Recent Submissions

  • Review of Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action by G.F. Schueler 

    Macintosh, Duncan. 2007. "Review of Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action by G.F. Schueler." In , 86-88. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The article reviews the book "Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action," by G. F. Schuller.
  • Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 1998. "Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality." In Modeling rationality, morality, and evolution, . New York: Oxford University Press.
    No abstract available.
  • Intransitive Preferences, Vagueness, and the Structure of Procrastination 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 2010. "Intransitive Preferences, Vagueness, and the Structure of Procrastination." In The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination, 68. Oxford University Press.
    Against Chrisoula Andreou and her reading of Warren Quinn's self-torturer, I argue that intransitivity in an agent's preferences cannot explain his procrastinating 'irrationally delaying' because, contra the money-pump ...
  • Who Owns Me, Me or my Mother? How to Escape Okin's Problem for Nozick's and Narveson's Theory of Entitlement 

    MacIntoss, Duncan. 2007. "Who Owns Me, Me or my Mother? How to Escape Okin's Problem for Nozick's and Narveson's Theory of Entitlement." In Liberty, games and contracts : Jan Narveson and the defence of libertarianism, . Aldershot, England: Ashgate Pub..
    No abstract available.
  • THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF QUINE'S INDETERMINACY THEORY 

    MACINTOSH, DUNCAN. 1988. "THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF QUINE'S INDETERMINACY THEORY." PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE 3: 22-26.
    No abstract available.
  • Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 2003. "Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons." In Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, 230. New York: Oxford University Press.
    I reject three theories of practical reason according to which a rational agent's ultimate reasons for acting must be unchanging: that one is rationally obliged in each choice (1) to be prudent--to advance all the desires ...
  • The Mutual Limitation of Needs as Bases of Moral Entitlements: A Solution to Braybrooke's Problem 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 2007. "The Mutual Limitation of Needs as Bases of Moral Entitlements: A Solution to Braybrooke's Problem." In Engaged philosophy : essays in honour of David Braybrooke, 77. Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
    No abstract available.
  • Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 2001. "Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(3): 346-365.
    Hume said the reasons fixing the rationality of one's acts are the desires one has when acting: one's acts are rational iff they advance these desires. Thomas Nagel says this entails calling rational, acts absurdly ...
  • Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action - By G.F. Schueler 

    macintosh, duncan. 2007. "Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action - By G.F. Schueler." Philosophical Books 48(1): 86-88.
    The article reviews the book "Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action," by G. F. Schuller.
  • Buridan and the Circumstances of Justice (On the Implications of the Rational Unsolvability of Certain Co-ordination Problems) 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 1992. "Buridan and the Circumstances of Justice (On the Implications of the Rational Unsolvability of Certain Co-ordination Problems)." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73(2): 150-173.
    Gauthier and Hobbes reduce Prisoners Dilemmas to co-ordination problems (CPs). Many think rational, face-to-face agents can solve any CP by agreed fiat. But though an agent can rationally use a symmetry-breaking technique ...
  • Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 1992. "Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22(4): 503-529.
    To the normal reasons we think can justify preferring something, "x" ("x" has objectively preferable properties, or ones one prefers things to have, or "x's" obtaining would advance one's preferences), I add: "preferring ...
  • Persons and the Satisfaction of Preferences: Problems in the Rational Kinematics of Values 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 1993. "Persons and the Satisfaction of Preferences: Problems in the Rational Kinematics of Values." Journal of Philosophy 90(4): 163-180.
    If one can get the targets of one's current wants only by acquiring new wants (as in the Prisoner's Dilemma), is it rational to do so? Maybe not. For this could justify adopting unsatisfiable wants, violating the rational ...
  • Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth 

    Macintosh, Duncan. 1994. "Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45(1): 153-170.
    Scientific Realists (SRs) argue that it would be a miracle if scientific theories were getting more predictive without getting closer to the truth. Van Fraassen, Laudan "et al" argue that owing to the underdetermination ...
  • Could God Have Made the Big Bang? (On Theistic Counterfactuals) 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 1994. "Could God Have Made the Big Bang? (On Theistic Counterfactuals)." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 33(1): 3-20.
    Quentin Smith argues that if God exists, He had a duty to ensure life's existence; and He couldn't rationally have done so and made a big bang unless a counterfactual (CF) like 1) "If God had made a big bang, there would ...
  • Co-Operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma 

    MacIntosh, Duncan. 1991. "Co-Operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma." Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 64(3): 309-321.
    For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior ...
  • McClennen's Early Cooperative Solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma 

    MACINTOSH, Duncan. 1991. "McClennen's Early Cooperative Solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma." Southern Journal of Philosophy: 341-358.
    No abstract available.
  • LIBERTARIAN AGENCY AND RATIONAL MORALITY: ACTION-THEORETIC OBJECTIONS TO GAUTHIER'S DISPOSITIONAL SOLUTION OF THE COMPLIANCE PROBLEM 

    MACINTOSH, DUNCAN. 1988. "LIBERTARIAN AGENCY AND RATIONAL MORALITY: ACTION-THEORETIC OBJECTIONS TO GAUTHIER'S DISPOSITIONAL SOLUTION OF THE COMPLIANCE PROBLEM." Southern Journal of Philosophy 26: 499-525.
    DAVID GAUTHIER THINKS AGENTS FACING A PRISONER'S DILEMMA ('PD') SHOULD FIND IT RATIONAL TO DISPOSE THEMSELVES TO COOPERATE WITH THOSE INCLINED TO RECIPROCATE (I.E., TO ACQUIRE A CONSTRAINED MAXIMIZER--'CM'--DISPOSITION), ...
  • Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality 

    Macintosh, Duncan. 1991. "Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 30(1-2): 3.
    No abstract available.
  • TWO GAUTHIERS? 

    MACINTOSH, DUNCAN. 1989. "TWO GAUTHIERS?." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 28: 43-61.
    DAVID GAUTHIER CLAIMS IT CAN BE RATIONAL TO VOLUNTEER COOPERATION IN A PRISONER'S DILEMMA IF ONE ADOPTED A DISPOSITION CONSTRAINING ONE FROM MAXIMIZING ONE'S INDIVIDUAL EXPECTED UTILITY (A CMD). BUT I CLAIM COOPERATION ...
  • Modality, Mechanism and Translational Indeterminacy 

    MACINTOSH, DUNCAN. 1989. "Modality, Mechanism and Translational Indeterminacy." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 28(3): 391-399.
    Ken Warmbrod thinks Quine agrees that: translation is determinate (D) if it is D what speakers would say in all possible circumstances (PCs); what things would do in merely PCs is determined (Dd) by what their subvisible ...

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