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dc.contributor.authorKidane, Liyusew Solomon
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-13T13:22:34Z
dc.date.available2012-12-13T13:22:34Z
dc.date.issued2012-12-13
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10222/15816
dc.description.abstractThis thesis examines the best system for health professions regulation in Ethiopia with a view to sketch the roles of state and non-state actors in that system. It argues for statist regulation as self-regulation is worrisome for its tendency to promote private interest instead over public protection. A statist regulation is an efficient system that is more capable of establishing accountable and procedurally fair processes and strengthening public trust than a system of self-regulation. But the state lacks capacity, expertise, and legitimacy, and risks capture and corruption. These could be resolved through an enforcement strategy rooted in responsive regulation theory. That strategy should emphasize soft regulatory instruments, which requires utilization of the capacity and motivation of non-state actors, particularly health professional associations. A statist regulatory framework that harnesses the contribution of non-state actors in implementing soft regulatory strategies would effectively protect patients and improve the quality of health care services in Ethiopia.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectHealth Professions Regulation in Ethiopiaen_US
dc.titleFramework and Enforcement Strategy for Health Professions Regulation in Ethiopiaen_US
dc.date.defence2012-12-12
dc.contributor.departmentFaculty of Lawen_US
dc.contributor.degreeMaster of Lawsen_US
dc.contributor.external-examinern/aen_US
dc.contributor.graduate-coordinatorProfessor Steve Coughlanen_US
dc.contributor.thesis-readerProfessor Richard Devlin, and Professor Michael Hadskisen_US
dc.contributor.thesis-supervisorProfessor William Laheyen_US
dc.contributor.ethics-approvalNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.manuscriptsNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.copyright-releaseNot Applicableen_US
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