DOMINIONS OLD AND NEW

CHARLES MORSE

TRADITION has it that Preacher George Whitefield could move his hearers to ecstacies of bliss by simply uttering the word 'Mesopotamia'. But one could hardly conceive of his tongue with all its wizardry doing the like with the word 'colonial'. True, this word came into our speech infused with all the dignity of its Latin original—for there were Roman provinces (such as Cisalpine Gaul) whose citizens were politically equated to those of Rome, and there are Roman writers who use the term *colonia* as an equivalent of the Greek apoikia denoting an independent or self-governing settlement of apoikoi ('people from home'). But in Whitefield's time and on to the latter part of the nineteenth century 'colonial' implied a status of political subjection and social inferiority to the lords of the world who dwelt in London. Even if we can say that in these days *nous avons change tout cela,* (1) and that Downing Street—confronted by the ineluctable spirit of equality that has emerged from the alembic of war—is well content to 'suffer a sea change' in its policy towards the autonomous units of our so-called Empire (2) that lie beyond the King's Chambers, yet we must recognize that the tale of England's unhandsome treatment of her American colonies in the eighteenth century is an ineffaceable chapter in history. Nor is our racial pride exalted when we find vestiges of the policy that led to the Revolution of 1776 persisting long afterwards in the relations between Downing Street and the loyal British communities in America. Despotism in its retreat from England found its last ditch in colonial administration, and died hard there. The quest for responsible government in these communities was a long and painful one, and when the boon was granted it had been paid for to the uttermost farthing by the travail of soul of such 'colonials' as Howe, Baldwin and La Fontaine. If the scroll of our tutelage was not greatly charged with punishments, it did not lack humiliations; and it was a strait gate indeed through which emancipation came. Nor

(1) "There has been a complete change in conditions since 1856. . . . The sole control of Britain over foreign policy is now vested in the Empire as a whole". Mr. Lloyd George in addressing the House of Commons, December 14th 1921.

(2) "There are many mansions in the British empire, and no one wants to build them all alike or fill them with a homogeneous population. For that and for other reasons, 'empire' is not a happy term; it implies an unconstitutional authority, military domination, and rigid uniformity. The essence of the British realms is government by consent, liberty and heterogeneity." Prof. A. F. Pollard's *Evolution of Parliament*, p. 364.

was the Orbilian rod flourished only in the weightier matters of the law; its suasion was found more convenient than argument in minor things. No great while before 1867—the epochal year for British North America—Gladstone felt himself free to treat with supercilious disregard Thomas Chandler Haliburton's plea in the House of Commons for consideration of the interests of the New Brunswick timber-merchants in the English market as against those of foreign competitors. The situation was rendered more acute by Gladstone's use of the following language in his reply to a letter from a citizen of the province of New Brunswick protesting against any law being passed which would injure the colonial timber trade:—"I could not admit your right," declares Gladstone, "even individually, to protest against any legislation which Parliament may think fit to adopt on this matter." Disraeli, too, was *du meme acabit* in his early days. By putting his eye to the wrong end of the telescope in viewing England's 'place in the sun' he was misled into exclaiming against "those wretched colonies which hang like a mill-stone round our neck..." Before he died, however, he had put this inept notion of England's *Weltstellung* so far behind him that he did not look askance upon Canada's ambition to be ranked as a kingdom. At all events it was not his fault that 'Dominion' was substituted for 'Kingdom' in the draft of the British North America Act, 1867.(3) Indeed, the governing class in England as a whole had become so purblind to the value of the overseas empire that the workingmen of London in 1869 were constrained to present an address to Queen Victoria protesting against the suggestion that the colonies should be invited to assume their independence. The address bore over one hundred thousand signatures, and used these spirited words:—

> We have heard with regret and alarm that Your Majesty has been advised to consent to give up the colonies, containing millions of acres of unoccupied land which might be employed profitably both to the colonies and to ourselves as a field for emigration. We respectfully submit that Your Majesty's colonial possessions were won for Your Majesty, and settled by the valour and enterprise and the treasure of the English people; and that, having thus become part of the national freehold and inheritance of your Majesty's subjects, they are held in trust by Your Majesty, and ought not to be surrendered, but transmitted to Your Majesty's successors, as they were received by Your Majesty.

Shall we not, then, justify the poet when he sings—

> Oh, was it wise when, for the love of gain,
> England forgot her sons beyond the main?

(3) See Pope's Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald, p. 451.

And yet Dr. Berriedale Keith, in his *Responsible Government in the Dominions* naively remarks that the dislike of the term 'colony' by the peoples of the self-governing British Dominions "is not very intelligible to Englishmen." But it may be that Dr. Keith is not speaking for himself in this instance; he was born north of the Tweed.

Now all this is by way of foreword to the subject in hand; and while I have some misgiving as to its palpable relation to that subject I trust it does not demand quite so violent an evocation of affinity as that which led Mrs. Nickleby to associate the warmth of a fine summer day with roast pig and onion sauce.

* * * *

In dipping into a recent article by Mr. T. Baty, of the Inner Temple, on the British colonies (4) my attention was arrested by the following observation of the learned writer:—

> 'Dominion' is a misleading and ambiguous word, the sole object of which is to gratify the *amour propre* of large colonies. It is constantly being confused with 'dominion' in the wide and proper sense of territorial possessions. Its use dates from a very recent period. As a proper noun it is the special title of Canada—of course, it goes back to 1870 [*sic*] at least—but as a common noun, meaning 'large self-governing colonies', it would be surprising if an instance could be found of it antedating the twentieth century. Its official use is very recent indeed.

Taking thought in the matter, one is haunted by the conviction that as 'dominion' is no upstart word in its general signification it may well be that its use to designate a species of body-politic is not so new as Mr. Baty seems to imagine. Starting practically at the threshold of English political history, and considering the first sentence of our most famous constitutional document—"*Johannes Dei gratia rex Anglie, dominus Hibernie, dux Normannie et Aquitannie et comes Andegavie, etc.,*"—must we not regard the word *dominus* as quite as distinctive in its intendment as the word *rex*? Did not the draftsman of the Great Charter (5) advisedly differentiate the constitutional position of John in England and John in Ireland? It would seem so. Henry II had obtained the suzerainty of Ireland by the consent and proffered allegiance of its native rulers rather than by conquest in the twelfth century, and it passed to John on his coronation.

Now *dominus* in the terminology of English feudal law found its complement in *dominium directum*—the estate of the King in all lands held either mediately or immediately of him as lord paramount. (6.)

(4) *Sovereign Colonies,* 34 Harvard Law Review, p. 837.

(5) Probably Archbishop Langton, one of the chief scholars of his time—and medieval scholarship included a knowledge of constitutionalism. Cf. Figgis: *From Gerson to Groitius,* Lect. I p. 11.

(6) *Co. Litt.* Ib.; 2 *Bl. Com.* 105.

So it is reasonably clear that Magna Charta, in declaring John to be 'lord' of Ireland and not 'king', had in view the manner in which the royal title to Ireland had been acquired, and regarded it as a feudal domain (dominion) of the Crown of England. The kings of England were lords of Ireland for more than three centuries. (7) Indeed, the title was not changed until Henry VIII, in the year 1541, was presented with the office of 'king of Ireland' by an Act passed by the Anglo-Irish Parliament in Dublin.

Then again, we have the case of Wales. After that country was finally reduced by Edward I and annexed as a fief to the crown of England, we find it repeatedly designated in the statutes as the 'Dominion of Wales'. Sometimes, it is true, we find 'dominion' used convertibly with the term 'principality'; for instance, in 34-35 Henry VIII,c. 26 we have 'The King's Majesty's Dominion, Principality and Country of Wales', as well as 'Dominion of Wales' alone. It is a 'dominion' pure and simple in 12 Charles II,c.34, and many other statutes in the seventeenth century. So that it would appear from these somewhat ancient examples that Mr. Baty's dictum that 'dominion' is "a misleading and ambiguous word, the sole object of which is to gratify the *amour propre* of large colonies", and that "its official use is very recent indeed" requires some revision. But more than all this, there is quite satisfactory evidence that the term was used in connection with the American colonies so early as the reign of Charles II. The name 'Old Dominion' has long been associated with Virginia in song and story; and it appears that it originated from the fact that the royalist governor, Sir William Berkeley, had sent word to Charles, while exiled in Holland, that he would raise his flag in Virginia, making it a royal dominion, if there was any prospect of success. Charles declined the offer, but always remembered it with gratitude (8). However that may be it appears that the term 'dominion' was in fact applied to the colony under the sanction of law. Brewer says (9) :"Every Act of Parliament to the Declaration of Independence designated Virginia 'the Colony and Dominion of Virginia.' " I have not been able to verify this statement, so far as the legislation of the British Parliament is concerned, but I have found high constitutional authority for the use of the designation in question in the patent of Charles II appointing Lord Culpepper as Governor of Virginia in the year 1677. The

(7) Hence, by the treaty of 1921 history merely repeats itself and Ireland once more becomes a 'Dominion'.

(8) See J. E. Cooke's *Virginia*.Pt. II, c. 10.

(9) *Dictionary of Phrase and Fable*, p. 911.

document speaks of the "Colony and Dominion of Virginia in America" (10).

And when we turn to the legislation of the Virginia Assembly prior to the Revolution we find the term 'dominion' commonly used, either by itself or in conjunction with 'colony', to describe the political character of this pioneer English settlement in America. Thus in 34 Charles II, Act VIII, we read of "His Majesty's Dominion of Virginia," and in Act XII of the same year "His Majesty's Colony and Dominion of Virginia"(11). Clearly, then, Virginia affords an instance "antedating the twentieth century" of the use of the word 'Dominion' to denote a "large self-governing colony".

But the most surprising—and surely the most interesting to Canadians—of all instances of the application of the term in question to a colony is found in the early history of Nova Scotia. On the news of the death of King George I reaching Annapolis Royal, Lieutenant-Governor Armstrong convened a meeting of his Council on Thursday, the 7th of September 1727, wherein it was resolved, first, "that as the day was far Spent, the remainder of it Should be employed to solemnize the death of that Most Excellent and Glorious prince in the most decent manner"; and, secondly, "that a proclamation should be prepared declaring the accession of the High and Mighty prince George, prince of Wales, *to the Imperial Crown of Great Britain, France and Ireland, and Supreme dominion of Nova Scotia, etc.*" (12). Now, bearing in mind that in all Nova Scotia at this time there were probably fewer than five hundred English-speaking people, indifferently organized for government and surrounded by at least five times the number of French inhabitants more or less hostile to British rule, the declaration that the colony was a 'Supreme Dominion' of the British Crown is a remarkable one. Admitting that Armstrong may have had the example of Virginia in his mind, and admitting, further, that the application of the term 'dominion' was technically correct in view of the cession of the country to Great Britain in 1713, why the proud adjective 'Supreme'?

The scanty records of the time afford us no positive answer to this question. I am inclined to think that Armstrong's purpose in giving this ambitious title to the infant colony whose government he administered may be explained by his knowledge of the matter I have stressed in my foreword, namely, the stigma of inferiority to the people of the home-land that galled the colonists in America, and a

(10) See Hening's *Statutes at Large of Virginia*, vol. II, p. 566

(11) These Acts may be found in Hening, op. cit., vol. I.

(12) The italics are mine. I do not think this language should be regarded as loose-lipped hyperbole, with no technical meaning. The resolution is to be found in *N. S. Arch.* vol. iii p. 156.

laudable desire on his part to sow the seeds of pride of country in the hearts of settlers coming into these new parts. This, of course, is no more than a guess at truth, but it finds support in the fact that Armstrong was the first to suggest a House of Assembly to assist in making laws for the peace and progress of the colony. This was a rare thing for a military proconsul to do in those days. In fact throughout his tenure of office, beginning in 1725 and ending with his sad death by his own hand in 1739, he busied himself in the endeavour to make it an attractive place for settlers. He did not hesitate to insert advertisements in New England newspapers offering grants of land "to all Protestant settlers who might come from those colonies" (13). At all events I offer this as a not unreasonable explanation of Lieutenant-Governor Armstrong's apparent intention to lead Nova Scotia into world politics as a 'Supreme Dominion' of the Imperial Crown of Great Britain. Nova Scotians have ever been celebrated for the fervour of their *amour du pays*, and it may well be that the splendid flowers that blossomed in Joseph Howe's garden of patriotism in the nineteenth century sprang from the seed thus sown by Armstrong a hundred years before. I know that in these days it is the fashion to pour contempt on the sentiment of patriotism. Dr. Johnson's famous apophthegm—infamous, rather, when not qualified by Boswell's explanation—is quoted against it. We are warned that it feeds and fosters the cult of war, that it poisons the springs of international brotherhood, that it cramps the play of the spiritual forces that would cover the earth with peace as the waters cover the sea. But surely the love of country is no more than an extension of the affectionate tie that binds us to our family and our home, and filial sentiment has never yet subverted the interests of good citizenship. Are there many of us in this day so unregenerate as to seek to ravage our neighbour's house because his fair fame shines on our obscurity, or because he has a goodlier store of oil and wine and the fat of bullocks and of rams than we possess? "These emotions of loyalty and devotion", says the Dean of St. Paul's (14) "are by no means to be checked or despised. They have an infinite potency for good .....He who loves not his home and country which he has seen, how shall be love humanity in general which he has not seen?"

(13) See Calnek's *Hist. Annapolis* (by Savary) p. 78. Cf. N. S. Arch. vol iii pp. 91, 109. In a letter written to the Secretary of State in 1725 Armstrong speaks of "this almost forgotten province" as one which "will soon be equal to (if not excell) any of the Colonys in North America." N. S. A. vol. xvi, pp. 128-133.

(14) *Outspoken Essays*, p. 58.

SCIENCE AND FAITH-HEALING

By D. Fraser Harris

Professor of Physiology, Dalhousie University

THE purely materialistic view of life is incomplete. To ignore consciousness, the mind, the non-material in the individual, is philosophically absurd. Consciousness as a real existence, and its influence on the body and on other minds, must be reckoned with in any analysis of life more serious than that we might expect to hear from some ephemeral orator in Hyde Park. So too it is highly unphilosophical to ignore consciousness as a cause, merely because we do not at the present moment understand how it arises and how it disappears. A man in his waking state is, indeed, not anatomically different from a man in deep sleep or under the influence of chloroform, but physiologically the differences are important and are directly related to the absence of consciousness in the latter conditions.

The fact is, we rise to no adequate conception of the characteristics of vitality until we regard the body and the mind as one organism, a single functional unit with two aspects, one towards the material and the other towards the *supra*-material order of existence. The individual, the person, is more than the body and more than the mind at one and the same moment. He is the resultant of two mutually dependent and mutually reactive orders of existence, for which complex there is no single term in common use. "Mind-body" expresses the notion, although psycho-some might serve as a more technical term. We are told that Plato was originally responsible for the extreme dualism of the popular belief.

One of the most remarkable bye-products of the Great War has been the recognition on the part not only of professional psychologists but of ordinary medical practitioners of the doctrine of mind or consciousness *as a cause*. "Psychogenesis", "psychotherapeutics" were indeed terms used before the date of that great conflict, but they were used in the fullness of their meaning by only a few writers on matters mental who wished to express the idea that the mind was responsible for some bodily state in a manner we know not how. The day is not so very long past when "interactionists" were regarded with disfavour and even pity by

metaphysicians and "pure" psychologists. Some of us who proclaimed that consciousness could be the cause of a material condition as truly as any material antecedent could be, and who believed in the reality of nerve-energy, were considered to be intellectually not quite respectable, and to be lost in the outer darkness of the unthinkable. But the hospitals during the war soon became crowded with men whose troubles were evidently largely mental and whose cures were entirely so. Materialistic physicians began crediting emotions with all sorts of curative powers, and began using hypnotic suggestion for curative purposes with a success as astonishing to themselves as to their patients. Before the end of the war medical men began publishing their gratifying results in books in which interactionism was acknowledged as of the essence of the treatise. A special Journal—*Psyche*—devoted to non-material things is now regularly advertised in the pages of *Nature* which also reports the transactions of the Metaphysical Society.

The view of the ordinary person that mind influences body, and body mind, is so obvious and familiar that some of my readers may not have realised that a causal bond between the two was ever questioned. That we cannot at present explain *how* the interaction comes about, must not prevent our recognizing the fact as a natural phenomenon.

It is a commonplace of popular admission that a hungry man is an angry man; and it is futile to deny that it is the state of depletion of certain of his bodily tissues which is the direct causal antecedent of his experiencing the disagreeable emotion just alluded to. It is not without physiological and psychological sanction that it is towards the end of the feast that the subscription list for the charity is sent round for signature. The sea-sick person hails even drowning as a way out of his misery. The point is much too familiar to be laboured further; we know very well how bodily conditions can reverberate in the mind and arouse more particularly the affective aspects of it.

Pain itself is but the conscious correlate of a tissue condition which has overstepped in intensity the elastic limits of the normal. In this aspect pain is "subjective", mental, in the sense that it is a modification—a disagreeable one—of the consciousness or psyche. You crush your foot, you say your foot hurts you. The consciousness of your foot has become so obtrusively, disagreeably modified that it receives the special name of "pain"; and that pain is in the mind and of the mind as truly as is our recollection of yesterday or our hope of to-morrow. But this is by no means all. Pain is not experienced save in connection with a disturbance in an inconceiv-

ably complicated organ of the central nervous system called the brain. The brain must cooperate as an underlying material substratum before pain can arise in consciousness. No cerebrum, no pain. Thus the sympathy that certain people bestow on brainless oysters and lobsters about to be cooked is almost certainly wasted.

Pain is the conscious correlative of an unduly excited condition in the brain in consequence of too violent nerve-impulses having ascended from some tissues of the body physically or chemically insulted. The pain is in the foot, in the nerves, in the brain, and in the mind all at the same time. But it is not in the foot unless the nerves are intact. If, as arising from some congenital or accidental condition, the nerves of pain in the spinal cord are not conducting, then a person may lift up a hot coal and feel no pain. In leprosy, where the nerves are destroyed, it is impossible to induce pain in the fingers or toes. Cases of this kind were met with during the war. Not many hundred years ago such a person would have been persecuted as a wizard in league with the devil. But he would have been capable of doing a miracle, for no ordinary person can handle red-hot coals and not be painfully scorched. Cases are known where from disease in the centre for vision in the brain there is blindness although the eyes and optic nerves are quite intact; and conversely, with eyes shut in sleep we may nevertheless see gorgeous visions because the centre for vision is awake.

Pain cannot be in the foot and not also in the brain, but it can be in the brain and not also in the foot. Pain is not in the nerves or in the brain unless the person is conscious, and yet it can be in the brain and in the mind long after the foot may have been amputated. This is the well known "hallucination of the absent member." Long after limbs have been removed, men have imagined not only their presence but their *painful* presence. Severe pain produces a disturbance throughout the whole psycho-some expressed on the material side by demonstrable, microscopic changes in certain cells of the brain, expressed on the conscious side by the extreme fatigue which prolonged pain induces. The most materialistic of surgeons now recognize that the patient's fear and his distress before operation put him into a physical condition in which he is much less able to withstand the operation than if precautions have been taken to minimize or ward off that fear.

But this by no means exhausts our analysis of pain. We have just seen that pain may be hallucinatory; we have now to learn that pain may also be illusory.

One of the things most familiar to those who have to examine patients complaining of pain is the existence of pain over certain

regions of the body which have apparently nothing to do with the internal organ which is believed to be in discomfort or disease. Certain sufferers know that in liver disease there is pain behind the right shoulder blade, in heart disease pain shoots into the left arm, in severe indigestion there may be pain not only over the breast-bone, but in the head (frontal or ocular headache.) These so-called "sympathetic" or referred pains can be explained by assuming that the irritation in the nerve from the internal organ has somewhere and somehow become transferred to the nerve from the skin-area in question, with the result that the mind believes the latter to be the seat of pain when that skin-area is not the seat of any painful condition on its own account. Psychologically it is an illusion; pain is believed to be where there is no lesion, no pain-producing state. Technically described, it is an algesic illusion; consciousness has made a mistake in referring the pain to the skin when the disease is in an internal organ. The pain is real, it is mental, but it is referred to an unoffending part of the body and to that extent there is illusion about the source of the pain.

I draw attention to this condition to show that while pain may be reported as distinctly felt in a certain part of the body, it does not necessarily follow that in that same district lies the seat of the disease. Disease may be in one place, its referred pain in another, and it would be possible to remove the referred pain without removing the disease responsible for it. If the most distressing thing for the patient be the referred pain and not the inward hidden cause of the disease, then the removal of the referred pain might be accepted by the inexpert or uncritical as a cure of the disease itself. There is no doubt that certain present day "miraculous" cures belong to this class.

There is one more feature of sensation and pain which requires to be kept in mind in connection with their mental aspects, the feature that physiologists call "after-sensations."

A sensation does not subside the moment its stimulus has ceased to act; a pain often persists after the morbid condition has been removed. Most physicians know that there is a tendency in the bodily organs to continue to act in the abnormal or depraved manner even although the source of their previous derangement has been successfully treated; a morbid habit, in other words, has been established, and as such tends to persist. The persistence of pain is to be included among the possible after-sensations. These post-stimulant pains are of the nature of illusions in that they are in the mind when now there is no objective morbid state to account for them. They are retained in consciousness by a sort of psychic

momentum. It is not difficult to see how a cure by so-called "faith-healing" might be claimed through the removal of an illusory pain, the actual lesion for which was at the time non-existent.

When now we turn our attention to the other correlation, that of mind over body, we encounter something of the highest importance for the subject of truth about faith-healing.

That mind can influence body is again so elementary a conception that the child in the nursery would give assent to it as soon as he had grasped the meaning of the words employed. The mind plays on the body with a facility comparable only to that of some expert musician playing on the organ. By our will we have control over many scores of muscles designed for the execution of a large number of movements of bones around joints. It is on this account that these muscles are called "voluntary." Psycho-physiologists know, however, that the emotional aspects of the mind are capable of much more varied expression in the activities of the bodily organs than is the will itself. If the will is a musician fingering the keys of one instrument, the emotions are a whole orchestra playing on a specimen of every instrument yet invented.

Emotional expression is multiform; blood-vessels may dilate or contract in blushing or blanching; glands may secrete or be dried up in pleasurable excitement or in devitalising terror. The heart may be hastened or slowed in rate, may be increased in force, weakened or brought altogether to a standstill through the influence of emotion alone. So universally is this recognized, that the word "heart" has come to be a synonym for emotion. Very few of the other internal organs are exempt from this emotional influence or interference. The emotion, too, may combine with the will in intensifying its power over the voluntary muscles, as when the fragile woman, to save her child from the burning building, can perform feats of muscular power absolutely beyond her every-day, calm state of mind. *More than that*, emotion can achieve what is impossible to the will. The will is powerless to flush or blanch the cheek, the will can call forth no digestive juices, but excitement can increase or diminish their quantity. It is the mother's agitation of mind, and not her intention, that can alter the quality of the milk so that it becomes actually poisonous for the infant. Emotion is the great, causal, mental state, mightier than the will, outside its control, beyond it and above it.

Within the last few years physiologists have perfected an electrical method for demonstrating objectively the existence of emotion as distinguished from volition or from a purely intellectual state of active thought. A particularly interesting feature of the

method is, that while the instrument is plainly influenced by emotional states, and quite evidently by the primitive emotions of displeasure or anger, it is left absolutely unaffected by simulated emotion as in acting a part or reciting a poem no matter how "emotional" the characterisation may appear. The instrument gives a large response when a pin prick is either actually given or only threatened; whereas, when the person experimented on declaims the most "rousing" speech, the emotions of which he does not experience, the instrument makes no response whatever. It does not take much knowledge of medicine to appreciate the potential value of an objective method that will distinguish between the emotional and the non-emotional states of mind, and which will also actually discriminate between the depressing emotion of real grief and the fictitious emotions of the hysterical and the malingerer. A good many "faith cures" have been in persons whose illness was due to feigned emotion.

Now, what is "faith" but the emotional aspect of religious consciousness? If religion is the highest aspiring of the human consciousness, then faith is its omnipotent, emotional aspect. The will can do much, emotion can do more, but faith can "remove mountains"—mountains of physical disease and of mental disease, of misery and of suffering. And "Faith can subdue kingdoms", the kingdoms of the rule of everything that is unlovely, such as indifference to the welfare of others, self-seeking at the expense of others, and self-righteousness with the condemnation of others.

The omnipotence of mind in that dual organism, the individual, is then abundantly manifest. But mind can not only influence the body, it can create conditions within itself. The mind has forces *per se*; emotion is the supreme creative activity in the realm of mind. This mental creation is learnedly called a "hallucination", a sensory perception based on no external, objective stimulation of the organs of sense—"a dagger of the mind", as Shakespeare has it:—

> Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
> To feeling as to sight? or art thou but
> A dagger of the mind; a false creation
> Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?

This power of mental creation is of the utmost consequence when the influence of the psyche is considered. By it the mind can, on the one hand, create its own state of insensibility to existing pain, and on the other, can institute a condition of well-being even when the body is in the throes of a malignant disease. The mind is in this sense *all*—all-powerful. There is nothing physically good or bad, but thinking makes it so.

The mind can either exalt or reduce the bodily resistance to disease. We have definite chemical and physical objective proofs of increased and diminished tissue-changes produced by a cheerful and by a depressed state of mind respectively. It is this aspect of pain and suffering which the so-called "Christian Scientists" have emphasized. Their contention that pain is mental is true; that it is *wholly* mental is not true. We find no warrant in Scripture for their assertion that all pain is an expression of moral evil and would not exist were evil not present. The Book of Job seems to indicate quite the contrary.

It is in the condition of the hypnotic trance that hallucinations are most surely produced, and are most potent for the amelioration of disease. Let me quote a paragraph from a paper in *Brain*, by one of the most critical professional hypnotists in London, Dr. J. Milne Bramwell:—

> "He" (the hypnotized person) "has acquired a control over his own mind and body without parallel in waking life. He can alter the rhythm of his pulse, control his secretions and excretions, and increase or arrest the activity of his special senses. He can induce anaesthesia and analgesia, and yet maintain consciousness and volition unimpaired. From the therapeutic side he can obtain relief from the pain of disease or injury, procure sleep at will and for as long or short a time as he wishes. He can escape from obsessions, conquer the diseased craving for alcohol and narcotics, and get rid of numerous functional nervous disturbances. All these phenomena cannot be evoked in every case, but something can always be effected beyond the power of the waking will."

Relief or cure has been obtained by hypnotic treatment in the following diseases:—Painful affections of muscles and joints persisting after injury, curvature of the spine, heart-disease and dropsy, certain paralyses, certain skin diseases, certain dyspepsias and their attendant irregularities, certain forms of deafness, epilepsy, neuralgia and headache; various forms of muscular spasm such as chorea, hysterical paralysis and aphasia. Such mental conditions as somnambulism, catalepsy, monomania and delirium tremens have similarly been ameliorated or cured. Scores of medical men tell us how during the war they saw, for the first time, suggestion or mental healing employed instead of drugs or the knife. It was indeed a sudden conversion for some of these materialistic physiologists to find that their purely materialistic theories of life had been weighed in the balances of a therapeutic emergency and found wanting. Many a man who had ignored consciousness as a cause had unexpectedly to admit that the greatest thing in man was mind.

It was certainly a strange result of that Armageddon which seemed to enthrone brute force and physical suffering amid an outraged humanity, to discover the beneficent action of mind over the ills of the body so abundantly demonstrated.

The astonishing possibilities of hypnotism, whether called by the names of hetero- or auto-suggestion, mental therapy, or Mesmerism, are known only to comparatively few medical men owing to the obloquy under which for so long a time the practice of this art has remained in English-speaking countries. France used it early in scientific treatment. Mesmer, (1734-1815), who discovered the power of mental suggestion, soon became a conscious deceiver of the public. "Mesmerism"—hypnotism—soon became so overlaid with quackery and credulity that its practice in England was early abandoned almost entirely to unscrupulous charlatans. Possibly no curative agency has been so abused; possibly none is capable of so much abuse. Its practice for purposes of mere entertainment had to be forbidden in England some thirty years ago. Hypnotism is not a play-thing, it is a great reality. But hypnotism, except in name, is no discovery of this present age. It is as old as the use of magic itself, as old as the human race. The mysterious incantations, the dimmed lights, the monotonous lowered voices were all accessories to the priestly practice of what we should nowadays simply call "suggestion."

In the hypnotic state, what is believed forthwith exists. You tell your patient he will become cold, and in due time he shivers; that he will become hot, and in due time he perspires. You tell him that quinine is sweet and he drinks it with avidity, you tell him that sugar is bitter and he forthwith rejects it. There seems to be no limit to these mental creations; but it is his *own* belief that you are using, his *own* faith that is operative. The mind finds what the mind brings. I admit I am not using the word "faith" for the moment in the exclusive sense of the highest form of religious emotion; but what I want to emphasize is, that the belief in the powers of one's own mind as a curative agency—auto-suggestion—is a thing of the same therapeutic order as that morally receptive attitude designated by Christians as "faith."

It is an impossible task to establish the historical truth of every case of so-called "faith-healing", or to explain by what agency even those verified cases of cure have been accomplished. For such a task I am in no way qualified, being versed neither in Theology nor in Ecclesiastical History. I merely wish to indicate the scientific principles on which the amelioration or cure of a certain number of diseases can be accounted for.

There is no better definition of "suggestibility" than that given by Professor McDougall, formerly of Oxford University, now of Harvard. He defines it as a "process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance." It seems to me that this definition is by no means far away from a definition of "faith" itself—"Believing where we cannot prove." For psychotherapeutic purposes, conviction or belief is half the battle: "faith is the substance of things hoped for"; and this attitude of mind is the opposite of that which waits on proof. There is so much that is unknown and possibly unknowable in the interactions of psyche and soma that faith is the only possible attitude, faith not indifference, faith not a hopeless agnosticism, the faith of which Jesus is the "author and finisher." Many a time it has been demonstrated that he will get well who believes he will. Auto-suggestion is of amazing therapeutic import.

It has been truly remarked that the diseases specially recorded both in the New Testament and in the earlier ages of the Church's history as being cured by an act of faith, were just those which a physician of the present day would call "functional." By "functional" is meant not the result of anatomical injury or demonstrable gross lesion. No amount of faith will remove a cancer or make the two bits of a broken bone come together at a rate faster than is determined for them by the *vis medicatrix naturae*; but the attitude of the patient's mind can exert a good or a bad influence—particularly through the blood supply—on the condition of those tissues which are contributing to the union. It must not be forgotten that the unconscious mind is at times quite as potent as the conscious in bringing about curative results. Indeed, the resemblances between the unconscious mind and the emotions themselves are in this direction exceedingly close. Under strong emotion the person can become oblivious of his surroundings—"beside himself" with rage, transported with joy, and so forth, until we say he is "another being." Now a subconscious influence may work unsuspected, perhaps for a long time, either for good or evil in an individual until his character has become definitely moulded, and his personality determined in some particular direction. Unconscious influences for good in the realm of the physical organism are now firmly believed in, and, as auto-suggestion, should be included under the expression "faith-healing."

It has often been remarked in certain instances of faith-healing on the part of Our Lord, that He used the cooperation of the sick person's faith itself. This is notably so in the case of the woman

in the eighth chapter of Luke's Gospel, to whom Christ said—"Daughter, be of good comfort, thy faith hath made thee whole", and this, although it is also recorded that "Jesus perceived that virtue had gone out of Him." A similar case is to be found in the 17th chapter of Luke's Gospel, where the leper, the stranger, on being cured returned to give thanks, to whom Christ said—"Arise, go thy way, thy faith hath made thee whole."

In judging of the diseases of which people were cured in New Testament times, we have to remember that their exact nature is not necessarily revealed by the names given to them in our translation of the Bible. It is not to be expected that the terminology of diseases in use in the first and second century should be at all consonant with the names we give these diseases at the present day. Obviously the names were intelligible to those for whom the Gospels and Epistles were originally written. For instance "leprosy" in ancient times may have meant something different from what a modern pathologist means by the oriental disease of the nervous system due to a bacillus, the *bacillus leprae.*

Another notable feature of the faith-healing in New Testament times is what one may call "curative action at a distance". Such a case is that of the leper in Luke 17, for while he was on his way to the priest the cure came. Other cases of cure at a distance are: the curing of the child of the Syro-Phoencian woman (Matt. 15) to whose mother Christ said, "Oh woman, great is thy faith"; the servant of the centurion (Matt. 8) to whose master Christ said: "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel"; and the son of the nobleman alluded to in the Gospel of John, Chapter 4 to whose father Christ said, "Go thy way, thy son liveth."

It is well known that under the influence of hypnotism a patient can be *en rapport* with the hypnotist to such an extent that, after hours or days of absence, something that the latter has suggested being done or not being done will be done or not respectively. This, clearly, is not so much action at a distance, as action after a certain interval of time; it is, no doubt, what is meant by "telepathic", although either "telaesthetic" or "tele-inductive" would be a better term. Evidently, if action is being induced in another mind as a post-hypnotic suggestion, space as space does not enter into the process as a deterring condition at all.

Space in fact is being rapidly annihilated as is shown in the latest triumph of science, wireless telephony. Consider the transformations involved in the following series:—

One person thinks, nerve-impulses descend to the muscles of his tongue, palate, lips, etc., and he speaks his thoughts, the sound-

waves travel through the air, and, falling on a telephone receiver, are through magnetic means transmuted into electrical waves which travel without wires it may be for thousands of miles through the invisible aether. Having arrived at a receiving station (whose instrument is in tune with the transmitting one), the aetherial waves become instrumental electrical waves, which through magnetic means are converted back into the sounds of words that arouse ideas in the mind of a second person. Thus A's thoughts have induced afar corresponding thoughts in B's mind. If, now, the thoughts of A were of therapeutic value for B, and B was in hypnotic rapport with A, B could quite conceivably be the subject of a veritable cure at a distance. This is tele-psycho-therapeutics, and there is no theoretical limit to the intervening distance. Sir Oliver Lodge has hinted that it might extend to other worlds. To talk to your friends and to be replied to without any material bond whatever would have been magic, the blackest of black art in an earlier age. Men and women were burned for much less. Only a few years ago, wireless telephony itself would have been pronounced impossible because inconceivable; but the inconceivable of the last generation is the attainable of the present, and the common-place of the next.

At this moment the potentialities of the human mind are only being vaguely hinted at. The rôle assumed by the subconscious mind—the subliminal ego revealed as auto-suggestion in psycho-analysis—the results which flow from the partition of consciousness and from the simultaneous or alternating states of a duplicate or multiple personality, the recognition of the reality of nerve-energy and of therapeutic telepathy are nowadays part of the accepted order of things. So too the restoring of the body to health by mental means may some day be regarded as the very least of the achievements of the human spirit: space has already been overcome, the conquest of the dark kingdom of disease is even now in progress. We are a very long way from knowing as we are known, and "it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is."

Inasmuch as disease is disharmony in animate Nature, it is our duty to banish it; and in so doing we shall but be treading in the footsteps of the Great Physician. But to what end is this continual striving to abolish pain, and that pain often the result of our own misdeeds? The desire to abolish personal suffering is, no doubt, perfectly natural. But, I ask, shall we lay the foundations of our religion on no higher aspiration? Shall we bind ourselves together on no basis of belief or faith more worthy than this, that we desire to escape from pain and to banish disease?

How can this be the object of the exercise of our most fervent faith? Where in *this* religion would be the place for worship? Do we not seem to hear the apostle's warning?—"And though I have *all faith* so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing."

THE ROADWAYS OF GOD'S RAPTURES

J. D. LOGAN

Soon as the winds blow hither Evening's dewy cool,
And heaven's twinkling lanthorns begin their wonted rule,
I run the Roadways of God's Raptures by the light
Of His star-festoons swung along the lanes of Night;
Or ride His comet-coursers far, and chase
The lightning chariots of the All-Encompasser,
Careering past Aldebaran, Canopus, and the Bear;
Or dumbly marvel while I watch the All-Artificer,
Whose forges are candescent with the glory of His face,
Toss from His Titan anvils a million worlds in space.
So from my spirit's secret scanning-tower I look above,
Beholding God's omnipotence—and, lo, Omnipotence is Love!
For through the overwhelming, soul-appalling while
The unperturbed and pious Stars benignly smile,
And win for me from their seraphic silences
The benediction of a sacramental peacefulness.