplin sees England’s late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century commercial expansion through the Levant, Muscovy, East India, and London Virginia Company as part of England’s desire to compete with Spain in the context of the post-Elizabethan peace. Scholars focusing on England’s economic competition with Spain have overlooked the extensive connections between the dual Virginia Companies, England’s early seventeenth-century North American trade voyages, and England’s contemporary economic competition with France. English and French competition for North American trade during the late

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232 See, footnotes 11, 61, 30 and adjoining discussion in Chapter One.
235 Ibid., 323.
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was a primary stimulus behind French and
English North American trade voyages, Jamestown, Sagadahoc, and the French colony of
Port Royal Acadia.

The French conducted trade voyages to North America throughout the sixteenth
century, and the English sought to emulate these French voyages. French fishermen
began operating seasonal trade voyages to northeastern North America in conjunction
with cod fishing sometime in the early sixteenth century. In the 1580’s voyages
concentrating on the fur trade in New France and Acadia became a seasonal occurrence
continuing into the seventeenth century. During the 1580’s English and French
fishermen, primarily Huguenots from La Rochelle, Navarre, and Normandy, maintained
close contact and cooperation in the Newfoundland fishery. Through contact with
French fishermen, England followed France in pursuing North American trade as early as
1580. Englishmen interested in North American trade and colonization continued to
observe and imitate French trade voyages to North America throughout the late sixteenth
century.

In his 1584 report “A Discourse Concerning Western Planting,” Richard Hakluyt
recounted the voyage of his friend Stephen Bellinger, a merchant of Rouen, to the
Acadian coast in 1583 where he made a profit of 411 crowns. Hakluyt claimed the
French traded for more than 20,000 crowns worth of furs in 1583, and reported that the
French city of Saint-Malo sent five ships to Canada and the Gulf of St. Lawrence to trade

238 Quinn, North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements, 390; DSOD, 46.
239 Quinn, North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements, 417.
240 Ibid., 387.
for furs in 1584. Hakluyt sought to chastise English leaders with reports of French activity in hopes of reinvigorating England’s North American ventures. Hakluyt’s report confirms that French trade voyages influenced English plans for North American ventures, and this influence often operated through personal connections between French and English individuals such as the Hakluyt and his friend Bellenger. The English continued to imitate the French by entering the fishing, walrus hunting, and whaling trade in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in the 1590’s with the help of a French Basque pilot Stevan Bocall. French and English trade activity in North America predated the economic revival which followed the French-Spanish peace of 1598 and English-Spanish peace of 1604. Yet, it was the Spanish peace first in France and then England which led to the simultaneous revival of competing French and English trade voyages to North America in the early seventeenth century.

Following the end of the French religious civil war and the Spanish peace of 1598, King Henri IV of France attempted to encourage colonization in North America by granting a fur trade monopoly in New France to the nobleman La Roche. In return for the fur trade monopoly, King Henri charged La Roche with colonization. La Roche planted a small colony on Sable Island which lasted until 1603, but King Henri soon handed over the majority of New France to the another nobleman Chauvin. King Henri granted fur trade monopolies to Chauvin and his successor Chaste from 1600-1603.

242 Ibid., 81-2, 102.
Chauvin and Chaste’s monopolies required the establishment of colonies, but minimal effort was put into this obligation with Chauvin leaving 16 men to winter in a makeshift shelter at Tadoussac in 1600. 247

Chauvin and Chased largely ignored their obligations to enact colonization and focused on the fur trade by sending four separate trade voyages, each consisting of multiple ships, to North America from 1600-1603. 248 The English trade voyages of 1602-1605 were a direct imitation of these French voyages. The sudden resumption of English activity in northeastern North America with Bartholomew Gosnold’s voyage to northern Virginia in 1602 was an attempt to compete with the French by combining the French fur trade with the English interest in collecting sassafras. 249 Samuel Mace was also collecting sassafras for Walter Raleigh in southern Virginia in 1602, and the supposedly medicinal root may have been used to fund trade voyages to southern Virginia prior to 1602. 250

1602 marked the resumption of France and England’s competition for North American trade which would continue to influence events in Jamestown, Sagadahoc, and Port Royal through trade voyage personnel such as Gosnold and Samuel de Champlain.

In 1603 two French ships were authorized to trade for furs in North America as part of Chaste’s monopoly. 251 The first ship under Gravé Du Pont traded at Tadoussac before exploring up the St. Lawrence River, and the second ship under Sieur de Prevert

248 Ibid.
249 ENEV, 112.
250 Ibid., 34; “A briefe Note of the sending another barke,” in ENEV, 166-7. Haklyuty reports that the English interest in sassafras originated in French documents discussing the Florida colonies in the 1560’s. See, Haklyuty, “A Discourse Concerning Western Planting,” in NAW Vol. 3, 77.
251 A third ship was granted to the city of Saint-Malo, “Extract from the Decrees of the Council of State, March 1603,” in DSOD, 207.
traded and explored along the Acadian coast. Samuel de Champlain was a member of the Gravé voyage and wrote an account of the expedition published in 1603 under the title *Des Sauvages*. Champlain published his account the year after the English promotional pamphlet containing Brereton’s narrative of the Gosnold voyage and the Hayes Treatise on colonizing northern Virginia. The French did not extensively utilize promotional literature in the late sixteen century and the publication of Champlain’s promotional account was likely inspired by the established English practice of using firsthand accounts to generate support for North American ventures.

Conrad Heidenreich and Janet Ritch have found that traces of information within Champlain’s 1603 account were likely taken from the Hayes Treatise of 1602, concluding that Champlain’s account was essentially a French rebuttal to the 1602 English pamphlet. England’s northern Virginia included the North American coast from the latitude of 38 to 45 degrees, but France also claimed this area in 1602 under the name of Acadia extending south to the latitude of 40 degrees. After 1602 the French and English were directly competing for the trade of this region, and this rivalry stimulated the transition from trade voyages to trade colonies in France and England.

With the death of Chaste in 1603, King Henri awarded the fur trade monopoly to the Huguenot nobleman Sieur de Mons. The choice of de Mons represented the continued prevalence of Huguenots in France’s North American trade, and de Mons’ colony would include a mixture of Huguenot and moderate Catholic investors and

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253 DSOD, 55, 460.
Unlike the previous monopoly holders, de Mons intended to honour his mandate to establish a substantial colony, choosing the contested coast of Acadia in 1603. De Mons’ colony was a trade base in Acadia, but it also functioned to claim land for France and to protect French claims to the region against the resurgence of English trade and colonization efforts. The 1603 commission from the Lord High Admiral of France to de Mons positioned the colony as a counter to the intentions of the English to colonize Acadia clearly stating, “certain strangers design to go to set up colonies and plantations in and about the said country of La Cadie, should it remain much longer…deserted and abandoned.” The French transition from trade voyages to the trade colony of Port Royal in 1603-4 was a direct result of competition with English trade voyages. Much like the militarized English colonies in 1607, Port Royal possessed a distinct military component and larger scale that differentiated it from the previous French trade voyages.

The late sixteenth-century North American cooperation between France and England gave way to an imperial rivalry in the early seventeenth century, but King James and King Henri hoped to maintain good relations and were both primarily concerned with the continuing threat of Spanish power. David Quinn speculates that the failed voyage of the Castor and Pollux, including a mixture of French and English investors and crewmembers, sent out before the English-Spanish peace in 1604 was an attempt by France and England to reach an amiable division of the disputed North American

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256 Lescarbot, Vol. II, 233; Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 7; Jones, Gentlemen and Jesuits, 8.
France and England justified their claims to North American territory based on previous exploration and trade in the region. Yet, due to their competing claims to the North American coastline between the latitude of 38 and 45 degrees the French and English ultimately came to rely on the establishment of bases to occupy the land continuously. The French and English in Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc relied on the occupation of territory backed by force of arms to secure their claims. Thus, the core of each colony was a compact fort armed with cannons and defended by experienced military men.

The Royal charter granting de Mons his monopoly had a strong military element in its instructions and requirements for colonization. De Mons was instructed to build a fort and maintain it with an armed garrison, as part of his, “…conquest, settlement, colonisation, and preservation of the said land of La Cadie.” The Lord High Admiral’s commission similarly mentioned the need to, “…build forts and fortresses…ports, havens, and all else necessary for the safe retreat of French vessels from hostile designs and piratical incursions.” De Mons carried out these defensive measures in 1604 on his
arrival in Acadia. The French chose a small island in the midst of the St. Croix River for the initial site of their colony.  

Champlain praised the defensible site with its high cliffs, and the French set to building a fortified colony armed with cannons.  

De Mons, Gravé, Champlain, and many of the colonists were military men with experience in the French religious civil war. The group of 79 initial colonists also included a contingent of skilled Swiss soldiers to bolster the colony’s defences. The French at Port Royal had defensive concerns comparable to Jamestown and Sagadahoc in 1607, and these common motivations led to similarities in the size, military nature, and defensive habitations of each colony. French competition with the English over trade territory in North America led to a transition from seasonal trade voyages, which made only small and half-hearted attempts at colonization, to a large militarized trade colony intended to lay claim to the region.

The revival of English North American activity in the early seventeenth century beginning with the Gosnold Voyage in 1602 and culminating in the foundation of Jamestown and Sagadahoc in 1607 was largely the result of this English-French competition. The Gosnold voyage attempted to establish a small trade colony on the French model in 1602, and the Hayes treatise emphatically argued for English colonization in northern Virginia before the French could claim the area and exclude the

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265 Ibid., 270-1.
266 For Champlain, de Mons and the various other nobles’ military backgrounds see, “Payment of Various Sums to Jean Hardy and Samuel de Champlain, for Their Wages and Traveling Expenses in the Royal Army of Brittany, March 1595 – April 1597,” in DSOD, 163-165; Lescarbot, Vol. II, 209-210; Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 7; Jones, Gentlemen and Jesuits, 6.
English. The English trade voyages of Pring and Waymouth also competed with the French, and the Sagadahoc colonists feared a French attack in 1607-8. While Jamestown focused on competition with Spain and feared a possible Spanish attack English competition with France in northern Virginia helped to stimulate the North American activity and interest that was central to the formation of both the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies in 1606. Gosnold, Archer, and Martin transferred their north Virginian trade voyage experiences and economic objectives derived from competition with the French to Jamestown in 1607. The trade colonies of Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc possessed a common trade voyage heritage and similar economic objectives.

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The Economic Influence of Trade Voyages in Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc

The French colonization effort in 1604 included many Frenchmen who had previous experience in the trade voyages of Chauvin and Chaste. Sieur de Mons the primary investor and organizer of the 1604 colony and holder of Henri’s fur trade monopoly had been to Tadoussac in New France as part of the Chauvin trade expedition in 1600. Similarly, Gravé Du Pont who would assist de Mons in the fur trade and commanded Port Royal in 1605-6 had extensive experience in the St. Lawrence region in

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270 Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 67; Biggar, The Early Trading Companies of New France, 42.
1599-1603 as part of the Chauvin and Chaste fur trade monopolies.\textsuperscript{271} Samuel de Champlain was part of the 1603 Chaste expedition, and served as the cartographer and secretary in Port Royal.\textsuperscript{272} Scholars of French colonization acknowledge the connections between the French trade voyages and the colony of Port Royal in general terms, but the extent and specific nature of these connections are overlooked.\textsuperscript{273} French trade voyage experiences shaped the tactics, objectives, and preconceptions of the French colonization effort in Port Royal. In each case, this transfer of experience from trade voyages to Port Royal represents direct parallels with the English trade voyages and their influence on the colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc. The French and English colonization efforts in Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc were far more similar and intrinsically linked than the French and English scholarship has accepted.

Port Royal’s main economic objective in 1604-7 was exploiting de Mons’ fur trade monopoly.\textsuperscript{274} Gravé oversaw the fur trade in the first year of the colony trading at Canso and along the coast of the Gulf of St. Lawrence while de Mons proceeded to find a suitable spot for his colony.\textsuperscript{275} The French also pursued trade while exploring the coast south of Port Royal in 1604, 1605, and 1606.\textsuperscript{276} In the two major accounts of Port Royal, Champlain and Marc Lescarbot occasionally mentioned other members of de Mons’

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\textsuperscript{272} Champlain, Vol. I, 280. in a factum written in 1613 the merchants of Saint-Malo referred to Champlain as a passenger and an artist (pointre) in Port Royal, “Factum of the Merchants of Saint-Malo, January 1613,” in DSOD, 199.

\textsuperscript{273} Biggar, \textit{The Early Trading Companies of New France}, 51-64; Trudel, \textit{The Beginnings of New France}, 54-92; DSOD, 3-82.


\textsuperscript{275} Champlain, Vol. I, 233-4, 276. H.P. Biggar also mentions two ships sent from Saint-Malo as part of de Mons monopoly which traded in the St. Lawrence during 1604. See, Biggar, \textit{The Early Trading Companies on New France}, 54.

\textsuperscript{276} Champlain, Vol. I, 296, 316, 398.
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company, such as a group of Saint-Malo men encountered off the coast of Canso, and it is clear that de Mons’ company continued to send out seasonal trade voyages alongside the colony in Acadia. The French reliance on the fur trade also determined the original site of the colony on St. Croix Island, as Champlain observed:

This place we considered the best we had seen, both on account of its situation, the fine country, and for the intercourse we were expecting with the Indians of these coasts and of the interior, since we should be in their midst.

Port Royal’s primary source of income was the fur trade established by previous French trade voyages. Port Royal’s focus on Native trade represented a parallel with English economic objectives in Jamestown and Sagadahoc.

In the early seventeenth century French and English North American colonies attempted to profit from Native trade and the varied outcomes of these trade colonies were the result of local conditions rather than differing objectives. The London Virginia Company intended Jamestown to be a trade base. While poor relations with the Powhatans and trading for foodstuffs over profitable goods adversely affected the colony’s trade function, there were attempts to establish a fur trade in the Chesapeake. Gabriel Archer listed furs among the regions profitable trade goods in 1607, and during his trade voyages throughout the Chesapeake Bay in 1608 John Smith was reported to

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278 Champlain, Vol. I, 271-2: “Qui est le lieu que nous iugeâmes le meilleur: tant pour la situation, bon pays, que pour le communication que nous pretendions auec les sauvages de ces costes & du dedans des terres estans au milieu d’eux.”
have collected, “…mantles and furs.” Later Smith complained that the waged sailors of the resupply ship had bought all of the Natives’ furs, with one man taking 30.

The Sagadahoc colony had some success in establishing a fur trade, although the fragmented record leaves the scale of the trade a mystery. De Mons’ company was much more successful in exploiting the fur trade in Acadia and New France. De Mons’ company earned an estimated 90,000 crowns in their first year. The Mi’kmaq of Acadia and the Montagnais of the St. Lawrence were established fur trade partners with more experience than the Eastern Abenaki in the region near Sagadahoc or the Powhatans of the southern Chesapeake.

Despite de Mons’ profits, the cost of Port Royal more than offset these gains and the fur trade proved incapable of supporting his Acadian colony. Lescarbot mentioned de Mons’ huge naval expenses during 1604-1607, and the Saint-Malo merchant factum of 1613 claimed Port Royal was an economic disaster with total losses of over 100,000 livres. The competing French and English trade voyages transferred their common interest in Native trade to Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc. While Native trade was profitable during seasonal trade voyages it would prove incapable of supporting large

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280 Ibid., 326.
282 Jones, Gentlemen and Jesuits, 41.
284 Biggar, The Early Trading Companies of New France, 65; Jones, Gentlemen and Jesuits, 123.
and expensive colonies in the early seventeenth century. French trade voyages also transferred hopes for mineral deposits based on trade voyage accounts to Port Royal.

Based on the findings of previous trade voyages the French hoped for mines in Acadia. In his 1603 account Champlain described his meeting with Sieur de Prevert who led the Acadian branch of Chaste’s fur trade monopoly. Prevert reported a rich mine of copper on the coast of Acadia.\(^{286}\) While Prevert’s report would eventually prove false, Champlain and other Frenchmen involved in Port Royal considered his report credible at the time.\(^{287}\) This apparent confirmation of mineral deposits contributed to de Mons’ choice to colonize Acadia in 1603-1604.

De Mons’ 1603 commission from the Lord High Admiral observed the possibility of mines in Acadia, declaring, “on the advice and report lately made by the captains recently returned thence of the number and quantity of good mines found therein, the working of which will bring much profit and advantage.”\(^{288}\) De Mons and the French government’s high hopes for mineral wealth in Acadia were based on the reports of men involved in trade voyages such as Prevert. The royal commission to de Mons in 1603 commanded him to, “…survey all manner of mines, of gold, silver, copper, and other metals and minerals.”\(^{289}\) The French government’s strong belief in the existence of mineral deposits was demonstrated by the inclusion of a clause discussing the procedure

\(^{286}\) Champlain, *Des Sauvages*, in DSOD, 355,357.

\(^{287}\) Ibid.


for mining and the royalties due on any mineral wealth found in Acadia. These hopes led the colonists at Port Royal to search for the copper mine reported by Prevert, and other sites along the Acadian coast were repeatedly surveyed for mineral deposits. The imperfect knowledge acquired in French and English trade voyages misled the French in their search for mineral wealth in Acadia.

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the French and English repeatedly exchanged information on mineral deposits in North America, and each groups’ hopes for mines were influenced by the other’s reports. In the 1602 promotional tract on the Gosnold and Mace voyages, Richard Hakluyt reported the Frenchmen Stephen Bellenger’s discovery of copper mines in the Bay of Fundy during his 1583 voyage. The English colony of Sagadahoc would have relied at least partially on these older French reports of mines. Champlain and other members of the French expedition to New France in 1603 seem to have been aware of this 1602 pamphlet, and this may have fuelled their belief in Acadian copper mines. De Mons and the French government’s staunch belief in mines, despite having only the unconfirmed reports of Prevert, may indicate that they were also relying on Hakluyt’s reports of mineral deposits. It is also possible that the speculation and myth concerning Norumbega as a land of abundance and wealth similar to El Dorado in the sixteenth century influenced these French and English belief in mines. Yet the only reference to this older concept of Norumbega in the context of the French and English trade voyages and colonies is given by Champlain

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290 Ibid., 214.
293 DSOD, 55, 460.
during the exploration of the Penobscot River in 1604, and he considered the wonders of Norumbega to be a baseless myth.\(^{295}\)

The official grant to de Mons stating the French belief in Acadian mines would have been available and known to the English organizers of the dual Virginia Companies. King Henri had De Mons’ patent published and distributed to warn the many French merchants involved in the fur trade of the monopoly.\(^{296}\) The *Castor and Pollux*, a North American trade venture including a mixture of French and English interests sailed from Plymouth in 1604 carrying a copy of de Mons’ patent with its reports of Acadian mines.\(^ {297}\) Despite the lack of any tangible evidence to support the existence of mines in Acadia or northern Virginia, the English and French repeatedly exchanged false reports of mines. With each exchange the French and English became more certain of these mineral deposits’ existence, leading to disappointment at Sagadahoc and Port Royal. Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc’s similarities were not only the result of their common trade voyage heritage, the French and English were well informed on each others’ activities and utilized the information in each others’ promotional pamphlets and published documents. These significant connections demonstrate the limitations of using a nation specific scope in studying the colonization efforts of France and England in the early seventeenth century.

In the early seventeenth century, personal, political, and economic connections between France and England facilitated the effective dissemination of information, and

\(^{295}\) Champlain, Vol. I, 300.
both countries were well aware of the others’ North American activities. France was crucial as a training ground where young elite Englishmen acquired knowledge of continental European languages, politics, and culture before taking their places among the leaders of England.\(^{298}\) Many English merchants lived in the port cities of northern France and many French merchants resided in London.\(^{299}\)

These connections created countless channels for information to flow quickly between France and England. Richard Hakluyt had spent time in France as part of England’s embassy and had personnel connections with many Huguenots involved in France’s North American trade.\(^{300}\) Through these connections Hakluyt acquired and translated the works of Frenchmen such as Samuel de Champlain.\(^{301}\) Similarly, Chaste served as ambassador to England in 1602 while involved in France’s North American trade ventures.\(^{302}\) Detailed information on Jamestown was first published in France early in 1608 and the French author knew the size of the colony, identified the leaders Newport and Wingfield by name, and was aware that the colony had returned false gold ore to England.\(^{303}\) This cycle of information exchange affected the objectives of the French and English in their North American colonies and encouraged French hopes for a Northwest Passage through the interior of North America.

During his 1603 voyage to the St. Lawrence Champlain was fixated on finding a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for a Northwest Passage through the river systems of Canada, and these hopes for 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Passage influenced the objectives of de Mons and the French in Port Royal. After visiting Tadoussac in 1603 the French slowly made their way up the St. Lawrence River, and when strong currents halted their progress Champlain proceeded via canoe with Native guides. 304 Frustrated in his progress, Champlain took great pains throughout the voyage to collect information from several Natives on the region upriver. 305 Based on this Native information Champlain concluded that the St. Lawrence River led to the South Sea or Pacific Ocean. 306

Champlain was consumed by his search for a Northwest Passage in 1603, and he transferred these aspirations to Port Royal in 1604. Although Champlain had little power in Port Royal he was at the forefront of events in the colony and was one of the only colonists to remain in Acadia for the entire duration of the colony. 307 Champlain later described the context of Port Royal’s foundation:

…to effect a permanent settlement in those lands which we call New France in hopes of attaining more easily to the completion of this enterprise, since the voyage would begin in this land beyond the ocean, along which the search for the desired passage is to be made. 308

Champlain saw French North American colonies as way stations to find and exploit the Northwest Passage. It was partly in hope of finding a Northwest Passage that three separate coastal voyages set out from St. Croix and Port Royal exploring the coastline to the south in 1604, 1605, and 1606. 309 Champlain was unimpressed by the size of each

304 Champlain, Des Sauvages, in DSOD, 295-297, 311, 313.
305 Ibid., 301, 305, 323.
306 Ibid., 336-7.
308 Ibid., 228-229: “à essayer de faire vne demeure arrestée és terres que nous disons la Nouuelle France, esperans parvenir plus facilement à la perfection de ceste enterprise, la Nauigation commençant en la terre d'outre l'ocean, le long de laquelle se fait la recherche du passage desire.”
river he encountered during these voyages, the largest being the Penobscot River which the French found navigable for only 25 leagues inland.\textsuperscript{310} The French found no sign of a Northwest Passage on the coast of Acadia in 1604-1606. In 1608, hopes for a passage to the South Sea reverted to the St. Lawrence River system. In 1618 Lescarbot still believed the St. Lawrence River led to the South Sea, and Champlain’s maps of New France published up to 1632 included a Northwest Passage through the St. Lawrence River.\textsuperscript{311}

The French and English search for a Northwest Passage through the interior of North America in Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc shared common roots. Edward Hayes drew on French sources discussing the St. Lawrence to make his argument for the existence of a Northwest Passage in his 1602 treatise.\textsuperscript{312} In his 1603 account Champlain demonstrated a distinct lack of knowledge concerning these earlier French sources used by Hayes, and Champlain provided only a single inaccurate reference to the voyages of Cartier in his account.\textsuperscript{313} Conrad Heidenreich and Janet Ritch argue that Champlain was aware of the Hayes treatise in 1603, and that Champlain’s search for a Northwest Passage was driven by these recent English claims of a Northwest Passage.\textsuperscript{314}

Hakluyt translated the work of Champlain including \textit{Des Sauvages}, and it is possible that Hakluyt had read and relayed the information in Champlain’s account to the London Virginia Company before 1607.\textsuperscript{315} Douglas Hunter argues that references to a Northwest Passage by John Smith and George Popham indicate that they were aware of

\textsuperscript{310} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{312} Edward Hayes, “A Treatise, 1602,” in ENEV, 177.
\textsuperscript{313} Champlain, \textit{Des Sauvages}, in DSOD, 299.
\textsuperscript{314} DSOD, 55, 460.
\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., XII-XIII.
and using the information in *Des Sauvages*, but he overlooks the fact that in his pamphlet Champlain provides a description of the Northwest Passage that is nearly identical to that given by Hayes in 1602.\(^{316}\) It is much more likely that Smith and Popham were referencing the 1602 Hayes treatise, given the pamphlet’s connections to the Virginia colonization effort. Regardless of the exact context of transmission, the French and English clearly used each other’s information on the Northwest Passage. The French and English search for a Northwest Passage was a common goal representing part of a shared heritage of North American exploration. Champlain supported this shared French and English heritage when he wrote a miniature history of the search for the Northwest Passage later in the seventeenth century, including the voyages of French and English explorers such as Cabot, Cartier, Davis, Frobisher, and Gilbert.\(^{317}\)

Cod fishing was another concern of the previous trade voyages which was transferred to the colony of Port Royal. Seasonal trade voyages to Acadia and New France had combined cod fishing and the fur trade for decades. In 1591, an English privateer apprehended a French ship loaded with a cargo of fish, train oil, and furs returning from the Gulf of St. Lawrence.\(^{318}\) During his third trade voyage to New France in 1603 Chauvin contracted with Rouen merchants to deliver 100,000 dried fish.\(^{319}\) While Champlain’s 1603 account does not include any discussion of French fishing during the Chaste voyage, it likely occurred and merely did not merit mention by Champlain who focused on geographic features during the expedition.\(^{320}\) De Mons’ and other trade voyage veterans continued to utilize Acadia’s fishing banks in Port Royal. De Mons did

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his best to combine fishing with Port Royal’s resupply voyages in order to maximize profits in 1604-1607, and Lescarbot mentions Port Royal’s main supply ship the *Jonas* fishing off Canso.321

Jamestown, Sagadahoc, and Port Royal’s parallel efforts to engage in profitable fishing were the product of these colonies’ common heritage of North American trade voyages with their roots in the Newfoundland fishing industry. Newfoundland was the dominant North American industry for both the French and English in the early seventeenth century, and this was increasingly the case for England as the privateering effort against Spain declined and then ended in 1603-4.322 The Newfoundland fishermen established the northern sea route to North America via the Azores, and this path was used by the French and English trade voyages and the colonies of Port Royal and Sagadahoc.323 It was only practical that the longstanding and profitable example of the Newfoundland fishery would influence the economic objectives of the French and English in the early seventeenth century during trade voyages and colonization efforts. The Newfoundland fishery’s influence on these French and English colonies highlights the common importance of North American activity in forming the parallel economic objectives of Jamestown, Sagadahoc, and Port Royal.

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322  According to David Quinn in 1579 there were 50 English ships reported yearly at Newfoundland, with as many as 500 French Ships. There were reported to be approximately 200 English ships at Newfoundland in 1609. Quinn, Explorers and Colonies, 210, Quinn, America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements, 423. For the relative size of the Newfoundland fishery trade see, Peter Pope, *Fish into wine: the Newfoundland plantation in the seventeenth century* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2004),13-19.
Scholars divide French and English colonization based on commodities and developmental patterns resulting from the regional availability of these commodities.\footnote{Benjamin, \textit{The Atlantic World}, 297-8; Stephen Hornsby and Michael Hermann, \textit{British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America}. (Hanover: University of New England, 2005), 2.} Yet, this divide did not initially exist in Jamestown, Sagadahoc, and Port Royal, and when this economic divide did develop it was not solely the result of the availability of local commodities. Stephen Hornsby in his book \textit{British Atlantic American Frontier} divides the fur and fish based economy of Canada from the agricultural settlement of British North America.\footnote{Hornsby and Hermann, \textit{British Atlantic, American Frontier}, 2.}

Similarly, Thomas Benjamin sees the development of both French and English colonies as determined by the local economic resources and the material interests of Europeans.\footnote{Benjamin, \textit{The Atlantic World}, 297-8.} Benjamin argues that the French sought furs not agriculture, and sees English colonization as focused on land and settlement.\footnote{Ibid.} The preceding survey of French and English economic objectives shows this divide did not exist during the initial phase of colonization. There were distinctions between French and English objectives, such as the search for Raleigh’s lost colonists in Jamestown, the English interest in sassafras, and the larger scale of the French fur trade. The similarities in Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc’s focus on Native trade, fishing, and searches for the Northwest Passage and mines were the central components of both French and English colonial objectives. It was only after heavy financial losses resulting from the failure of trade voyage methods to fund large colonies that the objectives of the French and English diverged.
After the failure of Port Royal in 1607, de Mons refocused his efforts on the St. Lawrence, deputizing Champlain to establish a colony upriver at Quebec in 1608. Proutrincourt, a former member of de Mons’ company, re-established Port Royal in 1610. These French colonies adapted to the economic realities of the fur trade in New France and Acadia, earning a profit by keeping costs down with limited personnel. Quebec had 28 colonists in 1608 and remained small and precariously self-sufficient financially into the 1630’s. The Plymouth men simply abandoned Sagadahoc in 1608. Ferdinando Gorges and Francis Popham continued seasonal voyages to northern Virginia, but many of the investors joined the London Company in 1609. The London Company was slow to adapt to the failures and losses in Jamestown, and continued to increase investment and expand the number of investors before eventually making the shift to selling land and focusing on tobacco production.

The divide identified by Hornsby and Benjamin arose only a few years after the establishment of French and English North American colonies, but it was not an inevitable divide. Virginia would prove capable of supporting a profitable fur trade beginning in the 1620’s, as would the New England coast near the site of Sagadahoc. The traditional narrative of Jamestown’s transition to agriculture and tobacco often

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328 Champlain, Vol. I, 231; Jones, Gentlemen and Jesuits, 124; Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 17.
329 Ibid., 17.
330 W.J. Eccles, The French in North America 1500-1783 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998), 21; Quinn, Explorers and Colonies, 143; Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 5, 18; Jones, Gentlemen and Jesuits, 130.
331 Eccles, The French in North America, 21; Quinn, Explorers and Colonies, 143.
overlooks the flourishing fur trade which developed in Virginia after 1624 and lasted until 1660. The choices of colonial leaders, company investors, and colonists’ relations with local Native groups in the initial stage of colonization were largely responsible for the divergence of French and English products and methods.

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**French and English Perceptions of the North American Climate and Native Characteristics**

The seasonal nature of French trade voyages to Acadia prior to 1604 lead to misrepresentations of the regions climate, and had a significant impact on the colonization effort in Port Royal. Positive reports on the climate of Acadia had resulted from season trade voyages as early as the 1580’s. In 1584 Richard Hakluyt cited a French captain of Dieppe’s report on the coast of Norumbega between the latitude of 40-47 degrees, who found the area to be fertile, abundant, and lush with fruits. Prevert gave Champlain a similar description of the Acadian coast in 1603 and based on Prevert’s report Champlain concluded, “The entire land is very beautiful and flat, where there are all the kinds of trees which we saw going to the first rapids of the great Riviere de Canadas…” These positive reports on the Acadian coast influenced de Mons’ choice to establish his colony there. The commission from the Lord High Admiral praised the, “…discovery and colonisation of the coasts and countries of La Cadie, both in view of

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the climate, the goodness of the soil, the advantageous situation of the said province...”

French views of Acadia’s climate were reinforced by the connections they perceived between latitude and climate. Acadia was located in the same latitude as France, and the French assumed the two regions would have relatively similar climates. Firsthand experience contradicted this view to an extent, with Champlain citing the excessive cold at Tadoussac in 1603, but this same limited experience could just as easily mislead seasonal visitors. Champlain accepted Prevert’s exaggerated account of the Acadia coast, comparing Prevert’s account to his own positive report on the region up the St. Lawrence River. The French optimistically believed Acadia to be a plentiful land with a mild climate, but the information provided by seasonal trade voyages proved to be deceptively incomplete.

Arriving in Acadia in 1604 and scouting the coast, the French choose to settle on an island in the midst of the St. Croix River on the Western coast of the Bay of Fundy. The first snowfall occurred in early October and the St. Croix River soon clogged with ice, making travel nearly impossible. All of the colony’s stores except the Spanish wine froze, the French were unable to travel to the mainland for fuel, and scurvy set in

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339 Examples of this correlation exist throughout the writings of the French, but tend to decline with firsthand experience. For example in his History of New France, Marc Lescarbot comments that Virginia, referring to the Chesapeake region, is in the latitude of 35-38 degrees, and so must have a good and healthy climate. Lescarbot, Vol. II, 278.
340 Champlain, Des Sauvages, in DSOD, 289.
341 Ibid., 259.
killing 35 of the 79 colonists. Champlain observed that the winter was much colder and longer than that of France and speculated that it was due to the uncultivated nature of the land and the northwestern winds. Addressing the French miscalculations of Acadia’s climate Champlain commented, “It was difficult to know this country without having wintered there; for on arriving in summer everything is very pleasant…”

The French colonists’ miscalculation of Acadia’s climate was aggravated by the severity of the winters during the early seventeenth century. The climatic event known as Little Ice Age produced extreme cold in the early seventeenth century resulting in October snows and ice in Acadia during 1604. The harsh winter of 1604-5 resulted in a scramble to find a more suitable spot for the colony. The colony relocated to Port Royal across the Bay of Fundy in the Annapolis Basin in 1605, but de Mons remained unsatisfied and the coastal voyages in 1605 and 1606 sought a new location further south in a warmer climate. The experience gained during seasonal trade voyages led to a misunderstanding of Acadia’s climate. This misinformation on Acadia’s climate causing serious damage to the French colonization effort in 1604-5, and de Mons became disenchanted with region, questioning its viability for colonization.

Jamestown, Sagadahoc, and Port Royal experienced parallel misunderstandings of the North American climate based on the inaccurate information provided by seasonal trade voyages. Much like Jamestown, the French colonists emphasized defence in choosing St. Croix Island for the site of their colony at the expense of other

344 Ibid., 302-3.
345 Ibid., 307: “Il estoit mal-aisé de reconnoistre ce pays sans y avoir yuerné, car y arriuant en été tout y est fort aggreable...”
346 Fagan, The Little Ice Age, 104-5, 151.
considerations such as the availability of drinking water. In Jamestown the saline
contaminated water near the fort would be a major factor leading to the high death rates
in 1607-9. In 1604-5, the French at St. Croix lacked access to wood for fuel or fresh
drinking water due to their island location, attributing to the colony’s heavy casualties.
The harsh winters of eastern North America caught the colonists at Jamestown,
Sagadahoc, and St. Croix off guard, and led to dissatisfaction and confusion. While the
English abandoned Sagadahoc the French persevered, moving to Port Royal and
contemplating a move to the south along the coast.

The presence of de Mons, the main investor and monopoly holder, in Port Royal
gave the French the ability to quickly respond to the adversity they faced during the
winter of 1604-5. In contrast, the London Company would not learn of the unhealthy
nature of the Jamestown site until the return of the first resupply under Newport in the
spring of 1608, and did not attempt to amend the problem until the third resupply in
1609. Even then, the disastrous wreck of the Sea Venture with Jamestown’s new
charter and governor foiled these plans for relocation. The French and English held
similar views connecting latitude to climate, and came to similar conclusions on the
environment of North America based on incomplete information gathered in seasonal
trade voyages. The French would also rely on the experiences gained during trade
voyages to formulate their views and policies towards the Native groups of Acadia.

Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 222-3.
350 For discussion of the London Virginia Company’s 1609 plan for relocation see, Horn, A Kingdom
Strange The Brief and Tragic History of the Lost Colony of Roanoke (New York: Basic Books, 2010),
220-221, 232.
280-281.
During the French trade voyage to the St. Lawrence in 1603, Champlain expressed disdain for Native Americas despite constantly depending on Native assistance. Champlain’s negative views reflected the dominant views of Native Americans among the French trade voyage personnel during the early seventeenth century. During his voyage to the St. Lawrence Champlain had extensive contact with the Natives of the region, including the Montagnais, during feasts, trading, and while traveling upriver with the help of Native guides. During the French-Montagnais feast at Tadoussac Champlain described the Montagnais as having a joyful disposition and observed, “I assure you that there are plenty of them who have good judgment and respond quite appropriately to whatever one could ask of them.” These patronizing complements implying that the Montagnais are simple and malleable were the only remotely positive remarks on the Natives of the St. Lawrence in Champlain’s 1603 account.

Throughout his account, Champlain repeatedly referred to the Natives as wicked, liars, brute beasts in their manner of living, without religion or government, and insinuates that they practice cannibalism. Discussing the French-Montagnais feast at Tadoussac, Champlain explained:

They have a wickedness in them, in that they resort to revenge and are great liars, a people whom it is not too good to trust, except within reason and with force at hand. They promise much and perform little. They are, for the most part, a people who have no law...

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352 Champlain, Des Sauvages, 1603, in DSOD, 257-59, 313.
353 Ibid., 271, 272-3: “car je vous assure qu’il s’en trouve assez qui ont bon judgement, & respondent assez bien à propos sur ce que l’on leur pourroit demander.”
354 Ibid., 272-3: “Ils ont une meschanceté en eux, qui est, user de vengeance & estre grands menteurs, gens en qui il ne fait pas trop bon s’asseurer, sinon qu’avec raison & la force à la main; promettent assez & tiennent peu: Ce sont la pluspart’ gens qui n’ont point de loy...”
Champlain repeatedly made similar comments attacking the character and behaviour of the St. Lawrence Natives in his account, later observing, “I believe that they have no law among them, nor know what it is to worship and pray to God: and they live, for the most part, like brute beasts.” Champlain implied that the Natives of Canada practiced cannibalism in his account and then explicitly states that the French saved an Iroquoian woman the Montagnais intended to eat. Conrad Heidenreich and Janet Ritch argue that as the newcomer Champlain was merely repeating the views of the more seasoned French traders such as Gravé Du Pont regarding the Natives’ characteristics. Based on Heidenreich and Ritch’s interpretation Champlain’s account provides a rough representation of French views of the Natives of New France among the members of trade voyages in the early seventeenth century. The French trade voyage personnel considered the Native of the St. Lawrence treacherous, thievish, and liars without government or religion, but these negative views were tempered by the need to maintain friendly relations with Native trade partners.

During his time on the St. Lawrence Champlain would have witnessed the French dependence on Natives on a nearly daily basis. The primary purpose of the French voyage in 1603 was to trade for furs, and this basic premise necessitated friendly cooperation with the Montagnais and other fur trade partners. Champlain personally relied on Native guides and attempted to travel further upriver by means of a Native guide.

355 Ibid., 280-1: “Voilà pourquoi je croy qu'il n'y a aucune loy parmy eux, ne sçavent que c'est d'adorer & prier Dieu, & vivent la plus part comme bestes brutes...” Similar examples can be found on, 283, 353.
356 “All these people suffer so much sometimes that they are almost forced to eat each other,” (“Tous ces peuples patissent tant quelques-fois qu’ils sont presque contraints de se manger les uns les autres pour les grandes froidures & neiges.”), “We asked them for a woman of the Irocois whom they wanted to eat...” (“Nous leur demandasmes une femme des Irocois qu’ils vouloient manger laquelle ils nous donnerent...”), Champlain, Des Sauvages, in DSOD, 272-3, 362-3.
357 DSOD, 234.
Unable to travel further upriver Champlain relied solely on Native accounts to determine the geography of the area upriver, and his confirmation of a Northwest Passage was based entirely on Native information. Champlain and the numerous trade voyage veterans in Port Royal continued to have mixed views of Native Americans based on the need for cooperative trade and the French belief that Natives were inferior and possessed a wide range of negative character traits.

English and French interaction with Natives in North America during seasonal trade voyages produced similarly mixed views of Native Americans. The evidence for French-Native interaction is limited, but based on Champlain’s account the French had established friendly relations with the Montagnais for at least two consecutive seasons, with Gravé returning several Montagnais men willingly taken to France during a previous voyage. The French’s establishment of friendly relations with the Montagnais for at least two seasons indicated a lack of violence and a high degree of cooperation. Champlain did not mention any violence or overt hostility between the French and the various Native they encounters in 1603. This alone separated Champlain’s 1603 account from every English trade voyage narrative during the early seventeenth century. The French had a longstanding trade relationship with the Natives of the St. Lawrence and Acadia, and this allowed for less friction compared to the English’s newly established trade partnerships in northern and southern Virginia.

While the French avoided conflict with Native groups during their 1603 trade voyage the French view of the Natives as treacherous, thievish, and liars all reflected

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358 Champlain, *Des Sauvages*, in DSOD, 313.
359 Ibid., 323-5, 329.
360 Ibid., 255.
361 DSOD, 55, 460.
negative stereotypes with clear parallels in the English sources. Furthermore, the prevalence of these negative views among the French trade voyage personnel indicates that despite a lack of violence in Champlain’s account, hostility, conflict, and violence were a reality during many French trade voyages in the early seventeenth century. These French views were based on the accumulated experience of Frenchmen such as Gravé with extensive firsthand experience in French-Native interaction in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The French’s negative views of Native Americans and their need for close cooperation with Native trade partners influenced French colonization policy.

Despite their reliance on Native fur trade partners, The French established a Native policy which combined notions of amiable relations with the desire to subdue and conquer the Natives of Acadia in 1603. The royal commission to de Mons from King Henri and the commission from the Lord High Admiral both demonstrated the French government’s desire for the conquest of the Natives of Acadia. The commission from King Henri opened with a strong statement emphasizing France’s intention to convert the Natives of Acadia.362 This conversion had a more insidious component as the commission went on to command de Mons to, “…subject, submit, and render obedient thereto all the tribes of this land, and those adjacent…” and if diplomacy failed, “to make open war upon them to constrain and bring them to such terms as you shall judge necessary…the establishment, maintenance, and preservation of our authority among them.”363 De Mons’ Royal commission exhibited hopes for the peaceful conversion and

submission of the Acadian Natives, but was set on achieving French control of the region and did not shy away from the prospect of using force against Natives.

De Mons’ commission from the Lord High Admiral demonstrated similarly mixed views of how Native relations were expected to develop in Acadia. The commission highlights the goal of civilizing and Christianizing the Natives through, “intercourse with the French for the gain of their commerce…” but also makes it clear that the Natives are to submit to the authority of the French King.364 The French determination to convert the Natives of Acadia, even by peaceful means, is itself a declaration of French disdain for the Natives, their culture, and religion. The Royal commission described the Natives of Acadia as without religion based on the reports of, “the ship-captains, pilots, merchants, and others who for many years have visited, frequented, and trafficked with the various tribes of these parts…”365 French views of Native Americans and their objectives in French-Native relations were the result of trade voyage experiences and advice given by trade voyage veterans. These mixed expectations

363 Ibid., 212-13, 490-1: “Et en icelle étendre & faire conoître nôtre nom, puissance & autorité. Et à icelle assujettir, submettre & faire obeir tous les peuples de ladite terre, les appeller, faire instruire, provoquer & émouvoir à la conissance de Dieu, & à la lumiere de la Foy & religion Chrétienne, la y établir : & en l'exercice & profession d'icelle maintenir garder & conserver lesdites peuples, & tous autres habituez esdits lieux...Entretenir, garder & soigneusement observer les traittés & alliances dont vous conviédres avec eux : pourveu qu'ils y satisfacent de leur part. Et à ce defaut, leur faire guerre ouverte pour les contraindre & amener à telle raison que vous jugerez necessaire pour l'honneur, obeissance & service de Dieu, & l'establlissement, manutention & conservation de nôtrédite autorité parmi eux.”


for French-Native relations were not restricted to the French government and extended to the men in Port Royal. Champlain commented on the French objectives in 1604 stating:

In course of time we hoped to pacify them, and to put an end to the wars which they wage against one another, in order that in the future we might derive services from them, and convert them to the Christian faith.  

While the French planned to support their colony based on the long established trade in furs with the Natives of Acadia and New France the colonists also intended to establish French authority in the region, and over the Native inhabitants. The information and personal experience gained in French trade voyages was used to develop the French government’s Native policies and the Port Royal colonists’ mixed views of Native Americans.

Similar experiences with Native Americans in the context of seasonal trade voyages led to the formation of the initial policies used by de Mons’ company and the dual Virginia Companies. Port Royal, Jamestown and Sagadahoc’s original plans for Native trade required the colonists to cooperate with and even depend upon Native trade partners and guides. Yet, the French and English designed the colonies of Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc to claim territory, and all three colonies included an element of domination that was not present in the previous seasonal trade voyages. The French and English were prepared to use force against Europeans and Natives alike in their attempts to claim and profit from North American territory. There were differences between the initial Native policies of each colony, but similar trade objectives and negative views of Natives American groups overshadowed these minor differences. Of

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course, the instructions and charters of these three colonies reflected their past experiences and future expectations, not the reality of events in the colonies. Native characteristics and the personal agency of colonists and Natives would shape Native-colonist relations as much as these expectations and previous experiences, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

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The Limitations of National Unity in French and English North American Colonization

Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc were all government chartered colonies operating on the behalf of their monarchs, but these national associations existed alongside the regional and individual character of the privately owned joint stock companies which operated these colonies. While King James and King Henri hoped to expand their territories and supported national unity in England and France, de Mons’ trade company and the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies represented regional interests and sought personal profits. The French and English were diverse groups, and in using the imperfect terms French and English scholars must acknowledge the many connections between and divisions within France and England in the early seventeenth century.

Many scholars studying sixteenth and seventeenth-century colonization work within a national framework that emphasizes the differences between the French and English. The prominence of scholarly works specifically discussing either French or
English colonization and seeking to determine what traits were uniquely French or English in the seventeenth century demonstrates this national divide. In her book *Ceremonies of Possession*, Patricia Seed argues for a sharp division between the nascent Western European nations and their colonization efforts. Seed claims that a vast gap existed between the culture, language, and intellectual ideas of nations such as France and England, producing completely different perceptions of the criteria for legitimately claiming American land. Seed characterizes English claims as focused on building houses, gardens, and fences to signify and justify territorial possession. In the case of the French claims to territorial possession, Seed assert they needed the affection and consent of local Natives, and used ceremonial processions combined with the planting of markers such as crosses.

This cultural divide between French and English colonists is widely cited by scholars such as Alfred Cave, Gordon Sayre, Conrad Heidenreich, Janet Ritch, and the nineteenth-century historian Francis Parkman to explain the differences in English and French relations with Native American groups. While France and England were two distinct political entities in the early seventeenth century the connections and competition

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367 The main divides are cultural, demonstrated by Patricia Seed’s work, economic objectives, seen in Hornsby and Benjamin’s works, and Native relations which will be addressed in the third chapter. Benjamin, *The Atlantic World*, 297-8; Hornsby and Hermann, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 2; Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).


370 Ibid., 17-18, 21-3, 26-29.


between French and English North American activity were of central importance in both
groups’ decisions to establish permanent colonies and helped to shaping the similar
methods and objectives of Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc. In seeking to overturn
a scholarship that generalizes in terms of Europeans, scholars such as Patricia Seed have
shifted to generalizations in terms of nationality.

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries France and England were
both composite monarchies with considerable linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity.
Under Queen Elizabeth I, England was part of a composite monarchy consisting of
England, the Principality of Wales, and the Kingdom of Ireland.373 In 1604 this
composite monarchy was expanded to include Scotland, and England accepted a Scottish
king, James I.374 In addition, England was religiously diverse with a considerable
Catholic minority.375 France was also a recently united composite monarchy. Many
regions of France including Brittany, Normandy, and the Basque Kingdom of Navarre
possessed semi-autonomous governments.376 This regionalism is further highlighted by
the existence of inter-provincial custom duties in France charged on de Mons’ furs in
1605.377

French and English are useful terms in distinguishing distinct written languages
used for promotional accounts and various documents in the early seventeenth century,
but these written languages did not correspond to unified spoken languages. Marc

373 Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, 117.
374 Ibid., 117-118.
375 Despite ongoing religious hostility and reoccurring bouts of oppression, England practiced a limited
degree of religious tolerance under Queen Elizabeth and King James. See, Carla G. Pestana, “Religion,”
in David Armitage and Michael Braddick eds., The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (New York:
376 Quinn, Explorers and Colonies, 128; Chavez, John R. Chavez, Beyond Nations: Evolving Homelands in
Lescarbot, a member of the Port Royal colony and afterwards a renowned author and historian, commented on the linguistic diversity of France declaring, “yea in one and the selfsame province languages differ...the people of Lower Brittany, the Gascon, and the Basque do not agree.”\textsuperscript{378} Similar English linguistic divides existed between Wales, northern England, and southern England.\textsuperscript{379}

Many scholars depict the French and English as possessing a greater degree of linguistic and cultural unity than actually existed in the early seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{380} This perceived uniformity is the inevitable result of scholars using documents written in the official French and English languages. These published documents necessarily promoted national unity in the names of their monarchs. The vast majority of surviving sources discussing England’s North American ventures in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were compiled and edited by Richard Hakluyt the younger and Samuel Purchas who tailored these documents to fit their literary standards and their common aim of promoting English nationalism.\textsuperscript{381} This could result in major alterations, such as Hakluyt’s removal of Catholic sentiment and references from James Rosier’s 1605 account of the Waymouth voyage.\textsuperscript{382} In the early seventeenth century, neither England nor France constituted coherent nations, but were kingdoms united by loyalty to monarchies rather than a common language, culture, or religion. These monarchies

\textsuperscript{378} Lescarbot, Vol. III, 113, 364: “Voire en vne méme province il y a langage different, non plus ne moins qu’es Gaulles le Flamen, le bas Breton, le Gascon, le Basque, ne s’accordent point.”
\textsuperscript{381} ENEV, 30-31, 40, 43-44, 48.
\textsuperscript{382} James Rosier was the representative of the Catholic Sir Arundell on the Waymouth voyage and became a Jesuit priest shortly after his voyage to Virginia. Ibid., 62-64.
depended on the cooperation of semi-independent local elites to maintain their power, and most individuals’ interests and concerns were regional rather than national.383

French and English are useful terms within the context of comparative colonization, distinguishing groups united by their loyalty to common monarchs and their involvement in national colonization efforts. Individuals involved in North American colonization referred to themselves and others using the terms French and English in the context of national competitive. These reductive national categories coexisted with contemporary knowledge of the divisions within the French and English. In his work The Principle Navigations, Richard Hakluyt acknowledged the diversity and divisions within France declaring:

...conducted English ships so farre within this gulfe of S. Laurence, and haue brought vs true relation of the manifold gaine which the French, Britaynes, Baskes, and Biskaines do yerely returne from the sayd partes;.”384

While Hakluyt acknowledged the divisions within France he sought to present the English as a unified group. Seventeenth-century authors used national terms or regional identifiers depending on whether or not they wished to stress unity or divisions. Thus, Samuel de Champlain often used the terms French and English, but referred to the free traders who opposed de Mons’ monopoly as Basque and Breton merchants, highlighting their divisions with de Mons’ royally chartered company.385

384 Richard Hakluyt and Edmund Goldsmid, The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation Made by Sea or Over-Land to the Remote and Farthest Distant Quarters of the Earth at Any Time Within the Compasse of the 1600 Yeeres. Volume XIII (Edinburg, E & G Godsmid, 1889), 59.
It is difficult to determine how French and English individuals involved in colonization would have identified themselves beyond the assumed loyalty to their monarchs. In their accounts Champlain and Lescarbot nearly always identified French individuals by their city or province of residence. The Mi’kmaq of Acadia called the Port Royal colonists Normans demonstrating the prominence of regional associations among seasonal fur traders prior to colonization and possibly reflecting the Port Royal colonists’ strong connections to Rouen in Normandy.

This regional identification is less prominent in English sources relating to Jamestown and Sagadahoc, and this was the result of the regional division between the Plymouth and London Companies. The Jamestown colonists were overwhelmingly from the eastern counties of England, and many of these colonists were either relatives or otherwise connected through previous associations. Similarly, Sagadahoc consisted of colonists from the west of England and was dominated by the relatives and associates of the Pophams and Gilberts. The French use of regional identification in Port Royal was a result of de Mons’ sole monopoly and the involvement of a diverse group of French colonists from across northern France, and the English found the use of such regional identification largely unnecessary in Jamestown and Sagadahoc due to the common regional origins of the leading colonists and many of the rank and file colonists as well. Regionalism led to divisions in France and England marked by opposition and competition over the granting of monopolies for trade and colonization.

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386 Ibid., 239, 261, 276, 310, 366, 375, 390, 463; Lescarbot, Vol. II, 229, 301, 310, 350.
388 Horn, A Land As God Made It, 34-40; Grizzard, and Smith, Jamestown Colony, 234; Map of England showing the places of Origin of a number of the first Jamestown colonists [map], in William M. Kelso, Jamestown, the Buried Truth (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 19.
389 ENEV, 76, 376-7.
The French cities of Saint-Malo and Rouen were intense competitors in the North American fur trade during the early seventeenth century. The monopolies granted by King Henri to Chauvin and Chaste were based in Rouen, and La Roche declared Gravé, a former Saint-Malo resident, a traitor when he joined Chauvin’s monopoly based out of Rouen. 390 Many independent merchants who had a long history of trading for furs in New France continuously opposed the monopolies granted by Henri IV to Chauvin, Chaste, and de Mons. It was due to the protests of these free traders that Henri revoked de Mons’ monopoly in 1606-7. 391

The hotbed of this opposition was the port city of Saint-Malo in Brittany which claimed the right of first discovery in New France thought the Malouin explorer Jacques Cartier. 392 The 1613 factum of the merchants of Saint-Malo argued that the discoveries and claims of Norman and Breton fishermen, Jacques Cartier, and the English sponsored voyage of Sebastian Cabot all superseded the claims of de Mons’ monopoly. 393 Many of these free trade merchants violated the monopoly granted to de Mons, and continued to trade in New France and Acadia defying the decrees of the King. 394 Against the interests of their king and country, these monopoly breakers went so far as to ally with Dutch trading interests in violating the monopoly from 1604-1607. 395 The fierce regional trade rivalries in France and the Saint-Malo merchants’ opposition to colonization

393 Ibid., 199-201.
demonstrates the limits of French unity and the dominance of regional interests over the
government’s attempts to establish national colonies.\textsuperscript{396}

This regionalism has parallels in England where Exeter and Bristol opposed the
leading role of Plymouth in forming the West Country division of the Virginia Company.
Exeter declined to invest in the Plymouth Virginia Company, and only a third of Bristol’s
merchants invested for a combined total of less than 600 pounds.\textsuperscript{397} At the same time the
Plymouth Company was vehemently opposed to the idea of a London based Royal
Council, and made numerous protests to the Earl of Salisbury, even threatening to
withdraw from the Virginia venture entirely.\textsuperscript{398} The simple fact that two separate Virginia
Companies were established shows the divisions between the West Country and London
interests. The English colonization effort was affected by internal divisions, competition
between regions, and even rivalries between cities within regions.

The French colony of Port Royal established in Acadian in 1604 had strong
connections to the previous trade voyages through an extensive overlap in personnel.
Previous trade voyage experiences influenced Port Royal’s economic objectives
including the fur trade, the search for mines and a Northwest Passage to the south sea,
and fishing. These economic objectives had a substantial overlap with the English
colonies of Jamestown and Sagadahoc. The French and English had similar trade voyage
experiences and exchanged information in promotional literature and published

\textsuperscript{396} Naomi Griffiths discusses the Catholic and Protestant rivalries which also existed both within and
between the French port cities, but this divide did not strictly apply to de Mons’ company which
included members of both religious groups. Griffiths, \textit{From Migrant to Acadian}, 30-31.
\textsuperscript{397} “Exeter City Chamber refuses to participate in the voyage, March 1606,” in ENEV, 379; “Bristol
Common Council opens subscriptions for the north Virginia venture, April 1606,” in ENEV, 381-383.
\textsuperscript{398} Walter Mathewe, “Walter Mathewe, for Plymouth Corporation, to earl of Salisbury, May 1606,” in
documents, resulting in these shared colonial objectives. The seasonal trade voyages also influenced Port Royal by helping to shape French perceptions of Acadia’s climate and Native Americans. The French misunderstood the climate of Acadia to their determent, and developed a negative view of Native Americans, a view that coexisted with a need to cooperate with Native trade partners and guides. The connections between French and English colonization efforts in the early seventeenth century do not conform to the national divides that have shaped many scholars interpretive frameworks. France and England were distinct countries, and the colonies of Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc were all separate ventures with different personnel, locations, and leadership. Yet, the similarities and connections between these colonies are striking, and are a necessary part of understanding the development of early English and French North American colonization.

Scholars often associate the establishment of Jamestown in 1607 with the eventual foundations of the United States. Many works on Jamestown possess titles stressing the connections between the colony and the future United States such as James Horn’s *A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth of America*, and Alexander Brown’s, *The Genesis of the United States*. This nationalistic perspective has led many scholars in the United States and Canada to focus on colonization efforts occurring within their modern nations’ geographic boundaries. Thus, Jamestown is extensively studied in the United States, and Quebec has occupied a similar position in Canada. This national focus has led scholars to neglect both Sagadahoc and Port Royal, and privileges those students of

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settlements that survive. James Axtell, W.J. Eccles, and Ian Steele give limited attention to Port Royal, seeing it as little more than a prelude to the colony of Quebec which they associate with the foundation of Canada.\textsuperscript{400} This national perspective has had the unfortunate effect of creating artificial divides in the events of the seventeenth century colonies. To understand the context and events in the colonies of Jamestown, Sagadahoc, and Port Royal a transnational and comparative perspective is necessary.

The scholarship often focuses on nations and national divides during the seventeenth century. This seventeenth-century nationalistic perspective can create a strict division between English, French, and Native Americans while simultaneous overstating the unity within each group. English, French, and Native American are often necessary labels indicating broad geographic and political associations, but scholars often overlook how these terms have severe limitations when applied to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The scholarship has constructed a division between the Native relations of English and French North American colonies on the basis of European, rather than Native American, cultural differences. Many scholars view the French as developing cooperative relations with Natives through their cultural flexibility and acceptance of Native American culture. On the other hand, scholars view English colonists as developing hostile and violent relations with Native Americans resulting in reoccurring conflicts.

The next chapter with address these larger French and English trends in Native relations within the context of Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc. While these

patterns of French and English Native relations did emerge in the seventeenth century, they represent a break with similar hopes for Native trade in French and English trade voyages and for the colonies of Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc. Many scholars argue that differing French and English cultures and objectives resulted in divergent Native relations, but this is not supported by the similarities in French and English methods and objectives in these early seventeenth century colonies.\textsuperscript{401} The scholarship has understudied the divisions which existed in the experiences, cultures, and societies of Native groups encountered by the French and English in North America. The major divisions between Native groups such as the Mi’kmaq in Acadia and the Powhatans in the Chesapeake dwarf the divisions between the French and English colonization efforts. Native characteristics and actions were a major factor in the development of Native-colonist relations in Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc, and had an impact of the larger development of French and English North American colonies in the seventeenth century.

\textsuperscript{401} See, footnotes 77, 78, 81, 87, and adjoining discussion in Chapter One.
CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF PORT ROYAL, JAMESTOWN, AND SAGADAHOC IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH AND ENGLISH SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
NORTH AMERICAN NATIVE RELATIONS
Distinct forms of French and English Native relations sprang from the common heritage of North American trade voyages. Rather than viewing the divide in French and English Native relations as a new development in the seventeenth-century, many scholars maintain that this was an inherent divide resulting from the cultures and formative experiences of the French and English.402 During the seventeenth century the various English North American colonies would develop similarly negative Native relations defined by hostility and violence. The French North American colonies would establish essentially cooperative Native relations based on trade alliances throughout the seventeenth century. While many scholars emphasize the divisions between European nations involved in American colonization, the French and English colonization efforts in Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc shared similar goals and methods that were the result of interconnected North American trade traditions. The French and English also possessed similar views of Native Americas that blended the necessity for cooperation and trade with distrust, hostility, and feelings of cultural superiority over Natives. In Port Royal and Sagadahoc these French and English commonalities led to similar trade alliances with the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Eastern Abenaki. The colonists of Port Royal, Sagadahoc, and their Native trade patterns were able to overcome hostility and misunderstandings to maintain peaceful relations. This view of Native relations in Port Royal and Sagadahoc contradicts the established interpretation of poor Native relations in Sagadahoc and the overly positive interpretation of Native relations in Port Royal.

402 DSOD, XVII-XIX; Seed, Ceremonies of Possession, 11-13. Also See, historiography discussion on pages 19-21 of Chapter One.
From the perspective of French and English North American trade voyages the events within the colony of Jamestown presented a break with past precedents. Unlike Port Royal and Sagadahoc, Jamestown’s relations with the Powhatans of the southern Chesapeake were distinguished by persistent animosity and reoccurring violence. The scholarship has sought to explain the English-Powhatan conflict using the military background of the Jamestown colonists, but the Port Royal and Sagadahoc colonists possessed similar military experience and maintained Native trade alliances. The Port Royal colonists’ conflict with the Natives of Cape Cod, referred to as the Armouchiquois, during coastal voyages in 1605 and 1606 sheds light on the conflict between the English and Powhatans. The culture, societies, and past experiences of the agricultural Powhatans and Armouchiquois varied drastically from the hunter-gather Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, and Maliseet. The French and English experienced conflicts with the Armouchiquois and Powhatans, but were capable of establishing cooperative trade alliances with the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Eastern Abenaki. In Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc Native characteristics and actions played a central role in determining colonist-Native relations, and helped to shape the divergent development of English and French North American colonization.

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The Misrepresentation of Native Relations in Sagadahoc and Port Royal

Port Royal has come to represent the French ability to peacefully coexist with Native groups, while the recent scholarship considers Sagadahoc an example of the English tendency to use violence and establish poor Native relations. This division
reflects the long-term trajectory of English and French relations with Natives in North America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but this division is being projected backwards onto the colonies of Sagadahoc and Port Royal. French and English relations with Native Americans in Sagadahoc and Port Royal consisted of a similar combination of cooperation, trade, hostility, and violence that did not strictly conform to the larger seventeenth-century pattern. The many scholars’ division of French and English North American colonization based on the culture and formative experiences of these groups is called into question by Port Royal’s and Sagadahoc’s similar Native relations.

The negative depictions of Sagadahoc originate with the seventeenth-century Puritan historian William Hubbard and the late eighteenth-century Maine historian James Sullivan. Sullivan reported that the English at Sagadahoc committed brutalities such as firing a cannon as it was being moved by a group of Eastern Abenaki. In Hubbard’s account of Sagadahoc the Natives turned on the English for their brutality and assaulted the colonists in their fort. Both accounts are rife with factual errors, and Sullivan misidentified various personnel and investors, and is unclear on the date of the colony. Despite the deficits of Hubbard and Sullivan’s work, they were reiterated in 1875 by John Abbot, and recent works such as D.W. Rice’s biography of Sir John Popham give these

tales consideration.\textsuperscript{406} The historical sources that survive contradict Hubbard and Sullivan’s accounts.

When the Plymouth Virginia Company evacuated Sagadahoc in 1608 the colonists and investors sought to justify their failure. They provided a wide range of excuses including the death of the Plymouth Company’s main supporter Chief Justice Popham, the lack of precious metals, Raleigh Gilbert’s decision to return to England, and the bitter cold of the region’s winter.\textsuperscript{407} With this strong desire to rationalize the colony’s failure the Sagadahoc colonists and investors would have had no qualms about vilifying and blaming the local Eastern Abenaki natives. The Jamestown colonists attempted to place much of the blame for Jamestown’s continued failures from 1607-1624 on the local Natives, yet the Sagadahoc colonists did not blame the Eastern Abenaki. This fact alone largely proves that there was no substantial conflict between the English and the Eastern Abenaki.

In his 1658 memoirs Ferdinando Gorges reflected on the civil nature of the Native captives Nahanda and Skidwarres during their time in England as well as their close cooperation with the English in Sagadahoc.\textsuperscript{408} Similarly, in 1616 John Smith praised the Eastern Abenaki sagamore Nahanda who remained a staunch English ally and helped facilitate trade between Smith and the Eastern Abenaki.\textsuperscript{409} Despite the existence of contradictory evidence, modern scholars still accept negative accounts of English-Eastern


\textsuperscript{408} Gorges, \textit{A brieve narration}, in ENEV, 344-5.

Abenaki relations at Sagadahoc due to their desire to fit Sagadahoc into the larger seventeenth-century trend of English-Native relations in North America.  

James Axtell applies this larger seventeenth-century pattern of English-Native conflict to English relations with the Eastern Abenaki in Sagadahoc. Discussing the English trade voyage of George Waymouth preceding Sagadahoc, Axtell is keen to highlight every instance of English-Eastern Abenaki violence and hostility while glossing over the prevalence of cooperation and peaceful trade. Axtell continues to interpret every meeting between the English and Eastern Abenaki in Sagadahoc as hostile, and assumes that the sagamore of the Pemiquid band Nahanda saw the English colony as an intrusion. Nahanda and Skidwarres, another member of the Pemiquid band, were captured by George Waymouth in 1605 and lived in England before being returned to northern Virginia in 1606 and 1607. Axtell interprets this previous capture and captivity as a clear indication that Nahanda and Skidwarres resented and distrusted the English. Axtell argues that Nahanda and Skidwarres actively sought to sabotage the English attempts to establish a fur trade using a statement by Ferdinando Gorges in a letter to the Earl of Salisbury in February of 1608:

Whose Conuersations, & familiarity they haue most frequented, which is on of the cheefest reasons, wee haue to hope in time, to gayne that which presently cannot bee had, they shew themselues exceedingly subtill and conninge, concealing from vs the places, wheare they haue the commodityes wee seeke for, and if they finde

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412 Ibid., 164. Sagamore was the Eastern Abenaki word for leader, captain, or chief, ENEV, 93.

any, that hath promised to bringe vs to it, those that came out of England instantly carry them away, and will not suffer them to com neere vs any more.\textsuperscript{414} Gorges letter focused on excusing the colony’s failures, and it was written after the return of the \textit{Gifte of God} carrying a number of the Sagadahoc settlers and reporting a bitter winter without profit.

There is a high degree of ambiguity in this passage, and it is not entirely clear to whom Gorges was referring. David and Alison Quinn interpret Gorges’ statement as meaning that the Sagadahoc colonists’ factional behaviour led to the Eastern Abenaki’s cooperating with one group of colonists against their rivals in the colony.\textsuperscript{415} Earlier in the letter Gorges blamed the colonists for disgracing each other through infighting, and his statement was primarily intended to blame the colonists, specifically Raleigh Gilbert whom Gorges disliked, for the failures of the colony.\textsuperscript{416} Axtell’s argument that Gorges’ quote indicates English-Eastern Abenaki hostility is only one possible interpretation and the quotation’s meaning is ultimately inconclusive. Axtell seeks to give Nahanda and the Eastern Abenaki agency through their resistance to English colonization, but Axtell oversimplifies the context of English-Eastern Abenaki interaction and is implicitly focused on the larger English pattern of hostility and violence against Native Americans.

It is likely that Nahanda and Skidwarres resented the English for their captivity in 1605, but it seems that Nahanda and the other captives were realistic about their situation and cooperated with the English for their own gain. Discussing the five Eastern Abenaki captives aboard Waymouth’s ship in 1605 Rosier claimed:

\textsuperscript{414} Ibid., 164; Ferdinando Gorges, “Letter to the earl of Salisbury, reporting the return of the \textit{Gifte of God, 7 February 1608},” in ENEV, 456. This interpretation of Nahanda and Skidwarres attitude towards the English is also accepted by Alfred Cave, Cave, “Why Was the Sagadahoc Colony Abandoned?” 636-7.

\textsuperscript{415} ENEV, 456.

\textsuperscript{416} Gorges, “Letter to the earl of Salisbury,” in ENEV, 455.
First, although at the time when we surprised them, they made their best resistance, not knowing our purpose, nor what we were, nor how we meant to use them; yet after perceiving by their kind usage we intended them no harm, they have never since seemed discontented with us, but very tractable, loving...  

While Rosier had every reason to provide a positive perspective on the English capture of the Eastern Abenaki the captives had more to gain through cooperation than resistance. In England Nahanda and the other Eastern Abenaki captives provided an extensive description of their country which was later published by Samuel Purchas. The Eastern Abenaki captives’ practical cooperation continued after their return to northern Virginia. The Sagadahoc colony was located over ten miles from Nahanda’s band on the Pemiquid River, and did not present a substantial threat or inconvenience to the Eastern Abenaki. On the other hand, the Sagadahoc colony presented enticing benefits to the Pemiquid band specifically and the Eastern Abenaki generally.  

Nahanda and the Pemiquid band’s knowledge of the English language, culture, and their personal connections to the English colonists allowed them to act as interpreters and intermediates. Axtell argues that Nahanda and Skidwarres actively sought to inhibit English trade, when they had everything to gain from facilitating English-Eastern Abenaki trade. Nahanda came to Sagadahoc after the English had established their colony. During this meeting Nahanda promised to guide the English to Bashabes the regional leader of the Eastern Abenaki located on Penobscot River. This would allow the Pemiquid to gain power and prestige through their ability to facilitate trade and communication between Bashabes and the English. After this plan failed due to

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418 Gorges, A brefe narration, in ENEV, 340-1; “Eastern Abenaki captives describe their country of Mawooshen,” in ENEV, 470-6.
navigational difficulties, Nahanda returned to Sagadahoc with a representative of Bashabes and reaffirmed his desire to facilitate a meeting with Bashabes. Sagadahoc’s fragmented record does not reveal whether or not this meeting occurred, but commenting on the events in the colony William Strachey observed Raleigh Gilbert made many discoveries of the surrounding rivers and traded for many furs.

An unrecorded meeting between the English and Bashabes in the spring of 1608 likely occurred, given the English and Eastern Abenaki desire for such a meeting. Axtell’s interpretation of Native hostility to the English ignores this immediate context, and focuses on the future patterns of English violence, domination, and the displacement of Natives. The Eastern Abenaki and Sagadahoc colonists were utterly unaware of this outcome. In 1607 the English colony of roughly a hundred men dependant on Native cooperation and trade appeared to the Eastern Abenaki as a trade opportunity rather than a dangerous territorial incursion.

Sagadahoc would have provided the Eastern Abenaki with direct access to European goods. Until this time the Eastern Abenaki had largely depended on Mi’kmaq middlemen for European goods. The Mi’kmaq of Acadia were enemies of Bashabes and the Eastern Abenaki under his nominal leadership. The Eastern Abenaki had a strong interest in finding an alternative source of European trade goods to end their dependence on the Mi’kmaq. Beginning in 1604 the Eastern Abenaki began trading with

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420 Ibid., 413.
421 Ibid., 414. Alfred Cave discounts this statement by Strachey, arguing that due to the colony’s economic failure the English could not have traded for any considerable number of furs. Yet as discussed in chapter three, even a considerable fur trade would have proven insufficient to maintain a colony the size of Sagadahoc or Port Royal, Cave, “Why Was the Sagadahoc Colony Abandoned?” 638.
the French during their southbound voyages from Port Royal. Yet, the French and Mi’kmaq cooperated closely and trade between the Eastern Abenaki and the French was facilitated by Mi’kmaq interpreters and their Maliseet allies. The timely arrival of the English in 1607, just as the French allies of the Mi’kmaq were evacuating their colony of Port Royal, presented an important economic and diplomatic opportunity to the Eastern Abenaki under Bashabes. The shared English and Eastern Abenaki desire for trade was the best guarantee for cooperation and peaceful relations. Many scholars focus on the English missteps in their attempts to trade with the Eastern Abenaki as the cause of hostility between the two groups, but this view fails to consider the divisions within the Eastern Abenaki and the Sagadahoc colonists’ role in these intra-Native rivalries.

The most commonly cited example used to demonstrate the English lack of skills at Native trade and their general hostility to the Eastern Abenaki is Raleigh Gilbert’s trade voyage up the Kennebec River, as recorded by William Strachey. The Eastern Abenaki sagamore Sabenoa initiated a meeting with Gilbert and presented trade goods including tobacco and small skins. Gilbert displayed English trade goods in turn, but finding the Native goods of little value he departed without any exchange. This refusal to trade sparked a struggle in which Sabenoa’s men stopped the English from departing and reportedly extinguished their fire brand to deny the English the use of their firearms. The encounter ended in a tense standoff, but no one was injured on either

424 Ibid., 294-6.
425 Ibid., 294.
427 Cave, “Why Was the Sagadahoc Colony Abandoned?” 636, 639.
429 Ibid., 411-12.
While Gilbert’s actions were certainly responsible for causing this standoff, his behaviour did not represent English ineptitude or a general hostility between the English and Eastern Abenaki.

Sabenoa had previously been at war with Nahanda and the Pemiquid band as the Davies Journal declares, “...they had ben att war with Sasanoa & had slain his Soone in fight skidwares and Dehanada wear in this fyght.” Gilbert and the English were aware of the divides among the Eastern Abenaki. While they were interested in maintaining good relations with the Pemiquid band and the powerful sagamore Bashabes, the English had little interest in wasting trade goods on establishing relations with Sabenoa’s band. Gilbert’s hostility to Sabenoa represented the strength of the English-Pemiquid alliance, and English economic pragmatism when dealing with Native groups they did not have an immediate interest in allying or trading with.

The reports of hostility between the Eastern Abenaki and the English at Sagadahoc were specific to Sabenoa and those groups on the Kennebec River who were associated with Sabenoa. When the Jesuit Father Biard received reports of English-Eastern Abenaki hostility and violence in 1611 his source was the sagamore Meteourmite. Meteourmite reported that when Raleigh Gilbert replaced George Popham as President he mistreated the Eastern Abenaki, which led to violence and several deaths. While even Father Biard found Meteourmite’s story suspect, it is important to note that Meteourmite was a sagamore on the Kennebec River not far from Sabenoa’s

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430 Ibid., 412.
It is believed that Sabenoa was seeking to build his power base on the Kennebec in 1607-8, and he is reported to have declared himself the lord of the Kennebec River to the English. Meteourmite would have been an ally of Sabenoa and evidently shared his distaste for Raleigh Gilbert.

While Meteourmite’s claim that the Eastern Abenaki killed eleven Englishmen was blantly false, certain aspects of his claims ring true. The 1616 version of Father Biard’s encounter with Meteourmite omitted the English slaughter, but mentioned the English setting their dogs on the Eastern Abenaki. The use of mastiffs to terrorize Natives was noted in the account of Martin Pring’s 1603 voyage to northern Virginia, and this tactic was utilized in Jamestown as well. There was clearly hostility and perhaps some violence between the English and the Eastern Abenaki allied with Sabenoa. The knowable extent of this hostility and violence is limited by their complete lack of mention in English sources, which were open about the standoff with Sabenoa in 1607 and had no clear motivation to hide English-Eastern Abenaki conflicts. Despite the predominance of negative depictions of English-Eastern Abenaki relations in Sagadahoc, the record demonstrates a mixed relationship that varied from group to group based on circumstance.

433 Ibid., 68-70; “Eastern Abenaki captives describe their country of Mawooshen,” in ENEV, 473.
The colonists in Sagadahoc established a peaceful and cooperative relationship with the Pemaquid band of the Eastern Abenaki, as well as those groups that interacted with the English through the cultural intermediaries Nahanda and Skidwarres. When the Sagadahoc colonists first arrived in north Virginia they visited Pemiquid, where Skidwarres was successful at re-establishing peaceful contact with Nahanda who had been returned in 1606.437 In September, as the Sagadahoc colonists were constructing their fort, Nahanda visited with a group of 40 Pemiquid Eastern Abenaki that included women and children.438 The English feasted Nahanda’s band and several Englishmen including Raleigh Gilbert spent the night camping across the river with Nahanda’s band.439 The presence of women and children in Nahanda’s visiting group, and the English Captain’s willingness to sleep among the Pemiquid band demonstrates an extremely high degree of trust between the English and the Pemiquid. This peaceful cooperation stands in contrast to the larger seventeenth-century interpretation of English-Native conflict and testifies to the importance of linguistic and cultural interpreters such as Nahanda and Skidwarres.

William Strachey reported a second visit by Nahanda along with his wife, the brother or representative of Bashabes, and another sagamore named Amenquin.440 In stark contrast to the encounter between Gilbert and Sabenoa, during this meeting the English adhered to the Native customs of hospitality and gift giving. The Eastern Abenaki sagamores were feasted by President Popham, and gifts were given to Bashabes’

438 Ibid., 408; Davis, “The Relation of a Voyage,” in ENEV, 438.
439 Ibid., 438.
brother along with gifts intended for Bashabes and his wife.441 Nahanda profited as well, receiving gifts of copper beads and knives, which were reported to have greatly contented him.442 Scholars have oversimplified the nature of English-Eastern Abenaki relations in Sagadahoc as predominately negative due to their foreknowledge of English-Native relations throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Sagadahoc closely resembled the English trade voyages to Northern America with their mixture of cooperation, trade, hostility, and occasional violence between the English and Natives. In stark contrast to the negative interpretations of Native relations in Sagadahoc, scholars have generally depicted Port Royal as the quintessential French colony establishing cooperative and peaceful Native relations with the Mi`kmaq and other Native groups.

Scholars project the larger cooperative trajectory of French-Native relations in the seventeenth century onto the colony of Port Royal, often contrasting these benevolent relations with what they assume to be the uneasy tension between Natives and Englishmen.443 The positive depiction of French-Mi`kmaq relations at Port Royal overlooks the existence of hostility between the two groups and the explicit French belief in their own cultural and political superiority over the Natives of Acadia. Discussing the various Native groups of New France and Acadia, Champlain observed:

All these peoples of Norumbega are very swarthy, and are clothed in beaverskins and other furs like the Canadian Indians and the Souriquois; and they have the same manner of living. 444

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441 Ibid.
442 Ibid.
Champlain’s generalization concerning the Algonquians of Acadia and the St. Lawrence region was dismissive, and shows an opacity towards Native Americans which was present in his account of the St. Lawrence in 1603. While Champlain lived, sailed, and even fought beside the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet throughout his three year stay in Acadia he never displayed any close camaraderie with these trade partners in his account of the colony. Champlain continued to generalize about the Natives of Acadia, describing these various groups as a people few in number who lived a miserable life as nomadic hunters. Writing after the establishment of Quebec, Champlain observed that the Natives living in the interior of New France were civil compared to the intractable Natives of the Acadian coast. Champlain simply viewed the relationship with the Acadian Natives as a practical alliance. The French were fully capable of the hostility and brutality generally reserved for scholars’ descriptions of English colonists when they lacked sufficient motivation to maintain good relations.

The Port Royal colonists had two recorded clashes with the agriculturalists living south of the Kennebec River, called Armouchiquois by the French and Mi’kmaq. In both instances the French showed themselves to be violent and blunt in their dealings with Native groups outside of their established trade partners in Acadia. The first conflict occurred during a trade and exploration voyage to Nauset Harbour in 1605 led by de Mons. During a French visit to the shore an Armouchiquois man stole a French kettle and a skirmish ensued in which the French fired on the Armouchiquois and a French sailor

444 Champlain, Vol. I, 298: “Tous ces peoples de Norembegue sont fort basannez, habillez de peaux de castors & autres fourrures, çôme les sauuages Cannadiens & Souriquois: & ont mesme façon de viure.” Champlain used the term Etchemins to describe both the Eastern Abenaki and Maliseet, and the term Sourquois refers to the Mi’kmaq.
445 Ibid., 308.
446 Ibid., 232.
447 The term Armouchiquois was provided by Mi’kmaq and Maliseet guides, Ibid., 325.
was killed. Champlain’s description of the conflict is followed by a discourse on the Native’s lack of religion or government, and the need to always be on your guard among Natives. This single occurrence provides more direct evidence of hostility and conflict with Native groups than exists in the entire record of the Sagadahoc colony, demonstrating scholars’ untenable and historiographically entrenched contrast between French and English Native relations in these two colonies.

The second conflict between the French and Armouchiquois occurred in the fall of 1606 at Stage Harbour, during a French voyage commanded by Poutrincourt. Despite the previous conflict the French stopped to trade for corn and other foodstuffs among the Armouchiquois. Lescarbot reported that Poutrincourt put on a marshal display before the Armouchiquois in Stage Harbour with swords and muskets. Again the French were unable to maintain peaceful trade with the Armouchiquois and Lescarbot reported that the French fired on the Armouchiquois twice for theft. Predictably given the overt hostility and violence of the French, the Armouchiquois attacked and killed four Frenchmen who had stayed onshore overnight to bake biscuits. Stranded in the harbour due to contrary winds, Poutrincourt and the French escalated the conflict. The French decided to retaliate by taking a number of Armouchiquois captive to perform the arduous task of grinding corn with a hand mill at Port Royal. Luring a number of Armouchiquois in with trade goods, the French attempted to take captives by choking the Armouchiquois with

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448 The primary source for this event is Champlain. Lescarbot confirms this event briefly but it occurred before his arrival in Acadia. Ibid., 353-4; Lescarbot, Vol. II, 277.
450 Ibid., 398. Stage Harbour is located on the east coast of Cape Cod.
452 Ibid., 333.
453 Ibid., 333-4; Champlain, Vol. I, 420.
454 Ibid., 427.
cords.\textsuperscript{455} The plan failed, but the French succeeded in hacking six of seven Armouchiquois to pieces.\textsuperscript{456}

Champlain’s account mentions an additional landing by the French, who were simply seeking revenge at this point.\textsuperscript{457} After this battle the French made their way back to Port Royal with four or five wounded and as many dead.\textsuperscript{458} The viciousness of the French under Poutrincourt is a stunning demonstration of the French capability for conflict with Native Americas. This single incident directly contradicts Heidenreich, Ritch, Sayre, and Cave’s interpretation of French cultural adaptability contrasted with the English reliance on coercion in Native relations.

In some cases the long established model of seventeenth-century French-Native cooperation has led scholars of French colonization to ignore the existence of French hostility and violence with Native groups both in Port Royal and within the larger record of French-Native interaction. In his history of New France Marcel Trudel refers to Poutrincourt’s conflict with the Armouchiquois as a surprise Native attack, omitting the French martial display and their attacks against the Armouchiquois for theft prior to the Native retaliation.\textsuperscript{459}

The French conflicts with the Armouchiquois did not interfere with their trade alliance with the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet. Prior to the second conflict at Stage Harbour a Maliseet emissary to the Armouchiquois made his intentions to wage war on the

\textsuperscript{455} Ibid., 428
\textsuperscript{456} Lescarbot, Vol. II,338.
\textsuperscript{458} Ibid., 431.
Armouchiquois clear to the French. The Maliseet Secodun took part in the fight against the Armouchiquois and is reported to have taken several scalps. The French at Port Royal were capable both of maintaining cooperative alliances with Natives and of committing brutal violence against Native when the circumstance required it.

While the French at Port Royal maintained peaceful relations with the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet of Acadia these relations were not without hostility. Many scholars laud the close relations between Membertou’s Mi’kmaq and the French as the cornerstone of peaceful French-Mi’kmaq relations which would persist throughout the seventeenth century. In many ways this was certainly true, but these relations were not without hostility. Champlain gave almost no attention to the Mi’kmaq in his account, and when he mentioned Membertou he comments that while he was a French ally he had a bad reputation among the Mi’kmaq for his treachery. In his account of Port Royal Lescarbot was openly suspicious of Membertou and claimed that his close association with the French was for his own protection and ends. During the year Marc Lescarbot spent in Port Royal he had close contact with Membertou and the Mi’kmaq while overseeing Port Royal during Poutrincourt’s voyage south in 1606. Despite his close contact with the Mi’kmaq, Lescarbot thought little of them and compared the French sharing their bread with the Mi’kmaq to the alms given to the poor in France.

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460 Ibid., 395-6.
461 Ibid., 436.
465 Ibid., 319.
466 Ibid., 331.
Lescarbot’s account also contains more substantial evidence of overt hostility between the French and Acadian Natives in 1607 prior to the colony’s evacuation. Lescarbot reported that the Maliseet sagamore Chkoudun warned the French that Membertou was plotting to betray the French, and rather than disregard this rumour Lescarbot became increasingly suspicious of the Mi`kmaq and Maliseet prior to the colony’s evacuation in 1607.\textsuperscript{467} Soon after Lescarbot stated that the French fur trader Chevalier was concerned that the Maliseet might attack the French when they visited the St. John River.\textsuperscript{468} The tensions between the French and Maliseet escalated to open threats as a Maliseet shaman foresaw that in two years time “...either they must kill all the Normans, or the Normans them.”\textsuperscript{469} Lescarbot reported that he and the other Frenchmen responded by laughing at the shaman and threatened to put all the Natives to sack, essentially threatening the Maliseet with war.\textsuperscript{470} After this unpleasant exchange the French visited the island of St. Croix, where Lescarbot began to express open hostility towards the Mi`kmaq and Maliseet. Lescarbot commented that there were large numbers of Mi`kmaq and Maliseet in the woods, including Membertou, with evil intentions towards the French.\textsuperscript{471} Far more hostility existed between the French and their Native trade partners than the scholarship generally acknowledges.

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the French and English drew on accounts of Spanish cruelty against Natives and their slaughter of Huguenot colonists in Florida to create a “black legend” intended to undermine Spain’s claims to American

\textsuperscript{467} Ibid., 355.  
\textsuperscript{468} Ibid., 357.  
\textsuperscript{469} Ibid., 357: “Se Voyant éconduit il dit que devant qu’il fût deux ans il faudroit qu’ilz tuassent tous les Normans, ou que les Normans les tuassent. Nous-nous mocquames de lui, & lui dimes que nous allions mettre notre barque devant leur Fort pour les aller tous saccager.”  
\textsuperscript{470} Ibid., 357.  
\textsuperscript{471} Ibid., 358.
Yet, within the surviving records of Port Royal, Sagadahoc, and Jamestown Lescarbot alone attempted to justify colonization based on the colonists’ humane treatment of the Acadia Natives and claimed the Natives’ willingly accepted French rule. Lescarbot’s attempts to justify French colonization coexisted with his personal suspicions of Mi’kmaq and Maliseet treachery and his descriptions of the French-Armouchiquois conflict. Englishmen openly acknowledged their maltreatment of Natives in published works, and John Smith described the torture of Powhatans on his orders as well as his use of child hostages. The black legend of Spanish cruelty did not cause the French and English to depict themselves as benevolent in their treatment of Natives in Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc, but instead these colonists vilified Natives as treacherous and wicked to justify occurrences of colonist-Native conflict.

Despite the existence of hostility between the French and Mi’kmaq, the French depended on and valued their Native neighbours as trade partners, guides, and interpreters. As soon as the French arrived at La Have on the east coast of Acadia they met the Mi’kmaq led by Messamouet. The Mi’kmaq of La Have immediately began to act as guides for the French, and continued to cooperate with the French as guides and interpreters throughout the existence of de Mons’ colony. A number of exploration and trade voyages were sent out from Port Royal between 1604 and 1607. Guides such as

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477 Ibid., 238.
Messamouet and Secodun, a Maliseet from the St. John River with close ties to the Mi’kmaq, were indispensible throughout these voyages. Many Mi’kmaq and Maliseet spoke a trade pidgin developed through extended contact with Basque and Norman fishermen and traders. This trade pidgin facilitated Mi’kmaq-French cooperation, and allowed guides such as Messamouet and Secodun to act as interpreters between the French and other Native groups.

In 1604 de Mons charged Champlain with the exploration of the coast to the south of St. Croix. With twelve sailors and two Native guides Champlain explored and mapped the coast in a small bark as far south as the Kennebec River. During this voyage Champlain met and traded with the Eastern Abenaki sagamore Bashabes, communicating through Messamouet and Secodun. Coastal trade and exploration voyages by Champlain in 1604, de Mons in 1605, and Poutrincourt in 1606 all included Mi’kmaq and Maliseet guides who were indispensible as interpreters. These guides were also important as navigators.

The Mi’kmaq were experienced traders and often utilized European shallops for longer trade voyages south. The coast of Acadia was rocky and treacherous, and the experience of Mi’kmaq guides was important in facilitating French voyages. The French and English at Port Royal and Sagadahoc often had great difficulty navigating the coast without Native help. Raleigh Gilbert was unable to locate the Penobscot River in 1607

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480 Ibid. 280,300.
481 Ibid., 294.
without the help of Nahanda and Skidwarres.\textsuperscript{483} In 1606 Gravé and Champlain set out
from Port Royal in a pinnace only to wreck on a rocky shore nearby. Luckily Secodun
and a group of Maliseet arrived to help unload the wrecked pinnace and transport the
French back to Port Royal.\textsuperscript{484} The French were dependant on the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet,
and necessity required the French to overcome those tensions which arose with their
Native allies.

The colonists in Port Royal and Sagadahoc had a keen interest in Native trade,
and ultimately the French were no more accepting of Native culture than the English.
French-Native cooperation and English-Native conflict became established patterns in
North America, but rather than representing an inherent difference between the French
and English this divide had to be developed in the early seventeenth century and
ultimately represents an oversimplification of complex and diverse Native-colonist
relations. The cooperative Native relations established in Port Royal would
fundamentally shape the development of French North American colonization. Port
Royal was re-established by Poutrincourt and other Frenchmen with experience in de
Mons’ colony, and the French-Mi’kmaq trade alliance established in 1604-1607 would
continue to be the crux of French activity in Acadia.\textsuperscript{485} Similarly, de Mons and
Champlain’s experiences in Acadia would shape the Native relations developed in early
Quebec.\textsuperscript{486} Sagadahoc represents the English ability and desire to establish colonies based
on Native trade similar to Port Royal and Quebec, but the colony was a failure.

Sagadahoc helped to shape English-Native relations along the coast of modern day

\textsuperscript{483} Davis, “The Relation of a Voyage,” in ENEV, 439; Strachey, “The historie of trauaile into Virginia
Britania,” in ENEV, 439.
\textsuperscript{484} Champlain, Vol. I, 381.
\textsuperscript{485} Griffiths, \textit{From Migrant to Acadian}, 17.
\textsuperscript{486} Champlain, Vol. I, 231; Griffiths, \textit{From Migrant to Acadian}, 17; Jones, \textit{Gentlemen and Jesuits}, 124.
Maine, but would not greatly influence English North American colonization. It was in Jamestown that the patterns which would characterize the seventeenth-century English approach to North American colonization and Native relations would first develop.

*Conflict in Jamestown: the Limits of European Experience and Agency*

The Jamestown colonists possessed economic objectives and trade experiences similar to the colonists in Port Royal and Sagadahoc. The 1607 expedition of Christopher Newport and Gabriel Archer up the James River established friendly relations with numerous Powhatan villages, demonstrating the influence of English trade experience and the colonists’ desire for cooperative Native trade. Yet, like Port Royal and Sagadahoc, Jamestown possessed a strong military component and many of the colonists in these colonies were military veterans of recent European wars. Military men such as Edward Wingfield in Jamestown and Poutrincourt in Port Royal had difficulty cooperating with Natives and relied on their military experience and excessive force over cooperation and compromise. Ultimately the pattern of English-Powhatan conflict in Jamestown cannot be explained by the English colonists’ formative experiences and objectives alone. Consideration of Native societies, cultures, and actions is necessary to explain the divergent Native relations in Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc.

In their early interactions with the Powhatans the Jamestown colonists exhibited a desire for trade and cooperation similar to the Sagadahoc and Port Royal colonists. Christopher Newport and Gabriel Archer led an exploration party up the James River in May of 1607. Newport was in command and Archer acted as secretary, recording the
region’s resources and commenting on the character of the Powhatans. This English expedition received hospitality from a number of local werowances, most notably at the town of Arrohateck. Archer described how the English were treated with courtesy in each place they visited as they traded with the towns along the river. The general tone of mistrust and hostility that is prevalent throughout most early English accounts of the Powhatans in Jamestown was notably absent from Archer’s account. Archer remained comparatively positive about the Powhatans even after the assault on Jamestown in May of 1607, believing many of the Native groups encountered on the James River were English allies in opposition to the hostile Powhatans.

During Newport’s expedition several Natives acted as guides for the English and were allowed to sleep onboard without suspicion of treachery. Archer noted the trustworthiness and genuine friendship of their primary guide Naviran, who continued to be an ally of the English even as Jamestown was under attack by the Paspahegh and several other Powhatan towns. During this expedition, the English and Powhatans’ mutual desire to establish trade relations resulted in cooperation, mirroring the relationships established between the French and Mi’kmaq at Port Royal and the English and Pemiquid band of Eastern Abenaki at Sagadahoc. Newport and Archer’s cooperation

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488 Archer, “A relation of the Discovery of our River,” in Barbour, The Jamestown Voyages, Vol. I, 83-4, 88, 90. Werowances were hereditary leaders or chiefs usually controlling a village under the paramount chief Powhatan. The term included a religious connotation similar to a priest or shaman, and is reported to have roughly translated to he or she is wealthy, Helen C. Rountree, The Powhatan Indians of Virginia: Their Traditional Culture (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 103, 142; Martin D. Gallivan, James River Chiefdoms: The Rise of Social Inequality in the Chesapeake (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 169, 24-26.
490 Ibid., 84, 97. For an account with the standard hostility to the Powhatans covering same time frame as Archer see, Percy, “A Discourse of the Plantation,” in NAW Vol.5, 270-1.
492 Ibid., 86.
493 Ibid., 86, 97.
with potential Native trade partners was partly the result of their immediate goals, but Newport and Archer’s use of compromise and restraint was also facilitated by their previous trade voyage experiences.

Gabriel Archer possessed considerable trade voyage experience which influenced English conduct during their expedition up the James River and demonstrates the parallels between Newport’s expedition and previous English trade voyages. During his 1602 trade voyage Gabriel Archer had extensive interaction with coastal Native groups on a daily basis for several months as the English explored and traded along the coast.494 Throughout their reoccurring visits the English and Natives traded, shared communal meals, and several Natives stayed with the English to assist them in harvesting sassafras.495 During this trade voyage Archer witnessed the Native customs of gift exchange and reciprocal hospitality, and experienced peaceful trade and cooperation which he would utilize in Jamestown.

Relations between the Natives of north Virginia and the English were not perfect during the 1602 voyage, but despite misunderstandings and tensions the English and Natives were successful in maintaining peaceful relations. When a Native took an English round shield during a meeting the problem was resolved and the Native sachem had the shield returned.496 Another instance of Native theft occurred soon after when a Native man staying the night with the English took several hooks.497 Archer discounted

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496 Archer, “The Relation of Captaine Gosnols Voyage,” in ENEV, 135. Sachem was the southern New England Algonquin equivalent of the title sagamore, see, ENEV, 93-4.
the event, claiming that the Native man had no malicious intent in the act. Archer must have seen the parallels both real and perceived between the Natives of north Virginia and the Powhatans during Newport’s voyage up the James River in 1607.

Captain Newport and the Native werowances quickly and peacefully resolved those misunderstandings that did rise between the English and Powhatans on the expedition up the James River. When a bullet-bag went missing the werowance of Arrohateck quickly had it restored, and Newport in turn allowed the Arrohatecks to keep most of the goods they had taken. On another occasion, Newport had an English sailor bound to a tree and beaten with a cudgel before the werowance of Arrohateck because Newport believed the sailor had struck a Native man. The werowance of Arrohateck interceded, and in turn he and several others ran down the Native man they believed to actually be at fault, beating him in a demonstration of reciprocal justice to ensure good relations with the English. In contrast to the hostility, mistrust, and violence which came to characterize English-Powhatan relations at Jamestown, during this expedition the English and Powhatans went to great lengths to maintain friendly relations. Newport was set to march inland past the fall line of the James River, but he determined that the werowance of Arrohateck, and another werowance, whom the English incorrectly believed to be the paramount chief Powhatan, disliked the idea. Newport called off the march judging good relations with the Powhatans to be more important than exploring Virginia’s interior. Instead the English relied on the Powhatans’ knowledge of the interior which Archer collected by questioning the Powhatans and having them draw him

The Jamestown colonists, like the Port Royal and Sagadahoc colonists, were capable of peaceful interaction and cooperation with Natives. There was no distinct national divide in the behaviour of these French and English colonists during their interaction with Native groups.

James Horn identifies the hospitality and friendly interaction with the Powhatans of the James River as a ruse to keep Newport busy while the Powhatan launched an assault on the English down river at Jamestown. Yet, during the siege of Jamestown, following the initial assault, the Arrohateck met the English on friendly terms, suggesting that the English cut down the tall grass used by the Paspahegh and other hostile Powhatans for ambushes. The local werowances under the paramount chief Powhatan had a great deal of personal freedom within the largely non-coercive political association of the Powhatan Chiefdom. It is just as likely that the Newport expedition was an authentic example of peaceful interaction between the English and Powhatans. The peaceful interaction and trade during Newport’s expedition was the result of the Powhatans’ actions as much as the English’s. Yet, as was the case in the French conflict with the Armouchiquois and the English conflict with the Kennebec Eastern Abenaki, it was often Europeans’ trade misconduct and their violent responses to Native theft that soured relations with Native groups and resulted in violence.

Christopher Newport’s conciliatory and restrained method of Native relations during the 1607 expedition can be explained by his extensive trade voyage experience.

503 Ibid., 82-3.
504 Horn, *A Land As God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth of America*, 52
gained as a privateer captain in the Spanish West Indies.\textsuperscript{507} English privateer voyages to the West Indies often involved trade with other privateers, Natives, and Spanish settlers. As part of a privateer fleet in 1590 Newport traded with Caribs and cooperated with Spanish defectors while raiding Spanish shipping.\textsuperscript{508} Similarly, George Percy described how the Jamestown fleet of 1607 traded knives, beads, and hatchets for food, tobacco, and cloth with Natives while island hopping their way through the West Indies.\textsuperscript{509} All Jamestown colonists acquired this West Indies experience during the outbound voyage to Virginia until the innovation of the direct route in 1609. Yet, Newport was continuously involved in West Indies voyages for nearly two decades prior to 1607, and his experience dwarfed the one or two months spent in the West Indies by most colonists.\textsuperscript{510} A prime example of the complexity of Newport and other Jamestown colonists’ privateer experience is provided by the joint French and English privateer, trade, and exploration voyage of the \textit{Castor and Pollux} in 1604.

The \textit{Castor and Pollux} set out from Plymouth and made its way to Trinidad where the crew traded for tobacco, then stopped in Punta De Rey where they traded for salt.\textsuperscript{511} Traveling north the \textit{Castor and Pollux} looted a Spanish caravel, scavenged a substantial amount of wine from a shipwreck, and then sold these goods at the English, French, and

\textsuperscript{509} Percy, “A Discourse of the Plantation,” in NAW Vol.5, 267.
Dutch privateer mart of Hispaniola.512 The Castor and Pollux then engaged in more substantial privateering against two Spanish ships before heading to the Florida coast to trade for sassafras and china root with local Natives.513 Unfortunately for the crew of the Castor and Pollux, their voyage ended when a battle with Spanish authorities resulted in their capture and interrogation.514

The Castor and Pollux represented general characteristics of privateer voyages applicable to Newport’s numerous West Indian commands. Newport’s interaction with diverse groups, both violent and friendly, during West Indian voyages taught him the importance of compromise and the need for restraint among military men. Like Archer and those with experience in north Virginia, Newport was familiar with peaceful trade and cooperation with Native groups, as well as hostility and conflict against the Spanish. Despite the trade experience of colonists such as Newport and Archer, Jamestown’s relations with the Powhatans were dominated by reoccurring brutality and violence on a scale that was absent in Sagadahoc and Port Royal.

The conflict between the Powhatans and English was partly caused by the Jamestown colonists’ experience in the bloody military training grounds of European.515 The majority of Jamestown’s leaders including Edward Maria Wingfield, John Ratcliffe, George Kendall, and John Smith were military veterans who had served in the

512 Ibid., 114.
513 Ibid., 114.
515 Greene, Pursuits of Happiness, 8-9; Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 20-1; Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established 1565-1576, 160-1; Canny, Kingdom and Colony, 29.
Netherlands. President Wingfield was perhaps the most experienced soldier in Jamestown serving in Ireland, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands from 1579 into the 1590’s.

The example of England’s late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century colonization efforts in Ireland were an important contemporary context for the Virginia colonies, but Irish colonization was not a trade venture and was defined by the use of military force and the seizure of Irish land. The tactics and objectives of Irish colonization served no purpose in North American trade colonies which initially sought to avoid conflict with possible Native trade partners. The records of the English trade voyages, Sagadahoc, and the early documents relating to Jamestown make minimal use of analogies relating Native Americans to the Irish. John Smith utilizes only one such analogy in his three works published before 1616, relating the Powhatans’ deerskin mantles to Irish clothing. The principal source of Irish influence in early Jamestown was President Wingfield who had military experience in Ireland, and this experience may have influenced his militant policy against the Powhatans. The military background of

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521 The three notable examples of Irish analogies by Martin Pring, Gabriel Archer, and John Smith all refer to the clothing of Native Americans and are not commentaries on Native behaviour. Irish references are noticeably absent from Wingfield’s account given his Irish experience and hatred of the Powhatans. “Martin Pring’s Voyage,” in ENEV, 222; Archer, “The Relation of Captaine Gosnols Voyage,” in ENEV, 177; Smith, *A Map of Virginia*, 5.
the Jamestown colonists has been widely used by scholars to explain the violent nature of English-Powhatan relations, and this certainly has validity in the initial conflict with the Powhatans in May 1607.\textsuperscript{523}

The colonists at Jamestown under President Wingfield matched the compromise and diplomacy of Newport on his expedition up the James River with hostility and violence against the Powhatans. While Newport and Archer explored the upper James River, President Wingfield and the majority of the colonists began constructing Jamestown on a small island-like peninsula in the land of the Paspahegh. When the werowance of Paspahegh came to visit Jamestown with a complement of warriors, a tense standoff ensued during which the English were openly hostile and refused to set down their weapons.\textsuperscript{524} Later in this meeting an Englishman struck a Paspahegh man for the theft of a hatchet, and the werowance of Paspahegh took this as a sign of open hostility and retreated with his men.\textsuperscript{525} Soon after this conflict several hundred Powhatans including the forces of Paspahegh, assaulted Jamestown.\textsuperscript{526}

The Jamestown colonists ascribed the Powhatans’ attack to the realization that the English intended to stay, with the construction of their fort.\textsuperscript{527} Jamestown was only a threat to the Powhatans if the English were enemies. During his visit the werowance of Paspahegh was investigating the nature of the English settling on his hunting territory. It

\textsuperscript{524} George Percy, “A Trewe Relacyon,” in Horn. \textit{Captain John Smith}, 926.
\textsuperscript{525} Ibid., 928.
was English misconduct in their meeting with the Paspahegh that demonstrated their hostility and caused the initial Powhatan assault. If Wingfield had provided the Paspahegh with hospitality and gifts, similar to Newport’s conduct on his simultaneous expedition, instead of blunt hostility and violence the initial assault almost certainly would not have occurred. Jamestown’s leaders with military experience in Europe had difficulty cooperating with the Powhatans and had a tendency to rely on violence over compromise and diplomacy.

After the English were caught unprepared by the Powhatans’ assault in May and in light of the ongoing ambushes, Wingfield began to arm and drill the colonists in late May. 528 With a shoot-on-sight policy that was likely due in part to the English’s inability to distinguish between the various Powhatans, the English even began attacking those Powhatans with whom Newport had established friendly relations. 529 Newport departed Jamestown on June 20th leaving Jamestown, “...in warres and in danger of the Savages.” 530 With Newport’s departure, the military men such as Wingfield and John Smith took full control of English-Powhatan relations. Given the dire state of the colony and the reality of ongoing warfare with the Powhatans it was a practical choice to favour the experience of military men over those with trade voyage experiences such as Bartholomew Gosnold, John Martin, and Gabriel Archer. 531

The Powhatans decided to re-establish a tenuous peace with the English during Newport’s absence, but Wingfield and the other military leaders of Jamestown continued

531 The Jamestown Council member John Martin was also a member of Gosnold’s 1602 north Virginian Voyage, Brown, The First Republic in America, 33.
to rely on military force and ultimately considered the peace only a temporary truce.

Even as the Powhatans came to Jamestown daily with the gifts of corn and deer necessary to keep the colonists alive, Wingfield declared, “the doubtfull peace that wee had with the Indyans, which they would keepe no longer then opertunity served to doe us mischief.”

George Percy another military man in early Jamestown similarly referred to the Powhatans as his mortal enemies while depending on the Powhatans’ goodwill for his daily sustenance. With these military men in charge of Jamestown there was little chance of reconciliation with the Powhatans after the initial assault. John Smith was unable to forgive the Powhatans, citing the initial attack in May 1607 as a precedent when he imprisoned, questioned, and tortured several Powhatan men on a mere suspicion of treachery in 1608.

The Jamestown colonists’ military backgrounds contributed to the initial conflict with the Powhatans and assured continued English hostility and militancy. The London Company’s choice of European military veterans to lead Jamestown was partly a response to the threat of Spanish attacks in the Chesapeake, but the English gentry was virtually synonymous with military service, and those Englishmen with sufficient social status to merit leadership positions were drawn from the ranks of privateers and soldiers seeking employment following the Spanish peace in 1604. Yet, attributing the near constant English-Powhatan struggle to Europe military experience alone is an oversimplification. The colonists of Sagadahoc and Port Royal possessed military

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532 Wingfield, “replies to the charges made against him,” in NAW Vol. 5, 278.
534 Smith, A True Relation, in Horn. Captain John Smith, 32-33.
535 Ian Steele refers to this class as the predatory English gentry, Steele, Warpaths, 40, Kupperman, The Jamestown Project, 218.
backgrounds similar to the Jamestown colonists, but were able to maintain relatively peaceful relations with their Native allies.

There is no doubt that the Sagadahoc colonists possessed military experience similar to the Jamestown colonists, but the Sagadahoc colonists maintained peaceful relations with their Eastern Abenaki allies despite their military backgrounds. The colony’s most prominent members George Popham and Raleigh Gilbert possessed military experience, but scholars have been unable to determine where and when they acquired this experience. There were at least two prominent figures named George Popham who may have been the Sagadahoc President; one George was a privateer with experience in Guiana, and the other was a commander in Ireland. Raleigh Gilbert’s specific military experience before Sagadahoc is unknown, but as captain of the Mary and John, Admiral of Sagadahoc, and a relative of Humphrey Gilbert and Walter Raleigh he undoubtedly had experience as a privateer.

The majority of colonists with military experience in Sagadahoc were demobilized soldiers who had fought against the Spanish in the Netherlands. Despite the strong military nature of the Sagadahoc colony, the colonists maintained close cooperative relations with the Pemiquid band of Eastern Abenaki and the representatives of the sagamore Bashabes. The widespread assumption of poor English-Eastern Abenaki relations in Sagadahoc has precluded scholars from asking why similar groups of colonists in Jamestown and Sagadahoc developed distinctly different relations with local

536 ENEV, 87.
Native groups. The military and trade voyage experience of the Port Royal colonists sheds further light on both the importance and limitations of colonists’ formative experiences in these French and English colonies.

Like the Jamestown and Sagadahoc colonists, the French colonists in Port Royal were primarily military men. Most of the colony’s leaders had experience in France’s recent civil war.540 The French civil war was in many ways an extension of the religious war between the Spanish and the Dutch Protestants in the Low Countries. During the French civil war England and the Protestant German powers both sent troops to support Henri of Navarre, while Spanish landed troops in Brittany and invaded from the Spanish Netherlands to support the French Catholic League.541 Wingfield fought in Brittany during the French civil war, as did Samuel de Champlain, which demonstrates the similarity between the military experience of the English and French colonists.542 Despite their military experience, the French colonists maintained good relations with their Mi’kmaq and Maliseet allies in Acadia. While the military men of Port Royal were largely successful at maintaining cooperative Native relations, those instances of French-Native violence that occurred in Port Royal help to explain the poor Native relations of Jamestown.

De Mons and Poutrincourt’s conflicts with the Armouchiquois in southern Acadia provide a parallel to the divide in Native policies between Newport and Wingfield in Jamestown. De Mons and Poutrincourt were both veterans of the French civil war, but

540 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 7; Jones, Gentlemen and Jesuits, 6.
542 “Payment of Various Sums to Jean Hardy and Samuel de Champlain, for Their Wages and Traveling Expenses in the Royal Army of Brittany, March 1595 – April 1597,” in DSOD, 163-165; Grizzard and Smith, Jamestown Colony, 233.
Poutrincourt had limited experience in North America while de Mons had been involved in New France and Acadia since his visit to the St. Lawrence in 1600. The voyages commanded by de Mons and Poutrincourt both ended in conflicts with the Armouchiquois in 1605 and 1606. Yet, the more experienced de Mons displayed restraint in the face of the Native attack while Poutrincourt responded with excessive retaliation. Champlain reported that de Mons only attacked the Armouchiquois after they had slain a French sailor, and even then he called off the attack and released a Native prisoner when he determined that nothing would be gained from further conflict. Like Newport among the Powhatans in May of 1607, de Mons used restraint and compromise gained through his trade voyage experience when dealing with the newly encountered Armouchiquois.

In contrast Poutrincourt instigated the conflict with the Armouchiquois in 1606. Poutrincourt met the Armouchiquois with a hostile display of French weapons, and during this meeting the French fired at several Natives in retaliation for theft. Poutrincourt’s hostility and violence towards the Armouchiquois provides a close parallel to the hostility and violence Wingfield exhibited towards the Paspahegh in Jamestown before the initial assault on the colony. Poutrincourt and Wingfield were military commanders with limited experience in North America, and they both relied on their European military experience in dealing with Native groups. The Armouchiquois responded to Poutrincourt’s attacks with violence, as did the Paspahegh in their assault on

543 Jones, Gentlemen and Jesuits, 7; Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 7; Biggar, The Early Trading Companies of New France, 42.
545 Ibid., 333.
Jamestown in May of 1607. While de Mons saw that there was nothing to gain from further conflict and released an Armouchiquois captive, Poutrincourt attempted to take a number of captives and killed numerous Armouchiquois in revenge. Poutrincourt’s use of excessive retaliation matches the militarization against the Powhatans that the English underwent under Wingfield following the assault on Jamestown in May of 1607. The parallels between Poutrincourt and Wingfield demonstrate that the divide in Native relations between colonists with military experience and those with trade voyage experience were real and extended to both the French and English in the early seventeenth century.

The Jamestown colonists sought to establish trade relations with Powhatans, and many of the English possessed trade voyage experiences which had taught them the importance of restraint and compromise in cooperating with Native trade partners. Yet, from the beginning the numerous military men within the colony such as Wingfield relied on force in dealing with the Powhatans and were unable to forget or to forgive previous conflicts while formulating the colony’s policies towards the Powhatans. European military experience did not directly correspond to hostility and violence against Natives. Despite their military experience and capacity for violence, the Sagadahoc colonists were able to maintain peaceful relations with the Eastern Abenaki and the Port Royal colonists remained close allies with the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet. What caused the Jamestown colonists’ conflict with the Powhatans, and why did the French utilize their military experience against the Armouchiquois but not the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet? Consideration of French and English characteristics, experiences, and actions only addresses half of the

546 Ibid., 333-4; Champlain, Vol. I, 420.
547 Ibid., 427.
equation which resulted in the Native relations of Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc. Due to Euro-centric biases in the availability of sources scholars are largely restricted to seeking causation within English and French experiences and actions, but a comparative-Native perspective helps to shed light on the importance of Native characteristics in producing both cooperative and hostile Native-colonist relations in these three colonies.

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The Impact of Native Societies on French and English Colonization

The violent French-Armouchiquois encounters and reoccurring conflicts between the English and Powhatans cannot be explained by the colonists’ formative experiences alone. The characteristics of Native groups and their previous experiences were central in shaping colonist-Native interaction in Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc. The Powhatans and Armouchiquois shared a number of characteristics relating to their agricultural lifeways that contributed to their violent relations with English and French colonists. These characteristics distinguished the Powhatans and Armouchiquois from the semi-nomadic hunter-gather Eastern Abenaki, Mi’kmaq, and Maliseet who shared traits which facilitated peaceful relations with French and English colonists.

The Armouchiquois of Cape Cod had limited interaction with Europeans prior to their encounters with the French in 1605 and 1606. Before the renewal of French and English voyages in the early seventeenth century it is unlikely that the Armouchiquois traded with Europeans due to their position far to the south of the Newfoundland fishery
and the established fur trade sphere in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.\textsuperscript{548} Bartholomew Gosnold’s voyage of 1602 and Martin Pring’s voyage of 1603 both explored Cape Cod near where the French fought the Armouchiquois in Stage and Nauset Harbours.\textsuperscript{549} The Gosnold voyage encountered Natives likely belonging to the Nauset band who approaching the English to engage in trade.\textsuperscript{550} While Gosnold and Pring’s crews avoided violent conflicts with the Natives of Cape Cod, both small groups felt threatened by the numerous Natives they encountered along the coast. Hostile standoffs ensued during both voyages when small groups of Englishmen were approached by dozens of Native men armed with bows.\textsuperscript{551} The English encounters with the Natives of Cape Cod were not unlike de Mons’ conflict with the Armouchiquois in Nauset Harbour. Both English voyages departed on bad terms with the local Natives, after an English forager was wounded during the Gosnold voyage and after a tense standoff with nearly a hundred Native warriors during the Pring voyage.\textsuperscript{552} The Armouchiquois lacked considerable experience with Europeans, and this likely contributed to the misunderstandings, hostility, and violence with the French in 1605 and 1606. Like the crews of the Gosnold and Pring voyages, one of the primary reasons for French hostility towards the Armouchiquois was that the French felt threatened by the overwhelming numbers of the Armouchiquois.

\textsuperscript{548} Bourque and Whitehead argue that European traders in region of the Eastern Abenaki and Armouchiquois were minimal before 1602, with the Mi’kmaq acting as middlemen, Bourque and Whitehead, “Trade and alliances in the contact period,” in Baker ed. American Beginnings, 132, 138-9.

\textsuperscript{549} “Martin Pring’s Voyage to ‘North Virginia’ in 1603,” in ENEV, 218; Archer, “The Relation of Captaine Gosnols Voyage,” in ENEV,118.

\textsuperscript{550} Ibid., 118-122. Thus, three leading men in Jamestown, Bartholomew Gosnold, John Martin, and Gabriel Archer encountered the Armouchiquois prior to their arrival in Jamestown.

\textsuperscript{551} Ibid., 134; “Martin Pring’s Voyage to ‘North Virginia’ in 1603,” in ENEV, 227.

\textsuperscript{552} Ibid., 227; Archer, “The Relation of Captaine Gosnols Voyage,” in ENEV,136.
The Armouchiquois greatly outnumbered the small French crews encountered in 1605 and 1606, and this was a primary cause of the French hostility during de Mons and Poutrincourt’s voyages. Heading south in 1605, Champlain observed that the lands of the Armouchiquois were far more populous than the other regions of Acadia the French had previously seen.\textsuperscript{553} During a stop along the coast prior to the conflict in Stage Harbour Champlain commented, “Poutrincourt caught sight in the woods of a great many Indians, who with the intention of doing us some injury were on their way…”\textsuperscript{554} The mere appearance of a large Native group produced hostility and fear among the French. The French apprehension of the Armouchiquois’ overpowering numbers is clear in Champlain’s depiction of the battle between the French and Armouchiquois in Stage Harbour. Champlain’s sketch features less than a dozen Frenchmen, many of them pierced with arrows, fighting outnumbered against a multitude of Armouchiquois warriors estimated to be 400 in number.\textsuperscript{555} Champlain may have embellished the number of Armouchiquois warriors, but in any case the prominence of the Armouchiquois’ large numbers in Champlain’s account demonstrates the French associated large Native groups with hostile and violent encounters.

The Powhatans and Armouchiquois’ conflicts with Europeans were shaped by their large populations and agricultural lifeways. The Powhatans had an estimated population of 13,000 people living on 6,500 square miles extending inland to the fall lines of the various rivers feeding into the southern Chesapeake in 1607.\textsuperscript{556} The

\textsuperscript{553} Champlain, Vol. I, 337.
\textsuperscript{554} Ibid., 339.
\textsuperscript{555} Ibid., 420; Plate LXXIX, facing page 428.
\textsuperscript{556} Helen C. Rountree, “Who Were the Powhatans and Did They Have a Unified ‘Foreign Policy’?” in Helen C. Rountree ed., Powhatan Foreign Relations 1500-1722 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 1; Gallivan, James River Chiefdoms, 22.
Powhatans were a semi-sedentary farming people who lived off a mixture of agriculture, fishing, hunting, and gathering.\textsuperscript{557} While information on the various Natives groups referred to as the Armouchiquois is limited, they are clearly defined by Champlain and Pring as a populous people living in villages and practicing intensive agriculture along the coast of modern New England south of the Saco River.\textsuperscript{558} The Powhatans and Armouchiquois’ large and dense populations were a primary cause of their conflict with Europeans. Native groups with large populations were more likely to have violent encounters with Europeans because, as was seen in the case of the French and English among the Armouchiquois, the small groups of English and French exploring and settling the North American coast were threatened when outnumbered by Natives.

The large and dense population of the Powhatans triggered hostility among the military men in Jamestown and exacerbated these military men’s reliance on force. Like Champlain among the Armouchiquois, the densely inhabited nature of the Chesapeake struck the Spaniard Juan Rogel in 1572 who observed:

\begin{quote}
I have noticed that the population here is thicker than has been seen in any other part of the coast that has been discovered; and it appears to me that they live here with habitations more fixed than in any of the other places where I have been.\textsuperscript{559}
\end{quote}

Despite limited evidence, pre-1600 epidemics in the Chesapeake certainly occurred as a result of repeated contact with Europeans, and epidemics broke out soon after English-Powhatan contact in 1607.\textsuperscript{560} The Powhatans’ maintained their high population levels

\textsuperscript{557} Rountree and Turner, \textit{Before and After Jamestown}, 87.
\textsuperscript{558} Champlain, Vol. I, 327, 398; “Martin Pring’s Voyage to ‘North Virginia’ in 1603,” in ENEV, 223.
following epidemics and ongoing warfare by absorbing conquered peoples.\footnote{561} In his aggressive expansion the paramount chief Powhatan absorbed 24 separate districts before the arrival of the English and continued to wage expansionist wars against the Chesapeake and other peoples in 1607.\footnote{562} During these wars of expansion and in their ongoing struggles with the rival Native groups to the northwest the Powhatans constantly absorbed conquered peoples and replenished their population following the inevitable decline resulting from the introduction of Eurasian diseases.

The English directly linked the Powhatans’ large population to their conflicts in 1607. In 1607 Thomas Studley commented on the danger encountered during John Smith’s trade voyages throughout the Chesapeake due to the, “…want of a sufficient power, (knowing the multitude of the Salvages)…”\footnote{563} Captain Newport also saw a connection between the violence with the Powhatans experienced in Jamestown in 1607 and the high population of the region. After speaking to Newport on his arrival in Plymouth in 1607 Ferdinando Gorges reported to the Earl of Salisbury that the people of the Chesapeake were, “daungerouse to bee dealt with, beinge by nature valiente and in number many.”\footnote{564} The Paspahegh alone mustered as many fighting men as Jamestown when they visited in May of 1607, and they were only one of the 30 Algonquin groups loyal to the paramount chief Powhatan.\footnote{565} The small groups of French and English colonists were far more likely to overreact with violence against the Armouchiquois and


\footnote{562} Rountree, and Turner, \textit{Before and After Jamestown}, 37.


Powhatans solely on the basis of their large and dense populations. Colonist-Native interactions in Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc were not simply the result of colonists acting and Natives reacting. As a result of their semi-sedentary agricultural lifeways the Powhatans were highly territorial and possessed a complex governmental system designed for warfare against Natives and Europeans alike.

The Powhatans possessed a history of reoccurring violence with Europeans prior to the establishment of Jamestown. The Powhatans had several clashes with the Spanish in the 1570’s. The Paspahegh slaughtered a Jesuit mission on the York River in 1571, which sparked a brutal and indiscriminate reprisal from a Spanish fleet under the command of Governor Pedro Menéndez in 1572. In 1588 another Spanish expedition to the Chesapeake kidnapped several Natives. Perhaps not incidentally, Bartholomew Gilbert and several of his men were killed by Natives along the coast near the Chesapeake Bay in 1603. The Powhatans experience with Europeans prior to the establishment of Jamestown was erratic and dominated by violence, and this trend simply continued into English-Powhatan relations.

Warfare was endemic in the Chesapeake during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In addition to reoccurring fights with the Spanish along the coast the Chesapeake Natives were facing attacks from the Monacans and other Native groups.

566 Karen Kupperman observes the Jamestown colonists’ tendency to overreact and rely on excessive retaliation when threatened, and this can be extended to the personnel of Sagadahoc and Port Royal as well, Karen Kupperman, *Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 9.
569 Canner, “Thomas Canner’s Account of Bartholomew Gilbert’s Voyage,” in NAW Vol. 5, 166.
from the interior. The political organization of the Powhatans was highly complex with roughly thirty separate towns with local and district chiefs organized under the leadership of the paramount chief Powhatan. This paramount chiefdom was a response to external military pressures on the Algonquians of the southern Chesapeake in an era of repeated droughts and increased competition for territory. In 1607 the Jamestown colonists choose to settle among a populous cluster of Native groups who were well versed in defending their land against Natives and Europeans alike, and due to the Powhatans’ militancy reoccurring English-Native conflict was nearly unavoidable.

The Powhatans’ militant foreign policy would shape the first English-Native encounter in the Chesapeake during Jamestown. On their initial landing on the southern shore of the Chesapeake Bay the English were ambushed by a group of Natives who injured Gabriel Archer and a sailor before retreating. Whether these Native attackers were Powhatans or members of the rival Native group known as the Chesapeake, the attack shows the violence that dominated Native-Native and Native-European relations in the region. The Paspahegh assault on Jamestown and the reoccurring conflicts between the English and Powhatans throughout the early years of the colony were merely a continuation of the Powhatans’ existing policy towards hostile invaders. The conflict between the English and Powhatan resulted from both Native and English military experiences and a reliance on force. Instances of peaceful interaction between the English

and Powhatans such as Newport’s expedition up the James River in 1607 required that both sides exercise restraint and possess sufficient motivation to maintain cooperative relations. Predictably, instances of close English-Powhatan cooperation were almost exclusively facilitated by trade, and both the Powhatans and English found it difficult to maintain such relationships for long in the early years of Jamestown.

The extent to which the Powhatans’ political structure and militant foreign policy reflected the populous agriculturalist Armouchiquois is unclear. It is possible that the Armouchiquois possessed a militant territoriality due to their lifeways, and their violent retaliation against the conduct of de Mons and Poutrincourt parallels the behaviour of the Powhatans against the English. Unfortunately due to severely limited sources the political structure and foreign policy of the various groups referred to as the Armouchiquois in 1604-6 cannot be substantiated. Despite their hostility to the French and English the Armouchiquois and Powhatans greatly desired these Europeans’ trade goods, and trade relations were further influenced by these Natives groups’ lifeways.

As populous semi-sedentary farms, the Armouchiquois possessed agricultural surpluses but few valuable trade goods. The French in Port Royal had little interest in trading for agricultural products, and as a result the French had no economic incentive to maintain good relations with the Armouchiquois. Champlain observed a group of Maliseet and Mi’kmaq under Secodun and Messamouet trading French goods such as axes, knives, and kettles with the Armouchiquois near the Saco River.574 The Armouchiquois provided agricultural products such as corn, beans, and squash in exchange for these European trade goods, but the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet were displeased.

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with the exchange and decided to make war on the Armouchiquois. Champlain also mentions the French trading a few items for chards, but does not mention furs or any substantial trading among the Armouchiquois. The Armouchiquois did not have the large quantities of furs the semi-nomadic hunters to the north such as the Eastern Abenaki possessed.

The conflict with the Armouchiquois during de Mons voyage was the result of the theft of a kettle. The Armouchiquois likely resorted to theft because the French were uninterested in trading their goods for corn and squash. The English refusal to trade with the Sabenoa’s band of Eastern Abenaki had resulted in similar Native hostility in Sagadahoc. Trade was a central part of Native diplomacy. Secodun and Messamouet decided to go to war with the Armouchiquois of Saco River when they did not adequately reciprocate their gifts of French goods, and the French disinterest in trading with the Armouchiquois would have sparked similar resentment. The Armouchiquois lack of valuable trade goods contributed to the hostility and violence with the French under de Mons and Poutrincourt in 1605 and 1606. While the French did not encounter serious food shortages in Port Royal and had no interest in agricultural products, the English at Jamestown found themselves in dire need of the Powhatans’ corn in 1607.

The English in Jamestown desperately needed Native agricultural products as a result of their chronic supply shortage. English dependence on the Powhatans’ foodstuffs

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576 Ibid., 398.
577 Quinn & Quinn observe that the Nauset Natives had few furs of little value during the Gosnolod voyage, see, ENEV, 122 footnote 2. In comparison Rosier reported trading for 40 beaver skins in a single trading session with a group of Eastern Abenaki, Rosier, “A Trve Relation,” in ENEV, 273.
fostered short-term cooperative trade, but ultimately resulted in conflict over scarce and essential agricultural resources. With Wingfield and then Ratcliffe overseeing the Jamestown settlement, Captain John Smith conducted trade and exploration expeditions throughout the Chesapeake in the absence of Newport in 1607-1609. Smith was an aggressive trader who saw Newport’s adherence to Native protocol in his gift exchanges as weak and wasteful. In 1608 during a meeting with the paramount chief Powhatan, colonists Studley and Todkill observed, “we had not 4.bushels for that we expected 20. hogsheads...Newport seeking to please the humor of the unsatible Salvage; Smith to cause the Salvage to please him...” Smith was a hardened military veteran with experience in the Netherlands and Eastern Europe. Perhaps as a result of his military experience Smith was virtually incapable of trusting Native Americans, and used openly hostile trade tactics against the Powhatans.

The Powhatans were often willing to trade their corn for copper, beads, hatchets, and other goods, but they had a relatively limited corn surplus and as early as 1607 Powhatan villages were refusing to trade with the English. The English dependence on Native corn led Smith to use force when the Powhatans refused to trade. Describing Smith’s method of trading with the Powhatans in 1608 Russell and Todkill commented:

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581 Ibid., 316, This divide between the diplomacy of Smith and Newport is discussed by Daniel Richter who considers Smith’s missteps as the primary cause of renewed Native-English warfare in 1608-9, Daniel Richter “Tsenacommacah and the Atlantic World”, in Mancall ed., The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550-1624, 58.
584 The first recorded instance of Smith initiating trade using force occurred in 1607 against the Kecoughtan on the lower James. This tactic became increasingly prominent as the Powhatans became less willing to trade with the English in 1608-9. See, Smith, “The Proceedings,” in NAW Vol. 5, 314, 326, 327, 329, 337.
585 Ibid.
…at our first meeting our captaine ever observed this order to demaunde their bowes and arrows swords mantles or furres, with some childe for hostage, wherby he could quickly perceive when they intended any villainy. 586

In Jamestown the English demand for the Powhatans agricultural trade goods resulted in hostility and conflict. The Powhatan were numerous and depended on agriculture to supplement their hunting, fishing, and gathering in an era of intense drought. 587 If Smith and the English had traded for non-essential goods such as furs with the Powhatans, like the colonists in Sagadahoc and Port Royal, much of the conflict that plagued the colony throughout its early history might have been avoided. 588

While the Chesapeake would later prove capable of a profitable fur trade the main source of furs was the Potomac River far to the north of Jamestown, and the colonists’ extreme need for foodstuffs took precedents over the fur trade in the early years of the colony. 589 The English conflict with the Powhatans was partially caused by the Powhatans possession of substantial quantities of corn and the London Company’s continued failure to supply the Jamestown colonists. The Powhatans and Armouchiquois’ agricultural lifeways and their violent conflicts with the French and English stand in stark contrast to the cooperation between the colonists of Sagadahoc and Port Royal and their semi-nomadic hunter-gather allies.

The Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, and Maliseet peoples encountered by the Sagadahoc and Port Royal colonists did not farm, lived in dispersed groups, and possessed more considerable stores of furs for trade. In 1604 the Mi’kmaq had a

586 Ibid., 321.
587 Rountree and Turner, Before and After Jamestown, 143-44.
population of 3,000 living on approximately 30,000 square miles in what is today Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, and Prince Edward Island.\textsuperscript{590} At the time the Mi’kmaq were a seasonal migratory people living off game, fishing, and gathering.\textsuperscript{591} The description of the Eastern Abenaki land of Mawooshen provided by the captives taken by Waymouth in 1605 listed 21 villages with an adult male population of 2,930 for a total population of perhaps 10,000 living on 20,000 square miles between the Saco and Penobscot Rivers.\textsuperscript{592} Father Biard estimated the total Eastern Abenaki population from the Penobscot to the Kennebec was only 3,000 in 1616.\textsuperscript{593} The Eastern Abenaki captives and the English likely overstated the Eastern Abenaki population in 1605-6, but this discrepancy also depicts the terrible ravages of European diseases on Native American populations.

In his exploration of the Acadian coast Champlain observed that the Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, and Maliseet possessed similar non-agricultural lifeways.\textsuperscript{594} As a result of their large territories and semi-nomadic lifeways the Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, and Maliseet had access to considerable supplies of furs and pelts valued by the French and English. Colonists and Natives’ mutual desire for trade facilitated cooperation while avoiding the tensions inherent in trading essential foodstuffs such as corn. The Powhatans had a population density at least four times higher than the Eastern Abenaki and twenty times higher than the Mi’kmaq. Because these Native groups in Acadia had low population densities and dispersed settlement patterns the French and English often dealt

\textsuperscript{590} Jones, \textit{Gentlemen and Jesuits}, 22; Griffiths, \textit{From Migrant to Acadian}, 9.
\textsuperscript{591} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{593} Ibid., 304; Biard, “Relation of New France,” in Reuben Gold Thwaites, \textit{The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents}, Vol. 3, 111.
\textsuperscript{594} Champlain, Vol. I, 308.
with smaller Native groups that did not trigger the fear and hostility that was produced by encounters with the numerous Powhatans and Armouchiquois.

Port Royal’s Mi’kmaq and Maliseet trade partners were far less numerous than the Powhatans and Armouchiquois, and the French often outnumbered their Native allies or dealt with them from a position of numerical parity. The Mi’kmaq band near Port Royal led by Membertou spent much of 1605 and 1606 living in close proximity to the French. Lescarbot described how Membertou and between 20-30 Mi’kmaq were always in attendance at Port Royal’s evening meals during the winter of 1606.595 Port Royal had 79 wintering colonists in 1604 and 45 in 1605.596 Even if the total number of Membertou’s band was greater than the French, the French could muster more fighting men and were unlikely to be threatened by the Mi’kmaq. The French often found themselves only moderately outnumbered by Native groups of 20 or 30 men during trade voyage encounters among the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Eastern Abenaki.597 The largest Native gathering the French encountered north of the Armouchiquois was during their meeting with Bashabes which included three Eastern Abenaki groups with a combined total of approximately 80 men.598 Predictably, Champlain commented that the French were on their guard during this meeting with their weapons ready due to the large numbers of Eastern Abenaki present.599 Dealing with smaller Native groups gave the French confidence and helped to avoid the fear, hostility, and violence that resulted when both the French and English were outnumbered by Native groups. This same trend holds true for the Sagadahoc colony.

597 Ibid., 316.
598 Ibid., 294-5.
599 Ibid., 294-5.
The English colonists in Sagadahoc were able to cooperate with the Eastern Abenaki with limited hostility or violence because they possessed numerical superiority over their Native partner. The English reported Nahanda’s Pemiquid band of Eastern Abenaki numbered 100 individuals including men, women, and children. With over a hundred initial colonists, Sagadahoc possessed several times more fighting men than the Pemiquid, and the Davis journal never hints at the English feeling threatened by the Pemiquid. On the contrary, during their initial visit to the Pemiquid a group of fifty Englishmen made the Pemiquid nervous, and Popham decided to land only twelve men. During Raleigh Gilbert’s tense standoff with the Eastern Abenaki on the Kennebec River, the only confirmed incident of English-Eastern Abenaki hostility, the numerical parity of the English crew and the Eastern Abenaki likely contributed to both groups level-headed withdrawal without violence. The Sagadahoc colonists were less likely to feel threatened and overreact with violence against the Eastern Abenaki because they were not overwhelming outnumbered, as the English and French would find themselves among the Powhatans and Armouchiquois. The lack of English and French hostility and aggression towards their Native allies in Sagadahoc and Port Royal was matched by Mi’kmaq and Eastern Abenaki acceptance of French and English settlement.

The Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, and Maliseet’s semi-nomadic hunter-gather lifeways did not generate the militant territoriality the Powhatans displayed towards the English. Far from opposing French and English settlement the Mi’kmaq and Eastern Abenaki eagerly embraced their presence for their own ends. In the southern Chesapeake

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601 Ibid., 427-8.  
602 The Kennebec Eastern Abenaki numbered 16 compared to the 9 Englishmen in Gilbert’s boat, Strachey, “The historie of trauaile into Virginia Britania,” in ENEV, 410.
the Powhatan utilized all available land either as farmland or hunting grounds.⁶⁰³ Thus, soon after the English began to construct Jamestown the werowance of Paspahegh arrived with a hundred warriors to investigate the intrusion on his lands.⁶⁰⁴

The Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, and Maliseet possessed their own forms of territoriality, but they could easily spare the small areas occupied by St. Croix, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc.⁶⁰⁵ The Eastern Abenaki sagamore Sabenoa declared himself lord of the Kennebec to the English, but he saw Sagadahoc as a trade opportunity rather than a territorial intrusion.⁶⁰⁶ Sagadahoc was not in close proximity to any Eastern Abenaki villages, and both the Pemiquid band and representatives of Bashabes took the initiative traveling to Sagadahoc in order to establish relations with the English. The Mi’kmaq eagerly welcomed the French when they relocated their colony from St. Croix to Port Royal in 1605. The Mi’kmaq group led by Membertou took advantage of this opportunity by remaining in the vicinity of the colony until its evacuation in 1607.⁶⁰⁷ Membertou and his band gained access to French trade goods and prestige among the Mi’kmaq through their association with Port Royal, and the Eastern Abenaki hoped for the same first with the French and then the English.⁶⁰⁸ The Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, and Maliseet acceptance of French and English settlement was partly the result of their large territories and dispersed settlement patterns, but they were also eager to welcome the colonist because their extensive European trade experience gave them a considerable knowledge of European objectives and facilitated communication.

⁶⁰³ Rountree and Turner, Before and After Jamestown, 84.
⁶⁰⁴ George Percy, “A Trewe Relacyon,” in Horn, Captain John Smith, 928.
⁶⁰⁵ For discussion of the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet’s wars with the Eastern Abenaki and Armouchiquois, see, Thorp, “Equals of the King: The Balance of Power in Early Acadia,” 1-10.
The Mi’kmaq and Eastern Abenaki’s acceptance of French and English settlements was a result of their substantial European trade experience which facilitated communication and trade. The Mi’kmaq had longstanding ties to European traders and possessed a wealth of knowledge about Europeans prior to establishment of Port Royal. When the French arrived in Acadia they encountered Mi’kmaq such as Messamouet who spoke a mixture of French and Basque and had been to France.\textsuperscript{609} The Mi’kmaq were not only established French trade partners, but were themselves mariners and traders along the Acadian coast.\textsuperscript{610} The Mi’kmaq were fully aware of the French interest in the fur trade, and were able to effectively communicate with the colonists using their French-Basque trade language. The circumstances of English-Eastern Abenaki interaction in Sagadahoc were much the same as French-Mi’kmaq relations. Despite being further removed from the European traders, the Eastern Abenaki traded with the English in 1605 during the Waymouth voyages, and with the French expeditions sent out from Port Royal.\textsuperscript{611} The Eastern Abenaki trade experience was matched by linguistic and cultural intermediates in Nahanda and Skidwarres who had spent time in England and could effectively communicate with the Sagadahoc colonists.\textsuperscript{612} The Mi’kmaq and Eastern Abenaki’s trade experience and knowledge of European languages were key factors in establishing cooperative trade alliances with French and English colonists, and these were advantages that were entirely lacking in the English-Powhatan and French-Armouchiquois encounters.

\textsuperscript{609} Lescarbot, Vol. II,324.
\textsuperscript{610} Bourque and Whitehead, “Trade and alliances in the contact period,” in Baker ed. American Beginning, 138-9; see footnote 70.
\textsuperscript{612} The clearest example of the considerable communication skills developed by Nahanda and Skidwarres is the detailed description of the Eastern Abenaki peoples based on their information, “Eastern Abenaki captives describe their country of Mawooshen,” in ENEV, 470-6.
Tensions between the Jamestown colonists and the Powhatans were heightened by their limited ability to communicate. The Englishmen Thomas Harriot compiled substantial amounts of ethnographic information on coastal Algonquin peoples south of the Chesapeake and acquired a working knowledge of the region’s Algonquin language during the first Roanoke colony of 1585-6.\(^\text{613}\) The London Virginia Company purchased Harriot’s published works, but it seems they did not utilize his language skills, consulting him only once in person during 1609.\(^\text{614}\) As a result of this missed opportunity the English arrived in the Chesapeake without any means of communicating with the Powhatans. In the month following the English arrival in the Chesapeake Gabriel Archer reported the English attempted to communicate with the Powhatans through hand gestures, and Archer struggled to acquire a few words of Algonquin from the Powhatan Naviran.\(^\text{615}\) In the fall of 1607, more than five months after the English arrival in the Chesapeake Thomas Studley reported that John Smith set out to trade despite, “the want of the language... & other necessaries, [which] were infinite impediments...”\(^\text{616}\) The English and Powhatan were slow to develop even basic communication skills, and effective communication beyond describing objects and simple actions was only possible after cultural intermediates such as Thomas Savage had lived among the Powhatans for several years.\(^\text{617}\) The English and Powhatans inability to communicate was bound to lead to cultural misunderstandings and hostility. The Powhatans’ main experience with

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\(^{614}\) Ibid., 164.


\(^{617}\) Smith reported that Thomas Savage was left with Chief Powhatan by Captain Newport in 1608, and according to Ralph Hamor Savage had become a natural speaker of the Powhatans’ language in 1615. See, Smith, *A True Relation*, in Horn, *Captain John Smith*, 24; Ralph Hamor, “A True Discourse of the Present Estate of Virginia,” in Horn, *Captain John Smith*, 1146-7; Kupperman, *Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America*, 83-87.
Europeans prior to Jamestown consisted of violent encounters with the Spanish, and without an English explanation to the contrary the Powhatans could reasonably assume the English were hostile like the Spanish before them.

The French-Armouchiquois and English-Kennebec Eastern Abenaki conflicts were partly caused by the language barriers between these groups as well. The Mi’kmaq and Maliseet interpreters could not understand the language of the Armouchiquois. Champlain observed, “Our Indian could understand only certain words, inasmuch as the language of the Almouchiquois..differs entirely from that of the Souriquois and Etechemins.” The French inability to communicate with the Armouchiquois made it impossible for Champlain to ask simple question such as how much snow the region received, and this lack of communication led to tensions and violence during these encounters. The only Native-French encounters that ended in violence were those that lacked effectively communication. Similarly, when the English colonists at Sagadahoc dealt with the Eastern Abenaki of the Kennebec River without their interpreters Nahanda and Skidwarres hostility and a tense standoff resulted. The correlation between poor communication and hostile in colonist-Native relations is confirmed by the events of Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc.

The semi-sedentary agricultural lifeways of the Powhatans and Armouchiquois resulted in a number of similar characteristics which caused conflicts with the Jamestown and Port Royal colonists. The division between the agriculturalist Powhatans and Armouchiquois’ hostile European relations and the semi-nomadic hunter-gather

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618 Champlain, Vol. I, 325: “Nostre Sauuage ne pouuoit entendre que quelques mots, d’autant que la langue Almouchiquoise, comme s’appelle ceste nation, differe du tout de celle des Souriquois & Etechemins.”
619 Ibid., 323, 338.
Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Eastern Abenaki’s cooperative European relations verifies the key importance of Native characteristics and actions in determining Native-colonist relations in Jamestown, Port Royal, and Sagadahoc.

The dense populations of the Armouchiquois and Powhatans provided an overwhelming numerical superiority over English and French colonists, which generated fear and caused a reliance on force among both the French and English. The French and English’s propensity for violence was matched by the militancy of the Armouchiquois and Powhatans. The French were uninterested in the agricultural products of the Armouchiquois which allowed for violence without harming Port Royal’s Native trade, and the English’s dire need for Powhatan corn led to conflict over a scarce food source. The Armouchiquois and Powhatans possessed limited trade experience and lacked the communication skills and cultural intermediates that the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Eastern Abenaki utilized when they established trade alliances with Port Royal and Sagadahoc. The hunter-gather Mi’kmaq, Eastern Abenaki, and Maliseet were less numerous, lacked the agriculturists’ intensive use of limited territory, possessing considerable numbers of valuable furs, and were exceptionally well informed on the culture, intentions, and language of Europeans.

Scholars often see the small number of France’s North American colonists requiring the French to establish cooperative Native relations, leading to limited conflict over land, and helping to facilitate the fur trade.\textsuperscript{620} Yet Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc all started small and the patterns of French and English Native relations were

established before population growth occurred. The French fur trade, predating colonization, required cooperative Native relations and helped to limit the size of the French colonies’ populations to maximize profits and avoid conflict with Native allies. Perhaps the only reason the French developed agriculture in North America was the availability of land that was not being extensively utilized by their Native allies. The St. Lawrence region near Quebec had been depopulated prior to French settlement in 1608, and the Mi’kmaq were relatively tolerant of French agriculture, perhaps due to their large territory and low population density. French-Native cooperation and the emphasis on the fur trade that would define French North American colonization were facilitated by the characteristics and actions of the Mi’kmaq and other Native groups the French interacted with. Port Royal would set this trend and directly influenced the development of Acadia and Quebec.

Initially the English in Jamestown and Sagadahoc hoped for Native trade alliances similar to those established in Port Royal. Jamestown’s conflict with the Powhatans and eventual shift to agriculture represented a break with the previous English trade voyages and the colony of Sagadahoc. Jamestown’s violent Native relations restricted the colony’s ability to establish a profitable Native trade, but facilitated the confiscation of Native lands. In developing agriculture in Jamestown the English learned from the example of the Powhatans, using lands previously cleared by Native labour to grow established Native crops such as corn, beans, and tobacco. Thus, the English colony of Jamestown came to reflect the characteristics of the Powhatans in its larger population and

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621 Ibid., 236.
622 Rountree and Turner, Before and After Jamestown, 96-7, 103-4.
agricultural focus, just as the French colonies of Port Royal and Quebec came to reflect
the low population and fur trade focus of the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet and Montagnais.

Virginia’s Native relations and those of later English North American colonies
came to resemble Jamestown’s conflict with the Powhatans. To some extent Jamestown
influenced the development of English North American colonization through the literary
accounts of colonists such as John Smith and William Strachey. While it is difficult to
gauge the influence of these published works, major events such as the Powhatans’
assault in 1622 killing 347 colonists were well known in England and would influence
English colonial policy.\textsuperscript{623} This literature may have had a considerable influence, but
perhaps the same mixture of English and Native characteristics and behaviours which led
to conflict in Jamestown influenced the development of English-Native conflicts in other
areas such as New England.

The importance of Native societies and these societies’ particular experiences in
determining Native-colonist relations demonstrated in Jamestown, Port Royal, and
Sagadahoc are consistent with the records of numerous sixteenth and seventeenth-century
French and English colonies. The French and English colonies of Charles Fort, Fort
Caroline, and Roanoke all experienced conflict with agricultural Native groups south of
the Chesapeake, and Quebec established cooperative relations with the hunter-gather
Natives of the St. Lawrence region.\textsuperscript{624} The characteristics and actions of Native groups
were central in shaping the larger trajectories of French and English North American
colonization. The scholarship needs to consider the intricate details of French and English

\textsuperscript{624} Quinn, \textit{Explorers and Colonies}, 260, 264-7; Kupperman, \textit{Roanoke: The Abandoned Colony}, 63-4, 77,
86; Eccles, \textit{The French in North America}, 20-25.
Native relations rather than the current overreliance on century and continent spanning macro patterns. Additionally, scholars must acknowledge the divisions within, connections between, and limitations of categories such as English, French, and Native. In the modern era of increasing global connectivity, scholars must acknowledge the subtleties of divisions within nations and the diversity of connections between nations that have always existed underneath the shadow of nationalism.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The modern world is in the midst of an era of increasing globalization. Trade, communication, financial, and political networks span the globe and regional events often have important implications for the daily lives of people around the world. While the nation-state remains an integral part of the world’s governmental organization, transnational connections and rising cultural diversity are simultaneously transcending national divides and increasing individuals’ awareness of the heterogeneity and regionalism existing within every imperfect nation-state. Rather than being mutually exclusive, globalism and regionalism can coexist and even promote each other. One may even speculate that the western world is currently heading towards a post-nationalist future where national polities will cease to represent the principal government institution and will be subordinate to international and regional political and cultural associations.

This modern atmosphere of global connectivity has stimulated the study of Western Europe’s early modern expansion in the Mediterranean and Far East over the last decade. Scholars should continue this line of enquiry and attempt to supplement these early modern connections with consideration of the diversity and powerful regionalism within African, American, Asian, and European groups.

Despite modern globalization and the Atlantic world historiography’s increased focus on international trade, many scholars of early modern history continue to operate within modern national frameworks. These national frameworks have led scholars to use geographic scopes adhering to modern national borders, and these scholars emphasize colonial ventures associated with the foundations of national empires. Thus, American scholars neglect the colony of Sagadahoc because of its failure to spawn a lasting colony, give minimal attention to French colonization efforts they consider distinct from English
North American colonization, and fixate on Jamestown as the beginning of what would become the British North American colonies and the United States. Similarly Canadian scholars have extensively studied Quebec as the foundation of Canada while overlooking the colony of Port Royal and the connections between early seventeenth-century French and English colonization efforts.

While intra-imperial studies are a key component of the French and English Atlantic scholarship, inter-imperial studies have been underrepresented both generally and in the specific context of early seventeenth-century French and English North American activity. A comparative scope is a necessary addition to the largely intra-imperial scholarship on Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc. These French and English colonies shared a common heritage of North American activity including the Newfoundland fishery, privateering against the Spanish West Indies, and seasonal trade voyages. The scholarship on France’s North American colonization acknowledges the importance of trade voyages in stimulating the establishment of permanent colonies, and this study has added a detailed examination of the transition from French trade voyages to trade colonies, with consideration of the contemporary English transition, which the scholarship lacked. These various North American precedents have been underappreciated in the scholarship on English colonization, and even David Quinn, a leading proponent of England’s North American activity in the sixteenth and early

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625 This study does not seek to discredit the importance of the intra-imperial scholarship, and this thesis largely builds on the work of such studies by adding an inter-imperial comparative component. There is no reason why the scholarship cannot combine elements of intra and inter-imperial studies, and Chapter Two of this thesis is primarily intra-imperial in scope. For a recent discussion of the merits of intra-imperial studies see, Jerry Bannister, “The Oriental Atlantic: governance and regulatory frameworks in the British Atlantic world,” in H.V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke, and John G. Reid eds., Britain’s Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, 1550-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 151-7.
seventeenth centuries, never sought to connect the early seventeenth-century trade voyages, Sagadahoc, and Jamestown. The competition between France and England in the early seventeenth century was an important stimulus in the renewal of each country’s colonization efforts, and a comparative study of Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc provides new insight into the perceptions, tactics, and objectives of the groups involved in these ventures. The North American activity of France and England in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was only one of many precedents leading to the establishment of Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc, but it had a powerful influence on the objectives and perceptions of French and English colonists which has been understudied within the scholarship.

Many scholars operate within national frameworks focused on the French or English in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries despite the fact that nationalism was still in a nascent form during this era. Early seventeenth-century nationalism was intended to unite diverse peoples under the rule of common Monarchs using the idealized concepts of a shared history, language, and common national goals.626 This early nationalism was largely restricted to official documents and written accounts, and had yet to surpass the existing regionalism and transnational connections in both France and England. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries France and England were composite monarchies consisting of diverse groups united by their common loyalty to their monarchs. The political associations of France and England coexisted with regional loyalties and identities, and competition between France and

England was accompanied by competition among the regional interests within France and England. The divide between the English West Country and the London-dominated east of England was great enough to necessitate two distinct colonization efforts in the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies. Even within regions there were fierce rivalries between cities, and the rising influence of Plymouth was opposed by Bristol and Exeter. French regionalism was even more pronounced, and the French free traders led by the merchants of Saint-Malo opposed and violated the monopolies of Chauvin, Chaste, and de Mons throughout the early seventeenth century. De Mons’ trade company was defined by its members’ regional associations, but de Mons’ company also required cooperation between diverse groups of Frenchmen from across northern and coastal France. Thus, the dual Virginia Companies and de Mons’ trade company were not clear-cut national colonization efforts but dynamic combinations of transnational, national, and regional cooperation and competition.

Within the context of early seventeenth-century French and English North American colonization, regional, national, and transnational frameworks are all equally necessary in explaining Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc. The establishment of North American trade colonies was a major hallmark in the expansion of the French and English empires during the seventeenth century, and the regional and transnational influences on these imperial expansions require more scholarly investigation. Many scholars seek to pinpoint the origins of French and English nationalism in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but scholars should also explore the continued regional and transnational limits of nationalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth
In the early seventeenth century the national divisions and imperial competition between England and France had not yet solidified. British and French Atlantic scholars tend to focus on the eighteenth-century national and imperial competition between France and Britain and projects these themes backwards into the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries. A large-scale comparative study exploring the development of this national and imperial competition from a sixteenth and early seventeenth-century perspective, when regionalism and transnational connections superseded nationalism, would be a valuable counterpart to the existing scholarship.

Many studies looking at the long-term development of French and English colonies in North America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tend to depict the Natives of North America as a relatively cohesive group sharing common traits, similar to the French and English, but this was not strictly accurate in the early seventeenth century. In the early seventeenth century the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, Eastern Abenaki, Armouchiquois, and Powhatans were all distinct societies with their own cultures, social organizations, and unique formative experiences. Like the French and English these Natives were not uniform, and there were regional divisions within each of these groups. The French used the general term Armouchiquois when these agricultural peoples of southern New England constituted many distinct groups, and the English

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628 For two prominent examples of this pan-Native American framework see, Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country;* Calloway, *New Worlds for All.*

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depicted the Powhatans as a united kingdom when they were in fact a loose confederation of semi-independent groups.\textsuperscript{629}

The biased nature of surviving sources originating almost exclusively from European authors writing for European audiences will always be a serious obstacle for scholars seeking to determine the actions, perspectives, and historical contributions of Native Americans. The divergence in French and English relations with Native groups is nearly universally explained by the cultural and national identities of the French and English. This Eurocentric interpretation of colonist-Native relations is largely the result of primary source limitations. Yet, using comparative Native and comparative colonization frameworks provides innovative insight into the relations between colonists and Natives, and highlights the importance of Native societies in helping to shape colonist-Native relations both within and beyond the early seventeenth century.

The colonies of Sagadahoc and Port Royal possessed similarly mixed records of Native relations which combined cooperative trade, colonist-Native hostility, and occasional violence. The similarities between these two colonies’ Native relations were the result of their common objectives and their interaction with related Native groups who possessed similar cultures and past experiences with Europeans. The violent English-Powhatan relations in early Jamestown can only be partly explained by the objectives, formative experiences, and actions of the English. In Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc a combination of colonists and Natives’ actions and characteristics

resulted in colonist-Native relations and helped to shape the development of French and English North American colonization in Acadia, Virginia, and New France.

The beginnings of French and English North American colonization in the early seventeenth century are often addressed by scholars seeking to fit these events with developments later in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This has led many scholars to expect benign French-Native relations and antagonistic English-Native relations which are contradicted by the similar Native relations experienced in French and English trade voyages, Port Royal, Sagadahoc, and even between Captain Newport and the Powhatans in Jamestown. Similarly, the French fur trade and the English focus on agriculture have shaped scholars’ interpretations of French and English colonial objectives and tactics in the early seventeenth century, conflicting with the similar economic goals of these contemporary colonization efforts. The established interpretive frameworks within the historiography on French and English colonization are essential for the creation of a coherent Atlantic history narrative spanning several continents and centuries, but due to their size these macro frameworks have limitations and scholars must take care to reconcile these frameworks with the specific context of their studies. Interpretive frameworks should be developed based on the detailed study of specific historical events rather than resulting in the distortion of historic events to fit a larger interpretative model.

The use of both comparative colonization and comparative Native frameworks creates a more comprehensive context in which to consider the development of French and English North American expansion. This study has stressed the importance of historical context, and has sought to determine the importance of diverse and competing
elements of this context by virtue of their temporal, geographic, interpersonal, and literary connections. Throughout this study careful consideration has been given to the chronology of events within the primary timeframe of 1598-1609, and the Atlantic history scholarship would benefit from a greater consideration of chronology and a more detailed application of historical context. While this study focuses on the French and English transition from trade voyages to trade colonies and these colonies’ interactions with Native groups, these events and themes were only a small part of much larger seventeenth century developments. This study has sought to fill a gap within the scholarship rather than discredit existing studies, and provides a small corrective for the immense scholarship on French and English colonization.

The strength of this study’s in-depth analysis utilizing sources relating to France and England’s North American activity in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is also its primary limitation. The French and English trade voyages, Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc were preceded by a century of North American activity including countless voyages and numerous colonies, and these colonies mark the beginning of France and England’s seventeenth century North American colonization. French and English activity would continue in Acadia, Virginia, and along the coast of New England without pause. The mixture of national competition, transnational connections, regional divisions, and colonist-Native interaction expanded far beyond this short era discussing Port Royal, Jamestown, and Sagadahoc. In 1613 Captain Samuel Argall would lead an English attack from Virginia against the French colonization efforts in Acadia with the help of Native information; destroying the second colony of Port
Royal and taking a number of Frenchmen to Jamestown.\textsuperscript{630} In 1624 the French and English both colonized the island of Saint Kitts where they experienced complex relations with each other and the Natives groups of the West Indies.\textsuperscript{631} The larger history of French and English North American expansion throughout the seventeenth century is ripe for studies combining comparative colonization with comparative Native approaches.

\textsuperscript{630} Thorpr, “Equals of the King,” 3-4; Jones, \textit{Gentlemen and Jesuits}, 235-7; Lescarbot, Vol. III, 68. Lescarbot claims it was the Jesuit Father Biard and not a Native informant how helped the English. \\
Appendix A: Natives, French, and English in North America, 1600-1609

Appendix B: Glossary of Names

Amenquin: Eastern Abenaki Sagamore, visited Sagadahoc in 1607 with Nahanda and the representative of Bashabes.

Gabriel Archer: A lawyer by training with the rank of captain, Archer wrote an unpublished account of the Gosnold voyage. Archer was the secretary of Jamestown and became a member of the Jamestown council.

Samuel Argall: English captain, pioneered the direct route to Virginia in 1609 via the Azores Islands. Argall Would go on to attack the colony of Port Royal in 1613.

Armouchiquois: A diverse group of agriculturalist Native groups living south of the Saco River as far as Cape Cod. Armouchiquois was a general Mi’kmaq and Maliseet term adopted by the French rather than the actual name of these groups.

Arrohateck: A village of the Powhatans on the upper James River, the Arrohateck established peaceful trade relations with Captain Newport’s expedition in 1607.


Stephen Bellinger: A French merchant of Rouen, operated a 1584 trade voyage to Norumbega which he reported to his friend Richard Hakluyt the younger.

Pierre Biard: A Jesuit Priest, Biard was present in Acadia as part of Poutrincourt’s second colony of Port Royal in 1611 and published an account of the colony.

Stevan Bocall: A French Basque pilot involved in English fishing and whaling activity in the Gulf of St. Lawrence during the 1590’s.

John Brereton: The chaplain during the 1602 Gosnold voyage, he wrote an account of the voyage published as a promotional pamphlet.

Thomas Canner: A member of the Bartholomew Gilbert voyage to southern Virginia in 1603, Canner wrote an account of the voyage.

Jacques Cartier: French explorer from Saint-Malo, Cartier conducted voyages exploring the St. Lawrence in 1534-1542. The accounts of Cartier’s voyages were influential in French and English North American activity.
Henry Challons: Captain of the Richard the 1606 Plymouth Company ship captured by the Spanish.

Samuel de Champlain: A veteran of the French civil war, Champlain was a key observer of French trade voyages and Port Royal before leading Quebec himself in 1608.

Aymar de Chase: Successor to Chauvin’s monopoly, Chaste operated a single season of the fur trade in 1603 before his death.

Pierre de Chauvin: A French nobleman, granted a fur trade monopoly in New France by King Henri from 1600-1603.

Chawonock: An Algonquin Native groups living to the south of the Powhatans.

Chesapeakes: An Algonquin group south of the Powhatans who were conquered by the Powhatans soon after the establishment of Jamestown.

Chevailer: A member of de Mons’ trade company.

Walter Cope: A political figure and member of the London Company, a number of correspondences of Cope’s discussing Jamestown have survived.

Chkoudun: A leader of the Maliseet, Chkoudun warned Lescarbot that Membertou planned to betray the French in 1607.

Robert Davis: The man identified as the author of the Davis Journal, the main source on the Sagadahoc colony. Davis may have been a pilot or ship’s captain, but his exact identity is unknown.

Eastern Abenaki: An Algonquin peoples inhabiting the area of modern Maine.

Bartholomew Gilbert: A member of the Gosnold voyage to northern Virginia in 1602, Gilbert captained his own voyage to southern Virginia under the sponsorship of Walter Raleigh in 1603. Gilbert was a London resident and had no connection to the West Country Gilbert family.

Raleigh Gilbert: Son of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Admiral of Sagadahoc, and the second President of the colony. Gilbert abandoned the colony to claim his inheritance in 1608.

Ferdinando Gorges: Commander of Plymouth Fort, hosted the Eastern Abenaki captives of the Waymouth voyage in 1605-1606. Was a central figure in the Plymouth Company.
Bartholomew Gosnold: Leader of the 1602 trade voyage to northern Virginia, Gosnold became an advocate for colonization in London, acted as a recruiter for the London Company, and was a member of the Jamestown Council in 1607.

Thomas Harriot: A member of the first English colony of Roanoke, wrote extensively on the colony and the local Algonquin peoples.

Richard Hakluyt the Younger: Reverend Hakluyt was involved in promoting English North American activities including the Gosnold, Pring, and Waymouth voyages before becoming a member of the London Virginia Company.

Edward Hayes: An English promoter of North American colonization, Hayes wrote a treatise on the Northwest Passage published in 1602 and submitted a plan for a publicly funded colonization effort to the Earl of Salisbury in 1606.

Jamestown Council: Ruling council of Jamestown, originally consisted of seven men including: Wingfield, Gosnold, Martin, Ratcliffe, Kendall, Smith, and Newport.

Marc Lescarbot: A lawyer by training, Lescarbot oversaw Port Royal as a subordinate of Poutrincourt in 1606. A noted author, Lescarbot wrote extensively on French colonization.


Samuel Mace: A veteran of numerous trade voyages to southern Virginia in 1600-1603. Many of these voyages have left little or no surviving record besides the note in the Brereton Pamphlet.

Maliseet (Passamaquoddy): An Algonquin peoples inhabiting the area between the St. John and Penobscot Rivers. The Maliseet had close ties to the Mi’kmaq in the era of Port Royal.

Mangoages: A Native groups living to the south of the Powhatans.

John Martin: A member of the 1602 Gosnold voyage, Martin had many merchant connections in London and within the London Company. Martin served as one of the original members of the Jamestown Council in 1607, and was active in Virginia until at least 1616.

Mawooshen: Eastern Abenaki homeland between the Penobscot and Saco Rivers as described by the five Eastern Abenaki captives of the Waymouth voyage in 1606-1606.

Membertou: Leader of the Mi’kmaq group who lived near the Port Royal in 1605-7. Membertou spent a great deal of time with the French at Port Royal.
Pedro Menéndez: Commander of Spanish expedition to the Chesapeake in 1572, responsible for the brutal retaliation against the Chesapeake Natives for the murder of the Jesuit Mission.

Messamouet: leader of the Mi’kmaq of La Have, Messamouet had been to France and was essential as a guide and interpreter for the French colonists in Port Royal.

Meteourmite: Sagamore of an Eastern Abenaki village on the Kennebec River, reported English-Eastern Abenaki conflict during the Sagadahoc colony to Father Biard in 1612.

Mi’kmaq: An Algonquin people inhabiting the area of modern Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, and Prince Edward Island.

Monacans: A Siouan people living in the piedmont of the southern Chesapeake, reported to be the enemies of the Powhatans.

Pierre Du Gua de Mons: a Huguenot nobleman who first visited the St. Lawrence as part of the Chauvin voyage in 1600. De Mons was central in founding Port Royal and Quebec.

Montagnais: An Innu people inhabiting the region near the St. Lawrence River.

Nahanda: Sagamore of the Pemiquid band of Eastern Abenaki, Captured by George Waymouth in 1605 and returned to Pemiquid by the Hanham-Pring voyage in 1606.

Naviran: A member of the Arrohateck Powhatans, Naviran acted as a guide and helped Gabriel Archer to acquire a few Algonquin words during Newport’s 1607 expedition.

Christopher Newport: An experienced pioneer, Admiral of Virginia, and an important figure in Jamestown.

Paspahegh: A village of the Powhatans on the north side of the James River, Jamestown was established on Paspahegh land.

Pemiquid band: The Eastern Abenaki band headed by Nahanda with close ties to Sagadahoc, their village was located approximately 10 miles north of Sagadahoc.

George Percy: An original Jamestown colonist who wrote an account of the colony’s early events.

Francis Popham: The son of John Popham, Francis continued to send trade and fishing voyages to northern Virginia after the Sagadahoc colony’s failure in 1608.
George Popham: First President of the Sagadahoc colony and a relation of the Plymouth Company’s chief investor Lord Chief Justice Popham, George died during the winter of 1607-8.

Chief Justice John Popham: The central investor in the Plymouth Virginia Company, Popham’s death reported to the Sagadahoc colonists in 1608 contributed to the colony’s abandonment.

Gravé Du Pont: A veteran of the fur trade commanding many voyages to the St. Lawrence and Acadia as early as 1599, Gravé was a central figure in Port Royal.

Walter Russell: A Jamestown colonist, Smith reportedly used his journal for his The Proceedings.

Sabenoa: Sagamore of an Eastern Abenaki village on the Kennebec River and self-proclaimed lord of the Kennebec River.

Sieur de Poutrincourt: A nobleman and veteran of the French civil war. Poutrincourt oversaw Port Royal in 1606-7, and re-established the colony in 1610.

Paramount Chief Powhatan (Wahunsonacock): Head of the Powhatan confederation, Powhatan oversaw the conquest of the southern Chesapeake prior to the establishment of Jamestown.

Powhatans: A confederation of 30 distinct Algonquin groups in the southern Chesapeake.

Juan Rogel: A member of the Spanish expedition to the Chesapeake in 1572 responsible for the brutal retaliation against the Chesapeake Natives for the murder of the Jesuit Mission.

Sieur de Prevert: Commanded the 1603 fur trade voyage to Acadia as part of the Chaste monopoly.

Martin Pring: Commander of the 1603 trade voyage to northern Virginia, a member of the Plymouth Company, and captain of the Hanham-Pring voyage to northern Virginia in 1606.

Quiyoughquohanock: A Powhatan group south of the James River.

John Ratcliffe (Sicklemore): An original Jamestown Council member and the colony’s second President.

La Roche: A French nobleman with connections to North American trade, La Roche founded a colony on Sable Island which lasted from 1600-1603.
James Rosier: The cape merchant during the Waymouth voyage, Rosier wrote the published account of the voyage. Rosier was a Catholic and became a Jesuit Priest.

Royal Council of Virginia: Council consisting of 15 representatives of the London Company and 10 representatives of the Plymouth Company intended to police the two companies.

Sable Island: A small French colony offshore of Acadia operating from 1600-1603.

Earl of Salisbury (Robert Cecil): Key political leader during the early reign of King James I. Many of the surviving correspondences of the London and Plymouth Companies were addressed to Salisbury.

Secodun: A prominent member of the Maliseet of the St. John River, acted as a guide and ally to the French in Port Royal and took part in the French conflict with the Armouchiquois.

Skidwarres: Member of the Pemiquid band of Eastern Abenaki, captured by Waymouth in 1605 and returned to Pemiquid by Popham and Gilbert in 1607.

Thomas Studley: A Jamestown colonist, Smith reportedly used his journal for his *The Proceedings*.

Tadoussac: An established French fur trade center near the mouth of the St. Lawrence River.

John Smith: An original member of the Jamestown council, Smith was an experienced soldier and was a central figure in Jamestown’s Native relations during 1607-1609.

(Hernando) Fernando de Soto: A Spanish conquistador, de Soto led an ill fated expedition into the American southeast during 1539-1541.

William Strachey: A Jamestown colonists who wrote extensively on the colony’s history beginning in 1609, Strachey published an important account of the Sagadahoc colony.

Anas Todkill: A Jamestown colonist, Smith reportedly used his journal for his *The Proceedings*.

George Waymouth: Leader of the 1605 voyage to northern Virginia, captured five Eastern Abenaki including Nahanda and Skidwarres who were left with Gorges in Plymouth.

Edward Maria Wingfield: First President of Jamestown, Wingfield was a major investor in the London Company and an experienced soldier.
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