

preserve the long ascendancy of the Liberal party through another election.

Yet even more alarmed than the Liberals by the result of the election in Saskatchewan are the leaders of "Big Business". They had persuaded themselves that the success of the C.C.F. in Ontario was merely a flash in the pan, and that its popular support was waning as the result of the elaborate campaign of educative propaganda which they had organized about the perils and evils of Socialism. But they were scarcely happy in the choice of some of their agents of education, and the placing of Major Gladstone Murray in the forefront of the battle for the system of free enterprise was a gift to its opponents. So now the C.C.F. is visualised in St. James and Bay Streets as a more dangerous ogre than ever, and dismal forebodings are rife there that it may secure a clear majority in the Federal House of Commons at the general election which Mr. King has solemnly undertaken to hold within a twelvemonth.

These alarms seem exaggerated, in view of the fact that except in the Cape Breton area the C.C.F. has made no serious headway in the territory east of the Ottawa River, which returns 96 out of 243 members of the Federal Commons, and, until it can gain substantial voting support all through that region, it must remain a minority party. But the captains of industry and finance want no chances to be taken, and they are now ardent for an immediate merger of the two historic parties as the only safe insurance against the installation of a C.C.F. Ministry at Ottawa in the near future. It is difficult to see how this can be accomplished as long as the issue about the present limitations on conscription divides the Liberals and Progressive-Conservatives. Moreover, Mr. King still commands the allegiance of the Liberal party, and it would be almost unthinkable that he, an inveterate hater of Coalitions, would wind up his career as a coadjutor of the Tories whom he has been fighting all his life. If it happened that the C.C.F. was returned with the largest group in the new House of Commons, but without a clear majority, his natural inclination would be to make terms with the C.C.F. and help them to power with benevolent support—in the same way as Lord Oxford and Asquith helped Mr. Ramsay Macdonald to take office in 1924. He would thus retain a controlling rein over the activities of a C.C.F. administration, and he would be doing a great service to "Big Business." If most of its leaders were not political innocents, they would realize that nothing could ensure the occurrence of the calamity which they dread so much as a pre-

election merger of the two historic parties. Mr. Coldwell and his lieutenants would at once proceed to point out the validity of their assertions that the two old parties were identical in spirit, outlook and policies, that their fights for years had been merely sham battles, and that they had now revealed starkly the hypocrisy of their ancient feud by suddenly forswearing it for the preservation of the economic *status quo*. A relatively small proportion of the voters of Canada are now safely herded within the old party groups, and the spectacle of a hasty marriage of the two elderly political parties would scandalize thousands of voters, who might have no real sympathy with the C.C.F.'s programme, into voting for the young party which promised a new deal.

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THE MILITARY OPERATIONS on the frontier of Assam and Burma have been overshadowing all other news from India, but the superficial appearance of tranquillity does not mean that the political situation has remained static, and there have lately been some interesting developments in it. The Indian Government has seen fit to release from prison Mr. Gandhi and some of his closest associates, and, although Colonel Amery, the Secretary for India, has explicitly stated that the release was solely on grounds of ill health and had no political significance, the Delhi correspondent of the *Times* of London reported that among the Hindu community it had a very favorable reaction and was interpreted as a conciliatory gesture of clemency.

Mr. Gandhi has given no pledges about his conduct, and is free to resume his political activities. But, although to the mass of the Hindu population he is still an object of reverence, at the age of 74 he is a very old man for an Indian; he is probably too old and too ill to play anything but a passive or negative rôle in politics. Moreover, he is confronted with a very interesting and important change in the fortunes of the Congress party. The group of wealthy Indian industrialists, whose generous contributions have for many years financed the party's organization and propaganda, have suddenly decided that the improvement of India's economic structure and a higher standard of living for her swarming millions are objectives more immediately desirable than the attainment of national independence. The war has stimulated greatly the industrialization of India, and consequently has increased the influence and prestige of her industrial leaders. So some of the most

influential industrialists, under the leadership of representatives of the great Tata firm, have worked out and published a very comprehensive plan for the economic reconstruction of India on bold lines. Various known as the Bombay or the Birla-Tata, it proposes vast new schemes of land reclamation and irrigation, power developments on a large scale, the improvement of transportation facilities, settlement projects and the creation of many new industries. Its avowed aim is to double within fifteen years the agriculture income of India, treble the income from services, and increase the industrial income sixfold. The London *Economist* thinks that the estimates of capital expenditures proposed for the scheme are too low, but, as they stand, the required funds cannot possibly be raised in India. So the authors of the plan are proceeding to London to enlist the cooperation of the British Government and British bankers. Obviously when they have embarked on such an enterprise, they cannot continue to finance a campaign for India's divorce from the British Commonwealth, and the power of the Congress party is bound to be materially weakened. But this move of the Indian industrialists is very unpalatable to Indian liberals like Mr. Rajacopalachari of Madras. For one thing, they dislike the idea of the authoritarian state-planning which the industrialists declare must be its bedrock foundation, and they also forebode that the movement for complete political autonomy may be sidetracked through the diversion of Indian interest to policies which promise a more abundant life. So they suspect the industrialists of secret collaboration with the British Government, and are prepared to oppose their project.

But meanwhile, according to Colonel Amery, the terms of the Cripps settlement stand available for acceptance and, if the now apparent division in the Congress party tends to bring its politicians to a more conciliatory frame of mind, the release of Nehru and other leaders, who are still in prison, might pave the way for a harmonious settlement of the constitutional problem. It must be solved if India is not to remain a hotbed of discontent and unrest in the post-war years, disturbing the whole of Asia. If modifications of the Cripps offer are needed to secure the acquiescence of all the Indian factions, it is reasonably certain that the influence of Lord Wavell, the liberal-minded soldier who is now Viceroy and who shows a more sympathetic understanding of the aspirations of Indian nationalism than his predecessor Lord Linlithgow the aristocratic Tory politician ever did, will be powerfully exerted to secure them.

The political, economic and social relations of Canada and the United States are now so closely intertwined, in some cases linked by specific pacts, that Canadians cannot be indifferent to the fortunes of the approaching Presidential election which will determine the character of the government ruling at Washington for the next four years. The lines of the campaign, which for all practical purposes is already in full swing, are being rapidly drawn, and it presents one abnormal feature, namely that for the first time for many years there is no serious contest for the nomination of the two historic parties. Even the reactionary southern Democrats, who abhor both Mr. Roosevelt and his policies, realize that no other candidate would have a reasonable prospect of procuring for them a fresh mandate, and it is now formally announced that Mr. Roosevelt, having recovered his health, will accept the renomination which will be proffered him by an overwhelming majority.

His Republican opponent for the Presidency will be Mr. Thomas E. Dewey, the Governor of New York, whom the Republican Convention recently held in Chicago nominated by a virtually unanimous vote. Mr. Dewey first came into the national limelight as a fearless and successful prosecutor of gangsters in New York City when he was District Attorney, and for the past two years, during his tenure of the governorship of the state of New York, he has been an industrious and competent administrator of its affairs. The careers of Grover Cleveland and the two Roosevelts prove that a creditable record in governing the most populous state in the Union is a very valuable asset for a Presidential candidate, but it will not suffice to elect Mr. Dewey unless he convinces the American voters of his ability to cope with national and international problems. At the age of 42 he has youth in his favor, and the Republican party is clearly going to advertise itself as the party of fresh youthful energy, which could provide in the troublous days ahead more efficient governance for the United States than a weary Democratic administration composed mainly of ageing men.

Governor Dewey is supposed to belong to the progressive wing of the Republican party, but the nature of the elaborate new platform which was adopted at the Convention indicates that Senator Taft and the reactionary die-hard element of the party, known as "the Old Guard", managed to make their will prevail in its drafting. After the last war the Republican party foisted a playboy of mediocre intellect, called Warren

Harding, as President upon the American people, with very calamitous results, under the slogan of "Return to Normalcy". It now reverts to the same slogan, with pledges about high tariffs, the termination of rationing, price-fixing and all other emergency powers, the mitigation of taxes on industry, the condemnation of the freezing of wage rates at arbitrary levels, and suggestions of loans to foreign countries. It pronounces strongly against government interference with private business or competition with it in regard to matters like housing, and it bears all the earmarks of favoring the interest of "Big Business", which can be relied upon to supply the Republican party with ample campaign funds.

In the field of foreign policy, the platform pledges the party to the prosecution of the war to complete victory, and calls for responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperation among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace by organized justice in a free world. So far so good; but there are ambiguities and reservations in the wording of the plank about foreign policy, which have induced Mr. Wendell Willkie to describe it as "double talk", and ominous emphasis is laid upon the retention of the two-thirds majority in the Senate for the ratification of treaties, a weapon which could easily be employed to frustrate American help for organizing a workable scheme of world security.

The two most eminent columnists in the United States, Miss Dorothy Thompson and Mr. Walter Lippmann, rarely see eye to eye about anything, but they agree in taking a very sombre and highly critical view of the new Republican programme. Mr. Lippmann declares that the platform "quite apart from the intentional ambiguity on foreign policy, is as regards domestic affairs as reckless and mischievous as irresponsible politicians dared to make it." Miss Thompson declares that if the Roosevelt administration is accused of being old and tired, "The Republican platform is the most senile and tired document I have read in many years." Furthermore, the powerful *New York Times*, which opposed Mr. Roosevelt in 1940 and now is none too friendly to him, sees numerous contradictions and reckless vote-catching phrases in the platform, and thinks that, if the Republicans won in November and proceeded to carry out some of their policies, they would open the floodgates of inflation. It remains to be seen whether Governor Dewey will make a serious effort to emulate Mr.

Wendell Willkie and succeed where the latter failed in diverting Republican policy into more progressive channels than the platform contemplates, or whether he will calmly acquiesce in its reactionary tenets. In the latter event it will be a millstone round his neck which should make him easy prey for President Roosevelt.

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THE grand strategy which the Allied leaders evolved at the Teheran Conference for the final undoing of Hitlerite Germany and her partners is now being unfolded. At mid-June, British and American armies accomplished successfully the crucial feat of making a substantial breach on a 60-mile front in the strong wall of fortifications with which the Germans had encircled the western mainland of Europe. If they are still pinned down to the coastal area of Normandy, they have secured a very substantial foothold and (what is most important) they have secured possession of an excellent deep-water port in Cherbourg. Its facilities, when repaired, will facilitate enormously the problem of landing reinforcements and supplies for the army of General Montgomery. He can now proceed to enlarge his beachhead, and gain freedom of manoeuvre for a large-scale offensive towards Paris and the heart of France, which might synchronize with fresh landings on the shores of the Bay of Biscay or the Low Countries.

In Italy the defeated army of General Kesselring, having given up Rome without a serious struggle, is retreating northward in considerable confusion to the line of the Po, but its prospects of making a stand there are dubious. If the Germans are compelled to fall back behind the barrier of the Alps, the allied forces could not only complete the liberation of Italy, but could soon effect a junction with Marshal Tito's army of Jugoslavian patriots which with inadequate arms and supplies has been harassing the local German garrisons very effectively. They could then begin, in conjunction with the advancing Russians from the East, a campaign for the re-conquest of the Balkan peninsula, for which they can rely on the help of anti-Nazi elements in Bulgaria and Greece.

For the moment, it is the developments on the eastern front which hold the greatest menace for the Nazis. The Russians required time to build up their communications and organize fresh supply lines after their great advances of the spring. But they were able to make coincide with the Anglo-American in-

vasion of France a resolute offensive against Finland, which has overwhelmed the resistance of the Finnish army and given them control of the Karelian Isthmus. Then, in the last week of June, three separate Russian armies launched attacks upon the German forces entrenched between Leningrad and the Pripet Marshes, and at the time of writing have made very encouraging progress. They have captured Vitebsk and other strong points in the German line, and taken thousands of prisoners. The plain objective of this offensive is to clean the Germans out of the three former Baltic republics, and pave the way for the invasion of East Prussia, one of the chief nurseries of the Junker caste. But the offensive in the north will not exhaust the still huge military resources at the disposal of Stalin and his commanders. It will be surprising if the southern part of the eastern front does not soon come to active life with at least two more Russian offensives, one directed against the German army holding the line between the Carpathians and the port of Galatz, and the other aiming at the capture of Lemberg as a prelude to a drive towards Warsaw and the heart of Poland.

The *Festung Europa* of the Nazis is therefore now for the first time being subjected to vigorous attacks at different points in its circumference, and they will be pressed home with relentless vigor. There is some ground for believing that in this hour of trial the direction of Germany's fortunes has definitely passed out of the hands of Hitler into those of the high command of the Reichswehr. Their only hope of averting unconditional surrender is to make the Allies pay so heavily for their territorial gains that war weariness will induce them to offer more lenient terms. But they are faced with a desperate and virtually insoluble problem. The tremendous casualties which the Reichswehr has suffered in the past two years must have been a serious drain upon the great central reserve pool of trained troops which they have kept organized to meet emergencies, and it is now being filled by youths of 16, which indicates that the man-power situation has become very serious. Then, thanks to the sustained aerial bombardment of Germany's industrial centres which is estimated to have cut her production of war materials by one third, the army is now handicapped by a growing scarcity of automotive vehicles and essential supplies like oil and copper. And the Luftwaffe, which was so powerful an ally to it in the early stages of the war, is now definitely mastered and can give only intermittent assistance.

So as the allied offensives increase in number and fury, the German generals will have to make very delicate calculations as to how their dwindled reserves can be most effectively utilized to prevent a real disaster at some point which would make the prolongation of resistance foolish. Their military skill may enable them to maintain the now unequal struggle for some time ahead, but the odds are now too heavily weighted against them for anything but a temporary recovery of military ascendancy on one or two sectors. In the end the deciding impulse to accept the terms of unconditional surrender may well come from a complete debacle of civilian morale inside Germany. Swiss observers, who have had opportunities for observing conditions inside the *Reich*, corroborate the reports of spies that now the great majority of the civilian population of Germany are in a state of mentally numbed despair, and crave for nothing so much as an immediate termination of war. The Gestapo still maintains a regime of terrorism, but it cannot prevent the spread of demoralization. The country is also full of deserters who refuse to return to the fighting fronts, and there is accumulating evidence that the same internal conditions as preceded the German collapse in 1918 have begun to develop. Accordingly, in the inner governing circles in London and Washington confidence that the European war may be finished off at an early date has been steadily mounting. When the situation inside Germany begins to become unmanageable, the German general staff will have to decide whether it prefers the Russians or the Americans and British to be the first occupiers of Berlin. They may well prefer the Anglo-American forces, on the ground that they will be more lenient conquerors, but after the disclosures about the brutal massacre of the recaptured airmen at Gorlitz they will be less certain on the point. If, however, they decide that they want the British and Americans to occupy Berlin first, they will then concentrate all their abilities and resources on defending the line of the Vistula rather than that of the Rhine, and the task of the Anglo-American armies would be made easier.

It was exceedingly unfortunate that the Anglo-American invasion of Normandy was accompanied by fresh friction between General De Gaulle and the British and American Governments. General De Gaulle, for reasons not yet satisfactorily explained, still remains *persona non grata* to President Roosevelt and his administration and, as long as they refuse to recognize his National Committee of Liberation as the provisional Government of France, the British Government, which is ready for recognition,



feels that it must keep in step with Washington on this issue. De Gaulle and his followers, moreover, have had their indignation over this treatment heightened by the action of the British and American Governments in concluding with other Governments-in-Exile agreements about the administration of their territories when they are liberated, and the outburst of unpleasant bickering on the eve of the invasion over General Eisenhower's broadcast to the French people was very disturbing.

Happily, however, there was achieved in time a *modus vivendi*, which permitted de Gaulle to land in France for a brief visit and sanctioned arrangements whereby French authorities are taking over, under the supervision of the Allied High Command, the civic administration of Cherbourg and other places as soon as they are freed from German control. But there still persists a serious state of tension in the relations of the Anglo-Saxon Governments with De Gaulle.\* To the mass of the French people he is a great symbolic figure, who kept alive in the darkest hours the fight for the recovery of their freedom, and the attempts to repress him merely increase his popularity with his countrymen. So while the underground movement in France has continued to harass the Germans with useful acts of sabotage, there have been ominous reports that a large element of the population of Normandy gave a far from cordial welcome to their would-be liberators. Such a situation must somehow or other be cured, because the cooperation of the French people is required for the rebuilding of European civilization, and it cannot be secured effectively, if through a sense of grievance they are filled with suspicion and mistrust of their Allies.

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THE CONFERENCE OF THE Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth, which was held in London in the first half of May, seems to have been a highly satisfactory gathering. At least the joint manifesto which the chief participants issued at its close professed that there has been a complete harmony of view both about the problems of the war, which naturally bulked large in the discussions, and about the problems of the post-war era. Incidentally, it seems deplorable that the leaders of the Commonwealth cannot frame an important manifesto, setting forth its ideals and policies to the world, without letting it be marred by no fewer than three false concords. A letter written to the *Times* of London thus gives chapter and verse for these deplorable errors in English:

\* Written before the recent meeting at Washington.—EDITOR.

(1) . . . until the defeat and downfall of our cruel barbarous foes *has* been accomplished—(2) Mutual respect and honest conduct between nations *is* our chief desire . . . and (3) we are determined to work . . . in order that tyranny and aggression shall be removed or . . . struck down wherever it *raises* its head.

Such carelessness in the wording of so momentous a document is unpardonable.

The desirability of preventing the outer world from getting the impression that, apart from Eiré, there was any lack of solidarity in the Commonwealth operated to smother any controversial issue, and the firm opposition of Mr. King, who was helped by Field-Marshal Smuts and certain British Ministers, effectually blocked endorsement of the proposal of Mr. Curtin, the Labor Prime Minister of Australia, for the creation of some form of machinery, such as a permanent Imperial secretariat, for the more effective coordination of the foreign and other policies of the Commonwealth. This problem was sidetracked by being referred to the different Governments for further consideration, but apparently the Conference after full discussion decided that no good case had so far been made out for a change in the constitutional machinery of the Commonwealth.

What is claimed as the most valuable fruit of the Conference was the agreement of the Prime Ministers of the Overseas Dominions to fall into line behind the British Government's conception of the sort of world authority which should be constituted after the war. It assumes that four great powers, the United States, the British Commonwealth, Russia and China will assume in the post-war era responsibility for the maintenance of peace and the organization of world security. But obviously until China has rebuilt the battered structure of her national life, and created at least the nucleus of a heavy industry, she cannot carry much weight in the councils of the supreme world authority. As for the smaller powers, they will be relegated to a very subordinate rôle, and will probably gravitate either as allies or as satellites into the orbit of one of the giants, seeking to exercise what influence they can through them. The idea of a revived and strengthened League of Nations, armed with a genuinely international police force, paid for and controlled by the international authority, is for the moment at least frowned on in Whitehall. Each of the Big Three will retain its own armed forces, and will not place them

at the disposal of an international authority, but will reserve the final decisions about peace and war. The perils and limitations of such a system of security are obvious. It may work all right as long as the three great powers remain in harmony about their policies. But the moment that a clash of interests creates any fissure between them, there is a possibility of infinite trouble and a revival of international anarchy.

There has been a great deal of loose talk and writing about the British Commonwealth serving as an admirable model for the world authority which should be built. But the *New Statesman* disposes of this foolishness very effectively in these words:

This Conference is visibly influencing British thinking, within the Commonwealth, if not beyond it, about the international authority which must be created after this war. If the British Empire can preserve its unity and its capacity for action without a paper constitution and with no institutions more formal than these irregular Conferences, may it serve us as a model on which the world-wide organization of tomorrow should be built? This is a fallacious argument. It is risky to conclude that methods which suit kinsmen, who inherit a common culture and close financial ties, will work where these are absent. The result of taking the British Empire as a model might not be the creation of a single world-wide international society; it might be the division of the earth among what would be in effect three vast empires, with their centres in London, Washington and Moscow.

Mr. Eden, in the review of the proceedings of the Conference which he presented to the British House of Commons, gave the impression that henceforth the British Commonwealth would speak with a single voice in support of this plan for having the destinies of the world guided by enormous concentrations of power at three centres. Now our own Prime Minister, in his comments upon Lord Halifax's speech at Toronto, pronounced most emphatically against power blocs as fraught with danger to the peace of the world, and was equally hostile to the idea of the British nations trying to speak with a single voice about international affairs. So since his return there has, in the light of Mr. Eden's assertions, emerged a veritable literature of controversial interpretation of the attitude of Mr. King. Critical papers, that condemned him for rejecting the views of Lord Halifax, assert that, having now seen international realities in a new light at the Conference, he has become converted to the necessity of a beneficent power bloc and to the desirability of a common voice for the whole Commonwealth.

But devoted champions of Mr. King, like the bright young men of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, maintain that this interpretation does him a grave injustice, that Mr. Eden had no warrant for some of his statements about the unified voice of the Commonwealth, and that Mr. King has in no whit abated his dislike of power blocs or his insistence that Canada must retain freedom of action in the international field, subject to continuous consideration of the common interests of the Commonwealth.

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