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THE BEHAVIOUR OF NATIONS

HISTORY, if it is ever to be more intelligible than an endless accumulation of facts, must become to an increasing extent a science. As in the closely related field of biology, this involves description, classification, and measurement. Marx, developing Hegel, produced a study of history not dissimilar to the groping intuitions of Darwin, but unfortunately Marx was more prophet than scientist, and, as one result, his theories have tended to be swallowed whole or discarded whole rather than utilized for the enlightenment there is in them. It is, therefore, a relief to see such a study as W. W. Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth*, which describes and measures the "take-off" of modern societies into affluence, compares this with Marx's forecasts, and evaluates his hits and misses. Rostow notices, too, that there are great differences in the patterns leading up to the break-through, and he attributes these to behaviour. His mathematical analysis is not applicable to periods of such inaccurate statistics, but one may find a little light by grouping the phenomena of behaviour as one might in the less emotionally charged field of ecology.

There are many resemblances and few differences between the development of human societies and that of communities of animals and plants. Probably the greatest difference is in the genetic background. Almost wholly among plants and very largely among animals the adjustment of species to their environment is effected by changes in the heredity of individuals. In man, social change is a result of learned behaviour which depends upon capacity to change rather than upon innate differences in pattern. It seems that at all times in the last hundred thousand years there have existed individuals of ability high enough to carry on a complex society but that, until recently, their morality and material culture have been inadequate to the task. One cannot, however, measure this ability, and even suitability varies with the circumstances, so that the heroic warrior of one decade becomes the gangster of the next.

A human society is an open system dependent upon energy which must

be derived from the environment. In any study of society we must recognize the importance of this basic source of energy, a sort of Gross National Reserve. It may, however, be derived from fertile land or from profitable trade, from military exactions or from the honesty of debtors. We are, therefore, reduced to description. Man is the greatest predator of man, so that the twin factor of Predation-Defence must rank high in any energy formula. Huntingdon has urged the importance of climatic change, but this seems to affect only marginal societies and can be left aside in first approximations. Disease is more important, as in the case of the plague of Pericles, but, in general, disease is most influential in periods of rising and falling cultures and can be lumped with factors in the Gross National Reserve. In no case, however, must one divide the elements in our picture into Good Things and Bad Things, for there is no ideal moment in social development at which one can say with Faust: "*Verweile doch, du bist so schön.*" Each moment leads on to another, and the most hopeless situation is when the next moment greatly resembles the last.

Agricultural societies seem to have at base a tripartite division into farmers, warriors, and priests. In Old World history one finds traces of this at all levels, though the stress varies. In the shamanistic animism of hunters the priest seems dominant; in the mystery-type religions of early agriculture the warrior is, at best, the villain; in the fighting religions of the pastoralists the warrior is supreme. We have no firm evidence that the native civilizations of America owed anything important to Old World cultures later than the Upper Paleolithic, yet they include the same divisions of society, which suggests that they developed by convergent evolution in response to a common demand of the environment, much as land-roving mammals and unrelated insects developed legs with comparable sections.

The functions of the three classes are obvious: the farmers produce the food; the warriors defend it; the priests, guardians of the wisdom and rituals of society, organize the whole. There will usually be a tendency for sons to follow their fathers in their functions, so any genetic differences may become concentrated into a slight differentiation of the classes; but mankind is so versatile, and his heredity is so uncertain, that differences of upbringing are likely to outweigh all else. Undifferentiated peasant societies seem rarely to have advanced beyond the village level of organization, for the peasant is bound to his land, which makes him much more certain of food than the hunter but infinitely more vulnerable to attack. The pastoral society, having certainty of both food and mobility, might destroy the peasant society, as in North

Africa following the introduction of the camel, or join it as a specialized warrior class, as seems to have happened in much of Europe. This specialization of function made possible the advance towards more complex civilization. If we wish to consider this as a new development to meet new conditions, we may justify our thesis by pointing out Alfred's development of professional warriors out of village farmers as the most economical means of meeting the threat of Danish raids. If we prefer to see it as an ancient Indo-European division, we can point out the resemblances between the dubbing of a knight with a sword and the dedication of a berserk to Woden by the touch of a spear. The "residue", in Pareto's sense, is that a warrior class appears.

The opposition of interests between the ruling nobles and their agricultural vassals is the first phase of what Marx called the "class war". At the beginning the value of division of function seems to have been recognized, so that there was little tension between the classes, but the more effective the defence of the country, the less apparent was the service rendered by the warriors and the greater the power of the warriors over the farmers. Here we have the makings of a predatory relationship, a true class war. In the animal world such a relationship between predator and host is obvious and has been romanticized as the "struggle for survival". In fact, the predators learn to adjust themselves to their hosts and to reduce their families at the first hint of shrinking numbers in the food species upon which they chiefly depend. This is the process of equilibration by which the predator becomes no more efficient than will result in a beneficial pruning of the host's numbers, a form of symbiosis, association for the benefit of both species.

The land-based feudal society was unstable except in periods of continual fighting. Because of their higher standard of living, the warriors tended to increase more rapidly than the peasants in spite of losses in war, so that such a society must have an open frontier to allow an outflow of young nobles if it is not to overburden its peasants. Such a society must expand or commit suicide or change.

Invention is comparatively rare; imitation is easy. Cultural advance, therefore, is greatest in areas touching the most populous and civilized states. Italy was within radiation of the Eastern Empire and later of the Arabs. There, too, remained the old hilltop cities of Etruscan days, which could still be used for defence, and these provided refuges for specialized industry far more productive than the generalized labour of the farms.

The rise of the city-states brings up a new type of man, neither predatory noble nor patient peasant. The citizen tended to be alert, realistic, short-sighted.

seeking possessions rather than land or power, and usually more loyal to the city than to any overlord. Nobles looked upon the citizens as troublesome vassals with a disloyal unwillingness to hand over their wealth to be used in the gentlemanly pursuits of war. The early histories of city-states are monotonously similar, quarrels for supremacy between nobles and guilds. Growth was not rapid until the Crusades poured wealth and trade and new knowledge into Italy.

The city-state is of interest to us because it first shows the political differentiation of mercantile society from its agricultural matrix. Since the beginning of the age of metals, agricultural society had never been wholly self-sufficient, and some technique had always been arrived at by which the lubricating circulation of trade was allowed to penetrate the fixed classes. This could take the form of months of peace, or of sacred nomadic clans of smiths, or of respected trading nomads. But for civilization to arise there must be specialization of work and fixity of position, and these were made possible by the city wall. This capital investment reduced the drain of energy towards perpetual defence. The surplus energy released could not be invested in agriculture, since the wall did not protect the fields. Trade and industry, however, could flourish, and these demanded a stable calculable world very different from the adventurous feudal world around them. It was in the nature of the city-state that it could prosper only in such conditions, midway between anarchy and order, as were provided by the sprawling Holy Roman Empire. Too much anarchy and the city became a refuge, a super-castle; too much order and it was made unnecessary by a wider area of safety. For the city to extend by land meant that it must take up the burden of feudalism and lose the advantages of the city wall.

Among the city-states we may distinguish a few types—the trading city, the industrial city, the maritime city, and the noble-dominated city—while the majority fall between these extremes. Every society is based upon some form of power. Feudal society was based upon military power and land; mercantile power was based upon money wealth, a deadly sin in tribal society and a vice among the feudal. Within the city the place of polar tension, or class-war, of nobles and peasants was taken by that between masters and workmen. There was another tension between city and castle, the opposition of two antipathetic societies. Both began with a differentiation of function to the benefit of the two classes, moved on to predation in which the uppermost exacted from the lower all that the traffic would stand, and tempered this in time with a degree of symbiosis in which the profits were shared. This

sequence, however, is dynamic and not mechanical, so that the trends may be reversed as new currents affect the equilibrium. In general, the development of the city helped rather than harmed the rural society, except as it provided a new centre of power.

In many city-states the nobles gained lasting control. Usually these nobles saw no value in wealth except to win power and land. When they controlled a city, they tended to drain the wealth of industry and so to stunt its growth. Medieval Rome is an example. This city had a fairly fertile hinterland, an available port, and the revenue of pilgrimages (what we should now call "tourist trade"). In early centuries nobles and merchant guilds struggled for dominance and tossed the powerless Popes from side to side. Perhaps because of the value of the pilgrimages, the nobles got the upper hand, and this passed on to the growing power of the papacy. Industry then declined, and culture followed it. It is difficult to assign any great man of the Renaissance to Rome, unless one shares Machiavelli's admiration for Cesare Borgia. Rome was rich owing to the tribute of religion, and thus could hire foreign artists. We may suggest a law: that the introduction of wealth into the ruling stratum of society impedes social development.

Venice was the complete maritime city-state. During the ravages of Goths and Lombards, the Venetians withdrew to the islands of the lagoons. The loss of natural resources resulting from this move was offset by the reduction of the waste on defence. Lacking land, the Venetians turned to the sea and ran through the normal sequence of maritime development: fishing, piracy, trade, empire. Maritime powers have the immense advantage that, in the early stages of trade, every ship must be armed against piracy and so may be used as a warship in defence of the state. A defensive army may be turned against the freedom of the people, but a defensive navy can not. Venice ran through the possibilities from peasant state to industry and finance and, though it met at last its inevitable hour, the memory of that small city facing the advancing power of the Turkish Empire is one of the wonders of history.

The greatest industrial city was Florence. It lay in a rich valley, but it lacked ready access to the sea and natural defences. In spite of these disadvantages, or perhaps because of them, Florence quarrelled its way to greatness. During three centuries it produced a flow of genius of every kind, from Dante and Leonardo to Lorenzo and Machiavelli, and attracted others whom it did not breed. Truculent and unstable as Athens, it was a similar forcing-house of talent, which seems to thrive better under freedom than under order and security.

No mercantile city-state developed, or could develop, into a national state. Unity, as Bismarck knew, is achieved by blood and iron, by patriotism and ruthless militarism poles apart from the bands of specialized mercenary soldiers that developed to fight the battles of the cities. A city-state that sought power on land weakened its finances and declined. The city-states produced the cultural advances of the century, but these could be imitated by the larger and less cultured feudal states, which could outmatch the cities in force. France, Spain, and the Popes plundered rich Italy and reduced it to "a geographic expression".

Among the national states we see the same patterns as among city-states. Aragon and Castile fought for centuries against the Moors and built up a military-minded nobility. Even before the fall of Granada, the Catholic Kings had begun to destroy or drive out Moors and Jews and so to ruin the very considerable mercantile development of southern Spain. The loot of Mexico and Peru poured wealth into the top of society, preventing development and financing the religious wars of a century which benefited almost every country in Europe more than Spain. As with Rome, the contributions of Spain to culture and social progress were meagre.

Matching Venice, England had a quite remarkable set of advantages in the trend towards nationhood. The English Channel reduced the need for powerful nobles or a standing army. The ocean, with the coming of sea-worthy vessels, opened the world of trade to a nation strong enough to protect its ships. Here was a stretch of fertile land, exceeded in Western Europe only by that of France, and an abundance of coal and iron that increased progressively in importance. With the Norman Conquest came the early centralized power of the king, based more upon accepted law than upon feudal force. Because there were long intervals without profitable wars, landholders tended to farm their estates and to have close relationships with trade which absorbed many younger sons, so that there was much movement between classes from early times. Industry, which in less untroubled lands thrived only behind city walls, here flowed out into the countryside and escaped the strait jacket of the guilds. When specialization of work developed, it soon became more widespread than in any contemporary country except the less naturally defended Netherlands. The unmilitary England that checked the military Louis XIV had less than one-half the population of France but may have been the wealthier of the two.

The industrial revolution was a break-through without parallel in history since the rise of agriculture. The steam engine and new machinery multiplied human labour many times in a generation, causing a tremendous in-

crease in productivity based upon resources which then seemed inexhaustible—the coal, iron, and wool of Britain, the cotton of America. Here was a national state with the mercantile pattern of a city-state, and tiny Britain had its century of dominating much of the world. Slowly political power followed money power from the landowning class into the hands of the industrialists.

Marx had it that the state was the machinery of oppression in the class war. Certainly any society not stagnated in immemorial custom must have machinery for maintaining order. Certainly, too, the rapacity of the capitalist system in its early days was as ruthless as that of a feudal nobility at its worst. But Marx's idea that the tyranny of the rich would drive the workers to revolution was less well-founded.

The transfer of power from one group in a social system to another is done reluctantly. While still in control, the declining rulers are apt to use force to repress change, and the effectiveness of such repression is likely to be proportionate to the military force available to the rulers. So France, military-patterned to offset its open frontiers, repeatedly swept away mercantile movements and preserved an obsolete aristocracy for the French Revolution. In less military states a more usual pattern is that of the "tyrant". During the mercantilization of ancient Greek cities, it often happened that one member of the declining landed nobility seized power by allying himself to the rising mercantile group, and he was known as a "tyrant". Such a phase of adaptable autocracy held the reins until the rising group reached the stability and self-confidence to throw it off. In England we see observant kings allying themselves with the merchant classes against the nobles. The Tudors were typical tyrants, ruling while the new men found their feet and became ready to seize the reins themselves. At first the growth of the towns enriched the rural gentry who produced the food for them, but the Industrial Revolution expanded the wealth of the towns much more rapidly, and the Whig nobles played tyrant and pushed through the First Reform Act. Soon the power of capital was also that of the state, and Marx's extending impoverishment of the proletariat might have occurred except that this is not the way in which a non-military society works. Any new class consists in great part of driving, grasping predators, ruthless and irresponsible. But such a society tends to kill itself. In this, as in all periods, there were understanding people who sought a more symbiotic relationship whether by legislation, as in the Factory Acts, or by direct action, as in the trade unions. Today, in England as in most industrial economies, the chief buttress of the capitalist system is its workers. These are not less self-seeking than their employers, but now that they have good wages,

and not only chains, to lose, they tend to value efficient management more highly than theories of ownership.

It has often been said that Britain alone lifted itself into industrial prosperity by its boot straps, providing its own capital without government assistance or foreign investors. This is probably not the whole picture. British textiles were financed largely by their own profits, but these profits had previously provided a living for skilled artisans over much of the world. These artisans were now transformed into proletarians at starvation wages or, in crowded countries, starved outright. That source of capital could not be tapped twice. Later industrializations were in part made at the expense of British capital which they had made obsolete by more complex machinery and organization.

The ideal that Britain should be the workshop of the world seemed not unfair, but its application in practice was often extortionate. Mineral wealth could be taken only once. Native produce was exchanged against manufactured goods, and the trader made his profit on both. Plantations might be set up to produce sugar, but the work was done by slaves, or later by day-labourers, and the profits returned to Britain, leaving little behind. Direct imperialism gave at least some order and protection in exchange for this exploitation, but economic imperialism beyond the boundaries of empire usually gave less. Investments planned for short-term profit lack sufficient permanence for symbiosis to develop; long-term investments demand the stabilizing of the government of the foreign society, not usually for its good.

In biological evolution, which parallels social evolution very closely, the sequence is adaptation, exploitation, specialization, gigantism. In human societies this is roughly: peasant agriculture, a slow rise from simple survival; specialization of labour, an exponential increase in population and prosperity (the curve of increasing return); organization, large units increasing towards monopoly, an exponential reduction of the rate of increase (curve of diminishing return); stagnation, where progress ceases altogether.

The mercantile cycle is something like this:

	<i>1st Land</i>	<i>2nd Land</i>	<i>3rd Land</i>	<i>4th Land</i>
Stimulus	Peasant	Peasant	Peasant	Peasant
Next phase	Cash-crop	Peasant	Peasant	Peasant
Next phase	Industry	Cash-crop	Peasant	Peasant
Next phase	Financial	Industry	Cash-crop	Peasant
Next phase	Protected	Financial	Industry	Cash-crop
Next phase	Peasant	Protected	Financial	Industry

Peasant societies may exist indefinitely without appreciable change. If

however, one of them comes within range of a civilized state which has desirable luxuries to exchange against peasant surplus produce, growth will be initiated. A peasant economy has little to offer, but energetic individuals, seeing opportunities, will begin to specialize in salable commodities. In the case of natural products, such as fur, this exploitation may deplete the supply; in the case of renewable products, such as wool, it may increase it. Once the output of raw materials becomes dependable, manufacturers tend to move towards them, whether by local development or by migration of capital. When the output of manufacture gluts the home market, the surplus will be sold to neighbouring lands and will convert these lands gradually to a cash-crop economy. In turn these lands will build up industry with the most advanced techniques, so that the first land can export to them only capital which will increase competition with its own products. To defend its own industries, which are now too small and outdated, the first land must reduce competition between its units, tending towards monopoly, and raise tariffs against competing imports. But now the familiar profits must be made chiefly from the home market, which will progressively deplete its purchasing power or inflate its currency unless each household protects itself by reverting to the peasant practice of producing its own essentials.

This is an ideal cycle as it might work if political factors did not enter (as they always do). Another oversimplification is that the picture portrays the wave-motion as running freely. In fact, the speed of development increases exponentially as the lands later involved telescope or even skip the earlier phase of development. As a result a whole complex civilization may break like a wave on the beach.

An example of overtaking is that of Germany. The Rhineland had had a long period of mercantile development when it became involved in the Prussian revival following Napoleon. The Industrial Revolution was begun, the *Zollverein* freed sources of raw materials to industry and markets for the products, while the government manipulated tariffs and bounties in order to break through Britain's lead. In this process much of the painful predatory phase of the Industrial Revolution was skipped. The government began to take some care of the workers, and industries grew to colossal size, almost to monopolies, and were closely linked to the state. The concentration of capital that Marx had foreseen took place, yet not the impoverishment of the workers. But the whole movement was motivated by the Prussian military mind. The industrialists might seek wealth merchant-fashion, but the government har-

nessed this wealth to the feudal ideal of military power and territorial expansion. The result was the explosion of the First World War.

The Versailles Treaty was a misguided attempt to change Germany's ideals by removing Kaiser and army, and impossible reparations were demanded in order to keep Germany weak. The Weimar Republic was a compromise between old ideals and the opportunism of an industrial society. Bismarck's paternalism had left Germany's industrialists ill prepared for responsibility. Before and after the inflation they mushroomed rapidly. Freed from the national debt by inflation, freed also from much of the care for the workers, freed from taxation by their control of the political machinery, they ran through their phase of predation in a few years. In the Great Depression this irresponsibility was fatal. Four million unemployed, starving on *Kreisgeld*, became a danger to society. Business blamed the unrest upon Communism and financed Hitler to check it; the army supported him because he promised to rearm. World War II came, the result of modern industrial power linked to feudal ideals.

The United States entered early into the spate of invention and mechanization that accompanied the industrial revolution, and this was most notable in the North. This has been attributed to the Puritan background of New England with its encouragement of individual responsibility and rejection of social pleasures other than money-making; it might, however, be argued that the New Englanders were feebly attached to the soil rather because the soil was poor than because they were Puritans. The land-based Southern economy owed its persistence to valuable agricultural exports for which the North had no equivalent.

Railways had been invented and developed in time to meet America's need for expansion inland. There was no great fund of local capital to expropriate in some way, so money was borrowed. Many early financial magnates were notably dishonest and by their predation might have dried up the sources of needed capital, so the usual symbiotic trend brought up more honest ones to succeed them. Labour was drawn from surplus families of farms and from immigrants, both groups accustomed to long hours and hard work, both unaccustomed to organization in self-defence. The aim of competitive self-enrichment was so widespread that there was no true working class, no proletariat resigned to working forever for wages, and to many it seemed cowardly to unite and so to confirm their inferior position. Governments were open to corruption, and employers could hire armies to defend their right to exploit. In the Great Depression Franklin Roosevelt played "tyrant" and forced the

unions upon capital. Now they have become powerful organizations, matching the great corporations and even threatening government and national welfare. We must recognize this as an overswing of equilibration and not as the rise of a new society or phase of development. Capital and labour are now linked in increasing symbiosis, while the government seeks to control the excesses of both when these threaten the welfare of the society. Here is a community that has reached a "standard of living", i.e. expenditure, unparalleled in history, two hundred million people absorbing something like fifty per cent of the world's production of materials.

The Russian revolution is an example of the triumph of behaviour pattern, traditional and theoretic, over orderly sequence. The Industrial Revolution had begun in Russia with railway construction but had reached only the level of cash-crop specialization when the Communists seized power. A chart of industrialization shows a curve rising smoothly until the disaster of World War I, collapsing until the coming of the New Economic Policy, and then the curve rising and continuing much as it would have done if there had been no war and no communist revolution. But in form the development was different. Under Stalin the preachings of Marx met and fused with the old Russian pattern of thought. Marx had said that the capitalistic world would unite to crush any Communist state; the Russian state had always been military in order to protect a land without natural defences. Soviet Russia was therefore built up with both eyes upon war; otherwise it might not have survived Hitler's attack. The method was that of bureaucratic organization, the last phase in social development, although the usual supports of sound agricultural specialization and economic well-being had not yet been established. Under Stalin the exploitation was more openly brutal than in any other industrial revolution, but since his death the swing towards symbiosis has accelerated. Whether Marx would have been satisfied with a state in which the members of the Communist Party seem to form a privileged minority in polar tension with the workers is another matter.

The Russian Five-Year Plan has now become the model for the industrialization of backward nations, and the need for government planning has penetrated even the most reluctant of capitalist states. Clearly the phase of organization is overtaking that of specialization. Britain is slipping progressively into socialism; the United States is approaching it by control rather than by positive action. New nations with their feet still entangled in tribalism are seeking capital and prosperity as a right and not as a result. In a world in which co-operation is most desirable, the three greatest powers, the United

States, Russia, and China, waste their energies in abusing each other and in arming against each other. The reason is obvious. Here again Marx seems to be right: the cohesion of the state is the result of the polar tension of the class war. If the class war is to be diminished, the tension must be projected against some enemy outside. Rulers have always been aware that a foreign war may unite a divided people. Shakespeare put this counsel into the mouth of the dying Henry IV; Machiavelli approved it in the conduct of Ferdinand of Aragon; and centuries later it emerged in physics as Bernoulli's principle. This is no longer a clash of rival ideologies, for the principal differences today are national, a will to power phrased in slogans of praise for one's own discarded principles and abuse of the opponent's discarded practices. The important question is: which behaviour pattern is best suited to the coming conditions?

In theory the phase of organization is the curve of diminishing returns, needing thrift rather than change. A city-state may have an organizational phase, like that of Venice after the sixteenth century, or a national state, like Britain today, may advance into it. But the wave overhangs such units, which cannot long survive in the neighbourhood of states of equal culture and greater power. Perhaps only the largest state in its area can reach this phase and grow for a space and survive. To find such empires it is necessary to go back to eras before science and technology existed, when the political possibilities may have been very different from those today.

The organizational state is of necessity imperial, taking in smaller states and incorporating them into itself. The Assyrian Empire was militarily very successful, but its conception of conquest was the enslavement of the conquered and their subjection to the gods of Assyria, in short, the rule of naked force. The result was fear, hatred, instability, and early destruction. The nearest parallel to it has been Hitler's Thousand-Year Reich, equally successful and cruel and yet lasting only twelve years before it built up enemies inside and out sufficient to crush it. In contrast we have the Persian Empire, which trebled the area of the Assyrian and yet ruled with considerable success and consent for more than two centuries, was conquered by Alexander, and yet re-emerged in Hellenized form to endure for another two centuries. Cyrus the great conqueror seems to have been pure predator, though he left memories of tolerance; Darius was definitely the organizer and was motivated by both practical and religious considerations. The degree of toleration in matters of custom and religion was unprecedented, and the centralization of administration and regard for the welfare of the widely differing peoples was wholly

new. The Roman Empire is another example. During the Republic the administration was largely predatory; under Augustus, Claudius, and Hadrian it improved and became chiefly symbiotic, apart from the continued parasitism of the city of Rome. The rather rapid degeneration of the empire once it had ceased to expand seems to have been due to exhaustion of soil, increase of disease, and the building up of more powerful enemies outside. At present it seems probable that we may be able to diminish soil-exhaustion and disease, though we may never eliminate them. The pressure of enemies outside is another matter. There seem to be only two possible remedies to this: extension to easily defensible frontiers, and the adoption of symbiotic, non-predatory, religious attitudes by both the country and its enemies. In fact, both Rome and its Germanic enemies accepted the pacifist religion of Christianity—and went on fighting. The Romans extended their frontiers to the desert in the south and east, but their northward limit seems to have been in part conditioned by their system of transportation, in part by the agriculture of the opposing tribes. Where these had fixed agriculture, the Roman troops could be fed from the conquered country; where agriculture was in the slash-and-burn stage, supplies had to be transported, and this had limits. Today we may say that the possibilities of modern transportation have no limits beyond the expense and the interruptions of war, so that even oceanic barriers become uncertain. Only a world state can have safe frontiers, because it will have none. Until the world state is reached, it may be doubted whether the friendliest relationships and the most symbiotic ideologies of super-states will long resist the pressures of overlapping fields of influence.

The super-states of today, then, must be looked upon as a temporary phase in the development of our civilization, comparable to that of the city-states and national states, and not as a stable and terminal possibility of growth. Among these super-states we may count the United States with its economic satellite, Canada; Russia with its European satellites, some of which are dubiously loyal; China with south-eastern Asia and Indonesia. It may be doubted whether Western Europe can shed its national behaviour-patterns in time to take its place in a super-state phase. India and the Moslem world have awakened late and seem to lack the resources for greatness. At present Latin America shows no sign of reaching unity in time. Which then will build the world state?

To meet the curve of diminishing returns it will be necessary to economize on defence and production by the creation of larger units, and to bring population and production into equilibrium with renewable resources. The

super-state will need power to dominate unwilling neighbours; a Messianic purpose to justify such domination; economy of means, lest diminishing resources be exhausted too soon; a symbiotic pattern to make the preliminary domination less repulsive.

Measured in these terms, the American super-state has many disadvantages. It has the needed power, at present more than any other bloc, though this superiority is not likely to endure for another generation. The Messianic purpose is lacking, for there is a fundamental contradiction in American thought. No people has been more sympathetic to the political freedom of small nations, few have been more ruthless in dealing with those—for example, Indians and Mexicans—who have interrupted its economic advance. Love of liberty inspired the Monroe Doctrine, yet Theodore Roosevelt's Big-Stick Policy transformed it into an instrument of economic exploitation. The Marshall Plan saved Europe from Stalin's Communist imperialism, but who can disentangle its motives—opposition to Communism, the wish to dominate, the need to protect and rebuild markets and so to prevent over-production and depression at home, and pure altruism? The basic motive of American economics is gain, however much it may be seasoned with good will, and power remains chiefly in the hands of the predacious. In 1920 Woodrow Wilson, whose economic principles were sound for his period, recommended a reduction in tariffs to suit America's new position as a creditor nation; instead, tariffs were raised to new levels, encouraging gold to flow into the United States where, lest it cause inflation, it was buried Fafnir-fashion at Fort Knox, which resulted in the Great Depression. The New Deal and the advent of Keynesian economics have created new markets by expanding domestic consumption until it has reached a level of "conspicuous waste" unattainable in less favoured areas. After forty years we find the "Kennedy Round" of talks to reduce reciprocally the tariffs which the United States no longer needs for her protection and which the other states do need. In the same way the American government generously gives credits to foreign countries, and these usually enrich the upper levels of society where they tend to prevent rather than to encourage change. Investments demand political stability, whereas often the interests of the peoples demand political reform, even if this brings temporary chaos and the expropriation of foreign interests. It is odd to recall that a rising which today would be labelled "Communist" led to the founding of the United States.

How do the Communist blocs compare? There are many forms of Communism. The most successful Communist nations, Russia and China,

are already powerful and are growing faster in strength than the United States. They have the Messianic purpose of conquering for the sake of Communism rather than for simple exploitation, though Stalin's imperialism and Khrushchev's policy of co-existence have been in no way different from the behaviour of capitalist states, while China's extension of power can find detailed parallels in the expansion of the United States westward from the Mississippi. In "economy of means" the advantage is less certain. There is great waste in the competition of capitalism, but this eliminates the inefficient. Under a planned economy this competition is reduced—though cost-accounting sees to it that some remains—but the likelihood of expensive mistakes on the grand scale is increased. The symbiotic elements in Marx's teaching fit the phase very well, but thus far they have not been carried out. Russia has been raising its standard of living, probably with an eye upon its model, the United States, and its neighbour, Western Europe, and seems to be seeking yet higher levels of conspicuous waste as a proof of communist superiority. All communist states have behaved nationalistically, and each group has a sense of superiority over every other group that is not endearing. Perhaps the greatest advantage that the Communists have over the capitalists lies in the areas of old civilization, where a landowning class dominates. Capitalist influence confirms the rule of this class; Communist infiltration breaks it down, creates a peasant state, and dominates this state by means of a "tyrant" Communist party that nurses the people into industrialism. To those interested chiefly in the improvement and welfare of the human race, both capitalism and Communism leave much to be desired, but in viability in the world of the future the advantages are on the side of Communism, and rather on that of Chinese than of Russian Communism.

Aristotle in his *Politics* compared the systems of the cities known to him. If he had had a sense of time and history, which as a Greek he could not have, he might have hazarded a forecast of the coming developments in Mediterranean government. Knowing Macedon, he might have guessed that Philip would rise to dominance in Greece, but he could scarcely have foreseen Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire. Among the cities that he described, there is no mention of Rome, which in his day was an inconsiderable village battling with its neighbours. The detail of our future is no less obscure today.