IMAGINING “AN OTHER ENGLAND” IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC, 1577-1625

by

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

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For Rick and Pauline
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the place of Newfoundland and the North Atlantic within early English colonization. Between 1577 and 1625, colonial promotion shifted from advocating primarily commercial to moral justifications in the North Atlantic. Late-sixteenth century colonial plans therefore need to be examined in their own temporal context rather than in relation to what the Northern colonies became. Merchants Edward Hayes and Anthony Parkhurst sought to secure the lucrative Newfoundland fish trade against the disruptions of war and piracy by exploiting antenational loyalties. However, when the first English colonies were planted in the seventeenth-century by chartered companies, French competition was more problematic than the security of the fish trade. Symptomatic of a larger shift in interest from Newfoundland to the southerly North Atlantic of Virginia and the Caribbean, the Jacobean clergy created colonial plans based around idealized godly settlements, ignoring trade.
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I first announced my intention to pursue graduate studies in Newfoundland history, my parents never asked the question that so many would – “Why Newfoundland?” – although they must have thought it. Instead, I have been truly blessed to have the unconditional support and encouragement of my parents throughout the years that have passed since then. They have done so much for me that there really is no way to properly thank them. All I can say is that every graduate student should be so lucky.

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Of course, there were many other professors who helped me along this journey as well. My mentor in Calgary, Dr. Ken MacMillan, has been a great source for honest feedback and sound advice. Dr. Krista Kesselring offered constant encouragement and guidance, reading numerous grant applications and welcoming me into the community of early modernists in Halifax. I also owe many thanks to my readers, Dr. John Reid of Saint Mary’s University and Dr. Justin Roberts, for kindly volunteering their insights and their time. Like every graduate student who passes through the department, I would not have made it very far without the administrative magic of Valerie Peck and Tina Jones.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Elizabethan colonization has often been portrayed as the precursor to the “real” colonization of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As such, early biographers cast Sir Humphrey Gilbert as a “pioneer” and “the father of English colonization” for making England’s first formal claim of sovereignty and possession in the Americas in 1583.\(^1\) While Gilbert has been almost universally regarded as a failure, disappearing at sea before his intended colonies in Newfoundland and Norumbega could be planted, it is often interpreted as a noble failure that nonetheless helped pave the way for his successors. Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall characterized later colonization as a continuation of “Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s mission to the west” and added that no one

\(^1\) Anthony Parkhurst, “Maister Anthony Parkhurst in commendation of this Treatise,” in George Peckham, A True Reporte Of the late discoveries, and possession, taken in the right of the Crowne of Englane, of the New-found Landes (London: 1583), §iii[r] (emphasis added). For the sake of consistency, dates and names have been modernized. Years have been modified to begin on January 1 rather than Lady Day, March 25 as was customary in early modern England. Outside of direct quotations, personal and place names correspond with modern spelling (for example, Hayes and Newfoundland). Abbreviations within quotations have been silently expanded and letters changed to conform with modern usage (for example, Majestie for Ma\(^\text{ie}\) and unto for vnto). All other idiosyncrasies in early modern spelling, capitalization, emphasis, and punctuation have been retained within quotations.

could have anticipated the scale of the movement that he helped to initiate.” YET such statements are almost entirely based on the assumption of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. The Elizabethans were the first to propose English colonization in the Americas; therefore, all English colonization must derive from this original plan.

The problem with this interpretation is that American colonization was so new to England that the Elizabethans produced many different plans and many potential “fathers.” Although some nobles and gentlemen such as Gilbert may have used their experiences in Ireland as a basis for further colonial treatises, English colonial plans were not simply an extension of Irish colonization. The North Atlantic offered the opportunity for different visions of colonization than Ireland, which was inseparable from “Old World” political and religious conflicts. It was only in the Jacobean period, after colonial charters had been issued and settlements begun, that a unified vision of colonization was carefully constructed and disseminated to a wider audience through the English clergy. For North Atlantic colonization, this meant that the late-Elizabethan merchants’ plans to exploit pre-existing mercantile networks were complicated by rhetorical arguments that bore little resemblance to the realities of the salt fish trade. While expedient in the short term as moral justification for colonization writ large, this Jacobean vision created tension between the supposed and actual purposes of Northern colonies.

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4 Nicholas P. Canny, “England’s New World and The Old,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., ed. Nicholas Canny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1: 153-155. Although Canny has often argued that Irish colonization “provided a model” for the American colonies, he was careful to note that this process began after 1600. Throughout the sixteenth century, Ireland was viewed more as an extension of England
One of the enduring characterizations of these colonies in general and the Newfoundland settlements in particular is that of “retarded development.” This idea of a “failed” or “deviant” colony has been effectively challenged by revisionist historians following the lead of Keith Matthews and Jack Greene, who questioned the standards of success and normality being used. Yet the origins of these standards still deserve further investigation. The following chapters argue that a substantial change in colonial promotion between the late-Elizabethan and early-Jacobean periods helped to create contradictory expectations for the North Atlantic. Rather than emerging fully formed from the Elizabethan period like the mythical goddess Athena, the concept of early English colonization was more akin to the many-headed Hydra.

**Historiography**

Early modern Newfoundland and the North Atlantic found itself at the hub of early colonial interest in England precisely because it intersected well with a variety of interests and motivations. Prominent patrons in the Elizabethan court, including the

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7 To early modern English critics, the Hydra came to represent disorder and rebellion. See Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon
Lords Walsingham, Burghley, and Salisbury, as well as the Queen herself, found themselves inundated with the proposals of “projectors” such as Edward Hayes. 8 Until the mid-twentieth century, this early modern interest contrasted with a general historiographic “neglect” of Newfoundland in favour of “more attractive and better documented” colonies: namely, Virginia and Plymouth. 9 Those who had studied Newfoundland were accused by revisionists such as Keith Matthews of accepting “the historical mythology of Newfoundland” without documentary evidence. 10 While Matthews’ dissertation may not represent the dramatic “watershed” it was once believed to, his subsequent work did inspire a number of critical reevaluations by historians such as Gillian Cell, Jerry Bannister, Nicolas Landry, and Peter Pope. 11 Their critiques examined myths such as the perpetual conflict between fishers and planters, the ineffective nature of eighteenth-century governance, and the pre-eminence of directed over vernacular growth in French and English settlements. 12

Press, 2000). However, for this analysis it represents the differing views of colonization. Up to 1625, there was not yet an authoritative colonial vision to rebel against.


10 Matthews, “Historical Fence Building,” 145.


12 See Gillian T. Cell, Newfoundland Discovered: English Attempts at Colonisation, 1610-1630 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1982); Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the
The most pervasive myth, that of “exceptionalism,” has further been challenged by imperial and Atlantic historians utilizing a comparative perspective. Harold Innis, David Quinn, J.H. Parry, and Gerald Graham demonstrated the North Atlantic’s important role within not only English colonization, but also general European overseas expansion. It was the rich fishing banks around Newfoundland, Quinn and Innis argued, that first sustained European interest in North America as something more than an obstacle to the Pacific. Although some scholars continue to treat Newfoundland as tangential to colonial history, figuratively and literally off the map, more have begun to incorporate its history into the broader Atlantic World. Similarly, historians such as Pope and Landry have demonstrated the influence of broader Atlantic developments on English and French colonial history in mid-seventeenth century Newfoundland. Yet both imperial and Atlantic historians have often been more concerned with the apparent

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16 Steven Sarson’s British America, 1500-1800: Creating Colonies, Imagining an Empire (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005) covers the thirteen colonies in great detail, yet summarizes three hundred years of Newfoundland history in only a few pages and excludes it fully from the appended maps. However, such examples are increasingly displaced by surveys such as Stephen J. Hornsby’s British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2005) and James Pritchard’s In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

17 Pope, Fish Into Wine; Landry, Plaisance.
consequences of early colonial interest – settlement, mercantilism, and Newfoundland’s status as a “nursery for seamen” – than with sixteenth-century Newfoundland itself.

The terms Newfoundland and North Atlantic have thus far been used interchangeably. Until the seventeenth century, Newfoundland truly was the North Atlantic to English projectors. Like “Florida” or “Virginia,” the early modern usage of “Newfoundland” encompassed a much wider territory than the modern Canadian province. Sixteenth-century Newfoundland stretched west to the mouth of the St. Lawrence, north to Labrador, and as far south as Maine. Colonial promoters and royal officials viewed the region as distinct from the more southerly Florida – which extended up the Atlantic coast to North Carolina – and from the northern “Meta Incognita” of Greenland and Frobisher Bay. Moreover, Newfoundland occupied a central location in the minds of Europeans. Innis and Pope have argued that by the close of the sixteenth-century, the Newfoundland fishery was “by far the most important component of European commercial activity in North America.”18 This region was, in many ways, a gateway to the colonial ambitions further North, East, and South that would dominate the seventeenth century. Newfoundland was not only one of the first colonies, but a testing ground for colonial ideas.

As geographic knowledge and exploration increased in the mid-sixteenth century, territories such as Norumbega, Cape Breton, Labrador, and the major islands of the Gulf of St. Lawrence were defined within the newfound lands through travel narratives and

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maps. However, most of these territories still lacked any definite borders.\textsuperscript{19} Much of this vagary was deliberate. If the coordinates in promotional literature were too precise, then a colonial venture might be granted letters patent accordingly and thus be unable to relocate or expand into other territories. Precision also meant risking Spanish attack or French piracy, inter- and intra-national legal disputes, or being pre-empted by foreign plantations.\textsuperscript{20} The seasonal fishing industry that first drew English interest to the North Atlantic further contributed to this geographic vagary. The main territories being exploited were the cod fishing banks – which extended far beyond the island of Newfoundland to the coasts of Nova Scotia and New England – as well as whaling regions in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Strait of Belle Isle. It was the oceanic territory rather than the land that early modern Europeans first explored. Lauren Benton’s \textit{A Search For Sovereignty} serves as ample reminder that oceanic territories were tangible legal spaces in their own right throughout the early modern period.\textsuperscript{21} The North Atlantic region was defined as much by newfound seas as it was by newfound lands, literally and figuratively a “\textit{terra de bacalhao}.”\textsuperscript{22} The tendency to read the boundaries of modern Newfoundland back to the sixteenth century has contributed to a certain historiographic reluctance in acknowledging Newfoundland’s early centrality.

\textsuperscript{19} As late as 1625, some English promoters continued to claim that these newfound lands were a series of islands through which a Northwest Passage could easily be found. See Luca Codignola, \textit{The Coldest Harbour in the Land: Simon Stock and Lord Baltimore's colony in Newfoundland, 1621-1649} (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988), 23-24.
\textsuperscript{20} This argument has been applied to early modern English mapmaking more broadly. See, Ken MacMillan, \textit{Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 150.
\textsuperscript{21} Lauren Benton, \textit{A Search For Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), especially Chapter 3: Sovereignty at Sea, 104-161.
Despite a growing interest in the history of this North Atlantic region, its important place within what A.J.B. Johnston aptly termed the “imagined Atlantic” has elicited only minimal scholarly attention.\textsuperscript{23} It is generally accepted that sixteenth-century travel narratives and colonial promotion, particularly the works of the two Richard Hakluys and John Dee, helped forge a cohesive national identity in England and that seventeenth-century Newfoundland was colonized to create an English monopoly over the fishery.\textsuperscript{24} In this interpretation, North Atlantic colonization both contributed to nationalism and was a product of it. However, these assertions remain untested and unproven. Unlike the Hakluys and Dee, the colonial plans of late-Elizabethan merchants Edward Hayes and Anthony Parkhurst – both advocating colonization around Newfoundland – have been deemed irrelevant in discussions of nationalism.\textsuperscript{25} However numerous, their colonial plans and underlying bids for patronage were ultimately unsuccessful; no English colony was established in the North Atlantic until 1610. The Hakluys and Dee are portrayed as political philosophers, whereas Parkhurst and Hayes were merely useful as reporters who brought back information on the Americas for others to base their great English Empire upon.

\textsuperscript{22} The term “land of the cod” was usually attributed to Portuguese and French sources. Pope, “Comparisons,” 491.
\textsuperscript{25} Hakluyt the younger and Dee have been the subject of numerous biographies and analyses. The most recent examples are Peter C. Mancall’s \textit{Hakluyt's Promise: An Elizabethan's Obsession for an English America} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) and Glyn Parry’s “John Dee and the Elizabethan British Empire in Its European Context,” \textit{The Historical Journal} 49, no. 3 (2006), 643-675.
Until quite recently, the role of Jacobean clergymen such as Richard Eburne in colonial promotion had slipped into similar obscurity. Secular authors such as John Mason and Richard Whitbourne were valued for their “straightforward and highly practical” prose, based on experiential knowledge of the first Newfoundland plantations; clergymen were simply “hired pens.” The following chapters offer a reassessment of what has been deemed “important” in early colonial promotion by focusing on typicality and trends rather than the exceptional. Hayes, Parkhurst, and Eburne were typical of their eras. The former two were, like most late-Elizabethan promoters, as much concerned with how colonization could directly benefit them as they were with persuading their patrons to pursue it. These middling merchants did not simply report on their experiences in Newfoundland, they offered a specific, commercially centered vision of colonization – one which has hitherto not been analyzed on its own. Eburne was typical of Jacobean promotion for the opposite reason: his connection to colonization was highly impersonal and his writing derivative. His purpose was to persuade English men and women of the moral imperative to contribute to his patrons’ colonial ventures. However practical they may have been, secular Jacobean authors also relied on ecclesiastical intermediaries to provide moral justification.

In attempting to re-centre colonial studies thusly, this study draws on the example of historians such as Lauren Benton, Andrew Fitzmaurice, and Ken MacMillan – all of whom have made important contributions towards integrating the fields of Atlantic and

28 In his study of Elizabethan martial culture, Rory Rapple has similarly challenged the tendency to seek out or claim exceptionalism for one’s subjects. Rory Rapple, *Martial
intellectual histories. David Armitage’s *Ideological Origins of the British Empire* spurred examinations of a later “British” identity as it related to empire, highlighting the Irish, Scottish, and Welsh contributions to imperialism. While the past two decades have seen numerous studies on the development of an earlier English national identity, few have made specific use of colonial promotion as an expression of English culture or identity. From 1570 to 1603, in the face of excommunication, rebellions, war with Spain, and a potential succession crisis, England found itself in an almost continuous state of religious, political, and social upheaval. As the kingdom redefined and reformed itself, colonization offered a unique opportunity to vent these anxieties and offer possible solutions.

Chapters Two and Three examine the anxieties of late-Elizabethan merchants through the promotional treatises of Anthony Parkhurst and Edward Hayes. Chapter Two seeks to understand exactly what these merchants meant when they suggested planting “an other England” in the North Atlantic. Was this new England to be a mirror image of their own England or a transmutation? The assumption has hitherto been that the English empire was, in the words of David Armitage, “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free.” However, the type of colonization proposed by Hayes and Parkhurst only

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31 Parkhurst, “commendation,” §iii[r].

partially fits this model. It was certainly to be commercial and maritime, with a primary focus on protecting the Newfoundland fisheries and transatlantic trade from the effects of war and piracy. However, it was only vaguely Christian and, as David Quinn aptly noted, “the venture was not a humanitarian one.”33 Disorderly men would be reformed, but only through forced labour for fishing merchants and service in galley fleets. Chapter Three gives particular emphasis to the ways in which Hayes tailored this proposed colonial solution to the problems of wealth, stability, and security in order to appeal to different audiences.

This connection between social commentary and colonization, first established in Thomas More’s *Utopia*, would continue well into the Jacobean period although its purpose would change dramatically.34 Unlike France, whose seventeenth-century American colonies served as “site[s] for reevaluation and discord concerning what it meant to be French,” Jacobean colonial promotion sought to smooth over such discord.35 Chartered companies and proprietary adventurers utilized the moral authority and rhetorical training of clergymen to broadcast a unified message of colonial support. In their promotional sermons and published tracts, social commentary became rhetorically useful, converting English anxieties into justifications for colonization. Chapter Four analyzes this body of ecclesiastical promotion as a single entity, examining how and why the clergy created a more unified idea of colonization than had previous existed. Although Hayes had also attempted to persuade a broad audience, it was the Jacobean

33 Quinn, *Discovery of America*, 239.
34 David Harris Sacks offers an excellent overview of the text as a commentary in Thomas More, *Utopia* [1516], trans. Ralph Robynson [1556], ed. David Harris Sacks (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999), 1-59.
clergy that portrayed colonization as universally appealing regardless of actual geographic limitations. This new colonial ideal was therefore a double-edged sword for the North Atlantic colonies. While it served to justify and sustain interest in colonial ventures throughout an unprofitable phase of colonization, it also created expectations that conflicted with the primary source of profit in the North Atlantic: the salt fish trade.
In the autumn of 1578, Sir Humphrey Gilbert departed on his first colonial reconnaissance voyage and Sir Francis Drake, having left the previous year, was off earning his fame as England’s first circumnavigator of the globe. Both voyages combined the imperialistic goal of expanding English power overseas with the more basic desire of the captains to enrich themselves by plundering the wealth other nations had gained in this “New” world. Yet along the southwestern coast of England, most fishing merchants found themselves too busy making preparations for the next year’s fishing voyages to take note of such events. Their most pressing concern was the provisioning of their ships to ensure the earliest possible departures. An earlier departure in the spring meant better selection of fishing rooms in Newfoundland and returning to continental markets before their competitors meant higher profits.36 Timing was everything in the salt fish trade. When Anthony Parkhurst wrote to the elder Richard Hakluyt that autumn, neither he nor his fellow fishing merchants anticipated that the actions of adventurers such as Gilbert and Drake, along with the tense political climate of late-sixteenth century Europe, would force the Newfoundland fishery to change dramatically.37

Responding to a request from Hakluyt, his friend and fellow advocate of colonization, Parkhurst drew on his experiences in Newfoundland and the wider Atlantic to describe the island’s geography, commodities, and size of the fishing fleets.

36 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 29.
37 Unlike merchants in the Levant Company, who protested piracy vigorously, the Newfoundland fishing merchants seemed to believe (despite the evidence at hand) that piracy, privateering, and war would not disrupt their overseas commercial networks.
Alternating between “merrie tales” and the formulaic promotional statements of a letter written the previous year, he listed the reasons why he believed the Northwest region was ideal for English colonization.\(^{38}\) Through a sobering account of his recent financial losses, Parkhurst also revealed the tenuous antenational loyalties on which the late-sixteenth century fishery depended:

And thus I ende, assuring you on my faith, that if I had not beene deceived by the vile Portugals, descending of the Jewes and Judas kinde, I had not failed to have searched this [St. Lawrence] river, and all the coast of Cape Briton, what might have bene found to have benefited our countrey: but they breaking their bands, and falsifying their faith and promise, disappointed me of the salte they should have brought me in part of recompense of my good service in defending them two yeeres against French Rovers that had spoyled them, if I had not defended them.\(^{39}\)

Soliciting the legal advice of his friend, as Hakluyt was also a lawyer, Parkhurst outlined his plan to petition the Portuguese monarch for compensation of his 300£ losses in Newfoundland. Failing that, he would seek a letter of reprisal from the English monarch, Queen Elizabeth I, and extract payment from the Portuguese by force, as a privateer.

By 1578, the relationship between Portugal and England was already under strain. The partnership that had existed in the early sixteenth century, when the two nations often made joint expeditions to explore the Americas, had been undermined by the political and religious conflicts in Europe. With Elizabeth I excommunicated in 1570 and religious wars erupting across the continent between Protestants and Catholics, hostility

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\(^{38}\) Anthony Parkhurst, “[13 November 1578] Letter to Richard Hakluyt of the middle Temple,” *PN*, 2: 132-134, quote on 133. E.G.R. Taylor suggested that the earlier letter was written to Edward Dyer in 1577, though neither the date nor recipient were recorded. E.G.R. Taylor, *The Original Writings & Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluys*, 2 vols. (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1935), 1: 15. See also, Anthony Parkhurst, “Commodities to growe by frequenting of Traficq to new found Land,” BL, Lansdowne MS 100, 95-96.

\(^{39}\) Parkhurst, “Hakluyt,” 134.
between England and its Iberian neighbours became increasingly common.\footnote{Relations with Spain, who would annex Portugal in 1580, were much worse due to the English aiding Dutch rebels from 1572 onward.} England itself was rife with rumours of Catholic plots to assassinate the queen and place her cousin, Mary Queen of Scots, on the throne. Yet it was not the confessional beliefs of the Portuguese that irked Parkhurst, but rather the fact that they had broken an oath to him.\footnote{According to the \textit{Oxford English Dictionary}, his use of the term “faith” rather than “the faith” indicates that Parkhurst was referring to an oath rather than to religion. He accused the Portuguese of being unchristian for breaking their oaths to him, not because they were Catholic. “faith, n.,” \textit{OED}.} In his mind, they had betrayed him, just as Judas betrayed Christ, and he was owed some kind of retributive justice. He clearly believed that whatever conflicts their respective nations may have had, Newfoundland was neutral ground, subject to its own customary laws. Here they were citizens of the Atlantic, loyal to the fishery first.

This adherence to antenational commercial loyalties continued to be a defining characteristic of colonial promotion by English merchants and their allies over the late-sixteenth century, even after the cooperative system described by Parkhurst had been effectively disrupted by the predations of war. These promotional documents provide both a snapshot of the Newfoundland fishery before it became the nationally insular version of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and illustrate the foundation on which mercantilism and David Hancock’s “citizens of the world” were born.\footnote{David Hancock, \textit{Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). It should be noted that mercantilism was a product of mid-seventeenth century Anglo-Dutch political conflict. While Elizabethan commercial colonization plans employed similar language to the Navigation Acts, these plans did not inevitably result in mercantilism.} Unlike the more competitive and isolationist vision of colonization presented by gentlemen such as Sir George Peckham and Sir Walter Raleigh, English merchants sought to facilitate foreign
trade and escape the conflicts plaguing Europe. However, to imply that there was a neat dichotomy between a commercial vision of colonization and an isolationist vision in the sixteenth century would be an oversimplification. Not only could these visions of colonization intersect at points of common interest, wealthy merchants often aspired to become gentlemen and gentlemen enriched themselves through commerce.\(^\text{43}\) Two concepts of English colonization did exist, but like the social divisions they were entangled with one another in an intra-imperial web.

This chapter examines the commercial vision of colonization created in the late-sixteenth century, as merchants sought a solution to their North Atlantic trade problems. Despite his humble background as a merchant, Edward Hayes was one of the most persistent and prolific writers on colonization throughout the late-sixteenth century. From his initial involvement in Humphrey Gilbert’s colonial schemes, Hayes continued to advocate colonization in the North Atlantic for the next thirty years.\(^\text{44}\) Throughout this time, Hayes’ plan remained essentially the same, changing only in its proposed location and financial backing. His promotional works will be examined along with Anthony Parkhurst’s letters to demonstrate the commercial colonization plans of the late-sixteenth century. Their vision was a hybrid of residual antenational loyalties to their trade and

\(^{43}\text{As one contemporary described it: merchants “often change estate with gentlemen, as gentlemen do with them, by a mutual conversion of the one into the other.” William Harrison, as quoted in Laura C. Stevenson, Praise and Paradox: Merchants and Craftsmen in Elizabethan Popular Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 80.}\)

\(^{44}\text{The last known incident of Hayes promoting colonization was shortly before his death in 1613: Edward Hayes, “[7 December 1611] Letter to Lord Carew,” Calendar of Carew Manuscripts Preserved in the Archiepiscopal Library at Lambeth, eds. J. S. Brewer and W. Bullen, 6 vols. (London: 1867-1873), 5: 138-140. Given Carew’s personal dislike for salt cod or “poor John” as it was known, he was unlikely to promote Hayes’ plan. See, for example, George Carew, “[13 July 1602] President of Munster to the Privy Council from Corke,” SP 63/211/1, 217-228.}\)
burgeoning national loyalties to the English commonwealth. While references were made to Christianity, according to the intended audiences of their treatises, commercial colonization was not motivated by or predicated on a specific confessional belief. In this, Newfoundland had much more in common with the inclusivity of Mediterranean trade than the oppressive tone of Elizabethan Irish conquest.

Historians such as Nicholas Canny have demonstrated the many ways in which Europeans sought a reformed version of their Old World in the Americas rather than a “New World.”45 Using this model, English merchants sought something closer to a New Antwerp than a New Ireland. Their “city upon a hill” was a safe haven for trade – close enough to lure European merchants, yet beyond the influence of religious and political turmoil.46 Irish colonization – and, as Chapter 4 will discuss, seventeenth-century American colonization – was an extension of these European conflicts, rather than an attempted escape from them. This is not meant to imply that every English merchant wished to colonize the North Atlantic or any foreign territory. As Hayes himself acknowledged, many merchants opposed all colonial plans on the grounds that colonization would actually interfere with trade.47 Nonetheless, Hayes’ works and the letters written by Parkhurst do suggest that when merchants took an interest in Newfoundland, they saw a pre-existing transatlantic network ready to be exploited in the name of colonization.

46 John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity (1630) as referenced in Greene, Pursuits of Happiness, 60.
47 Edward Hayes, “[10 January 1586] A Discours of Mr. Haies, of Distante Landes Discovered,” BL, Lansdowne MS 100, 89[r]. Hereafter referred to by Hayes’ term, as his
The Imperial Web

Atlantic, Reformation, and imperial historians have all remained divided on the true motivations behind the colonial impulse in Elizabethan England. David Armitage’s famous characterization of the British Empire as “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free” hints at many of the dominant historiographic trends. From Gerald Graham’s *Empire of the North Atlantic* to Kenneth Andrews’ *Trade, Plunder and Settlement*, commercial motivations have tended to take precedence. Louis B. Wright’s 1943 classic *Religion and Empire*, which countered commercial arguments with the importance of religious motivations, has in turn been displaced by a growing focus on transnational links between empires. Legal historians such as Anthony Pagden, Lauren Benton, and Ken MacMillan have demonstrated the similarity between legal justifications for empires throughout Europe. Andrew Fitzmaurice has argued that “a platform for the empire of commerce” was not present in the colonial promotion of the sixteenth or early-seventeenth centuries because humanist goals overshadowed all else. The works of two English merchants shed light on the motivations of these particular men and offer a caution to broad generalizations about early modern identities.

52 Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Humanism and America*, 187.
Atlantic history purports to study the interactions and movements of people around the vast Atlantic Ocean, blind to national boundaries, yet several Atlantic historians, including Fitzmaurice and Armitage, have ascribed fixed national identities upon sixteenth-century Atlantic communities. Countless monographs have emerged in the past two decades on the “English Atlantic World” or, more commonly, the “British Atlantic World.” While these terms are more appropriate for describing later imperial developments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, under the composite Stuart monarchies and the rise of mercantilism, they are too often applied backwards onto the sixteenth century. It is difficult to ascertain what was distinctly “British” about the sixteenth-century Atlantic or, for that matter, what was distinctly French, Spanish, or Portuguese. Sixteenth-century Newfoundland was not a unique place because of its transnational fishery, but rather it was the product of a unique period in time in which national boundaries had not solidified around these Atlantic communities. The Avalon peninsula on which fishing fleets congregated annually had not yet been sharply divided into the English and French shores that would characterize the seventeenth century.

With its implicit connection to the British Empire, widespread use of “British Atlantic” prior to 1603 has resulted in the assumption of a nation already unified by


54 The Spanish and Portuguese, while dominant in much of the Caribbean and South Atlantic during the sixteenth century, were never able to keep the English and French out of these regions entirely and illicit trade flourished. French imperial historians have been far more reluctant to embrace the idea of a French Atlantic. Only recently has the term been used, and even then almost exclusively for the eighteenth century. See Kenneth J. Banks, Chasing Empire Across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 7-10.
loyalty to a single “sovereign.” Humphrey Gilbert certainly advocated this sense of duty in 1566 when he wrote that a man “is not worthie to live at all, that for feare, or daunger of death, shunneth his countrey service, and his owne honour.” However, what exactly one owed service to was not always clearly defined and depended greatly on individual interpretations. Although some – including Gilbert – would claim that their first duty was to their monarch, to English Catholics this could just as easily mean Mary Queen of Scots as Elizabeth I. Elizabeth’s excommunication effectively absolved her Catholic subjects of loyalty or obedience to her. Religious martyrs throughout the sixteenth century would claim that their first duty was to God and a particular confessional community, not a secular authority. Patrick Collinson’s “citizens... concealed within subjects” would have cited maintenance of the English commonwealth as their first duty, which was sufficiently vague as to encompass both humanist ideals of a “monarchical republic” and commercial goals of profit.

Parkhurst and his fellow merchant-propagandist Hayes do not, therefore, fit easily into a singular model of loyalty. Both proposed to use colonization in Newfoundland to expand Christianity, to bring glory to Elizabeth I, and to reform and enrich England. Yet, because Parkhurst and Hayes proposed to accomplish these ends through an inclusive cod fishery and transatlantic trade, the “benefit” to the commonwealth of England would be

55 See Landry, Plaisance and Pope, Fish Into Wine for detailed studies of each region.  
56 Fitzmaurice, Humanism and America, 6.  
57 Humphrey Gilbert, [30 June 1566] A Discourse Of a Discoverie for a new Passage to Cataia (London, 1576), Ii[v].  
only slightly more tangible than the benefit to the commonwealths of France, Spain, or Portugal. The Newfoundland colony, Hayes wrote in 1586, would “provyde wares that are greatly in requeaste” not only within England but also throughout “all the weste Countryes of Europe.” In addition to accessing a market with less restrictions and political instability than those within Europe, all of these nations’ merchants could purchase provisions for their navies and consumer goods for their countrymen. These commodities would include those shipped from Europe to Newfoundland, the multitude of resources expected to be extracted locally, including cod, timber, iron, and furs, and the luxury goods which would be brought from China through the highly-anticipated Northwest Passage.

The English were ultimately unable to regulate the transatlantic trade in the Americas as Parkhurst and Hayes had imagined. The seventeenth-century Navigation Acts, which codified mercantilism into the English empire, were in part a reaction to this inability and to the continual incursions by Dutch and French merchants into English territories. The Spanish empire developed several large commercial centres in its Caribbean and South American colonies, attracting foreign merchants for trade just as the sixteenth-century English merchants had hoped to do in Newfoundland. Yet even the powerful Spanish navy ultimately failed to assert total imperium over Atlantic

the common wealth as the general well being of a group – financial and otherwise. “commonwealth, n.” OED.
59 Parkhurst, “Hakluyt,” 134; the terms “commonwealth,” “common weal,” and “weal public” appear throughout Parkhurst’s letters and Edward Hayes’ numerous treatises. See Tables 1 and 2.
60 Edward Hayes, “[c. 1586] Mr Ed: Hayes booke towching of Newe fownd Land,” BL, Lansdowne MS 100, 86[v]; ibid., 84[r]. Referred to as his “first platt.” The original date was lost to water damage. However, it was likely composed in early 1586, before his letter to Lord Burghley that May. See Hayes, “Lord Burghley,” 166-167.
commerce. As Elizabeth Mancke has noted, “the Atlantic world offered myriad and frequently uncontrollable points of access for Europeans seeking new opportunities”; so despite numerous efforts, no early modern nation ever succeeded in controlling it completely. Adherence to national foreign policies, recognition of royal monopolies and charters, and even fulfillment of personal oaths, as demonstrated by the Portuguese fishing merchants, were never assured. The English did have a duty to their sovereign and country but, like all Englishmen, merchants treated these loyalties as negotiable whenever possible and open to interpretation.

By appealing to the vague concept of “the commonwealth,” these merchants could claim to benefit England while maintaining trade relations with the nation’s supposed enemies. As Andrea Shannon argues, it was precisely because of this ambiguous loyalty that Elizabeth I treated the port towns of the West Country with suspicion. When Plymouth sought to select the captain for its new fortification in 1593, a jurisdictional dispute arose between the town, mainly composed of merchants, and the Crown. Agents of the Crown responded bluntly to Plymouth’s request, stating that the security of the nation could not be left in the hands of merchants:

They are most to be trusted, that have best Interest in the State. A Marchaunt may live as a Marchaunt; and a Townes-man as a Townes-man in all worlds and under all Princes. A gentleman shall never lyve as a gentleman but under his naturall Prince.

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64 “[1594] Against the suite of the Towne of Plimouthe for kepinge the newe fort theare,” BL, Lansdowne MS 76, 75-76 (quote 76). The document is unsigned, but internal evidence suggests that it was written by a representative of Elizabeth I.
The Crown’s decision to trust the gentry over merchants seems well founded given their different views of colonization. The colonial plans proposed by men such as Edward Hayes often conflicted directly with Elizabethan foreign policy, even if this was not their intention.

Like their Atlantic counterparts, historians of the European Reformation such as Brad Gregory have often assumed that men’s primary loyalty lay within one clearly defined category: confessional beliefs. The willingness of sixteenth-century Europeans to disobey authorities, celebrate martyrs, and kill others in the name of religion have all been taken as evidence of this loyalty’s primacy. Carla Gardina Pestana has further argued that Protestantism and religious conflict were critical to the formation of the English Empire over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, like the British Atlantic, the influence of confessional loyalty on colonization should not be read backwards into the sixteenth century. Rory Rapple has argued that the religious motivations of Elizabethan soldiers in Ireland have been grossly exaggerated and simplified. Religious loyalty, he counters, “could take a multitude of forms in line with the temperament of the person who held it.” Although Rapple addresses only the historical treatment of soldiers, his characterization is also fitting for the treatment of colonial promoters. Neither Parkhurst nor Hayes advocated an explicitly Protestant form

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of colonization. Instead, both depicted the Newfoundland trade as a cooperative network of merchants in which confessional differences did not matter.

Just as Levant Company merchants trading in the Mediterranean had done, Hayes attempted to discourage activities that brought profit to Elizabeth and her courtiers but harmed trade relations abroad, namely privateering against the supposed enemies of England.\textsuperscript{68} Trade with Catholic markets in Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean, where salt fish were consumed in far greater volumes than in England, was crucial to the Newfoundland cod fishery. As the Portuguese fishery declined from 1580 onward, English merchants were able to supply the increased demand for dry-cured cod in the Iberian countries.\textsuperscript{69} In return, these merchants gained commodities from Europe and the East to sell in England. This symbiotic trade relationship required by English merchants was in direct opposition to the foreign policy of Elizabeth I, particularly following the Spanish Armada’s failed attack in 1588. Yet, even in the face of bitter anti-Catholicism in 1602, Hayes continued to propose the creation of colonial markets in the North Atlantic as a peaceful means to purchase “Wines, Sweet oiles, Fruits, Spices, Sugars, Silks, Gold, and Silver” from Iberian merchants.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{67} Rapple, \textit{Martial Power}, 16. Rapple further suggests that such loyalty could be compromised as these men were forced to adapt themselves to circumstances within England and Ireland. \textit{Ibid}.


\textsuperscript{69} Pope, \textit{Fish Into Wine}, 22.

\textsuperscript{70} Edward Hayes, “A Treatise, conteining important inducements for the planting in these parts, and finding a passage that way to the South sea and China” in \textit{A Briefe and true Relation of the Discovery of the North part of Virginia} (London: 1602), 18.
Although they were ambiguous by necessity, these merchants were not irreligious or “secular.”\textsuperscript{71} Both Parkhurst and Hayes promoted colonization as a means to spread Christianity to the indigenous North Americans, proving England’s piety to its skeptical continental neighbours. However, both merchants tended to avoid emphasizing confessional differences when discussing the desirability of conversions.\textsuperscript{72} It was enough for the English to bring the indigenous people “unto the faiathe of Jesus Christe,” without specifying how that faith would be practised.\textsuperscript{73} This ambiguity was necessary to avoid offending their foreign and domestic Catholic trading partners. In the religious climate of Elizabethan England, it was also necessary to remain as politically neutral as possible. Even after Mary Queen of Scots was executed in 1587, Elizabeth I’s refusal to marry and produce an heir, despite numerous illnesses and assassination attempts, made the religious future of England uncertain. Her Thirty-Nine Articles of Faith were sufficiently vague as to allow considerable leeway in how Protestantism would be practised within the Church of England, assuming she would be succeeded by a Protestant monarch at all. The fate of England’s religious “Reformation” would remain uncertain well into the

\textsuperscript{71} Historians like Rapple who reject the assumption of a totalising religious worldview have often jumped to the opposite conclusion: that these Elizabethans’ “wonted lack of piety” was due to their “secular worldview[s].” Rapple, \textit{Martial Power}, 84. Marcus Rediker has made a similar argument of English maritime culture being essentially irreligious. See Marcus Rediker, \textit{Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 172-179.

\textsuperscript{72} In 1586 and 1602 Hayes expressed his anxiety over “that deffect in our churche” – unlike the Spanish Catholics, England had not converted any “paganish Americans” to Christianity. [Hayes], “A discourse Concerning a voyage intended for the planting of Chrystyan religion and people in the North west regions of America in places most apt for the Constitution of our boddies and the spedy advauncement of a state [c.1592-

\textsuperscript{73} Hayes, “first platt,” 84[v].
seventeenth century. While militant Protestantism and fierce loyalty to Elizabeth I might have been politically expedient for the gentry, it was far too risky for merchants to be so vocal.

Although imperial historians have differentiated colonial plans more often than Reformation or Atlantic scholars, they have similarly tended to divide complex networks of loyalty into clearly defined and irreconcilable factions. For David Quinn and the “old imperial” school, Elizabethan ideologies were determined solely by powerful patrons in the nobility. In the case of colonization, treatises catered to either William Cecil, Lord Burghley or Sir Francis Walsingham’s colonial visions – Burghley favouring a peaceful, Northern, commercial empire and Walsingham sought an aggressive, Southern, anti-Spanish empire. However, this dichotomy fails to account for discrepancies such as Christopher Carleill, whose treatises reflect most closely the supposed Burghley faction and often overlapped with Hayes’, even though his primary patron was his stepfather, Walsingham. If the two factions were truly irreconcilable, then it is also unclear how both Walsingham and Burghley could be involved in Gilbert’s colonial ventures from 1578 to 1583.

While supporting the argument for factional divisions, Kenneth Andrews also attributed differing colonial interests to dichotomous regional loyalties. According to Andrews, the Spanish model of colonization through military conquest in the Atlantic was adopted by the West Country, while Londoners favoured “a peaceful empire of

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75 Quinn, *Discovery of America*, 235-236.
maritime commerce” in the Mediterranean and Pacific. Yet neither Parkhurst nor Hayes could be considered representatives of either region. Neither were raised in London or the West Country and throughout adulthood both moved around England, Ireland, continental Europe, and the wider Atlantic. The last, and certainly most pervasive division of colonial interests, has been between merchants and the gentry. To a certain degree, it can be argued that this division has contributed to the mistaken historiographic assumption of a conflict between “West Country” merchants and colonial landed elites – setting up an inevitable battle between commercial interests and settlement.79

In anthropological terms, the formation of sixteenth-century identities for such men were both “negotiated” and “situational.” Their identities consisted of overlapping and sometimes conflicting loyalties to ethnicities, regions, ranks, and confessional beliefs. As such, merchants such as Hayes and Parkhurst could and did collaborate on projects with gentlemen when the interests of both groups intersected. Having exhausted investors from the nobility in 1578, Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s final 1583 venture relied heavily on financial support from Catholic gentlemen such as Sir George Peckham and

77 Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 9-10. Andrews admits that “it is easy to overstate the distinction,” but sees the only intersections between them as the vague desire for “power” and “commercial gain.”
78 Andrews warns against this “usual” comparison due to the prevalence of collaboration between the two. Ibid., 17.
79 D.W. Prowse claimed that after 1588 “the Western adventurers believed they had a right to keep [Newfoundland] as a perpetual possession for fishing, and nothing more; for this reason, after the death of Elizabeth, they banded together to resist settlement.” D.W. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland, 83.
the “Marchant Adventurers” of Southampton.\textsuperscript{81} To the former, he promised landed estates in the Americas and escape from Elizabeth’s harsh 1581 recusancy fines; to the latter, he granted exclusive shipping rights between England and the colony as well as promising them lower customs rates. However, due to their different colonial goals, such collaborations were not generally successful. A month after signing the agreement with the merchants in Southampton, Gilbert extended freedom of trade to any former or current investor, effectively ending any hopes of a regional commercial monopoly.\textsuperscript{82} While this must have been a bitter disappointment for some, other merchants such as Hayes applauded the inclusiveness of this gesture.

That neither Hayes nor Parkhurst can be placed neatly within the rigid categories of national, regional, factional, or confessional loyalties indicates just how complex these early modern identities were and how important it is to avoid over-generalizing. A useful starting point and means of avoiding these generalizations is the entangled approach to Atlantic history proposed by Elijah Gould. Whereas comparative historical analysis is limited by a tendency “to accept national boundaries as fixed, to take the distinctiveness of their subjects as a given, and to assume that the subjects being compared are, in fact, comparable,” entangled histories examine a variety of interconnected and overlapping

\textsuperscript{81} Humphrey Gilbert, “[2 November 1582] Articles of agreement indented between Sir Humphrey Gilberde and such of [South]Hampton as adventure with him; as also with other Merchant Adventurers, touching new lands to be discovered or conquered by him,” SP 12/155, 152-159. This group of investors were not actually incorporated, but rather named “the Marchant Adventurers” by Gilbert. In reality, they were not even all merchants but included several tradesmen, mariners, and gentry. For a more detailed look at his investors, see p. 49 of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{82} Gilbert, “Additions to the former articles,” 23-25.
processes. As this approach was designed to analyze the transnational Atlantic World more generally, it does not transfer perfectly to a nationally specific analysis of colonial plans. Nonetheless, certain aspects can be appropriated for this study.

The porous nature of boundaries stressed by the entangled approach does not need to describe interactions between nations alone, for it can also describe the interactions occurring intranationally. The interconnected processes Gould describes as “cosmopolitan phenomena” – race, gender, religion, commerce, and law – were just as important within nations as they were between them. These phenomena have often been read by historians as “markers of difference” in identity formation, each generating its own field of research. Yet identities were constructed by inclusion as well as exclusion. Thus, the entangled approach suggests that the worlds of men such as Edward Hayes and Anthony Parkhurst cannot be understood without first acknowledging the multiple communities to which each belonged. To understand how and why these men formulated their vision of colonization, we must first understand who they were.

Elizabethan Projectors as Chameleons

Neither Parkhurst nor Hayes was particularly exceptional in Elizabethan England. Both men came from families that were moderately wealthy, but neither inherited land or

84 Ibid.
85 The term “markers of difference” was first used in the context of race and racism studies but has since been applied more broadly. See, Sidney W. Mintz, “Groups, Group Boundaries and the Perception of ‘Race’, Review Article,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 13, no. 4 (1971), 437-450; Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830-1867* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
While both men gained some prominence as merchants associated with the exclusive inner-circle of Elizabethans promoting colonization to the queen and the public, they could best be described as middling – neither rich nor poor. Parkhurst was born a gentleman, but moved to Bristol after being disowned by his father in 1570. Between 1564 and 1565, he had travelled to Africa and the Caribbean with Sir John Hawkins on his second slaving voyage. It was on his return to England that Parkhurst first visited the Newfoundland fishery; connections made with the transnational community there would become invaluable after his disinheritance forced him to take up trade permanently. Yet, eight years after moving to Bristol and establishing himself in the Newfoundland trade as the owner and captain of a fishing ship, Parkhurst still described himself as “from Kent and Christendome,” apart from the “Westerne men.” If a distinct West Country vision of colonization did exist, Parkhurst was unlikely to subscribe to it simply because he lived in Bristol.

Hayes was equally grounded in his childhood home of Liverpool, where he was the son of a prominent merchant and a middle child with five siblings. Despite the ominous beginning of his career – being caught smuggling wheat and leather into Spain in 1554 – his father, the elder Edward Hayes, had become a successful merchant and a

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87 Hayes’ entire inheritance at the time of his father’s death was a gold signet ring, valued at 50 shillings. Quinn, *Discovery of America*, 231.
89 Quinn, “Parkhurst.” He also made connections on this voyage with the English ambassador in Spain. See Anthony Parkhurst, “[13 July 1564] Letter to Thomas Chaloner,” SP 70/73, 58.
91 He most certainly would have taken exception to Gillian Cell’s characterization of him as “A Bristol man.” Gillian T. Cell, *English Enterprise*, 22.
Liverpool burgess by 1570. The younger Hayes moved almost constantly around southern England, Ireland, and the North Atlantic throughout his adult life, but maintained close contact with his father. David Quinn conjectured that the younger Hayes’ interest in colonization grew out of time he may have spent in continental Europe with Thomas Hoby. As no evidence of such a journey exists, a more likely scenario is that the elder Hayes, having invested in Gilbert’s 1578 voyage as “Master Haies gent of Leerpolle,” introduced his son to colonial ventures. The two were known to have collaborated on investments and projects up to the father’s death in 1602. Although the younger Hayes had become more active in lucrative coinage schemes with his brother Thomas at this point, their father had clearly left an impression. For the rest of his life,

92 Quinn, Discovery of America, 227.
93 “[24 October 1554],” Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Philip and Mary, 4 vols. (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1936), 2: 38; Quinn, Discovery of America, 228. The 100£ fine for smuggling wheat, calfskins, and leather into and out of Spain was split between forty-eight merchants in Chester.
94 Quinn, Discovery of America, 231.
95 Ibid., 230; Gilbert, “Additions to the former articles,” 24[v]. David Quinn, and those after him, have always assumed that the “Master Haies” listed as an investor in Gilbert’s 1578 voyage referred to the younger Hayes. Given that both Hayes’ were involved in promoting Newfoundland and the younger never subsequently referred to himself as a gentleman, only a captain, it is more likely that the elder Hayes was the initial investor.
97 Previously, Thomas Hayes has only been identified as a “kinsman” previously (Quinn, Discovery of America, 234). However, while both were stationed in Ireland debasing silver coinage, accounts refer to them simply as “Capt. Hayes and his brother.” See “Account of ingots of silver [6 August 1601],” SP 12/281, 206-208, quote on 206; Privy Council of England, “Letter to Thomas Knyvet and Sir Richard Martin [17 April 1601],” Privy Council: Registers, vol. 26, 158. Thomas Hayes and Edward’s brother-in-law Oliver Lambert, both professional soldiers, collaborated with him on his militia plans at this time as well. Edward Hayes, “Letter to Sir Robert Cecil,” Calendar of the Manuscripts of Salisbury, 12: 590.
the younger Edward Hayes never ceased advocating for colonization in the North Atlantic.

Perhaps because both Hayes and Parkhurst were not born and raised in either the West Country or London exclusively, neither fit within Kenneth Andrews’ regionally defined “two faces of seaborne expansion.”98 Rather than promoting colonization as a regional enterprise, beneficial to only a select group, both men sought to include all of England in their ventures. In his second 1586 treatise on Newfoundland, Hayes listed what he proposed would be the six primary port towns involved in the supplying of men and ships: Westchester, Bristol, Southampton, London, Harwich, and Newcastle. The diversity of the ports is striking, covering the entirety of England and giving weight to his assertion that colonization would be “a great benefit unto this Realme.”99 (See Figure 1) Less detailed in his plans, Parkhurst also expressed concern that the Newfoundland trade was so fully dominated by West Country merchants in 1578. Although he was glad to see more Englishmen in Newfoundland, Parkhurst believed that many West Country merchants only went hoping to make a quick profit and discover “some secret commoditie,” while other English fishing merchants continued to gather their salt fish in Iceland, subject to the whims of its Danish monarchs and customs officials.100

99 Hayes, “second platt,” 91[r]; 92[v]. Liverpool was likely absent from the list because it was at that time a dependency of Westchester. Quinn, *Discovery of America*, 239. However, these six ports were not a definitive list for Hayes, but rather the minimum number that he imagined would be required.
100 Parkhurst, “Hakluyt,” 132. Given the context, the secret commodity that Parkhurst alludes to was likely gold or silver. For the most detailed examination of late-sixteenth century these customs disputes, see Edward P. Cheyney, “England and Denmark in the Later Days of Queen Elizabeth,” *The Journal of Modern History* 1, no. 1 (1929): 9-39.
Figure 1 The six ports of Edward Hayes' 1586 treatises

Few merchants, however, were likely to deal exclusively in trade. Their occupations were loosely defined in the sixteenth century and did not preclude earning income in other ways when opportunities arose. Merchants could be the sons of landed gentry such as Parkhurst, drawn into trade because they had the right connections and finances to establish themselves. However, they were often occupational chameleons such as Edward Hayes, proposing various projects to their patrons in search of other employment. Such men were highly adaptable by necessity and juggled a number of interests in England, Ireland, and the wider Atlantic. For Hayes especially, the colonization of Newfoundland was simply one of many schemes that he proposed to Burghley and his son Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, between 1579 and 1613. Like Parkhurst, these projects included other colonial ventures that he could lead in the North
Atlantic – to the St. Lawrence Valley, Norumbega and Northern Virginia. However, Hayes also proposed improvements that he could make to copper and silver coinage in Ireland, the water supply in London, or the English military, along with various proposed monopolies for himself and his associates. It was his coinage schemes, rather than his plans for colonization, that proved most profitable, eventually earning him an income of 100£ a year from King James I.

What was unusual about Parkhurst and Hayes was their decision to travel to Newfoundland, captaining their own ships, rather than delegating those tasks to proxies. Most merchants, and indeed most colonial promoters, had no interest in witnessing the fishery “in proper person,” as Parkhurst phrased it. This lack of interest is surprising, given that cod was so important to transatlantic commerce. It exceeded both the fur trade in North America and European trade with the Gulf of Mexico in volume and value by the late-sixteenth century. Where Hayes and Parkhurst saw the potential of Newfoundland from their first visits, most Englishmen probably would have agreed with

101 Quinn, *Discovery of America*, 233, 243.
102 Although it was largely mythical and therefore an imprecise location, Hayes’ “Norumbega” roughly corresponds to what is now Maine, extending north into the St. Lawrence Valley and east to Cape Breton. To most sixteenth-century commentators, “Northern Virginia” stretched along the coast from modern North Carolina to Maine, while “Southern Virginia” could reach as far south as Florida. However, Hayes never promoted colonization below 40 degrees latitude – approximately modern day New York City – for fear the “hoatt & untemperat” climates further south would be unhealthy for English colonists. [Hayes], “A discourse Concerning a voyage,” 163.
103 Ibid., 234.
104 Parkhurst, “Hakluyt,” 132; Cell, “Newfoundland Company,” 613. It is possible that the near disastrous voyage of thirty gentlemen “desirous to see the strange things of the world” in 1536 had quelled interest in travel to Newfoundland. “Richard Hore’s voyage to Newfoundland and beyond,” *PN* (1589), 517-519, quote on 517. After being separated from their charterer, Richard Hore, they were stranded on the northern shores of Newfoundland. They nearly died of starvation, finally resorting to cannibalism, before a French fishing ship arrived.
the Hungarian poet, Stephen Parmenius, who complained in 1583 that it was “nothing but a very wildernesse.” Stories of exploration or piracy offering adventure and quick profits, rather than descriptions of the fishery itself, were far more likely to gain the attention of gentlemen investors. Nonetheless, both Hayes and Parkhurst were able to use their experiences in Newfoundland during the 1570s and 1580s to promote colonization in the hopes that it would speed the growth of the fishery and secure their financial futures.

In both his letter to Hakluyt, the elder, and his earlier treatise, Parkhurst presented himself as the foremost expert on Newfoundland geography, proposing that he lead future explorations to the islands of Cape Breton and Anticosti. As no evidence of such an expedition has been found, it seems that Parkhurst’s bid for patronage was rejected. Nonetheless, his later subscription to Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s 1583 voyage and commendation of Sir George Peckham’s *A True Reporte* that same year indicate his expectation that the English would become “lordes of the whole fishing in small time.” He proposed that all they needed was to establish fortifications at strategic points on the island’s coast and then exchange protection of the fishery for foreign commodities, as he had agreed to do with the Portuguese. His willingness to accept Peckham’s intended agrarian settlements in Newfoundland demonstrates that Elizabethan merchants were not necessarily hostile to the idea of settlement but rather ambivalent. Settlement could potentially supply the fortifications with provisions and men, but it was not seen as necessary for a commercial colony to succeed.

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Hayes went beyond this semi-feudal model of simply protecting the fishery from piracy in his two 1586 treatises written for Lord Burghley. Like Parkhurst, he saw the Newfoundland fishery as an opportunity to gain not only salt cod but also commodities from continental Europe; he proposed turning the island into the world’s largest “mart” or market, free from foreign taxation or interference. The island already attracted annual fishing fleets from every major port in Western Europe by the 1580s. Hayes’ 1583 voyage with Gilbert to St. John’s harbour had impressed him with the rich variety of “wine, marmalades, most fine ruske or bisket, sweet oyles and sundry delicacies” that these ships brought with them. Yet it was not until after the 1585 Spanish seizure of English shipping and Sir Bernard Drake’s subsequent privateering attack on the Portuguese in Newfoundland that Hayes wrote his two treatises to Burghley.

From 1585 to the end of the Anglo-Spanish war in 1604, Spanish authorities continued to seize foreign and domestic – as much as the Portuguese and Basques could be considered domestic – merchant vessels, using their crews for galley work and confiscating any provisions or merchandise for their own navy. Meanwhile, privateers sanctioned by Elizabeth I preyed on any number of merchant vessels in the Atlantic – especially, but not exclusively, Iberians. Thus, trading in either English or Iberian ports was precarious. As the war progressed, the Newfoundland trade became an increasingly

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109 Hayes, “first platt,” 83[r]. However, he was careful to note that trade would still be subject to English taxation of “a tenth.” Ibid.
110 Edward Hayes, “A report of the voyage and success thereof, attempted in the yeere of our Lord 1583 by sir Humfrey Gilbert knight,” PN, 2: 151. He later gave an extended list of provisions gathered in 1583: “wines, bread or ruske, fish wette and drie, sweete oiles: besides many other, as marmalades, figs, lymmons barrelled, and such like: Also we had other necessary provisions for trimming our ships, nets and lines to fish withall, boates or pinnesses fit for discovery. In briefe, we were supplied of our wants commodiously, as if we had bene in a Countrey or some Citie populous and plentifull of all things.” Ibid., 154 (emphasis added).
dangerous yet profitable occupation. Salt fish, necessary for provisioning both militaries and civilians, was in high demand throughout Europe at a time when Icelandic fishing was beginning to decline. In 1580, the Danish authorities began enforcing a licensing fee for foreign ships in Iceland in addition to the pre-existing customs; this marked the beginning of a long and bitter legal battle between the Danish and English monarchies over freedom of the seas.\textsuperscript{111} Much as Parkhurst’s plans for protecting the Newfoundland trade were based on his own experience with French pirates, Hayes’ treatises were reacting to contemporary problems plaguing salt fish trade and offering what he believed was the best solution.

\textbf{Newfoundland as the “Greatest Mart in the World”}

At the close of the sixteenth century, the Newfoundland fishery was the centre of European commercial activity in the North Atlantic.\textsuperscript{112} Hundreds of fishing vessels from the West Country of England, Brittany, Normandy, the Bay of Biscay, and Portugal arrived annually to make train oil and catch cod. The cod was cured, using either the wet or dry method, and shipped back to the major European ports. The Northern French typically used the wet or “green” cure popular in that region’s markets, where fish were preserved in the ship’s hold using large quantities of salt or packed in brine. The English, Portuguese, and Basques, on the other hand, used the dry cure favoured by larger Iberian and Mediterranean markets for its superior preservative qualities in hot, humid conditions.

\textsuperscript{112} Pope, \textit{Fish Into Wine}, 14; Innis, “Economic History of the Maritimes,” 27-42.
climates.\textsuperscript{113} As a result, ships from across Western Europe converged annually on the shores of Newfoundland in order to prepare and dry their cod. English fishing merchants would then take their catches either back to England for re-export or, increasingly, directly from Newfoundland to Spain, Portugal, and Southern France, in what became known as the triangular trade.\textsuperscript{114} (See Figure 2)

Figure 2 The North Atlantic fisheries. From Duhamel du Monceau and Henri Louis, \textit{Traité général des pesches, et histoire des poissons qu'elles fournissent...} (Paris, 1772). Reproduced by permission of Memorial University of Newfoundland.

\textsuperscript{113} Margaret R. Conrad and James K. Hiller, \textit{Atlantic Canada: A Concise History} (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006), 30.
\textsuperscript{114} Pope, \textit{Fish Into Wine}, 93. Merchant ships that acted as middle men between Newfoundland fishery and the continental European markets, known as “sack ships,” developed in the early seventeenth century. However, Parkhurst’s letters and Elizabeth I’s warning to the fishing fleet in 1585 indicates that there was little differentiation between merchant and fishing vessels in the sixteenth-century fishery. For a more detailed explanation of sack ships, see \textit{ibid.}, 79-116.
These continental markets offered both a high demand for salt fish and a rich variety of the consumer goods sought by social elites in England. Prior to the 1560s and 1570s, when civil wars in the Low Countries destabilized the Antwerp market, the cloth trade out of London had enjoyed similar success.\(^{115}\) By the beginning of Elizabeth I’s reign in 1558,

Antwerp had become the entrepôt of northern Europe, as a result of its favoured location at the intersection of trading routes (the east-west route from the Baltic to Biscay and the north-south routes through the Rhine Valley), its choice by the Portuguese as the staple town for the spices of the East and the proximity of well-developed industries such as cloth-finishing.\(^{116}\)

The devastation caused by the loss of Antwerp and temporary collapse of the cloth trade served as a hard lesson for the English. Their dependency on foreign markets, where merchants were at the mercy of political and religious conflicts, became a proverbial albatross as the growing salt fish trade made their independence ever more improbable.\(^{117}\)

Even before war with Spain broke out and severed legal trade between the two nations, the triangular trade from Newfoundland was problematic for the English for two reasons. First, the fishing merchants trading in foreign ports, particularly in the Iberian empire, were subject to heavy, and often arbitrary, taxation by foreign customs officials. Throughout the late-sixteenth century, the heavy taxation imposed by Spanish officials helped cripple the small Portuguese fishery and severely damaged that of the Spanish


\(^{117}\) Stephen Hornsby has argued that the collapse of Antwerp helped facilitate colonial interest more broadly. As Iberian and Mediterranean markets had little interest in English wool, merchants had to find new commodities to trade for foreign goods and salt fish fit this niche nicely. Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 14.
Basques. According to Hayes, his own loss of profits as a merchant coupled with a second problem: the political rivals of England were enriching themselves through this taxation of the salt fish trade. The confiscation of foreign ships and impressment of their crews for galley work up to 1604 further served to enrich Spain at the expense of England.

Hayes’ depiction of the triangular trade as a drain on the public as well as private wealth acknowledged England’s increasingly problematic dependence on foreign trade. However, unlike seventeenth-century mercantilists, Hayes did not identify commercial independence as the only solution. After all, there were significant profits to be made by selling salt fish to Catholic nations, as evidenced by the number of merchants who continued to smuggle fish into Spain directly or through French Basque Country, regardless of embargos or wars. Between 1586 and 1602, Hayes maintained that trade with Iberian merchants should continue as it previously had. The one exception he made after the 1588 Spanish Armada was that naval provisions should not be purchased from “forren dominions... seing that upon accidents occurring in state affayrres, we may be barred from them, to the weakening of our puissant Navyes.”

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120 Henry Roberts, *Newes from the Levane Seas* (London: 1594), B3v, and HCA 13/96, August 20, 1591 – both reprinted in *NAW*, 4: 114-120. The Iberian nations were equally dependent on the salt fish trade, as evidenced by the prevalence of illicit trade throughout the 1569-1573 embargo and the 1585-1604 war.
121 [Hayes], “A discourse Concerning a voyage,” 164.
As England had recently witnessed, its navy was essential to preventing foreign invasion, so it is entirely reasonable that Hayes would recommend producing naval supplies either domestically or in the colonies. Mercantilists seeking to “maximize national power in a world of bitter international rivalries” by restricting or eliminating foreign trade entirely would have found more in common with the English isolationists than with Hayes’ colonial plans.  Rather than targeting foreign trade, Hayes identified foreign taxation and political instability as the weaknesses of triangular trade. He believed that disruptions caused by animosities – internationally and intranationally – could be avoided by simply creating entrepôts like Antwerp in the more neutral ground of North America. Only when foreign trade could not be secured as Hayes intended and showed signs of diminishing did it become necessary to supplant this with trade to the English colonies.

Examples such as Darlene Abreu-Ferreira’s study of the sixteenth-century Portuguese fishery suggest that Hayes’ claim of imminent danger to English commerce may have been an exaggeration. The Portuguese had become considerably dependent on English merchants for imported cod by the close of the century, encouraging the late-sixteenth century growth of English fishing fleets in both Newfoundland and Iceland.

122 Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, 114.
123 The English did not immediately jump to a mercantilist model. The first steps after the loss of Antwerp were increasing domestic production of commercial goods to replace imports and diversifying overseas trade into the Levant and the Indies. Archer, “Commerce and Consumption,” 411-426. The end of privateering, which had also supplied foreign goods to England, in the seventeenth century added impetus to this economic change. Nicholas P. Canny, “The Origins of Empire: An Introduction,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, 1: 4.
124 Contrary to claims that the Newfoundland fishery grew due to the decline of the Icelandic fishery, Evan Jones has demonstrated that both witnessed dramatic growth at the end of the sixteenth century. Although the Newfoundland trade was profitable by American standards, the Icelandic trade exceeded it as late as the 1630s. Evan T. Jones,
Gillian Cell has also claimed that “War, in fact, created the ideal situation for the expansion of the English fishery at Newfoundland” through a “consistent policy of governmental protection” and higher prices in England and Europe. Yet the English merchants would not dominate the salt fish trade in the much larger Iberian markets until the second half of the seventeenth century. The Spanish seizure of English shipping and imprisonment of mariners in May 1585, followed quickly by Sir Bernard Drake’s retaliatory attack on the Iberian fishing fleets in Newfoundland further demonstrated that triangular trade still carried considerable risks. When Hayes wrote to Burghley in early 1586, it was unclear how far this escalation of violence towards merchants would go.

Trade embargoes had become fairly routine in the late-sixteenth century, but were usually short-lived. Between 1569 and 1573, Anglo-Spanish trade had witnessed a similar, though significantly less damaging, embargo as retaliation for Elizabeth I’s seizure of Spanish pay-ships. In 1564, an even shorter embargo had been declared in the Straits. It is likely, then, that Hayes anticipated a similarly timely conclusion to the latest Anglo-Spanish conflict. However, even legal trade during peacetime was constantly threatened by the Spanish Inquisition and impressment. When a vindictive master’s boy reported the presence of Protestant literature on his ship to Inquisitors in 1575 Seville, the Red Lion’s crew were imprisoned for fifteen weeks while the ship’s

125 Cell, English Enterprise, 33.
master and merchant were sent to work in the galleys for five years.\textsuperscript{128} As Spain found itself increasingly short of mariners, the pretence of religious reform often gave way to forceful impressment.

To avoid foreign taxation and potential confiscation or imprisonment, Hayes suggested that the harbours of Newfoundland, the St. Lawrence, and later New England, be fortified and used as markets for peaceful trade with French, Spanish, and Portuguese merchants. Like Parkhurst and the colonial promoters before and after him, Hayes imagined a rich variety of commodities extracted from the Northwest Atlantic. These included fish, furs, salt, lumber, minerals, and grains.\textsuperscript{129} Whatever England could not produce itself would be gained either through foreign trade at these markets or the natural abundance of North America. Hayes even suggested that labourers at these overseas ports would provide an outlet for surplus English cloth, the trade of which had suffered throughout the 1580s.\textsuperscript{130} Under Hayes’ plan, therefore, direct trade between the colonies and England would be an adjunct to foreign trade, filling potential gaps, rather than a wholesale replacement.

Hayes’ commercial vision of colonization was designed to maximize profit and minimize risk for merchants. In this, he borrowed from the experience of West Country port towns such as Plymouth. The fortification of harbours in Newfoundland that Hayes suggested was remarkably similar to the requests for fortification in the Elizabethan port towns over the 1580s and 1590s.\textsuperscript{131} The dual appeal to protecting public and private

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 263-264.
\textsuperscript{129} Hayes, “first platt,” 83v; Hayes, “A report of the voyage,” 153-154. The latter was decidedly more fanciful in its predictions of commodities, including cherry and pear trees.
\textsuperscript{130} Hayes, “A Treatise, conteining important inducements,” 18.
\textsuperscript{131} Shannon, “Chapter III,” 1-55.
wealth in these requests, as well as the use of fortifications to protect trade from attack rather than to keep out a hostile indigenous population, as in Ireland, were both echoed in Hayes’ treatises. Historians such as Nicholas Canny have frequently argued that Ireland served as the blueprint for English colonization. In the colonial developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the evidence for reliance on Irish precedents is persuasive. Yet in the promotional documents produced by sixteenth-century merchants, the blueprint – if there was one – was primarily the domestic situation in England and commercial developments on the continent, not the ongoing conquest of Ireland. In both Newfoundland and the West Country, the security of trade was at risk due to continued hostilities with Spain. In England, the biggest threats to security were piracy and foreign invasion – a fear that would manifest itself fully following the 1588 Armada attack. In Newfoundland, however, the biggest threat was undoubtedly piracy.

Piracy and Privateering

From the perspective of marauding pirates, the annual gathering of fishing vessels in Newfoundland coincided conveniently with the return route of Spanish ships from the Caribbean, doubling the chances of a lucrative capture. As the examples of Richard Clarke and Sir Bernard Drake demonstrate, the line between legitimate privateering and illegal piracy was often blurred in the late-sixteenth century. On behalf of Henry Oughtred, Clarke raided the Portuguese fishing fleet in Newfoundland under the false

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pretence of privateering in the summer of 1582.\textsuperscript{133} Like many English merchants in the late-sixteenth century, Oughtred and his partner Sir John Perrot had suffered substantial losses to Spanish customs and confiscations. Yet, rather than obtaining a letter of reprisal from Elizabeth I, Oughtred decided to hire Clarke to plunder Iberian fishing ships indiscriminately.\textsuperscript{134} With Oughtred’s ship, the large 200-tonne \textit{Susan Fortune}, and Perrot’s modest 60-ton \textit{Popinjay}, Clarke attacked over twenty Portuguese vessels, taking one as a prize and stripping the rest of their cargos and supplies.\textsuperscript{135} Initially claiming that he had a letter of marque from Elizabeth I to attack Iberian ships, Clarke later told the sceptical English fishing merchants that the commission was from a claimant to the Portuguese throne, Dom Antonio.

Robert Ritchie has found that many sixteenth-century Englishmen became “professional privateers [and] sought commissions in the service of another prince if their own sovereign decided to opt for peace, so that it was difficult to tell who was a legitimate privateer and who was a pirate.”\textsuperscript{136} Clarke’s claim to act on behalf of Dom Antonio was therefore not implausible. However, since he had no documents to back up either of his claims when questioned more closely, the English and foreign fishing

\textsuperscript{133} Robert Ritchie would likely deem Clarke’s act to still be “officially sanctioned piracy” since, even without letters of marque or reprisal, his actions went unpunished by the English courts and he was free to sail with Gilbert the following summer. Robert Ritchie, \textit{Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 11.

\textsuperscript{134} David B. Quinn, “Clarke (Clark), Richard,” \textit{DCB}: 1.

\textsuperscript{135} Although witnesses only saw three Portuguese vessels spoiled at Renews and Fermeuse, one testified that Clarke had “committ[ed] manye other robberies the said yeare 1582 in the partes of Newefounde Lande.” The Spanish ambassador, Bernardino de Mendoza, accused the \textit{Susan Fortune} and \textit{Popinjay} of pillaging more than twenty ships in Newfoundland. “[16 October 1583] Paulo Dies testifies as to Captain Clerke’s actions in Newfoundland in 1582,” \textit{NAW}, 4: 20; Bernardino de Mendoza, “[9 November 1582] Letter to Lord Burghley,” SP 94/1, 106.

\textsuperscript{136} Ritchie, \textit{Captain Kidd}, 11-12.
merchants at Renews and Fermeuse sent written testimony against Clarke and Oughtred to the English High Court of Admiralty on behalf of Francisco Fernandes, the owner of the stolen Portuguese ship.\textsuperscript{137} Several testified again the following spring at the trial. During this trial, Oughtred finally did produce a letter of marque, but it was dated well after the two ships had departed for Newfoundland and was from neither Elizabeth I nor Dom Antonio. No record has been found of the court’s decision, if there was one. However, given that Clarke was free to leave with Gilbert and Hayes on their voyage to Newfoundland the following summer, it does not appear that Oughtred, Perrot, or himself were punished for piracy, which at that time carried the death penalty in England.\textsuperscript{138}

The ambiguity of Clarke’s piracy in Newfoundland and apparent inability or unwillingness of the fishing merchants to stop him demonstrates how vulnerable fishing ships could be to attack. Clarke had surreptitiously attacked the Portuguese ships while the majority of their crews, as well as the other ships’ crews, were away fishing.\textsuperscript{139} Even with full crews to defend them, witnesses indicated that the \textit{Susan Fortune} and \textit{Popinjay} had been “appoynted and furnished in warlike sort with men and munition victuall artillery and all other suche necessaries for the warre.”\textsuperscript{140} Out-manned and out-gunned, even the admiral of the harbour at Renews, a French Basque named “Domingo Hewes,”

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\textsuperscript{137} Quinn, “Clarke”; Quinn, \textit{NAW}, 4: 13-20. \\
\textsuperscript{138} What normally prevented a piracy conviction was the lack of eyewitnesses. Ritchie, \textit{Captain Kidd}, 140-141. Yet the High Court of Admiralty interviewed at least four witnesses for this case and had written testimony from several more. According to a letter from Bernardino de Mendoza, the stolen goods had been released to Oughtred in 1582, even though the investigation was ongoing, by Lord Burghley’s orders. It may be that Burghley also secured a pardon for Oughtred, Clarke, and Perrot in return for a portion of their prize. Mendoza, “Lord Burghley,” 106. \\
\textsuperscript{139} “[25 April 1583] Examination of William Dill,” \textit{NAW}, 4: 17. \\
\textsuperscript{140} “Paulo Dies,” 19.
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was unable to prevent the subsequent looting.\textsuperscript{141} Given that many of the most popular Iberian ports in the triangular trade, such as San Sebastian and Viana, were inaccessible by ships over 120 tons, most of these fishing ships would have been no more than 80 tons.\textsuperscript{142} Compared to Clarke’s two ships, even the best-armed fishing ship seemed to witnesses “but slenderlye appoynced for fighte”\textsuperscript{143}

Paulo Dies, a Portuguese master who lost his provisions, his stock of salt fish and train oil, as well as his munitions, sails, and anchors in Clarke’s attack, came to England in October 1583 to testify and provided one of the most detailed accounts of the event. Dies believed that the English ships made “noe resistance” because they were in a state of confusion over the legitimacy of Clarke’s claim when the attacks began. He believed it was this uncertainty that caused them to hesitate when they normally would have defended the Portuguese ships, outnumbered or not.\textsuperscript{144} By the time they had realised that Clarke was a fraud, the best the English ships could do was hide Portuguese mariners from the pirates, who were threatening to murder them all, and offer the Portuguese safe passage home and testimonials for the High Court of Admiralty.\textsuperscript{145}

For licensed privateers, such as Bernard Drake, the opportunity to plunder Newfoundland fishing fleets was just as enticing as it was to Clarke. Drake’s attack on the Iberian fishery in 1585, again damaging smaller Portuguese fishing vessels far more

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\textsuperscript{141} “[25 April 1583] Examination of Thomas Peers,” \textit{NAW}, 4: 15. In the court’s examination of the witnesses, the tenth question asked was why the admiral of the harbour had not stopped Clarke. As Anthony Parkhurst indicated in 1578, the admiral was supposed to uphold his end of the contract by defending other ships from pirates. Parkhurst, “Hakluyt,” 134. Even though this was customary to Newfoundland and not England, the High Court of Admiralty seems to have recognized its legitimacy.
\textsuperscript{142} Croft, “English Mariners,” 261-262.
\textsuperscript{143} “William Dill,” 17.
\textsuperscript{144} “Paulo Dies,” 20.
\end{footnotesize}
than the Spanish, was sanctioned by Elizabeth I as retaliation for Spain’s confiscation of English ships. Humphrey Gilbert had first suggested such an attack in 1577 as a means to “annoy the King of Spain”; in his plan, the Queen would pretend to be outraged, while secretly giving her consent. The general assumption of men such as Gilbert was that war with Spain was inevitable, so England should strike the first blow. Although it was Spain that technically struck first against the English merchants, interest in Gilbert’s scheme had already been revived by Sir Francis Walsingham earlier that year. That England “reacted” so quickly to the Spanish embargo is therefore unsurprising. Unlike Gilbert, Walsingham had no expectation that the King of Spain would be fooled by Elizabeth’s protestations and declared simply that “The traffike into Spayn wyll be cutt of.” He hoped that a league between the English, Scottish, and French could help prevent the Spanish from taking “revenge,” but offered no solution for merchants who relied on the Anglo-Iberian trade for their livelihoods.

The earlier Habsburg-Valois war, ending in 1559, had already demonstrated the disastrous impact that this kind of warfare could have on the Newfoundland trade. From 1554 to 1555, the French Newfoundland fleet was all but wiped out by the predations of Spanish privateers, culminating in a raid on St. John’s harbour that saw twenty-one ships captured and many more destroyed. This event served to bring the disparate national fishing fleets together both for their mutual protection and to ensure amicable trade relations. As Parkhurst’s letter to Hakluyt the elder indicates, letters of reprisal were

146 Francis Walsingham, “A plotte for the annoyeng of the King of Spayn [c.1584-1585],” NAW, 4: 46-47, quote on 47.
147 Ibid, 47.
148 Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, 8-9.
generally a last resort for fishing merchants in the late-sixteenth century. Only when all negotiations and appeals had failed would merchants attack the fishing community in Newfoundland. This attitude is also apparent in Hayes’ first 1586 treatise, where he proposed that peaceful trade with foreign fishing merchants “will allure them more, then force shall [quell th]em.”

Hayes proposed that ships unwilling to submit to English authority and taxation could have their small pinnaces and stages in Newfoundland confiscated or destroyed during the winter months, sabotaging their fishing operation, but he fell short of suggesting outright piracy. This punishment could just as easily have been administered to uncooperative English ships as to the French, Spanish, or Portuguese.

Using piracy to enforce English sovereignty would have seemed counterproductive to both Hayes and Parkhurst. Piracy was dangerous for all merchants; even if they were not targeted by it directly, their allies and themselves often became collateral damage, either attacked by indiscriminate English pirate ships or targeted in the inevitable reprisals. Instead of enforcing order, piracy would have created confusion, anger, and instability in the mercantile networks. By 1585, this anger had already surfaced in lobbying by London merchants against English privateers and the open hostility of mariners towards those they believed had incited the war through piracy. In one such instance, a master’s mate, Thomas Prise, was accused by his crew of being a

Hayes, “first platt,” 85[v].

The closest Hayes came to supporting piracy was his suggestion that Elizabeth I could prevent French and Spanish aggression against English merchants in Europe by “pretendinge warres” against their Newfoundland fishing fleets. This is almost a complete reversal of Walsingham’s plan, using the threat of attack to maintain peaceful trade relations. Hayes, “first platt,” 84[r].
“thief and sea-rover, ... [as] he had been with that villain Sir Francis Drake in the Indies.” The resulting insubordination included threats of reporting him to the Spanish authorities and a refusal to leave the harbour of Ribadeo. Even though England was at war with Spain and they were all trading there illegally, the mariners clearly viewed their actions as a social crime but piracy as a far more serious matter.

To reassure investors that such attacks would not be involved in colonization, Hayes stated that only the largest and strongest Basque ships might resist English authority in Newfoundland. He based this on their ability to protect themselves from piracy, making the offer of English protection in fortified harbours appear redundant. However, the retaliation he suggested to persuade the Basques would only have damaged shore-based fishing, which required small boats and large areas of shore to process the cod. From his own experience in Newfoundland, Hayes was no doubt aware that the largest and strongest ships usually participated in the Grand Banks fishery well off the coast, using a wet cure. This implied element of Hayes’ argument is significant because it reveals his perceived limits for English sovereignty in Newfoundland. His plans for colonization were limited to exploiting the shore-based fishery; although it has sometimes been assumed, Hayes did not seek a monopoly of the entire Newfoundland fishery, which would have been far more difficult to enforce.

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151 A legal grey area existed when foreign goods (that is, goods belonging to foreign merchants) were transported in English vessels and vice-versa, though privateers often used any excuse they could find to plunder. Ritchie, *Captain Kidd*, 11.


153 Hayes, “first platt,” 85[v].

154 See, for example, Cell, *English Enterprise*, 43. This characterization of Hayes’ plan is a conflation with Parkhurst, whose letters made much more grandiose claims about the potential extent of English sovereignty in Newfoundland but had no concrete plans to support them. *Ibid.*, 23. It further conflates Hayes’ intentions with those of the
The Limits of English Sovereignty

Exploiting the entire Newfoundland fishery, especially given the geographic vagary of the term, would have certainly been impossible for the English. Even with modern technology and international law, nations still struggle with the difficulties of enforcing oceanic sovereignty. Assuming that this was the intent of Hayes and other colonial promoters, historians have often used this as a point of criticism for later colonial efforts: the English never achieved total sovereignty over the fishery, therefore the Newfoundland colonies were deemed a “failure.”\(^{155}\) As such, the history of early Newfoundland colonization has often become a matter of explaining this failure. Although modern historians have greater access to archaeological and documentary evidence than Hayes, they have nonetheless given him too little credit. However limited his experience – which centered primarily around the Avalon Peninsula – Hayes’ participation in the sixteenth-century Newfoundland fishery gave him valuable insights that should not be dismissed so easily.

Underlying this assumption of failed sovereignty claims is a broader historiographic issue: labeling colonial Newfoundland a failure for deviating from the supposedly uniform British model of colonial governance and then reading this back into the sixteenth century.\(^{156}\) As historians such as Jerry Bannister and Jack P. Greene have argued, the major flaw in this analysis is that “a single model of colonial development

\(^{155}\) Although oil has replaced cod as the most lucrative maritime resource to exploit, the continuation of French sovereignty and possession in the seas surrounding Saint Pierre and Miquelon remains a contentious issue.
never existed." In part, this divergence was due to the variety of territories and the different types of colonists each attracted. However, it was also the outcome of the late-sixteenth century’s diverse colonial plans. Hayes’ proposals for colonizing Newfoundland were ambitious, but no more outlandish or implausible than other proposals. He saw a problem, the interruption of Anglo-Iberian trade, and proposed a solution, an international market in Newfoundland. Hayes and Parkhurst also undeniably saw the pre-existing trade of security for commodities in Newfoundland as a lucrative opportunity and sought to exploit it on a larger scale.

Protection from piracy was only one part of the arrangement, however. As Peter Pope has noted, harsh winter weather and the island’s aboriginal inhabitants – the Beothuk – also caused considerable damage to the pinnaces, stages, flakes, and various buildings; often these structures would need to be rebuilt each spring, adding to the cost and length of a fishing voyage. The offer of protection from these losses, in both time and resources, would likely have appealed to the shore-based fishing fleets just as Hayes anticipated. The issuing of passports by Humphrey Gilbert to fishing merchants such as Portuguese Tomas Andre further suggests genuine interest from these merchants in English protection. Historians such as D.W. Prowse have dismissed the passport’s survival as coincidental and insisted that foreign merchants such as Andre likely thought nothing of it. Yet the passport guaranteed him the right to fish and trade freely in

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156 Cell, “Newfoundland Company,” 625.
157 Bannister, Rule of the Admirals, 5. See also, Greene, Pursuits of Happiness.
158 Stages were used for unloading and cleaning the cod brought in; the actual drying areas were termed flakes. The Beothuk disassembled such wooden structures to extract the iron nails, which were then re-worked into tools. Pope, Fish Into Wine, 73-76.
159 Prowse, A History of Newfoundland, 72-73. See also, Alan Taylor, American Colonies (Toronto: Viking Penguin, 2001), 94. Andre’s passport was sent to the Spanish King Philip II, who was monitoring Gilbert’s voyage to gauge the seriousness of English
Newfoundland along with the assurance that any English colonies established there would assist and protect “him and his ships and goods.”\textsuperscript{160} Given Gilbert’s general lack of interest in the fishery – he was far more interested in potential silver mines – Hayes may not have been exaggerating when he stated that the exchange of protection for recognition of English sovereignty through passports such as Andre’s was actually suggested by the fishing merchants themselves.\textsuperscript{161}

As the piracy at Renews in 1582 demonstrated, even the best-armed fishing ship was no match for pirates “soe stronge as throwghlye appojyncted with men munition and artyllerye” as Clarke had been.\textsuperscript{162} Yet with the loss of his largest ship, the two-hundred ton \textit{Bark Ralegh}, on the way to Newfoundland in 1583, along with crewmen lost to disease, death, and desertion, Gilbert’s four remaining ships would certainly have been outnumbered by the thirty-six fishing ships they faced in St. John’s harbour that summer.\textsuperscript{163} In 1578, Parkhurst had estimated that most Newfoundland fishing vessels were around sixty tons, a conservative estimate when compared to the records of several French ports; Spanish ships were relatively bigger and better-armed than this average, while Portuguese ships were comparatively smaller.\textsuperscript{164} Hayes’ assertion in 1586 that “many” ships in Newfoundland were between two hundred and three hundred tons is

\textsuperscript{161} Hayes, “first platt,” 85[v].
\textsuperscript{162} “John Heimers,” 18.
\textsuperscript{163} Gilbert’s expedition consisted of the \textit{Delight} (120 tons), the \textit{Golden Hind} (40 tons), the \textit{Swallow} (40 tons), and his little frigate the \textit{Squirrel} (10 tons). Hayes, “A report of the voyage,” 148.
\textsuperscript{164} Parkhurst, “Hakluyt,” 134. French records indicate that their fleet was larger than Parkhurst estimated it to be, with ships up to one hundred tons. See Pope, \textit{Fish Into Wine}, 20. However, it is possible that Parkhurst’s estimates were based solely on the smaller, shore-based fishing vessels that he had encountered.
therefore highly unlikely, as is his claim that there were few or no ships under sixty to eighty tons.\textsuperscript{165} Nonetheless, there is little chance that Humphrey Gilbert could have simply bullied provisions out of the Portuguese fishing merchants without other ships intervening, as Peter Pope has suggested.\textsuperscript{166}

Perhaps the most telling example of antenational cooperation was Richard Clarke’s dramatic rescue in 1583. Clarke was the master of Gilbert’s flagship, the \textit{Delight}, which was shipwrecked while trying to locate Sable Island. While Hayes estimated that a hundred men died in the shipwreck, Clarke and sixteen crewmen were able to escape in a small boat with one oar.\textsuperscript{167} Despite having preyed on the Portuguese fishing fleet the previous summer, when a French Basque ship found the shipwrecked Clarke and his remaining crew – some having died of starvation and exposure – it offered them safe passage back to the port of Pasaia. When Inquisitors came aboard, demanding to know who these men were, the master of the French ship lied and said they “were poore fishermen that had cast away [their] ship in Newfound land.”\textsuperscript{168} That night, he brought them to shore, where they quickly crossed the border into France. Although Clarke referred to the French master as “our great friend” and insisted that Spanish Basque whalers would have been equally willing to help, the lie told to Inquisitors is most revealing. English fishing in Newfoundland was tacitly accepted by foreign

\textsuperscript{165} Hayes, “first platt,” 84[v].
\textsuperscript{166} Peter E. Pope, \textit{The Many Landfalls of John Cabot} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 166.
\textsuperscript{167} Hayes, “A report of the voyage,” 348-349.
officials for the moment, but as the Portuguese, Spanish, and French all made claims to the region, colonization was a far more contentious issue.\textsuperscript{169}

Gilbert’s sudden, unexpected death on the return voyage in 1583 and the explicit exclusion of the Newfoundland fishery from Ralegh’s subsequent patent likely helped sway ambitions further south to the Chesapeake and Guiana, but this was by no means inevitable. Interest in colonizing Newfoundland and the North Atlantic was not limited to English merchants and gentlemen in the sixteenth century, but was just as common within their Portuguese, Basque, and French counterparts. Carla Rahn Phillips’ assessment that the French viewed Northeast America “less as a venue for serious colonization than as a passageway through the American landmass toward Asia” oversimplifies a complex issue.\textsuperscript{170} Permanent agricultural settlements were certainly not the only kind of “serious colonization” being proposed within Europe. Late-Elizabethan colonial promoters such as Hayes hoped that colonization would help speed the English discovery of a passage to China, whose existence had been guaranteed by the “infallible argument[s]” of Humphrey Gilbert and John Dee.\textsuperscript{171} This perception of colonization as a means to access trade with China and Europe rather than an end in itself was altogether typical of early European colonial plans.

Although North America was, in William Eccles’ terms, “a geographical nuisance” preventing Europeans from easily accessing trade with China, hopes of a

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} [Hayes], “A discourse concerning a voyage,” 169.
Northwest Passage continued to fuel colonial schemes into the seventeenth century. The highly theoretical nature of geographic arguments for the passage and continual failure of prominent navigators to locate it did not dissuade Europeans, David Quinn reminds us, because for no other venture “were the potential rewards of success so great.” Humphrey Gilbert’s own interest in colonization stemmed from a plan to establish fortifications along the Northwest Passage “for the shortening of the voyage.” The idea of settlement as a means to speed the discovery along, however, was not the product of Edward Hayes’ imagination. Rather, it began with the Portuguese Barcelos and Corte Real families in the early to mid-sixteenth century. Of all the European powers, the Portuguese were particularly tenacious, planning colonies around Newfoundland, Labrador, and Cape Breton from 1521 right up to the union with Spain in 1580. The evidence is sparse in all sixteenth-century colonial attempts in the North Atlantic, particularly regarding the precise geographic locations, but the level of sustained interest is clear.

173 Quinn, NAW, 4: xix.
174 Gilbert, Cataia, Hi[v]-Hii[r].
176 Part of the problem with geographic vagueness lies in the fluidity of terms like “Newfoundland,” “Norumbega,” “New France” and “Acadia.” See Pope, Fish Into Wine, 15; Kristen A. Seaver, “Norumbega and ‘Harmonia Mundi’ in Sixteenth-Century Cartography,” Imago Mundi 50 (1998), 34-58; Allan Greer, The People of New France (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 3-4; Jeffers Lennox, L’Acadie Trouvée: Mapping, Geographic Knowledge, and Imagining Northeastern North America, 1710-1763 (PhD diss., Dalhousie University, 2010), 55. Rumoured overwintering of Normans, Bretons, and Basques preceeding officially-sanctioned colonization have not been confirmed and remain highly speculative. See, for example, Eccles, The French in North America, 12.
Many of the prominent figures in colonization paralleled one another across national boundaries in both their motivations and colonial plans. Martin Frobisher was in some ways an English Jacques Cartier. While attempting to discover the Northwest Passage, both believed they had discovered rich mines of precious metals – the former in Greenland, the latter in the St. Lawrence Valley. In both cases, the English and French monarchs eagerly invested only to be disappointed, after which each became far more cautious. Further south, the Charlesfort settlement of Huguenots founded by Jean Ribault in 1562 planned to use the colony as “a base from which to trade with or plunder the Spanish,” combining the later aims of Hayes and Gilbert into one. Early-seventeenth century French colonization would demonstrate that its subjects, like the English, harboured a variety of opinions on colonization.

The consortium of fur traders and Acadian colony established by Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Monts in 1604 was built on much the same premise as the corporation proposed by Hayes in 1586. The expectation of de Monts and his investors was that “fish and fur would provide profits enough” to sustain explorations into a route through America. The disastrous penal colony of the Marquis de la Roche on Sable Island – begun with fifty men in 1598 and ending with just eleven survivors in 1603 – had quieted interest in criminal labour, but it was hoped that vagrants would be more resilient. Foreshadowing the difficulties faced by the English in Newfoundland from 1610 onward, de Monts was unsuccessful in both his efforts to enforce a monopoly on the fur trade and

attempts to create a monopoly over the North Atlantic fishery.\textsuperscript{181} Just as the English would discover of their own fishery, the Newfoundland merchants had become accustomed to fishing and trading with few restrictions and would not part with this freedom easily. In the case of de Monts, his attempts to monopolize trade were constantly challenged in court by French merchants and thus eventually abandoned in 1607. Perhaps anticipating the jurisdictioinal problems of the seventeenth century, Hayes proposed a symbiotic relationship with the fishing merchants rather than overt domination.

Acknowledging the interest of other Europeans in the North Atlantic is essential to understanding sixteenth-century English anxiety over the Newfoundland fishery. As Richard Hakluyt wrote in 1584,

\begin{quote}
yf wee doe procrastinate the plantinge... the frenche, the Normans, the Brytons or the duche, or some other nation, will not onely prevent us of the mightie Baye of St. Laurence, where they have gotten the starte of us already... but will also deprive us of that goodd [sic] lande which now wee have discovered.\textsuperscript{182}
\end{quote}

If the French or Spanish annexed the North Atlantic before England, there was no guarantee that they would build peaceful trading ports and welcome foreign merchants as Hayes intended. Even more alarming than the possibility of being taxed by a foreign noble like de Monts was the possibility of being forcefully excluded from the fishing grounds. The Iberians had been particularly territorial in their Southern Atlantic possessions, executing foreign merchants who attempted to trade there as “pirates.”\textsuperscript{183} Outnumbered by French and Iberian fishing fleets in Newfoundland throughout the

\textsuperscript{181} Conrad and Hiller, \textit{Atlantic Canada}, 37.
\textsuperscript{182} Richard Hakluyt, “A particulcer discourse concerning the greate necessitie and manifoide comodities that are like to growe to this Realm of England by the Western discoveries lately attempted [Discourse of Western Planting, 1584],” \textit{NAW}, 3: 102.
sixteenth century, the English could easily have lost access to that “singuler commoditie” – salt cod – if antenational loyalties were not secured.\textsuperscript{184} It was with this in mind that Hayes and Parkhurst envisioned their inclusive colonial plans.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter began with a dispute between Anthony Parkhurst and the Portuguese fishing merchants in Newfoundland in 1578. When English Brownists were sent to locate a potential settlement in 1597, they encountered a rather different kind of antenational loyalty. Believing they had found an easy target, the Brownists attacked a Spanish Basque fishing vessel in the Gulf of St. Lawrence only to be repelled by four nearby French ships. An antenational loyalty was still present, but only between the culturally similar French and Spanish Basques.\textsuperscript{185} Had Spanish Basques attacked an English fishing vessel, it is unlikely the French would have intervened. Where these ships had previously come to the aid of English mariners, rescuing the shipwrecked Richard Clarke in 1583, there was now open hostility. When that same Richard Clarke attempted to purchase salt from three French Basque ships in St. John’s thirteen years later, his vessel was set upon to cries of “\textit{rende vous rende vous... Anglice yeeld your selves}”\textsuperscript{186} Even though commercial ties with England had not been severed completely by the long Anglo-Spanish War, acts of aggression such as those of Clarke, Drake, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{183} Eccles, \textit{The French in North America}, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Hakluyt, “Discourse of Western Planting,” 102.
\item \textsuperscript{185} \textit{NAW}, 4: 78-79. The four vessels were French Basques, three from Saint-Jean-de-Luz and one from La Rochelle (with the crew being mainly from Saint-Jean-de-Luz); the Spanish vessel was from Orio, near San Sebastián.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Richard Clarke, “Complaint against Michael De Sance, Martin de Dance and Nicholas de Biscay,” \textit{NAW}, 4: 54-55.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Brownists – who did eventually succeed in their piracy – had seriously damaged them. The early modern Newfoundland fishery did not exist “in a vacuum,” unaffected by outside events.¹⁸⁷

By the end of the sixteenth century, English merchants Anthony Parkhurst and Edward Hayes had created their own vision of colonizing Newfoundland based on their experiences in England and the Atlantic world. By doing so, these men revealed their assumptions about the purpose of colonization and what they believed were the largest problems facing England. Essentially, colonization served to facilitate and encourage trade within England as with European nations and China. This was not settlement for the sake of settlement. While the detailed plans laid out by Hayes would not have been easy to achieve, given certain legal vagaries and the divisive political climate of Elizabeth I’s court, they were not impossible. However, events in England and Europe over the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century would make it increasingly improbable for his plans to succeed.

In England, the passing of prominent patrons Sir Francis Walsingham in 1590 and Lord Burghley in 1598 along with an aging but childless queen served to cool interest in overseas colonization by distracting Englishmen with political tensions at home. The 1590s became known as Elizabeth’s “second reign,” dominated by the factions of the Earl of Salisbury, arguing for peace with Spain, and Essex, arguing for war. As Edward Hayes discovered, the most profitable sixteenth-century overseas projecting was to be found in Ireland, not the Americas. However, he never did give up on a North American colony. Chapter Three examines the ways in which Hayes tailored his successive plans

¹⁸⁷ John P. Greene, Between Damnation and Starvation: Priests and Merchants in Newfoundland Politics, 1745-1855 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999),
to suit various patrons and audiences. However, by the end of the sixteenth century, colonization could no longer rely on a few influential gentlemen such as Sir Humphrey Gilbert raising funds through their friends and familial networks with promises of glory and plunder. To put it bluntly, these men – and their families – had gone bankrupt in the process. In the end, a compromise of sorts was reached with the 1610 Newfoundland Company. The participation from lower gentry and merchants increased from what it had been between 1578 and 1583, spreading the burden out further than before but stopping short of state-funding.

In Europe, the Portuguese fishing merchants had been strong allies of the English in Newfoundland since their first ventures in 1502 but the union with Spain made this transnational alliance increasingly difficult to maintain. Portuguese merchants were slowly weakened through Spanish taxation and wartime demands, English and French privateering in Newfoundland, and of course the disastrous Spanish Armada defeat in 1588. In addition, Peter Pope has added that the distraction of Portuguese colonial interests in South America, increased wages, and a decreased supply of shipbuilding materials such as iron and timber all helped reduce the Portuguese fishery to sack trade. The Portuguese fishery in Newfoundland declined from 1580 onward, and with it the strongest ally and likeliest supporters for Hayes’ inclusive colonial plan.

The French fishery also moved away from any allegiance with the English in the late-sixteenth century. The French King Henri IV’s conversion to Catholicism in 1593, followed by the Edict of Nantes and negotiated peace with Spain in 1598 signalled an end to civil and foreign wars, opening up resources to fund exploration and colonization. The

5. As quoted in Rule of the Admirals, 4.

188 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 17-18.
increased French interest in the Atlantic produced an intense rivalry with England that would last over two centuries. As they increasingly fished either the Grand Banks or moved to Newfoundland’s western shores, French merchants’ reliance on mercantile networks and consequent loyalty to the fishery became less pronounced.\textsuperscript{189} Under the early Stuarts, the English also changed their attitudes towards the fishery and became increasingly insular. As shore space opened up on the Avalon peninsula through the decreased presence of the Portuguese, Basques, and French, the English had both less need and less ability to enforce control and taxation over foreign fisheries. Those who continued to fish spread out to other harbours and the distant Grand Banks, making any kind of antenational organization increasingly difficult. The plans for colonization proposed by Hayes and Parkhurst were aimed at an earlier version of the Newfoundland fishery, one that changed too rapidly for them to anticipate.

What Hayes and Parkhurst offer, then, is a snapshot of the Newfoundland fishery before it became the nationally insular and competitive version we are more familiar with. This transnational fishery offered opportunities for increasing both public and private wealth through resource extraction and trade beyond the influence of heavy foreign customs. As Peter Pope has often contended, an “economic logic” dominated early colonial plans for Newfoundland.\textsuperscript{190} However, this logic was not as tied to cut-throat competition between fishermen in the late-sixteenth century as it would become the following century. Intellectual historians such as Andrew Fitzmaurice often take exception to the suggestion of commercial motivation, insisting that there was more to

\textsuperscript{189} Between 1565 and 1605, French Basque fishermen had already travelled to Trepassy, St. Mary’s Bay and Plaisance, but the seventeenth century witnessed a higher concentration upon these banks for mutual protection. Landry, \textit{Plaisance}, 15.

\textsuperscript{190} Pope, \textit{Fish Into Wine}, 65-78.
colonization than simple greed. Yet, commercial motivation need not be seen as an exclusively negative force and it certainly was not enough on its own to persuade the English to support colonization.

The following chapter explores Hayes and Parkhurst’s efforts to convince the English nobility and gentry that protecting the Newfoundland trade would not only be profitable, but also beneficial to all of England. Commercial growth could help spread Christianity, reform idle men into productive labourers, it could bring glory to Elizabeth, honour to her subjects, provisions and mariners to the navy, and, through corporations, wealth to even the poorest investors. The benefits of adventuring in purse and person, they argued, was both direct and indirect – appealing to both self-interest and a burgeoning sense of patriotism. Despite their different visions of colonization, the treatises of merchants were constructed with as much care to rhetoric and persuasion as the later Jacobean promotion would be.

CHAPTER 3
EDITING EMPIRE: SECULAR COLONIAL PROMOTION, 1577-1602

When Humphrey Gilbert defended Elizabeth’s royal prerogative in the 1571 parliament, an angry Peter Wentworth accused him of being a “Cameleon... [who could] change himself to all fashions but honesty.” The accusation was perhaps unfair in this instance – Rory Rapple has demonstrated that Gilbert’s speech represented a consistent belief in absolute imperium – but it offers an interesting insight into the Elizabethan understanding of mutability. Gilbert stood accused of altering his behaviour in order to gain favour with the Queen, yet this is precisely what well-regarded colonial promoters did with each successive treatise. Unlike ecclesiastical Jacobean promoters, who targeted their parishioners and relied on a set formula, secular Elizabethan promoters addressed a variety of audiences – both publicly through published works and privately through correspondence. Despite their personal focus on transatlantic trade, Anthony Parkhurst and Edward Hayes were keenly aware that their colonial project would require assistance from those outside the mercantile community in order to succeed. In addition to explaining the economic logic of colonization to his fellow merchants, Hayes directed his attention towards the English nobility, gentry, and, through them, the English “publike.”

193 For a more detailed examination of Gilbert’s speech and the surrounding debate on imperium, see Rapple, Martial Power, 195-199.
While Anthony Parkhurst’s writings on colonization were limited to the two letters and brief commendation examined previously, Hayes was far more tenacious. Between 1583 and 1606, he produced a narrative of his first voyage to Newfoundland, two detailed treatises or “platts” for colonizing Newfoundland, almost identical treatises for colonizing Norumbega and Northern Virginia, a petition for parliamentary funding of colonization, and numerous letters to his various patrons in the nobility.\(^{195}\) Although his proposed site for an Atlantic entrepôt moved gradually south over the years, Hayes consistently framed it around the pre-existing mercantile networks of the Newfoundland fishery. It was these merchants that he sought to lure to an English colonial market with the promise of increased safety and rich natural resources. By 1602, he wrote that the cold winters in Newfoundland prevented year-round trade, “nor [could it be] fortified for securitie of the ships and goods; oft spoiled by pirats or men of warre.”\(^{196}\) However, when he wrote to his patron Lord Burghley in 1586, Hayes was still optimistic that trade in Newfoundland could be secured by a commercial colony.

Likely because they were never published and produced no immediate or recognizable results, most of Hayes’ treatises for colonizing Newfoundland have been deemed by historians of early colonization too impractical and unimportant for detailed textual analysis. Instead, they have been either summarized briefly – as his two 1586

\(^{195}\) The 1608 letter from T. Gerolyn to Sir Julius Caesar, generally assumed to be written by Thomas and Edward Hayes to parliament in 1606, has been omitted from this analysis. It is possible that this document was based on their earlier work, but I do not believe it was actually written by Hayes as the language differs significantly from his earlier work. See T. Gerolyn, “Reasons to move the High Court of Parlament to raise a stocke for the maintaining of a Collonie in Virgenia,” *NAW*, 5: 168-169.

treatises were by David Quinn and Gillian Cell – or forgotten entirely.197 Hayes’ later treatise, “A discourse Concerning a voyage,” and his 1606 petition to parliament received only cursory acknowledgment in Quinn’s New American World series, while his letters to patrons are not discussed at all.198 By comparison, Hayes’ narrative of Humphrey Gilbert’s 1583 voyage to Newfoundland has received far more scholarly attention, confirming his apparent role as a reporter rather than participant in colonial promotion. From this narrative, Hayes’ first attempt to persuade an audience beyond his immediate patrons, historians such as Andrew Fitzmaurice and Robert Williams have extrapolated his entire political and religious philosophy.199

This dismissal of Hayes’ treatises has arguably contributed to a tendency to read North Atlantic history backwards. The presumption that colonial plans which did not result in immediate settlement were impractical reflects modern sensibilities more than sixteenth-century reception. Although none of Hayes’ colonial plans materialized as he had hoped, they were still taken seriously by his contemporaries. Quinn may be correct in his assessment that Hayes “was something of a bore,” but he was ultimately a bore with an audience.200 Even without an easily discernable legacy, Hayes’ treatises are important to the field of intellectual history. As Chapter Two has demonstrated, colonial promotion reveals what Englishmen thought they knew about the North Atlantic as well

197 Quinn, Discovery of America, 238-239; Cell, English Enterprise, 44-46. Cell’s brief analysis of the 1586 treatises assumed an interest in settlement and an international fishing monopoly even though there is no indication of either from Hayes; she does not note his plan to use Newfoundland as a market for transnational trade, even though he mentions this repeatedly.
198 NAW, 3: 156; ibid., 5: 168.
199 Robert A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990), 164-165; Fitzmaurice, Humanism and America, 49-50.
200 Quinn, Discovery of America, 244.
as what they perceived as social, political, and economic problems facing England. An extensive body of work such as Hayes’ also reveals the kinds of arguments he believed patrons and potential investors would find most persuasive: namely, appeals to religious and humanist motivations. However, just as Hayes recognized that colonization needed justification beyond mere profit to reach a wider audience, he also knew that these justifications would fall on deaf ears without the promise of easy wealth.\textsuperscript{201}

**Profit and Piety**

The British Library lists Hayes’ 1586 treatises as “Mr. Herritt and Mr. Hayes’s discourses concerning the discovery of Newfoundland.”\textsuperscript{202} This document – or, more appropriately, compilation of documents – can be divided into three distinct sections. Based on the use of personal pronouns, such as “in my opynyoun,” the first and last sections were likely composed by Hayes himself, even though they are in two different secretary scripts.\textsuperscript{203} These two sections, which Hayes called his two “platts,” will be referred to as the first and second treatises because they were written and delivered to Burghley separately.\textsuperscript{204} The second treatise has more abbreviations than the first, as well as crossed out words, a lack of marginal notes, and a less neatly written script. All of these characteristics indicate that the second treatise was still at the stage of an early draft.

\textsuperscript{201} [Hayes], “A discourse Concerning a voyage,” 167: “pietie. honor. or profitt wyll draw [many] to assist thys cause.”

\textsuperscript{202} No mention of a “Herritt” can be found in Quinn’s brief biography of Hayes in *Discovery of America*, but there are several possible collaborators for the 1586 treatises. These include like-minded promoters such as Christopher Carlell or Hayes’ family members. His plans for debasing Irish coins were usually endorsed by his brother, Thomas. However, the most persuasive evidence points to Hayes’ father. See E. Hayes, “[1596] Cecil,” 182-183.

\textsuperscript{203} Hayes, “first platt,” 83[v].
when it was sent to Burghley. The rush to get this document to his patron likely indicates the positive reception of the first treatise and perhaps certain time constraints. That is, either Burghley or Hayes may have foreseen an opportunity to promote this vision of colonization while Walter Ralegh’s colonial plans appeared to be flexible and the vulnerability of the salt fish trade, as demonstrated by recent confiscations and privateering, was still fresh in the English public’s memory.

Marginal notes in the first treatise and the entire middle section, which serves as an introductory abstract for the second treatise, may have been written by the unknown “Mr. Herritt” since they are in the same, identical italic script. The editorial hand of this collaborator and the addition of reading aids may also be evidence of an intention to publish the two treatises that never came to fruition. This failure to publish the treatises was likely a result of Ralegh’s patent, confirmed by Parliament in 1585, which gave him a monopoly on American colonization. As it became clear that Ralegh’s intention was to establish colonies further south, first on Roanoke Island and then Guiana, while refusing to relinquish rights to northern colonization, Hayes’ treatises would quickly have become irrelevant. From 1585 to at least 1603, Ralegh’s patent prevented the establishment of English colonies or exploitation of American resources – excepting Newfoundland cod – without his explicit permission. While the patent explicitly excluded the salt fish trade from his control, Hayes’ plan to create an entrepôt in Newfoundland would have required

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204 Hayes, “Lord Burghley,” 166.
205 The disappearance of the colonists at Roanoke in 1588 and subsequent lack of settlement should have effectively ended Ralegh’s colonial monopoly, given the terms of his patent, but the expiration was never enforced. When Ralegh officially lost these privileges has been the subject of debate, but James I showed no hesitation in redistributing colonial rights in 1606. By this point, “It was easier and safer to obtain new charters than to revive any questionable old ones.” Henry Stevens, *Thomas Hariot, and His Associates* (New York: Lennox Hill, 1972), 72-73.
a far too generous interpretation of this loophole. Whatever interest Burghley may have had in the plan, he was unable to act on it.

The first of Hayes’ 1586 treatises outlined the necessity of colonizing Newfoundland along with potential benefits that he anticipated for England and its foreign trade. Like the seventeenth-century promotional sermons, this treatise served to reassure Hayes’ audience that the venture was just, lawful, and guaranteed to succeed. The second treatise proposed the founding of a joint-stock company in order to finance the colony, which, it was implied, Hayes would oversee himself as “Generall.” This treatise was directed primarily at fellow merchants, providing specific figures for investments and profits as well as outlining how the colony would be governed. Between these two treatises, the difference in language is striking. The terms “God,” “religion,” “Christianity,” “Christians,” and “Christendom” were used over twice as often in the first treatise as they are in the second. The sole reference to the “Romishe Churche” was also within the first treatise. This semantic pattern was repeated by Hayes in the later-sixteenth century, between 1592 and 1602, when he composed “A discourse Concerning a voyage.” Within the first three pages, religious is referenced thirty times, yet only

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206 Elizabeth I, Queen of England, “The letters patents, granted by the Queenes Majestie to M. Walter Ralegh now Knight, for the discovering and planting of new lands and Countries, to continue the space of 6 yeeres and no more,” PN, 2: 244.
207 Hayes, “second platt,” 92[v]-93[r]. On the final page, Hayes omits his usual term “the Generall” and suggests that pardoned criminals be “Committed unto my orderinge” (emphasis added). This momentary slip demonstrates that Hayes saw himself as the leader of the proposed Newfoundland corporation, not John Gilbert or Walter Ralegh as has sometimes been assumed.
208 See Table 1. Within the two 1586 treatises: “Religion” appears three times (twice in the first treatise; once in the second), “Christianity/Christians/Christendom” thirteen times (nine times in the first; four times in the second). “God” appears ten times (seven times in the first; three times in the second) usually in the context of God’s glory.
209 Hayes, “first platt,” 84[v].
eleven times in the subsequent outline of his plan for colonizing the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

Table 1: The Treatises and Letters of Edward Hayes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document by year</th>
<th>Length in words (^{210})</th>
<th>Religion (^{211})</th>
<th>Commonwealth (^{212})</th>
<th>Profit (^{213})</th>
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<tr>
<td>1583 narrative</td>
<td>14,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>1586 letter</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>1586 first platt</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1586 second platt</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.1592-1602 treatise</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>41 (30 in first 3 pages)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 revised treatise</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1606 letter</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1606 petition</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
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Table 2: The Treatises and Letters of Anthony Parkhurst

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<th>Commonwealth</th>
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<td>1583 commendation</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

Revealingly, religion was more emphasized in the sections of both treatises containing the motivations and justifications for colonization than it was in the actual plans for colonization. While Hayes had no concrete plans for how the indigenous inhabitants of Newfoundland would be converted, he had quite detailed plans on how to exploit and maintain the fishery. Parkhurst similarly refrained from religious references in his letters to Dyer and Hakluyt, the elder. Though his plans were not as detailed as Hayes’ second treatise, Parkhurst nonetheless implied or stated outright that profits were

\(^{210}\) Word counts have been rounded to the nearest hundred.

\(^{211}\) Included terms: God, religion, church, Christendom, Christianity, and our/the faith.

\(^{212}\) Includes variants common weal, common wealth, and weal public.

\(^{213}\) Includes variants wealth, gains, riches, and returns.
assured. This indicates both their motivational bias as merchants and the largely rhetorical nature of Hayes’ religious justifications in the first treatise. Although pious motivations were highlighted first, he anticipated that profit would be more compelling than religion for a prominent noble such as Burghley.

The most familiar promotional document produced by Hayes was neither a letter nor a treatise on colonization, but rather the aforementioned narrative of his voyage with Humphrey Gilbert to Newfoundland in 1583. This narrative was published in abbreviated form by George Peckham that same year and then in extended form by Hakluyt, the younger, in his 1589 collection, *The Principall Navigations, Voiages and Discoveries of the English Nation*. The 1583 narrative is exceptional within his body of written works for its overtly religious language; this was due to Hayes tailoring his style to an audience outside of his patrons in the nobility. The latter he knew to be interested in English commerce, but the same could not be assumed of Hakluyt’s readers. In a document roughly the same length as the two 1586 treatises combined, Hayes used the word “God” fifty-nine times in nineteen pages, as opposed to ten times in eighteen pages. Conversely, profits – which had figured largely in both 1586 treatises – are mentioned only five times in the narrative. Throughout the narrative, he used the term “God” solely in the context of God’s providence when describing events of the voyage.

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214 In the letters to Dyer and the elder Hakluyt: Christianity and Christendom are used once each (both in the letter to Hakluyt), God is used seven times (three times in the letter to Dyer; four times in the letter to Hakluyt) – again, in the context of God’s glory. See Table 2.
215 Hayes, “A report of the voyage,” 320-358; Hayes, “first and second platts,” 83-95. Between the two 1586 treatises there are approximately 10,400 words, accounting for water damage along the margins. By comparison, the narrative published by Hakluyt is 14,900 words. For a full comparison, see Table 1.
216 This includes the terms “profit,” “wealth,” “riches,” and “gain.” By comparison, the two platts contained thirty references to profit, distributed equitably between them.
Historians have often interpreted this overt language as an indication of Hayes’ Protestant zeal.

Based on the 1583 narrative and the brief time Hayes spent in Cambridge, Robert Williams has argued that he was an early Puritan Calvinist. Williams’ claim that the “seed” of Christianity, a popular Cambridge metaphor for planting, is mentioned “numerous” times in the 1583 narrative obscures the fact that it is only mentioned once there and once in Hayes’ 1602 treatise, never in any other letter or treatise. This highlights the problem of over-generalizing, especially of attempting to determine a person’s entire belief structure in a single document. As Williams states, the Cambridge preacher who invented this seed metaphor, William Perkins, was very popular and well known throughout England. Hayes was likely capitalizing on this fact by using the same language when writing to a more general audience. The combination of this reference and the frequency of religious language indicates that Hayes believed piety would be the most persuasive motivator across English society.

However, there is little evidence of any strong spiritual motivation from either Hayes or Parkhurst. Even with Hakluyt as editor, Hayes was deliberately vague regarding religion and omitted the overt anti-Spanish invectives and implied anti-Catholicism that the clergyman had displayed in his 1584 Discourse of Western Planting. In order to gain both political and financial support for his venture, Hayes had to be cautious and avoid alienating any potential patrons, investors, or trading partners. After all, Gilbert’s 1583 voyage never would have occurred without the help of English Catholic investors such as Peckham. Hayes did not criticize the Spanish brutality against

indigenous Americans, nor did he argue against the papal donation or the Treaty of Tordesillas, both of which were discussed at length by Hakluyt in *Western Planting*. Instead, Hayes went so far as to praise the Portuguese “above other nations” for their generosity towards Gilbert in St. John’s harbour, while Spanish fishing vessels were conspicuously missing from his narrative. The constant references to God’s providence are anomalous within Hayes’ work, yet unfortunately have been taken as wholly representative of his viewpoint.

As Hayes’ later treatises demonstrate, he envisioned a commercial empire for England and had little, if any, real interest in active conversion. David Quinn and Gillian Cell both praised the narrative of the 1583 voyage for its “sincerity,” while deriding the 1586 treatises as “pure propaganda.” The likelihood is that neither of these works was wholly sincere, as both were promotional. Most historians, including Quinn and Cell, have assumed that Hayes wrote the narrative shortly after his return to England in 1583. Given the similarity to details in Peckham’s *A True Reporte*, it is probable that Hayes wrote a version of the narrative in 1583. However, Philip Edwards has argued persuasively that the narrative published by Hakluyt was likely composed around 1586 in order to blame the earlier “failure” on Gilbert’s personal flaws and reassure the public that Newfoundland colonization was still tenable under the proper leadership. By presenting himself as a pious Christian throughout the narrative, the only captain of

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219 Hayes, “A report of the voyage,” 151. Hayes gives no indication that there were any Spanish ships in St. John’s Harbour, yet Stephen Parmenius estimated that there were twenty Portuguese and Spanish ships. Parmenius, “Hakluyt,” 2: 162-163.
220 Quinn, *Discovery of America*, 236; Cell, *English Enterprise*, 44.
221 Peckham, *A True Reporte*, B1r-Bii[r].
Gilbert’s fleet to maintain control of his crew and avoid piracy, mutiny, or shipwreck, Hayes set himself up implicitly as the type of leader the Newfoundland project would require.

In 1602, John Brereton published an abbreviated version of Hayes’ treatise “A discourse Concerning a voyage” in *A Briefe and true Relation of the Discouerie of the North part of Virginia*. David Quinn suggested that the full treatise had been composed around 1592 with Christopher Carleill, as the latter had easier access to Richard Hakluyt’s recently intelligence on French overseas activities. However, the tone of the document reflects the 1583 narrative more closely than his letters or treatises written to patrons, suggesting that it was probably composed specifically for the 1602 publication. Like the 1586 plans, this treatise was never published in its full form, although in this instance it would appear the rationale had more to do with length, style, and content as the dedication indicates that Ralegh had given “permission” for a Northern venture. The publication itself revolved around this permission, as Brereton and his partners attempted to placate a rather angry Ralegh over their unauthorized voyage made earlier that year. To this end, the published 1602 treatise was altered to address both Ralegh and its original audience of middling investors.

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223 Although it is unsigned, the treatise was undoubtedly written by Hayes as it is almost identical to that published in his name in 1602. Brereton’s narrative was also abbreviated for publication, the full version eventually published in Samuel Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his pilgrimes* (London: 1625).

224 *NAW*, 3: 156.

225 John Brereton, *A Briefe and true Relation of the Discovery of the North part of Virginia* (London: 1602), Al[r].

226 When the ship returned in August, Ralegh confiscated all their sassafras and cedar because it had been brought from New England “without [his] leve.” Walter Ralegh, “[21 August 1602] Letter to Sir Robert Cecil,” *Calendar of Salisbury*, 12: 311.
Rather than Newfoundland, Hayes now focussed his efforts to the southwest, the area between New England and the St. Lawrence Valley. For the published version, Hayes omitted his plan to establish fortifications around the St. Lawrence and instead concentrated on the coastline between modern day Halifax, Nova Scotia and New York City, a region often referred to as Norumbega.\textsuperscript{227} Hayes and Brereton used the titular “Virginia” to describe a large geographic area, just as Parkhurst had used the term “Newfoundland” in 1577 and 1578 to describe a much wider area than the island itself. This “indiscriminate” use of the term Newfoundland, as it has been characterized by Peter Pope, was very much intentional.\textsuperscript{228} By keeping the geographic boundaries of his proposed colony deliberately vague, Parkhurst left the Newfoundland project with considerable wiggle room to expand into the St. Lawrence Valley and beyond. As his letter to Hakluyt, the elder, reveals, Parkhurst wished to establish fortifications in several strategic locations around the island, including Cape Breton, Belle Isle, and Anticosti Island, as well as on Newfoundland itself. Hayes’ 1586 treatises were unusual because he gave precise and surprisingly accurate coordinates for the latitude of Newfoundland’s most northern and southern tips. In all likelihood, Hayes was basing these figures on his voyage to Newfoundland three years prior, in which he only witnessed the region from Belle Isle to Cape Race. It was only in the years after 1586 that Hayes expanded his geographic scope for colonization.

Hayes believed that the ships travelling to Newfoundland every year could be drawn south by a secure, permanent trading post that would provide them with North American commodities such as salt cod and sassafras year-round. He hoped that the New

\textsuperscript{227} Hayes, “A Treatise, conteining important inducements,” 15.
\textsuperscript{228} Pope, \textit{Fish Into Wine}, 15.
England region would have more “temperate” winters and be less vulnerable to piracy and privateering, which had caused severe disruptions in the Newfoundland trade throughout the prolonged war with Spain.\footnote{Ibid., 18. Both Quinn and Cell gave “the severity of the climate” in Newfoundland as the primary reason behind Hayes’ promotion of a colony in New England, yet securing trade was certainly as important a factor, if not more so. Cell, English Enterprise, 46. Much of this is based around the assumption that Hayes was trying to exclude the Spanish from the fishery, as England was at war and clearly this was his first priority.} These two concerns – piracy and climate – likely resonated with his audience, as mariners had publicly criticized colonial plans for Newfoundland on these ground since at least 1577.\footnote{Parkhurst, “Commodities to growe,” 95-96.} One benefit of colonizing Northern Virginia was that it did not have an established fishery yet and therefore did not have to contend with negative assessments by fishing crews. Yet, aside from the change in location, the 1602 treatise echoed the first 1586 treatise almost exactly. Three-quarters of the references to religion were made within the first three pages of the full 1602 treatise, after which the treatise focussed on commercial motivations and the details of investments.\footnote{[Hayes], “A discourse Concerning a voyage,” 156-172.} The commodities he expected to extract and the plan for a great market “free from all restraint by foreign princes” were the same in each.\footnote{Hayes, “A Treatise, conteining important inducements,” 15.} While this may suggest a certain inflexibility in Hayes’ thinking, continually targeting a mercantile audience, it does also indicate that he perceived the 1586 problems in Anglo-Iberian trade to be still present in 1602. As far as Hayes and his fellow merchants were concerned, as long as the two countries were at war, safeguarding England’s tenuous foreign trade was top priority. However, Hayes knew the gentry and nobility not involved in commerce would require more humanist incentives to join his corporation.
Profit, Honour, and the Common Weale

When Hayes first proposed a corporation in 1586 to finance Newfoundland colonization, there were five joint-stock trading companies in England as well as the Company of Cathay, which financed exploratory voyages to find a Northwest passage to China.\(^{233}\) Hayes, however, likened his colonial project to the financing of public works such as bridges, highways, and churches “withowt the help of a prynces purse & treasure.”\(^{234}\) As Peckham had done before him, he divided the investors of his proposed corporation into distinct categories within the second 1586 treatise: private and common adventurers. Private adventurers were defined as “great M[er]chants and owners of shipps.”\(^{235}\) These were the men who would invest their ships, goods, and lives in addition to their money. A one-time fee of 6s 8d per ton plus 10s per sail would be paid for every ship, along with the agreement to transport and provision one labourer for every twenty tons. Given the greater expense and risk involved, private adventurers were to be rewarded more generously than common adventurers. The labourers would help catch and cure their fish in the secured harbours without claiming a share of the profits, which were to be privately held by the merchant.

Common adventurers were those who possessed no ships but could still invest money. In this category, the returns would be proportional to the amount invested. One share in the company was 25£ but this sum could be divided between multiple investors.

\(^{233}\) The five companies were the Muscovy Company (1553), Guinea Company (1555), Eastland Company (1579), and the Venice and Turkey companies (1581; merged into Levant Company in 1592). Sarson, *British America*, 13.
\(^{234}\) [Hayes], “A discourse Concerning a voyage,” 166-167.
\(^{235}\) Hayes, “second platt,” 88[v].
using the tontine system.\footnote{As David Quinn has noted, the tontine could perhaps more accurately be called the “hayes” as his colonial plans pre-empted the tontine’s first usage in France by almost seventy years. Quinn, \textit{Discovery of America}, 239.} Once the principal investments had been deducted from the annual profits, as all investments were guaranteed, the remaining “overplus” would then be divided “ratably amongst the advanturers.”\footnote{Hayes, “second platt,” 91[r].} Those who had bought into a tontine would receive their portion of that share’s profits, with the last surviving investor eventually taking the full share. Although this meant that portions of the tontine were not inheritable, Hayes suggested that investments be made on behalf of these children as a kind of inheritance. The corporation would do what was most profitable for its shareholders, ensuring a continuous income. The alternative, he warned, was that “theyr patrimony Maye be C[onsumed]” by their “own follye and want of government” just as Humphrey Gilbert had done, according to Hayes’ 1583 narrative.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 92[r]. Hayes, “A report of the voyage,” 145: Gilbert was “too prodigal of his own patrimony, and too careless of other men’s expenses.”}

Hayes was innovative in his attitude towards common adventurers. Unlike previously established corporations, he advised that,

\begin{quote}

every man accordinge to the measure of his abilitie may be admitted into this Corporation. Leavinge it to theyr Choyse Whither they will adventer muche or littell. for equale regard shalbe had in th[e] imployment of small as of the greatest adventures proportionable to th[ere] benefit. Bicawse (in my opinion) the most furtherance to begin th[e] Action will grow by the Multitude of small adventers. Which others... have neglected to theyr great hyndrance admittinghe only a Certayn rate of Adventures, whearunto euery [ma]ns abilitie wold not streatche.\footnote{Hayes, “second platt,” 90[v].}
\end{quote}

The difference between Hayes’ intended method for financing colonization and the method initially employed by Humphrey Gilbert is striking. Whereas Gilbert and his associates John Dee and George Peckham sold off large tracts of land to a small number...
of gentlemen and nobility in order to raise most of their funds, Hayes anticipated that his
corporation would rely heavily on many small investments. By 1606, this broad investor
base had been expanded to include all of England, as Hayes requested a “publike” stock
be raised to fund colonization.240

In reality, Gilbert also resorted to involving a wider base of investors in
Southampton by late-1582, as the wealthier gentry and nobility such as the Earl of
Shrewsbury began to feel they already had too “many irons in the fire” and “had rather
disburthen [themselves] of some than enter into more.”241 It may be that Peckham’s A
True Reporte failed to raise sufficient capital for another venture because it was directed
at these same over-extended nobles and gentlemen. Yet of Gilbert’s approximately sixty-
seven new investors, only twelve were identified explicitly as merchants.242 By
comparison, the 1610 London and Bristol Company had forty-eight investors in their
colonial venture, thirty-six of whom were merchants.243 The bulk of Gilbert’s investors,
on the other hand, were gentry and tradesmen. Records were sporadic for the 1583
venture but nonexistent for 1578, which Gilbert was careful to veil in secrecy.
Contemporaries commented that he had financed his first expedition entirely from his
own fortune and that of his wealthy friends and family. The twenty-five men to whom
Gilbert awarded “free” shares in 1583 likely formed the financial bulk of these previous

241 George Talbot, “[20 May 1583] Earl of Shrewsbury to Thomas Bawdewyn,” Gilbert,
2: 373. For a more expanded account of the earl’s financial troubles, see Stephen E.
Kershaw’s “Power and Duty in the Elizabethan Aristocracy: George, Earl of Shrewsbury,
the Glossopdale Dispute and the Council.” in The Tudor Nobility, ed. G.W. Bernard
242 Gilbert, “Additions to the former articles,” 23-25. Not every merchant was identified
as such. For example, Anthony Parkhurst is listed as an “esquire.”
investors.244 Forty-four others, overwhelmingly from the gentry, were granted trading rights but not shares based on their earlier investments.245

Only fifty-five investments, ranging from 5£ to 100£, were recorded in detail between 1582 and 1583.246 Twelve additional men invested for “a single Adventure,” which entitled them to individual trading rights but not shares as they had not invested sufficiently high amounts.247 The price Peckham and his associates paid for the millions of acres of land Gilbert sold them around this same time was never specified, though David Quinn and others have speculated that it was considerably more than the roughly 3000£ garnered through Southampton.248 Although the variety of Southampton investors is impressive, ranging from yeomen and beer brewers to wealthy knights such as Sir Francis Walsingham, the 5£ price of a single share in Gilbert’s enterprise would certainly have been prohibitive for the lower orders.249 By enabling men from across the social spectrum to invest any amount, Hayes could more accurately have claimed that his proposed corporation would benefit the common wealth of England, spreading profits out over a wider range of small investors.

However, just as gentlemen such as Gilbert and Peckham sought financial support primarily within their own ranks, Hayes similarly directed his treatises at fellow

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244 This group was composed of 12 gentlemen, 9 esquires, and 4 peers. Gilbert, “Additions to the former articles,” 24[r].
245 This group was composed of 19 esquires, 15 gentlemen, 5 merchants, 4 unidentified men, and 1 peer. Ibid., 24[v].
246 This group was composed of 12 gentlemen, 11 merchants, 7 unidentified, 6 mercers, 3 esquires, 3 townsmen, 2 yeomen, 2 beer brewers, 2 bakers, 2 drapers, 1 captain, 1 shipmaster, 1 ironmonger, 1 tailor, and 1 widow. Ibid., 24[r-v].
247 This group was composed of 6 yeomen, 2 townsmen, 2 clerks, and 2 merchants. Ibid., 24[v]; Humphrey Gilbert, “[26 May 1583] Sir Humphrey Gilbert to [William Barwick], Mayor of Southampton,” Gilbert, 2: 374.
248 Quinn, Gilbert, 1: 59.
merchants. While the gentry were certainly not excluded from investing in his corporation, they were only encouraged insofar as their involvement would inspire the lower orders in their communities to join as well. The nobility, or rather members of the Privy Council, were only asked to write letters of commendation to the leading men in the six towns of his proposed venture and the “best reputed” gentlemen. It was this reputation that Hayes sought to attach to his venture, believing that the financial contributions of the gentry and nobility were of secondary importance. Historians such as G.W. Bernard have demonstrated the multiple ways in which the Elizabethan nobility did maintain a considerable influence over the lower ranks, despite the apparent centralisation of power during the Tudor period.

Hayes was particularly sensitive to the strength of regional loyalties in England. Seeking to use them to his advantage, he proposed that investments should be collected and managed locally within the designated ports. By appointing administrative officials from within each county, “men known to them to be of credit,” Hayes anticipated a higher degree of trust and participation from “the sympler sort” than previous corporations had enjoyed. It was through the local networks, familial and commercial, that Hayes sought to attract investors. Although his later treatises are less detailed when discussing the corporation, he continued to assert that Englishmen “wyll sooner

249 This would be equivalent to approximately $1200 USD in 2011, based on the calculations of the UK National Archives. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/
250 Hayes, “second platt,” 92[v].
251 G.W. Bernard, ed., The Tudor Nobility. This recent scholarship, emphasizing collaboration between the nobility and Tudor monarchs, has effectively refuted Lawrence Stone’s famous thesis that there was a political “crisis” in the sixteenth-century nobility. See Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
252 Ibid., 91[r]. Hayes uses the term “Contry” rather than county, with “Realm” used to designate England.
advente[r] a hundred livres [100£] upon certayn grounds confyrmed with theyr eyes: than tenn shyllings upon a bare probabilitie of matters they have not seen.”253 Hayes anticipated that the uncertainty of colonial ventures would scare off most investors; to counter this, he proposed targetting well-respected members of the towns initially. After seeing these men involved and witnessing the intial profits of colonization, Hayes was sure that others would be “vehement in prosecuting & followyng.”254

The proposal to found a Newfoundland corporation was not groundbreaking in itself. However, most corporations in England, and indeed most within Europe, were concerned with either resource extraction, exploration, or commerce at this time. Hayes was among the first to see the potential in combining these aims with rudimentary settlement. Rather than using large estates to lure investors as Gilbert had done, however, Hayes’ colonists were to be labourers whose main purpose was working for the fishing fleet and rowing in galleys to patrol the coast throughout the year. In 1586, he suggested that the corporation employ pardoned criminals. In theory, their labour would repay the initial cost of provisions and transporting them to Newfoundland. However, unlike indentured servants of the seventeenth-century colonies, there was no contracted date where the debt would be considered paid. Andrew Fitzmaurice has dismissed the influence of medieval feudalism on the Elizabethan psyche, claiming that early English colonization was motivated by humanist goals and thus incompatible with feudalism.255

Although Hayes’ colonial plans do not refute that some Elizabethans may have been

253 [Hayes], “A discourse Concerning a voyage,” 166.
254 Ibid., 165. Even in 1606, when Hayes petitioned Parliament to cover the intial costs of colonization, he ranked the “Reputacion and opinion of thinterprice” as the most important condition for a colony to succeed. [E. and T. Hayes], “Reasons to move the High Court of Parlament,” 168-169.
255 Fitzmaurice, Humanism and America, 8.
motivated purely by humanism, it is clear that others were not. A single motivation simply cannot be ascribed to the diversity of interests in late-sixteenth century England.

Both Parkhurst and Hayes emphasized master and servant relationships in their visions of colonization. Parkhurst’s use of the term “lords” is especially revealing. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, “lord” was specifically associated with *dominium* and *imperium* over both territories and people in the late-sixteenth century.256 In the context of the Newfoundland fishery, referring to fishing admirals as “lords of the harbors” implied a reciprocal master-servant relationship. The admirals exercised authority over the other fishing vessels, requisitioning small pinnaces and salt to “helpe in fishing if need require,” but maintained a paternalistic duty to protect these vessels in return.257 While Parkhurst did not elaborate on how this protection would be maintained when the English became “lorde of the whole fishing,” Hayes proposed the introduction of a galley fleet paid through taxation as an extension of this customary reciprocal arrangement.258 Inspired by recent legal developments in the Norwegian fishery and his own experience in 1583, Hayes believed that taxation of foreign fishing merchants trading in Newfoundland would be easily arranged and on solid legal ground. His optimism belied the bitter legal debate occurring throughout the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries over freedom of the seas.259

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256 “lord, n.,” *OED*.
257 Parkhurst, “Hakluyt,” 132. None of Parkhurst’s contemporaries, English or otherwise, is known to have referred to fishing admirals as lords. George Peckham suggested that the English could become lords of Newfoundland in *A True Reporte* but did not mention the fishing admirals. As such, Parkhurst’s choice of terms should be read as deliberate.
This debate was essentially between the conflicting legal arguments of *mare clausum* and *mare liberum*. The *mare clausum*, or “closed seas,” argument stated that European monarchs could legally claim *dominium* and *imperium* over the seas.²⁶⁰ Depending on the author, this sovereignty could encompass the foreshore, territorial waters of varying distances, and even the high seas. John Dee, the Elizabethan statesman and early imperialist, argued that Elizabeth I ruled not only England but also the coastal seas for one hundred miles in all directions.²⁶¹ When the Danish King Frederick II began taxing foreign fishing vessels in the territorial waters of Iceland in 1580 and attempted to monopolize the fishery, it was based on the principles of *mare clausum*.²⁶² Hayes frequently cited the Danish example in his treatises as a precedent for taxation, though his proposed application of sovereignty over the seas differed significantly from the heavy-handed approach of the Danish kings.²⁶³ Nonetheless, Dee and Hayes’ acceptance of *mare clausum* was at odds with the stronger current of Elizabethan support for *mare liberum*.

*Mare liberum*, or “free seas,” stated that monarchs could not claim *imperium* or *dominium* over the seas.²⁶⁴ It argued that, based on the laws of nature and nations, the sea was free for all to use. This use could include shipping, exploration, and, of course, fishing. The English had good reason to support *mare liberum* in the sixteenth century. The Alexandrine bulls were often attacked on the basis of papal authority being abused,

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²⁶³ Hayes’ unpublished “A discourse Concerning a voyage” outlined the clearest intent to collect “customs and tolls” from fishing vessels. [Hayes], “A discourse Concerning a voyage,” 171, 163. Notably, this proposal was removed for the 1602 published version.
but *mare liberum* further helped to refute Spanish claims in the Americas and West Indies. The younger Richard Hakluyt argued exactly this in the late-1590s:

> Seeing therefore that the sea and trade are common by the law of nature and of nations, it was not lawfull for the Pope, nor it is lawfull for the Spaniardi, to prohibit other nations from the communication and participation of this lawe.²⁶⁵

*Mare liberum* was again employed by the English Crown in 1602 to dispute the Danish exclusion of English fishing vessels in the northern seas. Rather than claiming the Danish king had no rights to territorial waters, the Elizabethan government chose a middle ground and argued that this jurisdictional right did not include *dominium*.²⁶⁶ The king could protect his Icelandic territory from naval attack, but he could not prevent English vessels from fishing.

Both sides of the dispute argued that their policy benefited the common wealth of England and guarded the interests of English trade. For *mare clausum* supporters, such as Hayes, closed seas meant protected seas. By barring pirates and hostile enemy ships from their seas, merchants could rest assured that their ships and port towns would remain secure. *Mare liberum* supporters such as Hakluyt, on the other hand, would argue that their policy protected the freedom of merchants to roam the seas, trading and travelling without fear of foreign intervention through taxes, licenses, or seizure of goods. Both threats were present for the merchants in Newfoundland. As the collapse of the Portuguese and Basque fisheries after 1580 demonstrates, both taxation and privateering

could substantially disrupt trade, causing irreparable damage. Based on Hayes’
treatises and narrative, some fishing merchants had decided that the latter posed the
greater threat and would willingly accept English sovereignty over the coastal waters of
Newfoundland in return for protection.

These legal disputes over freedom of the seas were not resolved under Elizabeth I
and continued well into the seventeenth century. While Hayes and Dee may have
disagreed with the official policy of Elizabeth I, they would have met with far more
sympathetic ears from the Stuarts, who, like the Danes and Spaniards, strongly supported
mare clausum. The general assessment, then, that Tudor monarchs simply were not
interested in colonization can be qualified regarding Elizabethan Newfoundland.
Elizabeth I simply was not interested in the kind of colony proposed by Hayes as it went
directly against her policies elsewhere. The shift from Tudors to Stuarts is therefore
quite significant for the history of Newfoundland colonization. The pacifist Stuarts were
far more likely to support Hayes’ plan for a commercial colony that exercised both
imperium and dominium. This helps to explain why the Newfoundland Company was not
founded when Hayes first suggested a corporation in 1586, but rather appeared almost
three decades later under James I. However, by the time John Guy founded the first

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267 Harold A. Innis, “The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Fishery in Newfoundland,” Essays
in Canadian Economic History, 43-61.
268 David Armitage examines the Scottish origins of mare clausum in “Making the
Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542-1707,” Past and Present 155 (1997),
52.
269 The historiographic assumption of Tudor disinterest has been characterized by Ken
MacMillan as a revisionist reaction to the older “overtly Anglocentric and imperialistic
interpretations in which ideological monarchs and crown officials pursued an
aggressively expansionist policy in order to improve the size, strength, wealth, and
international status of the ‘British empire.’” MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession, 4-6.
For example, see: Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 10-13, 339; George
Raudzens, Empires, Europe and Globalization, 1492-1788 (Phoenix Mill, 1999), 93.
Newfoundland colony in 1610, the accepted purpose of *mare clausum* was to exclude foreign fishing fleets, not to create peaceful transnational entrepôts.

If Hayes’ stance on maritime jurisdiction helped delay the creation of a Newfoundland corporation, his initial proposal to settle the colony with transported convicts was on even shakier legal ground. Although the possibility had been suggested as early as Frobisher’s 1577 voyage, the English would not begin transporting convicts to the colonies in large numbers until the eighteenth century.\(^{270}\) Proposals to use criminals and “sturdy beggars” for hard labour and military work, such as rowing in the galleys, were far more common by the 1580s.\(^{271}\) As Lauren Benton has stated, banishment “was entirely separate from penal servitude” both legally and in practise; the advent of transportation as a reprieve blurred these two categories and created a “fundamental tension” that would remain unresolved.\(^{272}\) Banishment was typically reserved for those considered disruptive to public order, but of too high status for the death penalty.\(^{273}\) The first instance of an English proposal to transport vagrants for specifically colonial labour appears to have been made by Hakluyt, the younger, in 1584, just one year prior to Hayes’ treatises.\(^{274}\) Hayes’ 1586 treatises may well have been the first proposal combining the ideas of convict transportation, or exile to the colonies in lieu of execution, with bondage. Both Hakluyt and Hayes’ plans emphasized the economic benefit to


\(^{274}\) Herrup, “Punishing Pardon,” 121.
England, providing cheap labour in the colonies, as well as the social benefits, forcing previously idle and corrupt members of English society into productive, respectable labour.

Among his list of potential benefits from colonizing Newfoundland, Parkhurst’s letter to Dyer praised the “honest” labour of the fishery at great lengths for its lack of both women and alcohol (although Hayes would later describe a rich variety of wines readily available) which would otherwise tempt the fishermen into sin and spending their wages. Instead, he promised their “wyves, chyldren, servantes and credytors,” that these men would return home from Newfoundland “ritche.”275 By this promise, Parkhurst implied that the fishing crews were normally quite prone to idleness and poverty, leaving their dependents to burden the English common wealth, but would be reformed through the hard labour of the Newfoundland fishery. Hayes, on the other hand, was less concerned with the reformation of criminals and idle men than he was with the procurement of cheap, or rather free, labour. In a sense, he still envisioned colonization as social reform, but it was social reform through extracting what he believed were the worst parts of England, men who “may be better spared then kept within the Realme.”276

Hayes proposed that these criminals, excluding only those convicted of “hygh treasons and willfull murdereres,” should become indentured to the corporation indefinitely, subject to the command of its appointed General in Newfoundland.277 The criminal’s land and goods, normally seized by the Crown, would be forfeited to the corporation in order to pay for his transportation and provisions. Anticipating the debates of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when transportation became common

276 Hayes, “second platt,” 92[v].
practise but the legal status of convicts remained unresolved, Hayes assured his audience that the pardoned criminals “shalbe dead in effect to this Comonweale, from Which they shalbe [no longer] members.”278 Their removal from England would be equivalent to a death sentence and they would never be permitted to return. Instead, they would spend the remainder of their lives in the “new state & common weal” of Newfoundland, rowing in galleys to protect the harbours and labouring in “Commen workes” under the watchful eye of Hayes.279

Legislation such as the 1598 Act for Punishment of Rogues, Vagabonds and Sturdy Beggars and its 1603 revision answered the proposals of Hakluyt and Hayes by giving justices alternative punishments for vagrancy, including galley service and banishment “beyond the seas” to Newfoundland, the Indies, and much of Western Europe.280 In 1615, James I extended this further, making transportation an optional reprieve for convicted felons.281 This was not a uniquely English development. The French and Mediterranean nations made wide use of galley service as a punishment and the Marquis de la Roche of France even established a short-lived colony of convicts on Sable Island in 1598. Yet these mitigated punishments were rarely used during Elizabeth’s reign. As Cynthia Herrup and other legal historians have demonstrated, they would have been easier to carry out in theory than in reality.

Although it was often proposed, the English never did build a galley fleet. Linda Colley has argued that a galley fleet and its forced labour would have been met with

277 Ibid., 92[v].
278 Ibid., 93[r].
279 [Hayes], “A discourse Concering a voyage,” 165; Hayes, “second platt,” 93[r].
considerable hostility from the English public, to whom “it seemed the negation of what England and ultimately Britain and its empire were traditionally about.”²⁸² James Thomson had not yet sentimentalized that “Britons never will be slaves,” but roaming Barbary corsairs had already caused panic by enslaving English merchants and mariners.²⁸³ John Langbein has suggested that it is possible galley service was simply meant as a metaphor for naval service and was not intended to be read literally.²⁸⁴ However, even if galley service were deemed socially acceptable, the Magna Carta of English common law prohibited involuntary banishment of English citizens out of the country as well as forced bondage. Krista Kesselring has argued that the legal problems of transportation could be avoided by “exchanging” pardons for either galley work or voluntary banishment.²⁸⁵ The Transportation Act of 1718 would quiet these debates by creating transportation as a sentence in itself, rather than a mitigation, but even this was met with mixed reactions from local magistrates.²⁸⁶

Although Hayes treatises after 1586 recommended vagrants rather than convicts as colonists, there was little distinction between the two in early modern England. As Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton have argued, most of Hayes’ contemporaries would have seen idleness and crime as intimately connected. Although “formal slavery” had

²⁸³ Ibid., 47.
been deemed unsuitable as a punishment for vagrancy under Henry VIII, it “became, in
the modified form of indentured servitude, the solution to a variety of social ills” during
the seventeenth century. Themes of overpopulation and idleness feature prominently
in both Hayes and Parkhurst’s colonial plans. Although he did not use the bee metaphor
of the Jacobean clergy, Hayes argued in 1602 that the decline in foreign trade had caused
England to “swarme full with poore and idle people.” England, he suggested, needed
to ensure its defense against internal threats just as much as against external threats such
as war and invasion. By employing convicts and vagrants as mariners, Hayes’ colonial
plan aspired to do both.

Conclusion

While Edward Hayes remained devoted to colonization in the North Atlantic,
venturing “both life and substance without Fruite,” he was never able to fully persuade
the English nobility and gentry to support his vision of a commercial colony. In part,
this may have been due to his inability or unwillingness to change the mercantile focus of
his plan. If Hayes had produced a less specific promotional document like the Jacobean
sermons, he might have had more success but he may also have been ridiculed like Sir
Humphrey Gilbert as a dishonest chameleon. However, Hayes could not have produced a
sermon with the requisite moral authority because he had not been trained in rhetoric and

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288 Hayes, “A Treatise, conteining important inducements,” 17.
289 Peter Pope has noted that English fishing merchants would invoke the idea of
Newfoundland as “a nursery of seamen” when it benefited them but had little desire to
actually risk their ships and lives in armed conflict with other nations. While Hayes
never explicitly says this, his galley fleets and forced labour could produce more easily
he was not a clergyman. Instead, Hayes attempted to tailor his various treatises to various audiences and their three main motivations as he saw them: piety, honour, and profit.

What began to change in early-seventeenth century England was the foundation upon which colonization was built. It could no longer rely on a few influential gentlemen such as Gilbert and Peckham raising funds through their friends and familial networks. To put it bluntly, these men – and their families – had gone bankrupt in the process. Had Gilbert survived the 1583 voyage, his life could have ended ingloriously in a debtors prison alongside Peckham. By the 1606, Edward Hayes was not alone in his belief that Parliament and the common Englishman should share the burden of financing colonization. However, petitions to members of Parliament and James I only succeeded in the formation of three chartered companies: the Virginia Company of London, the Virginia Company of Plymouth, and the Newfoundland Company of London and Bristol.

When John Guy’s colonists arrived in Cupid’s Cove in 1610, they did so with the blessing of the King but at the expense of the Newfoundland Company’s forty eight members. As harsh winters and piracy took their toll on the settlement, the hope of seeing a return on those investments gradually faded and a new kind of colonial promotion was needed to keep interest alive in England. Hayes’ promises of easy profit had failed to materialize and his inclusive commercial plan seemed increasingly outdated by new political and economic developments, but his religious and humanist justifications would prove far more difficult to refute. It is these general themes, as expanded and refined by the Jacobean clergy, that will be examined in Chapter Four.

CHAPTER 4
“HIREP PENS”: ECCLESIASTICAL COLONIAL PROMOTION, 1606-1625

The seventeenth century witnessed the beginning of a gradual movement away from the maritime, commercial, inclusive vision of North Atlantic colonization towards one that was continental, settled, and nationalistic. This process, which re-centered the North Atlantic away from Newfoundland, began with the displacement of Edward Hayes and Anthony Parkhurst’s colonial proposals by the Jacobean clergy. A new wave of colonial promotion began after the Virginia Companies of London and Plymouth and the Newfoundland Company were granted royal charters in 1606 and 1610, respectively. At this point, the Church of England began to play a much larger role, acting as an intermediary between chartered companies or proprietary individuals and the English public. Whether writing promotional sermons themselves or extolling the virtues of secular treatises such as Richard Whitbourne’s *A Discourse and Discovery of New-Found-Land*, the clergy’s position as moral authorities was used to garner and maintain support for ventures that were, as yet, still risky, unprofitable, and legally ambiguous. These clergymen consistently borrowed arguments and themes from previous ecclesiastical authors rather than secular ones such as Edward Hayes, making promotion of the diverse colonies of Newfoundland, Northern Virginia, Southern Virginia, Bermuda, and Guiana virtually indistinguishable. The first ecclesiastical promotion

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292 Bermuda was initially included in the Virginia Company of London’s royal charter and thus part of Southern Virginia. In 1615, administration was transferred to the Somers Isles Company.
was written for a colony in Southern Virginia, so it was from this new colonial centre that subsequent promotion was extrapolated and applied indiscriminately to other colonies. This chapter examines the complications that this re-centering posed for Newfoundland and the North Atlantic.

In *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, David Armitage claimed that English Protestantism was simply too diverse to produce a cohesive response to early colonization.\(^{293}\) Yet despite their divergent confessional beliefs – which ranged from the Puritanism of William Crakanthorpe to the Presbyterianism of Patrick Copland – the Jacobean clergy were able to create the appearance of a cohesive response.\(^{294}\) By focusing on key themes of anti-Catholicism, conversion of indigenous inhabitants, and social reform, these clergymen created the illusion of unity both within the Church of England and within colonial promotion. Settlement and inland expansion, which had been of little interest to Elizabethan merchants, became basis of the Jacobean clergy’s colonial vision. By the time Richard Eburne wrote *A Plaine Path-way to Plantations* in 1624 to promote colonization in Newfoundland and Guiana, the ecclesiastical formulas and rhetorical themes had already been well-established. Colonial promotion had entered a new phase, aimed at emphasizing the moral justifications and therefore necessity of colonization to a wider audience.

After colonial charters had been granted and plantations begun, there was little room left for detailed, self-promotional proposals such as Hayes and Parkhurst’s. These

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\(^{294}\) This diversity extended to the higher ranking clergy as well, with Arminian reformer George Montaigne, Archbishop of York after 1628, often clashing over doctrinal matters with George Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1611 to 1633. Andrew Foster, “Mountain [Montaigne], George (1569–1628),” *ODNB*; Kenneth Fincham, “Abbot,
Elizabethan merchants, while mindful of their audience’s motivations, had created highly personal colonial plans that benefited merchants first and foremost. Regardless of ecclesiastical writers’ private motivations, they were, to borrow Ethan Shagan’s term, more “collaborators” in English colonization than Elizabethan projectors had been. Their collaboration had tangible benefits for both the clergymen and the chartered companies and proprietary adventurers establishing colonies in the Americas. Their training and place of authority in Jacobean England made the clergy ideal propagandists. In turn, these clergymen could gain wealth and preference for ecclesiastical positions through their services as colonial promoters for various patrons, giving the appearance of unified ecclesiastical support. The dissemination of these promotional tracts – orally and in print – to a wide audience of potential investors and colonists served both the aims of the patrons and those of the collaborating clergymen.

This type of widespread ecclesiastical participation in colonial promotion was unique to James I’s reign. Elizabethan colonial promotion had been heavily dominated by secular authors; the middling sorts, such as Hayes and Parkhurst, sought to further their own employment while gentlemen, such as Peckham and Ralegh, sought to protect their investments and monopolies from interlopers. Only the younger Richard Hakluyt had served as an ecclesiastical “trumpet” for his patrons’ colonial plans. Typical of Elizabethan promotion, his Discourse of Western Planting was directed solely at the Queen, not his parishioners, and remained unpublished until the late-nineteenth century.

George (1562–1633).” ODNB. As this chapter examines later, both men were active in the promotion of colonization in Newfoundland and Virginia.


Under Charles I, the colonies increasingly came under the control of the Crown rather than chartered companies and proprietary adventurers, decreasing the opportunities for patronage. Combined with Charles and Archbishop William Laud’s divisive anti-Calvinist reforms to the English Church during the Personal Rule of the 1630s, this led to a shift in ecclesiastical focus away from colonization and back to more immediate religious concerns in England.²⁹⁷ Those few who continued to promote colonization, such as Puritan ministers John White and William Castell, addressed their tracts to Parliament rather than writing for a specific patron. By 1642, the collaboration between clergy and patrons had digressed into a handful of thinly veiled polemics, bearing little resemblance to the mutually beneficial relationship that preceded them. Their authoritative colonial vision, on the other hand, proved far more resilient.

**Historiography**

As David Armitage has noted, the role of religion in justifying early modern English colonization has been significantly understudied by historians, despite recent scholarly interest in Jacobean religious history.²⁹⁸ Indicative of this is the failure of the seminal first volume of *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, titled *The Origins of Empire*, to include religion amongst its central themes and David Quinn’s choice to omit the “long-winded” promotional sermons from his *New American World* series.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁹ Canny, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 1, The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century; *NAW*, 5: 233. Although Quinn simply dismissed the sermons as uninteresting, G.L. Beer, E.A.J. Johnson, J.A. Williamson, J.H. Parry, and Loren Pennington have dismissed them as
Similarly, while interest in the religious history of Newfoundland has gathered momentum, its relationship to early colonization remains unclear. Like Quinn, Gillian Cell omitted Richard Eburne’s *A plaine path-way to plantations* from both her published collection of documents and lengthier studies of the early-seventeenth century Newfoundland colonies despite analyzing secular treatises by William Vaughan and Richard Whitbourne extensively. The sole exception to this trend has been the historiographic debate over the influence of Catholicism in the Ferryland colony of Sir George Calvert, which bears little relevance to the Church of England’s role in early colonization.

Almost seventy years after its publication, Louis B. Wright’s *Religion and Empire: The Alliance Between Piety and Commerce in English Expansion 1558-1625* remains the most thorough analysis of the relationship between the clergy and colonial ventures even though many of its underlying arguments have been disputed and dismantled by imperial and Atlantic historians. David Armitage has challenged Wright’s assertion that the promotional tracts produced by the clergy contain “some of the more insincere propaganda.” Loren E. Pennington, “The Amerindian in English Promotional Literature, 1575-1625,” in *The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America 1480-1650*, eds. K.R. Andrews, Nicholas Canny, and P.E.H. Hair (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978), 175.


advanced ideas of imperialism in this period." Rather than demonstrating a link between the development of imperial ideology and Protestantism, Armitage argues, promotional sermons led to “imperial amnesia.” That is, the clergy were intentionally vague enough to accommodate a diverse range of interpretations of what English imperialism was. While over-emphasizing the disunity between ecclesiastical promotional tracts, he effectively challenged the assumption of a cohesive imperial ideology within them. Given that promotional tracts were written on behalf of a variety of patrons with different motivations for their colonial projects and differing geographies to contend with, this diversity of imperial ideologies is understandable. Yet these differing motivations also indicate that the repeated themes within ecclesiastical promotion reflect deliberate rhetorical choices rather than accidental points of intersection.

Andrew Fitzmaurice added nuance to Armitage’s critique through his examination of the humanist influence on Jacobean colonial promotion. Viewing clergymen primarily as rhetoricians who structured promotional sermons using their university training and the classical ideals of honour and civic duty, Fitzmaurice creates a compelling argument for a unified “civic ideology” based on the republican commonwealth rather than imperialism. However, Fitzmaurice’s research has focused primarily on the promotional tracts written for the Virginia Company of London, providing only cursory analysis of earlier tracts or those promoting other colonial

302 Wright, Religion and Empire, v.
304 It should be stressed that Armitage specifically addresses imperialism, an ideological concept, rather than plans for colonization. A unified vision of colonization did not require ideological unity to the same extent.
305 Fitzmaurice, Humanism and America, 101.
ventures. As this chapter argues, these promotional sermons should be analyzed together as representative of the early shift away from maritime, commercial interests. They retained a similar tone, style, and purpose regardless of the intended patron or geographic location. The illusion of homogeneity within English colonies contributed to a later tendency to judge Newfoundland against an idealized vision of “godly,” continental plantations.

Too often in his various works, Fitzmaurice does not distinguish between ecclesiastical and lay authors, grouping them together simply as “humanists” promoting colonization. Much like Wright’s imperialists, this generalization overlooks the diversity of motivations and the variant forms of patronage for colonial promoters. While Edward Hayes and Richard Eburne both sought financial benefits by promoting Newfoundland colonization, their terms of employment and intended audiences were quite different. Unlike Hayes, Eburne and his fellow clergymen were essentially “hired pens.”

Fitzmaurice paradoxically asserts that promotional tracts were composed by the Jacobean clergy to be persuasive and yet “it is precisely in such propaganda that we should look for deliberative statements of [company] policy.” By failing to distinguish exhortation from policy, he implies that clergymen somehow had intimate knowledge of their patrons’ plans, intentions, and motivations. The Jacobean clergy were collaborators with their patrons in colonial promotion, but it was by no means an equal relationship. Just as Hayes tailored his treatises to what he believed certain audiences would find most persuasive, the language used by the clergy reflected what they assumed, rather than

306 Ibid., 65.
knew, colonial policies to be. Unlike Hayes and Parkhurst, none of these clergymen had traveled to the Americas. Their authority to speak about colonization derived from their social status rather than detailed knowledge or experience.

Over half of an estimated thirty promotional tracts published between 1606 and 1625 were written by clergymen and likely several more were promoted by the clergy within their parishes. While no bibliography of this body of work exists to date, Fitzmaurice estimates that “no fewer than twenty” promotional tracts by lay and ecclesiastical authors were published for the Virginia Company alone. To this figure, we must add the less prolific tracts promoting the North Atlantic colonies of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New England, as well as the Southern colonies of Bermuda and Guiana. Some promotional sermons, such as Thomas Morton’s in 1609, have not survived but can be gleaned in part through the references made by subsequent authors. “Virginias Verger” and “Animadversions On The Said Bull of Pope Alexander” from *Hakluytus Posthumus* have been selected from Samuel Purchas’ extensive body of work as these tracts are believed to represent his own voice most clearly. Clear authorship is essential when determining the deliberate choices made by each clergymen and analyzing what these choices reveal.

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308 In his analysis of 1549 Edwardian rebels, Ethan Shagan characterized such power differentials as negotiations. Shagan, *Popular Politics*, 291.
309 John Brereton was the sole exception, having travelled to the New England region in 1602. His journal of the voyage was published that year in *A Briefe and true Relation of the Discovery of the North part of Virginia* (along with Hayes’ abbreviated treatise) to promote further colonization. However, it was so heavily edited by laymen – potentially Hayes himself – that it is impossible to establish clear authorship. Elizabeth Baigent, “Brereton, John (b. 1571/2?, d. in or after 1619?),” *ODNB*.
310 Fitzmaurice, “Civic Solution,” 33.
Ecclesiastical Participation

Examining the role of the clergy as colonial promoters raises a completely new set of questions for historians studying the diverse “Jacobethan” English society.\textsuperscript{312} Foremost is the question of why the clergy were so active in seventeenth-century colonial promotion, equaling their secular equivalents in number but vastly out-producing them in the volume of promotional tracts they wrote and in quantities printed. Historians have typically divided the clergy active in justifying and promoting England’s early colonial efforts into two categories: the \textit{compilers}, Samuel Purchas and his predecessor Richard Hakluyt, and the \textit{preachers}, dominated by the prolific 1609 and 1622 sermons crafted to promote the Virginia Company. The former have been portrayed as more dedicated to colonial ventures than the commissioned preachers and they are thus more likely to be grouped with the secular authors such as Edward Hayes. Their large written tracts, widely read and reprinted throughout the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are seen to transcend their status as clergymen.

Yet this separation is just as misleading as Louis B. Wright’s classifying all ecclesiastical promoters as one ideologically unified body of English imperialists. Both Hakluyt and Purchas were preachers as well as compilers and, based on their occupations and humanist education, often framed their essays in the form of sermons where secular authors were more inclined to write letters or numbered lists of justifications.\textsuperscript{313} Early modern sermons were composed using rhetoric modeled on classical sources such as

Cicero and Quintillian in order to be more persuasive. This method of composition was first experimented with by late medieval Italian humanists, disseminated throughout Europe in preaching handbooks written by Erasmus, Philipp Melanchthon, and Andreas Hyperius in the 1530s, and found credence in the published sermons of Protestant leaders John Calvin, Ulrich Zwingli, and Martin Luther. Sixteenth and seventeenth-century English clergy were thus specially trained in “moral persuasion” in universities.

The combination of intimidation and reassurance employed in their promotional tracts was actually based on Hyperius’ defined aspects of sermons: “teaching, rebuttal, training, correction, and comfort.” These categories were adapted by English Protestants in the more generalized approach, apparent throughout the promotional tracts, of alternately “encourag[ing], admonish[ing], or consol[ing] the audience.” In addition to their rhetorical training, the clergy were, quite literally, the authorities on religion, morality, and justice in England following the 1563 Thirty-Nine Articles. This key document in the Elizabethan religious settlement stated that doctrinal matters, or “controversies of faith,” were the exclusive prerogative of the clergy to decide. Their contribution to colonial ventures was, therefore, not just rhetorical, but also symbolic: legitimizing as well as justifying colonization through the appearance of unified

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313 Fitzmaurice, *Humanism and America*, 65. Both Parkhurst and Hayes often wrote colonial promotion in the form of lists.
ecclesiastical support. It was because Hakluyt and Purchas were members of the clergy, not in spite of it, that these men were such ideal propagandists.

Further emphasizing this point is the sheer popularity of sermons as a literary genre in early modern England. According to Peter McCullough, “the sermon – not the Shakespearean drama, and not even the Jonsonian masque – was the pre-eminent literary genre at the Jacobean court.”320 His research on attendance at Whitehall sermons supports Fraser Mitchell’s suggestion that “for one person who witnessed a play or ten who happened to read it, thousands may, without exaggeration, be said to have attended sermons, or afterwards studied them from shorthand notes or in printed copies.”321 Both served as entertainment for the English, appealing to a broad audience in a manner the “bore” Hayes could not.322 It is no coincidence that promotional sermons were often commissioned from the most famous preachers in England such as John Donne. This popularity was matched by the compiled works of Purchas and Hakluyt, blending the genres of sermons in their editorials along with travel narratives, as attested by the many editions and reprints of their large volumes. In fact, even James I was noted to have read Purchas, His Pilgrimage, which underwent four editions during Purchas’ lifetime, seven times – no small feat for a multi-volume work just shy of one thousand pages in length.323 Despite being twice as long, his monumental Hakluytus Posthumus was even more popular and widely read than Pilgrimage. By utilizing already popular genres and authors, the chartered companies and proprietary adventurers clearly believed they could

322 Quinn, Discovery of America, 244. The visceral nature of most Jacobean sermons contrasts starkly even with Hayes’ descriptive narrative of the 1583 voyage.
gain more widespread support for their colonial ventures than the Elizabethan projects had enjoyed.

The clearest indication of this strategy, although none of the accompanying sermons have survived, was the distribution of Richard Whitbourne’s *Discourse* through the parish churches of England from 1620 to 1623. At the request of several prominent Newfoundland Company members and proprietary adventurer George Calvert, the Privy Council assisted Whitbourne in publishing and distributing the treatise. Privy Council records only suggested that the treatise would “bee recommended” to George Abbot, the Archbishop of Canterbury.324 However, a subsequent letter distributed by the Bishop of London to his diocese in 1622 implied that clergymen of all ranks had received clear orders to

signifie unto your Parishioners in so friendly and effectuall manner as possibly you can, upon some Sabbath day, in the time of Divine Service, and when no other Collection is to be made, this my Letter, and the scope and intent of his [Whitbourne’s] Discourse, and seriously stir up and exhort them to extend their bountifull liberality herein; which you the Churchwardens are to collect, after the due and usuall manner from seate to seate; and such of the Parishioners as shall be then absent, to collect their gratuities thereunto at their houses.325

Arguably, the success of Whitbourne’s treatise, which was reprinted three times, relied on vigorous ecclesiastical promotion to raise donations from parishioners. As all

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324 “[Meeting] At Whithall [23 July 1620],” PC 2/30, 578. See also “[Meeting] At Starr chamber [14 February 1620],” PC 2/30, 425. Both were published in Cell, ed., *Newfoundland Discovered*, 100-101. The Archbishop of Canterbury was a founding member of the Virginia Company of London, so it seems unlikely that he would have ordered the promotion of a competing chartered company’s treatise – as the Bishop of London’s letter suggests he did – without significant pressure from the Privy Council. See George Montaigne, *Letter to all ecclesiastical officers within the diocese of London* [16 September 1622] (London: 1622).
325 Montaigne, *Letter to the diocese of London*. 
members of the Church of England were required to attend such services or risk recusancy fines, the Privy Council ensured that Whitbourne’s discourse – as interpreted by the local ministers – had guaranteed audiences across England.\footnote{The Bishop of London’s letter indicated that each parish church would receive one copy of the *Discourse*. It was the duty of the ministers to read it and write a promotional sermon that conveyed its basic arguments. There is no indication that the *Discourse* was then given to parishioners to read on their own. As most of the Virginia Company promoters were ministers within the diocese of London, it is a reasonable assumption that their sermons for the *Discourse* reflected similar themes to the printed sermons examined in this chapter. \textit{Ibid.}}

When clergymen were given a choice in the matter, they often had a more worldly motivation to promote colonization than simply spreading Christianity: subsidizing their otherwise insufficient incomes. Before he became a promoter of the Newfoundland and Guiana colonies, Richard Eburne published two significant treatises in 1609 and 1616 on the “poore and unadequate livings” provided for the clergy in England.\footnote{Richard Eburne, \textit{The royal law: or, The rule of equitie prescribed us by our Saviour Christ} (London: 1616), 43.} With each treatise, he repeated the assertion that clergymen were not being given their fair recompense by either their patrons or their parishioners. The patrons were accused of greed for their reliance on simony – the sale of ecclesiastical positions that had increasingly fallen into the hands of the laity throughout the Reformation – to further their wealth at the expense of the clergy and the Church of England in general. His frustration over simony was echoed by fellow colonial promoter Daniel Price, the Welsh chaplain to Prince Henry, in his 1609 sermon for the Virginia Company: “the Cleargy must labour, yet buy [employment] they must not, and to begge they are ashamed.”\footnote{Daniel Price, \textit{Sauls prohibition staide. Or The apprehension, and examination of Saule And the inditement of all that persecute Christ, with a reproofe of those that traduce the honourable plantation of Virginia} (London: 1609), F[r].} Likewise, the parishioners stood accused of withholding personal tithes due to their
minister in order to “bring him to that state, that he must crouch to them for a pice of bread.”  

Exacerbating the situation further was the late sixteenth-century expectation that Protestant clergy of all ranks would be far more scholarly than their Catholic predecessors, whom Eburne derisively refers to as “hedge priests.” This education, usually obtained at one of England’s two universities, was an expensive requirement and it ensured that only those who were well connected in English society could pursue ecclesiastical careers. In addition to these losses of income, Eburne argues that traditional stipends were insufficient regardless, given the rising cost of living in England. While he notes that this inequality between wages and expenses began during the reign of Henry VIII, Eburne carefully avoids criticizing the Henrician reforms that set it in motion. Eburne and Price may have exaggerated the state of clerical incomes in early modern England somewhat, but recent historical studies have demonstrated that they were more accurate than one might assume.

Articles such as those in *Princes and Paupers in the English Church, 1500-1800* illustrate a general consensus amongst historians that clerical incomes in England did suffer due to Protestant reforms, such as the dissolution of monasteries and chantries under Henry VIII and Edward VI, coupled with the social problems of a larger population and dramatic inflation. Further, these same historians agree that the insufficiency of

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clerical incomes encouraged clergymen to subsidize their wages by other means. The poor state of clerical incomes under James I was inextricably linked to Protestant reforms and was therefore, according to historians such as Rosemary O’Day and Ian Green, unable to improve throughout the seventeenth century.333 Claire Cross has examined the profitable pluralist careers of teaching and lectureships while B.A. Holderness demonstrated the surprisingly widespread practice of clerical money lending as means of subsidizing clerical wages.334 Yet the most immediate means available to the clergy of securing adequate incomes was to seek the patronage of one or more wealthy merchants, gentlemen, nobles, or higher ecclesiastical officials.

Ecclesiastical reliance on patronage is evident throughout Daniel Price’s dedicatory epistle to Sauls prohibition staide in which he states that his patron, Lord Ellesmere, “hath vouchsafed favour to helpe many a Clergie-man” as well as himself.335 This favour could include commissions, benefices, or simply preferential status amongst Ellesmere’s own social connections. Eight of the ten promotional tracts examined in this chapter explicitly referenced one or more patrons. Of these eight tracts, half dedicated their work to a chartered company and explained that they wrote at the company’s request. The remaining clergymen dedicated their promotional tracts to prominent members of chartered companies such as the Archbishop of Canterbury, patron of


335 Price, Sauls prohibition staide, F3[r].
Samuel Purchas.\textsuperscript{336} Richard Eburne dedicated \textit{A plaine path-way to plantations} to his current patron, the Bishop of Bath and Wells, who had previously demonstrated an interest in colonization by subscribing to the Virginia Company of London. In a bid for new patronage reminiscent of Hayes’ proposals, Eburne also dedicated the tract to two potential new patrons with connections to colonial ventures: the Bishop of Bristol and George Calvert, proprietary governor of Ferryland.\textsuperscript{337}

In the dedicatory epistle, Eburne also alluded to the Bristol Society of Merchant Venturers having commissioned his promotional tract. As one of the major trading ports in Jacobean England, well-situated for access to the Americas, these merchants would have undoubtedly profited from the anticipated shipment of commodities from Newfoundland and Guiana. That Newfoundland Company founder and first governor John Guy was then master of the Bristol Society makes this connection with Eburne even more probable.\textsuperscript{338} By hiring Eburne to promote Guiana as well as Newfoundland, the Bristol merchants demonstrated the shifting commercial focus taking place. Newfoundland was still economically important, and would continue to be so throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but it was no longer the undisputed centre of English commercial interests in the Atlantic or even the North Atlantic. By 1649, Peter Pope has argued that Newfoundland was already a part of “Greater New England.”\textsuperscript{339}

\textsuperscript{336} Fitzmaurice, \textit{Humanism and America}, 63.
\textsuperscript{337} Richard Eburne, \textit{A plaine path-way to plantations} (London: 1624), A2[r], H2[r]. Calvert was also heavily involved in colonial efforts in Ireland, Virginia, and New England, so it may be that Eburne intended to persuade him towards investment in Guiana as well as demonstrating support for the Ferryland colony. Cell, \textit{Newfoundland Discovered}, 48-49.
\textsuperscript{338} Christopher English, “Guy, John (c.1575–1628),” \textit{ODNB}.
\textsuperscript{339} Pope, \textit{Fish Into Wine}, 150-152.
When Hayes wrote his promotional treatises in the late-sixteenth century, New England had effectively been a part of Greater Newfoundland.

The division between the motivations of patrons and clergymen such as Eburne should not be overstated. Not only did the clergy benefit financially through their patrons’ favours, they were also frequently drawn into business partnerships with their patrons. Richard Hakluyt, Samuel Purchas, and William Crashaw all followed their patrons’ examples and invested personally in the same colonial ventures while Patrick Copland was made a “free brother” of the Virginia Company as payment for his promotional contributions. The moral focus of the clergy’s promotional themes – Catholicism, conversion, and social reform – justified their personal involvement in colonial ventures just as much as it justified the ventures themselves. Whether seeking wealth through patronage or investment, these clergymen clearly had temporal as well as spiritual interests in promoting English colonization and creating the illusion of united ecclesiastical support.

The Catholic Threat

The inclusive nature of Hayes and Parkhurst’s colonial plans as well as the uncertain religious climate under Elizabeth I made these merchants reluctant to justify colonization through anti-Spanish or anti-Catholic rhetoric. While individual

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341 Indicative of the religious climate under Elizabeth I, even Richard Hakluyt’s works have been characterized as “accommodationist” regarding religious differences in Sacks, “Discourses of Western Planting,” 432. As the previous chapters have argued, this relative religious tolerance was partially due to uncertainty surrounding the royal
merchants trading with Catholic nations likely maintained a more tolerant attitude by necessity, English society became increasingly suspicious of confessional differences under James I. Catholics in particular faced growing hostility following the failed 1605 Gunpowder Plot. When the second phase of colonial promotion began, therefore, a large part of English Protestant self-identification was negative rather than positive: they were essentially not Catholics. While the term Protestant could hold multiple meanings, Catholic was considered the antithesis of them all. By the 1630s, the suggestion that certain Protestant groups had Catholic leanings was seen as a real slur and thus a useful political weapon, as demonstrated by the attacks on Charles I’s attempted Arminian reforms of the English Church. Catholicism therefore provided the Jacobean clergy with an easily identified scapegoat to conjure up fear or hatred.

Some clergymen targeted Catholic Spain particularly, but most simply referred to the Pope and his so-called “papists.” In both cases, however, the greatest threat posed by these Catholic leaders was their claim to universal sovereignty. While Hayes and Parkhurst had viewed Newfoundland and the North Atlantic as beyond the European spheres of influence, the repeated refutations of the 1493 territorial donation by Pope Alexander VI by Jacobean clergy indicates that the Atlantic World was shrinking. With hundreds of fishing vessels crossing the Atlantic “road” each year, Newfoundland succession and future head of the Church of England. The comparative political stability brought by James I made religious intolerance easier to vocalize.

did not seem as distant to the English as it once had. One of the most vocal opponents of the papal donation was Richard Crakanthorpe, whose 1608 sermon for the Virginia Company referred to the Pope as not only the “Antichrist” but also “the Beast” and “the Whore.” While undeniably visceral, such labels also served to legitimize English colonization by denying papal authority and, by extension, the Papal Bull. Using scriptural examples in place of common or civil law, ecclesiastical authors argued that as there was no precedent for papal authority over monarchies prior to Hildebrand, it was against the “Laws of God and Nations.”

Anti-Catholicism in promotional tracts served not only to reassure audiences of the legality of English colonization, an issue Hayes and Parkhurst had studiously avoided, but also to intimidate those with doubts remaining by associating all disagreement with Catholicism. Just as it served political ends during the reign of Charles I, it is doubtful that any Jacobean Protestants wanted to be associated with those who “eate their God, kill their king, subvert the Scriptures, adore Bones, pray to Stones, Deifie the Dead, deserve Heaven, contest with God, and equalize their Popes with God.” Ecclesiastical promoters assured their audiences that only papists and the Devil could oppose such a godly project as overseas colonization. The papists opposed it out of jealousy, hoping to subject all of the indigenous American inhabitants to Catholicism and simply because

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345 Eburne, *A plaine path-way*, B1[v].
346 Richard Crakanthorpe, *A sermon at the solemnizing of the happie inauguration of our most gracious and religious soveraigne King James wherein is manifestly proved, that the soveraignty of kings is immediatly from God, and second to no authority on earth whatsoever* (London: 1609), C[r]; C[v]; C3[v].
347 Eburne, *A plaine path-way*, 96; Crakanthorpe, *happie inauguration*, E[v]; F3[v]; G1[v-r].
348 Price, *Sauls prohibition*, E3[r].
they “mislike[d] all things done by Protestants.” The Devil opposed colonization in order to protect his “kingdome” in the New World, where lack of Christianity could only mean that the Devil was worshipped instead. By leaving no room for opposition, the clergy effectively undermined all reports that contradicted the chartered companies’ official statements promising safety and prosperity in the Americas, dismissing them as mere rumours “hatched of some popish egge.” Furthermore, to dissuade others from voicing their opposition, these promotional tracts often suggested or stated outright that God would curse those who spoke against colonization just as he did those who misreported the richness of Canaan.

Although secular authorities in Newfoundland would mimic this characterization of negative reports, anti-Catholicism did not translate perfectly to the reality of diverse North Atlantic fisheries nor did it give a fair representation of Catholic involvement in overseas ventures. Although the Newfoundland Company’s 1610 letters patent required all colonists to swear allegiance to James I and the Church of England, it also

349 William Crashaw, *A sermon preached in London before the right honorable the Lord Lawarre, Lord Governour and Captaine Generall of Virginea, and others of his Majesties Counsell for that kingdome, and the rest of the adventurers in that plantation* (London: 1610), D[r].
350 Ibid., B4[v].
353 Secular authors attempted to mimic this characterization of negative reports. John Mason attributed negative reports of Newfoundland to “maligne persons, who out of envy to GOD and good Actions (instructed by their father the Devill) have fought to dispoile it of the dewe, and blamish the good name thereof.” John Mason, *A Brieve Discourse of the Newfoundland* (Edinburgh: 1620), [B3v]. A 1639 remark by then-governor Sir David Kirke that only “Jesuits and Schismatics” complained about the weather in Newfoundland, termed a “quip” by Peter Pope, indicates the longevity of this manifestation of anti-Catholicism and its continued utility. See Pope, *Fish Into Wine*, 289.
repeatedly stated that fishing vessels and their crews were exempt. The exclusion of the fishery from colonial interference in Ralegh’s 1585 patent was reiterated often by subsequent monarchs throughout the seventeenth century. Moreover, the salt fish trade that Newfoundland colonies were meant to protect continued to rely on Catholic markets in Spain and the Mediterranean. Just as George Peckham and his allies had enabled Humphrey Gilbert to make a second reconnaissance voyage in 1583, wealthy Catholics continued their interest in colonization as a means to escape religious persecution in England. As George Calvert began losing favour at court over his involvement in the failed marriage negotiations with Spain, he too turned his attention towards colonization. While the spectre of a Catholic threat was rhetorically useful, it bore little resemblance to the seventeenth-century North Atlantic, where competition with the French and Dutch was far more pressing.

**Converting The “Savages”**

Like anti-Catholicism, the proposed conversion of indigenous peoples to Protestantism within all of the ecclesiastical promotional tracts served several functions. As with anti-Catholicism, foremost was justifying the legality of overseas colonization


355 The notable exception of the 1620 New England charter, which did grant Sir Ferdinando Gorges’ company authority over the fishery, was met by staunch opposition from the English ports after attempts were made to exact a fee of 10£ for every thirty tons. Richard A. Preston, “Fishing and Plantation,” The American Historical Review 45, no. 1 (1939), 29-43.

356 Whether Calvert specifically intended his colony at Ferryland to be a Catholic refuge remains the subject of debate, but the terms of his 1623 charter and the presence of three
along with the addition of a moral imperative. Andrew Fitzmaurice has argued that prior to John Locke’s use of natural law to justify dispossessing indigenous peoples in 1689’s *Two Treatises of Government*, the English remained morally uncertain on the issue. They would, therefore, have been in constant need of reassurance and these promotional tracts demonstrate a willingness on the part of the clergy to give it. Thus, all of the clergymen promoting colonization stated on behalf of their patrons that indigenous peoples neither could nor would be lawfully dispossessed of their land. Instead, they proposed a peaceful trade of Christianity and civility in return for surplus land and commodities in the Americas. If this peace failed, as it would in 1622 Virginia, the clergy assured their audiences that the ensuing conflicts would be “the Lords battells” and easily won. Based on the scriptural examples of Cyrus, Jacob, Joshua, David, and Solomon, opposing such a war would be blasphemous.

Each clergyman repeated the same scriptural commandments, such as Genesis 1:28, which was interpreted as a requirement for all Christians “to spread themselves from place to place, and to have, hold, occupie, and enjoy any Region or Countrey whatsoever, which they should finde” with the caveat that the land had to be either

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358 William Symonds, Robert Gray, and William Crashaw assured their audiences, in turn, that it was not the Virginia Company’s intent to dispossess indigenous peoples of their “rightfull inheritaunce” by force. Robert Gray, *A good speed to Virginia* (London: 1609), C4[v]. Crashaw went so far as to claim that “we will take nothing from the Savages by power nor pillage, by craft nor violence, neither goods, lands nor libertie, much lesse life (as some of other Christian nations have done, to the dishonour of religion).” Crashaw, *A sermon preached in London*, D3[v].
359 Gray, *A good speed*, C3[v]: “we must first trie all means before weapons.”
360 Symonds, *Virginia*, 11-12.
unoccupied or legally obtained from the occupants.\textsuperscript{361} Therefore, conversion of the indigenous peoples became the lynchpin in most arguments. These clergymen provided a moral imperative for colonization by linking God’s command to “Bring forth fruite, and multiply, grow plentifully in the earth, and encrease therein, and replenish the earth” with Christ’s command to “Goe teach... all nations, and baptize them in the name of the Father, the Sonne, and the holy Ghost.”\textsuperscript{362} Potential investors and colonists were assured that colonization was not just legally sanctioned, it was the “necessarie dutie” of all good Protestants as prescribed by scriptural example.\textsuperscript{363} Building on the belief that it was God’s providence “giving us favour in the eies of the Savages, who rather invite us then resist us,” crying out to England, “O come and helpe us,” the clergymen argued that it would be an insult to God and an act of cruelty to the indigenous peoples not to support colonization with either one’s purse or person.\textsuperscript{364}

The failure of the English colonies to produce profits for their investors prior to 1625 provided yet another reason for the clergy promoting colonization to demand conversion so forcefully. While the chartered companies could not guarantee investors a profit, the clergy could guarantee spiritual benefits and tantalizingly suggest the potential for future profits if the colonists made conversion their initial aim. Protestant clergymen could not suggest that an investment in colonization would buy God’s favour or make them one of the elect, as this was associated with corrupt Catholic doctrine. However, they did offer a different kind of immortality: fame. This is not to say that they offered celebrity, but rather honour and remembrance, traits necessary for their salvation during

\textsuperscript{361} Eburne, \textit{A plaine path-way to plantations}, 17.
\textsuperscript{362} Symonds, \textit{Virginia}, 6; 9.
\textsuperscript{363} Crashaw, \textit{A sermon preached in London}, C2[r].
the Apocalypse that many in Jacobean England feared was swiftly approaching. William Symonds was the first to explicitly voice this potential for immortality in his 1609 sermon:

Get abroad where vertue is skant, and there, by the advancing of thy wisdome and vertue thou shalt bee more eminent and famous in a yeare, then at home halfe of thy ranke shall bee all their daies: hidden vertue is neglected, but abroade it is magnified... Thy way then to make the world ring of thy vertue, to thy praise among the good, and to the terror of those that are evill, is to go abroad when God calleth thee.365

While the first, Symonds was not the last colonial promoter to offer immortality. Of the seven Jacobean promotional tracts following Symonds, the same scriptural example is used in four: Daniel 12:3, “They that turne many to righteousnesse, shall shine as the starres for ever and ever.”366

By placing the emphasis in their promotional tracts on converting indigenous peoples rather than profit, the clergy were able to assure investors and colonists of the spiritual, and therefore less concrete, rewards awaiting them. Nonetheless, not all clergymen shied away from guaranteeing profit; those who did guarantee it, did so conditionally. The primary condition was that investors must “lay aside all consideration of profit for ever, never to looke for returne.”367 As John Donne argued, “though that be in Gods intention, to give it you hereafter, you shall not have it yet” because God’s first objective in the New World was converting all the heathens and only afterwards would

364 Ibid., C3[r]; Price, quoting Thomas Morton’s lost 1609 sermon, in Sauls prohibition, F3[v]; Gray, A good speed, C2[v].
365 Symonds, Virginia, 32.
366 Gray, A good speed, C[r]; Price, Sauls prohibition, F3[v]; Crashaw, A sermon preached in London, [title page]; Eburne, A plaine path-way, 8.
He urged current investors not to be discouraged by their early losses, for “Great Creatures ly long in the wombe.”369 William Crashaw was more positive about the potential for investors to see profit, assuring them that “if we first and principally seeke the propagation of the Gospell and conversion of soules, God wil undoubtedly make the voyage very profitable to all the adventurers and their posterities even for matter of this life.”370 Yet Crashaw added a warning to those seeking only profits: “if you should aime at nothing but your private ends, and neglect religion and Gods service, looke for no blessing, nay looke for a curse.”371 Once again, the clergy sought to silence dissent within the chartered companies by threatening God’s wrath.

Like Hayes and Parkhurst, however, the Jacobeans believed that Newfoundland was either uninhabited or so sparsely inhabited that the Avalon Peninsula could still be considered terra nullius.372 While this imagined absence of the Beothuk was convenient, for it meant that there was no illegal dispossession to cause anxiety, it was also problematic for this new colonial vision. If there were no nearby inhabitants to convert, then clergymen could not offer the intangible spiritual benefits that went along with conversion in place of profits. A clear solution to this paradox was never reached by the early promoters, as Richard Eburne demonstrated in 1624, asserting that Newfoundland was both wholly uninhabited and yet teeming with “an infinite number of... Savages, Heathens, Infidels, Idolaters, &c,” depending on which argument he was presenting.373 If

368 Ibid., 6.
369 Ibid., 19.
370 Crashaw, A sermon preached in London, G3[v].
371 Ibid., L[r].
372 Hayes, “A report of the voyage,” 341. Such claims clearly ignored complaints of fishermen that the Beothuk dismantled their stages, flakes, and cabins every winter to extract the iron holding these structures together. Pope, Fish Into Wine, 22.
373 Eburne, A plaine path-way, 4; 18.
potential investors were unconvinced by these conflicting justifications, it was hoped that appeals to Christian charity and the fear of disorder in England could sway them more readily.

**Social Reform**

It is in the theme of social reform that ecclesiastical promotion bears its strongest resemblance to the earlier commercial vision of Hayes and Parkhurst, though neither merchant focused as heavily on the humanitarian aspect of reform as the later clergy. Both the Elizabethans and Jacobians realized that colonization would require a large, cheap labour force to be profitable and to provide security against indigenous or European attacks. Skilled workers with families in England were unlikely to voluntarily risk their lives, but with the right legislation masterless men – vagrants and criminals – could be exiled and forced into hard labour. Where Hayes had made little effort to defend the morality of his proposed galley fleets because it made sound economic sense, the Jacobean clergy used specific imagery to describe the dual threat of overpopulation and crime. What often appears to be social commentary, therefore, served the familiar functions of intimidation and reassurance. Their message was clear: colonization was sanctioned by God and if anyone dared to oppose it, he would punish them.

Although E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield would certainly claim that the Jacobean clergy overstated their case, early modern demographic history is itself rife with controversies.\(^{374}\) Whether real or imagined, it is significant to note that all of the

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promotional tracts examined in this chapter offered colonization as the solution to the supposed problem of overpopulation. Like anti-Catholicism, they chose to use this fear of a population crisis in order to provoke an emotional response from the audience. Thus, the clergy did not need to give an accurate portrayal of English demographics and their statements should not be judged as such. Making the spectre of overpopulation seem imminent was the key to justifying the forced labour that early colonization required.

Based on late-medieval and humanist developments in preaching, evangelical reformers such as Calvin and Zwingli made use of “many images from everyday life to enliven their sermons and make biblical principles more palatable for the lay listener.”375 The promotional tracts written by clergy in England drew on these precedents by associating two specific images with overpopulation in order to demonstrate its inherent danger to lay audiences: bees and blood. While seemingly innocent, William Symonds’ contention that “The people blessed be God, doe swarme in the land, as yong bees in a hive in June; insomuch that there is very hardly roome for one man to live by another,” demonstrates the effective usage of bee imagery by the clergy.376 England was not simply overpopulated, it was swarming with potentially dangerous young men. The solution to this threat was, like the beekeeper, to divide the population and create new “Hives” in the Americas.377

Even more sinister was the use of blood imagery by Robert Gray and Patrick Copland: “For, even as bloud, though it be the best humour in the body, yet if it abound in greater quantitie, then the vessell and state of the body will contayne and beare, doeth

375 Ford, “Preaching,” 74.
376 Symonds, Virginia, 19.
377 Eburne, A plaine path-way, 9.
indanger the body, and oftentimes destroyes it.”\textsuperscript{378} The parallel drawn was that a large population brought glory to its monarch, based on the scriptural words of King Solomon, but overpopulation would destroy England completely through the social illnesses of “oppression, and diverse kinde of wrongs, mutinies, sedition, commotion, & rebellion, scarcitie, dearth, povertie, and sundrie sorts of calamities.”\textsuperscript{379} Essentially, overpopulation would cause a complete breakdown of social order. Once again, the New World was offered up as a solution to England’s problems. As John Donne stated in 1622, the colonies were “already, not onely a Spleene, to draine the ill humors of the body, but a Liver, to breed good bloud.”\textsuperscript{380} Colonization, therefore, offered not only the salvation of indigenous peoples’ souls through conversion, but also reformation of the less godly members of English society. Included in this were the “multitude of children” neither profiting their parents nor England, able-bodied vagrants, underemployed tradesmen, and petty criminals.\textsuperscript{381}

Idleness and vagrancy, particularly growing numbers of unemployed or underemployed youths, were perceived as threats to social order throughout the early modern period in England. A.L. Beier argued that a “baby boom” resulting from high birth rates and low mortality between 1500 and 1650 was the root of this perception. This fear is most evident in the disproportionate focus of sixteenth-century legislation on

\textsuperscript{378} Patrick Copland, \textit{Virginia's God be thanked, or A sermon of thanksgiving for the happie successe of the affayres in Virginia this last yeare} (London: 1622), 30. Almost the exact phrasing as in Gray, \textit{A good speed}, B3[r]: “for even as bloud though it be the best humour in the body, yet if it abound in greater quantities then the state of the body will beare, doth indanger the bodie, & oftentimes destroyes it.”

\textsuperscript{379} Copland, \textit{Virginia's God be thanked}, 30; Gray, \textit{A good speed}, B3[r].

\textsuperscript{380} Donne, \textit{Apostles}, 22.

\textsuperscript{381} Symonds, \textit{Virginia}, 36.
correcting idleness in vagrants between the ages of twelve and eighteen. Yet because their focus was unapologetically commercial, Hayes and Parkhurst did not take advantage of this growing anxiety to justify their colonial plans. Instead, the Jacobean clergy reassured to their audiences that the overlapping threats of idleness and vagrancy could be easily eliminated through the various colonial ventures of their patrons. To make the process of transportation seem more familiar and therefore acceptable, Richard Eburne compared it to the common practice of sending children away from their homes to apprentice in the trades. Derisively, he added that the idle nobility left behind in England would be likewise forced into industriousness when they were unable to rely on the surplus labour of the lower orders. Therefore, the transportation of vagrants and criminals was portrayed as a means to reform all levels of English society, making both England and its colonies wealthy and godly.

Many ecclesiastical authors portrayed colonization as a means of not only reforming the burdensome idle “frye of the wandringe beggars,” but also of preventing crimes caused by poverty. In addition to providing employment for the idle soldiers, artisans, and merchants of England, some argued that the colonies would help mariners who might otherwise “fall to piracie” through the steady labour of transporting goods and people between England and the colonies. Like mariners, Eburne suggested that the idle poor would also gladly give up crime if honest employment was made available to

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Underlying this appearance of paternalistic concern was the reluctance to differentiate employment from income as a factor of poverty and crime. In reality, the ecclesiastical colonial plans were no more humanitarian than Hayes or Parkhurst had been, essentially proposing the use of colonies as overseas Bridewells.

The plan to make colonists out of “the most disordered men that can bee raked up out of the superfluitie, or if you will, the very excrements, of a full and swelling State” was further defended by the scriptural example of David, whose kingdom was also founded by criminals, debtors, and the “discontented.” However, the most effective defence at the clergy’s disposal was to go on the offensive and debase the supposedly respectable members of English society for not participating in colonization and forcing the chartered companies to “send such as we can, not such as we would.” William Crashaw lamented that this was not the way

_our forefathers_ conquered kingdoms, subdued their enemies, converted heathen, civilized the Barbarians, and setted their common-wealths... it doscovers the pusillanimitie, the basenesse, the tendernesse and effemintatenesse of our English people: into which our nation is now degenerate, from a strong, valiant, hardie, patient and induring people, as our forefathers were.

Not only did the clergy call into question these non-colonists’ devotion to Protestantism, as anti-Catholicism and the conversion of indigenous peoples had clearly demonstrated that proper obedience to God required that all Protestants participate in colonization, they

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386 See for example, _ibid._, 317, 319, 326.
387 Eburne, _A plaine path-way_, 15. John Donne went so far as to claim that colonization could not only prevent crime but reform convicted criminals: “It shall redeeme many a wretch from the Jawes of death, from the hands of the Executioner, upon whom, perchauue [sic] a small fault, or perchance a first fault, or perchance a fault heartily and sincerely repented, perchance no fault, but malice, had otherwise cast a present and ignominious death.” Donne, _Apostles_, 21.
388 Crashaw, _A sermon preached in London_, E4[r], E4[v].
389 _Ibid._, E3[r].
also effectively emasculated these people. Richard Eburne remarked scornfully that “they cannot endure the hearing, much lesse the doing of any laborious attempts, of anything that shall be troublous or any whit dangerous unto them.” Therefore, it was not that colonization was too difficult, costly, or dangerous, the English were simply too soft and cowardly to volunteer themselves as colonists.

Claiming that the chartered companies had been forced to send less worthy colonists than they would have liked also offered a convenient scapegoat for the clergy to blame any and all colonial failures on, assuring their audiences that with industrious, godly colonists profit would be attainable, if not guaranteed. They were further assured by Patrick Copland that the high mortality rate of previous colonists was simply because “beeing the very scumme of the Land... they neglected Gods worship, lived in idlenesse, plodded conspiracies, resisted the governement of Superiours, and carried themselves dissolutely amongst the heathens.” The same traits that colonization was supposed to reform were, therefore, used to justify the colonists’ deaths. Those who gave up and returned to England were no more spared. Rather, Crashaw explains to his audience, they “went thither only for ease and idlenesse, for profit and pleasure, and some such carnall causes, and found contrariwise but cold entertainment, and that they must labour or else not eate, and be tied within the bounds of sharp laws, and severe discipline.” Being thus deemed lazy, the clergy again undermined any criticisms of colonization that these former colonists might have offered.

392 Copland, *Virginia’s God be thanked*, 24.
393 Crashaw, *A sermon preached in London*, F2[v].
As English fishermen had frequented the North Atlantic coasts since the early-sixteenth century, if not earlier, the Newfoundland colonies had to refute more negative reports of climate and commodities than others in the Americas. While the clergy’s labeling such reports as Catholic plots or idle excuses was useful, it was also problematic for the Newfoundland plantations as it reinforced the negative characterization of fishermen as disorderly and irreligious. With their explicit purpose being to “secure [the] trade of fishing,” the governors of these colonies continually attempted to disprove its reputation as “a beastly trade” within England.\textsuperscript{394} If they could not, then ecclesiastical claims that the colonies could reform the idle and criminals into godly English subjects would be far less convincing. In practice, sending young men and women to the colonies as apprentices elicited complaints from governors such as John Guy and Edward Winne, who requested that “no more boyes and girles be sent... nor any other persons which have not been brought up to labour.”\textsuperscript{395} While exporting the “unprofitable” members of English society to the colonies worked well in theory, it was untenable for a colony built around the specialized labour of catching and curing fish.\textsuperscript{396} As Peter Pope has demonstrated, a fishing crew with insufficient training would not only produce less salt cod but an inferior quality of cod that could not be sold in European markets.\textsuperscript{397} Without Hayes’ proposed galley fleet patrolling its shores, there was little use for unskilled labour in Newfoundland.


\textsuperscript{396} Eburne, \textit{A plaine path-way}, 62.

\textsuperscript{397} Pope, \textit{Fish Into Wine}, 24-27.
Conclusion

The Jacobean clergy constructed the illusion of united support for colonization by repeating the themes of anti-Catholicism, the conversion of indigenous peoples, and social reform for England’s overabundant and idle masses throughout their various promotional tracts. While these themes were rhetorically useful, providing persuasive arguments for colonization through the preaching methods of reassurance and intimidation, the illusion of unity that they gave the tracts was equally important. As the promotional tracts examined in this chapter have revealed, one of the main purposes of each one was undermining and silencing opposition to colonization. The authority with which these tracts were received depended heavily on the authors’ status as clergymen and, therefore, experts in morality and justice. Yet this status could only hold weight across a wide audience if the clergymen did not disagree within themselves. Major disagreements could have confused their audiences and, worse, risked opening a floodgate of criticism about the orthodoxy of their work. By keeping their promotional tracts relatively formulaic and impersonal, the clergy lowered the chances of being misunderstood or ridiculed personally.

The patrons of these clergymen also clearly benefited from the clarity of their tracts and the authority with which audiences received them. As Andrew Fitzmaurice suggests, the relative success of the promotional tracts as propaganda can be “measured by the persistent survival of... unprofitable colon[ies]” and the repeated attempts to establish new ones in locations such as Newfoundland despite continual reports that it
was too cold and inhospitable. It would appear then that the rhetorical style and arguments reflect not only what the clergy believed to be persuasive but also what was persuasive to their audiences. Or rather, the arguments were persuasive enough. As historians of propaganda such as Tim Harris have frequently noted, it is “extremely difficult to determine the impact such propaganda had” on its audience and thus nearly impossible to measure its success. The continued survival of colonial ventures throughout the seventeenth century, demonstrating a willingness to invest further finances and lives, does not suggest a general consensus from every person in England. If nothing else, all we may reasonably conclude is that these promotional tracts successfully gathered at least the bare minimum of support to keep colonial ventures alive.

The collaboration between the clergy and their patrons had tangible benefits for both that neither required nor excluded any deeper ideological agreement between them. In some cases, this may well have been a simple business transaction where the ecclesiastical writer accepted a commission from a chartered company or proprietary adventurer in order to subsidize his mediocre wages and gain favour with powerful individuals. This may also explain why we have so little information on clergymen such as Robert Gray and Richard Eburne who each produced only one tract promoting colonization. The more deeply involved the clergyman was with the colonial venture, the more documentary evidence about him has survived. Richard Hakluyt is perhaps the best example of this. He was involved in colonial ventures from at least 1582 onward,

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398 Fitzmaurice, “Civic Solution,” 47.
compiling the first promotional literature on colonization along with travel narratives. Like Hayes, his enthusiasm for colonization remained undaunted throughout his life despite the constant setbacks of war, disease, famine, and weak governance that plagued the colonies up to his death in 1616. Based on these disparate examples, it seems obvious that historians cannot make broad generalizations about the motivations of clergymen promoting colonization. Some, such as Hakluyt, were certainly sincere in their support of various colonial ventures while others may not have been. The diversity of these authors defies blanket statements that all were ideologically or theologically united either with each other or with their patrons.

Nonetheless, their success in convincing others of this unity had broader implications for the English colonies. The clergy’s adherence to such a generalized formula for colonial promotion resulted in misplaced expectations for these colonies much more than the treatises of their late-Elizabethan, secular predecessors had done. North Atlantic colonies built around the salt fish trade were expected to exclude Catholics when this was neither legally nor economically feasible. The Newfoundland colonies were expected to convert the Beothuk to Christianity despite the latter’s general avoidance of European contact and conflicting reports over their very existence. Finally, colonies whose main export was to be dry-cured cod were expected to employ and reform the idle members of society although the process relied heavily on skilled labourers to be profitable in a trade that was deemed morally corrupt. While ecclesiastical promoters helped to keep interest in English colonization alive, they certainly cannot have provided the clarity of the secular treatises they proceeded.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

What ayme you at in your Plantation?
Sought you the Honour of our Nation?
...Or amy’d you at your owne sweete private gaine?
-Robert Hayman (1628)⁴⁰⁰

The year 1583 has usually been viewed as pivotal in both the nationalistic
histories of Newfoundland and of English colonization. However, the first claim to
sovereignty and possession by Sir Humphrey Gilbert was actually preceded and
proceeded by the colonial promotion of late-Elizabethan merchants with antenational
loyalties. These merchants were not only present in Newfoundland before Gilbert but
also formulated colonial plans for the region while his attention was still consumed by the
Northwest Passage and Spanish treasure fleets. To begin the history of Newfoundland
colonization in 1578, on the other hand, offers a more definitive turning point and
problematizes our understanding of early colonization. The year that Gilbert received the
first English colonial charter to discover “territories not actually possessed of any
Christian prince or people” since Henry VIII’s reign also marked the beginning of
colonial promotion for the Americas.⁴⁰¹ The first clear articulation of English overseas
colonial interest was in Newfoundland and the North Atlantic, but was not exclusively
English. “Gilbert’s mission to the West,” characterized as the desire to spread

⁴⁰⁰ Robert Hayman, “To the first Planters of Newfound-land,” in Quodlibets, Lately
Come Over From New Britaniola, Old Newfoundland (London: 1628), 36-37.
⁴⁰¹ Elizabeth I, “The Letters Patents graunted by her Maiestie to Sir Humfrey Gilbert,
knight, for the inhabiting and planting of our people in America,” PN, 2: 307. As Gilbert
kept his colonial intentions closely guarded, this uncertainty opened the way for colonial
promotion intended to sway him to one venture or another.
Englishness and Protestantism abroad reflects much more the later sermons of the Jacobean clergy than Gilbert’s contemporaries.\textsuperscript{402}

The relationship between early English colonization and promotional literature may be best described as mutually dependent. Colonial promotion could produce colonies by proposing different plans and sparking enough interest to gain financial and political support for a venture; yet it was also a product of colonization, justifying ventures that had already begun and explaining away any previous failed attempts or unfavourable reports. This mutual dependency was the result of early colonization being sponsored through private individuals and groups of investors rather than directly through the English crown. Colonial charters and letters patent offered only the basic legal framework for colonies, leaving much to the imagination of late-Elizabethan and Jacobean authors. Whether producing colonial ventures or being produced by them, the success of each promotional document hinged on the status of its author as an authority within England. Without authority, a promotional document could be at best dismissed as mere opinion, too impractical to be acted upon, and at worst condemned as an unscrupulous bid for patronage.

Although the younger Richard Hakluyt’s 1582 \textit{Discourse of Western Planting} is widely considered to be the only piece of colonial promotion written in his own hand, the bulk of his promotional work was gathering, editing, and publishing documents by those who had traveled to Africa, the Americas, and the Indies. The Elizabethans and their clergy, therefore, privileged experiential knowledge in colonial promotion. Merchants such as Edward Hayes and Anthony Parkhurst were the authorities on North Atlantic colonization because they had witnessed and participated in the Newfoundland fishery in

\textsuperscript{402} Hinderaker and Mancall, \textit{At the Edge of Empire}, 7.
the same manner that Humphrey Gilbert was an authority on Irish colonization because he had led military campaigns against Irish rebels. The commercial vision of colonization that Hayes and Parkhurst created was based on a specific moment in Newfoundland history where political conflict threatened to derail a complex network of antenational loyalties protecting the salt fish trade. While Newfoundland would eventually become an entrepôt under the governorship of Sir David Kirke, it would base itself more around expanding inter-colonial than international trade as Hayes envisioned. Commercial anxieties under Elizabeth I were replaced by new anxieties by the mid-seventeenth century over the encroachment of foreign sack ships in the fish trade. While moral justifications were offered by the late-Elizabethan merchants to appeal to non-commercial audiences, their detailed plans reveal the impetus of profit underlying all other justifications. Neither Hayes nor Parkhurst shied away from guaranteeing quick and easy profits for investors.

Hakluyt’s *Western Planting*, based entirely on the second-hand accounts he had gathered, was not followed by another ecclesiastical promoter until 1608. As Chapter Four demonstrated, the Jacobean clergy were both amenable to writing promotional material and ideally suited for it, given their status as England’s moral authorities, their university training, and their reliance on patronage. Unlike the Elizabethan merchants, the clergy and their patrons preferred moral to commercial justifications and rhetoric to experiential knowledge. Profits had proven more elusive than the early chartered companies and proprietary adventurers had hoped, so new methods of exhorting investors were needed. Based on scriptural example rather than colonial precedence, the clergy assured their parishes of the intangible rewards for colonial ventures such as fame and
honour. Conversely, those who refused to support colonization – now characterized as a charitable venture, converting indigenous peoples and reforming English society – risked God’s wrath. This vision of colonization was promoted by the clergy as universally applicable, yet it contradicted the economic and geographic limitations of the North Atlantic region.

Outside of their contradictory vision of colonization, the rhetorical training and assured audience of parishioners made the Jacobean clergy seemingly ideal colonial promoters. However, this should have been equally true of the late-Elizabethan clergy. Therefore, the largest question remaining is why this shift between secular and ecclesiastical promotion occurred when it did. The answer is likely a combination of economic, political, and social changes that occurred between 1577 and 1625. The change in foreign and domestic policy from the Tudors to Stuarts had lasting consequences for the salt fish trade around which North Atlantic colonial plans were based. Most significant were the end to the Anglo-Spanish war, relative decline in the Iberian fisheries, and resumption of legal trade between England and Spain. With the dangers of imprisonment and impressment by Spanish authorities behind them and a growing demand for salt fish, there was less need for English merchants to establish an entrepôt in the Americas to protect Iberian trade.

The damaging effects of war on the Iberian fishing fleets not only served to encourage growth in the English and French fishing industries but also showed the fishing merchants that antenational cooperation offered slim protection against the predations of privateers. Even legal action against Richard Clarke’s piracy in 1582 seemed to produce little result. The North Atlantic fisheries had become just as much a
political battleground as La Rochelle or Antwerp had been in the late-sixteenth century. By 1610, when the Cupid’s Cove settlement was founded in Newfoundland, sectarianism increasingly displaced antenational loyalties. Colonists were required, by the terms of the colonial charter, to take an oath of supremacy recognizing James I as their political and spiritual sovereign. Unlike Hayes’ proposed labourers, these colonists were to be English subjects and members of its commonwealth.

That the late-Elizabethan commercial colonization plan had become unfeasible by 1608 still does not fully explain the sudden involvement of clergymen in colonial promotion. The increased political and religious stability under James I offers one possibility. When James succeeded Elizabeth I, he had already produced two heirs and established himself as a Protestant monarch. This stability provided more freedom for ecclesiastical and secular promoters to vent against Catholicism than they had previously. Richard Hakluyt’s “accommodationist” treatment of confessional differences in Discourse of Western Planting may have been the product of the late-sixteenth century political uncertainty rather than a reflection of his own religious convictions. While they were officially the moral authorities in England, Elizabethan clergy could not have used the same anti-Catholic invectives that were so rhetorically useful in Jacobean colonial promotion.

There was sound reason for the Jacobeans to distance themselves from and even deride experiential authority. Early attempts at settlement in the Americas had been hugely unprofitable and dangerous; the English could not fail to notice mariners’ reports

404 Irish colonization underwent a similar stabilizing process in the early Jacobean period. See Canny, Kingdom and Colony, 29.
405 Sacks, “Discourses of Western Planting,” 432.
of inhospitable climates in the North Atlantic and of atrocities committed against aboriginal inhabitants in Spain’s southern colonies. More than ever, the legitimacy and viability of colonization was being placed under scrutiny. Hiring clergymen to write promotional sermons during this time of heightened imperial anxiety was therefore an inspired strategy on the part of the chartered companies. In addition to reassuring potential investors and colonists that colonization was morally necessary, the clergymen were also more cautious about guaranteeing profits than predecessors such as Hayes had been and offered their patrons ample excuses for the slow return on investments. By the clergy’s new definition, colonization was primarily a moral rather than a commercial enterprise – a definition contradicted by the northern North Atlantic’s continuing focus on fishing.

Revisionist Newfoundland historians have stressed that the early conflict between commercial, fishing interests of the West Country and colonists in the Avalon Peninsula was greatly exaggerated by myth-builders D.W. Prowse and Lewis Anspach.406 Perhaps a more accurate assessment of seventeenth-century colonization in the North Atlantic is a conflict or contradiction between colonial visions. Some early Stuart proprietary adventurers such as Ferdinando Gorges and David Kirke continued to view North Atlantic colonies as Hayes had in 1583: adjuncts to the pre-existing fish trade. Others hoped that the presence of godly colonists and governors could reform the “beastly trade” of fishing and enforce order in the North Atlantic.407 Settlement was not necessarily anathema to merchants, but settlement that proposed to intervene in or usurp the fish trade was certain to be met with hostility. This conflict was worsened by inconsistent

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406 Pope, *Fish Into Wine*, 203-204.
legislation and royal proclamations up to the 1699 King William’s Act.\textsuperscript{408} Without a definitive vision of North Atlantic colonization being enforced, it was unclear whose grievances ought to be viewed as legitimate and who should be labeled deviant or disorderly.

Although the impact of colonial promotion on the English psyche was tangible, it would be too simplistic to draw the conclusion that every person involved in the early colonization of Newfoundland had purely commercial or purely religious motives in mind. When Robert Hayman commented on the first colonists in 1628, he claimed that they had eschewed their duties to England and to Protestantism as well as their duty to make the colony profitable for investors.\textsuperscript{409} Although Chapter One likened late-Elizabethan colonization plans to the Hydra, Jacobean ecclesiastical promotion was not the Greek hero Hercules. Both were entangled within their own temporal contexts. Jacobean colonial promotion did not negate all earlier visions of colonization nor did it extinguish dreams of profit in the North Atlantic. There was no single colonial vision that emerged victorious in 1625. What developed, instead, was a hybrid of these conflicting colonial ideals within the political, economic, and geographic realities of the North Atlantic. The importance of this early colonial promotion is not, therefore, in establishing a definitive “father” for English colonization but rather in illustrating the ways the North Atlantic was used to test different colonial ideas in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries.

\textsuperscript{407} Mason, \textit{A Briefe Discourse}, B[1r]; see also Richard Whitbourne, \textit{A Discourse and Discovery of New-found-land} (London: 1620), 62-65.

\textsuperscript{408} Keith Matthews, \textit{Collection and Commentary on the Constitutional Laws of the Seventeenth Century Newfoundland} (Memorial University of Newfoundland: Maritime History Group, 1975); Cell, \textit{Newfoundland Discovered}.

\textsuperscript{409} Hayman, \textit{Quodlibets}, 37.
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