dc.contributor.author | Payton, Jonathan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-06T14:05:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-09-06T14:05:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011-09-06 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10222/14197 | |
dc.description.abstract | This work is dedicated to the development of a unified account of both theoretical and practical rationality. I adopt a particular view of evaluative properties, according to which entities are evaluated as good or bad according to how well they fulfill the constitutive functions of their kinds. I argue that the function of belief is to accurately represent reality, while the function of action is to satisfy the agent’s desires. These functions fix the goodness- or success-conditions of belief and action. With these functions in place, I adopt a reliabilist conception of reasoning which evaluates reasoning processes by how well they allow us to achieve the constitutive aims of belief and action. Moreover, I argue that the process of determining which action will best satisfy our desires is a cognitive matter – non-cognitive states like desire do not actually provide the agent with reasons. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.subject | Action | en_US |
dc.subject | Belief | en_US |
dc.subject | Reason | en_US |
dc.subject | Rationality | en_US |
dc.subject | Desire | en_US |
dc.subject | Truth | en_US |
dc.title | Theoretical and Practical Rationality: Towards a Unified Account | en_US |
dc.date.defence | 2011-08-15 | |
dc.contributor.department | Department of Philosophy | en_US |
dc.contributor.degree | Master of Arts | en_US |
dc.contributor.external-examiner | Prof. Kirstin Borgerson | en_US |
dc.contributor.graduate-coordinator | Prof. Mike Hymers | en_US |
dc.contributor.thesis-reader | Prof. Duncan MacIntosh | en_US |
dc.contributor.thesis-supervisor | Prof. Greg Scherkoske | en_US |
dc.contributor.ethics-approval | Not Applicable | en_US |
dc.contributor.manuscripts | Not Applicable | en_US |
dc.contributor.copyright-release | Not Applicable | en_US |