

*L'Acadie Trouvée:*  
Mapping, Geographic Knowledge, and Imagining Northeastern North America,  
1710-1763

by

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For my parents, whose unfailing love and support never ceases to amaze me. And for  
Rosemary, who kept me sane and entertained.

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## Abstract

From the British capture of Port Royal in 1710 to the end of the Seven Years' War, imperial borders in northeastern North America were highly uncertain and vigorously contested. The British "conquest" of Acadia was not an event, but rather a disputed process that took over half a century and required a massive deportation. The rise and fall of French Acadia under *de jure* British rule demonstrated geography's central role in the struggle for territorial control. Aboriginal land rights, especially those of the Mi'kmaq and their allies, challenged British and French claims to sovereignty. This dissertation is the first in-depth study of how eighteenth-century geographic knowledge influenced relations among the British, French, and Native peoples in Nova Scotia.

Geographic debates – especially boundary negotiations, mapping projects, and settlement plans – underscored Nova Scotia's strategic importance in the eighteenth century and complicate the concept of "salutary neglect". Cartography was a powerful and multi-faceted tool, capable of illustrating past possessions and projecting future claims. It was also constrained by technologies of production and competing interpretations, as overtly biased maps were recognized as such and dismissed. Maps and geographic evidence cannot be properly understood outside of their historical context. British and French subjects were presented with maps and geographic reports in monthly magazines, allowing them to engage with the transatlantic imperial imagination. The growth of printed material, especially in Britain, allowed geographers to influence, and be influenced by, public opinion.

This dissertation argues that eighteenth-century Nova Scotia/Acadia was neither British nor French, but rather a political and cultural battleground founded on negotiations over geography. The Mi'kmaq shaped these discussions, influencing and modifying European expansion into Aboriginal territory: their claims to sovereignty, represented on maps, surveys, and in treaty negotiations, challenged English pales in the northeast and circumscribed French territorial power. For most of the eighteenth century, contested sovereignty, negotiated alliances, and fragile peace depended on cultural understandings built on shared territory. Mi'kmaq influence continued after 1763, but the Acadian deportation and the arrival of New England planters marked an imperial and geographic watershed as the British successfully mapped Nova Scotia over Acadia.

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I had a dream one night during the final weeks of this project. My dissertation, which I regularly left neatly piled on the kitchen table, grew to the size of a human and attacked me. The next day I called home and told my father about the dream. He counselled me (as only a father can) to “finish the damn thing and move on.” So, here it is. It’s not perfect and it’s not what I thought it would be, but it’s done.

Getting to this point required not only a good deal of work, but also (and just as importantly) a strong network of supporters. I’d like to thank the History department at Dalhousie University for providing a stimulating environment for graduate work. The office staff – Tina Jones, Mary Wyman, and Valerie Peck – was always there to help me navigate the administrative ins and outs, and offered encouragement at just the right time. During my MA and PhD, I benefited from exceptional field courses. Dr. Shirley Tillotson provided a rigorous and engaging survey of Canadian history, while Dr. John G. Reid illustrated just how fundamental Aboriginal history is to North American history generally, and to my area of investigation specifically. Both Dr. Tillotson and Dr. Reid have written more letters of reference than I care to admit, for which I am quite grateful.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

The map was found carefully hidden in a soap ball and buried in a chest en route to Louisbourg. The hand-sketched depiction of Halifax, drawn roughly to scale and including a detailed legend, was meant to complement a lengthy letter outlining how France could attack the British fortress. In 1755, after violence had broken out in North America, but before war had been declared officially in Europe, capturing Halifax would have profoundly altered geopolitical realities on both sides of the Atlantic. The map's author, François-Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, the son of New France's governor (and himself governor of Trois-Rivières), had been taken captive by the British and held in Halifax long enough to get a good sense of the town. His map noted the steep incline onto which the settlement was built, its fortifications, magazines, and primary buildings. He was not working from published maps of the town (several of which had been circulating among the public and administrators in Britain and France) which often misplaced important buildings; Rigaud correctly noted the position of St. Paul's church at the south end of the Grand Parade instead of the north, and described and numbered buildings, streets, and defences in the legend. This was valuable geographic knowledge meant to inform military operations against the British. Rigaud must have hoped that no one would think to examine a ball of soap.<sup>1</sup>

The British intercepted the ship sent to Île Royale and discovered the carefully hidden map. French officials never benefited from Rigaud's efforts. That he went to

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<sup>1</sup> See Jean Hamelin and Jacqueline Roy, "Rigaud de Vaudreuil, François-Pierre de," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* [DCB], [www.biographi.ca](http://www.biographi.ca); Joan Dawson, *Mapmaker's Eye: Nova Scotia through Early Maps* (Halifax: Nimbus, 1988), 85.

such lengths to create and dispatch a detailed map indicates how important geographic knowledge was in the competition for Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. Others before him had taken risks to share geographic information. François Du Pont Du Vivier, a French military officer who had served at Île Royale and led attacks on Annapolis Royal during the War of Austrian Succession, found himself back in Paris in 1750 just as long-awaited negotiations over Acadia's boundary were beginning. Unlike Rigaud, who attempted to smuggle geographic information out of enemy territory and into the hands of his superiors, Du Vivier was observed holding clandestine meetings with appointed British commissaries in Paris, whose sole purpose was to claim as much of northeastern North America as possible for Britain. While the substance of Du Vivier's secret meetings has gone unrecorded, he was investigated by the Paris police and rebuked by the minister of the Marine for his perceived collusion with the British.<sup>2</sup> Geographic information was a valuable currency in the quest for territorial sovereignty in the northeast.

Geographic knowledge was more than maps. Travel reports, written surveys, oral histories, and treaty negotiations all included information about boundaries and descriptions of land. The creation of this knowledge was a cumulative effort involving regular settlers and citizens, imperial officials, Native inhabitants, and professional geographers. The ubiquity of geographic information is made evident by a cursory inspection of popular French and British monthly magazines that advertised books on geographic instruction, new maps, and descriptions of newly settled territories. In official circles, manuscript maps, commissioned surveys, and detailed letters described geographic conditions in such a way as to allow those at a distance to visualize the territory. Maps and other sources of spatial information were tools of the imagination;

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<sup>2</sup> T.A. Crowley and Bernard Pothier, "Du Pont Du Vivier, François," *DCB*.

once unrolled on a table, a map presented its viewer with an organized and easily digestible picture of territory.

This dissertation examines the influence of mapping and geographic knowledge on the relationships among the British, French, and Native powers contending for territorial sovereignty in northeastern North America, specifically the region known to the French as l'Acadie, the British as Nova Scotia, and the Mi'kmaq as Mi'kma'ki. Beginning in 1710 (the British capture of Acadia from the French), and ending in 1763 (the fall of New France), this project uses maps, surveys, and geographic tracts to access and investigate what Eliga Gould has termed the "entangled" history of the northeast.<sup>3</sup> French-British-Native relationships were mutually influencing and must be understood as part of a shared process; the various images of Nova Scotia competed and negotiated with each other, but were also shaped by treaties and negotiations in North America and Europe. Mapping – the collection and dissemination of geographic information – was a skill practiced by Europeans and Natives. Their concepts of space, and the methods by which one group rendered their image intelligible to another, illustrate the complex cultural, political, and economic interactions at play in the eighteenth-century northeast. Geographic knowledge was the subject of inter- and intra-cultural debate, as its malleability provided for various interpretations and emphasis. Canadian historians have not sufficiently explored maps and geographic materials as historical evidence; similarly, cartographic historians often ignore historical context. This dissertation situates geographic and cartographic knowledge in the historical context of its creation.

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<sup>3</sup> Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *American Historical Review* 11, no. 3 (2007): 764-86. Entangled history is an adaptation of *histoire croisée*. See Michael Werner and Benedict Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (2006): 30-50.

Historians have increasingly noted the imperial importance of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. John G. Reid *et al* recently questioned the meaning of the Acadian “conquest” of 1710, arguing that there was as much continuity as change in the years that followed the British capture of Port Royal.<sup>4</sup> This dissertation begins where Reid’s study ended and uses the lens of mapping and descriptions of territory to trace the rise and fall of French Acadia under titular British rule. Paramount to such an investigation is the presence of the Mi’kmaq, Wolastoqiyik, and the wider Wabanaki confederacy.<sup>5</sup> Historians have begun to understand Nova Scotia as a microcosm of Canada’s three founding peoples (not simply a French settlement or British outpost), but an imbalance of sources has made analysing Native influence difficult.<sup>6</sup> Maps and ideas of territory provide access to the Mi’kmaq worldview. The Mi’kmaq and their allies provided geographic information, appeared and disappeared from European maps, expressed their geographic opinions during treaty negotiations and annual meetings, and represented a territorial force that neither the British nor the French could ignore.

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<sup>4</sup> John G Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> The term “confederation” should be understood loosely. I will use the term “allies” and “neighbours” interchangeably, though it should be understood that each group operated independently, coming together at certain times (especially during conflict) to discuss policy issues that affected them all. There were also inter-tribal conflicts. There is some debate as to whether the Mi’kmaq were members of this confederacy, but for the purpose of this dissertation I take their cooperation with (and support of) many Wolastoqiyik, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot groups to suggest that they were members of a loose and fluid alliance. See Bruce J. Bourque, Steven L. Cox, and Ruth Holmes Whitehead, *Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 235-44. Also, Philip K. Bock, “Micmac,” in *Handbook of North American Indians*, ed. William C. Sturtevant and Bruce G. Trigger (volume editor), vol. 15 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 109-22.

<sup>6</sup> Recent works that emphasize the northeast as a region of tripartite interaction include, John G. Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); N. E. S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People, 1604-1755* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005); John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W Norton & Co., 2005); Geoffrey Gilbert Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); William Craig Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); John G. Reid, "Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena? Planter Nova Scotia (1760-1782) and Competing Strategies of Pacification," *Canadian Historical Review* 85, no. 4 (2004): 669-92.

Mapping and imagining the northeast struck at the heart of contested and negotiated claims to territorial sovereignty. There was a tension between claiming sovereignty over people, over land, or over people and land. As Elizabeth Mancke argues, colonists maintained legal links with the empire and claimed the right to English law even if the people themselves were the only sovereign English spaces in distant territories.<sup>7</sup> Put simply, subjects carried the state with them. In the northeast, Acadians made similar claims to French law and were granted access to that law, even by British administrators.<sup>8</sup> British juridical weakness, illustrated by the inability fully to incorporate French Acadians into the British legal realm (thereby making them subjects of His Majesty), called for alternative expressions of sovereignty: expel the people and lay claim to the land. As a site of extended interaction between competing imperial subjects (in a region largely controlled by the Mi'kmaq and their allies with their own laws), the northeast complicates our understanding of imperial sovereignty by exposing the connections and conflicts between legal and territorial models.<sup>9</sup> The process of interaction leading up to, and culminating in, the Acadian expulsion (and subsequent conflict with the Mi'kmaq who limited British expansion into vacant lands) suggests that realizing a British vision of Nova Scotia depended on more than the subsuming power of British law.

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<sup>7</sup> Elizabeth Mancke, "Sites of Sovereignty: The Body of the Subject and the Creation of the British Empire," in *Imperial Identity: Construction and Extension of Cultural Community in the Early Modern World Conference* (Center for Early Modern History, University of Minnesota: Nov 4-7, 2004 (unpublished, cited with permission).

<sup>8</sup> Thomas Garden Barnes, "'The Dayly Cry for Justice': The Juridical Failure of the Annapolis Royal Regime, 1713-1749" in *Essays in the History of Canadian Law*, ed. Philip Girard and Jim Phillips, vol. III: Nova Scotia (Toronto: Published for the Osgoode Society by University of Toronto Press, 1981), 10-32.

<sup>9</sup> The legal model of sovereignty has been recently examined in Lauren A. Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ken MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).



This project provides an alternative view of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. Historians need to examine maps not just as (presumably) objective representations of space, but as textual documents that were created, used, and interpreted by human actors in a specific historical milieu. Maps influenced and were influenced by those who used them, both for practical reasons (such as navigation) and imperial imagining. Geographic knowledge was never static, but changed over time to address circumstances as they arose. This dissertation will demonstrate the analytical utility of maps, surveys, and geographic tracts.<sup>10</sup> For example, Stephen J. Hornsby recently described Nova Scotia during the eighteenth century as part of the "British Atlantic." Yet an examination of the region's contested nature, especially the maps and written reports on the region's boundaries, complicates and contributes to Hornsby's conclusions.<sup>11</sup> This dissertation is the first major work to investigate how the northeast was envisioned geographically, contested cartographically, and negotiated as an entangled imperial space during the eighteenth century.

### **Geography and History**

With the launch of Google Maps, Google Earth, and Google Street View, geographic knowledge has once again come to the fore as a contested (and sometimes controversial) source of information. So it was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

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<sup>10</sup> Reid, *Essays*; Daniel Wright Clayton, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000); Olaf Uwe Janzen, "Of Consequence to the Service: The Rationale Behind Cartographic Surveys in Early Eighteenth-Century Newfoundland," *Northern Mariner* 11, no. 1 (2001); Alan Morantz, *Where Is Here? Canada's Maps and the Stories They Tell* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2002); Matthew Sparke, "A Map That Roared and an Original Atlas: Canada, Cartography, and the Narration of Nation," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88, no. 3 (1998): 463-95; Richard I. Ruggles, *A Country So Interesting: The Hudson's Bay Company and Two Centuries of Mapping, 1670-1870* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991).

<sup>11</sup> Stephen Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005).

when empires were discovering “new” worlds and hoping to hide their discoveries from competing powers. Early Spanish explorers were required to submit their maps, charts, and journals to the royal authorities and were forbidden from publishing their conclusions.<sup>12</sup> Men such as Samuel Champlain and John Smith created maps of the regions they explored and selected what information they would include or exclude, often based on what kind of impression they wanted their charts to make. For example, John Smith’s map of New England originally included Native toponyms, but he later requested they be replaced with English place names to emphasize England’s territorial sovereignty.<sup>13</sup> In the eighteenth century, maps and representations of territory bifurcated into two parts: official and public. Popular journals and an active printing industry witnessed the rise of cheap and accessible maps. The public could view, interpret, and comment upon geographic depictions created by mapmakers, who collected as many sources as they could to inform their cartographic products.<sup>14</sup> Government officials had access to a wider array of primary sources: manuscript maps, commissioned surveys, geographic reports, and official correspondence, to name a few. Consequently, officials relied on maps to impose an imperial image onto the regions they claimed. For example, the British tried to incorporate India into its empire through “scientific” mapping, while the French hoped that maps of Egypt created to look like popular maps of France would integrate that region into its imperial possessions.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> *Science and Empire in the Atlantic World*, ed. James Delbourgo and Nicholas Dew (New York: Routledge, 2008).

<sup>13</sup> MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession*, 170.

<sup>14</sup> Mary Sponberg Pedley, *The Commerce of Cartography: Making and Marketing Maps in Eighteenth-Century France and England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Mary Sponberg Pedley, "The Map Trade in Paris, 1650-1825," *Imago Mundi* 33 (1981): 33-45.

<sup>15</sup> Matthew H. Edney, *Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Anne Godlewska, "Map, Text and Image. The Mentality of

Nineteenth-century colonialism was equally reliant on geographic information to impose a particular image onto foreign lands. British exploits in South America, particularly their quest for El Dorado, employed an army of surveyors who eventually determined the boundaries of colonies in northern South America.<sup>16</sup> Africa was similarly divided along lines of latitude and longitude, most of which ignored local boundaries that marked ethnic or community divisions. Maps of Africa changed to reflect the altered purpose of cartography as imperialism transitioned into colonial rule. Small scale maps necessary to facilitate local control became more important than large scale charts that illustrated *dominium*.<sup>17</sup> During the colonial era, maps and surveys illustrated the differences between local and colonial concepts of nationhood. As Thongchai Winichakul has demonstrated, British mapping projects imposed a new definition of nation on Siam, present-day Thailand. The nation was discursively constructed through the process of geographic mapping, which challenged traditional forms of ethnic and regional identities. The result was a “geo-body,” a political entity in which the state was the people who inhabited a shared territory with common boundaries.<sup>18</sup> It was during the nineteenth century that cartography became the metaphor for imperial expansion. Britain and its dominions were literally “painting the map red.”<sup>19</sup>

The twentieth century witnessed the collapse of Britain’s second empire and heightened global conflict. As territorial stakes grew, so too did the importance of

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Enlightened Conquerors: A New Look at the Description de l’Egypte,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 20, no. 1 (1995): 5-28.

<sup>16</sup> D. Graham Burnett, *Masters of All They Surveyed: Exploration, Geography, and a British El Dorado* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

<sup>17</sup> Jeffrey C. Stone, “Imperialism, Colonialism and Cartography,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 13, no. 1 (1988): 57-64.

<sup>18</sup> Winichakul Thongchai, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994).

<sup>19</sup> Carman Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902* (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993).

geographic knowledge. Germany, beginning with the Weimar Republic, launched massive map propaganda campaigns to convince its people (and other nations) of its territorial rights. Maps were presented as scientific and objective sources indicating the boundaries of the German state. They remained a powerful political and propaganda tool during the Nazi regime.<sup>20</sup> The post-war period was one during which former colonies across Africa and southeast Asia claimed independence. During this period cartography was used against former imperial forces, as new countries used map logos to represent both their independence and their new identity. These map/logos replaced geographic information with nationalist symbols, though their political influence remained as strong (if not more) than maps from the colonial period.<sup>21</sup> Instead of representing geographic space to be monitored, claimed, and controlled, these carto-logos came to represent a national community around which people could rally and to which they could pledge their allegiance.

In the context of pre- and post-Confederation Canada, maps and mapping have been as influential as in other parts of the world. In the eighteenth century, maps and spatial information helped incorporate diverse regions into the British or French imperial sphere. George Vancouver's maps of the west coast helped claim that region for Britain by removing competing visions of territorial sovereignty, especially those of Spain and the Natives living around Nootka Sound.<sup>22</sup> France and Britain relied on maps and geographic knowledge in their search for a passage through North America to the Pacific and China. France believed the route led through the fictional *mer de l'ouest*, while

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<sup>20</sup> Guntram Henrik Herb, *Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918-1945* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

<sup>21</sup> Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 170-78.

<sup>22</sup> Clayton, *Islands of Truth*.

Britain searched in vain for an easily navigable northwest passage.<sup>23</sup> The belief in mythical seas and easy routes through the continent belie the central tenets of the “Age of Reason,” by which myth and speculation were to be replaced with knowledge and observation. After the Seven Years’ War, Britain relied on landscape art and the geographic images it presented to integrate new territories (especially those formerly possessed by the French) into a specific British worldview, defined as “picturesque.”<sup>24</sup> Territorial images and information came from a variety of sources, and each served a purpose in transforming foreign territory into something both recognizable and useful.

Once transformed, territory had to be controlled. Land management continued to shape colonial development during the nineteenth century, and its effects problematize traditional concepts of gender roles. In nineteenth-century Prince Edward Island, land surveys and grants favoured a small number of wealthy owners who failed to improve their plots or encourage settlement. Absentee landlords, limited access to lands, and high taxes led women (and men) to violence in their movement for an escheat.<sup>25</sup> As settlement progressed across North America (as British colonies before 1867 and the Dominion of Canada after), territorial images were transformed to serve public policy. The northwest, which had been depicted as an unforgiving territory inhabited by dangerous Natives and only the hardiest of fur traders, was transformed in promotional literature into a modern-

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<sup>23</sup> Glyndwr Williams, *Voyages of Delusion: The Quest for the Northwest Passage* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Denis P. Combet, *In Search of the Western Sea: Selected Journals of La Vérendrye* (Winnipeg: Great Plains Publications, 2001).

<sup>24</sup> John E. Crowley, "'Taken on the Spot': The Visual Appropriation of New France for the Global British Landscape," *Canadian Historical Review* 86, no. 1 (2005): 1-28.

<sup>25</sup> Rusty Bitterman, “Women and the Escheat Movement: The Politics of Everyday Life on Prince Edward Island,” in *Separate Spheres: Women's Worlds in the 19th Century Maritimes*, ed. Janet Vey Guildford and Suzanne Morton (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1994), 23-38.

day Eden: fertile, welcoming, and ready to be settled.<sup>26</sup> Attempts to transform the new western imagination into reality required more land management and territorial knowledge. The Canadian government's push west, into lands possessed and inhabited by various Aboriginal and Métis groups, led to conflict. Often, land surveyors were the first government agents sent into newly acquired territories. In their quest to collect geographic knowledge to assist expansion efforts, surveyors met resistance from groups who were aware of what territorial knowledge could mean for their perseverance as an independent people. Not surprisingly, the first Red River rebellion began when Métis guards prevented surveyors, under the authority of William McDougall (chosen by John A. Macdonald as lieutenant-governor of the new province), from entering the region.<sup>27</sup> As Canadian authorities pushed expansion, territory was mapped, bounded, and re-imagined under a national aegis.

Territorial issues from earlier periods re-emerged during the twentieth century. Especially in the latter part of the century, Aboriginal territorial rights and land claims became the subject of court cases in which one image or map challenged another. Native groups, such as the the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en in British Columbia, questioned Canada's rights to Native territories by reframing geographic knowledge to address Native concerns. These groups also used "western" cartography to explain and detail their claims.<sup>28</sup> Aboriginal groups on the east coast, such as the Mi'kmaq, fought similar court battles to have their historic land rights recognized by the Canadian government.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Doug Owsam, *Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856-1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Suzanne Zeller, *Inventing Canada: Early Victorian Science and the Idea of a Transcontinental Nation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

<sup>27</sup> Donald G. Creighton, *John A. Macdonald*, 2 vols. (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada, 1965), Vol. II, 35-47.

<sup>28</sup> Sparke, "A Map That Roared," 463-95.

<sup>29</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*.

By the close of the twentieth century, the government had created a new map with the creation of the territory of Nunavut. With renewed interest in a northwest passage, and rekindled cartographic competition among Canada, Russia (which planted a flag on the north pole in 2007), the United States, Denmark, and Norway, mapping projects are once again being used to claim territorial sovereignty.<sup>30</sup>

Maps, surveys, and geographic tracts have endured as political and ideological tools because of their direct relevance to claiming sovereignty, establishing boundaries, and shaping political and cultural interaction. Mapping is one process by which competing powers become entangled in their quest for territory. Eighteenth-century geographic knowledge was produced discursively; its sources were varied, often in competition, and at times encompassed divergent worldviews. Establishing territorial hegemony involved understanding, subsuming, and replacing competing visions. My project details this process as it relates to the northeast, a territory shared by the British, French, and Aborigines. The British “conquest” of this region was a fifty-year undertaking, heavily reliant on mapping projects and the use of geographic knowledge. It was influenced from without (imperial competition in North America) and within (specific contexts and contingencies at work in the region). Consequently, British Nova Scotia as it emerged as an imperial territory in the 1760s can only be understood through its geographic entanglement with French Acadia and Mi’kmaq Mi’kma’ki.

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<sup>30</sup> Steven Chase and Campbell Clark, "Summer Melt Buoys PM's Bid to Champion Arctic Sovereignty," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 August 2008.

## Maps as Historical Evidence

Maps are a valuable, yet underused, historical resource. Historians have traditionally relied on maps for their ability to illustrate geographic areas under discussion. A typical textbook might feature a map of New France as it was in 1660 or before just before the conquest, but rarely is that map itself the subject of historical inquiry. How was it produced? By whom? For what reason? Until the 1980s, cartographic historians were more likely to study the technological advancements in mapmaking or the institutional history of surveying than cartography's political, social, and economic influence. In 1966 Don Thomson wrote a three-volume history of Canadian cartography entitled *Men and Meridians*. Thomson provides a general history of cartography, beginning in ancient times, and outlines the men and methods that influenced the production of maps and geographical understanding. The chronology of cartographic development is provided for each Canadian region, illustrating the roles of prominent surveyors and mapmakers across the country. *Men and Meridians* provides a solid foundation for more specific studies of regional cartographic development, but much remains to be added.<sup>31</sup>

In 1988, Barbara Farrell and Aileen Desbarats co-edited a volume, *Explorations in the History of Canadian Mapping*, which complements Thomson's *Men and Meridians*. The contributors focused on four themes: research background, exploring the coasts, routes and patterns of settlement, and surveys and resources. The strength of this collection is Richard I. Ruggles' essay, "The Next Step Forward: A Further Review of Research on the History of Cartography and Historical Cartography in Canada" in which

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<sup>31</sup> See Don W. Thomson, *Men and Meridians: The History of Surveying and Mapping in Canada*, 3 vols. (Ottawa: R. Duhamel Queen's printer, 1966).



Ruggles calls upon future historians to attend to the neglected areas of the field. Ruggles laments “there is almost nothing written about the early cartography of the Maritimes.”<sup>32</sup> Works that do explore maps of the North Atlantic often lack theoretical enquiry or provide only a cursory examination of Nova Scotia.<sup>33</sup> Ideas of space and the geographic imagination are a fruitful but neglected field in Canadian scholarship. Rod Bantjes argued in 2005 that “this impulse to transform geography is an attractive focus for study in part because almost nothing has been written about it.”<sup>34</sup>

Cartographic history was profoundly influenced by the work of J.B. Harley. He pioneered the field of critical cartography by forcing historians to evaluate, question, and investigate the role and use of maps and cartographic materials. Prior to Harley’s work, cartographers and cartographic historians often interpreted cartography as a discrete science that became increasingly accurate and advanced with time. Critical cartography challenges this assumption by recognizing that the mapmaker can infuse into his map an ideological or political agenda, just as a map reader can selectively interpret cartographic information.<sup>35</sup> This interpretive flexibility means that geographic information could unite as easily as it could divide. Harley’s efforts injected the field of cartographic history with a theoretical element that increased its applicability across various disciplines. His untimely death in 1991 cut short an academic trajectory that was constantly challenging

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<sup>32</sup> “Introduction” in *Explorations in the History of Canadian Mapping: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Aileen Desbarats and Barbara Farrell (Ottawa: Association of Canadian Map Libraries and Archives 1988), 12.

<sup>33</sup> See William Francis Ganong, *Crucial Maps in the Early Cartography and Place-Nomenclature of the Atlantic Coast of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in cooperation with the Royal Society of Canada, 1964); William Patterson Cumming, *British Maps of Colonial America*, Kenneth Nebenzahl, Jr., Lectures in the History of Cartography at the Newberry Library (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); Donald Percy Lemon, *Theatre of Empire: Three Hundred Years of Maps of the Maritimes = Ambitions Impérialistes: Trois Cent Années de Cartographie Dans Les Maritimes* (Saint John NBM Publications = Publications MNB, 1987).

<sup>34</sup> Rod Bantjes, *Improved Earth: Prairie Space as Modern Artefact, 1869-1944* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 4.

<sup>35</sup> For an overview of Harley’s work, see J. B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

historians to re-evaluate the power of maps and geographic knowledge. As Matthew H. Edney wrote, Harley's last two essays "crystallized the cross-disciplinary dissatisfaction with the uncritical manner in which maps have traditionally been treated and examined."<sup>36</sup>

Harley was both an empiricist and a theorist. His theoretical work engaged with Foucault and Derrida as he explored cartography within the framework of post-modern power/knowledge. His reading of Foucault (in translation, as Barbara Belyea noted) was somewhat misguided and provided for a clumsy theoretical analysis of cartography's influence on power relations.<sup>37</sup> Harley did not develop his ideas of a cartographic discourse sufficiently, and therefore his foray into post-structuralism, according to those with expertise in the field, left something to be desired.<sup>38</sup> His efforts built upon an increasing number of studies in which cartography was analyzed as a text or language, and encouraged historians to pursue such investigations. In a semiotic context, historians such as William Boelhower have gone so far as to break cartography into its constituent languages of image, word, and line. Maps consequently become not representations of geography but spaces of linguistic competition.<sup>39</sup> Robbed of its geographic referent, cartography could be explored as a language without real meaning.

These linguistic efforts tipped the scales too far in favour of theory. Critical cartography should not go so far as to ignore historical context. The social and political power of maps comes from their ability to straddle science and interpretation. Without

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<sup>36</sup> Matthew H. Edney, "The Origins and Development of J.B. Harley's Cartographic Theories," *Cartographica, Monograph 54* 40, no. 1-2 (2005): 2.

<sup>37</sup> J.B. Harley, "Maps, Knowledge and Power" in Harley, *The New Nature of Maps*, 51-82.

<sup>38</sup> Barbara Belyea, "Images of Power: Derrida, Foucault, Harley," *Cartographica* 29, no. 2 (1992): 1-9.

<sup>39</sup> William Boelhower, "Inventing America: A Model of Cartographic Semiosis," *Word & Image* 4, no. 2 (1988): 475-97.

their practical use as (constructed) representations of physical space, maps lose their historical importance. Matthew H. Edney has recently reminded historians that maps cannot be explored in the binary of traditional/critical interpretations. Traditionalists believe that maps have a relationship only with the territory they represent, while critical scholars believe it is the reader/map interaction that defines cartography's value.

Following in Harley's footsteps, Edney argues that cartography requires a combination of these positions. "Every reader of a map has both a physical and cognitive relationship to the map," he argues, "so that in the modern world every map, regardless of its mode, entails an act of intellectual appropriation and can potentially serve a more instrumental function."<sup>40</sup> This project examines mapping and cartographic materials in this light.

Maps were useful because they served many purposes. They represented the vision of the cartographer, reflected the aspirations and biases of the reader, and contained images of territory that served practical purposes. As maps became framed as increasingly exact, scientific, and unbiased during the enlightenment, they gained political currency. Their biases and agendas were partially shielded by claims to enlightened objectivity. Maps, mapping, and geographic knowledge were tools of imperial expansion, political policy, and public opinion. Geographic knowledge served practical ends because it could be used (by mapmakers or map readers) to construct persuasive arguments.

### **Historiographical Contexts**

This project draws from, and will contribute to, four primary areas of historical research: Canadian history, Atlantic and Imperial history, Cartographic history, and

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<sup>40</sup> Matthew H. Edney, "The Irony of Imperial Mapping," in *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire*, ed. James R. Akerman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 24.

Aboriginal history. Consequently, this project will help resituate northeastern North America in Canadian national history; it will refine the notion of an Atlantic and imperial world by insisting on recognizing geographic knowledge's role in shaping inter- and intra-cultural relationships; it will draw on the tenets of critical cartography to demonstrate the importance of understanding and evaluating territorial envisioning; and, finally, the geographic implications of contact, conflict, and settlement will further integrate Native and European history in the context of the eighteenth century.

### *Canadian Historiography*

Canadian history has for decades focused on the impact of space and geography. The influence of waterways and geographic features has shaped colony-to-nation historical interpretations.<sup>41</sup> This "Laurentian" thesis and its Ontario-centred approach to Canadian history faced growing opposition during the 1960s from the "limited identities" school that argued against a single Canadian identity in favour of numerous political and social affiliations of which being Canadian was only one.<sup>42</sup> The concept of limited

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<sup>41</sup> See Donald G. Creighton, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937). This interpretation situated southern Ontario as the Canadian metropole that depended on a vast hinterland for economic development. This interpretation, even at the time of its initial popularity, was not without critics, even if they did accept some of the "Laurentian thesis's" basic tenets. See W. L. Morton, "Clio in Canada: The Interpretation of Canadian History," *University of Toronto Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (1946): 227-34; W. L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from Earliest Times* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963). The importance of the St. Lawrence River fell from the central narrative of Canadian history, but has recently been revived through an Atlantic World approach that links waterways, hydrography, and state formation in Canada. See Roger S. Marsters, "Sounding an Empire: Canada, Admiralty Hydrography, and the British Atlantic, 1758-1867" (Ph.D. diss. Dalhousie University, In Progress). For a useful overview of Canadian historiographic trends to 1970, see Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

<sup>42</sup> Ramsay Cook, "Canadian Centennial Celebrations," *International Journal* 22 (1967): 659-63; J. M. S. Careless, "'Limited Identities' in Canada," *Canadian Historical Review* 50, no. 1 (1969): 1-10; J. M. S. Careless, "Limited Identities - Ten Years Later," *Manitoba History*, no. 1 (1980): 3-9; Ramsay Cook, "Identities Are Not Like Hats," *The Canadian Historical Review* 81, no. 2 (2000): 260-65.

identities resonated with historians outside of Ontario and regional studies soon acquired a central position in Canadian historical scholarship.<sup>43</sup>

More recently, Michael Bliss has railed against the perceived loss of public Canadian history in the face of regional and overly specialized topics, and called for a return to public history that can lead Canadians toward a better understanding of their country.<sup>44</sup> Ian McKay's recent attempts at establishing a national historical framework replace colony-to-nation and regional analyses with a broader "liberal order" interpretation. McKay argues that Canada is a "project of rule" in which liberal values, especially that of private property, were during the nineteenth century normalized and unfurled across the nation. Opposition to the liberal order may have forced small changes in its development, but the process of adaptation to and assimilation of dissent ensured the liberal order's success.<sup>45</sup> Historians such as Jerry Bannister and Philip Girard have recently challenged McKay's framework. Bannister argues that loyalism accounts for the external factors that influenced political development before 1840, while Girard

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<sup>43</sup> Of particular interest to this dissertation is the Atlantic region. See Margaret Conrad and James Hiller, *Atlantic Canada: A Concise History* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006); *The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History*, ed. Phillip A. Buckner and John G. Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); *The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation*, ed. E. R. Forbes and D. A. Muise (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993). For a recent assessment of regionalism and 'limited identities,' see P. A. Buckner, "'Limited Identities' Revisited: Regionalism and Nationalism in Canadian History," *Acadiensis* 30, no. 1 (2000): 4-15.

<sup>44</sup> Michael Bliss, "Privatizing the Mind: The Sundering of Canadian History, the Sundering of Canada," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 26, no. 4 (1991): 5-17. Bliss has recently restated his opinions – although in a less polemic fashion – and suggested there is only a handful of historians, namely H.V. Nelles, working on public history. See Michael Bliss, "Has Canada Failed? National Dreams That Have Not Come True," *Literary Review of Canada* 14, no. 2 (2006): 3-5.

<sup>45</sup> Ian McKay, "The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History," *Canadian Historical Review* 81, no. 4 (2000): 617-45. For an extended investigation into radicalism and the liberal order in Canada, see Ian McKay, *Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Rethinking Canada's Left History* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2005); Ian McKay, *Reasoning Otherwise: Leftists and the People's Enlightenment in Canada, 1890-1920* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2008). McKay's work challenges regional and Canadian historiography. See, respectively, Ian McKay, "A Note on 'Region' in Writing the History of Atlantic Canada," *Acadiensis* 29, no. 2 (2000): 89-101; Ian McKay, "After Canada: On Amnesia and Apocalypse in the Contemporary Crisis," *Acadiensis* 28, no. 1 (1998): 76-97. Essential to McKay's thesis is the concept of land management and private property that serves as the basis for individual liberalism.

suggests that liberalism was tempered by family and community concerns that recognized individuals as part of a wider network.<sup>46</sup> McKay's thesis ignores the eighteenth century, when questions over property and territorial control were of central importance.

Representations of land and geography were equally influential in re-imagining the west to promote expansion. Doug Owsram's *Promise of Eden* demonstrates that migration required a change in how the west was imagined from a hostile wilderness to a utopian agricultural hinterland. Careful surveys and scientific knowledge helped in this transition.<sup>47</sup> Nova Scotia offers an early example of competing visions of territory and their influence on imperial expansion, boundaries, and sovereignty. Land was imagined and reimagined in ways that cleared the way for settlement, save for the resistance offered by the region's Aboriginals who were unprepared to surrender their image of territory.

When Canadian expansion slowed and settlement increased, land management and geographic knowledge played instrumental roles in state formation. Rusty Bitterman demonstrates how rural farmers played upon middle class concepts of femininity in modes of political protest surrounding absentee land owners in Prince Edward Island. Women became the perfect actors in political resistance specifically because of the

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<sup>46</sup> Jerry Bannister, "Canada as Counter-Revolution: The Loyalist Order Framework in Canadian History, 1750-1840," in Michel Ducharme and Jean-François Constant, *Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 98-146. And Philip Girard, "Land Law, Liberalism, and the Agrarian Ideal: British North America, 1750-1920," in John McLaren, A. R. Buck, and Nancy E. Wright, *Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 120-43. Also, "Liberty, Order, and Pluralism: The Canadian Experience," in *Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600-1900*, ed. Jack P. Greene (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 160-90.

<sup>47</sup> Owsram, *The Promise of Eden*. See also Zeller, *Inventing Canada*. For an excellent survey of the Canadian west, see Gerald Friesen, *The Canadian Prairies: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). On the attempt to liberalise western Aboriginals by turning them into productive farmers, see Sarah Carter, *Aboriginal People and Colonizers of Western Canada to 1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Sarah Carter, *Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).

gendered assumptions of the upper class. However, Bitterman also claims feminizing protest minimized its impact.<sup>48</sup> To understand clearly the cause of absenteeism in the Atlantic region requires a more thorough analysis of land allocation practices because ideas of property, Aboriginal displacement, and geographic knowledge were the foundation for much of the social unrest in eighteenth-century Nova Scotia. Legal historians have begun the task of re-examining Atlantic Canada's past, but much work remains to be done.<sup>49</sup>

Historians focusing on the twentieth century continued to emphasize the importance of geography and landscape in Canadian development. Alan MacEachern's *Natural Selections* traces the establishment and management of four national parks in Atlantic Canada. The parks employed and altered the existing landscape in an attempt to preserve the natural geography and to provide a tourist destination.<sup>50</sup> Reimagining geography as a tourist destination was a national phenomenon that required replacing the

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<sup>48</sup> Rusty Bitterman, "Women and the Escheat Movement: The Politics of Everyday Life on Prince Edward Island," in *Rethinking Canada: The Promise of Women's History*, ed. Veronica Strong-Boag and Anita Fellman (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997).

<sup>49</sup> See, respectively, James Muir, "Civil Law in Colonial Halifax: Merchants and Craftsmen, Creditors and Debtors" (Ph.D. Dissertation, York University, 2004); Jim Phillips, "'Securing Obedience to Necessary Laws': The Criminal Law in Eighteenth-Century Nova Scotia," *Nova Scotia Historical Review* 12, no. 2 (1992): 87-124; R. Blake Brown, "The Jury, Politics, and the State in British North America: Reforms to Jury Systems in Nova Scotia and Upper Canada, 1825-1867" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Dalhousie University, 2005); Jim Phillips and Allyson May, "The Criminality of Women in Eighteenth-Century Halifax," *Acadiensis* 31, no. 2 (2002): 71-96; Jerry Bannister, *The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832* (Toronto: Published for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 2003). For an instance of resistance to some of these legal and political developments, see Philip Girard, "'I Will Not Pin My Faith on His Sleeve': Beamish Murdoch, Joseph Howe, and Responsible Government Revisited," *Journal of the Royal Society of Nova Scotia* 4 (2001): 48-69. For an overview of legal development in Nova Scotia, see *The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, 1754-2004: From Imperial Bastion to Provincial Oracle*, ed. Philip Girard, Jim Phillips, and Barry Cahill (Toronto: Published for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 2004).

<sup>50</sup> Alan MacEachern, *Natural Selections: National Parks in Atlantic Canada, 1935-1970* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001). See also Michael Dawson, *Selling British Columbia: Tourism and Consumer Culture, 1890-1970* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004); Patricia Jasen, *Wild Things: Nature, Culture, and Tourism in Ontario, 1790-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Claire Campbell, *Shaped by the West Wind: Nature and History in Georgian Bay* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005).

concept of space as a site of industry, a source for natural resources, or land reserved for Aboriginals. This dissertation will analyze one of the earliest examples of such a transition in the northeast and therefore illuminate how ideas of space influenced perceptions of northeastern North America.

Also important to this project is the work of Canadian historical geographers. Historical geography combines field work and documentary evidence to deduce how landscape influenced human development, and how that influence changed over time. One example, and perhaps the most influential in the Canadian context, is R. Cole Harris and Geoffrey J. Matthews' *Historical Atlas of Canada*, which illustrates the forces, both natural and man made, that have shaped the Canadian landscape. The *Historical Atlas* is not a history of maps, but history through geographic images. Each beautifully illustrated Plate in the *Historical Atlas of Canada* presents Canada's history on the area in which it occurred, providing the reader with both a written explanation of events and a visual understanding of the event's geography.<sup>51</sup> While the *Historical Atlas* is a valuable tool, it is limited by its lack of an analytical framework that investigates how ideas of space influenced Canadian history. I will use the *Historical Atlas* as a jumping off point by employing the information it provides in my discussion of ideas about geography.

Atlantic Canada has received significant attention from historical geographers. In Cape Breton, minerals and fish attracted capital and workers and shaped settlement patterns and social development; in Acadia, fertile marshlands influenced coastal settlement and increased competition for agricultural space; and Newfoundland's development was dictated in part by the island's harsh geography and important marine

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<sup>51</sup> R. Cole Harris et al., *Historical Atlas of Canada*, 3 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). See also R. Cole Harris and John Warkentin, *Canada before Confederation: A Study in Historical Geography* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991).



resources.<sup>52</sup> In terms of state formation, Atlantic Canada's geography and natural resources were important elements of the imperial relationship to Britain, the process of Confederation, and the development of the resulting Canadian state.<sup>53</sup> While my project is not one of historical geography, I will contribute to the discipline by problematizing notions of space and geography. Understanding the differences among and negotiations within British, French, and Mi'kmaq geographic knowledge will help explain how mapping and ideas about land influenced interaction and provided a foundation for early state formation.

### *Atlantic / Imperial Historiographies*

Historians of the eighteenth century are currently debating the merits of an Atlantic World perspective that focuses on how the Atlantic Ocean connected the early modern world. Bernard Bailyn is a major force in the field, in part because his annual Atlantic World seminar at Harvard University has shaped the development of Atlantic

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<sup>52</sup> See, respectively, R. Cole Harris, *The Reluctant Land: Society, Space, and Environment in Canada before Confederation* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); Stephen J. Hornsby, *Nineteenth-Century Cape Breton: A Historical Geography* (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992); Andrew Hill Clark, *Acadia; the Geography of Early Nova Scotia to 1760* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968); Peter Pope, *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2004); John J. Mannion, *The Peopling of Newfoundland: Essays in Historical Geography*, ed. John J. Mannion (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1977).

<sup>53</sup> See David Clark MacKenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1939-1949* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); *Colonial Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Canada*, ed. Allan Greer and Ian Radforth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); J. Murray Beck, *Joseph Howe*, 2 vols. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982); Creighton, *John A. Macdonald*; Thomas William Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes," in *Interpreting Canada's Past. Vol. 2: After Confederation* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), 68-90; Ernest R. Forbes, *The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979); Raymond Benjamin Blake, *Canadians at Last: Canada Integrates Newfoundland as a Province* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); Jeff A. Webb, "Confederation, Conspiracy and Choice: A Discussion," *Newfoundland Studies* 14, no. 2 (1998): 169-87.

approaches.<sup>54</sup> David Armitage's framework – in which the Atlantic is analyzed as an oceanic region of exchange/interchange, a collection of littoral settlements that can be compared and contrasted, and a historical force capable of influencing inland regions – has encouraged a plethora of monographs and articles.<sup>55</sup> Despite the current popularity and debate surrounding the Atlantic World, older works also centred on bodies of water. For example, Fernand Braudel's famous 1972 study, influenced by the *Annales* school, demonstrated that the Mediterranean Sea provided a foundational link for political, social, and environment history over the *longue durée*.<sup>56</sup>

Atlantic history has faced criticisms for its focus on the British world, specifically colonial America.<sup>57</sup> Lately, efforts have been made to reinvigorate Atlantic frameworks by moving beyond compartmentalized studies of specific empires (British or French Atlantic) and thematic connections (commercial or slave Atlantic).<sup>58</sup> Inspired by J.H.

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<sup>54</sup> See Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

<sup>55</sup> David Armitage, "The Concepts of Atlantic History," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, ed. David Armitage and M. J. Braddick (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

<sup>56</sup> Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

<sup>57</sup> Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Alison Games et al., "Forum: Beyond the Atlantic," *William and Mary Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (2006): 675-743; John G. Reid and Luca Codignola, "Forum: How Wide Is the Atlantic Ocean?," *Acadiensis* 34, no. 2 (2005): 74-87.

<sup>58</sup> Slavery studies is perhaps the most active sub-discipline in Atlantic History. Its necessary focus on mid- and southern Atlantic colonies (though slaves existed in the northern colonies, including Nova Scotia) has weighted the field heavily in that geographic region. See Philip D. Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture Williamsburg Virginia by the University of North Carolina Press, 1998). See also Kenneth Morgan, *Slavery and Servitude in Colonial North America: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1973). On the experience of French slavery, see Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution & Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2004). Some slaves were able to take advantage of their maritime proximity, securing for themselves an element of freedom while developing networks along the Atlantic coast that could facilitate communication and potentially escape efforts. See David S. Cecelski, *The Waterman's Song: Slavery and Freedom in Maritime North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). On the commercial aspects of Atlantic history, especially its influence on social positions and labour relations, see Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker,

Elliot's study of British and Spanish imperial and Atlantic connections, Eliga Gould proposed an "entangled" historical model, concerned with "mutual influencing," "reciprocal or asymmetric perceptions," and "processes of constituting one another."<sup>59</sup> This framework would address the weakness of comparative studies (which often fail to account for their subjects' differences) by examining the various ways two or more subjects influence each other directly or indirectly. Gould has been charged with dressing up borderlands history in new clothes, as his analysis focuses on imperial peripheries but does not address the core. Yet in North America there was no core; an entangled model, therefore, can account for the context of North America's Atlantic connections and local developments.<sup>60</sup>

Borderland history and entangled history have, for the most part, focused on areas of British-Spanish interaction in southern North America.<sup>61</sup> John G. Reid and Stephen J. Hornsby have edited and contributed to collections that explore the northeast as a borderland region, arguing that the spaces of (British-Native) interaction during the

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*The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000); Marcus Rediker and Michael F. Jiménez, "What Is Atlantic History?," *CPAS Newsletter: The University of Tokyo Center for Pacific and Asian Studies* (2001); Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For a review / overview of this material, see Bryan Palmer, "Hydra's Materialist History," *Historical Materialism* 11, no. 4 (2003); Marcel van der Linden, "Labour History as the History of Multitudes," *Labour / Le Travail* 52 (2003). See also Geoffrey Gilbert Plank, *Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

<sup>59</sup> John Huxtable Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds," 764-86.

<sup>60</sup> Jorge Canizares-Esguerra, "Entangled Histories: Borderland Historiographies in New Clothes?," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007): 787-99; Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Atlantic Histories: A Response from the Anglo-American Periphery," 112 (2007): 1414-22.

<sup>61</sup> Samuel Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Rosemary A. King, *Border Confluences: Borderland Narratives from the Mexican War to the Present* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2004); Samuel Truett, "The Ghosts of Frontiers Past: Making and Unmaking Space in the Borderlands," *Journal of the Southwest* 46, no. 2 (2004): 309-50. An influential analysis of borderlands history is Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History," 104 (1999): 814-41.

eighteenth century were as likely peaceful as they were violent. Though this region has gone from borderland to bordered territory, various social, political, and cultural influences continue to permeate boundaries and shape regional development.<sup>62</sup> As the borderland approach becomes eclipsed by Atlantic and entangled histories, historians must not exclude the northern regions of North America. My dissertation serves as a reminder that the North Atlantic was an entangled space. British, French, and Aboriginal powers extended their influence from the northeast to the Ohio River Valley and to the political and social centres of Britain and France. In the quest for territorial sovereignty, actions in one theatre reverberated in another.

Entangled empires also shed light on how the English and French Atlantics influenced each other. In *The English Atlantic*, a pioneering work in Atlantic history, Ian K. Steele challenges the assumptions that Atlantic passages were slow, dangerous, and infrequent. Although the time it took to cross the ocean depended on port of origin, destination, and season, trips lasted as long as they had to and passengers were willing to accept that. It was this maritime highway that connected colonists to their homeland during the early modern period.<sup>63</sup> The French Atlantic was less well connected during

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<sup>62</sup> Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid, *New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005); *The Northeastern Borderlands: Four Centuries of Interaction*, ed. Stephen Hornsby, Victor A. Konrad, and James Herlan (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1989). Other studies of northern borderlands include Karl S. Hele, *Lines Drawn Upon the Water: First Nations and the Great Lakes Borders and Borderlands* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008); Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution* (Vintage: 2007); Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, *Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture Williamsburg Virginia by the University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

<sup>63</sup> Ian Kenneth Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Other historians have argued that this connection was strongest at the beginning but weakened with time. See Luca Codignola, "How Wide Is the Atlantic Ocean? Larger and Larger," *Acadiensis* 34, no. 2 (2005): 74-80; David Cressy, *Coming Over: Migration and Communication between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge:

the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Kenneth Banks argues that French imperial authorities attempted to assert control over their Atlantic possessions by controlling the flow of information. Yet because there was no existing communications infrastructure “the French empire was always in the making but never made.”<sup>64</sup> As Alexander Dubé has argued, however, there are elements of the French empire that Banks could have investigated further. The intellectual connections between academics and administrators, or academics and other members of the intelligentsia, provide important information about the French colonies.<sup>65</sup> This dissertation examines the northeast as a region where the French and British Atlantics connected and competed with Aboriginal maritime networks. In this context, the English Atlantic suffered communications problems, while the French benefited from their alliances with the Mi’kmaq.

The competition among the French, British, and Mi’kmaq for territorial sovereignty affected the creation of social and political networks that bound people together in common cause. With recent scholarship positioning the thirteen colonies as Royalists until the outbreak of the Revolution, the task of deciphering the difference between what became the Thirteen Colonies and what became British North America

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Cambridge University Press, 1987); Nicholas P. Canny and Anthony Pagden, *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

<sup>64</sup> Kenneth J. Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002). See also James Stewart Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); W. J. Eccles, *France in America*, Rev. ed. (Markham: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1990); James S. Pritchard, *Anatomy of a Naval Disaster: The 1746 French Naval Expedition to North America* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).

<sup>65</sup> Alexandre Dubé, "S'Appropriier l'Atlantique: Quelques Reflexions autour de *Chasing Empire across the Sea* de Kenneth Banks," *French Colonial History* 6 (2005): 33-44. "...il lui suggère fortement de placer la Louisiane...en relation avec la Havane et Mexico, près de l'empire espagnol plus propre à exciter les rêves de fortune," 38. See also Christian Jacob, *L'Empire des Cartes: Approche Théorique de la Cartographie à Travers l'histoire* (Paris: A. Michel, 1992).

becomes increasingly important.<sup>66</sup> The “conquest” of Acadia took over fifty years, leaving little time for Nova Scotia to coalesce as a colonial entity independent (or critical) of British authority. Martin Brückner has investigated how geographic thought influenced nascent American identity, but a complementary study is required for early Canada.<sup>67</sup>

Atlantic history might face criticism from historians demanding a larger perspective, but disciplines that provide a broad view, such as imperial history, have been censured for sacrificing specificity to the larger narrative. Classic imperial history traced the overseas growth of European powers, documenting the specific technological and political developments that facilitated international authority. J.H. Parry uses the term “reconnaissance” to define an era of early exploration that generated knowledge more than it addressed specific imperial goals. He argues that intellectual curiosity and a sense of responsibility towards other races endowed this era with a sense of respect and nobility. It was these early endeavours that laid the ground work for true imperial expansion.<sup>68</sup> Linda Colley’s *Britons* draws from these older works to argue that despite

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<sup>66</sup> Brendan McConville, *The King's Three Faces: The Rise & Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture Williamsburg Virginia by the University of North Carolina Press, 2006). This work will challenge older interpretations of the American / British North American revolutionary divide. See George A. Rawlyk, *Revolution Rejected 1775-1776*, Canadian Historical Controversies (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968); J. M. Bumsted, *Understanding the Loyalists*, Winthrop Pickard Bell Lectures in Maritime Studies ; 1985-86 (Sackville: Centre for Canadian Studies Mount Allison University, 1986). On the Loyalist experience in Nova Scotia, see Neil MacKinnon, *This Unfriendly Soil: The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia, 1783-1791* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986).

<sup>67</sup> See Martin Brückner, *The Geographic Revolution in Early America: Maps, Literacy, and National Identity* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

<sup>68</sup> J. H. Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration and Settlement 1450-1650* (London: Cardinal, 1973). See also K. G. Davies, *The North Atlantic World in the Seventeenth Century* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974); Henry Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 1492-1763* (London: Allen Lane, 2002); Gerald Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958). A more recent work that focus on the creation of an imperial state is John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (New York: Knopf, 1989).

internal problems within Britain, there were many forces that united Britons, including religion and the perceived existence of a common enemy. Internal dissention was mitigated by commercial profits, the creation of a ruling elite, and the majestic nature of the monarchy.<sup>69</sup> Colley does not discuss geography explicitly, but I will suggest that newspaper reports, letters, and published maps were tools of the imperial geographic imagination.

The “new” imperial history responds to older works by investigating how imperial development affected regular citizens and marginalized groups. These new works “decentre” the empire by studying those on whom empire was thrust. Kathleen Wilson’s collection, *A New Imperial History*, explores the concepts of difference that empires engendered and argues that the imperial/colonial unevenness provides an opportunity to question the essentialist definitions of metropolitan / periphery. Wilson notes that recent imperial works, such as the *Oxford History of the British Empire*, fail to demonstrate adequately the influence of gender and non-western perspectives.<sup>70</sup> Linda Colley’s *Captives* surveys the prisoners’ experiences and how their stories provided Britons with a sense of the danger and fragility of empire.<sup>71</sup> These new imperial histories

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<sup>69</sup> Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). On the creation of a British fiscal-military governance, see Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*.

<sup>70</sup> Kathleen Wilson, *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). See also David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). While the *OHBE* might be light on gender, it does not lack works of new imperial history. See Richard Drayton, “Knowledge and Empire” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume II: The Eighteenth Century*, ed. Peter J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 231-52.

<sup>71</sup> Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2002).

offer instructive new approaches to the idea of empire, but, as Phillip Buckner has argued, there is a danger of ignoring the metropole for the sake of the periphery.<sup>72</sup>

The latest works of imperial history refuse to divorce the social from the political. In *The Persistence of Empire*, Eliga Gould argues that despite recent historical analysis that emphasizes British sympathies for the America cause, most Britons supported their King and Parliament during the conflict. Gould studied hundreds of pamphlets, broadsheets, memoirs, and newspapers that he argues helped create an “imagined community” to which Britons at home expressed loyalty. Britons valued their liberty and interpreted imperial actions abroad as necessary to protect the United Kingdom’s security.<sup>73</sup> Other works challenge Gould’s conclusions but support the claim that the British citizenry were actively involved in state affairs via petitions of support or protest, street theatre, and print culture.<sup>74</sup> One facet of this debate that requires attention is by what method British and French citizens were convinced to accept or reject ideas of empire. I will argue that geographic knowledge and its presentation to the public served as the foundation for an imperial image. Official propaganda and stories from the margins of empire influenced Nova Scotia’s cartographic image and place in imperial geographic thought.

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<sup>72</sup> Phillip A. Buckner, "Was There A 'British' Empire? *The Oxford History of the British Empire* from A Canadian Perspective," *Acadiensis* 32, no. 1 (2002): 110-28. Also, Phillip A. Buckner, *Canada and the British Empire*, The Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>73</sup> Eliga H. Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 2000). On the imperial implications of the American Revolution, see Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); McConville, *The King's Three Faces*. On the creation of “imagined communities” see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. On the development of an imperial vision of places outside Europe, see Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992); Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003).

<sup>74</sup> Kathleen Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).



### *Cartographic Historiography*

Cartographic history has gone through significant changes over the past twenty years. Cartography prior to 1980s was considered a science by many historians and most cartographers. Works published on the subject of cartographic history were often commissioned by governmental agencies to recount the evolution of the science, the introduction of new technologies and tools, and the increasing accuracy of maps through the ages.<sup>75</sup> In the mid-1980s, however, J.B. Harley forced cartographers and historians to reconsider the world of maps, mapping, and spatial knowledge. In a series of influential essays, Harley questioned the scientific nature of maps and argued that maps could be used as ideological, political, and social tools.

Daniel Clayton has examined imperial cartography on Canada's west coast in his work on George Vancouver. Analyzing Vancouver's cartographic contributions while serving the British crown, Clayton argues that Vancouver surveyed the island that now bears his name and used cartography to appropriate into the British sphere of influence what had been Native territory. Vancouver's maps excluded Natives, dispossessing them of their traditional territory.<sup>76</sup> Also for the west coast, Matthew Sparke has analyzed cartography's political ambivalence as it relates to Native land claims. By comparing the role of maps in *Delgamuukw v. the Queen* and *The Historical Atlas of Canada*, Sparke argues for the existence of "contrapuntal cartographies" that represent western and Native worldviews. This post-colonial analysis, drawing upon Michel Foucault and Homi

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<sup>75</sup> An excellent overview of cartographic history from the 1950s to the early 1990s can be found in Edney, "The Origins and Development of J.B. Harley's Cartographic Theories." For an example of older but important cartographic history in Canada, see Thomson, *Men and Meridians*. For an American example, see Sarah S. Hughes, *Surveyors and Statesmen: Land Measuring in Colonial Virginia* (Richmond: Virginia Surveyors Foundation and the Virginia Association of Surveyors, 1979).

<sup>76</sup> Daniel Clayton, "Circumscribing Vancouver Island," *BC Studies*, no. 122 (1999): 10. See also Daniel Clayton, "The Creation of Imperial Space in the Pacific Northwest," *Journal of Historical Geography* 26, no. 3 (2000): 327-50; Clayton, *Islands of Truth*.

Bhabha, questions the dominance of a western perspective but illustrates that perspective's ability to incorporate and nationalize dissent.<sup>77</sup>

On the east coast, John G. Reid's "The Conquest of 'Nova Scotia': Cartographic Imperialism and the Echoes of a Scottish Past," investigates the process by which the name Nova Scotia survived the first attempt to colonize the province in 1632 and was revived to legitimize later settlement endeavours. Reid argues that the union of Scotland and Britain in 1707 renewed importance for the name Nova Scotia as it was "subsumed into a context of increasing Scottish involvement in British imperial affairs." The re-emergence of "Nova Scotia"—a term that survived not because the settlement was a success but because it was included on maps—had little to do with the seventeenth-century Scottish settlement. Instead the name was invoked during the early eighteenth century to reflect imperial demands that required justifying present actions through past events.<sup>78</sup> At the local level, Joan Dawson's *The Mapmaker's Eye* provides an important account of Nova Scotia's cartographic history. Dawson investigates the maps and some of the events that may have influenced their creation, offers insightful arguments concerning the use of maps as tools to attract settlers, and lays a solid foundation for a critical cartographic analysis of Nova Scotia's maps.<sup>79</sup> While Dawson is correct to argue that these maps were used to advertise potential areas of settlement, more context is required to situate Nova Scotia / l'Acadie in its imperial setting. These works have begun the task of applying critical cartography to Canadian topics. My project builds on this literature by further contextualizing geographic information in its historical setting and

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<sup>77</sup> Sparke, "A Map That Roared," 463-95.

<sup>78</sup> John G. Reid, "The Conquest of 'Nova Scotia': Cartographic Imperialism and the Echoes of a Scottish Past," *Nation and Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600-1800*, ed. Ned C. Landsman (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2001). Quoted from page 41.

<sup>79</sup> Dawson, *Mapmaker's Eye: Nova Scotia through Early Maps*.

exploring how surveys and mapping projects influenced imperial politics and local relations.

In “Cartography and Power in the Conquest and Creation of New Spain,” Raymond B. Craib argues that “maps are active, creative, and constitutive. More bluntly, they are implicated in creating the reality that they presume to reveal.”<sup>80</sup> Cartography and geographic knowledge were instrumental tools in the process of empire building. As Matthew Edney has argued, it was with maps that British administrators delimited new territories and defined them as British. Interestingly, the development of mathematical techniques and new instruments made mapping easier and more accurate in theory, but the expense of these tools, the education required to use them, and the harsh conditions on the ground meant that surveying and mapmaking remained a laborious and inexact task.<sup>81</sup> Mapping straddled the line between art and science, which made it doubly useful as a tool of imperial engineering.

Cartographers required an education before they could influence the geographic imagination. In her study of geographic instruction in late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth-century England, Leslie Cormack identifies three main geographic disciplines: mathematical geography, descriptive geography, and chorography. These geographers addressed questions of map projection, navigation, accurate chart making, and improving the practical nature of geography.<sup>82</sup> These educational disciplines were

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<sup>80</sup>Raymond B. Craib, "Cartography and Power in the Conquest and Creation of New Spain," *Latin American Research Review* 35, no. 1 (2000): 13.

<sup>81</sup>Edney, *Mapping an Empire*. See also Burnett, *Masters of All They Surveyed; The Compleat Plattmaker: Essays on Chart, Map, and Globe Making in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Norman Joseph William Thrower (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Dava Sobel, *Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time* (New York: Walker, 1995).

<sup>82</sup>Lesley B. Cormack, *Charting an Empire: Geography at the English Universities, 1580-1620* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). On a similar topic, see Lesley B. Cormack, "'Good Fences Make Good

not always complementary. In France, as Anne Godlewska has argued, geographic thought and cartographic production stalled in the late eighteenth century as geographers encountered challenges from mathematicians and natural scientists. Geographers and their maps had spent the eighteenth century answering questions such as “where” and “how” and developing an international language and set of practices for their maps.<sup>83</sup> Yet, as this dissertation illustrates, their maps were still used for practical purposes and influenced political decisions.

### *Aboriginal Historiography*

By widening their scope and incorporating cross-disciplinary approaches to the past, historians have made significant gains toward incorporating a strong Aboriginal presence into North American history. The development of ethnohistory – a study that combines traditional historical methodology, anthropology, and linguistics – provides a promising, although not problem-free, window into the past. This dissertation will draw upon ethnohistorical methodology to provide a fuller interpretation of Aboriginal geographic thought and mapping techniques.

A.G. Bailey is often credited as the father of ethnohistory. In 1937, Bailey published *The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures, 1504-1700: A Study in Civilization*, which received scant attention until the second edition appeared in 1969. Bailey’s primary concern was the state of Native culture at the time of European contact.

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Neighbors': Geography as Self-Definition in Early Modern England," *Isis* 82, no. 314 (1991): 639-61. For an account of geographic education in America, see William Warntz, *Geography Now and Then: Some Notes on the History of Academic Geography in the United States* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1964).

<sup>83</sup> Anne Godlewska, *Geography Unbound: French Geographic Science from Cassini to Humbolt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). On the importance of geographic thought to the Enlightenment, see *Geography and Enlightenment*, ed. Charles W. J. Withers and David N. Livingstone (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

Bailey argues convincingly that both the French and the Algonkians had something the other wanted – the French desired furs and the Natives wanted iron tools – and that cultural exchange went both ways.<sup>84</sup> One of Bailey’s contemporaries, Frank Speck, studied the Penobscot in Maine but was unable to avoid many of the generalizations and assumptions that plague Aboriginal history. He considered the Native past a “primitive Utopia” disrupted and subsequently ruined by European contact.<sup>85</sup> Of particular interest to my study is Speck and Bailey’s disagreement over the Algonkian use of land. Speck argued that family hunting territories were pre-Columbian, while Bailey believed that Europeans introduced family territories which replaced communal land tenure.<sup>86</sup> This project shifts the focus from Native land tenure to how geographic control influenced Aboriginal interaction with the British and the French.

There is a difference between an ethnohistorical approach and Native history from an Aboriginal perspective. That non-Native historians struggle with the concept of a non-

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<sup>84</sup> Alfred G. Bailey, *The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures 1504-1700: A Study in Canadian Civilization* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969). Bailey argues that the French altered Aboriginal hunting patterns and seasonal migration, while the Natives influenced the French style of dress and practice of war. See also Cornelius J. Jaenen, "Amerindian Views of French Culture in the Seventeenth Century," *Canadian Historical Review* 55, no. 3 (1974): 261-91; Cornelius J. Jaenen, *The French Relationship with the Native Peoples of New France and Acadia* (Ottawa: The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Research Branch, 1984). On the career of A. G. Bailey see, Alfred G. Bailey, "Retrospective Thoughts of an Ethnohistorian," *Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers* 14 (1977): 15-29; Bruce G. Trigger, "Alfred G. Bailey - Ethnohistorian," *Acadiensis* 18, no. 2 (1989): 3-21. For an overview in historiographic trends in ethnohistory, see James Axtell, "The Ethnohistory of Early America: A Review Essay," *William and Mary Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (1978): 110-44.

<sup>85</sup> Frank G. Speck, *Penobscot Man: The Life History of a Forest Tribe in Maine* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1940). For an updated analysis of the cultural developments and conflicts in pre-contact North America, see Bourque, Cox, and Whitehead, *Twelve Thousand Years*; Stephen A. Davis, "Early Societies: Sequences of Change," in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation*, 3-21; David Sanger, "Pre-European Dawnland: Archaeology of the Maritime Peninsula," in *New England and the Maritime Provinces*, 15-31.

<sup>86</sup> See Bailey, *The Conflict*, xi-xxiii; Frank G. Speck and Loren C. Eiseley, "Significance of Hunting Territory Systems of the Algonkian in Social Theory," *American Anthropologist* new ser. 41, no. 2 (1939): 269-88; John M. Cooper, "Is the Algonkian Family Hunting Ground System Pre-Columbian?," *American Anthropologist* new ser. 41, no. 1 (1939): 66-90; Dean R. Snow, "Wabanaki 'Family Hunting Territories'," *American Anthropologist* new ser. 70, no. 6 (1968): 1143-51. Other debates in Ethnohistory include the tension between anthropology and history, and the depiction of Aboriginals as rationalist-materialist (Innis’s “economic man in feathers”) or idealist-culturalist (driven by spiritual and non-rational concerns). See Trigger, "Alfred G. Bailey - Ethnohistorian."

linear past is only one obstacle in this historiography. Another is the fact that Native history is inextricably linked with present political and social problems. Daniel Paul's anger and hurt is palpable in *We Were Not The Savages*, a Mi'kmaq perspective on the cultural conflict that resulted from European contact.<sup>87</sup> Non-Native historians who focus on the mythic and spiritual nature of Aboriginal history also face harsh criticism. In *Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur Trade*, Calvin Martin offers non-economic explanations for Native involvement in the fur trade. Martin relies on oral tradition to argue that Algonkians blamed the beaver for upsetting the natural balance by introducing a deadly sixteenth-century epidemic. Subsequently, the Natives declared war on all beavers.<sup>88</sup> In a published response, Bruce Trigger argues that there is no evidence of an epidemic in the sixteenth century. In that same response, Shepard Krech, Lydia T. Black, and Charles Hudson attempt to apply Martin's conclusions to other Aboriginal groups and find his theory wanting.<sup>89</sup> The limits of evidentiary sources

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<sup>87</sup> Daniel N. Paul, *We Were Not the Savages: A Mi'kmaq Perspective on the Collision between European and Native American Civilizations* (Halifax: Fernwood, 2000). For example, Paul compares eighteenth-century British officers to Nazi officials, suggests that the current Nova Scotia government's refusal to address past wrongs is the equivalent of supporting African Apartheid, and inflates the pre-contact Mi'kmaq population to over 100 000. Although the exact pre-contact population is unknown, the accepted estimates range from 12000 to 30000. See Ralph Pastore, "The Sixteenth Century: Aboriginal Peoples and European Contact" in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation*, 22-39; Virginia P. Miller, "Aboriginal Micmac Population: A Review of the Evidence," *Ethnohistory* 23, no. 2 (1976): 117-27. An important and useful collection of Aboriginal oral history – which pairs Native stories with documented accounts – is Ruth Holmes Whitehead, *The Old Man Told Us: Excerpts from Micmac History, 1500-1950* (Halifax: Nimbus, 1991).

<sup>88</sup> Calvin Martin, *Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 20.

<sup>89</sup> See *Indians, Animals, and the Fur Trade: A Critique of Keepers of the Game*, ed. Shepard Krech (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1981). For accounts of the fur trade in Canada that include rational-materialist and idealist-culturalist perspectives, see Bruce G. Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 1986); Sylvia Van Kirk, *Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670-1870* (Winnipeg: Watson & Dwyer, 1999); Arthur J. Ray, *Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998); Jennifer Brown, *Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980); Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1992).

provide no shortage of challenges for historians and ethnohistorians, Native and non-Native alike. To avoid the challenges of oral history, this project will rely on the written record to incorporate, as much as those records allow, the Mi'kmaq perspective on geographic thought and spatial renderings.

Despite the dearth of Native-authored documentary evidence, Aboriginal history has become increasingly important as historians focus on Atlantic connections and the contested nature of early modern imperial expansion. As Charles Martijn has demonstrated, the Mi'kmaq were a maritime people. Unlike other Algonkian groups that adopted a horticultural and somewhat sedentary way of life, the Mi'kmaq retained migratory seasonal hunting and fishing patterns. Their proficiency on water enabled the Mi'kmaq to navigate the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, as well as to travel along the northeastern coast to trade with the Wabanaki.<sup>90</sup> There was in the eighteenth century an Aboriginal *cis-* and *circum-*Atlantic world.

This Aboriginal Atlantic extended beyond the northeast to Europe. Corte Real took a number of Natives back to Europe during his voyages in the early sixteenth century, as did explorers such as Jacques Cartier.<sup>91</sup> Recent work has helped to understand fully how British citizens experienced Natives in Britain. A single example drawn from the mid-eighteenth century illuminates this phenomenon. Benjamin Lester was an English merchant whose British world included a seasonal migration from Poole, England to Trinity Bay, Newfoundland. His was a truly Atlantic world, but the defining

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<sup>90</sup>*Les Micmacs et la Mer*, ed. Charles A. Martijn (Montréal: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1986). On the existence of Aboriginal maritime trade, see Bruce Bourque and Ruth Whitehead, "Trade and Alliances in the Contact Period" in *American Beginnings: Exploration, Culture, and Cartography in the Land of Norumbega*, ed. Emerson W. Baker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 131-48. On Mi'kmaq naval capabilities in their conflict against the British, see Olive P. Dickason, "La 'guerre navale' des Micmacs contre les Britanniques, 1713-1763" in *Les Micmacs et la Mer*, 233-48.

<sup>91</sup> Stephen Patterson, "Aboriginal Peoples and European Contact" in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation*, 33.

cultural element of northeastern North America, the Native presence, was virtually non-existent in Newfoundland at Lester's time. It was in 1769 while enjoying some time in England that Lester encountered his first Aboriginals: he attended a public viewing of a Native woman and her son.<sup>92</sup> That Lester, a merchant who spent several months of each year in North America, first Aboriginals in Britain suggests that the Aboriginal Atlantic was just as wide, although not as dense, as that of the British.

William C. Wicken's investigations into Mi'kmaq-British and Mi'kmaq-French relations on the North American side of the Atlantic indicate the important role that Natives played in imperial expansion. The Mi'kmaq's ability to shape and constrain imperial policy continued after Britain captured Port Royal in 1710, evidence of which can be found with varying degrees of clarity in the official correspondence, private letters, and treaties.<sup>93</sup> Wicken's research, and also that of John Reid, demonstrates that emphasizing written documents does not mean ignoring the existence and influence of Native history. Written documents must be analyzed critically and paired with works of anthropology and archaeology to provide a rounded interpretation of Aboriginal history, but with the correct methodology it is possible to access Native voices through English and French documents. The result is the recognition of deceit and miscommunication by

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<sup>92</sup> Bannister, *The Rule of the Admirals*, 158. See also Jerry Bannister, "Citizen of the Atlantic: Benjamin Lester's Social World in England, 1768-69," *Newfoundland Quarterly* 96, no. 3 (2003): 32-37. For an important analysis of the "Aboriginal Atlantic," see Alden T. Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-1776* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also Reid and Codignola, "Forum: How Wide Is the Atlantic Ocean?," 74-87.

<sup>93</sup> William Wicken, "Mi'kmaq Decisions: Antoine Tecouenemac, the Conquest, and the Treaty of Utrecht" in Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia*, 86-100. See also Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*; William C. Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760" (Ph.D dissertation, McGill University, 1994).



both Natives and non-Natives, illustrating the complex interactions that developed and changed in the eighteenth century.<sup>94</sup>

Land was a constant source of tension between the Europeans and the Aborigines. Historians struggle to understand the spiritual relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the land; however, Aboriginal groups appear more powerful than has traditionally been assumed when the focus is shifted away from Native cosmology and directed towards the contest for land. Nevertheless, there is little consensus in this debate. John G. Reid argues that the Mi'kmaq remained a dominant force in the region until 1784, while Stephen A. Patterson suggests that the Mi'kmaq were defeated by the late 1750s.<sup>95</sup> This dissertation contributes to the exchange by illustrating how Mi'kmaq maintained territorial control and influenced British settlement into the 1760s. Unlike the *pays d'en haut*, which has been described by Richard White as a "middle ground" where Natives and Europeans adapted to each other's cultures to facilitate a delicate and developing relationship, northeastern North America was a site of more direct negotiations between clearly defined groups. Northeastern North America was an entangled imperial space, not a middle ground.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> For examples in northeastern North America, see Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, "Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast: A Reappraisal," *William & Mary Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2004): 77-106; David Ghere, "Mistranslations and Misinformation: Diplomacy on the Maine Frontier, 1725-1755," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 8, no. 4 (1984): 3-26.

<sup>95</sup> See, respectively, Reid, "Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena?," 669-92; Stephen E. Patterson, "Indian-White Relations in Nova Scotia, 1749-61: A Study in Political Interaction," *Acadiensis* 23, no. 1 (1993): 23-59; Gary P. Gould and Alan J. Semple, *Our Land, the Maritimes: The Basis of the Indian Claim in the Maritime Provinces of Canada* (Fredericton: Saint Annes Point Press, 1980). For an investigation into the Native perspective of Europeans in British America, see Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

<sup>96</sup> On the "middle ground," see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Taylor, *The Divided Ground*. On borderlands, see *Northeastern Borderlands*; Olive P. Dickason, "Amerindians between French and English in Nova Scotia, 1716-1763," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 10, no. 4 (1986): 31-56; *New England / New France 1600-1850: The Dublin Seminar for New England Folklife, Annual Proceedings, July 1989*, ed. Peter. Benes (Boston: Boston University Press, 1992), 18-27.

## **Methodology and Sources**

This dissertation favours chronology over thematic organization. Chapters follow temporally one after another, beginning in 1710 and ending in the 1760s. An adherence to chronology facilitates an historical narrative, while each chapter includes thematic sections that allow for an investigation into the period under consideration. The resulting combination of “story” and analysis allows for both macro- and micro-history based on specific case studies, biographies, and selected examples that speak to larger trends. Moving from the general to the specific illustrates how larger movements influence small actors, and vice versa. Although this dissertation explores geographic knowledge’s ability to shape a variety of relationships in northeastern North America and the wider Atlantic world, that knowledge was possessed, expressed, and manipulated by humans who were the product of their surroundings.

This project is rooted in primary research undertaken in Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. At Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management I consulted official letters between Nova Scotia governors and the Board of Trade, surveyors’ geographic reports, and various maps. NSARM also holds copies of popular British journals, including the *London Magazine* and *Gentleman’s Magazine*. At the Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa) I continued my research into official correspondence and had access to a number of maps from the eighteenth century. Research in Canada laid the foundation for subsequent work in Europe. At the Archives Nationale d’Outre Mer (Aix-en-Provence) I consulted official correspondence between the ministry of the Marine and governors at Port Royal, Louisbourg, and Quebec City. There was also an extensive fonds concerning the limits of New France / l’Acadie and boundary negotiations with

Britain. The Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris held copies of popular French journals, including the *Journal des Sçavans* and the *Mercure de France*. In London I consulted maps and the British State Papers series at the National Archives (Kew), and published geographic tracts, journals, and geographers' biographies at the British Library.

The official correspondence between British and French officials and their governors in the northeast gives this dissertation its narrative spine. Public magazines provide insight into how British and French citizens engaged with geographic knowledge specifically, and imperial expansion and competition generally. The maps created and published during this time crossed social and political boundaries. Although the public rarely had access to officially-commissioned materials, administrators were aware of (and at times referenced) maps published for public consumption. Combining official letters and popular journals with cartographic evidence helps contextualize geographic knowledge within its historical milieu. Administrators and the public had to see their empire to understand it; maps served that purpose. What they saw in turn influenced their thoughts on expansion and imperial competition.

### **Dissertation Structure**

This project studies how maps, surveys, and geographic reports influenced claims of territorial sovereignty. It investigates how spatial information was used and how those uses changed over time to address specific concerns. Maps and mapping infused political negotiations with an image that could be used to enforce one argument or weaken the next, and encouraged cultural interaction in ways that facilitated alliances and exposed differences. The French, British, and Aboriginal powers in the northeast each had their

own vision of their territory. At times these images were complementary and at times they conflicted. Throughout the eighteenth century, however, ideas and visions of territory informed both political negotiation and cultural interaction.

The northeast has been examined as a borderland, an outpost, and a space of power.<sup>97</sup> Historians such as John Mack Faragher have suggested that Acadia was part of an “American homeland,” while recent Atlantic history surveys barely recognize its existence.<sup>98</sup> This dissertation contributes to the existing historiography by exploring Nova Scotia / l’Acadie as a site of imperial importance and geographic significance. The maps, surveys, and geographic tracts that dealt with the region enabled Britain and France to place the northeast within a wider imperial framework. Competitions over territorial sovereignty shed light on imperial planning, the contribution of Aboriginals to local and imperial development, and the various uses of geographic knowledge in envisioning imperial territory. Nova Scotia / l’Acadie was not an peripheral region. As a site of inter- and intra-cultural exchange and interchange, the northeast represented access to the heart of North America.

Chapter Two begins with the British capture of Port Royal in 1710, and ends with the British-Mi’kmaq treaty of 1726. This chapter investigates how mapping projects and geographic information were used as tools of political and cultural negotiation when the Mi’kmaq and their Wabanaki allies were at the height of their power. The British, *de jure* proprietors of much of the northeast after 1710, sought to strengthen their position in

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<sup>97</sup> Hornsby and Reid, *New England and the Maritime Provinces*; Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier; Northeastern Borderlands*; John Bartlet Brebner, *New England’s Outpost: Acadia before the Conquest of Canada* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927).

<sup>98</sup> Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme; The Atlantic World, 1450-2000*, ed. Toyin Falola and Kevin D. Roberts, *Blacks in the Diaspora* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); Douglas R. Egerton et al., *The Atlantic World: A History, 1400-1888* (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 2007).

Nova Scotia and expand into French Acadia; the French, both Acadian residents and officials at Île Royale, hoped to constrain British territorial control; the Mi'kmaq, largely unaffected by the initial conquest, continued as they had before 1710. The chapter investigates four major events that shaped relations during this period: the Treaty of Utrecht, Mi'kmaq and Wabanaki expressions of territorial sovereignty; French-British boundary negotiations, and British-Native treaties. From 1710 to 1726, Acadia and Nova Scotia remained subservient to Mi'kma'ki.

Chapter Three explores the relatively peaceful period from 1727 to 1744. This was the Acadian “golden age” during which French inhabitants of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie thrived under British titular rule. Geographic control was instrumental to establishing and maintaining a balance of territorial sovereignty that made this peace possible. The British, French, and Native groups in the region had aspirations for more sweeping geographic power, but each prevented the other from extending their authority beyond mutually acceptable limits. Consequently, this chapter complicates the conclusions of historians such as Elizabeth Mancke, Lauren Benton, and Ken MacMillan, who have argued that the law and legal frameworks were tools of imperial sovereignty. In the face of limited legal authority, geographic spaces operated to prevent one group from attaining control over too much territory.

Chapter Four examines British efforts to strengthen their presence in Nova Scotia. The British settlement at Halifax was a watershed in British imperial history, signalling a change in imperial policy and forcing the French and the Mi'kmaq to respond. The decade surrounding the Halifax settlement, from 1744 to 1755, was a turning point not because Halifax itself was a successful endeavour, but because the British made their

intentions to expand clear. While Halifax remained a pale beyond which the British exercised limited territorial sovereignty, the settlement made both the Mi'kmaq and the French aware of the shifting regional geo-politics, to which both groups replied by reasserting their desired geographic boundaries. After 1749, all three powers were working to assert their sovereignty through geographic control.

The efforts in Nova Scotia were matched by those in Paris. Chapter Five recounts the travails of the Acadian Boundary Commission, which met in Paris to resolve geographic disputes. This chapter challenges and complicates Mary Pedley's conclusion that the commissaries distanced themselves from cartographic evidence. To the contrary, I argue that maps and geographic knowledge were integral elements of the discursive construction of empire that took place in Paris and London between 1750-55.

Cartography was instrumental in envisioning an imperial Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, acting as both proof and disproof while illuminating acceptable sources of geographic authority.

When the appointed commission stalled, diplomats sought to create an acceptable boundary in lieu of discovering ancient limits. Both sides poured over maps in an attempt to bolster their claims, and the British made it clear that Nova Scotia was a valuable imperial possession. Official maps of the region were kept within administrative circles for fear that public opinion would influence private discussions.

The negotiations eventually broke down as war spread across North America and Europe. Chapter Six explores how geographic knowledge influenced ideas about the war (in Britain and France) and the spread of conflict (in the northeast). This chapter emphasizes just how entangled British, French, and Aboriginal groups were in Nova Scotia / l'Acadie by analysing three major elements of the Seven Years' War and its

aftermath: the tension between enlightened thought and geographers' imperial bias, Nova Scotia / l'Acadie's local and imperial importance during the Seven Years' War, and the Acadian expulsion's relationship to British resettlement plans and Mi'kmaq treaties. Chapter Six also contributes to recent studies on the legal implications of territorial sovereignty. The Acadian expulsion signalled a change in British imperial policy; earlier efforts at integrating Acadians into the British empire via land surveys and legal methods had failed, and more direct action was necessary to secure territorial control. There were limits to what the law could accomplish. In Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, the lack of material power – the ability to dominate an area through military force or demographic weight – was balanced with cartographic arguments. Imperial powers relied on maps and geographic knowledge to pursue their interests in the face of territorial competition.

### **Dates and Translations**

Britain used the Julian (Old Style) calendar until 1752. This system marked the new year on March 25<sup>th</sup>, and was 11 days behind the Gregorian (New Style) calendar in force in France, where the new year began on January 1<sup>st</sup>. To avoid confusion, this dissertation has simply followed the dates as they were noted at the time. When a record is used to describe an event in Britain and France, both Old and New style dates are included. After 1752, there is no discrepancy between British and French dates.

All translations from the French primary sources, published records, and secondary literature, unless otherwise noted, are the author's.

## Chapter 2

### Duplicitous Diplomacy: Geographic Knowledge and the Early Treaty Process, 1710-1726

#### Introduction

In 1710 there was no “Nova Scotia”. There was barely an Acadia. While both names could be located on a map, neither carried much weight on the ground. When the British captured Port Royal in 1710, few local inhabitants – Acadian French, Mi’kmaq, or Wolastoqiyik (Maliseet) – thought that the fort had changed hands for the last time. Port Royal, renamed Annapolis Royal, was the European centre of the region known to the French as *l’Acadie* and to the British as Nova Scotia. The fort was little more than a European pale in *Mi’kma’ki*, a geographic region dominated by the Mi’kmaq and their eastern Algonkian neighbours. The poorly fortified and undermanned garrison had been captured and returned several times during the seventeenth century.<sup>1</sup> The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht ended the War of Spanish Succession and ceded to Britain the French colony of *l’Acadie* according to its “ancient limits.” Determining those limits was reserved for a later date. The British were *de jure* proprietors of peninsular Nova Scotia, but this chapter will demonstrate that the Mi’kmaq, Wolastoqiyik, and Abenakis<sup>2</sup> employed their geographic knowledge and military strength to maintain *de facto* authority. Natives had well-established local Atlantic connections that allowed allied groups to engage in trade and resist territorial encroachment. France had learned to ingratiate itself into these networks through trade and religion, while Britain hoped to control the region by force.

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<sup>1</sup> For an account of Acadia’s early years, see John G. Reid, *Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland: Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).

<sup>2</sup> The terminology here can be tricky. The Wabenaki Confederacy consisted of five eastern Algonkian tribes: Abenakis, Penobscot, Mi’kmaq, Wolastoqiyik, and Passamaquoddy. Each group retained its own political leadership, but as a Confederacy they collaborated on larger issues of diplomacy, trade, and war.



From 1710 to 1726 Nova Scotia/l'Acadie was on the periphery of European Atlantic connections. Ian K. Steele has argued that the "English Atlantic" was a connecting force and that communications between England and its colonies improved over time. There were various routes of different durations to travel across the sea, but those routes were relatively safe, dependable, and served to unite the British empire.<sup>3</sup> Yet once in North America, navigation remained important and depended on geographic information and accessibility, both of which could be shaped by Aboriginal actions. The French empire was less successful in using its Atlantic connections for imperial aims. As Kenneth Banks and James Pritchard have demonstrated, the French empire lacked a unifying force. "The differences between the real and the imagined geographies of imperialism," Pritchard argues, "are very great in the French case."<sup>4</sup> What did exist in the northeast were strong Aboriginal commercial and political networks maintained by maritime travel along the Atlantic littoral. Natives were able to exploit the European presence for their own benefit because they controlled trade routes and could organize themselves for defence when necessary.<sup>5</sup> When Britain captured Port Royal from the French, they gained control of a region that was dominated by the Mi'kmaq and incorporated into an Aboriginal Atlantic in northeast North America.

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<sup>3</sup> Ian Kenneth Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). See also Ian K. Steele and Nancy L. Rhoden, *English Atlantics Revisited: Essays Honouring Professor Ian K. Steele* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> James Stewart Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xx. Also, Kenneth J. Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> Bruce J. Bourque and Ruth H. Whitehead, "Trade and Alliance in the Contact Period," in *American Beginnings: Exploration, Culture, and Cartography in the Land of Norumbega*, ed. Emerson W. Baker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 131-45.

Imperial space was easier to delineate on maps than to control on the ground. Whereas territorial claims were often vast and neatly organized, effective control was fluid and based on geographic knowledge that “unfolded along routes and corridors that in turn partially followed rivers, coastal passages, sea lanes, and overland paths.”<sup>6</sup> Regions and regionalism require, according to Benton, more attention to understanding imperial space. These spatial fragments can help shed light on inter-imperial competitions.<sup>7</sup> A regional analysis will also complement sweeping studies that can generalize or simplify more complicated geographies. Daniel K. Richter’s *Facing East From Indian Country*, for example, investigates British America yet ignores Nova Scotia which, in many instances, challenges or complicates some of his conclusions. Richter’s imperial era, especially from 1713-1744, was one where the British gained stability and Natives realized that conflict was suicidal. This was not the case in Nova Scotia.<sup>8</sup>

Scholars have examined Nova Scotia / l’Acadie as a site of inter-imperial and inter-cultural competition.<sup>9</sup> The region was something of an exception to both British and French America because of the limited European presence (compared with either New England or New France), giving the Mi’kmaq the opportunity to learn from the experiences of their allies.<sup>10</sup> This chapter will build on those studies by contributing a detailed analysis of how maps, surveys, and reports influenced claims of suzerainty and instituted limits on territorial sovereignty among the British, French, and Mi’kmaq.

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<sup>6</sup> Lauren Benton, "Spatial Histories of Empire," *Itinerario* 30, no. 3 (2006): 22.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 19-23

<sup>8</sup> Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), Ch.5.

<sup>9</sup> Stephen Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005); Geoffrey Gilbert Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).

<sup>10</sup> L. F. S. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979), 31.

The inter- and intra-cultural relationships between 1710 (the capture of Port Royal) and 1726 (the first Mi'kmaq-British treaties) illustrate how political negotiation operated when the Aboriginals were at the height of their power.<sup>11</sup> Mapping the region – collecting, recording, and representing geographic knowledge – was a central element of establishing and exerting territorial sovereignty. To control territory was to exercise power, and each group relied on spatial information to inform and influence treaties and agreements. Tension between the British, French, and Aboriginals in the northeast rose as European settlement increased. Each group had an agenda: the British wanted to expand, the Aboriginals wanted to maintain their ancient territorial rights, and the French wanted to keep their alliances and limit British strength. British and French officials in Europe and North America relied on maps and geographic reports to negotiate the limits of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, but the eastern Algonkians retained territorial control through their knowledge of the region, their ability to define its limits, and their willingness militarily to defend Mi'kma'ki. Investigating the use of geographic knowledge in this period demonstrates how Natives' mapping capabilities and land claims shaped early British and French (geographic) rivalries in Nova Scotia.

The French retained power in the northeast because they were included in Native life both through religion and trade, while the British survived in Nova Scotia only because they were too weak to pose a threat and because they benefited from the increased English presence in New England. Nova Scotia was not during this period (or

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<sup>11</sup> It is important to keep in mind that British, French, and Native groups negotiated amongst themselves as well as with each other. In Europe this was a period of nation building, not of nations. See Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); David A. Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). For Aboriginal relations in the northeast, see Alfred G. Bailey, *The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures 1504-1700: A Study in Canadian Civilization* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969); Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759," *Ethnohistory* 36, no. 3 (1989): 257-84.

after) “New England’s Outpost,” but the weak fort at Annapolis Royal benefited from the stronger and more populated settlements in Massachusetts by joining in their treaties with the Wabanaki Confederacy.<sup>12</sup> Put simply, the British at Annapolis Royal were too weak to be much of a nuisance to the Mi’kmaq. The French remained integrated in the Aboriginal Atlantic by the cultural connections they had established. Constant trade and sustained interaction allowed the French and Mi’kmaq to learn each other’s customs. The French were primarily interested in trade and preventing British expansion, which they accomplished by supporting Aboriginal territorial rights. By 1726, after concluding treaties with the Mi’kmaq and their allies, the British were tenants in the Aboriginal Atlantic, not residents of a truly British territory.

This chapter will examine four main elements of the 1710-26 period: first, the Treaty of Utrecht and its influence on British and French mapping and cartography; second, Aboriginal mapping, map use, and territorial sovereignty in northeastern North America; third, the Nova Scotia / l’Acadie boundary negotiations in Europe and North America during the 1720s; and finally, the British-Wabanaki conflict, known as Dummer’s War, and the treaties that followed. As John G. Reid has argued, after the Treaty of Utrecht the British employed a “double diplomacy” that allowed them to alter the workings of the local administration in Nova Scotia to accommodate Native concerns

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<sup>12</sup> John Bartlet Brebner, *New England's Outpost: Acadia before the Conquest of Canada* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927). For recent investigations into New England’s influence on the northeast, see Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid, *New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005); John G. Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

while simultaneously adhering to official negotiations with France.<sup>13</sup> France, on the other hand, relied more directly on Native land claims to limit the amount of land ceded to Britain in 1713, which in itself demonstrates the strength of Aboriginal geographic control. The Wabenaki Confederacy, although never a homogenous group, mapped its geography and staked its claims with as much, if not more confidence than either European empire.<sup>14</sup> Aboriginal territorial sovereignty was demonstrated by their ability to resist European encroachment, to ignore British-French boundary negotiations, and to agree to treaties of “peace and friendship,” not of land surrender. In short, this was a period when both l’Acadie and Nova Scotia were subordinate to *Mi’kma’ki*, and the region’s Native groups were strong enough to enforce their image of the northeast.

### **The Fall of Port Royal and the Treaty of Utrecht**

British forces under Francis Nicholson attacked Port Royal in October 1710 as a consolation prize. The War of Spanish Succession was raging in Europe and, consequently, in North America, and the British sought to strike at the heart of France’s American empire. A larger scheme involving an attack on Quebec was postponed and then abandoned, leaving Acadia as the sole target. The crumbling fort stood little chance

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<sup>13</sup> John G. Reid, “Imperialism, Diplomacies, and the Conquest of Acadia,” in John G. Reid et al., *The ‘Conquest’ of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 108.

<sup>14</sup> On Aboriginal cartography, see *Cartographic Encounters: Perspectives on Native American Mapmaking and Map Use*, ed. G. Malcolm Lewis, The Kenneth Nebenzahl, Jr., Lectures in the History of Cartography (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998). On French cartography and imperial claims, see Dale Miquelon, “Les Pontchartrain se Penchent sur leurs Cartes de l’Amérique: Les Cartes et l’Impérialisme, 1690-1712,” *Revue d’Histoire de l’Amérique Française* 59, no. 1 (2005): 53-71. On the British example, see Matthew H. Edney, *Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). On the Wabanaki Confederacy, see Bruce J. Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).

of resisting the British. Acadia's governor, Daniel d'Auger de Subercase, surrendered after a few days of fighting.<sup>15</sup> The fort was renamed Annapolis Royal and garrisoned with British soldiers, but little else in the region changed. John G. Reid and others have investigated the impact of the capture of Port Royal and questioned the implications of the "conquest," suggesting that both Acadian and Native inhabitants responded in 1710 as they had several times previously.<sup>16</sup> Yet popular historians continue to argue that after 1710, "suddenly and silently, the Acadians assented to their fate, while their new British masters looked upon them with disdain and suspicion."<sup>17</sup> To the contrary, the Mi'kmaq remained the dominant force and the Acadians responded to the British presence in measured and deliberate ways.

The Mi'kmaq, Wolastoqiyik, and their ancestors had lived along the Atlantic shore for thousands of years. The Mi'kmaq were Algonkian speaking, semi-nomadic hunters who travelled throughout the eastern Atlantic region by land and ocean to seasonal hunting and fishing sites.<sup>18</sup> They had descended from (or supplanted) the Souriquois; the Wolastoqiyik, who lived in region of the St. John River, had descended

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<sup>15</sup> For an account of the attack, see the introduction to Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia*. The Nicholson-Subercase correspondence during the attack can be found in 1-5, vol. 6, RG 1, Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management [NSARM].

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> William M. Fowler, *Empires at War: The Seven Years' War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2005), 4.

<sup>18</sup> For an ethnohistory of the eastern Algonkians, see Bailey, *The Conflict*. Bailey's views on Aboriginal land use opposed those of another ethnohistorian, Frank Speck. See Frank G. Speck, *Penobscot Man: The Life History of a Forest Tribe in Maine* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1940). On Bailey's career, see Alfred G. Bailey, "Retrospective Thoughts of an Ethnohistorian," *Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers* 14 (1977): 15-29; Bruce G. Trigger, "Alfred G. Bailey - Ethnohistorian," *Acadiensis* 18, no. 2 (1989): 3-21.

from (or supplanted) the Etchemins.<sup>19</sup> As much as the British or the French, the Mi'kmaq were a maritime people. They had over the course of centuries perfected canoe making and water travel, allowing them to include in their seasonal migrations islands that were hundreds of kilometres offshore. The Mi'kmaq designed several types of canoes and used each for a distinct purpose: longer voyagers, faster speeds, and better handling. In the early 1720s, Sebastien Rale, a Jesuit Missionary living with coastal Abenakis, wrote of the Natives' proficiency on water:

It is in these canoes made of bark – which has scarcely the thickness of an *écu* – that they cross the arms of the sea, and sail on the most dangerous rivers, and on lakes from four to five hundred leagues in circumference. In this manner I have made many voyages, without having run any risk.<sup>20</sup>

This maritime nature made the Mi'kmaq a distinct group among the eastern Algonkians.<sup>21</sup>

Their ability to navigate the Atlantic littoral allowed the Mi'kmaq to establish trade relations with the Abenakis of northeastern North America. Before the arrival of the Europeans these Aboriginal groups were engaging in trade and developing socio-political boundaries that were understood and enforced.<sup>22</sup> After the arrival of Europeans, the Mi'kmaq were able to adjust their way of life while maintaining their culture. The Mi'kmaq lived in bordered territories, intermarried, and practiced a subsistence way of

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<sup>19</sup> The historical ethnicity of the region's Aboriginals has not yet been fully determined. For an overview, see Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759," 257-84. Also, Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*.

<sup>20</sup> Sebastien Rale to his Brother, Narantsouak, 12 October 1723. *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791* [hereafter *Jesuit Relations*] Ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites. Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company, 1900. An *écu* was a French silver coin.

<sup>21</sup> See especially Ingeborg Marshall, "Le Canot de Haute Mer de Micmacs," in *Les Micmacs et La Mer*, ed. Charles A. Martijn (Montréal: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1986), 29-48.

<sup>22</sup> Bruce J. Bourque and Ruth Whitehead, "Trade and Alliances in the Contact Period," in *American Beginnings*, 131-45. On the Abenaki and their relations with the French and English, see Kenneth M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

life that enabled them to retain a worldview radically different from that of the Europeans. As William Wicken has argued, “this refusal to cast off entirely their indigenous culture and values in favour of European social and political mores helped many Native peoples to respond effectively to the challenges posed by colonization.”<sup>23</sup> Yet during this early period, and longer in Nova Scotia than in other regions, the Europeans focused on trade and religion more than on convincing the Natives to surrender their way of life.

By the time the French settled at Port Royal in 1604 the Mi’kmaq had some experience with Europeans. English, French, and Spanish fishing boats began visiting northeastern North America at least one hundred years earlier and, as a result, there had been some cultural interaction.<sup>24</sup> Henry IV of France in 1603 commissioned Pierre Du Gua, Sieur de Monts, a Protestant nobleman, to establish a French settlement in North America. De Monts was charged with converting the region’s Natives and with preventing English territorial encroachment. By 1608 France was focused on Quebec, but Acadia continued to develop in part because of the good relations established with the local Mi’kmaq and their leader, Membertou.<sup>25</sup> Acadia grew in the seventeenth century despite receiving scant attention from the government in France; Louis XIV was kept busy consolidating his authority, dealing with the Jansenists, and faring poorly in European military conflicts, which left little time to administer French settlements in

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<sup>23</sup> William C. Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760" (Ph.D dissertation, McGill University, 1994), 89-90. John G. Reid has recently suggested that the term “colonial” does not adequately represent the situation in Nova Scotia because the English presence in the region was so constrained by the more powerful Aborigines. See John G. Reid, "How Wide Is the Atlantic Ocean? Not Wide Enough!," *Acadiensis* 34, no. 2 (2005): 81-87.

<sup>24</sup> Laurier Turgeon, "French Fishers, Fur Traders, and Amerindians During the Sixteenth Century: History and Archaeology," *William & Mary Quarterly* 55, no. 3 (1998): 584-610.

<sup>25</sup> See N. E. S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People, 1604-1755* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 3-13.



North America.<sup>26</sup> The settlement faced challenges from the Massachusetts Bay colony and from the attempted Scottish settlement under Sir William Alexander in the 1620s. The Acadians remained adaptable to geopolitical changes and kept as their focus the survival and growth of their settlements.<sup>27</sup>

The British during the seventeenth century had plantations stretching from St. Augustine to St. John's, most of which were threatened by a combination of French, Spanish, and Native settlements. In the northeast, the English claimed Nova Scotia / l'Acadie by the 1621 grant of James VI of Scotland (James I of England) to Sir William Alexander. Alexander, and later his son, attempted to settle in the region in the late 1620s and early 1630s but quickly quit the country in the face of French and Native resistance and inclement weather.<sup>28</sup> The English Civil War, Restoration, and Glorious Revolution kept much of the English government's focus on the European sphere, but concerns over imperial developments were never too far from officials' minds.<sup>29</sup> The War of Spanish Succession, known in North America as Queen Anne's War, provided the British with an opportunity to attack the French in North America, and in 1710 they captured Acadia for the last time.<sup>30</sup> The region was not officially ceded to Britain until

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<sup>26</sup> Colin Jones, *The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to Napoleon 1715-99* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 14-21. Jansenism was a branch of Catholicism that emphasized original sin, predestination, and the centrality of divine grace. It is comparable to Calvinism. Jansenists challenged the role and work of the Jesuits, an active group in Nova Scotia.

<sup>27</sup> For Acadia's early years, see Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*; John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W Norton & Co., 2005); Reid, *Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland*.

<sup>28</sup> See Reid, *Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland*. Also, John G. Reid, "The Conquest of 'Nova Scotia': Cartographic Imperialism and the Echoes of a Scottish Past," in *Nation and Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600-1800*, ed. Ned C. Landsman (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2001), 39-59. On the settlement of North America generally, including British, Spanish, and French activities, see Alan Taylor, *American Colonies* (New York: Viking, 2001).

<sup>29</sup> On the development of British imperial thought, see David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

<sup>30</sup> The War of Spanish Succession began in Europe when Charles II of Spain died and Louis XIV of France attempted to secure the vacant throne for his grandson. The Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold I, fought for

1713, and even then the wording of the Treaty of Utrecht and France's desire to minimize the amount of land it surrendered launched geographic debates and negotiations that lasted fifty years.

### **The Treaty of Utrecht and Negotiations for Nova Scotia**

The Treaty of Utrecht negotiations, as they pertained to Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, did not spend much time attempting to define the region's boundaries. The treaty ceded l'Acadie to Britain according to its "ancient limits," but the two sides had different ideas of where those limits lay. France's secretary of state for the Marine, Jérôme de Phélypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain, provided the French commissioners sent to negotiate the treaty with a memorial outlining his thoughts on the matter, including the importance of reserving the fishery for France and establishing the New England-Acadia boundary at the Kennebec River.<sup>31</sup> Both sides made demands concerning Acadia's limits, but in the end it was decided that a commission would settle the matter at a later date.<sup>32</sup> While reserving this discussion may have facilitated reaching a peace in 1713, inaction on determining Acadia's boundaries would later set the stage for a geographic and cartographic battle that would test the limits of diplomacy in Europe and of peace in the northeast.

France possessed a well-developed archive of maps and geographic reports.

French officials had used those maps to help shape their North American geographic

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his dynasty's claim to the Spanish throne. He was later joined by England and the Dutch Republic who fought to prevent the combination of Spanish and French monarchies and to maintain imperial balance in Europe.

<sup>31</sup> Dale Miquelon, "Envisioning the French Empire: Utrecht, 1711-1713," *French Historical Studies* 24, no. 4 (2001): 656-57. As Miquelon notes, in the first stages of the Utrecht negotiations "the image of the Americas had not yet extended beyond the shores lapped by salt water."

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 661.

imagination, but the use of geographic information was not static. As Dale Miquelon has argued, improved cartography of French territory in North America led to a more restricted French view of its possessions. Large maps of the 1690s that emphasized and exaggerated the connections between the St. Lawrence and Mississippi rivers to encourage imperial aspirations were replaced by smaller and more accurate maps that positioned Canada at the heart of the French empire. Geographic knowledge was centrally important to shaping French administrators' view of their empire.<sup>33</sup> Maps were so influential, according to Miquelon, that they retained much of their geographic authority even when directly contradicted by first hand oral reports.<sup>34</sup> Miquelon rightly demonstrates that French maps focused on smaller areas, but this change represented the ebb and flow of geographic knowledge. After the fall of Acadia, French geographers once again focused on the western expanse, especially the mythical *mer de l'ouest*.<sup>35</sup>

Maps became increasingly detailed and politically persuasive. French officials created geographic knowledge to support their ideal construction of Acadia. In 1713 Pontchartrain wrote to Governor Vaudreuil and Intendant Bégon at Quebec asking them to marshal evidence that would restrict the Acadian boundaries. The minister then included what he thought the boundaries should be and asked that a map be prepared and

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<sup>33</sup> There are, of course, those who suggest that the French empire never really existed. See Pritchard, *In Search of Empire*. On the attempts at making a French empire in the eighteenth century, see Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea*.

<sup>34</sup> In Miquelon's words, "Les cartes...peuvent nous informer sur l'élaboration des politiques, sur la négociation des traits et, part la suite, sur la mentalité d'une époque." Miquelon challenges Eccles' argument that the beginning of the eighteenth century marked a turning point for France's imperial policy from restricted to more ambitious. According to Miquelon, an investigation into the cartographic record illustrates that France became more focused on a smaller region, which it mapped clearly. See Miquelon, "Les Pontchartrain se Penchent sur leurs Cartes," 53-71. Quoted from p.57.

<sup>35</sup> Lucie Lagarde, "Le Passage du Nord-Ouest et la Mer de l'Ouest dans la Cartographie Française du 18e Siecle, Contribution à l'étude de l'oeuvre des Delisle et Buache," *Imago Mundi* 41 (1989): 19-43.

sent to France to emphasize those limits.<sup>36</sup> These maps influenced the treaty negotiations and, as shall be demonstrated, set a precedent for continued reliance on malleable geographic images to inform discussions on boundaries and land claims.<sup>37</sup> The French government also referred to international maps to bolster its geographic imagination. When Intendant Bégon replied to Pontchartrain, he argued against English claims to the land from Beaubassin to Kaskébé (present-day Portland, Maine). He argued that the ancient maps of England, France, and Holland countered this assertion by marking only peninsular Nova Scotia with the name Acadia (Figure 2.1). Moreover, Père Aubry, a Jesuit missionary stationed with the eastern Abenaki, created a map informed by the Treaty of Ryswick that set the boundary between New England and New France at the St. George River.<sup>38</sup> The western coast of the Baie Française, he argued, was New France and not Acadia.

The undefined limits set by the Treaty of Utrecht were bound to conflict with France's rich cartographic materials. In 1713 the duc de Villiers received a memoir expressing confusion over Nova Scotia's limits as suggested by the Treaty. There were two major concerns: first, the French would be prevented from fishing within 30 leagues east of Sable Island; second, the southern limits of Acadia as listed in article twelve were unclear and did not correspond to those indicated on French maps. Moreover, the memoir's author was suspicious that the British were conveniently adjusting their maps to correspond to their desired location of Sable Island to exclude France from the region's

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<sup>36</sup> Ministre à Vaudreuil et Bégon, Versailles, 28 juin 1717, *Collection de manuscrits relatifs à la Nouvelle-France* [hereafter *CMNF*], vol. 2, ed. J. Blanchet (Québec, 1884), 560.

<sup>37</sup> Miquelon, "Les Pontchartrain se Penchent sur leurs Cartes," 66.

<sup>38</sup> Bégon à Pontchartrain, Québec, 15 November 1713, *CMNF*, vol. 2, 567.

fishery.<sup>39</sup> Accusations of cartographic impropriety would increase over the following decade as Britain and France employed geographic evidence to strengthen their interpretation of Nova Scotia's limits.

The sources of geographic confusion between British and French renderings of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie were numerous. For their part, the French argued that l'Acadie was comprised of three different sections. In a 1713 Memoir on the ceded region, one French author argued that there was a western and eastern Acadia, and the confusion lay in determining the limits of the western region, which the British called Nova Scotia



**Figure 2.1** François de Creux's *Novae Franciae*, 1660. The term "Acadia" is limited to the peninsula, and Native toponyms feature heavily. From his *Historiae Canadensis: seu, Novae-Franciae libri decem, ad annum usque Christi MDCLVI*. Paris, 1664.

because it was north of New England like Scotland is to England.<sup>40</sup> The author argued that it would be possible to grant this part of "western" Acadia to the British "by giving

<sup>39</sup> M. le Due à Duc de Villiers et Marquis de Forey, 17 July 1713, 54, vol. 4, RG 1, NSARM. See also "Mémoire sur les pays cedes aux Anglois dans le Canada," 11 July 1713, f6, vol. 2, C11E, Archives Nationale d'Outre Mer (ANOM). On the importance of maps to the Utrecht negotiations, see Miquelon, "Envisioning the French Empire," 653-77.

<sup>40</sup> "Memoire sur les Pays de L'Amerique, que la France doit ceder aux Anglois par la Paix prochaine," 13 January 1713, f10, vol. 2, C11E, ANOM.

to this large region natural boundaries that will prevent any future dispute between the two nations.”<sup>41</sup> The eastern limit would be the Baye Française, the northern limit would be the St. John River. Lands through which rivers ran into the St. John would be British, while lands through which rivers ran into the St. Lawrence would remain with France, as would “eastern” or peninsular Acadia. The author’s desire to retain the peninsula was justified because France needed access to the fishery and to the Gulf of the St. Lawrence to reach New France. The French could temper this demand by destroying Port Royal and promising to build no new forts on the Bay’s coast.<sup>42</sup>

There was a disconnect among British administrators between local and imperial imperatives. On the one hand, British officials in Nova Scotia were less confused over Nova Scotia’s boundaries than afraid that they would quickly lose whatever authority they had in the region. From the time that Britain captured Port Royal there was a fear that the French and Natives would combine forces and retake the post, and local officials and military officers outlined these concerns to imperial administrators.<sup>43</sup> This concern was more than paranoia. In 1711, having returned to France after surrendering Acadia, Subercase wrote to the minister of the Marine informing him that he had spent his time studying maps of Port Royal and its surroundings to develop a plan for retaking Acadia. Subercase believed that time was of the essence, noting that the English inability to win over the French inhabitants and local Natives would facilitate his plans.<sup>44</sup> Yet the French

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., f10v.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> General Hill to Lord Dartmouth, 9 September 1711, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series: America and the West Indies* [hereafter *CSP*], vol. 21, ed. Cecil Headlam (Vauduz: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1964), 92.

<sup>44</sup> Subercase to Minister, Rochefort, 7 February 1711, f135-135v, vol. 7, C11D, ANOM.

would have more time than originally anticipated. Nova Scotia's governor complained in 1720 that his authority did not extend "beyond cannon reach of this fort."<sup>45</sup>

On the other hand, the commissioners in the months leading up to the Treaty of Utrecht were more concerned with determining the boundaries of Nova Scotia than with bolstering the crumbling fort. The Board wrote to Secretary St. John in 1712 to argue that Cape Breton should be included in any negotiation over Nova Scotia as it had always been considered part of that province. The year before, French authorities seemed unsure of Cape Breton's status as part of Acadia. In a memorial outlining how to retake Acadia, the region's limits were initially described as including Cape Breton until an editor's pen crossed out that claim.<sup>46</sup> The British Board of Trade outlined clearly what it believed to be Nova Scotia's boundaries: the region included what the French called Acadia, with its boundaries being the St. Croix to the west, north towards the St. Lawrence River, and east to the Atlantic Ocean. It was to be described as such to avoid future disputes.<sup>47</sup> At this stage the Board of Trade had few maps to support its claims, but it found other sources of geographic information. Of particular importance were the passes that Subercase granted to inhabitants as France's governor in Acadia. By these passes he claimed authority over l'Acadie, Cape Breton, and all lands adjacent from Cape Rozier to the Kennebec River.<sup>48</sup> While these passes helped demonstrate to the British how local French authorities understood the limits of l'Acadie, more evidence was necessary to counter France's numerous maps.

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<sup>45</sup> Philipps to BTP, Annapolis, 26 September 1720, 8, vol. 18, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>46</sup> The memoir describes the limits of Acadia as "depuis le passage de Canseaux inclusivement jusqu'a la riviere St. George y compris aussy l'He du Cap Breton pendant l'espace de 60 amieres." See 1711, f153, vol. 7, C11D, ANOM.

<sup>47</sup> Board of Trade and Plantations [BTP] to Mr. Secretary St. John, Whitehall, 5 April 1712, *CSP*, vol. 21, 374.

<sup>48</sup> Mr. Popple to Mr. Filson, Whitehall, 10 December 1712, *CSP*, vol. 22, 166.

As Mary Pedley has argued, the French were far superior to the British in the production of maps and charts in the first half of the eighteenth century. France had established educational and military infrastructures to train and employ geographers, whereas British schools taught elements of geography but provided no real assistance in the production or distribution of maps.<sup>49</sup> Yet Britain was not entirely devoid of capable geographers and the Board of Trade managed to secure geographic descriptions and maps of Nova Scotia after the fall of Port Royal. In 1710, Massachusetts naval commander Cyprian Southack wrote a memorandum in which he outlined the boundaries of Nova Scotia as he interpreted them: starting at the St. George River and extending to the Gaspé, down through the Gut of Canso and around the eastern coast of the peninsula.<sup>50</sup> Around the time of this memorandum a map of Annapolis Royal was sent to the Board of Trade.

The map was entitled

PLAN of Annapolis Royall Fort the principall place of strength in Nova Scotia in America, its situation is upon a tongue of land formed on the North East Side by the river Dauphin, and on the south east by a large morras in 44 degrees 25 minutes North Latitude surrendered to her majesties armes under the command of the Honourable Collonel Francis Nicholson after eight days Siege in October 1710.<sup>51</sup>

The title provided British officials with a geographic description of Annapolis. The image itself featured an imposing fort and the location of settlers' houses and fields (Figure 2.2). As the Board would soon learn, the fort at Annapolis was crumbling and in desperate need of repair.

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<sup>49</sup> Mary Sponberg Pedley, *The Commerce of Cartography: Making and Marketing Maps in Eighteenth-Century France and England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). On France's strength in mapmaking see Christine M. Petto, *When France Was King of Cartography: The Patronage and Production of Maps in Early Modern France* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007). English students were exposed to geography in schools starting in the late sixteenth century, but the institutions devoted to training geographers were slow to develop. See Lesley B. Cormack, *Charting an Empire: Geography at the English Universities, 1580-1620* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

<sup>50</sup> Cyprian Southack's Memorandum, 16 October 1710, 8, vol. 7½, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>51</sup> 10, vol. 7½, RG 1, NSARM.



In 1714 Nova Scotia's governor, Samuel Vetch, who had returned to London, provided a slightly more detailed account of the British possessions in America. Vetch could not resolve the confusion over the boundary between British land and Hudson's Bay Company territories, but he did claim that British territory on the eastern coast began at the Gut of Canso, which separated Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, and extended to the limits between South Carolina and St. Augustine. The region behind this stretch of land had no real boundaries and was currently the site of several French forts. Vetch suggested that "it would very much contribute not only to the peace and posterity but true interest and honour of Great Britain to have those limits advantageously adjusted," presumably by mapping the region and establishing cartographic authority. Vetch also



**Figure 2.2** Extract from the *Plan Annapolis Royal*, 1710 illustrating a strong fort and its surrounding settlements. National Archives, London. MPG1/274

illustrated the challenges inherent to such an endeavour, particularly the costs involved.<sup>52</sup> It was becoming obvious that the British would entrench their claims in America, especially in Nova Scotia, through maps and surveys of territory.

More maps crossed the Atlantic in the following years. In 1715 Lieutenant Governor Caulfeild wrote to the Board of Trade with a geographic report on Nova Scotia in which he listed the main areas of settlement (Annapolis Royal and Minas), their location in relation to each other, and the quality of soil and number of harbours in the region. After complaining that the Natives came to Annapolis as a last resort due to the lack of a King's magazine, Caulfeild warned the Board that the French were planning to fortify Cape Breton at St. Ann's and St. Peter's and provided an illustrative map.<sup>53</sup> Caulfeild did not indicate the map's origins, but it was likely produced in Nova Scotia.

Though the map to which Caulfeild referred does not seem to have survived, he was accurately anticipating the Board's desire for graphic representations of their American territories. Later that year the Board complained about the dearth of reliable maps of the American colonies and requested the British minister at the Court of France to collect the best maps he could find, sure that many good maps had been printed publicly, or were held privately by men with interests in America.<sup>54</sup> European

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<sup>52</sup> Vetch to [Secretary Popple], London, 3 August 1714, 36, vol. 5, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>53</sup> Caulfeild to BTP, 1 November 1715, *Nova Scotia Archives II: A Calendar of two letter books and one commission book in the possession of the government of Nova Scotia, 1713-1741* [hereafter *NSA II*], ed. Archibald M. MacMechan (Halifax: Public Archives of Nova Scotia, 1900), 24-7.

<sup>54</sup> BTP to Secretary Stanhope, Whitehall, 15 July 1715, *CSP*, vol. 23, 518. Although it was Acadia's limits that were unknown, the British Royal Navy completed surveys of Newfoundland shortly after the Treaty of Utrecht. See Olaf Uwe Janzen, "'Of Consequence to the Service': The Rationale Behind Cartographic Surveys in Early Eighteenth-Century Newfoundland," *The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord* XI: 1 (January 2001): 1-10.

governments had long relied on maps to secure territories and facilitate administration, but London was forced to play catch up.<sup>55</sup>

The British remained cartographically disadvantaged four years later. In 1719 the Board of Trade issued a circular letter to all governors requesting geographic information, especially concerning each colony's boundaries and limits, including maps, surveys, and naval charts if available. They were also to include accounts and written records that would support their cartographic materials.<sup>56</sup> The request for supporting materials suggests that maps often demanded authentication. As Leslie Cormack has argued, in the sixteenth and seventeenth century the value of geographic information often depended on the social standing of its source, with members of the gentility and clergy perceived as the most reliable.<sup>57</sup> While this older European precedent for collecting geographic knowledge would not apply in Nova Scotia until the founding of Halifax and the arrival of qualified surveyors, it did apply in older British American colonies. As Sarah Hughes has demonstrated, surveying was a skill most likely acquired by colonial politicians and members of the gentility.<sup>58</sup> A map's authority was not inherent, but increased depending on the status of its producer.

While the British struggled to define Acadia and gain a foothold in the region, the French were forced to re-evaluate their position in eastern Canada and relocate to Île Royale. Though Louisbourg would become the new French Atlantic stronghold, an

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
<sup>55</sup> On maps and administration in the early modern period, see Jeremy Black, *Maps and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith, *Geography and Empire* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). On cartography's role in the development of an Atlantic world, see James Delbourgo and Nicholas Dew, *Science and Empire in the Atlantic World* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 29-96.

<sup>56</sup> Circular letter from the Council of Trade and Plantations to Governors of Plantations on the Continent of America, Whitehall, 7 August 1719, *CSP*, vol. 26, 354.

<sup>57</sup> Lesley B. Cormack, "'Good Fences Make Good Neighbors': Geography as Self-Definition in Early Modern England," *Isis* 82, no. 314 (1991): 639-61.

<sup>58</sup> Sarah S. Hughes, *Surveyors and Statesmen: Land Measuring in Colonial Virginia* (Richmond: Virginia Surveyors Foundation and the Virginia Association of Surveyors, 1979), 156-65.

earlier plan suggested a site that could have drastically shifted the balance of geographic strength in Nova Scotia. In the summer of 1711, Pontchartrain received a letter from M. Jourdan suggesting a new settlement that might preserve French authority in Acadia. Jourdan noted that Acadia could become one of the richest colonies in North America,



**Figure 2.3 Delebat's 1711 map of Chebucto. He suggested a settlement on present-day Cornwallis Island, with a fortress on the harbour's coast. Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management, F/240-1711**

and listed “Chibouquetout” as a strong candidate for a French fortification. He argued that settling this harbour would protect both the French fishery in the region and the French inhabitants in Acadia. Moreover, “this establishment would render the English conquest of Port Royal completely useless, so claim Sieurs Pessere and Delabat.”<sup>59</sup> Sieur Delebat had gone so far as to map the harbour that the English would later settle as Halifax,

<sup>59</sup> M. Jourdan to Pontchartrain and Fontanieu, Paris, 9 July 1711, f161v, vol. 7, C11D, ANOM.

though in his plan the main fortifications were set on the islands in the harbour (Figure 2.3). Though the plan was never realized, these early French maps and the ideas they represented foreshadowed the geographic strength of Chebucto harbour.

Attention turned quickly to Île Royale. Plans for establishing a strong French presence on Île Royale, heavily dependent on the collection and transmission of territorial information, began shortly after the French surrendered Port Royal. A 1713 memorial on settling the French on the island provided a detailed description of Île Royale's size (90 leagues<sup>60</sup> in circumference), its geographic position (between 45 and 47 degrees northern latitude), and its shape (nearly triangular). The memoir explained that there is a distance of about 40 leagues between Île Royal and Newfoundland, and about a half league between the island and Acadia. The challenge was to select a port that was both easy to defend and capable of holding many ships. This was a difficult task because the maps available were created by those "with only an imperfect knowledge of the island," so sending a ship with capable geographers and engineers would be an important undertaking.<sup>61</sup>

Settling the island was no small feat. Île Royale's inhabitants had to be transported from Port Royal and Plaisance, both of which were to be abandoned. There was also confusion over which port in Île Royale would become the new capital. Louisbourg won early approval, but in 1715 the French court at Versailles decided that Port Dauphin was the better choice. Only after the administration and the garrison had been transported to this new location was the decision reversed again, and in 1718

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<sup>60</sup> The French measurement is actually in "lieues," which is an ancient régime unit of measurement corresponding roughly to 4.4 kilometres. A "league" is roughly 5.5 kilometres, though both take as their basis the distance that a man or horse can walk in one hour.

<sup>61</sup> *Memoire sur Ile Royale*, 24 January 1713, f17-17v, vol 1., C11B, ANOM. Quote from 17v.

everyone headed back to Louisbourg.<sup>62</sup> While officials in France debated the location of the new colony, they demanded a constant supply of maps to inform their decisions. In 1717, the Council of the Marine sent an order to Pierre-Auguste de Soubras, the first councillor of the Superior Council of Île Royale, informing him that Costebelle had been requested to make “exact maps of each inhabited area” listing “the name of the inhabitants and the amount of land they hold.”<sup>63</sup> Such geographically rendered information would allow the Council to “cast a glance” at the maps and learn more than detailed written plans could provide.<sup>64</sup> Both the Board of Trade and the French ministers at Versailles recognized the importance of mapping territories and staking claims, and in the years immediately following the Treaty of Utrecht both groups of administrators hinted at the possibility of moulding geographic information to address specific concerns. What neither side could fully appreciate was the strength of local Aboriginal groups and their ability to interject an equally forceful geographic imagination.

### **Aboriginal Resistance and Geographic Imagination**

Europeans did not introduce the concept of cartography to the Natives of North America. The Mi'kmaq and their Algonkian neighbours understood geographic space and had rendered it visually long before contact. Their graphic depictions were different from those produced by Europeans, resulting in confusion (usually accidental, though perhaps at times deliberate) when Europeans viewed Native maps through a western mindset. Despite this difference, Natives generally, and the Mi'kmaq specifically, were

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<sup>62</sup> “Pastour de Costebelle, Philippe”. *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* [hereafter *DCB*], [www.biographi.ca](http://www.biographi.ca).

<sup>63</sup> Arret du Conseil de Marine to Soubras, 1717, f45, vol. 2, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>64</sup> “...le Conseil pû avoir d’un coup d’œil un idée juste que les autres les plus détaillées ne peuvent jamais donner.” *Ibid.*, f45-45v.

praised for their mapping skills. In the late seventeenth century the Recollet missionary Chrestien Le Clercq noted the Mi'kmaq's ability to map their territory:

They have much ingenuity in drawing upon bark a kind of map which marks exactly all the rivers and streams of a country of which they wish to make a representation. They mark all the places thereon exactly and so well that they make use of them successfully, and an Indian who possesses one makes long voyages without going astray.<sup>65</sup>

Le Clercq continued to describe how well the Mi'kmaq knew their region and with what ease they travelled great distances over dense terrain. Of particular importance was the missionary's discovery that the Mi'kmaq measured travel in terms of time (using a variable scale) and not distance.<sup>66</sup> Native maps were temporal as much as territorial documents, and Aboriginal cartography reflected their distinct geographic imagination.

Wayne Moodie argues that maps from Western Canada demonstrate that Aboriginals did not share a European perception of space. They were able, however, to depict large geographic areas in map form. Two Aboriginal manuscript maps created in 1801, one Blackfoot and the other Chipewyan, serve as excellent examples of the spatial and temporal nature of Native geographic thought.<sup>67</sup> Long and easy passages took up less graphic space than shorter, more difficult trips. While Aboriginals were perfectly capable of measuring space and depicting geography in graphic form, there were important differences between European and Aboriginal concepts of space.

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<sup>65</sup> Chrestien Le Clercq, *New Relation of Gaspesia with the Customs and Religion of the Gaspesian Indians*, trans. and ed. William F. Ganong (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1910), 136.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> The Blackfoot maps covers 1 000 000 square miles. D. Wayne Moodie, "Indian Map Making: Two Examples from the Fur Trade West" in *People, Places, Patterns, Processes: Geographical Perspectives on the Canadian Past*, ed. Graeme Wynn (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), 57. For other examples of Aboriginal mapmaking during the colonial period and later, see Mark Warhus, *Another America: Native American Maps and the History of Our Land* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). On the influence of Aboriginal geographic knowledge on imperial expansion in western North America, see Paul W. Mapp, *Mysterious Lands, Pacific Passages, and the Contest for Empire: The Elusive North American West in International Affairs, 1713-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming).

Understanding the nuances of Aboriginal geographic systems depended on comprehending their world view, which required sustained cultural interaction.

Despite this disconnect, European explorers and traders in North America relied heavily on Aboriginal cartography and oral instructions to facilitate their travels and inform their maps. Interaction in the northeast was different than in places such as Africa or South America. As Philip D. Morgan has noted, Africans were able to trade with Europeans without sharing territory. Africans traded slaves for textiles and other goods along the shores without inviting European settlement, leaving Africa's territory largely under the control of Africans.<sup>68</sup> In South America, the Spanish incorporated Natives into their towns or forced them into separate Spanish-controlled settlements. The Spanish were also able to infiltrate Native social systems and attempted to control them from within. Certain Native groups lived on the frontiers while others remained autonomous, but many who came into contact with the Spanish were heavily influenced by the European presence.<sup>69</sup>

Samuel Champlain depended on his Native guides when voyaging in the northeast, as did John Smith during his travels in Virginia and New England. In his famous 1612 map of Virginia, Smith credited local Natives for providing him with geographic information that he later incorporated into the image.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, Europeans who assumed that their method of mapping was universal often found themselves hopelessly lost. As Martin Brückner has argued, Lewis and Clark in their

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<sup>68</sup> Philip D. Morgan, "Africa and the Atlantic, c.1450 to c.1820" in Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 223-41.

<sup>69</sup> Amy Turner Bushnell, "Indigenous America and the Limits of the Atlantic World, 1493-1825," in *Ibid.*, 191-212.

<sup>70</sup> J. B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 173. See also Gwenda Morgan, "Smith, John (*cap.* 1580, *d.* 1631)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), <http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/view/article/25835> (accessed June 1, 2005).



voyage across America read an Aboriginal map as they read all other maps and quickly discovered that they were off course.<sup>71</sup> Like Europeans, eastern Algonkians mapped their geographic surroundings and described physical space within the milieu of a specific worldview, and when these mapping techniques were taken out of context they lost much of their meaning.

As Europeans expanded inland they encountered Native groups with their own notions of geography. White settlers did not immediately recognize Native spatial ideas and the devices they used to delineate boundaries. There was variation between different Aboriginal groups; those with more experience dealing with Europeans had adapted to French and British cartographic standards. While Natives in the northeast left few maps, it is possible to investigate their ideas of land use in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries by examining what little evidence does exist, including European accounts and land deeds. Sebastien Rale, a Jesuit missionary among the Algonkians, recounted the story of a Native who believed that Rale had been captured by the English. “Having come to my quarters, and not finding me,” Rale described,

Or any of those who had camped on the seashore, and who was ignorant of my return to the Village, caused a new alarm. Having come to my quarters, and not finding me...he did not doubt that we had been carried away by a party of Englishmen; and, going on his way in order to inform the people of his own neighborhood, he came to the shore of a river. There he stripped the bark from a tree on which he drew with charcoal the English surrounding me, and one of the number cutting off my head (This is the only writing of the Savages, and they understand each other by figures of that kind as well as we understand each other by our letters).<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> See Martin Brückner, *The Geographic Revolution in Early America: Maps, Literacy, and National Identity* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 204-37.

<sup>72</sup> Rale to his Brother, *Jesuit Relations* vol. 67, p. 225.

Rale continued to describe how the Native affixed the image to a pole and left it by the river's shore. Shortly after, a group of Natives arrived in the area, saw the note, and were immediately informed of the presumed fate of the Jesuit.<sup>73</sup> This account may have been embellished, or even fabricated for the readers' interest, but the methods described by Rale accurately depicted the importance of graphic images among Native groups.

Possessing the ability to render space graphically was an important skill in land transactions. Recent scholarship argues that Natives were more than simple dupes of European deceit in the land grant process. Both Margaret Wickens Pearce and Emerson Baker have examined how the British secured land from the eastern Algonkians. Pearce investigated Native mapping as it relates to southern New England land deeds, and she defines maps as “representations that facilitate spatial understanding, and mapping is the process of creating and interpreting these representations.”<sup>74</sup> This type of definition puts Native spatial representations on an equal footing with the European map, which is often considered a universal symbol for geographic representation.

Pearce's focus on land deeds provides an excellent opportunity to analyze cultural perspectives of space and how geographic knowledge was put to use. Land deeds most often included graphic and written descriptions, and because they were created after some sort of inter-cultural negotiation these sources capture both Native and European ideas about geography.<sup>75</sup> What becomes apparent is that Natives and Europeans emphasized different cartographic elements when creating a map. Working from a predominantly oral culture, Natives relied heavily on instructive toponyms. A place was named for its

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Margaret Wickens Pearce, “Native Mapping in Southern New England Indian Deeds,” in *Cartographic Encounters*, 159.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 157.

physical features, the people who lived in the region, and for its geographic location in relation to other places. Consequently, the name was not simply a signifier, but was also a mnemonic device.<sup>76</sup> Another important component of a name was its ecological element that suggested how the area was used and for what purposes. The name did not reflect ownership in the European sense, but outlined the usufructuary relationship between Natives and their surroundings.<sup>77</sup> Administrators favoured European forms of geographic knowledge over Native spatial concepts, but both were included on the deeds. The process of deed making was two-fold: an oral negotiation followed by the creation of an official deed, signed by representatives for both sides.<sup>78</sup>

There are examples of graphic maps written by Natives. In 1666, Metacomb, known to the English as King Philip, deeded a tract of land for which he supplied an English-style map. His words that accompanied the deed were recorded as follows:

This may informe the honord Court that I Phillip ame willing to sell the Land within this draught; but the Indians that are upon it may live upon it still but the land that is waste may be sold and Wattachopp is of the same mind; I have set downe all the pricipall names of the land wee are not willing should be sold.<sup>79</sup>

This ability to understand English cartography and employ it to retain Native use of granted lands was initially beneficial for Native groups, but as the number of settlers increased in the late seventeenth century Aboriginal title and usufructuary rights were ignored altogether. Territorial sovereignty was dependent on the ability to enforce boundaries militarily. Despite the ultimate outcome of these cultural encounters, Native

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 159. It is, of course, possible to go too far in analysing the impact of signs and signifiers in cartographic evidence. For the post-modern approach, see William Boelhower, "Inventing America: A Model of Cartographic Semiosis," *Word & Image* 4, no. 2 (1988).

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 160.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 163. Natives usually signed with an X, and it was not uncommon for illiterate settlers to do the same.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 171.

geographic knowledge and its application presented English settlers with a challenge to expansion.

Emerson Baker's investigation into European-Native land deeds in seventeenth-century Maine suggests that Natives could benefit from land deals. He challenges the popular historical conception that eastern Algonkians were either the victims of blatant fraud, or that they did not understand what kind of deals were being made. According to Baker, Maine's Aboriginals had a concept of land ownership, evidenced by the protocols that developed to deal with land encroachment by other Native groups.<sup>80</sup> In 1642, for example, Maine's lieutenant governor mused about the skill with which Natives engaged in trade, noting that it was not possible to take advantage of them. Baker extrapolates from this argument that Maine's Natives must have applied the same skill to land exchanges.<sup>81</sup> He is able to counter the argument that Aboriginals had no concept of private property, and assumed that they were simply sharing the land, by emphasizing the fact that Natives demanded the right to use the land in the deeds themselves. Clearly, Baker argues, this indicates an awareness of land surrender.<sup>82</sup> Similarly, as Natives moved to different regions – inland from the coast, for example – they were willing to part with the unoccupied land. The argument that these Aboriginal groups were simply forced into parting with their land does not represent the geopolitical realities of the time. Baker argues that King Phillip's War, in which Native groups attacked New England frontier farms, demonstrates clearly that despite their reduced numbers the Aboriginals

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<sup>80</sup> Emerson W. Baker, "'A Scratch with a Bear's Paw': Anglo-Indian Land Deeds in Early Maine," *Ethnohistory* 36 (1989): 239.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 244.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 245.

remained a formidable regional force.<sup>83</sup> While this is likely an accurate assessment, being a regional force (opposing settlements) is not the same as exercising territorial sovereignty (controlling how land is used).

Knowing and mapping their region put the Mi'kmaq in a position to exercise control over local geography by limiting settlement in their territory. They did not simply acquiesce to competing European imaginations and land claims, even though there was no Mi'kmaq representation at the Treaty of Utrecht negotiations. The European combatants involved Aboriginal issues only when discussing how the division of land would affect Native allegiance. In short, Britain and France divided between themselves the Mi'kmaq, Wolastoqiyik, and Abenaki groups living in Nova Scotia and the northeast. After 1713 the Mi'kmaq continued to resist and attack British settlements in Nova Scotia, which led British officials to protest to the French. Lieutenant Governor Caulfeild wrote to Governor Vaudreuil in 1713 to complain that a group of Mi'kmaq, apparently unaware that a treaty had been struck, attacked a trading vessel at Beaubassin. Caulfeild wanted "satisfaction" for the attack, reflecting the British opinion that Quebec and the French missionaries controlled the eastern Aboriginals. This claim was repeated into the 1750s.<sup>84</sup>

While the eastern Algonkians were, for the most part, closely allied with French missionaries, they were not inherently aligned with the French government at Quebec.<sup>85</sup> Most importantly, the Mi'kmaq operated with their own motivations and goals, many of which revolved around their fear of European encroachment. For their part, the French

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 246-49

<sup>84</sup> Caulfeild to Vaudreuil, Annapolis Royal, 7 May 1713, *NSA II*, 5.

<sup>85</sup> For divisions within the eastern Abenaki, see Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast*; Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, "Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast: A Reappraisal," *William & Mary Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2004): 77-106.

admitted at times to being unable to control the Mi'kmaq and their allies. Particularly after the Treaty of Utrecht, when both the British and the French needed to appear interested in maintaining the peace, accusations of French complicity in Native violence against the English was a source of tension between the European powers. In 1714, Philippe Pastour de Costebelle, the governor of Plaisance and Île Royale, wrote to the minister of the Marine to update him on the French settlements. He had heard of the Native attacks on British ships, and assured his superior that the Mi'kmaq of Acadia were irreconcilable enemies of the English, and even the most peaceful supplications could not prevent similar attacks.<sup>86</sup> Two months later, Costebelle informed the minister that he had personally informed the English that his administration had nothing to do with the Mi'kmaq attacks.<sup>87</sup>

The British may have blamed the French, but they feared the Natives. In 1715, Francis Nicholson warned the Board of Trade that the Mi'kmaq were angry because they believed the British had cheated them. Nicholson feared they would become violent.<sup>88</sup> The Mi'kmaq were angry, and they did retaliate. Soon after the British took Port Royal in 1710 a group of Mi'kmaq attacked a group of soldiers sent to retrieve fleeing Acadians. Père Gaulin, a missionary to the Natives of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, described the attack to Costebelle, outlining how the Mi'kmaq killed a few officers and held the rest in a house. The Native chief then sent a letter to the English garrison threatening to burn the house and its inhabitants if the English failed to surrender the fort.<sup>89</sup> Although the English did not quit Annapolis Royal, they did find themselves hemmed in behind the

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<sup>86</sup> Costebelle to Minister, Port Dauphin, 9 September 1714, f128v, vol. 1, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>87</sup> Costebelle to Minister, Louisbourg, 5 November 1714, f142v, vol. 1, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>88</sup> Nicholson to Popple, London, 13 August 1715, CSP vol. 23, 571.

<sup>89</sup> Costebelle à Minister, Plaisance, 20 June 1711, 51, vol. 3, RG 1, NSARM.

fort's walls and therefore unable to extend their territorial control. Two months later Costebelle reported that the English were afraid to leave the fort because the Mi'kmaq and the Acadians, who Costebelle provided with guns and ammunition, continually threatened to recapture the garrison.<sup>90</sup> In this light, the maps of Annapolis Royal sent from the garrison to London take on a new meaning: whereas officials in London might have seen a strong fort in an increasingly "British" Nova Scotia, local administrators saw a fragile pale beyond which Nova Scotia could only be imagined.<sup>91</sup>

Mi'kmaq resistance went beyond empty threats. Vetch was so concerned that in 1712 he proposed importing a Mohawk force from New York to defend the fort. He argued that any number of Natives in the British cause would be worth twice as many British soldiers.<sup>92</sup> Six months later Vetch reported that Mi'kmaq threats persisted, but that "the Indian company is now of very great use to us, and without them even in peace it will be hard for this Garrison to subsist, the Indians of this country being never to be trusted."<sup>93</sup> Resistance extended beyond the Mi'kmaq to their eastern Abenaki neighbours. In 1715 officials at Annapolis Royal sent two commissioners to the Penobscot Natives with instructions to, *inter alia*, issue a proclamation of King George, demand an oath of allegiance, and encourage the Natives to come and trade at Annapolis Royal. The Penobscot representative responded by refusing to swear loyalty to any King, arguing on the contrary that the French King was never his master. Nor would they go to Port Royal to trade, it being too far a distance to travel; the English, however, were welcome to come to the open harbours of the Penobscot to trade. Finally, the Native

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<sup>90</sup> Costebelle à Minister, Plaisance, 15 & 17 September 1711, 52, vol. 3, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>91</sup> Emerson Baker and John G. Reid employ the concept of an English pale in the northeast in Baker and Reid, "Amerindian Power," 77-106. The term is perhaps even more fitting in the Nova Scotian context.

<sup>92</sup> Vetch to Dartmouth, Boston, 4 January 1711/12, 25, vol. 5, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>93</sup> Vetch to Dartmouth, Annapolis Royal, 27 June 1722, 29, vol. 5, RG 1, NSARM.

chief refused to acknowledge British territorial control. “I do not like to be told that my land is under the authority of Port Royal,” he responded, “I am the only master of this land given me by God, and I depend on no one.”<sup>94</sup> While the Penobscot wanted only peace, they would permit no one to build forts on their land.

Unlike the British, who claimed authority over Nova Scotia but remained trapped behind the crumbling walls of Annapolis Royal, the eastern Algonkians were able to follow through on their threats. Six months after the commissioners met with the Penobscot a group of Cape Sables Mi’kmaq attacked a group of British ships and took the men hostage. “The Indians say the lands are theirs,” one merchant reported, “and they can make warr and peace when they please it’s feared they are animated to do what they do by the French at Cape Britton.”<sup>95</sup> Native expressions of geographic control over Nova Scotia were more than military threats; disrupting trade and capturing merchant vessels hindered economic exchange in the region and exacted a tangible price on what Natives believed to be European interlopers.<sup>96</sup> This economic penalty was evidence of Mi’kmaq territorial jurisdiction. As Lauren Benton has argued, claimed space could be controlled through a variety of methods, including trade. By limiting the successful establishment of “corridors and enclaves of imperial control,” the Mi’kmaq maintained their “realm of sovereignty” in the face of European expansion.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Report of Mr. Button and Mr. Capon, 3 Jan 1714, 19, vol. 6, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>95</sup> David Jeffries and Charles Shepreve to Captain Robert Mears, Boston, July 1715, 7b, vol. 7, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>96</sup> On Nova Scotia’s economics see John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607-1789* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 91-117. On the Mi’kmaq as a naval power, see *Les Micmacs et La Mer*.

<sup>97</sup> Lauren Benton, "Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47 (2005): 700-24.



The eastern Algonkians recognized the importance of trade and were not opposed to sharing resources with the British, though they insisted on setting the terms. They were more likely to succeed in this practice at Nova Scotia than in New England, where demographic changes had limited Aboriginal military effectiveness. In a 1713 meeting near Portland, Maine, the governor of Massachusetts explained to a group of eastern Abenakis what had happened during the treaty negotiations in Europe. France had ceded to Britain much of the northeast and the English expected to hunt and fish in peace. The governor cautioned the Natives from entering certain areas for fear of inciting a violent response from settlers still angry over Native attacks during the war. A Native delegate responded to English claims by dismissing France's territorial authority:

You say...that the French gave you Plaisance, Port Royal and its surroundings. France can surrender what it likes; for me, I have my land that I have given to no one, that I will not give. I want always to be the master of this land. I know its limits, and when someone wants to live here they will pay.<sup>98</sup>

The Abenakis stated clearly that they were aware of their land's "limits" and that they would not suffer unwelcome intrusions, but, in contradistinction to British views of private property, the delegate continued to assure the governor that as long as there was enough water, game, and fish the English were welcome to take what they needed.<sup>99</sup> If problems arose, however, the Natives would perhaps reconsider their offer.

In 1716, the Wolastoqiyik responded to British land claims in a similar fashion. Officials at Annapolis Royal indicated that the St. John River valley was always part of l'Acadie and therefore was now part of Nova Scotia. The Wolastoqiyik replied that the land in question had always belonged to them, and in fact they were never subjects of the

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<sup>98</sup> Lettre du R.P. Rasle à Monsieur le Gouverneur General, 9 September 1713, *CMNF* vol. 2, p. 564 .

<sup>99</sup> Ibid. An important part of European expansion into North America was converting communal Aboriginal lands into private property. On this topic see John C. Weaver, *The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003).

French King but only allies.<sup>100</sup> Their logic here seems clear: no nation could surrender its allies' land, and therefore Britain had no claim to the western coast of the Bay of Fundy. The Wolastoqiyik joined their Abenaki neighbours at a Boston conference a few months later to stand together against the English. The meeting's goal, as far as the Boston governor was concerned, was to form an English-Abenaki alliance; however, the Chief of the Narantsouak, Ouaourené, was very firm in his desires. Père Rale, who was sent to find out what happened at the meeting, reported to Vaudreuil that he believed the Natives would never allow the British to settle within the limits they had set out.<sup>101</sup>

The French networks of trade and religion provided them with a distinct advantage over the English, who were generally more interested in acquiring land. The tradition of peaceful accommodation among Native and Acadian groups served French officials well, though the eastern Algonkians were aware of the differences between French administrators and French missionaries. Jesuit missionaries were important figures in Acadia, and from them the French court received important information about the local Natives. A 1715 memorial concerning the missions among the Mi'kmaq ensured that French officials were aware of the location and strength of the Aborigines. There were about 600 Mi'kmaq capable of carrying arms – presumably a rough estimate of the male population over the age of twelve – and this group was divided into several villages in Île Royale, Acadia, and Île St Jean.<sup>102</sup> The memoir stressed that trusted missionaries instructed the Mi'kmaqs in the Catholic religion; Father Gaulin had gone so

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<sup>100</sup> Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Ministre, 6 September 1716, *CMNF* vol. 3, pp. 19-21.

<sup>101</sup> Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil, Québec, 31 October 1718, *CMNF* vol. 3, p. 31.

<sup>102</sup> *Memoire sur les missions des Sauvages Micmacs et de l'Acadie, 1715, f249, vol. 1, C11B, ANOM.* Villages listed include: Mariguouguiche (Île Royale), Artiguonieche (Acadian coast), Malpec (Île St Jean), Pictou (Acadie), Tagmegouche (Acadie), Beaubassin (Acadie), Chediak and Chibouctou (Acadie), Chebnakadie (Acadie), Port Royal (Acadie), La Have (Acadie), Cap de Sable (Acadie), Miramichy and Restigoutchy (Bay des Chaleurs).

far as to translate religious lessons into Mi'kmaq.<sup>103</sup> The missionaries themselves were stationed in a few key villages – Mariguauouguiche, Malpec, and Shubenacadie – but the demands of their calling required they travel great distances to serve the various groups.<sup>104</sup>

Though religion was important to the Mi'kmaq, it was an insufficient attraction if not coupled with trade and other necessities. Missionaries discovered that raising a church and presbytery would not attract the Mi'kmaq if the location made hunting and fishing difficult.<sup>105</sup> The Mi'kmaq and their allies were also accustomed to receiving gifts, and would not hide their displeasure if one year's presents were less bountiful than those previous. The French feared that Native dissatisfaction could lead to disunion, and the Mi'kmaq were too valuable an ally to lose.<sup>106</sup> Part of the problem, argued Gaulin, was the geographic realities faced by the missionaries. The Mi'kmaq were spread widely across Acadia, and at least one or two long trips were required each year to dispense presents and hold religious meetings. By 1719 there was a concern that the English, who had been making overtures to the eastern Algonkian groups, would win them over.<sup>107</sup> The French, aware that the Mi'kmaq and their allies could become as dangerous enemies as they were valued allies, were forced to recognize the eastern Algonkians' territorial sovereignty (perhaps superficially, likely begrudgingly) by supporting their right to much of the land.

French officials in eastern Canada realized that careful diplomacy was required to keep their Native allies while also asserting France's authority in the region. In 1718,

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 249v.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> *Memoir on the Distribution of Gifts to Natives, 1717*, f188, vol. 2, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>107</sup> *St Ovide to the Council, Louisbourg, 24 November 1719*, f195-196, vol. 4, C11B, ANOM.

Intendant Bégon wrote a memoir on the limits of New France and Acadia in which he argued that the English had no right to the lands beyond the peninsula. Citing old maps, Bégon argued that though the English cartographers attempted to colour the stretch of land from Beaubassin to the St. George River as part of New Scotland, the majority of old maps marked the region as New France.<sup>108</sup> After explaining the importance to France of maintaining this stretch of land, he admitted,

it is true that the Abenakis and Maliceet Natives spread throughout this region claim that they are its first possessors, that the lands belong to them, and it is for this reason that on the enclosed map the region is marked as “Abenakis land,” but the 15<sup>th</sup> article of the peace [Treaty of Utrecht] notes that commissioners will regulate exactly and distinctly which Natives will become subjects of France, and which will become subjects of Great Britain.<sup>109</sup>

For the French, geographic knowledge generally and maps specifically became the conduit for successful double diplomacy. Like the British, local French officials told their superiors one thing and their allies another.

French maps of northeastern North America produced in the early-eighteenth century often emphasized the region’s Native inhabitants and provided them with a cartographic existence that supported their land claims. Henri Chatelain’s 1719 map illustrates the complex and overlapping nature of geographic authority (Figure 2.4).<sup>110</sup> French-British lands are clearly divided at the Kennebec, but the geographer has stretched the word “Acadie” across the Bay of Fundy and into the region that France claimed was always considered New France, not Acadia. However, the map’s second most prominent typology is that of the region’s Aborigines, including “les micmaques”

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<sup>108</sup> Bégon, “Mémoire pour servir à régler les limites entre la Nouvelle-France, la Nouvelle Angleterre et l’Acadie,” 8 November 1718, f16-16v, vol. 2, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 22v.

<sup>110</sup> Chatelain, likely a French Huguenot, was born in Paris but moved to London and Amsterdam. His geographic works borrowed heavily from prominent French geographers such as Nicolas Sanson.



Figure 2.4 Extract from Henri Chatelain's, *Carte de la Nouvelle France, 1719*. Aboriginal toponyms feature heavily, serving as an important buffer zone between the French and the British. McGill University, W.H. Pugsley Collection, G3400 1719 C5 RBD Map

and “souriquois” on peninsular Nova Scotia, “Nations des Etechemins” on the Bay of Fundy’s west coast, and, behind them, the “Nations des Ebnakis.” Chatelain straddled the word “Canada” over the St. Lawrence to claim for France the lands extending south from that river. “Canada” nearly meets the word “Etechemins,” and is guarded from “Nouvelle Angletierre” by the word “Abnakis.” The French and Aboriginal place names serve to hem the British along the eastern seaboard, which over time became France’s primary goal. As a tool of geographic negotiation, this map militated against British claims to an extended Acadia. Using maps such as Chatelain’s, the French could argue that Aboriginal territory might not be French, but nor was it British.

A British map produced four years earlier demonstrates what little attention Herman Moll, a British cartographer of German origin, paid to the Aboriginal presence in

northeastern North America (Figure 2.5). Compared with the Chatelain map, Moll's Acadia was deliberately uninhabited, a blank territory to be filled with British settlers.



**Figure 2.5** Extract from Herman Moll's *A New and Exact Map...of North America*, 1715. Regional Natives are almost non-existent, and Acadia is marked along the disputed coastal region. Dalhousie Special Collections, Map 48 (Morse) 1715.

Not surprising is the fact that Moll stretched the word “Acadia” from just east of Casco Bay almost to the isthmus of Chignecto. He also boldly claims the land south of the St. Lawrence River by beginning “New Scotland” just south of Quebec, and “New England” just south of Trois-Rivières. Whereas Chatelain’s map employed the anachronistic “Port Royal” to refer to the Acadian capital, Moll’s Nova Scotia features “Annapolis Royal.” He also replaced “Baye François” with “Fundi Bay.” It is important to stress that these maps influenced how the public imagined the new world, so placement of names, inclusion or exclusion of Aboriginal groups, and the use of English or French toponyms imbued the map with a particular vision. As Denis Reinhartz has argued, mapmakers

were concerned about border disputes, and maps could shape both official policy and public opinion. “Moll’s maps,” according to Reinhartz, “reached many who could not read and made immediate strong impressions on those who could.”<sup>111</sup>

The eastern Algonkians did not have recourse to these maps, but they offered logical arguments against British land appropriation. In a 1720 letter from the Mi’kmaq and their allies to Governor Philipps, the Natives made an obvious yet powerful point: they argued that if they wanted to move to England they would do so only after receiving permission from the English. The British faced Aboriginal resistance and aggression in Nova Scotia because they had not asked for permission to settle and because they had disrupted the peace.<sup>112</sup> In the years following the fall of Utrecht, it was with such clarity and logic that the Mi’kmaq expressed their disapproval of British encroachment. French priests were clearly involved in writing letters on Natives’ behalf and must have influenced certain elements of their resistance. Yet the region’s Aboriginals had their own motivations and goals, and, importantly, they were willing to defend their geographic imagination of Mi’kma’ki in the face of challenges from both the British and the French. Though this resistance was common in North America, Nova Scotia’s case was unique because there were so few British settlers. Settlements from New England to the Carolinas grew quickly and were therefore more successful in quelling Aboriginal opposition.<sup>113</sup> As will be demonstrated, the 1720s provided the Mi’kmaq and their allies

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<sup>111</sup> Dennis Reinhartz, *The Cartographer and the Literati: Herman Moll and His Intellectual Circle* (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1997), 123. The fact that maps were printed and circulated in popular magazines demands that they be included in the creation of what Jürgen Habermas calls “the public sphere.” See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

<sup>112</sup> Lettre des sauvages à monsieur le general Philipps, Minas, 2 octobre 1720, *CMNF* vol. 3, pp. 46-7.

<sup>113</sup> For example, almost all the Natives were gone in Virginia by 1720. The total non-Native population at the time was 60,000, and grew to 230,000 by 1750. See Rhys Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-*



with ample opportunity to assert their territorial control in the face of French-British negotiations over the limits of l'Acadie.

### **Resistance, Negotiations, and Treaties in the 1720s**

The 1720s witnessed in Europe and northeastern North America an increased desire to settle boundaries and establish territorial sovereignty. The Treaty of Utrecht had brought to a close the most recent imperial conflict, but undefined borders contributed to violent clashes. Administrators wanted to settle the disputes and concentrate on reorganizing finances and military strength in Europe, and developing trade in North America. The pattern of double diplomacy continued; European officials argued over maps while administrators in Nova Scotia faced increased Native resistance and hostility. Examining geographic negotiations in Europe and similar attempts at reconciliation in the northeast demonstrates how “double diplomacy” operated in the specific case of boundary negotiations. European maps that emphasized boundary lines favourable to one side or the other could not prevent the Mi'kmaq and their allies from exerting geographic control over the northeast. At best, they provided administrators with an image of the territory from which they could argue *de jure* possession. It was the geographic negotiations that took place locally that established agreements and limited conflict.

As early as 1718 the Board of Trade was fielding requests to address the boundary issues in Nova Scotia. Governor Philipps suggested that metropolitan officials establish a commission to examine the Treaty of Utrecht and set the limits of Nova Scotia and New



France.<sup>114</sup> At Louisbourg that same year, Governor Saint-Ovide de Brouillan gathered an assembly of inhabitants, both French and English, to discuss where the limits of their lands had been after the Treaty of Utrecht.<sup>115</sup> The next spring Governor Vaudreuil was informed that the King of France had charged his ambassador in England with the same task. The French at Quebec were especially concerned with English settlements in the St. John River valley, which they wanted removed. The King reminded Vaudreuil that Britain and France were at peace and demanded that he be prudent in his actions towards the English.<sup>116</sup> In 1719 the Board of Trade was informed that one of its members, Martin Bladen, had been named along with Daniel Pulteney to the boundary commission that would meet in Paris.<sup>117</sup>

These negotiations had not officially begun when they started to break down over cartographic confusion. Mr. Bladen wrote to the Board of Trade in late 1719 to inform its members that he had attended a preliminary meeting with Maréchal D'Estrées and Abbé Dubois of France to discuss how they would settle the boundary of the Hudson's Bay Company, one of several limits the commission was charged with settling. Bladen lamented that the commissaries encountered difficulties before the negotiations officially began. The boundaries recorded on French maps differed by at least two degrees from those provided to British officials by the Hudson's Bay company itself. He sent the Board of Trade a map to illustrate his point.<sup>118</sup> Maps were most persuasive when they restricted their claims; obviously incorrect or biased maps were easily dismissed.

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<sup>114</sup> Philipps to BTP, 26 April 1718, *CSP* vol. 25, 507.

<sup>115</sup> Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 10 December 1718, f157v, vol. 3, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>116</sup> *Memoire du Roy à Messieurs Vaudreuil et Bégon*, Paris, 23 mai 1719, *CMNF* vol. 3, 40.

<sup>117</sup> *CSP* vol. 26, v.

<sup>118</sup> Mr. Bladen to BTP, Paris, 27 October / 7 November 1719, *CSP* vol. 26, 432.

Negotiations were further complicated by the events at Canso, a group of islands that served as a valuable fishery in northeastern Nova Scotia. The British claimed the region, but the French, supported by the Mi'kmaq, continued to fish in the area. Tensions between the British in Nova Scotia and New England and the French at Île Royale increased, and in 1718 Massachusetts Governor Samuel Shute sent Captain Thomas Smart to destroy the French fishing houses. He not only destroyed the huts, but he also captured two large French ships. In 1720, Governor Saint-Ovide de Brouillan permitted a reprisal during which French merchants and the local Natives took £18,000 from the British. These sanctioned acts of privateering indicated that the region was valuable enough to protect with military force. Richard Philipps staged a military occupation of Canso to strengthen British possession.<sup>119</sup>

What required attention was how the geographic location of Canso related to the wording of the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1719 Abbé Dubois sent to James Craggs, secretary of the Lord Justices, a coloured map of Cape Breton and its surroundings. The map, Dubois claimed, clearly indicated that Canso was separated from Nova Scotia by water, and must therefore be considered an island located in the mouth and Gulf of the St. Lawrence. Like other islands so situated, according to the Treaty of Utrecht, it belonged to France.<sup>120</sup> Canso was valuable to both crowns, and the boundary commission that met in Paris attempted to settle the rights to this territory while also addressing the attacks and counter attacks that had taken place.

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<sup>119</sup> W. Stewart MacNutt, *The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 21-22. See also Barry Moody, "Making a British Nova Scotia," in Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia*, 149-54.

<sup>120</sup> Mr. Delafaye to BTP, Whitehall, 28 May 1719, *CSP* vol. 26, 208iii.

The Lord Justices wrote to the Board of Trade to suggest that the captured French vessels be returned. The Board replied that while Captain Smart might have been overzealous in his defence of Canso, he was asserting British title to the fishery. They approved of returning the ships, but cautioned the Lord Justices to keep in mind the upcoming boundary commission. The instructions for returning the ships must be carefully worded, because the French were attempting to apply a reading of the Treaty of Utrecht that would include Canso in their territory. In addition, accounts of the capture had described the region as an island, a cape, or part of the continent of Nova Scotia. With so much uncertainty, the Board was instructed to use clear language in its order to prevent their ruling from being misapplied in the future. Cartographic confusion was not to be exacerbated by vague official orders.<sup>121</sup> Britain's spotty cartographic holdings and its difficulty undertaking mapping projects in Nova Scotia was a clear concern for the Board of Trade. Providing the French crown with any future cartographic ammunition was to be avoided at all costs. Although Britain and France were officially at peace, a map war was on the horizon.

The Board of Trade commissioned a report on Canso to determine the validity of French claims. The resulting memorial strengthened Britain's claim to Canso and questioned the integrity of the French geographers. Canso was described as distant from both Cape Breton and the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. The French map that placed Canso within French territory was not impartial, but favoured France's claim to the fishery.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, according to the passes issued by Subercase during his gubernatorial term at Port Royal, Canso was clearly included in what the French called l'Acadie. As the

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<sup>121</sup> BTP to Lords Justices, Whitehall, 5 June 1719, *CSP* vol. 26, 221.

<sup>122</sup> Mr. Vaughan and Mr. Capon to BTP, 10 June 1719, *CSP* vol. 26, 236.

negotiations progressed, Britain continued to counter French maps with reports from Nova Scotia, illustrating both the weakness of British mapping capabilities and the ease with which French maps could be dismissed as overtly biased.

The Board of Trade sought out additional sources to support their claim to Canso, or at least to weaken French pretensions. In late 1719 the Board sent a letter to the Bishop of London, referring to the twelfth article of the Treaty of Utrecht by which France was to cede to Britain all of Nova Scotia and l'Acadie. On the day the treaty was ratified, the French King was to deliver to Queen Anne official letters concerning the land transfer.<sup>123</sup> The Board requested that the Bishop inform them if he had, or had seen, any of these letters. If so, the Board requested copies at the earliest convenience. The Bishop replied, assuring the Board that he did indeed have copies of the succession papers signed by the French King, and that he would forward copies immediately.<sup>124</sup>

In the final preparations for the boundary meetings, Mr. Delafaye, the secretary to the Lords Justices, provided the Board of Trade with letters of instruction for Daniel Pulteney and Martin Bladen. The negotiations' importance was made quite clear, as once settled British and French subjects would be restricted to the territory granted to their nation.<sup>125</sup> The Lords Justices knew where the boundary should fall. They created a map outlining their desired borders and instructed their commissaries to settle the limits accordingly.<sup>126</sup> The British were not wholly without cartographic evidence, though their arsenal of maps was but a fraction of France's. There was one last concern raised by the Lords Justices: the language of the Treaty of Utrecht. Aware that France was claiming

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<sup>123</sup> BTP to Bishop of London, Whitehall, 23 September 1719, *CSP* vol. 26, 393.

<sup>124</sup> Bishop of London to BTP, 23 September 1719, *CSP* vol. 26, 394.

<sup>125</sup> Mr. Delafaye to BTP, Whitehall, 4 November 1719, *CSP* vol. 26, 443.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

Canso, the Lord Justices reminded Pulteney and Bladen not to allow France to use the French version of the treaty if it provided them with more land than the Latin translation.<sup>127</sup> Maps, and the language used to inform their particular meaning as it related to the Treaty of Utrecht, dominated the short and ultimately fruitless boundary negotiations that followed. The treaty and its related maps were separate yet complementary. Both could be misread or misinterpreted.

The boundary commissioners did not meet until late summer 1720. A month before the discussions began the Board of Trade wrote to Governor Philipps to inform him that the limits of Nova Scotia had not yet been set, but that they believed them to begin at the St. Croix river, extend northwards up that river towards the St. Lawrence, along the St. Lawrence to Cape Rozier, down through the gut of Canso, out to Cape Sables, and then southwest to St. Croix.<sup>128</sup> The Board must have realized how inadequate their geographic image of Nova Scotia was, because one week later the members sent a letter to the Lords Justices pressuring for a surveyor to be sent to Nova Scotia to complete a full survey of the region.<sup>129</sup> British authorities had stalled and, as the boundary commissioners would soon learn, they were woefully unprepared to challenge French maps.

The production of maps was a difficult task and required skills possessed by few in North America (or Europe). Even when a capable surveyor was available, any number of complications could prevent the successful mapping of unknown territory. The Board of Trade faced this reality in its quest to acquire cartographic information. Canso had


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<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> BTP to Philipps, Whitehall, 21 July 1720, *CSP* vol. 32, 71. Note: the print volumes of the *CSP* are numbered differently than the online version. From this point on, print volumes are referenced.

<sup>129</sup> BTP to Lords Justices, Whitehall, 29 July 1720, *CSP* vol. 32, 76.

become something of an amorphous geographic entity as far as the British and the French were concerned; its importance to claiming a valuable area of Nova Scotia's east coast



**Figure 2.6** Captain Southack's *The Harbour and Islands of Canso*, 1720. The region's importance as a fishery is demonstrated clearly in this Anglo-centric map. Library and Archives Canada, H2/240/Canso/1720.

serves as a perfect example of the very basic challenges that could stand in the way of producing a map. Because Canso was a popular fishing station, and because several English captains had spent time in the region, Philipps received in 1720 a fairly detailed map of the region as surveyed by Captain Southack (Figure 2.6). The map includes water soundings noting the depth “in fathoms at low water on Spring tides.” Southack included the geographic hazards in the regions, such as dry rocks and low water marks, but he was also careful to provide the region with a distinctly English character. On Canso Island Southack provided the exact location of fishing stages, houses, and areas of “French

intruders.” He also included, marked by a pricked line, the route that Captain Smart took in his 1718 attack. There can be no mistaking the importance of this region, as Southack included a cartouche of a fishing ship hauling in large cod.<sup>130</sup>

In May of that year Governor Philipps sent a letter to the Board of Ordnance suggesting that the seat of government be moved from Annapolis to Nova Scotia’s Atlantic coast to provide a more secluded and protected placement. He noted, though, that the Board’s desire for a survey of the east coast would require a sloop to facilitate the surveyor. Paul Mascarene was capable of undertaking the task, so Philipps decided to appoint him to the local boundary commission that would meet at Île Royale to settle the matter; he could simply make a survey of the area at the same time.<sup>131</sup> Mascarene wrote to the Board of Ordnance two days later hinting at only one of the problems that could prevent a timely survey. “The continual rains and bad weather we have had since our arrival here,” he complained, “have hindered me hitherto from using my plain table.”<sup>132</sup> As it turns out, inclement weather, while not uncommon in Nova Scotia, would be the least of the surveyor’s problems.

The first challenge Philipps and Mascarene faced was finding a ship. The history of a survey ship, the *William Augustus*, recounts just how difficult completing a survey (for local or imperial purposes) could be. There were no sloops of appropriate size available in Nova Scotia, so Mascarene was sent to Boston to “hasten” the construction

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<sup>130</sup> On the symbolic importance of the cartouche generally, see G. N. G. Clarke, "Taking Possession: The Cartouche as Cultural Text in Eighteenth-Century American Maps," *Word & Image* 4, no. 2 (1988): 455-74.

<sup>131</sup> Philipps to the Board of Ordnance, Annapolis, 26 May 1720, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives II*, 62.

<sup>132</sup> Mascarene to the Board of Ordnance, Annapolis, 28 May 1720, fol. 49, p.125, MG21, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). A “plain table” (plane table) is a surveying instrument. The table swivels, and includes rulers, a compass, attachments for taking horizontal sightings, and other tools to facilitate surveying on the ground.

of a ship.<sup>133</sup> The ship arrived months later than Philipps had wanted, and he was left with little time to do any surveying of the east coast. During the late summer and early fall of 1721 Philipps and Mascarene undertook only a cursory survey of the east coast from Cape Sable to Canso, and they created a rough map that was sent to the secretary of state. Plans to perfect the survey were put on hold when the *William Augustus* was sent to Annapolis Royal to perform other duties. When the sloop returned to Canso in December it was in bad shape, having lost its anchor and split its sails. After minor repairs, the *William Augustus* was used to transfer some of the garrison from Placentia to Nova Scotia. When this task was completed, in August of 1722, the ship was in even worse condition and unable to serve as a surveyor's sloop.

To compound the issue, Canso had recently been attacked by a group of Natives who had taken several English vessels. The *William Augustus* was then called to duty to counter this attack, and with two other armed vessels reclaimed all the ships stolen by the Natives, many of whom were killed in the process. At the close of these hostilities, the ship was sent to Boston for refitting and returned to Annapolis Royal in December. For reasons unknown the survey remained on hold, and the ship was laid up in August of 1723.<sup>134</sup> Two years later Lawrence Armstrong, Nova Scotia's lieutenant governor, wrote the Board of Trade and informed them that the ship *William Augustus* was in very poor condition, and asked if the vessel should be refitted to serve the province.<sup>135</sup> Apparently Armstrong received no advice on the matter, for two years later Philipps himself wrote to

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<sup>133</sup> Philipps to Mascarene, Annapolis Royal, 6 May 1721, 10, Vol. 9, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>134</sup> "Journal of His Majesty's Vessel the *William Augustus* in the service of the Government of Nova Scotia, for the perusal of the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners for Trade," received in London September 1724, 19, Vol.18, RG 1, NSARM. A similar account is found in 32, Vol. 7, RG1, NSARM. In this second account, however, Philipps notes that in the first summer the survey covered from Annapolis eastward to LaHave only, then ending due to the lateness of the season.

<sup>135</sup> Lawrence Armstrong to [not addressed], Canso, 5 September 1725, 4, Vol. 17, RG 1, NSARM.



the Board of Trade to update them on the state of Nova Scotia's defences. Aside from the usual complaints of a crumbling fort and insufficient armaments, Philipps noted that the entire region needed an improved communication system. He mentioned that there was a ship that had been laid up for four years, and asked if the Board would be willing to refit the vessel as a communication ship.<sup>136</sup>

It is not surprising that Armstrong and Philipps received no final instructions for the ship. This was a period when the Board of Trade paid very little attention to Nova Scotia, and aside from a 1722 letter in which the Board announced their pleasure that a ship had been found for the survey, the *William Augustus* seemed to matter very little to administrators in London.<sup>137</sup> What the life of this ship illustrates, however, is that there were practical realities that prevented the timely surveying of Nova Scotia. There were soldiers to transport, provisions to secure, and enemies to fight. The Board might announce that they needed new and better maps, but their desire for cartographic knowledge often extended beyond the reach of surveying capabilities.

These limits to local navigation and communication capabilities, and restrictions on surveying and mapping, need to be understood in the context of wider Atlantic networks. Ian K. Steele has described the Atlantic ocean as a highway crossed with increasing safety and regularity over the seventeenth and eighteenth century, allowing settlers in British North America to remain in contact with Britain.<sup>138</sup> Once in North America, however, new networks were required to create spaces of empire to complement the Atlantic highway. To control the coasts and inland waterways, European

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<sup>136</sup> Philipps to [not addressed], 25 May 1727, 34, Vol. 18, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>137</sup> Board of Trade to Philipps, Whitehall, 6 June 1722, 7, Vol. 16, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>138</sup> Steele, *The English Atlantic*.

powers first had to travel through and map them.<sup>139</sup> These dependent spaces – the Atlantic highway and the local coasts and rivers – represented two arteries of imperial control. Yet mastery of the former did not guarantee control over the latter. Practical realities (such as securing a vessel) and outside forces (such as Aboriginal maritime control) were major obstacles to securing control over regions of claimed imperial space.

The requests for maps that originated from the British boundary commissioners in Paris passed from the Lords Justices to the Board of Trade, and often back. As John Brewer has argued, expanding state activity led to an increased desire for information about government actions.<sup>140</sup> There was bound to be administrative overlap. Not two months after the Board of Trade asked for a surveyor to be sent to Nova Scotia, the Lords Justices responded by requesting maps of Nova Scotia to aid Pulteney in Paris. Specifically, Pulteney wanted to know the location of Sable Island and if Canso was attached to Nova Scotia, as the British claimed it was, or if it was an island.<sup>141</sup>

Pulteney explained a point of crucial importance that tied territorial knowledge and mapping to the perceived differences between the French and Latin translations of the Treaty of Utrecht. The French argued that Canso was an island, and therefore was not attached to Nova Scotia and should be considered French territory. The British responded by citing a passage of the treaty that ceded to Britain lands dependent on granted land.<sup>142</sup> Unsatisfied with that response, the French attempted to favour the French translation of the treaty, which they argued granted to France all islands within

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<sup>139</sup> Benton, "Spatial Histories of Empire," 19-34.

<sup>140</sup> John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (New York: Knopf, 1989), 223.

<sup>141</sup> Mr. Delafaye to BTP, Whitehall, 8 September 1720, *CSP* vol. 32, 219.

<sup>142</sup> The passage in the French version of the Treaty, which France preferred to the Latin, reads "tout ce qui depend des dites terres et Îles de ce pais là."

the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In contrast, the Latin version granted the French islands within the *mouth* of the St. Lawrence River and *in* the Gulf of St. Lawrence.<sup>143</sup>

This was an important distinction because the mouth of the Gulf could be argued to extend beyond the limits that the British were willing to cede to France. The exact position of Canso, and its definition as either an island or part of Nova Scotia, was now at the heart of the boundary dispute.

Considering the value of the Canso fishery, it is not surprising that the French attempted to claim the region as its possession. Pulteney reported that at the conference the French agreed not to fish within 30 leagues east of Sable Island and presented a map of those fishing boundaries. On the map they had drawn a line starting 30 leagues east of Sable Island and travelling southeast. A second line extended directly west from Sable Island to Nova Scotia hitting the province well south of Canso, thereby leaving the region open to French fishing. The French commissioners supported this boundary by arguing that France had established governors at Cape Canso, which meant it was not part of Acadia and therefore never surrendered to the British.<sup>144</sup> Sr. Robert Sutton, one of the British boundary commissioners, summarized the meeting as a tumultuous encounter meant only to provide the French with an opportunity to justify their possession of the fishery at Canso. France's commissaries had even created false maps to support their arguments.<sup>145</sup> The British realized that the French were attempting to deceive them, but proving the inaccuracy of French maps would be difficult.

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<sup>143</sup> Pulteney to Defaye, Paris, 10 September 1720, *CSP* vol. 32, 219i. See also MacNutt, *The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857*, 21.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> Sr. Robert Sutton to Secretary Craigs, Paris, 5/16 September 1720, *CSP* vol. 32, 219ii.

The French were in an equally difficult position regarding the importance of Canso and the delicate peace that had to be maintained with Britain. They also faced the additional task of balancing relations with the Mi'kmaq and their allies, which entailed continued gift-giving and military support while simultaneously distancing themselves from any Native attacks on the British. The French were well aware of Canso's value as a fishery as well as its strategic geographic location. For this reason, French administrators at Louisbourg monitored closely the British actions on the islands. After the British attack at Canso, Saint-Ovide sent an emissary to Boston to plead their case and demand restitution, but early diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful.<sup>146</sup> Appeals to Boston continued even while both nations discussed Canso in Paris.

For the French at Île Royale, Native resistance to the British in Nova Scotia complicated matters. While the French were required to maintain their friendship with the Natives to ensure trade and prevent the Mi'kmaq and their allies from forming an alliance with the English, Saint-Ovide was unable to impose restrictions on what Natives could do with the presents they received. In 1720, after he met with about 100 Mi'kmaq to discuss the state of their relationship and hearing about the difficulties the Natives faced as a result of declining gifts, Saint-Ovide received an English visitor who informed him that the Mi'kmaq had pillaged Canso and forced many of its English inhabitants to flee. Saint-Ovide informed the officer that he was horrified at the news, and would do whatever he could to bring justice to those responsible. He then reassured the British

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<sup>146</sup> Ovide to Council, Louisbourg, 5 September 1720, f184, vol. 5, C11B, ANOM.

officer that the French were in no way involved in these hostilities, admitting that the Natives followed only the orders of their chiefs.<sup>147</sup>

The tensions in Nova Scotia meant that much was riding on the discussions in Paris. While both sides relied on maps as evidence, each accused the other of forgery. As has been demonstrated, the British had trouble collecting reliable, British maps. The French were as wary of British maps as the British were of French maps. Père Aubry, a Jesuit Missionary working in New England, warned French officials at Versailles, “the English have falsified a map by placing Nova Scotia from the St. George River to Beaubassin,” even though older maps never accorded this space to the English.<sup>148</sup> After warning of altered or inaccurate British maps, French administrators and religious figures dispatched a flurry of French maps to bolster their claims. One was a map that claimed to place Canso on the French side of the line drawn from Sable Island to the peninsula, as expressed in the Treaty of Utrecht; another map demonstrated that Canso and the islands of that name were separated from the mainland by an arm of water, positioned in the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, and therefore belonged to France.<sup>149</sup> No less than treaties, maps were subjected to interpretation and used to persuade as much as to reflect objective geographic “truth.”

The Board of Trade was eager to secure Canso for Britain. Days after Pulteney and Sutton’s letters reached Britain, the Board wrote to the Lords Justices outlining what they knew and reminded the Lords of Britain’s cartographic paucity. The Board

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<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 186v. French officials who did too much to reassure the British might be accused of condescending to the British instead of defending French territory. Sieur d’Auteuil, former attorney general at Quebec, charged Vaudreuil and Saint-Ovide with just that. See S. d’Auteuil to d’Orléans, January 1720, f59, vol. 2, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>148</sup> Papers relating to the limits of Canada and Acadia, 10 January 1720, f76, vol. 2, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 78v-80v.

emphasized that Francis Nicholson and Samuel Vetch – the men who had conquered Acadia in 1710 – agreed that Canso was part of Nova Scotia. Unfortunately for the Board, however, neither man could provide additional material for Mr. Pulteney. They had in their possession no dependable maps of the region, and when they requested some from the Admiralty they learned none existed in their possession either. The Board pleaded once again with the Lord Justices to send a surveyor to North America to make a map of the colonies. The French had completed this task and were reaping its benefits, while the British remained in the dark.<sup>150</sup> The British had not adequately mapped the territory and therefore could not bring it into their sphere of control, nor could they present a rigorous challenge to French maps. The French King supported his commissioners' claim to Canso because their maps argued it was not part of Nova Scotia, being separated by an arm of water like that dividing Île Royale from Nova Scotia.<sup>151</sup> Pulteney himself informed the Board of Trade that some Englishmen in the Canso region agreed that it was separated by water as claimed by the French; therefore, the British would be wise to stake their claim on the fact that Canso, even if an island, lay outside the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

There were French officials, however, who wanted to restrict severely the limits of Acadia and these efforts persisted even after the negotiations at Paris ended. Abbé Jean Bobé, a Parisian cleric and member of the duc d'Orléans' entourage, wrote a memoir in 1723 concerning the limits of France's possessions in North America. When discussing Acadia, Bobé stressed that Port Royal was in fact part of southern New France, not part of Acadia. He emphasized the need to influence how people envisioned

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<sup>150</sup> BTP to Lords Justices, Whitehall, 15 September 1720, *CSP* vol. 32, 231.

<sup>151</sup> Reply of Archbishop of Cambrai to the Memorial of Sr. R. Sutton, Paris, 1/12 September 1720, *CSP* vol. 32, 232ii.

or imagined Acadia, employing cartographic imagery to support his argument. “In order to destroy these frivolous and unjust pretensions of the English,” Bobé contended,

I request that the trouble may be taken to read in the Memoir on the boundaries that I had the honor to present to Count de Toulouse what I state there to prove that Acadia, according to its ancient limits ceded by France, does not include all the imaginary Nova Scotia, but only all that is embraced between the South Coast of the Peninsula and a straight line drawn from Cape Forchu to Cape Campseau exclusively.<sup>152</sup>

It was clear to Bobé that because England had been ceded Port Royal *and* Acadia, the former was not within the bounds of the latter. While these arguments had little impact in the early 1720s, a map influenced by Bobé’s interpretation was to cause quite a stir during the 1750-54 Acadia boundary negotiations.<sup>153</sup> Despite the conflicting interpretations of boundaries and land claims, the entire European negotiation was moot. Actions on the ground at Canso would determine who controlled the region.

British and French officials in northeastern North America had attempted to settle the boundary issue prior to the official commission meetings in Paris. In 1719 Governor Shute of Massachusetts sent Captain Smart and Captain Southack to Île Royale to meet with Governor Saint-Ovide and discuss the limits of Acadia. Shute informed Smart that Southack knew the regional boundaries better than anyone and possessed a good chart of

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<sup>152</sup> *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York [DRNY]: Vol. IX.* E.B. O’Callaghan, ed. (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1855), 916-7. Cape Forchu is at present-day Yarmouth, Nova Scotia. Père Bobé himself was an interesting figure, as his correspondence with prominent French mapmakers illustrates. He kept in touch with Guillaume Delisle and encouraged him to produce maps that would attract settlement to the French colonies. See Nelson-Martin Dawson, *L’Atelier Delisle: l’Amérique du Nord sur la Table à Dessin* (Québec: Septentrion, 2000). On the need for more investigation into Bobé and men like him in the French Atlantic world, see Alexandre Dubé, “S’Appropriier l’Atlantique: Quelques Reflexions autour de *Chasing Empire across the Sea* de Kenneth Banks,” *French Colonial History* 6 (2005): 33-44. Dubé’s major suggestion is that the French Atlantic requires a work similar in scope, content, and context to David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

<sup>153</sup> See Chapter 5. Also, see Mary Sponberg Pedley, *Bel et Utile: The Work of the Robert de Vaugondy Family of Mapmakers* (Herts: Map Collector Publications, 1992), 69-73.

the area.<sup>154</sup> Southack's map did not convince Saint-Ovide, who after the meeting wrote to Shute arguing that the compass points on the British map were unequal. It was impossible to reach an agreement working from their maps because, following the rhumb lines, the British could claim parts of Cape Breton and the French possessed areas around St. Mary River.<sup>155</sup> Saint-Ovide concluded by offering to remove all French settlers and fishers from the region until the issue was settled in Europe, provided that the English would do the same. Poorly produced maps were easily identified as lacking geographic evidence and did little to advance a territorial argument.

In 1719 Governor Philipps arrived at Annapolis Royal and shortly after travelled to Canso to oversee the construction of fortifications that would, *inter alia*, help protect New England fishing vessels from French privateers. The Mi'kmaq continued to harass the British; one conflict resulted in over twenty Mi'kmaq deaths, and five Mi'kmaq heads were posted on spikes around the fort.<sup>156</sup> The British were convinced that the French were behind the Native attacks, and Philipps doubted gifts would prevent future violence. He informed Secretary Craggs in 1720 that he had done his best with the Natives and given them £150 out of his own pocket, although he doubted that £100,000 could win the Mi'kmaq from the French.<sup>157</sup> In one French-Native attack on Canso in 1720 they plundered English ships and took £18,000 of goods. This same group then returned to Minas and attacked and plundered another English ship. Exasperated, Philipps informed the Board of Trade that he had written to the Acadians asking why they had not tried to

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<sup>154</sup> Papers relating to the proceedings of H.M.S. *Squirrel* on the coast of Nova Scotia, 2 June 1719, *CSP* vol. 26, 213.

<sup>155</sup> Saint-Ovide de Brouillon to [n/a Governor Shute], Louisbourg, 23 September 1717 [*sic.* should be 1719], *CSP* vol. 26, 213vii, 213viii. A rhumb line is the line of constant bearing used for navigation.

<sup>156</sup> Geoffrey Plank, "New England and the Conquest," in Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia*, 81-2.

<sup>157</sup> Philipps to Secretary Craggs, Annapolis, 26 September 1720, in *Acadia and Nova Scotia: Documents Relating to the Acadian French and the First British Colonization of the Province, 1714-1758*, ed. Thomas B. Akins, trans. Benjamin Curren (Cottonport: Polyanthos, 1972), 49-52.



stop the Minas attack, “which is all I can do in my present circumstances.”<sup>158</sup> Philipps’ attempts to fortify the region concerned Saint-Ovide. “This affair [the boundaries] holds all the new colonies in a state of unrest,” he wrote, “both nations equally desire to possess Canso and its eastern coast which is without question the best and most abundant fishery.”<sup>159</sup>

Administrators and religious figures on both sides of the Atlantic had been working feverishly to prove French title both to the Canso region within the Nova Scotia peninsula, and the stretch of land along the continent’s east coast from Beaubassin to St. George River. Père Aubry sent “to the Court a map more exact than any seen before, with a memoir to inform about the disposition of these Acadian lands.”<sup>160</sup> But his efforts went unnoticed and in 1720 he wrote again to stress his point: if France lost those lands they would also lose their Native allies who lived there.<sup>161</sup> A second memoir reported that Antoine Lamothe, Sieur de Cadillac had interviewed some of the oldest inhabitants of Acadia, residents of the province in 1685, and they attested to the fact that Acadia was always considered only the peninsula. In fact, the 80-year-old Sieur Petitpas claimed that from 1604 to 1624, Acadia was the stretch of land from La Have to Minas. Everything else to the North and East was “the country of the Etchemins, also of New France, just to the Kenebec, as now there are no more Etchemins.”<sup>162</sup> The report continued to note that from La Have to Canso to the Gaspé was also considered New France.<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Philipps to BTP, Annapolis Royal, 26 September 1720, 2, vol. 17, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>159</sup> Saint-Ovide to Council, Louisbourg, 20 September 1721, f367-367v, vol. 5, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>160</sup> Père Aubry’s Memoir, January 1720, f90, vol. 2, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, f91.

<sup>162</sup> *Memoire sur l’Acadie*, January 1720, f94, vol. 2, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, f94v.

Aware of Britain's extended claims to Nova Scotia based on Sir William Alexander's grants, the French argued that sovereignty depended on settlement and improvement, not grants or claims.<sup>164</sup> Learning of Philipps' plans to fortify Canso would have been especially provocative in light of this view. The French could challenge cartographic claims in official discussions, but they were forced to respond in kind to news of British fortification efforts. By the spring of 1722, officials in France issued an order to build a fortification in southern Île Royale. "We propose," the order stated, "that without interrupting the fortification of Louisbourg, measures should be taken to fortify...Port Dauphin."<sup>165</sup> The same orders recommended improving the fortifications at Port Toulouse, which was close to the British fortifications at Canso. To this end the French could amass strength along the coast to counter the efforts of the English.<sup>166</sup> As negotiations faltered in Paris, the French and the British maintained a façade of peace while preparing for war. Though both sides kept a watchful eye on each other, the region's Mi'kmaq and some of their allies were reasserting their territorial control.

In August 1720, a group of eleven Mi'kmaq, led by Peter Nunquadden, claiming the country as theirs, demanded and received £50 from an English merchant for permission to trade at Minas. By paying the fee and taking no action against the Mi'kmaq, the merchant (perhaps reluctantly) legitimized the Mi'kmaq claim to territorial rights.<sup>167</sup> Other Native groups did not necessarily support the Mi'kmaq's actions. Philipps received letters from the Passamaquoddy and the Wolastoqiyik reaffirming their desire for peace and distancing themselves from the Mi'kmaq attacks at Canso. Philipps

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<sup>164</sup> *Memoire contenant des observations...*, January 1720, f144v, vol. 2, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>165</sup> *Arrête du Conseil*, 5 May 1722, f15v, vol. 6, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, f16.

<sup>167</sup> Deposition of John Alden, master of sloop taken at Canso, 1720, *CSP* vol. 32, 241xii.

had in fact met with a group of Natives from the St. John River area and put their agreement into writing.<sup>168</sup> The eastern Algonkian Natives might have shared some of the same goals, but the individual groups could also operate on their own motives without the support of their neighbours. In times of conflict the Mi'kmaq and their neighbours were capable of coming together for a common cause.

### **Dummer's War and the 1725/6 Treaties**

The boundary negotiations in Europe floundered, and in Nova Scotia the British were able to assert tenuous authority only over Annapolis Royal and Canso. The tripartite negotiations in Nova Scotia better reflect the power dynamics at play: while France and Britain quibbled over degrees of latitude and longitude, the eastern Algonkians clearly outlined what lands belonged to them and how they would deal with European encroachment. Initially, the Abenakis tolerated encroachments into their land. As Pierre de Charlevoix explained, after the Treaty of Utrecht began a slow English migration to the Kennebec River,

An Englishman asked the Abenakis for permission to build on the banks of their River a magazine for trade, promising to sell his merchandise at a much better price than they could get at Boston. The Natives, finding a great advantage in this proposition, agreed. Another Englishman, a little later, asked for the same permission, offering conditions even more advantageous than offered by the first man, and it was again granted. The Natives' facility emboldened the English; they established themselves in great numbers along the River without troubling themselves to get permission from the country's original inhabitants.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Natives of Passamaquoddy to Philipps, 23 November 1720 and François de Salle to Philipps, 10 November 1720, *CSP* vol. 32, 298i and 298ii. See also Philipps to Crags, Annapolis, 26 September 1720, 2, vol.17, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>169</sup> Pierre de Charlevoix, *Histoire et description generale de la Nouvelle France*, vol. II (Paris: 1744), 376. For a second account, see Sébastien Rale to his Brother, Nanrantsouak, 15 October 1722, 99-101, vol. 67, *Jesuit Relations*.

It was only when the English stopped asking permission that the Abenakis became angered and demanded to know by what right the English invaded their land.<sup>170</sup> It was just these types of incursions that bred conflict in the northeast.

Charlevoix, a Jesuit Priest who travelled through North America at the request of the government of France, recognized the significance of Aboriginal territorial control in his 1720 memoir on the limits of Acadia. Missionaries informed Charlevoix that any plan to move the Abenakis from their land to Île Royale was ill advised, as the Abenakis were attached to their territory.<sup>171</sup> Charlevoix recounted a meeting between Vaudreuil and a group of Abenakis at which the Natives requested assistance in their conflict with the English. The governor assured them that he would provide weapons and request other Aboriginal groups to join the cause. The Abenakis responded by mocking Vaudreuil, taunting him and threatening that if they so desired the eastern Algonkians could combine their strengths and wipe all Europeans off the continent. The threat was enough quickly to make Vaudreuil reconsider his offer, and he assured the Abenakis that if they needed help he would assist them himself.<sup>172</sup>

Charlevoix described the limits of French and English territory by its entanglement with Native lands.<sup>173</sup> In 1721 Charlevoix noted that the Algonkian

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<sup>170</sup> In Charlevoix's words, "Ils demanderent aux Anglois de quell droit ils s'établisoient ansi sur leurs terres, & y construisoient des forts?" Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Charlevoix, *Memoire sur les limites de l'Acadie*, 29 October 1720, *CMNF* vol. 3, 49-52.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>173</sup> The concept of "entangled" histories is one current in imperial and Atlantic scholarship. What needs to be emphasized, however, is the geographic overlap (physical and imagined) that contributes to this entangling of history. See Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *American Historical Review* 11, no. 3 (2007): 764-86; Jorge Canizares-Esguerra, "Entangled Histories: Borderland Historiographies in New Clothes?," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007): 787-99; Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Atlantic Histories: A Response from the Anglo-American Periphery," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 5 (2007): 1414-22.

language begins in Acadia, and “makes a circuit of twelve hundred leagues, turning from the south-east by the north to the south-west.” He continued,

The Abenakis, or Conibas bordering upon New England have, for their nearest neighbours the Etechemins, or Malécites in the country about the river Pentagoet, and further to the east are the Micmaks or Souriquois, whose country is properly Acadia, all along the coast of the gulph of St. Laurence as far as Gaspey, whence a certain author has called them Gaspesians, as well as the neighbouring islands.<sup>174</sup>

He noted that the Abenakis claimed most of the northeast coast and the rivers that met there and suggested that France support the Natives to prevent English encroachment.

Charlevoix was concerned with how the Abenakis would react to French and English land claims, and he knew that if France angered the Natives they could easily side with the English.<sup>175</sup> The Abenakis had already questioned the French missionaries about France’s right to cede Aboriginal land, and the missionaries responded that Abenaki land was not included in the Utrecht negotiations. Charlevoix recommended settling the limits in the northeast and assuring the Abenakis that if to conserve “their country” they must fight the English, the French would join them.<sup>176</sup> Charlevoix concluded by calling for quick action, as the Iroquois were already soliciting the Abenakis to join them against the French. An English-Abenaki-Iroquois alliance could only mean the loss of New France.<sup>177</sup>

By 1722, tensions between the English and the Abenaki had erupted into war. Saint-Ovide and his administrators were aware of dangerous tensions between the two sides in 1721. The governor of Île Royale had travelled to meet with a group of Mi’kmaq

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<sup>174</sup> Pierre Charlevoix, 1 May 1721, *Journal of a Voyage to North America*, vol. I (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1966), 283.

<sup>175</sup> Charlevoix, *Memoire sur les limites de l’Acadie*, 29 October 1720, *CMNF* vol. 3, 49-52, 49.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 51. “...les assurer meme que si pour conserver leur pays ils étoient constraints d’en venir à la guerre, on se joindrait à eux.” The term “pays,” translates roughly into “country,” and could refer to either a specific country (France, England), or an expanse of space generally.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, 53-4.

in July with the intention of exchanging gifts and receiving information about the region's Native groups. After hearing the Mi'kmaq's complaints about the difficulty they faced surviving on such meagre gifts, Saint-Ovide offered what he could to alleviate their suffering. In return he asked for information about the Wolastoqiyik and the Abenakis. He eventually learned that a group of ten or twelve Abenakis had killed a number of cattle and the British had captured two or three Natives and taken them to Boston as hostages. Another Abenaki was taken hostage when he went to Boston to trade furs, though he paid for his release and informed his chief of what had transpired.<sup>178</sup>

These attacks heightened tensions. A Native force was raised and responded, killing twenty-eight settlers.<sup>179</sup> The British at Boston declared war on the Abenakis in 1722. The French at Louisbourg received letters from various missionaries outlining the troubles and the official declaration of war. By late December 1722, Saint-Ovide learned that the British at Annapolis had also declared war on the Mi'kmaq and hoped to engage the French inhabitants in the fight.<sup>180</sup> The French, however, supported the Abenakis in this conflict, and Vaudreuil informed the governor of Boston that he had brought these problems on himself by taking lands that by right belonged to the eastern Algonkians.<sup>181</sup> The Algonkian-French relationship was reciprocal; the French provided the Mi'kmaq and their allies with guns, ammunition, and reassurance of geographic control in return for continued Native aggression against the British. Put simply, the French were hoping to fight a war by proxy.

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<sup>178</sup> Saint-Ovide to Council, Louisbourg, 15 September 1721, f358-362v, vol. 5, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., f362-364.

<sup>180</sup> M. de Bourville to Saint-Ovide, Louisbourg, 22 December 1722, f.102, vol. 6, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>181</sup> Vaudreuil to Shute, Québec, 28 October 1723, *CSP* vol. 33, 405iii.

A 1723 memoir emphasized the importance of supporting the Abenaki to keep the British at bay. Native forts in strategic positions were France's best defence, and if the English could convince the Iroquois to fight against the French only the Abenakis could stand against them. More than serving as a buffer zone against the English, the Abenakis often granted the French access to their resource-rich lands and the French were eager to maintain those links.<sup>182</sup> In 1724 the British destroyed the Native village of Norridgewock, prompting many Abenakis to retire to Montreal and pursue peace negotiations. Their ability to dictate territorial use had been weakened by the influx of British settlers. The Abenakis were also divided between those who desired peace and those who wanted to continue warring against the English.<sup>183</sup> Increasingly out-numbered and unable to rally to a common cause, unlike their brethren in the less populated Nova Scotia, the Abenaki were forced to negotiate new terms of settlement in their traditional lands.

Though most of the fighting was focused in New England, the Mi'kmaq launched attacks on the British in Nova Scotia. Accompanied by a few Abenakis, the Mi'kmaq descended to Annapolis Royal from a settlement to the north of the fort, travelling along a river in canoes that they had confiscated from French inhabitants. They attacked, lured soldiers out of the fort, ambushed them and killing eight, forcing the governor to close the fort.<sup>184</sup> Strategic geographic positioning was an important factor for the Mi'kmaq. The ability to reach Annapolis Royal safely and undetected facilitated attacks on the

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<sup>182</sup> Memoir on English claims to New France, 1723, f218v-219v, vol. 2, C11E ANOM. On the French-Iroquois relationship, see Gilles Havard, *The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century*, trans. Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).

<sup>183</sup> See Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast*.

<sup>184</sup> Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 24 November 1724, f24-26v, vol. 7, C11B, ANOM.

British, but at the same time the Natives wanted to remain safe from an attack themselves. In 1723, a group of Mi'kmaq moved to a settlement on the Shubenacadie River where Gaulin, a missionary priest, had built a church and a presbytery. Saint-Ovide reported the advantages of this river, including its position below the Minas Basin and its path between two large hills, which was too rapid and dangerous for passage by boat. Though it was the French missionary who built the church in the region, Saint-Ovide implicitly recognized Mi'kmaq sovereignty when he noted that five or six French inhabitants lived along the coast of the river on land "that the Natives gave to them."<sup>185</sup> A few leagues above these inhabitants was a village of around forty Natives who lived without fear of a surprise attack because of the information networks that ran along the waterways.<sup>186</sup> The Mi'kmaq and the Acadians on the Shubenacadie shared land and information; the French at Louisbourg received information from both.

By late 1724 negotiations to end Dummer's War were fast approaching. The Nova Scotia Council received a letter from Lieutenant Governor Dummer asking what demands should be made in Boston on Nova Scotia's behalf. The Council proposed seven articles: the first stipulated that King George and his heirs be recognized as the sole owners and proprietors of Great Britain; the second demanded that the King's subjects be allowed to settle in Nova Scotia.<sup>187</sup> In 1725 Dummer wrote to Lieutenant Governor Armstrong to inform him that peace with the Abenakis in Boston seemed certain, but that peace with the Mi'kmaq at Annapolis Royal seemed "distant and uncertain." Armstrong

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid., f29-29v.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., f29v.

<sup>187</sup> Archibald MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III: Original minutes of His Majesty's Council at Annapolis Royal, 1720-1739*, p. 79

<http://www.gov.ns.ca/nsarm/virtual/heartland/archives.asp?Number=Three&Page=3001&Language=English>



was left with the task of ensuring that representatives arrived at Annapolis to sign the peace, keeping in mind the interest of all British subjects.<sup>188</sup>

Dummer's War ended in 1725 with a series of treaties and negotiations at which the Natives illustrated both their territorial knowledge and their insistence on acceptable boundaries.<sup>189</sup> The Abenakis complained that British missionaries were invading their land. British officials sent to Montreal to demand that Vaudreuil stop supporting the Natives in this war found themselves in an unofficial conference. The two sides met at Montreal to discuss the matter and the English demanded to know what lands the Abenakis wanted vacated. The Natives were specific in their response: Abenaki land began at the Gountigon River, which ran west across from Boston.<sup>190</sup> This river was, according to the Natives, an incontestable boundary between the Abenaki and Iroquois land, and therefore Boston and all settlements to the east of this river were built on Abenakis land. The Natives were willing to tolerate those settlements but demanded that the British withdraw from the region between Saco River and Port Royal, which divided Abenaki and Mi'kmaq land.<sup>191</sup> The Abenakis announced that they were aware of British claims to this land and demanded that they prove their title, but the British argued they claimed only land on the west side of the Narantsouak river. The Abenakis replied that the British must therefore admit that the Aboriginals controlled lands east of that river.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Dummer to Armstrong, 16 August 1725, *DHSM* vol. 10, 322-3.

<sup>189</sup> For a study of geographic information in English-Abenaki land negotiations, see Margaret Wickens Pearce, "Native Mapping in Southern New England Indian Deeds" in *Cartographic Encounters*, 156-87. See also Baker, "'A Scratch with a Bear's Paw'," 235-56.

<sup>190</sup> Likely the Connecticut (Quonehtacut) River, which after the Mohawks defeated the Mahicans in 1624 served as the boundary between Iroquoian and Algonkian territories. During this period Boston was often used as a synonym for Massachusetts, which helps explain the geographic description of the river. Thanks to Dr. John G. Reid for helping with the transliteration.

<sup>191</sup> Bégon to Minister, 21 April 1725, *CMNF* vol. 3, 121.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*

They also argued that lands to the west were purchased under false pretences as the Natives who sold them could neither read nor write.<sup>193</sup>

The meeting concluded with an argument over the Boston region, which the Abenakis claimed belonged to them since time immemorial. They agreed that the English had been settled there for 80 years, but countered that the Natives had continually resisted English attempts to seize land. Besides Fort Saco, which was built forty years earlier, all forts and settlements that caused English-Abenaki conflict were constructed after the Treaty of Utrecht. The British had no reply to this argument. The Abenakis demanded reparations for attacks and murders during the war: the right for French missionaries to operate in the region, that no Protestant missionaries be sent to them, and appropriate presents for the destruction of Native property.<sup>194</sup> To these demands the British responded only that they would consult with officials at Boston.

William Wicken has studied the British-Abenaki treaty negotiations that took place in Boston and were later ratified at Casco Bay, but it will be useful here to demonstrate just how central geographic knowledge and authority were to the process.<sup>195</sup> The negotiations provided Native groups with an opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge of boundaries and borders. Although the Mi'kmaq and the Wolastoqiyik would sign a separate treaty with Nova Scotia, they were represented at the Boston negotiations. Nova Scotia also participated, sending Paul Mascarene to observe the negotiation and outline Nova Scotia's position. The conference began in July of 1725 and immediately the Abenaki representatives, Loron and Atanquid, announced to Massachusetts lieutenant governor William Dummer that they would take whatever is

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., 122-3.

<sup>195</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*.

said and report it to the eastern Natives who “are all agreed as one” and who would not let any “unknown tongue, that is the French,” dissuade them. The Native representatives also outlined their willingness to negotiate territorial control: “If you can shew fair purchase of land,” they argued, “we do not insist on having it, notwithstanding what we have said of claiming as far as Cape Elizabeth.”<sup>196</sup>

After laying some of the groundwork for peace negotiations, the Native representatives were granted forty days to consult with their neighbouring groups, and return to sign the treaty. A second conference was held in November 1725. The British officials outlined the articles of Peace, which included acknowledging the sovereignty of the crown, forswearing acts of hostility, allowing the King’s subjects to enjoy their property, and addressing any future problems through the court system.<sup>197</sup> The Native representatives, Loron and Atanquid of the Penobscot, responded that they understood the articles, but suggested that there was nothing new in this agreement. The topic of land negotiations followed. While the English were hesitant to embark on this touchy subject without first reaching other agreements, the Natives claimed “we like it very well it is the main thing we want to come to. But the custom of the Indians is to begin with the principal and main things, and the rest will come easily afterwards.”<sup>198</sup>

The issue of land claims was not easily settled. Demonstrating their negotiating ability, the Native representatives were very careful to ensure all clauses were understood. Two important parts of the treaty dealt with territorial sovereignty. The

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<sup>196</sup> 1725 Conference Meeting, July 1725, 1, vol. 12, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>197</sup> As David Ghere has argued, the legal system often failed the eastern Algonkians. See David Ghere and Alvin Morrison, "Searching for Justice on the Maine Frontier: Legal Concepts, Treaties, and the 1749 Wiscasset Incident," *The American Indian Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2001): 378-99; David Ghere, "Mistranslations and Misinformation: Diplomacy on the Maine Frontier, 1725-1755," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 8, no. 4 (1984): 3-26.

<sup>198</sup> “At a Conference with the Delegates of the Indian Tribes etc managed by the Commissioners appointed by the Honourable Lieutenant Governor on the 16<sup>th</sup> of November 1725,” 18-21, 5, vol. 12, RG 1, NSARM.

English were to “peaceably and quietly enter upon, improve, and forever enjoy all and singular their rights of land and former settlements, properties, and possessions within the eastern parts of the Province” free from Aboriginal harassment. The treaty saves for,

the Penobscot, Norridgewock, and other tribes within His Majesties province aforesaid and their Natural descendants respectively all their lands, liberties, and properties not by them conveyed or sold to, or possess’d by any of the English subjects as afores’d. As also the privilege of fishing, hunting, and fowling as formerly.<sup>199</sup>

The clause that related to English settlements was of particular importance, and the Native delegates asked about the phrase “former settlements,” wanting to know if the British intended to build beyond where they were currently located. The commissioners responded that “when we come to settle the bounds we shall neither build or settle any where but within our own bounds so settled without your consent.”<sup>200</sup>

Apparent from the commissioners’ clarification was the fact that the exact land boundaries were to be decided later. The following day the English officials suggested that it should be inserted into the treaty that “a committee of able, faithful, and disinterested persons” be appointed by the New England government to deal with any land claims issues that arise in the future.<sup>201</sup> Over the following year, the New England officials suggested, this committee would hear complaints and go into the province with a group of Native chiefs to settle boundary issues. Such a proposition seemed to provide the British with the upper hand as they would be in a position to make the final determination. The Native delegates wanted reassurances that the English really were interested in peace, and they asked for a sign of good faith. To that end, the Aboriginal

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<sup>199</sup> The entire treaty can be found at “The Submission and Agreement of the Delegates of the Eastern Indians,” 15 December 1725, p. 14, 3, vol. 12, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>200</sup> “At a Conference with the Delegates of the Indian Tribes etc managed by the Commissioners appointed by the Honourable Lieutenant Governor on the 16<sup>th</sup> of November 1725,” pp. 23, 5, vol. 12, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24, 5, vol. 12, RG 1, NSARM.

representatives requested that the English remove “as far as from Cape Elizabeth.” They continued,

In case the English will quit St. Georges and Richmond it will show an inclination to peace and as everything which you have said is reasonable, so it seems reasonable that we should insist upon those two places only...it is the mind of all the tribes that if those two garrisons were removed, they would all think that the English were hearty, and in earnest for a lasting peace.<sup>202</sup>

The British were not pleased by this demand and countered that their government had deeds to these lands but would be willing, if a peace was concluded, to use the forts for commercial instead of military purposes. They presented their deeds to the Native delegates, who upon learning that some of the sachems who signed the deeds were still alive, left the meeting to consult with the large group of Natives that attended the meeting.

The Aboriginal delegates returned in the afternoon to continue the question of territorial boundaries. They had two primary concerns: first, although satisfied with the deeds concerning St. Georges and Richmond, they wanted to know if any more houses would be built in those areas; second, as the deeds were separated by vast tracts of land, the Natives asked if they would be compensated for that vacant intermediate land if settled by the English. The commissioners responded that there might be more houses built, but the settlers would be careful not to encroach on Aboriginal land. If the Natives were willing to sell the land they would receive consideration. In a concession that was sure to cause future conflict, the English added that “the government will take due care

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<sup>202</sup> 24 November 1725, p.24, 5, vol. 12, RG 1, NSARM.

that you shall not be wronged, and you shall have free liberty of hunting and fishing etc. anywhere, but in the Inclosures or lands that are fenced in.”<sup>203</sup>

Also included in this treaty was the promise that the delegates would meet at a future date with Lawrence Armstrong, Nova Scotia’s lieutenant governor, to enter into a peaceful agreement with that government, represented at Boston by Mascarene. While this was apparently accepted without reservation, the first part of the treaty, demanding the recognition of the King as sovereign over his lands and their inhabitants, was received with less enthusiasm. The delegates responded “we shall pay our respect and duty to the King of Britain as we did to the King of France, but we reckon ourselves a free people and are not bound.”<sup>204</sup> Having concluded the initial negotiations, the Native delegates were sent off to convince other eastern Abenakis to ratify the agreement.

When Loron and the other Aboriginal delegates arrived at Casco Bay in July 1726 to ratify the agreement, they informed the English commissioners that they represented only the Penobscot. Other Native groups, such as the Norridgewock, St. François, and Wonenock, refused to appear, requesting instead that the English officials meet them at Montreal. One sticking point was the British refusal to remove settlements from St. Georges and Richmond. Loron argued that the houses did not have to be moved a great distance, but only from St. Georges to Pemaquid, and from Richmond to Arrowsick. Loron suggested that had the government acquiesced to this demand, “we, with the other Indians should all have come into a peace before now, and there would be no difficulty

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<sup>203</sup> Ibid., p.27. On the influence of fences on Native-Settler relations, see Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003).

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., p.29.

with the others.”<sup>205</sup> The lieutenant governor responded that it was beneath his dignity to go meet with the Natives in French territory. Furthermore, the officials sent to Montreal that previous spring had no authority to negotiate and were sent only to demand that the French cease supporting the Natives in their war against the English.<sup>206</sup>

Loron’s reply pushed the land encroachment issue despite the deeds. Looking to the present generation of Aboriginals living in the area, he argued that there were many young people who had no idea that the land was sold. If it had been sold, it was purchased for a very small amount, and therefore it would not be a large matter for the government to “make allowances” for the land. When asked to explain what he meant, Loron stated, “we desire that no houses or settlements may be made to the Eastward of Pemaquid, or above Arrowsick, as for the Penopscut [Penobscot] tribe in particular we don’t know that they ever sold any lands.”<sup>207</sup> The commissioners refused to surrender their settlements as requested by Loron, reminding him that they had shown the deeds to these lands.

Loron did not back down. He informed the commissioners that there was none among the Penobscot who remember selling the land. The deeds presented the year before were signed by Medoccewando and Sheepscut John, neither of whom were members of the Penobscot tribe. “We do not remember of any settlements at St. Georges,” Loron argued, “we remember a pretty while, and as long as we remember, the place where the Garrison stands was filled with great long grown trees.”<sup>208</sup> After further debate, Loron and his delegates agreed to allow the fort at St. George to remain as a truck

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid., p.35.

<sup>206</sup> Treaty Ratification at Casco Bay, July 1726, pp.34-6, 11, vol. 12, RG 1, NSARM.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p.37.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., p.40

house only, but forbade the construction of additional houses unless permission was given.<sup>209</sup> The Penobscot then ratified the treaty. Loron informed Mascarene that he should send a vessel for the Natives who would go to Annapolis Royal to ratify an agreement with the Nova Scotia government.

Word of the British-Wabanaki discussions reached Louisbourg in December of 1725, and Saint-Ovide did what he could to disrupt them. Only a few months earlier, during the height of the treaty negotiations, Saint-Ovide reported to his superiors that nothing of note had happened in the colony save for a Mi'kmaq-Abenaki attack on Canso the previous January.<sup>210</sup> When he learned of the treaty, Saint-Ovide reported only that he had been informed that the British had struck an agreement with the Wolastoqiyik and with several villages of Mi'kmaq on the coast of the Bay of Fundy close to Minas. Obviously desirous to know more, he had written to Gaulin who he expected would the following spring deliver a full account of the treaty.<sup>211</sup> By the fall, Saint-Ovide had met with the Natives on several occasions and had also heard from Gaulin. At his conferences with the Mi'kmaq, Saint-Ovide attempted to persuade the Natives not to accept any offers made them by the English; the French governor seemed to believe that they were amenable to his suggestions.<sup>212</sup>

As for the presumed treaty struck with a number of Mi'kmaq villages along the Bay of Fundy, Saint-Ovide learned from Gaulin that accounts of this agreement were perhaps exaggerated. The French missionary noted that in fact a small number of younger Mi'kmaq from the Saint Jean River had negotiated with the British, but the

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 17 August 1725, f179, vol. 7, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>211</sup> Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 10 December 1725, f192v, vol. 7, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>212</sup> Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 18 September 1726, f34v, vol. 8, C11B, ANOM.



terms of those agreements were currently under consideration by the village elders and a response was not expected until the following spring.<sup>213</sup> Though seemingly confident that the Mi'kmaq would distance themselves from the British, Saint-Ovide was ultimately unable to dictate the actions of his Aboriginal allies in Nova Scotia. The Mi'kmaq and the Wolastoqiyik were part of a larger political organization that made decisions for their mutual benefit. In 1726 many members favoured peace over continued war.

In 1726 the Mi'kmaq signed a treaty with the British at Annapolis Royal – an exact copy of the 1725 treaty signed in Boston – to end their participation in the recent conflict. As William Wicken has persuasively argued, although this war was about land the treaty that ended hostilities was not one of land surrender. The Mi'kmaq agreed to recognize British legal jurisdiction over Nova Scotia and to submit to King George as they had to Louis XV.<sup>214</sup> Yet the Mi'kmaq never submitted to the French crown and never signed any treaties with France.<sup>215</sup> It is also important to recognize the different British and Aboriginal interpretations of the treaty. One Abenaki delegate, upon learning that the English considered the treaty a recognition of British territorial sovereignty in the northeast, issued a response in which he clarified his understanding of the agreement:

I answered—Yes, I recognize him King of all his lands; but, I rejoined, do not hence infer that I acknowledge thy King as my King, and King of my lands. Here lies my distinction—my Indian distinction. God hath willed that I have no King, and that I be master of my lands in common.<sup>216</sup>

The eastern Abenakis recognized the British had claims to some lands, just as they could demonstrate the borders between Iroquois, Mi'kmaq, and Abenakis lands. What they would not tolerate was the British assertion of complete geographic control in a territory

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<sup>213</sup> Ibid., f35-35v.

<sup>214</sup> For the text of the treaty, see Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 61-2.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>216</sup> Indian Explanation of the Treaty of Casco Bay, *DCHNY* vol. IX, 966-67. See also Ibid., 83-5.

where their political jurisdiction was limited to a small settlement in Nova Scotia supported by larger ones in the northeast.

Among the Wabanaki confederacy there was no unanimity regarding the peace. Just as members of the Abenaki had refused to ratify the treaty at Casco, so too were various Mi'kmaq groups wary of the agreement. In November of 1727 several Mi'kmaq and some Abenaki groups met with Saint-Ovide, who had called them to Île Royale in an attempt to derail negotiations with Governor Armstrong. Tensions between the British and the eastern Algonkians were high, as Natives had recently been killed at Boston. To take advantage of the cracks in the newly minted British-Wabanaki agreement, Saint-Ovide informed the Natives that he had fallen sick and therefore could not meet them for conferences in Nova Scotia. He requested that they come to Île St Jean to enjoy a feast and receive presents.<sup>217</sup> He went further and invited the chiefs to visit him at Louisbourg, where he held conferences and warned them repeatedly that the English cruelty they had suffered would continue until they had been “absolutely destroyed.”<sup>218</sup> The chiefs responded by requesting that Saint-Ovide maintain his close ties with their people and help them when necessary, to which the French governor happily agreed.<sup>219</sup>

Before the chiefs left Louisbourg, Saint-Ovide asked them about the rumoured British-Mi'kmaq treaty. The Natives responded that it was the avarice of a few of their younger members that had led to this agreement and that the treaty was of no consequence to them. Saint-Ovide was reassured that the British were the Mi'kmaq's

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<sup>217</sup> Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 20 November 1727, f64v-65, vol. 9, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., f65.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., f65v.

greatest enemy, and that the killing of their brothers in Boston would forever weigh on their hearts, and the hearts of their children.<sup>220</sup>

To assume that the French or the British were the only groups capable of “double diplomacy” during this period is to discount the political savvy of the Wabanaki confederacy. As Daniel K. Richter has argued, “modern Indian politics” had at its root the capability (and necessity) of playing the British and French against each other to establish political room in which Natives could operate.<sup>221</sup> Their politics also created geographic room by staking claims to territory and refusing to sign treaties of land surrender. The Mi’kmaq and their Abenaki allies had lived in the region, mapped it, and determined its boundaries. Europeans were tolerated, but their presence during this era was continually negotiated with the region’s Aboriginals, who proved worthy geographic adversaries. It is evident from the treaty negotiations that the Native delegates were clear about what land they considered Aboriginal territory; while willing to negotiate, the Mi’kmaq and their allies worked to retain their particular vision of the northeast.

## **Conclusion**

The period from the fall of Port Royal in 1710 to the establishment of the first British-Native treaties in 1726 was one of almost constant negotiation. The Acadians remained on their lands and adapted to the British presence as necessary; the French at Louisbourg hoped that l’Acadie could be retaken; the Mi’kmaq and their allies asserted their territorial control when European encroachment threatened their traditional lands; and the British, possessing only two strongholds in Nova Scotia, were continually frustrated in their attempts to extend authority beyond the walls of their forts. Nova

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<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country*, 168-69.

Scotia / l'Acadie was as contested in 1726 as it was in 1710. Confusion regarding the region's limits, failed boundary negotiations based on suspect and suspicious cartography, and treaty settlements that secured only Aboriginal "peace and friendship" made clear that Britain and France were arguing over land that neither could control.

Each stage of the tripartite negotiations rested on conflicting and competing geographic images. Maps sent to London were largely unable to reflect the pale within which local British administrators were forced to operate. French maps emphasized Native territory when necessary, but also made claims for France's rights to areas of economic value, such as the Canso fishery. The Wabanaki confederacy was the most consistent in their claims, operating as they did with a much deeper understanding of the region's geography and an ability to depict their territory graphically. "Double diplomacy" was an instrumental element of these negotiations, as each side struck alliances, emphasized their strengths over their weaknesses, and tailored information (geographic and otherwise) to suit their specific needs. What Daniel Richter defines as "modern Indian politics" could be attributed to all sides: each "cultivated the mystique of exclusive loyalty" while keeping their own interests at heart.<sup>222</sup>

The Mi'kmaq were better positioned to take advantage of alliances and geographic knowledge than were either the British or the French. Nova Scotia was a central region within an Aboriginal network based on both land and maritime connections. France succeeded in securing a place in this network because of the cultural negotiations, alliances, and religious links they had established. The British aimed not at fitting into the system, but replacing it. British officials in Nova Scotia lacked the resources and personnel to secure the geographic knowledge necessary to exert territorial

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<sup>222</sup> Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country*, 169.

control. The Atlantic highway went only so far before local rivers and coastal paths shaped how different groups interacted. The Mi'kmaq dominated this terrain and controlled access to it, preventing their enemies from mapping, knowing, and absorbing their surroundings into imperial space. They set boundaries, defined their limits, and were more successful in keeping them than either the French or British were in breaking through.

## Chapter 3

### Contested Places and Useful Spaces: Competing and Cooperating for Territorial Sovereignty, 1727-1744

#### Introduction

The 1726 British-Aboriginal treaties were aimed at ending violence in the northeast. After years of scattered fighting and surprise attacks, the prospect of peace appealed to both sides. While open warfare was curbed, the treaties could do little to stop the jostling for territorial control in Nova Scotia / l'Acadie and its surroundings. The treaties concluded at Annapolis Royal and Casco Bay were vague enough to be misunderstood and misapplied by either side. The lack of substantive change on the ground meant that while the English were no longer engaged in official conflict, they remained a weak force in a land inhabited by Acadians and Aboriginals, neither of whom were interested in facilitating British expansion in the region. Nor were the French at Île Royale pleased with the agreements struck in New England and Nova Scotia, and they would continue to press the Natives to fight the British.

The result of these treaties was less a peace than a mutual recognition of coexistence. On the one hand, the British could not will their territorial sovereignty into existence, but instead had to appeal to and negotiate with stronger Aboriginal groups and the region's Acadian settlers. The Mi'kmaq and their allies, on the other hand, were forced to acknowledge the continued presence of the British and adapt to the changes that such a presence had forced upon them. The French, for their part, worked clandestinely to disrupt British-Native alliances while feigning fidelity to the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht. This period was characterized not by conflict or unbridled expansion, but by

carefully constructed and monitored areas of interaction that served to maintain a balance of geographic control.

There existed from 1727-1744 a period of relative peace among the British, French, and Natives living in Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, though sovereignty remained contested. This chapter will argue that peace depended on a balance of authority among groups living in the province, none of which could claim absolute sovereignty. Central to that balance of authority were the negotiations around geographic power, by which I mean the ability to enforce actions taken on territory. According to Greg Denning, power and authority are not mutually exclusive. Power is “public, impersonal” and “dependent on rituals of reification,” while authority is “private, personal, dependent on interpretive wisdom and signs of adaptability.”<sup>1</sup> Each group’s geographic power (drawing a boundary, raising a fort, engaging in trade) was legitimated as authority only in select areas, while sovereignty remained elusive. Limits on geographic power, imposed by resistance, negotiations, and some violence, restricted the extension of authority and preserved a regional balance in the face of wider aspirations for territorial control.

There were competing visions of territorial control among the region’s three main groups (British, French, and Native), and no one group was able to implement completely its own vision to the exclusion of others. Within each group were internal divisions that reduced its ability to present a united front against challengers, and allowed for cooperation and collaboration with competing groups. As Daniel K. Richter has

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<sup>1</sup> Greg Denning, *Mr Bligh's Bad Language: Passion, Power and Theatre on the Bounty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 80. My concepts of power, authority, and sovereignty, are informed by K. J. Kesselring, *Mercy and Authority in the Tudor State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); G. W. Bernard, *Power and Politics in Tudor England: Essays* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

demonstrated, coexistence between European and Native groups was possible because the interests of some Europeans coincided with those of certain Natives peoples some of the time.<sup>2</sup> What developed was a system of checks and balances in which alliances and interconnections between groups appeared as necessary and disappeared when they no longer served a purpose. Tools of geographic control (including religion, commerce, cross-cultural negotiations, threats of violence, and settlement projects) were used to create and monitor fluid, seasonal, and temporally limited areas of interaction and exchange in which problems could be addressed, discussed, and, ideally, resolved.

The competing visions of territorial sovereignty were influenced by the different objectives held by each group. The Mi'kmaq, the region's oldest residents, wanted to maintain their seasonal migrations, continue their trade alliances with the French, and preserve their Catholic practices. Their migratory patterns meant that certain locations were more important at different times of the year, although they maintained a series of settlements to which they would return.<sup>3</sup> The British and French had to adapt to Mi'kmaq movements, organizing treaty negotiations and annual conferences to coincide with the Natives' schedules and locations.<sup>4</sup> These areas of interaction were never permanent, but they served an important purpose.

The Acadians envisioned a province in which they were allowed to expand and continue living as they had prior to 1710. As N.E.S. Griffiths has demonstrated, this

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<sup>2</sup> Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 182.

<sup>3</sup> William C. Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760" (Ph.D dissertation, McGill University, 1994), 396-411.

<sup>4</sup> Olive Patricia Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations, 1713-1760* (Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1976), 86. The French made more concessions in this regard because they, unlike the British, held regular meetings with the Mi'kmaq and their allies.



period was the Acadian “golden age” during which their population increased and so too did their desire for new land.<sup>5</sup> Expanding into uncultivated lands that the British hoped to control brought the settlers and the government at Annapolis Royal into conflict. Neither side could ignore the presence of the other, so an informal compromise was reached: Acadian deputies, acting as quasi-governmental agents, oversaw the expansion of their fellow settlers, mediated disputes over land claims, and recorded (as best they could) the process of settlement. The Acadians could not simply do as they wished, but nor would they allow the British government to dictate their settlement patterns. Who would control vacant territory and how it could be peopled was of singular importance in the Acadian-British struggle for sovereignty and demonstrated how ineffectual was the “conquest” of 1710. The British begrudgingly accepted Acadian expansion, and Acadians recognized titular British rule. These negotiations of geographic power served as an early example of the French and British coexistence that became common after 1760.

The two aspiring imperial powers, Britain and France, were unable to assert territorial sovereignty much beyond the walls of their forts. The French at Louisbourg relied on alliances with the Mi’kmaq and their allies to influence developments in Nova Scotia. Those alliances were established and maintained by creating seasonal sites of negotiation in which the two sides met to discuss problems and formulate strategy, although both the French and the Natives had their own (at times divergent) ideals at heart. Unable to demonstrate clearly the monarch’s power from across the Atlantic, the French benefited from the shared religious spaces that brought the Natives and French

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<sup>5</sup> Naomi Griffiths, "The Golden Age: Acadian Life, 1713-1748," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 17, no. 33 (1984): 21-34.

together and created a sense of community that excluded the British.<sup>6</sup> The British at Annapolis Royal were weak, and therefore relied on military displays to assert control over the province. The construction of forts and magazines was an attempt to balance the presence of Acadian settlers, but the Mi'kmaq and the French at Louisbourg opposed the extension of British military posts and refused to legitimate British military power as geographic authority, especially those placed in the disputed areas beyond the peninsula.

The result of these competing territorial strategies was a relative balance of authority and relative peace. This balance was facilitated by the desire of France and Britain to prevent conflict, organize economies to recuperate past wartime expenditures, and negotiate alliances with other countries to serve the interest of peace. Officials in Britain especially were happy to leave Nova Scotia in the hands of local administrators, and this *laissez-faire* attitude persisted until 1749.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, each group in Nova Scotia was responsible for guarding against the incursions of another. The Acadians extended their settlements, the Mi'kmaq continued their seasonal migrations, and the British built forts where they could. Left largely to their own devices, the British, French, and Natives in Nova Scotia developed a practical political matrix based on competing and cooperating geographic sovereignty that endured until renewed conflict in Europe led to fighting in northeastern North America.

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<sup>6</sup> Kenneth J. Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002). The French had a long history of converting Natives in New France. See Gilles Havard and Cécile Vidal, *Histoire de l'Amérique Française* (Paris: Flammarion, 2008), 333-43; Kenneth M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). The English were less successful in their attempts to convert the Natives to Protestantism. See Carla Gardina Pestana, "Religion," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, ed. David Armitage and M. J. Braddick (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 69-92.

<sup>7</sup> James A. Henretta, *"Salutary Neglect": Colonial Administration under the Duke of Newcastle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Ian. K. Steele, *Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, 1696-1720* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

An investigation into interpretations of boundaries and borders is necessary to understand fully the current use of geographic sovereignty as an analytical framework. Canadian and American scholars who have examined the northeast have used a range of geographic theories to explain how different groups interacted in shared or contested areas. In an important study on borderlands in the northeast, John G. Reid argued that while historians often describe the early modern northeast in terms of conflict, the region could equally be understood as a peaceful borderland. The northeast was an imperially unsuccessful region because neither France nor Britain attained exclusive control. There were many opportunities for violence, but the region's inhabitants avoided continued conflict because it was too destructive. The hazy boundaries provided many spaces of interaction where peace and commerce triumphed over conflict and competition. Acadians reclaimed land from the sea and therefore did not encroach on Mi'kmaq territory, New England enjoyed trading with the Acadians, and members of the Abenaki did what they could to maintain peace with the English.<sup>8</sup> Commentators on this interpretation argue that there is a danger of replacing one simplistic paradigm (the northeast as a region of conflict) with another (the northeast as an area of peaceful interaction).<sup>9</sup> Recognizing the fluidity and temporality of the spaces within Nova Scotia will help establish an alternative method of understanding the importance of geographic control in shaping inter- and intra-cultural relationships. Areas of interaction were not simply peaceful or violent, but were adaptable and always changing.

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<sup>8</sup> John G. Reid, "An International Region of the Northeast: Rise and Decline, 1635-1762" *The Northeastern Borderlands: Four Centuries of Interaction*, ed. Stephen Hornsby, Victor A. Konrad, and James Herlan (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1989), 10-25.

<sup>9</sup> Alaric Faulkner, "Commentary," *Ibid.*, 27.

The borderlands framework was revisited in a recent collection comparing New England and the Maritime provinces. In their introduction, John G. Reid and Stephen J. Hornsby trace the historiography of borderlands and frontier studies to argue that recent scholarship has demonstrated that borderlands theory is not a “dogma,” but “an interpretive model capable of generating productive debate.”<sup>10</sup> American historians have employed a borderland framework to investigate how cultural groups interacted in contested spaces, but the focus is often on the southwest. More recent scholarship, such as Alan Taylor’s *The Divided Ground*, deals with the northeast. Both fields are dominated by investigations into the Native-non Native relationship and struggles for control over land.<sup>11</sup>

A recent shift in focus is challenging the borderlands approach. J.H. Elliott’s *Empires of the Atlantic World* suggests that much can be learned by constantly comparing and contrasting experiences, as he does with the British and Spanish empires in America. Elliot hopes that “a light focused on one of them at a given moment will simultaneously cast a secondary beam over the history of the other.”<sup>12</sup> Eliga Gould elaborated on this theme and argued for a shift from “borderlands” to “entanglement” history in an attempt to examine how cooperating and competing powers influenced each other without resorting to a more limiting comparative approach. Unlike the borderlands

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<sup>10</sup> Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid, “Introduction” in *New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons*, ed. Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 6.

<sup>11</sup> See Karl S. Hele, *Lines Drawn Upon the Water: First Nations and the Great Lakes Borders and Borderlands* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008); Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution* (Vintage: 2007); Samuel Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Rosemary A. King, *Border Confluences: Borderland Narratives from the Mexican War to the Present* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> John Huxtable Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), xviii.

approach, which most often investigates groups living in a shared or contested geography, entangled histories allow for a broader scope. For example, England could justify its actions in Ireland by referring to Spain's conquest of Mexico.<sup>13</sup> Entanglement histories, however, have been criticized for being borderland studies in new clothes "because most of them describe interactions at the margins, not at the core."<sup>14</sup>

In an attempt to avoid the challenges of a centre/periphery framework, Elizabeth Mancke and Stephen Hornsby employ a "spaces of power" model to explain the process of European expansion and resistance. Mancke defines spaces of power as "systems of social power, whether economic, political, cultural, or military, that we can describe functionally and spatially."<sup>15</sup> She argues that a spaces of power analysis differs from other interpretations of European expansion because it does not assume colonization, and it incorporates more easily systems of power without an identifiable centre. Moreover, because these spaces can be identified functionally, they often overlap in ways that frontiers and borderlands do not.<sup>16</sup> While Mancke provides examples of these spaces of power – economic, cultural, and imperial – her analysis does not detail how these spaces were created and maintained, or how they changed over time.

Mancke's framework provides an important realignment for how historians can think about geographic authority, and her arguments work well with those of Stephen J. Hornsby. In *British Atlantic, American Frontier* Hornsby divides British America into three spaces of power: the Atlantic staples region, closely tied with England; the

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<sup>13</sup> Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *American Historical Review* 11, no. 3 (2007): 364-86.

<sup>14</sup> Jorge Canizares-Esguerra, "Entangled Histories: Borderland Historiographies in New Clothes?," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007): 787.

<sup>15</sup> Elizabeth Mancke, "Spaces of Power in the Early Modern Northeast," in *New England and the Maritime Provinces*, 32.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

continental staples region, positioned between Atlantic trade circuits and the American interior; and the agricultural frontier, distanced from the Atlantic and largely independent from Britain.<sup>17</sup> Nova Scotia, however, is largely overlooked in this sweeping analysis of British America and Natives seem to have little influence on the impact of the three spaces. While Nova Scotia might fit into the British Atlantic model, its inner spaces of power were diverse, dominated by a Native presence, and require a more specialized investigation. John G. Reid's *Essays on Northeastern North America* helps fill this void. His essays focus on how maps informed the creation of Nova Scotia as a Scottish (and then British) space, how Natives in the northeast generally and Nova Scotia specifically maintained military and political authority by controlling British expansion, and how memory and commemoration shape our understanding of past events.<sup>18</sup>

Other models of geographic space and multi-cultural interaction are less applicable to Nova Scotia / l'Acadie / Mi'kma'ki. Richard White's *The Middle Ground* offers an intricate model for examining how different groups lived together in a shared space, but his interpretation requires a specific set of circumstances that did not exist in Nova Scotia. He argues that "perhaps the central and defining aspect of the middle ground was the willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner's cultural premises."<sup>19</sup> In other words, no group had more authority than the others, and all groups were forced to argue for what they wanted in terms that would be comprehensible, and desirable, to other groups. Although

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<sup>17</sup> Stephen Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005).

<sup>18</sup> John G. Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

<sup>19</sup> Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 52.

the “middle ground” has become shorthand for any interaction between different racial or cultural groups, White’s argument was specific to his subjects’ time and place: small groups of relatively equal power, dislocated by violence and forced to interact, each with the goal of acquiring something belonging to the other. The argument has been challenged recently. Heidi Bohaker suggests that White did not investigate fully the way that kinship ordered society in the Great Lakes region, arguing that Native relocations were “planned, negotiated, and preferred,” not forced on them by war.<sup>20</sup> Brett Rushforth questions White’s depiction of Algonkian unity, which might undermine the importance of war and violence as deciding factors in alliance making in the Great Lakes region.<sup>21</sup>

As will be demonstrated, although there were elements of a “middle ground” at work in Nova Scotia, the region generally was not a middle ground. The Aboriginals had lived there for thousands of years, the French for over a century, and the British had roots just to the south. None of these groups were forced into the area to avoid conflict, and the goal was not to live together in peace but rather to control as much territory as possible. The French-British-Native relationships were governed by fluid and fleeting areas of interchange, seasonal settlements, and competing aspirations for territorial sovereignty. This investigation will begin where the “spaces of power” model ends. Exploring contested, shared, and settled spaces demonstrates how groups interacted and helps explain how territory influenced relationships, while emphasizing that these spaces were constructed to serve specific purposes. Attention to territorial fluidity illustrates the limits of British rule by highlighting the various areas beyond their control. This

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<sup>20</sup> For an analysis of White’s influence, including his reaction to the book’s response, see Susan Sleeper-Smith et al., “Forum: The Middle Ground Revisited,” *William & Mary Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (2006). Quote from p. 39.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

analytical framework incorporates Natives better than a strict examination of settlements or shifting borderlands because spaces of Aboriginal importance (such as sites of religious and economic interaction, or areas of treaty negotiation) were often ephemeral. Accepting that power could be expressed in geographic spaces, the question becomes how (or if) that power was legitimated as authority and contributed to claims of sovereignty.

### **Boundaries, Expansion, and Land Claims**

The British-Native treaties of 1726 are significant less for the boundaries they established (general ones in New England, and none at all in Nova Scotia) than for the mutual recognition they signalled between members of the Wabanaki confederacy and British settlers. Natives in New England had a longer history of interaction with the British than did the Mi'kmaq and Wolastoqiyik in Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, and there was by the early eighteenth century a significant power imbalance in New England that favoured the British.<sup>22</sup> New England settlers were eager to expand into the lands between New England and Nova Scotia, and were unwilling to let the 1726 treaty derail their aspirations. What first stood in the way of this expansion, however, was resistance and confusion within the British administration itself. It was not uncommon in contested spaces to find members of the same group pitted against each other.

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<sup>22</sup> On the development of Native-English relationships in New England, see *American Beginnings: Exploration, Culture, and Cartography in the Land of Norumbega*, ed. Emerson W. Baker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, "Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast: A Reappraisal," *William & Mary Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2004): 77-106; William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003); Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast*.



Confusion within the British administration in Nova Scotia, New England, and Britain over who should control the lands between New England and Nova Scotia unwittingly protected Aboriginal territory – for a time, at least. The Abenakis had been fighting with settlers in lands lying between the Kennebec River and the St. George River for a generation; in fact, they drove out most English settlers during King William’s War (1689-1697).<sup>23</sup> By the late 1720s, Thomas Coram was pressing the Board of Trade to grant him permission to settle in the abandoned region, in part to prevent the Natives from claiming the land as their own to the detriment of British interests.<sup>24</sup> Best known as a philanthropist who established a foundling hospital in London, Coram had spent time in New England in the early-eighteenth century and was always interested in colonization projects, particularly in Maine and, later, Georgia.<sup>25</sup> His petition to the Board of Trade suggested that convicts could be sent to America working for Britain’s benefit by clearing trees and cultivating the wasteland in preparation for settlement.<sup>26</sup> Though his petition ultimately failed to win favour with the Board of Trade, his interest in the project continued and a new acquaintance, David Dunbar, provided new hope.

Dunbar had been appointed surveyor general of the woods in 1728 and had formulated a plan to raise a settlement in the lands between the Kennebec and St. Croix rivers. Coram and Dunbar began consulting on the project, and soon offered the Board of

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<sup>23</sup> William D. Williamson, *The History of the State of Maine from Its First Discovery, A.D. 1602, to the Separation, A.D. 1820, Inclusive* (Hallowell Glazier, Masters,, 1832).

<sup>24</sup> Gillian Wagner, *Thomas Coram, Gent* (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2004), 66.

<sup>25</sup> James Stephen Taylor, “Coram, Thomas (c.1668–1751),” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* [hereafter *ODNB*], ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, October 2006, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/view/article/6282> (accessed March 19, 2009).

<sup>26</sup> Wagner, *Thomas Coram, Gent*, 67. On the role of convict transportation and its influence on British-American relations, see Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton, *Eighteenth-Century Criminal Transportation: The Formation of the Criminal Atlantic* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Trade a new proposal to settle destitute Irish families from Massachusetts and a number of Palatines in the region. The Board of Trade favoured sending these settlers to Nova Scotia to bolster that province's English Protestant character, but the Irish in Massachusetts argued it was too far for them to travel and Coram cautioned that the lack of civil government in Nova Scotia would weaken settlers' resolve to stay. The Board of Trade eventually agreed, and Dunbar was named governor of the Royal Province he called Georgia.<sup>27</sup>

There was, moreover, a further problem. The land between the Kennebec and the St. Croix was populated – it was the Abenakis, after all, who had forced out previous settlement attempts – and another British government had staked a claim to the region (Figure 3.1). Governor Philipps of Nova Scotia wrote to Thomas Pelham Holles, the Duke of Newcastle and secretary of state for the Southern Department, to clarify plans for the region. Philipps had learned of Dunbar's new position and of the creation of a new province on the lands bordering New England, "which I looked upon to have been a part of this Government, but if it be determined otherwise I have no objection to make."<sup>28</sup>

This was not quite true: he did, in fact, have objections to make,

As Colonel Dunbar is both Governor and surveyor he is at liberty to receive immediately all families that shall offer, whereas my hands have been tied up from the beginning, not to be loosed but by [Dunbar] having finished the survey of this whole Province, whereby its settlement has been postponed and balked all the time of my government and may continue to be in its fame some time longer for I look upon it not to be the work of months but years and unless (in the doing of it) regard be had to the harbours and places that are most proper for settlements, I am afraid to think that all encouragement will be quite taken away.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Wagner, *Thomas Coram, Gent*, 71. See also Dunbar to Newcastle, Boston, 11 October 1729, 14, v12, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>28</sup> Philipps to Newcastle, Annapolis Royal, 3 January 1729, 15, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*



**Figure 3.1** Extract from Henry Pople's *Map of the British Empire in North America*, 1733, illustrating the area of contested British settlement from Pemaquid Fort to the St. Croix River. Library and Archives Canada, H11/1000/1733.

Not only was Dunbar in the enviable position of overseeing the survey of a province for which he would be governor, but also the very establishment of that province robbed Nova Scotia of its surveyor and offered an alternative location for potential settlers.

Philipps' was not the only claim to the region. Governor Dummer of Massachusetts sent a letter to Dunbar arguing that the proposed settlement fell under his jurisdiction, and therefore his government had the right to oversee any development.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Dummer to Dunbar, Boston, 6 December 1729, 16, vol. 12, RG1, NSARM.

Dunbar had previously explained to Dummer that the Board of Trade granted him the lands by separating them from Nova Scotia, not from Massachusetts; but Dummer persisted that the province fell under his government.<sup>31</sup>

There were concerns about what influence Massachusetts oversight might have for the project. Thomas Coram informed the Board of Trade that any involvement of the government of Massachusetts “would infalably be the destruction” of the settlement, as the Penobscot and eastern Abenakis people had “in time past received so many injurious provakations by the base & fraudulent practices of the Massachusets in making them drunk, then enticing them to execute deeds of conveyance for large quantities of their land, when they knew not the meaning of those deeds.”<sup>32</sup> In other words, having so angered and abused the Aborigines, the Massachusetts government would be unable to prevent violent reprisals on new settlers.

Dunbar was seemingly fighting battles on two fronts. Nova Scotia’s governor was angered at more competition for settlers, while Massachusetts’ governor challenged Dunbar’s authority to undertake the project at all. At this early stage, Dunbar’s only ally in the project was the Penobscot. The 1726 treaty ratified at Canso had set limits on British expansion into Penobscot territory, and so long as Dunbar adhered to those limits the Natives would welcome him as a friend. The chief of the Penobscot, upon hearing of Dunbar’s plan, sent him a friendly, but cautionary response via translator and military captain John Gyles:

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<sup>31</sup> Dunbar to Dummer, Boston, 4 December 1729, 15, vol. 12, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>32</sup> Thomas Coram to BTP, London, 28 November 1729, *Documentary History of the State of Maine [DHSM]*, vol. 10. Ed. James Phinney Baxter (Portland: Lefavor-Tower Company, 1907), p.436. Scholarship suggests that the Natives were, by this time, well versed in the art of land dealings. See Emerson W. Baker, "'A Scratch with a Bear's Paw': Anglo-Indian Land Deeds in Early Maine," *Ethnohistory* 36 (1989): 235-56.

Great Sir, we heard your Lettar, it was Red and Interpreted to Us by Captn Gyles & we Like it well & we hear your ar Planted at Pemaquid, it was Unknown to Us but since you ar Settling ye old Settlements that was formally we Consent to it, and not to Exceed ye old boundarys of Pemaquid we are well Plesd to hear of your Observing the articles of Peace made between Us & Ye Province of ye Masachussetts Bay. Good frind you say you ar Imploid by his Majty King George, if you Pass St Georges River we shal be Uneasy we mention this to you Bleiving you are Imploid from his Majty & that you will be our frind. We say no more at Present & what we have sd is from our hearts, & what we concluded on at our Chief Village at Penobscot, and if any Pass St Georges River to Plant we shall not thinke them to be our frinds. We salute you Col. Dunbar.<sup>33</sup>

The letter demonstrated how one group worked to limit the territorial aspirations of another. While British officials quibbled over jurisdiction, the Penobscot chiefs saw a new settlement – one governed by a previous treaty – as an opportunity for new friendship. Similar to examples of Natives involved in the fur trade, mutually beneficial European settlements were welcomed. Yet they were also controlled.<sup>34</sup>

Aboriginal compliance, like the attempted settlement itself, did not last. Dunbar's plans for the settlement attracted attention and opposition from competing groups in New England, including settlers claiming the right to settle up to the St. Croix River, well beyond the limits set in 1726.<sup>35</sup> The intensified interest in the region likely concerned the Penobscot, who felt the need to assert their territorial sovereignty to slow British expansion. One year after being welcomed by the Penobscot, Dunbar received an advisory letter from Philipps on how to proceed now that the local Aboriginals opposed

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<sup>33</sup> The Chiefs of the Indians of Penobscot to Col. Dunbar, St. Georges, 14 November 1729, *DHSM*, vol. 10, pp. 446-7. On the Penobscot generally, see Frank G. Speck, *Penobscot Man: The Life History of a Forest Tribe in Maine* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1940). John Gyles had been captured by the Wolastoqiyik as a young man and spent several years with them, learning language skills and gaining cultural knowledge that would make him indispensable to the English and Abenakis. See W.S. MacNutt, "Gyles, John," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography [DCB]*, www.biographi.ca. For an account of his time with the Wolastoqiyik, see *Memoirs of odd adventures, strange deliverances, etc. in the captivity of John Gyles, esq., commander of the garrison on Saint George River, in the district of Maine* (Boston: 1736).

<sup>34</sup> Arthur J. Ray, *Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 16.

<sup>35</sup> David Dunbar to Jeremiah Dunbar, 7 October 1730, 170, vol. 38, CO 217, LAC.

the settlement. “I am sorry,” Philipps began, “that you inform me of the Penobscott...dislike to the making of this settlement,” adding that the Natives “have the direction of Peace and War,” being the most considerable group in the province.<sup>36</sup> Philipps reminded Dunbar that there had been no work on the Nova Scotia survey, although two deputy surveyors had been dispatched to the province. He hoped that the spring would bring some progress.<sup>37</sup>

Dunbar faced other obstacles from within the British government. Most importantly, his desire to become a governor was never realized. He arrived in Boston with only the position of surveyor general of the woods, though he had been assured of more. His gubernatorial appointment from the Board of Trade, however, was rejected by the Privy Council, which ruled that the land in question was in fact under Nova Scotia’s jurisdiction and could not be made into a new province. Dunbar’s problems with the Massachusetts government worsened when Jeremiah Belcher, who grew to detest the surveyor, replaced William Dummer as governor. By 1732, after Dunbar was ordered to leave the area, the new settlement was officially scuttled.<sup>38</sup>

As Dunbar’s attempted settlement illustrates, contested areas were centrally important in maintaining a balance of geographic control even when those in competition were members of the same larger group, in this case British settlers and administrators. Put simply, territorial competition limited sovereignty. Yet conflict also existed between

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<sup>36</sup> Philipps to Dunbar, Annapolis Royal, 9 November 1730, 43, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. One of the problems facing surveyors was a lack of equipment, including a vessel. The *William Augustus*, the ship used and abused in earlier surveys – described in Chapter Two – was inspected and considered by the shipwright, carpenter, and various ship masters to be too decayed for the task. See John Corny, Henry Barlow, Samuel Ruck, and Nicholas Shepherd to Philipps, Canso, 16 July 1729, 168, vol. 38, CO 217, Library and Archives Canada [LAC].

<sup>38</sup> Wagner, *Thomas Coram, Gent*, 73. For a brief account of Dunbar’s problems with Massachusetts, see David Dunbar to Jeremiah Dunbar, 7 October 1730, 170, vol. 38, CO 217, LAC.

different groups. The British faced especially stiff resistance from the Natives in Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. In 1730, Joseph d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin, a French officer and Abenaki chief – the son of a French officer and his Abenaki wife – issued a report on the state of the Abenakis “of Acadia.” The English had established new forts at Pemaquid and were intent on building more to establish a presence in the region. They had pressed the Abenakis to rent or sell their lands, though the Natives resisted. The British even went so far as to promise Saint-Castin a command of the British troops and a monopoly on the trade, should he only declare himself a subject of the King of England.<sup>39</sup> Saint-Castin refused the offer, and the French authorities encouraged him to continue resisting British expansion.

The Kennebec River was not the only area of attempted British expansion. As Dunbar's efforts faltered, the government at Annapolis Royal looked to extend its authority into regions inhabited by the Wolastoqiyik and the French. In 1731 Joseph de Monbeton de Brouillan, *dit* Saint-Ovide, the governor of Île Royale, reported that the British had sent English families to the St. John River area, and were constructing forts in various places. Unable successfully to people the region, the British relied on forts to demonstrate military strength in the face of administrative weakness. The trappings of power were poor stand-ins for territorial control. Saint-Ovide was sure that such actions would trouble the Natives.<sup>40</sup> He was correct, and the Mi'kmaq and Wolastoqiyik groups responded to British attempts at expansion. When British settlers attempted to build a

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<sup>39</sup> Resumé du rapport du sieur de St. Castin, 1730, *Collection de Manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France, recueillis aux archives de la province de Québec, ou copies à l'étranger* [CMNF]. vol. 2, ed. J. Blanchet (Quebec: 1884), p. 149. See also Sieur de Saint-Castin concernant les Acadiens, 1730, f72, vol. 8, C11D, Les archives nationales d'outre mer [ANOM]. On Saint Castin's life, see Georges Cerbelaud Salagnac, “Abbadie de Saint-Castin, Joseph d', Baron de Saint-Castin,” *DCB*.

<sup>40</sup> Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 25 November 1731, f36, vol. 12, C11B, ANOM.

magazine at Chignecto, the Mi'kmaq plundered the proprietor's house "under a pretence of a premium or rent due to them for the land and liberty of digging."<sup>41</sup> Indicating a misunderstanding or misapplication of the 1726 treaties, Lieutenant Governor Armstrong argued that such violence against the British was a breach of the agreements made at Boston and Annapolis.<sup>42</sup> Armstrong failed to realize that his actions – attempting to build new settlements in contested areas – could also be interpreted as a breach of the treaty. These attacks made it clear that the Mi'kmaq were unwilling to legitimize British power beyond Annapolis Royal.

Armstrong himself knew that the Mi'kmaq and their allies questioned his government's authority beyond the walls of Annapolis Royal, and at times even government within those walls was questionable. Armstrong complained that authority at Annapolis Royal, like the fort itself, was weak "after having been so long as upwards of twenty one years (which may be said imaginarily only) under the English government."<sup>43</sup> The British could barely exert control over a crumbling fort let alone convince the Mi'kmaq that the King controlled the entire province. The Mi'kmaq argued that Britain had conquered only Annapolis Royal, leaving Minas, Chignecto, and other areas in the province unchanged.<sup>44</sup> Though in the Treaty of 1726 the Mi'kmaq and their allies acknowledged "His Said Majesty King George's Jurisdiction & Dominion over the territories of the said Province of Nova Scotia or Acadia," they also agreed not to disturb

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<sup>41</sup> Armstrong to Newcastle, Annapolis Royal, 15 November 1732, 20, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.



the English “in their settlements already made or lawfully to be made.”<sup>45</sup> In contested spaces, “lawful” was a relative term.

As Thomas Barnes has demonstrated, Annapolis Royal lacked the ability to delineate “lawful” behaviour and could not convert the region’s inhabitants into legal subjects. This failure had much to do with Whitehall’s neglect in instituting measures that could bring Acadians into the British constitution. Administrators were unable to secure an unconditional oath of allegiance from the Acadians, and they came to depend on Acadian deputies to settle legal matters traditionally under the Council’s authority. Acadians filed complaints based on their custom, which likely derived from the *Coutume de Paris*, and because the British were unable to institute British law, they were forced to hear the complaints and adjudicate based on established Acadian practices.<sup>46</sup> This juridical weakness similarly forced the British to incorporate Native customs into their negotiations (demonstrated by the treaty process) as administrators were unable clearly to incorporate, assimilate, or annihilate the Mi’kmaq. Considering the importance of legal spaces of empire to the extension imperial authority, British weakness in the face of French and Native resistance is a telling indicator of their tenuous position.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Article of Peace and Agreement: Annapolis Royal 1726, f3v-5v, vol. 5, CO 217, LAC. For a detailed analysis of the treaty and its implications, see William Craig Wicken, *Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).

<sup>46</sup> Thomas Garden Barnes, “The Dayly Cry for Justice’: The Juridical Failure of the Annapolis Royal Regime, 1713-1749,” in *Essays in the History of Canadian Law*, ed. Philip Girard and Jim Phillips, vol. III: Nova Scotia (Toronto: Published for the Osgoode Society by University of Toronto Press, 1981), 10-41. Legal frameworks in Acadia were a complex combination of French law, local customs, and Aboriginal influence. See Jacques Vanderlinden, *Regards d’un Historien du Droit sur l’Acadie des XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècles* (Moncton: Université de Moncton, Institut d’études acadiennes, 2008).

<sup>47</sup> Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). The British also faced financial restrictions, as governors were warned not to raise forts or trading houses in Aboriginal territory unless the local administration could pay for them. See Armstrong to Belcher, Annapolis Royal, 11 September 1732, *Nova Scotia Archives II: Two Letter Books and One Commission Book, 1713-1741 [NSA II]*, ed. Archibald M. MacMechan (Halifax:

When the government at Annapolis Royal ventured beyond the fort and into contested lands, the Natives responded. Their response indicated that while generally opposed to the extension of British authority, the Mi'kmaq and their allies were not a homogenous group, but consisted of different political elements. In the summer of 1732, Major Henry Cope and a Mr. Cottnam were in Minas at the house of René Le Blanc, an Acadian notary, when three Natives arrived – Jacques Winaguadesh, his brother Antoine, and their cousin Andress. After threatening Le Blanc and disparaging his family as “dogs and villains,” Jacques promised Le Blanc a violent end should the English build a fort in the area. Cope assured the Natives there were no such plans, but asked what the response would be if there were. The Natives responded that they would not suffer it, for this was their land and the British had no business there.<sup>48</sup>

Cope was convinced that the three Natives had been put up to the attack by a group of Acadians who often treated Le Blanc poorly, but what is evident is that Jacques, Antoine, and Andress did not speak for all the Mi'kmaq. Three days later a group of twelve Natives approached Henry Cope and asked for pardon on behalf of those who had harassed Le Blanc. Cope informed them that they should make a proper apology and indicate who had encouraged them to oppose the blockhouse. The Council was forced to re-evaluate their plans for a magazine at Minas, and while they initially settled on issuing a proclamation among the Acadians and Mi'kmaq stating that such a building did not infringe on any of their rights (a tacit recognition that Acadians and Mi'kmaq had rights

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Public Archives of Nova Scotia, 1900), 86. Also, Armstrong to BTP, Annapolis Royal, 14 January 1734, 63, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>48</sup> Minutes of Council, Annapolis Royal, 25-26 July 1732, *Nova Scotia Archives III: Minutes of Council, 1720-1739 [NSA III]*, ed. Archibald M. MacMechan (Halifax: Public Archives of Nova Scotia, 1908), 239-242.

to begin with), opposition was strong enough to force them to abandon the plan.<sup>49</sup> Other Native groups periodically wintered around areas of British interest, which Lieutenant Armstrong suggested indicated their intention to disrupt any British plans to expand.<sup>50</sup>

In 1740, seven years after Lawrence's problems at Minas, the Abenakis continued to stress the importance of restraining geographic expansion to the limits set in 1726. At a meeting in Montreal, a group of eastern Abenakis informed the governor of New France, Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois, that they had discussed settlement with the British. They had told the English to live in peace and the English had invited them to leave their settlement on the Penobscot and come down river to a house that they had built. The Abenakis responded that they would not; in fact, they wanted the house destroyed or they would destroy it themselves. The British complied and removed the offending establishment from the contested area, a clear indication that their power had not been legitimated.<sup>51</sup> The Native-English negotiation over the house, which had been built above the English fort at St. Georges, demonstrates the importance of contested space as an area in which territorial control could be kept in check. There were, however, political repercussions. The Abenakis, who had not complained during the 1730s when the British established themselves at former English settlements beyond Aboriginal lands, expected the English to honour the 1726 treaty as they had. Jeremiah Belcher, the governor of New England, agreed. Yet doing so angered prominent Boston merchants with interests in the region, who then used their influence to have the governor

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid. See also Robert Rumilly, *L'Acadie Anglaise, 1713-1755* (Montréal: Fides, 1983), 98-99.

<sup>50</sup> Armstrong to BTP, Annapolis, 29 October 1733, 56, vol. 18, RG1 NSARM.

<sup>51</sup> Paroles des Abeankis à Monsieur le Beauharnois, Montreal, 10 July 1740, *CMNF*, vol. 3, p. 188.

replaced.<sup>52</sup> The Natives, however, had once again used their territorial control to challenge British sovereignty.

### French Settlement and Acadian Neutrality

There were other fronts in the competition to control land. Just as the Natives resisted British expansion by refusing to recognize British title to Aboriginal territory, Acadians in Nova Scotia (at times aided by French administrators at Louisbourg) asserted




Figure 3.2 Extract from Charles Morris's *Draught of the Northern English Colonies*, 1749, illustrating Acadian and Native settlements on the St. John River. British Library, K.top.118.52 "portfolio 2".

<sup>52</sup> Bruce J. Bourque, Steven L. Cox, and Ruth Holmes Whitehead, *Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 196-7.

their position as the region's rightful inhabitants. One particularly contentious location was the St. John River, to which both the British and French claimed title (Figure 3.2). In a letter to the Board of Trade, Nova Scotia's lieutenant governor Lawrence Armstrong noted that "a small colony of French have settled themselves in St. Johns River, upon the North side of the Bay of Fundy, who despise and condemn all authority here," and asked for advice on how to proceed.<sup>53</sup> The British method of securing a foothold in disputed regions was to build forts and magazines, which they would continue to do in response to French settlements along Fundy's western shore.

French officials were no less perturbed at British efforts in the region. Quebec's Governor Beauharnois complained to administrators in France that "the English have continued to build forts in the Baie Française [Bay of Fundy] from the St. George River to Beaubassin, which they claim is part of Acadia."<sup>54</sup> And so the pattern continued in the region: the French sent settlers and the British built forts. Acadia's role in French foreign policy was one of a bargaining chip often used to ameliorate France's position in Europe, evidenced by the Treaty of Utrecht. Yet Maurepas, the French minister of the Marine, was increasingly concerned with British expansion. Acadia's limits served as the northeastern boundary of British settlement, which the French attempted to control by establishing a string of posts from the St. Lawrence River, along the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico.<sup>55</sup> In their efforts to prevent British expansion, the French continued to serve as the Wabanakis' geographic allies. Ultimately, the Natives and French both had

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<sup>53</sup> Armstrong to BTP, Annapolis, 10 June 1732, 50, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>54</sup> Beauharnois and Hocquart to Minister, Quebec, 16 October 1731, *CMNF* vol. 3, p. 160.

<sup>55</sup> Havard and Vidal, *Histoire de l'Amérique Française*, 116-17. See also Maurice Fillion, *La Pensée et l'Action Coloniales de Maurepas vis-a-vis du Canada, 1723-1749: L'Âge d'Or de la Colonie* (Ottawa: Lemeac, 1972), 400-01.

as their goal preventing the British from establishing themselves between the St. George River and Beaubassin.

Neither European power, however, was anxious to renew open hostilities. Both France and Britain were feeling the strain of prolonged fighting, and new political leaders – Robert Walpole in Britain and Cardinal Fleury in France – encouraged peaceful negotiations that would allow for rebuilding state coffers and political power. In France, Louis XV found himself surrounded by weakened allies suffering under the financial burdens of war, many of which required time to reorganize finances or were growing closer to newer allies, as Poland was to Austria and Russia.<sup>56</sup> Britain was concerned with the Jacobites who, with the support of France, recognized James Edward Stuart, and then Charles Edward Stuart, as the rightful King of Britain.<sup>57</sup> In the larger context of balancing power in Europe with aims towards peace, the local complaints emanating from Nova Scotia / l'Acadie rarely garnered a metropolitan response. France's policy of British containment was defensive in nature, and Britain's general disregard for Nova Scotia left local officials with few instructions.

Despite the lack of interest from London, the British at Annapolis Royal were increasingly worried about specific land claims within the peninsula. One particularly troublesome case was Agathe Saint-Étienne de La Tour, who took the surname Campbell after her second husband, a British officer named Hugh Campbell. Her first marriage was also to an English officer, Lieutenant Edward Bradstreet, but that union ended with

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<sup>56</sup> Colin Jones, *The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to Napoleon 1715-99* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 133-5.

<sup>57</sup> Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 75-80. On the Jacobite rebellions and imperial influence, see Geoffrey Gilbert Plank, *Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

Bradstreet's death in 1718.<sup>58</sup> Acadians living near Annapolis Royal increasingly married into the garrison, especially as the commercial ties grew and marriage came to represent opportunity. Annapolis Royal merchant William Winniett's marriage to an Acadian woman in 1711 is another example of this trend.<sup>59</sup> These interconnections posed a problem for the British. As John G. Reid has argued, Nova Scotia could not be governed like other British provinces; it lacked English and Protestant settlers and the entrenched powers – both Acadian and Aboriginal – were difficult to co-opt for the British cause.<sup>60</sup>

The British tactic of extinguishing Acadian land grants and creating new ones for future Protestant settlers was not easily implemented. Agathe Campbell's case reveals the Atlantic nature of British territorial expansion, as British officials had faced similar challenges to their authority when they attempted to assert the King's sovereignty over Ireland by re-granting lands.<sup>61</sup> Control over geography was of paramount concern, but the law demanded that Britain recognize and legally terminate grants that existed before 1713. In 1703, by a decree from Louis XIV's Council of state, Mrs. Campbell's family received the seigneurial lands previously granted to her grandfather, Charles de La Tour. The grant included part of Annapolis Royal, Minas, and Cape Sable. Though she in fact only inherited her share of the grant – one fifth of the total – she laid claim to the entire

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<sup>58</sup> Clarence d'Entremont, "Saint-Étienne de La Tour, Agathe (Marie-Agathe) de (Bradstreet; Campbell)," *DCB*.

<sup>59</sup> Maurice Basque, "The Third Acadia: Political Adaptation and Societal Change," in John G Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 163.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 120-21.

<sup>61</sup> See Kesselring, *Mercy and Authority in the Tudor State*, 13. On obvious and crucial difference was the lack of feudal lords in Acadia to facilitate an elite co-option.

area, arguing that her uncles, aunts, and siblings had bequeathed their shares to her.<sup>62</sup>

While in Canso during his second of two visits to Nova Scotia, Governor Philipps wrote to Newcastle about three or four Acadian families, including Mrs. Campbell's, that were claiming large areas of Nova Scotia. Philipps had received for proof "a foul script of paper, which they say is a copy of part of the original grant...but I have told them that all pretensions to seigneuries fell to the ground at the conquest of the country."<sup>63</sup> Despite Philipps' confidence, the matter would not be settled quite so easily.

Three years later, the question was still under consideration. Philipps warned the Board of Trade, to whom Mrs. Campbell had presented a petition, that Campbell "imposes grossly" by claiming that she is the sole heir to the lands, when several other descendants laid claim to La Tour's original grant.<sup>64</sup> The Privy Council considered Mrs. Campbell's petition and received the following advice from the Board of Trade:

"Whereupon we would take leave to propose that his Majesty should be graciously pleased to order a valuable consideration to be paid to the petitioner for her said quit rents, and also for the extinguishment of her claim to any other part of Nova Scotia."<sup>65</sup>

Her right to the lands, though contentious, was recognized and she was paid £2000. The cost of extinguishing Campbell's seigneurial holdings was deemed necessary to ensure Britain's ability legally to grant lands in the future. Without the ability to determine how territory would be controlled and used, Britain's rights granted by the Treaty of Utrecht would be worthless. Allured Popple, secretary of the Board of Trade, argued that Mrs.

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<sup>62</sup> Clarence d'Entremont, "Saint-Étienne de La Tour, Agathe (Marie-Agathe) de (Bradstreet; Campbell)," *DCB*. See also William G. Godfrey, *Pursuit of Profit and Preferment in Colonial North America: John Bradstreet's Quest* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982).

<sup>63</sup> Philipps to Newcastle, Canso, 2 September 1730, 18, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>64</sup> Philipps to BTP, 7 June 1733, 54, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>65</sup> BTP to The Right Honourable Lords of the Committee of His Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, 23 October 1733, no number (20), vol. 16, RG1, NSARM.



Campbell's weakened health made the matter even more pressing, as there was no guarantee that her heirs would be as anxious to settle.<sup>66</sup> N.E.S. Griffiths has argued that the extinguishing of previous grants and the purchase of Mrs. Campbell's title "was an affirmation of the British crown as the sole source of property rights in the colony."<sup>67</sup> Britain might have gained *de jure* ability to grant lands, but their *de facto* territorial control was far from established. The power to act, as Greg Denning argues, is not the same as having the authority of those actions recognized.<sup>68</sup>

Governor Philipps complained that the Acadians were "like Noah's progeny spreading themselves over the face of the province," which meant securing an oath of loyalty to King George was growing increasingly important.<sup>69</sup> British concern about Acadian loyalty began in 1710 and was exasperated by both the close proximity of Quebec and Louisbourg and most Acadians' refusal to swear an unconditional oath.<sup>70</sup> As Gilles Havard and Cécile Vidal have argued, the British debated over several decades how to make Nova Scotia British: suggestions ranged from expelling the Acadians and

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<sup>66</sup> Clarence d'Entremont, "Saint-Étienne de La Tour, Agathe (Marie-Agathe) de (Bradstreet; Campbell)," *DCB*.

<sup>67</sup> N. E. S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People, 1604-1755* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 324-5.

<sup>68</sup> Denning, *Mr Bligh's Bad Language*.

<sup>69</sup> Philipps to Newcastle, Canso, 2 September 1730, 18, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM. For a detailed account of Acadian history and historiography, see Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*. Griffiths argues that the Acadians' refusal to take the oath of allegiance, more so than their religion, was the principal factor in their deportation. While the Acadian historiography is too vast to list here, see, *inter alia*, Julien Massicotte, "Les Nouveaux Historiens de l'Acadie," *Acadiensis* 34, no. 2 (2005): 146-78; John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W Norton & Co., 2005); Geoffrey Gilbert Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); Jean Marie Fonteneau, *Les Acadiens: Citoyens de l'Atlantique* (Rennes: Editions Ouest-France, 1996); N. E. S. Griffiths, *The Contexts of Acadian History, 1686-1784* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).

<sup>70</sup> It has been argued that even when the Acadians did swear an unconditional oath in 1730, it was most likely the result of a verbal guarantee that they would not be required to fight. See *The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History*, ed. Phillip A. Buckner and John G. Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 116-17.

assimilating the Mi'kmaq to Anglicizing the former while forcing the latter out of the region.<sup>71</sup> Loyalty was important, as was ensuring that Britain had subjects to govern in Nova Scotia; there were, after all, only a few hundred British citizens at Annapolis Royal, so it was imperative to convert Acadians into British subjects. Surveys and grants were one way to make this transformation: if Acadian land grants were replaced with those issued from the British crown, Acadians would become one step closer to British subjects. Yet Acadians resisted British attempts to control how they would expand and by what right they would claim property. As Robert Rumilly has argued, Lieutenant Governor Mascarene wanted to use the dispensation of property to secure an oath of allegiance. Acadians would be granted legal title to their lands (and, presumably, lands into which they might expand) only if they swore an unconditional oath of allegiance. Mascarene believed that if he could convince the Acadians of the advantages of holding their lands in the name of the King, and if he could convince them to appeal to the Council to resolve disputes, he would be able gradually to win them over to the British government.<sup>72</sup> For most of the Acadians, however, there was little impetus to become British subjects because they paid such low rents to the French government (which were only sporadically collected).<sup>73</sup>

Administrators at Annapolis Royal had no choice but to compromise. Unable to secure territorial authority in Nova Scotia, but unwilling to admit that the Acadians could move about the province as they wished, British officials relied on Acadians to monitor themselves. Regional deputies, elected by Acadians and serving as conduits between the

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<sup>71</sup> Havard and Vidal, *Histoire de l'Amérique Française*, 614-15.

<sup>72</sup> Rumilly, *L'Acadie Anglaise, 1713-1755*, 120.

<sup>73</sup> R. Cole Harris, *The Reluctant Land: Society, Space, and Environment in Canada before Confederation* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 57, 61.

inhabitants and the government, became increasingly involved in land management. The Council was flooded with property disputes and had to wade through complicated French *contrats* and inherited seigneurial grants, not all of which led to a clear explanation of title. As Thomas Barnes has argued, “from the outset the British regime tacitly equated ‘right’ with possession if supported by *contrat* or inheritance from *contrat*.”<sup>74</sup> Issuing new grants depended on completing new surveys, which was difficult because there was no surveyor in Nova Scotia before 1732. Acadians resisted land surveys and were little concerned with the threatened reprisals from Annapolis Royal, aware as they were of the government’s weakness.<sup>75</sup>

When surveys were performed, local officials relied on Acadian deputies to oversee the work and report on the results. In April of 1735, René Blanchard, of Minas, presented the Council with a petition complaining that Anthoine Celestine, Claud Babin and their associates had trespassed on his land. A map was produced and both sides offered arguments and responses. The Council turned the matter over to the Acadians:

The Board agreed as by the plan their difference could not easily be understood, That the Secretary should write an order to four of the Deputys to choose four of the Antient Indifferent Inhabitants of the Grand Pré in order to go upon the Spot, to visite the Situation of their ground & the road in dispute; & to make a Report & plan thereof in order to be laid before His Honour.<sup>76</sup>

Cartography’s limitations forced the British to rely on “antient indifferent inhabitants” who were as likely to rely on local custom as they were British law. Government officials also relied on Acadian deputies to monitor settlers around an area known as “the Lake,” when a map proved insufficient to determine property boundaries. Settlers were

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<sup>74</sup> Barnes, “‘The Dayly Cry,’” 25.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 25-8.

<sup>76</sup> Council Minutes, Minas, 26 April 1735, *NSA III*, p. 320-21.

warned not to expand beyond the present boundaries. They did anyway, aware that officials' threats were empty and that Acadian custom could regulate lands.<sup>77</sup>

As Sarah Hughes has demonstrated in her examination of colonial Virginia, “until the cadastral surveyor’s chain traversed the land, it could not be converted to private property and personal advantage.”<sup>78</sup> Surveying was not an occupation that required extensive training, nor was it generally a career. It was a skill that could be acquired through some instruction and perhaps an apprenticeship.<sup>79</sup> Determining Acadian land tenure is a difficult task. R. Cole Harris argued that before 1710, “metes and bounds were probably the rule, but most farmers probably never held a notarized deed from a seigneur for their land or paid any seigneurial dues.”<sup>80</sup> The system of metes and bounds provided a workable, though not always accurate, definition of property. It relied on the local geography or other property lines to describe the perimeter of a parcel of land, often citing distances and corner angles to clarify possession. After 1710, surveying was informally completed by deputies and, when available, a government surveyor. In 1731 the Council prepared to publish a notice for the Acadian deputies ordering them to employ the King’s surveyor (likely Dunbar or one of his associates) and reminding them

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<sup>77</sup> Mascarene to Deputies of Chignecto, Annapolis Royal, 11 January 1742, 87, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM. Also, Rumilly, *L'Acadie Anglaise, 1713-1755*, 120.

<sup>78</sup> Sarah S. Hughes, *Surveyors and Statesmen: Land Measuring in Colonial Virginia* (Richmond: Virginia Surveyors Foundation and the Virginia Association of Surveyors, 1979), 1.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>80</sup> Harris, *The Reluctant Land*, 61. Similarly, Andrew Hill Clark wrote in 1968, “there is no more vexing question in Acadian historiography than that relating to the circumstances and characteristics of land tenure after 1710. Cloudy as the situation was before, especially on the fringes of Minas, and in Shepody, Pisquid and Cobequid, it became deeply confused by the ambiguity of the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht and of their interpretation by the Board of Trade or by the governor or his representatives on the spot.” Andrew Hill Clark, *Acadia; the Geography of Early Nova Scotia to 1760* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 195.

that his work required payment.<sup>81</sup> The lack of progress in this matter suggests that Acadians were simply unwilling to pay for a surveyor, whose work would result in increased quitrents.<sup>82</sup>

While this refusal was frustrating to officials at Annapolis Royal, the Acadian position provided a scapegoat for the failings of the province; as long as officials could claim that Acadians were illegally occupying the best lands, there was a reason for the paucity of British settlers.<sup>83</sup> The Acadians, on the other hand, were demonstrating their ability to extend geographic control over new territories. The British recognized Acadian territorial strength (to an extent), and the Acadians similarly supported titular British rule over the province. As N.E.S. Griffiths argued, the Acadians “considered themselves the rightful inhabitants of the lands on which they lived, not just as negotiable assets to be moved about as pawns for the purposes of a distant empire,” but also “accepted that the English officials at Annapolis Royal had a final jurisdiction over a broad area of Acadian life.”<sup>84</sup> The struggle over geographic control clearly demonstrates how Acadians and British authorities negotiated this difficult relationship.

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<sup>81</sup> Don W. Thomson, *Men and Meridians: The History of Surveying and Mapping in Canada*, 3 vols. (Ottawa: R. Duhamel Queen's printer, 1966), 116.

<sup>82</sup> Armstrong to Newcastle, Annapolis Royal, 10 May 1734, 22, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM. The high rents were also a deterrent to potential British settlers, who could find cheaper land in the New England colonies.

<sup>83</sup> This was, of course, a common complaint. Council to Philipps, Annapolis Royal, 10 June 1738, *NSA II*, 120. Though a better scapegoat would be the British government itself, especially its requirement to survey and reserve 200 000 acres of timber before lands could be granted for settlement. As Don W. Thomson argued, “any serious study of Nova Scotia land settlement during the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century cannot be divorced from consideration of the timber-cutting policies of the British government in the province.” See Thomson, *Men and Meridians*, 116.

<sup>84</sup> Griffiths, *Contexts of Acadian History*, 36, 43. On the Acadian-British legal matrix, see Vanderlinden, *Regards d'un Historien*.

## Shared Spaces

British jurisdictional weakness (even when tacitly recognized by the Acadians) and inability to attract significant Aboriginal support meant that Nova Scotia / l'Acadie remained under the control of no single power. Consequently, the province abounded with opportunity and ambition remained a driving force among the French, British, and Native groups. But so long as territorial sovereignty was regulated by each group's desire to limit the strength of the others, pockets of shared spaces – areas where the three groups could interact for mutual benefit – provided outlets for the economic, political, and religious needs of Nova Scotia's varied populace. These particular sites of interaction were seasonal and temporal, influenced most heavily by migration patterns, the push and pull of fishing seasons, and the annual conferences and religious ceremonies celebrated by the French and the Natives. With no single authoritative body controlling the province, territory could be shared when the conditions permitted.

Nova Scotia was not a “middle ground.” Yet shared spaces exhibited certain characteristics that could be described using Richard White's model.<sup>85</sup> Trade, negotiation, and religion – all of which depended on the existence of certain shared spaces – forced each group to attempt to understand the cultural norms of another. Material goods served economic and spiritual ends; agreements were expressed in terms that could reflect the worldviews of both European and Aboriginal diplomacy, even when influenced by deceit; and shared religious beliefs brought different groups together in ways that allowed each to learn about the other. Unlike in the *pays d'en haut*, where

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<sup>85</sup> White, *The Middle Ground*.

refugee Native groups and a weak French presence demanded that each group express their desires in terms another could understand and support, there were in Nova Scotia defined (though not homogeneous) groups with a strong sense of their own culture. However, during the relatively peaceful period of 1727-1744, those groups had to interact with each other in ways that would address individual needs and concerns in a milieu of balanced territorial strength. Nova Scotia's shared spaces facilitated those interactions, but those spaces existed only when each group attempted to understand the concerns of the others.

### *Trade and Commerce*

In their sweeping study of the economy and trade in British America, John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard indicate that much more work needs to be done on Nova Scotia. They argue that economic development required an imbalance of power in favour of the British: first, Acadia had to be won from France; second, the Acadians had to be cleared out to make room for New England settlers and merchants.<sup>86</sup> The authors continue to argue, relying heavily on J.B. Brebner, that Nova Scotia was, economically speaking, “new New England” or “New England’s Outpost.”<sup>87</sup> Yet the Aboriginal influence is essential to understanding Nova Scotia’s economy. The Mi’kmaq and their

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<sup>86</sup> John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607-1789* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 113.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 113-14. See also John Bartlet Brebner, *New England's Outpost: Acadia before the Conquest of Canada* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927). Newer scholarship challenges this depiction of Nova Scotia, arguing that New Englanders were hesitant to settle in the province and happy to continue clandestine trade with the French at Île Royale. See Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia*, 67-85 and 127-54.

allies had developed regional trade networks, and Native goods played a large role in European trade.

William Wicken has demonstrated how the Mi'kmaq were able to incorporate trading with Europeans into their migratory pattern and used European goods for both practical and ceremonial purposes. Glass and beads were fashioned into decorative jewellery, while steel kettles shortened the time required to boil water. The Mi'kmaq supplied furs, first to the traders who arrived on their shores, and later to the Acadians who then traded with Boston.<sup>88</sup> Trade relations in Nova Scotia, like those across North America, produced Native-European intermarriage and alliance building which served to improve access to trade goods and develop mutual trust. As Sylvia Van Kirk has argued, unlike other staple industries the fur trade required a system of exchange between groups.<sup>89</sup> Laurier Turgeon has examined archaeological findings to determine which French group traded where, and with whom. For example, red copper kettles, typical among Basque fishermen, were common in Mi'kmaq sites in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, while the New England Iroquois had many brass decorative objects, found most often among the Normans.<sup>90</sup> Equally important to understand are the spaces and conditions necessary for trade to occur, especially in Nova Scotia where trade was carried out among groups who, in other circumstances, challenged the legitimacy and limits of their rivals' authority.

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<sup>88</sup> Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails", 170-84 and 273-308.

<sup>89</sup> Sylvia Van Kirk, *Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670-1870* (Winnipeg: Watson & Dwyer, 1999), 12.

<sup>90</sup> Laurier Turgeon, "French Fishers, Fur Traders, and Amerindians During the Sixteenth Century: History and Archaeology," *William & Mary Quarterly* 55, no. 3 (1998): 584-610.



The Mi'kmaq had traded with Europeans for hundreds of years, and their reasons for carrying out that trade were myriad, such as material gain, spiritual development, and alliance building.<sup>91</sup> In Nova Scotia, the Mi'kmaq's ability to trade peacefully depended on the success of balancing economic interest with preservation of territory. The balance was even more difficult because past violent acts were difficult to forget. In 1727, the Wolastoqiyik and Passamaquoddy were worried that British ships (primarily from New England) stationed at Canso might continue to harass Natives as they had before. Lieutenant Armstrong did his best to convince them that such was not the case. Armstrong reassured the Mi'kmaq, the Wolastoqiyiks, and the Passamaquoddy that they would be safe and invited them to continue fishing at Canso. He also invited them to visit him and receive "the marks of his friendship," including gifts and reassuring words.<sup>92</sup> Canso was an important commercial site coveted by both the French and the British, and the Mi'kmaq often raided settlers of both nations and suffered reprisals for their actions. However, despite French complaints, the Natives continued to visit Canso and traded with the English so long as peaceful conditions persisted.<sup>93</sup>

Canso was an important economic site for the British in Nova Scotia until the late 1730s, and challenges arose even without an Aboriginal presence. It could be difficult

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<sup>91</sup> On these topics, see Bruce G. Trigger, "Alfred G. Bailey - Ethnohistorian," *Acadiensis* 18, no. 2 (1989); Alfred G. Bailey, *The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures 1504-1700: A Study in Canadian Civilization* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969); Frank G. Speck and Loren C. Eiseley, "Significance of Hunting Territory Systems of the Algonkian in Social Theory," *American Anthropologist* new ser. 41, no. 2 (1939); Calvin Martin, *Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); *Indians, Animals, and the Fur Trade: A Critique of Keepers of the Game*, ed. Shepard Krech (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1981).

<sup>92</sup> Armstrong to the Chief of the Passamaquoddy Indians, Annapolis Royal, 17 June 1727; and, Armstrong to the Indians of St. John, &c, Annapolis Royal, 29 July 1727, *NSA II*, p. 77-8.

<sup>93</sup> At a 1732 meeting at Port Toulouse, Île Royale governor Saint-Ovide chastised the Mi'kmaq for their trading visits to Canso, an obvious source of contention between the French and Natives. See Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 14 November 1732, f254-255, vol. 12, C11B, ANOM.

for British settlers in Nova Scotia and their neighbours in New England to share such a valuable area. The British encouraged trade with the Natives as a means of winning their allegiance, but the settlers and officers at Canso were unable to secure from Natives the clothes, utensils, and furnishings required for daily life. To secure these necessities the British at Canso were forced to rely on New England. Fishermen and merchants from New England visited Canso, bringing with them necessary and valuable supplies which the local inhabitants purchased at great expense.<sup>94</sup> Tension over Canso between the British in Nova Scotia and the New England settlers had begun before 1720 and focused primarily on land use. Governor Phillipps had done what he could to regulate operations in the region by granting fishing lots and garden plots to fishermen, hoping to mollify their complaints and increase the fishery's utility. Protecting the shared space was difficult because official British policy that no new fortifications be erected before a province-wide policy had been tabled ran counter to the immediate needs of New England fishermen. The government at Annapolis Royal did what it could – relying on contributions from the fishermen themselves to raise an inadequate fort – to regulate shared space in a way that would bring more profits to those involved in the fishery while serving the needs of the permanent settlers.<sup>95</sup>

As a common space, Canso was not only shared but also seasonal. Buzzing with fishermen and traders during the summer months, the region was largely deserted for the winter. In 1729, only three families were reported to be year-round inhabitants; by the mid 1730s there was a school with up to 50 students, but the settlement remained largely

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<sup>94</sup> Phillipps to Newcastle, Annapolis Royal, 3 January 1729, 15, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>95</sup> Barry Moody, "Making a British Nova Scotia," in Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia*, 150-51.

transitory.<sup>96</sup> Yet in 1735 Lieutenant Governor Armstrong described Canso as the only place of value in the province, and encouraged the construction of fortifications to defend



**Figure 3.3** Extract from J.H. Bastide's *Particular Plan and Survey of the Harbour of Canso in Nova Scotia*, 1742. The fort, projected fort, and settlements are indicated. National Archives, London. MR1/1783 (1-6).

the British against French attackers.<sup>97</sup> French fishermen continued to visit Canso and profit from its fishery, much to the dismay of officials in London who were aware of how Canso was shared but could do little to stop it (Figure 3.3).<sup>98</sup>

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 152.

<sup>97</sup> Armstrong to Newcastle, 8 December 1735, 26, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>98</sup> Popple to Armstrong, Whitehall, 4 July 1735, 22, vol. 16, RG1, NSARM. Another concern for the Board of Trade was the amount of trade occurring at Canso, and in whose ships – Britain's or New England's. Confusing information prompted the Board to ask if there was even enough commerce at Canso to help pay

To the French, Canso remained British-occupied French territory. The official negotiations over the collection of islands held in the early 1720s had not resolved the issue, and though Governor Philipps had managed to exclude most of the French from the region during the 1720s, it remained a disputed territory. The French argument rested, as it always had, on the wording of the Treaty of Utrecht. The French translation suggested, *inter alia*, that all islands in the mouth of the Gulf of the St. Lawrence (Canso would perhaps fall into this category) belonged to France. At the time of the dispute the English had presented a map of Nova Scotia to prove their point, but the French believed that they had “demonstrated to the English by the same map that the Gulf of St. Lawrence had three mouths.”<sup>99</sup> The first fell between the coast of Labrador and the northern part of Newfoundland, the second between the eastern part of Île Royale and the southern tip of Newfoundland, and the third between the western part of Île Royale and the land of Acadia. According to the French, Canso rested in this third mouth, and therefore belonged to France.<sup>100</sup>

Canso demonstrates how seasonal and temporal forces influenced a region’s importance. Different groups arrived in the region at different times: the Natives during their hunting and fishing rounds, traders when the weather permitted access, fishermen in the summer, and military personnel when administrators were concerned about an attack. Even though the British had established a fort and a small settlement, Canso remained an area of interaction that benefited those who could establish themselves there even

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for the forts Armstrong requested. See BTP to Armstrong, Whitehall, 7 May 1736, 24, vol. 16, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>99</sup> Deux mémoires sur l’île de Canceaux tendant à prouver qu’elle appartient à la France, 1744, f245v, vol 26, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., f246.

temporarily. So long as the waters produced fish, the claims, counter-claims, and a desire to trade ensured that Canso remained a shared space in Nova Scotia. When its prominence as a commercial site diminished, confusion over boundaries and imperial aspirations kept Canso central to negotiated territorial sovereignty.

The economic impact of shared spaces was in part influenced by the lack of government control over trade and commerce.<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, there was so little commerce of interest to Britain in the province – other than the fishery at Canso – that most attempts to develop resource extraction or manufactures were encouraged by the local administration, even if the proprietors were Acadian or from New England. In 1732, the government at Annapolis Royal responded to the Board of Trade’s concerns over how the laws governing trade in Nova Scotia might affect Great Britain. The reply was indicative of the province’s inability effectively to implement a legal regime and its poor economic state: “No manufactories or laws pertaining to them. Very little trade: all done by four or five coasters from Boston which supply the French with European and West India goods and take away grain, a few fish, but chiefly furs.”<sup>102</sup> By essentially describing a legal frontier, Annapolis Royal officials indicated both the limited governmental authority and subsequent room for opportunities within the province.

Members of the garrison at Louisbourg, such as François Du Pont Duivivier, were active traders with the Acadians in Nova Scotia.<sup>103</sup> John Mack Faragher has demonstrated the strength of the Acadian trade economy, arguing that despite the needs

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<sup>101</sup> The Navigation Acts made Acadian trade illegal, though it was also illegal to grant land or hold office. The practical realities demanded some form of representation (Acadian deputies), and little could be done to prevent Acadian trade with either Louisbourg or Boston. These questions were related to the Acadian oath of allegiance, which was debated constantly and never truly resolved before the expulsion. See Elizabeth Mancke, “Imperial Transitions,” in Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia*, 191-99.

<sup>102</sup> Report of Committee on State of the Province, Annapolis Royal, 29 May 1732, *NSA II*, 84.

<sup>103</sup> Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 336-7.

of the garrison at Annapolis Royal, the Acadians preferred to trade with New England merchants who provided bows, ribbons, pins, stoneware, guns, and pipes. They also received rum, cloth, and sugar which they could trade at the fort, if they so desired. When Acadians did trade with Annapolis Royal, they were able to set their price. Any attempt by the officials in Nova Scotia to regulate prices resulted in fewer traders arriving with necessary goods.<sup>104</sup> The Council was angered by this “insolence,” and believed the Acadians were charging exorbitant prices to distress the garrison. For example, the Council had established a price for a cord of wood that it considered reasonable, but Acadians were charging double.<sup>105</sup> The Acadians had other markets to exploit, namely New England. Merchants would travel to Acadia and take advantage of the shared economic spaces to exchange manufactured goods for Acadian produce. The produce was then taken to Île Royale and sold for a considerable profit, completing a circuitous trade route that ensured Acadians provided food to Louisbourg.<sup>106</sup>

Not surprisingly, the British in Nova Scotia complained about this trade; yet complaints were all they could muster. In 1731, Governor Philipps passed an order that forbade Acadian trade with any vessel that did not take place under the watchful eyes of government at Annapolis Royal. Like previous orders on the subject, this one was ignored.<sup>107</sup> Eleven years later, the problem persisted. Lieutenant Governor Armstrong complained that not only were the Acadians continuing to settle themselves on

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<sup>104</sup> Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*, 184.

<sup>105</sup> Beamish Murdoch, *A History of Nova-Scotia, or Acadie*, 3 vols. (Halifax: J. Barnes, 1865), vol.1, 505-06.

<sup>106</sup> Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*, 185. Geoffrey Plank is less eager to give the Acadians a clear upper hand in the regional economy during this time, arguing that while Acadians grew in number and prosperity they did not exercise any kind of economic dominance. See Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*, 88-9. Both authors seem to agree with N.E.S. Griffiths that this was, however, a “golden age” for the Acadians. See Griffiths, “The Golden Age.”

<sup>107</sup> Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*, 185.

unappropriated lands, they were also engaging in clandestine trade with the French government at Île Royale. Armstrong was aware that his government was powerless to stop such commerce.<sup>108</sup> It would also be foolish to do so, as Acadians were acquiring goods they needed and could in turn provide to the garrison. In Nova Scotia's shared economic spaces, practicality triumphed over British desires for control.

### *Temporary Sites of Negotiation*

Aboriginals were most likely to frequent spaces of negotiation, where groups met to discuss issues, air grievances, and attempt to resolve problems. As William Wicken has demonstrated, a treaty or negotiation presupposes that each side at least recognizes the existence and rights of the other.<sup>109</sup> Unlike economic spaces, which were often seasonal, spaces of negotiation were temporary and existed briefly but could occur at regular intervals. Their nature also depended on which parties were participating. As Giles Havard has argued, the Great Peace of 1701, at which the French established a long-desired treaty with the Iroquois, brought representatives from over forty tribes to Montreal to witness “a spectacular expression of this spirit of adaptation and of the intensity of cultural exchange in the diplomatic sphere.”<sup>110</sup> English-Native spaces of negotiation were often held at settlements, forts, or on important and convenient transportation routes. This choice of location required the superimposition of one space – that of negotiation – over another. French-Native negotiations also took place in shared

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<sup>108</sup> Armstrong to [not addressed/BTP], Annapolis Royal, 24 September 1742, 37, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>109</sup> William Wicken, “Mi'kmaq Decisions: Antoine Tecouenemac, the Conquest, and the Treaty of Utrecht,” in Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia*, 99. See also Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*.

<sup>110</sup> Gilles Havard, *The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century*, trans. Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 181.

religious spaces or areas included in a seasonal migration pattern. Spaces of negotiation were ultimately transportable and powerful, as they were able to exist in areas otherwise avoided by one or both sides.

Annapolis Royal served as an important shared space of negotiation. It had been the site of violent encounters, with deaths and damages incurred by all sides. The British also attempted to make the fort a place for shared and supervised trade. In 1727, however, Annapolis Royal served as the location for important negotiations that transformed the military fort into a more welcoming space for Aboriginals. It was there that Mi'kmaq and Wolastoqiyik leaders met with British officials to ratify the treaty struck at Boston.<sup>111</sup> In his report to the secretary of state of the Southern Department, Armstrong described the cordial meeting:

In the month of May last an Indian tribe consisting of about 26 men under the command of 3 or 4 of their sachems from the village of Meductoo, an Indian settlement fifty odd leagues up the River of St. Johns, came here to ratify the Peace concluded at Boston and to make their submission to the government, whereupon I advised with the commission officers here in the Garrison about their treatment and reception, who were unanimously of opinion that they should be handsomely entertained while they staid and at their going away should receive some testimonies and marks of his majestie's bounty.<sup>112</sup>

The confusion over the meaning of the treaty notwithstanding, the negotiation itself illustrates the importance to the Wabanaki and British of creating spaces of negotiation in which the terms of a relationship could be discussed and debated.

The exchange of gifts was an essential element of Native-European negotiation. As William Wicken has argued, the French relied on annual ceremonies at which gifts were exchanged to renew alliances and receive information about events that had

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<sup>111</sup> See Chapter Two.

<sup>112</sup> Armstrong to the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, Annapolis Royal, 9 July 1728, 13½, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.



occurred throughout Nova Scotia. The earliest records of these exchanges dates to the 1690s and indicate that the French government spent up to 4000 *livres* a year on gifts for the Mi'kmaq, the Penobscot, the Abenakis, and the Wolastoqiyik.<sup>113</sup> The British at Nova Scotia struggled to compete with French gifts, often unable to satisfy the Mi'kmaq's demands for presents. When the Mi'kmaq appeared to warm to the British, the French would increase the amount of presents they gave.<sup>114</sup> The British, however, too often underestimated the importance of gifts and responded to perceived Native wrongdoings by limiting or ending exchanges. This lack of cultural understanding damaged British officials' ability to exert its influence beyond Annapolis Royal.

In 1734 Governor Philipps was asked to account for the money allotted for Native presents. He began by blaming one of his agents, Mr. Bamfield, for spending the money carelessly and keeping half for himself. "His death," Philipps explained, "prevented the more full detection of that Fraud."<sup>115</sup> Other reasons for not providing the Mi'kmaq with gifts included the poor weather (which in 1721 prevented the goods from being shipped from Boston to Annapolis Royal), and Native hostility (which Philipps felt should hardly to be rewarded with presents). Even when the gifts were presented to Native chiefs, Philipps argued, there was little security that those good relations would last. After holding meetings with Native chiefs at Canso and sending them off with presents, Philipps learned that the Mi'kmaq attacked British vessels, killed some of the seamen, and kept others as navigators. In response, Philipps charged two ships with a counter attack. They found the Mi'kmaq, killed a number of them and returned with a severed

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<sup>113</sup> Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails", 396-402.

<sup>114</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 107.

<sup>115</sup> Philipps to BTP, 30 November 1734, 62, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM.

head to show Philipps. The governor recognized him as one of the men to whom he had given presents just a few weeks before. Philipps concluded that the gift giving must end. “They will take whatever we give them,” he argued, “and cut our throats the next day if our neighbours see it their interest to disturb our settlements.”<sup>116</sup> Philipps, who spent more time in Britain than in Nova Scotia, might not have understood the intricacies of Native negotiation and alliance building. His lieutenant, Armstrong, argued to the Board of Trade just two months later that annual presents for the Natives could help win them into the British interest.<sup>117</sup>

By failing to provide adequate presents, the British in Nova Scotia were refusing to create spaces of negotiation that allowed the airing of grievances and provided a forum for dispute resolution. There was a history of British-Native negotiations in the northeast throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century that recognized Aboriginal strength, evidenced by the fact that negotiations followed Native protocol.<sup>118</sup> As Daniel K. Richter has argued, these ceremonies were rife with misunderstanding. Native speechmakers “phrased their arguments in a ceremonial language that differed nearly as much from everyday Mohawk speech as did the King James Bible from the ordinary discourse of New England farmers raised in East Anglia.”<sup>119</sup> But the ceremony itself was important as it brought together different groups in an area of cultural exchange. At Annapolis Royal, however, those lessons were largely ignored. The weakest settlement in the British northeast followed a policy most reliant on military strength. The British were willing to meet to confirm treaties, but less willing to engage in continued negotiations to develop

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Armstrong to BTP, Annapolis Royal, 14 January 1734, 63, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>118</sup> Baker and Reid, “Amerindian Power,” 15.

<sup>119</sup> Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country*, 133.

lasting alliances. The result was continued hostility and only limited success in making alliances with the region's most powerful inhabitants.

The French were aware that one-time gifts did not ensure allegiance, and that relationships with Natives were constantly negotiated. For this reason the governor of Île Royale made annual trips throughout the island, as well as to Île St Jean, creating spaces of negotiation to which the region's Mi'kmaq and their allies were invited. The discussions at these conferences – which were more likely to be held at places of convenient access for the Natives than at the strongest French settlements – ranged from an exchange of news, to demands for assistance, to requests for military alliance. The French officials were careful to do what they could to help the Natives without openly breaching their peace with the English. In 1729, Saint-Ovide received a request from the chiefs of Beaubassin and Pisiquid, who had suffered an English attack and wanted revenge. They asked Saint-Ovide to assist them, but he informed them that he could not and they seemed to understand.<sup>120</sup> The French, unlike the British, entered into an open dialogue with the Natives to foster a stronger relationship (one based on shared cultural knowledge and respect) capable of withstanding minor setbacks.

These conferences also exhibited the alliances and disagreements within the region's Native groups. Saint-Ovide learned from a group that had arrived by canoe from the St. John River that a number of their nation had previously gone to Boston to make peace – the treaty of 1726 – but others were not prepared to do so. They wanted to renew their alliance with the French and, since they had not received presents in some time,

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<sup>120</sup> Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 11 November 1729, f187v, vol. 10, C11B, ANOM.

requested a gift. Saint-Ovide complied and the Wolastoqiyiks were pleased.<sup>121</sup> The French governor also settled disputes between Native groups that could have otherwise persisted. When a few Wolastoqiyik complained that a Mi'kmaq had murdered one of their nation, Saint-Ovide gave presents to atone for the death and promised not to forget what had happened.<sup>122</sup> It was primarily through the creation of areas of negotiation that the French learned how Aboriginal society functioned, and what was required to maintain an alliance. Negotiations of this sort were as much about acquiring cultural knowledge as they were focused on settling disputes. These fleeting areas of interaction, created and dissolved as the need arose, bestowed on the participants that visited them the ability better to understand each other.

Another benefit of conferences and created sites of negotiation was the ability of both sides to discuss their disappointment in the other and take the necessary steps to remedy the situation without resorting to violence. As Kenneth Banks has argued, “the conferences with Native peoples...functioned as a kind of court where cross-cultural transgressions could be openly settled.”<sup>123</sup> When Saint-Ovide learned that a group of Natives had gone to Canso and received alcohol, he expressed his concern and informed their elders that if such behaviour continued they would anger the French, their “father.” The Native elders retired, discussed the problem, and returned later to tell Saint-Ovide that they were aware of the actions of a few of the young members, and that they would be willing to summon them so that Saint-Ovide could chastise them as he saw fit.<sup>124</sup> With this matter resolved, the Natives then expressed their concern that France had

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., f188-188v.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., f190.

<sup>123</sup> Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea*, 190.

<sup>124</sup> Saint-Ovide to Minister, Louisbourg, 14 November 1732, f254-255, vol. 12, C11B, ANOM.

abandoned them spiritually, as they no longer enjoyed the presence of a missionary priest. It was then Saint-Ovide's turn to apologize, which he did by reassuring the Natives that he had requested more missionaries from France to serve in their communities.<sup>125</sup> With the issues dealt with and the alliance refreshed, presents were distributed and all retired to their homes.

These spaces of negotiation were often within areas of seasonal migration or Native settlement. Sometimes French officials would travel to Native settlements, and other times the Natives were summoned to French forts. Though French administrators spoke on behalf of the King and represented his authority and magnificence, there came times when the Natives wanted to see for their own eyes what was so often described to them.<sup>126</sup> Natives had crossed the Atlantic for hundreds of years, though in smaller number and less frequently than Europeans had made the opposite voyage. Alden T. Vaughan has documented the voyages of approximately 175 Natives who arrived in Britain before the American Revolution, challenging the stereotype that most Natives were stolen from North America, displayed as oddities in Europe, and then died. Vaughan suggests that most Aborigines "crossed the Atlantic...voluntarily, conducted serious business abroad, survived the exposure to deadly viruses, and, safely home, influenced their own people."<sup>127</sup> But not all Natives who requested to visit Europe were

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., f257.

<sup>126</sup> Royal magnificence, as Kenneth Banks has demonstrated, often lost some of its potency as it crossed the Atlantic. See Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea*, passim.

<sup>127</sup> Alden T. Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-1776* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xiv. Vaughan's monograph helps fill a gaping hole in the historiography, but there remains much work to be done. See Paul Cohen, "Was There an Amerindian Atlantic? Reflections on the Limits of A Historiographical Concept," *History of European Ideas* 34, no. 4 (2008): 388-410; John G. Reid, "How Wide Is the Atlantic Ocean? Not Wide Enough!," *Acadiensis* 34, no. 2 (2005): 81-87; Ian K. Steele, "Exploding Colonial American History: Amerindian, Atlantic, and Global Perspectives," *Reviews in American History* 26, no. 1 (1998): 70-95.

granted permission. In 1737, New France Governor Beauharnois informed the King that he had received requests to travel to France from both Abenakis and Acadian Natives. Both groups were anxious to witness the King's majesty and confirm his power for themselves. He had interpreters tell them that there was no point in making such a journey.<sup>128</sup> French officials wanted to control how authority was explained and displayed, and therefore preferred to keep their negotiations local.

The request to visit European monarchs was a reasonable reaction to the process of land negotiations that often excluded an Aboriginal voice. The Abenaki were aware that British and French monarchs possessed the ability to grant land (even if they refused to accept their authority to do so), and the Natives were troubled by their exclusion from an important space of negotiation across the ocean. Beauharnois fielded complaints from the eastern Abenakis, who questioned the British practice of securing land concessions from their King. "An English captain who went to England two years ago," the Abenakis lamented,

carried with him a map of our lands. Upon his return he told us that the King had given him the concession and that he would seize our lands. We are confident that no one can take the lands from us because they belong to us. But he wants to act as if the lands belong to him and he has already started to build on them.<sup>129</sup>

The Abenakis were willing to negotiate land dealings when proper protocol was followed, including a ceremony held in a shared space of negotiation. When excluded from the process, the Abenakis became agitated and received reassurances from the French that they could do what was required to retain control over their lands.<sup>130</sup> Spaces of negotiation were an important site of cross-cultural interaction, but they better served

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<sup>128</sup> *Memoire des Sieurs de Beauharnois et Hocquart au Roy, 1737, CMNF, vol.3, p. 183.*

<sup>129</sup> *Paroles des Abenakis à Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois, Montreal, 10 July 1740, CMNF, 188.*

<sup>130</sup> *Reponse de Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois aux Abenakis, Montreal, 11 July 1740, CMNF, 189.*

willing participants. Therefore the French, who had a longer and more collegial relationship with the Mi'kmaq and their allies, benefited more than the weaker British whose limited territorial power was never legitimated as authority.

### *Religious Spaces*

Of all the sites of interaction in Nova Scotia, those of a religious nature were perhaps the most contentious. The Mi'kmaq, Wolastoqiyik, and eastern Abenakis had long been exposed to Catholic missionaries, and most had been converted to Christianity. The Treaty of Utrecht preserved for the Acadians the practice of their religion while reserving for the British administrators the right to appoint and dismiss Catholic priests in the region. Consequently, religious spaces represented a strange amalgam of shared religious practice – among the French and many of the Mi'kmaq – and begrudged acceptance by the British who remained distant (and almost excluded) from shared religious areas. Administering religious difference had a profound impact on the British and on the course of Canadian history. Ramsay Cook has argued that the Conquest of Quebec and the incorporation of French Canadians – primarily Catholics – into a British and largely Protestant Canada was the defining feature in Canadian history.<sup>131</sup> The Nova Scotian experience, however, provides an early example of important elements of such a conquest, namely how to deal with religious difference. As J.B. Brebner argued in 1927, the capture of Acadia forced Great Britain to “govern in a colony a large number of

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<sup>131</sup> Ramsay Cook, *Watching Quebec: Selected Essays* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 190.

Europeans who were alien in religion as well as race,” lessons from which could be applied to Quebec after 1760 when the “conquest” of Acadia was finally completed.<sup>132</sup>

As N.E.S. Griffiths argues, scholars have focused on the perceived power of the Catholic clergy to influence the Acadians and the Natives in Nova Scotia. Griffiths warns of the danger of assuming that Catholicism was a unified force, recalling the various conflicts and debates within Catholicism during the eighteenth century. For all their influence, the priests were unable to convince the French inhabitants and the Mi'kmaq to relocate to Île Royale or Île St Jean after 1713, and priests were not regarded as beyond contradiction.<sup>133</sup> There was, however, a change in religious policy after 1713, with the establishment of permanent missions among the Natives, the creation of new missions, and the construction of churches and presbyteries to facilitate missionary work.<sup>134</sup> This increased effort by the French was not imitated by the British, who found it difficult to relate to the Mi'kmaq on a spiritual level, and whose efforts to introduce Protestantism were largely unsuccessful.<sup>135</sup>

Even if unsuccessful, there were British efforts to introduce the Protestant faith among the Natives which resulted in “unintended consequences and unexpected outcomes.”<sup>136</sup> Governor Philipps expressed his frustration over the Board of Trade's slow response to these overtures in 1730. Philipps had sent to Newcastle a proposal he

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<sup>132</sup> Brebner, *New England's Outpost*, 7. I am not suggesting that the capture of Acadia is important only as it relates to the Conquest of Quebec; however, the latter must be understood in light of the former.

<sup>133</sup> Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 272-73. On the religious debates in France, see Cyril B. O'Keefe, *Contemporary Reactions to the Enlightenment (1728-1762): A Study of Three Critical Journals: The Jesuit "Journal de Trévoux," The Jansenist "Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques," And the Secular "Journal Des Savants."* (Geneva: Slatkine, 1974).

<sup>134</sup> Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails", 330-32.

<sup>135</sup> See Jennifer Reid, *Myth, Symbol and Colonial Encounter: British and Mi'kmaq in Acadia, 1700-1867* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1995).

<sup>136</sup> Pestana, “Religion,” 70.



received from a French protestant missionary who wanted to settle 100 Protestant families in Nova Scotia. After receiving no reply on the matter, Philipps lamented that such projects were not “embraced and encouraged” by London administrators, especially considering the difficulties Nova Scotia was having attracting settlers and granting lands.<sup>137</sup> Administrators in Britain faced financial and organizational challenges, and Nova Scotia’s inability successfully to introduce Protestantism to Native inhabitants (and Acadians) was indicative of the larger North American experience.<sup>138</sup> Equally important was the state of the province’s defences, which were meagre in part because a militia could not be formed by “Papists.”<sup>139</sup>

Though the British were rarely able to share their religious practices with the French and Natives in religious spaces, they were charged with the administration of those spaces insofar as they could appoint or reject priests. This oversight helped the British balance religious power from a distance. Government officials at Annapolis Royal kept tabs on the comings and goings of priests as best they could, and, as Lieutenant Governor Mascarene did in 1741, often chastised Acadian deputies for failing to report the arrival of new priests.<sup>140</sup> Mascarene was also forced to remind the religious authorities in Quebec of Britain’s jurisdiction over clerical authority in Nova Scotia. He reported to the Board of Trade that a bishop in Quebec “pretends to the power of sending at pleasure his Missionaries into this Government, as presuming it a part of his diocese, and would dignify one or more of those with the title of his grand Vicars for the

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<sup>137</sup> Philipps to Newcastle, Canso, 2 September 1730, 18, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>138</sup> Pestana, “Religion,” 74-9.

<sup>139</sup> Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 329.

<sup>140</sup> Mascarene to Bergenau, Annapolis Royal, 16 July 1741, *NSA II*, p.152.

Province.”<sup>141</sup> Mascarene saw this attempted superimposition of religious space (a diocese) onto the province as a threat. He wrote to Bishop Pontbriand – addressing him as “monsieur” instead of the more respectful “monseigneur” – and reminded him of the limits of religious power. “I hope,” Mascarene wrote, “that the distinguished reputation that you enjoy in your church will lead you to prevent the desolation and ruin that certain of your missionaries have very nearly brought to this province’s inhabitants.”<sup>142</sup> Acadians could practice their Catholic faith under the guidance of a French priest, but those priests were to be approved by the British. Otherwise the British would have no influence over religion in the province, and no potential avenue for winning the Acadians over to the British interest.<sup>143</sup>

Religion was an aspect of eighteenth-century Nova Scotia that separated the British and the French. Yet Lieutenant Governor Mascarene was particularly well suited for his post in Nova Scotia and for the religious issues he was forced to address. He was a French Huguenot who fled France with his father after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. He was smuggled into Geneva, where he was raised and educated before entering the military and finding himself in Nova Scotia as a lieutenant. With Armstrong’s death in 1739, Mascarene staked his claim as the president of the Council, though Alexander Cosby challenged his authority until Cosby’s death in 1742. Mascarene did his best to remain on good terms with the Acadians, and he expressed a deep concern over their religious practices. Instead of deriding their faith, Mascarene

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<sup>141</sup> Mascarene to BTP, Annapolis Royal, 3 December 1742, 90, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>142</sup> Rumilly, *L'Acadie Anglaise, 1713-1755*, 123.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

entered into spirited, yet friendly correspondence with leading members of the Catholic clergy.<sup>144</sup>

Mascarene discussed religion and its impact on daily life in the letters he sent to Catholic priests and in the personal meetings he had with them, thus interjecting into religious spheres of influence. He was able to debate the virtues of Protestantism and Catholicism in an academic fashion, and while never swayed by the priests' arguments, he valued their point of view. These letters discussed how religious matters could affect temporal ones, specifically how the priests should relate to their followers. Mascarene wrote to the missionary Jean-Baptiste Desenclaves to discuss how a priest's religious authority, when extended into a civic setting, would challenge Britain's position in Acadia. "Consider, Monsieur," he stated,

How this tends to render all civil judicature useless, & how easy it will be for the Missionarys to render themselves the only distributors of justice amongst the people bred up in ignorance; and of what consequence it is for the maintaining of his Maj'tys authority to restrain that power which the priests are but too apt to assume.<sup>145</sup>

This religious tolerance had its limits, of course; when the curé at Annapolis Royal, Claude de La Vernède de Saint-Poncy, went to Chignecto without the Council's permission and refused to return when ordered, Mascarene cut off all correspondence.<sup>146</sup> Though intellectually engaged, Mascarene refused to let the shared spaces of religion infringe on his duties as an administrator for the province. The areas of religious

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<sup>144</sup> Maxwell Sutherland, "Mascarene, Paul" *DCB*.

<sup>145</sup> Mascarene to Desenclaves, 29 June 1741, *Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of Nova Scotia*. Ed. Thomas Akins (Halifax: Charles Annand, 1869), 112.

<sup>146</sup> Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*, 212-13. On Paul Mascarene, see Barry Moody, "'A Just and Disinterested Man': The Nova Scotia Career of Paul Mascarene, 1710-1752" (Ph.D Dissertation, Queen's University, 1976).

exchange were mutually beneficial: the government could exercise limited authority and the Acadians and Mi'kmaq could practice their religion.

Acadians themselves were somewhat ambivalent in their religious lives. N.E.S. Griffiths argues forcefully for a more tempered view of Acadian Catholicism, stressing the inhabitants' tendency to question their priests instead of blindly adhering to religious dogma. It was perhaps this practical approach to religion that facilitated the shared religious space in Nova Scotia. The Acadians' priests themselves found cause for complaint in their behaviour, writing to their superiors at Quebec about drunkenness – on Sundays, at that – as well as lascivious behaviour, such as men and women dancing together after dark and singing bawdy songs. “It is clear,” Griffiths suggests, “that the Acadian interpretation of Catholicism owed little to Jansenism.”<sup>147</sup>

Yet the Acadians were practicing Catholics who attended Mass regularly and said their prayers before bed.<sup>148</sup> They were also quick to complain if they felt that the British were preventing them from practicing their faith. In 1736, the Acadians of the Saint-Jean-Baptiste parish wrote a memorial complaining that they were without a priest, and that the British refused them their prayer services.<sup>149</sup> The British undoubtedly did what they could to maintain their position within the shared religious space, and if they were not able to prevent Catholic worship, they could develop relationships with Catholic priests who emphasized the obligation to respect authority. At times these opportunities presented themselves to the officials at Annapolis Royal because priests would arrive to

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<sup>147</sup> Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 311. Similar examples are found in New France. See Allan Greer, *The People of New France* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

<sup>148</sup> Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 312.

<sup>149</sup> Memorial from Acadians of Saint-Jean-Baptiste, 1736, f74, vol. 8, C11D, ANOM.

complain about jurisdictional authority. The British government had only to determine which priest was most sympathetic to British rule, and find in his favour.<sup>150</sup>

As A.J.B. Johnston has demonstrated, the Acadians were more likely to receive religious assistance from Quebec than from Louisbourg. Bishops in Quebec took an active interest in dispatching priests to, and declaring clerical jurisdiction over, the Acadian settlers. Yet Louisbourg struggled to support the Brothers of Charity of Saint John of God, the Récollets of Brittany, and the Sisters of the Congregation of Notre-Dame who ran the hospital, served as priests, and educated girls, respectively. With a primarily military, merchant, and somewhat transient population, Louisbourg's religious groups suffered from under-funding and indifference. Inhabitants refused to pay the *tithe*, bishops never visited, and religious organizations struggled to attract and retain the necessary personnel to function as spiritual and educational guides.<sup>151</sup> With so many issues to deal with at the fort, there was little that these religious orders could do to support the Acadians in Nova Scotia.

Louisbourg was more interested in maintaining its alliance with the Mi'kmaq and their allies, and religion played an important role in that relationship. Many Mi'kmaq, Wolastoqiyik, and eastern Abenakis had converted to Catholicism and enjoyed a close relationship with their priests, and government officials relied on the bonds of religion and the influence of clerics to keep Natives in the French interest. Such efforts required financial assistance, and administrators at Louisbourg received frequent requests from their missionaries. In 1740 Abbé Le Loutre requested funds to build a church in Acadia

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<sup>150</sup> Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*, 95.

<sup>151</sup> A. J. B. Johnston, *Life and Religion at Louisbourg, 1713-1758* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 151-54.

because neither he nor the Mi'kmaq were in any position to undertake such a project without help. The officials agreed, and in turn suggested to the minister of the Marine that 500 or 600 *livres* should cover the cost.<sup>152</sup> The minister also received assurances that both the medallions provided to the Natives and the work of missionaries such as Abbé Maillard were successfully retaining the Mi'kmaq as allies.<sup>153</sup>

Louisbourg was only one administrative centre to field requests for aid from Natives or their missionaries. It was to Quebec that many eastern Abenakis living in the disputed regions of southern Nova Scotia / l'Acadie sent representatives to complain or ask for assistance, and it was from Quebec that many missionaries received their orders. In 1731 the King of France approved of Governor Beauharnois' decision to send missionaries to the Abenakis at Narantsouak (Kennebec) as judged necessary, but he "recommends them to be continually attentive to the movements of the Abenakis to keep them close and prevent them from going to live in their old village."<sup>154</sup> Clerics and missionaries, it was hoped, could act as proxy government agents to direct Native actions.

The Aborigines, especially the eastern Abenakis, were well aware of the divisions between clerics and government officials, and their close bonds with the former did not necessarily lead to allegiance to the latter. As Kenneth Morrison has argued, divisions within the eastern Abenakis led a significant portion of the population to search out an alliance with the British.<sup>155</sup> The French were concerned because the British at Boston were attempting to make inroads with the Abenakis by providing them with

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<sup>152</sup> Bourville and Bigot to Minister, Louisbourg, 30 October 1740, f69-69v, vol. 22, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>153</sup> Bourville to Minister, Louisbourg, 25 October 1740, f118-121v, vol. 22, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>154</sup> Memoire du Roy aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnois et Hocquart, Marly, 8 May 1731, *CMNF*, vol. 3, p. 157.

<sup>155</sup> See Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast*.

presents. The conferences and discussions between the British and the Natives, however, lacked the strength of regularly attended shared religious areas which facilitated the exchange and interchange of cultural knowledge. Beauharnois assured the minister of the Marine that “religion is a bond that will keep [the Natives] in our interests.”<sup>156</sup>

The British wanted an alliance with the Natives and realized that the French were successful largely because of the religious bond. As late as 1751 an English settler argued that it would be possible to attract the Natives, as “they cannot be entirely rooted in the French interest,” even though they are bound by religion; but if they could be converted to the “more pure and rational [faith],” things might change.<sup>157</sup> The difficulty facing the British was that they spent less time with Natives in spaces of interaction (such as those of negotiation) that produced cultural knowledge. Attempts to win Abenakis allies by providing their chiefs with commissions and gifts failed at shifting Native alliances.<sup>158</sup> Only with an improved sense of the Mi’kmaq worldview could the British develop shared religious tenets. Even that might not be enough, as according to Carla Gardina Pestana the British were not satisfied to adapt Protestantism to appeal to Aboriginal spirituality, but wanted instead to “obliterate and replace” Native religion.<sup>159</sup> Creating and maintaining a cultural connection with the Mi’kmaq required more effort, more shared spaces, and perhaps more understanding than the British were willing to make.

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<sup>156</sup> Lettre de Messieurs de Beauharnois et Hocquart au ministre, Quebec, 5 October 1735, *CMNF* vol. 3, p.173.

<sup>157</sup> Abbé Maillard, *An Account of the Customs and Manners of the Micmakis and Maricheets, Savage Nations Now Dependent on the Government of Cape Breton* (London: 1758), v-vi.

<sup>158</sup> Memoire des Sieurs Beauharnois et Hocquart au roi, Quebec, 13 October 1735, *CMNF* vol. 3, p. 173.

<sup>159</sup> Pestana, “Religion,” 79.

Religion was a source of identity, and true reconciliation with the British would remain elusive so long as the Acadians and Mi'kmaq felt as though they belonged to a different religion than the British. As Linda Colley has demonstrated in the British context, religion served as a defining characteristic between British Protestants and French Catholics on the continent. So long as there was a common and identifiable enemy, internal divisions could be overlooked.<sup>160</sup> Similar conditions existed in Nova Scotia's areas of religious interaction. Geoffrey Plank demonstrates that a single Catholic mission could serve to unite a variety of groups. Religious ceremonies at Père Gaulin's chapel at Shubenacadie were attended by "Acadians, French travelers from Ile Royale, and representatives of Algonkian nations from the region...and so the mission helped to strengthen the links that tied the various Catholic peoples of the maritime region together."<sup>161</sup> These groups could worship together, but could also share news and pertinent information from throughout the region.<sup>162</sup> The British, who were only nominally part of this shared religious space – acting as administrative overseers instead of active participants – were unable to benefit from these centres of religion and communication. Consequently, the British lacked a true understanding of how a shared religious culture affected regional alliances. Created areas of religious interaction were effective tools for building and maintaining alliances that favoured the French and Mi'kmaq at the expense of the British.

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<sup>160</sup> Colley, *Britons*. See also Robert Tombs and Isabelle Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King to the Present*, 1 ed. (New York: Knopf, 2007).

<sup>161</sup> Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*, 80.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*



## **Controlled Spaces**

Instrumental to the system of checks and balances that from 1727 to 1744 monitored competing territorial sovereignties was the attempt to create and secure controlled spaces that could provide each group with their own territory. In the complex and changing world of eighteenth-century Nova Scotia, these locations signalled a change from the largely fluid and temporal areas of interaction to more permanent settlements and strictly defined boundaries. The creation of settlements involved inter- and intra-cultural competition, with members of the British, French, and Native groups arguing both among themselves and with each other. These groups projected outward signs of stability, though internal relationships were shaped by negotiation and competition. Records of these internal contests illuminate the mechanics of settlement, which depended on territorial control. Settlers participated in local governance by voicing their concerns over property and boundary issues. An investigation into the creation of settlements and boundaries sheds light on the inner workings of territorial sovereignty and the importance of controlling space to balancing regional power.

### *Settlements*

The British in Nova Scotia operated within a circumscribed pale. There were two primary settlements – Annapolis Royal and Canso – within which the British were able to exercise authority without facing heavy or constant opposition. The forts and their immediate surroundings marked the limits of British geographic control in the province, and any forays beyond those limits resulted in a reaction from the French and Mi'kmaq who monitored British movements. Within the crumbling sodden walls of Annapolis

Royal sat a government forced to recognize their impotence locally while projecting an image of British expansion and authority to their superiors. Their superiors, however, who had not yet embraced the idea of empire in Nova Scotia, were often indifferent or discouraging. As Jerry Bannister has argued, it was not until the 1740s that Britain began strengthening imperial authority in North America.<sup>163</sup> In the summer of 1727, Lieutenant Governor Armstrong received a letter from Allured Popple, the secretary of the Board of Trade, informing him that the Board was considering plans for settling Nova Scotia with Protestants. The following October, Armstrong learned that the death of King George I had slowed progress on the matter, but details would be forthcoming. That summer, the Board of Trade announced the appointment of a Royal surveyor of the woods, which would allow the granting of land in Nova Scotia upon the completion of his tasks.<sup>164</sup> The surveyor of the woods, Colonel Dunbar, had his own project and Nova Scotia's survey would simply have to wait. The British lacked the political will to assert control over Nova Scotia's geographic development. France benefited through British inaction, if only because it left Nova Scotia / l'Acadie vulnerable to future attacks. In the meantime, the Acadians enjoyed demographic (and territorial) expansion and the Mi'kmaq lived largely as they had before 1727.

By the early 1730s, with little movement on the larger settlement plans in Nova Scotia, the British government began focusing on increasing its presence at the valuable fishery at Canso. This process involved claims and counterclaims, as various members of

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<sup>163</sup> Jerry Bannister, *The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832* (Toronto: Published for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 2003), 148-49.

<sup>164</sup> Popple to Armstrong, Whitehall, 1 June 1727, 8, vol. 16, RG1, NSARM; Popple to Armstrong, Whitehall, 5 October 1727, 9, vol. 16, RG1, NSARM; Popple to Armstrong, Whitehall, 27 June 1728, 10, vol. 16, RG1, NSARM.

the government jockeyed for plots of land and attempted to leverage their claims against those of their competitors. As Thomas Barnes has demonstrated, there was a lack of legal clarity at Annapolis Royal. Administrators were to govern following the set of instructions sent to the Virginia settlement in 1715, but the conditions at the two settlements were vastly different and only rarely did administrators refer explicitly to the Virginia instructions.<sup>165</sup> Personalities clashed at Annapolis Royal. “Philipps acted with unconcealed vindictiveness towards Armstrong,” Barnes argues, appointing the lieutenant’s enemies (including Alexander Cosby and William Winniett) to powerful positions.<sup>166</sup> Land grants often allowed for a certain amount of score settling. Alexander Cosby, who in 1725 had lost out on the position of lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia to Lawrence Armstrong, feuded with his superior over various matters and often disobeyed orders to remain at his post at Canso. Armstrong was frustrated by Governor Philipps’ decision to name Cosby lieutenant governor of the fort and town of Annapolis Royal in 1727 and to appoint him to the governing Council.<sup>167</sup> In 1731, Alexander Cosby petitioned for a “garden plot” – an area of land separate from the settlement used to grow crops – at Annapolis Royal. When his request demanded approval, Armstrong blocked it because (he claimed) a deed already existed that favoured a different claimant. Cosby was forced to defer his claim and hope to receive a plot at Canso.<sup>168</sup>

Sorting out the division of land in British settlements helped keep the Board of Trade informed of how Annapolis Royal was progressing. Though officials in London

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<sup>165</sup> Barnes, ““The Dayly Cry for Justice,”” 14-15.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>167</sup> Barry M. Moody, “Cosby, Alexander,” *DCB*.

<sup>168</sup> Philipps to Secretary Shirreff, Annapolis Royal, 21 July 1731; Shirreff to Philipps, Annapolis Royal, 24 July 1731, *NSA II*, p. 78.

were often slow in responding to letters and requests, administrators in Nova Scotia had to be prepared to answer for their actions. If Whitehall was guilty of “salutary neglect,” the same can hardly be said for local officials who were well aware of the importance of land management.<sup>169</sup> In the fall of 1732, after organizing land grants and attempting to sort through the quit rents owed and collected, Armstrong sent to the Board of Trade “abridgements of the buttings and boundings of all the patents granted here since my arrival, to whom, their quit rents, and terms of payment which, if judged not sufficient, I shall order copies to be drawn out at length, and shall transmit them accordingly.”<sup>170</sup> Armstrong had moved quickly in this regard, having only shortly before received permission from London to grant land even though the 200,000 acres of suitable woodland had not been surveyed and reserved for naval stores. The new regulation stated that for each section of land granted, one of equal size was to be surveyed and reserved for the King.<sup>171</sup>

Even before the application of the relaxed granting regulations, the Council at Annapolis Royal tried to work quickly to meet requests for settlement. In 1731, the Council received an application from a group of Boston merchants who wanted to secure an extent of land between Chignecto and Minas along the Bay of Fundy. The land could not be granted until surveyed for potential naval stores, so one of Colonel Dunbar’s deputy surveyors was dispatched to complete the task. Drawing from the surveyor’s report, Philipps indicated that the reason the merchants sought this particular grant was

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<sup>169</sup> See Henretta, *“Salutary Neglect”*; Murray Newton Rothbard, *“Salutary Neglect”: The American Colonies in the First Half of the 18th Century* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1975). On the development of colonial policy within the Board of Trade, see Steele, *Politics of Colonial Policy*. Recent scholarship questions the traditional argument that the Seven Years War signalled the end of salutary neglect. See Bannister, *The Rule of the Admirals*, 148-49.

<sup>170</sup> Armstrong to Newcastle, Annapolis Royal, 15 November 1732, 20, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>171</sup> BTP to Armstrong, Whitehall, 2 November 1732, 17, vol. 16, RG1, NSARM.

for the region's coal deposits. The Council advised Philipps to grant the land, as it would increase the number of British settlers in Nova Scotia.<sup>172</sup> Settlers would help transform the seasonal fishing settlement and temporary fortifications into sites of British settlement.

Attempts at making a settlement more permanent could cause conflict. There were clashes between soldiers and settlers at Canso, an area that became more British as competition over the fishery waned and France relaxed its claim to the region. In 1739 the government at Annapolis Royal ordered a patent for a township at Chedabucto "by the Gutt of Canso," which was to be surveyed, laid out, and granted to an Edward How and Company. William Shirreff, the commissioner of musters, noted that officers and other men in the garrison expressed "what a prejudice such a grant will be to his Majesty's said garrison and his other subjects at the place."<sup>173</sup> Shirreff, who had been charged with executing the grant, suggested the Council be recalled to examine the matter as their decision might not have considered all factors.<sup>174</sup>

Armstrong's response illustrated the complexity of granting land, attracting settlers, and creating a sense of British permanence in Nova Scotia. Maps and surveys were the building blocks of settlement growth. After informing Shirreff of the lack of precedent for recalling the Council, Armstrong cautioned his subordinate against discouraging settlement. Grants must necessarily come before surveys, the lieutenant governor argued, because no settlers would finance an expensive survey without a guaranteed title to the land. Surveys were more involved than taking a few

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<sup>172</sup> Minutes of Council, Annapolis Royal, 24 June 1731, *NSA III*, p. 179.

<sup>173</sup> Shirreff to Armstrong, Annapolis Royal, 6 August 1739, *NSA II*, p. 124.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

measurements and plotting them on paper. Vessels had to be located and hired and guides were necessary to protect the surveyor from hostile Natives.<sup>175</sup> Surveyors, assistants, and chainmen were required to carry out the division of property at a cost (in the 1750s) of ten pence/day, five pence/day, and 10 pence/month, respectively.<sup>176</sup> Armstrong added that he did not believe a settlement would disadvantage the garrison, nor had he heard any complaints from the officers or commanding officers themselves. It was the King's wish to settle the region, especially considering the growing Acadian population, and that was what he intended to do.<sup>177</sup>

William Shirreff provided a precedent for recalling Council to debate land grants. He argued that there was no proof that profitable and unprofitable land was granted in equal measure as demanded by the regulations, nor were all the settlers' names known at the time of the grant.<sup>178</sup> The issue stalled in Council, and it was not until 1744 that the grant went through, demonstrating the difficulties faced by local administrators in securing a truly British space.<sup>179</sup> It was necessary to balance military and civic affairs while adhering to stringent imperial regulations. Annapolis Royal and, to a lesser extent, Canso were increasingly permanent British settlements, but the management of those spaces illuminated the internal problems that limited British geographic expansion.

The English did what they could to include Acadian settlements in their land management programme in an attempt to extend their territorial control into contested and shared areas, but they faced competition from the French at Louisbourg. The French

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<sup>175</sup> Armstrong to Shirreff, Annapolis Royal, 8 August 1739, *NSA II*, p. 125.

<sup>176</sup> Estimate of the Expense of Civil Officers, 1757, f105, vol. 16, CO 217, LAC.

<sup>177</sup> Armstrong to Shirreff, Annapolis Royal, 8 August 1739, *NSA II*, p. 125.

<sup>178</sup> Shirreff to Armstrong, Annapolis Royal, 9 August 1739, *NSA II*, p. 126.

<sup>179</sup> C. Alexander Pincombe, "How, Edward," *DCB*. Shortly after establishing the settlement it was stormed and destroyed during François Du Pont Duvivier's attack on Canso.

government in Paris was farther along than the British in collecting and maintaining a geographic archive of their overseas possessions, and officials expected to receive updated maps and surveys.<sup>180</sup> Saint-Ovide complied with such expectations. In 1734 he sent to the minister of the Marine a detailed list of settlements presently occupied by habitants and fishermen. The list also included an estimate of what was required in the province both for the development of the settlement and for the well being of its inhabitants.<sup>181</sup>

An example from this survey indicates the detailed nature of the information collected and sent to France and reveals land management practices in French settlements. George Lasson, an inhabitant and fisherman, possessed a piece of land occupied by his nephews, Jean and Michel Lasson. It consisted of a gravel bank that ran 107 toise long by 12 wide.<sup>182</sup> The land stretched from one marker to another and out to the sea in the harbour. It contained, in total, 2484 toise.<sup>183</sup> The survey included numerous entries like this for settlers around Louisbourg, and also traced the transfer of plots within a family or from one resident to another. The French administration was therefore kept well informed of settlements and land use at Île Royale.

Such detailed records were a boon for the government, but could also provide litigious settlers with valuable information to support or challenge land claims. Geographic documents were tools of both the state and the people. Land management was one area in which a settlement's propertied members could become directly involved

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<sup>180</sup> On French cartographic development, see Christine M. Petto, *When France Was King of Cartography: The Patronage and Production of Maps in Early Modern France* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007).

<sup>181</sup> Saint-Ovide and Lenormant to Minister, Louisbourg, 1734, f15-50v, vol. 15, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>182</sup> 1 toise equals approximately 2 metres.

<sup>183</sup> Saint-Ovide and Lenormant to Minister, Louisbourg, 1734, f15, vol. 15, C11B, ANOM.

in local governance and even challenge official policy. In the winter of 1735, M. Lartigue, a bailiff, complained to the minister of the Marine about the plot of land granted him in 1714. He had improved the land and made it suitable for fishing – built a house, cultivated a garden, and constructed fishing flakes. He argued that for the past twenty years the engineer had persecuted him over his land. He built a house the previous year, part of which extended onto land that was to become a new road; he was ordered to take it down, and he did. He moved the house at great expense and effort to a section of land previously marked out for him by the surveyor, but his neighbour, Mr. Verrier, “constructed a large kiln quite close to the house which was then often covered by flames and smoke.”<sup>184</sup> He pleaded, “I find myself with reason, sir, in a continual fear that [the house] will be consumed and I have good reason to believe that it will not be able to stay if the kiln is not removed.”<sup>185</sup>

Mapping was not just a tool of the state. Surveys and knowledge of boundaries and borders provided settlers with an opportunity to engage with (even to challenge) government regulations. To illustrate his point, Lartigue forwarded a survey of his property and that of his neighbour, indicating that Mr. Verrier had taken much of the land reserved for the King to build his large house, garden, and shed. Had he not, there would have been plenty of room for his own house, but instead he had been ordered to remove his house and abandon his garden by spring. He asked the minister either to allow him to stay in his house so that he could support his family or for permission to move his plot to the area he marked in yellow on the plan. Once a financially secure settler from Plaisance, Lartigue was reduced to plotting his own map and hoping that his government

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<sup>184</sup> Lartigue to Minister, Louisbourg, 20 December 1735, f289-290, vol. 17, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.



would see fit to let him reside on the marked areas of his choosing.<sup>186</sup> Nearly destitute, Lartigue's access to surveys and property management provided him with an avenue into official affairs, and a voice in the governance of the settlement.

The use of surveys to record settlements and categorize them as English or French was often a source of contention. The Acadians, especially those living on lands claimed by both Britain and France, were the object of much cadastral interest. At times the decision whether to survey was made by neither the French nor the British. In 1732, a group of Acadians from the St. John River area arrived in Annapolis to swear an oath of allegiance and receive grants issued by the British King. They were informed that a surveyor would accompany them on their return trip to map the area that would then be granted. The Acadians replied "they could not answer for carrying with them a person to survey the land, because of the Indians."<sup>187</sup> The matter was held for consideration, and the survey was delayed indefinitely in the face of Native opposition.

Opposition to surveys did not necessarily lead to violence, but there was often the expectation of opposition. In a letter to the Acadian deputies at Minas, William Shirreff informed them that he had dispatched George Mitchell, Colonel Dunbar's deputy, to survey Acadian lands. The deputies were to remind the inhabitants not to disrupt or affront his work.<sup>188</sup> Even in areas where surveys had been completed, Acadians were quick to dispute their findings and challenge the quit rents collected as a result. Part of the Acadian resistance to British territorial authority had always been economic in nature: Acadians did not want to pay higher rents for their lands. Lieutenant Governor

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid., f290v-292.

<sup>187</sup> Council Minutes, Annapolis Royal, 4 September 1732, *NSA III*, p. 252.

<sup>188</sup> Shirreff to Deputies of Minas, Annapolis Royal, 30 November 1734, *NSA II*, p. 96.

Armstrong sent the deputies of Pisiquid and Cobequid a letter concerning the number of complaints received about property boundaries, informing them that all inhabitants must present their deeds of sale and contracts if any conflicts were to be settled.<sup>189</sup> The act of resisting surveys and refusing to surrender old French grants for new British ones helped the Acadians retain control over their settlements.

The British (who were unable to go much beyond Annapolis Royal and Canso) and the French (with Acadian pockets in Nova Scotia and fortified bastions at Île Royale) were still making their settlements on Native territory. Eastern Algonkians had their own settlements and their own methods of dealing with land claims and infringement on territory. Native territory in Nova Scotia was influenced by transhumance, which Peter Pope defines as more than “nomadic drifting,” but reflecting “seasonal movements by rural folk, in search of farm and other employments.”<sup>190</sup> The Mi’kmaq were not “rural folk,” but the concept is equally applicable. As William Wicken has argued, the Mi’kmaq were able to retain a remarkable degree of continuity in the seasonal migration patterns despite the arrival and influence of Europeans.<sup>191</sup> During the spring and summer, the Mi’kmaq lived along the shoreline or on major river systems to facilitate fishing. They also practiced agriculture during the warm months, but as the temperatures cooled the Mi’kmaq moved inland and prepared to spend the autumn hunting and fishing. Winter brought the establishment of base camps from which the men would go on

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<sup>189</sup> Armstrong to the Deputies of Piziquid and Cobequid, Annapolis Royal, *NSA II*, p. 97.

<sup>190</sup> Peter Pope, *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 249.

<sup>191</sup> Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails", 64.

extended hunting trips. In the spring, settlements would move back to the shoreline.<sup>192</sup>

This transhumance affected both the location and the size of Native settlements. Summer population centres were larger than winter sites, “which suggests a degree of semi-permanency.”<sup>193</sup> The Mi’kmaq continued their seasonal migrations and adapted as necessary to the presence of the British and Acadians, but as Stephen Hornsby has illustrated in the case of British America, competition between systems of geographic organization could easily lead to conflict.<sup>194</sup>

Understanding Aboriginal land use illustrates how the Mi’kmaq and their neighbours shaped French and British settlement. Native territorial boundaries existed and were enforced. The way Aboriginals divided the land has been the subject of debate among Aboriginal historians, anthropologists, and ethnohistorians. Early debates focused on whether family or communal land allotment systems – the process by which an extended family gains the rights to hunt in a specific region – existed before contact, or if this system was introduced.<sup>195</sup> Natives recognized exclusive rights to land, but that exclusivity was never permanent because villages would migrate every few years and abandon what land they had been using. “The difference between Indians and Europeans,” argues William Cronon, “was not that one had property and the other had none; rather, it was that they loved property differently.”<sup>196</sup> In Nova Scotia, Aboriginal geographic boundaries were more fluid and susceptible to established migratory patterns,

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<sup>192</sup> Ibid., 64-70.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>194</sup> Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*.

<sup>195</sup> See Bailey, *The Conflict*; John M. Cooper, "Is the Algonkian Family Hunting Ground System Pre-Columbian?," *American Anthropologist* new ser. 41, no. 1 (1939): 66-90; Speck and Eiseley, "Significance of Hunting Territory Systems of the Algonkian in Social Theory," 269-88; Dean R. Snow, "Wabanaki 'Family Hunting Territories'," *American Anthropologist* new ser. 70, no. 6 (1968): 1143-51.

<sup>196</sup> Cronon, *Changes in the Land*, 62-80. Quote from p. 80.

but the boundaries existed, were enforced, and shaped how the Mi'kmaq related to their geography and to the region's other inhabitants.

The Mi'kmaq recognized the European desire for exclusive ownership over what were in Native communities traditionally communal things: animals and land. Eastern Algonkians learned fairly quickly that Europeans considered animals to be property, and they experienced the impact of animal husbandry on their traditional hunting territories as fences were erected and land was put to pasture.<sup>197</sup> Yet eastern Algonkians did have a system of usufruct ownership, with distinctions between the lands belonging to one group from those of another. An Aboriginal could hunt game beyond his own land if he was starving, if the hunt began on his lands, or if the animal was killed by mere chance.<sup>198</sup> There were rules in place to shape land use and to make amends when necessary.

Traditional accounts state that the Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia were divided into seven groups, each hunting in one of seven political districts: Kespekewaq (Gaspé), Sikniktewaq (New Brunswick and eastern Quebec), Pittukewwaq aqq Epekwtk (Prince Edward Island), Unimaki (Cape Breton), Esgigeoaq (northern Nova Scotian peninsula), Sipeknekatik (central peninsula), and Kespukwitk (southern peninsula). However, members of one group seemed to have migrated to another with relative ease, and it was not uncommon for several groups to inhabit the same district.<sup>199</sup> As Arthur Ray explained in relation to Native migratory patterns further west, "the ability to exploit all

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<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 128-31. See also Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

<sup>198</sup> Cooper, "Is the Algonkian Family Hunting Ground System Pre-Columbian?," 68.

<sup>199</sup> *Handbook of North American Indians*, ed. William C. Sturtevant and Bruce G. Trigger (volume editor), vol. 15 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 109-10. The *Handbook* uses an older orthography. I have taken the spelling of these districts from Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails", map 6.

of these zones gave these groups a great deal of ecological flexibility. This flexibility permitted them to make rapid adjustments to changing economic conditions.”<sup>200</sup>

These fluid boundaries within which the Mi’kmaq followed their seasonal migration patterns stood in stark contrast to the surveyed lines on maps created by the British and the French, but provided the Mi’kmaq with enough room to adapt to the presence of Europeans. It is not surprising that Lieutenant Governor Armstrong received complaints from the St. John Natives. In 1735 he received a letter expressing the Natives’ concerns over the surveyor’s intentions, and he assured them that they had nothing to worry about.<sup>201</sup> There was, of course, much to be concerned about: the governor intended to survey as much land as possible, distribute plots to settlers, and convert Native territory into British property.

Mi’kmaq transhumance should not suggest that territorial sovereignty was unimportant to Nova Scotia’s Aboriginal groups; in fact, it was the land and what it could provide to the Natives that helped the Mi’kmaq resist European encroachment. They had a relationship with the land and were united to it, not masters over it. “Viewed from this perspective,” argues William Wicken, “Mi’kmaq occupation of defined territories throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries indicates a degree of social cohesion despite the spread of disease, the fur trade, European settlement and colonial conflict.”<sup>202</sup> There were eighteen principal settlements in present-day Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island, most of which were along the coast or on major riverine routes.<sup>203</sup> The population

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<sup>200</sup> Ray, *Indians in the Fur Trade*, 46.

<sup>201</sup> Armstrong to the St. John’s Indians, Annapolis Royal, 27 September 1735, *NSA II*, p.98.

<sup>202</sup> Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails", 91.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, map 7. It has been argued that some Wabenakis organized themselves politically and territorially along riverine, not terrestrial boundaries. See Snow, "Wabanaki 'Family Hunting Territories'," 1143-51.

of these settlements fluctuated with the seasons – there were summer sites and winter sites – but there were established areas of habitation from which the Mi’kmaq operated. Any attempt by the British or French to impose geographic restrictions was bound to cause conflict, especially at a time when territorial sovereignty was subjected to a system of checks and balances. The settlement areas, the migratory patterns that linked them, and the communications networks between sites provided the Mi’kmaq with a strong sense of territoriality with which they could judge the actions of European settlers who had established themselves within *Mi’kma’ki* and were trying to make it their own.

### **Conclusion**

During the relatively peaceful period from 1727 to 1744, geographic control was divided among the Mi’kmaq, the French, and the British. A system of checks and balances developed by which each group could protect its possessions while limiting the aspirations of the others. The migratory, seasonal, and temporary Mi’kmaq settlements infused Native geographies with an element of transhumance as the Mi’kmaq travelled from one site to another according to subsistence patterns. The French Acadians grew and expanded during this Acadian “golden age” that witnessed a demographic increase and an extension of Acadian lands. Acadian deputies served as quasi-official British agents to oversee territorial growth and land claims, providing the Acadians with the ability to monitor their own growth. Hemmed behind the fort walls at Annapolis Royal

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The Mi’kmaq were, at the very least, a maritime people. See *Les Micmacs et la Mer*, ed. Charles A. Martijn (Montréal: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1986). Lauren Benton has recently demonstrated the importance of riverine networks for European empires. See Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*.

and Canso, the British attempted to extend their presence in the region by constructing forts and extending British law to Acadian settlers.

Although these were conflicting and conflicted territorial competitions (no group was homogenous), their coexistence was facilitated by the creation of areas of interaction. It was in these areas of interaction (contested, shared, and controlled) that relationships were formed, alliances built, and problems resolved. Contested areas prevented any one group from extending its authority beyond acceptable means; shared spaces allowed for the mutually beneficial interchange of commerce, religion, and negotiation; and controlled spaces provided each group with their own (generally) undisputed territory. These areas of interchange also illuminated the internal workings of the Mi'kmaq, French, and British. The intra-group competition and disagreements made room for alliances with other regional powers that helped maintain balance in the competition for territorial sovereignty.

The nature of these areas of interchange speaks to the fluidity and temporality of created spaces in Nova Scotia. Sites of interchange were created and maintained only so long as they served a purpose for their participants. The period of 1727-1744 was defined by imperial failure (on the part of Britain and France) and Native stagnation (as the Mi'kmaq and their allies were unable or unwilling to remove foreign settlers). The desire for peace was a driving factor in Nova Scotia, influenced heavily by a similar desire in Europe. Maintaining that peace provided the Mi'kmaq, French, and British with a common cause. Yet conflict was unavoidable because each group expressed geographic control differently: the Mi'kmaq remained transitory and required large swaths of land to carry out their traditional migrations; the Acadians expanded rapidly

and recognized British jurisdiction only nominally; and the British relied on displays of power (often military in nature) because they could not exercise true authority. Though power allowed for action, authority demanded that such actions be accepted. British officials at Annapolis Royal readily admitted that they could do nothing to stop the Acadians from expanding or the Mi'kmaq from travelling. The Acadians and the Mi'kmaq were well aware that they could resist British expansion, but they could not remove the British altogether. The resulting balance in territorial sovereignty shaped how each group dealt with the other.

This tripartite relationship was governed in spaces of interaction. Those areas provided the opportunity for cultural exchange, which led to increased understanding and knowledge of other groups. The French and the Mi'kmaq (and their Native allies) benefited from these areas. The Mi'kmaq did not increase their strength, but they maintained their traditional relationship with the French and suffered little interference. Acadia remained more French and Native than British, allowing French administrators (in France and Île Royale) to view the region as an illustration of British weakness. Acadia was a French bargaining chip, and even when in British hands it played into French favour. British policy was based not on negotiation and understanding but on increased militarization. Such a policy would require both a huge financial investment and a shift in how Britain managed its empire. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the founding of Halifax was a manifestation of this change. While the project's success was far from guaranteed, the settlement at Halifax forced the Mi'kmaq and the French to realize that Britain intended to challenge Acadian expansion and Aboriginal migration with English military settlements. Sovereignty hung in the balance.



## Chapter 4

### A Pale on the Coast: The Founding of Halifax and Looming Conflict, 1745-1755

#### Introduction

The founding of Halifax altered the geo-political landscape in Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. The various spaces that had operated within the province – shared, contested, and defined – did not immediately disappear, but the arrival of Governor Edward Cornwallis signalled a change in imperial policy that would force a realignment in the contested territories of northeastern North America. Territorial sovereignty was no less important, but after 1749 the French and the Mi'kmaq were made aware that the British presence in the region was not only permanent, but also growing. The period from 1744 to 1755 was one in which the British acted and the French and Natives reacted. The geographic knowledge created during the settlement's formative years shaped local and imperial ideas of British space and influenced the socio-political organization of power. Spatial knowledge was also instrumental to the formulation of resistance against British expansion by both the French and the Natives living in an increasingly contested Nova Scotia.

This chapter will argue that the founding of Halifax was an imperial watershed for the British, French, and Aboriginal groups in Nova Scotia not because it accomplished settlement goals or resolved geographic issues, but because it made obvious new British political and military intentions. Instrumental to those intentions was the collection and dissemination of maps, surveys, and tracts, first by the British but then by the French and the Mi'kmaq. The settlement (and the reactions it engendered) must be understood in the context of territorial conflict, imperial competition, and developments in the field of

mapping and cartography. Halifax was not an immediate success and France responded by strengthening its position in the northeast, as did the Mi'kmaq who realized that their position between two imperial powers would require increasingly nuanced interactions. The Mi'kmaq had to emphasize their territorial role not as an extension of either the French or the British, but as a group that could work with either side if common ground was found.

Older works on the northeast recognized the imperial importance of the Halifax settlement. J.B. Brebner argues that the arrival of Cornwallis signalled a policy shift that would unfold with both military and financial support.<sup>1</sup> Thomas Raddall romantically describes Halifax as the “warden of the north,” founded to secure the safety of New England and enhance local economic opportunity in the fishery.<sup>2</sup> W.S. MacNutt entitled the chapter in which he discussed the settlement “The Beginnings of Permanence,” and refers to Nova Scotia in this period as “a royal colony,” emphasizing the huge sums of money spent by Britain on Halifax.<sup>3</sup> N.E.S. Griffiths describes the founding of Halifax as a central element of British militarization in the northeast, though her claims to the success of this endeavour are more tempered than other historians.<sup>4</sup>

More recent accounts have downplayed the significance of the Halifax settlement. Stephen A. Patterson discusses the settlement's establishment in the context of the British-Aboriginal-Acadian relationships and stresses less its imperial importance than

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<sup>1</sup> John Bartlet Brebner, *New England's Outpost: Acadia before the Conquest of Canada* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927), 166.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Head Raddall, *Halifax, Warden of the North*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: McClelland, 1948), 8-9, 17-18.

<sup>3</sup> W. Stewart MacNutt, *The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 53.

<sup>4</sup> N. E. S. Griffiths, *The Contexts of Acadian History, 1686-1784* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 80.

the change it signalled in Britain's Acadian policy.<sup>5</sup> Atlantic history has paid little attention to Halifax. Stephen J. Hornsby briefly refers to the settlement's founding, describing it as a quintessential "garrison town" meant to balance French strength at Louisbourg. He also suggests that the town was laid out in a grid-iron fashion to emphasize political, religious, and military control, but does not investigate the settlement's influence on the Seven Years' War or the Acadian expulsion.<sup>6</sup> In their recent critical appraisal of Atlantic History, Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan make no reference to Halifax as a site of Atlantic importance, even though John G. Reid and Elizabeth Mancke describe the settlement as part of an "unprecedented" militarization of British North America.<sup>7</sup>

This chapter will build on work by Geoffrey Plank to investigate further how the founding of Halifax – and the events that surrounded it – influenced local and imperial developments. As Plank argues, bold British action in the northeast elicited an equally bold response from the French and the Mi'kmaq. Louisbourg was strengthened, new French forts were founded on the isthmus, and the Mi'kmaq were forced to re-evaluate their allegiances to ensure they maintained their independence.<sup>8</sup> As will be demonstrated, the French (both in l'Acadie and at Île Royale) were able to resist, or at least oppose, British expansion. Acadians refused to be subsumed by British law, which was one

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<sup>5</sup> Stephen A. Patterson, "Colonial Wars and Aboriginal People" in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History*, ed. Phillip A. Buckner and John G. Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 84.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005), 206.

<sup>7</sup> Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). John G. Reid and Elizabeth Mancke, "From Global Processes to Continental Strategies: The Emergence of British North America to 1783" in Phillip A. Buckner, *Canada and the British Empire*, The Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 33.

<sup>8</sup> Geoffrey Gilbert Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 123-27.

potential avenue of extending control over the local geography.<sup>9</sup> The Mi'kmaq were similarly capable of striking treaties that would appease the British temporarily without surrendering to them control over important geographic resources. Viewed in this light, the founding of Halifax was a watershed of imperial intention but failed in realizing the short-term of goals of controlling Nova Scotia.

This chapter and Chapter 5 work together to recount the local and imperial aspects, respectively, of the Halifax settlement and the boundary concerns it reawakened. They demonstrate that the founding of Halifax shifted British and French imperial (and Atlantic) attention towards the northeast from the southern colonies and sugar islands. A renewed British presence in Nova Scotia under a different colonial model than previous settlements – Halifax was funded solely by the British government for military purposes with little expectation of trade or resource extraction – clearly indicated the region's strategic worth. Questions of imperial boundaries re-emerged and dominated French and British affairs until the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. Geography was a vital component of understanding imperial policy as Britain, France, and the Mi'kmaq marshalled cartographic evidence to support their image of the province and challenge that of their competitors. Changes in mid-eighteenth-century geographic knowledge – with its interest in locally-sourced information and detailed tracts that accompanied maps – ensured that Halifax specifically and Nova Scotia in this period generally garnered official and public attention in Britain and France.

This chapter will unfold by analyzing British actions and the corresponding responses from the French and Mi'kmaq. The War of Austrian Succession raised

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<sup>9</sup> Lauren Benton, "Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47 (2005): 700-24.

boundary concerns in the northeast and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle led to calls for an increased British presence in Nova Scotia. The settlement itself was the result of reconnaissance surveys and plans that outlined how best to establish a town and fortress to offset the French at Louisbourg. Individual actors, such as William Shirley, the governor of Massachusetts, and Charles Morris, a capable surveyor, were instrumental in this early phase. The maps created during this period provided the Board of Trade with invaluable geographic information with which they could formulate policy. A steady flow of geographic information crossed the Atlantic to inform the imperial understanding of Nova Scotia's position in the northeast.

The founding of Halifax itself led to opposition from both the French and the Mi'kmaq. Treaties were made and broken, attacks in the region persisted, and the French built forts along the isthmus and attempted to relocate both Acadians and the Mi'kmaq (with limited success in both instances). At Halifax, land management remained an important imperial tool as settlers were encouraged to clear their land and erect houses. The maps produced during this period better served local officials than imperial administrators, as problems resulted from issues over land tenure and property disputes. In Britain, "selling" the Halifax settlement to literate Britons required the public distribution of appealing maps, several of which appeared in popular magazines. Britons read about the settlement's progress, but they were not always provided with a full picture of Halifax's position or the opposition it faced.

Finally, the French reaction to Halifax requires careful attention. Cartography became a focus of French interest as the British settlement grew and as administrators at Halifax and London argued for extending the boundaries of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. The

French reaffirmed Native alliances, established forts, and claimed land along the western coast of the Bay of Fundy. Furthermore, Louis XV sent representatives to evaluate and establish the limits of l'Acadie and report on the state of France's defences, doing for France what Charles Morris had done for Britain. This geographic knowledge was especially important in light of the boundary commission that was meeting at Paris to discuss the matter.

The founding of Halifax signalled a change in British imperial policy that neither the French nor the Mi'kmaq could ignore. There was no guarantee that this policy would succeed, especially in light of past British indifference to Nova Scotia, but founding a settlement funded exclusively by the state announced a renewed British interest in military and political control. Britain acted, but French and Mi'kmaq reactions largely succeeded in blunting the effect of the Halifax settlement. The maps, reports, and geographic descriptions produced during this period demonstrate how geography was increasingly a tool of imperial action and opposition. Administrators in London and Versailles, the British and French public, and local English, French, and Native groups were aware that the careful balance established from 1727 to 1744 would not last. Nova Scotia / l'Acadie became increasingly important to all three groups and it remained to be seen if the British, French, or Mi'kmaq would be left as the region's dominant power.

### **War Years and Boundary Concerns**

In 1744 European conflict once again reached North American shores, pitting the British against the French and forcing their disputes upon the Acadians and the Mi'kmaq. The War of Austrian Succession (known in North America as King George's War), in

which France and Britain fought on opposite sides of a Europe-wide conflict, ended the peaceful years so highly valued by Walpole in Britain and Fleury in France. In Nova Scotia, British officers and soldiers at Annapolis Royal and Canso found themselves under attack from the French at Louisbourg and their Native allies, who were fighting as much for themselves as for France. With war declared, boundaries could be pushed back or extended farther depending on which side claimed victory; considering the heated disputes over land, all three groups involved in the war were eager to secure their vision of the region.

The French wasted little time in attacking the British in Nova Scotia. Canso, a contested site of waning economic importance but increasing military value, was the obvious first target. Plans for an attack on Nova Scotia dated back to 1739, when Isaac-Louis de Forant, who succeeded Saint-Ovide as governor of Île Royale, proposed a detailed amphibious attack from Louisbourg.<sup>10</sup> Forant's tenure as governor lasted only from April of 1739 until his death in May of 1740, during which time he focused on reorganizing Louisbourg's garrison, particularly dealing with the rampant alcoholism and ineptitude of many soldiers and officers.<sup>11</sup> Forant's death, and the appointment of Jean-Baptiste-Louis Le Prévost Duquesnel as his successor – holding the title of commander, not governor – did not prevent the realization of Forant's plans. Though Duquesnel's appointment came with instructions to strengthen Louisbourg's defences, he was also

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<sup>10</sup> François Du Pont Duivivier and Bernard Pothier, *Course à l'Acadie: Journal de Campagne de François Du Pont Duivivier en 1744* (Moncton: Editions d'Acadie, 1982), 38.

<sup>11</sup> In collaboration, "Forant, Isaac-Louis de," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography [DCB]*, [www.biographic.ca](http://www.biographic.ca).

encouraged to act offensively. After familiarizing himself with Forant's plans, Duquesnel launched his attack, first on Canso and then Annapolis Royal.<sup>12</sup>

The attacking force, under the command of François Du Pont Duvivier, faced little resistance at Canso and captured the fort easily. The success emboldened Duquesnel, who ordered them on to Annapolis Royal. His plan was to coordinate a joint attack with troops from Louisbourg, naval ships from France, and local Natives. Support from France did not materialize, but Abbé Le Loutre assured Duquesnel that the Mi'kmaq would help take the fort. The Natives positioned themselves outside the fort in early July, but when the French reinforcements from Louisbourg failed to arrive the Mi'kmaq launched a weak and disorganized attack before retreating.<sup>13</sup> Lieutenant-Governor Mascarene reported to the Board of Trade at the end of July that the French took Canso but that Annapolis Royal was safe, having withstood the Mi'kmaq's minor attempt on its walls.<sup>14</sup>

Duquesnel was not disheartened and organized another attack on the British fort, again selecting Duvivier to oversee the effort. Duvivier was a member of an elite Louisbourg military family, and his interest in business and trade had made him wealthy. To his natural business acumen was added preferential treatment and favouritism from Louisbourg's financial commissaries. His ascent of the military ranks was similarly facilitated by those who favoured him, namely his uncle (a major at Louisbourg) and Governor Saint-Ovide. As will be demonstrated, Duvivier's time at Île Royale met with an untimely exit after unsuccessful military ventures, and he later found himself accused

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<sup>12</sup> Blaine Adams, "Le Prévost Duquesnel (du Quesnel), Jean-Baptiste-Louis," *DCB*.

<sup>13</sup> Du Pont Duvivier and Pothier, *Course à l'Accadie*, 42. In Pothier's words, "Le lendemain, ils lancèrent sur le fort une attaque timide et désordonnée."

<sup>14</sup> Mascarene to BTP, Annapolis Royal, 27 July 1744, 11, vol. 11, RG 1, Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management [NSARM].



of holding secret meetings with the English commissaries in Paris to discuss the Acadian boundary.<sup>15</sup> Duvivier's military rank and knowledge of local geography would have made him a threat had he decided to act as an English informant.

Duvivier arrived in Nova Scotia to begin his attack in early August but was unable to attract much support from the Acadians as he made his way to Annapolis Royal. He faced similar difficulties in convincing the Mi'kmaq and Wolastoqiyik to join him so soon after the July attack. Only about thirty Mi'kmaq from Nova Scotia volunteered to fight a second time, and to them were added about 100 Mi'kmaq from Île Royale. There were also about seventy Wolastoqiyik from the Bay of Fundy.<sup>16</sup> It is entirely likely that even with his limited force Duvivier could have taken Annapolis Royal, but he hesitated, missed his opportunity, and entered into a four-week siege with little offensive direction.<sup>17</sup> Mascarene defended the fort well, aided by the arrival of reinforcements from Boston. Eventually the governor at Île Royale dispatched Le Chevalier de Gannes from Louisbourg to Annapolis Royal to inform Duvivier that the ships expected from France were not going to arrive in time. With this news, Duvivier was forced to retreat first to Minas, and then to Louisbourg.<sup>18</sup>

The two attacks levelled at Annapolis Royal met with a limited but sufficient defence. Mascarene learned of the attack on Canso and quickly notified William Shirley, governor of Massachusetts, to ask for assistance. He specifically requested a group of rangers (a force of English and Native fighters) to act "as Scouts and keep in awe the

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<sup>15</sup> T.A. Crowley and Bernard Pothier, "Du Pont Duvivier, François," *DCB*.

<sup>16</sup> Du Pont Duvivier and Pothier, *Course à l'Acadie*, 43-4. See also Le Chevalier de Gannes memoir, Louisbourg, 28 November 1744, f204-206, vol. 26, C11B, ANOM. For an anonymous account of the failed expedition, see Account of the Failed Expedition of Port Royal, 1744, f87-94v, vol. 8, C11D, Archives Nationale d'Outre Mer [ANOM].

<sup>17</sup> T.A. Crowley and Bernard Pothier, "Du Pont Duvivier, François," *DCB*.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

Indians of this peninsula who believe all the Indians come from New England are Mohawks of whom they stand in great fear.”<sup>19</sup> Mascarene wanted to control the Mi’kmaq and the Wolastoqiyik, who despite their weak first attempt on Annapolis Royal remained a dangerous fighting force.

Some Native groups in Nova Scotia were less eager to fight. In May of 1744, a group of Wolastoqiyik from the St. John river visited Annapolis Royal to discuss how the actions in Europe might affect North America. “We have had news from Canady and Boston,” Joseph, the chief’s son announced, “that peace still continues between England and France, but that at the River St. Johns things are variously reported wherefore we desire to know from your self how matters really are.”<sup>20</sup> The British reported that war was likely, and the Council stated their desire to know the Natives’ intentions should the French encourage them to fight. Joseph responded that if the French and English go to war, “our designs are to lye quiet and meddle on neither side.”<sup>21</sup> The conference concluded with both sides stating their observance of the last treaty and addressing wrongs that had occurred since that time; the Wolastoqiyik expressed gratitude for receiving such friendly treatment and assured the British that they would “live with you and all the English in friendship.”<sup>22</sup>

It is not possible to determine if any of the Natives from this meeting attacked Annapolis Royal with Duvivier, but the limited Native assistance he attracted makes it unlikely. What is clear is that the Acadians remained largely neutral, refusing to fight

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<sup>19</sup> Mascarene to Shirley, 9 June 1744, f46, 19071, MG21, Library and Archives Canada [LAC].

<sup>20</sup> Mascarene’s meeting with the Natives from St. Johns River, 5 May 1744, f74, 19071, MG21, LAC.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, f74v.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, f75v.

with Duvivier and providing supplies to French troops only after receiving threats.<sup>23</sup>

After the failed attacks, Acadian deputies arrived at Annapolis Royal to assure Mascarene and the Council that they had nothing to do with the recent violence, and had been forced to supplying some of Duvivier's troops. The Council seemed to accept their statements, but Mascarene informed the deputies that the Acadians would also be forced to serve the British. In lieu of supplies, some Acadians would be exploited for their geographic knowledge and ability to pilot vessels. Mascarene informed the deputies that they could furnish a pilot when requested, or one would be pressed into service when necessary. Arguing that volunteering their services might anger the Mi'kmaq, the deputies chose the latter option. Mascarene stressed that the British were not expecting them to fight, only to help navigate ships through the region.<sup>24</sup> In this instance, navigational ability was more important than military assistance.

Mascarene received most of his military support from William Shirley, who organized a New England force to attack Louisbourg. In 1745, under the command of William Pepperell, the force attacked. As George Rawlyk has argued, the plans and directives for the attack were founded upon an understanding of the region's geography that allowed for improvisation and changes where necessary.<sup>25</sup> The attack was successful and the French surrendered Louisbourg into the hands of Pepperell and Admiral Peter Warren, who had brought his squadron from Jamaica to assist in the operation. In trying to explain the capture of the fort, French officials relied on geographic knowledge and cartographic hindsight. "I have examined the map of the Port of Louisbourg," Monsieur

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<sup>23</sup> George Rawlyk, "1720-1744: Cod, Louisbourg, and the Acadians" in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation*, 120-24.

<sup>24</sup> Minutes of Council, Annapolis Royal, 11 December 1744, f57, vol. 11, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>25</sup> George A. Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg* (Orono: University of Maine Press, 1967), 58.

Chaussegros de Lery wrote to the minister of the Marine in 1745, “I believe it would have been advisable to build a good battery to the left of the port’s entry, below the lighthouse, and above the lighthouse a fortified lookout.”<sup>26</sup> Just as Pepperell and his forces relied on good maps to plan their attack, the French looked at maps to analyze what went wrong, and determine how the fort could be recaptured.

Yet there was no immediate effort to retake Louisbourg. The New England troops who captured the fort stayed there to guard against the French; they also suffered from an illness that swept through the fortress. The French in Quebec learned of the English suffering from their Native allies. In 1746, two Natives arrived in Quebec from Acadia carrying letters from Le Loutre and another missionary, Père Germain. Le Loutre’s letter described how the Natives had intercepted letters from Louisbourg to Annapolis Royal requesting that Mascarene send ships to Boston to collect 1000-1200 men “pour remplacer les morts.”<sup>27</sup>

The French would suffer their own setbacks during the war. In June of 1746 France sent a fleet of fifty-four ships under the duc D’Anville to recapture Louisbourg and attack the British in Nova Scotia. The fleet encountered a rough crossing; bad weather scattered the ships as they approached Nova Scotia, damaging many and forcing several to return to France. D’Anville arrived first at Chebucto and died shortly thereafter. Chebucto was an obvious choice for the attack because of its strategic position, of which the French were well aware from the maps and settlement plans they created around the time Port Royal fell to the British (see Figure 2.3). Command of the expedition fell to the rear admiral Constantin-Louis d’Estourmel, who attempted suicide

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<sup>26</sup> Monsieur Chaussegros de Lery to Minister, Quebec, 9 November 1745, *Collection de Manuscrits Relatifs à la Nouvelle France* [CMNF], vol. 3, ed. J. Blanchet (Québec: 1884), p. 267.

<sup>27</sup> Extrait en forme de journal, 28 February 1746, CMNF vol. 3, p. 272.

three days later. An epidemic swept through the fleet and eventually the entire expedition was cancelled and the remaining ships returned to France. Of the 7000 men who set out, 587 died and 2274 returned sick.<sup>28</sup>

Mascarene informed Newcastle of D'Anville's unfortunate attempt, believing that he had "died of grief believing all the rest lost."<sup>29</sup> Mascarene also reported that the French fleet had buried upwards of 3000 dead soldiers along the shores of Chebucto and that the vice admiral had attempted to kill himself after going mad. These were not quite the facts of the case, but three years later when Cornwallis arrived at Chebucto he found spots of cleared land and grave sites as a reminder of D'Anville's crew and their attempt on Nova Scotia.

As the war carried on, little changed in the region. Though the British held Louisbourg and fighting continued throughout Nova Scotia, neither side made much progress in increasing territorial control because successes in one area were balanced by stalemates in others. In short, sovereignty in Nova Scotia / l'Acadie remained largely as it was before the war. Mascarene openly admitted that Annapolis Royal was "the only place of strength in this province and the only one where the English have now a footing."<sup>30</sup> One small advantage was that the war had at least spurred on improvements to the fort, "which was in a very ruinous condition" but has been "repaired in the best manner the situation and circumstances would allow."<sup>31</sup> A French memoir on the state of

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<sup>28</sup> Étienne Taillemite, "La Rochefoucauld de Roye, Jean-Baptiste-Louis-Frédéric de, Marquis de Roucy, Duc d'Anville," *DCB*. On the expedition and its aftermath, see James S. Pritchard, *Anatomy of a Naval Disaster: The 1746 French Naval Expedition to North America* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995). See also, "Journal Historique du voyage de la flotte commandée par M. le Duc D'Enville, et partie pour le Canada le 20 Juin 1746," *Collection de documents inédits sur le Canada et l'Amérique publiés par le Canada-Français*, vol. I (Quebec: L.-J. Demers & Frère, 1888), 70-108.

<sup>29</sup> Mascarene to Newcastle, Annapolis Royal, 12 November 1746, 44, vol. 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>30</sup> Mascarene to the Secretary of State, Annapolis Royal, 15 June 1748, 45, vol 17, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

Acadia argued that “the French and Natives currently possess the entire province save for a small party at Annapolis Royal, and they strengthen their possession of it by the fortifications they have built at Chignecto, Gaspé, and other strategic places.”<sup>32</sup> Even with the fall of Louisbourg, few inroads had been made in securing Nova Scotia for the British. Their territorial sovereignty remained largely coterminus with the walls of their forts.

### **Aix-la-Chapelle and the Brief Period of Peace**

The conclusion of the war did little to reassure the British in Nova Scotia, nor the English in New England, that their position was safe. The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, signed in 1748, returned to the region a *status quo ante bellum*, which meant that Louisbourg was once again under French control. New Englanders were upset that their singular accomplishment was reversed; as George Rawlyk has argued, however, the return of Louisbourg was hardly a surprise, there was no real public outcry, and many Boston merchants were pleased that illicit trade with Île Royale could recommence.<sup>33</sup> Geoffrey Plank has noted that Governor Shirley helped soften the reaction in Massachusetts by asking Britain to reimburse the colony’s wartime expenses.<sup>34</sup> It is also important to view the peace of 1748 not solely in a global context – marking the end of the War of Austrian Succession – but, as Stephen Patterson argues, in the very local context. Locally, war was a more constant state as the Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik were not signatories at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and therefore continued to fight, albeit

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<sup>32</sup> Mémoire, non signé, sur l'état de l'Acadie, 26 December 1747, f135-138v, vol. 8, C11D, ANOM. Quote from f.135v.

<sup>33</sup> Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg*, 158-59.

<sup>34</sup> Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*, 117.

sporadically, until treaties were renewed in 1760-61.<sup>35</sup> Peace with the French and continued conflict with the Natives meant that the focus shifted from outright and sustained warfare to short skirmishes and a renewed interest in boundary lines.

The peace with France was more like a ceasefire; both sides continued to operate with that mindset. The French had not given up their aspirations to reclaim Acadia, and they had in their possession no shortage of tracts on the subject. A 1748 memoir demonstrated France's continued geographic knowledge and the detailed information they possessed about Acadia's landscape. They knew who lived where, and how the land was used. "From Canso to Musquodoboit the country is inhabited only by Natives," the memoir explained, "who hunt in the woods of Shubenacadie and fish in the abundant rivers."<sup>36</sup> Foreshadowing British plans for the region, the memoir described Chebucto as one of the region's best harbours, large enough to fit an infinite number of ships. Importantly, the report added, the Mi'kmaq were always loyal to France and received gifts regularly and bounties for English prisoners and scalps during times of war.<sup>37</sup>

What the French knew, the British were eager to learn. To that end, Mascarene commissioned Charles Morris, a Boston surveyor, to chart sections of the province and provide maps and descriptions. Morris was put in command of a ship going to Minas Basin, as "this gentleman is well skill'd in taking drafts of coasts harbours etc and as there never was a compleat draft of this Bay yet made I thought it would be an

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<sup>35</sup> Stephen E. Patterson, "1744-1763: Colonial Wars and Aboriginal Peoples," in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation*, 125.

<sup>36</sup> *Memoir sur l'Acadie*, 1748, no page, vol. 10, C11D, ANOM.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

importance service.”<sup>38</sup> As will be demonstrated, Morris’s surveys were an invaluable addition to British geographic knowledge.

While Morris was mapping regions that the French knew well, Nova Scotia’s western boundaries were again brought into question. Before the War of Austrian Succession, France and Britain claimed the St. John River area as their own, or at least described it as a disputed area inhabited by the Wolastoqiyik and Passamaquoddy. The war itself did not resolve the issue, so both sides continued to express their concerns over the presence of the other. In 1749, William Shirley wrote to the governor of New France, Roland-Michel Barrin, le Marquis de la Galissonnière, responding to a letter the French governor had sent Mascarene in which he asked if the Abenakis – who had joined the war as French allies – were to be included in the peace. Shirley argued that the St. John River had been long considered the “heart” of Nova Scotia. The inhabitants residing there, both Acadian and Native, were therefore subjects of the British King and received the same protection from the governor of Nova Scotia as did all other subjects living in the province.<sup>39</sup>

La Galissonnière angered Shirley because of two inflammatory statements that he included in his letter to Mascarene. First, he informed Mascarene that the Abenakis were French allies and if they were not included in the peace he would have to support their efforts to continue the war in Nova Scotia or Massachusetts. Second, he referred to the Abenakis and the region they inhabited as “dependances du gouvernement de Canada.” Shirley responded angrily, noting that the Abenakis had acted treasonously by attacking Annapolis Royal after promising Mascarene to remain peaceful. Yet Shirley was perhaps

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<sup>38</sup> Mascarene to [n/a], 31 May 1748, f.115, 10971, MG21, LAC.

<sup>39</sup> Shirley to la Galissonnière, Boston, 9 May 1749, *CMNF* vol. 3, pp. 422-3



mistaken in identifying which Native group had done what. He referred to the group of Wolastoqiyik who visited Mascarene to discuss the possibility of war and who promised the British to live in peace. Shirley then described how “three weeks later they returned with others from their village and their priest, Le Loutre” to kill British officers found outside the fort, slaughter cattle, and burn houses.<sup>40</sup> Le Loutre, however, worked with the Mi’kmaq at Shubenacadie, while Père Germain counselled the Wolastoqiyik and Passamaquoddy of the St. John River.<sup>41</sup> Despite the confusion over Native groups, Shirley’s point that the St. John River area was part of Nova Scotia was forcefully made.

There would be other opportunities for the British and French to compete over Native territory. In early July of 1749, Captain John Rous arrived at the St. John River to claim the region for Britain. He found there Charles Deschamps de Boishébert, a French naval officer who had been charged with preventing the British from building forts in the region. Rous announced that he had orders from the King to investigate the harbours and ports and collect geographic information, and he wanted to know by what authority Boishébert was in the region.<sup>42</sup> Though Boishébert struck his colours and admitted that the territory was contested, he later explained to Cornwallis, the new governor of Nova Scotia, that he had been sent to the region by la Galissonnière and ordered to prevent the British from building any fortifications until the two crowns had officially settled the boundary dispute.<sup>43</sup>

The French had another source in the region from whom information could be collected. A few days after Rous confronted Boishébert, Père Germain informed the

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<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 423.

<sup>41</sup> Gérard Finn, “Le Loutre, Jean-Louis,” *DCB*.

<sup>42</sup> Captain Rous to Sieur Boishébert, St. John River, 12 August 1749, f153, vol. 8, C11D, ANOM.

<sup>43</sup> W.A.B. Douglas, “Rous, John,” *DCB*; Boishébert to Cornwallis, Menecouetre, 12 August 1749, *CMNF*, vol.3, p. 450.

authorities at Quebec of what he had witnessed. Germain wrote to Jacques-Pierre de Taffanel, Marquis de la Jonquière, who had replaced la Galissonnière as governor of New France two days after Rous and Boishébert met on the river, and explained to him that the British interpreted the Acadian boundary quite widely. In fact, the British argued that their territory stretched to a place thirteen leagues closer to Boston than the St. John River, and went quite a distance inland.<sup>44</sup> This was not a new claim, but its persistence, coupled with renewed British interest in Nova Scotia, troubled the French.

It would be up to appointed commissaries in Paris to attempt a boundary settlement, but possession was apparently one of the strongest proofs the British could muster. The British were quite anxious to determine Nova Scotia's limits, and Mascarene himself had pleaded with the Board of Trade that spring to have the matter looked after. Mascarene had always considered the inhabitants of the St. John River to be British, and he was concerned over the news that the French were building a fort and a new settlement at the river's mouth.<sup>45</sup> He had "maintained the rights of the British Crown on the foot they have appeared to us here to be established in these parts of the world."<sup>46</sup> His efforts were well and good, but what Britain needed was a much bigger foot.

### **Reconnaissance Surveys and Settlement Plans**

The settlement at Chebucto, later renamed Halifax, was long in the planning. Calls for establishing a new imperial fortress, originating from officials at the weakly-

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<sup>44</sup> Père Germain to La Jonquière, Saint Jean River, 16 August 1749, f156-157, vol. 8, C11D, ANOM.

<sup>45</sup> Mascarene to la Galissonnière, Annapolis Royal, 25 April 1749, 95, vol. 18, RG 1, NSARM; Mascarene to BTP, Annapolis Royal, 2 June 1749, 96, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>46</sup> Mascarene to BTP, Annapolis Royal, 28 April 1749, 94, vol. 18, RG1, NSARM.

fortified Annapolis Royal, began in the 1720s; in the late 1740s, however, William Shirley began repeatedly memorializing the Board of Trade and Plantations. Over time these pleas became more urgent and expressed a need for both a physical and cartographic presence in Nova Scotia. Shirley argued in a letter to the Board of Trade in 1745 that the French presence at Louisbourg must be counterbalanced, possibly with a large fortified and garrisoned place “erected at Chiboucto.”<sup>47</sup> Shirley’s concerns were heightened during the War of Austrian Succession when the French Admiral Duc d’Anville attempted to attack Nova Scotia via Chebucto.<sup>48</sup> Shirley wrote directly to the Duke of Newcastle, the secretary of state of the Southern Department who oversaw colonial administration, to express his desire to establish a stronger British presence on the Atlantic coast of Nova Scotia. Shirley argued that the province’s French inhabitants were prepared to join d’Anville, or any French force for that matter, in an attack against Annapolis.<sup>49</sup>

With time, calls for a stronger British presence in Nova Scotia were expressed increasingly in cartographic and geographic terms. Using maps to secure land title was important in Britain and in the colonies.<sup>50</sup> That colonial authorities employed map imagery, therefore, whether intentional or not, is not surprising. In early 1748, Shirley wrote to the Duke of Bedford, who by then had replaced Newcastle, complaining about French encroachments at Crown Point, a disputed area along the British - French

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<sup>47</sup> Referred to in Mascarene to BTP, Annapolis, 17 October 1748, 37, vol. 11, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>48</sup> See Pritchard, *Anatomy of a Naval Disaster*.

<sup>49</sup> Shirley to Newcastle, Boston, 23 October 1746, 27, vol. 12 RG1, NSARM.

<sup>50</sup> Roger Kain and Elizabeth Baigent, *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: A History of Property Mapping* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 335.; John G. Reid, “The Conquest of ‘Nova Scotia’”. An excellent investigation of cartography and British imperialism can be found in Matthew H. Edney, *Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

boundary that Shirley argued must be secured for the British. Shirley pleaded with Bedford, arguing that it was

absolutely necessary for commissioners to run lines between his Majesty's colonies and Canada, that the boundary may be settled in such a manner if possible as to take away all pretence of dispute which will otherwise perpetually arise between the subjects of the two crowns and to put an end to the continual encroachments of the French.<sup>51</sup>

These boundary lines between the colonies would appear on maps, and would thereby provide the British Empire with an official cartographic foundation upon which to base its land claims. Shirley understood that maps could be used as tools of imperial authority, and he therefore supported the creation of a cartographic record that would favour British territorial expansion over that of the French.

In that same letter, Shirley voiced his concern about the possibility of French inhabitants in Nova Scotia becoming loyal British subjects. Britain had neglected the administration of Nova Scotia since it captured the region in 1710, allowing the Acadians to live in a virtually unchanged province. As the War of Austrian Succession came to a close in both Europe and North America, careful land management was required to assert authority over long ignored regions. Shirley doubted that the French in the province would transfer their allegiance to the British crown without the influence of British settlers. To that end, Shirley commissioned Captain Charles Morris, a surveyor and army officer from Boston, to create a survey of the Bay of Fundy. Shirley "directed Capt. Morris in his survey to see what room there was for interspersing British settlements to be seated in a commodious and defensible manner among those of the French within the

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<sup>51</sup> Shirley to Bedford, Boston, 18 February 1748, 45, vol. 12 RG1, NSARM.

aforementioned tract, which he has done, and marked out in the enclosed plan.”<sup>52</sup>

Morris’s manuscript map and accompanying survey provided both local and imperial officials with the geographic and cartographic information necessary to make decisions concerning imperial expansion (Figure 4.1).

Morris was instrumental in the creation of official geographic and cartographic knowledge relating to Nova Scotia generally, and eventually to Halifax specifically. Morris recorded that he was to locate “places in the Province of Nova Scotia a number of Protestants may speedily settle,” and to ensure that they could support and protect themselves.<sup>53</sup> His report divided the region into the three areas most heavily populated by Acadians: Annapolis Royal, Minas, and Chignecto. Morris determined the limits and location of the Bay of Fundy, provided detailed settlement proposals, and suggested how the region could be defended. When he described the proposed settlements around Annapolis Royal, Morris suggested that families there could support the garrison “in the labour of repairs, in finding timber, boards, shingles and firewood.”<sup>54</sup> He suggested that each lot include waterfront acreage to allow communication with other settlers and access to the central garrison, at which the settlers could sell their goods to help sustain themselves while clearing their land. When describing the area around Chignecto, Morris

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid. In 1748, Lieutenant Governor Mascarene received orders from Governor Shirley to provide support for Morris while he created his survey. The correspondence between Mascarene and Morris indicates the importance that Mascarene ascribed to this project. In an undated letter to Morris, Mascarene stated that he would provide a detachment of men to be put on board Morris’s schooner for defence, which would allow the surveyor “to go on with the draught of this Bay, a service I have endeavoured to make you sensible will be of great service to the public.” To further facilitate Morris’s work, Mascarene arranged for him to serve as captain on ships that were headed into areas of the bay that required surveying. The British Empire possessed the necessary financial and military infrastructure to commission men like Charles Morris to create new drafts and surveys. See Mascarene to Morris, Annapolis, undated, 235-6, vol. 9, RG1, NSARM, and Mascarene to Morris, Annapolis, 6 August 1748, 242, vol. 9, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>53</sup> Charles Morris, “Survey of the Bay of Fundy, 1748,” 12, vol. 44, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.



**Figure 4.1** Extract from Charles Morris's *A Draught of the Upper Part of the Bay of Fundy, 1748*. The indication of "Fort Edward 1750," and "French Fort built 1750" suggests that this map was used for strategic purposes after its creation. Morris noted Acadian settlements and Mass Houses. National Archives, London. CO700/NS17.

explained how the area's natural geography would defend against French attacks. A virtually indestructible fort could be erected at Chignecto because "the marshes surrounding it for a mile distant, except toward the Basin, would render it impregnable and large ships cannot approach within half a mile and that only upon the top of high water and in great danger by the rapidity of the tide and their grounding in two hours."<sup>55</sup> Moreover, settlers would benefit from the ample pasture for cattle and sheep and large tracts of arable land.<sup>56</sup> The 1748 survey of the Bay of Fundy positioned Morris as the thin edge of an expansionist wedge. His work in the region established his imperial

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

importance, and his cartographic contribution was rewarded with additional commissions.

After Morris completed his survey of the Bay of Fundy and supplied his draft of the region to William Shirley, the Massachusetts governor commissioned him to complete a survey of the entire province of Nova Scotia. Again, he was instructed to define the limits of the province, record areas of current French habitation, propose areas for English settlement, and describe the province's climate and geography. Defining the provincial limits was of great importance because the Treaty of Utrecht had left the issue unresolved. In "A Brief Survey of Nova Scotia," Morris divided the province's geography into three regions: lands bordering on the Canada River (St. Lawrence River), lands bordering the northern part of the Bay of Fundy, and Nova Scotia's peninsula. Morris was well aware of Nova Scotia's imperial importance, and his surveys and reports suggested ways that Britain could strengthen its hold on North America. If settled with Protestants, he argued, Nova Scotia "will then be not only a barrier to all other British Colonies, but with their assistance may sooner or later, either ruin the French Provinces, or at least greatly distress them."<sup>57</sup>

Morris provided a history of the province, beginning with Cabot's voyage of 1496 and ending with the Treaty of Utrecht, and compared the provincial boundaries as defined by the French and the English. The French boundaries were more fluid than were the English. France had stretched its claim from the mouth of the St. Lawrence River in the north to the Penobscot River in the south when favourable relations with the Mi'kmaq and their neighbours permitted. But the French could also claim that Acadia was limited to peninsular Nova Scotia – minimizing the amount of land ceded to Britain in 1713 –

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<sup>57</sup> Charles Morris, "A Brief Survey of Nova Scotia, 1748," f10, MG18, LAC.

since no record clearly indicated otherwise. Morris's "Draught of the Northern English Colonies" notes that Nova Scotia must include the peninsula, present day New Brunswick, and the Gaspé region of Quebec. The map also suggested, "this country from Kennebeck river to Cape Rozier was always called by the French ACCADA" (Figure 4.2). As tools of British expansion, Morris's maps and reports were important for their geographic knowledge and their imperial presentation. These surveys made a significant contribution to the development of imperial policy because the extent of land under British control was of central importance to the metropolitan administrators.<sup>58</sup>

The pleas and plans for settlement that originated primarily from New England, Morris's reports and maps, and a plan for civil government drafted by William Shirley assisted George Montagu Dunk, the earl of Halifax and president of the Board of Trade, in creating "A Plan for Settling Nova Scotia." His direct involvement in the settlement's planning is characteristic of Dunk himself, who fought for "his right, and the right of the board, to be regarded as the directing force in colonial affairs."<sup>59</sup> Dunk's plan addressed most requirements for a successful settlement, but he emphasized the importance of surveys and cartography. Careful land management was important because the availability of land served as a primary attraction for potential settlers. Dunk had specific instructions for future governors and surveyors concerning how best to lay out towns and

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<sup>58</sup> In 1750, France and Britain established a committee to resolve the boundary dispute. This subject is covered in Chapter 5. See also Mary Sponberg Pedley, "Map Wars: The Role of Maps in the Nova Scotia/Acadia Boundary Disputes of 1750," *Imago Mundi* 50 (1998). The commissioners did not refer to Morris's survey, but the records suggest that it was in the Board of Trade's possession. In a 1749 letter discussing the need to settle the boundary issue, Governor Cornwallis explained to the Board of Trade that "you will see by the map carried home by Governor Shirley the most accurate I have seen (done by Captain Morris)..." Cornwallis to BTP, Halifax, 7 December 1749, 9, vol. 35, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>59</sup> Arthur Herbert Basye, *The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations Commonly Known as the Board of Trade, 1748-1782* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), 36. For a comparison of settlements founded by the King and those founded by Parliament, see Elizabeth Mancke, *The Fault Lines of Empire: Political Differentiation in Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, Ca. 1760-1830* (New York: Routledge, 2005).



settle new citizens in Nova Scotia. Five settlements were proposed, with two to be marked out “containing one hundred thousand acres or 12 miles each...at Chibucto,



**Figure 4.2** Extract of Charles Morris’s *Draught of the Northern English Colonies*, 1749. Morris notes clearly that Nova Scotia’s boundaries extend to Gaspé and he indicates the location of Mi’kmaq missions and settlements. United States Military Academy at West Point, Digital Collections: <http://digital-library.usma.edu/collections/maps/>

which is intended to be the metropolis,” and each town was to be allotted an equal number of inhabitants.<sup>60</sup> These settlements were to be surveyed in such a way as to provide for expansion when required, so sufficient land was to be left surrounding the original settlement. The plan was overly optimistic, and upon their arrival at Chebucto the settlers were able to establish only one of the proposed five towns.

<sup>60</sup> George Montagu Dunk, “A Plan for Settling Nova Scotia, 1749,” 23, vol. 160, MG1, NSARM.

Dunk also included instructions for specific placement of the settlements and the general manner in which the towns should be laid out. Towns were to be surveyed to ensure that each lot shared a common boundary with its neighbour, “taking care, however, that the said lands do not extend in length along the sea coast, but only a necessary part therefore do abut upon the sea.”<sup>61</sup> Unlike the French Canadian seigneurial system, in which each lot fronted onto the water to facilitate travel and communication, Dunk was explicit in his desire to establish an English grid style township.<sup>62</sup> He repeated this sentiment when he instructed the governor, with whom the final design for the town layout would ultimately rest, that “a regular plan ought to be observed in the laying out the streets and buildings of each town,” and that although some alterations to such regular plans may be required, that he “should be directed to observe as much regularity as possible in this.”<sup>63</sup> A town laid out in a “regular” fashion would stamp the new geography with a British design.

Dunk was also aware that carefully placed surveys could bring the French inhabitants under the power of the British authorities, a concept that echoed Morris’s surveys and maps. Surveyors were instructed to ensure that towns laid out for the proposed settlement, and any future settlements, include land currently inhabited by the French. As the number of towns grew, each carefully surveyed to encompass a section of Acadian settlement, French settlers’ property rights would then be defined and controlled

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> For a study on French land management, see R. Cole Harris, *The Seigneurial System in Early Canada: A Geographical Study*, 1st paperback ed. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984). The seigneurial system was employed in New France, but not in France’s other American colonies, see James Stewart Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80.

<sup>63</sup> Dunk, “A Plan for Settling Nova Scotia.” As Stephen J. Hornsby as argued, eighteenth-century British towns were increasingly dominated by “rigid geometry consisting of a gridiron of wide, straight streets; rectangular, standard-sized lots; and public squares.” See Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 180-87.

by the imperial authorities. Land surveys would also help British authorities keep track of French inhabitants whose lands could not be expropriated by careful town planning. Dunk instructed the governor promptly to make an account of French settlements, including their placement and the number of inhabitants at each. Furthermore, Dunk required “that a survey be now likewise made of their lands now under actual improvement, specifying the numbers of acres cultivated by each particular person.”<sup>64</sup> Careful town planning, as far as Dunk was concerned, could control the French as long as detailed geographic surveys were employed as tools of imperial power to support the British military presence in the colony. Though the British had previously been largely unable to use land grants for imperial purposes, a stronger settlement provided new opportunities for success. Spatial knowledge, from Morris to Shirley to Dunk, served two important purposes during this early reconnaissance phase: first, the land was measured, mapped, and therefore known; second, geographic information was presented in terms favourable to imperial expansion.

### **Territorial Security and Settlement Opposition**

Upon his arrival at Chebucto, Cornwallis began corresponding with the Board of Trade. In his first letter, he gave the commissioners an idea of the region’s geography, informing them, “the country is one of continued wood, no clear spot to be seen or heard of.”<sup>65</sup> Aside from the small area of land cleared by d’Anville’s fleet during their aborted

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid. Dunk’s instructions read: “That care be taken in laying out the aforementioned townships, or any others that may hereafter be laid out, that some part of the lands belonging to the French inhabitants be taken into each township, so that the whole of their possessions may be comprehensive in so many townships as shall be laid out, by which means they will be subjected to Magistracy thereof, and to such rules and orders as may be made for the better governing the same.”

<sup>65</sup> Cornwallis to BTP, Halifax, 22 June 1749, 2, vol. 35, RG1, NSARM.

attack on Nova Scotia in 1746, the settlers recognized few changes in the region's natural geography.<sup>66</sup> A month later, Cornwallis again emphasized the labour required to clear the forests, but added that twelve acres had been cleared in July and that he was confident he could have all the settlers in homes by winter. Along with this letter Cornwallis intended to send a plan of the settlement drafted by military engineer John Brewse.<sup>67</sup> The plan merely anticipated construction, but as the first of only a few maps sent to London during this period, Brewse's contribution was quite influential.

Little is known of Brewse's career before he arrived in Halifax with Cornwallis. However, military engineers made a considerable contribution to European mapping and surveying during the early modern period. Since the sixteenth century, military engineers had surveyed potential battlegrounds and in the 1740s they took a leading role in cartographic development, often drafting town plans and fortifications. As artillery improved, cities could no longer be protected by high walls and instead relied on thicker, lower ramparts able to deflect artillery fire and support defensive cannons. These new fortifications required careful planning prior to construction and military sketches often served as the basis for town development, providing engineers with a central role in establishing settlements in the British Empire.<sup>68</sup>


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<sup>66</sup> Cornwallis and the settlers may not have recognized the Native geographic influence, but L.F.S. Upton has argued that the local Mi'kmaq had cleared land and long used the sites on which Europeans settled, see L. F. S. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979), 48. See also William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003).

<sup>67</sup> Cornwallis to BTP, Halifax, 24 July 1749, 2, vol. 35, RG1, NSARM. It appears that Cornwallis intended to include this plan in his July letter, but his letter dated 20 August states "from Mr. Brewse's plan enclosed which I should have sent by my last..." Cornwallis to BTP, Halifax, 20 August 1749, 5, vol. 35, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>68</sup> David Buisseret, *The Mapmakers' Quest: Depicting New Worlds in Renaissance Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 114-16, 22-25, 50. See also R. A. Skelton, "The Military Surveyor's Contribution to British Cartography in the 16th Century," *Imago Mundi* 24 (1970): 77-83.

Brewse wasted no time in creating a *Project for Fortifying the Town of Halifax in Nova Scotia, 1749* (Figure 4.3), which was sent to the Board of Trade in Cornwallis's letter of August 1749. This letter also included Captain Durell's map of the harbour,



**Figure 4.3 John Brewse's *Project for Fortifying the Town of Halifax, 1749*. There are no trees to be cut and the well-organized town is surrounded by strong fortifications. The position of the church (marked B) and the government building (marked C) are reversed. This error was reproduced on Halifax maps long after both buildings were constructed on their respective ends of the Grand Parade. Library and Archives Canada, H3/240/Halifax/1749**

created in the 1730s; the combination of both charts gave the Board of Trade a visual representation of the region. "From seeing the plan only," wrote Cornwallis, "one would be apt to choose Sandwich Point as the best situation for a town," but the governor continued to list the faults of Sandwich Point (Point Pleasant) and the benefits of the situation he chose, which is where the city stands today.<sup>69</sup> Brewse's map is less

<sup>69</sup> Cornwallis to BTP, Halifax, 24 July 1749, 2, vol. 35, RG1, NSARM.

informative than other military plans, which usually included forests and other aspects of the natural environment to give military authorities enough information to make strategic decisions. The use of striations on Brewse's map was an attempt to provide an idea of relief, but the markings do little to portray accurately the incline upon which the city was to be built.<sup>70</sup> Stephen Hornsby has argued that "the governor's residence, parade ground, Anglican church, and citadel dominated the town's grid plan and symbolized British political, military, and religious authority in the colony."<sup>71</sup> The planned palisade was substantial and included a proposed earthen ditch, a cross-section of which is provided on the map's lower right corner. Military engineers usually produced detailed maps, which makes Brewse's lack of detail surprising. His contribution was little more than an architectural plan which served limited strategic purposes. Specifically, the omission of any sign of the Mi'kmaq, from whom the settlers were trying to protect themselves, is particularly revealing.

The exclusion of Natives on Brewse's plan illustrates how the British image of Nova Scotia changed as administrators developed new policies. As J.B. Harley has argued, "it is in the nature of all maps...to construct a world in the image of society rather than to hold a mirror to an 'objective reality.'"<sup>72</sup> When the settlers arrived at Halifax they renamed the region, replacing Native terms with British ones in an attempt to claim the land and superimpose British references that suited the purpose of the colony. Ignoring the Mi'kmaq presence and providing new names helped create order out of wilderness

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<sup>70</sup> Buisseret, *The Mapmakers' Quest: Depicting New Worlds in Renaissance Europe*, 116. Contour lines were not employed on maps "until quite far into the nineteenth century," 118.

<sup>71</sup> Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 206.

<sup>72</sup> J. B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 187.

which made the image of Halifax comprehensible and attractive to people in Britain.<sup>73</sup> Cleared of the surrounding dense forests and threatening Natives, Halifax appeared on maps as an ideally situated colony, heavily fortified against a seemingly non-existent enemy. However, as John G. Reid has argued, it is no longer possible to examine eighteenth-century northeastern North America in terms of “colonialism.” Nova Scotia was the site of competition and negotiation between empires and Aborigines, and there was no certainty that Europeans would be the victors.<sup>74</sup> Despite their reduced numbers, the local Mi’kmaq were formidable foes who controlled much of the regional geography until the arrival of the Loyalists in the mid-1780s.<sup>75</sup> An investigation into British maps of the Halifax region must recognize this tension and not simply argue that the Mi’kmaq were ignored. Individual mapmakers could choose to exclude Aborigines from British maps, thereby denying Natives a place in the British image of Nova Scotia. Mapmakers who did recognize Aborigines could choose where and how they were represented. At the very least cartographers imposed a British definition of the region’s indigenous inhabitants.

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<sup>73</sup> William Craig Wicken, *Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 174.

<sup>74</sup> See John G. Reid and Luca Codignola, “Forum: How Wide Is the Atlantic Ocean?,” *Acadiensis* 34, no. 2 (2005): 74-87.

<sup>75</sup> John G. Reid, “*Pax Britannica* or *Pax Indigena*? Planter Nova Scotia (1760-1782) and Competing Strategies of Pacification,” *Canadian Historical Review* 85, no. 4 (2004): 669-92. For an opposing view, see Stephen E. Patterson, “Indian-White Relations in Nova Scotia, 1749-61: A Study in Political Interaction,” *Acadiensis* 23, no. 1 (1993): 23-59. William Wicken has argued that the local Mi’kmaq paid little attention to the British until thirteen years after Port Royal was captured for the last time, see “Mi’kmaq Decisions: Antoine Tecouenemac, the Conquest, and the Treaty of Utrecht” in John G. Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 86-106. On the extent of the Mi’kmaq’s geographic exploration see *Les Micmacs et La Mer*, ed. Charles A. Martijn (Montréal: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1986). and Bruce J. Bourque and Ruth H. Whitehead, “Trade Alliances in the Contact Period” in *American Beginnings: Exploration, Culture, and Cartography in the Land of Norumbega*, ed. Emerson W. Baker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 131-47.

In the settlement's early days, there were signs that the Native-British relationship might be less strained than it had been. In August and September of 1749, Governor Cornwallis and the Council met with Wolastoqiyik chiefs from the St. John River as well as a Mi'kmaq representative from Chignecto. At this meeting the Natives agreed to a renewed treaty based on that signed in 1726. Their understanding of the previous treaty was stated clearly, and there were present among the Natives a few men who had attended the earlier negotiations and ratification. Similarly, British Lieutenant Governor Paul Mascarene witnessed both the 1749 and 1726 treaties. Olive Dickason has argued that the English believed each treaty to be a renewal and confirmation of the 1726 agreement while "the Indians shared no such view and considered each new signing as a separate treaty"<sup>76</sup>; recent scholarship suggests, however, that the Mi'kmaq and members of the Wabanaki were well aware that each treaty built on the one that came before. If anything, it was the British who hoped that a new treaty could impose new rules and reshape British-Native relations.<sup>77</sup>

The impact of the 1749 treaty is debatable. William Wicken argues that "the delegates represented only a fraction of the region's Mi'kmaq and Maliseet populations."<sup>78</sup> Daniel Paul, however, suggests that by signing the treaty the Wolastoqiyik abandoned the Mi'kmaq, leaving their allies as "the sole opposition to the occupation of Nova Scotia by the English invaders."<sup>79</sup> Determining the effects of this treaty is difficult because although chiefs signed the agreement, there is no record that it

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<sup>76</sup> Olive Patricia Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations, 1713-1760* (Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1976), 79.

<sup>77</sup> See Reid, "Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena?," 669-92; Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*; Patterson, "Indian-White Relations," 23-59.

<sup>78</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 176.

<sup>79</sup> Daniel N. Paul, *We Were Not the Savages: A Mi'kmaq Perspective on the Collision between European and Native American Civilizations* (Halifax: Fernwood, 2000), 105.



was widely ratified by other members. As L.F.S. Upton argues, most Mi'kmaq distanced themselves from the agreement and continued carrying out hostilities against the British.<sup>80</sup> According to Père Germain, the missionary priest serving at the St. John River, even the Wolastoqiyik failed to ratify the agreement to which their chiefs had agreed.<sup>81</sup> The French had spent decades establishing their relationship with the Mi'kmaq and the Wolastoqiyik while remaining careful not to encroach on their lands. It is unlikely that the British would succeed in cementing a lasting agreement shortly after arriving to construct a military fort.

While there is confusion over the reach and strength of the 1749 treaty, general Mi'kmaq opposition to the British settlement was made clear by letters sent to Halifax. One letter, likely written on behalf of the Mi'kmaq by Père Maillard, a missionary at Île Royale, outlined Mi'kmaq anger over British encroachment. “The place where you are,” the letter begins,

the place where you live, the place where you are building a fortification, the place where you want now to establish yourself, the place of which you want to make yourself the absolute master, this place belongs to me. Me, the Indian, I come out of this earth like [a blade of] grass. I have been born there and the son [and] from father to son. This place is my land, I swear it. It is God who has given me this land to be my homeland forever...My king and your king together distribute these lands and it is because of that they are presently at peace, but for me I can make neither alliance or peace with you. Show me where I could, an Indian, withdraw to. As for you, you hunt me down. Show me then where you want me to take refuge. You have taken over almost all of this land, so that the only resource left to me is Kchibouctouk [Halifax]. Yet you begrudge me even this piece [of land] and you even want to chase me from it. That is what makes me know that you have sworn to not cease to make war on us and to never enter into alliance with us. You are proud of your great numbers. I, who am in very small number, can only count on the God which knows what this is about. An earthworm knows to rise up when it is attacked; I, an Indian, know at least as much as an earthworm and will similarly respond forcefully in defence when I am attacked. Your residence at Port Royal did not give me much cause for concern,

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<sup>80</sup> Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, 51.

<sup>81</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 178.

therefore you see that for a long time I left you in peace, but now you force me to speak out because of the considerable theft you have made.<sup>82</sup>

This response left no room for doubt; some Mi'kmaq considered the founding of Halifax a "theft," and they demanded that the fort be removed. Whereas before the Mi'kmaq had fought only sporadically against the British settlement at Annapolis Royal, they were now more concerned for their territorial rights. The British, however, were ready to dig in their heels as never before and maps would play a crucial role.

Halifax maps of the mid-eighteenth century illustrate how cartographic representations had changed, especially in relation to the inclusion or exclusion of Natives. There is reason to suggest that eastern Algonkian Natives were able to express to British settlers their concepts of geographic space. In New England, seventeenth-century land deeds demonstrated Natives' use of cartography to sketch what lands they were willing to sell, even if the terms of sale were not always understood by both sides.<sup>83</sup> In Nova Scotia, the Mi'kmaq chief Aikon Aushabuc in 1761 used his hand as a map to explain to an English captive the region's geopolitical situation. Making an open circle with his thumb and index finger, Aushabuc explained the relative positions of Quebec (tip of index finger), Montreal (joint of index finger), New York, Boston (joint of thumb), and Halifax (tip of thumb). He then pressed his thumb to his index finger to illustrate

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<sup>82</sup> "Déclaration de Guerre des Micmacs aux Anglais s'ils refusent d'abandonner Kchibouktouk," *Canada-Français*, vol. 1, pp. 17-19 [translated by William Wicken in *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 179-80, with additional translation by the author].

<sup>83</sup> Investigations into Native cartography are progressing despite the evidentiary challenges posed by the ephemeral nature of many Native maps, which were often scratched in the sand, sketched on tree bark, or explained using gestures. See Emerson W. Baker, "'A Scratch with a Bear's Paw': Anglo-Indian Land Deeds in Early Maine," *Ethnohistory* 36 (1989): 235-56; *Cartographic Encounters: Perspectives on Native American Mapmaking and Map Use*, ed. G. Malcolm Lewis, The Kenneth Nebenzahl, Jr., Lectures in the History of Cartography (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998); *The History of Cartography, Volume Two, Book Three: Cartography in the Traditional African, American, Arctic, Australian, and Pacific Societies*, ed. David Woodward and Malcolm G Lewis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998). J. B. Harley, "Rereading the Maps of the Columbian Encounter," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 82, no. 3 (1992): 522-36.

how the British presence was threatening his people.<sup>84</sup> As this example demonstrates, there were multiple conceptions of space and myriad ways of rendering geographic information at the time of the Halifax settlement. Although the evidentiary record favours a Western interpretation, Aboriginal mapping remained centrally important to their quest for territorial sovereignty.



Figure 4.4 Extract from Henry Popple's *A Map of the British Empire in America*, 1733. Like French geographers, Popple included prominent Aboriginal names. Library and Archives Canada, H11/1000/1733

Despite the Natives' military prowess and geographic power, British geographers and their maps created to record the founding of Halifax controlled and sometimes removed the Mi'kmaq presence in Nova Scotia. Comparing British geographer Henry

<sup>84</sup> *The History of Cartography, Volume Two, Book Three*, 68-9.

Popple's 1733 map with those that appeared at the time of the Halifax settlement illustrates cartography's ability figuratively to clear the land in preparation for settlement. Although Popple's rendering of Nova Scotia's coastline leaves something to be desired, he indicated in large font the areas of three prominent Native groups: "Micmaques," "Souriquois," and "Etechemins" (Figure 4.4). Less than twenty years later, when Thomas Jefferys was circulating his influential maps in Britain, this Aboriginal element was conspicuous in its absence. The Natives had not disappeared, but certain maps made it appear as if they had.<sup>85</sup> Jefferys' cartographic competition in London, Thomas Kitchin, did not ignore Natives but did exert power over their representation. "*Ind. Vil.*" appears only in three locations on peninsular Nova Scotia, although none on its Atlantic coast where Britain was to establish Halifax (Figure 4.5). Maps produced locally for official use, like Morris's "Draught of the Northern English Colonies," were only marginally better than the popular cartography produced for public consumption in Britain. Morris's peninsular Nova Scotia is nearly empty, save for a small marker explained by the text "Here is a church for the Cape Sable Indians" (Figure 4.2). Morris may have been more interested in justifying British claims to the region than in illustrating who was living within. Morris and the other geographers demonstrated a British cartographic ambivalence towards Natives. When included on maps, Aboriginals were often controlled and suppressed on paper in ways that were impossible in reality.

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<sup>85</sup> Technically, the Etechemin and Souriquois had by 1730 been replaced by and/or evolved into the Wolastoqiyik and the Mi'kmaq, respectively. For an investigation into the changing Aboriginal presence in the region see Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759," *Ethnohistory* 36, no. 3 (1989): 257-84.



Figure 4.5 Thomas Kitchin's *Nova Scotia Drawn from Surveys*, 1749. "Ind. Vil." marks the location of Mi'kmaq settlements, but none are placed along the Atlantic coast. There was a Mi'kmaq Mass House on the Shubenacadie by this time. Library and Archives Canada, H3/200/1749

In practical terms, Mi'kmaq resistance to Halifax forced Britain to change its settlement plans. George Dunk wanted five settlements, but Cornwallis established only one, arguing, "while there is any danger from the Indians the more compact we are the better."<sup>86</sup> As William Wicken has argued, the Mi'kmaq had good reason to be angry. The treaty process between the British and the Natives that began in 1725 – by which time the British presence in Nova Scotia was sufficient to demand an official acknowledgement by the Mi'kmaq – had been compromised in the years between 1725 and 1749. The French had encouraged the Natives to harass the British and fight on the side of France during the War of Austrian Succession, forcing the English to realize that

<sup>86</sup> Cornwallis to BTP, Halifax, 19 March 1749/50, 11, vol. 35, RG1, NSARM.



new treaties were necessary to secure Mi'kmaq cooperation.<sup>87</sup> The fact that the British arrived unannounced and raised a town on what traditionally had been Mi'kmaq land did not endear the settlers to their indigenous neighbours, who made their disapproval evident.

The Mi'kmaq resisted British settlement and influenced its development long after Halifax was founded. Yet maps of Halifax belied the presence and power of Aboriginals and did nothing to recognize Native conceptions of space; in so doing these maps expressed the discordance between the images and language of empire and the reality that settlers faced on the ground. In their discussion of Native power in the early modern Northeast, Emerson Baker and John G. Reid provide an analytical framework that applies to spatial organization in early Halifax, despite what British maps presented: the British at Halifax inhabited a "pale" beyond which lay a geography dominated by Natives with their own understandings and representations of space.<sup>88</sup> Although the founding of Halifax was crucially important to the British Empire, there was no guarantee during the early period that the settlement would succeed. Spatial knowledge, especially when captured in cartographic form, did not reflect Britain's tenuous position on Nova Scotia's eastern shore.

In 1752, the British tried yet again to secure a lasting peace with the Mi'kmaq. As with earlier treaties, the government in Nova Scotia followed that of New England. The government at Boston had struck a treaty with members of the eastern Abenakis in 1749, but that treaty was never ratified and violence after 1749 forced the British to invite

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<sup>87</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 175. See also Wicken, "Mi'kmaq Decisions".

<sup>88</sup> Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, "Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast: A Reappraisal," *William & Mary Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2004): 77-106. See also Reid, "*Pax Britannica*," *passim*.

the Natives to discuss their issues and ratify the earlier agreement. The Boston government was most concerned with the Norridgewock (Kennebec) Natives who had launched attacks on the Boston frontier, one of their members going so far as to return the 1749 treaty to the British.<sup>89</sup> Present at the meeting in 1752 was Louis, a Penobscot authorized to treat on behalf of the tribe, and Quinoius, a Norridgewock, also charged with representing his tribe. The St. John Natives sent Joseph and Sabadis on their behalf, though they were authorized only to listen and to report back what had been discussed. All were gathered to reaffirm their commitment to Dummer's Treaty of 1726.<sup>90</sup>

Instrumental to Dummer's Treaty was the division of land that set boundaries on who could settle where. The Natives at this meeting informed the representatives from Boston that there had indeed been violence, but that it should end. They then reminded the British that Dummer's Treaty had concluded "that the English should inhabit the lands as far as the salt water flowed, and no further; and that the Indians should possess the rest."<sup>91</sup> The eastern Abenakis made it clear that the land was theirs:

Brethren, as I said before, so I now say, that the lands we own, let us enjoy; and let no body take them from us. We said the same to those of our own religion, the French. Altho' we are a black people, yet God hath planted us here God gave us this land, and we will keep it. God decreed all things; he decreed this land to us; therefore neither shall the French or English possess it, but we will.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> "A Journal of the proceedings of Jacob Wendell, Samuel Watts, Thomas Hubbard and Chambers Russel, Esqrs; commissioners appointed by the Honourable Spencer Phips, Esq; lieutenant-governour and commander in chief, in and over His Majesty's province of the Massachusetts-Bay in New-England, to treat with the several tribes of Eastern Indians, in order to renew and confirm a general peace," *Collections of the Maine Historical Society*, Vol. 4 (Portland: Published for the Society, 1856), 170-1.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 172-4. The records do not indicate if the representatives from the St. John River were Wolastoqiyik or Passamaquoddy, but both were members of the Wabanaki Confederacy and both inhabited lands claimed by Nova Scotia and New France.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 174.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

To this the representatives from the St. John River concurred, “the tribe of the St. John’s say the same.”<sup>93</sup> The new treaty was read aloud and the Native representatives authorized to do so ratified the agreement.

The government at Halifax was in a similar position to that of Boston, having also struck a treaty in 1749 with dubious results. It learned that the Mi’kmaq had captured a ship at Canso and attacked vessels at Chignecto. In late September, the Mi’kmaq attacked a group of British men cutting wood at present-day Dartmouth. Four men were killed and one was taken away. Rangers were sent in retaliation, and when they had caught up to the Mi’kmaq two were beheaded and one was scalped.<sup>94</sup> In response, Governor Cornwallis declared war on the Mi’kmaq and offered a bounty for Native scalps.<sup>95</sup> The British waged this war against the Mi’kmaq only, as the Wolastoqiyik had agreed earlier that summer to be peaceful allies.<sup>96</sup> Yet Wolastoqiyik anger towards the British was evident by their role in an attack (with the Mi’kmaq and Abenaki) against British soldiers at Minas where they captured nineteen soldiers and held them for a week.<sup>97</sup> The bounty brought in many scalps, but in time the violence died down and the British at Halifax tried yet again to strike a treaty with the Mi’kmaq.

What differentiated the Nova Scotian treaties from those made in New England was the implementation of boundaries. The eastern Abenakis knew that their land began

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Thomas Beamish Akins, *History of Halifax City* (Dartmouth: Brook House, 1895; reprint, 2002), 18. Daniel Paul questions the veracity of this account, suggesting that the story is possibly British “propaganda,” or perhaps the men were in fact armed. See Paul, *We Were Not the Savages*, 111-12. Paul takes particular issue with the British scalping proclamation, referring to it as “genocide” (p.108), while arguing that Cornwallis was a “white supremacist,” “barbaric,” and “unforgivable” (p.110). What Paul does not account for, however, is the fact that the Mi’kmaq received payments from the French for British scalps. See Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians*, 99.

<sup>95</sup> Scalping Proclamation, Halifax, October 1749, f.118, vol. 9, CO 217, LAC.

<sup>96</sup> Patterson, “Colonial Wars and Aboriginal Peoples,” 130.

<sup>97</sup> John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W Norton & Co., 2005), 262.



where the salt water ended, and while this was a vague and perhaps unenforceable limit (one never accepted by the British), it served as a basis from which the Natives could make complaints. In Nova Scotia, there was no demonstrable boundary limit between British and Aboriginal land. Soon after the founding of Halifax and the weak 1749 treaty, the British attempted to extend their geographic control by establishing military posts on the isthmus. Cornwallis sent Lieutenant Colonel Charles Lawrence to the region in the summer of 1750, and though his first attempt was thwarted he returned in the fall to construct Fort Lawrence. The French had built Fort Beausejour, and so both posts stood at opposite ends of the thin strip of land connecting the peninsula to the mainland.<sup>98</sup> Native resistance in the face of such expansion was to be expected.

When that resistance quieted, the British did what they could to secure a lasting peace. In 1752, Cornwallis sent a messenger to the Mi'kmaq, who were gathered at Port Toulouse, and invited them to come treat with the British. Jean-Baptiste Cope, who claimed to be a chief of the Shubenacadie Mi'kmaq, arrived at Halifax to treat with Governor Hopson, who had replaced Cornwallis.<sup>99</sup> Cope and Hopson discussed their issues, and a new treaty was struck. Based on the 1726 agreement, this treaty did not specifically address land but repeated the promise that the Mi'kmaq should not be bothered in their hunting and fishing.<sup>100</sup> As the British learned soon after, both the treaty and the Native delegates who signed it had little influence over the Mi'kmaq population.

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<sup>98</sup> Dominick Graham, "Lawrence, Charles," *DCB*.

<sup>99</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 183. There is some debate over Cope's standing among the Mi'kmaq. As Wicken argues, "while we cannot conclude that Cope was the Grand Chief of the Mi'kmaq, neither can we demonstrate that he was not. What we can say is that at the very least, Cope's influence extended beyond his own village." *Treaties on Trial*, 184.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.

The winter of 1752 passed in relative peace, but in the spring of 1753 the British learned that Native hostilities – fuelled in no small part by British actions – were not to be easily quelled. That summer two men came into the Halifax harbour claiming to have escaped Native captivity after the Mi'kmaq murdered their shipmates. In fact, they had been part of a crew that robbed a Native sloop at Jeddore and then shipwrecked when they encountered rough weather. The Mi'kmaq rescued and cared for the two surviving members, who in turn killed their rescuers to collect the bounty on scalps.<sup>101</sup> The Mi'kmaq were enraged and wanted vengeance. Cope's son informed the government that the Mi'kmaq were angry about the 1752 treaty and the subsequent British hostilities, and requested permission to remove himself to Halifax for protection. He asked for assistance with the move, and the British sent a sloop to meet Cope and his followers, who then killed all the men save for Anthony Casteel, whom they took prisoner because he was French.<sup>102</sup>

Casteel made his way through Nova Scotia and eventually to Louisbourg, where he met with Abbé Le Loutre and Comte de Raymond, the governor of Île Royale. Raymond was particularly interested in the route Casteel had taken and asked him for geographic information. After being summoned to the governor's quarters, Raymond “unfolded a map of this coast, where I showed him all the rivers, creeks, and places I was in.”<sup>103</sup> Thus informed, Raymond eventually freed Casteel, who returned to Halifax to inform the authorities of his experience. Aware that the 1752 treaty had failed, British officials continued their attempts to secure their position in Nova Scotia.

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<sup>101</sup> *Canada-Français* vol. II, p. 112. See also Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, 55. Upton mistakenly notes the year as 1754.

<sup>102</sup> Patterson, “Colonial Wars and Aboriginal Peoples,” 134-35.

<sup>103</sup> “Anthony Casteel’s journal, while prisoner with the Indians in the month of May and June, 1753,” *Canada-Français*, vol.II, p.123.

## Land Use and Town Management in Halifax

When not attempting to strike alliances with the Mi'kmaq and their allies or expand into the peninsula, the local administration relied on geographic knowledge and land management to govern the Halifax settlement. The distribution of land facilitated administration in several ways, most of which required direct involvement on behalf of the surveyors themselves. At one of the earliest Council meetings held aboard the ship *Beauport* in August of 1749, Cornwallis informed the Council that Charles Morris and John Brewse had laid out the town lots and were ready to allocate land to the settlers. But Cornwallis wondered whether the lots should be granted before the colonists had been put to work building a line of defence around the town. The Council minutes record that an unanimous vote decided that the next day settlers would be told that before they received their lands they were to spend "a few days to cast up a line of defence," and that afterwards they would be allocated lands upon which they could construct their houses in security.<sup>104</sup> Using land allocation as a reward for performing the necessary task of strengthening defences secured a modicum of safety for all Halifax inhabitants. As David Sutherland has argued, the common depiction of the original settlers as lazy often misrepresents the situation. In fact, settlers were eager to build, although less eager to spend time on public works when still in want of personal shelter. An initial line of defence, however, was a project in which settlers could find comfort.<sup>105</sup> The promise of land allocations following this brief employment would have eased the tension between settlers and administration that seems to have slowed much of the town's construction.

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<sup>104</sup> Council Minutes, 13 August 1749, 12, vol. 186, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>105</sup> Judith Fingard, David A. Sutherland, and Janet Guildford, *Halifax: The First 250 Years* (Halifax, N.S.: Formac, 1999), 14. Cornwallis complained bitterly about the laziness of settlers, perhaps not realizing that many were more focused on personal gain than public works. See Akins, *History of Halifax City* 6-7.

Granting land to hundreds of families was bound to cause confusion or encourage deceit, and the first few months at Halifax witnessed both, keeping Brewse and Morris busy settling disputes. At a Council meeting in November, Beamisley Glazier brought a case against Lance Shipton, arguing that while he was away Shipton had built a house on his lot number 25 on the north side of the town.<sup>106</sup> In his defence, Shipton argued that the lot had been lawfully granted to him, and the land register was called for. Finding Mr. Glazier's name assigned to lot 25, the Council asked Shipton why he had built on a lot to which he clearly had no title. "Mr. Shipton," according to the minutes, "said he could prove that Mr. Brewse the Engineer who had the laying of the lots had given him the choice of that lot No.25 or No.3." Shipton had first built on lot 3, but had since yielded that land to a Mr. Crosby. Both Brewse and Crosby were sent for. The land registry showed that Shipton's name had appeared in lot 3 but had been erased and Crosby's name put in its place. To avoid future confusion, the Council passed a motion that the exchange of lots must be completed in the form of deeds, and must be recorded in a separate register.<sup>107</sup> Mr. Shipton agreed to give up his title to the land, and Mr. Glazier agreed to allow Mr. Shipton to remain in the house he had built until that spring.

Recently evicted from lot 25, Shipton could not convince Crosby, to whom he had ceded his original grant of lot 3, to move off the plot. Both parties appeared before the Council to argue their case. Shipton claimed that he had yielded his property only on the condition that his claim to lot 25 should stand, which it had not. Crosby denied the condition, and Shipton called for his wife to corroborate his story. The Council did not believe Shipton or his wife, and the lot was confirmed to belong to Crosby. By adapting

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<sup>106</sup> Council Minutes, 14 November 1749, 26, vol. 186, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

to changing demands in town development, the surveyors were able to resolve the conflict, and another lot was laid out for Shipton.<sup>108</sup> The entire affair was not resolved until the following May, when Shipton visited the Council once again, this time requesting that he be granted lot 25, the lot over which Shipton and Glazier had originally quarrelled. Glazier had allowed Shipton to remain in the house he built on the lot until April, but the record indicates that Glazier was out of town when Shipton's time expired. As a result, Shipton requested that he receive permission to remain on lot 25, and the lot that had been set aside for Shipton be ceded to Glazier upon his return. The Council, undoubtedly wanting to put the entire ordeal behind them, agreed.<sup>109</sup> The daily administration of the colony required the Council to deal with situations as they arose, and land management required a system of record keeping that could adjust when necessary to facilitate governance.

During the first years of settlement, cadastral surveys were tools used by both the state and the settlers. As Roger Kain and Elizabeth Baigent argue, cadastral maps were essential to settlers because they defined and secured individual grants and land title.<sup>110</sup> Ordinarily, a cadastral map would be used by the government to assert control over the settlers primarily through the collection of rents and taxes. In Halifax, however, lands were held tax and rent free for the first ten years, as promised by George Montagu Dunk in his official call for settlers.<sup>111</sup> Certain conditions had to be met to retain title to any piece of land, and enforcing these conditions required surveys and surveyors. Unlike in

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<sup>108</sup> Council Minutes, 20 November 1749, 27, vol. 186, RG1, NSARM; Council Minutes, 21 November 1749, 29, vol. 189, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>109</sup> Council Minutes, 20 May 1750, 60, vol. 186, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>110</sup> Kain and Baigent, *The Cadastral Map*, 336.

<sup>111</sup> Akins, *History of Halifax City* 239. The advertisement reads "That 50 acres of land will be granted in fee simple...free from the payment of any quit rents or taxes for the term of ten years."

several other colonies, the governing Council at Halifax did not grant large plots of land to proprietors, who would then subdivide the land and form a council themselves to govern the area. Instead, lots were granted to individual settlers, allowing administrators to keep a watchful eye on land use and ensure that lots were being “improved” as required by the conditions of the grant.<sup>112</sup> Controlling land tenure was important during the first years of settlement at Halifax to ensure the town succeeded, but the Council would experiment with privately organized settlements after the town was established. Cornwallis’s primary concern was ensuring that the basic conditions of settlement were reached and that town plans were employed to that end.

There were times when land management was both practical and fiscally conservative, but when these two concerns clashed practicality took priority. Some public works that would have required hiring labourers were performed by settlers as a condition of their land grants. In July 1750, Cornwallis declared that each settler in possession of a lot in Halifax was “obliged to clear opposite to his lot to the middle of the street, the whole length of the grant.” Should land holders refuse or not clear the land within six weeks, labourers would be hired to perform the work at the expense of the lot.<sup>113</sup> Clearing trees and fencing lots was a perennial concern, and eventually the Council offered bounties for settlers who reached specific goals. In April 1752, Governor Hopson demanded that all grants be fenced and cleared within twelve months. The fence had to be at least four feet high, and no more than ten trees per acre were permitted to remain. Each settler was promised twenty shillings per acre cleared within the twelve months, demonstrating that the local government was willing to spend money

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<sup>112</sup> For a comparative analysis of land proprietorship in Nova Scotia and New England, see Mancke, *The Fault Lines of Empire*.

<sup>113</sup> Council Minutes, 2 July 1750, 67, vol. 186, RG1, NSARM.

to get results.<sup>114</sup> This kind of administrative control required careful surveys. Only by looking at the surveys and sketches and matching a plot of land to a settler's name as recorded in the allotment book could the Council ensure that the right settler was on the right plot of land, and that all the specific demands of settlement were reached. Charles Morris and John Brewse were essential to this process; they were called upon to resurvey land when a dispute arose, to act as mediators between parties, and to ensure that the Council was working from the most recent and accurate town maps. The maps and surveys that Morris and Brewse provided were practical, useful, and evolved as the town grew. As more settlers arrived and demanded their own plots of land, Charles Morris and his surveys would become even more important to the local administration. Unlike the Board of Trade, officials at Halifax had continual access to the latest geographic and cartographic information.

### **Lunenburg**

By spring 1752, three years after John Brewse drew his sketch for the town, most of the initial construction in Halifax required by the plan was complete. The Board of Trade was anxious to bring an end to the growing settlement expenses, and therefore instructed Cornwallis that since "the fortifications of Halifax are made as far as the present plan extends," perhaps he should terminate plans for any new construction.<sup>115</sup> Proposals to improve fortifications at the harbour were put on hold, as were the perennial improvements to the battery on St. George's island. The Board suggested that Cornwallis continue building only as his yearly budget allowed, and whenever possible to employ

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<sup>114</sup> Council Minutes, 8 April 1752, 167, vol. 186, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>115</sup> BTP to Cornwallis, Whitehall, 6 March 1752, 8, vol. 29, RG1, NSARM.

the foreign Protestants who had travelled to Halifax on the condition that they would work off the cost of their passage.<sup>116</sup>

Many German settlers had arrived in Halifax but had been unable to establish a new settlement for fear of Native attacks. Cornwallis was unsuccessful in his settlement attempts, but the Board of Trade assured Hopson that “we doubt not but that your humanity and prudence will also suggest to you the means of alleviating the distress and disappointments of the people themselves.”<sup>117</sup> The Board had in its possession a map of a proposed area of settlement at Musquodoboit, which “according to the plan and survey... appears to be a very proper place.”<sup>118</sup> Instead, however, the German settlers were to be sent to Merligash.

Unlike Halifax, which was surveyed only after the settlers arrived, Merligash, renamed Lunenburg, was scouted and mapped for settlement by Charles Morris, who continued to serve imperial ends in Nova Scotia. Charles Lawrence was put in charge of the settlement after he had established his reputation by founding Fort Lawrence in 1750 in an attempt to remove the French from the Missaguash river area.<sup>119</sup> Lawrence relied heavily on Morris to ensure that plots were laid out and distributed in a manner that would please the settlers. Lawrence’s personal journal details Morris’s efforts. Over four hours in early June, for example, Lawrence “fixed with Capt. Morris... the situation of the Town, and also for the blockhouses for the defence of it.”<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> See Winthrop Pickard Bell, *The "Foreign Protestants" And the Settlement of Nova Scotia: The History of a Piece of Arrested British Colonial Policy in the Eighteenth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961).

<sup>117</sup> BTP to Hopson, Whitehall, 28 March 1753, 17, vol. 29, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Graham, “Lawrence, Charles,” *DCB*.

<sup>120</sup> Charles Lawrence, *Journal and Letters of Colonel Charles Lawrence*. Ed. D.C. Harvey, Bulletin 10, 1953, NSARM.



Morris was capable enough to realize that simply fixing boundary lines did not mark the end of settlement planning. The original instructions for the Lunenburg settlement stated that houses should be kept 200 metres from the shore, but due to the inconsistent shoreline it would “in Mr. Morris’s opinion have laid us infinite inconveniences.”<sup>121</sup> There were problems, especially with settlers arguing that their plot was too wet, or too stony, or too hilly, and such complaints demanded new plots be surveyed and distributed to those whose land was inadequate.<sup>122</sup> Settlers were growing impatient over a lack of supplies, so Lawrence did what he could to appease those who were upset about their land. He even managed to convince the settlers that creating a commons – shared land to be used by all inhabitants – was more profitable than smaller grants of individual plots.<sup>123</sup>

Lawrence sent maps back to Hopson, but he often waited until they could provide a complete view of the settlement’s progress. Incomplete maps could not fully outline potential risks. Not wanting to rush the charting and surveying, he informed Hopson, “it will be impractical to prepare the sketch of the peninsula, town, & blockhouses, so as to send it away tomorrow. But by the next opportunity, we shall certainly have it ready.”<sup>124</sup> Lawrence’s military background also caused him to stress Lunenburg’s need for defences. At times he worried that the clean lines on a map could not represent the settlement’s dangerous position. He wrote to Hopson and complained of the sketches that “it is impossible by these means to point out the many ascents & descents, the covers and the various advantages of ground” that provided cover and opportunity for a Native

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>123</sup> Bell, *The "Foreign Protestants"*, 432-42.

<sup>124</sup> Lawrence, *Journal*, 23.

attack.<sup>125</sup> The local Mi'kmaq were upset that yet another settlement was being constructed without their permission, which they believed was necessary for any expansion to be “lawfully made” as stated in earlier treaties.<sup>126</sup>

### **Maps and Preparations for War**

The Mi'kmaq grew increasingly upset about British expansion, and authorities at London and Halifax sensed an imperial struggle looming on the horizon that would require new fortifications to protect Halifax from both the French and Native forces. Commissioners of the Board of Trade were concerned that their knowledge of the geography surrounding the Halifax region was still limited. Lieutenant Governor Charles Lawrence, who had replaced Hopson, became increasingly diligent in sending geographic information to London and was requested to send over a plan locating the best areas for new blockhouses and batteries.<sup>127</sup> Lawrence wasted no time commissioning a new survey of the region, and by June 1754 he had a map ready to send to London that outlined strategic areas for blockhouses that would, *inter alia*, prevent the Mi'kmaq from getting too close to Halifax.

Although the British had by 1751 established Fort Lawrence on the isthmus of Chignecto and Fort Edward at Minas Basin to defend against the Mi'kmaq during periods of sustained warfare, it remained imperative to protect English settlements from surprise attacks.<sup>128</sup> Blockhouses on the Shubenacadie River were first proposed in 1752 to

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>126</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 170.

<sup>127</sup> BTP to Lawrence, Whitehall, 4 March 1754, 25, vol. 29, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>128</sup> Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*, 266, 68.

establish trade with the Mi'kmaq in an attempt to win them over as allies.<sup>129</sup> It was only after the short-lived 1752 treaty between Governor Hopson and Jean-Baptiste Cope that the plan was revised with a more sinister purpose.

In a 1753 report on the progress of British settlement in Nova Scotia, Charles Morris ominously linked Mi'kmaq prowess with the Acadian presence at Chignecto. The “disturbances given by the Indian enemy” were, according to the surveyor, the principal restriction to expanding British settlements.<sup>130</sup> Moreover, the Mi'kmaq secured provisions from the French at Chignecto before travelling down the Shubenacadie River en route to the English settlements on the coast to “destroy and *captivate* the people.”<sup>131</sup> A blockhouse on the Shubenacadie would end this tactic and also cut off the Acadians – whose neutrality was constantly doubted – from the French at Louisbourg.<sup>132</sup> Morris then took aim at his two birds and launched a stone: since the Acadians both supported the Mi'kmaq and refused to swear an unconditional oath of allegiance to the British, why not remove these “neutral French” from the region altogether?<sup>133</sup>

By this point, Lawrence was aware that he could not delay in sending geographic information, as he had at Lunenburg. The map that was demanded from Whitehall was considered important enough to send even though it was incomplete. Lawrence noted that the Shubenacadie River, the mouth of which was to be the site of a new fort, “tho' it

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<sup>129</sup> George Scott to Hopson, 17 August 1752, f.292, vol. 13, CO 217, LAC; see Patterson, “Indian-White Relations,” 38.

<sup>130</sup> Charles Morris, “Judge Morris’ Account of the Acadians, Drawn Up in 1753, with Causes of the Failure of the British Settlement in Nova Scotia, 1749, 50, 53,” *Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society* (Halifax: Nova Scotia Historical Society, 1881), 2: 154.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 156.

<sup>132</sup> The Acadians’ refusal to sign an unconditional oath of allegiance to the British crown was, according to Naomi Griffiths, the incriminating condition for their expulsion. See N. E. S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People, 1604-1755* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005). See also Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*; Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*.

<sup>133</sup> “It is also evident that if the inhabitants were removed from Cobequid, [Mi'kmaq] means of support among [the Acadians] would cease.” Morris, “Judge Morris’ Account,” p. 157.

is marked out and illuminated like the rest of the plan has not yet been surveyed.”<sup>134</sup>

Lawrence probably knew about the river’s strategic position from his military involvement in Nova Scotia, but he needed a detailed map to illustrate its importance to the Board of Trade.<sup>135</sup> Surveyors quickly created a more complete map that detailed the



**Figure 4.6** Extract from Charles Morris’s *A Chart of the Peninsula of Nova Scotia done by Order of His Excellency Charles Lawrence, 1755*. Although not the draft survey sent to the Board of Trade in 1754, this map was compiled the following year and illustrates the strategic significance of Shubenacadie River. British Library. Maps K.Top.119.57

strategic river, satisfying the Board of Trade’s desire to work from the most recent surveys. In August, Lawrence wrote to the Board to emphasize his desire to build a fort at the Shubenacadie. “I have just now obtained an exact survey of this River,” Lawrence

<sup>134</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 1 June 1754, 5, vol. 36, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>135</sup> Lawrence’s military activities in Nova Scotia included routing the French and Native presence from the Missaguash river area and establishing Fort Lawrence in 1750. See Dominick Graham, “Lawrence, Charles,” *DCB*.

declared, “which I enclose your Lordships... This further discovery of it has strongly confirmed me in my opinions of the necessity of building a fort there.”<sup>136</sup> The initial idea of constructing a fort required a map to show the fort’s location. After a more careful survey of the area was completed, Lawrence and the Board of Trade had an improved cartographic understanding and could coordinate their actions accordingly, even though Morris’s expulsion proposal was excluded (Figure 4.6).

The Board of Trade agreed with Lawrence, and its decision to support the lieutenant governor was influenced by the maps he had commissioned and sent to London. “We have attentively read and considered your observations of building a Fort upon Cebben Accadie River, have also carefully examined the charts you have transmitted, which mark its situation and advantages,” wrote the Board in the fall of 1754, and the members concurred that the locations indicated on the map would be the most strategic areas to fortify.<sup>137</sup> These maps and reports provided the Board with the knowledge of geography that its members required to administer the settlement from across the Atlantic. Cartography provided spatial information and anticipated an imperial presence in the region that would be more difficult to secure than the maps suggested.

### **Geographic Knowledge and the Promotion of Halifax in British Magazines**

In 1749, just before British settlers left for Halifax, an anonymous author published *The Historical Geography of Nova Scotia*, a one-hundred-ten page tract meant to do for the public in London, especially potential settlers, what Morris’s *A Brief Survey*

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<sup>136</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 1 August, 1754, 7, vol. 36, RG1, NSARM.

<sup>137</sup> BTP to Lawrence, Whitehall, 29 October 1754, 30, vol. 29, RG1, NSARM.

of *Nova Scotia* did for the officials. A map is conspicuously absent from this report, but the author explained,

my first design was to accompany the descriptions with a general map of the country, and particular draughts of the most remarkable bays and harbours in it. But as the intended settlers are now on their departure, I chose to publish it without the charts; this account being drawn up in such a manner as to be useful to those people in furnishing them with some necessary knowledge of the country to which they are going.<sup>138</sup>

Even without the map, the author provided a thorough account of Nova Scotia's geography and also included a general history of the province as Morris had done. The author employed a detailed written map<sup>139</sup> to define the province's limits and location in terms of latitude and longitude, as well as to describe major geographical landmarks. The author was concerned when describing the benefits of settling at "Chibouctou" about military vulnerability, arguing that the "harbour lies more open and exposed to the weather, and the entrance is not so easy to defend"; the author agreed, however, that the best place to settle was the eastern Atlantic coast.<sup>140</sup>

Definitions of the boundary lines between Nova Scotia and New England as well as Nova Scotia and Canada are scattered throughout this tract, most often when the author discusses treaties between the French and the English. However, the author dealt with one of the most contentious issues in the cartographic history of Nova Scotia – the "ancient" boundary of Acadia – in a cursory, almost dismissive manner. The author informed his audience,

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<sup>138</sup> Anon., *A Geographical History of Nova Scotia* (London: Printed for Paul Vaillant, 1749), preface, emphasis added. Although the extent this tract's circulation is unknown, it was successful enough to warrant translation into German in 1750, presumably to facilitate attracting "foreign protestants" to Halifax.

<sup>139</sup> "Written maps" are a textual geographic description that date back to the Medieval era. During this period, written accounts replaced cadastral surveys and served the same administrative function. See Kain and Baigent, *The Cadastral Map*, 3.

<sup>140</sup> Anon., *A Geographical History of Nova Scotia*, 29, 34.

soon after [the attack on Port Royal], in the year 1712, was signed the peace of Utrecht, by which a perpetual cession is made to England of Acadie, or Nova Scotia, in its full extent, according to its ancient limits...and what those ancient limits are, I presume sufficiently appears from the course of this history.<sup>141</sup>

As argued above, the boundary issue confounded British and French officials; despite the author's claim, this tract shed little light on Acadia's geographic limits. This cartographic stalemate would have been of particular interest to the author's audience, potential settlers and curious Britons alike, who during this early phase of cartographic development were interested in what was happening in North America and looked to the popular press for information. Imperial developments in general were the subject of debate among informed British citizens, many of whom expressed their opinions in a variety of ways, including contributing content to periodicals.<sup>142</sup>

"Geography is so necessary to illustrate history," wrote French geographer Jacques-Nicholas Bellin, quoted in the *Gentleman's Magazine* in 1746, "that they ought to be inseparably connected."<sup>143</sup> The monthly magazines published in Britain during the eighteenth century often emphasized this connection, and with a circulation of up to 15,000 copies for a single issue, these publications were effective vehicles for influencing public opinion.<sup>144</sup> In March 1749, the *London Magazine* printed the earl of Halifax's call for settlers to travel to Nova Scotia. A general description of the province and Kitchin's

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>142</sup> Kathleen Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 23-24. See also, Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Eliga H. Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

<sup>143</sup> *Gentleman's Magazine*, February, 1746, p. 72

<sup>144</sup> E.A. Reitan argues that *Gentleman's Magazine* in the 1740s published between five and six thousand copies per issue, but Anthony David Barker puts the number at ten to fifteen thousand for the same period. See E. A. Reitan, "Expanding Horizons: Maps in The "Gentleman's Magazine," 1731-1754," *Imago Mundi* 37 (1985): 54. Also Anthony David Barker, "Cave, Edward (1691-1754)," *ODNB*.

map accompanied this call (see Figure 4.5), providing potential settlers with a geographic depiction of the region. Other articles in these magazines supplied an historical context for the province's imperial significance, including details of the 1621 land grant issued to Sir William Alexander by King James I, which Britons believed established the original land claim to Nova Scotia from which Britain could assert territorial sovereignty.<sup>145</sup> More geographic descriptions followed. The reader was informed that the province was "surrounded by the river of St. Lawrence, the gulf of that same name, the gut of Canso, Cape Sable Shore on the Atlantic ocean, and the Bay of Fundy." The boundary between Nova Scotia and New England was traditionally set at the St. John River, which flows south-east from the St. Lawrence into the Bay of Fundy, although "a late order of council" set the boundary at the river of Holy Cross, which drains into the Bay of Fundy further south.<sup>146</sup> This general description of the boundaries was followed with more exact limits of the province and of Annapolis Royal, set in latitude and longitude. Readers engaged with the geographic, cartographic, and historical depictions of Nova Scotia, and many editorial contributors were able to identify geographic imaginations with imperial aspirations.

Cartographic imperialism, the process by which maps delineated imperial possessions and laid claim to geographic areas, was central to accounts of Nova Scotia in the *London Magazine*. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 may have ceded to Britain the French possession of Acadia, but Britons were concerned that the French used maps to

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<sup>145</sup> See Reid, "The Conquest of 'Nova Scotia,'" *passim*.

<sup>146</sup> *Gentleman's Magazine*, February, 1746, p. 72. The Holy Cross River was the English name for the St. Croix River.



manipulate the size of the area that they were surrendering.<sup>147</sup> “The French,” one contributor to the *London Magazine* argued,

since the property of this country has been vested in the English, affect to confine the name of Accadia to the peninsula only: but their own maps, made before the cession of this province, give it the limits we have now assigned. I will add, that the words of the treaty do not contract it within narrower limits than were before allowed to Accadia.<sup>148</sup>

The author continued to note that although many old French maps supported English geographic claims by providing a much larger depiction of Acadia than the French would prefer to cede, new French maps attempted not only to reduce the extent of Acadia but also to position new French land claims – especially that of the Gaspé fishing region – in the province. He continued,

this name [Gaspé] they do indeed sometimes extend so far, as to take of the greatest part of Nova Scotia, and leave us little if anything, more under the title of Accadie, than the peninsula before mentioned. Such a paper encroachment, if not well attended to, may, in time, be construed into a sort of claim by prescription.<sup>149</sup>

Informed Britons were aware of and concerned about cartography’s ability to influence imperial development, especially when the result was detrimental to the British cause.

That these discussions of cartographic imperialism took place in a public forum indicates an (increasing) interest in cartographic and geographic knowledge among educated Britons during the years prior to the founding of Halifax.<sup>150</sup>

When the time came to announce plans to establish a new settlement, the British government placed advertisements in popular British newspapers and magazines. In

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<sup>147</sup> On cartographic deceptions, see Mark S. Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

<sup>148</sup> *London Magazine*, March 1749, p. 181-2.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>150</sup> On the rise of geography in the British education system, see Lesley B. Cormack, *Charting an Empire: Geography at the English Universities, 1580-1620* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). On the use of geography in creating an English imperial identity, see Lesley B. Cormack, "'Good Fences Make Good Neighbors': Geography as Self-Definition in Early Modern England," *Isis* 82, no. 314 (1991): 639-61.

March 1749, an advertisement appeared in the *London Gazette* aimed primarily at “officers and private men lately dismissed His Majesty’s land and sea service,”<sup>151</sup> the rationale being that these men now had few other military responsibilities, were free to move, and could therefore settle in Nova Scotia. The notices and accompanying maps were so successful that the mayor of Liverpool wrote to the Board of Trade asking for money to support those “who came from distant parts of the country” to travel to Nova Scotia. The mayor wrote a week later asking if any more ships would be leaving for Nova Scotia that season, to which the Board replied that it was too late in the year to arrange extra ships and suggested “not to receive or enter more persons, than will be sufficient to fill the ship now receiving persons at that port.”<sup>152</sup> With the promise of free land, no taxes, and a year’s worth of provisions, the Board of Trade was able to enlist 2500 people to sail with Edward Cornwallis to Chebucto.

In the years following settlement, interested British citizens continued looking to printed maps, the popular press, and published travel accounts to learn more about Halifax. Although the information included in these media was not always detailed, the public discussion on geography and cartography that took place during this period, as in the pre-settlement era, suggests that many literate citizens were curious about developments at Halifax and relied on maps and geographic reports to inform their image of the settlement. Unfortunately for those who wanted to receive the most accurate maps and the most truthful reports on the colony, geographic information passed through several filters before being presented to the public. In the map publishing trade,

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<sup>151</sup> Quoted in Akins, *History of Halifax City*, 240.

<sup>152</sup> *Journal of the Commissioners For Trade and Plantations From January 1741-2 to December 1749, Preserved in the Public Record Office* (Nedeln: Kraus-Thomson Organization Limited, 1970), 415 and 419 covering the dates 23 and 29 May 1749, respectively.

economic barriers, and limited access to official information defined what maps could be published and how often each would appear. Periodicals such as the *Gentleman's Magazine* or the *London Magazine* were able to provide maps and colonial correspondence to a wide audience at an affordable price, but because these publications relied on contributions from settlers or excerpts from other printed sources, many months could pass between updates.

The best example of a Halifax settler contributing to popular magazines is that of Moses Harris, whose unpublished map captured some of the dangers at Halifax, while his published efforts reflected the British settlement that imperialists wanted to see. In 1749, nineteen-year-old Harris and his wife arrived at Chebucto on the *Winchelsea* with the first group of settlers sent from England. Harris's interests included nature and geography. He had studied entomology since his youth, and at fourteen he began an apprenticeship with the London geographer Charles Price. Harris left for Halifax before he could complete his apprenticeship, and within a short time of his arrival he produced three maps of the infant settlement.<sup>153</sup> Two of his surveys appeared in various forms in either the *Gentleman's Magazine*, published maps, or both, but Harris's first survey (which demonstrated the dangers at Halifax) was never printed or released to the public. Comparing his unpublished map to those made available to Britons illustrates the ways in which colonial promotion and the nature of the map trade influenced what kind of maps were made public. As the Harris maps demonstrate, geographic detail was often sacrificed for both aesthetic appeal and imperial objectives; instead of a simple reflection of regional geography, these maps provided an idealized image aimed at striking an imperial chord in the metropole.

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<sup>153</sup> Robert Mays, "Harris, Moses (1730-c.1788)," *ODNB*.

According to the records surrounding his voyage to Halifax, Moses Harris was a sawyer. Joan Dawson has suggested that this entry was probably a misreading of “surveyor,” which would explain why Harris made a few maps and then quit the




**Figure 4.7** Extract from Moses Harris’ unpublished *Plan of Chebucto Harbour with the Town of Hallefax*, 1749. The trees are dense and the settlement seems isolated. A bear guards the cartouche in the top left corner. The British Library. Maps K.Top.119 f73

colony.<sup>154</sup> His work may have benefited from, but did not infringe upon, that of Morris and Brewse. The official surveyors and mapmakers in Halifax were far more interested in facilitating expansion than submitting their maps for publication. The first map Harris created at Halifax was never published for reasons that seem obvious when the promotion of empire is weighed against a detailed geographic depiction. *A Plan of Chebucto Harbour with the Town of Hallefax* (Figure 4.7) isolated the settlement on the edge of a

<sup>154</sup> Dawson, *The Mapmaker’s Eye*, 112.

densely wooded peninsula with only a single path cleared towards the Northwest Arm. Ships in the harbour represent the settlement's sole connection to Europe, but also emphasized its reliance on naval support for defence.<sup>155</sup> The town, as on his maps that



**Figure 4.8** Extract from Moses Harris' unpublished *Plan of Chebucto Harbour with the Town of Halifax*, 1749. Note the Native wigwam (indicated) that would be removed in future versions. A dragon decorates the map's scale.

would be published later, is well organized and surrounded by a palisade; but unlike published maps, this particular version included the dangers in the area. The cartouche features a bear wandering around a tree trunk, and the scale at the bottom of the map features an angry dragon, both of which symbolize the potential threat posed by the region's wildlife (Figure 4.8).<sup>156</sup> Including dangerous animals – mythical or otherwise –

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> On the use of the cartouche as a cultural symbol see G. N. G. Clarke, "Taking Possession: The Cartouche as Cultural Text in Eighteenth-Century American Maps," *Word & Image* 4, no. 2 (1988): 455-74. In British heraldry, the dragon often symbolized a danger that had to be conquered. The depiction dates at least to Saint George, the patron saint of England, whose legendary tale included slaying a dragon.

was not common in maps aimed at colonial promotion, and in later versions of Harris's maps these predatory animals were replaced with much friendlier ones.<sup>157</sup>


Dangerous animals were not the only aspect of this map omitted from later versions. Trees were thinned, the topography was tamed, and all evidence of Natives was erased. Harris's first map is rare because it recorded the Native presence near Halifax (Figure 4.8). Across the harbour from the town, nestled amongst the trees at present day Dartmouth, Harris drew a Native wigwam. Other maps may have included a Native presence, but it was often an abstracted rendering situated at a distance from the Halifax settlement. Harris, on the other hand, depicted the Mi'kmaq using a Native dwelling and placed them within striking distance. Although Halifax settlers were well aware of the Mi'kmaq presence, this image of Halifax was not to be the one that informed curious Britons.<sup>158</sup> Harris's next two maps provided a gentler image of the colony, one that emphasized the town's strength and imperial importance while at the same time pushing the dangers at Halifax off the page.

The "Porcupine map," (Figure 4.9) which appeared in the *Gentleman's Magazine* in 1750, is the most famous of Harris's collection and is often admired more for the inclusion of insects and animals than for the cartographic depiction of Halifax. The sketch itself provides little geographic information, instead offering its viewers a glimpse of wildlife and imperial symbols. The local animals and insects, especially the porcupine, replaced the daunting topography and Native presence in Harris's earlier

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<sup>157</sup> Dawson, *The Mapmakers' Eye*, 112.

<sup>158</sup> By the end of September 1749 Natives had killed at least four settlers, see Akins, *History of Halifax City*, 18.



**Figure 4.9 Moses Harris's *Porcupine Map*, 1749. Wildlife and imperial symbols, not geography, dominate this chart. Special Collections, Dalhousie University. Map 38 (Morse) 1749**

map.<sup>159</sup> The map's scale is no longer guarded by a dragon but by a "Musk Beetle." Also included on the map is "The Ensign of Nova Scotia," as well as the coat of arms of the colony's seven baronets, an allusion to the imperial presence in the new colony.<sup>160</sup> The names given to various locations on the "Porcupine map" reflected contemporary imperial figures. What was Rowses Island on Harris's first map became Cornwallis

<sup>159</sup> Cleansing maps for colonial promotion was not a new phenomenon. See Louis de Vorsey Jr., "Maps in Colonial Promotion: James Edward Ogelthorpe's Use of Maps in 'Selling' the Georgia Scheme," *Imago Mundi* 38 (1986): 35-45. On the role of the *Gentlemen's Magazine* in supporting British imperial projects, see E.A. Reitan, "Expanding Horizons." While the animals on the map could carry emblematic significance (butterflies as transformation, porcupines as defensive, etc.), Harris left no records to suggest that this was his intent. His training in entomology would suggest a general interest in local insects and animals.

<sup>160</sup> Dawson, *The Mapmakers' Eye*, 112.

Island, Torrington Bay became Bedford Bay, and Hawk's River was renamed Sandwich River for the First Lord of the Admiralty. This map was meant to render Halifax familiar to a British audience by employing common names and symbols, presenting a tame landscape, and offering a view of interesting wildlife. Geographic details were of secondary importance.

In 1749, the engraver and copperplate printer Edward Ryland published Moses Harris's *A plan of the town of Halifax in Nova Scotia*, which was a simple map indicating the layout of the town.<sup>161</sup> The map resembled that of John Brewse, only Harris included some trees and wooden pickets surrounding the more formally constructed palisades. Thomas Jefferys, who would become one of Britain's most influential map publishers, was anxious to compile a new and impressive map of Halifax and Nova Scotia.<sup>162</sup> To that end, he combined Harris's "Porcupine map" and town map (originally published by Ryland) with a chart of Nova Scotia based on the surveys of the French geographer Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville. The result was *A New Map of Nova Scotia*, (Figure 4.10) an attractive map that did little to increase geographic knowledge in England but epitomized the process of British mapmaking.<sup>163</sup>

Its geographic information came from a variety of sources, none of which were created from officially commissioned professional British surveys. The main section of the map is a version of the "Porcupine map," but instead of filling unknown areas with animals and insects, Jefferys included three insets. At the top left corner is a map of


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<sup>161</sup> Ryland was best known as an engraver and copperplate printer, but he published at least two of Moses Harris's Halifax maps, both of which were likely used by Jefferys in his compilation maps. See Robert Mays, "Harris, Moses (1730–c.1788)," *ODNB*.

<sup>162</sup> See Laurence Worms, "Jefferys, Thomas (c.1719–1771)," *ODNB*.

<sup>163</sup> An excellent overview and comparison of French and British cartography is provided in Mary Sponberg Pedley, *The Commerce of Cartography: Making and Marketing Maps in Eighteenth-Century France and England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).





**Figure 4.10** Thomas Jefferys' *A New Map of Nova Scotia*, 1750. Insets of dubious accuracy and a dedication to the Board of Trade take up most of the space on this map. Special Collections, Dalhousie University. Map 40 (Morse) 1750

Nova Scotia oriented with Boston as a reference; in the top right is a replica of Harris's *A Plan of Halifax* with a legend to identify town buildings; and in the bottom right is a landscape portrait of the settlement, entitled "A View of Halifax drawn from the topmasthead." Examining the details of this map illustrates the difficulties and restrictions cartographers in Britain faced when compiling the latest geographic information.<sup>164</sup> The inset of Nova Scotia contains many of the same misrepresentations as other regional maps published in the mid-eighteenth century. Chebucto Harbour dwarfs Margarets Bay, which is in reality the larger of the two, making Halifax appear to

<sup>164</sup> The error of reversing the positions of St. Paul's Anglican Church and the Government building persisted on British maps until 1755.

be situated on the most welcoming bay on Nova Scotia's eastern shore. Jefferys, unable to acquire original surveys for the Atlantic coast, used d'Anville's map. The inset of Harris's plan of Halifax is an overly simplistic topographic representation. There is no attempt to indicate the slope upon which the city stood, the trees are sparse, and there are no indications of a Mi'kmaq presence.

The final inset, a landscape portrait of the town, illustrates the way in which landscape art was used to provide a British vision of overseas settlements. British colonial landscape art during the mid- to late-eighteenth century attempted to portray geography in a realistic fashion. But these paintings can also be interpreted as illustrating how the British wanted these regions to appear. Like maps, landscape art allowed Britons to define themselves as a "civilized and civilizing" people by presenting alien environments in an aesthetically familiar way, minimizing the cognitive leap required to associate a strange wilderness with an imperial possession.<sup>165</sup> The bird's eye view of Halifax on Jefferys' map, although not picturesque like the typical landscape art of the era, provided a British vision of Nova Scotia to which British readers could relate, emphasized by the British flag flying at the gates of the settlement.<sup>166</sup> The clearing upon which the settlers have built their homes is level, although both outside streets seem to be marked with striations that may be an attempt to indicate slope. Particularly important is the inclusion of tents on the outskirts of the settlement, nestled among felled trees and their stumps. Some settlers had yet to construct their homes at Halifax, so the inclusion

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<sup>165</sup> John E. Crowley, "'Taken on the Spot': The Visual Appropriation of New France for the Global British Landscape," *Canadian Historical Review* 86, no. 1 (2005): 2, 6. See also Edney, *Mapping An Empire*, 57-76.

<sup>166</sup> Mary Christine Sparling, "The British Vision in Nova Scotia, 1749-1848: What Views the Artists Reflected and Reinforced" (Master's, Dalhousie University, 1978), 10-11.

of these tents hints at the harsh settler reality in an otherwise largely optimistic image of Halifax.

This Jefferys map, like many others, was dedicated to the Board of Trade and Plantations. The Board had a complicated relationship with maps published for the general public. While they relied on commercially available maps to get a sense of colonial geography, they were receiving the latest manuscript surveys and reports and could commission maps to provide more detailed information. The flow of official geographic knowledge from settlement to metropole, although not always fast, was direct, multifaceted, and largely unfiltered.<sup>167</sup> As a result, the Board attempted to distance itself from British geographers, allowing them to dedicate maps in its honour only to help with sales, even though the Board never “superintended or approved” the manner in which these maps were executed.<sup>168</sup> A dedication to the Board of Trade gave maps an air of authority that would attract subscribers, even though the Board itself was not completely comfortable with the relationship. Its members did not want to appear as sponsoring geographic arguments over which they had no control. Geographers also inserted additional headings onto maps, hoping to increase sales by claiming them to be based on the “most recent surveys,” or calling them “newly improved.” There was a cognitive disconnect between the language geographers used to explain their maps and the content of those maps, just as there was a tension between the map’s image and the

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<sup>167</sup> Ian K. Steele has argued that the Atlantic Ocean was more of a highway than an obstacle. See Ian Kenneth Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). On France’s significantly less successful communications infrastructure see Kenneth J. Banks, *Chasing Empire Across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002). On the relationship between geographers and the Board of Trade, see Matthew H. Edney, “John Mitchell’s Map of North America (1755): A Study of the Use and Publication of Official Maps in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” *Imago Mundi* 60 (2008): 63-85.

<sup>168</sup> J. B. Harley, “The Bankruptcy of Thomas Jefferys: An Episode in the Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Map-Making,” *Imago Mundi* 20 (1966): 37.

reality it represented. British geographers catered to the public's curiosity, aesthetic tastes, and imperial outlook to increase sales. Imperialist Britons were more likely to purchase imperialist maps, especially those featured in popular magazines with an imperial bias. Though most mapmakers considered themselves arbiters of geographic "truth," almost all faced accusations from their competitors of serving state interests.<sup>169</sup> It was just as likely, however, that they were responding to market demands.

### **Reactions to Halifax and Imperial Tensions**

The founding of Halifax indicated to the French and the Mi'kmaq that Britain was serious about establishing Nova Scotia as a British province. While there was no guarantee that the settlement would survive, imperial support was a huge step towards increasing Britain's territorial sovereignty. Old concerns and new tensions resulted from the settlement at Chebucto: French and Natives in the province questioned the limits of Acadia and British authority within the peninsula; Native groups in Nova Scotia continued their conflict with the British and launched new attacks; and all three sides prepared for a war that would continue (British-Mi'kmaq) or begin again (British-French).

Even before Cornwallis and his fleet arrived at Chebucto, French officials were chastising the English for their contempt towards previous treaties. In June of 1749, a French official indicated that they must act quickly to ward off new British establishments, especially those planted outside the "ancient" Acadian boundaries mentioned in the Treaty of Utrecht. The most ancient maps placed Acadia on the peninsula, so French officials argued, which served as a perfect and natural boundary.

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<sup>169</sup> For specific instances, see Chapter 6.

Some maps created in England since the Treaty of Utrecht had extended Acadia beyond the isthmus, but such an interpretation could not change the agreement of 1713.<sup>170</sup>

Priests and missionaries were equally upset about Britain's attempts at extending their geographic control into disputed areas. In late August, Père Charlevoix wrote to the minister of the Marine, Rouillé, outlining what he believed were Acadia's boundaries. As before, Charlevoix relied on the presence of Natives to serve as a buffer zone. The English, however, were building on the St. John River, which he argued was never part of Acadia and which was much closer to the Abenakis than previous settlements. Charlevoix argued that France must continue to support Native title to this region to prevent the English from settling so close to Quebec.<sup>171</sup> To the Abenakis in this region were added the Acadians, who might also support French title. Abbé Le Loutre reported in the fall of 1749 that these Acadians might form a militia to retain possession of the St. John and other important rivers in the area. Such an action could both console and animate the Acadians, most of whom, according to Le Loutre, were ready to sacrifice for the glory of France.<sup>172</sup> While some Acadians might have fought for the French, many had displayed their neutrality in recent conflicts. As Maurice Basque has argued in relation to pre-conquest Acadia, the farther Acadians lived from British settlements the more likely they were to remain independent and, possibly, pro-French.<sup>173</sup> In all likelihood geographic location remained a factor in degrees of neutrality after 1710.

Aside from Native or Acadian support, the French required more geographic knowledge if they were to retake Acadia, or at least limit British expansion. Rouillé

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<sup>170</sup> Sieur Durand to English Minister, 7 June 1749, f9-10v, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>171</sup> Charlevoix to Rouillé, Paris, 23 August 1749, f14-15, vol.3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>172</sup> Lettre de Monsieur l'Abbe le Loutre, Beaubassin, 4 October 1749, *CMNF*, vol. 3, p. 457.

<sup>173</sup> Maurice Basque, "Family and Political Culture in Pre-Conquest Acadia," in Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia*, 49-50.

received letters from various officials and eager citizens who believed the time had come to retake Acadia. M. Brissart, writing from Saint-Malo and perhaps hunting for a patronage appointment, informed Rouillé that the existing peace between France and Britain provided the perfect opportunity for a surprise attack. He would even be willing to help organize such an endeavour, “but as I can find no maps to purchase of Canada, nor of the [St. Lawrence] river, nor of Acadia (always a cause of boundary issues), if the court would send me some it would be of great help.”<sup>174</sup>

Brissart suffered from a lack of geographic evidence in St. Malo, yet there was no shortage of maps in the French ministry of the Marine even though their accuracy was at times brought into question. These maps helped illustrate what the French considered to be outrageous British land claims. La Galissonnière, the governor of New France and a commissary at the Acadian Boundary discussions, learned that the British were not limiting their claims to the St. John River area, but were instead still arguing for the entire coast from New England to Beaubassin, as well as from Gaspé to Canso. Like Charlevoix, La Galissonnière argued that the Abenakis were France’s best allies, but he used maps to demonstrate the British claims themselves. “The English base their claims,” he argued, “on a map entitled *L’Empire Anglois dans l’Amérique avec les Conquete sur les Espagnols et les François* by which they extend their Nova Scotia to the southern coast of the St. Lawrence River almost to Quebec.”<sup>175</sup> Such a claim had to be balanced, and the French realized their need for persuasive, verifiable, first-hand geographic knowledge.

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<sup>174</sup> M. Brissart to Rouillé, Saint-Malo, 21 January 1750, f213-214v, vol. 8, C11D, ANOM.

<sup>175</sup> Collection du memoires sur les limites de l’ Acadie, May 1750, f32, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM. This is likely La Galissonnière’s translation of Henry Popple’s 1733 map (Figure 4.4), though the British would later claim that Popple’s map was never used in official negotiations.

### Improving Maps and Evaluating Defences

While Britain could rely on Charles Morris and his assistants to provide timely and useful geographic reports and maps, France was forced to dispatch capable surveyors to the northeast to survey territory. Louis XV commissioned two men to travel to l'Acadie, map the region, and issue geographic reports. The trips of Louis Franquet and M. de Chabert demonstrate the importance France placed on securing reliable geographic information in the 1750s. Wars already fought and those on the horizon, coupled with the boundary commission's focus on determining l'Acadie's ancient limits, proved that the competition over northeastern North America was about cartographic diplomacy as much as military operations.

Louis Franquet joined the French army at age twelve and served in various regiments until he entered the engineer corps in 1720. He remained a member of the engineer corps for thirty years, until 1750 when he was commissioned to travel to Île Royale and report on the strength of French fortifications. Though he spent several years in New France and wrote reports on the Canadians, the Acadians, and various Native groups, it was his work as an engineer that received the most attention.<sup>176</sup> Franquet's trips to Île Royale and Île St Jean provided the French government with detailed accounts of those regions and their fortification, useful information during the lull in British-French conflict. His findings were both strategic and cultural in nature, as travelling throughout the region provided Franquet with an opportunity to interact with its residents.<sup>177</sup> His voyage was connected to that of Chabert, as both men left France on *La Mutine* in late June, 1750.

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<sup>176</sup> F.J. Thorpe, "Franquet, Louis," *DCB*.

<sup>177</sup> *Voyages et Mémoires sur le Canada par Franquet*, ed. J. Cohen (Montréal: Éditions Élysée, 1974), i.

Though sent to investigate defences and report on military preparedness, Franquet's memoirs indicate an interest in geography, demography, and the culture of New France's residents. He noted that Îles Madame, two islands on the southeast coast of Île Royale with twenty inhabitants, were likely one single body in the past but were now separated by a thin band of water.<sup>178</sup> Îles Madame lay just beyond the Fronsac Passage (Gut of Canso), which Franquet described as a narrow waterway that could be easily controlled by the British.<sup>179</sup> Franquet then visited Île St Jean and found himself in the middle of a debate between two groups of residents who had decided to raise a church but could not agree where it should be located. They saw Franquet as a representative of the French government and asked him to listen to their arguments and render a decision.<sup>180</sup> Like Charles Morris and John Brewse, France's surveyors and engineers often took on civil responsibilities.

Franquet informed his superiors in France of the difficulties facing Acadian settlers and the need to determine the region's boundaries. He encountered a group of roughly eighteen families at Baye Verte who had settled there temporarily. Franquet emphasized their situation as people between empires in an uncertain time. He noted that they settled where they were only until Britain and France determined the limits of l'Acadie. If their former lands fell into the possession of the English and their present settlements remained with France, they would stay; if not, they would likely go to Île St Jean or Île Royale.<sup>181</sup> Franquet also provided reports on Beauséjour and Île St Jean. "As for the fort of Beausejour," he wrote, "the map attached here represents its exact

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<sup>178</sup> Fonds Louis Franquet, *Ile-Royale, Ile St-Jean et Acadie: Voyage du Sieur Franquet, 1751*, 3, ZF34, Centre d'archives de Québec, Bibliothèque et Archives Nationale de Québec [BANQ].

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-5.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, 34-5.



shape.”<sup>182</sup> It also included an explanation of its construction and what needed to be done to make it capable of defending against a cannon attack. Of Île St Jean, Franquet argued that the region was capable of more agricultural production, enough to supply Île Royale within only a few years of cultivation. The inhabitants would be much reassured of their security in case of another rupture with England if France built a garrison, redoubts, and placed forts at major ports. Ideally, according to Franquet, the island should be completely independent from Île Royale.<sup>183</sup> By combining his commissioned task (investigating forts and reporting on their state) with an account of inhabitants and their desires, Franquet’s geographic tracts helped French administrators better understand the region.

Franquet’s fellow passenger on *Le Mutine*, Marquis de Chabert, was similarly charged with reporting on conditions in the northeast. Specifically, Chabert was dispatched to rectify the various maps and charts of the area. Chabert, at twenty-five years old, was half Franquet’s age when the two sailed from France. Chabert was the grandson of a French rear-admiral and the son of a French captain who had been killed in battle. He entered the navy as a midshipman in 1741 and charts that he drew during several trips to the Mediterranean caught the attention of the minister of the Marine, who promoted him. In 1746 Chabert travelled to l’Acadie to correct French coastal charts. He mapped Chebucto harbour and managed secretly to map Annapolis Harbour and spy on British ships there. In 1750, after a brief period of imprisonment (his ship was captured off the coast of Spain by the British in 1747) and two years in Paris, Chabert was sent back to l’Acadie to continue his surveys. The project was under the direction of

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<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 42.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., 56.

Roland-Michel Barrin de La Galissonnière, who had been recalled from New France to serve as the head of the Dépôt des Cartes et Plans de la Marine in Paris, as well as represent France in the Acadian Boundary Commission.<sup>184</sup>

This second trip to l'Acadie resulted in the 1753 publication of an account of his voyage to North America. This work was important enough to the ministry of the Marine that they purchased 200 copies to ensure its completion.<sup>185</sup> Chabert began his account,

There are few countries where it was as necessary to make astronomical observations than in that part of North America that includes l'Acadie, Île Royale, and Île Terre-Neuve; it should suffice, to convince doubters of this fact, to cast an eye over the maps that have been used to this point, and to see how little they resemble each other. In truth, they are established on estimations and cannot find but little common ground.<sup>186</sup>

Part of the reason for Chabert's expedition was to ensure safer navigation for ships, too many of which were lost due to mistaken charts that led them off course or into dangerous areas. It was for this reason that newer maps created by the Dépôt de la Marine were based on journals and commentaries provided by a number of officers and pilots. These maps were further informed by observations taken at Quebec and Boston.<sup>187</sup> As an area of military and economic value, Acadia was understandably a region of heightened cartographic interest (Figure 4.11).

Chabert spent two years in Paris working on the surveys he had taken during his 1746 voyage to the northeast. The commission for his 1750 expedition coincided with the appointment to positions of imperial importance of two men with an interest in maps and charts: Rouillé and La Galissonnière. Named minister of the Marine in 1749, Rouillé

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<sup>184</sup> J.S. Pritchard, "Chabert de Cogolin, Joseph-Bernard de, Marquis de Chabert," *DCB*.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>186</sup> M. de Chabert, *Voyage fait par ordre du roi en 1750 et 1751, dans l'Amérique Septentrionale, pour rectifier les Cartes des Côtes de l'Acadie, de l'Isle Royale & de l'Isle de Terre-Neuve; et pour en fixer les principaux points par des Observations Astronomiques* (Paris: de l'Imprimerie Royale, 1753), 1-2.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

considered maps “an essential part of navigation, which often determines the success of the King’s forces, and always that of commerce and the safety of navigators.”<sup>188</sup>

Rouillé’s concerns were echoed by la Galissonnière, who informed Chabert that he would be dispatched to North America to continue his valuable work.



Figure 4.11 M. de Chabert’s *Carte Reduite des costes de l’Acadie*, 1751. Chabert correctly depicted Halifax Harbour as smaller than St. Margarets Bay. *Voyage dans l’Amérique Septentrionale*, 1753.

Chabert’s memoir of the voyage combined descriptions of his various trips from Louisbourg (where he was stationed) to the surrounding area. He detailed the difficulties he encountered, the characteristics of the regions he surveyed, and the technical methods by which he derived his conclusions. Astronomical observations were mixed with dead reckoning and practical sailing. He described the Fronsac passage as easily navigable by

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., 4.

anyone who had seen it, piloting almost any ship.<sup>189</sup> In mapping Canso (Figure 4.12), Chabert noted that he took detailed remarks while circumnavigating the islands; for areas that he did not visit, Chabert consulted the local inhabitants and followed their descriptions. He was also able to compare charts received locally with those in the possession of the Dépôt to determine how old maps could be altered with newer and more reliable information.<sup>190</sup>




Figure 4.12 M de. Chabert's *Plan du Port de Canseau*, 1751. Chabert included depth soundings as well as the ruins of the Canso fort. *Voyage dans l'Amérique Septentrionale*, 1753.

Essential to Chabert's memoir were the maps he published, including those of Canso, Île Royale, Halifax harbour, and Cape Sable. Some maps were new and served to correct errors of older maps (Île Scatari near Louisbourg was incorrectly positioned on Dépôt maps twenty-two leagues further than its actual location), while maps Chabert prepared on his 1746 voyage were updated (he added the town of Halifax to his 1746

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 79.

map of Chebucto). Also included were detailed astronomical observations for various places along the northeastern coast. These measurements provided France with updated and specific geographic knowledge. Combined with Franquet's analysis of the region's fortifications, France was well positioned to negotiate territorial boundaries and prepare for the inevitable outbreak of hostilities with Britain.

The publication of Chabert's memoir was heavily promoted in France. The *Journal des Sçavans* published a lengthy description of the project in 1754. The journal emphasized the French government's important role in the undertaking, describing how Chabert found that the Court did all it could to facilitate the expedition, including providing all the tools, an assistant, and a skilled pilot. The maps were praised for their ability to situate different parts of the northeast in relation to each other while also describing the northeast in relation to the continent. "These maps are the fruit of extraordinary and tireless efforts," the review stated, "of which it is difficult to comprehend unless one has himself worked in this field."<sup>191</sup> The main challenge Chabert faced, according to the review, was the necessity of making numerous trips onto land to take trigonometrical readings that could be combined with astronomical observations to complete the hydrographic charts. This kind of work was more difficult than terrestrial mapping, and small errors in the calculations could result in drastically incorrect maps.<sup>192</sup>

The readers of the *Journal des Sçavans* would have had knowledge of, or at least interest in, geography. Popular French magazines had since at least the early eighteenth century featured articles on maps, methods of geographic instruction, and the uses of geography in everyday life. Their content was more heavily vetted by Royal authorities,

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<sup>191</sup> *Journal des Sçavans*, August, 1754, p. 532.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 532-33.

and subsequently features less critical commentary and more government boosterism than British magazines, but geographic knowledge was a popular theme. Instructional materials were often advertised in these publications. In 1716, readers learned of a book, illustrated with Nicolas Sanson's maps, that would teach them how to create maps and transform them into spheres. They would also learn hydrography, especially the difficult task of taking latitudinal and longitudinal measurements.<sup>193</sup> Two years later there appeared a discussion on the nature of geography, particularly its association with philosophy. The author described geography as "the daughter of philosophy" because ancient philosophers were heavily concerned with geographic descriptions. Similarly, old geographers discussed philosophic matters, such as culture and government.<sup>194</sup> As eighteenth-century geographers attempted to define their discipline they could take solace in the fact that theirs was not a new quest.<sup>195</sup>

French readers had also long been interested in published memoirs of travels to North America, so Chabert could expect some measure of success (though he had the ministry of the Marine to support him). In June of 1728, Père Laval published an account of his voyage to Louisiana. Like Chabert, Laval was sent at the behest of the King and he included many astronomical observations. He also treated matters of physics, geography, and the sea. With twenty-one maps included in the report, Laval's work illustrated the popularity of travel narratives accompanied by cartographic information.<sup>196</sup> While these publications, and the numerous others that were published in the eighteenth century, satisfied the reader's curiosity about new places, they also demonstrated the importance

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid., January, 1716, p. 113-14.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., October, 1718, p. 363-34.

<sup>195</sup> Anne Godlewska, *Geography Unbound: French Geographic Science from Cassini to Humbolt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

<sup>196</sup> *Mercure de France*, June, 1728, p. 1416.

of first-hand observations in the map trade. A map's authority increased if its producer had voyaged to the lands he charted. For Chabert and Franquet, their access to territories rarely visited by European geographers ensured the influence of their memoirs. The French Court was in need of new geographic information, and French citizens were eager to read accounts of those who had travelled abroad. These journals and their maps helped citizens to envision empire and officials to craft policy.

### **Mi'kmaq Territory and French Support**

French officials in l'Acadie benefited less from maps published in Europe than they did from their relationship with the Mi'kmaq. As Olive Dickason has argued, the French and English took different approaches to Aboriginal land title. While the French claimed Mi'kmaq and Abenaki land for themselves, they also supported Aboriginal land title when it served French interests. Unlike the English, who, at least during the eighteenth century, tried to attain Aboriginal land legally through sales or treaties, the French preferred to leave land tenure and legal territorial rights unresolved. The French "held that the Indians had not received diplomatic recognition as belonging to the 'family of nations,' so therefore they had no such rights to recognize."<sup>197</sup> The Mi'kmaq surely realized that France put its own interests ahead of its allies, and they reminded local administrators that France had usufruct rights only. "Whether or not the French took this seriously as far as they themselves were concerned," notes Dickason, "they used it as a weapon in their diplomatic tug-of-war with England."<sup>198</sup> As N.E.S. Griffiths has noted, by the 1750s the Mi'kmaq considered themselves less allies of France than an

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<sup>197</sup> Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians*, 32.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

autonomous people convinced of their territorial sovereignty and working towards ensuring its persistence.<sup>199</sup>

The Abenakis stated clearly to the British their territorial rights to the land along the coast from Beaubassin to New England, which was claimed by Britain. In 1752 a group of Abenakis from St. François met with the deputy governor of Boston and the governor of Canada to express their frustration over continued encroachment into their lands. The Abenakis argued that they had never surrendered their land, and that while their elders had suffered a foreign presence in the past there were now limits that must be respected. The English were also informed that they could not kill a single beaver or cut a single tree without Native permission, though wood could be purchased from the Abenakis if so desired. “The lands we possess,” the Native delegates argued, “were given to us by the Great Spirit and we intend to keep them for ourselves.”<sup>200</sup> The English had heard these arguments before and responded that those who had encroached on the land had done so without official permission.<sup>201</sup>

English land encroachment was not new, and British officials were as duplicitous towards the Natives as French officials were towards the British. Each group in the struggle for land in Nova Scotia would, at times, say one thing and do another. The French were at an advantage, however, because they benefited from the Mi’kmaq and their allies – who they encouraged to fight by stressing the British desire for their lands – in ways the British could not. Such encouragement was possible because their interests intersected. Right after the founding of Halifax, Abbé Le Loutre wrote of his intentions to stir up Native resistance by encouraging the Mi’kmaq to fight against British

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<sup>199</sup> Griffiths, *Contexts of Acadian History*, 82.

<sup>200</sup> Paroles des Abenakis de St. François, 5 July 1752, *CMNF* vol. 3, pp. 509-510.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 511.



expansion and resist any treaty offers.<sup>202</sup> The British regularly accused the French of inciting the Mi'kmaq, but British knowledge of this policy had little influence on its effectiveness.

French strategy succeeded not because the Natives were their pawns, but because the Mi'kmaq and their allies were defending their own rights. After founding Halifax the British established a small fort at Minas (Fort Edward) in the hopes of exercising their influence over the Acadians and the local Mi'kmaq. Charles Des Herbiers, a French naval captain charged with removing the British from Louisbourg after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and serving as its commandant, kept French officials abreast of British movements in Nova Scotia.<sup>203</sup> “The news from Acadia,” he wrote, “informs us that the English built a picket fort at Minas from which they do not dare leave because the Natives killed nine of their men who were working in the wood.”<sup>204</sup> The Natives continued to resist British territorial expansion and were, in these early stages, quite successful.

More than simply keeping the British within the walls of their forts, the Mi'kmaq wanted to ensure that no new forts were built. Their struggle to maintain geographic control was not always a complete success, evidenced by the establishment of Fort Lawrence and Fort Edward. An important element of their resistance to Halifax was the creation and maintenance of geographic boundaries within Nova Scotia. Prior to the founding of Halifax, the British presence within the peninsula was limited to two forts from which little damage could be done. Although the Mi'kmaq had been forced to

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<sup>202</sup> Le Loutre to [n/a], Louisbourg, 29 July 1749, *CMNF* vol. II, pp. 437-38. See John Clarence Webster, *The Career of the Abbé Le Loutre in Nova Scotia: With a Translation of His Autobiography* (Shediac, N.B.: Priv. print., 1933).

<sup>203</sup> John Fortier, “Des Herbiers de la Ralière (la Ratière), Charles,” *DCB*.

<sup>204</sup> Des Herbiers to Minister, Louisbourg, 5 November 1749, f84, vol. 28, C11B, ANOM.

recognize a British element in the region, their daily life was little changed. Halifax was a clear indication of a policy change, and the Mi'kmaq and their allies – both Native and French – worked to preserve a swath of territory for Natives only.

The desire for Native territory was a contributing factor in one of eighteenth-century Nova Scotia's most infamous murders. Edward How, the Council member whose proposed township at Canso had caused problems in the late 1730s, was sent in 1750 with Charles Lawrence to establish a fort on the Missaguash. During this time he met with some of the French and Natives to discuss prisoner exchanges and settlement proposals. In October he went out of the fort under a flag of truce and held several meetings, but while returning to the fort he was shot dead, presumably by a Mi'kmaq who had been hiding near by.<sup>205</sup> Subsequent histories of the event have blamed Abbé Le Loutre for the murder, arguing that he set up the ambush, though various officials present that day left conflicting accounts that make it difficult to determine if Le Loutre was behind the murder.<sup>206</sup>

Four years later, however, the British remained adamant that Le Loutre was responsible for How's death. In 1754 the missionary was serving at Beauséjour when he attempted to broker a deal between the British and the Mi'kmaq that would reserve for the Mi'kmaq most of eastern Nova Scotia. Le Loutre had established a relationship with Otho Hamilton, a British military officer and member of the Nova Scotia Council, while Hamilton was a prisoner. He pressed Hamilton to do his best to open negotiations with Lieutenant Governor Lawrence on the subject of a Native peace. Hamilton received a response from Lawrence's secretary, stating,

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<sup>205</sup> C. Alexander Pincombe, "How, Edward," *DCB*.

<sup>206</sup> Gérard Finn, "Le Loutre, Jean-Louis," *DCB*.

[Le Loutre had made] the very same proposal, almost verbatim, that you have now transmitted, to captain How and me at Chignecto, about three days before he caused that horrible treachery to be perpetrated against poor How, who was drawn under a pretence of conferring with le Loutre upon this very subject.<sup>207</sup>

That “very subject,” peace with the Mi’kmaq, would require the British to make a sizable territorial sacrifice.

Although Lawrence initially refused to hear Le Loutre’s suggestions, he later invited the priest or any Mi’kmaq representatives to Halifax to treat for peace. Le Loutre took it upon himself to write the Council with his vision for a new Nova Scotia. He wanted much of the peninsula to be reserved as Mi’kmaq land on which the British could not build, and from which the British must remove their establishments, including Fort Lawrence. The boundaries of the Mi’kmaq land would run,

from the south of bay Verte, including Fort Lawrence, and the lands dependant thereon, as far as the entrance of the bay of Mines; thence running into Cobequid, and including Chigabencady, leaving this last place, formerly my mission, remounting and descending as far as the river Mouskedaboueck, and from that place, which is about eight leagues East of Halifax, passing by the bay of Islands, St. Mary’s bay, and Moukodome, as far as Cançeau, and from Cançeau by the passage of Fransac, as far as the said bay Verte.<sup>208</sup>

Le Loutre argued that if the British considered how regularly the Mi’kmaq had been forced to change the regions in which they live, “there could be no more just settlement.”<sup>209</sup> Lawrence and the Council disagreed, describing the claim as “too insolent and absurd to be answered through the author.”<sup>210</sup> They did, however, restate their desire to meet with the Mi’kmaq to negotiate a peace.

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<sup>207</sup> Beamish Murdoch, *A History of Nova Scotia, or, Acadie*, 3 vols., vol. II (Halifax: J. Barnes, 1865), 235-37. While it is not clear what the final meeting before How’s death was about, William Wicken notes that Le Loutre had discussed the partition of lands in 1750. See Wicken, *Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 189.

<sup>208</sup> Murdoch, *Nova Scotia*, 236.

<sup>209</sup> Le Loutre to Lawrence, 26 August 1754, f207v-210, vol. 8, C11D, ANOM. He continued, “les terres qu’ils vous laissent sont immenses à proportion au lieu que ces gens ne vivant que de leur chasse et de leur pêche auroient encore besoin d’une bien plus grandee space de terrain.”

<sup>210</sup> Murdoch, *Nova Scotia*, 237. See also Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, 55-56.

Their offer was taken up in January of 1755. The Mi'kmaq chief Algimou wrote to John Hussey, the British commandant at Fort Lawrence, and requested safe passage to Halifax to meet with the Council. Algimou wanted Hussey's assurance that the voyage would be worthwhile and that the British "will grant us a domain for hunting and fishing, that neither fort nor fortress shall be built upon it, that we shall be free to come and go wherever we please."<sup>211</sup> Hussey replied that going to Halifax was the best way to press their case, but could offer no assurances that the Council would grant such a request.<sup>212</sup>

Algimou and another Mi'kmaq, Paul Laurent, travelled to Halifax. Algimou went as far as Cobequid and then stopped, but Laurent carried on, met with the Council, and requested that land be reserved for the Mi'kmaq. The Council did not immediately strike down the request, as they had Le Loutre's. The next day, Laurent received word that the Council would not discuss peace further unless more chiefs were present.<sup>213</sup> As William Wicken has argued, the Council was not about to approve a request so similar to Le Loutre's – written in his own hand, even – believing that the missionary was more interested in serving France than in establishing a peace between the British and the Mi'kmaq.<sup>214</sup> Consequently, the Mi'kmaq continued expressing their geographic control through violence and questions of territory were increasingly settled by armed conflict rather than negotiation.

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<sup>211</sup> Algimou to Captain Hussey, Gasparau, 19 January 1755, in John Clarence Webster, *Thomas Pichon: "The Spy of Beausejour": An Account of His Career in Europe and America* (Halifax: Public Archives of Nova Scotia, 1937), 84.

<sup>212</sup> Captain Hussey to Algimou, Fort Lawrence, 20 January 1755, in *Ibid.*

<sup>213</sup> Murdoch, *Nova Scotia*, 257-8.

<sup>214</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 289-90.

## Conclusion

The founding of Halifax represented a fundamental shift in the tripartite relationships in Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. Previous to 1749, the British government was generally ambivalent towards Nova Scotia, content to allow authorities there to manage their affairs with little instruction from Whitehall. The French and Mi'kmaq, who opposed or tolerated the British at different times, were content to strike a balance of territorial sovereignty that favoured no single group. The War of Austrian Succession reminded Britain of Nova Scotia's strategic importance, especially as a barrier between Louisbourg and New England. British successes in that war, and their ultimate concessions to France after the conflict ended, demanded a change in imperial policy.

Establishing Halifax signalled new intentions more than it represented the successful implementation of an aggressive policy. Founding the settlement, convincing settlers to travel across the Atlantic, and managing inhabitants as the town grew all depended on maps and geographic knowledge. The region was surveyed and maps were sent to London to encourage the project. Britons were presented with sanitized maps of Nova Scotia before Halifax was founded, and equally appealing maps were published in the settlement's early years to demonstrate British strength in the province. The government remained generally well informed about developments, but their image of Halifax was filtered through maps that did not accurately represent the dangers in the province. As a new war loomed on the horizon, the Board of Trade requested more maps and formulated military strategy on the geographic information they received. Though there was a difference between the maps circulating Whitehall (surveys done on the ground that stressed imperial strength) and those for sale in geographers' shops or

included in popular journals (ornate renderings meant to appeal to particular aesthetic tastes), most maps, surveys, and geographic reports favoured an Anglo-centric vision of Nova Scotia.

Halifax was a watershed settlement, yet even it could not conclude the “conquest” of Acadia begun forty years earlier. Most British American posts were founded to serve British economic needs by contributing to an increasingly developed mercantile system. Halifax, on the other hand, was funded by the government and cost approximately £700,000 in its first ten years. Though Britain was clearly taking an active role in Nova Scotia, their efforts were far from guaranteed. The French were equally interested in retrieving l’Acadie and sent geographers and engineers to correct maps and report on the state of defences. British action spurred French reaction, as forces were bolstered at Louisbourg, Beauséjour, and along the St. John River. The Missaguash river that separated the French at Fort Beauséjour from the British at Fort Lawrence became the *de facto* imperial boundary line dividing the imperial powers, but each side realized that the ultimate contest for territorial control was on the horizon.

British intentions also shaped Native response. The Mi’kmaq continued to harass the Halifax settlement, though certain groups struck weak and fleeting peace agreements when it served their interests. These treaties were founded on opportunity instead of understanding, as neither the British nor the Mi’kmaq found common ground on which to build a relationship. The French continued to encourage the Mi’kmaq to fight the British, though such pressure was redundant as the Mi’kmaq and their allies had their own reasons to oppose the extension of English settlements. As long as French and Mi’kmaq desires intersected, they could work together. But both hoped to gain ultimate control

over the highly contested northeast. The proposed territory to be reserved for the Mi'kmaq was unacceptable to the British in part because it was tainted by Le Loutre's influence, but there could be little doubt that even after founding Halifax the British were unable to control the lands much beyond the walls of their forts.

As the British, French, and Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia prepared for war, imperial representatives met at Paris in an attempt to prevent conflict. The Halifax settlement had Atlantic-wide influence, forcing administrators in Britain and France to focus their attention on the northeast. This reorientation was the result of territorial conflicts, boundary disputes, and the increasing military and political significance of a region claimed by both empires. More than any other settlement – British or French – Nova Scotia / l'Acadie was a cartographic creation. Yet maps of the region represented neither its contested nature nor the strength of its Aboriginal inhabitants. In Europe, the Mi'kmaq and their allies would once again be ignored at the negotiating table as both France and Britain hoped resolving the Acadian boundary dispute could prevent (or limit the effects of) a global war.

## Chapter 5

### Envisioning Empire: The Acadian Boundary Commission and Imperial Negotiations, 1749-1755

#### Introduction

When the Board of Trade and Plantations sent Edward Cornwallis to Nova Scotia to establish settlements in the province, they were announcing Britain's intentions to strengthen their presence in northeastern North America. Ironically, Acadia had flourished under titular British rule from 1713 to 1749. The founding of Halifax did not end the competition for Nova Scotia, nor did the settlement's slow expansion seriously challenge the Mi'kmaq or their allies. Nova Scotia / l'Acadie remained a precarious imperial possession, legally possessed by Britain but populated primarily by French Acadians and the Mi'kmaq. Britain's territorial sovereignty remained weak and France's desire to reclaim the region persisted. British intentions in the region elicited a strong local response from the French, and led to renewed calls in France for settling the Nova Scotia / l'Acadie boundary.

The War of Austrian Succession had demonstrated the importance of the northeast to both Britain and France. The capture and return of Louisbourg, the attempted attack by D'Anville and his men via Chebucto harbour, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle that announced a return to the *status quo ante bellum* increased regional tensions and pressures to resolve the issue of territorial rights along the Atlantic coast from New England to Canso. Previous attempts at settling the matter (notably the failed boundary commission held in Paris in 1720) provided no solutions. Nova Scotia had for over thirty years existed in legal limbo, its boundaries moved forward and back on maps but never formally recognized by either imperial power. The region's Natives, though



able to adapt to changing conditions on the ground, were stuck between British and French settlements that wanted to control them, acquire their land, and align them against one side or the other.

As David Armitage has demonstrated, Britain's empire was defined as trans-Atlantic by some ("concentric" empires that existed *in* America and the West Indies, for example) and as pan-Atlantic by others (America and the West Indies as constituent parts *of* the British empire).<sup>1</sup> During the 1730s and the 1740s, the British Empire as "Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free" was, according to Armitage, an ideology (a scheme of ideas competing against other interpretations) and not an identity (a definition of self).<sup>2</sup> Linda Colley suggests that the British identity was more influenced by its relationship to France, which presented Britons with a common enemy against which could be measured the characteristics of British people.<sup>3</sup> Neither Armitage nor Colley examine how maps and geographic reports shaped perceptions of a wider empire.

France, on the other hand, had not yet settled on the importance of a nation, let alone an empire. According to David A. Bell, the idea of "nation" or "*patrie*" (fatherland) was being constructed throughout the eighteenth century. The very notion of a French nation was paradoxical; it served as a rallying call for action, but those actions had as their goal the formation of the nation that inspired them.<sup>4</sup> Historians in France have not done much work on their country's imperial past. The field of Atlantic history has not penetrated French historiography as it has British, Dutch, and other European

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<sup>1</sup> David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 175, 78.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

<sup>4</sup> David A. Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

countries. As Cécil Vidal recently argued, a “crisis” in French history – including the poor integration of colonial studies, the nationalist focus of French scholars and their students, and the division of university departments that separates historians of France from their colleagues who study other parts of the world – has prevented the Atlantic perspective from taking hold in France.<sup>5</sup> Examples such as the Boundary Commission and its influence provide an opportunity for historians of France to analyse French and British imperial thought in an Atlantic perspective. It was within these negotiations that France could emphasize the defensive nature of its overseas possessions, with the goal of preventing British expansion. In the context of defining imperial strategy, maps specifically and geographic knowledge generally were liminal to the discursive construction of empire. As Matthew Edney argues, “‘Empire’ is a cartographic construction; modern cartography is the construction of modern imperialism.”<sup>6</sup>

This chapter focuses on the Boundary Commission that met in Paris between 1750 and 1753 to establish the limits of Nova Scotia. The Commission is important because it demonstrates how France and Britain envisioned their overseas possessions. At these meetings maps and surveys were transformed into practical politics. Maps, geography, and the issues they raise provide historians with a unique window into the imperial imagination. Equally, historical context and contingencies contribute to the study of geography. The Acadian Boundary dispute is a perfect example of the connections between history and geography that must be exploited fully to comprehend

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<sup>5</sup> Cécile Vidal, "La Nouvelle Histoire Atlantique en France: Ignorance, Réticence et Reconnaissance Tardive," *Neuvo Mundo Mundos Nevos* Colloquium, September (2008). See also, Laurent Dubois, "The French Atlantic," in Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 137-61.

<sup>6</sup> Matthew Edney, "The Irony of Imperial Mapping," in *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire*, ed. James R. Akerman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 45.

ideas of empire. During the eighteenth century, empires required maps which were themselves imperial creations. Geographic knowledge, which before the 1750s was bifurcated between public and official maps, was essential to imperial discourse.<sup>7</sup>

Investigating how local and imperial officials envisioned their possessions – relying on maps, geographic reports, and manuscript surveys – allows historians to analyze the transformation of land claims into the expression of territorial sovereignty. Maps and geographic information, like legal regimes and ceremonies of possession, were the foundation of expressions of sovereignty.<sup>8</sup> Territorial sovereignty required hegemony: asserting an image of possession and convincing competitors to accept it.

The commissaries and diplomats were charged with just this task. They were representatives of (and answered to) their superiors; the memorials, letters, and debates created during their efforts to define Nova Scotia's boundaries reflected larger geopolitical ideas. The discussions and diplomacy provide insight into the struggles for security, the challenges of creating and maintaining trans-Atlantic possessions, and the role of geographic knowledge in formulating imperial policy. Put simply, the Boundary Commission was an example of deliberate imperial negotiation.

That the Boundary Commission failed to resolve the limits of Nova Scotia (the Seven Years' War completed that task) has become its defining characteristic; consequently, scholars have rarely examined its imperial influence. While some politicians put little faith in their commissaries, the introduction of concurrent diplomatic

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<sup>7</sup> Matthew H. Edney, "The Irony of Imperial Mapping," 11-46.

<sup>8</sup> Lauren A. Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ken MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

negotiations suggests that Britain and France genuinely hoped to avoid war over the issue. Max Savelle emphasized the distance between the two sides and the impossibility (or “diplomatic futility”) of resolving such a tenuous issue by commission. Savelle noted, however, that each side was defending “its own theoretical but as yet unoccupied empire.”<sup>9</sup> Twenty-seven years later, Savelle revisited the Paris negotiations. As the Boundary Commission faltered, Britain and France engaged in a parallel direct diplomatic negotiation in an attempt to establish a boundary and avoid war. As Savelle demonstrates, direct diplomacy shed light on French and British imperial policy (even as that policy was being created).<sup>10</sup>

More recently, Mary Pedley has examined the cartographic implications of the Boundary Commission, and Enid Robbie has demonstrated how the commission illustrates the interpersonal relationships of its members. Pedley argues that neither the French nor the British commissaries trusted cartographic evidence because each side possessed maps that both supported and challenged their ideals. Consequently, both sides referred to maps not as juridical proof of possession but to disprove the cartographic evidence offered by the other side. Put simply, Pedley argues that maps proved only that maps were no proof.<sup>11</sup> Yet her argument does not delve deeply enough into the Boundary Commission’s correspondence, and she ignores the direct diplomacy altogether. A more nuanced investigation into the boundary negotiations demonstrates that commissaries and diplomats demanded maps for consultation, debated the merits and faults of the maps in

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<sup>9</sup> Max Savelle, *The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary, 1749-1763* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 27.

<sup>10</sup> Max Savelle, *The Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History of Angloamerica, 1492-1763* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967).

<sup>11</sup> Mary Sponberg Pedley, "Map Wars: The Role of Maps in the Nova Scotia/Acadia Boundary Disputes of 1750," *Imago Mundi* 50 (1998): 96-104.

their possession, and questioned how the publication of new maps could influence negotiations. Maps were key tools to imperial negotiation. Enid Robbie's investigation into William Mildmay, who served with William Shirley for the British side, demonstrates the complexities of eighteenth-century diplomacy and highlights the role of personal relationships in imperial affairs. Robbie argues that there were opportunities for the commission's success, and those missed opportunities contributed to the outbreak of the Seven Years' War.<sup>12</sup>

This chapter explores how the Boundary Commission contributed to imperial policy and marked a significant change in geography's contribution to ideas of empire. Throughout the negotiations, British officials stated clearly that Nova Scotia was one of their most valuable possessions, more so than some Caribbean islands or the Ohio River Valley. Even after conflict began in the Ohio Valley, France and Britain hoped that an agreement on Acadia's boundaries would limit the spread of violence. Though the Mi'kmaq and their allies were not included in these discussions, they were able to influence the negotiations by their geographic presence and assertions of territorial sovereignty (which were supported or challenged by Britain and France as the situation required). Maps were read and interpreted differently at different times, illustrating their multifaceted nature. Maps were used to define an imperial past (proving a settlement's existence and possession) and project its future (extending or restricting boundaries). These various uses led to cartographic ambivalence, as neither France nor Britain could fully support geographic evidence without risking it being turned against them. Yet both countries were equally reliant on maps and employed them in the same way,

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<sup>12</sup> Enid Robbie, *The Forgotten Commissioner: Sir William Mildmay and the Anglo-French Commission of 1750-1755* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003).

demonstrating the similarities between their imperial systems. France's threat of publishing a map informed by official debates concerned negotiators because it would end the traditional bifurcation of geographic knowledge, increase imperial fervour, and possibly derail negotiations. When the Board of Trade did publish John Mitchell's map of North America in 1755, which they had commissioned, that bifurcation ended and began a new era of shared public and official geographic knowledge.

The Boundary Commission itself and the meetings held between diplomats are a synecdoche of the discursive construction of empire. The process illustrated the methods used by Britain and France to imagine their empire and then attempt to make real what they saw. More than simple discussions of latitude and longitude, the Boundary Commission reveals what French and British officials thought about North America, Native Americans, acceptable uses of territory, and Nova Scotia's position in the construction of imperial networks. Geography generally, and cartography in particular, were central to this process. Commissioners and diplomats referred constantly to maps, favouring some and finding fault with others. These negotiations exemplify cartography's duality: maps were more than simple representations of geography, but they were not purely constructed reflections of imperial aspirations. They were constrained by technology, knowledge, and practical limits of two-dimensional representations.<sup>13</sup> Yet as these discussions and negotiations make clear, the limits of geographic knowledge were outweighed by its contribution to political policy and the creation of an imperial imagination.

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<sup>13</sup> See David Buisseret, *Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe*, Kenneth Nebenzahl, Jr., Lectures in the History of Cartography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

## New France as a Defensive Empire

There were two important Atlantic crossings in late 1749. The first was Edward Cornwallis' voyage to Nova Scotia to establish new settlements. The second, around the same time, was Commandant General La Galissonière's return from New France, coming just after he had sent his men to protect the St. John River from British expansion. La Galissonière arrived in France with strong ideas concerning France's overseas position. By December of 1750 he had written a report expressing his views on colonial policy.<sup>14</sup> As demonstrated by Kenneth Banks, French colonial policy was easier to formulate than to implement. The difficulty in securing a communication network that would benefit state interests limited France's ability to create, enact, and monitor a coherent overseas policy. Communications networks existed, but they were controlled by merchants who were subsequently able to evade and influence government regulations.<sup>15</sup> France had created a centralized administrative state on the continent founded on communication networks, government infrastructure, and legal codes, but extending this system beyond France's borders proved difficult because of the various interests groups that inhabited France's overseas possessions.<sup>16</sup> When France implemented policy, it often failed to realize its full potential. For example, in attempts to populate its overseas possessions France implemented religious limits that excluded a large number of potential settlers, specifically Protestant merchants. The British, on the other hand, sent religious dissenters to establish new colonies in North America. French settlers who were sent overseas worked for the short-term profits of France (primarily in resource extraction and

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<sup>14</sup> Savelle, *The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary*, 18.

<sup>15</sup> Kenneth J. Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 4-13.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 219-21.

tax revenue) instead of the long-term benefit of French possessions (building strong and viable settlements).<sup>17</sup>

The state was the central motor of French overseas expansion, and it had one primary goal: “to transplant across the Atlantic an ideal French society, forged in the absolutist mould.”<sup>18</sup> French possessions were meant to serve French interests, and therefore mercantilist ideals and communication networks were of central importance. British movements against the French were of obvious concern, and only locally-produced geographic knowledge could accurately inform administrative officials of developments in the northeast. Official geographic information affected policy and carried political influence more than public maps and tracts, which served to stir up imperial fervour.<sup>19</sup> La Galissonnière’s report began by recognizing that British efforts in Nova Scotia required a French response. “The pretensions set up by his Britannic Majesty’s Commissioners respecting the extent of Acadia,” he argued, “and the measures which England is prosecuting to re-establish herself on that part of the American continent, are of a nature to demand the most serious attention on the part of the government.”<sup>20</sup> La Galissonnière continued to outline New France’s contribution to France’s mercantilist policy, noting that the colonies consumed European goods, produced raw material for France, and sold surplus resources to foreign countries “which contributes essentially to make the balance of wealth incline in favor of France.”<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> James Stewart Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 95 and 187.

<sup>18</sup> Gilles Havard and Cécile Vidal, *Histoire de l'Amérique Française* (Paris: Flammarion, 2008), 147.

<sup>19</sup> Matthew Edney, “The Irony of Imperial Mapping,” 39. See also Chapter 6.

<sup>20</sup> La Galissonnière, “Memoir on the French Colonies in North America,” December 1750, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York [DHNY]*, vol. X. ed. and trans. E.B. O’Callaghan (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1885), 220.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 221.



After listing the possible justifications for abandoning the French colonies, which presumably circulated in France (expensive, difficult to defend, and problematic to govern), La Galissonnière highlighted the non-commercial elements of France's overseas endeavours. First, the "motives of honor, glory and religion" forbade surrendering the work that had begun in North America.<sup>22</sup> French colonial efforts benefited and brought glory to the nation, and, as David Bell has argued, the nation before 1771 (when Louis XVI and his ministers broke the parlements) was manifest in the person of the King, Louis XV.<sup>23</sup> La Galissonnière was also reluctant to abandon what had been started, especially because so many French subjects had travelled to North America under the assumption that France would continue to support their efforts. Colonialism was portrayed as a contract, and French subjects having voyaged overseas "eminently deserve [government support and protection] on account of their fidelity and attachment."<sup>24</sup> It would also be unacceptable to abandon the Natives, the Christianization of whom was "so salutary a work."<sup>25</sup>

La Galissonnière's memoir demonstrates that he considered colonization and settlement worthy endeavours. After 1763, French officials turned away from this model in favour of a mercantilist empire (focused on their valuable Caribbean islands) that did not demand extensive settlement.<sup>26</sup> New France, according to La Galissonnière, had an intrinsic worth. The French philosopher Voltaire disagreed, describing the region in 1759 as little more than "*quelques arpens de neige*" and suggesting that Britain and France

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 222.

<sup>23</sup> Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France*, 57-9.

<sup>24</sup> La Galissonnière, "Memoir," *DHNY*, vol. X, 222.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> W. J. Eccles, *France in America* (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1972), 215.

were fighting over nothing. In 1750, La Galissonière took a different view.<sup>27</sup> Having set out his reasons for supporting New France, he emphasized its worth even if those reasons were ignored. “We shall confine ourselves to regarding Canada as a barren frontier,” La Galissonière announced, and “ask if a country can be abandoned, no matter how bad it may be, or what the amount necessary to sustain it, when by its position it affords a great advantage over its neighbors.”<sup>28</sup> This assertion suggested that mercantilism, *la gloire*, and religious zeal alone were not the driving forces supporting French efforts in North America. Geographic sovereignty was reason enough to finance any efforts that might keep the British from acquiring new territory. A defensive empire, one with the goal of preventing the territorial growth of an adversary, was as valuable as an aggressive colonial system.

If preventing British expansion could justify French actions in North America, defending the most geographically strategic positions and maintaining useful alliances must be the backbone of imperial policy. La Galissonière was aware of the importance of Native alliances to maintaining France’s position in North America, but he was equally aware that the Natives had their own agenda. With France and Britain relatively equal in strength, the Natives could “live independent of, and draw presents from, both.”<sup>29</sup> Aware that France was no match for the British navy in Europe, La Galissonière suggested fighting them in North America where they could win, or at least prevent the British from expanding. France was worse off for having lost Acadia in 1713, and if France was unable to retake the province at the outbreak of the next war Acadia would cause the fall

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<sup>27</sup> François Marie Arouet de Voltaire, *Candide* (Paris: 1759), 181.

<sup>28</sup> La Galissonière, “Memoir,” *DHNY*, vol. X, 223.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

of Louisbourg. La Galissonnière believed (incorrectly, as it turned out) that Canada could survive without Louisbourg, but it was a hugely advantageous fortification during wartime and as a fishery during peace.<sup>30</sup>

The most strategically important region in New France, according to the former French governor, was the St. John River. It was valuable as much for what it could prevent as for what it provided. La Galissonnière noted that there were months during the year that the St. Lawrence was too frozen for ships to pass through, and therefore the only practicable route to communicate with Île Royale (and, by extension, France) was via the St. John River. Economically, and even militarily, the St. John had little to offer. “Its soil, of itself, is of little fertility,” La Galissonnière continued,

Any detachments at all considerable cannot be supported there for a long time to come; but the River St. John, which runs through that country, is the sole available route during six months of the year, between Louisbourg and Quebec; and the only one affording a passage to small detachments, which, dispersed through the woods and sustained by the Indians, are often capable of disconcerting the projects of the English and rendering their execution of them difficult and murderous. Were [the British] masters of this communication, the aid of the Indians would at the same time be lost, Louisbourg would find itself abandoned too often and for too long a time to its own strength.<sup>31</sup>

The St. John River could prevent British expansion and therefore served as a central location in France’s defensive empire.

Aware that Britain and France were debating the Acadian boundary question, La Galissonnière turned his attention to how France could best limit British territorial control in the region. He set out what he believed to be Acadia’s limits as defined by the Treaty of Utrecht. Britain had been granted Port Royal and its *banlieu*, and the stretch of land

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 225.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 226.

from “the extremity of the Bay of Fundy unto Cape Canso.”<sup>32</sup> Here, his description of British territory became more defensive, emphasizing what they must *not* possess: Britain must have no territory on the Bay of St. Lawrence, nothing near the isthmus, nor any lands around Minas, which is populated by residents both French and Catholic. If the commissaries found it necessary to grant Britain land on the peninsula that did by right belong to them, it should be done with conditions that brought advantages to France. Britain must not build on Canso, which would remain neutral; there could be no settlements or fortifications along the coast from Canso to Cape Verte, but instead that land would be reserved for the Mi’kmaq; the isthmus must remain unfortified by both crowns, but the French shall reserve the right to pass over it for the purpose of communication.<sup>33</sup>

The conditions continued to define territory and protect Aboriginal allies. The British would be forbidden to navigate the Gut of Canso and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and in turn the French would refrain from constructing forts or villages within three leagues of the Bay of Fundy along the Etchemin coast. La Galissonière was adamant about reserving for France the St. John River, and argued that the boundary of New England should remain at the Kennebec River, or at any river that was at least twenty leagues from the St. John. Again, supporting Aboriginal territorial rights served French interests, so the former governor suggested that the Abenakis maintain their possession of Narantsouak (Kennebec) and Panaouamské (Penobscot).<sup>34</sup> While ultimately La Galissonière was formulating a defensive imperial strategy, he ended on a more

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 226-27.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 227.

aggressive note. “The result of this memoir is,” he argued, “that no means must be neglected to increase and strengthen Canada and Louisiana.”<sup>35</sup> Yet strengthening these areas was not the same as expanding them. Preventing British expansion was more important than growing France’s colonies.

### **La Galissonière’s Strategy and La Jonquière’s Actions**

La Galissonière was replaced as governor of New France by La Jonquière, whose actions in Nova Scotia were militarily defensive, putting into practice La Galissonière’s suggestions. These local actions influenced the first few months of boundary negotiations and sewed the seeds of imperial mistrust that came to dominate the discussions in Paris. The boundary negotiation was not an academic exercise; it took place in the context of competing imperial aspirations and was influenced by actions on the ground. Scholars such as Linda Colley have recently noted how events overseas influenced the metropole. In Britain, the size and expanse of imperial possessions were disproportionate to the small island and its limited population. Stories of Britons taken captive overseas were published in London, and those in Britain could read about the wider world and begin to question the process and purpose of empire building.<sup>36</sup> On a large scale, Britons learned about the wider world, questioned the differences between societies, and became paralyzed by the empire that they had created.<sup>37</sup> The French were equally capable of using overseas events to influence national sentiment. Washington’s killing of Jumonville in 1754 became fodder for French propaganda against the

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 231.

<sup>36</sup> Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2002), 17.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 363-66.

“barbaric” English.<sup>38</sup> The discussions over Acadia in Paris were equally susceptible to actions within Acadia, and therefore demonstrate l’Acadie’s influence on the French Atlantic.

The main source of contention was France’s forced removal of Acadian settlers from the English to the French side of the isthmus of Chignecto. In 1750, Governor Cornwallis received a letter from Acadian deputies asking for permission to remove themselves with their belongings from the province. Cornwallis refused the request, but learned that the deputies were asking because the French were forcing them to move. Louis La Corne, a French officer who had been stationed at Fort Beauséjour and who had fought off Lawrence’s first attempt to establish a fort on the isthmus, was working with Le Loutre to strengthen the French settlement.<sup>39</sup> Their method was to encourage migration by threatening the Acadians with massacre and burning their houses.<sup>40</sup> Their threats were not idle ones, and Beaubassin was eventually burned to prevent the British from taking it. While the British demonized Le Loutre for his actions, the priest had the support of officials in Quebec and France, making it difficult to determine where official orders ended and his own volition began.<sup>41</sup>

When British officials in London learned of La Corne’s actions they discussed how best to deal with the situation. The Duke of Bedford wrote to the Earl of Albemarle, the British ambassador to France, asking him to force the issue on the French and request that the matter be settled. Should the French do nothing it “may destroy the good

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<sup>38</sup> Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France*, 78-80.

<sup>39</sup> Beamish Murdoch, *A History of Nova-Scotia, or Acadie*, 3 vols. (Halifax: J. Barnes, 1865), vol. 2, 178. See also C.J. Russ, “La Corne, Louis (Jean-Louis, Pierre, Louis-Luc, Louis-François) de,” *Dictionary of Canadian Biography [DCB]*, [www.biographi.ca](http://www.biographi.ca)

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 134.

intelligence which subsists between the two crowns.”<sup>42</sup> Albemarle took what action he could and learned from the Marquis de Puyzieulx, the French minister for foreign affairs, that La Jonquière had acted without the King’s approval and that the British had cause for reparations. In fact, Puyzieulx had never heard of La Corne or Le Loutre, and was tempted to believe that they were pirates who had organized a body of men to plunder the province, not representatives of La Jonquière’s government.<sup>43</sup> Later, however, Puyzieulx came to a different conclusion. After presenting the letters to the King, the foreign minister wrote to Albemarle and suggested, “there might be some exaggeration in the exposition of facts.”<sup>44</sup> Puyzieulx noted La Jonquière’s wisdom and the clear instructions he had from the King about preserving the peace, expressing his frustration that Cornwallis had not appealed to La Jonquière before complaining to the courts. In a post-script, the French foreign minister suggested to Albemarle that Cornwallis himself had raised fortifications on contested lands.<sup>45</sup>

Cornwallis had written La Jonquière, and their letters demonstrate the influence of La Galissonnière’s defensive imperial strategy. La Jonquière informed Cornwallis that he had the right to act and had been authorized by the King to protect French territory. Regarding the stretch of land along the western coast of the Bay of Fundy, La Jonquière reminded Cornwallis, “the King of France is the first possessor of this continent and we built the first establishments in this part of New France.”<sup>46</sup> The New France governor took issue with the fact that Cornwallis called the region Nova Scotia, which should be

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<sup>42</sup> Bedford to Albemarle, Whitehall, 4 June 1750, f103v, vol. 236, State Papers: France [SP 78], National Archives, London [NA].

<sup>43</sup> Albemarle to Bedford, Compiègne, 13/24 June 1750, f119, vol. 236, SP 78, NA.

<sup>44</sup> Copie d’un lettre de Mons. Le Marquis de Puyzieulx au Comte d’Albemarle, Compiègne, 23 June 1750, f144, vol. 236, SP 78, NA.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 144v.

<sup>46</sup> La Jonquière to Cornwallis, Quebec, 2 April 1750, 166v, vol. 236, SP 78, NA.

applied only to that part of the peninsula ceded in 1713, and therefore changed the title to New France in his replies to Cornwallis. The French would protect the territory until the commissaries had settled the boundaries.<sup>47</sup>

Cornwallis did more than call the Bay of Fundy's coast Nova Scotia. He described the region into which La Jonquière had sent his men as "la Coeur de Nouvelle Écosse," and depicted the French presence there as directly contrary to treaties, public spirit, and the laws of men.<sup>48</sup> Cornwallis cited the Treaty of Breda as the definitive description of Acadia. At that time France claimed the lands along the Atlantic coast from the isthmus to the Kennebec River, therefore those were the "ancient boundaries" that defined Nova Scotia. He then turned to cartography to support his contention. "Look only at the maps published in France when you possessed this province," Cornwallis argued, "you will see if the lands in question are not those included in Nova Scotia or Acadia."<sup>49</sup> In his opinion those lands, and their Native inhabitants, were under the dominion of the British King. More troubling for Cornwallis was that La Jonquière, aware that the two crowns were meeting to settle the boundary dispute, sent troops to the region to fix them himself. "Be aware," the British governor warned, "that this government is not a dependant of yours."<sup>50</sup>

These letters provided the British with ammunition in their case against the French actions in Nova Scotia and demonstrated cartography's political influence. Albemarle met again with Puyzieulx, who informed him that the French put little credit in reports of La Jonquière's behaviour. As the discussion grew more heated, Albemarle

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 167-167v.

<sup>48</sup> Cornwallis to La Jonquière, Halifax, 5 May 1750, f170, vol. 236, SP 78, NA.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 170v-171.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 171-173v.



produced for the French foreign minister La Jonquière's letters that made plain his actions. Puyzieulx's anger then focused on La Jonquière. He asked Albemarle to write a report that would be presented to the French court.<sup>51</sup> Albemarle considered pushing Puyzieulx on the discussion of limits, especially as they related to La Corne's actions at Chignecto and Beaubassin, but Puyzieulx,

after declaring that he was not enough acquainted with the situation of that country...concluded by saying...he knew however that the two places I have mentioned above, were within the peninsula, and consequently that satisfaction ought to be given for the damage done, and security for the future, if the facts were proved.<sup>52</sup>

Proving the facts remained a difficult task. Though Albemarle wrote the memoir for the French court, the British were unhappy with its reception. Antoine Louis Rouillé, the minister of the Marine, slowed discussions and the French began to doubt if La Jonquière was the first aggressor on the isthmus. Rouillé sent a letter to La Jonquière that Albemarle found too lenient. The British diplomat went so far as to refuse forwarding to Britain the French court's reply to his memoir because it was found wanting and Albemarle wished to remove himself from the business altogether.<sup>53</sup> Before he could, however, he demonstrated to Puyzieulx how French maps supported the British territorial claim. "I show'd him all the latter maps that are publickly sold at Paris, and were engrav'd by order," Albemarle informed Bedford,

And very angry are they to find that they have not one map that is so partial to them as they would have it, Mr. Silhouette, one of the French Commissarys, has been with Danville (who was sent to that country in 1745) to scold him for having

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<sup>51</sup> Albemarle to Newcastle, Compiègne, 27 June / 3 July 1750, f191-192, vol. 236, SP 78, NA.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 192v.

<sup>53</sup> Albemarle to Bedford, Paris, 11/22 July 1750, f224-225, vol. 236, SP 78, NA.

made his map so favourable to us, tho' he cuts off above half a degree of the old limits, or better.<sup>54</sup>

The French officials were concerned enough with cartography's political power that they sent an agent to "scold" a geographer whose maps did not serve state interests. This should come as no surprise, as France had relied on cartography to serve state interests since the time of Charles VIII.<sup>55</sup> Maps projected a political image and were influenced by changes in policy, whether through deliberate bias or the necessity of selection.<sup>56</sup>

As the issue of La Jonquière's actions, carried out by La Corne, continued to dominate French-British diplomacy, the British debated cartography's capabilities and expressed their ambivalence towards maps. According to Newcastle, King George II was pleased with how Albemarle was handling the situation and wanted the ambassador to remain forceful in his assertions that Nova Scotia extended beyond the isthmus. He was equally pleased to learn that French maps supported the British cause, but was concerned that they did not go far enough. Newcastle believed that maps were useful tools in negotiations, but were ultimately unable to depict an exact vision of Britain's territorial possessions. Even a French map that favoured British land claims likely did not go far enough to assert the true extent of British possessions. He found that "those maps (as they must be supposed to be partial, in favour of France) do not allow His Majesty's right in its full extent."<sup>57</sup> These debates demonstrate that maps helped create an imperial image by contributing to the larger negotiations of empire building; yet cartography itself could

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 225-225v. Albemarle seems to have confused D'Anville the geographer with Duc D'Anville, who died at Chebucto during an ill-fated raid during the War of Austrian Succession.

<sup>55</sup> Buisseret, *Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps*, ch. 4.

<sup>56</sup> This remains as true today as in the eighteenth century. See Jeremy Black, *Maps and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). Geographers' bias will be discussed in Chapter 6.

<sup>57</sup> Newcastle to Albemarle, Hanover, 24 July / 4 August 1750, f268-271v, vol. 236, SP 78, NA. Quote from 271v.

not complete this task single-handedly.<sup>58</sup> This ambivalence towards maps would become a defining feature of the British-French negotiations.

The maps referred to by the British diplomats were those published by geographers and available for purchase in France. These public maps, as opposed to official surveys and manuscript maps, catered to a wider audience with specific aesthetic tastes. Consequently, they were less useful in political negotiations. As Mary Pedley has demonstrated, map sales was a competitive business and success depended on more than affordability. In fact, when the Delisle family of mapmakers sold their maps to an agent in Amsterdam they were told that the beauty and accuracy of their maps would give them an edge over cheaper maps sold in the region.<sup>59</sup> Map and atlas sales depended on securing subscriptions from the literate and interested public who desired general knowledge and beauty. The ideal public map was “*bel et utile*,” meant for living rooms and salons instead of government offices.<sup>60</sup> There was a financial incentive, then, to produce generally informative and highly attractive maps. French officials knew that Britain lacked a strong cartographic archive on which they could base their claims. Though Bedford viewed settling Acadia’s limits as the most important issue in the negotiations, he was aware that the topic had been so neglected in England that the best maps available were those done in France.<sup>61</sup> This reliance on foreign public maps put Britain at a disadvantage.

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<sup>58</sup> Edney, “The Irony of Imperial Mapping,” *passim*.

<sup>59</sup> Mary Sponberg Pedley, *The Commerce of Cartography: Making and Marketing Maps in Eighteenth-Century France and England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 74.

<sup>60</sup> Mary Sponberg Pedley, *Bel et Utile: The Work of the Robert de Vaugondy Family of Mapmakers* (Herts: Map Collector Publications, 1992), Ch.3.

<sup>61</sup> Durand to Minister, London, 13 July 1749, f306v, vol. 426, Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Correspondance politique: Angleterre, MG5, A1, LAC.

There were other maps that circulated only within official circles on which French administrators could rely to support their case. As Matthew Edney has demonstrated, by the mid-eighteenth century manuscript maps could travel from one side of the Atlantic to the other with relative ease. Maps created in North America for one purpose could be used in Europe for another.<sup>62</sup> In the months leading up to the boundary commission, as both the French and the British became increasingly aware of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie's heightened imperial importance, the two nations commissioned surveys to strengthen their territorial claims with manuscript maps and geographic reports. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Charles Morris produced maps for William Shirley and Edward Cornwallis, carefully emphasizing Britain's claims to lands beyond the peninsula from the St. Lawrence to the Kennebec River. The French, for their part, had their own maps created in Canada and l'Acadie and charged engineers and geographers with creating new ones.<sup>63</sup> La Jonquière himself had sent to France "a map that he had made of the Baie Française by which one can see that the limits of Acadie and New France must naturally be at the height of land between Baie Verte and the river that falls into Beaubassin."<sup>64</sup> By another letter sent to France, La Jonquière included two maps by which "it is easy to see that the English have no right to extend their possessions into the contested lands."<sup>65</sup> After the British established Halifax, French diplomats requested a map of the settlement to send to

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<sup>62</sup> Matthew H. Edney, "Competition Over Land, Competition Over Empire: Public Discourse and Printed Maps of the Kennebec River, 1753-1755, in *Early American Cartographies*, ed. Martin Brückner (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, forthcoming).

<sup>63</sup> A good virtual exhibit of these maps can be found on the Newberry Library website: <http://www.newberry.org/smith/exhibits/fe/fe.html>. On the maps created by Chabert and Franquet see Chapter Four.

<sup>64</sup> *Memoires sur des limites de l'Acadie*, May 1750, f37-37v, vol. 3, C11E, Archives Nationale d'Outre Mer [ANOM].

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 37v.

officials at Versailles.<sup>66</sup> These maps would not appear publicly, though they might serve as evidence for those that did. They would also provide French officials with cartographic evidence to be used in their memorials and discussions with the British.

Before the commissaries met, Bedford responded to a memoir written by Sieur Durand, the French envoy in London, concerning what parts of Nova Scotia should be included in the negotiations. Durand informed Puyzieulx that Bedford had insinuated in his reply that the British King was not disposed to discuss Canso, as it had belonged to Britain since the Treaty of Utrecht. Durand argued that Canso was comprised of two distinct parts: the cape, and the island. By the Treaty of Utrecht, the cape of Canso was undoubtedly a dependency of Acadia, and was therefore ceded to Britain. The island of Canso, however, lay in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and like other islands in that body was reserved for France. Durand also referred to the 1718 British attack on Canso in which the British warship *Squirrel* attacked the French fishing port and took goods valued at 200 000 *livres*. After the attack the British ordered reparations made to the French, which Durand argued indicated that the British knew the island belonged to France (the exact interpretation that British officials at the time had hoped to avoid).<sup>67</sup> Local events, and outstanding geographic debates, had a direct impact on imperial negotiations.

This exchange of letters did not resolve the problem, and the topic of Canso would frustrate the commissaries as the negotiations developed. Durand was also surprised to learn that Bedford wanted to claim Nova Scotia as far as the St. Lawrence.

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<sup>66</sup> Mirepoix to Minister, Putney, 12 September 1749, f190, vol. 427, MG5, A1, LAC. In a post script to his letter, Mirepoix wrote “J’espere être bientôt en état de vous envoyer le plan de Chebucto et les éclaircissement que je pouray avoir sur les établissement que les Anglois veulent faire dans la Nouvelle Ecosse.”

<sup>67</sup> Durand to Puyzieulx, 17 July 1749, f239-240v, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

Durand informed the minister of the Marine that such a claim could not be supported, and was in fact contradicted by a map he attached to his letter “which was engraved last year in London under the approbation of Parliament” and which “restricts Nova Scotia to the large peninsula as formerly under the name Acadie and it fixes the limits at Cape Noire to Cape Canso.”<sup>68</sup> These early letters and arguments only highlighted the need for a commission dedicated to resolving the Acadian boundary.

### **Commissaries and the Commission**

After both France and Britain agreed to establish a boundary commission, the two nations appointed their representatives. France selected La Galissonière and Étienne de Silhouette. La Galissonière had spent time as a naval officer and commander, and in 1747 was appointed commandant general of New France. La Jonquière had already been appointed governor general of New France, but his participation in duc d’Anville’s failed 1746 attack on Nova Scotia (and subsequent capture by the British) prevented him from assuming his post. La Galissonière was awarded with a command that brought all the same powers and pay of lieutenant governor. His time in New France, and the memoir on French colonial policy that he wrote upon his return to France, made him an obvious choice for the position of French commissary. Shortly after returning to France, La Galissonière was put in charge of the *Dépôt des Cartes et Plans de la Marine*, providing him with access to maps, surveys, and hydrographic charts that would no doubt inform the French commissaries’ decisions on the Acadian boundary dispute.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Durand to Minister, London, 22 June 1750, f448-448v, vol. 428, MG5 A1, LAC.

<sup>69</sup> Étienne Taillemite, “Barrin de La Galissonière, Roland-Michel, Marquis de La Galissonière,” *DCB*.

La Galissonnière's partner, Étienne de Silhouette, was the son of a tax collector and grew up with an aptitude for philosophy and literature. During a time when the administration recruited its members from wealthy and prestigious families, Silhouette was an unlikely candidate for high state service.<sup>70</sup> His desire for education led to a passion for law, which Silhouette studied in Holland. He published books on Chinese government and morals, and translated works on Spanish princes. In 1739, Silhouette wrote an essay on the importance of establishing tobacco in the French colonies and supplanting Britain's role in that trade. This publication received high praise from le marquis d'Argenson, a prominent French statesman and future president of the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, who went so far as to suggest that Silhouette's work gave France's minister of foreign affairs all the information he needed, rendering France's ambassador to England increasingly useless.<sup>71</sup> Having caught the attention of one French administrator, Silhouette soon found himself employed by another, serving as secretary to M. le maréchal de Noailles. He spent much of the 1740s in London in an official capacity, eventually writing another book on English finance, commerce, and navigation.<sup>72</sup> By the time the boundary commission was established, Silhouette was well placed to serve with La Galissonnière.

The British chose as their commissaries William Shirley and William Mildmay. Shirley was the son of a textile maker whose family exploited their connections to secure for him a good education and patronage appointments. After studying law, practicing in London, and losing money on poor speculation investments, Shirley sought out a position

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<sup>70</sup> Pierre Clément and Alfred Lemoine, *M. De Silhouette, Bouret et les Derniers Fermiers Généraux* (Paris: Didier, 1872), 8-10.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

in colonial governance. He began in the Massachusetts courts and worked his way up to the position of governor.<sup>73</sup> Shirley took an active interest in establishing new British settlements in Nova Scotia. Having commissioned maps of the province, he was well informed of the British-defined boundaries. Shirley was an expansionist who believed that British possessions in North America should extend well beyond the Ohio River, but he was also aware that the French were eager to establish a line of forts from Canada to Louisiana to keep the British on the Atlantic side of the Appalachian mountains.<sup>74</sup> Shirley had succeeded in convincing the Board of Trade to establish Halifax, but he would have less luck asserting his expansionist vision in Paris.

Shirley's co-commissary was William Mildmay, the son of the British East India Company's chief agent in Surat, India. He grew up in London and worked as a lawyer there until he was forty-one.<sup>75</sup> Though Mildmay was an intelligent and ambitious man, his position within the English administration owed much to his long friendship with Robert Darcy, the fourth Earl of Holderness. Mildmay's father married Darcy's mother, the widow of the third Earl of Holderness, and when she moved into the Mildmay house she brought her four-year-old son, Robert. William Mildmay was nineteen at the time, and the two grew close over the years. When Robert Darcy, Earl of Holderness, was named secretary of state of the Southern Department, Mildmay benefited from patronage appointments. He spent many years in France studying its economy and publishing

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<sup>73</sup> John A. Schutz. "Shirley, William," *American National Biography Online* [ANB], <http://www.anb.org/articles/01/01-00834.html>, Feb. 2000. See also John A. Schutz, *William Shirley: King's Governor of Massachusetts* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1961).

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> Enid Catherine Robbie, "A British View of Some French Institutions in the Mid-Eighteenth-Century: From the Papers and Books of Sir William Mildmay" (Ph.D dissertation, University of Toronto, 1996), 24.



works on its trade and commerce.<sup>76</sup> In this respect he resembled Silhouette, who did much the same for France in Britain. With the four commissaries chosen and prepared to settle the boundary dispute, meetings were set to begin in Paris in 1750.

The Boundary Commission that met in Paris was the second attempt at settling pressing Anglo-French issues. An earlier commission had been formed and was meeting in St. Malo, but with little luck. With the decision made to appoint new commissaries, the St. Malo meetings were ended.<sup>77</sup> The Paris meetings excluded northeastern Aboriginal groups, yet the resulting discussions serve to complicate Matthew Edney's recent arguments that Natives were excluded from imperial mapping discourses.<sup>78</sup> As will be demonstrated, the Mi'kmaq and their allies became indirect participants in the negotiations when Britain and France used Native territorial sovereignty to claim land or create buffer zones. Even this limited participation suggests Native geographic control was recognized and shaped imperial debates.

Determining the topics of discussion was the subject of deliberation, but it was not long before Acadia emerged as the most pressing issue. Newcastle wrote, "I think [Acadia] the most ticklish, and most important point, that we have almost ever had, singly, to negotiate with France."<sup>79</sup> For that reason, both the French and the British commissaries were given explicit instructions for the negotiations. La Galissonière and Silhouette were informed that the ancient limits of Acadia ran from Canso to Cape Forchu (Cape Sable, present-day Yarmouth, Nova Scotia), and did not include Port

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>77</sup> Savelle, *The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary*, 22.

<sup>78</sup> Edney, "The Irony of Imperial Mapping," 40.

<sup>79</sup> Newcastle Papers, f305-307, Add. MSS. 32822: 305-307, Library of Congress, in Savelle, *The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary*, 33.

Royal, which was ceded separately at Utrecht. Part of the peninsula and Canso belonged to France, but those lands could be ceded if they remained neutral and uninhabited. In return, the French expected the British not to establish themselves on any rivers that ran into the ocean via the St. Lawrence, the St. Louis, or the Mississippi.<sup>80</sup>

Shirley and Mildmay received their first instructions in August 1750. Newcastle wrote to Albemarle from Hanover informing him that the King wanted Nova Scotia to be the first subject of discussion at the meetings, an early indication of its imperial importance.<sup>81</sup> Bedford learned from Albemarle's secretary, Joseph Yorke, that the French were not eager to begin the negotiations with the Acadian boundary, as they were waiting on letters on that subject from Canada. "I observed to [Puyzieulx]," Yorke wrote,

that as to informations from America, they had no more occasion for them than we had, for as all that had ever pass'd relative to that country, in the cessions that had been made from one nation to the other had been transacted in Europe, every thing that could prove the respective titles and limits, were consequently to be found at Paris and London, and he might be assured, that we went no further to seek for them, nor could they, or at least they had no occasion.<sup>82</sup>

Yorke believed that the French might simply be stalling for time, or hoping to direct the negotiations away from Nova Scotia because the French knew they had the weaker proofs. Yet, as Richard Drayton has argued, imperial powers had much to learn from their overseas possessions. Knowledge that served the British state and shaped the creation of the empire (and, almost simultaneously, the nation) arrived in Britain from

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<sup>80</sup> Undated, Instructions à des commissaries, f26-27, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>81</sup> Newcastle to Albemarle, Hanover, 30 July / 10 August 1750, f294-295, vol. 236, SP 78, NA.

<sup>82</sup> Joseph Yorke to Bedford, Paris, 15/26 August 1750, f380v, vol. 236, SP 78, NA.

across the globe. Britain was not at the centre of a process of external diffusion, but was “also a child of the same processes which made its colonies.”<sup>83</sup>

The French continued to rely on the territorial sovereignty of their Native allies, arguing that lands along the western coast of the Bay of Fundy were either French or Native, but certainly not British.<sup>84</sup> Without Aboriginal representatives in Paris, the French and British could exaggerate alliances and appropriate lands in ways impossible in Nova Scotia or New France. Native alliances, especially the gifts given from governor to Native chief, were, according to Richard White, part of a complex process by which Natives were allowed to institute their own vision of patriarchy. In New France generally and in the *pays d'en haut* specifically, the governor provided for them so that they could in turn provide for their people through the redistribution of gifts. These alliances were not to be taken for granted nor exaggerated, as the gifts “did not create compliant puppets, and the gifts were not bribes.”<sup>85</sup> The Mi'kmaq and their allies might have been willing to share land with the British or French, but they rarely ceded it permanently.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Richard Drayton, “Knowledge and Empire” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume II: The Eighteenth Century*, ed. Peter J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 251. David Hancock agrees that people operating beyond the limits of Britain were instrumental in establishing both the empire and the nation itself. See David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). The French historiography on this topic is less developed, though there have been calls for work along these lines. See Alexandre Dubé, “S'Appropriier l'Atlantique: Quelques Reflexions autour de *Chasing Empire across the Sea* de Kenneth Banks,” *French Colonial History* 6 (2005): 33-44.

<sup>84</sup> “Memoire touchant le lieu où doivent être placées des bornes de les terres des abenaquis dans leur pays, appellé l'acadie sauvage,” 10 August 1750, f161-161v, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>85</sup> Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 179.

<sup>86</sup> On eastern Algonkians ceding territory, see Emerson W. Baker, “A Scratch with a Bear's Paw': Anglo-Indian Land Deeds in Early Maine,” *Ethnohistory* 36 (1989): 235-56. Also, Margaret Wickens Pearse, “Native Mapping in Southern New England Indian Deeds,” in *Cartographic Encounters: Perspectives on Native American Mapmaking and Map Use*, ed. G. Malcolm Lewis, The Kenneth Nebenzahl, Jr., Lectures in the History of Cartography (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 157-86.

A report written in the summer of 1750 set out to counter British claims to territories beyond the isthmus. France was aware that the land south of the St. Lawrence River was the most fertile and populated territory in the region. To prevent Britain from claiming the region the French decided to set the boundary between the two nations at the high point of the land, with territory in which the rivers ran into the Atlantic belonging to Britain, and those in which rivers ran into the St. Lawrence belonging to France. The problem with this division was the St. John, which ran into the Atlantic but had its source close to Quebec.<sup>87</sup> This particular memoir addressed the issue by referring to old grants and old maps. The British, the memoir argued, relied on Sir William Alexander's 1621 grant to establish Nova Scotia's boundaries and claimed that those boundaries were ceded to Britain at the Treaty of Utrecht. The memoir then makes a distinction that would serve as a central argument in the boundary discussions: the land was *ceded* to Britain, not *restored*.<sup>88</sup> A nation could cede what belonged to it, while restoration was the return of property that had been taken.

Unable to rely on the height of land or old grants to determine l'Acadie's limits, the memoir turned to old maps. Of particular interest was a map by the Flemish geographer Johannes de Laet (Figure 5.1). De Laet had spent a few years in London at the turn of the seventeenth century and developed close ties with leading political and intellectual figures. He eventually returned to Leiden, made his wealth on overseas trade

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<sup>87</sup> "Mémoire contre les prétentions des anglois sur des terres de la Nouvelle France," 25 July 1750, f179, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, f181.

and speculation, and was appointed director of the Dutch West Indies Company.<sup>89</sup> In de Laet’s 1630 map of “Nova Francia,” the word “Accadie” runs along the southern part of



Figure 5.1 De Laet’s *Nova Francia*, 1630. Acadia is only the peninsula, or even just the southern peninsula. Memorial University, Centre for Newfoundland Studies. G 3400 1630 L3 MAP

the peninsula only. The French memoir argues that “the ancient limits of Acadia are distinctly known and cannot be contested, the English cannot claim a larger extent of land.”<sup>90</sup>


The French, like the British, were able to use their competitor’s maps against them. While Silhouette berated D’Anville for his Anglo-friendly cartography,

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<sup>89</sup> Rolf H. Bremmer jun., “Laet, Johannes De (1581–1649),” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [ODNB]*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), accessed July 14, 2009.  
<sup>90</sup> “Mémoire contre les prétentions,” f.181v-182, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.



D’Anville’s maps were not explicitly intended to serve as a foundation for imperial land claims. The British, on the other hand, cited Sir William Alexander’s grant as illustrative of Nova Scotia’s boundaries (Figure 5.2). Fortunately for the French, Alexander was not



**Figure 5.2 Sir William Alexander’s *New Scot Land*, 1624. Memorial University, Centre for Newfoundland Studies. G 3400 1625 P8 MAP**

clear in his toponymy. Alexander’s map first appeared in 1624 to illustrate his pamphlet, “An Encouragement to Colonies”.<sup>91</sup> He stretched “New Scot Lande” across much of the territory south of the St. Lawrence and onto the peninsula, but he included no mention of Acadia. He named the peninsula “The Province of Caledonia,” and the land around Gaspé was called “The Province of Alexandria.” These names provided some ammunition for the French, who argued that Alexander was “instructed to call his

<sup>91</sup> D.C. Harvey, “Alexander, William, Earl of Stirling,” *DCB*.

concession ‘Nova Scotia,’ [but] being back in England changed the names on the map that he had printed.”<sup>92</sup> Cartographic historians, such as J.B. Harley, have illustrated the importance of examining not only what a map represented, but also how that representation could be interpreted. The geographic information included in maps was only half of a system of communication that required a reader to ingest and interpret that information.<sup>93</sup> D’Anville’s and Alexander’s maps were imbedded with a specific worldview (Nova Scotia as Scottish and Acadia as French), though elements of the maps could be emphasized by the reader to alter its meaning. Names were an important element of claiming a region, and renaming was an act of possession.<sup>94</sup>

As the first meeting of the commissaries approached, both France and Britain had amassed some evidence, many preconceived ideas of how the negotiations should unfold, and an increasing distrust of their opponent. Aside from settling the Acadian boundary, the commissaries were charged with determining the rights to St. Lucia and resolving the issue of ships taken by either side since the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. In their first meeting, the two sides exchanged written introductory memorials and set dates for future meetings. Shirley informed Newcastle of two potential challenges the negotiations would face. First, the French wanted to discuss ships taken as early as 1738. Second, the French agreed to discuss Acadia in the first meeting only if future meetings would alternate between Acadia and St. Lucia. “In answer to this,” Shirley reported, “we urged first the necessity of making Acadia the only object of our immediate discussion, as being

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<sup>92</sup> “Mémoire contre les prétentions,” f.183v, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>93</sup> Matthew H. Edney, "The Origins and Development of J.B. Harley's Cartographic Theories," *Cartographica, Monograph 54* 40, no. 1-2 (2005): 72-3.

<sup>94</sup> William Craig Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 174.

the most important point to be determined, for settling the same tranquility in America as had been so happily established in Europe.”<sup>95</sup> For the British, Nova Scotia was centrally important to their imperial vision. The French were adamant that St. Lucia receive equal attention, threatening in the second meeting that if the subjects were not treated alternatively they would break up the negotiations.<sup>96</sup>

### **Nova Scotia’s Strategic Importance**

Much of the history of the British empire or the British Atlantic passes over Nova Scotia in favour of the Caribbean and the colonies that would later separate from Britain. Stephen J. Hornsby pays more attention to the strategic importance of the Ohio River Valley than he does the possession of Nova Scotia, making no mention of the Boundary Commission. His view of Nova Scotia is limited to a site of imperial battles instead of a strategic geographic region at the heart of Britain’s overseas possessions.<sup>97</sup> Alan Taylor has to remind his readers that in 1754 there were fourteen British colonies in North America, “Nova Scotia was the fourteenth, neglected by historians who speak of only thirteen,” despite the fact that by that time the region had been the subject of lengthy imperial negotiations that were quickly deteriorating into talk of renewed war.<sup>98</sup> Richard R. Johnson’s chapter in the *Oxford History of the British Empire* misleadingly suggests that the Treaty of Utrecht “secured English title to the disputed areas of Acadia,” which if

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<sup>95</sup> Shirley and Mildmay to Newcastle, Paris, 22 August / 2 September 1750, f64, vol. 238, SP 78, NA.

<sup>96</sup> Shirley and Mildmay to Newcastle, Paris, 28 August / 8 September 1750, f70, vol. 238, SP 78, NA.

<sup>97</sup> Stephen Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005), 204-14.

<sup>98</sup> Alan Taylor, *American Colonies* (New York: Viking, 2001), 426.



true would have nullified the need for the Acadian boundary negotiations.<sup>99</sup> John Shy's chapter mentions negotiations that could have prevented war after 1748, and refers to Nova Scotia as "a focus of negotiation," but does not delve into the Boundary Commission or its influence on how Britain and France envisioned and prioritized their overseas possessions.<sup>100</sup> John G. Reid and Elizabeth Mancke have addressed this gap in imperial/Atlantic literature, demonstrating the imperial importance of Nova Scotia as a place where France and Britain competed for territory primarily controlled by the Mi'kmaq and their allies. They note that British administrators presented their superiors with an optimistic interpretation of British authority in the region, when on the ground they negotiated constantly with the French Acadians and Aboriginals.<sup>101</sup> Yet this much needed addition to Nova Scotia / l'Acadie's influence on imperial affairs overlooks the boundary negotiations that so clearly stated the region's importance to Britain and France.

Historians of France and the French empire have also overlooked the significance of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. Gilles Havard and Cécil Vidal note that while most French citizens are aware that North America has a French past, very little of that history is taught in schools and universities.<sup>102</sup> Their book provides an excellent overview of French America, but the focus is more on the colonies than on the relationship between France and their overseas possessions. Havard and Vidal rightly demonstrate that Acadia was a contested ground controlled by the Mi'kmaq and the French Acadians, but the

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<sup>99</sup> Richard R. Johnson, "British North America, 1690-1748," in *OHBE: The Eighteenth Century*, 281. John Shy, "The American Colonies, 1748-1783," in *OHBE: The Eighteenth Century*, 303-04.

<sup>100</sup> John Shy, "The American Colonies, 1748-1783," in *OHBE: The Eighteenth Century*, 303-04.

<sup>101</sup> John G. Reid and Elizabeth Mancke, "From Global Processes to Continental Strategies: The Emergence of British North America to 1783," in Phillip A. Buckner, *Canada and the British Empire*, The Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 22-42.

<sup>102</sup> Havard and Vidal, *Histoire de l'Amérique Française*, 13.

scope of their work prevents any in-depth analysis of the Acadian boundary dispute.<sup>103</sup>

Other recent French studies that examine France's colonies are similarly large scale, and are consequently unable to provide micro-studies on specific events that demonstrated France's imperial imagination. These works do, however, present the general argument that the Ohio River valley was the main catalyst in France's entry into the Seven Years' War.<sup>104</sup>

English historians of French America reached similar conclusions, and also failed to examine the Acadian boundary dispute.<sup>105</sup> Frederick Quinn notes, "Absurd as it would later appear, in the 1750s French and British leaders focused their imperial struggle on control of the Indian village lands on the Ohio and Wabash rivers."<sup>106</sup> There was nothing "absurd" about it, as France was trying to maintain its line of forts from Louisbourg to New Orleans, and Britain was hoping to break through into the western continent. To gain the full picture of France's imperial ideas, recent works on France's overseas possessions must be read with older political histories. Richard Waddington's *Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances* says nothing about life in New France or Acadia specifically, but provides a detailed account of the diplomatic negotiations over those regions that preceded the Seven Years' War. He too argues that the Ohio River valley was centrally important to France.<sup>107</sup> "La Belle Rivière" was strategically important, but there is more to the story. To claim that the Acadian boundary disputes caused the Seven

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 614-21.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 622-28. Havard and Vidal refer to "la Belle Rivière" as the "clé du continent." See also Jean Meyer and Jacques Thobie, *Histoire de la France Coloniale: Des Origines à 1914*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1990), 204-08; Pierre Pluchon, *Histoire de la Colonisation Française: Le Premier Empire Colonial, des Origines à la Restauration*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 169-74.

<sup>105</sup> Eccles, *France in America*, Ch.4.

<sup>106</sup> Frederick Quinn, *The French Overseas Empire* (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 69.

<sup>107</sup> Richard Waddington, *Louis XV, et le Renversement des Alliances: Préliminaires de la Guerre de Sept Ans, 1754-1756* (Paris: Firmin, 1896), 50-85.

Years' War might be an overstatement, but to argue that resolving those issues could have prevented or limited the conflict is not.

Recent studies in Atlantic History, specifically new syntheses that attempt to define the field and emphasize its central themes and contributions, have neglected the northeast. The Acadian expulsion is mentioned only in passing, and the prolonged debate over Acadia's boundaries receives no attention.<sup>108</sup> Instead, discussions of geographic confusion focus on the Ohio River Valley, which is often described as the central cause of the Seven Years' War.<sup>109</sup> A closer examination of geographic negotiation, maps, and boundary disputes challenges this interpretation and reorients Atlantic history towards the northeast. Maps were liminal to imperial envisioning, and cartographic questions had to be resolved before policy could be peacefully enacted. The Seven Years' War was a watershed moment that realigned imperial powers, and its roots can be traced to the Paris negotiations. For the British and French, Acadia remained a strategically valuable territory in North America; it represented direct access into the heart of North America via the St. Lawrence. King George insisted it be the first topic of discussion at the negotiations, and even after the first shots were fired in the Ohio Valley, diplomats clung to the belief that resolving the Acadian boundary could avert international war.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Douglas R. Egerton et al., *The Atlantic World: A History, 1400-1888* (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 2007); *The Atlantic World, 1450-2000*, ed. Toyin Falola and Kevin D. Roberts, Blacks in the Diaspora (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).

<sup>109</sup> Egerton et al., *The Atlantic World: A History*, 303-06.

<sup>110</sup> For Albermarle, the Acadian discussions served as a barometer for the larger negotiations. If the French were willing to treat Acadia first, he believed the talks would go well. Albermarle to Newcastle, Paris, 10/21 August 1750, f336v-337v, vol. 236, SP 78, NA.




Figure 5.3 Thomas Jefferys' *Carte d'une Partie de L'Amérique Septentrionale*, 1755. This is the British version of Bellin's map. The line hachures represent different administrative boundaries in the seventeenth century, while the dotted lines illustrate British (larger) and French (smaller) definitions of Acadia / Nova Scotia. Library and Archives Canada. F/200[1756]

Silhouette and La Galissonnière were instructed that Acadia was only the southern coast of the peninsula (Figure 5.3), so their ultimate goal was to negotiate a settlement that gave the whole peninsula to the British on the promise that they would not restrict French navigation in the Gulf of St. Lawrence nor harass French settlements.<sup>111</sup> The land running along the coast from Beaubassin to the St. Croix was not to be brought up, as France believed the territory was indisputably in its possession under the name of New

<sup>111</sup> La Galissonnière and Silhouette to Puyzieulx, Paris, 9 September 1750, f50-50v, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

France, not Acadia.<sup>112</sup> The British were similarly reluctant to discuss Canso, for fear that the simple act of mentioning the region would give the French reason to doubt Britain's claim, which it held as "so manifest and indubitable a right."<sup>113</sup>

### **Meetings and Memorials**

The Paris negotiations serve as an example of what Matthew Edney describes as the discursive construction of empires. The content of maps (and the technologies used to create maps) was less important than how that content was used in imperial discourse. In other words, accuracy and objectivity are less important than how geographic knowledge facilitated the construction of imperial visions in opposition to each other.<sup>114</sup> In this early stage, maps were useful if they could demonstrate the differences between claims, which would help clarify each side's position. The first two meetings covered primarily procedural issues, but the British were pressed to define their limits of Acadia. La Galissonière and Silhouette were employing a defensive strategy, forcing the British commissaries to prove their claim. When Shirley and Mildmay demanded that the French similarly define their interpretation of the boundaries, they were informed that because Britain was the "demandant" it was up to them to define their limits, "and whatever [Britain] could not prove to belong to us would of course belong to [France], they being in possession."<sup>115</sup> Shirley and Mildmay were consequently sent detailed instructions from the Board of Trade, informing them that Acadia began at the Penobscot

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid., f51.

<sup>113</sup> Bedford to Albemarle, Whitehall, 20 September 1750, f57, vol. 237, SP 78, NA.

<sup>114</sup> Edney, "The Irony of Imperial Mapping," 12-13.

<sup>115</sup> Shirley and Mildmay to Bedford, Paris, 12/23 September 1750, 160v, vol. 238, SP 78, NA. See also La Galissonière and Silhouette to Puyzlieux, Paris, 21 September 1750, f68, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

River, running straight north to the St. Lawrence, following that river to the its gulf, running through the Gut of Canso east to Sable Island, and from there running southwest to the Penobscot.<sup>116</sup>

Puyzieulx informed Albemarle that Britain's claims "were extended beyond what they had expected; and that his Most Christian Majesty had been much surpris'd at the largeness of the demand."<sup>117</sup> On 21 September 1750 (O.S.), written memorials were exchanged, a process agreed to by both sides to avoid lengthy verbal discussions that would then have to be repeated or recorded to present to their respective crowns.<sup>118</sup> The English memoir defined Acadia's limits as described above, but the French had a much more restricted interpretation.<sup>119</sup> The French argument rested on three main points: first, Annapolis Royal was not contained within the ancient limits of Acadia, but was ceded separately at Utrecht; second, Canso was situated in the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and therefore belonged to France; and third, the boundaries between New France and New England had not changed since 1713, and should be in 1750 what they were then.<sup>120</sup>

Each found the other's demands absurd. La Galissonière and Silhouette wrote to Puyzieulx on the day the memorial was received to inform him that "if we give them this, we give them all of Canada, as we won't be able to support it, nor will we be able to

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<sup>116</sup> Instructions to Shirley and Mildmay, f97v-99, vol. 238, SP 78, NA.

<sup>117</sup> Albemarle to Bedford, Paris, 19/30 September 1750, f59v, vol. 237, SP 78, NA.

<sup>118</sup> Shirley had told La Galissonière and Mildmay that the two sides could "talk for seven years and not discuss everything." La Galissonière and Silhouette to Puyzieulx, Paris, 21 September 1750, 67v, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>119</sup> *The Memorials of the English and French Commissaries Concerning the Limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia*, vol. I [*Memorials*], (London: 1755), 7-9.

<sup>120</sup> *Memorials*, 9-10.

travel to Quebec as soon as they decide to cut off navigation of the river.”<sup>121</sup> Although the written memorials facilitated the exchange of ideas and demands, La Galissonière and Silhouette realized that a visual aid would help make each nation’s demands more clear. “We propose to send you a map as soon as possible,” they wrote to Puyzieulx, “on which will be marked the British claims to clarify the matter.”<sup>122</sup>

Puyzieulx remained appalled by Britain’s “monstrous demands” to such a wide swath of land, but reminded his commissaries that they must wait until they received proof from the English commissaries to substantiate the claim. In the meantime, La Galissonière and Silhouette were to prepare a response in which they must emphasize that l’Acadie was only a small part of the peninsula following “the line traced along the map that La Galissonière sent me” (Figure 5.3).<sup>123</sup> After exchanging the memoirs, both sides continued to discuss what they could, though Shirley and Mildmay were still waiting for further instructions concerning St. Lucia and the prizes taken at sea. Acadia remained the central topic, and the British commissaries worked to support their definition of the limits. Shirley (the principal author), argued that Acadia was known before Nova Scotia, and Sir William Alexander’s grant included much of Acadia. In time the two regions became known simply as “Nova Scotia or Acadie.”<sup>124</sup> He continued to argue, “that part of Acadie which form’d the territory of Nova Scotia & which we should in this conference call by the name of Nova Scotia proper,” to distinguish it from “Nova Scotia or Acadia,” comprehends all the lands currently claimed by Britain.<sup>125</sup> This

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<sup>121</sup> La Galissonière and Silhouette to Puyzieulx, Paris, 21 September 1750, 66v, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 68v.

<sup>123</sup> Puyzieulx to La Galissonière and Silhouette, Versailles, 26 September 1750, f.70, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>124</sup> Shirley and Mildmay to Bedford, Paris, 27 September / 7 October 1750, f180, vol. 238, SP 78, NA.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 180v

explanation, evidence of Shirley's tendency to be overzealous and unnecessarily specific, was a tactical error; he had suggested a difference between "Nova Scotia proper," and the Nova Scotia as defined by the Treaty of Utrecht.<sup>126</sup>

Semantic gamesmanship was also a tool of the French. La Galissonière responded to Shirley's explanations by arguing that until the Treaty of Utrecht, the name "Nova Scotia" was a "mot en l'air" which carried no meaning and had not yet begun its existence.<sup>127</sup> The French commissaries also noted Shirley's error, suggesting to him that if he admits that there was at one time an Acadia and a Nova Scotia, he must realize that the British could only lay claim to one because the wording of the Treaty of Utrecht states "Nova Scotia or Acadia," not "and Acadia." Since, according to the French commissaries, Nova Scotia did not exist before 1713, then the only topic of discussion was what are the ancient limits of Acadia.<sup>128</sup> Shirley, who wrote in both English and French, challenged La Galissonière's definitions, noting the linguistic similarities between the disjunctive Latin *sive* and the French copulative *et*. Clearly, Shirley argued, "*Nova Scotia sive Acadia tota*" was the equivalent of "Nova Scotia et l'Acadie," not "ou Acadie." Not to mention that in the official cession of the province, which came after the Treaty of Utrecht, Louis XIV ceded to Queen Anne "La Nouvelle Écosse autrement dite l'Acadie en son entier."<sup>129</sup>

During the next few weeks no meetings were held. Shirley's remarks about Nova Scotia "proper" did not go unnoticed by the Board of Trade. In October Bedford

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<sup>126</sup> Shirley's error was admitting that Acadia and Nova Scotia could be understood as separate entities, which made possible the argument that only Acadia's boundaries mattered. It would be easier for the French to prove that Acadia's boundaries were more restricted than Nova Scotia's.

<sup>127</sup> La Galissonière and Silhouette to Puyzieulx, Paris, 4 October 1750, f78, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Shirley and Mildmay to Bedford, Paris, 27 September / 7 October 1750, f181v, vol. 238, SP 78, NA.



received a letter from the Board indicating their belief that Shirley and Mildmay had opened the conference “in a manner very different from the state of it annexed to the draught of the instructions which we prepared pursuant to his Majesty’s directions, signified to us by your grace.”<sup>130</sup> At issue was the fact that Shirley suggested the existence of both an Acadia and a Nova Scotia, when the official British position stated that Nova Scotia was Acadia as granted to Britain by the Treaty of Breda. Shirley and Mildmay were concerned about the reprimand, and assured the Board of Trade that they had begun their meetings with the French by presenting them with a near literal translation of their instructions and the lands claimed by Britain. Only in the second meeting did they discuss William Alexander’s grant, which comprised part of Acadia.<sup>131</sup> The Board of Trade had made its point, and both Shirley and Mildmay promised to be more careful with their arguments.

The two sides met periodically in October and November while they worked on their respective memoirs, during which time the French commissaries received a map and letter (signed P.B.R.) from Quebec suggesting that peninsular Nova Scotia was in fact British (Figure 5.4).<sup>132</sup> There were other matters to discuss (such as St. Lucia and the subject of prizes taken at sea), but negotiations often returned to Acadia. At the end of one meeting in November, Shirley and Mildmay pushed the French commissaries to explain more fully their understanding of Acadia’s limits. “Shirley noted to us at the end of the meeting,” reported La Galissonière, “that the memoir we provided on Acadia’s

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<sup>130</sup> BTP to Bedford, Whitehall, 11 October 1750, f201, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

<sup>131</sup> Shirley and Mildmay to BTP, Paris, 3/14 November 1750, f213-213v, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

<sup>132</sup> P.B.R., “Memoire,” Quebec, 20 September 1750, f96-99v, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

ancient limits did not mark exactly the extent of those limits.”<sup>133</sup> The French commissaries responded that they would reply immediately and in writing. Their definition of Acadia’s ancient limits, previously explained to them by their superiors in the French government, were much more restricted than Britain’s. Acadia began,



**Figure 5.4** P.B.R.’s *Plan d’une partie de la Nouvelle France*, 1750. The yellow line around the peninsula noted British possession. The red line began at the isthmus and stretched to St. George River. Archives Nationale d’Outre Mer, C11E, vol. 3, f104.

according to France, at “Cap de Ste Marie, ou le Cap forchu” (Yarmouth, Nova Scotia) and extended along the coast to Cape Canso.<sup>134</sup> Shirley and Mildmay received this description of Acadia’s limits with apprehension and became wary of France’s intentions.

<sup>133</sup> La Galissonnière and Silhouette to Puyzlieux, Paris, 17 November 1750, f90, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, f91.

They wrote to Bedford and informed him of the “loose manner” in which the limits were defined and suggested that “[the French commissary’s] design may be to break off the conference before we have an opportunity of delivering them a memorial of the proofs of his Majesty’s right to the limits we have claim’d.”<sup>135</sup> Despite this sense of urgency, it would be almost two months before the British provided France with a new memorial.

The delay in responding was due in part to Shirley’s desire thoroughly to investigate potential British proofs, especially in light of his earlier mistake. He evaluated potential arguments and counter-arguments in detail, and sent his conclusions to Bedford in private letters.<sup>136</sup> These letters were indicative of Shirley’s tendency to work around, not with, Mildmay. As Max Savelle has demonstrated, by late October Mildmay began expressing his frustration with his partner, referring to him as “a slow mule that understands neither French nor English.”<sup>137</sup> The two commissaries “fell to quarrelling,” but Savelle did not fully investigate the motives behind Mildmay’s complaints. In her study on Mildmay and the Anglo-French commission, Enid Robbie was able to delve more deeply into Mildmay’s personal papers to get a fuller picture of the disintegration of his relationship with Shirley. She too refers to Mildmay’s depiction of Shirley as a “slow mule,” but she quotes the rest of the passage, in which Mildmay declares, “the worst part of his character is his secret and reserved manner of sending private accounts to the Ministers upon points relating to our joint commission. This has

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<sup>135</sup> Shirley and Mildmay to Bedford, Paris, 7/18 November 1750, f266-266v, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

<sup>136</sup> Shirley to Bedford, Paris, 7/18 November 1750, f269-269v, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

<sup>137</sup> Mildmay to Fitzwalter, 28 October 1750,” in Savelle, *The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary*, 38.

been observed by other great personages here with proper indignity.”<sup>138</sup> It was Shirley’s secretive nature, more than his obstinacy, that frustrated Mildmay.

Shirley continued his private correspondence. His next letter to Bedford detailed France’s intention to maintain possession of Minas and Chignecto, considering that Acadia was only part of the peninsula. Shirley’s tactic here was to focus on Nova Scotia, not Acadia. The Treaty of Utrecht ceded Nova Scotia to Britain in express terms. Therefore King James I’s grant to Sir William Alexander were the ancient limits of Nova Scotia and should suffice as proof of the land currently under British control, letting “the ancient limits of Acadia be where they will.”<sup>139</sup> Shirley also relied on geography and maps to prove his points, even if his arguments were excluded from the final draft of the memoir. He offered as evidence for the western boundary of Nova Scotia Bellin’s 1744 *Carte de la partie Orientale de la Nouvelle France, ou du Canada* “in which the lands lying between the River Pentagoet or Penobscot and the River St. Croix, which are not within the limits of Nova Scotia, but parcel of Acadia, are laid down as part of the country of Nova Scotia.”<sup>140</sup> Maps also helped counter the French argument that Nova Scotia was but a “mot en l’air”. Shirley argued that ancient geographers had engraved the name on their maps in ways that conformed to the British claims established in the Treaty of Utrecht.<sup>141</sup> Commissaries were reluctant to use cartography as primary evidence, as Mary Pedley has demonstrated, but they were aware that maps made for excellent counter arguments.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Mildmay to Fitzwalter, 28 October 1750,” in Robbie, *The Forgotten Commissioner*, 81.

<sup>139</sup> Shirley to Bedford, Paris, 9/20 November 1750, f271, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

<sup>140</sup> “Design’d to have been inserted in Mr Shirley’s memorial, but struck out,” f275v, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., f277.

<sup>142</sup> Pedley, “Map Wars,” 96-104.

Shirley worked very hard on his reply to the French commissaries, even at the expense of his working relationship with Mildmay. He considered the strengths and weaknesses of the British argument, warned his superiors about possible contradictions, and even went so far as to prepare a memorial on the British possession of Canso, a topic that British ministers had flatly refused to negotiate.<sup>143</sup> Despite his best efforts, Shirley's contribution to the boundary commission was overruled by the Board of Trade, members of which were charged with approving (and usually writing) the memoirs used at the negotiation. In late 1750, the Board wrote to Bedford and offered him their thanks for Shirley's and Mildmay's efforts, but neither had crafted an acceptable response. The Board, like Shirley, had taken the time carefully to read old charters and treaties, which informed their idea of British territory in North America. Absent from their version of the memorial was Sir William Alexander's grant as it related to territory on both sides of the St. Lawrence, as well as articles from the Treaty of Saint-Germain which referred to contested territories in New France, Canada, and Acadia without distinction. It was impossible from these articles to draw an argument with respect to Acadia's limits. In fact, the Board argued that Shirley was wrong to suggest that the Treaty of Saint-Germain set Acadia's western limits at the Penobscot. Only after the treaty did the French extend their authority to that limit, which the Board would prove by producing commissions from the French King to his governors.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Shirley to Bedford, Paris, 7/18 November 1750, f293-295v, vol. 238, SP78, NA. This memorial argues that France translated the Treaty of Utrecht from Latin into French in such a way as to suggest that France retained all islands in River of St. Lawrence, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the mouth of the gulf. Britain argued that only islands in the river, its mouth, and the gulf were reserved for France.

<sup>144</sup> BTP to Bedford, Whitehall, 29 November 1750, f301-302, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

The Board of Trade also planned to use France's sources against them. France had referred to Charlevoix's history of New France to support their interpretation of a restricted Acadia. The Board had found passages in Charlevoix's works that argued for an extended Acadia, which they would use to support the British cause even though the discovery of his contradictions "rather weakened than strengthened his credit."<sup>145</sup> Britain would have to be satisfied with weakening French claims when it could. The Board also differentiated itself from Shirley's memorial by establishing the limits of Acadia, not of Nova Scotia. The Board argued that it would provide proof that Acadia extended to the Penobscot even if Sir William Alexander's grant for Nova Scotia did not. Alexander's grant would become useful only after it was explained that its western limits ended at the St. Croix because the land beyond that river had in 1620 been granted to the Council of Plymouth. However, Alexander was a member of that Council and its members eventually decided that the land from St. Croix to the Penobscot would belong to him.<sup>146</sup> With these (and other) issues settled and adjusted by the Board of Trade, the British memoir was ready.

The memoir was presented to the French commissaries on 11 January 1751 (O.S.). The arguments were offered as proof that Acadia extended to the Penobscot under French rule, and therefore British claims to that extent were justified. The memorial also took issue with the French claim that Nova Scotia was a "mot en l'air," and referred to a government memo from 1685 in which French officials wrote of "Nouvelle Écosse, autrement dite l'Acadie," indicating that the French were aware of the

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 302v.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., f303.

region under its English title.<sup>147</sup> The memoir then summarized the British case by addressing the claim that Nova Scotia and Acadia were different territories, only one of which was ceded in 1713:

1<sup>st</sup>, that we have clearly proved, that tho' the grant to Sir William Alexander, which first gave the name of Nova Scotia, extended no further westward than the River St. Croix, for the reasons above-mentioned, yet that the name of Nova Scotia was communicated to the whole country of Acadia. 2<sup>ndly</sup>, that the disjunctive term *Nova Scotia sive Acadia* in the Treaty, is clearly explained by the above-mentioned description in the Act of Cession, viz. *la Nouvelle Ecosse, autrement dite l'Acadie*.<sup>148</sup>

According to their proofs, the British believed Nova Scotia to be the Acadia that extended well beyond the isthmus.

The memorials provided an opportunity to debate cartography's ability to define possessions. The Board was concerned with previous French claims that maps made by all nations limited Acadia to the peninsula, which was a natural territorial division.<sup>149</sup> The Board countered this claim by arguing that maps "of the best authority are against France in this point."<sup>150</sup> Four French maps were referenced: Delisle's *Carte de l'Amérique Septentrionale* (1700) and *Carte du Canada, ou de la nouvelle France* (1703)(Figure 5.5); Bellin's *Carte de la partie orientale de la Nouvelle France* (1744); and d'Anville's *Carte de l'Amérique Septentrionale* (1746). Delisle's map extended Acadia's limits to the Pentagoet (Penobscot) River and bound New France to the northern side of the St. Lawrence.<sup>151</sup> Bellin's maps followed similar boundaries, extending Acadia north towards the St. Lawrence as far as the most northern point of Île St. Jean. The British memoir

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<sup>147</sup> *Memorial*, 45-7.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>151</sup> On the Delisle family of cartographers and their influence in France, see Nelson-Martin Dawson, *L'Atelier Delisle: l'Amérique du Nord sur la Table à Dessin* (Québec: Septentrion, 2000).

relied heavily on the fact that these maps were dedicated to, or produced with the support of, the French state. “It appears,” the memoir notes,

that Mons de l’Isles first mentioned chart, was one particularly corrected by himself, and formed upon the observations of the Royal Academy of Sciences, of which he was a member when he published the latter, and the King’s Geographer. That Mons. Bellin’s chart, was with other plans, composed by special direction from the Marine of France; and he remarks in it, ‘cette carte est extrêmement différente de toute ce qui a paru jusqu’ici; je dois ces connoissances aux divers manuscrits du Dépôt de Cartes, Plans, et Journaux de la Marine & aux Mémoires que les R.R.P.P. Jésuites de ce pais m’ont communiqués.’ And the Carte du Sieur d’Anville, was published *avec Privilege*.<sup>152</sup>

These maps were approved by leading intellectuals and statesmen.

Yet the British were reluctant to support cartographic evidence without qualifications. The sources from which maps were created should be subjected to inquiry to ensure that arguments were based on fact and not imperial ideology. In fact, the memoir proceeded to argue that maps were “slight evidence” and “most uncertain guides.”<sup>153</sup> Geographers created maps, and while the memoir did not go so far as to suggest that maps could be created to serve a particular purpose, it did note that cartography is too often based on faulty evidence or repeated mistakes. Even when the maps were geographically accurate – correctly demonstrating the location of rivers, mountains, and settlements – they “can never determine the limits of a territory, which depend entirely upon authentic proof.”<sup>154</sup> That proof itself, argued the British, was better evidence than the maps it informs. The French, argued the British memoir, were making different arguments based on different maps. Durand and the maps he chose defined Acadia as the peninsula because it was a natural boundary. The British questioned this

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<sup>152</sup> *Memorial.*, 71.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*



logic, “as if the rights of the Crown of Great Britain were to be affected by the accidental form and figure of the country.”<sup>155</sup> Even if they were, the St. Lawrence was as good a natural division as any other.



Figure 5.5 Extract from Delisle’s *Carte du Canada ou de la Nouvelle France, 1703*. Acadia is stretched across the peninsula and onto the mainland. McGill University, W.H. Pugsy Collection. G3400 1708 L5 RBD Map

### Maps and Sovereignty

As the negotiations progressed, maps were used in various ways. As an imperial instrument, mapping and cartographic evidence were multifaceted. They existed as one element in a complex matrix of methods used to claim sovereignty over a region. Maps

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

could emphasize an imperial past or project an imperial future. Lauren Benton has argued that legal regimes jockeyed against each other at a structural level, forced to recognize the existence of competing systems and eventually incorporate those systems into a colonial legal structure. Only through conflict, and creating a legal space to deal with conflict, could a legal hierarchy be created to govern new territories.<sup>156</sup> Similarly, Ken MacMillan has argued that even in the early days of English exploration and settlement, Kings and Queens worked to ensure that laws defended their territorial sovereignty in North America and provided for the safety of their settlers. These settlements might have been driven by commerce, but they were protected by monarchs and their laws.<sup>157</sup> Like laws and legal structures, geographic knowledge played various roles in creating and defending spaces of territorial sovereignty. Used as both proof and disproof, maps shaped imperial visions and defended against encroachment.

After submitting their report, the British waited. By March, three months later, Shirley and Mildmay could report only that the French commissaries had informed them it would be some time before their response was ready.<sup>158</sup> The French commissaries were producing a lengthy reply, informed in part by letters sent from Quebec. In the fall of 1751, La Galissonière received a letter from the Bishop of Quebec who passed along “a naïve reflection from one of my missionaries, who argues, despite what I tell him, that Acadia, the St. John River, Pentagouet, and all the disputed lands belong to the Natives, who lived there before there were any French.”<sup>159</sup> The missionary told the Bishop that in

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<sup>156</sup> Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures*, 3-4, 262-64.

<sup>157</sup> MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession*.

<sup>158</sup> Shirley and Mildmay to the Earl of Holderness, Paris, 6/17 March 1750/51, f55, vol. 239, SP78, NA.

<sup>159</sup> Bishop of Quebec [attributed] to La Galissonière, Quebec, 30 September 1751, f233, vol. 3, C11E, ANOM.

1699 the Natives told the English that they were independent and wished to allow the French to settle on their lands. Despite British efforts to persuade the Natives that France had surrendered the land to Britain, the Natives refused to accept that their land could be ceded without permission. If France had any right to Acadia, argued the missionary, it was granted by Aborigines.<sup>160</sup> Although this argument provided a voice for Native concerns in the European negotiations, France would later reject the idea that a European power could claim the land of their Native allies. To be effective, Native land rights had to be used to prevent the British from claiming land, not to grant land to France. Their value was defensive, not offensive.

It is easy to discount the impact of Native territorial rights on imperial geographic discourse. Cartographers often ignored Aborigines, or portrayed them in ways that favoured a European interpretation of rights. Historians have too often followed imperial intentions without considering their context. Ken MacMillan argues that John Smith's map of Virginia, which featured Powhatan, Native symbols, and Aboriginal geographic knowledge, suggests that the English and Natives had intermingled. This intermingling was, according to MacMillan, "an implicit statement of England's sovereignty over the land and its peoples, who have recognized English overlordship."<sup>161</sup> It is as likely (if not more) that the inclusion of Natives on Smith's map indicated their power: they simply could not be ignored. At the very least, Smith admitted to relying on Aboriginal

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 233-233v.

<sup>161</sup> MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession*, 168. Patricia Seed argues that mapping was a particularly Dutch "ceremony of Possession." See Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession*, 14. Lauren Benton has recently corrected this interpretation, noting that most empires relied on maps as tools of sovereignty. See Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 55.

geographic knowledge to inform his map. Knowing the land was a necessary precondition to controlling it. In this respect, Powhatan was in the stronger position.

Despite the “naïve” reflections offered by the French missionary, Native land rights played no role in France’s official response to the British memoir. La Galissonnière delivered the French memorial, all 240 folio pages, to Shirley on 4 October 1751 (O.S.). The French commissaries and their superiors had spent nearly eleven months crafting a response that they believed answered every British argument. They questioned by what right a country could claim territorial sovereignty. Simple discovery was not enough for any European power to claim title over a territory. England and France had in the fifteenth century worked to reverse Spanish claims to territory based on discovery and papal bull (Tordesillas), but they also required a method by which they could validate their own claims. England transformed their discoveries into territories via agricultural use, arguing that Natives had no right to land that they were not improving.<sup>162</sup> The French had a different approach. Less emphasis was placed on establishing settlements. Their interest in North America was to exploit trade networks and furnish France with raw materials, neither of which required extensive agricultural production.<sup>163</sup> As Gilles Havard and Cécil Vidal argue, “enterprises initiated or encouraged by the monarchy benefited from superior publicity, but lacked the continuity and importance of fishing and commerce.”<sup>164</sup> With these different views of property and territorial use, the boundary negotiations provided an excellent opportunity for both Britain and France to evaluate

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<sup>162</sup> Armitage, *Ideological Origins*, 92-98. On the topic of discovery and possession and its influence on Canadian nationalism, see Peter Pope, *The Many Landfalls of John Cabot* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

<sup>163</sup> Quinn, *The French Overseas Empire*, 45-47.

<sup>164</sup> Havard and Vidal, *Histoire de l'Amérique Française*, 55.

what were the proper justifications for claiming overseas territories. In short, they debated what made an empire.

Maps illustrated past and future imperial claims. They were part of literal and figurative narrative histories used to establish historical sovereignty and project future possessions. The French memorial argued that voyages to North America fell into two categories: those with the goal of establishing settlements, and those that did not. For example, John Cabot's voyage to North America was one of discovery and was not intended to claim territory for England. If the British claimed territory through Cabot, then France could just as logically claim most of the African coast. The memoir then worked through the various attempts at English settlement and concluded by arguing:

One sees by these facts, that the first English voyages had for their objective not to establish colonies in America, but only to search for a northwest passage to the Indies. That before 1585, no English had attempted to form a habitation in America; that the first attempts of this nature had failed, the project was abandoned for many years; that Virginia, the first and oldest of the English colonies, was not established until 1607; that the name 'New England' came into existence only in 1614, and that the first establishment under that name was not made until 1620; that the time of the birth of the famous colony of Massachusetts was not until 1629, and the founding of Boston in 1630, and that most of the colonies of New England were founded between 1630-39.<sup>165</sup>

These delayed settlements, according to France's commissaries, stood in stark contrast to French efforts in the region. Basques, Bretons, and Normans had been fishing the Grand Banks from at least 1504, Jean-Denys de Honfleur published a map of the Newfoundland coast in 1508, and Jacques Cartier took possession of lands around the St. Lawrence in 1535.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> *Memoir*, 102.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 103-5.

The memoir was equally quick to dismiss the validity of Sir William Alexander's settlement in (and map of) Nova Scotia. France never had a colony called "Nouvelle Écosse," so it was impossible to cede territory under that name. Both Nova Scotia and Annapolis Royal were terms unknown in France before the Treaty of Utrecht, and the simple act of changing a region's name did not grant that territory an ancient pedigree. The point was moot, according to France, because it was against all human and divine laws to grant territory that was already in the possession of another (Christian) power.<sup>167</sup> No attention was paid to Native territorial rights, which were derived spiritually from the creator, but also from the thousands of years that the Mi'kmaq and their ancestors had lived in the region.<sup>168</sup> The discussion on territorial rights demonstrates what John G. Reid has called "double diplomacy." Both William Shirley and La Galissonnière knew how important geographic negotiations were between Britain, France, and the Aborigines in North America, but in Paris neither man raised the thorny issue of Mi'kmaq and Abenaki rights.<sup>169</sup>

The territory included in Alexander's grant had already been granted by France in 1603 and established in 1604. Therefore, "the concession from James I must be considered null in all respects: and, consequently, the name Nova Scotia, which could only become real by this grant, has never existed; it was a name in the air, that is to say, it

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<sup>167</sup> David Armitage notes the difficulties of relying on religion to support land claims as it was difficult to exclude Catholics in favour of Protestants, and vice versa. See Armitage, *Ideological Origins*, 64-5, 94.

<sup>168</sup> On Aboriginal land title, see Gary P. Gould and Alan J. Semple, *Our Land, the Maritimes: The Basis of the Indian Claim in the Maritime Provinces of Canada* (Fredericton: Saint Annes Point Press, 1980); William C. Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760" (Ph.D dissertation, McGill University, 1994); Daniel N. Paul, *We Were Not the Savages: A Mi'kmaq Perspective on the Collision between European and Native American Civilizations* (Halifax: Fernwood, 2000).

<sup>169</sup> John G Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

has no meaning.”<sup>170</sup> The memoir continued on this topic and made three main arguments: before the Treaty of Utrecht the disputed territory was peopled only by the French (there is no mention of Natives); the oldest histories note that Alexander visited Nova Scotia but never established a settlement; and finally, any reports that Alexander chased the French from Acadia only prove that the French were already there, thereby nullifying King James’ grant.<sup>171</sup>

The French memorial continued to parse British claims. In the final section, the French turned their attention to cartography and geographic descriptions in imperial affairs and land disputes. The commissaries began with an examination of the maps that the British had employed. Their analysis indicates that maps could be misinterpreted or simply erroneous. Cartography’s influence was limited by available information and technologies of production. According to the French, British cartographic evidence was fairly recent, quite different from each other, and supported France’s arguments more than Britain’s. The Delisle maps did restrain New France to the northern side of the St. Lawrence, but the British ignored that these maps extend the word “Canada” over both coasts. These terms were essentially synonymous (“presque synonymes”), and therefore Delisle’s account of the boundaries was contrary to that of the British commissaries. The French recognized that these maps contained elements that supported the British cause (they marked some of Acadia’s territory along the St. Lawrence and into the Etchemin coast), but what benefits the maps provided Britain were dismissed because they were not ancient maps.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> *Memoir*, 143.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, 143-44.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, 179-81.

The French had an easier time challenging Bellin's map. He was a prominent French geographer (in the employ of the ministry of the Marine, charged with collecting and cataloguing French maps), but he had erred by following British geographers. Shirley had argued that there existed an Acadia separate from Nova Scotia, and that is what Bellin had included on his map, with Nova Scotia running along the coast from New England towards the isthmus. Following the French argument made earlier in the memoir – that Nova Scotia did not exist before 1713 – the commissaries stated simply that the map contained false geographic information. They were reluctant to discount Bellin altogether, though, because he placed Acadia on the peninsula only.<sup>173</sup>

D'Anville's map had similarly followed the errors of other cartographers, but the French commissaries were happy to note that he too confined Acadia to the peninsula. The French suggested that Britain was relying on new maps because there existed no ancient maps to support their claims. Nor were there modern maps that depicted Nova Scotia's limits exactly as set by the British.<sup>174</sup>

Despite the fact that the French commissaries went into detail discussing the weaknesses of British cartographic evidence, they were willing generally to reject a map's ability to support land claims and political territories. "It is true that in general," the French commissaries noted,

the geographers have comprised under the name Acadia all or most of the peninsula. One will agree with the British commissaries, that their authority must not be decisive. They are more occupied with giving their maps the appearance of a system [*un air de système*] and of truth, as well as the appearance of science and research, than to fix the rights of Princes and the true boundaries of a country.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 181.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 182.



Anne Godlewska agrees, characterizing eighteenth-century French geographers as concerned primarily with developing “a language of representation sufficiently simple to be widely understood and rich enough to fully express a growing knowledge about the world.”<sup>176</sup> Yet it was likely not that simplistic. Christine Marie Petto has recently argued that by mid-century Delisle and other French geographers provided positivist information “to administrators...who sought to classify better their domains in an effort not only to know the extent of the lands they controlled but also to be more effective administrators.”<sup>177</sup>

The division between a traditional interpretation (maps represented territory) and a critical one (focusing only on the relationship between the reader and the map) reveals cartography’s multi-functionality.<sup>178</sup> Maps were part of a larger programme of reform aimed at better governing France and its colonies and creating its empire. Britain was also reorganizing its administration to facilitate governance and finance imperial competition, but it lacked France’s cartographic infrastructure.<sup>179</sup> Britain taught geography in schools, but lacked an administrative body equivalent to France’s *Dépôt des Cartes et Plans de la Marine* until establishing the Royal Hydrographic Office in 1795.

The French examined Popple’s map of British possessions in North America and drew from it support for French rights to contested territories (Figure 4.4). They first established the authority under which this map was produced, noting that Popple had

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<sup>176</sup> Anne Godlewska, *Geography Unbound: French Geographic Science from Cassini to Humbolt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 41.

<sup>177</sup> Christine M. Petto, *When France Was King of Cartography: The Patronage and Production of Maps in Early Modern France* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), 81.

<sup>178</sup> Edney, “The Irony of Imperial Mapping,” 24.

<sup>179</sup> John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (New York: Knopf, 1989).

consulted ancient maps and titles, marked royally-granted lands better than most geographers, and had received approval (and assistance by way of colonial charts) for his work by the Board of Trade and Plantations. He limited Acadia to the peninsular coast and “sensibly” marked Minas and Chignecto not as part of Acadia, but as dependencies of the lands claimed as Nova Scotia, and therefore part of New France “because this claimed Nova Scotia was never itself but part of New France.”<sup>180</sup> Also important for the French commissaries was the fact that Popple relied more often on names than marked boundaries to delimit territory on his maps. The large tract of land between Nova Scotia and New England (much of which was included in the territories currently being negotiated) was, according to the French, New France. For a British geographer to stamp the territory as French would have gone against his nation’s claims, and so “he could find no better expedient than to leave the region unnamed.”<sup>181</sup> The French concluded that although these maps could not be considered wholly accurate, even the most qualified British geographers limited “l’Acadie propre” to the southern peninsula.

The French commissaries’ final argument on the subject of Acadian boundaries demonstrates geographic knowledge as part of larger narrative histories. Cartography was part of a wider discourse of geographic knowledge and represented historical moments that were recorded in historic texts as well as on maps. France argued not from ancient maps, but from the earliest travellers to (and governors of) New France and Acadia. These men made maps and left descriptions. Denys was the governor of the land from Canso to Cape Roziers, which he declared was not part of Acadia. Champlain referred to various territories – Gaspé, Etchemins Coast, New France, and Acadia – now

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<sup>180</sup> *Memoirs*, 185.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*

claimed by Britain under the umbrella title of Acadia. Lescarbot, who wrote a history of Sieur de Mons' first Acadian establishment at Île St. Croix (1604), never called the region Acadia but instead described it as New France, Canada, Pays des Etchemins, or Norumbega. The engraving that accompanied this history was entitled "Port-Royal en la Nouvelle France."<sup>182</sup> The French evidence was meant to demonstrate not only that British claims to an extended Acadia were incorrect, but also that there existed an established historical record to illustrate Acadia's restricted limits.

Regardless of their suspicion of cartographic evidence, the French commissaries relied heavily on maps and mapmakers to support their arguments. In this instance, the commissaries looked to the past and relied on the authority of geographers who had created the maps. The task was not to use maps to create new boundaries, but rather to determine which ancient boundaries were most accurate. Interpreting maps for this purpose illustrated the potential challenges that could be levied at static cartographic evidence. The French did, however, attempt to distinguish how they used maps. Nothing could be taken from geographers who believed that Acadia and Nova Scotia existed separately, because the French had proven that Nova Scotia had never existed at all. The only proof to be drawn from these maps was in respect to the existence of an "Acadie propre," which the best informed geographers placed on the southern peninsula. This general geographic information was perfectly acceptable, but "it is not by maps that we can determine the fixed limits of Acadia."<sup>183</sup> Maps fuelled images and ideas of imperial territories, but those territories' specific limits depended on political negotiations.

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<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 187-200.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., 228-9.

Though the French were convinced that their arguments damaged British claims and supported France's interpretation of Nova Scotia's / l'Acadie's limits, Shirley questioned the memorial's conclusions. He devoted two months to reading it closely and working through its arguments. After careful consideration, he reported that while those unfamiliar with the topic might be convinced, those who had studied the subject "will find it full of artifice, light and very sophistical."<sup>184</sup> Shirley warned Holderness that the memoir would likely strengthen the conviction of the French court and encourage France to believe that they had a stronger claim than they did. He suggested that a British reply to the points raised by France (and increasingly considered inviolable in that country) might do some good to the British cause, "tho' the points may not be likely to be settled between the respective Commissaries, by their memorials and conferences."<sup>185</sup>

Shirley and Mildmay were informed that they were to take no further action until instructions arrived from the King. By the end of December, Shirley informed Mildmay that he had begun working on a response to the French memoir which he intended to forward to the Board of Trade upon completion, and that he would include Mildmay's name as an indication of his approval. Mildmay, who preferred to follow orders, declined the offer and indicated his frustration to Holderness. "I am so well convinced of the necessity of maintaining union & harmony with [Shirley]," Mildmay wrote, "that I am willing to pass over every slight shown personally to me rather than that his Majesty's service should suffer by our not uniting our endeavours against a common enemy."<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Shirley to Holderness, Paris, 4/15 December 1751, f142, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, f142-42v.

<sup>186</sup> Mildmay to Holderness, Paris, 18/29 December 1751, f.145-146, vol. 238, SP78, NA. Quote from f145v.

Shirley and Mildmay might not have gotten along personally, but they both realized that the job at hand was more important than personal disagreements.

The two men worked together the following month when a French missionary from Acadia arrived in London. Nicolas Vauquelin, who had served in Acadia for over ten years, informed the British commissaries that he had evidence concerning the limits of Acadia. Shirley reported to Holderness that the only useful information the priest provided was the method by which they could extract from inhabitants of Acadia proof that the French did at one time consider the land from Cape Rozier to the Saint George River to be Acadia. Vauquelin, a Roman Catholic priest of Scottish extraction, wished to keep his identity secret and was providing the information because of the kindness he experienced in Acadia at the hands of the British.<sup>187</sup> Vauquelin was not the first secret French informant to visit the British commissaries. In 1750, François Du Pont Duvivier, the French officer who had led the unsuccessful attack on Annapolis Royal in 1744 and then returned to France, was allegedly observed having secret meetings with Shirley and Mildmay. He aroused the suspicions of Rouillé, the minister of the Marine, who had the lieutenant-general of the Paris police launch an investigation into these actions. Rouillé gave Duvivier a stern warning, and within two years the officer had retired.<sup>188</sup> What, if anything, Duvivier discussed with Shirley and Mildmay is unknown.

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<sup>187</sup> Shirley and Mildmay to Holderness, Paris, 22 January / 2 February 1752, f159-159v, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

<sup>188</sup> This account is from T.A. Crowley and Bernard Pothier, "Du Pont Duvivier, François," *DCB*. I found no evidence of this investigation in the archives of the Paris Police nor in France's National Archives. Rouillé letters for the year 1750 in the archives of the Ministry of the Marine include one letter to M. Berryer, lieutenant-general of the Paris police, concerning an officer in the Regiment of Champagne. Rouillé to Berryer, f4, C/1/66 (1750), MAR, Archives Nationale (AN).

### Final Efforts and Commission Stalemate

These clandestine visits provided a dose of intrigue into what was otherwise a lengthy and laborious negotiation. Shirley was recalled in 1752. Officially, the negotiations had kept the governor away from Massachusetts for too long, and he was sent back to Boston with the King's thanks for his efforts. It is also likely that Shirley was removed due to his stubbornness and poor working relationship with Mildmay.<sup>189</sup> Removing Shirley indicated that Britain wanted to clear any obvious barriers to reaching an agreement. The final months of active discussions focused on limiting the effects of cartographic knowledge by preventing the publication of maps in France that might influence the general public. Shirley's replacement, Ruvigne de Cosne, had worked at the British embassy in Paris as the personal secretary to Lord Albemarle, and was then promoted to first secretary of the embassy in 1751. He became the second British commissary under Mildmay in 1752.<sup>190</sup> After Shirley's departure, Mildmay and de Cosne learned that the French intended to publish their memorial. They had also included the British memorials and added "numbers of annotations which had never been communicated to us."<sup>191</sup> There would also be a map, on which was marked the lines by which different governments had set the limits of Acadia (Figure 5.3). Mildmay and his superiors recognized that France was proceeding "thus to intend making an appeal to the publick in such a manner without giving any opportunity of returning an answer."<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W Norton & Co., 2005), 283.

<sup>190</sup> Robbie, *The Forgotten Commissioner*, ix-x.

<sup>191</sup> Mildmay and de Cosne to Holderness, Paris, 20/31 August 1752, f207, vol. 238, SP78, NA. The previous November La Galissonière had informed the Minister that the French memoir was ready for publication, and that the English memoir was almost ready, "with the notes that I believe necessary to include." La Galissonière to Minister, Paris, 24 November 1751, f243, vol. 433, MG5, A1, LAC.

<sup>192</sup> Mildmay and de Cosne to Holderness, Paris, 20/31 August 1752, f207v, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

Mildmay included in his letter to Holderness a map he purchased, on the back of which he noted the boundaries as set out by France on the map that they had commissioned for the publication.

The commissaries considered maps to be influential enough that their publication should be prevented. An exchange of diplomatic letters put a stop to the publication before it could influence public opinion. The division between public and official geographic knowledge remained an important element of the negotiation process, as it ensured that discussions could take place without public interference. While it is impossible to determine how public opinion could have swayed the discussions, the mere fact that officials were concerned suggests that maps were powerful documents. After this issue was resolved, the boundary discussions fell into a linguistic quagmire, with most meetings focused on the issue of language and translation instead of specific issues of territory. The major concern was whether Britain could submit its memoirs in English. When Holderness sent Mildmay and de Cosne the third British memoir on Nova Scotia's limits in December of 1752, he instructed them not to translate it because the Board of Trade had used the most precise language possible, and the British did not want to be answerable to arguments that had been altered in translation.<sup>193</sup> The commissaries presented the memoir to the French on 23 January 1753.

For the British, it was not the right of possession (which they believed had been established by treaties, not discovery) but the extent of possession that was currently unclear.<sup>194</sup> The commissaries had to negotiate how they would interpret maps, as either proof or disproof. Ultimately, cartography was interpreted to serve both purposes. After

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<sup>193</sup> Holderness to Mildmay and de Cosne, Whitehall, 28 December 1752, f232, vol. 238, SP78, NA.

<sup>194</sup> *Memoirs*, 261.

revisiting the treaties listed as evidence and restating points made in earlier memoirs, the British response turned to maps. “In treaty of maps it may not be improper to remind the French commissaries,” the memorial stated,

that the commissaries of the King of Great Britain were not the first who appealed to these as an authority in the present discussion: that they never have cited them but to correct mistakes made by the French Commissaries: that in their last memorial they disclaimed any very great reliance upon the evidence of maps, even where they have proved them to favour the claim of the King of Great Britain. And that they should not at this time have gone into a more minute consideration of them, if the French commissaries had not made it necessary, by again giving a much greater credit to maps than they deserve, and by affecting to make them seem material in the discussion of the point before us; and if they did not themselves judge it to be essential, not to leave any one of the proofs urged by the French Commissaries in support of their system without sufficient confutation.<sup>195</sup>


Although both sides had stated explicitly that maps were poorly suited to determine boundaries, cartographic evidence remained a central point of contention in the negotiations. The simple fact that neither Britain nor France would dismiss maps out of hand speaks to their importance in envisioning imperial settlements and shaping the way administrators thought about their territories.

The British then investigated various maps. France had dismissed British cartographic evidence because the maps argued for the limits of Nova Scotia, which France did not believe existed before 1713, and because the maps were not sufficiently “ancient.” Britain’s response was to revisit the maps France used to support its case. Marc Lescarbot’s 1609 map, which the French had cited, was indeed ancient, published only a year after the founding of Quebec (Figure 5.6). However, the British argued that “Acadie” is not included on the map, and the rest of the names were “ignorantly placed

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid., 264-5.





**Figure 5.6** Marc Lescarbot's *Figure de la Terre Neuve, Grande Riviere de Canada, et Côtes de l'Ocean en la Nouvelle France*, 1609. Native toponyms dominate this early map. Memorial University, Centre for Newfoundland Studies. G 3400 1609 L4 1989 MAP

and assigned.”<sup>196</sup> This map was better support for Native land claims, as before there was an Acadia or a Nova Scotia, there was the peninsula that Lescarbot entitled “Souriquois,” and the eastern continental coast under the name “Etchemins.” The British were not allies of all the eastern Abenakis, and therefore they could not argue, as could the French, that they had a right to Native land (in Nova Scotia) through alliance.<sup>197</sup> The more cordial relationship that existed between the French and the Mi’kmaq (and their allies) is evidenced in part by the enduring use of terms such as “Etchemin Coast” on maps and in political correspondence. While Popple’s maps used these names, more common was the British practice of renaming Native territory as an act of appropriation.<sup>198</sup>

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, 267.

<sup>197</sup> What alliances did exist were based on treaties of friendship, and were often tenuous. See Kenneth M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Elsewhere in North America, British desires for land clashed with Native land rights and led to enduring animosity, Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 184.

<sup>198</sup> J.B. Harley, “New England Cartography and the Native Americans,” in J. B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 170-95.

The British again argued that Sir William Alexander's map was indisputable proof of Nova Scotia's extended boundaries. The French had disregarded Alexander's placement of "New Scot Lande" and emphasized his use of "Caledonia" and "Alexandria," but the British countered that New Scot Lande was Nova Scotia, and it clearly extended beyond the isthmus and towards the St. Lawrence (to the north) and New England (to the south). The British also noted that this map was the first produced by geographers after having had some time to investigate the region. It was a better informed map than Lescarbot's because it marked "both the boundaries of every territory within it, and the limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia in every particular, contrary to the description of the French commissaries."<sup>199</sup> This argument contradicts earlier statements made by officials from both Britain and France that maps could not adequately delimit boundaries. Because this map appeared so beneficial to the British cause, the commissaries (and, more specifically, the Board of Trade) imbued it with political and imperial power. While they might have been producing negative evidence – the map marked boundaries contrary to those suggested by France – the crux of the British argument was that maps could speak to territorial limits, and therefore served important political purposes.

The memorial questioned the French commissaries' evidence and the conclusions they inspired. It disputed France's depiction of Popple's map. Although the French argued the map was created with the support and approval of the Board of Trade, the British argued that though the Board approved the undertaking, they did not supervise its execution. Popple included a marginal note stating the map's authority, a common

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<sup>199</sup> *Memoir*, 268.

practice among geographers, but this statement was intended primarily to secure a favourable public reception. He never claimed that the Board of Trade approved of his efforts, and the geographic decisions he made were his alone.<sup>200</sup> In fact, the map itself is inconsistent with the records it claimed to have copied, and “has ever been thought in Great Britain to be a very incorrect map, and has never in any negotiation between the two crowns been appealed to by Great Britain, as being correct, or a map of any authority.”<sup>201</sup> The British memoir expressed surprise in the type of evidence selected by France, noting that Britain could have referred to many more French maps of this quality to prove their case, but they did not want to “increase the bulk of any evidence without adding to the force of it.”<sup>202</sup>

Further discussion only emphasized cartography’s various functions, particularly that as a tool of both proof and disproof. The British distanced themselves from cartographic evidence in favour of treaties, but they could not avoid citing maps. “This is the system upon which we shall argue,” the memorial summarized, “in defence of which we shall have no occasion to magnify the authority of maps made in the times of little credibility, or to rely singly upon the inconclusive testimony of the earliest historians of America.”<sup>203</sup> Yet even such a dismissal of cartographic evidence, which was largely contradicted by the attention paid to maps earlier in the memorial, could not put an end to the importance of geographic knowledge. The treaties referred to by both crowns listed locations, boundaries, rivers, and settlements that existed in London and Paris only as

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<sup>200</sup> Many mapmakers included on their maps dedications to administrative bodies to improve their sales and bolster confidence in their conclusions, though such measures were no guarantor of success. See J. B. Harley, "The Bankruptcy of Thomas Jefferys: An Episode in the Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Map-Making," *Imago Mundi* 20 (1966): 27-48.

<sup>201</sup> *Memoir*, 278.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 281.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, 397.

places marked on maps. When the British rebuked France's argument that Nova Scotia did not exist before 1713, they argued that the name appeared on the best maps from 1625 to 1700, regardless of France's refusal to refer to the region as such. "Nor indeed is it possible to suppose France not to have had an idea of the country call'd Nova Scotia," argued the British, "after it had been so frequently mentioned in the best maps and histories of America, as *Purchas's Pilgrim*, Laet and Champlain."<sup>204</sup>

Referencing *Purchas his Pilgrimage* did more than lend authority to the title Nova Scotia. As David Armitage has argued, Purchas was anti-Catholic and depicted England as a chosen land meant to extend Protestantism across the ocean.<sup>205</sup> The religious undertones to this cartographic evidence served further to differentiate Britain and France, a nationalist theme that, as Linda Colley has demonstrated, continued into the eighteenth century.<sup>206</sup> Both Armitage and Colley recognized that Britons highlighted differences with France to emphasize what made them British, but neither scholar examined how maps shaped imperial ideals.<sup>207</sup> The boundary negotiations demonstrate that French and British politicians needed to see their overseas possessions to aggregate their imperial vision, and they did so in remarkably similar ways. Maps were therefore invaluable pieces of evidence to prove that a place existed, and that empires existed cartographically as – at the very least – “ideas.” Cartography was more than the representation of ideas. It was part of the manifestation of imperial power. Conversely,

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<sup>204</sup> Ibid., 441-43.

<sup>205</sup> Armitage, *Ideological Origins*, 83-5.

<sup>206</sup> Colley, *Britons*.

<sup>207</sup> American scholars have begun working on how maps and cartographic literacy shaped the formation of a United States, separate from the British Empire. See Martin Brückner, *The Geographic Revolution in Early America: Maps, Literacy, and National Identity* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

the inability to create maps could suggest a lack of power or authority.<sup>208</sup> Yet both Britain and France had the ability to map their territories, and subsequently they had to negotiate how to apply maps and geographic evidence to imperial competition.

### **Direct Diplomacy, Acadia, and the Seven Years' War**

There were those who from the commission's earliest meetings believed it would fail, so it is perhaps understandable that the French did not respond to Britain's final memorial. It was not that government officials preferred the prospect of war to negotiations, but determining imperial boundaries was believed too big a task to be settled by appointed negotiators. In 1750, the Duke of Bedford suggested to le Marquis de Mirepoix, the French ambassador to London, that the negotiations be suspended in favour of traditional lines of diplomacy. Newcastle renewed the proposal in 1752.<sup>209</sup> France was cool to the idea, but with the obvious stalemate in negotiations by 1754, diplomacy became increasingly attractive. Savelle has argued that diplomatic discussions were, at least in part, a tactic for France to buy time and increase its military in preparation for war.<sup>210</sup> Yet the flurry of exchanges that occurred between 1754 and the late spring of 1755 suggests a genuine interest in avoiding war, or at least limiting the extent of the conflict. The French had effectively suspended the boundary commission by not responding to Britain's last memoir, and if they wanted they could have enacted a similar policy at the diplomatic level. But diplomacy persisted, and at this level Native territorial sovereignty was given more emphasis. Both sides relied on Aboriginal allies

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<sup>208</sup> Edney, "The Irony of Imperial Mapping," 30.

<sup>209</sup> Mirepoix to Minister, London, 28 January 1752, f88, vol. 434, MG5, A1, LAC.

<sup>210</sup> Savelle, *Origins of American Diplomacy*, 406.

(the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki in the northeast and the Iroquois in the Ohio Valley) to serve as place holders, buffer zones, or *de facto* subjects of imperial rule. The direct negotiations that took place witnessed watershed changes in cartographic diplomacy, as officially-commissioned maps for the first time became available to the public, ending the traditional bifurcation between administrative and general geographic knowledge. These discussions also emphasized how imperially strategic Nova Scotia was to Britain. Until all efforts dissolved, Britain was willing to sacrifice possessions in the Caribbean (and even the Ohio River Valley) to maintain their extended holdings in the northeast.

Officially, both negotiations (the commission and direct diplomacy) occurred simultaneously, but by 1754 it was more likely that diplomats would create a new boundary for Nova Scotia than appointed commissaries would agree on the “ancient” limits. This new process reveals cartography’s ability to innovate. Unlike the boundary commission, whose members investigated old maps and relied on the authority of ancient geographers, diplomats used geography to create new borders. Their task was not to rely on history or judge historical evidence, but to use maps to establish new norms for the present. Like the law, maps and their use could adapt to changing times and provide those in positions of power with the information they needed to formulate arguments and render decisions.<sup>211</sup> The diplomatic discussions were under more pressure than the commission negotiations because hostilities had broken out in North America over possession of the Ohio Valley. Both nations professed a desire to avoid war, and therefore continued the diplomacy in an attempt to stave off widespread conflict.

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<sup>211</sup> On the law’s ability to reflect social norms and innovate, see James W. St G. Walker, *“Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada* (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997).

Diplomats dealt with three main issues: the possession and extent of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, possession of and settlement in the Ohio River valley, and who should control which Caribbean Islands. Despite the fact that the boundary commissaries had attempted to distance themselves from cartographic evidence, diplomatic negotiations illustrated how important maps were to settling imperial differences. Direct diplomacy allowed imperial views to be explicitly aired, and it was in these negotiations that Britain and France defined Nova Scotia's importance to their overseas possessions.

The first object for France was to force Britain to halt all expansions in North America. Mirepoix's commission granted him full powers to negotiate a settlement with Britain, specifically regarding "the differences that have arisen in North America, particularly on the Ohio River."<sup>212</sup> An early suggestion for a boundary between New France and Nova Scotia drew from the old recommendation that high ground markers serve as territorial limits. A line should be drawn from the head of the Bay de Chaleur to Lake St. Pierre, leaving to France all land in which rivers ran into the St. Lawrence or the Gulf of St. Lawrence north of the Bay de Chaleur, and to the British the lands in which rivers ran into the Bay of Fundy or the St. Lawrence south of the Bay de Chaleur. The proposal noted that "the names here made use of are taken from Popple's map, Dr. Mitchel's is not yet published," which illustrates that the British would refer to Popple's maps in negotiations and diplomacy, despite the British memorial's previous argument to the contrary.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Plein Pouvoir pour M le Duc de Mirepoix, Versailles, 3 Febraury 1755, f91, vol. 438, MG5 A1, LAC.

<sup>213</sup> Alderman Baker's Proposed Delimitation for North America, in *Anglo-French Boundary Disputes in the West, 1749-1763*, ed. Theodore Calvin Pease, vol. 27 (Springfield: Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1936), 84. The texts are in translation.

Another recommendation for setting Nova Scotia's limits was to determine how the land was divided at the time of Utrecht, and return to those boundaries.<sup>214</sup> This path would presumably require less effort than searching for the "ancient" boundaries or negotiating entirely new ones through commissions or diplomacy. But diplomats soon learned the challenges faced earlier by the commissaries. First, there was a measurable discrepancy between British and French maps. Mirepoix learned from Thomas Robinson, who had been appointed secretary of state for the Southern Department in 1754, that "our French maps and their English maps differed entirely as to the location and course of the Ohio or Beautiful River; that the error amounted to more than 300 leagues, and that our French maps differed from each other."<sup>215</sup> Mirepoix also learned that the British would, when possible, base their land claims on alliances with the Natives. The French had used their Algonkian allies' rights to land to prevent the British from claiming territory between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers, and similarly Robinson argued that land around the Ohio River belonged Britain's allies the Iroquois, and therefore to Britain.<sup>216</sup>

The Mi'kmaq and their allies in northeastern North America fared better in diplomatic discussions than in commission negotiations. The geographic impetus behind the commissaries meeting at Paris was to prove how far Nova Scotia's limits extended, and therefore staking exclusive claim to regions long controlled by Natives was an ideal strategy. In the diplomatic negotiations, creating new boundaries was as preferred as establishing the ancient limits, meaning that territories could be assigned to either side or

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<sup>214</sup> Cabinet Minute, Newcastle House, 16 January 1755, in *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>215</sup> Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 January 1755, in *Ibid.*, 87.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.



left free of European settlement. The idea of Native buffer zones was first discussed in regards to the Ohio River valley. At a cabinet meeting, British diplomats suggested removing all forts in the area and “leaving that country a neutral country, where each nation may have liberty to trade; but to be possess’d by the Natives only.”<sup>217</sup> Robinson suggested a similar compromise for Nova Scotia. He wanted for Britain the peninsula together with a tract of land running along the west side of the Bay of Fundy north towards the St. Lawrence and south towards New England. “That the rest of the country,” he continued, “from the sd tract of...leagues, & by a line, dropped perpendicularly from the river St Laurence, opposite to the mouth of the River Penobscot, be left uninhabited by both the English, or French.”<sup>218</sup> This swath of land would have been recognized for what it was: territory inhabited and controlled by members of the Wabanaki confederacy.

Mirepoix reported to Rouillé that the early meetings with Robinson had gone well. They had discussed the limits of New York, New England, and Acadia. The concept of a Native buffer zone seemed useful, and Robinson had strongly approved of the idea. Much of the discussion of geographic boundaries existed at the level of abstraction, and it was necessary for both sides to have an image of what was being surrendered and what was being retained. Mirepoix noted, “after having consulted together, over maps, the regions we had discussed,” Robison stated that he would forward

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<sup>217</sup> Cabinet Meeting, Powis House, 9 February 1755, in *Anglo-French Boundary Disputes*, 109.

<sup>218</sup> Cabinet Meeting, 10 February 1755, in *Ibid.*, 111. At the time of this cabinet meeting, the breadth of land had not yet been determined. It was later set at twenty leagues.

along the proposal and issue a prompt response.<sup>219</sup> Maps were useful (and necessary) tools to construct boundaries, which increased their value in imperial diplomacy.

Lord Halifax had concerns over reserving land for Natives. To create a Native territory along the Ohio as proposed would surrender much of the settled areas in Pennsylvania. As for Nova Scotia, Robinson's recommendations were too vague. Moreover, Halifax argued that the King's rights to all of Nova Scotia, extending from the Penobscot to the St. Lawrence, were so "clearly & fully made out," that any concession of territory would require "concessions of equal importance, made by France, in other parts of North America."<sup>220</sup> In a meeting between Robinson and Philip Yorke, the earl of Hardwicke, Halifax's critiques were strengthened by a cartographic investigation. Hardwicke reported to Newcastle that he and Robinson compared Halifax's concerns with Dr. Mitchell's map. The map supported the argument that both Pennsylvania and New York would lose territory if part of the Ohio was reserved for Natives. The cartographic evidence also made clear that territorial limits determined by natural land marks – specifically the Appalachian or Alleghany mountains, but presumably also high water marks in Nova Scotia – would yield "a most dangerous & uncertain rule."<sup>221</sup> It would be much preferable to draw a new line than to follow natural markers.

Central to the diplomatic discussions was the bifurcation between public and official geographic knowledge. As tensions rose in Europe over fighting in North America, officials attempted to facilitate negotiations by limiting the influence of public imperial sentiment. Hardwicke emphasized the political influence of published maps.

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<sup>219</sup> Mirepoix to Rouillé, London, 10 February 1755, f118v, vol. 438, MG5 A1, LAC.

<sup>220</sup> Halifax's Observations on Robinson's Proposals, in *Anglo-French Boundary Disputes*, 112-14.

<sup>221</sup> Hardwicke to Newcastle, 16 February 1755, in *Ibid.*, 115.

Mitchell's map (Figure 5.7), if made widely available, could jeopardize any chance of reconciling their differences with France:

I find the Board of Trade are just publishing, or encouraging the publication of, this map; &, if not stopt, it will be out forthwith. I fear very inconvenient consequences from it, for it carries the limits of the British Colonies as far, or farther than any other, which I have seen. If it should come out just at this juncture, with the supposed reputation of this author, & the sanction of the Board of Trade, it may fill people's heads with so strong an opinion of our strict rights, as may tend to obstruct an accommodation, if attainable, on the foot of convenience, & make what may be necessary to be done to avoid the fatal evil of a war, the subject of great clamour.<sup>222</sup>



**Figure 5.7** Extract from John Mitchell's *Map of the British and French Dominions in North America*, 1755. Mitchell claimed for Britain the peninsula, the eastern continental coast, and all territory to the St. Lawrence River. Library and Archives Canada. H3/1000/1755

The Mitchell map demonstrated cartography's various uses. As a tool of geographic knowledge, the map illustrated points made in writing; as a tool of political influence, its

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

very publication could derail imperial negotiations. In this instance, a British official recommended cartographic constraint.

While the map's publication was delayed it could not be prevented altogether (it was eventually published in April, 1755). Mitchell was the son of a tobacco farmer and shopkeeper, and his earliest interests were in botany and medicine. He found success in both fields, presenting his findings to the Royal Society and corresponding with important figures in the sciences, such as Linnaeus. Mitchell was introduced to George Montagu Dunk, the Earl of Halifax, who also shared an interest in botany. Shortly after, Dunk became aware of Mitchell's mapmaking capabilities and he was commissioned to create a map of the British colonies, over which Halifax and the Board of Trade were exerting considerable influence.<sup>223</sup> Mitchell's 1755 map transformed seasonal British trading posts into established settlements, suggesting that huge swaths of land were already under British control when really they were contested areas on the fringes of the British and French empires. The cartouche noted that the map was both dedicated to and created under the authority of the Board of Trade. Though the map was well received in Europe and America and used in treaty negotiations until the 1930s, it was an overtly political document meant to present North America as more British than French or Spanish.<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Matthew H. Edney, "John Mitchell's Map of North America (1755): A Study of the Use and Publication of Official Maps in Eighteenth-Century Britain," *Imago Mundi* 60 (2008): 63-85.

<sup>224</sup> Elizabeth Baigent, "Mitchell, John (1711–1768)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, October 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/view/article/18842> (accessed October 19, 2009). A map's cartouche could be as politically influential as its content. See G. N. G. Clarke, "Taking Possession: The Cartouche as Cultural Text in Eighteenth-Century American Maps," *Word & Image* 4, no. 2 (1988): 455-74.

Edney argues that the Mitchell map was not unique in its creation – maps had long been made by soliciting geographic information from overseas administrators that would help solve specific geographic issues in London – but its use signalled a turning point in British imperial cartography. After Halifax had pressed the map on British officials working to determine boundary limits in North America (a typical use for commissioned manuscript maps), he published the map to influence British public opinion. The traditional bifurcation between manuscript maps (used by government officials for government business) and published maps (produced for general consumption and influencing public opinion) was broken, signalling an imperial interest in securing public support through officially sanctioned cartographic evidence.<sup>225</sup>

Even without the help of Mitchell's map, the French agreed that Robinson's definition of the new Acadian boundary was vague, but disagreed over the best method to determine the region's limits. Natural boundaries were "more sensible, less ambiguous" than limits based on latitude and longitude.<sup>226</sup> Robinson, in setting his limits of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, had made use of a map to clarify his division of regions, but he had not demonstrated how each space would be claimed. "Mr. Robinson drew on a map a line from the mouth of the river Pentagoet to its source," one letter states,

and from there perpendicularly to the St. Lawrence River, dividing the southern bank in two, one part heading towards Quebec and the other running to the Ocean. He then drew a second line parallel to the coast of the Bay Francaise which was twenty leagues wide from the river Pentagoet to the top of Cape Tourmentine.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Matthew H. Edney, "John Mitchell's Map of North America (1755): A Study of the Use and Publication of Official Maps in Eighteenth-Century Britain," *Imago Mundi* 60 (2008): 63-85. For more on the government/public cartographic bifurcation, see Jeffers Lennox, "An Empire on Paper: The Founding of Halifax and Conceptions of Imperial Space, 1744-55," *The Canadian Historical Review* 88 (2007): 373-412.

<sup>226</sup> Lettre de M. Rouillé, 13 February 1755, f140, vol. 438, MG5 A1, LAC.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, f144v.

Everything within the line running parallel to the St. Lawrence, right of the line running north from the Pentagoet would remain neutral, though the French were unclear what the British wanted to do with the land on the left. British ambiguity on this point suggested to French officials that they hoped to claim the southern coast of the St. Lawrence.<sup>228</sup>

Questions of territorial sovereignty became paramount. While Robinson had suggested reserving land for the Natives and claimed that Iroquois land was British land, Rouillé remained unconvinced that either crown could lay claim to Aboriginal territory. France had learned that it was a more effective strategy to support Aboriginal land claims, thereby denying others the opportunity to acquire more land. This defensive imperial positioning had been employed since 1713, and was increasingly important since Britain had explicitly claimed title over their Native allies' land. Rouillé argued that "the American tribes have preserved their liberty and their independence," and "if any Englishman claimed to exercise any authority over this people, the commission with which this court equipped him would not guarantee his life against the danger with which they would threaten it."<sup>229</sup> There were three primary reasons behind Rouillé's argument. First, the British had never had a governor nor a magistrate in Iroquois territory, so to claim sovereignty over this region was impossible. Second, Native tribes changed alliance at their whim, so an ally today could be an enemy tomorrow. And third, Rouillé (wrongly) argued that most Native tribes had no fixed territory, choosing instead to wander from one region to another as they desired or as demanded by the hunt for

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<sup>228</sup> Ibid., f144v-145.

<sup>229</sup> Rouillé to Mirepoix, 19 February 1755, in *Anglo-French Boundary Disputes*, 123.

resources. It was therefore impossible to claim jurisdiction over Aboriginal land because that land was indefinable.<sup>230</sup>

Mirepoix continued dealing with Robinson and had to visualize what sort of boundaries and buffer zones the British desired to implement in the Ohio River valley and Nova Scotia. In this instance, maps were not used to make arguments but rather to clarify intentions. They were not only negotiation tools, but were also the language of negotiation. Robinson remained convinced that reserving land for the Mi'kmaq and their allies could satisfy Britain and France. Mirepoix wanted a better idea of what territory would remain unoccupied, and requested maps from Paris. Rouillé informed him that he would send the maps as soon as possible, but warned Mirepoix that the tactics employed by the British did not bode well for resolving the issue.<sup>231</sup> Moreover, when the maps arrived Mirepoix noted that the differences between French and British cartography were so great that neither side could be satisfied with proposed boundaries. Mirepoix informed Rouillé, "you will see clearly by the lines Robinson has drawn just how far the English carry their pretension," but Robinson warned him that while some topics were negotiable, Britain was unwilling to alter their claims to Acadia.<sup>232</sup>

The British were similarly suspicious of France's intentions, especially their refusal to accept larger boundaries for Nova Scotia. Robinson wrote the British minister to Spain expressing his worries, noting that Rouillé did "not intend to leave to His

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<sup>230</sup> Ibid., 124. The literature on Aboriginal territorial use and management is well developed. See Frank G. Speck and Loren C. Eiseley, "Significance of Hunting Territory Systems of the Algonkian in Social Theory," *American Anthropologist* new ser. 41, no. 2 (1939): 269-88; Alfred G. Bailey, *The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures 1504-1700: A Study in Canadian Civilization* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969); William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003); Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails".

<sup>231</sup> Rouillé to Mirepoix, 5 March 1755, in *Anglo-French Boundary Disputes*, 144.

<sup>232</sup> Mirepoix to Rouillé, London, 8 March 1755, f261v, vol. 438, MG5 A1, LAC.

Majesty's subjects the quiet possession of even half of the peninsula," which, far from inspiring Britain to disarm, had caused even more alarm in London and in North America.<sup>233</sup> Rouillé was also aware of the shrinking likelihood that matters could be resolved through diplomacy. "We see with regret," he wrote to Mirepoix, "that war alone can end our differences, and I have nothing to add on this point to the public letter that I annex."<sup>234</sup> Rouillé was concerned that Britain was intent on disrupting the balance of power in North America by attempting to secure more than it could rightfully claim. He argued that Robinson's insistence on a Native buffer zone would create a territory devoid of laws (assuming, as he apparently did, that the Aborigines were lawless), and ignored that Natives had "neither limits nor boundaries and change their habitations according to their caprice."<sup>235</sup> Rouillé also hinted at France's preferred defensive empire, arguing that "each nation possesses more than she can use for a long time to come."<sup>236</sup> It would be better for each to secure what they have instead of acquiring more.

Britain was more interested in some areas than others. Mirepoix reported to Rouillé, that "as to the article for the Ohio, [Newcastle] repeated to me that it was much less important to them than that for Acadia." According to Mirepoix, Newcastle also stressed that "we have not the islands so much at heart as Acadia. If your court will consent to give us satisfaction on the peninsula and the Bay of Fundy, we will find means to give it to them on the islands."<sup>237</sup> He reassured the French ambassador that Britain had no desire to settle near the St. Lawrence if it would make the French colonies uneasy

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<sup>233</sup> Robinson to Keen, Whitehall, 11 March 1755, in *Anglo-French Boundary Disputes*, 156.

<sup>234</sup> Rouillé to Mirepoix, Versailles, 17 March 1755, in *Ibid.*, 161.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, 176.

<sup>237</sup> Mirepoix to Rouillé, London, 22 March 1755, in *Anglo-French Boundary Disputes*, 182-86.



or disrupt their navigation.<sup>238</sup> Robinson later reported to Newcastle that Mirepoix had agreed in principle to Britain's demands for Nova Scotia, but was curious what they would surrender in return. Robinson had pressed on about how to divide Nova Scotia and New France, to which Mirepoix replied by suggesting a Native buffer zone, like the one that France had rejected in the Ohio. While Mirepoix could speak only hypothetically, he believed a dividing line could be drawn towards the St. Lawrence, but bent in such a way "so as to fall upon a point over against Quebec," leaving a communication link from Quebec to Île St Jean, "and that each side of the said line of communication should be left to the natives with a prohibition to either French or English to make forts...or even to trade."<sup>239</sup> It was hoped that this strip of land, left neutral, would satisfy the French desire to keep their territories along the St. Lawrence safe.

Even with Britain's stated willingness to acquiesce in the Ohio River valley and the Caribbean islands, France remained concerned about the extended limits of Nova Scotia. Mirepoix informed Rouillé that Britain had negotiated as far as it could, and that its final demands were the entire peninsula, a swath of land twenty leagues wide along the western coast of the Bay of Fundy, and that a line be fixed from the mouth of the Penobscot running north towards the St. Lawrence, then turning east and running parallel along that river at a distance "as we shall propose."<sup>240</sup> The British might have hoped this compromise would appear enticing, but the French court viewed it as a prelude to an attack on Quebec. To control the northeast was to control the entrance to Canada.

Rouillé noted that the route from Nova Scotia to New England by land was impractical

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<sup>238</sup> Mirepoix to Rouillé, London, 22 March 1755, in *Ibid.*, 182-85.

<sup>239</sup> Robinson to Newcastle, Whitehall, 22 March 1755, in *Ibid.*, 189.

<sup>240</sup> Mirepoix to Rouillé, 6 April 1755, in *Ibid.*, 204.

because of the distance, the poor shape of the roads, and the number of rivers to cross. By sea, the route is short and easy. “As a result,” he argued, “the sole purpose of the English is to reserve themselves facilities for an invasion of Canada.”<sup>241</sup> France was willing to extend their definition of Acadia to cede to Britain most of the peninsula. However, Beaubassin and Chignecto would remain French territory, and a certain extent of land running towards the isthmus would remain neutral.<sup>242</sup> Rouillé also harkened back to La Galissonnière’s memoir on France’s North American position, which stressed the central importance of the St. John River, which became during the winter months the sole route by which Quebec could communicate with Île St Jean and Île Royale. Rouillé concluded his letter by informing Mirepoix that because Britain and France differed so greatly on this matter, there was no point in offering a reply.<sup>243</sup>

There was one last effort made to avoid war. If the two sides truly wanted to fight, there was no reason to continue negotiating, yet an offer was made. The British ministers hinted to Mirepoix that they would be willing to surrender St. Lucia, but the Acadian boundary remained a divisive issue. Lord Granville emphasized to Mirepoix that they would not desist on the land running from the isthmus to the Penobscot, but the French ambassador reported that on “this last object I still think we might perhaps get them to consent that the whole coast be forbidden as we propose for the northern coast of the peninsula; but they will not accord us possession of it.”<sup>244</sup> This proposition would have reserved even more land for the Mi’kmaq and their allies, officially recognizing their territorial sovereignty. Britain’s answer to this proposal highlighted British views

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<sup>241</sup> Rouillé to Mirepoix, Versailles, 13 April 1755 Ibid., 208.

<sup>242</sup> Mémoire sur la depeche de M le Duc de Mirepoix du 6 Avril 1755, f371-381, vol. 438, MG5 A1, LAC.

<sup>243</sup> Rouillé to Mirepoix, Versailles, 13 April 1755, in *Anglo-French Boundary Disputes*, 210.

<sup>244</sup> Mirepoix to Rouillé, London, 15 May 1755, in Ibid., 231.

on Native territory and property. The memoir stated that Native land was well known and that Natives “hold and transfer [their lands] like other proprietaries everywhere.”<sup>245</sup> Far from being transient inhabitants with indefinable territory, Natives were possessors of territory and could do with that land as they saw fit. According to British officials, this meant that when the Natives became British subjects, as they believed they had, their land became British land. This argument could not be applied to Nova Scotia because the Mi’kmaq were British enemies (who had entered only into treaties of peace and friendship, not of alliance) and the Abenakis were at best split over supporting British settlements. There could be no agreement when both sides held such divergent views of the Acadian boundary. Diplomacy had come to an end, and while it had failed to attain a peaceful resolution due to divergent imperial desires, it had succeeded in allowing both Britain and France to create their empires through geographic discourse (the former favouring Acadia and the latter the Ohio River valley). Once imagined and informed by maps and reports, conflicting imperial visions of Acadia could not be resolved through negotiations. However, after numerous rounds of negotiation, both Britain and France knew what they were fighting for.

## **Conclusion**

The Acadian Boundary Commission marked a watershed in imperial envisioning. The appointed commissaries failed in their assigned task of determining, *inter alia*, the “ancient” boundaries of Acadia, but they succeeded in illuminating how Britain and France imagined their overseas possessions. From 1750 to 1755, Nova Scotia / l’Acadie

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<sup>245</sup> English Answer of June 7, 1755 in *Ibid.*, 237.

was the topic of much diplomacy in Paris and London, and those discussions crystallized the centrality of geographic information to political discussions and imperial formation. The question of boundaries begged more questions, specifically how important was Nova Scotia / l'Acadie to Britain and France?

Both the boundary negotiations and the diplomatic discussions revealed Nova Scotia's strategic position in northeastern North America. For France, l'Acadie was an Atlantic outpost that provided access (via the St. John River) to Quebec when the St. Lawrence was frozen. For Britain, Nova Scotia was the crux of the continent. It was as valuable as some of Britain's Caribbean possessions, and more so than the Ohio River valley. It protected New England from Île Royale and provided access to (and control over) the St. Lawrence River, which led directly to the heart of the continent. The question of the region's boundaries was of primary importance to imperial planning, as neither Britain nor France wanted to surrender territory that would strengthen their enemy. France was especially focused on creating a defensive empire in the northeast with the goal of preventing British expansion instead of growing French territories.

The function of geographic and cartographic information was pliable in boundary negotiations. Maps served political and ideological purposes, outlining past possessions and projecting an image of future sovereignty. Their content was less important than their contribution to imperial discourse, both public and official. France and Britain used maps and geographic knowledge the same way, relying on cartography as an offensive and defensive tool. Neither power could ignore Aboriginal sovereignty, even when the Mi'kmaq and Iroquois were excluded from negotiations. Finally, both countries realized that keeping official and public geographic knowledge separate was instrumental to

boundary disputes. When this bifurcation ended, with the publication of John Mitchell's map, public imperial sentiment overwhelmed the diplomatic process and hindered its ability to reach an agreement.

Geographic knowledge was liminal to imperial imagining. Territory could not be possessed until it was known, and sovereignty could not be expressed until one vision absorbed or destroyed competing ideas. Maps and mapping were instrumental to imperial discourse, and historians must investigate how geographic debates influenced wider developments on either side of the Atlantic. Like legal regimes, government support, and ceremonies of possession, cartography and geographic knowledge were the building blocks of empire. When negotiations gave way to conflict, mapping and geography retained their importance. The Seven Years' War, the Acadian Expulsion, and Mi'kmaq territorial control were, as will be demonstrated, exercises in competing ideas of sovereignty. The boundaries that could not be redrawn peacefully in Europe would be mapped by violence in the northeast.

## Chapter 6

### *L'Acadie Perdue: Map Wars, Acadian Expulsion, and Native Space During the Seven Years' War, 1755-1763*

#### **Introduction**

The fighting had begun in North America before the commissaries and diplomats ended their negotiations in London and Paris. If the Seven Years' War was a territorial conflict meant to decide the fate of European possessions in North America, it began not with the first shots fired in the Ohio Valley but with the first arguments made at negotiating tables in Paris. A territorial conflict fought with pen and ink had been raging since 1750 and, had an agreement been reached, might have prevented the conflict that began in North America in 1754 from spreading. Forty years of debate had done much to improve geographic knowledge and increase the cartographic archives in Britain and France, but maps could not prevent war. Geographic knowledge would, however, be an instrumental tool in the conflict's progress and resolution.

The Seven Years' War brought imperial conflict to an end in the northeast. By 1763, Britain had completed the conquest of Acadia begun fifty-three years earlier. Investigating the role of geography and territorial control during this period demonstrates just how entangled the British, French, and Aboriginal powers were in Nova Scotia. Events in the Ohio River Valley influenced the expulsion of the Acadians and led to renewed efforts at colonizing Nova Scotia. The Mi'kmaq and their allies influenced both the progress of war and the formation of peace in the northeast, responding to shifting British and French military strategies while acting on their own motives and policies. Once begun, the Seven Years' War presented a number of possible outcomes. Territorial

sovereignty was not established until each regional power – French, British, and Mi’kmaq – accepted the new balance of authority and worked to maintain it.

Though the British completed the “conquest” of the French begun fifty years earlier, the Mi’kmaq and their allies remained opposed to British sovereignty and shaped the transition from empire to colony. John G. Reid has argued that 1710 was not really a conquest because the Acadians were able to adapt to the changes brought by British rule while the Natives largely ignored the British presence until 1726.<sup>1</sup> By 1763 over ten thousand French inhabitants had been removed from Acadia and the French had fallen at Quebec, leaving little doubt that Britain was the dominant European power in northeastern North America. In Nova Scotia the territorial issue remained contentious as the Mi’kmaq and their neighbours continued to harass the British and assert their sovereignty over traditional lands. The treaties signed between the Aboriginals and the British in Nova Scotia in the early 1760s remained based on peace and friendship, not geographic surrender. As late as 1762, the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia considered surrendering almost half of Nova Scotia to the Mi’kmaq, demonstrating Britain’s tenuous grasp on territorial control.

This chapter investigates three factors in the competition for Nova Scotia during the Seven Years’ War: geographic knowledge’s influence on enlightenment thought and imperial action, the local and metropolitan responses to maps and tracts created during the Seven Years’ War, and the connections between the Acadian expulsion, British settlement, and Native resistance in Nova Scotia. First, British and French mapmakers published new maps and pamphlets supporting their title to Nova Scotia while deriding

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<sup>1</sup> John G Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

the claims of their opponents. Their maps and published tracts contributed to a map war that mirrored military conflict on the ground. Geographers became imperial agents and supported their nation's claims to territorial possession, even though enlightened ideals (which many professed) stressed the importance of objectivity and disinterested observation.<sup>2</sup> Patricia Seed has argued (in the context of the early seventeenth century) that the English claimed possession of territory through settlement and improvement, the French relied on theatrical ceremonies, and the Dutch created maps.<sup>3</sup> Seed's analysis overlooks the historic importance of maps and geographic knowledge as an indication of claims to sovereignty. Both England and France relied on cartography to claim sovereignty over new territories (John Smith mapped Virginia and New England, Lescarbot and Champlain mapped New France), and the imperial debates among geographers in the eighteenth century demonstrate the influence of these claims.<sup>4</sup>

These were not debates that would have been lost on the literate public, as excerpts from pamphlets were published in popular magazines and read in Parliament. Geographers remained active participants in forming public opinion during the Seven Years' War and their maps reflect the divergent images of empire and territorial control in Nova Scotia. Historians have examined the social and political role of newspapers in both Britain and France, arguing that print was an essential element of creating "public

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<sup>2</sup> *Geography and Enlightenment*, ed. Charles W. J. Withers and David N. Livingstone (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

<sup>3</sup> Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

<sup>4</sup> On John Smith, see Ken MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 167-69. Though MacMillan reads too much into Smith's map, he does demonstrate its use in claiming sovereignty.



opinion” and marshalling support for military conflict.<sup>5</sup> Nova Scotia’s politics and geography became matters of public discussion and mapmakers were able to exploit the region’s increasing relevance by providing the public with arguments for empire.

Secondly, this chapter explores how Nova Scotia’s strategic position during the conflict contributed to the collection, dissemination, and use of new geographic information. The war threw British and French imperial strategies into relief and exposed the dangers of ignoring the strength and influence of the Mi’kmaq. Stephen J. Hornsby described Nova Scotia as part of the “British Atlantic” sphere, but the province was not understood as a single entity during the Seven Years’ War; the French, British, and Mi’kmaq each claimed all or part of the region as their own.<sup>6</sup> French captives held at Halifax were able to assess the settlement’s strengths and weaknesses, fleeing Acadians reported on British movements, and French military leaders created maps and plans that emphasized the importance of reclaiming at least the western coast of the Bay of Fundy. The British encouraged settlement and established an assembly to secure the province, both of which depended on increased territorial control and detailed surveys. Aboriginal military strength and geographic control shaped how Britain and France competed for

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<sup>5</sup> See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); Hannah Barker, *Newspapers, Politics, and Public Opinion in Late Eighteenth-Century England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Eliga H. Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Arlette Farge, *Subversive Words: Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France*, trans. Rosemary Morris (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Kathleen Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); John Brewer, *The Pleasures of the Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1997); David A. Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

<sup>6</sup> Stephen Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005); Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid, *New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).

Nova Scotia, though the Mi'kmaq retained their independence and worked to secure enough land for themselves. A focus on Nova Scotia / l'Acadie and its international influence, especially the map wars it engendered, lends weight to Louise Dechêne's argument for a "Sixteen Years' War," not a "Seven Years' War."<sup>7</sup>

Finally, this chapter will evaluate the Acadian deportation's influence on territorial control and British-Native-French relations. The expulsion signalled a failure in British imperial policy that first hoped to incorporate the French in Nova Scotia through land grants and British law.<sup>8</sup> Their removal and subsequent attempts at populating the region with English settlers demanded careful surveys and land management, all of which was carefully monitored by the Mi'kmaq. The removal of thousands of French Acadians was an international event. Acadians were sent to colonies throughout British America and Europe.<sup>9</sup> They took with them their knowledge of Acadia and their sense of belonging to a community that had overcome adversity in the past. Their expulsion opened up land for resettlement by British subjects and necessitated the collection of detailed geographic knowledge to "sell" Nova Scotia to settlers in New England.

One major obstacle to this resettlement process was the Mi'kmaq. Their treaties in 1760 and 1761 required careful monitoring to prevent hostilities. The British government at Halifax was aware that Natives remained a threat, and their settlement

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<sup>7</sup> Louise Dechêne and Hélène Paré, *Le Peuple, l'État et la Guerre au Canada sous le Régime Français* (Montréal: Boréal, 2008).

<sup>8</sup> John G. Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 177-78.

<sup>9</sup> Jean-François Mouhot, *Les Réfugiés Acadiens en France, 1758-1785: l'Impossible Réintégration?* (Québec: Septentrion, 2009); Jean Marie Fonteneau, *Les Acadiens: Citoyens de l'Atlantique* (Rennes: Editions Ouest-France, 1996); A. J. B. Johnston, "The Acadian Deportation in A Comparative Context: An Introduction," *Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society* 10 (2007): 114-31.

projects must be investigated in the context of Mi'kmaq influence on British territorial expansion. Consequently, it is not possible to understand the Acadian expulsion without considering the territorial power vacuum created by such a removal. The British nearly surrendered most of the peninsula to the Mi'kmaq in 1762, which demonstrates the difficulty the Halifax government faced in controlling the region. This chapter will investigate the Acadian expulsion, Native treaties, and British difficulties resettling the region as an entangled phenomenon. Each group in the region influenced the other by their actions and reactions.<sup>10</sup> Geoffrey Plank, John G. Reid, N.E.S. Griffiths, John Mack Faragher, and William Wicken have provided the foundation on which this chapter is built.<sup>11</sup> They depict the expulsion as a tri-cultural endeavour that did not end territorial conflict, but only removed one of the key players. Even with the French largely removed from Nova Scotia, Britain's attempt to transform an imperial outpost into a thriving British colony provided new opportunities for the Mi'kmaq to exert their influence, expose British weakness, and shape the progress of settlement.

### **Geographers and their pamphlets**

As the Boundary Commission debated the limits of Acadia behind closed doors in Paris, the mapmakers who informed their image of North America published pamphlets

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<sup>10</sup> Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *American Historical Review* 11, no. 3 (2007): 764-6.

<sup>11</sup> Geoffrey Gilbert Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); John G. Reid, "Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena? Planter Nova Scotia (1760-1782) and Competing Strategies of Pacification," *Canadian Historical Review* 85, no. 4 (2004): 669-92; N. E. S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People, 1604-1755* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005); John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W Norton & Co., 2005); William Craig Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).

extolling the rightful claims of either Britain or France. Geographers portrayed themselves as agents of geographic accuracy but could be as partisan as the politicians who cited their maps. Many turned their attention to Nova Scotia in the 1750s, an indication of the region's imperial importance. Mapmakers, who were also map-sellers, exploited the increased interest in the American northeast that arose during times of war.<sup>12</sup> Geographers were influential and their maps, which at times sacrificed utility for aesthetics to appeal to potential buyers, carried political significance. British diplomats were worried about the effect John Mitchell's 1755 map of North America could have on British-French negotiations. They no doubt remembered the diplomatic incident provoked by Didier Robert de Vaugondy's 1753 map of Canada, which depicted Acadia as only the southern coast of peninsular Nova Scotia. That depiction endured into the 1750s (Figure 6.1).

There was in the mid-eighteenth century a tension between enlightened ideals of objective, accurate knowledge and the political influence of imperial maps. The literate public in France and Britain were aware of the Acadian boundary issues, and became increasingly engaged in the discussion and its imperial implications. In her examination of the Robert de Vaugondy family of cartographers (father Gilles and son Didier), Mary Pedley notes, "there is perhaps no scientific field so inextricably linked with politics and state as cartography."<sup>13</sup> The eighteenth century was, as Michael Lynn has argued, a time when the public gained access to science through urban experiments and instructional courses offered to interested citizens. Classes were offered in mathematics, physics,

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<sup>12</sup> Matthew H. Edney, "A Publishing History of John Mitchell's 1755 Map of North America," *Cartographic Perspectives*, no. 58 (2007): 7.

<sup>13</sup> Mary Sponberg Pedley, *Bel et Utile: The Work of the Robert de Vaugondy Family of Mapmakers* (Herts: Map Collector Publications, 1992), 14.

musical theory, and geography to address a public desire for access to and instruction in the natural sciences.<sup>14</sup> Mapmakers had a willing audience onto which they could impart their political opinions as well as their advances in the field.



**Figure 6.1** Extract from Gilles Robert de Vaugondy, *Partie de L'Amérique Septent. qui comprend La Nouvelle France ou Le Canada*, 1755. Acadia remained restricted to the peninsula's southern coast. Memorial University, Centre for Newfoundland Studies, G 3400 1755 R6 MAP

Geographers desired to inform the interested public, and in so doing they exerted political influence by explaining how maps should (and should not) be used. The Robert de Vaugondy's inherited their cartographic holdings in 1730 from the famous French geographer Nicolas Sanson. Both father and son Robert de Vaugondy published and sold Sanson's charts while developing their own catalogue of maps, experimenting in

<sup>14</sup> Michael R. Lynn, *Popular Science and Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).

systematic geography. These maps were more geographic theory than representations of space, and their pamphlets often ended with an appeal for proof from the public.<sup>15</sup>

Louis XV, himself tutored in geography by Delisle, commissioned atlases and globes from Didier Robert in the 1750s. The Robert de Vaugondy family was interested in supplying useful geographic knowledge to those who wanted a better understanding of world events. As Pedley notes,

Herein lies the core of the Vaugondy philosophy about their atlas. It was designed for the public and not for the scrutiny of geographers. 'We only seek to give in our atlas what is most interesting for common use.' It was to be an illustrated guide for 'studious people, those who read history as well as those who are only aware of current events,' for whom the maps furnish a means by which 'one might be transported to the scene and find oneself on the threshold of judging events and even of reflecting upon the future.'<sup>16</sup>

Maps that made, or could be interpreted as making, overt political arguments often led to trouble for the geographer. Robert Didier's 1753 map was hugely influential. On it he outlined the French and British possessions in the contested region of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. The map saved for Britain only a sliver of land along the southern coast of peninsular Nova Scotia. Robert de Vaugondy dedicated the map to Marc-Pierre de Voyer de Paulmy, comte d'Argenson, who was Louis XV's minister of war and secretary of state. When he advertised the map in a 1753 issue of *Mercure de France*, Robert de Vaugondy suggested that his map was informed by papers from the Ministry. Such a claim implied links between official and public geographic knowledge and implicated the French government in Robert de Vaugondy's conclusions. While claims to accuracy based on the latest knowledge were common, the political atmosphere in which this map appeared (at the height of the boundary negotiations) caused a strong

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<sup>15</sup> Pedley, *Bel et Utile*, 16-20.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

reaction from Britain. Robert de Vaugondy went beyond simply dedicating his map to government officials (a common and generally accepted practice) to claiming to speak on their behalf.<sup>17</sup> The following month Robert de Vaugondy was forced to issue a retraction in the *Mercure de France* stating that he had not been privy to any maps from the French government.<sup>18</sup> Imperial cartography was most effective when its sources were clearly stated.

To spread their knowledge and influence, geographers turned to pamphlets and the public press. As Eliga Gould has argued, public pamphlets, newspapers, and journals did not carry the same authority as Parliament, but they did influence public opinion.<sup>19</sup> Kathleen Wilson referred to the British press as “that preeminent instrument of politicization in the eighteenth century,” noting that papers and journals provided both information and ideology that shaped perceptions of the state and the empire.<sup>20</sup> In France, a more tightly-controlled press restricted the distribution of political opinions and ideologies through print, but French citizens were interested in news and spread gossip, while their ideas and opinions reached the King’s ears by way of police spies who collected rumours and wrote reports.<sup>21</sup> As Jurgen Habermas has demonstrated, while a national public opinion in France appeared more fully after the French Revolution, there existed an interested literate populace eager to acquire information and use it to inform

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<sup>17</sup> J. B. Harley, "The Bankruptcy of Thomas Jefferys: An Episode in the Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Map-Making," *Imago Mundi* 20 (1966): 27-48.

<sup>18</sup> Christine M. Petto, *When France Was King of Cartography: The Patronage and Production of Maps in Early Modern France* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), 111.

<sup>19</sup> Gould, *The Persistence of Empire*, xxiv.

<sup>20</sup> Wilson, *The Sense of the People*, 29. See also Barker, *Newspapers, Politics, and Public Opinion in Late Eighteenth-Century England*; Jeremy Black, *A Subject for Taste: Culture in Eighteenth-Century England* (London: Hambledon and London, 2005), Ch.7.

<sup>21</sup> Farge, *Subversive Words*, 3-4.

their opinions.<sup>22</sup> Mapmakers relied on the power of print culture to express their ideas about imperial politics as they related to geographic knowledge.

While the political tensions surrounding the Acadian boundary dispute required an element of cartographic restraint by both France and Britain, geographers were loath to let pass an opportunity to sell their products. Advertising in popular journals was one method, but so too was publishing maps accompanied by tracts describing the geographic issues currently under debate. By the 1750s, maps published without explanations were easily criticized by geographers whose maps presented a different interpretation. Geographers in France often exchanged acrimonious letters or published biting critiques of each other's works.<sup>23</sup> Map production was a competitive and expensive business with tight profit margins. Because geographers often worked in close quarters, at times within a few blocks, personal and professional relationships overlapped to produce a coterie of cartographers who vied for public interest and government commissions.<sup>24</sup>

The publications of two geographers crystallize the French-British competition to define the importance and extent of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. From 1754 to 1760, Thomas Jefferys and Jacques-Nicolas Bellin issued maps and tracts defending, respectively, the British and French image of northeastern North America. This map war in the public press mirrored the real war in North America, as geographers became purveyors of imperial sentiment. Their tracts demonstrate that the enlightened ideal of disinterested objectivity could not dull imperial bias, even among those who stressed the importance of

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<sup>22</sup> Habermas, *Structural Transformation*, 67-9. See also Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

<sup>23</sup> Anne Godlewska, *Geography Unbound: French Geographic Science from Cassini to Humbolt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 34-5.

<sup>24</sup> Mary Sponberg Pedley, "The Map Trade in Paris, 1650-1825," *Imago Mundi* 33 (1981): 33-45.



value-free knowledge. In 1754, Jefferys published *The Conduct of the French with Respect to the British Dominions in America, Particularly Nova Scotia*, in which he declared that Nova Scotia was “one of the most valuable British colonies.”<sup>25</sup> The recent French encroachment into British territory in Nova Scotia was “a matter of so extraordinary a nature, and so injurious to the nation in general, that every true friend to his country ought to be fully acquainted with it.”<sup>26</sup> Jefferys was quick to describe French geographers as little more than state agents, arguing, “[France’s] geographers and historians have been influenced to prostitute their pens in the most shameful manner, to serve the injurious cause.”<sup>27</sup>

Jefferys used his tracts to deride French geographers and historians. He argued, as did Britain’s boundary commissaries, that geographic information was deliberately misconstrued to serve the French cause. For example, Charlevoix argued in his history of New France that Sir William Alexander’s map divided Nova Scotia into provinces and that only the peninsula was called Nova Scotia. Jefferys argued that Charlevoix wilfully ignored prominent historians, such as De Laet, who argued that Nova Scotia encompassed the entire region. Jefferys also suggested that Charlevoix must have noticed that on Sir William Alexander’s map the names of the provinces (Alexandria and Caledonia) were printed in a smaller font than Nova Scotia. Even the Bellin map that accompanied Charlevoix’s history marked Nova Scotia as both the peninsula and the continent (Figure 6.2).<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Thomas Jefferys, *The Conduct of the French with Respect to the British Dominions in America, particularly Nova Scotia* (London: 1754), 1.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-9.



**Figure 6.2 Jacques-Nicolas Bellin’s *Carte de la Partie Orientale De la Nouvelle France ou du Canada*, 1744, which was published in Charlevoix’s “*L’Histoire et Description Generale de la Nouvelle France*.” The shading (British dark, French light) clearly suggests British possession of the Bay of Fundy’s western coast. Library and Archives Canada, H3/900/1744**

The London geographer continued to offer a history of Nova Scotia culled from published reports, primarily that of Charlevoix. He paid particular attention to how French geographers altered their findings to correspond to imperial demands. Delisle, for example, published maps of l’Acadie in 1700 and 1703 (both of which were cited by the Boundary Commission) that included under the title of Acadia both the peninsula and much of the northeastern mainland. “However that may be,” Jefferys argued,

it may be presumed that Mr. Wiliam De L’Isle, the King of France’s principal geographer, had instructions to curtail the limits assigned by the English to Nova Scotia; for in his map of America, published in 1723, he restrains the name Acadia to a little less than the peninsula.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 45.

Delisle's integrity remained under attack when Jefferys suggested that the French geographer had once before performed a cartographic sleight of hand. According to Jefferys, Delisle's 1718 map of Louisiana transferred all of Carolina to the French by inclosing it behind a green line as part of the French colony, even though his 1703 map of the region placed the province among the English colonies. Altering maps was often to attract attention and support from the public. Delisle had received letters from the Parisian cleric Abbé Bobé suggesting that his maps of Louisiana could be improved by increasing font size and scope to appeal "not to academics, but to an infinite number of people, and might increase your subscriptions."<sup>30</sup> "Our neighbours are very dextrous at either expanding, or contracting," Jefferys noted, "for, whenever they please, they can turn a single fort into a large country, and reduce a large country into a piece of coast."<sup>31</sup>

Geographers were aware of the ideals of objectivity, but their ability to influence the public (intentionally or not) was difficult to moderate. French geographer Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville argued for the importance of securing reliable sources, sorting through dubious materials, and always explaining why one interpretation was chosen over another. While good information was often made available from the state, there was also an obligation to engage the public. "I believe in serving the public," d'Anville wrote, "who must be informed by what authority changes have been made in new maps, and how those changes benefit the study of geography."<sup>32</sup> As Daniel Roche has suggested, there was in the eighteenth century a general interest in educational reform

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<sup>30</sup> Bobé to Delisle, 9 July 1718, in Nelson-Martin Dawson, *L'Atelier Delisle: l'Amérique du Nord sur la Table à Dessin* (Québec: Septentrion, 2000), 240.

<sup>31</sup> Jefferys, *The Conduct of the French*, 45-6.

<sup>32</sup> "Lettre de Monsieur d'Anville à Messieurs du Journal des Sçavans, sur une Carte de l'Amérique Méridionale qu'il vient de publier," *Journal des Sçavans*, March, 1750, pp. 175-76.

that emphasized geography's role in understanding space, a critical component of addressing curiosity about the world.<sup>33</sup> The kings' education (Louis XV under Delisle and Louis XVI under Buache) represented a more general desire among French citizens to become geographically literate. Jefferys respected D'Anville and argued that his maps of North America featuring misplaced boundaries were the result of geographic ignorance and not sinister intent, though the end result remained the same: the casual viewer of the map was misled.<sup>34</sup>

D'Anville and Jefferys seemed to share the opinion that no geographer should ever alter his maps to favour one empire or another. Referring to D'Anville's shock that any mapmaker should be accused of tampering with boundaries, Jefferys stated,

I am surprised at it, no less than he; for it would be strange indeed, if the bounds of kingdoms, any more than the situations of places, were to depend on the arbitrary will of geographers: that would be to have kingdoms at their disposal. But then, I see it has been the case; and at this instant the maps but now just mentioned are produced as arguments, to support the French allegations.<sup>35</sup>

D'Anville himself had been visited by French officials angry that his maps supported British claims to the northeast. But he remained convinced, as did Jefferys, that geographers were not to meddle in international diplomacy. Regardless of their intent and public claims (genuine or not), maps were political tools that would be used and misused as administrators saw fit.

Even geographers who presented themselves as paragons of cartographic objectivity were not above reproach. Jefferys' pamphlet was read by interested citizens, politicians, and geographers across Europe, not all of whom considered the tract

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<sup>33</sup> Daniel Roche, *France in the Enlightenment*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 19-20.

<sup>34</sup> Jefferys, *The Conduct of the French*, 48-50.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

politically neutral.<sup>36</sup> Bellin published a pamphlet in 1755 which included a thinly-veiled criticism of Jefferys' presumed impartiality. Bellin argued that it was possible to degrade the field of geography by using maps to support false claims, which became obvious upon an examination of certain maps of North America, "particularly those recently published by English geographers."<sup>37</sup> Bellin chastised those who would chart their nation's political aspirations over accurate representations of space: love for country was no excuse for false geography.<sup>38</sup>

Bellin's depiction of Acadia belies his claims to objectivity and balanced conclusions. His interpretation was particularly influential considering his position and the political context of the boundary negotiations. Though his earlier maps had extended Nova Scotia onto the continent, Bellin's 1755 tract supported the argument that the English claimed title to only a small portion of the peninsula. In his section on the geographic history of "Acadie, Baie Françoise & Côte des Etchemins," Bellin describes l'Acadie as,

the southern part of a large presqu'isle, situated in the middle of the Bay Français, which had always been part of Canada and belonged to the French until 1713, when l'Acadie was ceded to the English by the Treaty of Utrecht, along with the fort of Port Royal and its surroundings, which were never part of l'Acadie.<sup>39</sup>

This was a powerful argument for someone in Bellin's position to make. As the primary geographer for the department of maps and plans, Bellin had access to all France's maps

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<sup>36</sup> It was translated into French and published in 1755 as *Conduite des François par rapport à la Nouvelle Écosse depuis le premier établissement de cette colonie jusqu'à nos jours*.

<sup>37</sup> Jacques-Nicolas Bellin, *Remarques sur la carte de l'Amérique Septentrionale* (Paris: 1755), 5.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

and was responsible for collecting new geographic information.<sup>40</sup> His tract appeared as commissaries and diplomats were debating the limits of Acadia and had largely accepted



**Figure 6.3** Extract from Bellin's *Carte du Golphe de St. Laurent et pays voisins pour servir à l'Histoire générale des voyages*, 1757. Note that Bellin has marked "Canada" along present-day New Brunswick, claiming that region for France. Memorial University. Centre for Newfoundland Studies, G 3435 1757 B4 c.2 MAP.

that Nova Scotia was the entire peninsula. It was Britain's claims to the western coast of the Bay of Fundy that had French diplomats concerned. Bellin's provocative arguments, coming only two years after Robert de Vaugondy's scandalous maps, did nothing to ease international tensions (Figure 6.3).

Bellin's geographic description of the northeast explicitly separated what was Acadia from the rest of the peninsula and the western coast of the Baie Française. He

<sup>40</sup> Jean-Marc Garant, "Jacques-Nicolas Bellin (1703-1772), Cartographe, Hydrographe, Ingenieur du Ministère de La Marine: Sa Vie, Son Oeuvre, Sa Valeur Historique" (Master's Thesis: Université de Montréal, 1973).

remarked that the French had settled in Acadia but did not neglect the rest of the peninsula and most of the continent. He referred to the western coast of the Baie Française as comprising part of Canada under the name Côte des Etchemins through which ran rivers inhabited by both Natives and the French.<sup>41</sup> It was just this region that the British were demanding as part of Acadia. Bellin was following the French tradition of using their Native allies (and alliances) to claim land for France. If French title seemed dubious, Bellin could always argue that the land was more Native than British. His maps could be read both ways.

### **Advertising and Public Magazines**

Advertising these maps was an important element of the geographer's trade. Presenting new maps to royal academies in both Britain and France helped garner attention for a new publication, but not all mapmakers could give presentations as membership in the Academy was often required.<sup>42</sup> A more public form of advertising was placing notifications in popular journals, such as *Le Journal des Sçavans* or *Gentleman's Magazine*. Journals were a popular, accessible, and often imperially biased medium, and maps published in them could argue for or against empire.<sup>43</sup> Geographers fortunate enough to be favoured by journal editors could find their work appearing in the publication itself to illustrate an article or serve as a frontispiece. Journal editors often expressed their political leanings through their magazines, which meant that maps would

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<sup>41</sup> Bellin, *Remarques*, 40-41.

<sup>42</sup> Mary Sponberg Pedley, *The Commerce of Cartography: Making and Marketing Maps in Eighteenth-Century France and England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 42.

<sup>43</sup> In the Canadian context, Arthur Silver has argued that journals crossed the boundary of literacy because they were often read aloud in public gatherings and discussed among groups. See A. I. Silver, *The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation, 1864-1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 29-30.

often cater to a particular audience. Edward Cave, publisher of the *Gentleman's Magazine* did not hide his imperial fervour and geographers such as London's Thomas Kitchin benefited from such patronage.<sup>44</sup>

By 1755 British maps were advertised in French journals and French maps appeared in British journals. Geographers responded as the Acadian boundary dispute fuelled European interest in North America. In 1755, just as negotiations over the Acadian boundary were faltering, *Le Journal des Sçavans* listed a number of articles and map advertisements concerning North America generally and Nova Scotia specifically. Georges Louis le Rouge, one of many *géographe du roi*, had published a new map of Canada and Louisiana specifically "to inform of recent developments" in North America. Also available from the same map-seller was Mitchell's eight-page map of North America.<sup>45</sup> In November Le Rouge advertised additional maps of North America, including Quebec, Quebec City, Louisbourg, Halifax, and Bellin's map of Port Royal. The notice continued, "the same geographer has for sale *Carte Géographique de l'Isthme de l'Acadie*, containing the forts of Beauséjour, Gaspereau, and the St. Lawrence."<sup>46</sup> Readers could also purchase a translated version of Thomas Jefferys 1755 map of eastern Canada, featuring "the country that the English call Nova Scotia."<sup>47</sup> Interested citizens had at their disposal both English and French maps and could follow international

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<sup>44</sup> E. A. Reitan, "Expanding Horizons: Maps in The "Gentleman's Magazine," 1731-1754," *Imago Mundi* 37 (1985): 54-62. On Edward Cave, see Anthony David Barker, "Cave, Edward (1691–1754)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/view/article/4921> (accessed October 15, 2009).

<sup>45</sup> *Le Journal des Sçavans*, September, 1755, p.636.

<sup>46</sup> *Le Journal des Sçavans*, November, 1755, p.763-764.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 764. Le Rouge lists the Jefferys map under the title *Carte de la partie Orientale du Canada*.



disputes by reading maps that purported to offer an unbiased representation of distant possessions.

The Jefferys map Le Rouge advertised was likely his 1755 map of Nova Scotia. To this map Jefferys added an *Explanation for the Map of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton with the Adjacent Parts of New England and Canada*. In this tract Jefferys described the mapmaker's trade and outlined how map production required careful selection of evidence. A geographer's interpretation depended on the evidence at his disposal (which itself could be biased). He informed his readers that this latest map made use of older maps by Popple, Bellin, D'Anville and others. He also relied on surveys and charts created by British naval officers Nathaniel Blackmore and Captain Southack.<sup>48</sup>

Collecting maps required networking; Jefferys relied on those "communicated to myself, or procured by my friends; who, out of a laudable zeal for the benefit of navigation and commerce, took more than ordinary pains to furnish me with materials."<sup>49</sup> Though Jefferys had criticized Bellin and other geographers in previous pamphlets, he propounded the benefits of collaborative efforts in his *Explanation*. He thanked those who had forwarded him maps and surveys but chastised one man who refused to send him a map because he had before lent the map to another interested publisher. "But this was so far from being a good reason why the draught in question should not have been communicated to me," Jefferys lamented,

For the end of such communications ought to be to advance useful knowledge; and more improvement is to be expected from the endeavours of many people,

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<sup>48</sup> Nathaniel Blackmore's Plaine Chart of Nova Scotia is possibly the first map to employ isobaths (lines connecting places of equal water depth) in the open ocean. See Arthur H. Robinson, "Nathaniel Blackmore's Plaine Chart of Nova Scotia: Isobaths in the Open Sea?," *Imago Mundi* 28 (1976): 137-41.

<sup>49</sup> Thomas Jefferys, *Explanation for the New Map of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton with the Adjacent Parts of New England and Canada* (London: 1755), 3.

than of only one. If the same materials be put into the hands of twenty different persons to work upon, each of them will contribute more or less, according to his abilities, to improve the art or science.<sup>50</sup>

As Mary Pedley notes, geographers often raised the question of plagiarism. It was difficult to balance the desire for individual sales with the belief that more contributors would result in better maps. Collaboration was increasingly popular as cartographic secrecy became less stringent. While earlier exploration and discoveries were closely guarded by government officials, by the eighteenth century there was less concern about what “new” lands could be discovered and more emphasis on supporting territorial claims.<sup>51</sup> Maps were used to both ends. Improved maps could quite literally save lives by ensuring safe travel. Though these debates raged, they were not in the eighteenth century channelled into protective legislation. Legal action was nearly impossible as what laws existed did not cross national boundaries, so a Briton copying a French map was safe from any prosecution.<sup>52</sup>

By listing the various contributors to his latest map, Jefferys demonstrated the Atlantic influence of map compilation. Aside from the famous French geographers, such as Bellin and D’Anville, Jefferys cited two maps created by Nova Scotia surveyor Charles Morris, both of which were praised for their accuracy. But accurate maps were no less political than those created for the sole purpose of furthering an imperial agenda. Jefferys was forced to draw much of his cartographic materials from the French but he took liberty with their conclusions. The area north of New England to the St. Lawrence

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>51</sup> On early imperial cartographic secrecy, see Alison Sandman, “Controlling Knowledge: Navigation, Cartography, and Secrecy in the Early Modern Atlantic,” in *Science and Empire in the Atlantic World*, ed. James Delbourgo and Nicholas Dew (New York: Routledge, 2008), 31-52. Sandman persuasively argues that maps were used to claim territories by the Spanish, a useful corrective to Seed’s over emphasis on Spain’s oral ceremonies of possession. See Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession*.

<sup>52</sup> Pedley, *The Commerce of Cartography*, Ch.4.

claimed by Nova Scotia was “forcibly possessed by the French” (though the French claimed the region as part of New France) and D’Anville’s maps had been much corrected by newer surveys.<sup>53</sup> According to Jefferys, the blame for cartographic inaccuracy lay not with the geographers who were forced to work with available materials, but with the navigators who neglected to observe latitude or did so carelessly.<sup>54</sup>

What Jefferys failed to recognize, or simply chose to ignore, was that navigation was as much an intuitive skill as a developed science. As Jessica Riskin has demonstrated in the case of Enlightenment-era France, empirical sciences were not coldly objective but appealed to human sentiment and sensibility. This “sentimental empiricism” demonstrated that the sciences, like art and literature (more commonly charged with sentimentality) were influenced by human reaction to the outside world.<sup>55</sup> Geographic knowledge in the eighteenth century straddled science and art and was undoubtedly dependent on human experience and a type of “sentimental empiricism.” When the British government commissioned surveys of Newfoundland in 1713, two different types of sailors were charged with the task. On the one hand, John Gaudy created a technical survey. William Taverner, on the other hand, was a practical mariner who simply knew how to navigate a passage and focused on collecting resource inventory and commenting on the voyage itself. For seamen, the practical art of sailing was as useful (if not more) than taking detailed notes of latitude.<sup>56</sup> Geographic

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<sup>53</sup> Jefferys, *Explanation*, p.8.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 10-11.

<sup>55</sup> Jessica Riskin, *Science in the Age of Sensibility: The Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

<sup>56</sup> Olaf Uwe Janzen, "'Of Consequence to the Service': The Rationale Behind Cartographic Surveys in Early Eighteenth-Century Newfoundland," *Northern Mariner* 11, no. 1 (2001): 1-10. The question of determining longitude remained a challenge for sailors while at sea until John Harrison created an accurate timepiece for sea travel. See Dava Sobel, *Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the*

knowledge as collected by geographers and dispensed to an interested public depended on calculations, human observations, and political interpretation.

One of D’Anville’s maps of North America, from which Jefferys collected some of his cartographic information, was advertised for sale and reviewed in 1756.

D’Anville, like Jefferys, included with the map a memoir on its creation. The advertisement invited the reader to judge D’Anville’s accuracy and his wisdom, “as there is as much effort involved in creating a map as in writing a book.”<sup>57</sup> A list of his sources was included as were explanations as to how and why older charts had been corrected. Though much of Nova Scotia and the northeast had been mapped in considerable detail, D’Anville recognized how much work remained. Of Newfoundland, one of Britain’s most commercially valuable colonies, D’Anville noted, “we have no knowledge of the island’s interior.”<sup>58</sup> After listing various other sources of information, including reports and letters, the review noted, “and such is the fruit of this pamphlet. A geographer who wishes to work successfully towards progressing the field of geography must not restrict himself to maps.”<sup>59</sup>

There were limits to what information geographers considered useful. Those who had travelled extensively and taken good measurements of both distance and astronomical positioning provided the best information. Social standing was another contributing factor; clergymen, gentlemen, and those in positions of authority were more

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*Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time* (New York: Walker, 1995); Brian William Richardson, *Longitude and Empire: How Captain Cook’s Voyages Changed the World* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).

<sup>57</sup> *Journal des Sçavans*, June, 1756, p.332

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 334.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 335. The article refers to D’Anville’s map, *Canada, Louisiane, et Terres Angloises* (1755), which was published with the 26-page pamphlet, “Memoire sur la carte intitulee: Canada, Louisiane, & Terres angloises,” 1756.

trusted to provide geographic knowledge than were regular citizens.<sup>60</sup> By the mid 1750s, geographers saw themselves as providing enlightened knowledge in which doubt and mysticism were replaced with observation and science.<sup>61</sup> European knowledge was preferred to that of Aborigines, likely because the differences in understanding space and measuring territory still confused many European explorers.<sup>62</sup> D’Anville noted this disconnect when he discussed his maps’ weaknesses, specifically the land beyond the Illinois River and the course of the Mississippi. “Positive knowledge” of this region ended at the 45<sup>th</sup> degree of latitude, “all that the maps mark beyond that point relies only on a simple understanding taken from the Natives.”<sup>63</sup> Yet map production was only half of knowledge creation. Once published, maps were read and interpreted by men and women who projected onto them their own imperial sentiments.

Even the most popular European maps, such as those of John Mitchell, faced criticism regardless of the disclaimers they might make about ignoring unreliable Native knowledge or working from the latest and most accurate surveys. Unlike earlier commissioned maps that remained at Whitehall, Mitchell’s chart was eventually published and sold publicly throughout Europe. Consequently, the Board of Trade was able to exert influence on a wider audience and shape how the British public understood the empire’s overseas possessions.<sup>64</sup> It also allowed the public to respond to an imperial image of North America. One colonial resident who saw Mitchell’s map found fault not

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<sup>60</sup> Lesley B. Cormack, "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors!: Geography as Self-Definition in Early Modern England," *Isis* 82, no. 314 (1991): 639-61.

<sup>61</sup> See *Geography and Enlightenment*.

<sup>62</sup> Paul W. Mapp, *Mysterious Lands, Pacific Passages, and the Contest for Empire: The Elusive North American West in International Affairs, 1713-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming).

<sup>63</sup> *Journal des Sçavans*, June, 1756, p. 337.

<sup>64</sup> Matthew H. Edney, "John Mitchell's Map of North America (1755): A Study of the Use and Publication of Official Maps in Eighteenth-Century Britain," *Imago Mundi* 60 (2008): 63-85.

in its overarching theme, but in the details. In July of 1756, *Gentleman's Magazine* published a letter from Andrew Johnston, the President of Council Proprietors of East New Jersey. Johnston's concerns were not with Mitchell's interpretation of French and British boundary lines, but with inter-colonial demarcations. According to Johnston, Mitchell had accorded to New York land that belonged to New Jersey. This mistake in the boundary ran contrary "not only to the deeds of the province of New Jersey, but to the general and public estimate."<sup>65</sup> Johnston continued to note the relationship between maps as a representation of space and as indication of private land holding:

We are sensible that it cannot be expected, that you should have minutely examined into the foundation of every line on your map, but believe they were drawn according to the best information you had obtained; and we doubt not that a gentleman of your general reputation for truth, justice, and integrity, will be ever ready to correct any mistake you might have fallen into, especially such as have a tendency to injure the property of others.<sup>66</sup>

The last claim might be accurate, as long as the dispute was among English settlers and not between French and British empires.

### **Local Events and Imperial Response**

Military strategy in the northeast was an element of France and Britain's imperial entanglement. Maps and geographic tracts circulated in both empires, and military success or failure in one theatre influenced actions in another. Even as the first shots were fired in the Ohio River Valley, commissaries debated the Acadian boundary question. As conflict moved northeast, Nova Scotia continued to be a site of central importance to the British and the French. For the British, early losses in the Ohio

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<sup>65</sup> Letter from Andrew Johnston, *Gentleman's Magazine*, July, 1756, p. 287.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

concerned both residents and officials in Nova Scotia and New England.<sup>67</sup> The French were encouraged by early victories to envision an extended French empire that could reclaim lands lost (nominally) to the British at the Treaty of Utrecht. This would be a war that would finally settle territorial conflicts that had persisted in the northeast for almost fifty years.

Stephen J. Hornsby has recently portrayed the Seven Years' War as a conflict based on divergent systems of territorial control. As British territorial possessions expanded, they came into contact with French territories founded on trade and Native alliances. The Seven Years' War ultimately removed the French presence from most of North America and Britain inherited a riverine trade network and accompanying territories that fit well within the British Atlantic trade settlements.<sup>68</sup> Hornsby provides a useful framework for understanding the roots of the Seven Years' War; however, exploring conflict and Nova Scotia's role in military strategy complicate some of his conclusions.

The war had a long history. Louise Dechêne's posthumous study on the people, government, and wars that shaped French Canada under the *ancien régime* suggests historians examine "the Sixteen Years' War," beginning in 1744 and ending in 1760.<sup>69</sup> While this is a fruitful reorganization of imperial conflict in North America, it does not address the continued conflict between the British and Natives after the fall of New France, especially in Nova Scotia. As Geoffrey Plank and John G. Reid have argued, the British succeeded only in separating the Mi'kmaq and their allies from the French; the

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<sup>67</sup> Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*, 324-25.

<sup>68</sup> Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*.

<sup>69</sup> Dechêne and Paré, *Le Peuple, l'État et la Guerre au Canada sous le Régime Français*, Ch.8.

Natives themselves remained a regional force capable of opposing the British in the northeast.<sup>70</sup>

The French at Louisbourg received regular updates about British movements in Halifax from both their Native allies and the Acadians. In 1755, a group of Acadian refugees that had fled to Île St Jean to escape British soldiers informed French officials that their lands at Cobequid, Tatamigouche, and their surroundings had been burnt.<sup>71</sup> Other information relayed to the French was less worrying. A British deserter described the poor state of some British posts. At Beauséjour, for example, there were roughly 1000 men of relatively poor capabilities. They came mostly from Boston and were malnourished. Boston had suffered a poor harvest that year and army officials were having a hard time convincing capable men to enlist.<sup>72</sup> The deserter also informed French officials of the British strategy to take Île St. Jean as soon as the sea became navigable in the spring. From there they would institute a blockade of Louisbourg and let diminishing supplies and famine do the work of soldiers and marines.<sup>73</sup>

Military action in the northeast was limited by attempts at Paris to reach an agreement and mitigate the effects of war. Despite British plans, violence was limited because Britain and France had not yet officially declared war. Jacques Prevost de la Croix, a high-ranking civil administrator at Louisbourg who served in 1755 as acting war commissary under Governor Drucour, informed the minister that the British were carefully selecting which regions they would attack.<sup>74</sup> By June Prevost had learned that

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<sup>70</sup> Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*, 164; Reid, "Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena?," 669-92.

<sup>71</sup> Drucour to Minister, Louisbourg, 14 October 1755, f97, vol. 35, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>72</sup> Declaration of an English Deserter, 1 December 1755, f.132, vol. 35, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> T.A. Crowley, "Prevost de la Croix, Jacques," *DCB*.



the English had attacked posts in both the Ohio River and, more importantly for the French at Louisbourg, at Beauséjour. He noted that the British were not prepared to attack “ancient” French possessions until war had been officially declared, but “they are resolved in all their undertakings to put themselves in possession of the territory they believe belongs to them up to the banks of the St. Lawrence.”<sup>75</sup> This left exposed large swaths of disputed lands along the coast of the Bay of Fundy, including the St. John River so coveted by the French for its year-round access to the Atlantic. The British in Nova Scotia were too occupied with expelling the Acadians to launch effective campaigns beyond the isthmus. In November, Prevost reported that though he had seen warships off the coast, they were likely reconnaissance ships and returned to Halifax, “which had not been calm since the Ohio affaire.”<sup>76</sup>

At Halifax, the prospect of collecting geographic information transformed a period of captivity into a cartographic opportunity. The British might have been hesitant to attack uncontested French settlements, but at least one French soldier had plans to strike at Halifax (Figure 6.4). In 1755, François-Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, the son of Governor Vaudreuil, was captured when his ship strayed from a convoy returning from France. De Rigaud was taken prisoner and sent to Halifax.<sup>77</sup> Later that year, the British intercepted an anonymous letter and map (attributed to de Rigaud) hidden in a ball of soap and placed in a French chest destined for officials in Louisbourg.

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<sup>75</sup> Prevost to Minister, Louisbourg, 14 June 1755, f156v-157, vol. 35, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>76</sup> Prevost to Minister, Louisbourg, 7 November 1755, f198-198v, vol. 35, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>77</sup> Jean Hamelin and Jacqueline Roy, “Rigaud de Vaudreuil, François-Pierre de,” *DCB*.

The map of Halifax was more detailed than most printed maps published since the settlement's founding (evidenced by the correct location of St. Paul's church, often misplaced on published British maps), and the letter was entitled "Projet d'attaque




Figure 6.4 Anonymous (attributed to François-Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil), *Halifax Spy Map*, 1755. This map included fortifications (shore batteries) not included on published maps, and the north and south suburbs are marked with great detail. National Archives, London. State Papers: Domestic, Naval 38.

Hallifax.”<sup>78</sup> The map used hachure lines to indicate the steep incline onto which the settlement was built, and buildings were drawn in detail. It is impossible to determine if each building was sketched accurately, but de Rigaud obviously attempted to provide as

<sup>78</sup> Joan Dawson, *Mapmaker's Eye: Nova Scotia through Early Maps* (Halifax: Nimbus, 1988), 85.

much information as possible. Fortifications, streets, and major buildings were numbered and listed in a corresponding legend. Both the north and south suburbs were plotted, and he included a scale to provide a general idea of the settlement's size. De Rigaud had military experience, but he was not an engineer. His ability to create such a useful map demonstrates how important cartography was to the military. De Rigaud offered a specific plan of attack. A force of 3500 men would be necessary, including 500 regular troops, 2000 Canadians, and 1000 Natives. The first task would be to cut down or uproot the palisades surrounding the town. These wooden logs were not too tall and were embedded no more than three feet in the ground. Once removed, the attackers would have access to the settlement's blockhouses (*fortins*) and magazines (*poudrière*), all of which were carefully labelled on the map.<sup>79</sup>

The author meant for the instructions to be read with the map to clarify exactly where to find important locations within the settlement. The description of the first wave of attacks outlined both where soldiers should go and how they could get there. The letter's recipients would have learned that a blockhouse, called the citadel, cut the town and the garrison in two, and taking it would require a larger force than other blockhouses. After attacking the citadel it would be imperative to gain control of the magazine located near by, which was "36 feet long, white, standing alone, and without surrounding palisades, just below blockhouse labelled #3."<sup>80</sup> From there the regulars could get to a magazine located just across from the Anglican church in the "Place d'Armes" (present-day Grand Parade) by turning left and heading down one of the large streets until the

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<sup>79</sup> Anonymous (François-Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil), "Projet d'attaque Hallifax," f225-225v, State Papers: Dominions, Naval 38, National Archives, London.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, f227.

white church with an elevated clock appeared. Approximately 200 Canadians were to follow the regulars to the church but carry on down the same street to take the governor's house, which was marked #15 on the map. If unable to take the house, these men were to burn it and return to the church.<sup>81</sup>

The ambitious plan to take Halifax also recognized the potential for failure. De Rigaud instructed the attackers, if unable to take the town, to set fire to as much of it as possible and retreat. They were to burn all the blockhouses, the magazines, the governor's house, and the church. The author makes several references to these structures as built of hard, dry wood, obviously emphasizing their incendiary nature. There is even the suggestion that the church could be burnt with the prisoners in it, though de Rigaud left that instruction vague.<sup>82</sup> Once all the soldiers had assembled together at a meeting point they would return the way they came, passing magazines and setting them to flame en route.

The map and accompanying instructions did more than offer a detailed invasion plan. It would have put the French in possession of comprehensive information about Britain's strongest settlement north of Boston. The second section of the letter described the town itself. Halifax could contain 1500 wood houses built into the side of a hill that dominated the settlement. The town had eight streets running parallel to the shore intersected by seven streets running perpendicular to the harbour. Each street was approximately thirty feet wide and roughly constructed. When in the town, it was

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., f227v-228.

<sup>82</sup> Attackers were to burn the magazines, destroy the cannons, and "de mettre le feu dans toute la ville, à l'Eglise ou seront les prisonniers, dans les fortin qu'on aura brulé d'avance..." Ibid., f230.

necessary to climb from one place to another thanks to the steep incline of the hill.<sup>83</sup>

Outside of the settlement proper were two neighbourhoods, one to the north and one to the south, marked #18 and #17, respectively. The southern neighbourhood had about 250 houses while the northern had approximately 100, none set too far from the shore.

During the winter these areas were almost totally deserted and those who remained were Irish and German. Aside from the soldiers, there were in Halifax about 1500 residents, “all generally miserable and fearful of an irruption this winter.”<sup>84</sup> This description of the settlement as it was in 1755 paints a picture of a poorly-fortified settlement that could be taken or put to flames with a force of only 3500 men. French officials never benefited from the map nor the invasion instructions (they were intercepted by the British), but reclaiming Acadia remained a French goal.

The violence in Nova Scotia encouraged Acadians and the Mi'kmaq to combine their efforts (and considerable geographic knowledge) against the British. It was essential for the French to continue harassing the British in Nova Scotia. As Acadians fled from their settlements and took up residence wherever they could, the French found themselves able to exploit Acadian frustration and resentment towards the British, who had in 1755 begun deporting the neutral French to other British American colonies.

Louis-Joseph de Montcalm, a colonel in the French army, had in 1756 been appointed major-general of the regular troops in Canada partly because few ranking French officers wished to serve in the remote theatre of North America when a war was coming to Europe.<sup>85</sup> He wrote to his minister from Montreal that bothering the British was an

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., f230v-232.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., f233.

<sup>85</sup> W.J. Eccles, “Montcalm, Louis-Joseph de, Marquis de Montcalm,” *DCB*.

ongoing tactic. “Monsieur de Boishébert still occupies his little post in Acadia,” Montcalm informed his superiors, “where there is a collection of Acadian families with Père Germain, the Jesuit. They are in the woods now from where they can harass the English.”<sup>86</sup>

If sending parties of Acadians and Natives from the woods to assault the British was not enough, Montcalm was willing to go further. By the fall of 1756 he had devised a campaign against Acadia, but he required assistance from France. He needed ships, troops, and provisions. Montcalm could raise 1000 men (including Natives) but requested 1500 men to supplement the force, which would gather in Acadia. The major-general was concerned that the British wanted to control Gaspé, from where they could institute naval blockades and limit what assistance was coming from France. Though France had maintained naval dominance in the region in 1750-54, Montcalm requested a squadron because the British had ships at Halifax.<sup>87</sup> Gerald S. Graham argued that France’s geographic position on the continent required a stronger army than navy, which weakened its ability to defend or conquer new territories in North America because such actions demanded a strong naval presence.<sup>88</sup> N.A.M. Rodger disagrees, however, noting that Britain had no “blue-water policy” by which naval power amassed territorial possessions. The British navy’s main concern was protecting Britain.<sup>89</sup> These debates

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<sup>86</sup> Montcalm to Minister, Montreal, 12 June 1756, *Collection de Manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France* [CMNF], vol. 4, Ed. J. Blanchet (Quebec: 1885), 27.

<sup>87</sup> Montcalm to Minister, Montreal, 1 November 1756, *CMNF*, vol. 4, 80-81. Julian Gwyn, *Frigates and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters, 1745-1815* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).

<sup>88</sup> Gerald Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), 109-11.

<sup>89</sup> N.A.M. Rodger, “Sea-Power and Empire, 1688-1793,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume II: The Eighteenth Century*, ed. Peter J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 169-82.

must be infused with an Aboriginal element. In North America, particularly in the northeast, the Mi'kmaq and their allies influenced the development of imperial strategy by allying themselves with one side or the other. The Mi'kmaq were a maritime power who knew the coasts and rivers of Nova Scotia better than the British or French. Effective French maritime attacks in Nova Scotia depended on Mi'kmaq participation.<sup>90</sup>

### **France's Acadia Military Strategy**

As the war progressed across North America and Europe, Acadia continued to influence British and French military strategies. Officials in France, even after the failed boundary negotiations of 1750-1755, considered Acadia a touchstone for any potential agreements with Britain. Charles Louis Auguste Fouquet, Maréchal duc de Belle-Isle, the eldest son of the Marquis de Belle-Isle, climbed the ranks of France's military. In 1756 he was named minister of state and would later become the secretary of state for war.<sup>91</sup> In 1757, as minister of state, he wrote from Versailles about the war. He argued that because America was the cause of the war, it should remain the focus of France's efforts. According to Maréchal duc de Belle-Isle, there could be no peace agreement with Britain "if we cannot possess Acadia."<sup>92</sup>

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On the existence and importance of a British "blue-water policy," see Daniel A. Baugh, "Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce: The use of a 'Grand Marine Empire,'" in Lawrence Stone, *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London: Routledge, 1994), 185-223.

<sup>90</sup> In 1756, the French and Mi'kmaq captured a British ship with thirty men attempting to cross the Gut of Canso. At least ten men were scalped. See, Prevost to Minister, Louisbourg, 2 October 1756, f149, vol. 36, C11B, ANOM. These attacks were successful enough to lead Lawrence to reinstate a bounty on Mi'kmaq scalps. See Stephen E. Patterson, "1744-1763: Colonial Wars and Aboriginal Peoples," in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History*, ed. Phillip A. Buckner and John G. Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 147-48.

<sup>91</sup> Christophe Levantal, *Ducs et Pairs et Duchés-Pairies Laïques à l'Époque Moderne (1519-1790): Dictionnaire Prosographique, Généalogique, Chronologique, Topographique et Heuristique* (Paris: Editions Maisonneuve & Larose, 1996), 439.

<sup>92</sup> Lettre du Maréchal duc de Belle-Isle, Versailles, 13 January 1757, *CMNF* vol. 4, 84.

As late as 1758, just months before the British captured Louisbourg, Montcalm shared Maréchal duc de Belle-Isle's opinion. By this time Montcalm's disagreements with Vaudreuil, the governor of New France, over military strategy were well known. Kenneth Banks has suggested, "their division rested directly on different types of geographic knowledge and training gained in the field."<sup>93</sup> Vaudreuil favoured a policy that would emphasize the importance of the Lake Ontario region and the maintenance of Native alliances, while Montcalm saw little value in inland lakes and preferred traditional military engagement to that influenced by Native ambushes and quick retreats. Central to Montcalm's strategy was building defences and preserving the core of the colony.<sup>94</sup> As evidenced by Montcalm's correspondence with the minister of the Marine, that core included Acadia.

Montcalm's vision of French Canada relied heavily on France's possession of Acadia. He illustrated this image with the maps he described or sent to France. The minister of the Marine had requested Montcalm's opinion on how best to settle the limits of New France. This request revisited the question of how New France, Acadia, Nova Scotia, and New England were to be divided. Montcalm noted that Vaudreuil had a map in his possession that had been created from various reports from officers, Natives, and prisoners. Attached to the map were observations made by Monsieur Pouchot, an army officer and engineer who held various posts in New France and served as Vaudreuil's geographer.<sup>95</sup> Pouchot had also created his own map for Vaudreuil which had been sent to France. Not surprisingly, considering his rift with New France's governor, Montcalm

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<sup>93</sup> Kenneth J. Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 198.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 198-99.

<sup>95</sup> Peter N. Moogk, "Pouchot (Pouchot de Maupas, Pouchat, Pourchaut, Boucheau), Pierre," *DCB*.



had not seen Vaudreuil's maps; nor had Monsieur le chevalier de Levis, Montcalm's second in command, though he had requested them. Consequently, Montcalm admitted that his vision might differ from Vaudreuil's. He decided to send his ideas to the minister to be used as he saw fit, possibly with a map of Canada to illustrate his points.<sup>96</sup>

Montcalm then sent a coded message outlining his vision of territorial boundaries in North America. His arguments were not always clearly stated, but he did put an emphasis on the importance of the northeast. Montcalm began his message by arguing that "to regulate the limits it is necessary at the very least that France possess what the English call Acadia, extending to the isthmus, and retake Beauséjour."<sup>97</sup> What is unclear is whether Montcalm meant the peninsula or the Bay of Fundy's western coast, both of which the British called Acadia at different times. He likely meant the continental coast (a territory the French claimed was part of New France) as his next argument emphasized the strategic importance of controlling the St. John River.

Montcalm, like his predecessors, was willing to concede that supporting Aboriginal title was an equally viable option so long as it prevented British expansion. While he recognized the importance of the St. John River, he added that the region could be left undivided to the Abenakis and the Mi'kmaq.<sup>98</sup> Although the British were at this time focused on capturing Louisbourg, their focus would also turn to the St. John River area after the fort's fall when New England soldiers were dispatched to remove the

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<sup>96</sup> Montcalm to Minister, Montreal, 23 February 1758, *CMNF* vol. 4, 151-52.

<sup>97</sup> *Memoire de Monsieur de Montcalm sur les limites de la Nouvelle-France (en chiffre)*, 1758, *CMNF* vol. 4, 152.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

Acadians and take possession of the region.<sup>99</sup> Montcalm's willingness to surrender strategically valuable territory to France's Native allies suggests not only that this alliance would last, but also that the Native forces in northeastern North America remained strong enough to possess and defend such territory. Though France's desires to divide territory around l'Acadie became moot with the fall of Louisbourg (1758), then Québec (1759), and Montréal (1760), their Native allies continued to trouble the British without support from France.

### **Land Management and Military Conflict in British Settlements**

The Mi'kmaq were an external threat to the administrators at Halifax, but government officials also faced internal challenges. Of particular concern were calls for a representative assembly and the desire to secure Acadian lands. These related issues were matters of land: one barrier to creating an assembly was a lack of English settlers who possessed property and could stand for office. Property was a fundamental concern for British settlers in Nova Scotia. Territorial sovereignty, as defined by settling and improving lands, was supported both by Roman and English common law.<sup>100</sup> Furthermore, in the eighteenth century, settlement in Nova Scotia was influenced by New England (its neighbour), Virginia (the example on which its government was established), and France (who had administered the colony until 1710). These entangled influences shared a dependence on surveys and geographic knowledge. Before land could be settled productively, it had to be mapped, recorded, and allotted.

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<sup>99</sup> Geoffrey Plank, "New England Soldiers in the St John River Valley, 1758-1760," in *New England and the Maritime Provinces*, 59-73.

<sup>100</sup> MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession*; Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession*.

Property distribution and land claims undoubtedly shaped the early development of representative government in Nova Scotia, but administrators (drawing from the French) learned that land was a tool of allegiance and loyalty (and vice versa). Lawrence explained to the Board of Trade that he had not called for a representative assembly because Halifax was the sole township in the province. The governor wanted detailed instructions from London on how best to proceed, but warned his superiors that such an undertaking would be costly, requiring the erection of a building and the hiring of clerks and other bureaucratic employees. In Lawrence's opinion, this was not a cost that residents of Halifax could carry on their own.<sup>101</sup> This was not a new argument. Nearly twenty years earlier, *Gentleman's Magazine's* only mention of Nova Scotia was the following short description: "A new government not sufficiently settled to establish an assembly, and therefore cannot make laws or raise taxes."<sup>102</sup>

Even without an assembly, Governor Lawrence encouraged inhabitants within the peninsula to improve the plots they had been granted. Settlers were paid to clear land under previous governors (quickly draining the apportioned funds), demonstrating the importance of "improvement" to British sovereignty.<sup>103</sup> Though the war delayed the consideration of any new settlements in Nova Scotia, Lawrence did use his time to visit the region and evaluate its prospects.<sup>104</sup> His trips throughout Nova Scotia convinced him of the region's capacity to support thousands of new settlers. Chignecto, Cobequid, Minas, Pisiquid, and Annapolis alone could bear 20,000 settlers. He had been

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<sup>101</sup> Lawrence to the Board of Trade and Plantations [BTP], Halifax, 8 December 1755, f9-10, vol. 16, CO 217, National Archives London [NA].

<sup>102</sup> *Gentleman's Magazine*, October, 1736, p.575.

<sup>103</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 3 November 1756, f69, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, f71-71v.

announcing both the quality and quantity of arable lands in New England papers and was sure that when the war was over the settlers would come.<sup>105</sup> Yet there were also concerns among settlers already established in Nova Scotia. Men such as Malachy Salter complained through their London agent, Ferdinando John Paris, about the lack of an assembly, a want of military defences, and few enforceable laws.<sup>106</sup> British officials in Nova Scotia had to address internal challenges before they could hope to attract settlers.

Of these numerous complaints, the first to be resolved was the establishment of a general assembly. Creating a legislative body took years of encouragement and instructions from the Board of Trade. Cornwallis was directed to create an assembly, but he felt there were too few settlers and townships to do so. When Lawrence became governor in 1755, his focus on military concerns overshadowed the need for representative government, and he actively delayed fulfilling the Board of Trade's instructions. Georgia, a settlement with only 4000 inhabitants, created an assembly in 1755, which encouraged the Board of Trade that action could be taken in Nova Scotia. For British Whigs and the Board of Trade, an assembly elected by the people was a central component of government. Imperial jurists had determined that it was in fact illegal for Nova Scotia to be governed by governor and Council, as they lacked the authority to pass laws. Nova Scotia officials were continually pressured by imperial administrators to establish an assembly, until finally Lawrence acquiesced in 1758.<sup>107</sup> An assembly would also allow Nova Scotia (eventually) to collect taxes and help finance its

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<sup>105</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 9 November 1757, f174-75, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.

<sup>106</sup> Ferdinando John Paris, "Petition on behalf of Freeholders of Halifax, Nova Scotia," n/d[1758?], f204-204v, vol. 16, CO 217, NA. See also, S. Buggiey, "Salter, Malachy (Malachi)," *DCB*.

<sup>107</sup> W. Stewart MacNutt, *The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 56-60.

development, which had cost the British government approximately £700,000 in the settlement's first ten years.<sup>108</sup> Yet complaints against Lawrence's management of that body continued after its creation, especially his tampering with settlements and township boundaries to influence its membership.

After calling an assembly, Lawrence found that he could manipulate township boundaries to favour his inner circle in an attempt to limit the assembly's influence on his power. In 1760, two years after the assembly had been established, Robert Sanderson wrote a memorial detailing the Lawrence administration's abuses of power and manipulation of land resources. Sanderson was the first speaker of the Nova Scotia assembly, and his accusations demonstrated how Governor Lawrence used land and property to maintain influence over the assembly. Sanderson's accusations fell into two categories: property theft and unethical political behaviour. He began with the story of a man who purchased his lot in 1753 and built a house with a fence. Soldiers removed part of the fence that winter, likely for fuel. The same thing happened in 1755 and 1757. In 1759 the settler went away on business and during his absence Lawrence gave the land to someone else. Similarly, Mr. John Seutt bought a lot with a house and intended to enlarge it. Soldiers took down the house and carried away the wood. They were eventually caught, tried, and sentenced to be whipped, but Lawrence remitted their sentence and refused any restitution to Seutt. Another settler, John Grant, found his house removed by order of the governor to make room for a battery. He too was unable

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<sup>108</sup> Thomas Beamish Akins, *History of Halifax City* (Dartmouth: Brook House, 1895; reprint, 2002), 242-44.

to secure damages as was customary in similar cases.<sup>109</sup> According to Sanderson, Lawrence did more than take land from settlers; he granted to individuals land that Cornwallis had intended to benefit the public. The Commons, surveyed and set-aside by Charles Morris for general use, was slowly being divided, granted, and enclosed by settlers favoured by Lawrence.<sup>110</sup>

Though Lawrence did call an assembly in 1758, Sanderson charged that the governor influenced its makeup to ensure men in his inner circle found seats. As Sanderson explained, the Board of Trade issued instructions on how to elect representatives for the available pool of qualified, propertied men. To ensure his men had a better chance at being elected, Lawrence created new townships. According to Sanderson,

To effect his purposes the Governor granted away large tracts of the best lands in these countys & towns (being mostly such as were cultivated by the old Nova Scotians lately removed) to such persons as he thought proper, to make them Freeholders therein and qualify them to choose members or to be chosen to represent the said uninhabited countys & towns.<sup>111</sup>

Control over the distribution of land and the setting of boundaries could be used as easily for patronage as for representative government. Sanderson charged that Jonathan Belcher, the chief justice, received 1320 acres; Benjamin Green, the treasurer, 2030 acres; John Collier, judge of the admiralty, 1560 acres; Charles Morris, surveyor general, 3712 acres; and Richard Bulkeley, lieutenant-governor, 2120 acres. Lawrence called an assembly shortly after these grants were made. The assembly, together with the

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<sup>109</sup> The Memorial of Robert Sanderson, Esq., Late Speaker of the House of Assembly at Halifax in Nova Scotia, f74-5, vol. 18, CO 217, NA. The memorial was sent to the Board of Trade who took it seriously enough to demand an explanation from Benjamin Green, who was accused in the memorial of giving Malachy Salter, a Halifax merchant, two government contracts in exchange for a portion of the profits. See Donald F. Chard, "Green, Benjamin," *DCB*.

<sup>110</sup> The Memorial of Robert Sanderson, f75.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, f78.

governor's council, comprised the general assembly of the province. Its members included Lawrence's men and one Phillip Knaute, the representative for Lunenburg.<sup>112</sup> After Lawrence's death in 1760, the Board of Trade asked Jonathan Belcher to investigate the various accusations made against the late governor. Belcher concluded that the accusations were without foundation.<sup>113</sup> Considering Belcher's close association with Lawrence, and notwithstanding his opposition to Lawrence's delay in calling an assembly, his examination was at best "awkward," and quite possibly biased.<sup>114</sup> During Lawrence's gubernatorial term, territorial control was as much about asserting his political will within British Nova Scotia as it was about extending imperial power in northeastern North America.

### **The Seven Years' War in the Popular Press**

The Seven Years' War was the subject of much debate among British and French literate citizens. Imperial conflict was the subject of much debate in both Britain and France, with journals in each country describing the important location and strategic value of Nova Scotia and l'Acadie. As Kathleen Wilson has argued, popular journals allowed the British public to express their discontent with many aspects of British political culture and imperial policy, including the perceived weakness of an increasingly "effeminate" British state too influenced by France.<sup>115</sup> In France, the Seven Years' War was remarkable because it allowed the press not only to stir up hostility towards an

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid., f78-78v.

<sup>113</sup> Dominick Graham, "Lawrence, Charles," *DCB*.

<sup>114</sup> S. Buggey, "Belcher, Jonathan," *DCB*.

<sup>115</sup> Wilson, *The Sense of the People*, 185.

enemy, but also to mobilize French support for a lengthy war. Previous to 1756, only religious wars resulted in a similar campaign for national support.<sup>116</sup>

Much of the attention on l'Acadie began in 1755 with published excerpts from the Boundary Commission. These journals allowed the reader to put imperial negotiations in the context of overseas conflict, and transformed official discussions into (at times biased) public knowledge. *Le Journal des Sçavans* first offered its readers a sampling of the lengthy memoir in December of 1755. The editor noted that while the Commission had released three volumes of the memoirs, only the first concerned negotiations (the other two were comprised of old treaties and other sources cited by the commissaries). As an indication of the region's importance, the *Journal* began its coverage with l'Acadie, which required eight full pages of that month's publication, leaving the discussions over St. Lucia for a future date.<sup>117</sup> The first summary covered most of l'Acadie's history and referred to the authority of geographers to determine the region's boundaries. Published in a French journal, the excerpt highlighted France's claims to l'Acadie.

In Britain, *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *London Magazine* offered a more Anglo-centric interpretation of competition for Nova Scotia. An anonymous letter in the *London Magazine* argued that though the region of Nova Scotia had been given various names in the past, especially on French maps, France could lay no claim to the province after 1713 when it was ceded to Britain. The author suggested that France was not satisfied with its possessions in North America and was now looking towards the Mississippi, "having a view, according to their royal map-maker, of no less extent than to

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<sup>116</sup> Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France*, 83-91.

<sup>117</sup> *Le Journal des Sçavans*, December, 1755, pp.786-94.



have a communication of commerce from the river St. Lawrence to the bay of Mexico?”<sup>118</sup> In 1756, *Gentleman's Magazine* ran its own summary of the Boundary Commission running over two full pages. The excerpts were drawn from the English memorials and emphasized that what France considered Acadia was co-terminus with what the British considered Nova Scotia.<sup>119</sup>

A letter sent from a cleric to a member of the British administration underlined the concern some Britons had over France's management of their dominions. What concerned the cleric were the annual surveys France conducted. “The political arithmetic, your Lordship cannot fail to observe,” noted the cleric, “does not only regard their people, in respect to their numbers, sexes and ages, colours and qualities, but descends even to their cattle, their manufactures, and the very produce and dimensions of their lands.”<sup>120</sup> The cleric worried about the military potential of such knowledge and warned his letter's recipient that Britain imported from France too much that was “ruinous” and “illicit,” while not adopting what useful practices the French had developed such as this kind of surveying.<sup>121</sup>

As the conflict continued in North America and the likelihood of war in Europe grew, popular journals in Britain and France increased their coverage of North American affairs. Readers were given more detailed accounts of how imperial strategy was unfolding in the northeast and of the importance of controlling territory, which often depended on Native support. A letter sent from British administrators to local officials in New York made France's intentions clear. They wanted to cut off Britain's

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<sup>118</sup> *London Magazine*, May, 1755, pp. 215-16.

<sup>119</sup> *Gentleman's Magazine*, March, 1756, pp. 183-85.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, February, 1756, p.59.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

communications with the Natives and “make a line of circumvallation, to confine the English settlements within such bounds as the French are pleased to set to the English provinces.”<sup>122</sup> To prevent France from becoming the masters of North America, Britain had to improve their relationship with the Natives. Doing so would require becoming “masters of the Indian countries, so as to secure themselves, and protect the Indians. Then, and then only, would the English have a real, an actual interest and an alliance with the Indians.”<sup>123</sup> If this letter was in fact sent from an administrator to officials in New York (no doubt some letters published in popular journals were fabricated), then it points to the flawed logic of British imperial strategy. As demonstrated by the French, the best way to secure an alliance with the Natives was to support their land claims; taking Native land was not a new policy, nor was it effective.

French journals were equally interested in the geographic implications of the Seven Years’ War. They reported on (and criticized) British accounts. The lead article in the March 1756 issue of *Journal des Sçavans* was a review of *The Geographical History of Nova Scotia* (London: 1749), which was meant to promote settlement and commerce in the province around the founding of Halifax. Readers learned of its extent, its importance both to commerce and security in North America, and the worldview of its Native inhabitants. They were informed that Canada, as a geographic location, stretched both north and south from the St. Lawrence river; Acadia, the review suggested, was never more than the southern part of the peninsula, contrary to the limits assigned in the original publication. This description was necessary, the article argued, to ensure that the reader was aware that the region described in the work under the name “Nouvelle

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., May, 1756, p. 211.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p. 212.

Écosse” was in fact southern New France and Acadia.<sup>124</sup> The review also took issue with how the French were portrayed in the publication. Far from extending their claims and relying on artifice and force to take the region from the English, France was the victim of English aggression not only in l’Acadie, but throughout North America.<sup>125</sup>

The review argued that to secure title to certain regions in North America, including Nova Scotia, the British renamed them. William Wicken and other historians have similarly argued that renaming was an act of possession employed by both Britain and France.<sup>126</sup> Holland had made similar complaints against the British concerning their sixteenth-century settlements. “This conduct [against Holland],” noted the review, “is no different than that taken against New France and Acadia, where the English claim to be the first to discover a territory and to ensure their title to the possession they have recourse to the imaginary names that they introduced.”<sup>127</sup> The Treaty of Saint-Germain served as an example. On the one hand, the author of the original publication argued that the English derived legitimacy for the name Nova Scotia from that 1679 treaty. Yet the review, on the other hand, argued that the name Nova Scotia “was an imaginary term that the French never used, preferring to employ names both common and known.”<sup>128</sup> Though the review was actively emphasizing the perceived biases and errors that plagued the original publication, it too was biased. Geographic reports, like maps, often conveyed a political message.

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<sup>124</sup> *Journal des Sçavans*, March, 1756, pp. 131-133.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 174. Naming as an element of possession is a common theme in cartographic historiography. For a specifically Nova Scotian example, see “The Conquest of ‘Nova Scotia’: Cartographic Imperialism and the Echoes of a Scottish Past,” in Reid, *Essays*, 87-102.

<sup>127</sup> *Journal des Sçavans*, March, 1756p. 134.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

The British were equally interested in following both the progress of the Seven Years' War and the geographic information that the conflict provided. Maps from previous conflicts reminded readers that the region was strategically important. By 1758, Cape Breton was featured heavily in British magazines. In August, the title page of the *London Magazine* was Thomas Jefferys' 1745 map *A Plan of the City & Fortifications of Louisbourg* (Figure 6.5). That issue included a republication of the journal of the siege at Louisbourg first published by the *London Gazette*, outlining how the British attacked and took Île Royale. Also included in the issue were the terms of capitulation offered to and accepted by the French governor.<sup>129</sup> The September 1758 issue continued the coverage of events in northeastern North America by publishing a map of the region accompanied by a geographic description. The author outlined some of the differences between French and English maps of the area, notably around the Saguenay River. "In entering it," the author noted, "you leave the port of Tadoussac on the right. Most geographers have placed a town here, tho' there never was but one French house, and a few Indian hutts for the Savages, who come here at the fair time, and carry away their booths with them, when it is over."<sup>130</sup> Readers were made aware of how easily a map could transform a seasonal meeting place into an established town.

Transforming wilderness into a prosperous settlement was important for British officials in Nova Scotia, and journals with an interested audience facilitated attracting settlers to a newly conquered territory. *Gentleman's Magazine* published a call for proposals aimed at those interested in taking up land made vacant by the Acadian expulsion. Readers learned that "a favourable opportunity is thereby given for the

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<sup>129</sup> *London Magazine*, August, 1758, pp. 379-83, 420.

<sup>130</sup> *London Magazine*, September, 1758, p. 439.



**Figure 6.5** Thomas Jefferys' *A Plan of the City and Harbour of Louisbourg, 1745*. *London Magazine*, August, 1758.

peopling and cultivating, as well as the lands vacated by the French, as every other part of that valuable province.”<sup>131</sup> One hundred thousand acres of the available land was described as capable of producing wheat, rye, barley, oats, hemp, and flax, while a similar amount had been cleared and planted with English grass. Granted lands would be intermixed to ensure that every farmer had a portion of arable land, woods, and grassland. In addition, these grants were situated in the Bay of Fundy with its various rivers navigable “for ships of burthen.”<sup>132</sup> Governor Charles Lawrence issued the proclamation, but he would soon learn that advertising available land was far easier than convincing settlers to take grants.

<sup>131</sup> *Gentleman's Magazine*, January, 1759, p. 41.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42

Magazines were a forum in which readers could respond to advertisements, providing them with a voice in imperial affairs. Few interested citizens in Britain were willing to move to North America before a peace was signed with France. One contributor to *Gentleman's Magazine* shared with its readers how best to secure a peace both beneficial to Britain and capable of preventing future wars. The author began by rebuking the role of patronage in British politics by suggesting that finding a negotiator qualified to secure a lasting peace would be difficult "owing to the state policy so systematically adopted of late years, of giving places, not to the persons who can best execute the business, ---but to those who can best do a job."<sup>133</sup> The author eventually turned his attention to France's "perfidy" in relation to Nova Scotia. Britain had done little with its Atlantic province from the Treaty of Utrecht to that of Aix-la-Chapelle, and since the founding of Halifax boundary disputes had dominated British policy in the northeast. Both sides agreed to the commission, but "while the commissaries trifled away their time at Paris, the usurpations went on in America."<sup>134</sup> France built forts on the isthmus and made frequent incursions on the peninsula, "thus deciding by the sword, in time of full peace, that controversy which they themselves had agreed should be amicably adjusted by their commissaries."<sup>135</sup>

The author continued to argue that to avoid another war Britain must keep Canada, notably British Acadia and Nova Scotia, including the Bay of Fundy and the St. John River. France had long tired of that possession; if they demanded the territory it

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<sup>133</sup> *Gentleman's Magazine*, December, 1759, p. 586. Historians seem to agree that patronage and electoral influence were determining factors in securing appointments. See James A. Henretta, "*Salutary Neglect*": *Colonial Administration under the Duke of Newcastle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 32-35.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 587.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

would be only to lay the foundations for future expansion which would lead inevitably to another war. In a bid to avoid future conflict, the author presciently suggested destroying French posts of no use to Britain. The British possession of Halifax and Newfoundland rendered Louisbourg redundant. “Without waiting for a congress,” the letter read, “let orders be forthwith sent to demolish it, so as not to leave one stone of the fortification upon another; to remove the inhabitants to Nova Scotia, a better country; and to leave the island a bare and barren rock.”<sup>136</sup> Louisbourg had been returned to France at the peace of 1748 only to serve as a military hub for the Seven Years’ War; Britons were warned to avoid repeating such a mistake at future agreements. For literate citizens of Britain and France, geographic reports and maps were fodder for opinions, insults, and ideas. Understanding imperial policy depended on envisioning overseas possessions and military operations; public journals provided not only a source of information but also a medium of intellectual exchange.

### **The Geography of Expulsion, Resettlement, and Resistance**

The Seven Years’ War provided an opportunity for British forces to implement a political strategy that had been debated since shortly after the Treaty of Utrecht: expelling the Acadians. Events in Ohio and the likelihood of an imperial war with France made the expulsion possible. The British had learned that controlling Nova Scotia was contingent on removing opposition, as past attempts at accommodation had not yielded the desired result of creating a truly British settlement. The decision to expel the “neutral French” signalled a failure in British policy, which had until then favoured using land grants and

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid., pp.590-91.

the law to transform Acadians into British subjects.<sup>137</sup> What administrators in Halifax eventually discovered was that removing the Acadians increased the potential for British settlement, but it did not make Nova Scotia British. This argument can be extended to North America generally. Colin G. Calloway recently argued, “the end of the Anglo-French contest for North American dominion did not end the contest for North American land. In fact, it intensified the competition.”<sup>138</sup> Natives prepared for conflict as the British turned their attention towards Aboriginal land. Expelling the French created a political vacuum in the northeast. While removing settlers was a matter of opportunity and military capability, settling their lands required securing a lasting alliance with the Mi’kmaq and their allies, which was never a British strength.

The legal justifications for the removal, sent from Jonathan Belcher to Secretary Pownall in 1755, were weak.<sup>139</sup> Negotiations were held in July between officials at Halifax and Acadian delegates over swearing an unconditional oath, but the Acadians refused to acquiesce to British demands. The decision to expel the French required legal support, so the governor’s council called on Belcher to write a report justifying the actions.<sup>140</sup> Belcher was aware of the implications of such an action and constructed his findings as explicitly as possible, “as this resolution may possibly come under debate upon a future Treaty.”<sup>141</sup> His remarks, written in late July 1755, hinted at the various contexts and contingencies that led the British seriously to consider expelling the French. He argued that the Acadians had since the Treaty of Utrecht been nothing other than

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<sup>137</sup> Reid, *Essays*, 177.

<sup>138</sup> Colin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 47.

<sup>139</sup> Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*, 320.

<sup>140</sup> Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*, 144-45.

<sup>141</sup> Belcher to BTP, New Jersey, 24 December 1755, f22, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.



rebels to the British King, and keeping them in Nova Scotia would run contrary to the instructions provided to Cornwallis upon the founding of Halifax. The British had recently captured Fort Beauséjour and retaining the Acadians would go against the stated intentions of that expedition, which was to strengthen Britain's claims to the northeast. Belcher also argued that if the Acadians were allowed to stay in Nova Scotia they would inevitably return to their "treacherous" and "perfidious" ways, at which time the opportunity to expel them would no longer exist.<sup>142</sup> Nor would the increased number of ships and troops at Halifax, sent in preparation for an expanded conflict in North America, be available after the war; after years of discussion and inaction, according to Belcher, Britain must act decisively. John Mack Faragher notes that Cornwallis's instructions said nothing about removing the Acadians; in fact, his instructions had been superseded by Hopson's. Unable to rely on the law for justification, Britain took advantage of an opportunity.<sup>143</sup>

Historians have offered different interpretations of the deportation's significance. On the one hand, John Mack Faragher has argued that the Acadian deportation was an early example of ethnic cleansing, referring to Charles Morris's expulsion plan as the "smoking gun" that proves the removal was a "thoroughly Yankee affair."<sup>144</sup> He also (rightly) notes that Belcher's arguments for removal were largely devoid of legal foundation. Cornwallis's instructions made no mention of expelling the Acadians, and in 1755 Hopson was governor of Nova Scotia, and Cornwallis's instructions had been

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid., f24-27.

<sup>143</sup> Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*, 320-21.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 472. It should be noted, however, that Faragher's conclusions are dependant on his dating of Morris's letters, which is a matter of some speculation. See Ibid., 289 footnote 18.

replaced.<sup>145</sup> Peter Pope, on the other hand, suggests that the British carried out the deportation. They had done the same in other areas (such as Newfoundland). While Henry Wadsworth Longfellow mythologized the Acadian removal in *Evangeline*, no poets or authors did the same for other instances of deportation which are less well known as a result.<sup>146</sup> Geoffrey Plank argues that the expulsion had international precedent with the English removal from Newfoundland in 1697, the French expulsion from St. Kitts in 1702, and the Highland Scots deportation after the failed Jacobite rebellion of 1745.<sup>147</sup> John G. Reid concludes that blaming individuals is too simplistic, noting that misjudgements and misunderstandings, coupled with the Acadians' Native alliances, must be considered in any understanding of the removal. N.E.S. Griffiths agrees, though she stresses the Acadian refusal to swear an oath (and not the simple fact that they were Catholics) as a determining factor in their deportation.<sup>148</sup>

The Acadian expulsion was an episode of imperial entanglement. Competing claims to territorial sovereignty in one area reverberated throughout North America and influenced decisions made elsewhere. France's early success in the Ohio River Valley increased Britain's desire to bolster their territorial strength in the northeast, and also shaped how France would respond to British actions. The decision to expel the Acadians signalled Britain's desire to transform Nova Scotia from an imperial outpost to a colonial settlement. What requires more examination is the geographic element of the removal and its influence on subsequent British settlement schemes. The French at Louisbourg

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 320-1.

<sup>146</sup> Peter Pope, "Comparisons: Atlantic Canada" in Daniel Vickers, *A Companion to Colonial America* (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 489-507.

<sup>147</sup> Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*; Geoffrey Gilbert Plank, *Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

<sup>148</sup> John G. Reid, *Six Crucial Decades: Times of Change in the History of the Maritimes* (Halifax: Nimbus Pub., 1987), 29-60; Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 426.

learned quickly of the Acadian expulsion as some of the neutral French were able to escape with the Natives and hide in the woods. Acadians who went into hiding were informed that if they returned they would be treated well and shipped to British colonies, but if they continued hiding they would be considered rebels of the state and suffer severe punishment.<sup>149</sup> An English deserter who arrived at Louisbourg was able to confirm that British ships had removed the French from l'Acadie, but he was unsure of where those ships were headed.<sup>150</sup> Information continued to arrive at Louisbourg from military officers stationed near or in l'Acadie, but the French were unable to prevent the expulsion.

The deportation demonstrated the strategic ties between Acadians and the Mi'kmaq, and France's reliance on the Natives to challenge British actions. François-Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil's detailed map and "Projet d'attaque" suggested how best to end the Acadian expulsion. He believed that only the Natives could prevent the continued removal of the French. Aware that the Acadians were increasingly unhappy with the British, who had disarmed them in 1755, de Rigaud noted that many had guns hidden away and were simply waiting for their opportunity to support the French King. They were also aware that some French had been removed and fearful that the English would not waste time following this example throughout l'Acadie. The French were to be sent to British colonies, given land and beasts of burden, and in time it was hoped that they would simply assimilate into British society. According to N.E.S. Griffiths, the

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<sup>149</sup> M. de Villejoin to [not addressed/Drucour and Prevost], Port-Lajoie, 27 November 1755, f133-136, vol. 35, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>150</sup> Declaration of an English Deserter, 1 December 1755, f132v, vol. 35, C11B, ANOM.

expulsion was meant not to exterminate a race, but to terminate a community.<sup>151</sup> The British plan was to remove as many French as possible including those of the St. John River near the Abenakis. They did not hide, however, as they had heard these threats many times.<sup>152</sup>

While being close to Native groups did not guarantee Acadian safety, the Mi'kmaq and their allies were, according to the author of "Le Projet d'attaque," the best and perhaps only defence against the expulsion. Although the Mi'kmaq could not necessarily prevent the British at Halifax from taking the Acadians and sending them to other colonies, they could discourage those colonies from accepting them. "The only way to prevent the expulsion," de Rigaud outlined, "is if the Natives take English officers or other citizens of that nation and inform the general at Boston that all will be burned unless the French are returned."<sup>153</sup> The Natives were to give officials at Boston a date by which they must provide a response. If none came, they should then burn a prisoner in an area that will get attention and inform the officials that if they miss the next deadline without good reason the Natives will burn another prisoner, and then one after another until they have their satisfaction. De Rigaud concluded that the English had in the past perpetrated painful suffering on the French that demanded equally painful remedies.<sup>154</sup> His plans, captured by the British and never revealed to the French, emphasized Mi'kmaq capabilities during the Seven Years' War.

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<sup>151</sup> N. E. S. Griffiths, *The Contexts of Acadian History, 1686-1784* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 103.

<sup>152</sup> "Projet d'attaque Hallifax," 1755, f235v-237, vol. 38, State Papers Dominions: Naval, NA.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, f237. Natives did help the Acadians escape from deportation ships and worked to reunite them with their families. See Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*, 149-50.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

Colonial connections facilitated the Acadian removal, but British American towns were not able to prevent Acadians from attempting to return to their homeland. In 1756 Governor Lawrence wrote to the Board of Trade to inform them that no colonies had yet refused to receive the French.<sup>155</sup> Lawrence also noted the efficiency of the removal. One ship that had departed from Halifax had been instructed “to call, in their way, at Cape Sable in order to destroy the French settlement that was there, and to carry off the inhabitants, which they have executed.”<sup>156</sup> Arrival at their point of destination did not mean that the Acadians were no longer a concern. Once in a new colony many Acadians endured grave hardships and did what they could to escape. Governor Vaudreuil reported in 1757 that six Acadians had arrived in Canada after fleeing Boston “through the woods and over the mountains, to St. John.”<sup>157</sup> The governor admitted that he was touched by the stories of cruelty suffered by the Acadians at the hands of their captors. The British at Halifax, who wanted the Acadians removed, were perhaps more likely to mistreat the French (Acadians or not) than the English at Boston. Officials at Louisbourg reported that prisoners returned to the fort reported receiving better treatment in New England than in Nova Scotia.<sup>158</sup>

The expulsion was not a complete success. Empty territory was as threatening as it was promising, and left the British who entered it exposed to reprisals. Many Acadians

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<sup>155</sup> Acadians were also returned to France, which would have pleased some more than others. As Jean-François Mouhot argues, as with their neutrality in Nova Scotia, Acadians had different opinions of life in France depending on their place of origin and time of deportation. See Mouhot, *Les Réfugiés Acadiens en France, 1758-1785: l'Impossible Réintégration?* Acadian history is not terribly well known in France, but French scholars are beginning to correct this historiographic gap. See Fonteneau, *Les Acadiens: Citoyens de l'Atlantique*; Marion F. Godfroy-Tayart de Borms, "La Guerre de Sept Ans et ses Conséquences Atlantiques: Kourou ou l'Apparition d'un Nouveau Système Colonial " *French Historical Studies* 32, no. 2 (2009): 167-91.

<sup>156</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 28 April 1756, f38, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.

<sup>157</sup> Vaudreuil to Minister, Montreal, 8 September 1757, *CMNF* vol. 4, p. 127.

<sup>158</sup> Rapport de Messieurs Drucourt et Prevost, Louisbourg, 27 November 1757, *CMNF* vol. 4, p. 141.

eluded capture by hiding in the woods and joining forces with either the Mi'kmaq or French troops operating in the area. By the 1760s, the Acadian presence, though much diminished, was enough to annoy the British at Halifax. By 1761, Charles Lawrence was dead and Henry Ellis, the governor of Georgia, was appointed captain general and governor in chief of Nova Scotia. His lieutenant (and acting governor) was Jonathan Belcher, who wrote to the Board of Trade complaining of the Acadian presence in the northeast of the province. There were upwards of two hundred and fifty families in that region, none of which had taken an oath of allegiance.<sup>159</sup> They were working with the Natives to harass English trading vessels and had to be dealt with. Unlike their brethren who were expelled from their lands to make room for British settlers, this particular group of Acadians was to be granted lands along the coast between Halifax and Annapolis. The location of these grants was important. Placing the Acadians in Nova Scotia's frontier would be dangerous as they could continue their interaction with the Natives, while providing the group as whole with a settlement would do little to break their defiant attitude. By separating them from each other and from the Natives and spreading them across a larger stretch of land (intended to comprehend twelve townships), the British could force French families into areas dominated by British settlers.<sup>160</sup> This was a small-scale dispersion instead of a large-scale expulsion, but the desired results were identical.

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<sup>159</sup> Belcher to BTP, Halifax, 14 April 1761, f143, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>160</sup> Council Meeting, Halifax, 14 April 1761, f145, vol. 18, CO 217, NA. This was the tactic used by many colonies that received Acadians, Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest*, 150. Families expelled earlier were more likely to remain together than those deported in the late 1750s. See Griffiths, *Contexts of Acadian History*, 103-05.

Belcher reported 1300 Acadians at Restigouche and Mirimichi, 240 at Chignecto, and 90 at Halifax.<sup>161</sup> While these numbers pale in comparison to those shipped to Europe or to British colonies, the remaining Acadians posed a threat to British expansion.

Belcher warned the Board of Trade in 1761 that new settlements planned by the isthmus would be in danger from the Acadians who still resided in the area. “I crave leave to add,” Belcher wrote to the Board of Trade, “that the Acadians who were expelled and by Vaudreuil termed prisoners in New England had not so openly defied His Majesty’s authority as the Acadians at Ristigouche and Meremichi.”<sup>162</sup>

Belcher was so concerned about the planned settlement at Chignecto that he wrote to Jeffery Amherst, the British commander-in-chief in America, and warned him against going forward with the establishment. Amherst received the same complaints as the Board of Trade, but Belcher added that the Acadians were influential enough in the region to prevent the Natives from signing a peace treaty with the British. The French at Chignecto were aware that Quebec had fallen and they had received proof of the “mild treatment and indulgencies shewn to those who have surrendered themselves,” but to no avail.<sup>163</sup> According to Belcher, their sense of belonging, attachment to the region, and belief that perhaps the land would be theirs again fuelled their obstinacy. “Besides the reasons I have already offer’d you sir,” Belcher wrote to Amherst,

there yet remains one of some weight which is that there are many amongst the Acadians at Ristigouch who were formerly in possession of some of those lands in the district of Chignecto, and as they have not yet lost hopes of regaining them through notions which they have received from Priests and Frenchmen, I think it at least probably that they will disturb the beginnings of these settlements, in which case, the loss of two or three lives will strike such terror as may not only

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<sup>161</sup> Council Meeting, Halifax, 14 April 1761, f145, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>162</sup> Belcher to BTP, Halifax, 17 April 1761, f162-162v, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>163</sup> Belcher to Amherst, 15 April 1761, f164, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

intimidate and drive away the people of three townships, but may also greatly obstruct the settlements in other parts.<sup>164</sup>

The Acadians, like the Mi'kmaq before them, were expressing their attachment to territory by threatening those who aimed to resettle. The British found themselves forced to deal with a power vacuum created by the expulsion, and even a few dedicated inhabitants could wreak havoc on any settlement plans. Yet the Acadians were only part of the resistance faced by the British. The Mi'kmaq and their allies also sensed the power shifting in the northeast and were eager to take advantage of whatever opportunities arose.

### **Native Conflict and Peace Treaties**

As Nova Scotia began the transition from imperial bastion to colonial settlement, weaknesses in territorial control were exposed and exploited by the Mi'kmaq. In the instructions accompanying the spy map of 1755, de Rigaud noted just how deep ran British fears of the Mi'kmaq and their allies. The French in their planned attack on Halifax would have to prevent the Natives from burning the settlement and killing all the animals, an instruction that suggested such an act was at least possible.<sup>165</sup> The British had in 1749 and 1752 signed a treaty with some of the Wolastoqiyik and Mi'kmaq, but not all. Only three years later, British troops were prevented from deserting in part by the fear of being caught defenceless outside of Halifax's fortified walls. Without that fear, according to de Rigaud, it was likely that many soldiers from both Halifax and

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 164v.

<sup>165</sup> "Projet d'attaque," f230, vol. 38, State Papers Domestic: Naval, NA.



Beauséjour would pass quickly to the French side.<sup>166</sup> French officials at Île Royale did what they could to stoke British fears. Prevost reported to the minister in 1756 that a group of Natives stationed at Port Toulouze to guard the passage had organized themselves into three detachments, “two of which have gone to attack the enemy in and around Chebucto.”<sup>167</sup> Even in small numbers, roaming groups of Aboriginals kept the British alert and wary of moving into the interior.

The Seven Years’ War witnessed widespread British-Native conflict. From Georgia to Nova Scotia, Aboriginals (acting of their own accord or in alliance with the French) attacked British settlements. A French report on the affairs of Canada recounted the effectiveness of Native violence against the British. It described how the Aboriginals “ravaged” Georgia, Carolina, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, forcing inhabitants living in the country to take refuge in the cities. This hyperbolic account noted that Natives never took prisoners, preferring to kill men, women, and children. They allegedly favoured massacring and burning their victims, always taking the scalps. The commandant of Fort Duquesne on the Ohio River had in December informed his superiors that the Natives had taken over 200 scalps in that month alone.<sup>168</sup> In the northeast, these attacks served strategic ends. A group of Natives captured a provisions boat from Boston travelling to Port Royal, in which were found gazettes, papers, and a letter from a general to the commandant at Port Royal noting his displeasure with General Braddock’s impudent

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid., f234.

<sup>167</sup> Prevost to Minister, Louisbourg, 27 September 1756, f136, vol. 36, C11B, ANOM.

<sup>168</sup> Monsieur Conard, “Sur des affaires du Canada,” *CMNF* vol. 4, p. 33.

attack on the Ohio.<sup>169</sup> This insight into British morale likely encouraged the French to keep pressure on the enemy.

The British did what they could to inflict suffering on the Mi'kmaq, while the French continued to rely on gifts to maintain their Aboriginal alliances. Olive Dickason has argued that the Mi'kmaq were more than French pawns, but were not so strong as to swing the balance of power from Britain to France in the northeast.<sup>170</sup> At the very least they slowed British expansion and worked towards securing their own position in Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. Governor Lawrence, on the advice of his Council, issued a proclamation in 1756 offering a bounty on Native prisoners and their scalps, effectively ending the treaty struck in 1752. By the time he wrote to the Board of Trade about his decision there were already three parties gone out in search of the Mi'kmaq.<sup>171</sup> The French, for their part, stressed the importance of continued gifts to their Native allies. In 1757, 200 Natives arrived at Port Toulouze to receive presents. Not providing presents, or providing gifts in smaller amounts and of inferior quality, had a direct affect on French imperial and military strategy. Boishébert travelled to the St. John River to implore the Natives there not to make peace with the British, a step they were considering in part because they were not receiving adequate supplies from the French. "Only a strong speech full of promises," Governor Drucour wrote the minister, "brought them back over to his side."<sup>172</sup> Abandoning the tradition of gift-giving was not an option, for "[the

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>170</sup> Olive Patricia Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations, 1713-1760* (Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1976), 105.

<sup>171</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 25 May 1756, 77v, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.

<sup>172</sup> Drucour to Minister, Louisbourg, 12 July 1757, f56v, vol. 37, C11B, ANOM.

Natives] are a nation...which can be influenced only in this way.”<sup>173</sup> Aboriginal territory, especially in the St. John River valley with its year-round access to the Atlantic, was far more valuable than whatever price must be paid for gifts.

While the gifts encouraged an alliance that benefited the French, Native actions against the British were based on their own political and military strategy. The Mi’kmaq, positioned between two powers, acted with their own interests at heart. Limiting the number and extent of British settlements on the peninsula benefited the Mi’kmaq who maintained an element of their pre-contact semi-nomadic way of life. The Mi’kmaq were relatively successful in influencing the pattern of British settlement in Nova Scotia. They restricted Cornwallis and his settlers to just one town in 1749 (as opposed to the five originally planned by the Board of Trade), and it was not until 1753 that German settlers could be transported from Halifax to construct a new settlement at Lunenburg.<sup>174</sup> In 1758, those German settlers remained afraid of the region’s Native groups. Though the British had by this time taken Louisbourg and routed the French from Nova Scotia, the Mi’kmaq continued harassing English settlements. Lawrence reported in the winter of 1758 that a group of Natives “have just now destroy’d a whole family remarkable for their industry and merit” and had consequently driven “three parts of the people from their country lotts, into the town for protection.”<sup>175</sup> These actions slowed the progress of the settlement, which was likely just what the Natives had desired. The defeat of the

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid. The Natives were not the only financial concern at Île Royale. Religious orders, specifically the Sisters of the Congregation of Notre Dame, were increasingly destitute and repeatedly requested to leave the island for Quebec. Prevost to Minister, Louisbourg, 28 December 1757, f254, vol. 37, C11B, ANOM. See also A. J. B. Johnston, *Life and Religion at Louisbourg, 1713-1758* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).

<sup>174</sup> Winthrop Pickard Bell, *The "Foreign Protestants" And the Settlement of Nova Scotia: The History of a Piece of Arrested British Colonial Policy in the Eighteenth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961).

<sup>175</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 26 December 1758, f306v-307, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.

French did not leave the British unopposed. Emptied lands could fall under the authority of either the Mi'kmaq or the British.

Of primary importance for the British was establishing a workable relationship with the Mi'kmaq and their allies to help colonial settlement. Previous efforts had met with limited success, as treaties were often entered into hastily and without a foundation of cultural understanding to ensure their endurance. With the French largely removed from the northeast, the British focused on establishing trade relations as a strong foundation for alliance with the Mi'kmaq.<sup>176</sup> The Passamaquoddy and Wolastoqiyik Natives from the St. John River – likely the same group Boishébert convinced not to sign a peace with the British in 1757 – were the first to agree to a treaty with the British in 1760. This treaty referred to the 1725 and 1749 agreements. The Passamaquoddy and Wolastoqiyik agreed to the same terms, including acknowledging British jurisdiction over the territory of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie and making submission “to his said Majesty in as ample a manner as we have formerly done to the Most Christian King.”<sup>177</sup> This last claim, coupled with the promise not to molest settlers in their settlements “already or lawfully to be made” provided for an element of subjectivity, just as they had in previous treaties.

Historians of Nova Scotia have debated the implications of the treaties of 1760/1761. At root is the question of Aboriginal surrender. Stephen A. Patterson has argued that the Mi'kmaq and their allies realized by 1760 that they had lost their French

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<sup>176</sup> The Mi'kmaq had long been involved in trade with French Acadians who sent goods to Louisbourg and New England. See William C. Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760" (Ph.D dissertation, McGill University, 1994), 292-308.

<sup>177</sup> Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Delegates of the St. Johns and Passamaquoddy Tribes of Indians at Halifax, February 1760, f17v-19v, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

allies and were therefore a conquered people in Nova Scotia, unable to oppose the British on their own. Consequently, the treaties they signed differed from previous versions in that the British were identified as the region's dominant group.<sup>178</sup> John G. Reid and William Wicken challenge Patterson's interpretation. Reid argues that the expulsion of the Acadians and the fall of the French in North America posed a challenge to the Mi'kmaq but did not terminate their ability to shape British settlement patterns in Nova Scotia. The Mi'kmaq continued to exert their influence over contested territories until the arrival of the Loyalists at the close of the American Revolution.<sup>179</sup> William Wicken examines eighteenth-century British-Native treaties as they related to contemporary Aboriginal hunting and fishing rights. He argues that each agreement was based on its predecessor and served to confirm Native hunting and fishing rights while never surrendering property. These were treaties of "peace and friendship," not of surrender.<sup>180</sup> These treaties demonstrate a continuation of Native strength and political savvy. As they had done in 1726, 1749, and 1752, the Mi'kmaq sought to establish a balance of territorial control that could be monitored and enforced. The 1760-1 treaties provided the Mi'kmaq and the Wolastoqiyik with a framework in which they could address, challenge, and shape British settlement.

Mi'kmaq territorial influence on British settlement was the price of maintaining and improving British-Native trade. The Mi'kmaq, whose treaties with the British had been shorter-lived and on a smaller scale than the Passamaquoddy and Wolastoqiyik,

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<sup>178</sup> Stephen E. Patterson, "Indian-White Relations in Nova Scotia, 1749-61: A Study in Political Interaction," *Acadiensis* 23, no. 1 (1993): 23-59; Patterson, "Colonial Wars and Aboriginal Peoples," in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation*, 125-55.

<sup>179</sup> Reid, "Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena?," 669-92.

<sup>180</sup> Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*.

needed to be won over through economic exchange, according to administrators at Halifax. Lieutenant Governor Belcher informed the Board of Trade in late 1760 that the commissary for trade with the Natives, Benjamin Gerrish, had presented an account of the trade's importance. It was essential that advantages in trade be given "in favour of the Indians, as by shewing how much it be to their interest, may induce them to become firmly attached to a friendly intercourse with his Majesty's subjects."<sup>181</sup> Providing the Mi'kmaq with advantageous trade would require Britain to incur a loss, but Belcher hoped it would not be too great. Reports to Britain also listed what goods were requested to trade with the Mi'kmaq: blue and red Indian stroud, pieces of scarlet, Irish linen, coarse and fine ruffled shirts, powder and shot, blankets, silver buckles, knives, iron and brass trumps, bowls, and ivory combs. Added to these items (that were to be traded at a loss) were sundry supplies costing more than £5200 to be given as presents at the various truckhouses.<sup>182</sup> The British were imitating the French, who had long supplied the Mi'kmaq with gifts. Yet the French had also protected Native territorial rights, which the British would not.

In 1761, Lieutenant Governor Belcher and representatives from Nova Scotia's Mi'kmaq groups met to sign a new peace agreement. Tents were raised on the governor's farm to accommodate the various representatives and attendees. The speeches given by both British and Native delegates demonstrate how central ideas of property and territorial sovereignty were to the negotiation, despite the fact that no land was surrendered. This treaty, like those previous, was one of peace and friendship. Belcher

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<sup>181</sup> Belcher to BTP, Halifax, 12 December 1760, f84v, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>182</sup> Items Requested for Trade with the Natives, Halifax, 17 November 1760, f98 and 100v, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

spoke first, referring to the English as “your merciful conqueror.” He continued, “you see that this triumphant and sacred King can chastise the insolence of the invader of the rights of his Crown and subjects, and can drive back all his arrows and trample the power of his enemies under the footstool of his sublime and lofty throne.”<sup>183</sup> Then, in an obvious reference to the covenant chain – the metaphor by which the British and the Iroquois understood their alliance – Belcher argued that protection and alliance were fastened together like a chain, and if one link should break the chain will come loose.<sup>184</sup> By keeping that chain strong, the Mi’kmaq were welcomed into “the wide and fruitful field of English liberty.”<sup>185</sup>

After promising the Mi’kmaq that they could continue practicing their faith, Belcher used a territorial simile rooted in English concepts of property to describe how British laws would work on behalf of Native subjects. British officials in attendance were more likely to grasp the comparison than were the Mi’kmaq. Belcher explained,

The laws will be like a great hedge about your rights and properties, if any break this hedge to hurt and injure you, the heavy weight of the laws will fall upon them and punish their disobedience. On behalf of us, now your fellow subjects, I must demand that you build a wall to secure our rights from being trodden down by the feet of your people.<sup>186</sup>

The concept of enclosing territories was not foreign to the Mi’kmaq. Their allies in the Wabanaki confederacy, especially the Abenakis, had experienced what fences and hedges

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<sup>183</sup> Ceremonials at Concluding a Peace with the several Districts of the general Mickmack Nation of Indians in His Majesty’s Province of Nova Scotia, and a Copy of the Treaty,” 22 June 1761, f279-279v, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>184</sup> On the covenant chain, see Francis Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984).

<sup>185</sup> Ceremonials at Concluding a Peace, 279v-280.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, f280.

could do to Native land.<sup>187</sup> Yet Belcher's explanation of the importance and operation of English laws was rooted in British culture, which favoured property. His description indicated the differences between British and Aboriginal ideas of alliances generally and of the 1761 peace treaty specifically.

After the hatchets were buried to symbolize the end of the conflict, the chief of the Île Royale Mi'kmaq spoke and was interpreted by Abbé Maillard. While taking into consideration the nuances of his speech that must have been lost in translation from Mi'kmaq to English, it is evident that the chief's response was informed by his cultural contexts. Some of his remarks suggest that he was not only aware that the British hoped to control Mi'kmaq territory, but also warned them against extending their authority beyond the limits of recognized British settlements. As Leslie Upton argues, it is possible that there were unrecorded conditions granted the Mi'kmaq to encourage their entrance into the agreement.<sup>188</sup> The chief's words indicate a suspicion of British desires. He began by praising the British for taking pity on the Acadians who had been wandering the sea coast since the expulsion. He then declared, "you are now Master here such has been the will of God. He has given you the dominion of those vast countries always crowning your enterprises with success."<sup>189</sup> It is unclear to which "vast countries" the chief was referring. Perhaps it was the lands previously occupied by the French government at Quebec, Montreal, or Île Royale; he could also have been referring to the settlements at Halifax, Lunenburg, and Annapolis Royal. What the chief made clear,

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<sup>187</sup> Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). Also, Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession*.

<sup>188</sup> L. F. S. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979), 59.

<sup>189</sup> Ceremonials at Concluding a Peace, f281v.



however, was that the Mi'kmaq could compliment British moral character without recognizing extended territorial rights:

You were before these acquisitions a very great people, but we now acknowledge you to be much more powerful, tho' less great in the extensiveness of your possessions than in the uprightness of your Heart, whereof you have given us undoubted and repeated proofs since the reduction of Canada.<sup>190</sup>

The British had accepted returning Acadians and had treated the French inhabitants at Quebec well, both of which pleased the Mi'kmaq enough to enter into an alliance with their former enemies. British authority in the region was moral, not territorial. The Mi'kmaq had come to appreciate British “uprightness” of heart, but not “the extensiveness of [their] possessions.”

### **Native Space or British Settlement**

The limits of British territorial control were made evident when they nearly reserved half of Nova Scotia for the Mi'kmaq. This was less an act of surrender than an economic policy hastily ordered, promptly ignored, yet never repealed. Reserving land for the Mi'kmaq would strengthen British-Native relations, ensure the Mi'kmaq could hunt (and therefore trade), and allow the British to focus on developing what regions they could most easily control. In 1762, Jonathan Belcher issued a proclamation reserving much of present-day Nova Scotia and New Brunswick for the Mi'kmaq and the Wolastoqiyik. How the British administration at Halifax moved from establishing a peace in 1761, by which they claimed right to all of Nova Scotia, to surrendering much of the province a year later is a story of confusion, misunderstanding, and unintended consequences. Belcher's proclamation of 1762 remains an important yet understudied

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<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 281v.

element in the history of territorial sovereignty in Nova Scotia. In an attempt to preserve the peace in Nova Scotia and prevent a Mi'kmaq-Wolastoqiyik-Acadian alliance against the British, the Board of Trade in 1761 ordered Lieutenant Governor Belcher to forbid settlers from intruding on Native land. No governor or lieutenant governor, "upon pain of our highest displeasure and of being forthwith removed from your and his office," should "pass any grant or grants to any persons whatever of any lands within or adjacent to the territories possessed or occupied by the said Indians or the property possession of which has at any time been reserved to or claimed by them."<sup>191</sup> Six days later the King's government dispatched an Order-in-Council requiring all colonial governments to direct to London all future requests for settlements on Native land.<sup>192</sup> This sweeping Order in Council assumed that each colony had dealt with Native territorial rights the same way and that there was a clear distinction between British and Aboriginal land. Some British American colonies had purchased lands or secured land surrender treaties, but not Nova Scotia.

Working from the instructions sent to him from the Board of Trade, Lieutenant Governor Belcher in 1762 issued a proclamation. Francis Jennings and Leslie Upton have suggested that he did not issue it "at large" for fear that the Mi'kmaq would seize the opportunity to claim territory.<sup>193</sup> In order to respect recent treaties with the Natives, all persons "who may either wilfully or inadvertently have seated themselves upon any lands so reserved to or claimed by the said Indians without any lawful authority for so

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<sup>191</sup> BTP to Belcher, Whitehall, 3 December 1761, in Gary P. Gould and Alan J. Semple, *Our Land, the Maritimes: The Basis of the Indian Claim in the Maritime Provinces of Canada* (Fredericton: Saint Annes Point Press, 1980), 17.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, 59; Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 185.

doing” were ordered to remove themselves from those lands.<sup>194</sup> Belcher continued to define an area that was to be set aside for the Natives, including the northern half of the peninsula, the isthmus in its entirety, and the coastline running from Musquodobit to Gaspé. On the same day, Belcher enacted a bill to regulate trade with the Natives. Included in this bill was a provision that forbade any land dealings between settlers and Aborigines and declared null and void any territorial agreements that had been or will be made without government licence.<sup>195</sup> This second bill would have been published “at large” to inform the traders of new regulations. When combined with Belcher’s proclamation and the 1761 treaty with the Mi’kmaq, these pieces of legislation reserved much of Nova Scotia for its Native inhabitants, or at the very least protected Native territory from British settlers.

Securing trade with Natives jeopardized British economic development by prohibiting settlers and merchants from establishing themselves in regions of economic value, particularly along the coasts. Merchants in Nova Scotia were unhappy with Belcher’s proclamation. Joshua Mauger wrote to the Board of Trade complaining that the land set aside for the Mi’kmaq included valuable coastal property, preventing the development of the fishery.<sup>196</sup> The Board of Trade agreed. As Gould and Semple note, the minutes of the Board of Trade’s proceedings provide evidence of their displeasure, specifically stating that Belcher’s proclamation was “imprudent, and not warranted by His Majesty’s Order in Council.”<sup>197</sup> The Board of Trade argued that the Order in Council referred to Aboriginal land “admitted and allowed on the part of the Government and

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<sup>194</sup> Belcher’s Proclamation, 4 May 1762, f27v, vol. 19, CO 217, NA.

<sup>195</sup> A Bill Entitled An Act for the Regulation of the Indian Trade, 1762, f36v, vol. 19, CO 217, NA.

<sup>196</sup> Gould and Semple, *Our Land*, 21.

<sup>197</sup> Whitehall Dispatches, 3 December 1762, f10, vol. 31, RG 1, NSARM, as quoted in *Ibid.*, 22.

confirmed to them by solemn compacts,” not to any and all territory claimed by the Natives.<sup>198</sup> The problem with applying this definition to Nova Scotia was the lack of any treaties or compacts specifically related to land. The Board must have realized the danger in applying the Order in Council as it was issued and perhaps wished to revisit their own instructions to Belcher. The Board’s instructions made no distinction between lands claimed by the Mi’kmaq and those “admitted and allowed” to them by treaties or agreements; areas in question were defined as “the territories possessed or occupied by the said Indians,” either claimed by them or reserved for them. Belcher’s strict adherence to these instructions left him no choice but to issue his proclamation. The Board was displeased with Belcher’s proclamation, but it was never repealed or overruled. Nor is it likely that the Board of Trade had the authority to augment or repeal an Order in Council issued by the Privy Council on behalf of the King. The Board was subordinate to the Privy Council, reporting to it through the secretary of state for the Southern Department.<sup>199</sup> Technically, the order not to encroach on Native land stood, though it was not enforced. Settlers in Nova Scotia responded similarly, settling themselves throughout the province with no regard for Native land rights. Such had long been the practice, leading to conflict and complaints from both settlers and the Mi’kmaq.

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<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Arthur Herbert Basye, *The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations Commonly Known as the Board of Trade, 1748-1782* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), 4. See also Ian. K. Steele, *Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, 1696-1720* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

## Resettlement and Resistance

Legal ambiguities and ignored instructions did not change the British desire to transition Nova Scotia from an imperial settlement to a colonial one, a process closely monitored by the Mi'kmaq who wanted to limit British expansion. From the beginning of the Acadian expulsion, British attempts to settle territories and establish townships met with opposition from the Mi'kmaq. Establishing settlements effectively would require a legislative body to evaluate proposals and oversee their implementation. In 1755, Jonathan Belcher noted that one benefit of establishing an assembly in Halifax would be to facilitate the management of vacated Acadian lands; he encouraged convening an assembly before fielding requests and granting lands in the valuable Chignecto, Minas, and Pisiquid regions.<sup>200</sup> Yet want of an assembly paled in comparison to Native hostility as an obstacle to settlement. Lawrence expressed his frustration to the Board of Trade in a 1756 letter, admitting that only minor progress had been made at Lunenburg and Lawrencetown because those places were exposed to threats from the Mi'kmaq. Though Lawrence never referred to Nova Scotia as Native territory, he noted their superior knowledge of the region made preventing their attacks or capturing them nearly impossible. "But my Lords," he lamented,

What scheme can I propose or what terms of encouragement can be granted that will induce hardy and industrious settlers to plant themselves in a frontier country, liable to have their throats cutt every moment by the most inveterate enemies, well acquainted with every creek and corner of the country by which they can make their escape after the commission of any act of barbarity that revenge & cruelty will prompt them to? I say My Lords, that until the country can be possessed in peace, I am but too apprehensive that no inducement whatever will

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<sup>200</sup> Jonathan Belcher, Proposal for Convening an Assembly in his Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia, Halifax, 24 October 1755, f28, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.

prevail with the people upon the continent to attempt settlements upon those lands.<sup>201</sup>

Acadian land largely devoid of Acadians would not easily fall under British sovereignty.

When Lawrence published a call for settlers in 1758, he downplayed the threat posed by Natives despite the fact that no peace had been declared. Lawrence announced that “the enemy” had been forced to retire to Canada and left Nova Scotia open for settlement. Presumably he was referring to the French, as the region remained inhabited by Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik groups. This call, the same that was published in London, described the land to be granted and solicited proposals to be sent to agents in Boston and New York.<sup>202</sup> Lawrence published another proclamation a few months later, and another in 1759 to answer questions he had received. By the spring of 1759, Lawrence reported that he had begun organizing tours of the region for agents representing associates interested in the proclamation. Charles Morris, the surveyor general, was chosen to accompany the agents, being “well acquainted with every department in the bay.”<sup>203</sup> Morris had been surveying and mapping the region for more than a decade and was an instrumental figure in orchestrating the Acadian expulsion; he was the obvious choice to lead a tour through Nova Scotia’s best available lands.

Ironically, the processes by which the British removed the Acadians would later hinder their resettlement plans. When rounding up Acadians and shipping them to various colonies, the British destroyed their homes and farms to deter the neutral French from wanting to return. In 1759, Lawrence received a letter from a group of proprietors who wanted to create a township at Annapolis. They had taken great care to survey the

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<sup>201</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 3 November 1756, f69-73v, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.

<sup>202</sup> 12 October 1758, Halifax, f311, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.

<sup>203</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 20 April 1759, f316v, vol. 16, CO 217, NA.

lands where the French inhabitants were settled and found it generally wanting. Lawrence's grant suggested the region could support 200 families, but the proprietors disagreed, citing the lack of arable land. Only 1500 acres were cleared of trees. The proprietors also complained that the marshlands, which had been so valuable to the Acadians, had been ruined, "the dykes for the most demolished & thereby rendered for this three years to come incapable of bearing grain."<sup>204</sup> While it is possible that these potential settlers were exaggerating the poor state of the grants to secure a better price, British policy during the expulsion was to destroy dikes and crops to discourage the Acadians from returning.<sup>205</sup> These men reminded Lawrence that he would have a difficult time attracting settlers unless he made the grants more attractive because better lands at lower rents were available in other colonies.<sup>206</sup> Another memorial sent from potential proprietors listed similar complaints for the township of Liverpool. The land was of poor quality and had been recently flooded (likely because the dykes had been destroyed). It would be too expensive to transport settlers and then support them while the land recovered.<sup>207</sup>

Any attempts at resettlement required a precise knowledge of Nova Scotia's geography. Charles Morris led land agents on a tour of available areas of settlement, but his tasks did not end there. As he had in the past, Morris created surveys of Nova Scotia for use by the local administration and imperial officials. Morris was a constant

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<sup>204</sup> Memorial of Joseph Patten, John Tapley, and Joshua Litcomb, Committee and Proprietors of a designed Township at Annapolis, Halifax, 3 December 1759, f25-25f, vol. 17, CO 217, NA.

<sup>205</sup> See Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme*, 289.

<sup>206</sup> Memorial of Joseph Patten, John Tapley, and Joshua Litcomb, Committee and Proprietors of a designed Township at Annapolis, Halifax, 3 December 1759, f26v, vol. 17, CO 217, NA.

<sup>207</sup> Memorial of Joseph Patten and Thomas Foster a Commission for the Proprietors of the Township of Liverpool, Halifax, 11 December 1759, f29v-30, vol. 17, CO 217, NA.

representative of British governance and exerted great influence on the province. He had initially served as the thin edge of an imperial wedge, using his maps and reports to gain




**Figure 6.6 Charles Morris's *A Chart of the Harbour of Halifax, 1759*. Published by Thomas Jefferys, this map demonstrated Morris's geographic influence and emphasized the need for settlers. National Archives, London. CO700NS/30**

British purchase in a land inhabited by the French and Mi'kmaq. When British policy altered and focused on clearing lands to encourage colonial settlement, Morris again performed the necessary leg-work of measuring, plotting, and creating boundaries and townships. His influence spread beyond the administrative centres at Halifax and Whitehall to the public in Britain with the publication (by none other than Thomas Jefferys) of his 1759 map of Halifax (Figure 6.6). As with his earlier maps, Halifax was presented as an imperial bastion. Water soundings and detailed instructions for entering the harbour demonstrated British mastery of the region. The town, though small, was



surrounded by empty space ready to be settled. Morris's earlier maps had emphasized British imperial strength, and his later ones indicated the need for colonization.

In 1760, Morris travelled along the province's western coast to adjust the limits of



**Figure 6.7** Charles Morris, *A Chart of the Peninsula of Nova Scotia*, 1761. Townships are marked but do not reflect the paucity of settlers. Much of the northern part of the province (included in Belcher's proclamation) remains empty. National Archives, London. CO 700, Nova Scotia 34.

townships for the fishery (Figure 6.7). A group of fifty families with six fishing schooners had already arrived at Liverpool in Port Seigneur and Lawrence was eager to facilitate their operation. Morris then travelled to Annapolis, Minas, and Pisiquid.<sup>208</sup> His reports from these regions offered more than simple geographic descriptions. Morris was able to describe the character of the settlers who took up land. In the Horton, Cornwallis,

<sup>208</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 11 May 1760, f58-59, vol. 17, CO 217, NA.

and Falmouth townships he found “substantial, laborious people adapted entirely to agriculture,” all of whom were pleased with the situation and fertility of their plots. Morris was also able to survey damaged lands and report to Governor Lawrence what would be necessary to put them back into good condition.<sup>209</sup>



**Figure 6.8** Charles Morris, *A Plan of the District of Chignecto*, 1761. Morris noted that only three townships had been granted (Amherst, Cumberland, and Sackville), the rest remained empty. He marked marshland in yellow and noted that certain areas were too mountainous for settlers. National Archives, London. CO 700, Nova Scotia 36.

Charles Morris produced maps of Nova Scotia’s townships to keep the Board of Trade informed of settlement progress (Figure 6.8). Belcher sent to Whitehall one of Morris’s maps, which the lieutenant governor considered “an exact chart of the Province describing the new townships.”<sup>210</sup> Morris’s travels throughout Nova Scotia to survey and

<sup>209</sup> Lawrence to BTP, Halifax, 16 June 1760, f1-6, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>210</sup> Belcher to BTP, Halifax, 10 April 1761, f134, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

map each region provided him with the opportunity to collect geographic information, not all of which could be included on his maps. Belcher commissioned Morris to create a report on the townships, which was forwarded to the Board of Trade in 1762. In Morris's report he described each town, its inhabitants and their progress, and whatever challenges they faced. For example, Chester had been settled in 1760 by about thirty New England families, but little had been done in the region save for what improvements the settlers had made themselves. Dublin, a township awarded to proprietors from Connecticut, was presently unsettled. Originally granted to 260 proprietors, only a few arrived and those who did lasted only nine months before quitting the settlement. Liverpool, situated at the base of Port Senior, was more promising with over 500 inhabitants working primarily in the fishery. They also produced shingles, clapboards, and had erected a sawmill. Morris provided detailed descriptions for each settlement, noting where settlers or proprietors had encountered difficulty, but rarely mentioning what obstacles (aside from poor land) stood in the path of progress.<sup>211</sup>

In each of these maps, Morris bolstered British strength and minimized Mi'kmaq territorial control. Morris made only passing references to the Mi'kmaq and Wolastoqiyik groups that had prevented the quick settlement of vacated Acadian lands. In his description of lands around the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Morris noted that the coast had lately been well patrolled, driving both the Acadians and Natives to "great distress," and leading various Native groups to solicit a peace with the British. While supposedly forced into a treaty, these Aboriginal groups were recognized as possessing knowledge of their territory. Morris argued that the land between the St. John River and the Penobscot

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<sup>211</sup> Charles Morris, *A Description of Several Towns in the Province of Nova Scotia*, 1761, 13<sup>3/4</sup>, vol. 37, RG 1, NSARM.

was “full of Bays, Islands and Harbours and but little known to any but Indian Traders.”<sup>212</sup> Similarly, the maps Morris included with his reports provided no indication of Native land. When the Board informed Belcher in 1762 that he was to respect all regions claimed by Natives, they were misinformed as to the extent of that territory. In Morris’s descriptions and maps, Nova Scotia was a collection of townships established in a presumably vacant province.

Morris’s contribution helped Belcher appease the Board of Trade, who chastised the lieutenant governor for granting land too extensively and disregarding the expense involved. Belcher reminded the Board that they had earlier approved of his settlement plans and encouraged him to act at the earliest convenience.<sup>213</sup> There had been a miscommunication somewhere, but at the very least the Board had requested maps of the region and Belcher was eager to provide them. “In obedience to your Lordships,” Belcher wrote,

I have now the honor to transmit three accurate maps plann’d by the Chief surveyor of the places actually settled, and of those where settlements are speedily expected and also of the lands on the River St. John. These maps will give your Lordships a view of all the ungranted cleared lands in the province.<sup>214</sup>

While these maps indicated ungranted and cleared lands, they did not (and could not) indicate the boundaries between British settlements accepted by the Natives and those believed to encroach on Mi’kmaq territory. This discrepancy contributed to confusion when Native territory was protected by an Order in Council, instructions from the Board of Trade, and Belcher’s proclamation.

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<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

<sup>213</sup> Belcher to BTP, Halifax, 3 November 1761, f199-200, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid., f200.

Aside from the challenges to new settlements posed by Nova Scotia's Mi'kmaq, peopling the region faced two additional obstacles: from where settlers should be drawn, and how far along the continental coast they could settle? Answering these questions demonstrated the limits of imperial support from Britain, indicating the colonial transition that was taking place. The first of these issues was brought to light by a settlement scheme proposed by Alexander McNutt, an army officer and land agent who moved to Nova Scotia after serving as a Massachusetts provincial captain at Fort Cumberland. He then became actively engaged in Governor Lawrence's settlement campaign.<sup>215</sup> McNutt's memorial to the Board of Trade informed the commissioners that he had, at great expense, contracted thousands of Irish Protestant families to settle in Nova Scotia and he hoped that the Board would facilitate this project. Specifically, MacNutt hoped to receive a contract to remove whatever Acadians remained in the province to ensure that his ships had cargo both to and from North America. He wanted permission "to erect a city by the name of Jerusalem at Port Rosea on the Cape Sables Shore," an ideal spot to carry on a fishery.<sup>216</sup> The Board of Trade was troubled by MacNutt's request, but he convinced them of the project's value. The Privy Council eventually rejected his proposal. Though he had already settled several hundred Irish on lands granted to him in Nova Scotia, the Council disapproved of his choice of inhabitants. Settling Nova Scotia was desirable, "yet the migration from Ireland of such great numbers of His Majesty's Subjects must be attended with dangerous consequences to that Kingdom."<sup>217</sup> Not only was the proposal rejected, but the Privy Council also informed Nova Scotia's governor

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<sup>215</sup> Phyllis R. Blakeley, "McNutt, Alexander," *DCB*.

<sup>216</sup> Memorial of Alexander MacNutt to the BTP, 16 March 1762, f297-98, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>217</sup> At the Council Chapter, Whitehall, 29 April 1762, f305-305v, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

that no Irish were to be permitted to settle in the province unless they had lived in British America for more than five years.<sup>218</sup> Though Nova Scotia was a valuable possession, it was only one part of a larger empire and should not drain other kingdoms (especially those with a large number of Catholics) of their Protestant residents.

Belcher and his administration continued to attract settlers from northeastern North America. Questions of boundaries persisted in this region even after the fall of New France, and resolving those issues indicates that even while encouraging colonization from British American colonies, Nova Scotia retained elements of its imperial allegiance. Belcher and his administration continued to defer to London in territorial matters that other colonies hoped to settle themselves. The land between New England and Nova Scotia was poorly delimited, leading Governor Bernard of Massachusetts to write Belcher and request they settle the limits between their respective provinces. The New England government argued that Nova Scotia's boundary was defined by Sir William Alexander's grant, "bounded by the River St. Croix to the head thereof, and the remotest westernmost branch or stream and from thence by an imaginary line to run North to the River St. Lawrence."<sup>219</sup> The Massachusetts government suggested that by "divers maps and charts" published since the first French voyages to the region, the location of this river could be ascertained. Governor Bernard recommended appointing representatives from both governments to repair to the St. Croix river and determine from where the imaginary line heading north should begin and mark that place on trees.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>219</sup> Belcher to Council and Assembly, Halifax, 3 May 1762, f48, vol. 19, CO 217, NA.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

In a second letter to Belcher, Governor Bernard noted that his assembly was prepared to appoint commissioners to settle the provincial limits and enquired into Nova Scotia's stance on the matter and how it could be resolved quickly.<sup>221</sup> One month later, in May 1762, Belcher's Council informed him that settling boundaries was an imperial matter that should be left to the King, but Belcher did not forward that opinion to Governor Bernard.<sup>222</sup> Having received no word from Nova Scotia by June, Bernard wrote again to Belcher. This letter suggested that the settling of boundaries would be somewhat more complicated than had been anticipated. Instead of marking the location of where the northern line should commence, running from the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence, Bernard admitted that "the sole doubt concerning the line dividing the two provinces will arise from this question: which of the Rivers which fall into the Bay of St. Croix is the River St. Croix."<sup>223</sup> The River St. Croix, so long and so ardently claimed as the southern boundary of Sir William Alexander's Nova Scotia (and often French Acadia) was a geographic unknown.

Although Belcher could rely on the services of Charles Morris, a capable surveyor and mapmaker, he decided to refer the question of the Nova Scotia-New England boundary to London. Elizabeth Mancke has demonstrated that Nova Scotia's imperial linkages were made evident by its deferral to the King-in-Parliament. Older British American colonies considered themselves beyond Parliament's reach because that legislative body acquired much of its political authority after the American colonies were

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<sup>221</sup> Bernard to Belcher, Boston, 3 April 1762, f55, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>222</sup> Council Chamber, Halifax, 3 May 1762, f53, vol. 18, CO 217, NA.

<sup>223</sup> Bernard to Belcher, Boston, 17 June 1762, f56, vol. 18, CO 217.

founded.<sup>224</sup> Consequently, Nova Scotia's developing colonialism retained an imperial hue. In his tardy reply to Governor Bernard, Belcher suggested that the question of geography was moot because settling colonial boundaries fell within the imperial purview, and therefore both provinces should address their concerns to the King. To avoid further settlement controversy, Belcher recommended that it may be "advisable for both governments to forbear making any grants upon the Borders that may be disputable, till the bounds be legally adjusted."<sup>225</sup> Internal boundaries within British America remained a question of geographic knowledge and administrative authority, a problem not addressed by the reduction of the French as geographic competitors.

Further differentiating Nova Scotia's colonial development from that of other British colonies in the northeast was the persistent influence of the Mi'kmaq and the Wolastoqiyik. Two months after issuing his controversial proclamation reserving much of Nova Scotia for the Mi'kmaq and the Wolastoqiyik, Native-British tension remained on the peninsula. Settlers continued to arrive in the province and were placed in the various townships marked out by Charles Morris. In a likely reaction to these continued encroachments into what the Natives considered their territory, the Mi'kmaq displayed their military strength by threatening an attack on Lunenburg, Nova Scotia's second-largest settlement, in July 1762. The principal inhabitants of Lunenburg wrote a memorial in response to an order requesting their militia to march to Halifax. The memorial indicated that the town was surrounded by Natives who were "not only insolent but have been and are continually committing outrages on the inhabitants. In our present

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<sup>224</sup> Elizabeth Mancke, *The Fault Lines of Empire: Political Differentiation in Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, Ca. 1760-1830* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

<sup>225</sup> Belcher to Bernard, Halifax, 30 June 1762, f57-57v, vol. 19, CO 217, NA.



circumstances we are of opinion our families would be in utmost danger should the party proceed.”<sup>226</sup>

This was likely a display of Native strength intended to intimidate the settlers more than an indication that an attack was imminent. Though they were numerous, their actions and insults over the course of twenty-four hours suggested to some Lunenburg residents that it was “more than doubtful they are mediating an attack,” though the “out settlers” beyond the safety of the town were scared enough to return and seek shelter.<sup>227</sup> Belcher took these threats seriously and was aware that if word of Native attacks spread throughout the province settlers “in other parts of the weak settlements...might be alarmed.”<sup>228</sup> He was admitting that the Native threat remained a defining element of Nova Scotia’s settlements. With their French support removed and facing an influx of British settlers, the Mi’kmaq remained capable of preventing a militia from marching between Nova Scotia’s two strongest and most populated settlements. This was a message that the British at Halifax could not ignore.

By the Treaty of Paris, 1763, Britain found itself *de jure* proprietors of Nova Scotia / l’Acadie in its entirety. By Article 4, King Louis surrendered all claims to the region and encouraged the Acadians to find themselves new homes where they saw fit. Many returned to France only to be sent to what colonies France had retained, or hoped to create under the direction of the Duc de Choiseul. There was a disastrous attempted settlement at Cayenne (French Guiana) in 1763, resulting in the death of most of the colonists. Acadians were also sent to the Falkland Islands, Miquelon and St. Pierre,

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<sup>226</sup> Memorial of the Principal Inhabitants of the Town & County of Lunenburg, 17 July 1762, f120, vol. 19, CO 217, NA.

<sup>227</sup> Zouberbuhler, Creighton, and Rudolph to Belcher, Lunenburg, 15 July 1762, f118, vol. 19, CO 217, NA.

<sup>228</sup> Belcher to Colonel Denson, Halifax, 17 July 1762, vol. 19, CO 217, NA.

Quebec, and Louisiana.<sup>229</sup> The eastern Algonkians were not included in the Treaty of Paris, nor did their land rights fall clearly under the stipulations issued in the Proclamation of 1763. That legislation set the Appalachian Mountains as the western limit of British expansion, well beyond the Atlantic region. Yet Mi'kmaq and Wolastoqiyik rights fell under a section of the Proclamation that protected "the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected" from being molested in territories reserved for them. Those lands could not be purchased by individuals but must be acquired by the crown.<sup>230</sup> In practice, the Treaty of Paris and the Royal Proclamation of 1763 changed little in terms of territorial sovereignty in Nova Scotia. As John G. Reid has argued, the 1760s constituted a period of transition in Nova Scotia during which imperial goals gave way to colonial aspirations. With the French threat removed, British officials could focus their energies on populating Nova Scotia with Protestant settlers. The agreements they had struck with the Mi'kmaq, who remained a strong counter-balance to British sovereignty, would force continued negotiation and highlight Aboriginal territorial strength in Nova Scotia.<sup>231</sup>

## Conclusion

The end of the Seven Years' War brought imperial competition in Nova Scotia to a close. The conquest of Acadia was completed with the Treaty of Paris (1763), fifty years after Britain first claimed title to the province. The process of defeating France in

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<sup>229</sup> Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America*, 162. See also Mouhot, *Les Réfugiés Acadiens en France, 1758-1785: l'Impossible Réintégration*; de Borms, "La Guerre de Sept Ans et ses Conséquences Atlantiques: Kourou ou l'Apparition d'un Nouveau Système Colonial": 167-91.

<sup>230</sup> J.M. Bumsted, "1763-1783: Resettlement and Rebellion," in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation*, 156-59.

<sup>231</sup> Reid, *Essays*, 182-90.

the northeast was an entangled affair. Enlightened geographers in Britain and France, administrators on both sides of the Atlantic, and powerful Natives forces in the northeast contributed to a shared process during which the British not only removed the French from most of North America, but also began the transition from imperial power to colonial settlement in Nova Scotia. What appointed commissaries and diplomatic delegates in Paris had failed to achieve peacefully was decided in North America by violence.

The war exposed tensions in enlightened geographic thought as men such as Thomas Jefferys and Jacques-Nicolas Bellin used their maps to assert a political position in the hopes of convincing interested citizens of the arguments for or against empire. The enlightened ideal of objectivity and accurate knowledge succumbed to the imperial fervour that swept Europe. Citizens read about, and commented on, the progress of the war, demonstrating their grasp of imperial geography and the influence of maps. In North America, British and French political and military leaders relied on their images of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie to inform policy. Maps and reports crossed the Atlantic as administrators developed military strategy that they hoped would bring their image of the northeast to reality. Territorial control lost in one area had powerful implications for residents in another, as the Acadians learned after the British suffered defeats in the Ohio River Valley. When the French fell at Louisbourg, the political calculus in the northeast was altered. Territorial competition persisted, but the question focused not on whose image of the region would materialize, but whether Nova Scotia would become a British colony or remain an imperial fortress.

Controlling land was paramount. Plans for the Acadian expulsion, the establishment of an elected assembly, and attracting settlers from other British American colonies all demanded detailed geographic knowledge and surveys. Charles Morris, as he had since 1748, influenced the direction of British policy. His maps presaged the deportation, created townships, and eventually gained public purchase in Britain. His efforts also signalled the imperial to colonial transition in Nova Scotia. As this transformation progressed, it exposed the limits of British territorial control and the continued ties to imperial powers. The Mi'kmaq treaties in 1760-61 indicated a renewed territorial agreement by which Native powers could monitor British expansion. Emptied Acadian lands were not automatically British possessions, but would serve as negotiating tools by which the British and Natives could attain a new balance of territorial sovereignty. Colonial settlement was to be no less negotiated than imperial expansion.

Though officials at Halifax continued to defer to their imperial superiors over questions of administration (especially land management), colonial ideals started to develop after the fall of New France. Economic interests, which at times required sacrificing profits to ensure Native alliances, brought settlers to Nova Scotia. Surveys and geographic reports were used to "sell" the idea of relocating to the province and to monitor settlers once they had arrived. The Mi'kmaq watched this process closely, and displayed their strength (through threats or acts of violence) when they felt it was necessary. A new balance had been created in Nova Scotia. Imperial competition among the British, French, and Natives gave way to colonial negotiations between Britain and the Mi'kmaq. The threat of France had been removed, and Britain entered a new period of negotiated territorial sovereignty.

## Chapter 7

### Conclusion

As J.H. Parry famously stated, “old maps are slippery witnesses.” This aphorism has too often been repeated without the sentence that followed: “But where would historians be without them?”<sup>1</sup> Parry was cautioning historians against taking cartography at face value, but reminding them that maps and mapping serve a significant purpose in the study of the past. When limited simply to illustrating a geographic region under examination, maps can often raise more questions than answers. Why are regions coloured a certain way? Who made the map? For what purpose? How has the map been used? Maps and mapmaking reveal as much about the politics, personalities, and ideas behind their creation as about the physical territory they claim to represent. Geographic knowledge informed political decisions, influenced imperial relations, and shaped how the public understood their government, allies, and enemies. The history of northeastern North America, especially the region known as Nova Scotia, l’Acadie, or Mi’kma’ki, demonstrates how ideas and images of territory influenced political, intellectual, and cross-cultural relationships in the Atlantic World. This region was exceptional because three powerful groups – the British, the French, and the Mi’kmaq-Wolastoqiyik – lived in close quarters on contested territory for over fifty years. Each claimed the region as its own and envisioned the territory differently. Their actions and reactions were intertwined and entangled, each influencing the others and responding to changes as the situation demanded. This dissertation has argued that mapping, surveys, and geographic tracts were central to competing and negotiated territorial sovereignties in the northeast.

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<sup>1</sup> J. H. Parry, "Old Maps Are Slippery Witnesses," *Harvard Magazine [Alumni ed.]* 78, no. 8 (April) (1976): 32-41.

This chapter summarizes the major themes developed in this dissertation and stresses the importance of transnational and transimperial perspectives. The development of the “conquest” of Acadia was a complicated undertaking that began in 1710, but did not conclude until 1763. Over the course of more than fifty years, British, French, and Aboriginal forces jostled for position in northeastern North America. *De jure* British territorial jurisdiction was forced to confront *de facto* geographic sovereignty as expressed by the Mi’kmaq and the Acadians. The British inability to control Nova Scotia is evidenced by the fact that Acadians flourished – demographically and economically – during the first half of the eighteenth century, a period known as the Acadian “golden age.” The Mi’kmaq and their allies were similarly little affected by British rule until the 1750s. The conquest was therefore a process and not an event. Native treaties slowly forced the Mi’kmaq to recognize an increasing British presence, while the founding of Halifax was a watershed moment in the quest to control Nova Scotia. Bricks and mortar were necessary because British law was incapable of transforming Acadian inhabitants into British subjects. The Halifax settlement itself did not make Nova Scotia British; the Seven Years’ war did. British defeats in the Ohio River valley encouraged the Acadian expulsion. By 1763, Britain was the dominant imperial power in Nova Scotia. The conquest had been completed, and what remained was to transition from imperial outpost to colonial settlement.

The Mi’kmaq and their allies in the Wabanaki confederacy were active participants in the negotiations for territorial sovereignty, and relied on territorial boundaries no less than the British and French. Though their ability to resist and prevent British expansion waned as the eighteenth century progressed, the Mi’kmaq consistently

shaped settlement and influenced how power was exercised on their traditional lands. The Mi'kmaq and the French had co-existed for over a century before Britain captured Port Royal in 1710; their relationship was based on shared religion and cultural understanding. The Acadian ability to reclaim land from the sea (instead of taking Aboriginal territory) removed from the French-Native relationship the thorny issue of land encroachment. The Mi'kmaq were never beholden to French authorities, preferring instead a continually negotiated relationship carefully monitored by regular conferences and gift exchanges. Consequently, the Mi'kmaq remained able to shape their own policy (often in concert with other members of the Wabanaki confederacy), even if their actions went against French designs. Internal politics influenced Mi'kmaq decisions and illuminated their heterogeneity. Like the British and French, Native groups were divided into those who favoured peace and those who pushed for violence. Certain groups were more willing than others to enter into agreements, and were at times chastised by detractors. The treaties of 1760-1 signalled a new era in British-Mi'kmaq relations, but did not accomplish the territorial surrender so coveted by the British. Natives continued to expose British weaknesses and influenced the transition from empire to colony during the early 1760s.

Competition for territorial sovereignty was a matter of public discussion in Britain and France. Popular magazines, such as *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *Journal des Sçavans*, emphasized the role of geographic knowledge in imperial affairs. Literate citizens learned of new territories and were exposed to cartographic images designed to "sell" the idea of empire by making new lands recognizable and appealing to British or French aesthetic tastes. Geographic knowledge was an important educational tool, and

journals advertised textbooks and didactic maps that hoped to increase geographic literacy. Political implications were never far from the surface, as contributors often referred to a map's ability to make an argument for or against geographic possession. Citizens were therefore active in the discursive production of empire, and they relied on maps and surveys to inform their debates. There were differences, however, between British and French responses. The British press, largely free of censorship, encouraged a more lively debate among its readers; French magazines, heavily vetted by Royal officials, were more likely to serve state desires than provide a forum for discussion. The wide circulation of these magazines ensured that ideas found wide purchase among those interested in engaging in an imperial conversation. Territorial control over northeastern North America was a popular topic in these magazines, particularly during periods of war. The bifurcation of geographic knowledge into official and public streams meant that the public was not fully informed, but what information was available was digested and critiqued by journal readers. Geography's ability to marshal support or encourage dissent was made evident by administrators' reluctance to publish politically provocative maps during periods of sensitive transimperial negotiations. Officials recognized the influence of public opinion and did what they could to control it.

Imperial negotiations had to consider the effects of local events. "Double diplomacy" was rampant in eighteenth-century Nova Scotia / l'Acadie. British officials in the northeast provided favourable reports to Whitehall, glossing over challenges on the ground that demanded policy adaptations. French officials feigned loyalty to the Treaty of Utrecht while encouraging hostility towards the British. Administrators in Britain and France relied on the information they received to formulate strategies, but they often



failed to take into account the myriad of local variables, including Native territorial strength. The maps sent to Europe provided an idealized image of the northeast, which led to misunderstandings and an imperial disconnect with local agents. British and French officials turned their attention to the northeast in the late 1740s in an attempt to secure the region, and geographic surveys helped plan settlements and govern inhabitants. The founding of Halifax, the Acadian Boundary Commission, and France's project to remap Acadia's coastline demonstrate that imperial figures, such as the Earl of Halifax and Minister Rouillé, were interested in overseas possessions and capable of directing expansion. The detailed memoirs exchanged at the Boundary Commission illustrate just how engaged British and French ministers were in their work. That these reports also indicate the difficulties of reconciling local actions with imperial aspirations should not detract from their utility as expressions of imperial envisioning. The northeast was strategically important to both France and Britain, and neither power was willing to surrender their claims to the region. It was important enough to go to war over. During the Seven Years' War, imperial strategies were affected by local realities. The Acadian expulsion was in part an answer to early French successes in the Ohio valley; early attempts at resettlement in Nova Scotia were plagued by Mi'kmaq and Acadian responses to the expulsion; and, the fall of New France left a power vacuum in the northeast that could be exploited by the Mi'kmaq and their allies. The context and contingencies of the struggles for territorial sovereignty underlined the difficulties of implementing an imperial vision in a contested region.

Maps and cartographic evidence were persuasive tools in these imperial and local negotiations. Ideas and images of the northeast crossed political and cultural boundaries,

forcing each group (British, French, and Aboriginal) to address its competitor's desires. This entanglement of imaginations was a driving force behind claims of territorial sovereignty. Nova Scotia / l'Acadie was an imperial microcosm; everyday interactions, negotiations, and conflicts represented the wider competition for control of North America. Yet the region was also exceptional because for much of the eighteenth century no single group could dominate the others. Britain controlled the continent's eastern coast from New England to Georgia; France held the St. Lawrence and several forts along the Mississippi to Louisiana; Aboriginals controlled almost everything else. In Nova Scotia, however, territory and political authority were shared. Over time, the balance of territorial sovereignty swung from Mi'kmaq and Acadian to British, though from 1710 to 1763 territorial hegemony remained elusive. Actions in Europe influenced developments in Acadia, and vice versa. The use of geographic knowledge to claim sovereignty reflects the complexity of imperial expansion and the central role played by Aboriginal forces in the competition for territorial control in the northeast. An entangled interpretation of eighteenth-century Nova Scotia / l'Acadie, viewed through the lens of mapping and geographic evidence, provides an alternative to studies that do not adequately integrate the northeast into the Atlantic world.

Cartography and the mapping process were powerful elements of eighteenth-century sovereignty because they served many functions. Maps could be used to argue for past possession of territory or to project future imperial aspirations. They allowed their readers to peer into the past and evaluate the authority of geographers, yet they also provided a foundation for negotiating new boundaries to cement alliances or avoid conflict. Consequently, maps were not only representations of geography, but nor should

they be considered as simple reflections of imperial desire. Cartographic evidence was limited by technologies of production, general knowledge, and the practical limits of two-dimensional representations. Overtly biased maps, or those of poor construction, were recognized as wanting and easily dismissed. Mapping's abilities and limits contributed equally to the legacy of geographic knowledge. Like legal frameworks, geographic evidence played various roles in creating, defending, and resisting territorial sovereignty.

This dissertation has argued that cartography and spatial knowledge were multifaceted tools used by the French, British, and Mi'kmaq in the quest for territorial control in northeastern North America. Moving beyond a comparative analysis that focuses on the similarities and differences among competing powers, this project is the first full study of Nova Scotia / l'Acadie to explore how the actions and interactions of three powerful groups (on both sides of the Atlantic) created an imperial matrix founded on geographic knowledge. Territory had to be known before it could be controlled, and the methods by which that knowledge was created and implemented reflected the technological, political, and ideological realities of the time. Material power and cartography were related: in regions where the former was limited (such as Nova Scotia), the latter became a method by which empires pursued their interests. Historians often describe the "negotiated" nature of power; mapping, surveys, and geographic information were central vehicles to that negotiation.

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