THE WRITERS IN THE ALLEY:
STATE LEGITIMACY AND LITERATURE IN NASSER’S EGYPT, 1952-1967

by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

In 1952 Gamal Abdel Nasser and his clique of disaffected young officers launched ‘the Free Officer’s Coup,’ deposing the monarchy, overturning the parliamentary system, and launching a durable regime that defined the face of Egypt in the second half of the twentieth century. This thesis examines the relationship between Nasser and Egypt’s intellectuals, and takes preeminent writers Naguib Mahfouz and Yusuf Idris to reveal the social environment in which this relationship took place. The literary and historical evidence reveals a lively relationship of contestation, critique, accommodation, dependence, and acclamation. Promulgating reformist domestic policies and defiantly nationalist foreign policies, Nasser earned legitimization from intellectuals. His regime endeavored to establish hegemony over Egyptian civil society, an effort resisted and repulsed by intellectuals. Inspired by the most relevant theoretical literature on intellectuals, namely the work of Julien Benda, Antonio Gramsci, and Edward Said, this thesis reveals responsibilities and challenges faced by intellectuals everywhere.
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>Arab Socialist Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMNL</td>
<td>Democratic Movement of National Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
</tr>
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<td>UECP</td>
<td>Unified Egyptian Communist Party</td>
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

When the Free Officers seized control of Egypt on July 23, 1952 and deposed King Faruq two days later, they overturned a political order that had lasted for 150 years. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had a small reputation for his brave conduct in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Anwar Sadat, Abdel Hakem Amer, Ali Sabry, and the other Free Officers were virtually unknown. None had rank higher than that of Colonel and none were over forty years old. Despite their youth, modest rank, inexperience, and obscure origins, the Officers aimed to transform their country; to free Egypt from poverty, corruption, and a de facto British occupation. Recognizing their disadvantages, the Free Officers wisely recruited popular General Mohammed Naguib to serve as the public face of the Free Officers movement. However, it would take more than a popular general to grant prestige and authority to men who lacked both popular mandate and royal lineage. Thus the Free Officers launched their populist revolution in the name of the Egyptian people, casting themselves as the guardians of the nation. If the people rejected their role, the Free Officers could expect to be removed in a revolution, a counter-coup, or royalist revival. They required popular consent and they required legitimacy, a widespread acceptance of the lawfulness of their governing role. The business of accepting or rejecting the Officer’s legitimacy fell to all Egyptians, especially to those who enjoyed access to resources, and a measure of responsibility, authority, or influence. Among these, intellectuals, those who occupied themselves with thought and the dissemination of ideas, played a role of particular importance in determining whether a cohort of obscure officers were indeed the lawful rulers of Egypt.
The present study explores the consolidation of political legitimacy within the Egyptian intellectual scene from 1952 to 1967. Paying particular attention to the two foremost writers of this period, Naguib Mafhouz and Yusuf Idris, this study takes the intellectual milieu of Nasser’s Egypt as its subject, and explores how intellectuals responded to the claims of Nasser and his cohort. Examining the extension of their rule into the realm of thought, belief, and meaning, this study traces how intellectuals negotiated, accommodated, and critiqued this expansion. This study argues that the Nasser and his ruling clique were successful in consolidating popular legitimacy, and that intellectuals largely accepted their claim to rightfully rule on behalf of Egyptians. However, this acceptance was not an easy transaction, and this acceptance emerged from a fiercely contested struggle between political elites and intellectual elites throughout this period. Although they contested the claims of government and critiqued its authoritarian excesses, intellectuals largely accepted and accommodated being governed by Nasser and the Free Officers. Intellectuals chafed at the suspension of civil liberties and the suppression of freedom of speech, but appropriated the Officers’ promise to bring about liberation, social justice, modernity, and a rational, secular social order. Intellectuals were persuaded to support the new political order and their support contributed to the durability of the revolutionary regime.

By following literary source material closely and comparing it with the political record, this thesis reveals how the Nasser regime sought to persuade or convince intellectuals to grant legitimacy to its rule, to which intellectuals either complied in light of the regime’s reformist agenda and successes, or else denied it in light of the regime’s authoritarian stance towards civil society. However, this thesis also posits that underlying
both criticism and collaboration was a kinship between political elites and literary elites in that both parties envisioned modernity and liberation for their nation.

The present study clarifies the understanding of the relationship between the Nasser regime and literary intellectuals by drawing close to the most relevant evidence, the novels and short stories of Naguib Mahfouz and Yusuf Idris, analyzing their literature and their political themes in light of the quickly changing environment of revolutionary Egypt, and submitting this evidence to the insightful theoretical perspectives on intellectuals. This approach reveals a twofold process in which literary intellectuals such as Yusuf Idris and Naguib Mahfouz contributed to the legitimacy of the Nasser regime, but resisted its push for hegemony among intellectuals.

The present study does not claim to definitive analysis of this battleground. Egypt had a massive group of intellectuals, while this study examines only two intellectuals in some depth, and dealing with others only in passing. Nevertheless, this study makes a meaningful contribution to this field, first by analyzing two of Egypt’s most influential writers of the revolutionary period, and second by exploring the intellectual milieu in which they operated. By observing how Naguib Mahfouz and Yusuf Idris interacted with the regime and how they responded to state authoritarianism, state patronage, and the associational appeal of Egyptian nationalism, an image of an intellectual milieu crystallizes, revealing the immense intellectual pressures to which Egyptian thinkers were subject. In this way, although the study gives careful analysis only to Naguib Mahfouz and Yusuf Idris, telling their story enables a clearer understanding of the environment in which all Egyptian intellectuals interacted with political power.
Although this topic has long been the source of scholarly interest, few have brought theoretical perspectives to their descriptions, and few have attended closely enough to uncover complicity underlying critique, or to follow the rapid transformations in the quickly changing political and intellectual landscape of revolutionary Egypt. This thesis succeeds in providing this more nuanced analysis by bringing to the historical record the most relevant theorists on intellectuals, namely Julien Benda, Antonio Gramsci, and Edward Said. These theorists provide lenses through which the social and political milieu, with its pressures and its longings, can be more clearly discerned.

Numerous historians and literary critics have explored the connections between writers and the regime, affirming that within the narrow confines of the Nile Valley and in the claustrophobic streets of Cairo, political elites and literary elites were bound together by common backgrounds, social standing, and especially by their mutual interest in the reformation of Egypt. An early study on intellectuals and writers in revolutionary Egypt was “The Egyptian Intellectual” by Georges Ketman. Mourning the decline of cosmopolitan intellectuals prominent during monarchical Egypt, Ketman denigrated the new generation of lower class and indigenous intellectuals, characterizing them as a poor and ill-educated lot who probably misunderstand the leftist creeds they claim to profess. Far from challenging or critiquing the government, Ketman’s intellectual was still no more than an official scribe, “smiling at the man holding the sword.” Malcom Kerr presented a more nuanced view of the relationship between the regime and intellectuals in a 1965 article on education, explaining that while the regime appeals to educated

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Egyptians as its key political constituency, this group could expect only a marginal economic role and no political role, thus jeopardizing Egypt’s modernizing project.²

Anouar Abdek-Malek, an Egyptian sociologist and Marxist analyzed the political role of intellectuals thoroughly in a definitive study. His 1962 work *Egypt: Military Society* explored the paradoxes that attended the regime’s efforts to develop a durable political economy.³ Abdel-Malek revealed that even while Nasser steered a course towards socialism, his regime suppressed, contained, and persecuted the small but influential communist movement. He argued that while the regime was endeavoring to uproot Egyptian Marxism, the intellectual and political life of Egypt as a whole suffered as consequence. Attuned to the influential role of Egypt’s literary intellectuals, Abdel-Malek noted that a critical novel by a writer such as Naguib Mahfouz could undermine the regime’s culture of propaganda.⁴

Meanwhile, literary critics were beginning to realize the important role of the writers in the Egyptian intellectual landscape. In his 1967 article “A Malaise in Cairo: Three Contemporary Egyptian Authors,” Trevor Le Gassick argued that the deep social upheavals sweeping through the Middle East were being captured and expressed in literature, with Egyptian writers especially producing sensitive works reflecting on social change. Le Gassick explored the fiction of Naguib Mahfouz, Yusuf Idris, and Ihsan Abd al-Quddus for evidence of a cultural and intellectual malaise in Egypt. Le Gassick noted that although these authors criticized the ruling establishment they were all recipients of

⁴ ibid, 319.
state patronage, indicating the moderation of the revolutionary regime.\(^5\) Le Gassick’s article set an important precedent in revealing the role of the writer as political critic and writers’ dependence on state patronage.

The relationship between Egyptian intellectuals, Nasser, and the ideology that formed around him, was thoroughly treated in Nissim Rejwan’s 1974 work *Nasserist Ideology*.\(^6\) Rejwan contributed a portrait of the intellectual landscape in Egypt in the 1960s, in which the regime steered civil society to an official creed of Arab Socialism, embodied in the 1962 Charter for National Action. Rejwan’s study revealed the implicit nature of intellectuals’ political commitment or criticism. For example, Rejwan analyzed Idris’ 1964 call for an authentically Egyptian theatre as evidence of the author’s nationalist conviction, bolstering the regime’s nationalist agenda in the arts.\(^7\) Jack Crabbs Jr. also analyzed the pressures to which the regime subjected intellectuals, although he argued that intellectuals endeavored to protect their intellectual freedom as much as possible in the face of the state-sanctioned socialist ideology.\(^8\) Like Rejwan, Crabbs was attuned to the implicit nature of commitment and criticism. In his 1995 article on Egyptian historian ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rifi’i, Crabbs argues that the historian’s obstinate silence on Nasser’s domestic policies clearly expressed his criticism on that score.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) ibid., 165-166.


Following Le Gassick, literary critics viewed Egyptian authors in light of their political situation with varying effectiveness. In her 1974 book *The Modern Egyptian Novel*, Hilary Kilpatrick noted that after the revolution, writers were encouraged to criticize life under the old regime and to hail the new.\(^\text{10}\) She astutely observed how Idris succumbed to uncertainty and literary romanticism, but failed to discern Mahfouz’s criticism within the author’s allegorical narratives. Sabry Hafez’s 1976 article “The Egyptian Novel in the 1960s” portrayed that decade as a period of censorship, conformity, political sloganeering and arbitrary unrests.\(^\text{11}\) Despite this insight into the tense political environment of the 1960s, Hafez was inattentive to the political and social thrust of Mahfouz’s 1960s novels, arguing that his works became personal, spiritual, and psychological.\(^\text{12}\) With a better understanding of Egyptian political transformations, Hafez would have discovered political themes underlying the existential tone. By contrast, Roger Allen’s criticism deftly reveals the ways in which literary intellectuals are shaped by their political and social environment, and how their reflections on social reality are distilled into fiction. Allen shows how Idris contained revolutionary Egypt in his brilliant short story “Farahat’s Republic.”\(^\text{13}\) Dalya Cohen-Mor’s 1992 monograph *Yusuf Idris: Changing Visions* submitted the author’s work to a thorough psychoanalysis, but misunderstood his political commitments by characterizing him as an opponent of the Nasser regime.\(^\text{14}\) Egyptian critic Rasheed El-Enany contributed thoughtful analyses of the

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\(^\text{12}\) ibid., 72-73.


Naguib Mafhouz, revealing how the author employed language and imagery from the Bible and the Qur’an in a powerful rebuke of the Nasser regime’s authoritarianism in novels such as *The Children of the Alley*.¹⁵

Literary critics continued in their analyses of the relationship between the Nasser regime and literary intellectuals. In a critical article on Naguib Mahfouz, Egyptian critic Samia Mehrez argues that despite the critical tone of his novels, Mahfouz in fact depended heavily on the state for legitimacy, patronage, and an income. In her treatment, Mahfouz’s political criticism discords with the Mahfouz’s apparent affinity with the establishment.¹⁶ In his 2008 work *Conscience of the Nation* The French critic Richard Jacquemond contributed a valuable survey of the Egyptian literary field since 1967, taking framework from Pierre Bourdieu to analyze intellectuals as intellectual workers who represent the dominated to the dominant class.¹⁷ He includes an astute summary of the Nasser period, in which he argues for a professional and political alliance between the regime and intellectuals, despite the regime’s authoritarian approach to the latter. Like Mehrez, Benjamin Geer has argued for Naguib Mahfouz’s complicity with the Nasser regime.¹⁸ He argues that despite the author’s covert and overt criticism of the revolutionary regime, Mahfouz could not credibly claim autonomy from the Nasser

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regime, for Mahfouz too was part of the nationalist project Nasser embodied. Geer draws upon the language of religion, arguing that Mahfouz and other secular writers and intellectuals were “priests” serving the nationalist project, of which Nasser was the charismatic “prophet.”

It is by no means remarkable that Egyptian intellectuals encountered the prestige, authority, and imposition of the modern nation state. The tendency for intellectuals to be drawn to the interests of political power is a feature of politics and society in the modern age. The French novelist and essayist Julien Benda described this trend in his 1927 work *The Treason of the Intellectuals.* Benda argued that civilizations have always featured “clercs;” the “philosophers, men of religion, men of literature, artists, men of learning,” whose role is to explore the transcendent world and to disseminate virtues such as brotherhood and justice. The clercs are distinct from lay-people, and especially distinct from men of power such as soldiers and politicians. The fundamental opposition between the calloused man of power and the virtuous intellectual is demonstrated in an anecdote with which Benda opened his book.

Tolstoy relates that when he was in the Army he saw one of his brother officers strike a man who fell out from the ranks during a march. Tolstoy said to him: “Are you not ashamed to treat a fellow human being in this way?” Have you not read the Gospels?” The other officer replied “And have you not read Army Orders?”

This scene shows Benda’s view of society as a contest between men of intellect preaching virtue and men of power perpetrating abuse. Benda preached to intellectuals

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20 Ibid., 44. Although no term in English captures precisely the meaning of the term “clerc,” Benda’s argument is directed towards intellectuals.

21 Ibid., 1.
that their proper role is to stand above the sordid world of power and gain, speaking to that world only as an unquiet conscience.

Benda wrote his treatise convicted that he was a witness to the shocking reversal of the true role of the intellectual. Writing in the France in the late 1920s, Benda observed an increasing number of intellectuals adopt socialism or nationalism. Intellectuals had begun to use their abilities to stir political passions, contributing to the strength and popularity of ideologues. Far from condemning the abuse of powerful men as Tolstoy had done, “most of the influential moralists of the past fifty years in Europe… called upon mankind to sneer at the Gospel and to read Army Orders.” The intellectuals were allowing themselves to be absorbed into the pursuits of political power; this is treason to their true calling.

Writing shortly after Julien Benda, the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci also wrote about the influence between intellectuals and political power. As an important leader in the Italian Communist Party, Gramsci was imprisoned by the fascist government of Mussolini. In prison, Gramsci devoted himself to writing, analyzing primarily why socialism had stalled in Western Europe and had suffered a devastating defeat in Italy. In addition to his extensive treatment of history, political philosophy and Marxist theory, Gramsci also addressed the role of the intellectual in relation to the exercise of power within society. Gramsci argued that although intellectuals may appear to constitute an autonomous and independent group, they are in fact linked ‘organically’ to a particular social group or social class.22 For example, priests are a class of intellectuals whose interests serve the landed aristocracy despite their apparent

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subservience to the Church alone. Every class aiming for the dominance of their own particular form of production and pursuing social pre-eminence generates intellectuals who advance the goals of the group in both government machinery and social hegemony. Gramsci argued that if a social group succeeds in generating its own intellectuals it can enable the group to assimilate traditional intellectuals who may be associated with rival social groups. If a social group achieves a monopoly not only on production but also the thought of intellectuals, it has won a critical success in extending its power throughout society. Under these conditions, the beliefs held by a society to be common sense are in fact the creeds of the dominant social group. With a monopoly on intellectual production, and the elevation and dissemination of foundational beliefs throughout society in the form of common sense, the dominant social group has achieved hegemony. It has not only captured power in the political arena, but also extended its preeminence in the area of thought and belief.

Antonio Gramsci and Julien Benda were divided by deep differences. Gramsci was a deeply committed politician and communist, the covert leader of the Italian communist party, who devoted both his political career and his writing to the problem of how the complexity of Western society could be transformed by Marxist revolution. Julien Benda was an essayist whose thought was deeply conservative, who valued the Church and decried both political ideology and mass politics. In contrast to Gramsci’s resolutely theoretical approach, Benda’s analyzed society from a binary perspective, describing intellectuals as either moralists or ideologues. Despite their profound differences, Benda and Gramsci share commonalities. In the milieu of the politically

23 Ibid., 7.
24 Ibid., 10.
divided Europe of the 1920s and 1930s, both Gramsci and Benda addressed the relationship between intellectuals and political power and both observed the same trend: that intellectuals were devoting themselves to ideology and the interests of political power. Naturally, Gramsci and Benda differed in their interpretation of this phenomenon. Gramsci believed that the apparent neutrality of intellectuals was merely pretence and that every intellectual was bound to a particular class or social group. Gramsci believed that an intellectual ought to be committed to a social group and its political aspirations, and devoted his own life to the aspirations of the working class. Conversely, Benda believed political commitment in intellectuals was treason, that true intellectuals were devoted only to speculation, transcendence, and humanistic virtue. Deeply different from each other, both these intellectuals witnessed the expansion of the strength of parties and ideologies. They both observed how political movements could influence or assimilate traditional intellectuals, or perhaps generate their own intellectuals from within a party. Their observations contribute incisive questions on the functions of political power and intellectuals in society.

Edward Said took up their questions on the complicity of power and intellectuals and affirmed their answers. Said agreed with Benda that intellectuals have defended and represented values that transcend and rebuke the interests of power. However, Said doubted the efficacy of solitary intellectuals in challenging the authority of political powers, and argued that intellectuals tend to be absorbed into a hegemonic consensus of their political order. He broadened Benda’s and Gramsci’s concern in the relation

26 Ibid.
between intellectuals and political power to any of the group associations which can claim the loyalty of intellectuals. Following Benda, Said posited that the proper role of the intellectual is disengagement, although for Said this disengagement appears not as a virtuous transcendence but in a posture of criticism, opposition, and irony.\(^{27}\) However, in this critical attitude the intellectual stands poised between two opposing temptations. The first of these is ‘filiative’ connections, those attachments attained with birth or circumstance, such as family, profession, and nationality. The second temptation is the intellectuals’ ‘affiliative connections,’ such as political, religious, or voluntary involvement.\(^{28}\)

Said’s analysis re-introduces the social aspect to political loyalty, and as such clarifies the context in which intellectual assent was negotiated in Nasser’s Egypt. By virtue of their education and their secular outlook, intellectuals resembled Said’s ideal of the disengaged intellectuals. However, Egyptian intellectuals were not immune from the human need for belonging. As Nasser’s nationalist vision of Egypt’s liberation and Arab unity disseminated throughout Egypt’s political, cultural, and intellectual landscape, the ‘filiative’ temptation national belonging exerted tremendous pressure on the disengagement of the Egyptian intellectual.

The present study explores the interplay between intellectuals and the operations of power in one of the most important watersheds in the history of the modern Middle East, during Nasser’s presidency of Egypt. In this exploration, certain questions will be asked that have been raised by Benda, Gramsci and Said. What was the approach of the Nasser regime to the intellectuals as it made a bid for power? As Gramsci asserted, were

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 29.  
\(^{28}\) Ibid., 25.
there attempts to generate its own intellectuals, or to assimilate and conquer traditional
intellectuals? Did intellectuals stand aloof from politics and devote themselves to
speculation, transcendence, and humanistic virtues, in the norm articulated by Benda? If
so, what was the response of these intellectuals to the passions aroused by Nasser’s
politics? How did intellectuals address the demand for loyalty represented by affiliative
and filiative connections, most especially to the powerful filiative pull embodied in the
national community? These questions can be absorbed into a single question that guides
the inquiry: what was the effect of the expansion of state power on Egyptian authors and
writers as they engaged in their work? As the regime established governance not only
over politics, the economy, and national defense, it also sought to earn legitimization and
a hegemonic influence on intellectuals as they engaged in their work of elaborating
meaning.

This study traces the response of intellectuals as the regime pursues its goals of
legitimization and hegemony. Understanding the unfolding relationship between the
political regime and the literary intellectuals requires a clear understanding of these
important terms. In this study, political legitimacy means the common understanding that
the government’s rule is lawful, right and just. The concept of legitimacy in politics
comes from sociologist Max Weber, who posited four sources of legitimacy: tradition,
emotion, rational belief, and legality. The second crucial term is hegemony, the ability
of a ruling group to establish its values legitimating myths as the dominant worldview of
the population, especially its leading intellectuals. The term is drawn from Antonio
Gramsci’s theory on the social expression of political power, thus:

The “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is “historically” caused by the prestige and consequent confidence which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function on the world of production.\textsuperscript{30}

The difference between legitimacy and hegemony is largely a question of scope. If a ruling group earns legitimacy, it has succeeded in persuading the population that it rules justly and rightly, and that no other has a better claim. Hegemony means that the ruling group has established its values and myths in regards to people’s attitudes about their government, but about every aspect of daily life; in other words, it establishes its particular worldview as the common sense of the common man. A ruling group that succeeds in establishing hegemony succeeds in creating a powerful and durable political order.

This study takes literary production as an important site where the negotiation between political power, the elaboration of meaning, and the contest for legitimacy and hegemony took place. Literary production was by no means the only intellectual arena into which the Nasserist state extended its influence. Rather, this contest happened throughout Egypt, in schools and universities, in mosques and in churches, in film studios and record-labels, in the editorial boards of newspapers and magazines, in the bureaucracy and in the courts. While giving attention to civil society whenever possible, this study selects for analysis a small group of intellectuals who were particularly sensitive to social change: writers of fiction. Their literary works, and the records of its production, constitute a vital body of evidence to the study of this period, because they contain a clear imprint of the contest for hegemony in Egyptian intellectual life. The

\textsuperscript{30} Gramsci, \textit{Selections from the Prison Notebooks}, 12.
literary evidence is readily available in translation and large enough to allow in-depth exploration. This analysis draws upon two writers who are most often identified with Nasser’s Egypt: Yusuf Idris and Naguib Mahfouz. Their literary production provides rich evidence for the negotiation of meaning between intellectuals and the revolutionary state.

Literary production provides rich material for historical analysis of how intellectuals received the claims of legitimacy from the political elite. Both writers and the political elite recognized that writers played an important role in disseminating the beliefs, ideas, and outlook that would form the character of the nation. Yusuf Idris demonstrated this attitude in his efforts in the 1960s to create a uniquely Egyptian dramatic form. Decrying the influence of figures like Shakespeare and Moliere, Idris aimed to build a theatrical tradition derived from Egyptian folklore. In this way, Egypt would enjoy a characteristically Egyptian drama proper to Egypt’s liberation from European influence.31 In the late 1960s the Egyptian Minister of Culture, Tharwat Ukasha who was himself a writer, affirmed that national character was most clearly expressed in “national” literature, literature which had grown organically from the national community.32 Political elites and intellectuals recognized that writers played an important role in forming and expressing the outlook of the national community and thus they played an important role in the intellectual negotiation of the Officers’ claims of legitimacy.

Analyzing this literature closely with the theoretical perspectives of Benda, Gramsci, and Said, this thesis argues that the Nasser regime succeeded in winning

31 Rejwan, Nasserist Ideology, 167-171.
legitimacy from intellectuals such as Mahfouz and Idris but failed in establishing hegemony over their thought and beliefs, as attested in Mahfouz’s increasingly critical literature in the 1960s. Exploring the intellectual careers of Idris and Mahfouz clearly reveals the relative successes and failures of the regime in establishing legitimacy and hegemony. Both Mahfouz and Idris grant legitimacy to the regime for its reformist agenda, its foreign policy successes, and its ability to establish social order. The experiences of Idris and Mahfouz extending legitimacy to the regime are the subjects of Chapters Two and Three, respectively. Not contend with legitimacy, the regime also sought to extend hegemonic influence over the thoughts and beliefs of intellectuals. As Chapter Two shows, Yusuf Idris acquiesced to the regime’s bid for hegemony. Chapter Three moves from the 1950s to the 1960s, broadens the scope of the thesis by taking a broader grouping of intellectuals, and examining the regime’s efforts to establish its vision of Arab socialism throughout civil society. Chapter Three concludes with an analysis of Mahfouz’s critical literature of the 1960s, showing definitively that Mahfouz rejected the regime’s bid for hegemonic influence.
CHAPTER 2  BLUNTING THE SCALPEL: POLITICS AND THE
FICTION OF YUSUF IDRIS FROM 1954 TO 1960

The writings of Yusuf Idris during the 1950s constitute clear evidence for the expanding influence of the state upon intellectual production. A brilliant intellectual who wrote prolifically during the 1950s, Idris’ works constitute some of the best evidence for the growing appeal of the Nasser’s revolutionary regime for intellectuals. Because Idris began to write at precisely the moment when the military regime was consolidating its position in society, his work constitutes evidence of the contested relationship between political power and the intellectual elaboration of meaning. As the revolutionary government won greater legitimacy as the 1950s progressed, Idris’ intellectual stance towards the government changed, moving from critique to accommodation and finally acclaim. Like many leftist and communist intellectuals, Idris converted to the regime after Nasser’s transformation into a militant anti-imperialist at Bandung and his defiant seizure of the Suez Canal. Idris’ trajectory provides compelling evidence of an intellectual’s vulnerability to a triumphant state.

A basic intellectual kinship existed between the Nasser regime and political leftists such as Yusuf Idris. Both Idris and Nasser shared a deep sense of patriotism that developed into a comprehensive nationalist ideology. Nasser’s entire political ambition and career was founded on patriotism. In his speeches, Nasser often recalled his days as a demonstrator against the British as a student in elementary school. In his biography of Nasser, Tom Little argued that “since boyhood he was animated by a single purpose: the

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liberation of Egypt from the British.”\textsuperscript{34} Nasser was formed by the spirit of revolt that gripped Egypt in the 1930 and 1940s, an endemic feeling of frustration with the erosion of the hopes raised by the Wafd party in the 1920s. Idris arrived into this atmosphere as a medical student in the 1940s and soon began to demonstrate against the King and the de facto British occupation.\textsuperscript{35} Idris shared with Nasser a deep patriotism and the belief in the nation as an ontological category, that a strong and independent nation would free Egyptians from poverty and inadequacy. This profound conviction in the nation informed both Egyptian leftists and the political elite of which Nasser was the head. The Communist organizations projected that the national struggle would accomplish liberation, which would open the door to the class struggle resulting in socialism. Leftist intellectuals saw Nasser’s revolution as a necessary stage within their own program, and Nasser increasingly came to use the language of the left to describe his vision of a strong and sufficient nation.

Idris pursued radical leftist politics early in his career. As a medical student in the University of Cairo, Idris’ militant role in anti-monarchical demonstrations earned him a role in a secretive student group called “The Executive Committee for Armed Struggle.”\textsuperscript{36} In this capacity he collected small arms for the guerilla campaign in the Canal Zone, and sought the company of guerilla fighters in their camps.\textsuperscript{37} However his activities as writer and propagandist attracted greater attention. In 1950 Idris began to distribute his own radical publication, Everyman’s Magazine and this lead to his arrest

\begin{footnotes}
\item[34] Tom Little, Egypt (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1958), 206.
\item[37] Ibid., 23-24.
\end{footnotes}
and one-year suspension from the University of Cairo. In 1951 he contributed to publications edited by prominent leftists and Marxists such as Lutfi al-Khuli and Ahmad Hamrush. Idris also became part of an author’s bureau of an organization called the Democratic Movement of National Liberation (DMNL), the largest communist organization in Egypt.

Idris’s writing style complemented his leftist politics. Although authoritative authors and critics such as Taha Hussein demanded strict adherence to classical Arabic, Idris wrote in colloquial Arabic, adopting the idiom of the class championed by his political community. In his subject matter Idris aligned himself with the concerns of the left, placing rural peasants and poor Egyptians in city slums in the forefront of his stories. Egyptian authors had portrayed peasants since the advent of the Arabic novel, but Idris broke tradition again by forsaking a sentimental style in favour of stark realism. This style followed the social-realism philosophy embraced by Idris’ colleagues in the writers’ bureau of the DMNL. The author’s realistic portrayals of the Egyptian poor written in a vivid colloquial style presented a clear break with tradition and audiences

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38 Ibid., 24.
40 The DMNL is also known as Haditu (Al-Haraka ad-Dimuqratayya li-Tahrir al-Watani). Kurpershoek, The Short Stories of Yusuf Idris, 25, 27.
41 In 1956, Taha Hussein, then considered ‘the Dean of Arabic Literature’ urged Idris to forego use of the colloquial, even while praising Idris’ literary talent. Sasson Somekh, “Language and Theme in the Short Stories of Yusuf Idris,” Journal of Arabic Literature 6 (1975), 90. Dalya Cohen-Mor notes “in line with his socialist orientation, [Idris] believed that since literature is meant for the people, in should be in the language of the people, namely the colloquial.” Cohen-Mor, Yusuf Idris: Changing Visions, 65-66.
42 Kurpershoek, The Short Stories of Yusuf Idris, 76.
43 Ibid., 75-76.
hailed his first collection of short stories as revolutionary material. Idris championed lower classes in their own language, and his writings captured the passions of the Egyptian left.

Many of Idris’ stories reflected his medical training and his concern for public health. These concerns were exhibited in is 1954 story “The Cheapest Nights”, in which the protagonist, a poor peasant named Abdel Karem, wanders through his village and complains about his poverty, the overabundance of children and his boredom on a summer’s night. Finally he returns home, clambers over his six children, and begins to arouse his wife. In the following year she will give birth to their seventh. The story ends with a sardonic remark that the next year would find Abdel Karem wondering “which pit in heaven or hell could have spit up so many children.” Literary critic Roger Allen called this story a “cri de couer” expressing the author’s “acute concern with his homeland’s most pressing concern, that of overpopulation.”

Idris wrote also about sterility, insanity, anemia, and infanticide. But even more than physical ailments Idris concerned himself with social ills and wrote about society like a pathologist. He writing covered topics such as unemployment, prostitution and adultery, focusing consistently on poverty, ignorance, superstition, and the abuse of the vulnerable. Informed by his own background of rural life in the Nile delta, Idris wrote

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stories about peasant poverty both brutally realistic and deeply sympathetic and humane.

Even in his writing style, Idris demonstrated the efficiency of a doctor. In contrast to many of his verbose contemporaries, Idris wrote tersely and precisely. Some of his most compelling short stories are only a few pages, the literary equivalent of doctor’s scribbled prescription. But like a doctor or surgeon, his work cut deeply. The image that forms around Idris is that of an efficient pathologist of society, working minutely but cutting deeply. Yusuf Idris wrote with a scalpel.

Like the other leftists in the DMNL, Idris welcomed the news of the army movement. On July 22 1952, Nasser sent for Ahmad Hamrush, the leader of the militant wing of the DMNL and briefed him on the upcoming coup d’etat. The DMNL responded favourably to the army movement, circulating pamphlets in support of the Free Officer’s takeover. The news of the coup broke when Idris happened to be undertaking his first surgical operation. The attendant anesthetist discretely informed Idris that military officers had seized power from the king. Overcome with excitement, Idris left the operation to a colleague and raced out of the hospital to celebrate. Leftists and communists celebrated the deposition of the king and cautiously gave their support to the Free Officers. One of the junta’s first decrees was to release communist political prisoners. The DMNL exerted influence over the newly powerful army movement through the offices Khalid Muhieddin, a Free Officer with open socialist sympathies and

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49 Ibid., 25.
50 Kurpershoek notes that the Free Officers released all but seventeen communist political detainees. Ibid, 26.
through Ahmad Fuad, a DMNL leader who became an adviser to Nasser. The Free Officers’ Coup held great promise for leftist intellectuals.

The intellectual affinity between leftist intellectuals community and the new military regime is demonstrated in the harmony between the regime’s Agrarian policies and Idris’ writings. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) instituted Agrarian Reform in large part to break the political and economic power of the landed aristocracy, but also to enfranchise landless peasants. Nasser expressed the Officers’ concern for this class in his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, stating,

I realize we have upset big land-owners; but was it possible not to upset them and yet behold some of us owning thousands of acres, while others do not own the plot of land wherein they are buried after their death?\(^{51}\)

Agrarian Reform was the touchstone of the Free Officer’s promise to bring justice to Egypt. The man responsible for implementing the reform, Sayyed Marei explained further that aims of the new law were to grant land to as many peasants as possible.\(^{52}\) Enfranchising poor peasants improves all of Egypt, Marei explained: “Egypt is looking forward to a new era of higher living standards in which the woes of poverty are mitigated and every trace of the feudal system has disappeared.”\(^{53}\) Agrarian Reform promised to replace rural poverty and corruption with justice and sufficiency.

The Nasser regime allocated land from aristocrats to peasants as part of a larger mission of bringing modernity to the Egyptian countryside. Marei’s department established agricultural cooperatives in villages to protect peasants from exploitation,


\(^{53}\) Ibid., 150.
to bring rational planning and modern values to rural Egypt. The Agrarian Reform Bill stipulated that modern machinery and scientific farming methods be implemented by the collectives, and supervised by graduates from Agricultural Institutes. The humanitarian and modernizing mission was propagated by popular General Naguib. At a distribution ceremony at the formerly royal estate of Zafaran, Naguib explained to the audience that each of their families were being granted land holdings of a few feddans. Neguib joked, “and when I come back next year, I don’t want to see you with two wives each… better buy a heifer.” When Jean and Simonne Lacouture returned to Zafaran in 1955, they found the peasants well clothed and healthy, spending their new earnings on a sufficient diet for the first time. An effective icon of the reforms, Naguib explained that although rural improvement would take a generation,

in the meantime, the Government will provide the villages with schools, electric lights, clinics, social-centres, and recreational facilities, including potable wells, cheap toilets, bath houses, playing fields, and places for listening to the radio and seeing films.

The Officer’s regime aimed to introduce modernity to the underdeveloped countryside by establishing economic sufficiency, modern standards of health and hygiene, and outlets for modern entertainment and leisure. Their policies were informed by a modern and humanitarian impulse to improve the lot of the abject Egyptian peasant.

Nowhere were these values more evident than in the government’s massive land reclamation project, the Tahrir Province. The project originated when Magdi Hassanein, an engineer and Free Officer, discovered a strata of clay underneath the sand in the desert

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54 Ibid., 148.
55 Lacouture and Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, 345.
57 Also known in English as Liberation Province.
west of the Nile delta. Convinced that this clay could provide rich agricultural land for Egypt’s landless peasants, Hassanein convinced Nasser to undertake the massive project of converting 600,000 feddans of desert into agricultural land.\textsuperscript{58} In April 1953 Nasser gave the project his support and Tahrir Province was created. A veritable army of heavy machinery moved into the desert, digging wells and diverting water from the delta to irrigate the Western Desert.\textsuperscript{59} However, Hassanein’s vision encompassed far more than allocation of land. Rather, he envisioned Tahrir as a rural utopia, a new society of peasants exhibiting all the virtues of the revolution. Hassanein insisted that Tahrir would mark “the creation of a youthful, coordinated and coherent Egyptian society… to serve as a model of what the Revolution intends for this noble nation.”\textsuperscript{60} The settlers who relocated to Tahrir were required to be young, monogamous, to have no more than three children, and to have passed a psychological exam.\textsuperscript{61} Land ownership was collective, the settlers moved into their own homes, complete with electricity and plumbing, and were given a new uniform, with blue overalls for the men and cotton dresses for the women.\textsuperscript{62} The new inhabitants of Tahrir province were trained in sports and music, especially in singing revolutionary anthems.\textsuperscript{63} Upon his first visit, Nasser asserted that Tahrir Province proved “that with patience, tolerance, and perseverance the sons of this land can work

\textsuperscript{58} Wheelock, \textit{Nasser’s New Egypt}, 95.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Harry Hopkins, \textit{Egypt, the Crucible: the Unfinished Revolution of the Arab World} (London: Secker & Warburg, 1969), 128.
\textsuperscript{61} Wheelock, \textit{Nasser’s New Egypt}, 96.
miracles.” Tahrir Province expressed the utopian hopes of the Officer’s modernizing mission and emphasized the humanitarian mission implicit in the Agrarian Reform policies.

The DMNL supported the Officers’ movement partially for their progressive Agrarian Reform policies. Although other communist groups denounced the movement as the work of military dictators and fascists, the DMNL looked favourably upon the Officers opposition to imperialism and the immense power of rural aristocrats, referred in Egypt as ‘feudalism.’ Nasser nurtured both organizational and personal connections to the influential communist movement in figures such as Yusuf Sadiq, both a Free Officer and a DMNL member. Nasser had been particularly influenced by a DMNL leader named Ahmad Fuad, a leftist intellectual trained in both economics and law. Prior to the revolution, much of Nasser’s reading was derived from the leftist works in Fuad’s large library. After the revolution Nasser met with Fuad and Mohieddin frequently to discuss pressing issues such as land reform. When the Free Officers decided to make land reform the symbol of their movement, they entrusted Fuad and another leftist economist, Dr. Rashid Barawi to draft a plan for Agrarian Reform. In addition to translating Das Kapital into Arabic, Barawi composed a detailed plan for agrarian reform in 1945. Agrarian Reform was not merely supported by the DMNL, but was drafted by a DMNL leader and a second leftist intellectual. Their collaboration with the government to

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64 Hopkins, *Egypt, the Crucible*, 135-136.
produce Agrarian Reform demonstrates a unity of aims between the Egyptian left and Egypt’s new regime.

Yusuf Idris was no exception to the tendency of leftists to support Agrarian Reform. His short stories from the 1950s harmonized with the Officers’ rural agenda. While the Free Officers were dividing royal and aristocratic estates between poverty-stricken peasants and creating a rural utopia in Tahrir, Idris was writing stories portraying the painful degradation of peasants in their unreformed mode of life. His own experience growing up in a remote village informed his concern for the Egypt’s rural poor. In a 1983 autobiographical sketch, Idris described his own experience of growing up in the Sharkiyya Province. He recalled living with his extended family in a single room.

I found myself compelled to live with the ugly reality of poverty. All of us thirty people used to sleep together in single room... the room was swarming with flies, cockroaches, and a variety of bugs and reptiles. There was a huge din of groans and snores, crying sometimes, and attempts at sexual congress. Everything repulsive and inhuman seemed to be gathered together in this small, totally dark room...  

His recollection indicates the deeply personal feeling of shame Idris associated with rural poverty. Idris evoked feelings of both shame and sympathy in his short stories about the degraded Egyptian peasant. His 1954 story “The Cheapest Nights” (mentioned above) portrays how the boredom of a summer night drives Abdel Karem to clamber over his children to couple arouse his protesting wife. Although Abdel Karem and his wife can hardly support their six children, they will soon have a seventh.  

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his concern in overpopulation and birth control, which the revolutionary government was already promoting in agricultural cooperatives and Tahrir Province.\textsuperscript{72}

P. M. Kurpershoek observes that Idris’ stories targeted not only material conditions of poverty, but also the mentality pervading village life.\textsuperscript{73} Idris portrayed this mentality as a powerful system of superstition and taboo founded upon ignorance, custom, and religion. In one such story, “Tabliyya min as-Sama’”, or “A Dining Table from Heaven”, one of the starving beggars in the village declares that unless God sends him a plenteous meal, he will foreswear the Islamic faith. Fearful of a divine calamity that may follow the fellow’s apostasy; some bystanders hastily provide a generous meal.\textsuperscript{74} But peasant morality sometimes shows a more chilling aspect. His story “The Hermaphrodite” narrates the fate of a village inhabitant of impaired mental ability and uncertain sex, variously called Shaikh Mohammed, Shaikha Fatima, or simply Shaikh Shaikha.\textsuperscript{75} Commenting that God has willed certain deformities, the villagers show Shaikh Shaikha tolerance and grant him the indifference reserved for animals, allowing him to overhear private conversations or witness them undress.\textsuperscript{76} Eventually the villagers come to fear that Shaikh Shaikha is not as witless as he appears, and that they have been terribly compromised. Some of the peasants accost and accuse Shaikh Shaikha of their suspicions. When they hear him groan “God forbid,” they know they have been deceived.\textsuperscript{77} Because of this revelation, the villagers could no longer see Shaikh Shaikha without being reminded of their secrets and transgressions. The story ends with an image

\textsuperscript{72} Wheelock, \textit{Nasser’s New Egypt}, 96. Hopkins, \textit{Egypt, the Crucible}, 124.
\textsuperscript{73} Kurpershoek, \textit{The Short Stories of Yusuf Idris}, 91.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 92.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 190.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 194.
of the inevitable fate of such a dangerous person; Shaikh Shaikha lying in a pool of blood.\textsuperscript{78}

The author’s concern in the inhumane character of village justice is expressed in a 1958 story “An Affair of Honour.” The story narrates the fate of a young woman named Fatma who is not only beautiful, but whose presence overflows with femininity and sensuality.\textsuperscript{79} Despite Fatma’s irreproachable conduct, the people of the village keep a close eye on the beautiful woman, waiting for her inevitable fall into shame.\textsuperscript{80} They also kept watch on Gharib, a young man notorious for womanizing. None are surprised, then when they hear Fatma screaming from a nearby field and witness Gharib making his escape. Fatma is left to face a crowd of accusers. The women of the village are determined to investigate and take her to a private place to probe her virginity. The beautiful woman protests this shameful treatment but has no recourse. Soon the cries are raised that Fatma has been spared and her honour is safe.\textsuperscript{81} But the invasive attention of the village women accomplishes the rape that eluded her assaulter and Fatma’s innocence has been lost.\textsuperscript{82} With this and other stories Idris creates a picture of a cruel morality governing Egypt’s abject villages, asserting his conviction that the villages demanded both material and moral improvement. He emphasized the suffering caused by poverty, ill health, illiteracy, and superstition, the very social ills that the government’s policies set to remedy. In this way, the author affirmed the humanitarian and modernizing mission of the government’s rural policies. The regime’s determination to win Egypt’s independence

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 196.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 161.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 173.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 176.
and terminate the abuses perpetrated by rural aristocrats earned the support of leftist intellectuals in the DMNL and writers like Yusuf Idris.

But the hopes in which leftist intellectuals held for the revolutionary regime were quickly tempered by caution and fear. The first note of alarm was sounded for the junta’s reaction to labour unrest in Kafr-al-Dawr on August 12, 1952. The regime interpreted the unrest as communist agitation against the peace and order of the new era, and moved aggressively against the strikers. The regime summarily executed two union activists, a shocking reversal of its nearly bloodless takeover of Egypt. After the brutal treatment of the Kafr al-Dawr unionists, all communists except the influential DMNL hardened their opposition to Nasser and the RCC. The junta began to move decisively to suppress rivals and to consolidate its authority. The RCC re-imposed press censorship in October, then announced the dissolution of all political parties and a three-year military dictatorship in early 1953. On the first anniversary of the Kafr al-Dawr executions the DMNL publicly revoked its support of the military regime. As the RCC’s governance hardened into a military autocracy, the suppression of the left intensified. The first five months of 1954 saw the imprisonment of 252 communists. In August 1954 Nasser excoriated the communist movement, saying, “Take communists for example. We know

84 P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (1961; repr., Westport: Greenwood Press, 1965), 80. The twelve members of the R.C.C. voted on the verdict for the Kafr al-Dawr culprits. Four members, including Khalid Muhieddin and Nasser argued for a merciful sentence but were outvoted. Lacouture and Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, 166.
85 Beinin, Was the Red Flag Flying There?, 107.
86 Ibid., 81-82.
88 Wheelock, Nasser’s New Egypt, 42.
this type of person aims only at anarchies, for they can only live in anarchy. They are printing leaflets filled with lies and deception… They appearances are rosy, but under the surface, they are filled with grudges…”

In the same month, Idris criticized Nasser’s negotiations for British evacuation from the Canal Zone for allowing the continued presence of British non-military technicians. For this infraction, Idris was arrested and put in the al-Qanatir prison for political detainees.

Shortly before his imprisonment, Idris wrote a story revealing the conflicted response of Egyptian leftists to their betrayal and suppression following the Kafr al-Dawr executions. “Farahat’s Republic” takes place in a police station at night and portrays an interaction between the narrator, an anonymous member of the intellectual class and Sergeant-Major Farahat, the officer on duty. Initially the narrator is intimidated by the grim setting and the Sergeant-Major, observing that “he was sitting at his desk like the chief of police, with more than fifty rifle barrels hanging on his right, a wooden board on the wall being him loaded with all kinds of chains, handcuffs, shields, axes, and helmets.” Initially Farahat appears inhuman, and the narrator notes “his head looked like one of the helmets hanging behind him, his eyes like the barrels of rifles, and his tongue undoubtedly a lashing whip.” But slowly the narrator loses his sense of fear. He perceives that Farahat is himself an aging man who will retire before he attains his

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92 Ibid.
dreams of promotion. The narrator takes further comfort when he realizes that Farahat is under the mistaken impression that the narrator has an official complaint, and is not a mere prisoner with the others. Farahat finds in the narrator a good listener and begins confiding in him, complaining about his job and the proliferation of false accusations. While bullying the criminals and the victims in his office, Farahat begins to tell the narrator about a movie he made. The narrator thinks Farahat is joking but politely asks about plot and is soon captured by Farahat’s narrative. In this story-within-a-story, a young Egyptian is rewarded for his good conduct by a wealthy visitor from India, who buys a lottery ticket on his behalf. The young man wins and uses his earnings to go into business and is so successful that he soon owns all the factories in Egypt. Deploring the conditions of the factories, the young has them rebuilt on one enormous site, complete with beautiful homes for the workers. Paid fairly for the first time, the labourers work terrifically and the new society became prosperous, replete with gardens, fine cafes, cinemas and casinos. Suddenly Farahat comes out of his rhapsody to wonder why his audience is accompanied by a fellow-officer and learns that the eager listener is himself a prisoner. Farahat discards his glowing narrative and becomes a suspicious and tyrannical officer once again.

“Farahat’s Republic” presents a scathing satire on the authoritarianism of Egypt’s military government. The story employs the image of the uniformed officer as a symbol

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93 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 16.
97 Ibid., 18.
98 Ibid., 18-19.
not only of the government, but President Nasser himself. The semblance between Nasser and the police chief was barely concealed in the original title of the story, “Abd al’Baqi’s Republic” on account of the similarity between the names Abd al-Baqi and Abd al-Nasser.  

Although the author changed the character’s name to Farahat, his similarity to Nasser was not missed. The description of Farahat as recognizably Upper Egyptian with a large forehead and nose clearly suggests that Nasser is the target of Idris’ satire. As Roger Allen observes, portraying Nasser as a tyrannical police-sergeant was not complimentary to the Egyptian president. This portrayal demonstrates the opposition of the Egyptian left as they faced government repression, marginalization, and imprisonment. In “Farahat’s Republic”, Idris diagnosis another social ill, but his target is no longer poverty and ignorance but a repressive political system.

However, the object of this story’s satire is not only the regime’s authoritarianism but the sincerity of its program of reform. The utopia Farahat envisioned for his film, in which a newly rich Egyptian brings about prosperity and reform to industry and agriculture clearly recalls the Free Officers’ policy ambitions. In Farahat’s story, German engineers come to cultivate the desert, the peasants wear suits instead of gallabiyas, and they go to school to learn their rights as citizens. Farahat’s dream clearly recalls the modernizing impulse behind Agrarian Reform and the utopian tone of the Tahrir Province. Idris intended to cast doubt on the reforming policies employed by the regime, and contrast it to the realities of poverty and the regime’s authoritarian approach to


100 Ibid., 10.


dissidence. Farahat’s tolerance dissolves when he realizes that his interlocutor is a political prisoner. He dismisses his glowing narrative saying, “forget it – it’s all just so many words. You don’t really believe it, do you?” In this way “Farahat’s Republic” vividly expresses Idris’ sense of disappointment in the failed promise of the revolutionary government.

Upon his release from prison, Idris found himself in a rapidly changing political environment. Nasser was reorienting his foreign policy from informal collaboration with the United States towards partnership with an international movement of embittered former colonies embracing radical nationalism and socialism. Frustrated by his failure to secure modern armaments from the United States, Nasser began to develop closer bonds with statesmen such as Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and Prime Minister Nehru of India, who enflamed Nasser’s commitment to national independence. In April Nasser attended the first African-Asian conference at Bandung in Indonesia. The anti-imperial tone of the conference was set by the Indonesian president Sukarno whose opening remarks announced, “the nations of Africa and Asia are no longer the tools and the playthings of forces they cannot influence.” At the Bandung Conference, Nasser discovered his flair for diplomacy, fostering a close working relationship with Chou En-Lai, the premiere of the People’s Republic of China. Relationships formed at Bandung

103 As Saad El-Gabalawy observes, the lofty ideals of Farahat’s vision is set in stark contrast to his callous indifference to the people in the police-station. Saad El-Gabalawy, introduction to Modern Egyptian Short Stories by Naguib Mahfouz, Yusuf Idris, Saad Elkhadem, and Saad El-Gabalawy (Fredericton: York Press, 1977), 8.
105 Lacouture, Nasser, 155-156.
106 St.John, The Boss, 196.
107 Ibid., 199.
soon proved beneficial, and in September Nasser announced to the world that Egypt had made an arms deal with Czechoslovakia.

In May 1955, Nasser lauded socialism for the first time in a public speech, speaking of the need to build a strong socialist society. In June the Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitry Shepilov met with Nasser in Cairo and communicated USSR’s interest in providing financing for the Aswan dam. The next day, Nasser ordered the release of six hundred political prisoners, many of them communists. The Nasser regime began to allow both foreign and Egyptian communists more leeway in cultural activities. Communist book shops were opened in prominent Cairene streets, Russian films were shown in theatres, and Egyptian theatres were filled with performers from communist Europe. The regime allowed leftist intellectuals to establish a new newspaper and in October 1956 the first issues of *al Masa’* were printed, featuring articles on the labour disputes, poetry written by workers in colloquial Arabic, and articles calling for workers’ right to strike. Communists gained permission to write for newspapers such as *al Jumhuriyya* and *al Sha’b*, and the United Egyptian Communist Party opened their own publishing house. The new ideological turn was captured in a Cairo Radio program announcing that while capitalists were ruling America, the true democracy was the Soviet Union, where the people chose their leaders via the Communist Party.

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109 Ibid., 219.
110 Ibid. 211.
111 Beinin, *Was the Red Flag Flying There?*, 94-96. Journalists used euphemisms such as “peaceful stoppage of work” because the word “strike” was not allowed. Ibid., 96.
112 Ibid., 178.
Convinced that the establishment of a socialist economy must be preceded by national independence, the majority of Egyptian communists responded enthusiastically to Nasser’s conversion to anti-imperialism in the atmosphere of Bandung. Even before Nasser departed for Bandung he received a congratulatory telegram from a group of recently imprisoned communists, proclaiming, “Long live our militant in the anti-imperialist struggle! We salute you!” Marxist intellectual Lutfi al-Khuli valorized Nasser’s cooperation with communist and progressive countries such as the USSR and China at an intense three-day meeting of the DMNL. Al-Khuli’s disagreement with the DMNL led him to quit the movement and he became editor of the new al Masa’ paper. After the Bandung Conference, the Unified Egyptian Communist Party (UECP) quickly reviewed its position towards the military government, and in March 1956 published a report announcing, “Egyptian society has undergone deep changes. After having been a dependent semi-feudal society it has today become independent and democratic.” Nasser’s purchase of modern weapons from Czechoslovakia afforded him the support of all the communist parties, who then sought accommodation and tacit alliance with the regime. Although the communist parties continued to call for democratic liberties, they concentrated their efforts on influencing the regime from within. When Nasser nationalized the Suez canal and defied British demands to “disgorge” it, communists’ felt their support for Nasser had been validated. Some communists were so inspired by Nasser’s leadership of the Suez canal affair that they composed an article declaring “We

114 Lacouture, Nasser, 159.
116 Ibid. Beinin, Was the Red Flag Flying There?, 96.
118 Botman, The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 140.
The Egyptian left had been assimilated into the ruling establishment. Imprisoned during the opposition of the Egyptian left and the Nasser regime, Idris was released after Nasser became the hero of the left at Bandung. In 1956 Nasser had transformed into a charismatic statesman who championed nationalism and socialism, the very creeds with which Idris identified most. This transformation left Idris at an intellectual crossroads. In January 1956, Idris released a patriotic short novel that revealed Idris’ emotional response to the Bandung transformation and his intellectual vulnerability to the regime. City of Love and Ashes reflects the patriotic fervour stirred in Egyptian leftists following Nasser’s transformation at Bandung. Both a traditional romance and a paean to the Egypt’s revolutionary spirit, City of Love and Ashes departs from the austere realism of his short stories. Set during the turmoil of early 1952 that saw the burning of Cairo and the implementation of martial law in Egypt which preceded the Officers’ Coup of July 23, City of Love and Ashes narrates the experiences of two freedom fighters, Hamza and Fawziya, as they attempt to participate in the struggle and avoid arrest. Hamza and Fawziya fall in love and commit their lives to the cause of revolution in Egypt. The story valorizes the patriotic morality held by Hamza. As the couple make their way through the crowded streets of Cairo, Hamza instructs Fawziya saying,

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120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid., 193.  
you and I have been absorbed in everybody, and we number in the millions. This is what I feel when I look at people. See those people walking up and down, riding on that cart, clinging on the steps of the bus, sitting in the café? Those are our people. See how beaten and humiliated they are? Now I feel I love them more and want to die for them, and I feel their need for a leader to pull them together and… got with them toward love and tomorrow.\textsuperscript{123}

At the climax of the story, Hamza confesses to Fawziya, “I used to be a revolutionary only because I despised the enemy and believed in the necessity of their extinction. Now I fight not just because I hate the enemy but because first of all I have come to love the people and believe in the necessity of their happiness.”\textsuperscript{124} Hamza learns that loving Fawziya enables him to embrace society more and thus their romance affirms the patriotic theme. Idris’ expressed his response to the Bandung transformation in Hamza and Fawziya’s humanistic politics and patriotic fervour. In \textit{City of Love and Ashes}, Idris surrendered his critical posture in favour of patriotic commitment. This patriotism was to prove greater than his critical and pathological concern for Egyptian society.

Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal secured for him the undisputed role as champion of the nation. The Suez conflict heightened the defiant and patriotic tone set at Bandung. Playwrights began to churn out patriotic plays exalting the struggle against imperialism.\textsuperscript{125} Idris was also affected by the nation’s dangerous bid for the Suez canal. In a 1958 story “The Secret of His Power,” Idris composed a legend of a peasant named Hamid who opposed the French occupation of Egypt in 1801 and embodied the Egyptian national to such a degree that he became a giant.\textsuperscript{126} Finally the French capture

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 116.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 141-142.
and kill Hamid, and to set an example, cut up his body and distribute the pieces throughout the country. To the dismay of the French conquerors, every village creates a shrine for Hamid, and each shrine further mobilizes resistance. El-Enany notes that the patriotic tone of “The Secret of his Power” was likely inspired by Nasser’s ability to mobilize the nation to defy the West.\(^\text{127}\) The author allowed his patriotism to compromise his earlier aloofness toward the Officers’ regime.

In the late 1950s, following Bandung, the Czech arms deal, and the Suez canal crisis, Idris became reluctant to treat political authority as he had in earlier short stories. He continued to write about the struggles of the lower classes against the more powerful, but chose to set his sights on civilian authority and the social elites. For example, in “City Dregs”, Idris narrates the corrupting influence of an arrogant judge who hires a housecleaner and forces her to become his mistress. Being mistress to a high-class judge changes the peasant woman, and she trades her modest covering for cheap modern clothes and begins asking for gifts. The woman resorts first to theft and then to prostitution, falling into complete corruption. In such works the abuses of political authority are absent, while the abuse of civil authorities are highlighted.

Idris continued to write stories set in rural Egypt and made explicit the harmony between his concern for rural poverty and the government’s Agrarian Reform Laws. His 1959 novel *The Sinners* revealed his concord with the regime, for its modernizing mission and its specific policies of enfranchising landless peasants through land grants. Set on a large and bustling cotton estate in the Northern Delta in the years preceding the 1952 Officers’ Coup, the novella centers on the discovery of an abandoned infant and the

\(^{127}\) Ibid., 51-52.
efforts of the agricultural commissioner of the estate Fikri Effendi to discover its mother. Fikri Effendi pursues his investigation zealously, tormented by the thought of the haram, the forbidden, being committed on the estate, a carefully maintained world of propriety and public virtue.¹²⁸ Fikri’s investigation focuses immediately on a community of migrant workers called the gharabwa, a sub-culture of agricultural labourers even poorer and more despised than the estate’s own peasants. Despite the suspicion cast on the gharabwa, none are considered safe from suspicion, and the specter of haram casts a shadow even on respectable homes. As suspicion gains strength, the serenity and moral order of the estate is endangered. A secret world of hidden desire begins to grow visible, and the innocent begin to contemplate the unthinkable. The illiterate post-man realizes that he has been carrying love-letters between his own wife and her lover.¹²⁹ The wife of estate commissioner Fikri Effendi dreams of seducing Dumyaan, a mentally impaired brother to the chief clerk. And the young daughter of this clerk, a secluded Christian girl named Linda begins to welcome the advances of the notorious womanizer, Sultan Ahmad.¹³⁰ However, the story quickly retreats from this collapse of the moral order. The investigation finally reaches its quarry, Aziza, a gharabwa woman who had been raped, conceived a child, and abandoned her infant immediately after birth. Having given birth on the banks of a dirty canal, the woman is ravaged with fever by the time she is discovered.¹³¹ Moved suddenly by pity, the whole community, including residents and

¹²⁹ Idris, The Sinners, 106.
¹³⁰ Ibid, 91-95.
¹³¹ Ibid., 76-77.
gharabwa, gathers around Aziza in her final days. Aziza dies and her body is removed to her home province for burial, but leaves a legacy of social harmony on the estate. In the epilogue, the narrator relates that the landowner was later obliged by the Agrarian Reform Law to reduce his holdings, and the estate is divided between the humble workers who become small land owners in their own right. In contrast to stories such as “The Hermaphrodite” (above) in which the plot moves inexorably towards its tragic conclusion, in The Sinners, social harmony is achieved, crowned with the Agrarian Reform Law. The author demonstrated his conviction that the revolutionary regime was indeed bringing about the promise of modernity and prosperity.

The Sinners demonstrates even more clearly the extent to which Idris’ artistic vision accorded with the modernizing agenda of the revolutionary government. Like stories such as “The Hermaphrodite” and “An Affair of Honour,” The Sinners portrays rural Egypt as afflicted with regressive mentalities that cruelly prosecute the innocent under the auspices of traditional morality. In both The Sinners and “An Affair of Honour,” the victims of rape and assault suffer public shame and censure while their attackers escape undetected or unscathed. However The Sinners positions its author even closer in line with the government’s rural agenda in his depiction of the managerial upper classes and their masters, the rural aristocracy whose power the military regime forcefully dismantled. The owner of the massive cotton estate lives in a sea-side palace in Alexandria and is rumoured to have dining room of pure gold, while estate commissioner Fikri Effendi feels so superior to his labourers that he imagines that they welcome his

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132 Ibid, 111.
133 Ibid, 113.
abuse and insults as kind condescension. If his ideological sympathies had not been made sufficiently clear, Idris ended *The Sinners* with the sweeping social changes brought about by the revolution and the Agricultural Reform Law that witnessed the removal of the aristocratic landlord, the razing of his mansion and stables, and the emergence of a “new society” of small peasant-farmers. With this tribute to the 1952 revolution and the Agricultural Reform Act, Idris stated explicitly what his earlier stories had only implied, that Egypt’s impoverished villages desperately needed the justice and modernity embodied in the regime’s rural agenda.

Idris had changed the critical thrust of his writing. Rather than targeting political authority as in “Farahat’s Republic,” Idris targeted civilian authority, as in “City Dregs,” he wrote patriotic works, and he valourized the Agrarian Reform Laws in *The Sinners*. The author’s new tone afforded him an entrance into the political establishment. While contributing to *al Gumhuriyya*, Idris developed a friendship with the newspaper’s editor, Anwar Sadat. Sadat became an important benefactor for Idris and arranged a sinecure for the author in the Ministry of National Guidance. Sadat then gave him a position in his office in his new role as Secretary General of Egypt’s single political party, the National Union, and served in its foreign affairs bureau. The gifted young writer had demonstrated his loyalty to the ruling political order, surrendered his intellectual disengagement to the ruling elite, and had been ushered into the institutional milieu of the ruling group.

134 Ibid., 26, 59.
135 Ibid., 113.
136 Ibid., 30.
Idris’ enjoyed a safe position within the establishment. This was demonstrated in early 1959 when the uneasy rapprochement between Nasser’s regime and the Egyptian left as brought to a swift and brutal conclusion. Although communists continued to support Nasser’s domestic policies, they took exception to his foreign affairs. Egyptian communists support the Abd al-Karim Qassem regime in Iraq, lauding his open reliance on the Soviet Union and his close cooperation with communists in a national front.138 Egyptian communists called upon Nasser to incorporate their movements into the government apparatus, appearing at rallies chanting, “Like Qassem, oh Gamal” and “Front, front, like Iraq.”139 Nasser responded angrily to the leftists’ demands. On the night of December 31, 1958, hundreds of communists were awoken and arrested by the police.140 By the end 1959, over two thousand communists had been detained.141 Some of these detainees were prominent writers and intellectuals like Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi and Louis Awad.142 In an autobiographical note Awad tersely noted that he “was imprisoned by ‘Abd al-Nasir without trial for sixteen months (March 28, 1958 – July 23, 1960) and did hard labour in Abu Za’bal penitentiary with hundreds of other Egyptian Marxists on police charges of Communism...”143 However, Idris was completely untouched by the purge.144 He was under Sadat’s patronage and his loyalty to the regime had been assured.

139 Ibid., 205.
140 Ibid., 206.
141 Ibid., 207.
144 Kurpershoek notes “Idris was left undisturbed, apparently because the authorities had come to view him as an inoffensive individualist.” Kurpershoek, *The Short Stories of Yusuf Idris*, 31.
Idris’ patriotism enabled his intellectual rapprochement with Nasser’s revolution regime. Edward Said argued that the proper role of intellectuals is to stand aloof the centres of power within society, directing towards tyranny, abuse, and domination an oppositional and ironic criticism.¹⁴⁵ But Said cautioned that while attempting to maintain a skeptical position within society, intellectuals are tempted towards the associations that claim their loyalty, associations determined by profession, class, conviction, or nationality.¹⁴⁶ In the enthusiastic atmosphere of Bandung, the Czech Arms Deal and the Suez Canal Crisis, Idris allowed the ‘filiative’ connection of the Nation to compromise his independence as an intellectual. Henceforth his intellectual production was made under the regime’s hegemonic influence. Idris’ life and career manifested the overwhelming appeal of nationality upon Egyptian intellectuals.

As a writer and intellectual Idris participated in the contest of values which accompanied the ascendance of Nasser’s regime. Initially ecstatic at the news of the military takeover and Faruq’s forced abdication, Idris quickly learned to fear and resist the rule of Nasser and his military associates. The Nasser regime viewed the Egyptian left as a dangerous threat to its own prerogative to govern Egypt, and starting with the suppression of the Kafr al-Dawr strike, energetically prosecuted the Egyptian left until the time of the Bandung Conference. During this period, between the coup d’état and the political transformations of Bandung, Idris wrote critically of the Nasser regime, satirizing its idealistic promises and condemning its authoritarian excesses. But the confrontational tone between the government and leftist intellectuals like Idris was not founded on philosophical or intellectual antagonism. Rather, their quarrel was

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 25.
organizational. The Nasser regime objected to the existence of other associations constituted on a political basis that existed outside the government establishment. In the ‘Bandung Period’ from 1955 to 1958, which witnessed Nasser’s emergence as a charismatic leader in the struggle against imperialism, the Czech arms deal, and the Suez Canal crisis, Idris blunted his political criticism; targeted civilian authority instead, championed agrarian reform, and published a number of patriotic works. The author’s patriotism ran deeper than his other convictions and necessitated that he support the new emblem of Egypt’s liberation, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Like other leftist intellectuals caught in the excitement of Egypt’s foreign policy successes, Idris contributed his intellectual activity to bolstering the regime’s claim to legitimacy and bid for hegemony.
CHAPTER 3  NAGUIB MAHFOUZ, STATE PATRONAGE, AND BENEVOLENT AUTHORITARIANISM FROM 1952 TO 1959

The literary and intellectual career of Naguib Mahfouz demonstrates a set of contradictions in the author’s dealings with the Nasser regime. On the one hand, Mahfouz’s novels contained sharp criticism of the Nasser regime, cunningly embedded in allegory and opacity. On the other hand, Mahfouz’s life in claustrophobic Cairo drew near the centre of political power and his major publications in the 1950s were indebted to the regime’s patronage. Indeed, Mahfouz’s literary success and personal safety depended on state patronage and on the state’s ability to impose order when the author provoked the wrath of al Azhar in 1959. The apparent contradiction between political criticism and state dependence in Mahfouz’s literary career can be understood in the light of author’s perspective on authority, as expressed in his literary works in the 1950s. In his two major novels of the 1950s, *The Cairo Trilogy* and *Children of Gebelawi*, Mahfouz created authoritarian characters, most notably the godlike patriarch Sayyid Ahmed in the Trilogy, and a cast of thugs, bullies, and chiefs, in *The Children of Gebelawi*. All of Mahfouz’s patriarchs and bullies were portrayed as intimidating and forceful, but some were righteous bullies while others were mere tyrants. This dual understanding of authority explains the author’s approach to political authority. Mahfouz warned the Nasser regime against tyranny, even while appealing for its benevolence.

Mahfouz’s character as an author and intellectual bears interesting contrasts with Yusuf Idris. Idris wrote tempestuously, writing urgently and brilliantly when inspiration
struck him, languishing when it left.\textsuperscript{147} By contrast, Mahfouz wrote methodically, researching and planning his novels before he wrote them and devoting himself to a strict writing schedule. Mahfouz planned his novels like an architect and established complex patterns within his novels.\textsuperscript{148} Throughout both his literary career and his career as a bureaucrat, Mahfouz demonstrated a love of stability. The characteristics of these authors shaped the way they engaged with the political transformations of the Nasser period. While Idris’ relationship to the state was mediated by his passionate patriotism, Mahfouz’s complicity to the state stemmed from the author’s deep respect for stability, order, and authority.

When the Free Officers seized control of the government in 1952, Naguib Mahfouz had already established himself as a novelist and intellectual of notable reputation. Born into a religious family in Islamic Cairo in 1911, Naguib Mahfouz grew up in the heady atmosphere of the 1919 revolution, embraced the Wafd party with religious fervour, and devoted himself to philosophy at King Fuad University before deciding to pursue a career in literature. As a young novelist in the 1940s Mahfouz received an encouraging reception to his work, attracting awards for two of his historical novels.\textsuperscript{149} The aspiring writer followed these publications with several novels set in contemporary Cairo garnering surprising literary acclaim. Critic Sayyid Qutb proclaimed that Mahfouz’s 1945 \textit{Khan al-Khalili} displayed greater merit than \textit{The Return of the Kurpershoek, The Short Stories of Yusuf Idris}, 47.

\textsuperscript{147} Kurpershoek, \textit{The Short Stories of Yusuf Idris}, 47.

\textsuperscript{148} For example, his novel \textit{The Children of the Alley} that draws upon religious imagery is divided into five books and 114 chapters, a strong echo of the five books of the Jewish Pentateuch and the 114 suras of the Qur’an. Milson, \textit{Najib Mahfuz: Novelist-Philosopher}, 80-81.

\textsuperscript{149} Matti Moosa, \textit{The Early Novels of Naguib Mahfouz: Images of Modern Egypt} (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), xi.
Spirit, a groundbreaking novel by one of Egypt’s foremost littérateurs, Tawfiq al-Hakim.\textsuperscript{150} By the mid-1940s, Naguib Mahfouz had established himself as an admirable literary talent.

In the spring of 1952 at the age of forty-one, Mahfouz completed a roman-fleuve, a massive accomplishment intended to mark the conclusion of his literary career.\textsuperscript{151} The epic novel The Cairo Trilogy was completed in April 1952 after seven years of writing.\textsuperscript{152} Over three hundred thousand words long and originally handwritten on over a thousand foolscap pages, Mahfouz’s The Cairo Trilogy is a long, complex, and multi-layered work.\textsuperscript{153} The novel documents a family of the merchant class living in old Islamic Cairo, following their fortunes from the end of the Great War in 1917 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. Mahfouz created a careful portrait of the family patriarch, Sayyid Ahmad Abd Al-Jawwad, his devoted wife Amina, their five children; Yasin, Khadija, Fahmy, Aisha, and Kamal, and their grandchildren, Khadija’s sons Ahmad and Abd al-Mun’im, and Yasin’s son Ridwan. But The Cairo Trilogy documents more than a single family. As the novel follows the characters through their daily lives in the home, workplace, school and university, mosque, and through the alleys and souks of the Husayni district, venturing timidly into the upper-class Abbasiyya neighbourhood, into cafés and brothels, the narrative reveals a portrait of an entire way of life; that of the

\textsuperscript{150} Milson, Najib Mahfuz: Novelist-Philosopher, 75.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{152} El-Enany, Naguib Mahfouz: His Life and Times, 67. The novels original title was Bayn al-Qasrayn, “Between Two Places.” It was later divided and published as three separate novels. Its common English title is The Cairo Trilogy. Milson, Najib-Mahfuz: Novelist-Philosopher, 45.
\textsuperscript{153} Somekh, Changing Rhythm, 50. Moosa, Early Novels of Naguib Mahfouz, 143.
Cairene middle class during the birth of the modern Egyptian nation. The novel was described by Somekh as a “world of yesterday… rapidly losing ground.”

*The Cairo Trilogy* features one Mahfouz’s most compelling characters, the family patriarch, Al Sayyid Ahmad. Al Sayyid Ahmad is Mahfouz’s master-portrait of a kindly tyrant who creates around himself a disciplined paradise. An imposing character, al Sayyid Ahmad bears an almost unrelenting fury for any kind of trespass against his personal authority. His wife Amina grants him the utmost respect, deference, and obedience that borders on piety, managing her household to accommodate his slightest whim. In a moment of independence, Amina allows herself to be persuaded into visiting the shrine of an important saint without her husband’s permission. When Sayyid Ahmad learns of his wife’s disobedience, he punishes her saying, “I just have one thing to say: Leave my house immediately.” However, Sayyid Ahmad’s tyrannical personality is mixed with impulses of sympathy, mercy, indulgence, and good humour. After Amina’s expulsion from the family home, their children endeavor to bring about her return. On one occasion, the eldest Khadija arranges to have a respected Aunt come to Sayyid Ahmad to plead on Amina’s behalf. Sayyid Ahmad reacts angrily and resentfully at this intrusion, declaring, “Let her come in. I won’t be able to drink my coffee with a calm mind after this. My room has turned into a court with judges and witnesses. That’s the kind of rest I find at home. God’s curse on all of you!” When Khadija makes a hasty retreat, Sayyid Ahmad

glowered angrily for a few moments. Then he remembered the sight of Khadija retreating so fearfully that her foot stumbled in its wooden clog and her head

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154 Ibid.
almost collided with the door. He smiled sympathetically. His impulsive fury was wiped away and left him feeling affectionate. What children they were! They refused to forget their mother even for a single minute.\footnote{Ibid., 225.}

When Sayyid Ahmad relents, his family reveres him all the more. Literary critic Rasheed el-Enany comments that Sayyid Ahmad’s combination of tyranny and mercy “live inside him in a harmony worthy of a god,” and argues that the character recalls the God of Islam who is both ‘the Compassionate’ and ‘the Vengeful.’\footnote{El Enany, \textit{Naguib Mahfouz}, 77.} The strict obedience commanded by Sayyid Ahmad slowly diminished throughout the epic and the forces of disorder erode the tranquility of the Abd al-Jawwad house in the form of political turmoil, evolving sensibilities, filial disobedience, disease, and death. Sayyid Ahmed’s moral authority and the respect he commands slowly fades, but is never slighted or condemned by the author. Rather, they are held up as an impossible ideal, or an ideal that was possible in a simpler age. Mahfouz’s clear love and nostalgia for the moral authority evoked by Sayyid Ahmad reveals the author’s deep admiration for righteous authority.

The years that followed the July 23 revolution constitute a puzzling episode in the author’s career. Following his completion of \textit{The Cairo Trilogy} in 1952, Mahfouz apparently refrained from novel writing until 1957 when he began his project \textit{The Children of Gebelawi}.\footnote{The original title is \textit{Awlad Haratina}, “The Children of Our Alley.”} Throughout his long career as a writer and intellectual, Mahfouz provided contradictory explanations of his literary interruption, occasionally suggesting that his five years of silence were caused by the new political order ushered in by the Free Officers. In 1963 he informed Egyptian critic Fu’ad Dawwara that following the
coup, he lost the desire to criticize the old political and social order.\textsuperscript{159} Expounding further, Mahfouz stated that in 1952 he felt satisfied that Egypt’s liberation had restored meaning to life and it no longer required exploration in fiction.\textsuperscript{160} However, in the same year an Egyptian critic Ghali Shukri argued that like other leftist intellectuals, Mahfouz was appalled at the suppression of political activity and responded with silent protest.\textsuperscript{161} In 1975 the author informed a Kuwaiti newspaper that a feeling of harmony with the Egyptian government dampened his creativity in the years following the coup.\textsuperscript{162} In contrast, he informed the Israeli educationist Haim Gordon in 1981 that during his silent period was filled with despair for the fall of Egyptian liberalism.\textsuperscript{163} This explanation accords with Shukri’s characterization of the author as a silent protester, and further supported in interviews given after being awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1988.

In an interview with American journalist Milton Viorst, Mahfouz recollected:

I was frightened of the dictatorship from the very first day. My friends and I… were angry but not brave. We were very careful in our conversations. We knew the walls had ears, that spies were listening to us. We were persuaded to keep our opinions to ourselves by what we saw all around us.\textsuperscript{164}

Despite the author’s frequent suggestions that the Officers’ Coup caused his silence, several definitive studies assert that it may be misguided to search for political causation. Somekh suggests that a “spiritual-metaphysical crisis” induced the hiatus, but also considers that after writing his long novel, Mahfouz was both tired and occupied finding

\textsuperscript{159} Somekh, Changing Rhythm, 52.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{162} Haim Gordon, Naguib Mahfouz’s Egypt: Existential Themes in his Writing (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 87.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
a publisher for the work. This is the argument taken up by Menahem Milson, who explains that Mahfouz’s literary career was abruptly arrested when his long novel was rejected on the grounds of its length. His publisher told him severely, “this is not a novel, it’s a calamity”, causing Mahfouz deep disappointment. It is also possible that the author did not anticipate more novels after his epic because he had conceived it as “the quintessence and conclusion of my literary life.” Naguib Mahfouz stopped writing novels primarily because he had completed his definitive novel and was occupied searching for a publisher.

The author’s literary ambitions were rescued by one of the Free Officers, Yusuf Siba’i, a cavalry officer and close associate of Anwar Sadat. Siba’i, himself a prolific author, was appointed secretary of the Higher Council for the Protection of Literature and the Arts, and played a large role in directing state patronage to promising novelists. Siba’i was in the midst of launching a new magazine al-Risala al-Jadida (The New Message), released by a government-publishing house. Siba’i heard that Mahfouz was seeking to publish a long novel and made him an offer. He took the author’s immense manuscript and the novel began serialization in al-Risala al-Jadida in April 1953. Mahfouz recalled his sense of gratitude to Siba’i, saying,

165 Somekh, Changing Rhythm, 53.
166 Milson, Najib Mahfûz: Novelist-Philosopher, 44.
167 Ibid., 45.
168 Ibid., 43.
170 Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics, 127.
171 Milson, Najib Mahfûz: Novelist-Philosopher, 45.
Yusuf Siba’i took the whole novel; it was a handwritten manuscript, and I had no copy of it… If Yusuf Siba’i, God have mercy on his soul, had somehow lost that single copy, the trilogy would have been gone forever…\footnote{al-Ghitani. \textit{Najib Mahfuz Yatadhakkar}. Quoted in Milson, \textit{Najib Mahfuz: Novelist-Philosopher}. 45}

Eventually the author’s original publisher noticed that the serializations in \textit{Risala al-Jadida} were attracting attention, and arranged to publish the novel in three parts, with the second part entitled \textit{Palace of Desire} and the third \textit{Sugar Street}.\footnote{Ibid., 44-46.} The appearance of the first volume resulted in critical acclaim with several critics noting that \textit{The Cairo Trilogy} marked the first novel in Arabic to rise to the level of world literature.\footnote{Ibid., 15-16.} The second and third volumes appeared in 1957 and Mahfouz was awarded the State Encouragement Prize for Literature for his trilogy.\footnote{Roger Allen, “Naguib Mahfouz and the Arabic Novel: the Historical Context,” in \textit{Naguib Mahfouz: From Region Fame to Global Recognition}, eds. Michael Beard and Adnan Haydar (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 35. Mahfouz was the first novelist to be awarded the State Prize. Fatma-Moussa Mahmoud, \textit{The Arabic Novel in Egypt} (Cairo: Egyptian General Book Organization 1973), 48.} After publication of the Trilogy was complete, the author began writing novels again.\footnote{Somekh, \textit{Changing Rhythm}, 51. Milson, \textit{Najib Mahfuz: Novelist Philosopher}, 45.} Mahfouz’s literary masterpiece, hailed everywhere as a landmark in Arab literature, was saved by a Free Officer and received significant state patronage.

Naguib Mahfouz enjoyed friendships with some of the newly powerful men within Nasser’s circle. Mahfouz had known al-Siba’i since the 1930 when they were both contributing to short stories to the \textit{al-Risala} magazine.\footnote{Gamal al-Ghitani, \textit{The Mahfouz Dialogs}, trans. Humphrey Davis (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2007), 9.} After the revolution, Mahfouz socialized with the cavalry officer in late-night conversations in cafés, after which Siba’i
drove him home in his private car.\textsuperscript{179} In 1955 Mahfouz made the acquaintance of another member of the ruling elite when Mahfouz was transferred from the Ministry of Religious Endowments to the Ministry of Culture. There he made the acquaintance of the Minister of Culture Free Officer Tharwat Ukasha, who promoted the writer to Chief Censor in 1958.\textsuperscript{180} Ukasha was close to the centre of power; it was Ukasha whom Nasser sent to reassure his wife in the morning of the coup on July 23, 1952.\textsuperscript{181} Ukasha became an important patron for Mahfouz, promoting him to influential positions and shielding him when he provoked powerful authorities. However, Mahfouz’s most significant connection to the political elite was in the person of Muhammed Hasanayn Heikal, the world-famous journalist who enjoyed Nasser’s complete confidence.\textsuperscript{182} Mahfouz’s close connection to Heikal proved worrisome to some of his associates of the ancien regime. As Mahfouz later recalled, several of the former pashas in Tawfiq al-Hakim’s group feared Mahfouz because of the short distance between him and political elite, for Mahfouz was close to Heikal and Heikal was close to Nasser.\textsuperscript{183} These relationships with three members of the political elite contributed to Mahfouz’s literary success and safety in revolutionary Egypt.

Despite his collaboration with Siba’i, Mahfouz demonstrated uncertainty about the political transformation sweeping across Egypt. Later he claimed to have feared the

\textsuperscript{179} Milson, \textit{Najib Mahfuz: Novelist-Philosopher}, 49
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} St.John, \textit{The Boss}, 125.
\textsuperscript{182} Heikal was known as a close confidante of the President, an honour he shared with only one other; Abdel Hakem Amer. Munir K. Nasser, \textit{Press, Politics, and Power: Egypt’s Heikal and Al-Ahram} (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979), 54.
\textsuperscript{183} al-Ghitani, \textit{The Mahfouz Dialogs}, 24-25.
regime from its first day.\textsuperscript{184} His timidity was characteristic of a period in which the officers of the RCC ruled Egypt by fear. The sudden chill that followed the complete suppression of strikers at Kafr al-Dawr reached its climax in the massive trials in late 1954 following the assassination attempt of Nasser, in which over 7000 were arrested, 1000 were sentenced.\textsuperscript{185} Respected literary critic Louis Awad, who had been personally courted by Anwar Sadat to write for \textit{al Gumhuriyya} took the dangerous step of supporting Nasser’s rival Mohammed Naguib and was forced into exile and obscurity for several years, a fate Mahfouz had long feared.\textsuperscript{186} Rather than expose himself to such dangers, Mahfouz conducted himself with great care and circumspection. Barred from political activism by his fear of the nation’s military rulers, Mahfouz required an outlet for his political convictions, and turning again to fiction, found refuge in allegory, a device which he had earlier described as a ‘cunning art.’

In the third part of his trilogy, Mahfouz composed a dialogue that explains his own tactics of expressing dangerous political views through fiction and allegory. In the scene, the leftist intellectual Safwan instructs Ahmad on how fiction mediates political activism. She cautions against transparency, saying, “an essay is blunt and direct. Therefore it is dangerous, especially when eyes are scrutinizing us. The short story is

\textsuperscript{184} Viorst, \textit{Sandcastles}, 105.
\textsuperscript{185} Stagh, \textit{The Limits of Freedom of Speech}, 19.
more devious and therefore harder to restrict. It’s a cunning art…”¹⁸⁷ In the atmosphere of increased government oversight in intellectual circles, Mafhouz was obliged to rely heavily upon allegory in order to express his dissatisfaction with the government of Officers. Mahfouz first criticized the revolutionary government in fiction in 1956 with the film he co-wrote with noted auteur Abu Seif, *The Thug*.¹⁸⁸ The film portrays the injustice and squalor of the capitalist system, embodied in the figure of a greedy grocer, “Zaydan the Vegetable King,” who carries out his corrupt racketeering with the support of government ministers and pashas. When Zaydan’s power is broken by the police, and the photograph of King Faruq is seen to fall from its place, it is clear that Mahfouz and Abu Seif have portrayed the new era of justice ushered in by the Free Officers’ Coup.¹⁸⁹ However, the valorization of Nasser and his clique is undercut abruptly in the epilogue, in which a new capitalist emerges who works within the new system.¹⁹⁰ In this way, Mahfouz used film to assert that Egypt’s revolutionary age was also susceptible to corruption.

Mahfouz’s reflections on the revolution received fuller treatment in his subsequent novel. After the complete publication of the trilogy and enjoying the prestige conferred by the State Encouragement Prize for Literature, Mahfouz began to write a new novel. His novel *The Children of Gebelawi* has often been characterized as a major break from his previous work, especially in the complete shift from almost photographic

¹⁸⁹ Shafik, *Arab Cinema*, 139.
¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 139-140.
realism into dense and shifting allegory.\footnote{Its original title Awlad Haratina means literally Children of Our Quarter, but appears in English translation as Children of Gebelawi. Sasson Somekh, “The Sad Millenarian: An Examination of Awlad Haratina,” in Critical Perspectives on Naguib Mahfouz, ed. Trevor Le Gassick (Washington: Three Continents Press, 1991), 101. It appears in translation as Children of Gebelawi. Naguib Mahfouz, Children of Gebelawi, trans. Philip Stewart (London: Heinemann, 1981).} However, the novel is continuous with Mahfouz’s literary and cinematic career. Although Children of Gebelawi is more condensed than The Cairo Trilogy, it too is a roman-fleuve, an epic documenting several generations, set in a timeless world. Like Midaq Alley, The Cairo Trilogy, and the films The Thug and The Thugs of the Husayni Quarter, the locale is the claustrophobic quarters of Old Islamic Cairo, although the setting has been transposed into a biblical environment, in which its bustling alleys are hemmed by unending desert and foreboding mountains. The novel’s unique feature, its decisive turn to allegory, was necessitated by the sensitive political milieu in which it was written.

The story, told in sweeping strokes, retells the story of human history in broad strokes, narrating the revolutionary lives of Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, and finally the age of science. These heroes are the descendents of Gebelawi, an old family patriarch who represents God. The wealth of his mansion, the pristine beauty of the grounds, and the perfect moral order inculcated by his authority evokes paradise. The novel begins with an episode about the first generation of Gebelawi’s children, that of Adham and Idris, who represents the biblical Adam and Sadan, respectively. Adham has been favoured over Idris and selected to manage the estate. When Idris protests, he is thrown out of paradise by his father whose mercy is almost always obscured by authority. Adham lives well for a time, until provoked by his brother, he steals a glance at the father’s will, and he too is
thrown out, forced to scratch out a bitter living outside the paradise where he was born.\textsuperscript{192} At the end Adham’s sorrowful life, he is visited by his father, who guarantees that although Adham’s family are not allowed to live in the father’s house, they will live on the generous largesse of the estate, and a trusteeship is established to provide for Adham’s family perpetually.\textsuperscript{193} But Gebelawi’s mercy for Adham’s descendents is quickly corrupted by the trustees appointed to oversee the inheritance, and Adham’s children live perpetually in misery and poverty, bullied by the trustees and their hired thugs.\textsuperscript{194} However, deliverance comes from the children of Gebelawi when a prophet appears in a generation. The first is Gebel, representing Moses, who succeeds in breaking the power of the corrupt trustee and his bullies, and secures a generous share of the estate for his family and descendents, granting them both justice and prosperity.\textsuperscript{195} Unfortunately for the alley, Gebel’s death sees a new trustee rule the alley with all its former injustice. The next prophet is Rifa’a, representing Jesus, who embraces the poorest of the alley and teaches them to live with inner happiness. When Rifa’a is cruelly murdered by the trustee and his bullies, his disciples revolt and succeed in winning their share of the inheritance from the trustee, bringing about prosperity and justice to their quarter of the alley for a generation.\textsuperscript{196} But before long, corruption sets in and the thugs control the street. Then Kassem, representing Mohammed, appears. He is a kind, strong, generous man, a scrupulous shepherd and a successful merchant, who begins to receive visitations from an emissary from Gebelawi’s house, urging him to establish justice in the

\textsuperscript{192} Mahfouz, \textit{Children of Gebelawi}, 30.  
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 71-72.  
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 73-74.  
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 130-131.  
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 197-198.
alley. So Kassem launches his campaign to break the power of the trustee, and finally succeeds in winning a new age of prosperity and justice.\textsuperscript{197} But Kassem, last of the prophets, is unable to secure justice after his death. Finally, a new deliverer named Arafa appears, a magician and trickster whose potions can cure and inspire anyone. Arafa represents science, whose concoctions wield even greater power than the prophets. His schemes come quickly to disaster. After Arafa breaks into Gebelawi’s house to have a look at the book that originally tempted Adham, Arafa’s audacity and his accidental murder of a house-servant give Gebelawi such a shock that he has a heart-attack and dies.\textsuperscript{198} Arafa plans to break the power of the trustee and use his magic to bring prosperity to the alley, but he is bought, bullied, and finally killed by the trustee. The end of the novel sees the children of Gebelawi living in worse squalor than ever; with the forlorn hope that Arafa’s brother might come and deliver them.

The novel constitutes an allegory within an allegory.\textsuperscript{199} The first layer of allegory is easily uncovered, that Gebelawi stands for God, and that Gebel, Rifa’a, and Kassem represent the founding figures of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. But Mahfouz’s novel has a message with immediate and pressing political consequences. Samia Mehrez comments that \textit{Children of Gebelawi} should be read as an allegory for revolutionary Egypt in which the struggle for meaning, social justice, and knowledge was still being waged.\textsuperscript{200} Milson asserts that in \textit{Children of Gebelawi} constitutes Mahfouz’s lament for Egypt under the rule of “the latter day futuwwat [thugs]”, Nasser and his army

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 285.  
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 320.  
\textsuperscript{199} Milson, \textit{Najib Mahfuz: Novelist-Philosopher}, 135-136.  
\textsuperscript{200} Mehrez, \textit{Egyptian Writers between History and Fiction}, 65.
Mahfouz related to a Kuwaiti newspaper in 1975 that he began to conceive of *Children of Gebelawi* when he observed the government’s abuses and authoritarian excesses, and that a new class had emerged and was growing wealthy by the revolution, proving that the revolution was failing to establish socialism. He stated, “I wanted to ask the revolutionary leaders which path they wanted to choose: the prophets’ or the thugs.” Mahfouz composed *The Children of Gebelawi* to dispel the glamour created by the regime’s propaganda and foreign policy successes, to challenge its repressive rule of Egypt, and to insist that the revolutionary government establish justice and prosperity in the nation.

However, Mahfouz’s *The Children of the Alley* does not only condemn corrupt overlord and brutal thugs. The novel features prophets who embody the author’s ideals for political and social leadership. Although the prophets differ from the overlords and thugs by establishing justice and fairness, they resemble the thugs in their strength and ruthlessness. In *The Children of the Alley*, Mahfouz conveyed his ideal for political leadership as “righteous bullies” who are quite as strong and fierce as the thugs, but who use their strength to establish a prosperous and just order. Like the family patriarch Sayyid Ahmad in *The Cairo Trilogy*, the righteous bullies in *The Children of the Alley* are commended for their ability to impose a healthy moral order. The first of the prophets, Gebel (Moses) is a fair and gentle spirit who learns to be fierce in order to bring about justice for the hapless denizens of the Alley. Gebel slowly learns to resist injustice until he kills all the bullies at once, trapping them in a disguised pond in an episode

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202 Ibid., 135.
reminiscent of the Israelite’s crossing of the Red Sea.\textsuperscript{204} After the bullies have been slaughtered and the trusteeship of the estate restored, Gebel institutes a rule of unyielding justice; an eye for an eye with no exceptions. Gebel grimly declares, “life must be based on order, or on a chaos that will spare none of you.”\textsuperscript{205} While the narrative hardly valorizes the authoritarian tone of Gebel’s reign, it commends his success in establishing law, order, and prosperity. Gebel is commended as fair and just, “the best man the alley has known.”\textsuperscript{206} Gebel’s strength and ruthlessness are portrayed as essential to the establishment of justice in the alley.

The image of the righteous bully does not shape the Christ figure in the story. Rifaa, who stands in for Jesus, is a meek spirit who aims for love, healing, and contentment instead of justice. Rifaa is murdered by the corrupt chiefs and his followers revolt, depose the chiefs and establish a rule of justice in his name.\textsuperscript{207} Rifaa is not a prophet who brings about justice and freedom, but a saint who heals and inspires. The Mohammed figure, Kassem, demonstrates the strength lacking in Rifaa. After receiving a vision from Gebelawi that his role is to share the estate with the whole alley, Kassem begins to propagate a message of justice and freedom. When met with the expected opposition from the corrupt chiefs and thugs, Kassem realizes the necessity of force. He proclaims, “we shall raise our cudgels as Gebel [Moses] did, but for the sake of the mercy that Rifaa [Jesus] called for. Then we’ll use the estate for the common good…”\textsuperscript{208} Kassem and his disciples indeed raise their cudgels, slowly wrestling control of the estate

\textsuperscript{204} Mahfouz, \textit{Children of Gebelawi}, 127.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 135.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., 131.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid, 197.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., 262-263.
from the thugs in a series of bloody battles. In one of these battles Kassem and his disciples consciously decide to imitate the ruthless methods of their enemies, attacking the thugs walking in a wedding procession. Kassem’s ruthlessness pays off, and soon his enemies are defeated. His victory attains a reign of justice, order, and plenty. Kassem is portrayed as a model leader who commands obedience through both strength and charm. The narrative depicts him as

...a model man such as had never been before not would ever be again. He combined strength and gentleness, wisdom and simplicity, lordliness and humility, was an honest trustee and was both feared and loved. Moreover he was witty, friendly and correct... never before had they known the brotherhood and love and peace they knew in his day.

Kassem embodies Mahfouz’s ideal for political, social, and moral leadership. The author clearly valorizes and idealizes the prophet’s strength, his ability to impose a just order. After Kassem’s death and the failure of his followers to match his stature, the alley sinks back into anarchy, injustice, and poverty. Like the family patriarch Sayyid Ahmand in The Cairo Trilogy, Kassem is valorized for his ability to use his strength to establish a just society. In this way, Mahfouz not only condemns the abuses of tyrants and thugs, but also writes with uncealed admiration for a righteous bully and enlightened authoritarianism.

Mahfouz’s attitude to political authority was revealed in a fierce controversy that attended the publication of Children of the Alley. Faced with anger and censorship from Egypt’s Islamic authority, the Azhar mosque and university, Mahfouz was protected by the very regime he was ostensibly criticizing. The furor was caused by the license Mahfouz took in using sacred stories in his allegorical work. One of the perils of allegory

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209 Ibid., 270-271.
210 Ibid., 286.
is that is liable to be misunderstood, and the publishing history of *Children of the Alley* amply demonstrates.\(^{211}\)

After the resounding reception of *The Cairo Trilogy*, which majestically portrayed the rise and fall of the nationalist hopes raised in 1919, audiences expected that Mahfouz might employ his next novel celebrating Egypt’s new independence secured by Nasser and his officer associates.\(^{212}\) Audiences were no doubt surprised with the surrealistic religious allegory of *Children of Gebelawi*, perhaps Egypt’s Islamic establishment most of all. When it serialized in *al Ahram* in September 1959, the novel aroused immediate concern among religious Egyptians.\(^{213}\) Mahfouz had taken daring liberties with the sacred stories of the faith, summarizing Kassem, representing the Prophet Mohammed, as “witty, friendly, and correct… it was a pleasure to smoke hashish with him,” while depicting God as a merciless and negligent autocrat, whose death changes little in the squalid slums outside paradise.\(^{214}\) As Mahfouz recalled to literary critic Samia Mehrez in 1989, “several petitions were sent to al-Azhar as soon as the novel appeared. For the first time the sheikhs of al-Azhar had to read a novel.”\(^{215}\) Judging the novel to be brimming with blasphemy, the authorities sent petitions to have it removed from *al Ahram* but these made little impression.\(^{216}\) But the fury against *Children of Gebelawi* grew stronger as

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\(^{211}\) “Even though Mahfouz offers us a political reading of *Children of Gebelawi*, the prevailing reading at the time was overwhelmingly religious.” Mehrez, *Egyptian Writers between History and Fiction*, 65.

\(^{212}\) Milson, *Najib Mahfuz: Novelist-Philosopher*, 80.

\(^{213}\) *Children of Gebelawi* was serialized in *Al-Ahram* from September 21 to December 25, 1959. Stagh, *The Limits of Freedom of Speech*, 157.

\(^{214}\) Mahfouz, *Children of Gebelawi*, 286, 320.

\(^{215}\) Mehrez, *Egyptian Writers between History and Fiction*, 65.

\(^{216}\) Stagh, *The Limits of Freedom of Speech*, 159.
preachers used their pulpits to rail against Mahfouz, and lead thousands of protesters to the *al Ahram* building, demanding termination to the offending novel.\(^{217}\)

The government moved swiftly to adjudicate between Al-Azhar and the novelist. The editor of *al Ahram*, Mohammed Hasanayn Heikal, a close friend and spokesman for President Nasser, insisted that his newspaper would not bow to Azhar, and *Children of Gebelawi* was published there in its entirety.\(^{218}\) However, Nasser’s deputy Hasan Sabri al-Khuli approached Mahfouz and informed him, “it is difficult to permit printing of this novel, since it would create considerable unrest, and we don’t need that. But you can print it outside [Egypt] if you want to.”\(^{219}\) The protest of the Al-Azhar had accomplished part of its objective, and *Children of Gebelawi* has never been made commercially available in Egypt. Furthermore, Minister of Culture Tharwat Ukasha conceded to the letters of protest from Al-Azhar and removed Mahfouz from his position as chair of the Cinema Institute.\(^{220}\) The government’s intervention proved effective. The hostile sermons ceased, and Mahfouz calmly accepted the government’s arbitration of the furor.

The controversy surrounding the publication of *Children of Gebelawi* brought about an ironic turn of events, in which the objects of Mahfouz’s pointed critique defended the novel from the authorities of Azhar, who failed to apprehend the political

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\(^{217}\) Ibid. Somekh, *Changing Rhythm*, 56.
\(^{218}\) Mehrez, *Egyptian Writers between History and Fiction*, 65-66.
\(^{219}\) Stagh, *The Limits of Freedom of Speech*, 159.
\(^{220}\) Mehrez, *Egyptian Writers between History and Fiction*, 66. Mahfouz enjoyed this position for its connection to the arts and artists, but was employed for less than a year when he was removed. Ibid. Milson, *Najib Mahfuz: Novelist-Philosopher*, 50.
meaning behind Mahfouz’s allegory. It is significant that by carefully brokering a suitable compromise between Azhar and Mahfouz, the government was employing its authority to impose peace and order. In this matter, the government resembled one of the ‘prophets’ of Children of Gebelawi, fostering justice by force and by cunning.

Strange contradictions attend the literary career of Naguib Mahfouz in the 1950s, in the publication of The Cairo Trilogy, during the period of his literary hiatus, and during the publication of Children of Gebelawi. On the one hand, Mahfouz claimed to fear and distrust Nasser and the regime of officers, deploring the suspension of democracy, the suppression of the left, and the exile and immigration of many leading Egyptians. This thread of combined fear and criticism found expression in his script for The Thug, in which the greed and corruption of the ancien regime appears again in the new era, but finds its fullest expression in Children of Gebelawi, the author’s second epic in which he delivers a complex critique of authoritarianism, pleading for the government to establish a rule of justice and prosperity. This thread is observed to spring from the author’s commitment to participate in the nation’s revolutionary politics. Barred from direct political involvement by the policies of a jealous regime, Mahfouz found expression for his lucid political commentary in his acclaimed fiction. However, there is a second thread weaving through Mahfouz’s career in this period, one that sees the author seek and depend upon both the bureaucratic apparatus and important personalities within the regime. The author’s literary career was rescued by an a Free Officer, Yusuf al-Siba’i, who wanted material for a new magazine he was launching, as part of the regime’s bid to

221 Mahfouz defended the Azhar clerics, stating, “one must remember that the work was considered highly innovative even in the intellectual circles… So the sheikhs cannot be blamed for their interpretation.” Mehrez, Egyptian Writers between History and Fiction, 65.
expand its cultural influence. The interest in culture demonstrated by the revolutionary government was also embodied in the State Encouragement Prize for literature, which constituted a critical source of patronage for the writer. Tharwat Ukasha, a cavalry officer and the government’s Minister of Culture, was both a friend and a patron to Mafhouz, securing him a position in the ministry where he worked as chief censor until forced out by the *Children of Gebelawi* unrest.²²² Finally, in the *Children of Gebelawi* controversy, he submitted completely to the guidance of the state apparatus, accepting protection from Heikal, censorship from al-Khuli, and transferal from Ukasha. Despite his claim fear the revolutionary regime, Mahfouz demonstrated his willingness to place his literary career into the hands of government men.

The contradictions between Mahfouz’s politically charged literature and his dependence on the government have attracted criticism. Mehrez details the vicissitudes of the author’s political confrontation and non-confrontation, arguing that throughout his career Mahfouz depended on government both for literary patronage and a salary in the bureaucracy. She argues that although Mahfouz maintained a rigorous distinction between his public service and his literary career, his dependence on the government grew steadily until had a determinative effect on the author’s literature and political convictions.²²³ Benjamin Geer went still further in tracing the complicity of Mahfouz with the Nasser regime. Geer argues that throughout his intellectual career, Mafhouz contributed to the nationalist project. In his early Pharaonic novels, Mahfouz called for a great national leader who could be worshiped in “divine patriotism,” positing a

²²³ Mehrez, *Egyptian Writers between History and Fiction*, 61-80.
nationalist and secular religion to replace the obsolete forms of Islam.\(^{224}\) Geer suggests that *Children of the Alley* also contributes to Mahfouz’s nationalist agenda, arguing that it also calls for a “Messiah-like national hero.”\(^{225}\) Geer concludes that nationalist writers such as Mahfouz legitimated Nasser in advance through their calls for a national hero, and Nasser responded by legitimizing such writers through awards and publishing opportunities.\(^{226}\) Together then, Mehrez and Geer help to explain Mahfouz’s quiet complicity with the Nasser regime, even while the author called for greater civil liberties.

Tracing Mahfouz’s literary and bureaucratic career, Mehrez discovers Mahfouz’s complete dependence on the state for his living. Geer explores Mahfouz in terms of his nationalist project, arguing that Mahfouz had legitimized Nasser’s revolution in advance.

As a westernized intellectual and a perennial Wafdist, Mahfouz advocated for parliamentary democracy and the freedom of speech. These were the impulses that informed his caution against authoritarianism in *Children of the Alley*. However, the same work reveals the author’s call for a charismatic national leader. Furthermore, the novel demonstrates Mafhouz’s deep admiration for strength, authority, and order, the same sentiments that shaped the patriarch Sayyid Ahmad in the *Cairo Trilogy*. This chapter reveals Mahfouz’s conflicting attitudes as an intellectual. Mahfouz was unique in his powerful ability to criticize the Nasser’s regime under the cover of a cunning allegory. However, in many ways he was typical of secular Egyptian intellectuals who looked to political leadership to advance the prestige of the nation, and to the state as the guarantor of modernity and social peace. The author’s political outlook was revealed in *The

\(^{224}\) Benjamin Geer, “Prophets and Priests,” 656.

\(^{225}\) Ibid., 656.

\(^{226}\) Ibid., 660.
Children of the Alley. In this work he cautioned the regime against tyrannical authoritarianism, but he also invited the regime to play the role of the ‘righteous bully’, defeating aggressors and establishing order, ruthlessly if necessary. The complete trust which Mahfouz showed to the regime in advancing and protecting his literary career demonstrates the extent to which Mahfouz accepted Nasser’s regime as a righteous bully, and the legitimate political authority in Egypt.

In the 1960s the Nasser regime moved aggressively to extend government ownership of the economy in order to accelerate its development goals. The massive nationalizations of the Egyptian economy were carried out in the name of socialism and social justice. While the regime was conducting this thoroughgoing social revolution, it was also carrying out a campaign to recruit intellectuals to support its aims and policies in a more fundamental way. This investigation traces a profound change in the regime’s legitimating strategy that began in the early 1960s. In the 1950s the regime earned legitimization from intellectuals for its policies; both domestic and foreign. In the 1960s the Nasser regime pursued a different track making explicit demands for loyalty and an openly authoritarian line in civil society. The regime made public demands for loyalty, most notably in a series of editorials in *al Ahram* known as ‘the crisis of the intellectuals.’ In this semi-official newspaper, two journalists close to Nasser argued that intellectuals were in crisis because they had never fully embraced the revolution. Following this mass-media intimidation of intellectuals, the regime sought hegemony by promoting its new constitution, the Charter for National Action, and promoting the new political party, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). With these efforts the regime made a far-reaching effort to extend hegemonic influence over intellectuals and throughout civil society.

This chapter traces these efforts and the responses of intellectuals and professionals who contested and resisted the regime’s efforts to extend hegemonic sway throughout civil society. Although legitimization had been largely completed, Nasser’s regime never succeeded in establishing its convictions as the common assumptions of
most Egyptians. While much of the present study has examined literary intellectuals, this chapter widens the scope of analysis by including, in addition to literary intellectuals, a broader scope of the responsible, educated, urban middle class, comprising doctors, lawyers, engineers, professors, and journalists; those sufficiently educated and self-aware to hope for an influential social role in revolutionary Egypt. The literary critic John Rodenbeck referred to this group as “the class and generation that should have provided Egypt with leadership.”227 This chapter explores the efforts of the regime to acquire the loyalty of this group in various settings, in the university, syndicates, editorial boards, and within Egypt’s sole political party: the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The evidence reveals that despite the regime’s efforts to extend hegemonic rule across civil society, professionals and intellectuals resisted the regime’s efforts as an intrusion, defending their intellectual space. Their resistance is exemplified in Naguib Mahfouz’s novels of the 1960s in which he re-interpreted the “crisis of the intellectuals” debate, attributing their paralysis to state authoritarianism. Mahfouz exemplified intellectuals’ resistance to hegemony portraying Egypt as a grim dystopia caused by state authoritarianism.

In July 1961 the Nasser regime unveiled a series of nationalizations that placed the management of Egypt’s banking, insurance, shipping, and manufacturing companies in the hands of the state.228 The nationalizations marked the beginning of a thoroughgoing social revolution in the United Arab Republic, a deep reordering of society that demanded deeper levels of civilian commitment to government policy. Without broad-based civilian support, the regime could be confronted with powerful opposition, as

demonstrated by Syria’s secession from the United Arab Republic (UAR).229 In 1958 Syria had joined Egypt in a new nation called the United Arab Republic, creating a triumphant symbol visible of Nasser’s pan-Arab ambitions. However, Syrian elites felt consistently slighted and exploited by the powerful Cairo government, and in September 1961, Syria seceded from the UAR. Syria’s secession demonstrated the inherent weakness in Nasser’s administration and deep problems in his pan-Arab rhetoric. Battered by this reversal, Nasser desperately needed to regain the initiative and launched his social revolution.230

In 1961 the Marxist intellectual Lutfi al-Khuli launched the “crisis of the intellectuals.” Imprisoned by the regime in 1959, al-Khuli was among the first leftist intellectuals to receive amnesty as Nasser initiated the socialist policies of the 1960s.231 Heikal facilitated an overture to al-Khuli and his colleagues of independent Marxists, negotiating their release from prison and offering to them positions at al Ahram.232 Al-Khuli quickly consolidated his new role as a popular journalist working within the establishment, writing articles hailing the socialist turn. A new member of the intellectual elites within the establishment, al-Khuli sought to inspire intellectuals to embrace politically active roles suitable to the revolutionary age. In March 1961 he wrote an article arguing that prior to the 1952 revolution, “the intellectuals were buried in their

231 Ginat, Egypt’s Incomplete Revolution, 54-55. Abdel-Malek describes al-Khuli as “a crafty, progressive lawyer until his internment in 1959 and then a convert to the government…” Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society, 191.
232 Independent Marxists subscribed to Marxist tenets without belonging to a party. Ginat, Egypt’s Incomplete Revolution, 54.
thoughts and in prisons … either imprisoned in salons or [engaged] in closed conversations in towns; their activities did not extend to rural areas and they were therefore completely isolated from the material and moral reality of their people and daily life.” When the Free Officers carried out the Revolution, intellectuals failed to understand its nature, and failed to join forces with it. The author called on the political leadership to welcome intellectuals into social affairs and for intellectuals to “go down from their ivory towers to the working people who live in towns and villages.” In this way al-Khuli expressed the official ethos of the socialist turn, rewarding the trust Nasser and Heikal had placed in him.

Keen interest in al-Khuli’s articles filled the correspondence pages of al Ahram, and management of the controversy was passed to the senior editor. Boldly calling for intellectuals to embrace the military leaders and the revolution, Heikal’s title announced,

*Is There A Crisis… and Where Did It Begin… and How Did It Develop?*
The merging of “the intellectuals” with “the revolutionary driving force” must be realized, and free and open discussion must be achieved so that there is a thaw!

Heikal’s title indicates that he aimed to facilitate reconciliation between the revolutionary leaders and intellectuals en masse; to repeat on a much larger scale his mediation between Nasser and al-Khuli’s group of independent Marxists. This reconciliation, he argued, “is vital in broadening and deepening the course of revolutionary action striving for the

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233 Ibid., 102-103.
234 Ibid., 103.
235 Ibid.
establishment of the new society.‖ Despite the ambitious range of his project, Heikal displayed an optimistic outlook, perhaps inspired by his success in promoting al-Khuli from prison to the editorial board. He wrote,

it seems lately as if there has been a thaw between “the revolutionary driving force” and “the intellectuals” and it appears as if there is a readiness and a blossoming which is beginning to shake the caution, negativism and other features which limit the intellectual exchange between the two; this is a matter which should be encouraged and consolidated by more open discussion and free thinking and free endeavor toward all sides of the horizon.238

Writing in the summer of 1961, it was perhaps possible to imagine that al-Khuli and his group constituted merely the first trickle of a wave of intellectual support for the socialist turn in Egypt. The acclaimed short-story writer Yusuf Idris also began to work within the establishment in the early 1960s, writing articles in al Jumhuriyya praising Egypt’s social revolution 239 Analyzing the causes of the intellectual’s current disengagement, Heikal affirmed with al-Khuli that their social apathy preceded and necessitated the July 23rd revolution. He argued that intellectuals had nurtured ties to the ruling classes so that when the revolution occurred, “they resorted to negativism like snails contracting inside their shells.”240 However, he expressed confidence that a thaw could be affected and that the potential of the intellectuals could “melt and merge” with the revolution.241 He stated that when the intellectuals adopted revolutionary thinking:

the 1000 young people among the new intellectuals, who today are in charge of implementing the development plan... will feel that they are the possessors of a legitimate and natural right in leading the great battle of development for the realization of the goals of the popular revolution.242

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237 Ibid., 104-105.
238 Ibid., 104.
240 Ibid., 118.
241 Ibid., 119.
242 Ibid.,
It was clear then that the regime was anxious to secure the popular legitimacy for the socialist turn. However, this popular legitimacy depended on an ideological basis that had not yet been established. Nasser had set a course for a state-guided socialist economy, and required a strong ideological apparatus. Accordingly, Heikal’s headline for the fifth article in the series announced, “Revolutionary clarity is the most important question which we face now...” and he explained that “the time has come... to build a clear intellectual framework for our revolutionary orientation in such a way that this framework, through practical experience, can develop in the future into a comprehensive ideology.”

Heikal emphasized that the role intellectuals had played until that time was inadequate for the development of ideology.

To say that the intellectuals collaborated with the revolutionary driving force after July 23 is not to define the goal that was to be reached. What was at work here was a kind of political loyalty. The natural and obligatory function of the intellectuals was not merely to collaborate with the Revolution but to enter into relations of interaction with it, to sponsor its cause, to assume it, to give it, through their thinking, its revolutionary theory to forge its revolutionary faith from the very depths of their consciences and their knowledge – that is, to point out its road to basic and radical change in Egyptian society.

No longer content with token expressions of support, the regime required commitment.

As demonstrated in his articles, Heikal imagined an influential role for intellectuals within the establishment, granting legitimacy to the socialist turn and generating its ideological apparatus.

The controversy marked an early move in the Nasser regime’s far-reaching plan to reorganize the economy of the UAR and to expand the regime’s social base. In spite of

intense efforts to industrialize and in spite of massive foreign aid, the national income of the UAR was increasingly slowly and its gains were being absorbed by a rapidly growing population.\textsuperscript{246} Although the regime had endeavored to industrialize in cooperation with the manufacturing and financial class, the national bourgeoisie were reluctant to invest in domestic development. When the private sector failed to supply the necessary 39% investment in the regime’s five-year economic plan of 1959, government officials began to consider a new approach.\textsuperscript{247} The regime signaled its impatience with its private-sector allies by nationalizing Bank Misr and the National Bank of Egypt early in 1960.\textsuperscript{248} Despite assurances that financial institutions would be returned to private management after economic goals had been reached, Egyptian capitalists balked, becoming even less likely to invest in development plans.\textsuperscript{249} Nasser responded in the summer of 1961 with a sweeping set of nationalizations, acquiring full ownership of all banks, insurance companies, and fifty large industrial and shipping companies, plus fifty percent shares in other major companies.\textsuperscript{250} Nasser became convinced that state control of the economy was necessary to propel modernization at the brisk pace dictated by poverty.

But the nationalizations were unpopular with the Egyptian propertied class, and the Syrian secession had demonstrated the dangers inherent in enacting social policies without strong civilian support. Painfully aware of these dangers, Nasser and his clique arrived at what Kirk J. Beattie calls a “Gramscian revelation,” a realization that

\textsuperscript{246} Abdel-Malek, \textit{Egypt: Military Society}, 150.


\textsuperscript{248} Stephens, \textit{Nasser}, 328.

\textsuperscript{249} Beattie, \textit{Egypt During the Nasser Years}, 155.

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid.
nationalization required ideological justification.\textsuperscript{251} Consistently pragmatic and practical, the regime had previously demonstrated an omnivorous approach to ideology. But in 1960, this attitude came to an end and the regime determined to formulate a coherent ideology to support their rule. In order to propagate an ideology, the regime required ideologues and turned to the Egyptian left as allies in the new social revolution. Starting with al-Khuli and his associates, the regime extended an overture to leftist intellectuals, hoping to trigger a movement of educated Egyptians to the new social revolution. The “crisis of the intellectuals” articles in \textit{al Ahram} marked an initial salvo in contest for intellectual autonomy and influence waged across civil society. The \textit{al Ahram} controversy publicized mutual feelings distrust and frustration in which the regime and intellectuals held each other. During the period of the socialist transformation, intellectual terrain was won or lost in bitter contest.

The \textit{al Ahram} series touched a nerve in the Egyptian reading public, indicated by the fifty thousand letters Heikal reportedly received on the subject.\textsuperscript{252} The responses indicated that intellectuals were sensitive to the issue of their estrangement from public affairs and that not all were prepared to accept the official diagnosis of their ills. Dr. Magdi Wahba, professor of English literature at Cairo University, reminded readers that it is customary for intellectuals stand aloof from the interests of power, stating, “the intellectual feels that Gamal Abdel Nasser is basically right. But at the same time he feels the need to formulate a certain amount of criticism by the very fact of his nature.” The problem is confounded, Wahba explained, by the poverty of Egyptian intellectuals which “compels them to appear as propagandists for the government’s rule instead of being its

\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., 156-157.
\textsuperscript{252} Abdel-Malek, \textit{Egypt: Military Society}, 190, 416.
critics.”  

Wahba argued that while the Free Officers were free to leave the army barracks in favour of governing, intellectuals were compelled to return to their “cultural barracks,” in other words, that intellectuals had devoted themselves to private roles because public roles was denied to them. The young writer Muhyi ad-Din Muhammad went further in identifying the regime’s political culture as the source of the intellectuals’ disengagement. Writing in al Adab, Muhammad argued that the reshaping of Egyptian democracy into a single party had caused confusion, and “a sort of weakness which can be called fear.” Muhammad suggested that intellectuals should seek public roles, but conceded that “fear still reigns supreme in the hearts of the writers and intellectuals, a fear which has killed everything that is liable to give them confidence in what they write and what they think.” Fear of the regime was evident in the al Ahram controversy itself. Heikal published an anonymous letter accusing him of opening “free discussion” as “a trap to unmask [the regime’s] opponents!” Intellectuals responded to al-Khuli and Heikal with an understanding that the regime and its spokesmen could not be fully trusted. The regime’s first public bid to recruit intellectuals en masse had attracted widespread attention but failed to engender new support for its policies. But the al Ahram controversy marked by no means the end of government’s efforts to establish hegemony in Egyptian civil society.

In the contest between state hegemony and intellectual autonomy, no terrain was more fiercely contested than that of the university. The revolutionary regime’s interest in mobilizing the university antedated the socialist turn in the 1960s. In 1953 the

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\(^{253}\) Ibid., 195.  
\(^{254}\) Ibid.  
\(^{256}\) Ibid., 146.
government revealed its attitude to universities in an *al Ahram* study entitled “Universities in Egypt Are Isolated from Public Life; Their Mission in the New Age Must Be Reconciled to the Activities of the Ministries.” Nasser displayed his mistrust of universities the following year, when his suppression of General Najib’s supporters included a vast purge of Cairo University during which seventy academics were suddenly dismissed from their positions. In the early 1960s, Nasser resolved to recruit universities for the social revolution. He aimed to transform universities into training grounds for the new industrial society and hotbeds of socialist thought. Nasser felt frustrated by the partial autonomy and liberalism of academia, as he demonstrated in a speech to the Preparatory Committee for the National Congress of Popular Forces in late 1961. He complained:

> At the Law College you teach political economy – Adam Smith’s theory of supply and demand – and you say that… such theories are ideal. People would then look at us in surprise and say: What we have learned in the Law Faculty differs from what is being applied here. I say: No, the process [in Egypt] is not one of supply and demand. We are forging a new system. Some authors have written books on economics that were simply copied from other countries. Who has written a book on the economy we are now dealing with? …When I realize that these economics books are merely a repetition of what we were taught at the Law Faculty in 1946, then I am filled with endless disappointment.

The president’s warning to academics gained volume in the 1962 Charter for National Action. The Charter narrated that under the old regime,

> the freedom of education, which might otherwise have released new energies of hope, was itself subjected to… abuse under the rule of reactionary democracy.

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260 Ibid., 200.
The reactionary rulers had to make sure that only those concepts which expressed their own interest reigned supreme… The consequences of all that were reflected in the systems and methods of education, which only recognized defeatist and subversive slogans.261

The equation of academic freedom with the abuses of the old regime brought the partial autonomy of universities under fire. Nasser envisioned the university as committed revolutionary force, as described in the Charter:

Science is the weapon with which revolutionary triumph can be achieved… The responsibility of the universities and the scientific research centres in shaping the future is not less important than the responsibility of various popular authorities… Therefore, the universities are not ivory towers but rather forerunners discovering a mode of life for the people…. Therefore, science for society should be the motto of the cultural revolution at the present stage.262

Nasser’s ambition was to convert universities, once the preserves of the liberal elite, to the revolutionary ethos and the turn to socialism. While Nasser expressed his aim with customary eloquence, his colleagues showed their more pragmatic outlook. In 1964 the new minister for Higher Education Abdul Aziz al-Sayyid summarized two major objectives comprising the government’s educational policy;

linking higher education planning with the overall planning of the state. This field of advanced education thus becomes an important source for supplying government departments and public corporations with their requirements of technicians and experts... [and] the creation of a new generation of (ideologically) cultivated leaders who believe in socialism and act in accordance with their beliefs.263

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With bureaucratic sensibility, al-Sayyid revealed what Heikal’s and Nasser’s rhetoric almost concealed; that each nationalization created more positions within the already vast bureaucracy, positions that ought to be filled by qualified personnel. To this end the regime pursued a concerted effort to bring universities into the revolutionary era. Academics and university institutions responded quickly to government attention. Professors raced to release publications in compliance with the educational policy, with the subject ‘Arab Society’ alone being treated in thirty new textbooks. These texts elaborated the ideology of Arab Socialism and played a role in diffusing socialism as a broad-based value in Egyptian society. Some of the academics who embraced the regime’s vision for education opened up new frontiers in Egyptian scholarship. Muhammad Anis, a history professor at Cairo University led an effort to re-write Egyptian history along socialist and revisionist lines, as outlined in the Charter. Anis was both a socialist who proclaimed socialism as an intellectual cause and a careful historian who made extensive use of primary source material. Anis championed the regime’s socialist policies and found in the Charter a genuine source of intellectual inspiration.

But Anis was exceptional among the majority of academics upon whom socialism rested lightly. Many of the textbooks written for the new era exhibited uncertainty about its central tenets. In his text on Arab Socialism, Alexandria University Law Professor Dr. Ali Barudi stated “the idea of socialism, even supposing that it can be found in one

264 Reid, Cairo University, 206.
265 Ibid., 197.
267 Reid, Cairo University, 202-203. Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 284
distinct form – a possibility ruled out by many students of the subject . . . We shall therefore avoid giving a definition of socialism."268 Such uncertainty could have been caused by fear of accidentally offending an orthodox position.269 While the new ideology carried the moral authority of a creed, Arab Socialism contained little doctrinal clarity and academics discovered considerable leeway in their work of explaining it.

Academics expounded conflicting ideas under the aegis of the Charter they claimed to uphold. For example, in 1965 Dr. Ismat Sayf ad-Dawla published a voluminous work placing the root of Arab socialism not in Marxism but Islam, and proposed that Arab socialism could only be reached if preceded by the emancipation and unity of all Arabs, an outcome ad-Dawla likely considered dubious.270 Cairo University professor and leading Islamic philosopher Dr. Zaki Najib Mahmud, operating within the framework of the Charter, suggested that the current manifestation of Arab Socialism was only a tentative ideology and that the Arabs were still searching for an ideological home.271 Scholars writing on Arabism differed so substantially that the topic came to signify “almost everything and nothing.”272 In the shifting sands of intellectual freedom, rightists and liberals formed a small bulwark against socialist scholarship. In one case, a professor evicted a student who belonged to the official Socialist Youth Organization, insisting, “I will never permit anyone in my class to speak like a communist. Get out!”273 Despite the

268 Rejwan, Nasserist Ideology, 100.
269 Students recalled that professors tried to avoid lecturing on the July 23rd Revolution for fear of saying something untoward. Reid, Cairo University, 206.
270 Rejwan, Nasserist Ideology, 103-104.
273 Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 189.
regime’s concerted efforts to reorganize universities for higher education, by the late 1960s faculties were still divided between progressive and conservative professors.274 Academics learned quickly how to express political loyalty to the Nasser regime while withholding their hearts, minds, and ideas, precisely those things for which Heikal had pleaded in 1961.

While Nasser and his associates were seeking intellectual influence in universities, they were also battling with professionals in Egypt’s large and influential syndicates. Fourteen professional syndicates existed for university graduates, including physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists, teachers, agronomists, engineers, accountants, lawyers, scientists, journalists, actors, film-actors, and musicians.275 The syndicates existed to provide regulation and protection for the professional interests of their members, regulating salaries, pensions, work conditions, and entry into the field.276 However, certain syndicates had a long tradition of political activity, especially the Bar Association and the Journalists’ Syndicate. In March 1954, the Bar Association released a statement urging the revolutionary officers to return to the barracks.277 Throughout the 1950s, the Nasser regime exerted pressure on the syndicates, and was met with sporadic and occasionally effective opposition.278 However, the professional syndicates were problematic for Nasser less for their political activism than for their continued existence, for they were hallmarks of the liberal age that his revolution had overturned. As Egypt

274 Gorman, Historians, State, and Politics, 60.
276 Springborg, “Professional Syndicates,” 278.
277 Wheelock, Nasser’s New Egypt, 32.
turned to state-managed industrialization in the name of the worker and the peasant, Nasser had to account for a class of urban Egyptian organized according to educational and professional qualifications.

In the Preparatory Committee for the Congress of National Popular Forces held in November, 1961, Nasser stated his conviction that syndicates were still a threat. He referred to syndicates as “factions that split society,” and mused about reorganizing them within the Federation of Arab Workers or into learned societies.\(^{279}\) Despite these dire warnings, 225 syndicate delegates attended the National Congress of Popular Forces, and took the opportunity to protest state authoritarianism. The head of the Bar Association, Mustafa el-Baradei called for the creation of an opposition party, arguing, “this, moreover, is the meaning of liberty as every Arab knows it.”\(^{280}\) The former head of the Journalists’ Syndicate, Husayn Fahmi, charged the regime with “dominating the thinking and opinions of newspapers,” while the head of the Doctors Syndicate led the opposition to the government’s plan to merge syndicates with labour unions.\(^{281}\) In turn, Nasser charged the syndicates as “reactionary capitalism” and “professional feudalism”, inconsistent with a socialist economy.\(^{282}\) In 1964 the regime passed a law reorganizing labour according to industry, gathering tradesmen and professionals working in the same sector into the same unions.\(^{283}\) However, the new unions failed to operate on account of the mutual distrust between workers and professionals.\(^{284}\) That year as the ASU began its

\(^{279}\) Ibid., 284.
\(^{281}\) Springborg, “Professional Syndicates,” 284.
\(^{283}\) Springborg, “Professional Syndicates”, 289.
\(^{284}\) Ibid.
regular operations, Nasser renewed his assault on syndicates, musing, “What exactly is the position of the ASU with relation to syndicates? Is there a necessity for the presence of syndicates? No doubt the ASU is the principal organization, and members of syndicates are members of the ASU… This is the question – shall we abolish the ASU or shall we abolish syndicates?"285 However, syndicates were saved from this fate by leftist ASU activists who argued that if given greater attention, syndicates could still be mobilized for socialism.286 The ASU began to target the syndicates’ most flagrant breach of the socialist ethos, their membership requirement based on academic degree. This approach affirmed Nasser’s statement in 1961, that syndicates could survive if they embraced the “democratic unity of labour” and opened membership to all workers regardless of educational qualifications.287 The Agricultural Engineers Syndicate bowed to pressure to admit graduates of agricultural secondary schools, and to abolish the differential treatment for higher-institute graduates and university graduates.288 From 1965 to 1967, the Teacher’s Syndicate waged a losing battle against the ASU to open its membership to administrative staff and manual workers, which was finally halted by the June War.289

Throughout this period of socialist reform, syndicates were forced to concede their former autonomy and accept the oversight of the powerful ASU.290 However, the political conquest of the professional syndicates failed to bring about Nasser’s effort to

285 Ibid., 286.
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid., 288.
289 Ibid., 288-289.
290 Springborg states, “by June 1967 syndicates were virtually moribund, having been effectively bottled up by the ASU.” Ibid.
absorb Egypt’s intellectuals into the new socialist order. In 1966 he instructed ASU officials on how to mobilize syndicates, saying, “Look for men who believe in the people… sincere and loyal to socialism and Revolution,” who could form a vanguard in each syndicate. This instruction, made five years after he first mused on the incompatibility of professional associations in a socialist society, indicates the slow frustration of the president’s objectives. In particular, the syndicates’ fierce resistance to open membership to non-academic applicants demonstrates that educated professionals had rejected Nasser’s socialist vision. The ASU had brought about a political conquest of professional syndicates, but Egypt’s intellectuals mostly remained aloof from the revolutionary order.

In April 1964, Nasser executed a coup in his recruitment drive to bring leftist intellectuals into the government establishment. Through intermediaries Nasser established connections with communists languishing in prison, and began negotiations. Nasser offered the high-profile leaders of the communist movements influential positions in a new secret apparatus within the ASU called the Vanguard Organization. Enticed by influential political roles, the leaders of the communist movements accepted Nasser’s offer in exchange for renunciation of their parties. After several key leaders had capitulated, further negotiations were held with the remaining leaders and the rank-and-file. After the important personalities had left, party leaders who remained negotiated from a weakened position. When party loyalists in the Democratic

291 Ibid., 287.
293 Ibid., 123.
294 Ibid., 123-124.
Movement for National Liberation (DMNL) objected to the move, they were advised that dissolution into the ASU was a ploy to allay suspicion.\textsuperscript{295} One by one, the three major communist parties in Egypt agreed to dissolve themselves and for their members to seek new roles within the ASU and the secret Vanguard Organization. The dissolution of the communist parties was a major success for the Nasser regime. The move swelled the ranks of the party apparatus with convicted socialist intellectuals, timed to compliment Kruschev’s state visit on the eve of the completion of the High Dam.\textsuperscript{296}

Some of the newly rehabilitated communists found themselves in influential positions in the Vanguard Organization, in the socialist journal \textit{Al Talia}, of which Lutfi al-Khuli was the editor, in businesses and in the media.\textsuperscript{297} However, most party members soon felt themselves carefully quarantined within the regime.\textsuperscript{298} Although these leftist intellectuals were necessary for the administrative expertise and ideological preparation, the regime refrained from welcoming them in large numbers into the ASU.\textsuperscript{299} Even those communists who were welcomed into the secret Vanguard Organization found that they were being watched and contained.\textsuperscript{300} A high-profile communist remembered an anecdote that affirmed the communists’ prescribed role in the establishment. He recalled,

> When the new building of \textit{al Ahram} was opened in 1966, Nasser visited \textit{al Talia} there and met with the staff, the majority of whom were formerly prominent members of the communist party. During the visit, he listened to their concerns about their level of participation in the leadership of Egypt’s socialist transformation and what they perceived to be the deliberate effort to isolate them. They pointed out that not one former communist was elected to any prominent

\textsuperscript{295} Ibid., 124.
\textsuperscript{296} Beattie, \textit{Egypt During the Nasser Years}, 176.
\textsuperscript{297} Botman, \textit{The Rise of Egyptian Communism}, 146.
\textsuperscript{298} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{300} Botman, \textit{The Rise of Egyptian Communism}., 127.
post in the Socialist Union. Nasser turned to the distinguished communist leader Abu Sayf Youssef and asked, ‘Did you run for any post?’ Abu Sayf Youssef replied no, and Nasser responded, ‘You are very smart.’ Turning to the group, he noted, ‘your role is like that of St. Peter; you are to propagate, not lead.’

The communists who had joined the establishment were disappointed with their limited role and many of them quietly left the positions that had been given them. Despite the relative freedom granted them at al Talia, the communist intellectuals found that after negotiating away their independence, little else remained. Thus, while most intellectuals remained disengaged, leftist intellectuals who joined the establishment found they had earned not influence but a set piece.

The ambivalence and containment of intellectuals held consequences for the ASU. Although Nasser had intended the party to function as an ideological cohesive movement whose comprising only committed socialists, the president was obliged to open up membership and overnight the ASU became a mass party, open to those of questionable political convictions. While communist intellectuals were quarantined in the ASU, other intellectuals viewed ASU membership as an expedient. Thus the party never developed a thoroughgoing socialist pedigree. ASU Secretary General Ali Sabri complained about the lack of ideological awareness and commitment to socialism in the leadership of the ASU. In al Ahram, Heikal echoed Sabri, stating, “The structure of the

301 Ibid., 128.
302 Ibid., 129.
303 Ibid.
304 Naguib Mafhouz recalled, “after the revolution, we all became members of the Arab Socialist Union, just like a new job.” Mehrez, Egyptian Writers Between History and Fiction, 36.
305 Hatem Ishaq al-Husaini, “Political Organization in the United Arab Republic: The Arab Socialist Union” (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, 1970), 86. A close associate of Nasser, Sabri was Prime Minister from 1964, and “one of the architects of socialist transformation.” Ibid., 88.
single party in Egypt is sound in theory, but in practice it is bad… principally because of the bureaucracy, the lack of revolutionary cadres, and the lack of coordination in action.”

A similar inertia plagued the Socialist Youth Organization, the youth wing of the ASU. Members in the Youth Organization underwent training in socialist thought, the nationalist cause, the Revolution, and Egypt’s development plan. However, the movement developed a reputation for pro-regime rallies and connections with the secret police and proved unpopular with students. The regime had failed to persuade intellectuals to adopt socialism and this failure was manifest within the ASU.

The estrangement of intellectuals is partially attributable to a transformation in the popular valuation of intellectual activity in revolutionary Egypt. During the liberal era of Egypt, political and intellectual elites sought to model Egyptian society on European liberalism, and therefore sought to be trained in European languages, literature, and law. Egyptians considered an education in the humanities essential for positions of influence. In contrast, the revolutionary regime sought to free itself from European influence and rejecting it as colonialism. Instead, revolutionary Egypt prized economic development with science as the driving force. For this reason when the Free Officers assumed power they demonstrated a preference for graduates trained in engineering, agronomy, science, commerce, and technical training. In 1958 an official in the Bar Association had observed the regime’s disregard for lawyers, noting “the present regime is military; it tends to expedite matters quickly. Lawyers set up all sorts of limitations and reservations in their work; thus they are not very much in demand. The demand is now for the graduates of

the School of Commerce." The regime’s indifference to the humanities grew more pronounced when Nasser embraced a socialist revolution taking science as its foundation and its guide. In the Charter of National Action, Nasser proclaimed, “Science is the weapon with which revolutionary triumph can be achieved… Our ability to master the various branches of science is the only way left to us to compensate for underdevelopment.” In a speech given to celebrate Education Day on December 14, 1964, Nasser elaborated on the essential role of science in the socialist revolution. He explained,

I would like to state plainly my conviction that science is the appropriate container for the preservation of dreams, plans and struggle… The time has come for us to adopt a correct and stable scientific approach to everything that faces us…The Revolution is not an emotional outburst; it is a science by which the society benefits… The Revolution is the scientific understanding of social relations and the determination to change them… If we have adopted the socialist method of construction, it should be mentioned that socialism cannot but be scientific.

Upholding science as the guide of the socialist revolution, the revolutionary leaders had small need for intellectuals of the humanities. As literary critic Louis Awad observed, the preeminence of scientific and technical training “has undoubtedly been at the expense of humanistic studies. It has certainly supplied the country with a large class of technicians,

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309 Farhat J. Ziadeh, *Lawyers and the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt* (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1968), 158-159. The regime’s preference for practical expertise is evident in the educational backgrounds of cabinet ministers. From 1952, the number of cabinet-members educated in the humanities declines steadily until their disappearance in 1964, while those educated in engineering and agriculture increase during the same period. Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir*, 183.


but has at the same time depleted our intellectual class...”\textsuperscript{312} The regime openly acknowledged its reliance on technical expertise. In his articles on “the crisis of the intellectuals,” Heikal explained that “technical expertise is a necessary means of serving the goals of the national struggle... but the national struggle and its political leadership are more capable of a comprehensive outlook for the goals of this struggle.”\textsuperscript{313} The regime demonstrated a preference for technicians than for educated intellectuals whose loyalty proved difficulty to ascertain.

Intellectuals themselves were painfully aware of their social isolation. As Dr. Wahba asserted, it caused consternation to intellectuals to appear as propagandists for the regime they would criticize.\textsuperscript{314} The frustration expressed by Dr. Wahba found its fullest expression in the writings of Naguib Mafhouz, who throughout the 1960s wrote short stories and novels exploring the tensions of the disengaged intellectual. These novels treat the inability of intellectuals to be reconciled to Egypt’s modern revolutionary age and are vital to understanding the cultural reaction to the regime’s social and economic revolution.

Mafhouz’s novel \textit{The Beggar} provides an in-depth portrait of an intellectual in malaise in 1960s revolutionary Egypt. The protagonist of the story is a lawyer with a successful practice and a young family, Omar is also a poet, and once belonged to a radical socialist cell that faced suppression under the old regime. The beginning of the novel finds Omar seeking medical help for feelings of lethargy.\textsuperscript{315} Although the doctor gives him the sensible advice of taking a holiday and getting exercise, Omar

\textsuperscript{312} Awad, “Cultural and Intellectual Developments,” 157.
\textsuperscript{313} Koning, \textit{The Crisis of the Intellectuals}, 61.
\textsuperscript{315} Mahfouz, \textit{The Beggar}, 9.
sets on a different course, seeking out those things that formerly motivated him like love, passion, and the intellectual search for truth. Omar finds solace for a time in a relationship with a showgirl while his family-life deteriorates, but eventually Omar finds his mistress as tiring as his wife and his sense of dissatisfaction grows. Fleeing from lethargy and despair, Omar retreats further from human relationships, seeking sublime and ecstatic experiences in a retreat to the desert. He briefly attains intoxicating joy, but the feeling quickly fades. The end of the novel finds Omar succumbing to madness, alienated from family, friends, and everything that once was meaningful.

Omar’s travels in the wastelands of the human psyche should not be interpreted as a psychological study of madness. Instead, Omar’s purposelessness and despair proceed from social and political causes. These causes are revealed in a conversation Omar holds with his wife, saying,

“It’s difficult to establish when or how the change began, but I remember meeting with one of the litigants of Soliman Pasha’s estate. The man said, “I’m grateful, counselor. You’ve grasped the details of the situation superbly. Your fame is well deserved. I have great hopes of winning the case.”

I replied, “So do I.”

“He laughed contentedly and I felt a sudden, inexplicable wave of anger. ‘Suppose you win the case today and possess the land only to have it confiscated tomorrow by the government?’ He answered disparagingly, ‘All that matters is that we win the case. Don’t we live our lives knowing that our fate rests with God?’ I had to admit the validity of his argument, but my head began to spin and everything seemed to disappear.”

Omar realizes that the law itself has become pliable in the hands of the state, rendering his work as a lawyer meaningless. The litigant’s pious formula is an ironic counter-foil to Omar’s realization that fate rests not with God, but the state. The lawyer’s former

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316 Mahfouz, The Beggar, 36.
confidence in his profession gives way to futility, as he muses to himself, “the client says to you, ‘I want to entrust my case to the Master.’ How ludicrous! Honourable counselors. All that’s left for us is to work in the national circus.”317 While Omar despairs of his legal practice his thoughts stray to his former calling as poet and playwright but these pursuits have also been rendered obsolete. Omar’s closest friend argues that the humanities have been completely discredited, saying,

believe me, science has robbed art of everything. In science you find the rapture of poetry, the ecstasy of religion, and the aspirations of philosophy… Read the astronomy, physics, or other science texts, recall whatever plays and collections of poetry you wish and note the sense of shame which overcomes you.318

Omar agrees, adding that the law now fills him with a similar feeling of shame. In a conversation with his daughter about poetry and science, Omar muses,

The era of art has ended, and the art of our age is simply diversion, the only art possible in an age of science. Science has taken over all fields except the circus… science has destroyed both philosophy and art. So let’s amuse ourselves without reserve… and let’s renounce delusions of grandeur and the throne of science.319

Omar follows his own advice, abandoning his law practice and his literary gifts, amusing himself with nightclubs and romantic dalliances. Omar searches for meaning in sex, the sublime, and madness, ending in defeat and inconsequence. He attempts to escape from the dystopic society, a society in which his literary talents are usurped by science, his political convictions suppressed by the socialist state and his legal practice paralyzed by

317 Ibid., 25. Mahfouz’s phrase “the national circus” summarizes the reduced role for Egyptian lawyers. Ziadeh mourns the reduction of the Egyptian legal profession, stating, “many prominent lawyers were forced to join the various government organizations… becoming government employees dependent on a salary. Thus the Egyptian legal profession, the leaders of society, the upholders of constitutionality and rule of law, and the supporters of liberal causes, were reduced to the status of legal technicians.” Ziadeh, Lawyers, 159.
318 Mahfouz, The Beggar, 18.
319 Ibid., 31-32.
an arbitrary state. This character is Mahfouz’s masterful portrait of an intellectual in crisis, not for his class associations as al-Khuli and Heikal alleged, but marginalized by state-induced social change.

Mahfouz went even further in attributing the disengagement of intellectuals to the Nasser regime itself in his 1966 novel *Adrift on the Nile*. This novel features a cast of characters drawn from the urban educated class, including civil servants, an actor, a student, a lawyer, an art-critic, and a journalist. Seen from the eyes of the protagonist Anis who works as a minor bureaucrat in the Ministry of Archives, the story narrates this urbane cast of characters in their nightly pursuits of dissipation on a house-boat on the Nile, featuring sex, hashish, and sophisticated chit-chat. The protagonist Anis spends every waking moment under the influence of hashish and his interior dialogue is filled with hallucinations and a seemingly meaningless commentary. *Adrift on the Nile* functions as a thematic sequel to *The Beggar*, and picks up the characters’ flight from responsibility into dissipation where the earlier novel left off. As in *The Beggar*, the character’s disengagement and flight from responsibility is not only a psychological study, but a social phenomenon springing from political causes. Here, the author clearly portrays the crisis of intellectuals as the natural effect of censorship, state supervision, and state intimidation. The characters demonstrate familiarity with their disengagement from public life. Explaining their way of life to a newcomer, the successful lawyer Mustafa states,

perhaps you are saying to yourself, they are Egyptians, they are Arabs, they are human beings, and in addition they are educated, and so there cannot be a limit to
their concerns. But the truth is that we are not Egyptian or Arab or human; we belong to nothing and no one – except this houseboat…

The art critic Ali agrees and elaborates,

we can see that the ship of state sails on without need of our opinion or support; and that any further thinking on our part is worth nothing, and would very likely bring distress and high blood pressure in its wake.

With this dialogue Mahfouz expresses the lament for the educated class of Egyptians forced into a silent and interior exile. The terms of their exile is portrayed more starkly in a later passage. A serious-minded journalist named Samara begins visiting the houseboat, hoping to reform the addicts. The lawyer Mustafa perceives her project, stating,

‘Now we begin to understand each other… you regret the time we waste in evenings like this one. You consider that it is an escape from our real responsibilities. That were it not for this, we would come up with solutions for the problems of the Arab world and the planet as a whole and the universe as well…’

They laughed again… Mustafa suggested that they throw the water pipe into the Nile, and then divide the work among them. Khalid would concern himself with national policy, and Ali with international affairs, and Mustafa himself with solving the more cosmic difficulties. How would they start? How would they organize themselves? How would they realize socialist ideals on a national democratic basis, without betraying these ideals or oppressing the people? How, after that, would they find the cure for world problems like war and racial discrimination? …They also gave careful attention to the challenging obstacles that lay in their path, the dangers awaiting them. Confiscation of personal assets. Imprisonment. Execution…

In startling clear terms, Mafhouz reversed the terms of ‘the crisis of the intellectuals’ controversy. In their 1961 articles in al Ahram, al Khuly and Heikal accused their fellow intellectuals of negligence, inquiring as to why they had not joined the ranks of the state. In these works Mahfouz accused the state of suppressing civil liberties, demonstrating that authoritarianism had sent intellectuals into a painful interior exile. Mahfouz

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321 Ibid., 48.
322 Ibid., 84-85.
demonstrated that the true crisis lay in the suppression of political freedoms. For these reasons Field Marshall Hakem Amer attempted to block the novel’s publication.\textsuperscript{323} Amer protested to Nasser, demanding that Mahfouz be punished for his critical assessment of the regime.\textsuperscript{324} However, Mahfouz’s patron Tharwat Ukasha insisted that critical literature be allowed for freedom of expression, and Nasser relented.\textsuperscript{325} Amer’s frustration demonstrates that intellectuals could withhold loyalty from the regime and contest its claim for complete social pre-eminence.

In his novels Mahfouz definitively answered al-Khuli’s and Heikal’s articles. Intellectuals were not in crisis because of their intrinsic weakness, their dubious class associations, or the failure of the revolutionary fervour. Rather, their disaffection sprang from being embedded in a social and political order that had rejected their right to stand aloof from the interests and dictates of the political elite. A deep divide separated Mahfouz’s novels and their dystopic rendition of revolutionary Egypt and the tone of political authority which filled al-Khuli’s and Heikal’s editorials in \textit{al Ahram}. Throughout the socialist period from 1961 to 1967, the Nasser regime attempted to span this divide, absorbing ambivalent intellectuals into the demands of their revolution. The attempts of the regime to carry out this operation revealed the regime’s authoritative attitude to Egypt’s intellectual elites; the regime never accepted their right to stand aloof from the ruling political order. Nasser never accepted the role of the intellectual as conceived by Benda, as a person whose primary loyalty was given to values that transcend material and political considerations. Nasser understood the intellectual as

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\textsuperscript{323} Milson, \textit{Najib Mahfuz: Novelist-Philosopher}, 86.
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{325} Mehrez, \textit{Egyptian Writers between History and Fiction}, 26.
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someone with a particular skill-set, for intelligent thought and skillful communication, but whose loyalties still must be circumscribed to material considerations and political necessity. His view of intellectuals as closer to that of Gramsci’s, that intellectuals were bound to particular classes, and must be compelled to give both their loyalty and their skill-set to the ruling group. Particularly with leftist intellectuals, he aimed to apply their abilities to propagating his government’s socialist turn, while carefully guarding against any influence they might have independently of his personal sanction. Throughout the 1960s he sought to establish hegemony in civil society. He attempted mass persuasion in the editorials of al-Khuli and Heikal. His regime brought universities under closer government supervision, setting new policy directions and patronizing the most revolutionary scholars. The syndicates were subjected to outright political conquest. To be sure, intellectuals were brought into the establishment and became perennial supporters of Nasser’s policy aims. Al-Khuli and Idris exemplify this trend. But in the main, intellectuals resisted the regime’s bid for hegemony and the conscription of their abilities. They withheld their loyalty, demonstrating the regime’s inability to completely persuade intellectuals and to install the demands of the revolution above all other considerations. Intellectuals recognized the regime’s right to rule, but had rejected its bid for total pre-eminence in the field of intellectual activity. Although the Officers governed Egypt’s political, economic, and social life with the consent of Egyptians, they could not establish hegemony over Egyptian intellectuals’ elaboration of truth and meaning. An intellectual such as Naguib Mahfouz clearly demonstrated his adherence to values that transcended material considerations and political demands.
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the young army officers who seized control of the government in the early morning of July 23, 1952, were mostly successful in convincing the Egyptian public and intellectuals of their legitimate right to govern the country. Given their lack of credentials, experience, lineage, and popularity, Nasser and his Free Officers movement were obliged to prove their legitimacy while they endeavored to bring about Egypt’s liberation and modernization. Following the coup, a lively contest for influence and independence ensued between the regime’s new political elites and Egypt’s intellectual elites. In the early years of the revolution, General Naguib embodied a more moderate and plural vision of revolutionary Egypt, and the open rivalry between him and Nasser stunted the popular and intellectual acclaim of the Free Officers movement. But after Nasser conquered Naguib and his faction, no serious rival remained to question his vision of revolutionary Egypt, and for the rest of the 1950s he demonstrated a remarkable ability to win legitimacy and loyalty from intellectuals. His militant foreign policy seemed to prove the strength of the Egyptian nation, thus winning the admiration of intellectuals who shared with the military rulers a deep patriotism and national pride. In this way, Nasser and his Officers’ regime earned support from intellectuals, contributing to the public legitimization of their government. However, in the early 1960s as the regime instituted a turn to socialism, it no longer contended itself with intellectuals’ loyalty and consent. Rather, the regime endeavored to establish hegemony over Egypt’s intellectuals and professionals, to establish its particular beliefs as the common assumptions of Egyptians. The regime sought to win a deeper commitment to its revolution and a
massive conscription of intellectual’s abilities for the social revolution. The regime failed in this effort. Although they had proven themselves the undisputed masters of the nation, they could not establish their revolution as the highest and only good. The intellectuals defended their autonomy from the demands of the revolutionary leaders, revealing the partial and contingent nature of the revolutionary political solution.

Chapter Two provided important evidence of the regime’s powerful appeal for a highly influential group of Egyptian intellectuals, the political left. This chapter undertook a qualitative analysis of a literary intellectual of the Egyptian left whose career vividly expressed the tension, mistrust, and ultimate concord between the left and Officers’ regime. Like other leftists, Idris’ early excitement at the Officers’ coup and the king’s deposition gave way to alarm and fear as the regime showed brutal intolerance for labour unrest. Idris articulated the left’s mistrust of the military regime in works such as “Farahat’s Republic,” in which the author sharply satirized Nasser’s rule, ironically exposing the gulf separating his utopian rhetoric and the grim reality of his authoritarian order. However, the mutual distrust in which the regime and leftist intellectual held each other sprang from organizational antagonism, not philosophical differences. Egyptian leftists were fundamentally motivated by a desire to see the Egyptian nation liberated from its colonial burdens and its historic poverty and to have its new prosperity shared among all Egyptians, especially workers. The ambitions of the left to see Egypt liberated, modernized, and industrialized clearly harmonized with the policy goals of the military regime. This harmony is evident in Idris’ fiction portraying the dysfunction of Egyptian poverty, especially in rural Egypt. The author described the ignorance, disease, superstition, and repressive morality that pervaded traditional village life, thus providing
a powerful argument in favour of the regime’s rural policies of Agrarian Reform and the development of Tahrir Province. Idris’ stories reveal the extent to which the regime and the Egyptian left advocated for modernity in rural Egypt. Granted, there were differences between the left and the military regime. Orthodox Marxists saw a far greater motive role for workers and for the influence of international communism than did the military regime. However, all Egyptian leftists called for a great national liberation in order for socialism to develop, and only Nasser seemed able to bring about the required transformation. This was the conviction of the Egyptian left in the period between 1955 and 1959, during which time Nasser attended the Bandung conference, recasting himself as a militant leader against any form of imperialism. Nasser secured modern armaments from the Soviet bloc and tolerated more public influence from both foreign socialist countries and local communist parties. The patriotism stirred by Nasser’s transformation is evident in Idris’ work City of Love and Ashes, manifesting the author’s deep love and belief in country that formed both the military elite and leftist intellectuals. In compliance with the thaw between the Egyptian left and the military regime, Idris refrained from criticizing political elites, targeting civil authorities such as judges in his story “City Dregs.” Furthermore, Idris made explicit his support for the regime’s Agrarian Reform Laws in his 1959 novel The Sinners, in which the story’s happy ending is guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform Laws which brought justice and prosperity to the estate’s landless peasants. The author’s deference to the revolutionary regime afforded him powerful patronage, and he came under the tutelage of Anwar Sadat. Idris’ cooperation with the regime was emblematic of the leftist intellectuals’ collaboration with the military regime, which contributed to the intellectual legitimizing of the leftist regime. Leftists
demonstrated their conviction that their vision of socialist Egypt was best served by the Officers’ regime and they gave it their full support.

Chapter 3 explored the tacit compromise between Naguib Mahfouz and the military regime. Even though Mahfouz’s literary and political silence in the mid-1950s was often interpreted as a protest against Egypt’s revolutionary age, the author was in fact close to the regime, receiving an important source of patronage in the State Encouragement prize for literature for his *Cairo Trilogy*, and cultivating friendships with significant power-brokers, the Free Officers Yusuf al-Siba’i, Tharwat Ukasha, and Nasser’s close friend Mohammad Hasanayn Heikal. Despite these connections, Mahfouz’z nonetheless retained the semblance of an autonomous literary intellectual. His fierce indictment of tyranny and authoritarianism accorded with his long-standing advocacy of parliamentary democracy and the heritage of the Wafd party. The apparent contradiction between his critical stance towards political power and his dependence on state patronage has three causes. Mahfouz depended on the political apparatus for his living, which included his salary from the bureaucracy and state prizes. Second, he had a deep personal admiration for strength, authority, and order, as manifested in his character Sayyid Ahmad in *The Cairo Trilogy* and in his rendition of Moses and Mohammed in *Children of the Alley*. Despite his lifelong advocacy for parliamentary democracy and civil liberties, the author admired strong leaders who established order from chaos, using as much strength and ruthlessness as necessary. The author’s love of authority surely contributed to his tacit collaboration with military regime. Finally, Mahfouz was a part of the mainstream of Egypt secular thought that embraced the nation as the meaningful community for progress and development. Despite his critique of authoritarianism,
Mafhouz longed for Egypt’s liberation and trusted in a strong leader to deliver it. For these reasons, Mahfouz was willing to draw close to the government establishment, entrusting his novels to al-Siba’i and Heikal, accepting bureaucratic positions, including censorship positions from Tharwat Ukasha, and complying with the regime’s arbitration of the *Children of Our Alley* controversy. Although Mafhouz maintained a critical posture towards the regime more than other intellectuals, he also stood within the mainstream of Egyptian thought, embracing secularism, progress, and a strong, liberated nation. By placing his literary career upon state patronage, Mahfouz tacitly accepted the legitimacy of the military regime. He criticized the tyrannical face of authoritarianism, but he accepted their right to govern Egypt and accepted its legitimacy.

In Chapter 4, this study moved its focus from the 1950s to the 1960s, exploring the regime’s failed effort to establish hegemonic influence over intellectuals and throughout civil society. The regime had already won legitimacy, an intellectual and popular acceptance for its rule in the 1950s for its reformist policies and its foreign policy successes. In the 1960s, in light of Syria’s secession from the UAR and Egypt’s stalling development, the regime undertook a turn to state-guided socialism and commanded intellectuals to embrace socialist policies and ideals. From 1961 to 1967 the regime sought to absorb intellectuals into the ruling establishment in a variety of ways, publishing provocative editorials in *al Ahram*, educational reform and publicly pressuring university administrations and professors to adopt Arab Socialism, carrying out a political conquest of syndicates through the ASU, and by offering amnesty and official positions to socialist leaders in exchange for political concessions. Despite the regime’s efforts, most intellectuals refrained from making a thorough commitment to socialism, or taking
up activist roles within the establishment. For the leftist intellectuals who traded their autonomy for a role within the establishment, they were curtailed from having any formative influence on political landscape. The regime’s failure to trigger a widespread migration of intellectuals into the establishment was revealed in the intellectual poverty of the regime’s sole political party, the ASU. Although individual intellectuals such as Muhammed Anis embraced the regime’s socialist vision, most intellectuals refrained from adopting socialism or activist roles within the establishment.

Intellectuals offered their own diagnosis of their malaise. The most significant of these diagnoses appeared in the 1960s novels of Naguib Mahfouz. In *The Beggar* and *Adrift on the Nile*, Mafhouz revealed how intellectuals recoiled from a regime that denied them opportunities, denied them a voice, and prosecuted any form of political criticism. His novels portrayed revolutionary Egypt as a dystopia featuring an arbitrary rule of law, the obsolescence of art, the extinction of political plurality, the desolation of civil society, and the alienation of intellectuals. His fiction demonstrates that although intellectuals granted legitimacy to the regime, consenting to its public and political role, they rejected its claims for preeminence in the realm of belief and meaning. The revolution could not ascend to a position of hegemony over Egypt. Nonetheless, Nasser and the Free Officers had instituted a moderate, secular, and modernizing revolution in the name of the Egyptian people, and intellectuals judged their efforts as legitimate.
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