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dc.contributor.authorPhillips, Donovan
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-06T12:16:53Z
dc.date.available2018-12-06T12:16:53Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10222/75011
dc.description.abstractPropositional attitude ascriptions raise important questions about what constraints a semantic theory for natural languages must accommodate, but ascriptions of “what is said” are thought by some to be semantically uninformative. Where past attempts to defend a semantically robust notion of “what is said” fail to meet several objections raised to them, I provide a way to specify semantic content through ascriptions of “what is said” by focusing on de se ascriptions, or as they are sometimes called: propositional avowals. For those that make such ascriptions, semantic content is fixed by the ascriptive immunity to error that avowals exhibit. The standard objections against a semantically informative notion of “what is said” are avoided by adopting a first-personal stance.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectMetasemanticsen_US
dc.subjectSemanticsen_US
dc.subjectMeaningen_US
dc.subjectFirst Person Authorityen_US
dc.titleSe What You Meanen_US
dc.date.defence2018-12-07
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.degreeMaster of Artsen_US
dc.contributor.external-examinern/aen_US
dc.contributor.graduate-coordinatorGreg Scherkoskeen_US
dc.contributor.thesis-readerDuncan MacIntoshen_US
dc.contributor.thesis-readerTyler Hildebranden_US
dc.contributor.thesis-supervisorMichael Hymersen_US
dc.contributor.ethics-approvalNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.manuscriptsNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.copyright-releaseNoen_US
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