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Rational Secret Sharing with and without Synchronous Broadcast, Conspicuous Secrets, Malicious Players and Unbounded Opponents

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dc.contributor.author Gidney, Craig
dc.date.accessioned 2012-04-13T16:53:20Z
dc.date.available 2012-04-13T16:53:20Z
dc.date.issued 2012-04-13
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10222/14647
dc.description.abstract In secret sharing we are asked to split a secret into several shares in such a way that a minimum number of shares is necessary and sufficient to reconstruct the secret. Rational secret sharing considers secret sharing in the context of adversarial players who want to learn the secret but, secondarily, want to prevent other players from learning the secret. We present protocols, and bounds on the effectiveness of any protocol, for recombining secret shares in the presence of players who do not want others to learn the secret (rationality), may not want to learn the secret themselves (maliciousness), may be colluding, may have unbounded computational capacity, may be able to synchronize sends (asynchronous/synchronous broadcast), and/or may be able to recognize the secret independently (conspicuousness). We propose four protocols and analyze their security against players and coalitions who are each rational or malicious. We also prove three results that show protocols using only asynchronous broadcast are less secure than what can be achieved by protocols using synchronous broadcast. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.subject Rational Secret Sharing en_US
dc.title Rational Secret Sharing with and without Synchronous Broadcast, Conspicuous Secrets, Malicious Players and Unbounded Opponents en_US
dc.date.defence 2012-03-22
dc.contributor.department Faculty of Computer Science en_US
dc.contributor.degree Master of Computer Science en_US
dc.contributor.external-examiner Richard Nowakowski en_US
dc.contributor.graduate-coordinator Qigang Gao en_US
dc.contributor.thesis-reader Norbert Zeh en_US
dc.contributor.thesis-supervisor Michael McAllister en_US
dc.contributor.ethics-approval Not Applicable en_US
dc.contributor.manuscripts Not Applicable en_US
dc.contributor.copyright-release Not Applicable en_US


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