WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, CHILDREN'S WELL-BEING & CHILD LABOUR IN ECUADOR

by

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the relationship between women's ownership of economic resources, beliefs, values and childhood experiences of violence and intimate partner violence, the relationship between household chores and children's self-assessed well-being and the intergenerational transmission of child labour. The individuals studied are Ecuadorian women and children. Chapter 2 explores whether having economic assets available to women helps protect them from intimate partner violence (psychological, physical, sexual and economic violence), taking into account the importance of beliefs, gender norms and childhood experiences of violence. While asset ownership is somewhat protective of intimate partner violence, access to money for personal expenses is strongly associated with lower likelihoods of all types of violence. 'Traditional' beliefs are, perhaps counterintuitively, protective of violence. Results provide compelling evidence supporting an intergenerational aspect to violence where violent family backgrounds are strongly associated with higher incidences of all types of intimate partner violence. Chapter 3 examines the effects of housework on children's self-assessed well-being. The domestic activities that Ecuadorian children (ages 8-17) perform are negatively associated with their self-assessed well-being, both at the extensive and intensive margin of household work. Although the decreases in happiness associated with household chores may appear small in magnitude given the mean level of happiness, the effect is similar to the decrease in happiness associated with the work children perform in the labour market. Chapter 4 studies the intergenerational transmission of child labour in Ecuador. Findings show that children of parents who were child labourers themselves are more likely to combine school and work and less likely to only attend school when defining 'child work' according to Ecuadorian legislation (i.e., children who are illegally working violating minimum age requirements, exceeding working hour limits, whose work interferes with their schooling or who work in dangerous conditions). The intergenerational effect of child labour for Ecuadorian children remains beyond the effects of parental child labour on current family income, it depends on the type of work the children perform and it is not gender neutral.

List of Abbreviations Used

BDH	Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Transfer)
ENTI	Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil (National Child Labour Survey)
ENVIGMU	Encuesta Nacional Sobre Relaciones Familiares y Violencia de Género Contra las Mujeres (National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women)
ILO	International Labour Organization
INEC	Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (National Institute of Statistics and Censuses)
IPV	Intimate Partner Violence
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PMK	Person Most Knowledgeable
UNDOC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSNA	United Nations System of National Accounts
WHO	World Health Organization

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This dissertation examines the determinants of negative outcomes experienced by vulnerable populations in Ecuador. Particularly, the focus is understanding the relationship between women's ownership of economic resources, beliefs, values, childhood experiences of violence and intimate partner violence, the relationship between household chores and children's well-being and understanding how child labour can be transmitted across generations. Economic research has focused on the determinants of intimate partner violence and the work children perform mostly as unidimensional issues. This dissertation addresses the gap in the literature by approaching intimate partner violence and child work with a multidimensional perspective taking into account the values and social norms, as well as the familial histories that shape the outcomes of Ecuadorian women and children. Additionally, the analysis focuses on individuals who are susceptible to further harm. Without having a comprehensive understanding of intimate partner violence and the work children do, the prevalence and depth of these issues may grow and outcomes may worsen.

Globally, approximately one in three women will experience physical or sexual violence from a partner during their lifetime (WHO, 2014). In Ecuador, over six in ten women will experience some form of intimate partner violence in their lives and three in ten would have experienced it in the last twelve months (MJDHC, 2018). While experiencing violence is an undesirable outcome in and of itself, it is also important

given that it can become a learned behaviour that is passed down and affect various generations (Aguero, 2013; Cools and Kotsadam, 2017; Orpinas, 1999; Safranoff and Tiravassi, 2018; Tarabah et al., 2016; WHO and PAHO, 2012). Exposure to violence tends to increase the likelihood of desensitization, habituation, normalization and imitation of violence (Tarabah et al., 2016). The further intimate partner violence is normalized, the easier it can spread and become justified. Even without considering the deep emotional personal costs, the societal costs of intimate partner violence are high. The National Institute of Census and Statistics in Ecuador (INEC for its name in Spanish) tried to quantify the costs related to violence at a national level.[1] In these calculations, for Ecuador, the cost of violence against women was estimated to be between 7-14.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) (Carrion, 2007; MJDHC, 2018).[2]

Economic theory suggests that, if experiencing intimate partner violence, the more resources available to women (e.g., income, wealth, employment, services, and institutions), the better positioned they are to leave an abusive partnership. While evidence shows that this is indeed the case (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017; Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997; Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013; Friedemann-Sanchez and Svec, n.d.; Jewkes, 2002; Tankard and Iyendard, 2018; Munyo and Rossi, 2015), I extend the analysis to incorporate norms and beliefs as well as the women's childhood experience of violence and their (former) spouses'. In Chapter 2, I explore whether having assets available to women helps protect them from intimate partner violence, while taking into account the importance of gender norms and intergenerational transmissions violence. Specifically, I ask whether having assets in the woman's name is associated with a lower probability of experiencing psychological, physical, and sexual intimate partner violence. Results show that while asset ownership is somewhat protective of intimate partner violence, access to money for personal expenses is strongly associated with a lower likelihood of all types of violence. 'Traditional' beliefs are, perhaps paradoxically, protective of violence. I also find compelling evidence supporting an intergenerational effect of violence with violent family backgrounds being strongly associated with higher incidences of all

[1] To do this, direct (costs associated with health, such as medical expenditures, institutional costs, and rehabilitation expenditures as well as costs associated with security including expenditures on prevention and legal fees) and indirect costs (such as loss of productivity and loss of economic activity due to death as well as emotional costs derived from compensation data and surveys on willingness to pay to not be a victim of a crime) were estimated (Carrion, 2007; MJDHC, 2018).

[2] To put this in perspective, education amounts to 12.6% of GDP.

types of violence. While resources can be helpful for women, social norms and violent experiences in childhood loom large and have the largest associations with intimate partner violence in adulthood.

Children engaged in some form of labour are the second vulnerable group studied. Child labour has been widely discussed in the policy arena over the last few decades. According to the last global estimates on child labour from the International Labour Organization (ILO), as of 2017, there were 152 million children working, 73 million of which engaged in hazardous labour. While a lot of attention has been given to the effects of child labour in the context of market activities, the literature remains thin when studying household work as part of child labour, especially, in terms of how it may affect children's well-being. Household chores are usually excluded from definitions of child labour given the "non-economic" nature of these activities. Yet, the number of children performing domestic chores is large and their contributions to their households are quite meaningful. About 800 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 years are involved in some form of housework weekly (ILO, 2017) and contribute between 4% to 12% of all household work in their homes. Blair (1992a); Goldscheider and Waite (1991); Gershuny and Sullivan (2014).

Chapter 3 explores the effects of housework on children's self-assessed well-being. Specifically, I seek to answer how happy children (between 8 and 17 years) self-report themselves to be, conditional on time spent on housework, i.e., do children perceive the unpaid work they do at home as being detrimental to their happiness? I find that the domestic activities that Ecuadorian children perform are negatively associated with their self-assessed well-being, both in the extensive and intensive margin of household work. From a baseline of 86% of children saying that they are happy most of the time, performing chores is associated with an average 4.0 percentage point (p.p.) lower probability in children's self-assessed happiness. An increase in domestic work of 10 hours per week is associated with a 2.1 p.p. lower probability of children self-reporting as happy. Although the decrease in happiness associated with household work may appear small in magnitude given the mean level of happiness, it is very close to decreases in happiness associated with the work children perform in the labour market. While a lot of attention is placed on the work children perform in economic activities, from the children's perspective, work in chores at home is almost as detrimental to

their well-being.

While housework is important, it is not the only form of work children are engaged in. There is considerable heterogeneity in the type of work (e.g., market vs. domestic work; paid vs. unpaid work) and the working conditions (light vs. excessive work; favourable vs. unfavourable - dangerous, unhealthy and abusive - work) children may perform. Most of the concern surrounding child labour stems from human capital implications of preventing children from going to school and affecting their future earnings. When children shift from school to the labour market it may create a vicious cycle where poor households send their children to work and these children grow to become poor adults due to the diminished investment in their education (Emerson and Souza, 2003; Udry, 2004). However, the mechanisms of this intergenerational transmission are not fully understood. It could be that the mechanism is exclusively an economic one, a budget constraint that families experience due to poverty. It could also be that the mechanism for the transmission is partly an attitudinal or behavioural one and child labour may be perpetuated due to beliefs, values, expectations and potentially rites of passage. The type of work that children engage in may depend on the mechanism at play. Presumably, if children work out of sheer necessity, the quality of work and potentially dangerous characteristics of work would not be as important as the need to sustain the household. However, if parents send children to work to develop attitudes and abilities, then, it is likely that children would not be engaged in work that would harm them. Target 8.7 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals calls to eradicate all forms of child labour by 2025 (ILO, 2017). If the goal is banning child labour due to the human capital argument and if the behavioural mechanism is important, even if poverty is eliminated, child labour would not be eradicated.

Chapter 4 examines the intergenerational transmission of child labour in Ecuador. I ask whether children are more likely to engage in child labour and less likely to go to school if a parent started working before the minimum age requirement (15 years old), after controlling for current family poverty. I explore whether there are differences in the transmission of child work depending on the type of work performed and on working conditions. I assume that the household's decision to send the children to work or school is a simultaneous one and look at outcomes that combine both alternatives.

I find that the children of parents who were child labourers themselves are more likely to combine school and work and less likely to only attend school when defining 'child work' according to Ecuadorian legislation. I also find that the transmission of child labour depends on the type of work the children perform (if both parents were child labourers, children are more likely to combine school and be engaged in work that is potentially harmful, i.e., heavy and unsafe work), and that the transmission of work is not gender neutral. Thus, policies solely aimed at reducing or eliminating child work through poverty alleviation may reduce the worst cases of child labour but will not eradicate all forms of child work given the intergenerational links that remain beyond poverty.

Given that all chapters focus on Ecuadorian individuals, what follows is a brief overview of Ecuador to provide context for the analysis.

Socio-Economic Context of Ecuador

Income Ecuador is an upper-middle income country with a population of 15,243,883 as of 2011 (WDI, 2019; INEC, 2015).[3] In 2011, average household income was $892.9 USD per month and average household expenditures were $809.6 USD per month (ENIGHUR, 2012). There are several social safety net programs for low-income individuals though the most well-known and used is the "Bono de Desarrollo Humano" (Human Development Transfer, BDH for its name in Spanish), a (now) conditional cash transfer. In 2012 it provided households in poverty with $35 per month (currently, it provides $50 to households in extreme poverty). It was instituted in 1998 (due to the country undergoing a financial crisis with hyperinflation, extreme devaluation of the local currency which culminated in dollarization, a bank run and high rates of unemployment). The transfer is given to mothers (Martinez et al., 2017).

Education The educational system of Ecuador divides universal education into "early education" for children between the ages of three to four years old, ten years of "general basic education" for children aged five to fourteen and three years of "baccalaureate education" for children aged fifteen to seventeen (S.R.O. No. 754,

[3]Given that the data used for this dissertation are from the years 2011-2012, most of the contextualizing information will be set as closely as possible to these dates.

2012). Once completed, children receive a "Baccalaureate Certificate."[4] Education is compulsory for general basic education and baccalaureate education, lasting a total of 13 years. Pre-primary education was not deemed mandatory until a reform in 2010.[5]

In 2012, net attendance rates[6] in general basic education, i.e., for children between the ages of five to fourteen, was 95.6% (95.4% for boys and 95.9% for girls). Net attendance rates for baccalaureate education, i.e., for children between the ages of fifteen to seventeen, was 63.9% (61.6% for boys and 66.3% for girls) (Antamba, 2015). Looking at the children who did not attend school, 35.58% said the main reason for not attending was 'lacking the economic resources to do so,' followed by 'due to work' (16.64%) and 'uninterested in school (11.60%) (Antamba, 2015).

Even though education is compulsory for children, enforcement is low. There are some instances in which enrolment and attendance are monitored. In 2008 a pilot program took place in the three main cities of the country, Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca to check compliance of requirements of the BDH. Almost a third (32%) of households were suspended from receiving the transfer for two months for not meeting the health and/or education requirements. The same year, households in rural areas in twelve provinces were selected to verify school enrolment and the government found that only 47% of households that received the BDH complied with the school requirement (Martinez et al., 2017). Another factor that potentially is related to completion rates in Ecuador is fertility. In 2012, the government reported that the adolescent (women between fifteen to nineteen years) fertility rate was 172 births per 1,000 teenagers, making 17% of adolescent females mothers, the second highest incidence of teenage pregnancy in Latin America (El Universo, 2012; MSP, 2012). As of the last census in 2010, 20% of all deliveries were from females between the ages of fifteen to nineteen who gave birth to 60,600 children. Additionally, 1,100 children were born to mothers between the ages of ten to fourteen years (El Universo, 2012). Abortion is criminalized in Ecuador, both the doctor and the patient could serve

[4]Prior to 2010, the educational system was divided into pre-primary education, primary education and secondary education. Pre-primary education was for children aged 4-5; primary education for children aged 6-11; and secondary education was for children aged 12-17 (UNESCO, 2014; S.R.O. No. 754, 2012). In 2012, the completion rate for primary education was 97.3%, 85.8% for lower secondary and 65.5% in upper secondary.

[5]Following the reform, the last year of what used to be pre-primary education, when the child is five years old, became the first year of general basic education. Early education (when a child is three or four years old) is universal (by law, the State is mandated to offer it to everyone) but not required for a child to be allowed to enrol in general basic education (S.R.O. No. 754, 2012).

[6]"Total number of students of the official age group for a given level of education who are attending school at any level of education, expressed as a percentage of the corresponding population" (UNESCO, 2014, np).

between six months to two years in jail following an abortion. The only exception, when abortion is not deemed a crime, is when the woman's life is in danger or in the case of rape to an individual with cognitive disabilities (COIP, 2014).

The Institution of Marriage In 2011, the minimum age to marry in Ecuador was 12 years old and 14 years old for women and men, respectively.[7] Legally, a marriage can end due to the death of one of its members, if it is deemed null or void, if a person is legally declared missing, or due to divorce. No fault divorce is legal (Civil Code, 2005). Common-law unions become a legally binding marital status after two years of cohabitation.[8]

Following the end of a relationship (either a marriage or common-law), the separation of conjugal property can be filed through a dissolution of union (not necessarily a divorce), so that the union's estate is divided and any other assets purchased following this division of joint property remains solely under the ownership of the purchaser, not the matrimonial estate. During the marriage or if the couple has separated but are still legally married, a spouse can file for espousal support for themselves as well as for their children (Civil Code, 2005; Metro Ecuador, 2016).[9] Child support can be requested for all children under the age of 18 (or under the age of 21 if the child is a student) by the parent (or legal representative) who has custody or by children themselves if they are over the age of 15 (Children and Adolescents Code, 2002; El Telegrafo, 2017, 2019).[10]

Violence In 2014, the Penal Code incorporated and criminalized physical, psychological and sexual violence against women or family members, including femicide (STPTV, 2018). Since violence against women was criminalized (and reports of violence were first recorded) in 2014, reports filed to the State Prosecutor's Office have shown an upward trend in gendered violence. In 2014, between August and December there were 2,016 reports filed for physical violence, 13,919 reports of psychological violence, 66

[7] Following reforms to the Civil Code in 2015, the minimum age to marry became 18 years old (El Comercio, 2015).

[8] In the 2015 reform, the cohabitation requirement was eliminated (El Comercio, 2015).

[9] Usually, espousal support is granted based on whether a spouse (commonly, the females) stopped working during the union, worked temporarily or earned significantly less than the other spouse (Metro Ecuador, 2016).

[10] Child support is calculated based on the earnings of the supporter and support is paid on a monthly basis (El Telegrafo, 2019). If the parent who provides child support is unemployed, a judge will decide a minimum payment for the children. If the parent misses alimony for two or more months, an arrest warrant can be issued against them (El Telegrafo, 2019).

reports of sexual violence against women, and 27 reports of femicide (MJDHC, 2018). In 2019, there were 9,090 sexual abuse cases reported, an additional 4,811 reports of physical domestic violence, 30,893 reports of psychological domestic violence and 250 cases of sexual domestic violence, and 65 femicides (FGE, 2019). In 6 out of 10 cases of femicide, perpetrators were the spouses, former spouses or live-in partners (STPTV, 2018). Since data was first collected in August of 2014 until November of 2020, 833 women have died by femicide, which approximately amounts to one woman being killed every 72 hours in Ecuador (El Comercio, 2020).[11]

[11] So far, 101 of these women died in 2020 and 82 femicides have occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic (El Comercio, 2020).

Chapter 2

Rule of Thumb: Intimate Partner Violence in Ecuador

> *"His Honor was of opinion that the defendant had a right to whip his wife with a switch no larger than his thumb, and that upon the facts found in the special verdict he was not guilty in law."*
>
> State v. A. B. Rhodes, 61 N. C. 453 (1868)

2.1 Introduction

The home is the most dangerous place for women (UNODC, 2018). On an average day, 137 women are killed by their partners or a member of their family (UNODC, 2018).[1] Although these estimates on gender-related killings reflect extreme violence inflicted on women, throughout their lives, a third of women will have survived physical or sexual violence from an intimate partner (WHO, 2014). In Latin America and the Caribbean, at least one in five women (20%), and as many as three in four women (75%), experience at least one emotionally abusive act by a partner throughout their lives (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005). In Ecuador, throughout their lifetime, 35% and

[1] Globally, in 2018, 58% of all reported female homicides were perpetrated by intimate partners or family members (UNODC, 2018).

14.5% of all women will have experienced physical and sexual violence, respectively, in their partnerships (INEC, 2012a; MJDHC, 2018).[2] Intimate partner violence is not slowing down. Even though ending gender-based violence is one of the Sustainable Development Goals, progress has been halted due to the Covid-19 pandemic (UNFPA et al., 2020).[3]

The goal of this chapter is to understand intimate partner violence in the context of Ecuador. Despite richness in the interdisciplinary literature analysing violence, there is no unified theoretical or empirical consensus providing a holistic understanding of intimate partner violence. In an attempt to provide such an understanding, I merge three major themes from the literature to study intimate partner violence in Ecuador. The first theme explores how economic resources, mainly, assets available to women, are associated with intimate partner violence. The resources available to women in a relationship are hypothesized to affect the well-being she could have outside marriage in the event of divorce (i.e., her 'bargaining position'), which in turn may have an association with the probability of violence. The second theme included is the importance of beliefs and social norms surrounding women. Identifying the beliefs women hold aids in uncovering the extent of the normalization of violence, the problems and backlash that women may face when going against those norms, or the protectiveness of abiding by them.

As Phipps and Woolley (2008) point out, the gains from marriage may not be shared in an equal way, "while women and men gain from cooperation within the family, there is inevitably conflict over how those gains are shared: men may 'bring home the bacon,' women may cook it, but who gets to eat it?" (pg. 592). Yet, in light of conflict, does cooking the bacon implies having the pan as a shield? Or is it the owner of the pan the person who can use it as a weapon? Or in turn, if roles are reversed, and if women bring home the bacon, will they be hit with the pan?

The third theme examines intergenerational transmissions of violence, whether the woman or her partner experienced domestic violence as children. Individuals who were abused as children or who witnessed abuse during their childhoods may be more

[2]Physical violence is defined here as all acts of force that cause harm, pain or physical suffering to the person on whom it is inflicted upon, independent of the means or consequence. Sexual violence is defined as the imposition of any sexual act to a person, forcing them to have sex or sexual acts with the aggressor or with third parties through the use of physical force, intimidation, threats or any other means of coercion (INEC, 2012a).

[3]It is estimated that for every three additional months of lockdown, there will be an additional 15 million cases of gender-based violence worldwide (UNFPA et al., 2020).

prone to inflicting or suffering from more violence later in life.

Specifically, I ask three main questions: (i) does ownership of resources affect intimate partner violence? (ii) are women's traditional or patriarchal beliefs or a stronger acceptance of wife beating beliefs associated with higher incidences of violence? And, (iii) is having a history of violence in childhood associated with higher violence?

Using a novel dataset from Ecuador, I find that assets in women's names are only somewhat protective of intimate partner violence. Alternatively, access to money for personal expenses is more shielding of intimate partner violence than ownership of (longer-term) wealth. 'Traditional' beliefs regarding obedience to spouses are similarly protective of all types of intimate partner violence. Lastly, without exception, for all women, there is a strong intergenerational aspect to violence. Having a violent environment in childhood either in their own family background and/or in their spouse's family background is strongly associated with higher incidences of all types of violence.

An important limitation of this study is unobserved heterogeneity in violence, i.e., women who experience(d) violence could be more likely to divorce or separate from their spouses due to the violence experienced. Even though there is no easy solution for this issue, I aim to address it by analysing the married or common-law women separately from their separated or divorced counterparts. Widowed women are also studied given that rather than there being a choice in separating from a partner, in this case, men 'leave' the marriage by death. Similarly, I include a measure of incidence of violence that accounts for exposure to violence through length of the relationship, 'exposure to violence.' Results remain robust to these sensitivity checks.

The chapter is organized in the following way. Section II provides a background and a literature review. Section III presents contextual information on Ecuador. Section IV outlines the empirical framework. Section V discusses the results and Section VI concludes.

2.2 Background and Review of the Literature

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines intimate partner violence (IPV) as "any behaviour within an intimate relationship that causes physical, psychological

or sexual harm to those in the relationship" (WHO and PAHO, 2012, pg. 1). It is distinguished from domestic violence in that domestic violence includes child abuse or any abuse to other members of the household (WHO and PAHO, 2012). Although women can be perpetrators of violence, when they inflict violence, it is generally agreed that they are mostly acting in self-defence and that in most cases, men are the perpetrators (WHO and PAHO, 2012; Heise et al., 1999).[4]

Theoretical Models of Relationship Between Intimate Partner Violence and Resources

Disciplines such as Economics, Sociology, Psychology, and Medicine, have dedicated significant efforts to understanding intimate partner violence, yet there is no consensus regarding the relationship between resources and intimate partner violence.[5] Note that when referring to resources, the ones that are commonly used in the literature are income, wages, transfers, wealth, savings, employment and education (Bobonis et al., 2013; Cools and Kotsadam, 2017).

In the 1960s, Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer began exploring 'household' models of how men and women allocate their resources (time and money) to maximize the well-being of the family unit (assuming everyone in the household has the same preferences and that income is pooled by all members of the family). The simplest models led to a predicted division of labour between men and women where their comparative advantage determines who would be responsible for home-making and who would be responsible for bread-winning. Specializing, i.e., when one members takes on the activity for which they have the lowest opportunity cost, usually predicted increased gains from the union (Blau & Winkler, 2014; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996).

Treating the family as a unit ignored the internal decision-making process within the household, differences in preferences of husband and wife and how outcomes can

[4]It is understood that all genders can experience intimate partner violence. However, given the larger prevalence of violence inflicted on women, especially in the context of Ecuador, throughout the chapter, when referring to intimate partner violence, it is implied it is in the context of a heterosexual couple where the male is violent towards the female. Statistically, when it comes to intimate partner violence, the most common perpetrators are men (WHO and PAHO, 2012). For example, in Canada, in 2015, in 79% of the 92,000 reports of intimate partner violence, women were the victims. In 2015 it was estimated that in the United States, 36.4% of women and 33.6% of men experience intimate partner violence (Smith et al., 2018). In Ecuador, looking at the complaints to the Commissioner for Women and the Family, in 97% of intimate partner violence cases, men were the perpetrators of violence in 2000 (Carrion, 2003; Ernst, 2002). In 2010, in 86% of all cases of intimate partner violence, women were the victims (La Hora, 2011).

[5]For an excellent review of the literature, see Cools and Kotsadam (2017).

be determined through bargaining (Blau & Winkler, 2014). Cooperative bargaining models introduced (typically) a Nash bargaining game in which agents (husbands and wives) have their own utility functions, representing unique (different) preferences (Blau & Winkler, 2014; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996; Mas-Colell et. al, 1995).[6] Agents also have their own threat points, the levels of well-being that each spouse would obtain in the absence of cooperation.[7] Threat points are assumed to reflect each individuals' 'outside options,' and are hypothesized to reflect the income that each partner would have if the marriage ends, given the cultural, political (social safety net) and legal environment (Blau & Winkler, 2014; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). The bargaining power that each individual has is determined by their threat point. The better-off a spouse would be by walking away from the marriage, the higher the threat point and the more bargaining power that spouse would have in the marriage. In these divorce-threat bargaining models, if there is a cooperative solution (one in which the couple stays together), the outcome would more closely resemble the preferences of the spouse with better 'outside options,' the one with stronger threat points, as they had stronger bargaining positions. A non-cooperative solution would be the end of the relationship (Blau & Winkler, 2014; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996; Mas-Colell et. al, 1995). Threats to leave a marriage can be perceived as real depending on a woman's economic independence: her employment, skills, education, savings, wealth or non-labour income indicate whether or not she has the financial footing to leave a marriage. (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996).

One important aspect to consider is that the decision to stay or leave an abusive relationship may be a repeated decision as suffering abuse may not be a one-time incident in marriages (Tiefenthaler, 2012) and that it may not be such a clean-cut decision as economic theory might suggest. Abusive relationships usually start by tension in the relationship increasing until someone inflicts abuse. In most cases (and usually before escalating to physical aggression) conflict is followed by repentance from the spouse who behaved aggressively so that the party who sustained the abuse remains in the relationship. The result is a "continuously repeating cycle of violence," followed

[6]For a detailed explanation of the model, see Lundberg and Pollak (1996).

[7]Given the nature of this chapter, it is worth making a clear distinction regarding the difference between the threat of violence and a threat point. A threat of violence is usually a way to inflict emotional abuse by threatening with but not physically inflicting violence. A threat point, on the other hand, is a theoretical concept that outlines the utility that would be obtained from abandoning cooperation, it does not refer to the menace of violence.

by the victim's inability or reluctance to leave the relationship, usually referred to as "learned helplessness" (Bowlus and Seitz, 2006).

There is also a hierarchy to violence. Less aggressive behaviours tend to be more frequent, but these behaviours could also escalate in their level of violence as time goes on (Orpinas, 1999). For instance, emotional or psychological abuse like insults are usually more frequent than physical aggressions like slapping or hitting, but can escalate to more intense aggressions (Orpinas, 1999). In an intimate partner violence context, husband-inflicted violence could be attributed to stress[8] and being less "in control" of one's temper, or to inherent pleasure derived from inflicting it, or violence could be used as an 'instrument' in the bargaining process that occurs between a couple, as means of coercion, twisting someone's arm both literally and figuratively (Bloch and Rao, 2002; Friedemann-Sanchez and Svec, n.d.; Jewkes, 2002; Weitzman, 2014).

Resources, Attitudes and Intergenerational Transmissions of Violence: A Review of Empirical Studies

Within the bargaining framework described above, resources available to women affect bargaining power. Resources can be studied in absolute terms, relative terms (i.e., relative to the spouse) and in societal terms (i.e., institutions or social norms).

Absolute Resources Absolute resources refer to the level of means available to women, including wealth, income, education, employment or earning potential. Some research has found that access to resources protects women from intimate partner violence. Generally, women with fewer resources are more vulnerable to abuse (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017) and men who have fewer resources tend to be abusive (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017; Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005; Jewkes, 2002).

The type of resources available may have different implications in terms of protectiveness. In Colombia, for instance, income, employment and asset ownership, are found to be protective factors against intimate partner violence (Friedemann-Sanchez and Svec, n.d.). Ownership of wealth can potentially affect women's well-being for

[8]For instance, when individuals are in a state of recurrent economic insecurity their mental state has been shown to be severely affected (Watson and Osberg, 2017).

much longer than income might (Phipps and Woolley, 2008), especially given the fact that wealth is accumulated, whereas income is a flow in a given period of time.[9] In Canada, women's employment serves as a significant deterrent of abuse (Bowlus and Seitz, 2006). Women's level of education similarly appears to mitigate the risks of violence (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997; Friedemann-Sanchez and Svec, n.d.; Jewkes, 2002; Tankard and Iyendard, 2018). In Ecuador, unconditional cash transfers that increase women's incomes are shown to significantly decrease emotional violence and controlling behaviours from the husband but only for women who have more than elementary education (Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013). Earning potential is also important as some argue that potential, rather than actual opportunities are what defines the threat points (Munyo and Rossi, 2015).

Increased property rights for women have been shown to benefit women's intra-household position. For instance, in Vietnam, land reforms were beneficial to women who held land-use rights exclusively i.e., without their partners. Through agricultural security, access to credit markets and higher control of their earning capacity, land titling increased the well-being of women. Women's control of assets benefited self-employment, enhanced their economic security, reduced their vulnerability to poverty and overall strengthened women's bargaining position within their homes (Menon et al., 2017). Changes to inheritance laws in India suggest that there were decreases in violence. Women who were eligible to receive an inheritance were 17% less likely to be victims of intimate partner violence. However, although women's security is likely to have increased due to the institutional change, their autonomy did not (Amaral, 2017). Another important aspect is under whose name the couple's wealth is, "owning assets improves a spouse's future bargaining position ... each spouse has an interest in having as many of 'the family's' assets in his or her name" (Phipps and Woolley, 2008, p. 596). Both social norms and reliability of law enforcement could influence the intra-household resource allocation determining under whose name the resources are under (Phipps and Woolley, 2008).

Counter-intuitively, from the bargaining perspective, increasing women's absolute resources has sometimes been found to increase violence via 'male backlash' if men

[9]When it comes to a couple, there are various determinants of savings decision. Given that the analysis in this chapter is conducted through evaluating the protectiveness of having crops, vehicles, savings or a house under the wives' names, these will be treated as assets or means of saving. Phipps and Woolley (2008) frame the determinants of saving decisions under the life-cycle model, theories of intra-household bargaining and government policy.

feel threatened and resort to violence to re-establish control or power in their marriage (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017). The relationship between intimate partner violence and absolute resources is not a monotonic one. Resources available to a woman can become protective but only up to a threshold, after which, access to more resources is associated with higher incidences of violence (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017; Jewkes, 2002). This is especially evident when the increase in resources available to women are not enough to leave the relationship (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017). In this case, the relationship between resources and abuse resembles an inverted U-shape (Angelucci, 2008; Cools and Kotsadam, 2017). In Mexico, when looking at the effects of women receiving conditional transfers from Oportunidades (a poverty alleviation program), receiving the smallest transfer, decreased aggressive behaviour by almost 40% (Angelucci, 2008). However, when women received larger transfers and their husbands had lower education levels, there was an increase in intimate partner violence (Angelucci, 2008).[10]

An alternative to the bargaining perspective is that household level poverty can increase stress in a couple which may result in violent behaviours. In this case, the pathway between violence and economic resources is stress. In Canada, for instance, job insecurity is associated with increased psychological distress in both men and women (Watson and Osberg, 2018). For males, specifically, a one-time, single, occurrence of economic insecurity is associated with higher levels of psychological distress whereas repeated insecurity has larger associations with mental distress, compared to those employed or job secure (Watson and Osberg, 2017). If the family (or men in the family) are having an economically difficult time, mental health suffers and heightened distress may result in individuals losing their tempers and resorting to violent behaviours. Mental health suffering would conflict with the rational behaviour assumption assumed in the economic models discussed above. However, it could be a mechanism by which the added stress from poverty or job insecurity could lead to intimate partner violence.

Relative Resources Being economically dependent on a partner is likely to increase the risk of intimate partner violence (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017). When women increase their relative economic position and become less dependent on their spouses,

[10] In a similar study, Bobonis et al. (2013) show that women who are beneficiaries of Oportunidades are less likely to be victims of physical abuse when compared to non-beneficiary women but more likely to face emotional abuse.

abuse is less likely as they are in a better position to leave the relationship. For instance, in California, between 1990 and 2003, reductions in the gender wage gap explained 9% of the decline in domestic violence (Aizer, 2010). Similarly, in Uruguay, exploiting exogenous changes in the exchange rate Munyo and Rossi (2015) found that a reduction in women's relative potential wages increased intimate partner violence, and when their relative wages increased, violence decreased. In Ecuador, the same unconditional transfers that in absolute terms increased women's incomes and decreased emotional violence were shown to increase emotional abuse when the relative education of women was higher than their spouses' (Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013). 'Male backlash' can also be present if the relative bargaining power is shifted towards women. Men can use violence to re-establish their dominant position in the relationship when resources cannot enable them to maintain it (Weitzman, 2014). The perceived power that an individual may have in a relationship could create conflict when "women's superior resources, relative to their spouse's, undermine patriarchal arrangements that include conservative gender norms" (Weitzman, 2014, p. 55).[11]

Beliefs, Attitudes and Norms An important aspect of both absolute and relative resources is how relevant gender norms are in the context of resources and violence. It could be that individually-held (micro-level) beliefs or societally-held (macro-level) beliefs affect the incidence of intimate partner abuse. The social resources available to women, such as institutions, economic security or social norms, beliefs and attitudes can also affect incidence of violence (Aguero, 2013; Cools and Kotsadam, 2017).[12] Absolute and relative resource theories are incomplete when social norms (especially those referring to the male identity) or social resources are not included in the analysis. Rather than solely looking at individual or intra-couple resources, contingencies on what can affect a household due to the social environment in which they live are

[11] In a similar vein, it has been shown that the relative amount of resources is important when it comes to many aspects of a marriage including its survival. In Bertrand et al. (2015) if a wife's potential income is likely to exceed that of her husband's, the wife faces a slew of negative outcomes: the wife is less likely to be in the labour force, and if she does work, there is a strong likelihood that she will earn less than her potential. For the women who do work, the couples report being less happy and having more problems in their relationship becoming more likely to divorce. Lastly, for couples where the wife earns more than the husband, there is a gender gap in household production. Wives have more non-market work (chores) suggesting that a "threatening wife takes on greater share of household work to assuage the husband's unease with the situation." Even though in this case there may not be intimate partner violence, clashing the societal norms tends to be detrimental for females and may result in the end of their marriage.

[12] Strong, equitable institutions can be protective of violence. For example, when the United States allowed unilateral divorce, the country experienced increases in the likelihood of ending an abusive relationship, as the bargaining power shifted towards the abused spouse (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006).

important (Atkinson et al., 2005; Cools and Kotsadam, 2017).

Violence against women is widespread in Latin American countries, it is deep-seated culturally and it is among the most pervasive types of violence (Aguero, 2013; Orpinas, 1999). A study conducted in the capital cities of Brazil (two cities), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Venezuela and Spain, explored cultural norms and attitudes surrounding violence and aggression. The study focused on general aggressive behaviours, including perceptions on violence towards children, spouses, and members outside the family (Orpinas, 1999). Results suggest that tolerance and acceptance of domestic violence in Latin American countries are high. For instance, the proportion of respondents who state that slapping their partners is justified ranged from 67% in Costa Rica to 98% in Spain (the highest in South America being 77% in Chile). There are co-morbidities with aggression, for instance, believing in corporal punishment[13] as a necessary way to rear children is linked to further violence against partners and others. Findings suggest strong associations between the likelihood of aggression to a partner and aggression to a child.

The cultural context in which a woman lives may be detrimental to modifying beliefs that accept women being battered (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017; Jewkes, 2002). It has been shown that when women are surrounded by strong patriarchal norms, there is a greater tolerance for intimate partner violence (Jesmin, 2017). Intimate partner violence may become not only tolerated but normalized, "girls are socialized from very early childhood that men are their protectors, and good wives are submissive to their husbands ... [increasing the] odds of justifying intimate partner violence (Jesmin, 2017, p. 3238).[14] When it comes to male gender roles, in Latin America, masculinity is often associated with a man's ability to provide for their family (Angelucci, 2008). As such,

[13]The action of a caretaker inflicting physical pain on a child or adolescent, commonly through spanking, slapping or hitting the child with an object (Orpinas, 1999).

[14]According to the World Values Survey, 62.6% of Ecuador is Roman Catholic (97% believe in God), which requires couples to be married by the Church in addition to having a legally binding union (Inglehart et al., 2014). Although this is anecdotal evidence only, a popular passage that is commonly read at weddings is Ephesians 5:26-32, which highlights a wife's submissive role in a marriage, "Wives, submit yourselves to your own husbands as you do to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of which he is the Saviour Now as the church submits to Christ, so also wives should submit to their husbands in everything ... [Husbands] each one of you also must love his wife as he loves himself, and the wife must respect her husband." Further, while civil divorce is accepted by the Catholic Church, the only way to dissolve a marriage under the eyes of the church is through an annulment of the marriage. If a divorced individual remarries (through civil procedures) without having had their marriage annulled by the church, they are excommunicated - though divorce itself does not lead excommunication. Grounds for annulment could be lack of consent, not believing in the vows, not wanting children, deceit, betrayal, amongst others. The process can be an arduous one and tends to lasts years in South American countries (Kirchgaessner, 2016).

the economic resources that men bring into their households could be highly reflective of their own identity (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017; Fortin, 2005; Jewkes, 2002). If, or when, women start contributing to their households with resources of their own, the male identity may be threatened which could result in retaliatory violence.

Similarly, if women's identity is strongly associated with housework or childrearing, taking on those roles has the potential of deepening that identity. For instance, for housewives who mostly stay at home, the bulk of their time would potentially be spent in their own household, interacting with those close to them, rather than with co-workers, who may not share and may even challenge their values.[15] This 'domestic isolation,' where women may be isolated due to the time they spend at home and, as such, are not exposed to competing beliefs or values, could result in a confirmation bias in terms of their identity and the beliefs surrounding their identity. "Women who do not work have their traditional gender roles reinforced and domestic isolation hinders change" (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017, p. 214). If domestic isolation prevents change, and if stronger patriarchal norms are associated with a higher tolerance of violence, then the acceptance and normalcy of violence can be reinforced at home. The more households accept violence in their homes, in aggregate, the easier it is for violence to become normalized (and potentially widespread) in society at large. If violence is normalized rather than penalized or rejected in society, violent spouses (or parents) are shielded from negative consequences, allowing impunity for violent behaviour both privately in individuals' homes and socially in their community (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017).

When there are 'atypical' roles taken by women, the male identity could be threatened resulting in male backlash, as previously noted. Even if women are empowered and have enough individual resources but society at large accepts intimate partner violence, actions that bring their independence to light can result in backlash (usually referred to as the 'pioneering hypothesis' which can explain having highly educated women being battered) (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017).[16] It may not only be

[15] For instance, a housewife with three children will not work daily next to a woman who works in an office, has never been married and has no desire for children because their work environments will not cross, and they will not be exposed as much to each other's life experiences. If women's schedules and interactions resemble and are restricted to women with similar lifestyles, their exposure to different household dynamics may be restricted.

[16] In Bangladesh, a study found that socio-economic status tends to have a negative correlation with views accepting intimate partner violence. Women in poorer communities were more likely to condemn domestic violence and, as illiteracy increased, the justification of intimate partner violence decreased (Jesmin, 2017). Results tend to indicate that, in poorer households, men are not able to exert control over their wives as they are less able to leverage financial

that women face violence from the ownership of resources, but that taking on different gender roles (including jobs outside of the home), away from those deemed as "socially appropriate" may also result in discrimination, harassment and violence. If women embrace different stereotypically "male" attitudes, they may face violent reactions not only at home, but also from society, like co-workers (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010).[17] When identities are threatened, violence may be used to reaffirm power and 'restore' "traditional" power dynamics where men are more powerful than women, forcibly so. As people challenge societal norms, violence 'enables' those norms to be reinstated. If a male's identity is challenged and the female does not respond with submissiveness to fall back into what norms dictate, violence can be used as a tool of 'restoration.' Social norms shape the behaviour that allow or condemn inflicting violence on women.

Intergenerational Transmission of Violence Beliefs and customs can be passed down and tend to be deeply rooted, especially when it comes to gender norms (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010; Fortin, 2005). The more accepted intimate partner violence is, the more likely it is observed intergenerationally (Aguero, 2013; Cools and Kotsadam, 2017; Orpinas, 1999; Safranoff and Tiravassi, 2018; Tarabah et al., 2016; WHO and PAHO, 2012). Pollak (2004) elaborates a theoretical model analysing the intergenerational transmission of domestic violence. The model hinges on three assumptions: first, that violent behaviour from a husband depends on him growing up in a violent home; second, that staying in a violent relationship depends on the wife growing up in a violent home; and, third, that individuals who come from violent backgrounds have a tendency to marry each other.[18] The model highlights the importance of the marriage market conditions and incidence of divorce. Pollak (2004) argues that there is an amplification effect to implementing policies in the short-run. Policies aimed at reducing the incidence of intimate partner violence could further reduce the incidence

contributions as means of control, which results in women being less tolerant of abuse (Jesmin, 2017).

[17] For instance, in a workplace environment, characteristics that are identified in men as 'assertive' are usually seen as 'bossy' in women (Fleming, 2018).

[18] The transmission pathway in the model is assumed to be witnessing domestic violence in the individual's family of origin. The model relies on the heterogeneity of men's violence and women's divorce decision, some men are violent, while others are not and some women divorce their violent husbands but not all women. The model begins by assuming that realized violence does not affect the marriage or fertility choices and if divorce occurs, it happens before violence materializes (it is triggered by a signal that violence will happen but it has not happened yet) so that divorce becomes protective of violence. This assumption is later relaxed. The model states that violence in the home of origin will determine violence in a partnership (if a man chooses to be violent and the woman chooses not to divorce him, violence will occur), implicitly, men are the perpetrators and women are the victims of violence, in all homes (in the current partnership and in the family of origin).

of domestic abuse in the long run for future generations given the intergenerational aspect of the model and violence.

When it comes to violence in childhood, the literature is vast in portraying how exposure to child abuse (e.g., corporal punishment) tends to have intergenerational effects. Studies point to physical violence in childhood being a risk factor in physically abusing own children. Children who were abused tend to become abusers themselves, to their partners, to their own children and to strangers (Bowlus and Seitz, 2006; Orpinas, 1999; Tarabah et al., 2016; Tankard and Iyendard, 2018; UNODC, 2018; WHO and PAHO, 2012). Evidence shows that, on average, when children are exposed to violence, they become more likely to: be desensitized and habituated to violence, see aggressive behaviours as normal and, potentially imitate such behaviours (Tarabah et al., 2016). Violence (or violence tolerance) is not the only behaviour (or norm) that can also be transmitted intergenerationally. Dynamics within a relationship can also be passed on depending on what an individual witnessed their parents do when the individual was a child. For instance, parental divorce has a positive association with offspring divorce, especially when both spouses have divorced parents (Amato, 1996; WHO and PAHO, 2012). Orpinas (1999) finds that there is a strong association between intimate partner violence and aggression to a child in various Latin American capital cities. These cities had high incidences of supporting attitudes favouring corporal punishment, "violence against children perpetuates the cycle of violence and may increase antisocial behaviour" (Orpinas, 1999, p. 242).

The present chapter seeks to contribute to the literature by integrating the themes of how access to resources, social norms and beliefs and childhood experiences of violence affect intimate partner violence. Ecuadorian women in the National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women (ENVIGMU for its name in Spanish) answer questions about their experience of intimate partner violence (physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence). Using these reports of violence as dependent variables, I am able to study links with assets, attitudes and childhood experience of violence. Rather uniquely, the survey asks about assets owned by the household and in whose name these assets are registered in addition to more standard economic resources such as income, education and labour force participation. Women are also asked if they believe a husband is justified in hitting his wife and

whether they accept patriarchal values. I use these measures to test the association between the experience of intimate partner violence and attitudes and beliefs held by Ecuadorian women. Perhaps most uniquely, women are asked about whether violence was experienced in their own and/or their partner's childhood. Thus, I can test for the presence of an intergenerational transmission of intimate partner violence.

2.3 Empirical Framework

Data In 2011, the Ecuadorian government conducted the National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women (ENVIGMU), a nation-wide survey covering 18,000 households with the goal of understanding family relations and violence against women. The survey covered all 24 provinces in Ecuador and included households in both urban and rural areas.[19]

The survey had a general section for all members of the household, in which basic demographic questions (age, gender and relationship to the head of household) were asked to all members if present or to an informant, the person more knowledgeable. This section included 70,446 people. All surveys were conducted in person. Following the general section, one woman from the household was randomly selected and the domestic violence portion of the survey was conducted on this selected woman. Of the 18,000 household covered, 16,415 women completed the survey fully. All women in these subsequent parts of the survey were women aged 15 years or above. There were three types of questionnaires, where slightly different questions were asked depending on whether the woman was married or in a common-law relationship; separated, divorced or widowed; had never been legally attached.

The first section of the violence portion of the survey addressed general experiences with violence throughout the woman's lifetime. The second section focused on childhood experiences, before the age of twelve. The third section covered sexual abuse, initially as a minor, and then throughout woman's lifetime. The subsequent components of the survey differed depending on relationship status. Currently partnered women were asked about experiences, starting with the current relationship. Women not in a partnership, were asked about their most recent former partner. In

[19] Households were selected so that the survey was nationally representative and with a 5% margin of error and a 95% level of significance, at the provincial level.

these, the main questions were geared to describe the relationships and identified what caused strife in the couples. The last portion of the survey asked about attitudes and beliefs regarding gender norms and intimate partner violence.

Given the sensitive nature of the topics covered in the survey, surveyors were rigorously trained. All surveyors were female and they were instructed to handle different possible scenarios throughout the survey, specially handling sensitive topics, someone interrupting, or the interviewees' partners arriving to the household. There were content warnings at the beginning of the survey as well as the assurance of confidentiality, all surveys were done in private (ENVIGMU, 2011).

Ecuador is a country in which multi-generational households are very common and there are many family structures.[20] An interesting feature of the data is that for each woman surveyed, their relationship to the "head of the household" is identified.[21] The women are noted as one of the following: head of household, spouse of head of household, child of head of household, spouse of child of head of household, grandchild of head of household, parent or parent in-law of head of household, or other relatives of the head of household, maid, other non-relatives. Only 12% of surveyed women were identified as the head of the household. Figure 2.1 shows examples of household structures from which one woman is surveyed.

A criterion for sample selection is relationship status. For the main analyses, women who are widowed as well as never married or legally coupled are excluded from the sample. Widowed women are later re-introduced in the sample for sensitivity checks. Women who do not remember the age at which they had their first child or when they were first coupled are dropped (317 (1.93%) and 269 (1.64%) of the original sample of women, respectively). With these restrictions, the estimating sample consists of 12,202 women, 10,801 of whom are married or common-law and 1,401 of whom are divorced or separated.

There is an important caveat with respect to the differences between the group of married and common-law women and the group of separated and divorced women. Presumably, violence is one of the reasons why women may be separated or divorced.

[20] For instance, the mean household size in the data is of 5.28 people. According to the Inglehart et al. (2014), 30% of individuals live with their parents.

[21] In this case, the head of the household is defined as the person, who resides in the home and is recognized by the other members in the household as their head due to the larger responsibility in decision making, prestige, seniority, economic reasons or social and cultural norms (ENVIGMU, 2011).

Figure 2.1: Examples of Women Surveyed in Relation to Head of Household in Different Household Compositions



(a) E.g. Child



(b) E.g. Spouse

(c) E.g. Mother

(d) E.g. Head of Household



(e) E.g. Daughter-in-Law

(f) E.g. Niece

These two groups of women are different,[22] their characteristics are very different, and although I looked for a plausible instrumental variable, nothing was available. A complication is that for women who are still coupled, the *current* protectiveness of resources, beliefs held by women and their childhood experience inform the *current* situation of violence in their relationships. For the separated and divorced women, the survey measures the extent to which a *previous* experience of violence associated with a *previous* division of assets. Thus, for previously coupled women, most key variables refer to the past, only the beliefs they hold are current. Even control variables, like length of relationship/marriage have different meanings; one is for an ongoing relationship and the other is for a relationship that has ended.[23] In both

[22]The results independent sample t-tests on the means of the intimate partner violence variables reject the null hypothesis that groups are the same and that the sample means are equal. This leads to the conclusion that the difference in means is statistically significantly between women who are married and common-law with the women who are separated or divorced, for all the violence variables.

[23]Specifically, the timing of the questions asked are different. For all women who are currently in a relationship, i.e., for the married and common-law women, questions about the relationship are asked in the present. For instance,

cases, samples are selected samples, and given the timing of events, no solution is possible. Similarly, and most importantly, for the separated and divorced women who faced violence, presumably, violence could have been one of the reasons why they ended their relationship and/or initiating the process of separation could have itself increased violence.

The initial exclusion and later inclusion of widowed women allows an examination of intimate partner violence in a way that is not entirely confounded by selection into these groups (remaining coupled or choosing to uncouple). Although there might be associations between socio-economic status and death that might also be associated with violence, for widowed women, their husbands' death is what ends their marriage rather than the woman's decision. The group of widowed women is thus used to test the sensitivity of results to the selection issue.

Dependent Variables The analysis will follow the literature by focusing on the experience of violence as a binary occurrence, i.e., exploring whether an individual has experienced a certain type of violence or not (Bloch and Rao, 2002; Friedemann-Sanchez and Svec, n.d.; Weitzman, 2014) depending on their ownership of resources, childhood experiences and beliefs. There are four main dependent variables that are defined and measured as follows:[24]

(i.) *Physical Violence:* includes all acts of force that cause physical harm, pain or suffering to the person on whom the acts are inflicted, regardless of the medium used or its consequences. It is a binary variable equal to one if the individual's partner (or most recent former partner) has ever either pushed or pulled from their hair, hit with their hands or an object, attempted to choke, attacked with a knife or switch-blade, fired a weapon or kicked the woman during the duration of their relationship. The following questions were asked to the women and used to create this variable:

- "Now, I'd like to ask you if you have lived or experienced difficult situations

ownership of resources, intimate partner violence, refer to current interactions with their partners. For separated, divorced and widowed women, the timing of the relationship questions refer to the time when the women were coupled with their former partners. In terms of the definitions of the variables in this analysis, all ownership variables pertain to *when the couple is/was still together*. Therefore, that a divorced woman has ownership of a vehicle refers to her having owned a vehicle at the time of her previous relationship that has ended. For a married woman, it refers to currently owning a vehicle with her spouse.

[24]Note that the questions from the survey that are used for these variables have been translated from Spanish.

or problems with your current (or former for post-coupled women) spouse or partner throughout your life together. Since your relationship with your (former) spouse or partner started:

  - have they pushed you or have they pulled your hair? Yes/No.
  - have they hit you with their hands or with an object? Yes/No.
  - have they tried to strangle or to choke/asphyxiate you? Yes/No.
  - have they attacked you with a knife or switch-blade? Yes/No.
  - have they fired a weapon at you? Yes/No.
  - have they kicked you? Yes/No."

(ii.) *Psychological Violence:* includes all acts or omissions that cause harm, pain, emotional distress, psychological alterations, or diminish self-esteem of the abused. It is a binary variable equal to one if the individual's partner (or most recent former partner) has ever either insulted, offended or humiliated, threatened to hit, locked up or prohibited visits, threatened with a weapon, threatened with killing the woman, their children or themselves during the duration of their relationship. With the same preamble as above, the questions that are asked to the women that inform this variable are as follows:

- "Since your relationship with your (former) spouse or partner started:
  - have they insulted, offended or humiliated you? Yes/No.
  - have they threatened to hit you? Yes/No.
  - have they locked you up or prohibited you from going out or from you receiving visits? Yes/No.
  - have they threatened you with a weapon (knife, switch-blade, gun or rifle)? Yes/No.
  - have they threatened to kill you, himself or the children? Yes/No."

(iii.) *Sexual Violence:* refers to impositions on the exercise of a person's sexuality to whom sexual relations or practices with the aggressor or a third party are forced upon through the use of physical force, intimidation, threats or any other coercive means. It is a binary variable equal to one indicating if the individual's partner (or most

recent former partner) has ever either demanded sex forcibly, forced to perform sexual acts against the will of the woman or used force to have sexual relations during the duration of their relationship. As above, the following questions were used to define this variable:

- "Since your relationship with your (former) spouse or partner started:
  - have they demanded to have sexual relations although you did not want to using force? Yes/No.
  - when having (had) sexual relations, have they forced you to perform things that you do (did) not like? Yes/No.
  - have they used force to make you have sexual relations? Yes/No."

(iv.) *Economic Violence:* refers to the transformation, theft, destruction, withholding of objects, personal documents, property rights and economic resources destined to satisfy the necessities of the victim.[25] It is a binary variable equal to one if the individual's partner (or most recent former partner) has ever either destroyed, thrown out or hid the woman's belongings or household belongings or appropriated or taken money or goods during the duration of their relationship. As with the other variables, with the same preamble, the following questions were used to create this variable:

- "Since your relationship with your (former) spouse or partner started:
  - have they destroyed, thrown out, or hidden your belongings or household items? Yes/No.
  - have they appropriated or taken from you money or goods (things, terrains, etc.)? Yes/No."

It is important to note that although the questionnaire tries to measure factual instances of experiencing violence, the harm that is inflicted on the person, and the way in which they process it psychologically is entirely idiosyncratic. Whether violence

[25] In line with the World Health Organization's forms of intimate partner violence, violent behaviours are grouped into four broad categories: physical violence, psychological, sexual violence and economic violence. The WHO and PAHO (2012) do not make the distinction of 'economic violence' from 'controlling behaviours' and includes restricting access to financial resources in the same group as isolating a partner or monitoring them. Taking advantage of the emphasis that the survey makes on the use of economic means to inflict violence, and incorporating the Ecuadorian's government distinction of 'economic violence,' in this study, 'economic violence' is a stand-alone category.

inflicted injury or harm, or the way in which women process its social significance may not be captured through these measures of violence. For instance, measuring being 'pushed' is presented as a 'yes' or 'no' question, regardless of whether or not the person assimilated it as a positive or negative experience and depending on what the person understands as 'push.' Holding the force of the movement equal, for some women a horizontal shift by their husband's arm could be a 'push,' for others it may be a 'nudge,' not strong enough to process it as a push, for others it may carry no meaning. Likewise, depending on the social acceptance of violence, or desensitization to violence, a woman may no longer perceive being called names as a way of being 'insulted, offended or humiliated' whereas another woman may perceive it as the complete opposite. The perception from the individual who experiences violence might affect the reliability and interpretation of not only the response to these question but also their meaning. In a way, women may only report experiencing violence if they thought it was significant or harmful, depending on how salient the experience was to them. The debate on whether socially accepted violence or desensitization to violence is perceived by the individual as harmful is beyond the scope of the chapter and perhaps even beyond the scope of the discipline. The assumption underlying the analysis is that, given the nature and efforts of the survey to provide a safe space for women to respond and talk about their experiences, their answers are as truthful as they could be.

The percentage of women experiencing each type of violence is shown in Figure 2.2 and discussed in the following 'empirical results' section of the chapter.

Economic Resources Given that ownership of assets may provide longer-term well-being and more protection to women than income (Phipps and Woolley, 2008), the main variables used to measure economic resources are binary variables defining ownership of four assets: crops, vehicles, savings or a home. These variables are identified as: assets owned just by the woman, assets owned just by the man, jointly owned or some mixed ownership (e.g., if some assets are owned by one spouse while the rest are co-owned, or any other combination) (Menon et al., 2017). In this case, 'ownership' refers exclusively to having a specific asset under the person's name, i.e.,

the owner.[26] The variables are defined as follows, at the time of the partnership:

i. 'all assets owned by the female;'
ii. 'all assets owned by the male;'
iii. 'mixed ownership of assets;'
iv. 'family owns no assets;'
v. 'all assets are co-owned' (base).

This aggregation of resources allows an examination of whether women's complete ownership or partial ownership of the resources associated with violence, compared to having co-ownership of all assets (reference category). As robustness checks, these resource variables are disaggregated and the base is changed to having no ownership of assets. Ownership of economic resources by marital status is shown in Figure 2.4.

Including whose name these assets are under allows to both explore absolute access to resources, as one can see which assets a person has ownership of, as well as the relative division of wealth in the household. Women in Ecuador tend to have strong property rights and can accumulate assets individually or as part of their conjugal community. Whatever assets are accumulated as a single individual prior to a marriage or union, remain the property of that individual, even after the union is dissolved. Similarly, any inheritance acquired remains the property of the individual who inherited it (El Comercio, 2011; Civil Code, 2005).[27] For assets that were shared or obtained during the union, the legal system in Ecuador entitles both parties to 50% of all shared assets following dissolution, which is especially protective of housewives who did not engage in work outside the home. Most women accumulate their individual assets through inheritances, especially crops. Only 1% of unions formulate and agree to a different legally binding contract or pre-nuptial agreements (Deere et al., 2014).

As a measure to control for access to resources, an indicator variable is included of whether the women answered affirmatively to the question "do you have money for personal expenses?" This variable aids in measuring women's access to the most liquid asset, money. Education, employment status and own income are similarly included

[26] To code these questions, two-part questions from the survey were used: "Are (were) you or your (former) partner the owner of [land or crops/ a car or vehicle/ savings/ the house you live in]?" "In whose name is (was) it [yours, (former) spouse or partner, both of you]?"

[27] Inherited assets remain the property of the individual who inherited it following the dissolution of a legal union, even if the asset is legally registered as a shared asset during the union.

in the analysis as research has found an association between intimate partner violence and the socio-economic status of the women (Aguero, 2013; Bloch and Rao, 2002; Svec and Andic, 2018; Bowlus and Seitz, 2006; Weitzman, 2014; WHO and PAHO, 2012).[28] Employment status is divided into three categories: employed, unemployed and not in the labour force. The indicator variable 'employed' denotes those individuals who worked in the previous week or who did not work but had a job in the previous week. 'Unemployed' is an indicator variable for those who did not work in the past week but are looking for a job. Lastly, 'not in the labour force' is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual is retired, a full-time student, a caregiver (including those who stated their job was being a housewife), or is unable to work.[29] Education is divided into four groups: 'no education' which refers to an individual did not receive a formal education (base group); 'basic education' which refers to completing Ecuador's general basic education of 10 years; 'medium education' which refers to the three years of 'baccalaureate education' (i.e., the individual would have completed high school); and 'technical or university education' which refers to completing a technical, university or graduate degree.

There is a slight difference in the variables for the coupled group compared to the no longer coupled group. In the case of the married and common-law women, as part of their individual characteristics, an indicator variable denoting whether the woman made 51% or more of the household income is included. This variable can only be added for the married women group and not the separated or divorced women. In the first place, there is an identification issue, as established by Stevenson and Wolfers (2009): women who earn more than 51% of total household income are more likely to face a divorce. Second, though perhaps more important, the measure of contribution to household income refers to the time of the interview, with the members of the household that currently live in that household, not prior to a divorce or separation. Therefore, analysing this variable for separated or divorced women will yield no useful information in terms of bargaining power with their former spouse.

As noted earlier, a limitation of the study is the potential of endogeneity. For

[28] In all regressions, income is scaled, i.e., own income is calculated by adding earnings, capital income, retirement income, gifts or donations, remittances and the BDH transfer and is divided by one thousand dollars, for scaling purposes.

[29] The 'employed' and 'unemployed' are the two main categories stemming from the 'economically active population' and the 'not in the labour force' category is the complement of the 'economically active population' category. The latter, 'not in the labour force' is the base category.

instance, having all resources under the husband's name and experiencing intimate partner violence could depict a 'controlling' marriage not a causal relationship between assets and violence. Using whose name the asset is under provides a measure of actual ownership of resources given that the strength of property rights are arguably not influenced by controlling behaviours. Nonetheless, the possibility of women being under extreme duress with their former, nearly former or current partner forcing them to transfer them all assets to his name, remains. It could be that they need to do this due to threats, so that they can lessen current violence, it could be learned helplessness or even an exit strategy to leave the marriage. Unfortunately, other than using these measures for ownership of resources, given the nature of the data, the potential of endogeneity cannot be fully addressed. Another limitation is that these resources reflect wealth accumulation or savings, as well as absolute affluence of the household. Savings also reflect preferences, discount rates and attitudes towards risk (Phipps and Woolley, 2008). These are not captured directly though any variable.

Attitudes and Beliefs The ENVIGMU survey asks respondents about circumstances in which they believe a husband is justified in hitting his wife. Specifically, if the woman believes that a husband is justified in hitting his wife if:

i. the wife does not obey her husband;
ii. the wife does not take proper care of the children;
iii. the wife is unfaithful; or
iv. the wife goes out too much.

This variable potentially reflects a woman's family values and own-tolerance of violence. Following Jesmin (2017), an 'Acceptability of Wife Beating Attitudes Index' is created, counting the responses of when the woman believes a husband is justified in hitting his wife. The index ranges from '0' to '4' and if the respondent agrees to all of these statements, they are awarded a '4' and if they agree to none, they are awarded a '0.'[30]

Similarly a 'Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Belief Index', is created using women's agreement with the statements:

[30]Note, the survey asks women their general belief in justifying a man hitting his wife, it does not explicitly ask them if they believe their own partner is justified in hitting them.

i. 'a good wife must obey all orders from her husband;'
ii. 'a wife can choose her own friends even if they are disliked by her husband;'
iii. 'men should be responsible for all family expenses;'
iv. 'women have equal rights to work and earn money;'
v. 'it is a wife's obligation to have sex, even if unwanted.'

If the woman strongly agrees with the statement, they are given a '2' as a value, if they agree, a '1,' and if they do not agree, they are awarded a '0'. This is reversed for statements (ii.) and (iv). The index ranges from 0 (least traditional/patriarchal beliefs) to 10 (most traditional/patriarchal beliefs). Whether either justified violence or holding "equitable" beliefs is more reflective of individually- or socially-held beliefs is purely a conjecture derived from the literature (see Jesmin (2017)). The survey does not ask either of these questions "as a whole" or "for you." Therefore, it is only the respondents' interpretation of the question that results in answering personally, or as a representation of the status quo, which is not information directly available from the survey. Beliefs by marital status are shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6.

Intergenerational Violence To capture the intergenerational aspect of violence and exposure to violence, as in Bowlus and Seitz (2006), I use information from the survey about whether there is violence in the individual's own family background, and violence in spouse's family background. For personal experience, there is an indicator variable, equal to one, if the woman, as a child, was verbally abused (insulted or offended), if she was physically abused (hit) by members of their household; and/or if she was sexually abused as a minor (kissed or touched against their will; forced to undress or show their intimate parts; forced to look at other's intimate parts; or had their intimate parts touched against their will)[31] For the spouses' childhood experience with domestic abuse, there are two variables: an indicator variable equal to one if as a child, the spouse was directly abused (physically or verbally) and/or if the spouse's father hit his mother. The second variable is a dummy equal to one if there is no knowledge of spouse's childhood violence background since non-responses or lack of knowledge could be correlated with abuse (Bowlus and Seitz, 2006). Note that the

[31]The age distinction between child and minor in this set of questions are due to the nature of the survey. When addressing the family context, the survey asks the questions using the timing "in childhood." When addressing the sexual abuse questions, the survey refers to the timing of these questions as "before you were 18," i.e., when the individuals were minors.

women are the ones who answer to question regarding their own childhood experience as well as their spouses'.

Control Variables A first set of controls describe personal characteristics of the woman. These include: age, number of children, and duration of relationship. Given the potential of collinearity between age, age at first birth and age of first marriage, indicator variables for whether the individual married or had her first child as a minor (below the age of 18) are added instead.

For household characteristics, there are controls for family size and whether the household is multi-generational. As previously mentioned, a multi-generation household is one in which at least three generations live in the household. Similarly, an indicator for other non-family members living in the household is included. This indicator combines any other non-related individual residing in the household and live-in maids (3% of the households in the sample have help living in the household).

The social characteristics included are the individual's cultural background (i.e., indicator variables for Indigenous, Afrodescendent, Mestizo (base) and Other (White, Montubio) ethnicities) and an indicator for whether the individual lives in a rural or urban setting. Lastly, location controls are included as province dummy variables, given that they could capture province-level economic opportunities as well as local norms and expectations (Weitzman, 2014; Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005).

Econometric Method The main specification is:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{IPV}_{ij} = \alpha + \theta\ \text{ResourceOwnership}_{ij} + \omega\ \text{ChildhoodExperiences}_{ij} + \rho\ \text{Beliefs}_i \\ + \delta IC_i + \gamma HC_{ij} + \varphi SC_i + X_i'\beta + \varepsilon_i\end{aligned}$$

Where, IPV_{ij} is one of the violence measures for a woman i , during their match j;[32] $ResourceOwnership_{ij}$ is the set of indicator measures describing the assets ownership for woman i during match j (as described above); $ChildhoodExperiences_{ij}$ is the set of indicator variables depicting the domestic violence experience by the woman i and her spouse in match j when they were children; $Beliefs_i$: is the set of indexes describing

[32]The unit of observation, are the women who are in a particular type of match. What is being studied is the violence experienced by a woman i, while she was in match j.

woman's beliefs; IC_i is the vector of individual characteristics of the woman; HC_{ij} is the vector of household characteristics (including length of relationship) depending on the type of match j woman i is in; SC_i is the vector of cultural characteristics for woman i and X_i' is the set of (location) controls, as described above.

Regressions are run for the four different definitions of intimate partner violence using this specification. The analysis is done initially for the full sample of women and subsequently, separately, by whether the women are married/common-law or separated/divorced. I estimate a linear model by ordinary least squares (OLS) and I estimate Probit models, with and without controls. The results presented below are the marginal effects obtained from the Probit regressions with controls for province. Standard errors shown are robust and clustered at the primary sampling units.[33] In all figures and tables results are weighted using the household weights provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC from its name in Spanish).

2.4 Empirical Results

For married and common-law women, intimate partner violence experience and asset ownership, for instance, pertain to their current relationship. On the other hand, for the divorced and separated women, variables describe the relationship that they have left so intimate partner violence and asset ownership reflect the environment in which they lived before they left the relationship. The only set of independent variables that relate to the time of the survey for both sets of women, are the variables that describe the women's beliefs.[34] Widowed women are excluded at this point.

Descriptive Analysis Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of women ever experiencing intimate partner violence. The most common type of violence experienced by Ecuadorian women aged 15 years or above is psychological violence: 60% of the separated and divorced women) and 34% of married and common-law women report experiencing

[33] In the case of the ENVIGMU, the primary sampling units are clusters of 30-60 occupied houses that share similar socio-economic characteristics.

[34] As previously mentioned, endogeneity may be problematic here. For instance, it could be that women who left their relationship, to justify their (past) divorce or separation, if they were abused, say (currently) that they do not think wife-beating is justifiable, and thus, they left. Whereas, the women who remain in a relationship and are hurt may say that it is acceptable for a man to beat their spouse to self-justify staying. The example, and endogeneity issue extends to all other forms of intimate partner violence. Due to data limitations, I am unable to fully address this concern.

psychological violence in their past and current relationship, respectively. This is followed by physical violence, where, 53% of post-coupled women experienced physical violence in their last relationship and 31% of coupled women experienced it in their current relationship. Sexual violence comes in third place, 29% of post-coupled women and 8% of coupled women having experienced violence in their past and current relationship, respectively. Economic violence is the least common type of violence, though 27% of post-coupled women in their last relationship and 7% of coupled women in their current relationship have experienced economic violence.

Figure 2.3 shows a similar pattern, post-coupled women have higher incidences of violence, even when controlling for years in the relationship, or, 'potential exposure' to violence, i.e., by dividing the indicator variable that the woman ever experienced violence by the length of the match. As in Figure 2.2, the most common type of violence women are exposed to is psychological followed by physical.

Figure 2.4 depicts asset ownership. Again, for coupled women this is asset ownership during their current relationship and for post-coupled women, this was asset ownership during their last relationship. Each bar in Figure 2.4 represents the average proportion of women who have a particular ownership of resources, who have access to personal resources or who received the BDH transfer and are identified as poor. Though half of the divorced and separated women are entirely asset poor, more of them own all assets than do married or common-law women. Nearly a third of coupled women have no assets, for a fifth of them, their spouses own all assets and close to a third co-own all assets with their spouses. For both coupled and post coupled women, around 70% of the women have access to personal resources. A third of all women are poor and receive the BDH government transfer.

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the sample means for own current beliefs. To reiterate, these are the beliefs the women themselves (as opposed to their spouses) hold currently, at the time of the survey. The Acceptability of Wife Beating Index shows that separated or divorced women have lower acceptance rates of abuse than do coupled women, however, most women (73% of coupled and 80% of post-coupled) women do not agree with any of the statements justifying wife beating. 12% of coupled and 9% of post-coupled agree that a husband is justified in hitting his wife in one of the circumstances while 4% of coupled and 2% of post-coupled agree that wife beating is

acceptable in all four instances. Similarly, the Strength of Patriarchal or Traditional Beliefs Index seems to point to previously coupled women being less traditional in beliefs than currently coupled women.

Figure 2.7 shows the average incidence of domestic violence in the woman's and her spouse's family background. Domestic violence in childhood is high for all women. The proportion of women who faced violence as children is higher for separated and divorced women than for married and common-law women, 60% and 52%, respectively. The proportion of women whose spouse experienced violence in childhood is slightly higher for the married and common-law women than for the divorced and separated women, 43% and 40% respectively - though, notably, post-coupled women are less likely to know their former spouses' family background of domestic violence.

The means for the control variables are presented in Table 2.1. Currently coupled women are younger, less educated, less engaged in the labour market (and earn less income) than previously coupled women. Households of separated and divorced women have lower household income, are slightly smaller in size, more urban and only 19% have a male household head, compared to 94% of the married and common-law women. Both groups of women have on average three children, gave birth for the first time at the age of 20 (around half of them were mothers as teenagers) and became first partnered around the same age. The average length of a marriage is 21.55 years for the currently partnered women and was 11.77 years for the currently separated or divorced women.[35]

Main Results The results discussed will focus on the tables of results for Married and Common-Law women and Separated and Divorced women, tables 2.3a. and 2.4a., respectively. All else equal, women who are currently coupled are less likely to report experiencing violence than the post-coupled women.

Married and Common-Law Women: In general, for married and common-law women, economic resources do not seem to be as important as the women's attitudes and beliefs or intergenerational experience. The largest associations between violence and resources come from having access to money for personal expenses. On average,

[35]Figures for the different aggregated and disaggregated measures are presented in the Appendix.

having access to money for personal expenses is associated with lower incidences of violence, ranging from - 7.9 percentage points (p.p.) lower for psychological violence to -2.2 percentage points lower for economic violence. Compared to the baseline, co-owning all assets, individual ownership of assets or a mixture of ownership of assets are associated with higher probabilities of all kinds of violence. The magnitude of the coefficients is larger if women own all assets in the household. On average, owning all assets is associated with 6.5 p.p., 10.6 p.p., 5.5 p.p., and 5.4 p.p. higher incidence of physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence for married or common-law women. Asset poverty is only associated with higher incidences of psychological violence. Own monthly income is not statistically significant for married women.

Earning more than 51% of household income is associated with a 4.2 percentage point lower incidence of physical violence only. On average, a woman who is more accepting of wife beating beliefs is associated with a higher incidence of physical and psychological violence, 2.5 p.p. and 2.0 p.p., respectively. Strength of patriarchal beliefs is correlated with lower incidences of all types of violence. A one-point increase in the strength of patriarchal or traditional beliefs index is associated with a -11.9 p.p. lower incidence of physical violence, a -13.3 p.p. lower likelihood of psychological violence, a -6.0 p.p. lower association of sexual violence and a -5.3 p.p. lower incidence of economic violence.

In terms of magnitude, the largest statistically significant variables are the childhood experiences of violence. Having domestic violence in the women's family of origin is associated with an increased incidence of physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence by 18.9 p.p., 17.9 p.p., 4.8 p.p. and 5.0 p.p., respectively, on average. Having a spouse who experienced domestic violence as a child is associated with an increased incidence of physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence by 18.4 p.p., 20.9 p.p., 5.5 p.p. and 4.5 p.p., respectively, on average. Not knowing their spouses childhood experience with violence is positively associated with physical and psychological violence.

Age, university education and having non-family members in the household are associated with lower probabilities of some types of violence. Identifying as Indigenous or as Afrodescendent, being employed, number of children and relationship length are associated with higher incidences of violence, on average, for coupled women.

Separated and Divorced Women: Results for separated and divorced women highlight that having had access to money for personal expenses in their past relationships was much more protective from violence than it is for the married and common-law women in their current relationships. However, the largest negative associations with violence for previously coupled women come from the women holding patriarchal or traditional beliefs. Intergenerational violence also has large positive associations with violence in their past relationship for the divorced and separated women, especially regarding their former spouses' history of domestic violence. All independent variables, with the exception of the belief variables ('acceptability of wife beating index' and 'strength of patriarchal/traditional beliefs'), refer to the post-coupled women's past relationship (belief variables reflect the women's current beliefs).[36] All control variables are either time-independent or reflect the women's current state and situation, including her current (at the time of the survey) household's conditions.

Although the direction of the coefficients for both the currently coupled and the formerly coupled are the same for access to money for personal expenses (negative), women being more accepting of patriarchal and traditional beliefs (negative), their own domestic violence experience as children and their (former) spouses' domestic violence background (positive), the magnitudes of the coefficients are considerably larger for the separated or divorced women.

Regarding economic resources, on average, for previously coupled women, having had money for personal expenses in their previous relationship was protective of violence, with associations of lower incidences of violence of -21.7 p.p, -22.5 p.p., -16.8 p.p. and -13.9 p.p., for physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence, respectively. In terms of the ownership of resources, compared to the baseline, co-owning all assets, sole ownership of assets is not associated with higher probability of violence, not for women owning all assets, nor for men owning all assets. Compared to co-owning all assets, having some mixed ownership of assets (e.g., the woman owns the house but the spouse owns the car and they both own crops) is associated with lower physical violence by -23.6 p.p., on average. Being asset poor, compared to co-owning assets is associated with lower probabilities of physical and psychological violence by

[36] Again, it is worth noting that current beliefs, may have been affected by women's past experience of violence.

-19.1 and -18.4 p.p., respectively.

Current acceptance of wife beating beliefs has no association with violence for separated or divorced women. Strength of patriarchal and traditional beliefs is associated with a lower incidence of violence, in all cases, -30.9 p.p., -38.9 p.p., -27.7 p.p., -30.0 p.p., for physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence respectively.[37] Having domestic violence in the women's own family background is associated with an increased incidence of physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence by 13.6 p.p., 15.6 p.p., 9.7 p.p. and 6.9 p.p., respectively, on average, at the time of the women's last relationship. Having a former spouse who experienced domestic violence as a child is associated with an increased incidence of physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence by 21.1 p.p., 18.1 p.p., 20.6 p.p. and 10.8 p.p., respectively, on average. Unknown violence in their former partners' childhood has no statistically significant associations with violence.

In terms of the controls, the statistically significant variables for the previously coupled women pertain to: size of family being positively associated with the likelihood of physical violence; having basic education (compared to no education) and number of children being positively associated with psychological violence; being employed size of household and living in an urban area are positively correlated with sexual violence while having non-family members living in the household is negatively associated with sexual violence; number of children is positively associated with economic violence, on average.

Robustness Checks

Disaggregation of Variables: First, in order to test whether key results were dependent on the sets of variables included, the variables and indexes are disaggregated. For ownership of resources, the variables are disaggregated by whether most assets are owned by the females, or the males, or co-owned. Specifically, the set of variables describing ownership of resources is organized into independent ownership of resources by the woman and by her (former) partner, joint ownership or lack of ownership, during the duration of the relationship. There are four assets: land and crops, cars

[37] Again, whether these beliefs changed or were strengthened after the separation or divorce remains untested and potential endogeneity remains an issue.

and vehicles, savings and homes. The variables are defined as follows, at the time of the partnership:

i. 'woman has ownership of [*asset*];'
ii. 'spouse has ownership of [*asset*];'
iii. 'household has no ownership of [*asset*];'
iv. 'woman has co-ownership of [*asset*];' (base)

Disaggregated ownership of assets by marital status is shown in Fig. A.1 to A.3.

For married or common-law women, owning a house is positively associated with psychological, sexual and economic violence, 6.7 p.p., 10.1 p.p., 4.2 p.p. and 2.7 p.p., respectively. If a spouse has individual ownership of a car or vehicle, this is associated with 8.6 p.p. higher likelihood of physical violence. Households who are asset poor, in terms of land and crops, compared to households who co-own assets, have lower incidences of physical (-4.8 p.p.), psychological (-4.7 p.p.) and sexual violence (-2.2 p.p.). Being asset poor in terms of a car or vehicle is associated with a higher incidence of physical violence by 8.0 p.p., sexual violence by 2.8 p.p. and economic violence by 2.0 p.p., on average. Having no ownership of savings is correlated with a 2.3 p.p. increase in the likelihood of sexual violence and having no ownership of a house is associated with a 4.6 p.p. increase in the likelihood of psychological violence, on average, compared to co-ownership of these assets. It is worth recalling that close to 4/5 of the sample is asset poor when it comes to a owning a car/vehicle, savings, and land or crops and close to 1/2 of the sample is asset poor in terms of owning a house.

Separated or divorced women who had land or crops in their name had a lower incidence of physical violence (-28.7 p.p.) during the course of their past relationship. Individually having owned any other resource has no statistically significant correlation to likelihood of violence. If a former partner had individual ownership of land or crops during their relationship, there is an association of -37.3 p.p. and -39.1 p.p. lower likelihood of physical and psychological violence, respectively, compared to having had co-ownership of assets. If the household was asset poor in terms of land or crops during the former relationship, on average, there is a negative correlation of -20.9 p.p. and -22.7 p.p. to psychological and sexual violence, respectively. See tables A.1 to A.2.

The Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Belief Index and the Acceptability of Wife Beating Attitudes Index are also disaggregated. The variable that seems to be driving

most of the effect in the aggregate index of beliefs is the woman's agreement with 'a good wife must obey all orders from her husband.' It is negatively associated with all types of violence for all women. Other than that, departure from patriarchal beliefs is associated with higher likelihoods of experiencing violence. For instance, for married and common-law women, if they believe they can choose their own friends even if their spouses do not approve of them, there is a higher likelihood of sexual and economic violence. In the case of divorced and separated, believing that a wife can choose her own friends is associated with higher incidences of psychological violence while the belief of equal rights to work and earn money is positively associated with physical and economic violence.[38] Interestingly, a patriarchal belief that seems to be associated with retaliation from men is when married and common-law women believe that men should be responsible for all family expenses. In the case of coupled women, this belief is associated with higher likelihoods of physical and psychological violence (for post-coupled women, this variable is insignificant for all types of violence). Perhaps, even though this belief aligns with patriarchal precepts, the onus does not fall on the women, it demands a lot of work from the man which may not be welcomed. Similarly, it could put a lot of stress on the males, and this financial worry may result in violence.

In the case of wife beating acceptability, for the married and common-law women, most beliefs have positive associations with at least one type of violence. The only exception is when women believe that 'a husband is justified in hitting his wife if she is disobedient', with that belief being negatively associated with sexual and economic violence. Again, as with the other set of beliefs, results here seem to imply that when a woman does not confront male dominance in her marriage or union, there is a lower likelihood that she experiences violence. For divorced and separated women all disaggregated measures of beliefs regarding acceptance of wife beating are insignificant. See tables A.3 to A.4.

For the violence in childhood measures, the variables are disaggregated as follows:

i. if the individual was verbally abused (insulted or offended) as a child by members of their household;

[38] As before, note that these are current beliefs and the experience of violence for the divorced and coupled was during the time of their last relationship so current beliefs might be coloured by their past relationship experiences, including the violence the women might have encountered.

ii. if the individual was physically abused (hit) as a child by members of their household;
iii. if the individual was sexually abused (kissed or touched against their will; forced to undress or show their intimate parts; forced to look at other's intimated parts; or had their intimate parts touched against their will) as a minor;
iv. if spouse had violence in their family background;
v. no knowledge of spouse's childhood violence background.

For currently coupled women, all types of violence in childhood are positively associated with increased likelihoods of all types of violence in adulthood. The only exception is no statistically significant association between being physically abused as a child with sexual violence in adulthood. For previously coupled women, most types of violence in childhood are positively associated with increased likelihoods of all types of violence in adulthood. The exception is physical abuse as a child, which is positively associated with psychological violence only. For both groups of women, being sexually abused as a child appears to be the most important part of the association between childhood domestic violence and adult intimate partner violence. See tables A.5 to A.6.

Sequential Addition of Variables: Second, the sets of independent variables (i.e., ownership of resources, beliefs and childhood experience) are added in different order exploring sequential addition mediation (Gelbach, 2016).

For married and common-law women, after the sequential addition of variables, the main specification with all sets of variables nearly doubles the pseudo R^2 in most types of violence, the only exception is economic violence. For physical and psychological violence, the magnitude of having money for personal expenses decreases by around 1 p.p. after all variables are included and the association with all asset ownership disappears completely. For sexual violence, the magnitude of having money for personal expenses and sole ownership of resources decrease by 1 p.p. and 2 p.p., each, respectively after all variables are included. See Tables A.7 to A.10.

For separated and divorced women, in all cases of violence, the sequential addition of covariates seem to slightly change the magnitude of coefficients. In all cases, the magnitude for women having money for personal expenses goes down by about 3 p.p. on average when adding all covariates. In the case of women having had ownership of

land or crops (for physical violence), of the spouse having had ownership of land or crops (for physical and psychological violence), or if the household had no ownership of land and crops (for psychological and sexual violence) and when the spouse owned a car or vehicle (for economic violence), the inclusion of all three sets of variables increase the magnitude of the coefficients, though the increase is vary, ranging from 0.4 p.p. (for sexual violence and no ownership of land/crops) to 9.5 p.p. (for psychological violence and spouse's ownership of land/crops). For the variables surrounding beliefs, the index for acceptability of wife beating is always insignificant (for all types of violence) and the variable for strength of patriarchal/traditional beliefs increases in magnitude when all covariates are added. Similarly, for all types of violence, the inclusion of all sets of variables increase the pseudo R^2. Altering the order in which the covariates are added (not shown, provided upon request) does not dramatically change results. These results point to most significant coefficients being relatively stable when different sets of covariates are added sequentially. See Tables A.11 to A.14.

Widowed Women: A third component in the robustness checks is the analysis of widowed women. Women enter the sample of widowed women not by choice, but because their spouse dies. Although their spouse's death might be correlated with socio-economic status, there is presumably no choice made by the woman. That is, widowed women do not select themselves into a sample as the divorced and separated women might. If models estimated for widowed women are similar to those estimated for divorced or separated women, this might provide some reassurance against concerns about selection. Initially, the main specification is run on the sample of 980 widowed women. Further, the sample is restricted to women between the ages of 45-65[39] years to make meaningful comparisons, which yields 3,918 women, of which 3,038 are married or common-law, 523 are separated or divorced and 357 are widowed.[40] Widowed women aged 45-65 have experienced high rates of intimate partner violence: 46% have experienced physical violence, 48% psychological violence, 19% sexual violence and 15% economic violence. See Figure A.8. It is worth noting that the smaller

[39]Most importantly, older women are excluded given the possibility of dementia or Alzheimer's disease and a host of confounding factors that might be associated with experiencing violence.

[40]Results presented are for the women in the 45-65 year old sample. The results for the main specification and for all robustness checks on the sample of 980 widowed women are not presented, and are available upon request.

samples reduce precision of estimates and that given that the women are older and were partnered with men who died earlier than other men (perhaps due to riskier jobs, or lower health status, or engagement in crime), they are still not an entirely representative sample.

By including widowed women in the analysis, ownership of resources continues to appear protective of violence. All results are shown in Tables A.15 to A.19 with a summary of results in 2.5. For widowed women, in most cases (the only exception being all assets owned by the spouse and sexual violence), asset ownership is negatively associated with all types of violence, compared to having no ownership of assets, Tables A.16 to A.19. It is worth noting, however, how large the coefficients are for asset poverty and violence for widowed women. For instance, when having "all assets are co-owned" as the base category, (Table 2.5), if their family owned no assets, widowed women were 51.6 p.p. 40.7 p.p. 38.6 p.p. and 48.2 p.p. more likely to experience physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence, respectively. This is not the case for either the coupled of post coupled women (see Table 2.5). Arguably, widowed women are more financially insecure than all the other women in this sample.[41] Results suggest that for widowed women, asset poverty is the strongest determinant of violence. As is the case for the coupled and post-coupled women in the all-ages sample, when all assets are owned by the male, there is a positive association with violence, in the case of the widowed, with sexual and economic violence.

Comparing across groups of women, there are few similarities between widowed and post-coupled women. There are no clear patterns of associations with attitudes/beliefs though violence in childhood is associated with higher psychological and sexual violence. Given that widowed women are different in that they lack self-selection into staying in their relationship or leaving it and the fact that they are also older, the insignificance of the belief variables could be explained in two ways. On the one hand, it could be the case that the strength and significance in these variables of the main set of regressions is only due to women forming or strengthening their beliefs due to self-selection, i.e., their beliefs are determined by their decision of staying or leaving their partnership. For instance, for married women, both in the main and the 45-65 year old samples, acceptability of wife beating is positively associated with physical and psychological

[41] Widowed women's own monthly income is higher (around $15 USD) than all other women that age, though their household monthly income is much lower ($259 USD) than all the other women

violence while for the separated/divorced and widowed these variables are insignificant. It is not that widowed women experience less violence (as a whole, they experience even higher incidences of violence than married/common-law women but less than divorced/separated) so it could be that in the case of married/common-law women, their acceptance of wife-beating and them remaining in a potentially abusive marriage could be a way to normalize abuse and/or there being cognitive dissonance. As it is the case for divorced and separated women, for women who are widowed there are no associations with believing it is acceptable for a husband to beat his wife perhaps since they no longer need to tolerate any abuse. On the other hand, it could be that, being older, accepting wife beating was 'of the times' for the cohort and it carry no meaning or real consequence to them as it could've been the norm to be more tolerant to abuse. Nonetheless, the age difference that the married/common- law and separated/divorced have with the widowed is on average slightly over four years, not enough of an age gap to think of generational differences (and cohort effects are explored, with no suggestion of there being any). Further, these beliefs are statistically significant for two types of violence for married women, which does not fully support this second potential option. Therefore, the story that widowed women tell appears to be one where intimate partner violence is strongly associated with resources and poverty as well as the intergenerational transmissions of abuse.

Exposure to Violence: Fourth, the dependent variables are modified to take into account the length of a relationship (and thus the potential exposure to violence) that a woman has (or might have had). The main specification controls for the length of partnership.[42] However, it could be that someone who is 55 years of age and has been married for 30 years would have a longer potential exposure to violence than someone who is 25 and has been married for less than a year.[43] To explore incidence

[42]The potential length of partnership being collinear with age is recognized. As previously mentioned, various non-linear forms of age where explored and they were always insignificant.

[43]Similarly, there is the potential of having cohort effects that are different from age effects. For instance it could be that older women experience more violence because they have longer exposure to violence or because violence has escalated or because societal norms are more accepting of violence. To test for this, regressions were run where dummy variables for age groups (Age 15-24 years; Age 25-34 years; Age 35-44 years; Age 45-54 years; Age 55-64 years and Age 65+ (base)) were included using a piece-wise linear approximation. For all cases of violence, for all groups of women, married and common-law, separated and divorced and widowed, the age group variables were statistically insignificant, the only exception being physical violence for married women for which there seems to be a decline in the cohort specific experience of violence as the younger cohorts have a lower probability of physical violence compared to women who are 65 years of age or older.

of violence as a function of duration of a match, a new variable is defined, *Exposure to [Type of] Violence*. In this case, the binary observation of all forms of violence, physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence, is divided by the duration of a match.[44] For instance, if a married women experienced physical violence (=1) over her 5 year marriage, this new variable would be 0.20 (1/5).[45] In this case, the model aims to capture if there was ever violence, divided by the number of years for which the person was exposed to the potential of violence. Similarly, in order to take into account that all variables are left censored at zero, with women who never experience different types of violence, the main regression is run using a Tobit.

Tables A.20 to A.23 look at the *potential exposure to violence* for the currently coupled and the previously coupled women. All results appear to be consistent with the results from the main specification. Given that all of these regressions take into account the length of the relationship, it seems that results are robust and are not sensitive to the duration of a relationship.[46] Tables A.20 to A.21 present the OLS estimates while A.22 to A.23 present the Tobit estimates with left censoring at zero for women who have not experienced violence. Again, results appear robust as ownership of resources seem to be protective of violence, beliefs and domestic violence histories are consistent with the main results for both coupled and post-coupled women. When taking into account the left censoring for the separated and divorced, the variables denoting having money for personal expenses and those denoting violence in childhood are statistically significant again.

Other Considerations: Various income measures are explored to test the sensitivity of the model to a specific definition of the variable, income (raw) these include household income standardized, log of income as well as using a poverty measure.[47] Results are

[44] In the survey, the women who were in the match for under a year were coded as having a length of their relationship equal to zero, '0.' So that this does not inflate the coefficients, for all women who are married less than a year, their length of relationship is coded as six months or 0.5 years.

[45] Looking at exposure to violence could resemble hazard models in the labour economics literature, e.g., hazard models of duration of unemployment spells or of being in social assistance programs. Although it could be plausible to try and find the duration of the marriage through these models, in this chapter duration of marriage is taken as given, and controlled for the years in the relationship.

[46] An exception being the OLS estimates for separated and divorced women, with having access to money for personal expenses being statistically insignificant for all types of violence, though this is not the case for these women with Tobit estimates.

[47] The poverty measure is whether the household receives the BDH transfer, equivalent, at the time of the survey, to $35 USD per month.

not sensitive to the income measure used. Similarly, interaction terms are used to explore whether the estimated effects differ by the age and education of the female. Arguably, it could be that the opportunity cost of leaving an abusive relationship increases with age (i.e., assets accumulate over the life course; so perhaps it is less likely of an issue in their relationships for the young women who own assets, as it could be the case for older women who might have accumulated more assets) or depending on women's education. Nonetheless, when interacting assets with age groups or when interacting assets with education, most of the interaction terms are statistically insignificant.[48]

In order to simplify presentation, for the robustness checks, tables are divided only into married and common law and separated and divorced women (i.e., the tables for 'all women' are excluded). All results for these robustness checks are presented in the Appendix.

2.5 Discussion

Women in Ecuador are repeatedly exposed to violence. Exposure starts as children, with over half of all women having had experienced domestic violence in their childhood and close to half, around 40%, of all male spouses also having had domestic violence in their family background. Violence later in life remains, on average 46.20% of all women (40.5% coupled and 65.8% of previously coupled women) have experienced some type of violence as adults. Consistently, results point to the largest associations with physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence coming from women's own patriarchal and traditional beliefs and from their own or their (former) partner's domestic violence background. Compared to economic resources, and the focus placed

[48] When looking at the interaction terms of asset variables and women's age, the only interaction terms that are statistically significant are men owning all assets interacted with age groups. In this case, compared to the baselines of co-ownership of all assets and the age group 15-24, all assets being owned by the male is negatively associated with the probability of experiencing violence, especially when looking at older age groups (55+) and at sexual violence. Results suggest that the positive impact of men owning all assets is concentrated on older men, which is in line with the idea that assets are accumulated over a lifetime and also in accordance with the life stage by which assets accumulate in Ecuador (see Fig. 2.8). In the case of interactions between assets and education, the only statistically significant variables are the interaction terms of women owning all assets and having higher levels of education (completing high school and above). Compared to the baselines (no education and co-ownership of all assets), women owning all assets and having higher levels of education is positively associated with higher probabilities of violence. Both results support the idea that married women may face backlash when going against cultural norms (e.g., being well-positioned resource-wise) and may be protected when abiding by them (e.g., the man being the sole owner of resources, especially so for older generations).

on them in the economics literature, the intergenerational aspect of violence and the belief/attitudinal aspect of violence are strikingly larger.

Overall, the findings are somewhat mixed when it comes to asset ownership. Compared to the baseline of having co-ownership of assets, any other type of ownership is associated with higher violence for the married and common law women. For the divorced and separated, mixed ownership of assets is associated with lower incidences of physical violence and asset poverty is associated with lower probabilities of physical and psychological violence, compared to co-owning all assets.

Looking at the disaggregation of ownership of assets, for all women, having land or crops in the woman's name seems somewhat protective of intimate partner violence, while (for married women only) having a house in her name is positively associated with intimate partner violence. Land or crops is the only asset in which women's sole ownership of it is associated negatively with violence.[49] For married and common-law women, being asset poor in terms of a car or vehicle is associated with higher probabilities of all types of violence, except psychological. Given that four in every five households do not own a car, this correlation affects a large majority of the women in the sample.

Having savings in a woman's name increases the likelihood of sexual violence for married women only. Perhaps this reflects an intense form of 'discrete' male backlash. Men could for instance, seeing that their wives hold a safety net outside of the home, resort to attempting to get control via sexual means. However, married women's own saving capacity is not very large, 5.39% of married women hold savings in their own name.[50] Perhaps it could be that it is so against the norm to have a safety net on her own that their spouses react in such a negative way to 'restore' control. Since women's ownership of a home is associated with an increased incidence of all types of violence for married women, it could also be a reflection of 'male backlash' potentially due to more relative power shifted towards the wife as having the same assets in the man's name or being asset poor in terms of owning a house have virtually no impact

[49] However, this large association affects only a very small group of people as only 4.56% of coupled women and 6.71% of previously coupled women own(ed) land or crops during their relationships.

[50] Although there is no data available on the amount of savings a woman has, women who have savings in their names have higher monthly incomes. The average monthly income for women who own savings is $300.23 USD per month, while for women who do not own savings their monthly income is $141.41 USD, on average. Going by the family basket being $548.63 USD in 2011, neither group of women would've had much saving capacity. Compared to the $264.00 USD per month minimum wage, women who own savings have incomes of about $36 USD higher than the minimum wage, on average.

on intimate partner violence. Given that this is the asset that women are most likely to own on their own (a little over one in every ten married women have the house in her name), it could also be the most common asset that men are able to retaliate against with negative effect and potential backlash being the largest observed.

Interestingly, for the currently coupled, not all kinds of relative bargaining power shifted towards women affects them negatively with backlash. The measure of contribution to household income, indicating that women earn 51% or more of the household income is slightly protective of violence, having a negative association with physical violence of 4.2% for married women.

Access to money for personal expenses is negatively associated with incidence of violence for all women, but strongly so for the separated and the divorced. A reason for this may be that ownership of assets requires accumulating wealth, which is out of reach for most people in Ecuador. Just in terms of saving capacity, the proportion of previously coupled women who owned savings during their last relationship is 8.1%, a stark contrast to the 58.8% of Ecuadorians that the government reports. In fact, for the main sample, only 18.9% of households own savings.

It could also be due to the fact that wealth accumulation takes time and women are still relatively young (on average, women are 41.46 years old for coupled and 43.33 for previously coupled) and the main sample analysed excludes the widowed women who potentially had more time to accumulate assets and own them at the time of the survey.[51] On average, only one half, 52.85%, of all unions own a house. By looking at asset ownership by age (see Figure 2.8), most households are able to own their house eventually. By the time women are 55-64 years old, 72.6% of households own a house. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the value of these houses for the households in the survey. Additionally, a house is pretty much the only asset that unions get to own.[52] Close to 80% of all households are entirely asset poor when it comes to land and crops, savings and cars and vehicles. In fact, 32.5%, close to a third of all households, are entirely asset poor and have no ownership of any asset.

Likewise, money is the most liquid asset. Therefore, when it comes to escaping a

[51] Widowed women though are in worse economic situations than their married/common-law or divorced/separated counterparts.

[52] The second most commonly owned asset would be owning land and crops. Peak ownership of land/crops happens when women are above 65 years of age where 35.9% of unions own crops or land. Other than that, peak ownership of vehicles happens when women are 45-54 where 24.5% of marital estates include a car or vehicle. The last peak in ownership would be for savings, where 22.8% of unions have savings and it occurs when women are 25-34 years old.

situation of violence, in the bargaining framework, threat points may be more sensitive to more liquid assets than not. It is presumably easier to take a wad of money (or perhaps a debit and a credit card for the more affluent) and flee, than it is to use or sell a crop or a house as means of protection. Changes to inheritance laws in India suggest that when women have improved inheritance rights, there is a positive impact on women's security but not on their autonomy (Amaral, 2017). Perhaps these findings are suggestive of a reverse scenario, where access to personal resources and crops (which have the potential to supply the owner with at a basic level food) provide autonomy but not security since sole ownership of other more durable assets have no or detrimental effects when it comes to violence. Assets are hard to quickly liquidate in value and particularly for crops, there is a seasonal component to them and even their value may depend on annual yields. Maybe it is the case that to flee violence women require more (short-term) autonomy than (long-term) security and perhaps the reason that this is the case is because this is not a really affluent population. As such, women may have to make do with what little they have to leave an abusive marriage or relationship.

In terms of beliefs, strongly adhering to patriarchal or traditional beliefs is negatively associated with all types of violence for both coupled and post-coupled women. The belief that appears to be the most protective of violence is women believing that a good wife must obey all orders from her husband (this is the case for both currently and previously coupled women). Although it may seem counter-intuitive at first, if a woman believes a good wife 'obeys all orders,' she is probably more likely to, in fact, obey her husband's orders and requests and thus, avoid confrontations and perhaps, consequently, avoid violence. Similarly, women's sense of identity may be strongly defined by 'obeying.' Simply looking at naming conventions following a marriage, if women choose to 'take on' their husband's name, they do not just take their last name as it is the case in some western societies, e.g., Women's [First Name] [Last Name], changes to [Women's First Name] [Husband's Last Name]. Rather, their name changes to 'of' their husband's last name, e.g., it changes to [Women's First Name] *of* [Husband's Last Name].[53] The underlying sense of ownership that remains through

[53]For instance, say the woman's name is Susana Chiriboga and her husband's name is Fernando Peñaherrera. Following their marriage, the convention would be to change her name to Susana Chiriboga 'of' Peñaherrera or simply Susana 'of' Peñaherrera. In Spanish: Susana Chiriboga de Penaherrera or Susana de Peñaherrera, respectively.

the naming convention may be reflective of women's sense of identity as 'belonging to' their husbands or of men's 'entitlement' over their wives. Therefore, 'obeying' may simply be what is expected of women as a vestigial remain from a perceived entitlement in the relationship.

The same would be true for feeling obliged to have sexual relations even if unwanted, the other protective belief for coupled women for both psychological and economic violence (it is statistically insignificant for previously coupled women). Acting on that belief could be protective and "allow" control to "return" to the man and re-establish or maintain harmony in the household. Further, violent individuals tend to be less confident in their ability to resolve their problems in ways that do not involve violence (Orpinas, 1999). By 'obeying' or 'indulging' their husbands, women may "resolve" requests or conflicts that way, through obedience and sex, avoiding violence.

Interestingly, although in line with traditional norms, for married women, believing that a husband should be responsible for all family expenses is also positively associated with higher incidences of physical and psychological violence. So the caveat might be, that patriarchal or traditional beliefs can be protective of violence, as long as they are convenient for the males. This perhaps alludes to current wives demanding economic resources from their spouses and it being received with abuse from their spouse.[54] Intriguingly, believing in financial dependence has no statistically significant associations for divorced or separated women.

Women's belief that 'women have equal rights to work and earn money' is positively related with psychological violence for coupled women which could indicate backlash from women voicing their opinions, and with physical and economic violence for post-coupled women. These results support the pioneering hypothesis. Women's belief in equality of work may still result in abuse from their husbands as it could be that the societal norms or that the male population have not caught up with women believing in equality. The same can be the case when it comes to the independence of separated and divorce women. Previously coupled women believe in associating with the friends they choose to, even if disliked by their spouses.[55] Autonomy in their social networks,

[54] On the one hand, it could be that a wife being completely financially dependent on a husband is a notion rejected by husbands, which leads to violence. It could also be that men resent that they are responsible for all expenses, and as women spend more money (on themselves, or their children, see Lundberg and Pollak (1996); Phipps and Burton (1998)) resentment grows and escalates to violence.

[55] Again, it is worth recalling that these are the associations between current beliefs with past experiences of violence.

thus, seems to have been confronted with psychological backlash. These findings seem indicative of supporting the literature that women with more liberal ideas tends to be associated with having had experienced violence (Jewkes, 2002). In line with the results from the World Values Survey, where 60% of people surveyed believe that if the mother works, their children suffer and where 59% of people believe being a housewife is satisfactory (Inglehart et al., 2014), the results support the premise that Ecuadorian society at large is traditional and patriarchal if women themselves hold these kind of beliefs. Especially because these beliefs may be strongly ingrained in Ecuadorian women. Therefore, disrupting the status quo and breaking from patriarchal beliefs may be hard to do especially when they seem so closely linked to women's own identity and norms.

Alternatively, increases in the 'acceptability of wife beating' index is associated with higher incidences of both physical and psychological violence for married women only. This might be an indication of how tolerant the coupled women are to intimate partner abuse. Aggregated, this variable is not statistically different from zero for the divorced and separated nor for the widowed women. The disaggregation of this variable provides further evidence supporting the idea that women's "obedience" is likely protective of violence. When married and common-law women believe that a husband is justified in hitting their wives when disobedient, there is a negative association with sexual and economic violence. Similarly, the backlash that seems to exist from women's autonomy is also present for the coupled women. If married or common-law women believe a husband is justified to hit his wife if they go out too much, there is an increased likelihood of physical and sexual violence. In general, for the coupled women it seems that believing that violence against them is justified is associated with higher likelihoods of violence. Unfortunately, in the absence of a causal mechanism, it is unclear in which direction the acceptance and normalization of violence and the experience of violence affect each other. However, that there is an association for the married and common-law in and of itself is important, especially due to the implications that this may also have for future generations if children witness or grow up in a violent household.

The experiences of domestic violence as a child and the individual's spouse's experience of domestic violence in childhood have the largest associations with all

types of violence. For all women, and especially so for the separated and divorced, the magnitudes of the coefficients are larger for the variables denoting their spouses' experience than the variables denoting their own, i.e., they are more likely to be (to have been) a victim of intimate partner violence if their spouse experienced or witnessed violence as a child than them being themselves victims or witnesses of domestic abuse during their own childhoods. This finding is consistent with the literature. Further, across women, the divorced and separated group have higher magnitudes for both types of domestic violence backgrounds than do married or common-law women. On average, there is a stronger association in the intergenerational transmission of violence and violence in their past relationship for the divorced and separated women than for the married and common-law women in their current relationship. Abuse is strongly associated with divorce and men observing domestic violence are likely to repeat those behaviours by abusing their wives (Bowlus and Seitz, 2006; Pollak, 2004). The importance of childhood experiences is supported by the sample of widowed women. Without exception, for all types of women, violence in childhood whether in their own family or in their spouse's family is strongly correlated with abuse. Consequently, there is strong evidence suggesting that violence perpetuates itself across generations.

As previously mentioned, the coupled and post-coupled women may self-select into their respective groups while widowed women, to a large extent lack self-selection. The decision to leave or stay in a marriage could depend on whether women experience violence or not. For the case of the widowed, their husband 'leaves,' not them, due to their death. In this case, comparing the main results with the widows' results, evidence is suggestive that it is mostly the absence of assets that is related to violence and that the spouse's childhood experience of violence is strongly associated with physical, psychological and sexual violence. The women's own childhood experience is positively associated with sexual violence. The only belief variable that remains significant with the widowed is the negative association between women's strength of patriarchal/traditional beliefs and sexual violence. In addition to the fact that for coupled women acceptability of wife-beating is associated with physical and psychological violence, whereas this is not the case for the post-coupled or widowed, the danger of remaining in a violent marriage is heightened as it may normalize the violence not only for these women, but also for their children, both males and females

alike. If these children learn from their parents how to socialize with their partners or their own future children, they may not have the resources to stop the propagation of violence in their own relationships.

It is important to recognize that the narrative or belief that accepts and normalizes abuse could be a means of protection that women use to address their cognitive dissonance in staying in an abusive marriage. Especially if violence has been normalized intergenerationally, it could be conceived, at a society level, simply as a 'cultural norm.' Corporal punishment to children remains common, spanking, pinching, flicking at children are normal occurrences in 'child rearing.'[56] Thus, for some families, if violence is 'normal' socially, a spouse inflicting violence may not be reason enough to end a relationship, especially in a country that is 73% Catholic, very traditional and ending a marriage is still taboo. As the sayings go, "better to be dead than divorced" or "though he hits, though he kills, my husband he is."[57] Even in the absence of the religion factor, and even the absence of violence being widely accepted socially, women may see a divorce as a failed marriage instead of an escape of violence and the fear of 'failure' may trump the 'pain' of abuse. The danger is that violence that was perhaps invisible (e.g., psychological) could eventually escalate into femicide, and it is truly 'death that does them part.' Further, social norms establish the ways in which social pressure is exerted, if the social pressure is tilted towards 'remaining married' as the social costs of divorce or separation are too high, higher than the cost of violence and women may change or disassociate what is seemingly 'good' or 'better' for them and stay in violent relationships.

2.6 Conclusion

Intimate partner violence is largely widespread worldwide and especially so in Ecuador. Six in ten women in Ecuador will experience violence in their lifetime (MJDHC, 2018). The purpose of this chapter was to provide a comprehensive view of intimate partner violence in Ecuador. This chapter does so by exploring the relationship between having assets in a woman's name at the time of their relationship,

[56] One in three, or 33% of all children receive corporal punishment if they are not 'obedient' or if they are not 'behaving' (El Comercio, 2018).

[57] In Spanish: "primero muerta que divorciada" and "aunque pegue, aunque mate, marido es."

their beliefs and attitudes towards wife-beating and patriarchal/traditional norms and their histories of domestic violence with the likelihood of them experiencing physical, psychological, sexual and economic intimate partner violence. The chapter contributes to scholarship by integrating the main ongoing themes regarding the relationship between economic resources and intimate partner violence, providing the analysis a thorough and multidisciplinary lens that also includes social norms and beliefs as well as the intergenerational transmission of behaviours.

Results show that conditional on having assets, these assets being in the women's names are only somewhat protective of intimate partner violence. The most protective resource for women appears to be access to money for personal expenses. It seems that, in the bargaining framework, threat points for Ecuadorians are more sensitive to the most liquid asset which is further substantiated by the fact that this is not an exceedingly affluent population. Similarly, for Ecuador, when it comes to ownership of assets and enforcing property rights, the results suggest the law is not biased towards or against any of the genders. There is no evidence of any systematic relationship, positive or negative between ownership of assets and economic abuse from an intimate partner.

It is worth highlighting that most economic models tend to focus on improving women's outside options in case a relationship fails. Usually, the way in which this is presented and studied is in terms of the economic resources and assets available to women like transfers, earnings, or labour market conditions as well as laws, services and institutions. All of these provisions for women are important in their own right and they may even allow opportunities for clear policies to be put in place. However, in the case of Ecuador, in the context of intimate partner violence, social norms and beliefs as well as the intergenerational transmission of violence really loom large and have the largest associations with violence. Women's 'traditional' beliefs supporting obedience to husbands are protective of all types of violence. Similarly, having domestic violence in both a woman's own family background and in her (former) partner's family background is one of the strongest predictors of experiencing intimate partner violence. In fact, that the spouse was a victim (direct exposure to domestic violence) or a witness (indirect exposure to intimate partner violence) of a violent family environment is associated with an even higher likelihood of all types of intimate partner violence.

This is particularly relevant for policy implications. Pollak (2004) argues that there is an amplification effect to implementing policies in the short-run aimed at the incidence of intimate partner violence, given the intergenerational effects of intimate partner violence. Due to the permanence of these behaviours across generations, aiming to reduce them today could further reduce the incidence of intimate partner violence for future generations. It is thus imperative to identify children who are experiencing domestic violence and individuals who have been abused in childhood to recognize their vulnerability for any sort of intervention. Therefore, it is not only necessary to protect women in abusive marriages but also to prevent future cycles of violence from occurring from children who have experienced or witnessed abuse.

An important limitation of this study is that, similar to previous research (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017), the data and the analysis do not include information on the male's (or society's at large) beliefs associated with tolerance and acceptance intimate partner violence. In this chapter, one can only assume that own-beliefs regarding social norms and tolerance of wife-beating are a reflection of the gendered or macro-level beliefs. Similarly, it is worth noting that when it comes to intimate partner violence, under-reporting is usual and can be due to various factors including "fear, shame or denial" (Bowlus and Seitz, 2006, p. 1116). Given the sensitive nature of the questions, there is a tangible likelihood that there was under-reporting and the associations may be larger than what the chapter presents. Another limitation is that the survey is planned as repeated cross-sections and so far, I was unable to identify a policy change or exogenous change that could allow for an instrument or a natural experiment. Ideally, the same women would be followed to examine any change that could happen, before and after a marriage, before and after abuse, the evolution of beliefs, etc. It is thus, imperative to continue gathering information on both domestic and intimate partner violence as this only gives a picture and to fully understand and address the problem, it would be extremely beneficial to have a more detailed, historical accounts of the same women. Therefore, the research frontiers lay in the improvement and investment in more data and in the continuation of multidisciplinary, intersectional and integrated research on intimate partner violence.

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: Means Values by Marital Status

	All Women		**Married & Common Law**		**Separated & Divorced**	
	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Relationship Status: Coupled	0.85	0.36	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Woman's Age	41.75	14.54	41.46	14.56	43.33	14.30
Woman's Edu. Level: Basic Education	0.53	0.50	0.55	0.50	0.44	0.50
Woman's Edu. Level: Medium Education	0.24	0.43	0.23	0.42	0.27	0.44
Woman's Edu. Level: Technic. or Univ. Education	0.17	0.38	0.16	0.37	0.23	0.42
Woman's Activity: Employed	0.41	0.49	0.37	0.48	0.62	0.49
Woman's Activity: Unemployed	0.11	0.31	0.11	0.31	0.09	0.28
Woman's Activity: Not in Labour Force	0.48	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.29	0.46
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Mestiza	0.73	0.45	0.73	0.45	0.72	0.45
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Indigena	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26	0.06	0.24
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Afrodescendent	0.07	0.25	0.07	0.25	0.09	0.28
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Other Ethnicity	0.08	0.27	0.08	0.27	0.06	0.23
Woman's Monthly Income (From All Sources)	149.33	315.76	135.31	319.85	227.00	279.55
Household Receives BDH Transfer	0.33	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.29	0.45
Household Income	637.70	679.48	649.41	692.18	572.80	600.18
Household Equivalent Income	305.15	339.30	309.69	347.89	280.61	287.22
Income Prop. to Household Income	24.93	30.07	20.00	24.74	52.27	40.52
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	-	-	0.11	0.31	-	-
Woman Has Children	0.96	0.20	0.96	0.20	0.97	0.18
Woman's Number of Children	3.02	1.71	3.06	1.72	2.77	1.65
Age at First Birth	20.49	4.34	20.51	4.32	20.42	4.46
Woman Had First Child as Teenager	0.46	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.49	0.50
Age When First Legally Partnered	19.90	4.71	19.93	4.71	19.76	4.71
Woman Partnered as Teenager	0.55	0.50	0.55	0.50	0.56	0.50
Woman's Marriage/Relationship Length	20.05	14.28	21.55	14.44	11.77	9.94
Size of Family in Household	4.68	2.04	4.74	1.98	4.34	2.31
Household is Multi-Generational	0.29	0.45	0.26	0.44	0.44	0.50
Non-Family Members Live in Household	0.03	0.18	0.03	0.18	0.03	0.18
Male Head of Household	0.83	0.38	0.94	0.24	0.19	0.39
Household in Urban Area	0.72	0.45	0.70	0.46	0.84	0.37
	N = 12,202		N = 10,801		N = 1,401	

Table 2.2: Percentage of Women Who Have Experienced Violence in Current or Past Relationship by Age Group

	Percentage of Women Experiencing Violence (%)			
	Physical	*Psychological*	*Sexual*	*Economic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age 15 to 24	30.77	33.36	6.70	7.40
Age 25 to 34	34.03	36.98	8.84	9.11
Age 35 to 44	35.06	39.51	11.56	9.95
Age 45 to 54	39.51	41.53	14.43	9.57
Age 55 to 64	40.45	42.42	15.35	11.33
Age 65+	40.58	42.94	12.39	9.29

Figure 2.2: Ever Experienced Intimate Partner Violence by Marital Status



Note: For post-coupled women, this refers to violence experienced during previous relationship.
Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure 2.3: Ever Experienced Intimate Partner Violence Divided by Years in Relationship (Exposure to Violence) by Marital Status



Note: Exposure to violence is defined as experiencing a type of violence, (0/1), divided by the duration of the match. For post-coupled women, this refers to violence experienced during previous relationship.
Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure 2.4: Ownership of Economic Resources by Marital Status (Aggregate Measures)



Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure 2.5: Strength of Acceptability of Wife Beating (Index) by Marital Status



Note: Each value in the index is the count of times in which a female agreed with a statement justifying wife beating (if a wife is disobedient; takes improper care of children; is unfaithful; goes out too much), i.e., a value of '0/4' refers to not agreeing with any of the statements justifying wife beating while a value of '4/4' refers to agreeing with all four statements justifying wife beating.

Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure 2.6: Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs (Index) by Marital Status



Note: Each value in the index is the strength of the agreement to patriarchal/traditional values (a good wife obeys; a wide cannot choose her friends, men are financially responsible, women do not have equal rights to work; it is wife's obligation to have sex with their husbands). For each of the statements, women agree with the statement, receiving a value of '0' for least agreement, '1' for agreeing, and '2' for strongly agreeing with the statement. Each category represents the total count of strength of agreement for each women regarding those values.
Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure 2.7: Domestic Violence in Family Background (Aggregate Measures) by Marital Status



Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure 2.8: Ownership of Assets in Marital Estate by Age of Women



Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Table 2.3a.: Results, Married and Common-Law Women: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Experiencing Intimate Partner Violence in Current Partnership

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.053***	-0.079***	-0.037***	-0.022***
	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.010]	[0.009]
All Assets Owned by Female	0.065**	0.106***	0.055***	0.054***
	[0.032]	[0.031]	[0.019]	[0.018]
All Assets Owned by Male	0.050**	0.070***	0.024*	0.023**
	[0.024]	[0.023]	[0.013]	[0.011]
Mixed Ownership of Assets	0.043*	0.043*	0.030**	0.023*
	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.013]	[0.012]
Family Owns No Assets	0.024	0.047**	0.009	0.011
	[0.021]	[0.023]	[0.010]	[0.010]
Woman's Monthly Income (Scaled)	-0.004	-0.010	0.003	0.006
	[0.030]	[0.028]	[0.010]	[0.009]
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	-0.042*	-0.009	-0.006	0.012
	[0.022]	[0.021]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index	0.025***	0.020***	0.003	0.003
	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs	-0.119***	-0.133***	-0.060***	-0.053***
	[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.021]	[0.016]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.189***	0.179***	0.048***	0.050***
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.008]	[0.007]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.184***	0.209***	0.055***	0.045***
	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.009]	[0.008]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.062***	0.079***	0.005	-0.001
	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.008]	[0.006]
Woman's Age	-0.007***	-0.005**	-0.001	-0.003**
	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Indigena	0.065**	0.039	0.040***	-0.001
	[0.032]	[0.035]	[0.015]	[0.013]
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Afrodescendent	0.043	0.119***	0.014	0.043*
	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.020]	[0.023]
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Other Ethnicity	-0.040*	-0.004	-0.007	-0.017**
	[0.023]	[0.025]	[0.011]	[0.009]
Woman's Edu. Level: Basic Education	0.002	0.050	0.002	0.000
	[0.027]	[0.031]	[0.013]	[0.012]
Woman's Edu. Level: Medium Education	0.004	0.046	-0.009	0.002
	[0.035]	[0.039]	[0.016]	[0.013]
Woman's Edu. Level: Technical or University Education	-0.100***	0.001	-0.008	-0.007
	[0.037]	[0.042]	[0.019]	[0.015]
Woman's Activity: Employed	0.054***	0.046**	0.016*	0.032***
	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.009]	[0.009]
Woman's Activity: Unemployed	0.045	-0.010	-0.007	0.030**
	[0.030]	[0.029]	[0.012]	[0.014]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801	10,801
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.146	0.123	0.120	0.117

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. All variables refer to the woman's current partnership. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence in partnership. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'All Assets Are Co-Owned;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table 2.3b.: Results, Married and Common-Law Women: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Experiencing Intimate Partner Violence in Current Partnership (cont.)

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman's Number of Children	0.023***	0.022***	0.011***	0.007***
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.002]
Woman Had First Child as Teenager	0.041**	0.027	0.016*	-0.009
	[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.010]	[0.009]
Woman Partnered as Teenager	-0.003	-0.027	-0.014	-0.008
	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.013]	[0.011]
Woman's Marriage/Relationship Length	0.009***	0.007***	0.002	0.003**
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Size of Family in Household	0.008	0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Household is Multi-Generational	-0.015	-0.000	0.002	-0.002
	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.010]	[0.008]
Male Head of Household	0.001	0.030	-0.005	0.013
	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.018]	[0.010]
Non-Family Members Live in Household	-0.117***	-0.109***	-0.019	-0.019*
	[0.038]	[0.040]	[0.021]	[0.011]
Household in Urban Area	0.047***	0.023	0.008	0.005
	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.008]	[0.007]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801	10,801
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.146	0.123	0.120	0.117

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. All variables refer to the woman's current partnership. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence in partnership. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'All Assets Are Co-Owned;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table 2.4a.: Results, Separated and Divorced Women: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Experiencing Intimate Partner Violence in Past Partnership

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.217***	-0.225***	-0.168***	-0.139***
	[0.047]	[0.041]	[0.042]	[0.040]
All Assets Owned by Female	-0.091	-0.122	-0.075	0.048
	[0.084]	[0.096]	[0.069]	[0.069]
All Assets Owned by Male	-0.121	0.010	0.052	0.093
	[0.099]	[0.105]	[0.086]	[0.084]
Mixed Ownership of Assets	-0.236***	-0.182	-0.012	0.004
	[0.089]	[0.115]	[0.085]	[0.082]
Family Owns No Assets	-0.191**	-0.184**	-0.110	-0.032
	[0.077]	[0.078]	[0.068]	[0.057]
Woman's Monthly Income (Scaled)+	0.072	0.013	-0.095	-0.113
	[0.090]	[0.081]	[0.073]	[0.076]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.028	0.020	-0.027	0.017
	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.309**	-0.389***	-0.277**	-0.300**
	[0.143]	[0.142]	[0.120]	[0.127]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.136***	0.156***	0.097***	0.069**
	[0.043]	[0.042]	[0.038]	[0.035]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.211***	0.181***	0.206***	0.108**
	[0.046]	[0.053]	[0.041]	[0.042]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.059	0.020	0.053	-0.042
	[0.052]	[0.049]	[0.042]	[0.039]
Woman's Age	0.000	-0.003	0.001	-0.003
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Indigena	0.038	0.065	0.058	-0.015
	[0.092]	[0.089]	[0.089]	[0.088]
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Afrodescendent	-0.004	-0.056	0.013	-0.031
	[0.100]	[0.105]	[0.080]	[0.053]
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Other Ethnicity	-0.074	0.041	0.043	0.024
	[0.070]	[0.056]	[0.060]	[0.056]
Woman's Edu. Level: Basic Education+	0.089	0.171*	-0.004	0.129
	[0.097]	[0.099]	[0.084]	[0.084]
Woman's Edu. Level: Medium Education+	-0.065	0.028	-0.104	0.091
	[0.113]	[0.111]	[0.083]	[0.103]
Woman's Edu. Level: Technical or University Education+	-0.134	-0.001	-0.066	0.137
	[0.122]	[0.125]	[0.103]	[0.122]
Woman's Activity: Employed+	0.033	0.044	0.090**	-0.016
	[0.052]	[0.050]	[0.042]	[0.047]
Woman's Activity: Unemployed+	0.069	0.067	0.071	-0.072
	[0.084]	[0.074]	[0.080]	[0.061]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401	1,401
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.200	0.203	0.205	0.152

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence in partnership. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'All Assets Are Co-Owned;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table 2.4b.: Results, Separated and Divorced Women: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Experiencing Intimate Partner Violence in Past Partnership (cont.)

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman's Number of Children+	-0.002	0.041**	0.025	0.029*
	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Woman Had First Child as Teenager	0.115*	0.001	0.087*	0.010
	[0.060]	[0.062]	[0.049]	[0.051]
Woman Partnered as Teenager	0.034	0.038	0.042	0.090*
	[0.055]	[0.059]	[0.048]	[0.051]
Woman's Marriage/Relationship Length	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.001
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Size of Family in Household+	0.036**	0.020	0.023*	-0.008
	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.012]
Household is Multi-Generational+	-0.089	-0.055	-0.071	0.000
	[0.060]	[0.058]	[0.049]	[0.049]
Male Head of Household+	0.003	-0.050	0.093	-0.004
	[0.070]	[0.079]	[0.064]	[0.056]
Non-Family Members Live in Household+	-0.095	-0.002	-0.167**	0.028
	[0.116]	[0.130]	[0.070]	[0.116]
Household in Urban Area+	0.075	0.025	0.119***	0.033
	[0.062]	[0.059]	[0.037]	[0.046]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401	1,401
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.200	0.203	0.205	0.152

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence in partnership. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'All Assets Are Co-Owned;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table 2.5: Summary of Results:
Statistically Significant Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence in Current or Past Relationship

	Panel A. Married/Common Law Women				**Panel B. Separated/Divorced Women**				**Panel C. Widowed Women (Age: 45-65)**			
	Type of Violence				*Type of Violence*				*Type of Violence*			
	Physical	Psychological	Sexual	Economic	Physical	Psychological	Sexual	Economic	Physical	Psychological	Sexual	Economic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Woman Has/Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.053***	-0.079***	-0.037***	-0.022***	-0.217***	-0.225***	-0.168***	-0.139***		-0.170*		
All Assets Owned by Female	0.065**	0.106***	0.055***	0.054***								0.182**
All Assets Owned by Male	0.050**	0.070***	0.024*	0.023**							0.261**	0.263*
Mixed Ownership of Assets	0.043*	0.043*	0.030**	0.023*	-0.236***							
Family Owns No Assets		0.047**			-0.191**	-0.184**			0.516***	0.407***	0.386***	0.482***
Woman's Monthly Income (Scaled)+											0.110*	-0.113*
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income+	-0.042*											
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.025***	0.020***										
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.119***	-0.133***	-0.060***	-0.053***	-0.309**	-0.389***	-0.277**	-0.300**			-0.212*	
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.189***	0.179***	0.048***	0.050***	0.136***	0.156***	0.097***	0.069**		0.141*		
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.184***	0.209***	0.055***	0.045***	0.211***	0.181***	0.206***	0.108**		0.172*	0.169***	
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.062***	0.079***										-0.107***

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence in partnership. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has/Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'All Assets Are Co-Owned;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Chapter 3

Seen and Not Heard: Household Chores and the Well-Being of Children in Ecuador

3.1 Introduction

While a lot of attention has been given to the effects of child labour in the context of market activities, the literature remains thin when it comes to studying household work as part of child labour, especially in terms of how housework might affect children's current well-being (ILO, 2017; Dammert et al., 2018).[1] Household chores or household work are domestic tasks that are used for consumption in the household (ILO, 2017).

[1]In this chapter it is worth noting the different ways in which children can divide their time, e.g., leisure, play, chores, market work and education. There is subjectivity in how children would understand or conceptualize these activities and that children could simultaneously combine household chores with play. For instance, a parent may request their child to take care of their elderly grandparent though taking care of the grandparent could involve playing cards with them which could also be regarded as play. There is nuance surrounding the definitions of leisure, play and work both in how the children conceptualize them and in how they can be studied. For the purpose of this analysis, the definitions used are those detailed in the Empirical Framework which rely on the conceptualization employed in the survey used. In what follows, domestic work, household work, housework, and chores denote the unpaid work that children perform at home. Market work refers to the work that children do in the labour market, whether they are employed by their parents (e.g., on a farm or for their own business) or employed by a third party. Even though children are "employed" they may or may not receive a wage, which is why it would be misleading to refer to it as paid work. However, domestic work broadly refers to chores done at home (excluding farming or tending to the family business) while market work refers to the children being engaged in economic activities (regardless of whether they are paid a wage or not).

Broadly, these tasks include caring for other household members, cleaning, getting groceries or water and cooking, as well as household maintenance (ILO, 2017). In most contexts, child labour refers to work in economic activities that children under the age of 18 perform, illegally (ILO, 2017). The work goes against regulations if it is in violation of minimum age requirements or if it exceeds the amount allowed, which depends on the child's age. Definitions of 'child labour' vary widely across nations, and there is even more variability on whether or not housework is included.

Chores are usually excluded from definitions of child labour given the "non-economic" nature of these activities, following standard guidelines for measuring economic activity (ILO, 2017). In some cases, 'light work,' working in only some economic activities or performing domestic chores for less than two hours a day, is allowed i.e., children can perform a certain amount of hours in household work with it not considered to be child labour (ILO, 2017). The variability in definitions and exclusion of household work from child labour is problematic for several reasons. The number of children performing domestic chores is large and their contributions to their households are not meaningless. Somewhat overlooked, 800 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 years are involved in some form of housework weekly (ILO, 2017). A large number of these children (37.5-39.6%) work less than 14 hours per week in their homes and in all cases, at every age, there are important differences in gender, as girls are more likely to perform household chores than boys (ILO, 2017; Bruckauf and Rees, 2017; Gershuny and Sullivan, 2014; Webbink et al., 2012). "Globally, girls aged 5-14 spend 550 million hours every day on household chores, 160 million more hours than boys their age spend" (UNICEF, 2016, p. 10). The amount of work that children contribute to total household work is not minimal and varies from around 4%-12% (Blair, 1992a; Goldscheider and Waite, 1991; Gershuny and Sullivan, 2014).

Overlooking the unpaid work children do at home feeds into an underlying assumption that this type of work may be helpful at best, and necessary at worst, when, in fact, it may be harmful. Whether housework is beneficial to children has not been tested in the context of self-assessed well-being and previous work suggests that household work performed by children is not universally harmless (Zapata et al., 2011; French, 2010; Ragui et al., 2010; Dinku et al., 2019; Sharmin, 2015). This chapter seeks to explore the effect of a child's involvement in housework on their self-assessed

well-being. Specifically, it seeks to answer how happy children self-report themselves to be, conditional on the time they spend on household work, i.e., do children perceive the unpaid work they do at home as detrimental to their happiness? A second question this chapter seeks to answer is: does the activity or specific chore matter? i.e., are there differences between cooking and cleaning? Is care-taking more detrimental than shopping for groceries? Similarly, when compared to other members in the household, is the share of the total work performed in domestic activities important in determining children's happiness, i.e., if the children take on a larger share of total household work, is their self-assessed happiness affected? It could be that the children regard being assigned a larger share of chores as 'unfair,' especially relative to their siblings which could in turn affect their perceived happiness. Lastly, this chapter explores the different threshold of hours of housework and its relationship to children's well-being. Is there a certain threshold hours where children start perceiving doing chores as detrimental to their well-being?

Results show that the domestic activities that Ecuadorian children aged 8-17 perform in their home are negatively associated with their self-assessed well-being. This finding holds both at the extensive and intensive margin of household work. On average, close to 86% of children say that they are happy most of the time. Performing chores is associated with an average -4.0 p.p. lower probability in children reporting as happy. An increase in domestic work of 10 hours per week is associated with a -2.1 p.p. lower probability of children saying they are happy. Not all chores are equal and there are differences in the type of chores children perform. For instance, care-taking and doing laundry are negatively associated with girls' self-assessed well-being while shopping for groceries is positively correlated with the probability that girls say they are happy. The share of work that children perform in their home, relative to both the household work from all other members and from all other children in the household is also important. Boys appear to be significantly more affected when they take on a larger share of the total work done from all members while both girls and boys are negatively affected when they take on a larger share of the household work performed by children, i.e., when they are doing more work than their siblings. Although the decrease in happiness associated with household work (-2.1 p.p.) may seem small given the mean level of happiness, the magnitude is very close to that of the decrease

associated with performing work in the labour market (-2.9 p.p.).

While a lot of attention is placed on the work children perform in economic activities, from the children's perspective, the work they perform at home is almost as detrimental, especially for younger children. Although legal thresholds for 'allowing' household work to be performed are usually kept at 14 hours per week (thus, ignoring this amount of hours in housework from child labour definitions), children engaging in any positive number of chores already perceive it as negative to their well-being. Working up to one hour per day (i.e., (0-7] hours per week) is negatively associated with boys' well-being (-4.8 p.p.). Overall, these findings bring attention to the importance of listening to children. While domestic activities are often assumed to be beneficial, by studying children's responses and their perceived well-being, household work is almost as detrimental as the work performed in the labour market, especially in a context where the average child performs at least an hour of chores daily and a tenth of all household work in their homes.

This chapter is structured in the following way, Section II provides a conceptual framework and reviews the literature, Section III discusses children and household work in the context of Ecuador. Section VI structures the empirical framework and describes the data. Section X presents the results.

3.2 Conceptual Framework & Literature Review

Household Work Children provide substantial contributions to their household in the form of domestic work. Early research using data on American households in the mid-1960s to the late-1980s by Goldscheider and Waite (1991), shows that the contribution of children and adolescents was considerable, totalling 15% of all household work (Goldscheider and Waite, 1991).[2] In 1988, Blair (1992a) shows that American children from married or cohabiting households work on average, seven hours a week, equivalent to 12% of total household work. Since then, studies have substantiated the claim that children's contributions to domestic work are not negligible (Gershuny and Sullivan, 2014; Webbink et al., 2012).[3]

[2] Goldscheider and Waite (1991) used the Young Men and Young Women and Mature Women samples of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labour Market Experience.

[3] By distinguishing between household types, using a sample of UK households from 2000-2001 and focusing on couples with children, Gershuny and Sullivan (2014) find that the contribution to housework from ranges from 4%

It has been further demonstrated that children's contribution starts early in life. By looking at evidence from twelve high income countries,[4] Bruckauf and Rees (2017) find that by the age of eight, more than half of all children (52%) already contribute to their household every day.[5] In the United States, most children (85% of boys and 81% of girls) are required to perform chores on a regular basis, as early as when they are two years of age. By ages 6-17, 88% of children perform at least one household chore on a regular basis (Blair, 1992a). Analysing sixteen countries,[6] 30% and 11% of children in Africa and Asia, respectively, between the ages of 8-13, do over 15 hours of housework (Webbink et al., 2012). In countries with data available on chores performed by girls, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates that 64% of girls (ages 5-14) help with cleaning and cooking meals (UNICEF, 2016).

Generally, adults are the ones who control the nature and amount of work that children do (Bruckauf and Rees, 2017). The participation of children in household labour is usually seen as ubiquitous and is regularly assumed as beneficial for children to learn valuable skills and become responsible while performing domestic tasks (Blair, 1992a; UNICEF, 2016). Child socialization happens when parents assign chores to children as an educational or instructional tool to help promote their responsibility and autonomy. The theory of socialization has a competing explanation, a pragmatic take on the requirements of a household: sourcing children for housework occurs when structural constraints alter the demand for household labour in the household, i.e., when parents are constrained in their time (Blair, 1992a). Evidence seems to support that children work to meet the labour demands of the household (Blair, 1992a).

- 9% depending on the child's gender, age and sibling configuration. In this case, the lower bound in participation corresponds to male only children between the ages of 8-13 and the upper bound corresponds to teenage girls, 14-17 years old who have younger siblings. One exception is Bonke (2010), who using the European Community Household Panel Survey from 1998, finds that in 1,328 Danish children, children's contribution to domestic work is only modest, compares to the total domestic work performed in households. The peak of contributions appears in girls at age 14 with a contribution of three hours per week. However, the author argues this is to be expected because of patterns witnessed in adults; Danish parents spend substantially less hours on domestic work than their Nordic or American counterparts. Another finding is that domestic work is gendered as boys participate less than girls in performing chores (Bonke, 2010).

[4]The countries are Estonia, Finland, Germany, Israel, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom and the analysis is performed using the 2013-2014 wave of the International Survey of Children's Well-Being.

[5]The results also show that the daily contribution to housework from the younger, eight year old children is higher than older, twelve year old children. This is interpreted as indication that later in their lives, children shift away from domestic work towards market work.

[6]The countries are Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Togo, Malawi, Mauritania, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, Vietnam and Yemen and the analysis is performed using the 2005-2006 round of UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.

The decision of parents to engage children in chores is likely also to be influenced by family and societal expectations and social norms (Bruckauf and Rees, 2017; Blair, 1992a; Wikle, 2014). These social norms can make household work gendered as the parental demand for domestic work could be sex-typed (Bonke, 2010). If parents expect boys to have a career in the labour market, they could consequently expect boys to be less engaged in household work and more involved in their investments in schooling, doing homework, sports and socializing (Bonke, 2010).[7] In fact, girls from more traditional backgrounds tend to do more housework following the behaviour of their mothers (Bruckauf and Rees, 2017; Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2017).

Attitudes towards the work that goes on in a household seem to be transmitted across generations. Gimenez-Nadal et al. (2017) argue that the mechanism of this transmission is three-fold: through the intergenerational transmission of preferences, having parental role models and through imitation. The intergenerational transmission of preferences relies on the idea that parents have a strong influence in the formation of their children's preferences (Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2017; Our Watch, 2018). Cunningham (2001) shows that what children perceive as an 'ideal allocation of housework' when they are eighteen years old, is predicted by their mothers' gender role attitudes when the children are very young, and by how parents divide their housework when the child is an adolescent.

Identity has been shown to be extremely important in determining behaviour within a household (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Cunningham, 2001). If there are gender norms dividing work within a home, and these are part of an individual's gender identity, then deviating from these behaviours results in social costs to the individual,[8] resulting in the individuals behaving according to the social norms to avoid guilt or social backlash. Parents may become role models to their children so that they can abide by these social norms or children may simply imitate what their parents do (Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2017; Cunningham, 2001) to prepare for their adulthood (Wikle, 2014; Ragui et al., 2010). In this context, "the 'doing' gender thesis also

[7]It is important to note that there is evidence contradicting these expectations. Using Canadian data, Fortin et al. (2015) study the predominance of girls at the top of the GPA distribution, i.e., a gender differential in academic achievement. Results show that post-secondary educational expectations are the most important factor in explaining the gender differential. The authors also note that parents in Canada have higher educational expectations for their daughters than for their sons.

[8]For instance, if for women their role and identity is that of Suzy Homemaker, then they may feel guilty if their house is not clean or if there is no pie fresh out of the oven cooling on the windowsill.

applies to children" (Bonke, 2010, p. 4).

In general, there is a wide consensus that girls do more work than boys when it comes to household labour. Worldwide, it is estimated that girls spend 50% more time on domestic chores than boys (UNICEF, 2016). Exploring the twelve countries mentioned above, Bruckauf and Rees (2017) show that girls do more daily housework than boys. Looking at children in the United Kingdom, Gershuny and Sullivan (2014) find that for the two age groups studied (ages 8-13 and 14-17), girls are more likely to work at home by cooking, cleaning or taking care of clothes and that participation rates are higher for the older group of girls. In Africa and Asia,[9] girls are not only more involved in housework (boys tend to be involved in farm/family business related work), but also, the percentage of girls who work long hours is larger than the percentage of boys working long hours (Webbink et al., 2012). Similar patterns are evident in Italy (Busetta et al., 2019), Brazil (French, 2010), Bolivia (Zapata et al., 2011), Egypt (Ragui et al., 2010), the United States, (Wikle, 2014; Blair, 1992a; Cunningham, 2001), Germany and Spain (Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2017) and Denmark (Bonke, 2010) where being an older child and number of children increases time doing chores.[10]

These differences in time spent doing housework between boys and girls seem to grow as children age. Looking at global averages, when girls are 5 to 9 years of age, they spend 30% more time helping in their homes than do their male peers of the same age. By ages 10 to 14 they spend 50% more of their time helping at home than do boys (UNICEF, 2016).[11] The participation of female children remains lower than that of the adult women in the household (Wikle, 2014). Nonetheless, the fact that the disparity in time spent at home grows as children age is worrisome as it may lead to these disparities being perpetuated through women's lives. As Bonke (2010) establishes, "the different amounts of time girls and boys spend on housework may contribute to the not fully documented unequal distribution of time spent by mothers

[9]Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Togo, Malawi, Mauritania, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yemen (Webbink et al., 2012).

[10]A few nuances exist when it comes to these patterns. The gender differences are reversed by changes in household composition and depending on the behaviour modelled by parents. For instance, teenage boys in single-mother households contribute more than female teenagers in dual-parent households (Goldscheider and Waite, 1991). Looking at children in Spain and Germany, Gimenez-Nadal et al. (2017) show that the effect of fathers' contributions to housework determines differences in participation in children. "If children observe that fathers devote more time to household labour, it can influence their behaviour, while mother's housework has no such influence, since it is perceived as work that must be done by women" (Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2017, p.1162).

[11]In the United States, for example, Wikle (2014) finds that the gender differential in time dedicated to chores begins for most girls at age eight and for the girls who work, it increasingly rises as children age through adolescence.

and fathers [in household production]" (Bonke, 2010, p. 2).

As previously mentioned, the discrepancies in time spent in chores by girls and boys, could be simply attributed to children growing into the roles that are pre-established. "Gender roles ... are shared beliefs that apply to individuals on the basis of their socially identified sex which are the basis of the division of labour in most societies. In Western societies, the home sphere, and the household chores as part of this sphere, it is assumed to be in charge of women" (Cerrato and Cifre, 2018, p. 2-3).[12] There are tasks that tend to be perceived as feminine including shopping for the home, cleaning, laundering, taking care of children, assisting children while masculine tasks include home and auto repair (Cerrato and Cifre, 2018; UNICEF, 2016; Cunningham, 2001; Wikle, 2014; Bonke, 2010; Blair, 1992a). Additionally, since these tasks are traditionally assigned to women, men do not feel obligated to be involved in the home in the way women do since the tasks are perceived as entirely voluntary or a hobby (Cerrato and Cifre, 2018, p. 3). Tasks that 'fall' under women's purview, like cooking or feeding taking care of the children are tasks that are unlikely or impossible to be deferred, unlike those of men, like mowing the lawn or washing a car. Consequently, even in the face of equal (or more) market work this specialization of women in household chores leads to less free time for them, a new form of inequality.[13]

A caveat worth noting is that the way in which individuals classify activities as leisure or household work is not clear cut. For instance, in adults, if a wife really enjoys rearing their children or cooking does it qualify as leisure or as household production (Phipps et al., 2001)? Or if children are cooking or doing chores with their parents or with their siblings, could it be considered socializing or enjoying family time (Bruckauf and Rees, 2017)? Perhaps if they are providing care for a grandparent, if that time is used playing cards, would it fall under play or domestic work or both? In general, for adults, it seems that time spent in paid work is the least enjoyed activity (Byson

[12]It is well documented that adult women work more in the home than do men in high-income and middle- and low-income countries (Blair, 1992a; Wikle, 2014; Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2017; Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla-Sanz, 2011). Women not only spend comparatively more time in household work, but they also spend more time on routine and time-intensive work. On the other hand, men tend to do work that is less time-intensive and more sporadic (Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2017).

[13]The difference in the amount of unpaid work at home for adults remains, even when women do comparable (or more) paid market work or earn more than their spouses (Bertrand et al., 2015; Bruckauf and Rees, 2017; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2009; Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla-Sanz, 2011). What is referred to as the "second shift" in the literature establishes that even though females have increased their labour market participation and work hours, a compensated decrease in their household work has not been observed (Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla-Sanz, 2011; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2009; Phipps et al., 2001). Women have a 'second shift' of housework at home after a shift in the labour market or vice-versa.

and MacKerron, 2015).[14] For activities at home, "housework has been reported to be among the less enjoyable daily activities" (Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2017, p.1172). Even though for some individuals it might be enjoyable to perform chores, in terms of momentary well-being, it seems that it generally has negative effects.[15]

Children's Work and Well-Being When it comes to children's work and their well-being, most of the literature has explored the effects of market work and very few studies have looked directly at household work (French, 2010; Ragui et al., 2010; Zapata et al., 2011; Dinku et al., 2019; Sharmin, 2015). One of the reasons that this might be the case is that in most cases, assisting parents with household chores or in the family enterprise or farm to help support the household is expected and usually acknowledged as a positive activity that contributes to the well-being of children by allowing them to acquire helpful skills, a sense of responsibility, competence, self-efficiency and maturity and even develop their identity as helpful members to their families and society (Blair, 1992a; Koller et al., 2014). This is particularly true if the work is performed in the children's own homes, in the company or supervision of their family members, under reasonable conditions and hours (UNICEF, 2016).

As it does with adults, working, whether in the market or at home, inevitably diminishes the time children have for leisure, and arguably for most children, it impacts the time they have for educational activities (even if it does not impact the child's ability to go to school, children may have less time to study or do homework, for instance). Over the years, most of the concern has been on children's engagement in market activities (ILO, 2017; Beegle et al., 2009; Bourdillon, 2013; Dammert et al., 2018). Working prevents children from going to school and investing in their human capital, children who work will consequently receive lower future earnings due to this diminished time allocated to education (Udry, 2004). The human capital consequences

[14] In the United Kingdom, paid work is ranked lower than all (39) activities reported, with the only exception being that the individual is sick in bed. Economists have generally argued that work derives well-being, especially due to the negative effects of unemployment (Byson and MacKerron, 2015). These assessments however, are in the context of evaluative, global assessments of life or eudaimonic well-being, related to meaning, purpose, and worth rather than hedonic, or moment-to-moment levels of experienced utility.

[15] Studies suggest that the disutility from household work is derived not only from general dislike from the work but also from inegalitarian distributions of work (Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2017). In adults, these inequalities in the division of work or leisure time, generally translate to inequalities in well-being (as measured by satisfaction with time) (Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla-Sanz, 2011; Phipps et al., 2001; Kulik, 2018; Cerrato and Cifre, 2018). In some cases, however, if there is a gender gap in household work, individuals are not negatively affected if the differences align with what is expected of them through social norms (Cerrato and Cifre, 2018).

from child work matter not only to the individual, but also to society, as a vicious circle of poverty may be created, hindering the development of society as a whole (Udry, 2004). In addition, child labour is associated with several risk factors like "hazardousness, insalubrity and hardship, ... diseases and accidents [and] damages the dignity of children and adolescents" (Koller et al., 2014, p. 4), including injuries, addiction, fatigue, malnutrition, sexually transmitted infections, abuse, amongst many others (Koller et al., 2014; Dinku et al., 2019).

When it comes to the well-being of children when performing household chores, the United Nations Children's Fund claims:

> "The types of chores commonly undertaken by girls - preparing food, cleaning and caring for others - not only set the stage for unequal burdens later in life but can also limit girls' outlook and potential while they are still young. The gendered distribution of chores can socialize girls into thinking that such domestic duties are the only roles girls and women are suited for, curtailing their dreams and narrowing their ambitions. Household chores are usually not valued by the family and community the way income-earning activities are, rendering the contributions of girls less visible and less valuable, and having lasting effects on their self-esteem and sense of self-worth.
>
> Time spent on chores also limits girls' chances to enjoy the pleasures and leisure of childhood, including time to play, build social networks and focus on their education. In addition, caring for other children or family members who are sick or elderly imposes adult responsibilities on girls while they are still children themselves. Other chores can inadvertently place girls at risk of violence - for instance, while travelling to or from their homes to carry water or collect firewood" (UNICEF, 2016, p. 11).

Empirical work exploring the consequences of housework for children support this claim.[16] When looking at educational attainment, all forms of child work - including domestic work and work for family enterprises negatively affect participation in school[17] (Webbink et al., 2012).

Examining girls' contribution to housework within a household, Ragui et al. (2010) explore the effects of domestic work on schooling in Egypt. A large percentage of parents in Egypt (47%) place a low value on education and many children, especially

[16] For a review of the literature regarding children's work in general and well-being, see Bourdillon (2013).

[17] This is especially so in low- and middle-income countries, where many children grow into occupations that value labour market experience over a formal education. For instance, in an agricultural or family enterprise, where children are trained by their parents; or in household spheres where girls are getting prepared for their marriage (Webbink et al., 2012).

girls, remain out of school and out of work. Ragui et al. (2010) highlight that arbitrary decisions are made to determine what constitutes work and what does not when it comes to examining child work. Unpaid activities, like working in the family's business or preparing food for a market stall are measured as child work due to the labour market nature of the work. However, similar activities, when they are conducted inside the household for internal consumption, are not regarded as child labour. "While such distinctions may make sense in the context of national accounts or labour force statistics, they may result in biases when trying to understand the phenomena of child labour and schooling" (Ragui et al., 2010, p. 81). Including domestic work and care of children to the definition of child labour, Ragui et al. (2010) study the relationship between the need for a daughter to contribute to household work and the parents' decision to have her drop out or not send her to school. Results show that an increase in the probability of work of 10% is associated with a 6% decrease in the probability that a girl attends school. "Many girls who work would have been in school had they not been expected to work fourteen or more hours per week" (Ragui et al., 2010, p. 117). Questioning whether a child would forego school to "simply" perform chores, (Ragui et al., 2010) argue that a household's need for housework is large and has an inelastic nature, (similar to what Phipps et al. (2001) find in adult women), and should not be underestimated, especially for poorer households.[18]

French (2010) studies the implications of labour market work and household work for education, life satisfaction and health of Brazilian children in 7th and 8th grade from two public schools. Examining 461 children in the city of Franca, a leather-shoe exporting town that heavily relies on child labour (independent of bans), French (2010) finds that both household chores and labour market work affect the well-being of

[18] An important methodological aspect of Ragui et al. (2010) is that the survey used made an exception for informed consent when it came to responses of children under the age of 15. Children could respond or their parents could respond for them. In 80% of the cases, parents answered the survey on behalf of their children, and in the remaining 20%, children responded themselves. In the case of market work, when comparing children's (6-14 year old) reports to proxy (parental) reports, there are no statistically significant differences in the activity rates for the children suggesting no systematic under-reporting of market work performed by children. This is not the case, however, for girls' domestic work, where there is a substantial difference and under-reporting from the parents of the work performed in the home. Although the actual differences are not reported in the study, authors hypothesize that the under-reporting might be due to discrepancies in perceptions between children and their parents on what comprises domestic work (Ragui et al., 2010). It has been similarly shown in the work of anthropologist Pamela Reynolds that adults do not necessarily categorize activities that children do as 'work.' For instance, adults do not include child care in their definitions of work, while children perceive it as such. From her work in Zimbabwe, her observations estimate that for girls under the age of 10, 56% of their time goes into taking care of younger children which is largely unrecognised by adults (Reynolds, (1991) as cited in Levinson (2000)).

children.[19] The negative effects that domestic work has on well-being are larger for girls than for boys. Effects are also sensitive to pay levels, for instance, the higher the pay the lower the grades and the higher the absences for boys.[20]

Zapata et al. (2011) directly explore the role that gender has on child labour and child education in Bolivia. Domestic tasks are included in the definition of child work noting that domestic work is not gender neutral and can demand significant time from the children. The authors measure simultaneously whether a child (aged 7-14) is in school or works at least 15 hours per week.[21] If the definition of child labour was only based on labour market activities, results show that boys are more likely to work than girls and that girls are less likely to enrol in school, a novel finding in the Latin American context.[22] Using a definition of child work that includes household chores, girls have a higher likelihood to be working and out of school than boys, a higher probability of combining work and school and a lower likelihood of being exclusively in school and out of work.[23]

A point that is highlighted is that most empirical work assumes that market work is more harmful to children (in terms of their educational outcomes) than domestic

[19] In this case, well-being is measured by how children fare in three indices. *Health* is an indicator constructed from frequently experiencing: headaches, stomach aches, feelings of dizziness, unusual fatigue, feelings of sadness, and nervousness. The children can agree completely, agree in part, disagree in part or disagree completely with the frequency of experiencing the above. For *life satisfaction*, the measure is constructed by the extent to which children are satisfied with: the support of their family, their time for leisure, the space and comfort of their house, their health, their friends, the opportunities in Franca and the quality of their clothing. Children can say they are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the above. For *education*, the author uses the children's final grades in Portuguese and Mathematics and the average number of absences in both classes during the year-long marking periods (French, 2010). Results show that there is gendered specialization; working in the shoe industry or commercial sector is negatively related to health but has no association with school attendance or grades; domestic work has a negative association with health and grades; and caring for children is negatively related to the children's health and life satisfaction.

[20] Another important outcome in the study is that there is evidence supporting the second shift argument for girls "unsurprisingly, employed girls do more work [within the household] than boys ... among younger (11-13) employed children girls' greater domestic work is nearly offset by fewer hours in employment so total work hours for each group are similar (30.0 for girls, 29.2 for boys)" (p. 75). Among older children (14-16), boys reduce the amount of work they do at home, reducing their total work load (to 28.4 hours per week) while girls increase employment hours and domestic work hours to a total of 37.4 weekly hours (9 more hours than boys) (French, 2010).

[21] The study also focuses on gender and on the Indigenous population in Bolivia, where almost a third (30%) of the population is classified as Indigenous according to their mother tongue.

[22] Education enrolment is defined as children's affirmative response to "did you enrol in a primary or secondary grade or college during this year?" For market work, the authors use children's responses to, "did you work last week?" Two measures of child work are used: a binary variable denoting that the child worked 15 hours or more in market activities and another binary variable if the child worked 15 hours or more in market activities *or* in domestic activities. For domestic work they use children's responses to: "during the previous week, did you carry out any of the following activities within your household? Take care of children and/or elderly family members; cook and clean the household; wash and/or iron clothes; perform minor household repairs; shop for food; chop and carry firewood; carry water from external water source; organize and maintain neatness" (Zapata et al., 2011, p. 598).

[23] The results are larger for Indigenous girls who are 82% more likely to just work and 16% less likely to be just in school compared to non-Indigenous girls. In general, Indigenous children have a 60% higher probability of being out of school and working.

work. Zapata et al. (2011) classify children into two groups: i. low-domestic (high-market) intensity and ii. high-domestic (low-market) intensity, where less than 50% of children's hours are in domestic work and 50% or more hours are in domestic work, respectively, to examine whether outcomes change depending on where the children spend most of their time (again, 'working' is still defined by working 15 or more hours per week, this part of the analysis explores the structure of those hours).[24] Results show that 73% of children spend a greater portion of their time doing household work, and if the work a child does is high-domestic intensity, girls have a 51% higher likelihood of being out of school and working and are 26% less likely to only study, compared to boys. If work is low-domestic (high-market) intensity, girls and boys are as likely to be working and out of school. Zapata et al. (2011) also explore the number of hours dedicated to both, and find that high-domestic intensity children work an average of 17 hours a week, compared to 23 hours a week that children spend in the high-market intensity category, suggesting that, although less time-intensive, more time at home is associated with lower likelihoods of enrolment.

Exploring intensity of domestic work, Dinku et al. (2019) analyse the effect that domestic chores have on two outcomes, 'school time' and 'body mass index for age' for 12-13 year old children in Ethiopia.[25] The authors study children's use of time by noting how children place 24 beans in 8 different pots interpreting this as how children divide their daily hours. Then, according to labour laws for children's work, two categories are defined, 'harmful level of chores' denoting children who report over four hours per day in household work and 'harmful-work' denoting children engaged in two hours or more in market work. Results suggest that excessive involvement in chores results in large negative effects on children's body mass index and with 13% less time in school (the same order of magnitude as the effect of participating in harmful work).

Although most official definitions of child labour assume domestic work is beneficial or deemed as 'light work,' evidence contradicts this seemingly innocuous assumption. In some cases, the work performed by children in their homes is excessive and could

[24] Explicitly, low-domestic intensity is defined as children spending less than 50% of their total hours worked in domestic activities. High-domestic intensity is defined as children spending 50% or more of their total hours in domestic work. The authors divide the sample by low-intensity of domestic work and high-intensity of domestic work and run their empirical specification on the sub-samples (Zapata et al., 2011).

[25] Dinku et al. (2019) measure education time as the children's time spent at school and studying time outside of school minus the commuting time that the children spend travelling. The health measure is the child's body mass index relative to their age using the World Health Organization guidelines (Dinku et al., 2019, p. 1264).

become a direct source of stress and even suffering for children due to an 'instrumental parentification' as they may fully take on the roles and responsibilities of their parents (Koller et al., 2014; Zapata et al., 2011; Dinku et al., 2019).

Without ignoring the merits of each of these papers, none of the previous studies address directly how the children perceive their own well-being. In the context of children's, when it comes to domestic work, well-being, as assessed by the children themselves, has not been directly studied. Several authors have explored it indirectly through indices of life satisfaction (asking them about support from their family, time for leisure, the comfort of their house, their health, their friends, labour opportunities and the quality of their clothing - though not directly asking them about their happiness) (French, 2010), health outcomes (French, 2010; Dinku et al., 2019), or educational outcomes (Ragui et al., 2010; French, 2010; Zapata et al., 2011; Dinku et al., 2019). As (French, 2010) notes that "equally important, the implications of work for children's welfare often depend on how they understand and interpret the experience" (p. 64). Similarly, when exploring children's housework and well-being, most of the research focuses on work in farms or family businesses or generally, subsistence work (Bourdillon, 2013) or it combines domestic work with market work or subsistence work for measures of child labour (Ragui et al., 2010).

This chapter expands the current literature in the following ways. First, I add a gender dimension to the existing research on household work and child labour, a component often overlooked in the research (Dammert et al., 2018). Although previous work (Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla-Sanz, 2011; Phipps et al., 2001; Hajdu and Hajdu, 2018; Kulik, 2018; Cerrato and Cifre, 2018) has highlighted how inequalities in housework impact the well-being of adults, especially women, little attention has been given to girls. Second, I focus my empirical work directly on the association between household work and well-being of children as perceived by children's own assessments of both time and well-being.[26] This is important since there are large differences between parents and children in reported domestic work hours (Ragui et al., 2010; Levinson, 2000) and it is quite rare to have children reports of their own happiness. Most measures of child well-being are obtained indirectly (either through life satisfaction indices, health or education measures or through parents' perception

[26]For what remains of the chapter, given that the data explores whether children feel happy, unless otherwise specified, a child's 'happiness' and their 'well-being' are used interchangeably.

of their children's well-being).[27] Reliable self-assessments of children's well-being begin at age eight and children are considered very capable of assessing their own well-being (Burton and Phipps, 2010). As Casas (2011) notes, "which members of the population can best inform us of well-being in different areas of life? The quality-of-life perspective suggested that the point of view of "experts" (practitioners, researchers, or whoever) may not be enough to understand complex social realities. It is important to understand the point of view of all social agents involved in a given phenomenon being studied... the point of view of the youngest generations is also important to understand our societies, particularly those aspects of social life involving or affecting them" (p. 559).[28] A third contribution to the literature is that household work takes a significant portion of children's time, especially in the case of young girls, and studying its relation to well-being is an important issue.[29]

3.3 Children and Household Work in Ecuador

Housework or domestic chores are not included in the official definition of 'child labour' under Ecuadorian legislation.[30] Household work usually consists of cooking and preparing meals, cleaning, conducting minor repairs, caring for others, washing and ironing clothes, buying groceries, accompanying family members in their commute, amongst other tasks (ILO, 2017). Technically, for accounting purposes, these tasks are deemed "non-economic" forms of production and are excluded from most national accounts in most nations following the United Nations System of National Accounts (UNSNA) with these activities going unmeasured for a very long time. Consequently,

[27] Fattore et al. (2017) argue that "Embedded in what children told us are challenges to adultcentric discourses on child well- being. These challenges affirm that not only are children authoritative about their own well-being, additionally, because of their location, structurally, in the social order, they see things differently from adults" (p. 46). Similarly, looking at health and education measures is in a way done to protect children's future, and as such, are measures of well-*becoming*, rather than current, present accounts of well-*being* (Fattore et al., 2017).

[28] See Burton and Phipps (2010), Fattore et al. (2017) and Casas (2011) for an overview of children assessing their well-being with measures like the ones used in this analysis.

[29] As argued by Levinson (2000), "banning child labour" from paid market work has effectively moved children to informal work and household work, which is often characterized by its social invisibility. For a review of how Economics has failed to recognize children's agency, why children should be treated as agents, and the need to study their well-being "in ways that are true to girls' and boys' experiences," see Levinson (2000).

[30] According to the Ecuadorian Childhood and Adolescence Code, the minimum age for work is fifteen years old. Children above the age of fifteen are allowed to work if the work day does not exceed six hours or five days a week, i.e., does not exceed 30 hours per week, as long as the work does not limit the child's right to an education or is not performed under conditions that endanger the child's health or safety (Children and Adolescents Code, 2002; INEC, 2012c). 'Child labour' refers to the work that children perform illegally and 8.56% of children were child labourers in 2012. This amounts to approximately 359,597 out of the 4,199,296 children in Ecuador (INEC, 2012a).

household work is not included in the definitions of child labour and is often overlooked.

Household work is not gender neutral, most home production in Ecuador comes from women. In an effort to conduct gender-informed policy, Ecuador started measuring unpaid household work in 2011.[31] Through this initiative, the government estimated that in 2012, unpaid household work would have contributed to around 18.8% of GDP (gross value added) (CSTNRH, 2019). In terms of household consumption expenditure, it was estimated that for total household final consumption expenditure in 2012, unpaid work in the home resulted in "savings" of 33%, i.e., for $100 USD of household final consumption expenditure, households "saved"' $33 USD in household work from the worked produced by members of their home instead of external purveyors of services. When looking at age groups, although this information is only available for 2015, children aged 12-17 contributed to 6.6% of all unpaid work, individuals aged 18-29, 29.2%, aged 30-44, 34.5%; aged 45-64, 22.8% and adults aged 65 years or more, 7.0%, respectively. Of the 6.6% contribution from children to total unpaid work, girls produced 67.3% of all unpaid labour from children and boys produced 32.7% (CSTNRH, 2019).[32]

3.4 Data and Empirical Framework

Data To examine gender differences in the well-being of children, I use microdata from the 2012 National Child Labour Survey (ENTI, for its name in Spanish, Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil) in Ecuador. The survey was conducted to understand and assess the children and adolescents between the ages of 5-17 who work in Ecuador. The survey targeted all provinces except the Galapagos Islands. Of the 31,687 households surveyed, 146,814 individuals completed the survey. Of these, 51,233 were children

[31] The government of Ecuador began calculating a satellite account for unpaid housework. The account measures 66 unpaid activities that are generally excluded from the Ecuadorian System of National Accounts. These activities are divided into three main groups, i. unpaid care to household members (care of children, care and support of people with a disability and any care related to health); ii. unpaid domestic work in own household (cooking, shopping, management, maintenance and organization of the household, construction and repairs, care of clothing and tailoring); and iii. unpaid work in other homes, community and volunteer work (charity work, community support and other volunteering activities). To calculate the gross value added from these activities, and its economic value, the number of hours dedicated to these tasks was multiplied by the average compensation those activities would receive had transactions occurred in the market (CSTNRH, 2019).

[32] Although not empirically shown family structures are close-knit in Ecuador. Children remain in their parents' home until they are approximately 25 or 26 years old or until they get married, which happens, on average, when men are 32 years old and women are 29 years old (Metro Ecuador, 2017; Rodriguez, 2017). Similarly, households are multi-generational as parents or in-laws of the heads of household are frequently found to live in the same household.

between 5 to 17 years of age.

The survey was divided into seven different sections. Surveyors were instructed to ask the head of household or their spouse to be the 'informant' or person most knowledgeable.[33] The person most knowledgeable (PMK) answered the first six sections of the survey providing information on all members of the household about their demographic characteristics, occupational characteristics and labour including both market and domestic work.

The last module, however, was entirely directed to the children of the household. Children between the ages of five to seventeen answered 48 questions regarding their educational attainment, activities in the past week, including time dedicated to market work and household work, job conditions, reasons for working, uses of earnings, health consequences of to work, and whether they consider themselves to be happy children.

Since children were surveyed, surveyors were explicitly trained to ensure the safety of children as they might have been in vulnerable situations and they wanted to limit or eliminate exposure to risk or abuse of children following their responses.[34] Surveyors were instructed to explain that the methodology required the last section be answered directly by the children. They required consent to direct questions to children and have the questions answered solely by the children, if in the presence of an informant, or to be left alone with the children. Respondents were informed of the confidentiality of the survey and guaranteed it throughout, assured secrecy. Although surveyors were to ensure no one else would listen in during the interview and it is noted in the survey's documentation that all responses were confidential, this is not the case for most children (71.77% of the estimating sample), as responses were not confidential from other family members given that, for these children, their parents/guardians were present. Surveyors make note of whether the child's parents (or whoever was

[33]Ideally, the head of household or the spouse of the head of the household were the informants as, in most cases, they would have been the parents of the child. Surveyors were asked to exert their own judgment and when parents were not in the household, the informant was meant to be of legal age (above the age of 18), habitual resident of the household who had good knowledge of the activities of household members (INEC, 2012b).

[34]The recommendations for surveyors to address the security and vulnerability of children included the following: kind and respectful conversation, creating an atmosphere of trust and showing empathy, support and understanding; informing all members the length of the survey and asking if they have time to answer without being interrupted or if they would rather do it in a different place or time (surveyors were in each survey area for three days); ensuring the surroundings are appropriate for the family and the children so that they can answer calmly and without exposure to uncomfortable situations, if that is not the case, agreeing to a different time or day; explaining the topics discussed are important and listening, paying attention and avoiding interruptions; as surveyors themselves could be at risk, keeping a cellphone with at least one phone number to call in case or need or maintaining contact with other surveyors in the area was suggested (INEC, 2012b, p. 8).

responsible for the child) were present at the time of their interview (INEC, 2012b).[35] All children in the household are asked these questions, therefore, there may be more than one child interviewed per household.

The survey was intended to be the first cross-section of a recurring (every two years) survey. Unfortunately, the data from 2014 was never published and the survey was discontinued shortly after. As such, an important disadvantage is that there is only a single cross-section of children, measured in 2012. Because of this, there is no way to track changes within a household, especially in terms of whether a household falls in or out of poverty, a stay-at-home mother decides to partake in the labour market, a divorce or death of a parent occurs, all of which could affect both the children's domestic duties and their well-being. Results thus, cannot be interpreted as causal effects as they are associations between variables.

The main advantage of the National Child Labour Survey, for the purposes of this research, is that in addition to a thorough battery of labour related questions, children were asked directly, "In general, would you say you feel a happy child/youth: most of the time? just in some instances? almost never?"[36] Given that the children are directly asked a question regarding their general, perceived happiness, there is no need to rely on proxy-based responses in this study. The options presented to the children, i.e., most of the time, some instances, almost never, prompt a general assessment of life and well-being, a eudamonic perception of their happiness rather than a hedonic, moment-to-moment assessment (Byson and MacKerron, 2015). Although advantageous, this measure is not perfect in terms of allowing variability as it only allows three categories as possible responses.

Another advantage is the fact that weekly hours are included for both market labour and domestic labour. Having the work done by children measured on a weekly basis is important given the inelastic nature of domestic work (Ragui et al., 2010; Phipps et al., 2001). It is uncertain, however, whether the weekly activities, "in the past week," are accurately representative of what life is like year-round for a child.

[35]It is worth noting that in the preamble of asking questions to the children, surveyors were asked to reiterate the objective of the survey: "updating data on child labour to abolish, relaying information on the age of children and adolescents and the nature of their work" (INEC, 2012b, p. 11). Given that the objective stated abolishing child labour, this might have resulted in measurement error with respondents under-reporting work, which in turn would potentially bias estimates downward.

[36]The questionnaire also allows for non- response, though it codes non-response and "do not know" in the same category.

The criteria for sample selection are as follows. As children can make meaningful assessments on their well-being from the age of eight (Burton and Phipps, 2010), the sample is restricted to children between the ages of 8 and 17. Children from dual-parent households are studied, children from single-parent households are excluded. Households from a single mother, or children who live with their grandparents, for instance, have arguably very different family structures which could have been impacted by death, divorce, separation, and might be associated with child happiness in very different ways than it would for children with both parents in the house. Therefore, the focus is on children who live with both of their parents.

The sample is also restricted to households where only children under the age of 18 reside. There is a lot of richness in terms of how multi-generational or diverse households are in Ecuador. Many individuals remain in their household home into their adulthood (their late twenties or early thirties) or until they get married (Metro Ecuador, 2017; Rodriguez, 2017). There could be members like a grandmother or an older brother living in the same household who could both supply labour to perform chores and increase the demand of housework (e.g., a grandmother could help with the cooking or an older brother could be an extra plate on the table). To make meaningful comparisons, households are restricted to only minors living in the same household. Children who have a disability are excluded. With these exclusions, the estimating sample includes 14,810 children.

Dependent Variables The focus of this study is to understand whether the unpaid domestic work that Ecuadorian children between the ages of 8-17 perform at their homes affects their well-being. From the survey responses, child well-being is defined as whether children consider themselves to be happy. The question is categorical, ordered by the frequency with which children experience happiness. The measure of happiness is defined as follows:

Happy: a binary variable equal to one if the child states that they are happy "most of the time" and equal to zero if the child states they are happy "just in certain occasions," or "almost never."[37]

[37]If a child states they "do not know" if they are happy or do not respond, both answers are coded in the same category and no distinction can be made between them. The 45 children (0.30% of the estimating sample) who fall

Independent Variables The main explanatory variable of interest is household hours, the total amount of hours that a child spent in the following activities:

i. *house cleaning* - sweeping, dusting or making the bed(s);
ii. *grocery shopping* - in markets or supermarkets;
iii. *clothing cleaning and repair* - laundering, ironing, sewing or fixing clothes;
iv. *food preparation* - cooking breakfast, dinner or lunch;
v. *care of other household members* - care of other children, elderly, or those who are ill;
vi. *help with homework* - helping other family members with schoolwork;
vii. *household repair* - repairing any equipment for the home.

To answer the question 'does unpaid domestic work affect the well-being of Ecuadorian children?' household work is studied both at the intensive and extensive margin with the total number of hours performed in all of these activities and with a binary variable equal to one if the child does any amount of household work, zero otherwise.

Similarly, given that there might be differences in the level of happiness that each activity brings (Byson and MacKerron, 2015; Turcotte, 2013), weekly hours spent on each of the seven activities: cleaning, grocery shopping, doing laundry, cooking, caring for others, helping with schoolwork and repairs are defined separately to test whether the association with happiness and household work depends on the activity performed by the children.

Even though it is anticipated that increases in own hours of work will have an impact on the child's perceived happiness, it is also likely that inequalities in the division of domestic work in the household could also have an impact in the well-being of children. Children may perceive doing more work than other family members as unfair and be unhappy doing a larger share of chores. This is especially the case for girls who are more likely to perform a larger share of chores than boys. To test this hypothesis, the share of total household work performed by the child is also defined and tested.[38] Similarly, to compare the share of housework across siblings, rather

in this group are dropped.

[38]To avoid potential multicollinearity, the link between well-being and *household hours* or *share of total household work performed by child* are tested separately. A caveat with regards to the share of household hours is that children between the ages of 8-17 are able to report how many hours of household work they perform in a week. The informant or person most knowledgeable (PMK) provides information on household work performed by all children as well as all other members in the household. Therefore, when it comes to the hours of household work a child performs, there

than all members of the household, child's share of children's total household hours is defined, denoting the share that a child takes on from all the housework that is performed by the children in the home.[39]

If children work in the labour market, the variable 'labour market hours' denotes the hours of work they perform in economic activities. For this measure, the survey asks the child whether they worked for at least one hour last week, whether they performed any economic activities[40] in the last week and whether they did not work last week but had a job. If the child affirmatively answered any of the previous questions, they are asked the amount of hours that they dedicated to these labour market activities, which is the number of hours used for this variable.[41]

A child's self-perceived well-being is likely affected by whether or not they attend school, so education is controlled for. Ideally, the hours spent in school and school related activities would be included (as well as sleep) to tally all hours in a child's day or week.[42] The survey does not ask the children how much time they spend in school or on school-related activities. The children are asked "are you attending school, currently?" Education is measured with a binary variable denoting whether the child

are both self-reported hours as well as the hours that the PMK reports, though these are not the same all the time. In 2,956 cases, children report less hours of domestic work than the informant reports (the average difference is -4.23 hours). In 7,783 cases, the PMK and the children report the same number of hours worked in chores. In 4,071 cases, children report working more hours of household work than their PMK reports (the average difference is 4.00 hours of domestic work). Therefore, when adding the total hours of household work performed by all members of the household, both measures could be used, one being adding the hours for all members in the household as reported by the PMK. The other measure being using the hours that the children report for themselves and adding those to the hours that the PMK reports for all other household members, so that for this measure, the total hours of household work performed in a household adds what the children (8-17 y.o.) report for their work to what the PMK reports for everyone else in the family, i.e., using the hours that the children report for themselves, and adding them to what the informant reports for all other adults, calculating total household work hours for the entire household. When calculating *share of total household work performed by a child*, it can be done using: *child's self-reported hours*/total household hours (*including children's self-report*) or *child's PMK-reported hours*/total household hours (*PMK-reported hours only*).

[39] To reiterate, all children in the same home are siblings.

[40] These activities include: tending to their own business, manufacturing a product, carrying out work for an income, providing a service, helping in a family business, helping in a family member's workplace, agricultural work or care of animals, student-related work, or working for another family.

[41] It is worth noting that in this case, I do not use the 'official' definition of child labour, which is defined by legislature (and depends on age, amount of work performed, days in which the work is done and working conditions), rather, I only denote whether the child works outside of the home in economic activities and calculate the total amount of hours in said activities. Importantly, the answers to these questions depend on the interpretation of 'work.' However, given that the children are first asked whether they worked, followed by whether they performed any of the aforementioned activities which is then followed by whether they had a job even if they did not work the previous week, I assume that the focus of the survey, and hopefully the understanding of these questions are on economic activities. When exploring the extensive margin of household work, if the child works in the labour market, rather than including their labour market hours, a binary variable identifying whether the child works or not is included.

[42] The focus of the study is precisely the potential effects of household work on well-being, implicitly testing how domestic duties impact leisure time. One cannot assume that all children spend the mandated 35 and 45 hours a week that is established by the government as weekly hour loads for "basic education" and "baccalaureate education," respectively given that their homework load could directly have an effect on the time available for them not only to attend classes, but to be focused for the entire school day (S.R.O. No. 754, 2012). The same applies to hours of sleep.

currently attends school or not.[43]

Control Variables For individual characteristics of the child, a set of dummy variables for age are included (ages 8-11 (base), 12-15 and 16-17).[44] There is a control for oldest child in the household, as being a first born is often associated with more contributions to housework (French, 2010; Zapata et al., 2011).[45] The child's cultural background (i.e., indicator variables for whether the PMK identifies the child as Indigenous, Afro-descendant, Mestizo or Other (including: White, Montubio and Other, unspecified), the base category is Mestizo) is also included to account for differences due to ethnicity (Zapata et al., 2011).

For household characteristics, work status of the parents is included by identifying whether the household is a dual-earner household: the head of household and their spouse are employed and earned a wage in the previous week.[46] Similarly, household equivalent income is included in the analysis due to its importance in the determination of well-being (Clark et al., 2008).[47] Household equivalent income is calculated by adding the income of all members in the household and dividing by the square root of household size (i.e., the number of members in the household).[48] As such, household equivalent income is income from all sources, before taxes[49] equivalized.[50] As a measure of socio-economic status, mother's and father's highest level of education attained is included as: primary education, secondary education, or university, the base category is less than primary education.

To identify who lives in the household in terms of children, there are indicator

[43] Although there is potential of having multicollinearity between household hours, labour market hours and education, the fact education is mandatory, labour restrictions impose bans on child labour and given the inelastic nature of household work, give enough reason to leave all three variables in the regressions, as having them is a priority in the study.

[44] Self-awareness and teenage angst may affect children as they get older and as such well-being may change as child ages.

[45] An interaction term for being female and first born (*female* × *firstborn*) was also included, though it was statistically insignificant in all regressions.

[46] Including directly employment status of the parents, or hours of work may be problematic due to endogeneity.

[47] For a review of the literature regarding income and subjective well-being, see Clark et al. (2008).

[48] Own-income is calculated by adding: earnings from the individual's main and secondary occupations; capital/interest earnings from saving accounts, loans, stocks, rental income from real state, land and machinery; transfers from retirement, widowhood, orphanage, disability, or divorce pensions, or severances; income from gifts or donations (e.g., lottery winnings); income from remittances and income from the human development transfer (BDH).

[49] Personal income in Ecuador is untaxed up to $10,800 USD/year. After $10,800 USD/year income is taxed at 5% and the rates increase progressively up to 35% for income above $110,190 USD/year.

[50] There is potential of collinearity with household equivalent income and other household variables, such as the parents being dual earners, their education attainment, fertility (household size) and especially, receiving transfers. However, given the importance with well-being, as detailed in Clark et al. (2008), it is kept in the estimation.

variables denoting the presence of children under the age of five, other girls between the ages 5-17, other boys between the ages 5-17.[51] There is an indicator variable for whether there is someone with a disability in the household. It is assumed that household composition is determined exogenously in the short term (Zapata et al., 2011). An indicator variable denoting whether the gender of head of household is female is included. Lastly, location controls are included by an indicator variable determining whether the household is in an urban setting as well as province dummy variables.

Econometric Specification The main specification is:

$$\begin{aligned} Happiness_i = \alpha + \theta \text{ HouseholdWork}_i + \omega \text{ LabourMarketWork }_i \\ + \rho \text{ AttendsSchool}_i + \delta IC_i + \gamma HC_i + X_i'\beta + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned}$$

Where, $Happiness_i$: is the well-being measure for child i; $HouseholdWork_i$ is one of the measures indicating domestic work performed by child i; $LabourMarketWork_i$ denotes child i's work in the labour market; $AttendsSchool_i$ is an indicator variable for whether the child currently attends school; IC_i is the vector of individual characteristics of the child; HC_i is the vector of child i's household characteristics; and X_i' is the set of (location) controls, as described above.

Regressions are run using this specification. Given the nature of the dependent variables, probit and ordered probit models are estimated, with and without controls. The unit of observation is the child. The analysis is done initially for the full sample of children and then separately by gender. The variables that are denoted as *'scaled'* are divided by ten, (e.g., for household hours (scaled) should be interpreted as 'an increase of 10 household hours is associated with ...'). The results presented below are the marginal effects obtained from the regressions with controls for province. Standard errors shown are robust and clustered at the household level (as there are multiple children surveyed per household). All results are weighed using household weights provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC).

[51] 'Other' refers to additional children within that age group, i.e., siblings in those ages who live in the home. These variables were also disaggregated as: *girls under the age of five*, *girls between the ages 5-7*, *girls between the ages 8-14*, *girls between the ages 15-17*, *boys under the age of five*, *boys between the ages 5-7*, *boys between the ages 8-14* and *boys between the ages 15-17*.

3.5 Results

In general, girls are more likely to perform chores and spend longer hours on chores (see Figure 3.1). In general, the more average daily/weekly hours performed by the children, the fewer children report being happy.[52]

Table 3.1 presents the means of variables. On average, 86.5% of children report being happy most of the time and there is no statistically significant difference between boys and girls. Most of the children (81.6%) perform domestic chores, though more girls (84.2%) do chores compared to boys (79.2%). Similarly, girls work more hours in domestic activities (8.4 hours per week) than boys (6.9 hours per week). The largest difference in hours comes from cooking, were girls cook on average 1.12 hours per week more than boys do. The only activity where boys spend more time in than girls is household repairs, though the difference is small, 0.04 hours per week. Though boys spend on average 1.28 hours working in the labour market more than girls, when looking at the total hours of work from both household chores and labour market work, girls spend on average 9.8 hours per week working, compared to 7.9 hours per week for boys, a difference of 1.63 more hours per week.

Girls are also more likely to take on a larger share of total household work. They perform on average 11.4% of the total household hours on chores while boys only perform 7.8%; girls perform 48% of all household chores done by children in the household while boys perform 41.3%, a statistically significant difference.

The main results are presented in Table 3.2. As a reminder, the variables denoting hours worked are scaled, a unit increase in this case is of ten hours per week. On average, for Ecuadorian children aged 8-17, an increase of 10 hours per week in household chores is associated with a lower probability of -2.1 percentage points that the child says they are happy. When compared to hours worked in the labour market, an increase of 10 hours per week in labour market activities is associated with a -2.9 p.p. decrease, on average, in the probability of children assessing their well-being positively in terms of happiness. A caveat worth noting is that when children respond in front of their parents or PMK (parents are present in 77% of the cases), children report to be happier by 3.3 p.p., on average.

[52]The only exception to this is boys who report working more than 21 hours per week but given that there are only 261 boys in this group it could be that the exception is due to the small sample size.

Tables 3.3a. and 3.3b. present the results disaggregated by chore performed. For girls, going shopping to get groceries is associated with higher levels of happiness, an increase in 10 hours of shopping per week is associated with a 9.4 p.p. increase in the probability that the child says they are happy. In contrast, an increase in 10 hours of doing laundry and 10 hours of care-taking are associated with a -6.3 p.p., and a -4.1 p.p. decrease, respectively, in the probability that children say they are happy. When disaggregating the activities, none of them are statistically significant for boys.

Table 3.4a. looks at the share of household work performed by children. Columns (1)-(3) look at the share of hours that children performed compared to the hours in household work performed by all members of the household (e.g., if the household includes parents and three siblings, the share of child i is based on the hours in chores of all six members). Columns (4)-(6) look at the share of hours that children performed compared to the hours in household chores performed by the children in the household (e.g., if two children live in the household the share of child i is compared to the total hours in chores performed by themselves and the other child). For boys, an increase of 1% in the share of total household worked performed by all members is associated with a -16.5 p.p. lower probability in their happiness assessment. For girls, the share of total household work from all members is statistically insignificant. Looking only at the work performed by children only, (i.e., excluding the work from their parents), an increase in 1% in the share of total household work performed by children is associated with a -6.6 p.p. decrease in the probability that boys say they are happy and a -4.2 p.p. decrease in the probability that girls say that they are happy.

Most of the legal restrictions establish a fourteen hours per week threshold as the maximum allowable time for children to engage in household work activities before this work can be considered 'child labour.' To test whether associations between household work and well-being are sensitive to different thresholds of domestic work and whether the effects are sensitive to the 14-hour international threshold, dummy variables are defined for the following thresholds of household work: the child does (0-7] hours of household work per week, (7-14] hours of household work per week, (14-21] hours of household work per week, and 21 hours of household work or more per week, identifying working an average of 1, 2, and 3 hours per day (Ragui et al., 2010). For boys, working (0,7] hours in chores is associated with a -4.8 p.p. lower probability

that they say they are happy, (7,14] with a -5.7 p.p. lower probability, (14,21] with a -15.3 p.p. lower probability of saying they are happy (the 21 or more hours is statistically insignificant). For girls, working (7,14] hours per week is associated with a -6.7 p.p. lower probability they say they are happy and working more that 21 hours per week is associated with a -11.2 p.p. lower probability of saying they are happy. See Table 3.5.

In all specifications, household equivalent income, age, and ethnicity are not statistically significant. For the parental education variables, that a father went to university, compared to a father with no education, is associated with a higher probability that boys say that they are happy. The more children in the household the lower the probability that boys assess themselves as happy children.

Robustness Checks To explore non-linear effects of household work (i.e., that possibly, performing some housework is okay and perhaps even beneficial, but that performing chores for a long time may be burdensome for children), various functional forms are explored.

To explore whether there is a diminishing nature to performing chores at home and the associations with happiness of the children a quadratic of the child's total hours in household chores is introduced. The squared term is statistically insignificant, see Table B.1.

To test whether it is the binary nature of domestic work (i.e., the extensive margin) that affects the well-being of the children rather than the hours of chores performed (i.e., the intensive margin) unpaid domestic work, market work and school attendance are introduced as binary variables, i.e., 'child does household chores' = 1 if the child performs any type of chore weekly; 'child works in the labour market' = 1 if child worked in the labour market during the past week; 'child attends school' =1 if the child attended school during the past week. Table B.2 presents the results of including only binary variables. Performing domestic chores is associated with a -4.5 p.p. and a -3.3 p.p. lower probability that boys and girls say they are happy. The magnitudes of the marginal effects of doing housework are about half of the magnitudes of the effect of the extensive margin for work in the labour market (-10 p.p. for boys and -6.5 p.p. for girls). These findings suggest that chores are negatively associated with children's

well-being both in the intensive and extensive margins.

Table B.3 summarizes the main results when dividing the sample into children aged 8-14 and 15-17. As it is the case with the fourteen-hour threshold, most 'child labour' definitions 'allow' some work to be performed after children turn 15, i.e., if the children who are 15 years of age and over work below a certain hour limit, this work is legally allowed and thus, not considered child labour. To look at whether this age limit should be taken into consideration for work at home, I explore both the extensive and intensive margin of performing household work as well as the different thresholds of hours worked (panels (i.), (ii.) and (iii.), respectively, in Table B.3). Columns (1)-(3) look at the sample of children aged 8-14 and columns (4)-(6) look at the sample of children aged 15-17.

In all cases, for both the intensive and extensive margin and when using thresholds as independent variables, for the sample of children aged 8-14, housework is negatively associated with children's well-being. For the 15-17 year old sample, when looking at the intensive margin an increase in household work of 10 hours is associated with a decrease in the probability that girls say they are happy of -1.9 p.p., while it is statistically insignificant for boys (labour market hours are statistically significant for boys (not girls) and an increase of 10 hours in labour market activities is associated with a decrease in boys' well-being of -2.5 p.p., on average). The extensive margin and the threshold variables are also statistically insignificant for children above fifteen years old.

It is worth noting that the sample of 15-17 year old children consists of only of 3,232 children while the 8-14 year old sample consists of 11,578 children which could be why the results are no longer significant for the older children. It is also worth noting that, on average, 15 to 17 year old boys perform 7.78 hours of household work while girls perform 13.53 hours of household chores (boys also work on average 7.19 hours in the labour market while girls work 3.78 hours in the labour market). Girls work almost twice the amount of housework hours than boys and boys work almost twice the amount of labour market hours than work which is why there might be a gendered difference in the intensive margin variables.

3.6 Discussion and Conclusion

The work that Ecuadorian children aged 8 to 17 years old perform at home appears to be as detrimental as the work that children perform in the labour market. The mean level of happiness for children is relatively high, 86% of children self-report to be happy most of the time. An increase of 10 hours per week in domestic chores is associated with a -2.1 p.p. decrease in the probability that both boys and girls say their happy. Compared to work performed in the labour market, an increase of 10 hours in market work is associated with a -2.9 p.p.in the probability of children self-assessing as happy. While most of the research on child labour focuses on the impact that activities outside the home, in economic activities in the labour market, in children's own perception and assessments, the work they perform in their own home is almost as negative to their happiness as the work performed in the market. The negative effects of household work on children's self-assessed happiness are present in both the extensive and intensive margins. It is not just the fact that they perform chores, the number of hours in chores are also associated with lower probabilities that children in Ecuador say they are happy.

The gendered aspect of chores is present in Ecuadorian children. While girls spend more hours cleaning, shopping for groceries, doing laundry, cooking, caring for others, and helping others with their school work, the only activity in which boys spend more time doing than girls is household repair, a finding consistent with previous literature (Cerrato and Cifre, 2018; UNICEF, 2016; Cunningham, 2001; Wikle, 2014; Bonke, 2010; Blair, 1992a).

When looking at the different activities children perform at home, not all chores are equal. Some activities seem to have no effect on children's perceived well-being (i.e., cleaning, cooking, helping with schoolwork or household repairs) while shopping for groceries is associated with higher probabilities of happiness. For girls, an increase of 10 hours per week going shopping is associated with a 9.4 p.p. increase in the probability girls say they are happy. Perhaps it is the socializing of going out to get groceries, perhaps it is the enjoyment of purchasing items, why sometimes 'retail therapy' is colloquially perceived as a way to boost someone's mood or perhaps it could be that having the ability to purchase and shop household goods provides a sense

of stability and thus, affects girls' well-being.[53] Another finding that is consistent with the literature is the negative associations between well-being and care-taking. For girls, an increase in 10 hours of care-taking is associated with a decrease in the probability that they say they are happy of 4.1 p.p., on average. For policies addressing the perceived happiness of children, this might be an area where children, particularly girls, would benefit with programs that provide respite for caretakers. Boys do not particularly seem affected when looking at the breakdown of chores, perhaps due to the fact that the amount of time per individual chore is much lower than what girls spend; meaning that, for boys, perhaps it is a matter of volume not type of chore.

When looking at how work is divided in the household, when compared to household activity performed by other members, boys seem to be negatively affected by taking on larger shares of chores. An increase in the share of total household work of 1% (i.e., 1% in the share of work from all household members) has a negative association with boys' happiness of -16.5 p.p., on average. In this case, going to school for boys is associated with a 15.3 p.p. increase in the probability that they self-assess as happy. Taking on a larger share of the household work done appears to be very negative to boys as the magnitude of the association is larger than the magnitude for the school variable. It could be perhaps that maybe it goes against their identity and shows a dislike in performing more 'feminine' activities. It could be that their perception of 'fairness' is affected. It could also be that perhaps the expectation of boys performing a large share of household chores is so low that when this expectation changes, boys perceive it as very negative.

When looking at only the activities performed by children (the share each child takes from the work performed by children in the household, i.e., relative to their siblings), both boys and girls have negative associations with the share they take on and their perceived happiness, though again, boys more so than girls. Interestingly, even though girls perform a larger share of work from children (48.8% on average, compared to 41.3% for boys), boys are more negatively affected (i.e., -6 p.p. lower probability of happiness for boys, compared to -4.2 p.p. for girls).

Importantly, the fourteen-hour threshold that is commonly used when taking into account domestic chores into definitions of child labour seems very arbitrary. Doing

[53]Note that this does not imply that these girls are better off as I am controlling for family income.

any type of work affects children's happiness negatively. Performing up to seven hours of chores a week (less than one hour per day) has a negative effect for boys, though is insignificant and seemingly irrelevant for girls. Performing up to twenty one hours of chores per week is also negatively associated with happiness for boys but not for girls while doing over 21 hours is only negatively associated for girls.

Even though it seems that girls have a higher tolerance of conducting more housework before it negatively affects their well-being, this might be a result of early socialization or parentification of girls. If one were to look at the importance of these thresholds for definitions child labour, it is unlikely that legal standards would be adjusted by gender to take into account these differences (e.g., for boys, the threshold of hours for child labour is any household work done whereas for girls, since there are no negative associations with up to seven hours per week, child labour is anything above seven weekly hours). Rather, these findings could support the argument that, instead, the threshold should be lowered for all children, using the effect on boys as the baseline and the expectations for girls to do more work that boys is contested. As such, the negative effect of housework should be examined more broadly and perhaps the threshold should be as low as the one for market work in an aim to include both how it affects children's happiness and also to dismantle potential expectations for girls being socialized to do more chores than boys.

Another important finding that relates to how 'child labour' is defined and whether or not housework should be included in the legal framework of child labour is how, when dividing the sample of children by age, the negative effects of household work are robust for younger (8-14 year old) children. The analysis of extensive and intensive margin variables as well different thresholds for housework shows that there is a negative association with chores and children's well-being. Although there is a small sample for children aged 15-17, for older girls, a negative association with household work and well-being remains when looking at the intensive margin. Girls carry a larger burden of housework and the effect this has on their well-being should not be overlooked. As ubiquitous as chores might be, results suggest that legislators and policy makers should not disregard the work performed at home given the negative impact it can have on children.

Lastly, by far, the largest effect on self-assessed well-being of children comes from

their school attendance, especially for boys. On average, attending school is associated with a 13.6 p.p. higher probability of a child saying they are happy (15 p.p. for boys and 12.1 p.p. for girls). Ensuring that children go to school and remain in school seems to be an important avenue to ensure their well-being.

To conclude, this chapter provides evidence that the unpaid chore work that children perform in their home is negatively associated with their well-being. This finding is true both at the extensive and intensive margin. Moreover, not all chores have the same effect on children's well-being. The brunt of work that children take seems to be more important for boys than for girls. Importantly, the analysis conducted in this chapter was done solely using children's responses. While policies suggest that domestic chores could be beneficial to children's development of their skills, character and sense of responsibility, listening to what children say, through their own voices, points to this not being the case. Most countries have laws against child labour (only defined as market work) and multi-government agencies call for the elimination of child labour (ILO, 2017). However, while children's market work is eradicated little attention is given to the work that they perform in their own home, which children perceive almost as detrimental as the former though chores are not regulated. Domestic chores need to be studied more thoroughly so that policies to address their negative impact can be tested an implemented, respecting children's agency and awareness of their own well-being.

Figure 3.1: Proportion of Children Working in Chores by Gender



Source: National Survey of Child Labour

Figure 3.2: Child's Responses of Feeling 'Mostly Happy' by Ranges of Hours Worked



Source: National Survey of Child Labour

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Means Values for Children Aged 8-17 Years Old, Living in Two-Parent Households by Gender

	Female Children		**Male Children**		**Diff.**
	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev	Girl-Boy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mostly Happy	0.868	0.338	0.863	0.344	0.0033
(Dummy = 1 if child is happy most of the time)					
Occasionally/Rarely Happy	0.127	0.333	0.133	0.340	-0.0036
(Dummy = 1 if child is happy occasionally/rarely)					
Well-Being (0= rarely, 1= occasionally, 2= mostly happy)	1.863	0.358	1.858	0.361	0.0029
Child Works in Domestic Activities	0.842	0.365	0.792	0.406	0.0543***
Child's Weekly Hours Spent Cleaning	2.176	2.462	1.631	1.966	0.4957***
Child's Weekly Hours Spent Getting Groceries	0.714	1.469	0.685	1.421	0.0742***
Child's Weekly Hours Spent Doing Laundry	1.475	2.133	0.810	1.464	0.6429***
Child's Weekly Hours Spent Cooking	1.623	3.226	0.598	1.530	1.1180***
Child's Weekly Hours Spent Caring for Others	1.384	3.769	0.982	2.670	0.4233***
Child's Weekly Hours Spent Helping with Schoolwork	1.033	2.362	0.849	2.139	0.1981***
Child's Weekly Hours Spent in Repairs	0.041	0.450	0.072	0.471	-0.0438***
Child Does (0,7] Hours of Household Chores Per Week	0.461	0.498	0.532	0.499	-0.0918***
Child Does (7,14] Hours of Household Chores Per Week	0.193	0.395	0.170	0.375	0.0446***
Child Does (14,21] Hours of Household Chores Per Week	0.097	0.296	0.055	0.227	0.0470***
Child Does More Than 21 Hours of Household Chores Per Week	0.090	0.287	0.035	0.184	0.0544***
Child's Total Hours of Household Chores	8.445	10.048	5.626	6.897	2.9084***
Child's Share of Total Household Hours of Chores	0.114	0.107	0.078	0.076	0.0373***
Child's Share of Children's Total Household Hours of Chores	0.488	0.346	0.413	0.347	0.0763***
Total Household Hours of Chores, All Members	71.393	38.285	70.157	36.716	2.0976***
Total Household Hours of Chores, Children	18.158	20.206	15.470	18.431	2.9317***
Child Works in Market Activities	0.086	0.280	0.136	0.343	-0.0568***
Child's Total Hours in Labour Market Activities	1.331	5.687	2.317	7.722	-1.2827***
Child's Total Hours of Household & Labour Market Work	9.777	12.099	7.943	10.671	1.6257***
Child Attends School	0.970	0.170	0.961	0.194	0.0070**
Boy	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	-
Age	11.792	2.767	11.897	2.795	-0.0861*
Age Group: 8 to 11	0.501	0.500	0.474	0.499	0.0223***
Age Group: 12 to 15	0.366	0.482	0.390	0.488	-0.0160**
Age Group: 15 to 17	0.132	0.339	0.136	0.343	-0.0063
Oldest Child	0.558	0.497	0.561	0.496	-0.0019
Identifies as: Indigenous	0.081	0.272	0.077	0.267	0.004
Identifies as: Afro-descendant	0.045	0.208	0.046	0.210	0.0015
Identifies as: Mestizo	0.809	0.393	0.792	0.406	0.0001
Identifies as: Other Ethnicity	0.065	0.246	0.085	0.278	-0.0055
Dual-Earner Household	0.673	0.469	0.656	0.475	-0.0003
Mother's Educ.: Less Than Primary	0.051	0.220	0.054	0.225	-0.0035
Father's Educ.: Less Than Primary	0.035	0.185	0.032	0.175	0.0027
Mother's Educ.: Primary	0.457	0.498	0.451	0.498	-0.0037
Mother's Educ.: Secondary	0.351	0.477	0.359	0.480	-0.0003
Mother's Educ.: University	0.141	0.348	0.136	0.343	0.0076
Father's Educ.: Primary	0.466	0.499	0.480	0.500	-0.0173**
Father's Educ.: Secondary	0.348	0.476	0.356	0.479	0.0078
Father's Educ.: University	0.151	0.358	0.132	0.339	0.0068
Household Equivalent Income	281.860	285.560	277.208	285.186	3.0761
Household Size	4.961	1.324	4.978	1.356	-0.0183
House has Children Below Age 5	0.295	0.456	0.301	0.459	-0.0042
House has Other Boys Aged 5-17	0.563	0.496	0.563	0.496	-0.0026
House has Other Girls Aged 5-17	0.551	0.497	0.542	0.498	0.0037
Household Has a Member With A Disability	0.046	0.209	0.056	0.229	-0.0066*
Head of Household is Female	0.014	0.118	0.013	0.111	-0.0004
Urban Setting	0.580	0.494	0.578	0.494	-0.0011
Parent or PMK Present During Child's Responses	0.769	0.421	0.771	0.420	-0.0057
Observations	N = 7,294		N = 7,516		N = 14,810

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance.

Table 3.2: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Feeling like a Happy Child by Gender of Child; Independent Variable: Total Hours of Household Work (Self-Reported)

	All Children (1)	**Male Children** (2)	**Female Children** (3)
Child's Total Hours of Household Chores (Scaled)	-0.021***	-0.021**	-0.021***
	[0.005]	[0.009]	[0.007]
Child's Total Hours in Labour Market Activities (Scaled)	-0.029***	-0.033***	-0.022**
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.009]
Child Attends School	0.136***	0.150***	0.121**
	[0.038]	[0.052]	[0.053]
Age Group: 12 to 15	-0.000	0.016	-0.017
	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Age Group: 15 to 17	-0.001	0.012	-0.014
	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.025]
Oldest Child	-0.005	-0.010	0.000
	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Identifies as: Indigenous	0.004	-0.005	0.009
	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.019]
Identifies as: Afro-descendant	-0.037	-0.055	-0.012
	[0.029]	[0.038]	[0.038]
Identifies as: Other Ethnicity	-0.026	-0.017	-0.038
	[0.026]	[0.033]	[0.034]
Boy	-0.007	-	-
	[0.009]		
Dual-Earner Household	-0.011	0.009	-0.034**
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Mother's Educ.: Primary	0.008	0.035	-0.023
	[0.021]	[0.025]	[0.026]
Mother's Educ.: Secondary	0.028	0.066**	-0.015
	[0.023]	[0.027]	[0.030]
Mother's Educ.: University	0.022	0.029	0.018
	[0.028]	[0.034]	[0.034]
Father's Educ.: Primary	0.017	0.002	0.027
	[0.028]	[0.033]	[0.032]
Father's Educ.: Secondary	0.016	0.001	0.022
	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.035]
Father's Educ.: University	0.060**	0.073**	0.040
	[0.027]	[0.029]	[0.036]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.014	-0.038	0.014
	[0.027]	[0.034]	[0.040]
Household Size	0.006	0.018**	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.008]
House has Children Below Age 5	-0.022	-0.033*	-0.011
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.019]
House has Other Boys Aged 5-17	-0.022*	-0.040**	0.001
	[0.013]	[0.018]	[0.020]
House has Other Girls Aged 5-17	-0.015	-0.039**	0.012
	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.019]
Household Has a Member With A Disability	-0.027	-0.026	-0.026
	[0.022]	[0.028]	[0.029]
Head of Household is Female	0.018	0.004	0.033
	[0.038]	[0.052]	[0.040]
Urban Setting	-0.015	-0.004	-0.025*
	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.015]
Parent or PMK Present During Child's Responses	0.033***	0.033**	0.030*
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Observations	14,810	7,516	7,294
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-5558	-2833	-2678
Pseudo R^2	0.0499	0.0581	0.0576

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENTI ages 8-17, living with both parents. The dependent variable, *happiness*, is an indicator variables equal to one if child feels happy most of the time. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects for the probability of the child self-assessing as happy. The base categories are: 'Child Doesn't Attend School;' 'Age: 8-11;' 'Not Oldest Child;' 'Child's Ethnicity: Mestizo;' 'Non-Dual Earners;' 'Less than Primary Educ.;' 'No Additional Members'; 'Male Head of Household;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'PMK not Present.' 'Province: Pichincha' omitted.

Table 3.3a.: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Feeling like a Happy Child by Gender of Child; Independent Variable: Total Hours of Household Work by Different Activity Performed (Self-Reported)

	All Children	**Male Children**	**Female Children**
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Child's Total Hours of Household Cleaning (Scaled)	-0.007	0.009	-0.024
	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.031]
Child's Total Hours of Household Getting Groceries (Scaled)	0.055	0.018	0.094*
	[0.037]	[0.046]	[0.053]
Child's Total Hours of Household Doing Laundry (Scaled)	-0.066**	-0.076	-0.063*
	[0.031]	[0.048]	[0.037]
Child's Total Hours of Household Cooking (Scaled)	-0.024	-0.028	-0.027
	[0.017]	[0.035]	[0.018]
Child's Total Hours of Household Caring of Others (Scaled)	-0.040***	-0.034	-0.041***
	[0.013]	[0.021]	[0.016]
Child's Total Hours of Household Helping with Schoolwork (Scaled)	0.016	0.004	0.030
	[0.023]	[0.028]	[0.030]
Child's Total Hours of Household Repairs (Scaled)	-0.066	-0.148	0.021
	[0.074]	[0.099]	[0.102]
Child's Total Hours in Labour Market Activities (Scaled)	-0.029***	-0.032***	-0.022**
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.009]
Child Attends School	0.130***	0.152***	0.109**
	[0.038]	[0.052]	[0.051]
Age Group: 12 to 15	-0.001	0.016	-0.017
	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Age Group: 15 to 17	-0.001	0.014	-0.012
	[0.017]	[0.021]	[0.024]
Oldest Child	-0.006	-0.011	-0.002
	[0.009]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Identifies as: Indigenous	0.005	-0.005	0.011
	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.019]
Identifies as: Afro-descendant	-0.039	-0.059	-0.010
	[0.030]	[0.038]	[0.037]
Identifies as: Other Ethnicity	-0.025	-0.016	-0.033
	[0.026]	[0.033]	[0.034]
Boy	-0.010	-	-
	[0.009]		
Dual-Earner Household	-0.010	0.010	-0.034**
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Mother's Educ.: Primary	0.005	0.035	-0.028
	[0.021]	[0.025]	[0.025]
Mother's Educ.: Secondary	0.025	0.066**	-0.021
	[0.023]	[0.027]	[0.030]
Mother's Educ.: University	0.018	0.028	0.011
	[0.028]	[0.035]	[0.035]
Father's Educ.: Primary	0.018	0.000	0.029
	[0.028]	[0.033]	[0.032]
Father's Educ.: Secondary	0.016	-0.002	0.025
	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.034]
Father's Educ.: University	0.060**	0.072**	0.040
	[0.027]	[0.029]	[0.036]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.014	-0.037	0.015
	[0.027]	[0.033]	[0.039]
Observations	14,810	7,516	7,294
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-5542	-2828	-2663
Pseudo R^2	0.0526	0.0601	0.0630

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENTI ages 8-17, living with both parents. The dependent variable, *happiness*, is an indicator variables equal to one if child feels happy most of the time. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects for the probability of the child self-assessing as happy. The base categories are: 'Child Doesn't Attend School;' 'Age: 8-11;' 'Not Oldest Child;' 'Child's Ethnicity: Mestizo;' 'Non-Dual Earners;' 'Less than Primary Educ.;' 'No Additional Members'; 'Male Head of Household;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'PMK not Present.' 'Province: Pichincha' omitted.

Table 3.3b.: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Feeling like a Happy Child by Gender of Child; Independent Variable: Total Hours of Household Work by Different Activity Performed (Self-Reported) (cont.)

	All Children	**Male Children**	**Female Children**
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Household Size	0.007	0.018**	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.008]
House has Children Below Age 5	-0.019	-0.032*	-0.008
	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.018]
House has Other Boys Aged 5-17	-0.022*	-0.041**	-0.001
	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.019]
House has Other Girls Aged 5-17	-0.017	-0.040**	0.009
	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.019]
Household Has a Member With A Disability	-0.025	-0.025	-0.022
	[0.022]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Head of Household is Female	0.018	0.003	0.035
	[0.037]	[0.052]	[0.039]
Urban Setting	-0.015	-0.004	-0.026*
	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.015]
Parent or PMK Present During Child's Responses	0.034***	0.033**	0.031*
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Observations	14,810	7,516	7,294
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-5542	-2828	-2663
Pseudo R^2	0.0526	0.0601	0.0630

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENTI ages 8-17, living with both parents. The dependent variable, *happiness*, is an indicator variables equal to one if child feels happy most of the time. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects for the probability of the child self-assessing as happy. The base categories are: 'Child Doesn't Attend School;' 'Age: 8-11;' 'Not Oldest Child;' 'Child's Ethnicity: Mestizo;' 'Non-Dual Earners;' 'Less than Primary Educ.;' 'No Additional Members'; 'Male Head of Household;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'PMK not Present.' 'Province: Pichincha' omitted.

Table 3.4a.: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Feeling like a Happy Child by Gender of Child; Independent Variable: Share of Household Work Performed by Children (Self-Reported)

	Share of Total Chores by All Members of Household			**Share of Chores by All Children in Household**		
	All Children	Male Children	Female Children	All Children	Male Children	Female Children
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Child's Share of Total Household Hours of Chores	-0.128**	-0.165*	-0.109	-	-	-
	[0.054]	[0.085]	[0.069]			
Total Household Hours of Chores, All Members (Scaled)	-0.005***	-0.004**	-0.006***	-	-	-
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]			
Child's Share of Children's Total Household Hours of Chores	-	-	-	-0.053***	-0.066***	-0.042*
				[0.017]	[0.023]	[0.024]
Total Household Hours of Chores, Children (Scaled)	-	-	-	-0.007**	-0.005	-0.008**
				[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Child's Total Hours in Labour Market Activities (Scaled)	-0.028***	-0.032***	-0.021**	-0.029***	-0.033***	-0.021**
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.009]
Child Attends School	0.139***	0.153***	0.128**	0.139***	0.148***	0.130**
	[0.039]	[0.052]	[0.055]	[0.038]	[0.052]	[0.053]
Age Group: 12 to 15	-0.002	0.017	-0.020	-0.001	0.016	-0.019
	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Age Group: 15 to 17	-0.003	0.012	-0.018	-0.005	0.008	-0.019
	[0.018]	[0.022]	[0.026]	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.025]
Oldest Child	-0.007	-0.011	-0.002	0.000	-0.000	0.002
	[0.009]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.015]
Identifies as: Indigenous	0.004	-0.005	0.009	0.006	-0.003	0.011
	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.019]
Identifies as: Afro-descendant	-0.037	-0.055	-0.013	-0.035	-0.055	-0.010
	[0.030]	[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.029]	[0.038]	[0.038]
Identifies as: Other Ethnicity	-0.026	-0.017	-0.039	-0.028	-0.020	-0.040
	[0.026]	[0.033]	[0.034]	[0.026]	[0.033]	[0.034]
Boy	-0.006	-	-	-0.006	-	-
	[0.009]			[0.009]		
Dual-Earner Household	-0.012	0.009	-0.036**	-0.010	0.011	-0.034**
	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Mother's Educ.: Primary	0.009	0.036	-0.021	0.010	0.037	-0.021
	[0.021]	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.021]	[0.025]	[0.026]
Mother's Educ.: Secondary	0.030	0.068***	-0.012	0.029	0.068**	-0.015
	[0.023]	[0.026]	[0.030]	[0.023]	[0.026]	[0.030]
Mother's Educ.: University	0.024	0.031	0.020	0.023	0.033	0.017
	[0.027]	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.027]	[0.033]	[0.034]
Father's Educ.: Primary	0.018	0.002	0.028	0.016	0.000	0.026
	[0.028]	[0.033]	[0.032]	[0.028]	[0.033]	[0.032]
Father's Educ.: Secondary	0.017	0.002	0.022	0.014	-0.003	0.021
	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.035]	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.035]
Father's Educ.: University	0.061**	0.074***	0.041	0.059**	0.070**	0.041
	[0.026]	[0.029]	[0.036]	[0.027]	[0.029]	[0.036]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.015	-0.041	0.016	-0.014	-0.037	0.015
	[0.027]	[0.034]	[0.038]	[0.027]	[0.034]	[0.040]
Observations	14,810	7,516	7,294	14,810	7,516	7,294
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-5549	-2828	-2672	-5555	-2826	-2681
Pseudo R^2	0.0514	0.0598	0.0597	0.0505	0.0606	0.0567

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENTI ages 8-17, living with both parents. The dependent variable, *happiness*, is an indicator variables equal to one if child feels happy most of the time. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects for the probability of the child self-assessing as happy. The base categories are: 'Child Doesn't Attend School;' 'Age: 8-11;' 'Not Oldest Child;' 'Child's Ethnicity: Mestizo;' 'Non-Dual Earners;' 'Less than Primary Educ.;' 'No Additional Members'; 'Male Head of Household;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'PMK not Present.' 'Province: Pichincha' omitted.

Table 3.4b.: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Feeling like a Happy Child by Gender of Child; Independent Variable: Share of Household Work Performed by Children (Self-Reported) (cont.)

	Share of Total Chores by All Members of Household			**Share of Chores by All Children in Household**		
	All Children	Male Children	Female Children	All Children	Male Children	Female Children
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Household Size	0.008	0.019**	-0.004	0.006	0.017**	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.008]
House has Children Below Age 5	-0.021	-0.033*	-0.011	-0.022	-0.033*	-0.013
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.019]
House has Other Boys Aged 5-17	-0.021*	-0.040**	0.003	-0.026**	-0.047***	-0.003
	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.020]
House has Other Girls Aged 5-17	-0.014	-0.038**	0.014	-0.021*	-0.047***	0.009
	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.019]
Household Has a Member With A Disability	-0.027	-0.024	-0.026	-0.026	-0.022	-0.027
	[0.022]	[0.028]	[0.029]	[0.022]	[0.028]	[0.030]
Head of Household is Female	0.017	0.004	0.031	0.020	0.005	0.036
	[0.038]	[0.052]	[0.040]	[0.037]	[0.051]	[0.038]
Urban Setting	-0.015	-0.004	-0.026*	-0.014	-0.003	-0.024
	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.015]
Parent or PMK Present During Child's Responses	0.032***	0.033**	0.028*	0.033***	0.034**	0.029*
	[0.012]	[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Observations	14,810	7,516	7,294	14,810	7,516	7,294
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-5549	-2828	-2672	-5555	-2826	-2681
Pseudo R^2	0.0514	0.0598	0.0597	0.0505	0.0606	0.0567

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENTI ages 8-17, living with both parents. The dependent variable, *happiness*, is an indicator variables equal to one if child feels happy most of the time. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects for the probability of the child self-assessing as happy. The base categories are: 'Child Doesn't Attend School;' 'Age: 8-11;' 'Not Oldest Child;' 'Child's Ethnicity: Mestizo;' 'Non-Dual Earners;' 'Less than Primary Educ.;' 'No Additional Members'; 'Male Head of Household;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'PMK not Present.' 'Province: Pichincha' omitted.

Table 3.5: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Feeling like a Happy Child by Gender of Child; Independent Variable: Thresholds of Total Hours of Household Work (Self-Reported)

	All Children (1)	**Male Children** (2)	**Female Children** (3)
Child Does (0,7] Hours of Household Chores Per Week	-0.035**	-0.048***	-0.020
	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.022]
Child Does (7,14] Hours of Household Chores Per Week	-0.063***	-0.057**	-0.067**
	[0.019]	[0.026]	[0.029]
Child Does (14,21] Hours of Household Chores Per Week	-0.093***	-0.153***	-0.057
	[0.028]	[0.043]	[0.035]
Child Does More Than 21 Hours of Household Chores Per Week	-0.101***	-0.049	-0.112***
	[0.030]	[0.041]	[0.039]
Child's Total Hours in Labour Market Activities (Scaled)	-0.029***	-0.033***	-0.020**
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.009]
Child Attends School	0.142***	0.152***	0.131**
	[0.038]	[0.052]	[0.053]
Age Group: 12 to 15	0.003	0.019	-0.011
	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Age Group: 15 to 17	0.002	0.012	-0.007
	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.024]
Oldest Child	-0.005	-0.010	0.001
	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Identifies as: Indigenous	0.006	-0.003	0.013
	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.018]
Identifies as: Afro-descendant	-0.035	-0.058	-0.010
	[0.029]	[0.037]	[0.037]
Identifies as: Other Ethnicity	-0.027	-0.016	-0.039
	[0.026]	[0.033]	[0.034]
Boy	-0.008	-	-
	[0.009]		
Dual-Earner Household	-0.009	0.011	-0.032**
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.014]
Mother's Educ.: Primary	0.008	0.034	-0.022
	[0.021]	[0.025]	[0.026]
Mother's Educ.: Secondary	0.028	0.065**	-0.016
	[0.023]	[0.026]	[0.030]
Mother's Educ.: University	0.021	0.029	0.016
	[0.028]	[0.034]	[0.034]
Father's Educ.: Primary	0.019	0.003	0.030
	[0.028]	[0.033]	[0.032]
Father's Educ.: Secondary	0.018	0.001	0.025
	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.034]
Father's Educ.: University	0.061**	0.073***	0.043
	[0.026]	[0.028]	[0.035]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.016	-0.042	0.012
	[0.027]	[0.033]	[0.040]
Household Size	0.006	0.018**	-0.006
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.008]
House has Children Below Age 5	-0.022	-0.036*	-0.010
	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.018]
House has Other Boys Aged 5-17	-0.021	-0.039**	0.002
	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.020]
House has Other Girls Aged 5-17	-0.015	-0.038**	0.013
	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.019]
Household Has a Member With A Disability	-0.027	-0.025	-0.026
	[0.022]	[0.028]	[0.029]
Head of Household is Female	0.020	0.005	0.032
	[0.037]	[0.052]	[0.041]
Urban Setting	-0.014	-0.002	-0.024
	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.015]
Parent or PMK Present During Child's Responses	0.033***	0.035**	0.030*
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Observations	14,810	7,516	7,294
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.0519	0.0636	0.0601

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENTI ages 8-17, living with both parents. The dependent variable, *happiness*, is an indicator variables equal to one if child feels happy most of the time. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects for the probability of the child self-assessing as happy. The base categories are: 'Child Doesn't Attend School;' 'Age: 8-11;' 'Not Oldest Child;' 'Child's Ethnicity: Mestizo;' 'Non-Dual Earners;' 'Less than Primary Educ.;' 'No Additional Members'; 'Male Head of Household;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'PMK not Present.' 'Province: Pichincha' omitted.

Chapter 4

The Road Not Taken or The One Most Travelled By: The Intergenerational Transmission of Child Labour in Ecuador

4.1 Introduction

Child labour has been widely discussed in the policy arena over the last few decades.[1] In most cases, child labour refers to children illegally working while being under the minimum age requirement (in most countries, 14 years of age) or children above the minimum age requirement who exceed the amount of work they are allowed to perform (usually 30 hours of work in economic activities[2] per week) (ILO No. 138, 1973; ILO

[1] A note on definitions. It is important to mention that there is no clear global consensus on what 'child labour' is. Although the ILO has resolutions outlining minimum age requirements or the worst forms of child work, each country has its own way of defining child labour (ILO, 2017; Dammert et al., 2018). This chapter focuses on exploring different definitions of child labour when analysing Ecuadorian households' decision to send children to work and/or school. As a benchmark, given the importance of its use in policy, I start by defining 'work' as child labour according to Ecuadorian legislation. That is, children who are illegally working violating minimum age requirements, exceeding hour limits, whose work interferes with their schooling or who work in dangerous conditions. I then examine the heterogeneity in the type of work and work conditions for Ecuadorian children by using different measures of 'work' reflecting this heterogeneity.

[2] Again, there is variation in what countries define as children employed in economic activities, and thus, child labour.

No. 182, 1999; ILO, 2017). From the bans and restrictions imposed by numerous countries, there seems to be a widely accepted understanding that child labour is in most, if not all respects, harmful. Yet, despite all bans, child labour has not been eliminated and is pervasive worldwide. According to the latest estimates of the International Labour Organization (ILO), as of 2017, there were 152 million children working, and 73 million of these children engaged in hazardous labour. Regional estimates of prevalence vary from 2.9% in Arab States to 19.6% in Africa and affects girls and boys differently (of the 152 million children, 58% are boys and 42% girls). Of all the children who work, it is estimated that 32% are out of school and for the remaining 68%, their educational attainment is hindered (ILO, 2017).

Most policies to address child labour stem from concerns about human capital implications. Working prevents children from going to school, which will decrease their future earnings (Emerson and Souza, 2003; Udry, 2004). There is a vicious cycle associated with child labour, where poor families send their children to work and children grow to become poor adults predicted by the diminished investment in their education (Emerson and Souza, 2003; Udry, 2004). Theoretically, there is the premise that child labour is partly a result from a vicious cycle of poverty. Empirically, it is important to understand the mechanisms of the intergenerational transmission, especially due to policy implications. On the one hand, it could be that the mechanism is exclusively an economic one, where child labour is transmitted from parents to children due to a budget constraint resulting from poverty. Presumably, if there is a dire need to sustain the household, the quality and potentially dangerous characteristics of the work would not be as important as the need to send the children to work. In this case, improving the economic standing of parents would be beneficial to children and child labour could be diminished or even eradicated.

On the other hand, it could also be that the mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of work is partly an attitudinal or behavioural one (i.e., that if parents were themselves child labourers, this might have an effect beyond the consequences of having had worked to sustain the household for current family income). Child labour may be perpetuated due to the beliefs, values, expectations and potentially rites of passage that are passed on from parent to child (e.g., "I learned a lot from being a child labourer" or "I had to work as a child and so should you"). If parents

send children to work to develop attitudes and abilities, then, it is likely that children would not be engaged in work that would harm them. The transmission mechanism and the way in which parents make this evaluation of sending their children to work would depend on how they perceive and value formal education, returns to formal education, as well as how dire their current household needs may be. In terms of policy, if the goal is banning child labour due to the human capital argument and if the behavioural mechanism is important, even if poverty is eliminated, child labour would remain.

This chapter contributes to the literature on child labour by exploring the effects of parental work histories of being child labour themselves on the family's school-work decision for their children (aged 5 - 17 years old). It does so while taking into account the heterogeneity in the type of work (e.g., market vs. domestic work; paid vs. unpaid work) and the working conditions (light vs. heavy work; safe vs. unsafe - dangerous, unhealthy and abusive - work) of children in Ecuador. Taking advantage of a detailed survey, where both children and parents are surveyed within a household, I can identify the age of first employment for both the children and parents for individuals who are currently working. The dataset also includes information on the households' current work experiences, incomes and poverty status.

Exploring the mechanisms of the intergenerational transmission of child labour and separating the behavioural and attitudinal argument from the budget constraint argument is important for policy prescriptions. If for instance, paid work in the labour market occurs as a consequence of poverty, where, children endure unfavourable work conditions in order to receive the pecuniary returns, it can be regulated (or more heavily regulated), even if imperfectly so. Notice, however, that child labour in the form of unpaid household work, is not subject to government regulation, it is often unaccounted for, yet a valuable activity for households.[3] It could be that labour performed by children, however, is perpetuated intergenerationally because of the attitudinal and behavioural motives rather than the budget constraint motive. It is thus, not just important to understand which mechanism is at play, but also to understand which mechanism applies to which kind of work for the creation of effective

[3]Children engaging in unpaid domestic work could be a way of alleviating poverty within a household. A child performing unpaid chores in the household could free up parents' time from these chores so that they can participate in paid market activities. In doing so, household income could increase, improving the well-being of the household.

policies that would benefit children.

This chapter seeks to address the following questions: (a.) what is the effect of having a parent who worked as a child on the likelihood of their own children (ages 5-17) engaging in child labour or going to school? Specifically, if a parent started working before the minimum age requirement (15 years old), are their children more likely to engage in child labour and less likely to go to school after controlling for current family poverty? (b.) are there differences in the intergenerational transmission of child labour depending on the type of work in which the child engages (i.e., market vs. domestic work, paid vs. unpaid work, light vs. heavy work, safe vs. unsafe work)? (c.) are there gender differences in the strength and nature of the intergenerational transmission process?

The decision to send children to work or to school is assumed to be simultaneously determined by the household. By modelling the household's school-work decision jointly, I am able to take into account correlations in the error terms of the school and work equations. For instance, if there are individual or household unobserved characteristics (e.g., like a child's unobserved ability or keen nature to learn and seek experiences) that jointly determine the school-work decision, modelling these decisions separately may produce biased estimates. The experiences of going to school and working vary, many children work while they are enrolled in school, other children do not work or go to school. Some children only work and do not go to school and others dedicate all their time to school and do not work (ILO, 2017, 2018; Zapata et al., 2011), thus, modelling the school-work decision jointly seems most appropriate.

Results suggest that there is an intergenerational effect of child labour for Ecuadorian children beyond the effects of parental child labour on current family income. Children of parents who were child labourers are more likely to combine school and work and more likely to work and forego school when defining 'child work' according to Ecuadorian legislation (i.e., children aged fourteen or younger working at least an hour a week in market activities (both with and without pay) or children between the ages of 15-17 whose work day is over six hours per day, who work over five days per week, whose work limits their right to an education or whose work is under dangerous conditions). Specifically, if a child's mother worked as a child herself, the probability that the child combines school and work is 2.0 percentage points higher for boys and

1.7 p.p. higher for girls. For boys only, if their mother worked as a child, they have a 0.8 p.p. higher probability to only work, without going to school. For children of fathers who started work below the age of 15, the probability of working and going to school is 1.9 p.p. higher for boys and 1.7 p.p. higher for girls, on average, compared to the children of fathers who were not child labourers.[4] The intergenerational transmission of child labour depends on the type of work the children perform, and is not gender neutral. Thus, policies solely aimed at reducing or eliminating child work through poverty alleviation may reduce the worst cases of child labour (e.g., those in hazardous or abusive environments), but poverty alleviation alone may not eliminate child labour given the intergenerational links that remain between children and child labourer parents.

What remains of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides a literature review. Section III discusses the legal and contextual framework of child labour and education in Ecuador. Section IV outlines the data and the definitions of variables used in the analysis. Section V presents the empirical strategy used. Section VI presents the results and Section VII concludes.

4.2 Relevant Literature

Child labour can be treated as a necessary best response that a household chooses to ensure their survival when in desperate circumstances (Basu & Van, 1998; Edmonds, 2007; Emerson and Souza, 2003; Udry, 2004). Working as a child is considered to be detrimental as it prevents children from investing in their human capital, mainly due to work interfering with or diminishing their time in school or for school activities. While the benefits of child labour are immediate, either through increased income or consumption, or through freeing up time resources for other family members, the main costs of child labour - reduced human capital investments - are realized in the future.[5]

It is worth noting that in most cases where the human capital argument is used against child labour, there is little nuance to the discussion of consequences

[4]Results are quite robust to more flexible measures of 'child labour' that do not incorporate as many restrictions as the official definition does.

[5]The losses from lower educational attainment may not only be lower future earnings when these children grow and enter the labour market, they may also extend to other dimensions, e.g., future health (Udry, 2004; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Currie, 2009). Similarly, the losses are not just individual, but in aggregate, there could be a less productive workforce in society that would hinder society's development (Udry, 2004).

stemming from the work children perform. Working could arguably allow children to learn valuable skills, promote their sense of purpose and develop their autonomy. Empirically, returns to child labour have been documented. Studying children from Vietnam, Beegle et al. (2009) explore the consequences of child labour five years after the children work. Results show that working during the ages of 8-13 results in decreased chances of being enrolled in school and lower grade completion five years later. However, when looking at their labour outcomes, children who worked in the past are significantly more likely to work for wages and be earning a higher wage, i.e., the returns to work experience appears to be higher than the returns to schooling (Beegle et al., 2009). The negative effects from forgoing investing in human capital through education seem to be offset by the benefits of having earlier work experience, at least in the short run. Even if it is not paid market work, whether it is working at the family farm or taking care of younger siblings, one could make the case that early exposure to work could be at least somewhat beneficial to children.

There are several theoretical arguments about why parents send their children to work.[6] A child working now increases family income either through their work or through freeing up time for their parents so that the parents can work (Edmonds, 2008; Ali, 2019; Emerson and Souza, 2003).[7] Theoretical discussions on the supply of child labour assume a unitary household, usually an overlapping generations model with a household that lives for two periods, consisting of an (altruistic) adult parent and a child. The decision-maker has preferences over current consumption and the child's future well-being, produced from human capital investments in education (the educational attainment as children is what determines wage earnings in adulthood). Children face a time constraint, limiting total hours of work and school. Sometimes leisure is included in the time constraint, other times leisure and play are assumed to be part of the child's education (Edmonds, 2007). Domestic work, work in farms or family enterprises or work for wages can all be modelled under 'work' (Edmonds and

[6]It is important to note that the decision that the child works, without delving into the potential future consequences for children, starts with a problem of agency. In most theoretical models, it is the parents (or unitary parent) who make(s) the decision to send the child to work or to school. Even though the household can immediately reap the benefits of the child's work, it is the child who experiences a reduction in their future welfare from not being able to invest in their education and accumulate human capital. Parents could potentially compensate their children for their work, through a bequest in the future, for instance. However, there is usually no way to enforce such compensations and particularly, for poor families, parents may never have the means to accumulate enough savings for such endowments (Basu & Van, 1998; Udry, 2004).

[7]For instance, if a child stays at home to conduct all unpaid household chores, the child's parent who was responsible for completing all unpaid homemaking could now go to the labour market and work for a wage.

Schady, 2012). There can be alternative lucrative uses of time beyond the work-school choice, like petty crime (Gonzalez and Rosales, 2017). Total family earnings include the wages of the adult as well as the wages of the children (if children engage in paid work). The family's budget constraint restricts consumption to be less than or equal to the household's total income that comes from adult and child earnings, with assumptions made to make the constraint hold with equality. Liquidity constraints are usually implicit, households cannot borrow against the future earnings of their children. Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint and the children's time constraint which results in an optimal choice for schooling and education. Multiple equilibria can be found where households send their children to school and/or to work depending on the assumptions made over the returns to schooling and preferences over current consumption (Basu & Van, 1998; Emerson and Souza, 2003; Edmonds, 2008; Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Udry, 2004).[8]

The emphasis of such models is usually on the role that poverty plays in household decisions. The crucial assumption tends to be that a child works if and only if everyone in the family falls below a fixed subsistence level without the child's income (Basu & Van, 1998), or if the benefit the household would enjoy in the future from investing in human capital are outweighed by the contributions from the child's work in current consumption (Emerson and Souza, 2003). Thus, the argument of child labour being a 'best response' to dire situations follows as households are only assumed to send children to work if it helps them survive. Nevertheless, even if child labour is a best response in extreme circumstances, this does not mean it is desirable socially. The intergenerational link, where poor parents decide on the human capital accumulation of their children, in turn may lead to those children becoming poor adults. If the parents themselves started working as children, this is a multi-generational poverty perpetual cycle.

A concern in economics has been equality of opportunity and social mobility (D'Addio, 2007; Corak, 2006; Corak and Piraino, 2011; Corak, 2013). Economists have explored the strength of intergenerational correlations through the transmission of "abilities, traits, behaviours, and outcomes from parents to their children," i.e., "intergenerational transmissions" (Lochner, 2008, p. 1). Particularly, in the presence

[8]If the model is a general equilibrium model, assumptions need to be made regarding firms and the model is solved as a standard labour market problem, see Basu & Van (1998).

of low intergenerational mobility, individuals' lives may reflect characteristics and realities for which they are not responsible, an example of which would be child labour. In this case, children's lives resemble their parents' and social mobility is low. This could lead to children entering a cycle of intergenerational deprivation (D'Addio, 2007). Breaking this cycle could make it possible for children to make prosperous transitions throughout their lives and allowing everyone to have an equal playing field through equality of opportunity.

In high-income countries, there has been evidence of a strong link between poverty and inequality and intergenerational transmission of mobility or work histories.[9] D'Addio (2007) highlights the importance of understanding the mechanisms of the intergenerational links across generations. Learning the extent to which children may experience disadvantage from the disadvantages that their parents experienced, can have strong ramifications for policy implications that could intervene by allowing children the "best possible start to their lives." However, there is no consensus about the desirability of policies particularly because of the difficulty in identifying which characteristics in family background matter most in affecting the future outcomes of children (D'Addio, 2007).

In a cross-country comparison of intergenerational mobility, Corak (2006) explores how the long-run labour market success or failure of children is related to that of their parents. Analysing the degree of generational mobility of earnings in a society, i.e., the generational income elasticity, Corak (2006) shows that there is significant variation across countries in the extent to which children inherit their parental advantages. Some countries like France, the United States and the United Kingdom document strong generational persistence, while in other countries like Canada, Finland, Norway and Denmark, family economic status is not as strongly associated with children's earnings success in adulthood.[10] The results are similar in many OECD countries,

[9] D'Addio (2007) provides an extensive survey of research in OECD countries exploring intergenerational mobility in income, education, occupations and personality traits. The survey also includes discussions on the importance of mobility under the lens of equality of opportunity and why it may be desirable and beneficial for societies. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members are: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

[10] Specifically, Corak (2006) finds that in the United States, for instance, half of all children born to low-income parents become low-income earners as adults. In Canada, for one in three children who were born to low income families, their low-income status persists as adults. Studying Canadian men, Corak and Piraino (2011) examine the intergenerational transmission of employers, specifically the main employer that fathers had when their children were adolescents becoming the child's main employer when children grow to become adults. Using a large administrative

mobility is usually lower at extremes, the top and bottom of the distribution, though early investments on children are helpful and education is a major contributor to mobility (D'Addio, 2007).

Poverty and the intergenerational transmission of child labour and deprivation are at the core of the discussion for low- and lower-middle-income countries. As Udry (2004) posits, the mutual reinforcement of child labour and poverty and the human capital implications are particularly important. Though the theoretical literature highlights the role that poverty has on child labour incidence, the empirical literature provides conflicting evidence.[11] While some scholars find evidence that poverty is the main reason that parents send children to work (Schady and Araujo, 2006; Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Fallon and Tzannatos, 1998; Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999; Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2002; Cockburn, 2001) others find that child labour also occurs when income is high or that there is an income effect with improving households' economic conditions (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Ray, 2000; Kruger, 2007; Soares et al., 2012) and that there is an intergenerational effect beyond what can be attributed to income (Emerson and Souza, 2003). Sorting out the intergenerational transmission mechanism is particularly important for policy. If the goal is to eliminate child labour, the efficacy of policies that aim to stop children from work by alleviating poverty (e.g., cash transfers, increasing access to credit) may be hindered if poverty is not the only or primary reason why families send children to work.

How child labour is defined, depending on the conditions in which children work and the type of work the children perform, is crucial for distinguishing between poverty or behavioural/attitudinal determinants. Ali (2019) argues that when studying the effects of poverty on child labour, most studies treat child labourers as one homogeneous group which ignores the differences that exist in the working conditions of children such as work intensity, hazard exposure and employer which in turn may also reflect heterogeneity in parental preferences or perceptions on returns to schooling or work. Ali (2019) defines sub-populations of working children depending on their working

dataset, results show that, at some point in time, 41% of men are employed with an employer their fathers worked for and that 5.6% of sons at age 33 have the same employer their father did two decades earlier (9.4%, conditional on the firm still being in business). These intergenerational associations are stronger at the top of the earnings distribution (Corak and Piraino, 2011).

[11] For a review of the literature on child labour, see (Basu, 1999; Edmonds, 2007, 2008; Fors, 2012). For a discussion on how the theoretical literature on child labour and the emphasis on the role of poverty conflicts with empirical findings, see Ali (2019).

conditions and conducts a series of bivariate probit models on the child labour and school attendance decision. The criteria used to differentiate favourable and unfavourable working conditions are: type of employer (market work vs. unpaid family work), work intensity (light economic activity vs. the definition of child labour from the ILO), age at first job (working as an adolescent vs. working before the age of 12). In addition to the intergenerational effect that is transmitted from parental income to child labour, a control variable that is equal to one if the head of the household worked as a child is included.[12]

Analysing 54,669[13] Egyptian children, Ali (2019) finds that with a broad definition of child labour (i.e.,children working at least one hour in the previous week), as income increases, children's probability of work decreases and children are more likely to go to school, other factors held constant. However, when exploring the heterogeneity of child's work, the effect of parental income is minimal on work that is not likely to harm children (work in the family business, jobs that are not physical or hazardous). On the other hand, higher parental income decreases the likelihood that children work in unfavourable work conditions (working in the labour market, jobs that are physically demanding and hazardous). In light of these findings, interventions that would increase the income of poor households with children working in unfavourable conditions would likely reduce this type of child labour. However, these interventions would have little effect on households who send their children to work for reasons other than the pecuniary returns from work.

Zapata et al. (2011) also explore differences in the definition of child work and consider the role that gender and ethnicity have on the work-school trade-off. The authors incorporate domestic chores to a second definition of child labour to understand the extent to which domestic activities displace schooling. Child labour is first defined as, a child (7-14 y.o.) working 15 or more hours a week in market activities and second, a child working 15 or more hours in market and domestic activities combined.[14] Using

[12]Coefficients or marginal effects of this variable are not reported though 19% of non-working children had household heads who worked as children as did 41% of working children.

[13]The starting sample is of 66,922 children aged 5-17. The restrictions on the sample are children who are sons or daughters to the head of the household, where at least one parent is present. The estimations include an indicator variable for the household being a single-parent household and another indicator denoting whether the mother is absent. The sample is further restricted to children who are too young to attend school as it wouldn't enter as a choice for the household and for whom there is no missing data on monthly income or school status.

[14]The authors use the survey question "did you work last week?" and "if not, were you absent due to sickness, vacation, labour strike, adverse weather, etc." to denote whether a child worked in market activities. Domestic work

a bivariate probit model, when including domestic chores into the definition of child work, girls are 23% more likely than boys to be out of school and working. In fact, for the 5,277 children in Bolivia that are examined, when the work is of high-domestic intensity (i.e.,50% or more of total hours worked are dedicated to domestic chores), girls are 51% more likely than boys to be working and out of school (Zapata et al., 2011). In contrast, when the definition of child work is restricted to market activities and excludes domestic chores, the opposite occurs, boys are more likely to work than girls. Outcomes for children differ depending on the type of work performed.

Exploring whether the child labour status of parents affects the probability of their own children being child labourers, Emerson and Souza (2003) investigate whether there is a child labour trap in Brazil. The main assumption is that financial need creates the link between parents and their children though they also examine whether the intergenerational link remains beyond what can be transmitted when income is held constant. The model presented is an overlapping generations model of the household's child labour decision that allows for a poverty trap.[15] Empirically, 28,805 Brazilian children from the ages of 10 to 14 are studied.[16] A child is defined as a child labourer if they worked any positive hours per week in the labour market (the threshold is increased to 20 hours per week as a robustness check, and results hold). Parents are said to have been child labourers if the age at which they started working is below 14 years. Two main models are estimated: a probit model using the child labour

is defined as children carrying out any of the following activities in the household: taking care of children and/or elderly family members, cooking and cleaning, washing and/or ironing clothes, performing minor household repairs, grocery shopping, chopping and carrying firewood, carrying water from an external water source and organizing and maintaining neatness (Zapata et al., 2011, p. 598).

[15]The model builds on the seminal work of Basu & Van (1998). In Basu & Van (1998), the model relies on two key axioms. The first, a luxury axiom, treats children's non-work as a luxury good where there might be cases in which households cannot afford this good. However, as soon as the household's income rises to a certain level, households are able to acquire it. The second axiom is the substitution axiom, where firms view child and adult labour as substitutable. Empirically, these hypotheses have not always held, see Ray (2000), where both hypotheses are rejected in a study comparing child labour in Pakistan and Peru (the luxury axiom is rejected in both countries, the substitution axiom in Pakistan). In Emerson and Souza (2003) instead of the luxury axiom, it is assumed that the head of the household makes the decision to send the child to work and this decision is made only if the child's current contributions to consumption outweigh the benefit the household would enjoy from future consumption if the child remains in school. Following assumptions on the household's preferences and the technology converting education in childhood to human capital, an analytical solution is presented where there is a critical value of human capital above/below which parents will send their children to study/work full-time, i.e., there are two steady state equilibria, one at full education and one at no education. If the household places more weight on their current consumption, the higher the likelihood that they will also choose no education. The higher the returns to schooling, the more likely the household will choose education over sending the child to work.

[16]The original sample of 36,975 is restricted by having complete work histories for both mothers and fathers, single-headed households are excluded as well as households whose age difference between the head of the household and oldest child is less than 14 years.

indicator for children regressed on their parent's child labour status and a vector of controls; and a Cox proportional hazard model of the year difference between the child's birth and age of entering the labour force on the parent's child labour indicator variable with the vector of controls.[17] If parents were child labourers, children are more likely to be child labourers themselves. Given that the model predicts that if the child labour trap is the only determinant of intergenerational persistence of entering the workforce as a child, then the parental child labour effect would disappear once family wealth (or a proxy) is included as a control. Using parents' years of schooling as a proxy for family wealth, the parental effect of child labour remains (the effect of parental schooling itself is negative and statistically significant; the more educated the parents, the lower likelihoods that their children work).[18] Results suggest that the persistence of child labour seems to remain beyond the effect of family income or parental educational attainment. Additionally, the earlier an individual starts to work, the lower their earnings in adulthood. Overall, the human capital gains that a child would obtain from educational investments outweigh those that could come from experiences in the labour market.

In Ecuador, specifically, both child labour and the intergenerational persistence of poverty have been examined in the context of cash transfers. Schady and Araujo (2006) explore the unconditional cash transfer, "Bono de Desarrollo Humano" (BDH, 'human development transfer')[19] and its impact on school enrolment and child work. The cash transfer positively impacted schooling and it negatively impacted child work (Schady and Araujo, 2006). Edmonds and Schady (2012) study the BDH transfer

[17] Emerson and Souza (2003) estimate three additional models (a sequential probit, a multinomial logit and a bivariate probit model) to account for the joint decision structure of child labour and school attendance. The main results hold for all models.

[18] To enhance the proxy of permanent family income, Emerson and Souza (2003) explore the effect of the educational attainment of their grandparents, finding no impact on child labour status of the children. The impact of schooling seems to operate through occurring through the child's parents' education only.

[19] The "Bono de Desarrollo Humano" (BDH) is (now) a conditional cash transfer. In 2012 it provided households in poverty with $35 (currently, it provides $50 to households in extreme poverty). Originally, it was instituted in 1998 (due to the country undergoing a financial crisis with high inflation, extremely devaluation of the currency which resulted in dollarization, a bank run and high unemployment). It has been explicitly means tested for poor households (in the lowest two quintiles) and when instituted, due to lack of monitoring or enforcing capacity it was virtually unconditional. Following changes in 2003-2013, to receive the transfer each member of the household below the age of 6 and pregnant women were required a bi-monthly visit to a doctor. It also required that children between the ages of 6-16 regularly attend public school (only four absences per two months were allowed). There was a 'proof of attendance' process where schools would provide stamps to a 'verification card' confirming that the children attended school. If households failed to comply to this schooling requirement, there was a $6 USD penalty. In 2013, the conditions of the transfer became stricter, both in health and education requirements and it further stipulated that households must commit to refrain children under the age of 15 from working and begging (however, there were no mechanisms in place to verify compliance of the latter commitment).

and the effect it has on the decision of Ecuadorian families to send their children to work. Using random assignment of the BDH to certain families as a source of variation,[20] Edmonds and Schady (2012) find that poor families use this income to delay the children's entry to the labour market. Focusing on 1,833 children who were 11 to 16 years of age at the baseline, child labour declines with receiving the BDH even though the size of the transfer does not offset the loss of earnings from the children. Particularly, the $15 USD transfer that accounted for approximately 7% of expenditures of the households studied but less than 20% of median earnings from the work of children ($80 USD), resulted in a 41% reduction of paid work for all children (a 78% reduction for children who were already enrolled in school) and a 34% reduction in unpaid activities. Similarly, for the children who attend school, there is also a shift from paid to unpaid activities presumably due to the rigidity of schedules in paid work. The higher income households achieve from receiving the transfer allows them to feel that they can continue to afford their children's schooling. Edmonds and Schady (2012) highlight the important role that poverty plays in deciding whether to send children to work or not.

Araujo et al. (2017) study the long-term (10 years) effects of the BDH in helping households escape intergenerational poverty traps. The identification mechanism is using the fact that there was randomization in assigning children under age six into early or late treatment groups (the former receiving $1,200 USD in transfers, compared to $625 for the latter in the period analysed) and that there was a cut-off for households to become eligible (making children just eligible or just ineligible). Comparing the children in the early treatment group to the ones in the late treatment group, there are no differences in language, mathematics, attention, or fluency tests, nor in behavioural outcomes. Further, focusing on the children who were eligible for transfers (at the age of entering and completing secondary school), they are slightly more likely to complete secondary school compared to the just ineligible children and there is no effect on increased employment of these (now) adults (and not due to higher enrolment in tertiary education). Overall, the long-term effects of the BDH appear to be modest. In Ecuador, it seems that programs, like this unconditional cash

[20] Based on scores of the means test, households were deemed eligible. During the re-structuring of the program in 2003, for new eligible households, the roll-out of the program contained a randomized component in four of the 24 provinces. Within selected parishes (territorial division), a sample of households was randomly selected for evaluation through a lottery and more households were eligible than those selected through the lottery.

transfer, are not sufficient to break the cycle of inter-generational poverty where the children of poor households (who are liquidity-constrained and do not invest in the human capital of their children) are not able to escape poverty in adulthood. It could also be that it is still too early to tell and ten years is not enough time to evidence the impacts of the investments.[21]

An important distinction in the literature is the way in which the decision to send children to work or school is modelled. Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) compare the determinants of child labour in Cote D'Ivoire, Colombia, Bolivia and the Philippines and approach the allocation of child's time as a sequential decision making process where assumptions are made regarding which options are preferred by the households. The authors note that whether a simultaneous or sequential approach is taken depends on how the decision process is viewed, whether it is assumed that the decision maker in the households considers the options available to them simultaneously or sequentially, in a hierarchical manner (Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999). The hierarchy presented for ordering of alternatives is: school, wage work, home enterprise work and no work.[22] In many cases, the impact of poverty on child labour has been studied using specifications that include child labour as a dependent variable, usually as an indicator of whether the child works or not (or number of hours to look at the intensive margin) (Edmonds, 2007; Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Ali, 2019; Udry, 2004; Beegle et al., 2004; Bhalotra and Heady, 2003). Emerson and Souza (2003) estimates a probit model using an indicator variable for child labour as the dependant variable, a Cox proportional hazard model of the difference in years between birth and the age children start to work, a sequential probit, a multinomial logit and a bivariate probit model to take into account the decision structure. Kruger (2007) estimates the school and child labour decision separately with univariate independent probit regressions for child

[21] Paxson and Schady (2010) find that the BDH improves the physical, cognitive and behavioural development of young (3-7 year old) children. Given the importance of early investments in childhood, (Almond and Currie, 2010), it could be that it is just too early to bear witness to the effects, if any.

[22] Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) argue that there is little dispute with schooling. However, if the quality of education or the returns to education in a country are low, then potentially under the same criteria (welfare of the child and income contribution), education can be may not always be the preferred alternative. Similarly, domestic chores are not included which could be highly beneficial for a household if it liberates an adult (who can then earn adult wages) from domestic work to labour market work. Further, wage work may be informally conducted, meaning that children may earn less than adults. In this case, if the household owns a business or a farm, where work is required and a non-family member may be hired to conduct such work, an alternative would be to 'hire' the children 'saving' the (adult) wages that would've been paid to the non-family member, which could potentially be larger savings than earnings that a child would make informally. Further, the hierarchy does not include petty crime that could be found to be lucrative for a household (Gonzalez and Rosales, 2017).

labour and for school participation. Ali (2019) and Zapata et al. (2011) both treat the school-work decision as simultaneously determined and estimate a bivariate probit.

Despite the ongoing efforts to understand child labour, the intergenerational effect of families' child labour histories is not fully understood. I explore the implications of parents having worked as children on different kinds of child labour (i.e., work as it is defined by Ecuadorian legislation; work in market activities (outside the household or in the family's farm/enterprise) vs. work in domestic activities (chores like cleaning, shopping, laundry, cooking, care-taking, house repair); paid (where children receive a wage) vs. unpaid work (where children are nor remunerated); light (less than 14 hours per week of domestic chores for children under the age of 15 and less than 30 hours per week of work for children between 15-17 years) vs. heavy work (over 14 hours per week of chores and 30 hours per week of work); safe (working conditions are favourable) vs. unsafe work (where the children are exposed to dangerous materials or chemicals, their health has been affected negatively or if they have received abuse)). Previous work has taken into account both child labour status of the parent and for heterogeneity in working conditions though not in detail simultaneously.

While Ali (2019) accounts for differences in the type of work that the child engages in, especially distinguishing favourable from unfavourable work conditions, there is little attention paid to whether the children's parents were child labourers themselves. An indicator variable denoting whether the head of the household worked as a child is included though there is no further study of when the parent started working nor whether it was the mother or the father of the child. There are also no controls for the economic conditions that the parents might have faced as children that led to them entering the work force when young. Further, the study does not account for differences in household composition. While there is a control for single-parent households or female-led households, these households are potentially very different from dual-earner households or multi-generational households. Zapata et al. (2011) include domestic chores as part of their definition for child labour and they analyse children separately depending on work intensity (towards domestic chores or towards market work). The inclusion of domestic chores to the definition of child work points to the implicit assumption that there might be a behavioural aspect to the type of work children perform and that gendered roles may inform the probability of

children working. Nonetheless, parental work histories are not included to understand the intergenerational persistence of child labour. Emerson and Souza (2003) most closely resembles this chapter's research question as the authors examine the child labour trap accounting for parental work histories (indicator variables of whether the parents worked under the age of 14) and their educational attainment. While Emerson and Souza (2003) find that there is in fact an intergenerational link in child labour incidence, their analysis focuses on children aged 10-14 from a 1996 household survey. It does not take into account younger children, older adolescents, or heterogeneity in working conditions. Lastly, I study the school-work decision as it being simultaneously determined by the household.

4.3 Legal and Contextual Framework

Ecuador's Childhood and Adolescence Code establishes the minimum age for work at fifteen years old.[23] The minimum age requirement applies to all types of work, though exceptions are provided for this clause when the type of work is traditionally related to ancestral practices.[24] In concordance with the Childhood and Adolescence Code, the Labour Code further specifies restrictions for children. Children above fifteen are allowed to work as long as a work day does not exceed six hours, children only work up to five days a week (excluding weekends), their work will be organized in a way that it does not limit the child's right to an education and the work is not performed in dangerous[25] conditions (S.R.O. No. 167, 2012; Children and Adolescents Code,

[23] In line with most of the international community, in 1988 Ecuador adopted the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. One of the declaration's core principles is the effective abolition of child labour. The Declaration calls attention to a set of eight labour standards, two of which are directly related to child labour and are drafted in ILO conventions. Convention No. 138, the Minimum Age Convention was created in 1973, recommends member countries to set the minimum age for work to be 14 years (ILO No. 138, 1973). Convention No. 182, the Convention for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour identifies four broad types of worst forms of labour: practices related to slavery or forced work, those related to prostitution and pornography, those related to illicit activity and finally, the ones that are "likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children." (ILO No. 182, 1999, np).

[24] While article 82 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code specifies that the minimum age requirement applies "to all forms of work, including domestic service," when calculating the hours worked in the reference week, "household chores" are not included as work by statisticians (INEC, 2012e). While it could be understood from the code that "domestic services" refer to only services performed in households different from where the child is (e.g., a cleaning service or childcare), this is not explicitly specified in the Code, and is assumed by how the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses calculates and codes child labour. In all official statistics, unpaid household work performed in the child's own home is not included as part of their 'official' work load, i.e., domestic chores at home are excluded from the official child labour calculations.

[25] Dangerous work is defined as any job that endangers a child's safety or health due to the nature of the work or the conditions in which the work is carried out (INEC, 2012e).

2002; INEC, 2012e). All work that complies with the Codes' regulations is allowed, otherwise, it is illegal and the work performed by the children who are illegally working is referred to as 'child labour.' Under this framework, Ecuador's official definition of child labour includes:

- all children ages 14 or younger who work at least one hour during the reference week in economic activities both paid and unpaid (work which is in violation of the minimum age requirement);
- all children between the ages of 15 to 17 who exceed 30 hours a week or work on weekends; whose work interferes with schooling or who work in dangerous conditions (work that exceeds or is in violation of the conditions for permissible work for adolescents).

4.4 Data

To study the work-school decision of Ecuadorian households, I use microdata from the 2012 National Child Labour Survey (ENTI, for its name in Spanish, Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil). Surveying 31,687 households and 146,814 individuals in Ecuador, the survey was conducted to understand and assess children and adolescents between the ages of 5-17 who work in Ecuador. The survey targeted all provinces except the Galapagos Islands. Of the 31,687 households surveyed, 51,223 children between 5-17 years of age completed the survey. All children in the household were surveyed so there may be more than one child interviewed per household.

For the purposes of this research, the main advantage of the National Child Labour survey is the detail with which the working experiences and histories of households are recorded. Particularly, all household members who are currently working (in the previous week) or who have a job but did not work the previous week, are asked, "at what age did you start working for the first time in your life?" From this question, parental work histories, specifically the age at which they first started working can be derived. Although advantageous, this measure is not perfect. The question is only asked to household members who worked in the previous week or who are currently working. If the person is unemployed or out of the labour force (even though they

have had a job or they started work as children), the question is not asked to them.[26]

Although the survey asks the age at which an individual starts working, there are no details on which activity individuals first engaged in, the type of work it was, or whether there were pecuniary returns or not. It could be that this question is biased in favour of paid labour and is interpreted as the first time an individual worked for pay outside their home (rather than, say, the first time they did unpaid work in economic activities such as the family's business or farm). If answers are biased towards wage labour there could potentially be a downward bias to the effects of parents working as children on their own children as unpaid forms of work would not be taken into account in parental work histories. Similarly, for the children, the survey relies on self-reports of the hours that they work and the working conditions in which they perform these activities. Although it is advantageous to have children's self-reports to acknowledge their own experience, the surveyors do not keep tally of the hours nor do they independently assess the working conditions. As such, there might be measurement error and the results are as reliable as the reports are.[27]

Another important disadvantage is that the survey was intended to be the first cross-section of a recurring (every two years) survey. Data from 2014 was never published and the survey was discontinued shortly after. Thus, there is only a single cross-section of children, measured in 2012.[28]

The criteria for sample selection are as follows. Children from single-parent or absent-parent households are excluded, the focus is on children who live with both parents. The dual-parent household restriction does not exclude multi-generational households.[29] While it restricts the sample to children who live with both parents,

[26]Since there could be household members (specifically, parents) who worked as children and are not accounted for, but there are no members who did not start to work in childhood but are considered child labourers in their work histories, estimates would likely be biased downwards and provide conservative estimates for the effect of the intergenerational transmission of child work. However, it could be that because parents worked as children and because of this, they did not invest enough in their human capital as children, resulting in them now being unemployed or out of the labour force (and thus, missing their age of first job) . To test this, the sample is later restricted to children of dual earner households. In this case, even though it is a selected sample, there is information on the age of first job for both parents.

[27]It is worth noting that for hours worked particularly, a person most knowledgeable (PMK, usually a parent) also reports the number of hours children work. Although there are differences between the children's reports and the parents' reports on the number of hours, these do not appear to be systematic and results are robust to when the PMK-reported hours are used (not presented but available upon request).

[28]Data limitations prevent tracking changes within a household, especially in terms of whether a household falls in or out of poverty, a stay-at-home mother decides to enter labour market, a divorce or death of a member occurs, all of which could affect the household's school-work decision. Results thus, cannot be interpreted as causal effects as they are associations between variables.

[29]Of the 51,233 children who completed the survey, 16,070 (31.37%) children do not live in dual-parent households

other family members, like grandparents could be part of the household. Children's whose age difference with their parents is less than 12 years are further excluded.[30] The initial estimating sample is 35,085 children and when the sample is further restricted to parents with complete work histories (i.e., dual-earner parents), the estimating sample becomes 24,327 children.

Dependent Variables The focus of this chapter is to understand the intergenerational persistence of child labour in Ecuador. In analysing child labour, the household's decision to send a child to school and/or to work is assumed to be made jointly. To model the school-work choice jointly, child labour and school attendance are defined as follows:

a. *School*: a binary variable equal to one if the child states that they are currently attending school.

b. *Official Child Labour*: a binary variable equal to one if the work performed by the child would constitute 'child labour' according to Ecuador's regulations, i.e., a child aged 14 or younger working at least one hour during reference week in market activities, children between 15 - 17 years old who exceed what is legally allowed (children whose work day is more than six hours per day, who work over five days per week, whose work limits the child's right to education and whose work is in dangerous conditions).[31]

The empirical question focuses on the impact of parents' child labour experiences on child labour understanding that the effect might depend on the type of work that the child engages in. Using the 'official definition of child labour' allows to establish a benchmark to define the work children do.[32] However, the official definition of child

and are removed from the sample.

[30] Although the age difference with parents is restricted to 12 years, with all other restrictions the minimum age difference in the estimating sample is 16 years, with either parent.

[31] This is slightly different than the official definition used in government reports and there are very nuanced discrepancies. Art. 137 and Art. 150 of the Labour Code establishes further restrictions on work performed by minors, mainly prohibiting minors working at night and on weekends or holidays, respectively. While INEC calculates the 30 hour threshold using hours worked on Monday-Friday, it does not take into account work performed on the weekends nor work performed at night. Similarly, when coding the 'official child labour' measure, the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses uses responses from both the child and the PMK to denote whether the child worked or not. In the analysis, I only use the responses from the children.

[32] This is especially important when it comes to policy implications as the government uses this definition for measuring purposes as well as policies to target and eradicate this type of work.

labour does not capture the heterogeneity in the work children perform and, in some cases, does not even treat some activities as 'work' given that it only measures work that children are carrying out illegally.

To have a clearer picture of the type of activities children participate in, the 'child labour' variable is disaggregated in four different ways. The first, differentiates the work children perform in 'market' and in 'domestic' activities (Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999). The second, divides child labour by whether the children who engage in the labour market earn a positive wage or not (Ali, 2019; Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999). Third, child labour is separated by the intensity with which the children work (Ali, 2019; Zapata et al., 2011). Fourth, unsafe working conditions are distinguished, i.e., if a child works under dangerous work conditions, if the work they perform harms their health or if their working situation is abusive (Ali, 2019).

(i.) *'Market' vs. 'Domestic Activities:'*

- *Market activities* refer to any work performed outside the household (whether paid or unpaid) or in a family farm or enterprise (a store or a kiosk).
- *Domestic activities* refer to any work performed by the child inside the home, including: *house cleaning* - sweeping, dusting or making the bed(s); *grocery shopping* - in markets or supermarkets; *clothing cleaning and repair* - laundering, ironing, sewing or fixing clothes; *food preparation* - cooking breakfast, dinner or lunch; *care of other household members* - care of other children, elderly, or those who are ill; *help with homework* - helping other family members with schoolwork; *household repair* - repairing any equipment for the home.

(ii.) *'Paid' vs. 'Unpaid' Market Work:*

- *Paid work* refers to work performed by the children for which they receive a positive monetary return in the form of wages.
- *Unpaid market work* is work performed by the children in a family farm or enterprise (store or kiosk) that is not remunerated. This work excludes domestic chores performed in the household.

(iii.) Work Intensity:

- *Light work* refers to work that is performed and legally allowed for the children depending on their age, i.e., a maximum of two hours per day (or 14 per week) of domestic chores for children under the age of 15 and a maximum of five hours per day of work (or 30 per week) for children between the ages of 15-17.
- *Heavy work* is work performed by children exceeding what is deemed appropriate for their age, i.e., over 14 hours a week of domestic chores for children under the age of 15 and over 30 hours a week of work for children between the ages of 15-17.
- Note: since the 'official child labour' variable addresses work that is illegal (i.e., children 14 or younger who work at least an hour in the labour market or children 15-17 years old whose work limits their education or is performed in dangerous conditions), these variables only focus on the activities that are permitted for the age group but the intensity with which these are performed, in terms of hours worked, is higher than what is permissible.

(iv.) Unsafe Working Conditions:

- *Dangerous exposure* refers to work that is performed by children where they are exposed to: dust or gases; fire, gas or flames; loud noises or vibrations; extreme heat or cold; dangerous instruments (e.g., knives); underground work; work in heights; work in water, lakes or rivers; work in darkness or excess confinement; insufficient ventilation; chemicals (e.g., pesticides, glues, etc.); explosives or other processes or conditions that are dangerous to the child's health or safety.
- *Unhealthy work* is work that children perform and has caused them: superficial injuries or wounds; broken bones; dislocations or sprains; burns, scalding or frost bite; respiratory problems; eye problems; skin problems; digestive issues; fever; exhaustion or other health problems.
- *Abusive work* is work performed by children where they have faced the following types of abuse: being yelled at; received insults; was hit or physically hurt; experienced sexual abuse (e.g., fondling or performing unwanted acts); other forms of abuse.

In each case, the '*official child labour'* variable is replaced by a specific type of '*child labour*,' a binary variable equal to one if the child's work falls under one of the criteria described above with the base case always being children who do not work in any type of labour.

Independent Variables The main variables of interest are the child labour variables for the parents. As described above, parental child labour histories are defined using the question "at what age did you start working for the first time in your life?" If a parent states that they started working before the age of fifteen they are considered to have been child labourers, as follows:

- *Mother Worked as a Child* is a binary variable equal to one if the mother of the child first started working when they were fourteen, or younger.
- *Father Worked as a Child* is a binary variable equal to one if the father of the child first started working when they were fourteen, or younger.[33]

Given that the question is asked to individuals currently working, it is possible that a parent worked as a child but because they are not currently in the labour force, this is not taken into account. Since non-response could be correlated with child labour histories (e.g., because the parent worked as a child, they could not invest as much time in schooling and thus in their human capital acquisition and as adults have irregular work histories, are discouraged workers, they are unemployed, etc.), an indicator variable is added, denoting if there is no knowledge of parent's age of first work. This is done through the variables 'mother not in the labour force' and 'father not in the labour force,' though, a parent not being in the labour force has meaning in addition to non-response to the child labour question.[34]

[33] As previously mentioned, this variable relies on what parents perceive or define as 'work' and the age at which they first performed these activities. Since there is no information other than age for the parents' earliest work experience, this definition of child labour is solely based on the minimum age requirement. There is no information on the number of hours they worked in their first job or the kind of activities the job entailed. To test the sensitivity of the threshold, this measure is changed to below the age of 10 and is also replaced by three different dummy variables: *[Mother/Father] started work at [5-9/10-14/15-17]* equal to one if the parent first worked at the ages of 5-9, 10-14 and 15-17, respectively; and a continuous variable for the age when they started working.

[34] Although there is less information available about parental child labour (e.g., the type of work parents engaged in or the working conditions) than there is for the children, I do check for the intergenerational transmission of work using exactly the same definition for parent and child, i.e., using the age for when they started working and defining a binary variable equal to one of they started working before meeting the minimum age requirement. See Robustness Checks.

In addition to their child labour experience, the parents' educational attainment, household income or a control for whether the household received the "Bono de Desarrollo Humano," (BDH) transfer are included.[35] If the intergenerational persistence of child labour is solely transmitted through the household's budget constraint, then the effect of parental child labour should vanish after controlling for family wealth or permanent income (Emerson and Souza, 2003). Although not a perfect measure, the education of parents can serve as a proxy for permanent income for the family. Thus, mother's and father's highest level education attained is included as: 'primary education,' 'secondary education' or 'university' as dummy variables indicating the education of the parents with the base category being 'less than primary education.'

Control Variables A first set of controls describe the child. These include: age, gender, and ethnicity (i.e., Indigenous, Afro-descendant, Mestizo or Other (including: White, Montubio and Other, unspecified), the base category is Mestizo) of the child, whether the child is the oldest child, often associated with more contributions to work (Zapata et al., 2011).

The following variables are included to control for household characteristics. Age and employment status for father and mother are included. For household composition, a set of controls identifying who lives in the household are added denoting both age and gender of other children and other adults in the household. It is assumed that household composition is determined exogenously in the short term (Zapata et al., 2011). An indicator variable for whether the household is in an urban setting is included. Geographic controls are added for location-specific characteristics. The data is divided into administrative units, 'cantons,' a division that is below 'province' but above 'parishes,' comparable to municipalities. Including canton-level dummy variables allows to control for permanent differences across these geographical locations, e.g., availability of schools, local labour market conditions (e.g., adult and child wages, unemployment rates) that could affect the demand and supply of child labour (Zapata

[35] As a robustness check, instead of the BDH measure, I include current family income (including income of all members except children) and household expenditures. Own income includes earnings from the individual's main and secondary occupations; capital/interest earnings from saving accounts, loans, stocks, rental income from real state, land and machinery; transfers from retirement, widowhood, orphanage, disability, or divorce pensions, or severances; income from gifts or donations (e.g., lottery winnings); income from remittances and income from 'development transfers.' Note, in the sensitivity checks, either *'household income'* or *'household is BDH recipient'* is included, not both simultaneously.

et al., 2011).[36]

4.5 Empirical Strategy

This chapter seeks to address the following questions: a. what is the effect of having a parent who worked as a child on the likelihood of their children engaging in child labour or going to school? Specifically, if a parent started working before the minimum age requirement, are their children more likely to engage in child labour and less likely to go to school after controlling for poverty? b. are there differences in the intergenerational transmission of child labour depending on the type of work the child engages in? and c. are there gender differences for the strength of the correlation in the intergenerational transmission of child labour where boys and girls are affected differently depending on the type of work and the gender of the parent who worked before they were legally allowed to?

In line with the theoretical literature, the present study focuses on the supply-side determinants of child labour. To study the household's decision of children's participation in school or working, the following latent variable model is defined. Child labour, C^*_{ijk} and school participation, S^*_{ijk} are two continuous latent variables, functions of vectors of individual characteristics, X_{ij}, household characteristics, Z_j, local characteristics, P_k, and random error:

$$\begin{aligned} C^*_{ijk} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \textit{Mother Worked as Child}_i + \alpha_2 \textit{Father Worked as Child}_i + \\ &+ X'_{ij}\alpha_3 + Z'_j\alpha_4 + P'_k\alpha_5 + \varepsilon_{ijk} \\ S^*_{ijk} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Mother Worked as Child}_i + \beta_2 \textit{Father Worked as Child}_i + \\ &+ X'_{ij}\beta_3 + Z'_j\beta_4 + P'_k\beta_5 + \eta_{ijk} \end{aligned}$$

C^*_{ijk} and S^*_{ijk} are not directly observed, it is only observed if the latent variables are positive. C_{ijk}, child labour, is a binary variable taking the value of one, $C_{ijk} = 1$, if child i from household j in region k works during that week (according to the

[36] School quality may determine the quality of the investment in education and with the labour market characteristics, returns to school can be captured. The data has no information on schools or labour market characteristics. Looking at 2011-2012 administrative records the Ministry of Education has on number of schools (30,070), number of teachers (238,0374) per school and numbers of students enrolled (4,433,538) per school, each canton has on average 135 schools, 1072 teachers, and 19,969 students. Per each school, per canton, there are 16.37 teachers per student and 114.07 students in each school, on average (Ministerio de Educacion, 2012).

definitions above), it is equal to zero otherwise. S_{ijk}, is a binary variable denoting school participation and is equal to one, $S_{ijk} = 1$, if child i from household j in region k currently attends school, zero otherwise.

$$C_{ijk} = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } C^*_{ijk} > 0; \\ 0 \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$S_{ijk} = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } S^*_{ijk} > 0; \\ 0 \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

It is assumed that the error terms follow a bivariate normal distribution and are correlated with a correlation coefficient $\rho \neq 0$.[37]

$$\begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{ijk} \\ \eta_{ijk} \end{bmatrix} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \rho \\ \rho & 1 \end{bmatrix} \right).$$

The following bivariate probit model is estimated:

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(C_{ijk} = 1) &= Pr(C^*_{ijk} > 0) \\ &= Pr(\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \textit{Mother Worked as Child}_i + \alpha_2 \textit{Father Worked as Child}_i + \\ &+ \alpha_3 \textit{Mother's Education}_i + \alpha_4 \textit{Father's Education}_i + \\ &+ X'_{ij}\alpha_5 + Z'_j\alpha_6 + P'_k\alpha_7 + \varepsilon_{ijk} \geq 0) \\ Pr(S_{ijk} = 1) &= Pr(S^*_{ijk} > 0) \\ &= Pr(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Mother Worked as Child}_i + \beta_2 \textit{Father Worked as Child}_i + \\ &+ \beta_3 \textit{Mother's Education}_i + \beta_4 \textit{Father's Education}_i + \\ &+ X'_{ij}\beta_5 + Z'_j\beta_6 + P'_k\beta_6 7 + \eta_{ijk} \geq 0) \end{aligned}$$

Where, the observed variables, C_{ijk} and S_{ijk} correspond to the latent variables for child labour and school attendance, C^*_{ijk} and S^*_{ijk}, respectively. *Mother Worked As Child*$_i$ is an indicator variable for child i if their mother started working at an age below the

[37] An advantage of estimating a bivariate probit over a univariate one, is that this joint model for two binary outcomes allow outcomes to be correlated. Estimating the child labour and school decision jointly with a bivariate probit can account for unobservable characteristics that affect both decisions (Ali, 2019).

minimum age requirement; *Father Worked As a Child*$_i$ is an indicator variable denoting that child i's father began working before the minimum age requirement. *Mother's Education*$_i$ and *Father's Education*$_i$ denote the highest level of education (indicator variables for *primary education*, *secondary education* or *university education* with a base category of *less than primary education*) child i's mother and father achieved, respectively. X'_{ij} is a vector of individual characteristics of child i in household j, including age, gender, an indicator for whether they are the oldest child and child i's ethnicity, child i's parents' ages are included as well as indicator variables for child i's father and or mother not being in the labour force. Z'_j is the vector characteristics for household j including variables denoting household j's composition, as well as an indicator variable for whether the household is in an urban setting and an indicator variable for whether household j received the BDH transfer that month;[38] P'_j is the vector of (location) controls, as described above, for each k canton.

The analysis is conducted initially for all children using the 'official definition of child labour.' Explicitly, for a general analysis, the bivariate probit model is estimated, where the child labour variable takes the value of one, $C_{ijk} = 1$, if the child is a child labourer according to Ecuadorian legislation.[39] To explore if there are differences in size or significance of estimated correlates of intergenerational transmission depending on the type of work conducted by the children, several definitions of child labour are used.[40] The types of child labour considered, i.e., $C_{ijk} = 1$, distinguish: (i). location and nature of work, (market vs. domestic activities); (ii). monetary returns, (paid vs. unpaid market work); (iii). work intensity, (light vs. heavy work); and (iv). safety of working conditions (safe vs. unsafe work).[41] A different bivariate probit regression is run for each definition of child labour. In all cases, the control group for the child labour variable, $C_{ijk} = 0$, are the children who do not work at all (i.e., who have had no engagement in either activities outside their home or in their home, children who

[38] Alternatively, this variable is substituted by household income, where the income earned by all minors is excluded.

[39] As a reminder, this means that the binary variable is equal to one if a child between the ages of 5 and 17 worked at least one hour during reference week and it excludes children between 15 and 17 years old who are legally permitted to work (children whose work day is less than 6 hours per day, who work up to 5 days per week, whose work does not limit the child's right to education and whose work is not under dangerous conditions).

[40] The way in which child labour is defined depending on type of work and potential harm to a child follows that presented in Ali (2019).

[41] For instance, in the case that distinguishes market from domestic work, a bivariate probit regression is run using '*market activities*' as the definition of 'child labour,' i.e., $C_{ijk} = 1$ if child works in market activities and another bivariate probit regression is run using '*domestic activities*' as the definition of 'child labour,' i.e., $C_{ijk} = 1$ if child works in domestic activities.

have zeros in their child labour variable).[42] Disaggregating the children into these categories of child labour is done to explore the different effects of parental child labour histories on the work-school decision. Specifically, it enables exploring for which types of work there is an intergenerational effect.

The results presented below are selected average marginal effects obtained from the different bivariate probit regressions with controls for cantons. The analysis is done initially for the full sample of children and subsequently, separately, by gender of the child, results for the latter are presented. Standard errors shown are robust and clustered at the household level. In all figures and tables results are weighted using the household weights provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC from its name in Spanish).

4.6 Results

Descriptive Analysis Most children in the sample attend school, 95.5%. Using the official definition of child labour, 8.9% of Ecuadorian children aged 5-17 years currently work illegally and boys (10.8%) work more than girls (6.9%).[43] While the same is true in market activities, 11.3% of boys work outside their home or in their family farm or enterprise (store or kiosk) compared to 7.1% of girls. For household work, 76.2% of girls perform domestic chores compared to 69.1% of boys. Very few children (2.7% of the sample) earn a wage while 6.2% of all children perform unpaid work. Most children (46.9%) have light workloads performing less work than what is deemed appropriate for their age, while 5.7% have heavy workloads. Girls work more hours than boys when it comes to hours spent doing domestic tasks in their home and market activities. See Table 4.1.

For children who work, the average age at which their mother started working is 10.3 years, while the average age at which their fathers started working is 12 years.

[42] For example, this means that when comparing children who receive monetary returns to those who do not, two regressions are run. The first, is a bivariate regression for school and children who work and earn a wage, the base group for child labour being children who do not work. The second regression is for school and children who work and do not earn a wage, with the base group for child labour also being children who do not work. This way, the comparison group for child labour $C_{ijk} = 0$ is always the same: children who do not work at all. I avoid including other groups (e.g., children who work in an unsafe environment but do not earn a wage) in the comparison group of $C_{ijk} = 0$. Specifically, for all previous definitions, $C_{ijk} = 0$ if children's total hours in any economic activity or in any domestic activity are zero. This amounts to 7,244 children.

[43] This is very similar to what is reported by the government as net attendance rates for general basic education are 95.6% (Antamba, 2015) and given that the official report on child labour states that 8.56% of children work.

For children who do not work, the mean age at which their mother started working is 8 years, and 14 years for their father. For children who are currently working according to the official definition of child work, half of mothers and almost three quarters of fathers worked before the age of 15 (compared to one fifth and almost half, respectively, for non-working children). Children who work have less educated parents, are older, are poorer (more of them receive the BDH transfer), have lower household income, are households with more members and live in more rural settings. See Table 4.2.

Main Results Tables 4.3a. and 4.3b. present the average marginal effects[44] of selected variables from bivariate probit regressions on the official definition of child labour and school attendance for all children.[45] Tables 4.4a. and 4.4b. present the same results but for children whose parents work, i.e., there are complete child labour histories for all mothers and fathers. Columns represent the possible school-work outcomes. Columns (1) and (3) show the probability that the children work and attend school (Work=1; School=1) for male and female children, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) show the probability that children only work and do not go to school (Work=1;School=0) , for boys and girls, respectively.[46]

The first panel, panel (a) in Table 4.3a., presents the effects for when 'child work' is defined as the official definition of child labour and the subsequent panels (b-f)

[44] Average marginal effects should be interpreted as follows. Suppose we are looking at the first variable, 'mother started working before the age of 15', and first column, that a child works and goes to school. In this case, when computing average marginal effects for the first observation, the person is treated as though their mother did not work as a child, regardless of whether that is the case or not. The probability that a child (if their mother had not worked under 15 years) is working and going to school is computed. The same is done subsequently by treating the child as though their mother did work when they were themselves children and calculating the probability again, of that child working and going to school. The difference of these two probabilities is calculated and would be the marginal effect of having a mother who was a child labourer for the first child observed. The process is repeated for all children in the sample and then the average of all marginal effects is computed, which is what is presented on the table, in this case, the average marginal effect of a mother starting to work before the age of 15 (Williams, 2012).

[45] The full set of results are presented in tables C.4.a. - C.4.b.. To put these effects in perspective, the bivariate predicted probabilities for each outcome have been calculated for two children: a child who lives in the canton Guayaquil, the largest city in the country, the economic capital, located in the coast and for a child who lives in the canton Cotopaxi a rural city centre in the highlands. Predicted probabilities in this case would be the probability of the outcome at the means of covariates for each canton. See Table C.7.

[46] In the Appendix, Tables C.1.a. and C.1.b. present all outcomes for all children and Tables C.2.a.-C.3.b. show all outcomes by gender. In this case, each column represents the possible school-work outcomes: the probability that the children work and attend school (Work=1; School=1) , the probability that children only work (Work=1;School=0) and the probability that they do not work and only attend school (Work=0; School=1). The probability that the children do not work and are not in school (Work=0; School=0) should be addressed with caution. As in Zapata et al. (2011), the theoretical framework establishes that children can go to work or school or combine both, arguably there is no motivation for children to remain idle. From the original sample of 51,233 children, 1,575 children (about 3%) are idle when work excludes hours in chores. If hours dedicated to domestic chores are taken into account, 457 children (0.89%) are idle.

present the effects for the different levels of disaggregation. For boys, if the child's mother worked when she herself was a child, i.e., the intergenerational transmission of child labour from the mother's side is associated, on average, with a 2.0 percentage points higher probability that the child goes to work and school and with 0.8 p.p. higher probability that the child only works. For girls, a mother working as a child is associated with a 1.7 p.p. higher probability of combining work and school, and has no effect on girls only working. On average, the probability of a child working and going to school, is 1.9 p.p. higher for boys and 1.7 p.p. higher for girls, if their father worked as a child than it is for those whose parents started working after the age of 15.

The effect of poverty is as predicted by theory. If household receives the BDH transfer, it is associated with a 1.9 p.p. higher probability that boys work and go to school, with a 0.8 p.p. higher probability that boys just work and with a 1.2 p.p. higher probability that the girls combine work and school. In terms of more permanent income as proxied by education (as discussed in Emerson and Souza (2003)), the more educated parents are (compared to parents who did not have an education), the lower the probabilities of a child combining school and work, doing neither, and just working (with no schooling) and the higher the probability that a child is just going to school, on average. The results for education and all other covariates for the regression on the official definition of child labour can be found in Tables C.4.a.-C.4.b. in the Appendix.

To explore if there are differences in the size or significance of the estimated correlates of intergenerational transmission depending on the type of work conducted by the children, child labour is disaggregated into different types of work. Disaggregating the kind of work a child performs into 'more' serious types of child labour versus 'less' serious types of child labour is done to understand whether the same processes (e.g., behavioural or attitudinal motivations or poverty) are at work for all kinds of child labour.

The first level of disaggregation is work outside the household or in the family's farm or enterprise (store or kiosk) and work that is deemed domestic and performed at home. As with all other levels of disaggregation, the comparison group for the working children are children who only attend school. They do not work outside nor inside their home, they perform zero hours of work per week. When looking at market activities having a mother who worked as a child is associated with a 2.5 p.p. higher probability

of combining work and school only for girls and has no statistically significant effect for other outcomes for either gender. Children have higher probabilities of combining work and market activities of 3.5 p.p. and 4.6 p.p., for boys and girls respectively, if their father worked as a child himself. Receiving the BDH transfer is associated with a 1.7 p.p. higher probability that boys only work and do not go to school, with a 2.7 p.p. higher probability that girls combine market activities with school. There does not seem to be an intergenerational effect of parental work histories for domestic chores for girls, which could reflect parents not reporting domestic work as 'child labour.' For boys, if a mother worked as a child, it is associated with a 0.9 p.p. increase in the probability male children only work. The average effects of parental work histories is that a father being a child labourer is associated with a -0.8 p.p. lower probability of just working in domestic chores for boys and a 2.5 p.p. higher probability that girls combine domestic chores with school. However, if the household is poor, boys have a 0.9 p.p. higher probability of performing chores without being in school, and a higher probability, 3.7 p.p. of combining work and school for girls. See panel (b) in Table 4.3a..

The results from the paid and unpaid work disaggregation are presented in panel (c) of Table 4.3a.. In this case, paid work is any work for which the child receives a wage while unpaid work is any economic activity performed including work in the family farm or enterprise, for which the child received no remuneration but excluding chores. The mother's work history seems to have no effect on any outcome in paid work (the extremely small sample sizes, in this case, might reduce the precision of estimates) or unpaid work for boys. It is, however, associated with a higher probability, 1.1. p.p. of combing school and paid work and a 1.9 p.p. of girls combining school and unpaid work. That a child's father was a child labourer is associated with an average 1.9 p.p. higher probability of working and being in school when work is paid for boys and with a 1.0 p.p. higher probability for girls. For unpaid work, a father working as a child is associated with higher probabilities of combining unpaid work and school, 1.9 p.p. for boys and 4.2 p.p. for girls. The poverty variable is associated with a higher probability (1.6 p.p.) of just being in paid work (and no school) for boys and high a higher probability (0.8 p.p.) that girls combine unpaid work and school.

Disaggregating light and excessive work is presented in panel (d) in Table 4.3b..

For light work, there seems to be no intergenerational transmission of child labour. For heavy loads of work, that the child's mother worked as a child herself is associated with increased probabilities of boys (1.4 p.p.) and girls (0.9 p.p.) only working, on average. If the child's father was a child labourer there is an average 3.0 p.p. higher likelihood that boys combine school and excessive work, and a 5.3 p.p. higher likelihood that girls do so. In terms of light work, being a recipient of the BDH transfer is associated with a 0.5 p.p. increase in the probability that boys only work and with a 4.6 p.p. increase in the probability that girls combine light work and school. For heavy workloads, being a recipient of the BDH transfer has no statistically significant effects with the exception of girls being 6.1 p.p. more likely to combine heavy workloads and school.

Lastly, panel (e) in Table 4.3b. presents the disaggregation between safe and unsafe work conditions. Safe working conditions are those that are free of dangerous exposures to materials or chemicals, where the health of the child is not negatively affected by injuries or health problems and where there is no verbal, physical or sexual abuse while unfavourable conditions are the opposite. When work is defined as safe, a father working as a child is associated with an increased probability of working in favourable conditions and going to school (2.6 p.p.) for girls only. Poverty is also associated with a higher probability of combining school and safe work for girls only, 3.7 p.p., on average. For unsafe working conditions, having parents who were child labourers, as opposed to not, is associated, on average with higher likelihoods (2.8 p.p. for a mother and 2.5 p.p. for a father for boys and 2.0 p.p. and 2.4 p.p. for girls, respectively) of working in and unsafe environment and going to school. Having a mother who worked as a child is associated with a 1.3 p.p. higher likelihood that boys only work and do not attend school. Poverty (as measured by the BDH transfer) has no statistically significant effect for the school-work outcomes when work is defined as dangerous, unhealthy and abusive other than a higher likelihood (2.7 p.p.) that girls combine school and work, on average.

Tables 4.4a.-4.4b. show the average marginal effects of parental work histories for children whose parents are both in the labour force, and as such, have complete work histories. As above, the first panel (a) presents the effects for when 'child work' is defined as the official definition of child labour and the subsequent panels (b-f) present the effects for the different levels of disaggregation. The marginal effects for this group

of children, when using the official definition of child labour are very similar, though slightly larger, on average. When child work is disaggregated between market and domestic work, the same occurs for market activities, estimates are larger by decimals. For domestic work, a father being a child labourer is associated with a -1.0. p.p. lower probability of just working in domestic chores for boys. However, if the household is poor, boys have a 1.4 p.p. higher probability of performing chores without being in school, no effects for girls. Given that in this case, boys would be out of school and not work, or be out of school and work only performing household it is interesting to find a negative association between fathers and sons but not fathers and daughters as it seems to indicate how chores may be perceived as 'feminine' and father who worked as a child may not want their sons to leave school to be idle or to work in domestic chores.

In the case of paid work, the effect of a child labourer mother loses significance. Having a father who worked as a child is associated with a higher probability of working in paid work and going to school for both boys and girls, on average (and a higher probability of only working for girls). For unpaid work, the effects for this set of children are the same as above. A mother having been a child labourer is associated with a higher probability (2.6 p.p.), that girls combine school and unpaid work, while a father child worker is associated with higher probabilities of combining unpaid and school for both boys and girls (3.4 and 3.3 p.p., respectively). Receiving the BDH transfer is associated with a higher probability (4.4 p.p.) that girls combine school and unpaid work. In terms of heavy and light work, the results for children of dual earners are the same as above, the estimates are slightly larger for this set of children. The intergenerational effects of child labour for unsafe working conditions mirror the main results while the effects for safe work are no longer significant.

In all regressions, the Wald test of the null hypothesis of no correlation in error terms, ($\rho = 0$) is rejected. This provides evidence supporting the joint estimation of the school-work decision.

Figures 4.4 to 4.12 present results of adjusted predictions for different combinations of parental child labour backgrounds at different ages. In all cases, for all definitions of work, the probability that a child combines work and school increases with age. For the official definition of child labour 4.4, when looking at both boys and girls

combining school and work, there is a marked difference between children whose parents were not child labourers compared to children whose parents were child labour. For market activities, paid and unpaid work, Fig. 4.5, Fig. 4.7, and Fig. 4.8, for boys, the father effect is almost as large as having both parents as child labourers. For domestic work, Fig. 4.6, light work, Fig 4.9, it seems that this stronger paternal effect is present for both girls and boys but slightly more marked in earlier years. For heavy workloads, the father effect is larger than that of both child labouring parents, for both boys and girls, see Fig. 4.10. The Appendix presents Fig C.2 to C.10 which include combinations with the BDH variable to include poverty in the comparison.

Robustness Checks As sensitivity checks, potential problems in carefully identifying the effect of the intergenerational transmission of child labour are addressed as follows.

Given that the 'official definition' of child labour excludes certain forms of work as it only measures work that children perform illegally, two other benchmark measures for child work are included.[47] First, I define the concept of 'work' as doing any positive amount of work in the labour market. In this case, the variable 'Work' equals one if the child works one hour or more in market activities, zero otherwise. This allows me to include a more comprehensive and standard measure of work that does not exclude 'legally allowed' work as the official child labour measure does. Second, I define the concept of work for the child in the exact same way as for the parents, depending on the age of their first job. In this case, the variable 'Work' equals one if the child started engaging in labour market activities before they turned fifteen.[48] This variable allows me to compare the same 'child labourer' definition in both the parents and the children variables. Results are quite robust to changing the 'work' variable to these benchmarks and are quite similar to those using the 'official definition' in the main specifications, see Tables C.5 and C.6.

As is the case of the results that employ the 'official definition' of child labour as a benchmark, when using the 'working one hour or more' variable in the sample

[47]Note that in redefining the dependent variable for work, the school variable remains the same as in the main specification.

[48]For some children who have positive labour market hours, there is no data on the age of their first job. For these children only (i.e., children who have a positive number of hours worked in labour market activities but do not have the age of when they first starting working), I use their current age as 'age of first job' and use that to determine whether they started working before the age of fifteen.

of dual-parent households (Table C.5 panel (i.)), the intergenerational effect of child labour from the mother remains for boys in the probability of working and not going to school, beyond what can be explained by poverty, though it disappears when looking at the sample of dual-earner households (panel (ii.)). As before, if a mother was a child labourer, boys are more likely to combine school and work (2.1 p.p.) and more likely to only work and not go to school (0.8 p.p.), on average, when using this definition of work. When using 'starting to work before the age of fifteen' as the definition of work, the same results (with slightly different magnitudes) can be found. The only difference when using this definition is that for the sample of dual-parent households (Table C.6 panel (i.)), the intergenerational effect of a child labourer mother extends to girls. For these girls, having a child labourer mother is associated with a 0.2 p.p. increase in the probability that girls start working before the minimum age and do not go to school.

To ensure that the results are not driven by the poverty measure used (household receives the BDH transfer), household income (excluding that of the children) is included. As previously mentioned, the BDH receipt measure is binary measure denoting the poorest households in Ecuador.[49] While the binary of being 'poor' or not is informative, it could also be that the mechanism of intergenerational transmission of child labour that operates through the budget constraint, is not a dichotomous one, but a gradual and continuous one, for which the income variable would be informative. Neither measure is perfect in the attempt to address potential endogeneity from reverse causality and excluding income from child earnings from the household income calculation may not rid of it completely. For instance, if a child's labour (in this case, suppose it is work conducted at the home in domestic chores) allows a mother to work outside of the home for pay, which would have not been possible without the work performed by the child, then the mother would've not entered the labour market and would have not been able to contribute to household earnings that way. Nonetheless, given the explanatory usefulness that both variables have, they are kept in the analysis (Emerson and Souza, 2003; Edmonds, 2007; Ali, 2019). As alternatives, monthly average household expenditures are included (Ray, 2000; Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999; Edmonds and Schady, 2012) and ownership of assets (whether the

[49] Notably, it was not only poor households who received the transfer nor were all poor people in the lowest two income quintiles recipients the transfer, but it is a good measure of households in poverty in Ecuador (see Araujo et al. (2017); Schady and Araujo (2006); Edmonds and Schady (2012)).

dwelling is: fully paid for (base); or if household rents dwelling; whether the household owns arable land; whether the household owns livestock and whether the household owns a vehicle) are used instead of household income.

Results hold when including household income, expenditures or assets instead of the BDH measure, see Tables C.8 and C.9. Using the official definition of child labour and market and domestic definitions of work, the intergenerational effects of child work are very close to the ones resulting from estimations using the BDH measure (they are slightly different in the decimals of percentage points). Household income and household expenditures seem to favour educational attainment (lower associations of children working and being in school or just working and higher associations of children just in school), on average. In terms of assets, compared to having a house that is fully paid for, other tenancy types do not appear significant. That the household owns arable land is associated with a higher probability of the children working and going to school, lower probability that they do not attend school and do not work, lower probabilities of the children just going to school for the official definition of work, market and domestic work (for the official definition only, it is also associated with a higher likelihood that the child only works), on average. Owning a vehicle is associated with lower probabilities of outcomes where the children are out of school. Owning livestock is associated with higher probabilities of combining school and work and only working and a lower probability of being just in school using the official definition of child labour; it is also associated with higher likelihoods of working and going to school and lower likelihood of just working when using the market activities definition of work.

There are two other potential sources of endogeneity, time-variant and time-invariant sources. For the latter, the community-level time invariant characteristics are controlled for using the canton variables.[50] For household-level time invariant characteristics that would affect child labour, a control variable is included denoting whether the child worked in the previous year. If households' circumstances or

[50] An interesting result (not presented) is that in some types of work, when controlling for cantons rather than having location controls at the province-level, the BDH measure loses significance, i.e., in some cases poverty is significant for some outcomes when province, not canton controls are included. Controlling for economic conditions, school quality and community-level characteristics at a more granular level allows to better distinguish household poverty from regional poverty in the sample.

preferences related to sending children to work or not are time invariant in the short-term (i.e., in the last year), the child's working status in the year prior would account for most observable and unobservable differences across households. See Table C.10. The results for paternal child histories and the official definition of child labour and market activities hold. The maternal effect disappears as well as the poverty effect from being a BDH recipient. Unfortunately, information on the previous year's work experience is only available for current labour workers. As such, this only captures changes in the children that are currently working, not children who were working and no longer are. It seems that perhaps the measure may be capturing sustained poverty that results in the household's need to send children to work and that we only see the effect for the households who are still in dire circumstances.

Time-variant sources of endogeneity could be omitting variables affecting the child labour decision for both the child and the parent (or the parent's income or wealth). Given that the driver of the link between parental work histories and child labour could be due to spurious correlation or a reflection problem, controls for local growth rates are included. It is possible that the correlation between child and parental child labour is largely due to both the parents and their child facing similar economic opportunities or circumstances as opposed to parental work histories influencing the child's decision to work. To separate the intergenerational link from the potential reflection problem, time, trends for labour force participation in 1960s-1980s and in 1990s-2010s are included by incorporating provincial average of labour force participation to control local employment opportunities. It is worth noting that this is an imperfect attempt in doing so. Labour force participation may not truly control for similar economic opportunities as well as local unemployment rates, GDP per person might. However, it is the only measure that is available at a provincial level at the time that parents were children themselves, 1960s-1980s. Results from these regressions are consistent with all previous findings. See Table C.11.

Although the growth variables aim to take into account the economic conditions that both the parents and the children faces, and the child's working history may reflect household circumstances in the previous year, I also am able to explicitly control for exogenous shocks to the household in the last year. The economic conditions for when the parents were children are not taken into account, but the household

is directly asked whether they received a negative shock, whether their income fell and whether they had to borrow in the last 12 months. Specifically, the household is asked whether a natural disaster, epidemic, firm closures due to recessions or fall in agricultural prices negatively affected the family in the last 12 months. The household is also asked if in the last 12 months there was a decrease in income due to a job loss, the family business closing, a disease or death in the household, due to the head of the household leaving, due to a fire or robbery, due to a land conflict, due to loss of support (unspecified), due to a fall in commodity prices, due to a loss of harvest or livestock or due to another reason, unspecified. Similarly, the household is asked if a member of the family had to take out a loan or borrow money in the last 12 months. The advantage of these variables is that they are asked to all households. Although both control for time-variant shocks to the household that could affect their income and consequently the household's child labour decision, controlling for these shocks would account for most of the potential endogeneity from previously unobserved events that may send children to work that would also affect household income. Similarly, the variable denoting loans and borrowing money allows to test the intergenerational transmission of child labour while taking into account potential credit barriers that the household faced, the argument that is usually key in the decision to send children to work.

When including the negative exogenous shock measure and when controlling for whether the household took out a loan or borrowed money in the last year, results are the exact same for the official definition of child labour, market activities and domestic activities definitions of work (see Table C.12) and consistent[51] in all other work definitions (unreported). All results include a control for the household experiencing a negative income shock in the last 12 months.[52] The effects from poverty (from the BDH measure) hold and remain significant in the same cases as in the main specification. If a household experiences a negative shock the probability of work and school increases by 1.1 p.p. and 1.8 p.p. when work is defined as the child labour officially and market work, respectively; it is also associated with a decrease (-1.2 p.p.) in the probability that the child only goes to school and is not an official child

[51] In the case of paid work and excessive work the magnitudes of the intergenerational average effects are larger.

[52] Without the control, the intergenerational effect of having parents working as children are consistent for the same school-work outcomes as in the main specifications (in some cases the magnitudes are slightly larger, by 0.1 percentage points).

labourer and with a lower probability (-0.5 p.p.) that the child is idle when work is defined as market work. On average, taking out a loan or borrowing has no effect on probabilities of the different work-school combinations when work is the official definition; it is associated with an increase (2.5 p.p.) in the probability of combining school and market work and a decrease (-1.9 p.p.) in the probability of just going to school without any market activities.

Results are sensitive to the age in which parents first started to work. For instance, when the cut-off is lowered to age 10, i.e., the indicator variables for parental histories denote their parents started working when they were younger, results are consistent, though the magnitudes of the average marginal effects are higher, see Table C.13. The younger parents work, the stronger the intergenerational transmission. The more conservative estimates are presented in the main results.

4.7 Discussion and Conclusion

In general, the intergenerational transmission of child labour provides an avenue to explore the intergenerational links that occur through behavioural or attitudinal aspects since there is presumably intergenerational transmission of economic status. Being in poverty (as measured by being a recipient of the BDH transfer) is in part a measure of the budget constraint that households face and in part, a measure of intergenerational poverty for those parents who were child labourers. Overall, results suggest that there is an intergenerational transmission of child labour, even after controlling for poverty. The direction and magnitude of the effects depend on the type of work the children perform. In the case of the official definition of child labour, that parents worked as children is associated with higher probabilities in working combined with schooling and higher probabilities of working foregoing school. On average, that a mother was a child labourer is associated with a 2.0 percentage point higher probability of working and going to school and a 0.8 p.p. higher probability that boys only work. For girls, a mother child labourer is associated with a 1.7 p.p. higher probability that girls combine school and work. That a father worked as a child himself is associated on average with a 1.9 p.p. higher probability of combining

school and work for boys, a 1.7 p.p. higher probability for girls.[53]

For domestic activities, the intergenerational channel is weaker though there seems to be a gendered aspect to it. For boys, a child labourer mother increases the probability that they only work, but a child labourer father decreases the probability that they only work in domestic chores. There is no maternal effect in combining work and domestic chores. Only for girls, if their father worked as a child himself, there is a higher probability of working and being in school. It is interesting to find that mothers' work histories have no effect on any of the work-school outcomes for girls when work is defined as domestic. Having a child labourer mother has no impact on how the school-work a girl combination for work performed at home.

On the other hand, when fathers were child labourers, their boys are less likely to just work at home (no school, just domestic work). It could be that the 'feminine' association to domestic chores is something that fathers perceive and they are averse to sending their boys to only work at home, forgoing an education; this aversion is not present for girls. Given the importance of identity and roles in what work is performed based on gender (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Fortin, 2005; Zapata et al., 2011), it is interesting to find the negative effect between fathers and sons and no effect from mothers to daughters. For female children, this could mean that either the behavioural or attitudinal channel of the intergenerational transmission of work is not present when it comes to chores, or it could be that performing chores is so normalized and expected of children that their parent's work histories has no significant impact on whether the children do it or not. It could also be that when the parents answered the question 'when did you first started working,' their answer reflects market rather than domestic work or when they first were hired by someone. This is supported by the findings for light work or work in safe working conditions.

In the disaggregation of paid and unpaid work, both 'work' definitions are regarded as economic activities. Even after controlling for poverty, an intergenerational effect of parents having worked as children remains through the child's father experience. It seems that for fathers, that their children develop a work ethic is important, though not at the expense of school, (unless it is to help in the family's farm or business for girls and when both parents are already working). Although a lot of the discussion on

[53]Notably, results are robust to using more 'flexible' definitions of 'child labour.'

child work focuses on unpaid work, usually in a farm or in the family's enterprises, boys are more likely to perform this type of work (ILO, 2017; Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2002). However, when it comes to the intergenerational link, the link in the case of Ecuadorian children is present in girls, not in boys, i.e., the intergenerational transmission of child labour when work is defined as unpaid work, is marked in girls. While boys may be more prone to perform this type of work in most cases, the perpetuation of this type of work happens in girls. If the intergenerational link is interpreted as attitudinal or behavioural (which, given the evidence and how the result remains after various tests to take into account poverty, economic conditions and shocks to the family), this is important as behavioural expectations seem to be only imposed on girls while boys seem to have more freedom from these intergenerational linkages in work that is unpaid and the girls receive no financial remuneration for their work.

While there is intergenerational persistence when work is defined as unsafe (working in dangerous, unhealthy and abusive conditions) for both boys and girls, poverty has no impact on the school-work choice for boys but it does for girls. Poverty plays no effect on outcomes for boys that involve dangerous unhealthy and abusive work which points to perhaps parental altruism in poorer households towards boys, and a more expendable attitude towards girls. For boys, even though the attitudinal aspect of the intergenerational transmission is work-biased, poverty is not enough to keep children in unfavourable working environments. Notably, working conditions are only observed for children who currently work, so it could also be that in altruistic households, pull the children from work after any of these conditions materialize (e.g., if the child comes home to inform their parents they were yelled at work). However, the altruism in poverty seems to be overridden by the character-development motivation (if that is part of the intergenerational transmission) as results point to a 'I did it, you can do it' or 'that is what working is like' attitude from the intergenerational link. Children who are poor are not more likely to sustain work in detrimental working conditions, but children of parents who worked when they themselves are children are. The hypothesis that households in very dire conditions would have their children work in any type of work as long as it sustains the household is rejected for dangerous, unhealthy and abusive work.

All sensitivity checks provide evidence of robust findings. Results hold when the

household faced adverse negative shocks as well as when the households took out a loan or borrowed money. If the reason why households send children to work is to sustain negative income shocks or because they cannot access credit, then the intergenerational effects would disappear and be capture entirely by the shock, falls in income or credit access measures. This is not the case, however, all intergenerational effects remain.

Evidence from Ecuadorian children suggests that there is an intergenerational transmission of child labour beyond what can be explained by a potential budget constraint. The intergenerational link depends on the type of work the children perform and the link does not dissipate when poverty or shocks to the household are taken into consideration and it remains when controlling for parents education. Gender differences suggest that the intergenerational link is perhaps an attitudinal or behavioural one that favours gaining experiencing from working.

Given that most policies are based on the idea that poverty alleviation will help eliminate child labour, evidence from this study suggests that this may not be the case. Although beneficial in their own right, policies improving household economic conditions will only partially reduce the incidence of child labour in Ecuador for the households who do use a child's work to sustain the household. However, the attitudinal or behavioural link remains, independent of poverty status or shocks to the household. The study is not able to determine the long-term effects of the children's increased probabilities of combining school and work or decreased probabilities of being just in school for the children of child labourers. However, if these decreased investments in time devoted to school or school attainment are negative, then the negative effects will be perpetuated beyond policies addressing household poverty or parental education. If, however, parents' lived experience point to high returns from working, as is the case in Beegle et al. (2009), where adults who worked as children have higher probabilities of working for a wage and higher living standards, parents might push their children to increase their work participation combining it with school or even at its expense if the returns from work in the future are potentially larger than those from education.

Results suggest that this might be the case in Ecuador, the intergenerational transmission of child work favours working beyond what can be explained by poverty,

shocks to the household and borrowing constrains (especially given that the poverty effect disappears but the intergenerational effect remains even in unfavourable working conditions). Importantly, a better understanding of parental attitudes, beliefs and behaviours is required as well as their perception of the returns to work if child work is to be eliminated. Additionally, the returns to working in childhood could be further explored in Ecuador to understand the intergenerational effect from child labour. These avenues of research are left as exciting possibilities in the research frontier.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics: Types of Work by Gender of Child

	All Children		Female Children		Male Children	
	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Child Attends School	0.955	0.208	0.960	0.197	0.950	0.217
Child Works, Official Definition	0.089	0.285	0.069	0.253	0.108	0.311
Child Only Attends School, No Work	0.257	0.437	0.230	0.421	0.283	0.450
Idle Child: No Work, No School	0.009	0.097	0.006	0.079	0.013	0.111
Child Works, Market Activities	0.092	0.290	0.071	0.257	0.113	0.316
Child Works, Domestic Activities	0.725	0.446	0.762	0.426	0.691	0.462
Child Works, Paid Work	0.027	0.162	0.014	0.116	0.040	0.195
Child Works, Unpaid Work for Family	0.062	0.242	0.055	0.229	0.069	0.253
Child Works, Light Work	0.469	0.499	0.473	0.499	0.464	0.499
Child Works, Heavy Work	0.057	0.231	0.068	0.251	0.046	0.210
Child Works, Unsafe Work	0.051	0.221	0.037	0.190	0.065	0.246
Child Works, Safe Work	0.041	0.199	0.034	0.180	0.048	0.215
Child's Total Hours of Household & Labour Market Work	7.466	11.298	8.294	11.792	6.676	10.747
	N= 35,085		N=17,176		N= 17,909	

Figure 4.1: Proportion of Children Working According to Official Definition of Child Labour by Parental Work Histories & Poverty



Source: National Survey of Child Labour

Figure 4.2: Proportion of Children Working According to Official Definition of Child Labour by Parental Education



Source: National Survey of Child Labour

Figure 4.3: Proportion of Children Only Going to School by Parental Work Histories & Poverty



Source: National Survey of Child Labour

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics: Means of Values by Whether Child is Child Labourer According to the Ecuadorian Legislation

	All Children		**Non-Working Children (Official Definition)**		**Working Children (Official Definition)**	
	Mean (1)	St. Dev. (2)	Mean (3)	St. Dev. (4)	Mean (5)	St. Dev. (6)
Age Mother Started Working	8.319	9.226	8.125	9.396	10.307	6.956
Age Father Started Working	13.960	4.837	14.152	4.867	11.992	4.016
Mother Started Working Before 15	0.213	0.409	0.179	0.384	0.552	0.497
Father Started Working Before 15	0.510	0.500	0.488	0.500	0.734	0.442
Household Receives BDH Transfer	0.439	0.496	0.415	0.493	0.689	0.463
Household Monthly Income (Excluding Children's Earnings)	664.937	645.440	680.590	659.441	505.052	449.358
Mother's Educ.: Less Than Primary	0.063	0.242	0.053	0.224	0.163	0.370
Mother's Educ.: Primary	0.467	0.499	0.450	0.497	0.646	0.478
Mother's Educ.: Secondary	0.342	0.475	0.360	0.480	0.165	0.371
Mother's Educ.: University	0.128	0.334	0.138	0.345	0.026	0.159
Father's Educ.: Less Than Primary	0.042	0.201	0.037	0.188	0.096	0.294
Father's Educ.: Primary	0.486	0.500	0.467	0.499	0.675	0.468
Father's Educ.: Secondary	0.346	0.476	0.360	0.480	0.206	0.404
Father's Educ.: University	0.126	0.332	0.136	0.343	0.023	0.151
Mother not in Labour Force	0.469	0.499	0.495	0.500	0.202	0.401
Father not in Labour Force	0.021	0.143	0.022	0.146	0.014	0.117
Boy	0.512	0.500	0.501	0.500	0.622	0.485
Age	10.725	3.706	10.470	3.666	13.325	3.051
Oldest Child	0.348	0.476	0.348	0.476	0.349	0.477
Identifies as: Indigenous	0.081	0.272	0.062	0.241	0.270	0.444
Identifies as: Afro-descendant	0.048	0.214	0.049	0.215	0.040	0.195
Identifies as: Mestizo	0.798	0.401	0.815	0.388	0.629	0.483
Identifies as: Other Ethnicity	0.073	0.260	0.074	0.262	0.061	0.240
Has a Disability	0.018	0.132	0.018	0.133	0.014	0.119
Mother's Age	37.735	7.971	37.413	7.911	41.019	7.837
Father's Age	41.773	9.058	41.482	9.004	44.747	9.080
Household Size	5.621	1.847	5.559	1.810	6.251	2.080
House has Children Below Age 5	0.316	0.465	0.317	0.465	0.308	0.462
House has Other Children Aged 5-7	0.266	0.442	0.260	0.439	0.326	0.469
House has Other Children Aged 8-14	0.599	0.490	0.586	0.493	0.737	0.441
House has Other Children Aged 15-17	0.287	0.452	0.278	0.448	0.376	0.484
House has Other Boys Aged 5-17	0.530	0.499	0.517	0.500	0.654	0.476
House has Other Girls Aged 5-17	0.521	0.500	0.511	0.500	0.622	0.485
House Has Daughter of Head of Household Aged 18+	0.172	0.378	0.170	0.376	0.192	0.394
House Has Son of Head of Household Aged 18+	0.209	0.406	0.205	0.404	0.249	0.433
House Has Other Female Relatives Aged 18+	0.049	0.216	0.051	0.221	0.025	0.157
House Has Other Male Relatives Aged 18+	0.058	0.234	0.059	0.235	0.051	0.220
Child's Grandmother Lives in Household	0.065	0.247	0.068	0.252	0.035	0.185
Child's Grandfather Lives in Household	0.042	0.200	0.044	0.204	0.023	0.151
Urban Setting	0.590	0.492	0.623	0.485	0.254	0.435
Household Average Monthly Expenditures	382.017	351.417	392.160	359.115	278.420	236.308
Household Experienced Negative Shock in Last Year	0.176	0.381	0.172	0.377	0.226	0.418
Household's Income Fell in Last Year	0.272	0.445	0.265	0.442	0.343	0.475
Household Accessed Borrowing or Credit in Last Year	0.265	0.441	0.263	0.440	0.287	0.453
	N = 35,085		N = 30,907		N = 4,178	

Table 4.3a.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, All Children

	Male Children		Female Children	
	Work=1;School=1	Work=1;School=0	Work=1;School=1	Work=1;School=0
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
a. Official Definition Child Labour				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.020**	0.008**	0.017***	0.003
	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.002]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019***	-0.002	0.017***	0.002
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.001]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.019***	0.008***	0.012**	0.002
	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.001]
	n=17,909		n=17,176	
b. Market Activities vs. Domestic Activities				
i. Market Activities				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.011	0.011	0.025**	0.002
	[0.016]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.006]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.035***	-0.006	0.046***	0.001
	[0.012]	[0.007]	[0.012]	[0.006]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.015	0.017**	0.027**	-0.000
	[0.014]	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.005]
	n=7,002		n=5,151	
ii. Domestic Activities				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.011	0.009*	0.002	-0.001
	[0.018]	[0.005]	[0.018]	[0.004]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.009	-0.008**	0.025**	-0.000
	[0.014]	[0.004]	[0.012]	[0.004]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.014	0.009**	0.037***	0.002
	[0.015]	[0.004]	[0.013]	[0.004]
	n=17,625		n=17,114	
c. Unpaid vs. Paid Work				
i. Paid Work				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.004	0.007	0.011*	0.005
	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.004]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019**	-0.001	0.010**	0.006
	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.004]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.018*	0.016**	0.008*	0.000
	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.003]
	n=5,010		n=3,613	
ii. Unpaid Work				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.007	0.003	0.019*	0.002
	[0.013]	[0.003]	[0.011]	[0.004]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019*	-0.002	0.042***	-0.000
	[0.010]	[0.003]	[0.012]	[0.003]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.016	0.004	0.027**	-0.002
	[0.012]	[0.003]	[0.011]	[0.004]
	n=6,136		n=4,792	
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendent,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table 4.3b.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, All Children (cont.)

	Male Children		**Female Children**	
	Work=1;School=1	Work=1;School=0	Work=1;School=1	Work=1;School=0
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
d. Light Work vs. Heavy Work				
i. Light Work				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.016	-0.003	0.003	-0.000
	[0.023]	[0.003]	[0.024]	[0.002]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.000	-0.002	0.018	0.001
	[0.017]	[0.002]	[0.016]	[0.002]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.025	0.005*	0.046**	-0.000
	[0.018]	[0.002]	[0.018]	[0.002]
	n=12,985		n=11,698	
ii. Heavy Work				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.018	0.014**	-0.014	0.009*
	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.021]	[0.005]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.030***	-0.001	0.053***	0.004
	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.016]	[0.004]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.009	0.004	0.061***	-0.001
	[0.013]	[0.005]	[0.018]	[0.003]
	n=5,179		n=4,556	
e. Safe vs. Unsafe Working Conditions				
i. Safe Working Conditions				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.006	0.003	-0.002	-0.001
	[0.019]	[0.004]	[0.019]	[0.004]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.006	-0.005	0.026**	-0.002
	[0.015]	[0.003]	[0.013]	[0.003]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.020	0.005	0.037***	0.003
	[0.016]	[0.003]	[0.014]	[0.003]
	n=16,253		n=16,131	
ii. Unsafe Working Conditions				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.028**	0.013*	0.020***	0.004
	[0.014]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.004]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.025***	-0.005	0.024***	0.005
	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.004]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	-0.002	0.008	0.027***	-0.001
	[0.010]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.004]
	n=5,890		n=4,353	
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table 4.4a.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, Children of Dual Earner Parents

	Male Children		**Female Children**	
	Work=1;School=1	Work=1;School=0	Work=1;School=1	Work=1;School=0
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
a. Official Definition Child Labour				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.022**	0.006	0.020***	0.002
	[0.011]	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.002]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.023***	-0.003	0.015**	0.002
	[0.009]	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.002]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.021*	0.012***	0.024***	0.005**
	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.008]	[0.002]
	n=12,429		n=11,898	
b. Market Activities vs. Domestic Activities				
i. Market Activities				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.007	0.009	0.032**	-0.002
	[0.019]	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.007]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.047***	-0.006	0.043***	0.003
	[0.015]	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.006]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	-0.003	0.021**	0.033**	0.013**
	[0.020]	[0.010]	[0.015]	[0.007]
	n=5,090		n=3,649	
ii. Domestic Activities				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.024	0.007	0.010	-0.002
	[0.019]	[0.006]	[0.019]	[0.005]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.009	-0.010*	0.011	0.000
	[0.015]	[0.005]	[0.014]	[0.004]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	-0.007	0.014**	0.014	0.007
	[0.019]	[0.006]	[0.019]	[0.006]
	n=12,203		n=11,849	
c. Unpaid vs. Paid Work				
i. Paid Work				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.012	-0.000	0.005	0.003
	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.006]	[0.003]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019**	0.001	0.024***	0.008***
	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.003]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.017	0.017*	-0.007	0.003
	[0.012]	[0.010]	[0.007]	[0.003]
	n=3,394		n=2,343	
ii. Unpaid Work				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.004	0.001	0.026*	-0.002
	[0.018]	[0.005]	[0.014]	[0.006]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.034**	0.001	0.033**	0.003
	[0.014]	[0.005]	[0.013]	[0.005]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.010	0.007	0.044***	0.006
	[0.019]	[0.005]	[0.016]	[0.006]
	n=4,399		n=3,351	
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table 4.4b.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, Children of Dual Earner Parents (cont.)

	Male Children		**Female Children**	
	Work=1;School=1	Work=1;School=0	Work=1;School=1	Work=1;School=0
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
d. Light Work vs. Heavy Work				
i. Light Work				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.038	-0.005	0.014	-0.002
	[0.024]	[0.004]	[0.026]	[0.003]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.005	-0.001	-0.000	0.000
	[0.018]	[0.003]	[0.019]	[0.002]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.007	0.005	0.019	0.002
	[0.024]	[0.004]	[0.026]	[0.003]
	n=8,778		n=7,898	
ii. Heavy Work				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.015	0.018**	-0.021	0.007
	[0.015]	[0.009]	[0.022]	[0.005]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.032**	0.002	0.068***	0.009**
	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.020]	[0.004]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.004	0.006	0.035	-0.001
	[0.017]	[0.009]	[0.023]	[0.006]
	n=3,474		n=3,022	
e. Safe vs. Unsafe Working Conditions				
i. Safe Working Conditions				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.022	0.001	0.009	-0.002
	[0.020]	[0.005]	[0.019]	[0.005]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.004	-0.005	0.012	-0.000
	[0.016]	[0.004]	[0.015]	[0.004]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.005	0.005	0.017	0.003
	[0.020]	[0.005]	[0.020]	[0.006]
	n= 11,049		n=11,018	
ii. Unsafe Working Conditions				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.036**	0.012	0.028***	0.002
	[0.016]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.005]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.025**	-0.003	0.021**	0.008**
	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.010]	[0.004]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	-0.016	0.008	0.019*	0.004
	[0.016]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.005]
	n=4,143		n=2,970	
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Figure 4.4: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Official Definition



Figure 4.5: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Work in Market Activities



Figure 4.6: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Work in Domestic Activities



Figure 4.7: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Paid Work

Figure 4.8: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Unpaid Work



Figure 4.9: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Light Work



Figure 4.10: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Heavy Work



Figure 4.11: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Safe Work

Figure 4.12: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Unsafe Work



Chapter 5

Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation is to understand intimate partner violence children's well-being and child labour in Ecuador. At present, there has not been a unified, multidimensional approach to intimate partner violence or child labour that takes into account gender norms and behavioural or attitudinal motivations or a focus on children's well-being in the context of household work from the children's perspective. Using rich datasets from Ecuador, I explore the relationship between intimate partner violence and women's ownership of economic resources, their beliefs and attitudes as well as their own and their (former) spouses' childhood experiences of violence (Chapter 2). I also examine children's well-being, particularly, the relationship between the household work and children's self-assessed happiness (Chapter 3) and the intergenerational transmission of different types of child labour (Chapter 4).

In Chapter 2, I explore the impact of economic resources, beliefs and attitudes towards wife-beating and patriarchal/traditional norms and childhood violence on the probability of coupled and post-coupled women experiencing physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence. I find that ownership of assets is somewhat protective of intimate partner violence. While the most liquid asset, access to money for personal expenses, is highly protective of violence for all women, ownership of houses, crops, vehicles and savings offer mixed results. There is evidence of 'male backlash,' when women own certain assets it is associated with higher incidences of violence.

Importantly, holding traditional beliefs encouraging obedience to spouses is quite protective of violence. There is also a pervasive intergenerational component to violence, the largest associations with intimate partner violence in adulthood pertain to childhood experiences of violence both in the women's home of origin and her spouse's home of origin. I address the limitations of the study with regards to endogeneity by looking at widowed women and find that for the widowed, poverty seems to have strong associations with violence. Similarly, I find that results are robust to taking into account the length of the relationships. Given the nature of the outcomes, it is likely that women may under-report their experiences of intimate partner violence.

In Chapter 3, I examine the relationship between household work performed by children aged 8-17 and their self-assessed well-being. I find that, with a mean level of happiness of 86% of children reporting they are happy most of the time, an increase in 10 hours of weekly chores is associated with around a 2 percentage point decrease in children's self-assessed happiness. Though it may seem like a small decrease in magnitude given the mean level of happiness, the decrease is similar to that associated with an increase in 10 hours of market work (-2.9 p.p.). The negative effect of domestic chores on children's well-being is present in both the intensive and extensive margin of performing household work. The effects depend on the type of chore performed and are not gender neutral. Activities like shopping are associated with higher probabilities of well-being while care taking has negative associations. When looking at the share of household work performed by children, both compared to the all household members and compared to their siblings, I find that the effect of a larger brunt of the work performed is more important for boys than it is for girls. Lastly, when thinking of how household chores are excluded from definitions of child labour, results suggest that given the negative impact of chores on children's self-assessed well-being (especially for younger children and given that the negative effects are present even when conduction less than seven hours per week), this exclusion should be reconsidered.

In Chapter 4, I investigate the intergenerational transmission of child labour. I aim to separate the intergenerational links that occur due to behavioural or attitudinal channels, beyond what can be transmitted through poverty. I find that, overall, having a parent who worked as a child (before meeting the minimum age requirement) is

associated with higher likelihoods that their children combine school and work and that their children only work and do not go to school, when child labour is defined according to the Ecuadorian legislation. Results suggest that the intergenerational transmission of child labour depends on the type of work that children do, on which parent was a child labourer and the gender of the child. Further, findings suggest that poverty elimination will not be enough to eradicate child labour as there seems to be a persistent attitudinal/behavioural link in the transmission of child work, even when poverty and economic shocks to the household are controlled for.

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Appendix A

Intimate Partner Violence

Figure A.1: Women's Individual Ownership of Assets by Marital Status (Disaggregated Measures)



Note: For post-coupled women, this refers to assets owned during previous relationship.
Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure A.2: Men's Individual Ownership of Assets by Marital Status (Disaggregated Measures)



Note: For post-coupled women, this refers to assets owned by former partner during previous relationship.
Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure A.3: Co-ownership of Assets by Marital Status (Disaggregated Measures)



Note: For post-coupled women, this refers to assets co-owned during previous relationship.
Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure A.4: Acceptability of Wife Beating (Disaggregated Measures)



Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure A.5: Agreement with Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs (Disaggregated Measures)



Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure A.6: Domestic Violence in Family Background for Women (Disaggregated Measures)



Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure A.7: Ever Experienced Intimate Partner Violence Divided by Years in Relationship (Exposure to Violence) by Marital Status



Note: Exposure to violence is defined as experiencing a type of violence, (0/1), divided by the duration of the match. For separated, divorced and married women, this refers to violence experienced during previous relationship.
Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure A.8: Ever Experienced Intimate Partner Violence by Marital Status: 45-65 Year Old Women



Note: For post-coupled and widowed women, this refers to violence experienced during previous relationship.
Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Figure A.9: Ownership of Assets in Marital Estate by Age of Women (All Women)



Source: National Survey on Family Relations and Gendered Violence Against Women

Table A.1: Disaggregation of Ownership Variables for Married and Common-Law Women: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.053***	-0.081***	-0.035***	-0.020**
	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.010]	[0.008]
Woman Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.098***	-0.116***	-0.024*	-0.011
	[0.028]	[0.031]	[0.012]	[0.013]
Woman Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.019	0.085	0.055	0.081*
	[0.052]	[0.059]	[0.051]	[0.046]
Woman Has Ownership of Savings	0.051	0.068	0.063*	0.028
	[0.048]	[0.052]	[0.033]	[0.023]
Woman Has Ownership of House	0.067**	0.101***	0.042**	0.027*
	[0.031]	[0.029]	[0.017]	[0.015]
Spouse Has Ownership of Land or Crops	0.014	-0.046*	-0.014	0.008
	[0.034]	[0.028]	[0.013]	[0.017]
Spouse Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.086**	0.055	0.049*	0.035
	[0.040]	[0.036]	[0.027]	[0.025]
Spouse Has Ownership of Savings	0.044	0.025	0.024	0.001
	[0.044]	[0.041]	[0.023]	[0.014]
Spouse Has Ownership of House	0.032	0.054**	0.015	0.015
	[0.027]	[0.025]	[0.014]	[0.013]
Household Has No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.048**	-0.047**	-0.022**	-0.003
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.011]	[0.009]
Household Has No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.080***	0.043	0.028***	0.020*
	[0.028]	[0.031]	[0.010]	[0.011]
Household Has No Ownership of Savings	-0.018	-0.026	0.023**	0.009
	[0.033]	[0.035]	[0.012]	[0.010]
Household Has No Ownership of House	0.010	0.046**	0.002	-0.001
	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.010]	[0.009]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.004	-0.018	-0.011	-0.010
	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.013]	[0.013]
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	-0.044**	-0.014	-0.008	0.011
	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.010]	[0.010]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index	0.025***	0.021***	0.003	0.002
	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs	-0.122***	-0.133***	-0.062***	-0.053***
	[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.021]	[0.016]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.188***	0.177***	0.047***	0.050***
	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.007]	[0.007]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.184***	0.211***	0.055***	0.045***
	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.009]	[0.008]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.063***	0.083***	0.005	-0.001
	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.008]	[0.006]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801	10,801
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.150	0.126	0.125	0.119

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.2: Disaggregation of Ownership Variables for Divorced and Separated Women: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.212***	-0.216***	-0.177***	-0.140***
	[0.045]	[0.040]	[0.042]	[0.039]
Woman Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.287**	-0.221	-0.093	0.095
	[0.126]	[0.162]	[0.089]	[0.119]
Woman Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.104	-0.252	0.183	0.224
	[0.196]	[0.238]	[0.198]	[0.174]
Woman Had Ownership of Savings	-0.094	0.016	0.073	-0.021
	[0.180]	[0.197]	[0.140]	[0.107]
Woman Had Ownership of House	0.030	-0.013	-0.098	0.053
	[0.079]	[0.078]	[0.060]	[0.072]
Spouse Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.373***	-0.391***	-0.025	0.086
	[0.107]	[0.132]	[0.102]	[0.125]
Spouse Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.099	0.084	0.062	-0.153***
	[0.150]	[0.147]	[0.117]	[0.059]
Spouse Had Ownership of Savings	-0.135	0.175	-0.059	0.151
	[0.182]	[0.132]	[0.110]	[0.184]
Spouse Had Ownership of House	0.022	0.010	-0.053	0.004
	[0.114]	[0.116]	[0.075]	[0.093]
Household Had No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.158	-0.209**	-0.227**	0.009
	[0.111]	[0.087]	[0.104]	[0.074]
Household Had No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	-0.046	0.065	0.014	-0.105
	[0.143]	[0.153]	[0.095]	[0.102]
Household Had No Ownership of Savings	-0.013	-0.028	0.072	-0.075
	[0.171]	[0.156]	[0.092]	[0.107]
Household Had No Ownership of House	-0.101	-0.085	-0.073	0.032
	[0.074]	[0.070]	[0.064]	[0.060]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)+	0.103	-0.050	-0.057	-0.094
	[0.089]	[0.093]	[0.084]	[0.091]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.027	0.024	-0.026	0.024
	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.020]	[0.019]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.295**	-0.406***	-0.229*	-0.294**
	[0.143]	[0.144]	[0.117]	[0.123]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.153***	0.166***	0.102***	0.079**
	[0.043]	[0.043]	[0.038]	[0.034]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.220***	0.196***	0.208***	0.124***
	[0.045]	[0.053]	[0.041]	[0.039]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.046	0.031	0.049	-0.040
	[0.050]	[0.051]	[0.041]	[0.036]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401	1,401
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.209	0.208	0.211	0.166

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Had Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.3: Disaggregation of Beliefs Variables: Married and Common-Law Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.051***	-0.079***	-0.033***	-0.019**
	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.010]	[0.008]
Woman Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.097***	-0.114***	-0.023*	-0.010
	[0.027]	[0.031]	[0.012]	[0.013]
Woman Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.015	0.079	0.052	0.082*
	[0.051]	[0.058]	[0.049]	[0.046]
Woman Has Ownership of Savings	0.051	0.068	0.061*	0.029
	[0.049]	[0.052]	[0.032]	[0.023]
Woman Has Ownership of House	0.066**	0.101***	0.043**	0.027*
	[0.030]	[0.029]	[0.017]	[0.015]
Spouse Has Ownership of Land or Crops	0.012	-0.048*	-0.017	0.005
	[0.034]	[0.028]	[0.012]	[0.015]
Spouse Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.085**	0.053	0.049*	0.034
	[0.040]	[0.036]	[0.027]	[0.024]
Spouse Has Ownership of Savings	0.044	0.022	0.023	0.001
	[0.044]	[0.042]	[0.023]	[0.014]
Spouse Has Ownership of House	0.033	0.053**	0.017	0.016
	[0.026]	[0.024]	[0.013]	[0.012]
Household Has No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.049**	-0.049**	-0.023**	-0.003
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.011]	[0.009]
Household Has No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.080***	0.040	0.027***	0.019*
	[0.028]	[0.031]	[0.010]	[0.011]
Household Has No Ownership of Savings	-0.021	-0.028	0.022*	0.008
	[0.034]	[0.035]	[0.012]	[0.010]
Household Has No Ownership of House	0.007	0.044**	0.001	-0.001
	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.009]	[0.009]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.004	-0.018	-0.010	-0.011
	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.012]	[0.013]
Belief: Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Disobedient	0.019	-0.031	-0.033***	-0.022**
	[0.037]	[0.036]	[0.009]	[0.009]
Belief: Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Improper Care of Children	0.011	0.035	0.013	0.048***
	[0.030]	[0.029]	[0.016]	[0.018]
Belief: Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Unfaithful	0.027	0.051**	0.001	-0.008
	[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.009]	[0.007]
Belief: Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Goes Out Too Much	0.054**	0.017	0.025*	0.005
	[0.027]	[0.029]	[0.015]	[0.011]
Agrees: a Good Wife Must Obey All Orders from Husband	-0.096***	-0.076***	-0.024***	-0.019***
	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.008]	[0.006]
Agrees: Wife Can Choose Friends Even Disliked by Husband	0.017	-0.002	0.013**	0.011*
	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Agrees: Men Should be Responsible for All Family Expenses	0.047***	0.039**	0.010	0.008
	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.007]	[0.007]
Agrees: Women Have Equal Right to Work and Earn Money	0.001	0.063**	0.001	0.003
	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.013]	[0.013]
Agrees: It is a Wife's Obligation to Have Sex Even if Unwanted	-0.008	-0.047*	-0.002	-0.022***
	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.010]	[0.007]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.185***	0.173***	0.046***	0.049***
	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.007]	[0.007]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.184***	0.212***	0.055***	0.044***
	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.009]	[0.007]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.063***	0.084***	0.006	-0.001
	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.008]	[0.006]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801	10,801
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.155	0.131	0.131	0.128

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.4: Disaggregation of Beliefs Variables: Separated and Divorced Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.206***	-0.219***	-0.172***	-0.128***
	[0.045]	[0.039]	[0.042]	[0.038]
Woman Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.307**	-0.241	-0.129*	0.046
	[0.123]	[0.158]	[0.076]	[0.108]
Woman Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.125	-0.280	0.225	0.305*
	[0.195]	[0.230]	[0.205]	[0.185]
Woman Had Ownership of Savings	-0.065	0.061	0.103	-0.023
	[0.171]	[0.182]	[0.142]	[0.103]
Woman Had Ownership of House	0.046	0.019	-0.083	0.054
	[0.077]	[0.074]	[0.060]	[0.071]
Spouse Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.339***	-0.363***	-0.012	0.105
	[0.115]	[0.137]	[0.104]	[0.125]
Spouse Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.103	0.061	0.068	-0.148**
	[0.149]	[0.149]	[0.119]	[0.059]
Spouse Had Ownership of Savings	-0.081	0.184	-0.015	0.186
	[0.176]	[0.122]	[0.117]	[0.181]
Spouse Had Ownership of House	0.006	0.023	-0.081	-0.025
	[0.109]	[0.113]	[0.067]	[0.087]
Household Had No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.165	-0.224***	-0.258**	-0.016
	[0.112]	[0.082]	[0.106]	[0.075]
Household Had No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	-0.020	0.060	0.049	-0.066
	[0.141]	[0.152]	[0.087]	[0.099]
Household Had No Ownership of Savings	0.021	0.001	0.085	-0.071
	[0.162]	[0.153]	[0.086]	[0.105]
Household Had No Ownership of House	-0.100	-0.077	-0.069	0.033
	[0.073]	[0.068]	[0.062]	[0.058]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)+	0.107	-0.051	-0.051	-0.098
	[0.085]	[0.089]	[0.085]	[0.088]
Belief: Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Disobedient+	-0.041	-0.133	-0.043	-0.062
	[0.115]	[0.121]	[0.083]	[0.082]
Belief: Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Improper Care of Children+	-0.136	-0.071	0.024	0.036
	[0.100]	[0.097]	[0.083]	[0.087]
Belief: Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Unfaithful+	0.068	0.111*	0.040	0.085
	[0.073]	[0.065]	[0.061]	[0.053]
Belief: Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Goes Out Too Much+	0.169*	0.089	-0.117**	-0.012
	[0.088]	[0.093]	[0.059]	[0.076]
Agrees: a Good Wife Must Obey All Orders from Husband+	-0.165***	-0.158***	-0.158***	-0.119***
	[0.047]	[0.045]	[0.035]	[0.036]
Agrees: Wife Can Choose Friends Even Disliked by Husband+	0.036	0.103**	-0.011	-0.035
	[0.045]	[0.043]	[0.039]	[0.039]
Agrees: Men Should be Responsible for All Family Expenses+	0.065	0.023	0.050	-0.017
	[0.051]	[0.053]	[0.040]	[0.041]
Agrees: Women Have Equal Right to Work and Earn Money+	0.150*	-0.129	0.080	0.156***
	[0.090]	[0.089]	[0.063]	[0.039]
Agrees: It is a Wife's Obligation to Have Sex Even if Unwanted+	-0.008	-0.105	0.030	0.007
	[0.074]	[0.074]	[0.076]	[0.062]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.152***	0.165***	0.100***	0.080**
	[0.043]	[0.043]	[0.038]	[0.034]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.222***	0.190***	0.205***	0.122***
	[0.046]	[0.052]	[0.040]	[0.039]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.052	0.036	0.049	-0.037
	[0.051]	[0.050]	[0.040]	[0.036]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401	1,401
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.224	0.221	0.228	0.178

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Had Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.5: Disaggregation of Childhood Violence Variables: Married and Common-Law Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.045***	-0.074***	-0.030***	-0.014*
	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.009]	[0.008]
Woman Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.106***	-0.115***	-0.020*	-0.006
	[0.029]	[0.032]	[0.012]	[0.015]
Woman Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.022	0.082	0.045	0.070
	[0.053]	[0.061]	[0.047]	[0.044]
Woman Has Ownership of Savings	0.071	0.094*	0.051	0.032
	[0.051]	[0.053]	[0.032]	[0.024]
Woman Has Ownership of House	0.064**	0.104***	0.048***	0.027*
	[0.032]	[0.030]	[0.018]	[0.015]
Spouse Has Ownership of Land or Crops	0.019	-0.031	-0.015	0.011
	[0.035]	[0.029]	[0.012]	[0.016]
Spouse Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.066	0.051	0.040	0.023
	[0.040]	[0.036]	[0.026]	[0.022]
Spouse Has Ownership of Savings	0.045	0.044	0.021	0.003
	[0.047]	[0.044]	[0.024]	[0.015]
Spouse Has Ownership of House	0.024	0.045*	0.017	0.009
	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.014]	[0.012]
Household Has No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.047**	-0.044*	-0.021**	-0.001
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.011]	[0.009]
Household Has No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.060**	0.031	0.023**	0.014
	[0.028]	[0.030]	[0.011]	[0.012]
Household Has No Ownership of Savings	-0.011	-0.006	0.019	0.010
	[0.036]	[0.034]	[0.013]	[0.010]
Household Has No Ownership of House	0.001	0.032	0.002	-0.005
	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.009]	[0.008]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.041	-0.031	-0.009	-0.013
	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.013]	[0.013]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index	0.021***	0.018**	0.002	0.002
	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.002]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs	-0.089*	-0.103**	-0.051**	-0.049***
	[0.046]	[0.045]	[0.020]	[0.017]
As Child: Woman Physically Abused	0.096***	0.077***	0.002	0.023***
	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.007]	[0.007]
As Child: Woman Verbally Abused	0.106***	0.128***	0.042***	0.030***
	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.010]	[0.009]
As Child: Woman Sexually Abused	0.211***	0.165***	0.100***	0.070***
	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.018]	[0.015]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.180***	0.205***	0.052***	0.042***
	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.009]	[0.007]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.071***	0.087***	0.008	0.000
	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.008]	[0.007]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801	10,801
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.160	0.136	0.154	0.135

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.6: Disaggregation of Childhood Violence Variables: Separated and Divorced Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.185***	-0.206***	-0.197***	-0.150***
	[0.047]	[0.041]	[0.045]	[0.042]
Woman Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.279**	-0.233	-0.083	0.139
	[0.136]	[0.168]	[0.100]	[0.140]
Woman Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.049	-0.351	0.214	0.268
	[0.213]	[0.220]	[0.213]	[0.192]
Woman Had Ownership of Savings	-0.076	0.052	0.027	-0.063
	[0.190]	[0.196]	[0.137]	[0.102]
Woman Had Ownership of House	0.017	-0.016	-0.117**	0.054
	[0.081]	[0.083]	[0.057]	[0.075]
Spouse Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.390***	-0.417***	-0.024	0.142
	[0.111]	[0.128]	[0.107]	[0.140]
Spouse Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.174	0.074	0.052	-0.165***
	[0.140]	[0.151]	[0.114]	[0.059]
Spouse Had Ownership of Savings	-0.178	0.162	-0.086	0.111
	[0.185]	[0.134]	[0.099]	[0.166]
Spouse Had Ownership of House	0.025	-0.008	-0.050	-0.002
	[0.114]	[0.120]	[0.077]	[0.089]
Household Had No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.131	-0.227**	-0.226**	0.050
	[0.121]	[0.089]	[0.115]	[0.078]
Household Had No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	-0.102	0.083	-0.011	-0.127
	[0.148]	[0.154]	[0.103]	[0.111]
Household Had No Ownership of Savings	0.032	-0.025	0.072	-0.087
	[0.181]	[0.156]	[0.092]	[0.114]
Household Had No Ownership of House	-0.093	-0.109	-0.070	0.043
	[0.076]	[0.074]	[0.063]	[0.062]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)+	0.106	-0.019	-0.047	-0.086
	[0.097]	[0.098]	[0.089]	[0.096]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.029	0.018	-0.025	0.030
	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.021]	[0.020]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.386***	-0.437***	-0.269**	-0.323***
	[0.145]	[0.145]	[0.116]	[0.124]
As Child: Woman Physically Abused	0.050	0.093*	0.028	0.004
	[0.047]	[0.049]	[0.047]	[0.038]
As Child: Woman Verbally Abused	0.128**	0.089*	0.112**	0.115***
	[0.055]	[0.051]	[0.048]	[0.041]
As Child: Woman Sexually Abused	0.132**	0.136**	0.223***	0.203***
	[0.052]	[0.055]	[0.050]	[0.054]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.255***	0.201***	0.195***	0.118***
	[0.045]	[0.053]	[0.041]	[0.040]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.105**	0.045	0.085**	-0.010
	[0.052]	[0.052]	[0.042]	[0.038]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401	1,401
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.227	0.215	0.255	0.197

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Had Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.7: Sequential Addition of Sets of Variables: Married and Common-Law Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results
Type of Violence: Physical Violence

	Set: Resources (1)	Sets: Resources & Beliefs (2)	Sets: Resources, Beliefs & Child. Violence (3)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.066***	-0.066***	-0.053***
	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.017]
Woman Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.099***	-0.103***	-0.098***
	[0.030]	[0.029]	[0.028]
Woman Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.006	0.007	0.019
	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.052]
Woman Has Ownership of Savings	0.075	0.073	0.051
	[0.050]	[0.051]	[0.048]
Woman Has Ownership of House	0.067**	0.066**	0.067**
	[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.031]
Spouse Has Ownership of Land or Crops	0.001	-0.001	0.014
	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.034]
Spouse Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.090**	0.090**	0.086**
	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.040]
Spouse Has Ownership of Savings	0.046	0.046	0.044
	[0.043]	[0.042]	[0.044]
Spouse Has Ownership of House	0.037	0.034	0.032
	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]
Household Has No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.055**	-0.058**	-0.048**
	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.022]
Household Has No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.093***	0.092***	0.080***
	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Household Has No Ownership of Savings	-0.027	-0.026	-0.018
	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.033]
Household Has No Ownership of House	0.012	0.014	0.010
	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.020	-0.018	-0.004
	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	-0.042**	-0.043**	-0.044**
	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index		0.026***	0.025***
		[0.007]	[0.007]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs		-0.152***	-0.122***
		[0.045]	[0.045]
Violence in Women's Family Background			0.188***
			[0.015]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background			0.184***
			[0.019]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background			0.063***
			[0.017]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.0773	0.0812	0.150

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.8: Sequential Addition of Sets of Variables: Married and Common-Law Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results
Type of Violence: Psychological Violence

	Set: Resources (1)	Sets: Resources & Beliefs (2)	Sets: Resources, Beliefs & Child. Violence (3)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.092***	-0.092***	-0.081***
	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.019]
Woman Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.113***	-0.117***	-0.116***
	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.031]
Woman Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.063	0.066	0.085
	[0.056]	[0.056]	[0.059]
Woman Has Ownership of Savings	0.091*	0.090*	0.068
	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.052]
Woman Has Ownership of House	0.099***	0.098***	0.101***
	[0.028]	[0.029]	[0.029]
Spouse Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.051*	-0.053*	-0.046*
	[0.029]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Spouse Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.062*	0.062*	0.055
	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.036]
Spouse Has Ownership of Savings	0.025	0.026	0.025
	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.041]
Spouse Has Ownership of House	0.053**	0.051**	0.054**
	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]
Household Has No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.052**	-0.056**	-0.047**
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.022]
Household Has No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.057*	0.057*	0.043
	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.031]
Household Has No Ownership of Savings	-0.033	-0.031	-0.026
	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.035]
Household Has No Ownership of House	0.047**	0.049**	0.046**
	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.034	-0.032	-0.018
	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.026]
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.021]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index		0.022***	0.021***
		[0.007]	[0.007]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs		-0.165***	-0.133***
		[0.044]	[0.045]
Violence in Women's Family Background			0.177***
			[0.016]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background			0.211***
			[0.017]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background			0.083***
			[0.017]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.0540	0.0575	0.126

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.9: Sequential Addition of Sets of Variables: Married and Common-Law Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results
Type of Violence: Sexual Violence

	Set: Resources (1)	Sets: Resources & Beliefs (2)	Sets: Resources, Beliefs & Child. Violence (3)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.043***	-0.043***	-0.035***
	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.010]
Woman Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.026*	-0.028**	-0.024*
	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.012]
Woman Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.056	0.056	0.055
	[0.052]	[0.051]	[0.051]
Woman Has Ownership of Savings	0.076**	0.076**	0.063*
	[0.036]	[0.036]	[0.033]
Woman Has Ownership of House	0.046**	0.046**	0.042**
	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.017]
Spouse Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.019	-0.019	-0.014
	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.013]
Spouse Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.056*	0.056*	0.049*
	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.027]
Spouse Has Ownership of Savings	0.029	0.029	0.024
	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.023]
Spouse Has Ownership of House	0.017	0.017	0.015
	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.014]
Household Has No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.026**	-0.028**	-0.022**
	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.011]
Household Has No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.035***	0.035***	0.028***
	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.010]
Household Has No Ownership of Savings	0.021	0.023*	0.023**
	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.012]
Household Has No Ownership of House	0.002	0.003	0.002
	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.010]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.018	-0.017	-0.011
	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.013]
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.010]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index		0.003	0.003
		[0.003]	[0.003]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs		-0.080***	-0.062***
		[0.023]	[0.021]
Violence in Women's Family Background			0.047***
			[0.007]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background			0.055***
			[0.009]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background			0.005
			[0.008]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.0737	0.0784	0.125

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.10: Sequential Addition of Sets of Variables: Married and Common-Law Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results
Type of Violence: Economic Violence

	Set: Resources (1)	Sets: Resources & Beliefs (2)	Sets: Resources, Beliefs & Child. Violence (3)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.027***	-0.028***	-0.020**
	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.008]
Woman Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.011	-0.013	-0.011
	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.013]
Woman Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.088*	0.088*	0.081*
	[0.046]	[0.045]	[0.046]
Woman Has Ownership of Savings	0.041	0.040	0.028
	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.023]
Woman Has Ownership of House	0.031*	0.031*	0.027*
	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Spouse Has Ownership of Land or Crops	0.003	0.003	0.008
	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.017]
Spouse Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.046	0.045	0.035
	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.025]
Spouse Has Ownership of Savings	0.003	0.003	0.001
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.014]
Spouse Has Ownership of House	0.017	0.017	0.015
	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.013]
Household Has No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003
	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.009]
Household Has No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.028**	0.028**	0.020*
	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Household Has No Ownership of Savings	0.006	0.007	0.009
	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.010]
Household Has No Ownership of House	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.009]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.016	-0.016	-0.010
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.013]
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	0.013	0.012	0.011
	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.010]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index		0.003	0.002
		[0.003]	[0.003]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs		-0.072***	-0.053***
		[0.019]	[0.016]
Violence in Women's Family Background			0.050***
			[0.007]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background			0.045***
			[0.008]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background			-0.001
			[0.006]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.0559	0.0608	0.119

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.11: Sequential Addition of Sets of Variables: Separated and Divorced Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results
Type of Violence: Physical Violence

	Set: Resources (1)	Sets: Resources & Beliefs (2)	Sets: Resources, Beliefs & Child. Violence (3)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.233***	-0.235***	-0.212***
	[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.045]
Woman Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.257**	-0.254**	-0.287**
	[0.123]	[0.125]	[0.126]
Woman Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.021	0.012	0.104
	[0.197]	[0.198]	[0.196]
Woman Had Ownership of Savings	-0.017	-0.038	-0.094
	[0.178]	[0.182]	[0.180]
Woman Had Ownership of House	0.018	0.022	0.030
	[0.074]	[0.073]	[0.079]
Spouse Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.306**	-0.309***	-0.373***
	[0.120]	[0.119]	[0.107]
Spouse Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.093	0.078	0.099
	[0.154]	[0.159]	[0.150]
Spouse Had Ownership of Savings	-0.119	-0.124	-0.135
	[0.177]	[0.179]	[0.182]
Spouse Had Ownership of House	-0.005	0.009	0.022
	[0.110]	[0.110]	[0.114]
Household Had No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.133	-0.129	-0.158
	[0.099]	[0.100]	[0.111]
Household Had No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	-0.056	-0.061	-0.046
	[0.145]	[0.148]	[0.143]
Household Had No Ownership of Savings	0.031	0.009	-0.013
	[0.166]	[0.170]	[0.171]
Household Had No Ownership of House	-0.088	-0.085	-0.101
	[0.071]	[0.071]	[0.074]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)+	0.104	0.104	0.103
	[0.083]	[0.084]	[0.089]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+		0.024	0.027
		[0.025]	[0.024]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+		-0.272**	-0.295**
		[0.136]	[0.143]
Violence in Women's Family Background			0.153***
			[0.043]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background			0.220***
			[0.045]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background			0.046
			[0.050]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.163	0.168	0.209

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Had Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.12: Sequential Addition of Sets of Variables: Separated and Divorced Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results
Type of Violence: Psychological Violence

	Set: Resources (1)	Sets: Resources & Beliefs (2)	Sets: Resources, Beliefs & Child. Violence (3)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.240***	-0.243***	-0.216***
	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.040]
Woman Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.186	-0.186	-0.221
	[0.150]	[0.153]	[0.162]
Woman Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	-0.291	-0.311	-0.252
	[0.200]	[0.200]	[0.238]
Woman Had Ownership of Savings	0.071	0.045	0.016
	[0.172]	[0.182]	[0.197]
Woman Had Ownership of House	-0.025	-0.017	-0.013
	[0.074]	[0.074]	[0.078]
Spouse Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.296**	-0.304**	-0.391***
	[0.143]	[0.141]	[0.132]
Spouse Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.095	0.079	0.084
	[0.136]	[0.143]	[0.147]
Spouse Had Ownership of Savings	0.181	0.178	0.175
	[0.122]	[0.127]	[0.132]
Spouse Had Ownership of House	-0.018	-0.004	0.010
	[0.118]	[0.118]	[0.116]
Household Had No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.185**	-0.180**	-0.209**
	[0.078]	[0.081]	[0.087]
Household Had No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.062	0.058	0.065
	[0.144]	[0.147]	[0.153]
Household Had No Ownership of Savings	0.009	-0.017	-0.028
	[0.151]	[0.152]	[0.156]
Household Had No Ownership of House	-0.073	-0.072	-0.085
	[0.068]	[0.068]	[0.070]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)+	-0.043	-0.044	-0.050
	[0.085]	[0.087]	[0.093]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+		0.020	0.024
		[0.025]	[0.024]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+		-0.370***	-0.406***
		[0.134]	[0.144]
Violence in Women's Family Background			0.166***
			[0.043]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background			0.196***
			[0.053]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background			0.031
			[0.051]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.156	0.164	0.208

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Had Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.13: Sequential Addition of Sets of Variables: Separated and Divorced Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results
Type of Violence: Sexual Violence

	Set: Resources (1)	Sets: Resources & Beliefs (2)	Sets: Resources, Beliefs & Child. Violence (3)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.212***	-0.206***	-0.177***
	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.042]
Woman Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.087	-0.083	-0.093
	[0.092]	[0.095]	[0.089]
Woman Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.140	0.119	0.183
	[0.193]	[0.193]	[0.198]
Woman Had Ownership of Savings	0.135	0.125	0.073
	[0.139]	[0.140]	[0.140]
Woman Had Ownership of House	-0.112**	-0.106*	-0.098
	[0.057]	[0.056]	[0.060]
Spouse Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.000	0.015	-0.025
	[0.109]	[0.109]	[0.102]
Spouse Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.070	0.073	0.062
	[0.121]	[0.121]	[0.117]
Spouse Had Ownership of Savings	-0.033	-0.047	-0.059
	[0.112]	[0.107]	[0.110]
Spouse Had Ownership of House	-0.070	-0.065	-0.053
	[0.075]	[0.075]	[0.075]
Household Had No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.223**	-0.209**	-0.227**
	[0.092]	[0.092]	[0.104]
Household Had No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.016	0.022	0.014
	[0.092]	[0.092]	[0.095]
Household Had No Ownership of Savings	0.103	0.092	0.072
	[0.080]	[0.084]	[0.092]
Household Had No Ownership of House	-0.063	-0.068	-0.073
	[0.061]	[0.060]	[0.064]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)+	-0.070	-0.063	-0.057
	[0.082]	[0.084]	[0.084]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+		-0.030	-0.026
		[0.021]	[0.020]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+		-0.214*	-0.229*
		[0.118]	[0.117]
Violence in Women's Family Background			0.102***
			[0.038]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background			0.208***
			[0.041]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background			0.049
			[0.041]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.159	0.167	0.211

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Had Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.14: Sequential Addition of Sets of Variables: Separated and Divorced Women
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results
Type of Violence: Economic Violence

	Set: Resources (1)	Sets: Resources & Beliefs (2)	Sets: Resources, Beliefs & Child. Violence (3)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.157***	-0.158***	-0.140***
	[0.039]	[0.039]	[0.039]
Woman Had Ownership of Land or Crops	0.097	0.108	0.095
	[0.116]	[0.118]	[0.119]
Woman Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.193	0.176	0.224
	[0.168]	[0.164]	[0.174]
Woman Had Ownership of Savings	0.028	0.004	-0.021
	[0.110]	[0.108]	[0.107]
Woman Had Ownership of House	0.041	0.049	0.053
	[0.070]	[0.071]	[0.072]
Spouse Had Ownership of Land or Crops	0.116	0.117	0.086
	[0.132]	[0.130]	[0.125]
Spouse Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	-0.135**	-0.143**	-0.153***
	[0.065]	[0.063]	[0.059]
Spouse Had Ownership of Savings	0.159	0.150	0.151
	[0.176]	[0.176]	[0.184]
Spouse Had Ownership of House	-0.014	0.007	0.004
	[0.095]	[0.098]	[0.093]
Household Had No Ownership of Land or Crops	0.008	0.018	0.009
	[0.073]	[0.071]	[0.074]
Household Had No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	-0.073	-0.079	-0.105
	[0.094]	[0.095]	[0.102]
Household Had No Ownership of Savings	-0.047	-0.074	-0.075
	[0.096]	[0.099]	[0.107]
Household Had No Ownership of House	0.040	0.043	0.032
	[0.061]	[0.060]	[0.060]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)+	-0.117	-0.110	-0.094
	[0.090]	[0.091]	[0.091]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+		0.017	0.024
		[0.020]	[0.019]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+		-0.290**	-0.294**
		[0.124]	[0.123]
Violence in Women's Family Background			0.079**
			[0.034]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background			0.124***
			[0.039]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background			-0.040
			[0.036]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.127	0.136	0.166

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Had Co-Ownership of Savings;' 'Had Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Inclusion of Widowed Women:

Table A.15: Descriptive Statistics: Mean Values by Marital Status, Sample of 45-65 Year Old Women, Including Widowed Women

	Married & Common Law		**Separated & Divorced**		**Widowed Women**	
	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Woman's Age	53.12	5.69	53.35	5.48	57.73	5.65
Woman's Edu. Level: Basic Education	0.59	0.49	0.44	0.50	0.61	0.49
Woman's Edu. Level: Medium Education	0.17	0.38	0.21	0.41	0.09	0.28
Woman's Edu. Level: Technical or University Ed.	0.14	0.34	0.27	0.44	0.09	0.29
Woman's Activity: Employed	0.37	0.48	0.64	0.48	0.41	0.49
Woman's Activity: Unemployed	0.10	0.30	0.06	0.24	0.14	0.35
Woman's Activity: Not in Labour Force	0.53	0.50	0.30	0.46	0.45	0.50
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Mestiza	0.74	0.44	0.70	0.46	0.72	0.45
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Indigena	0.07	0.25	0.08	0.27	0.09	0.29
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Afrodescendent	0.06	0.23	0.08	0.27	0.05	0.23
Woman's Ethnic Identity: Other Ethnicity	0.14	0.34	0.14	0.34	0.13	0.34
Woman's Monthly Income (From All Sources)	138.68	294.50	237.78	285.50	174.01	295.69
Household Receives BDH Transfer	0.31	0.46	0.20	0.40	0.42	0.49
Household Income	737.37	706.22	651.16	646.14	438.76	451.67
Household Equivalent Income	355.45	350.35	326.78	305.17	229.28	211.53
Income Prop. to Household Income	18.51	23.92	48.26	40.10	47.28	39.91
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	0.10	0.30	0.42	0.49	0.40	0.49
Woman Has Children	0.98	0.13	0.96	0.20	0.98	0.15
Woman's Number of Children	3.81	1.62	3.23	1.72	4.37	1.66
Age at First Birth	21.11	4.64	21.40	4.90	20.26	4.23
Woman Had First Child as Teenager	0.43	0.50	0.39	0.49	0.44	0.50
Age When First Legally Partnered	20.52	5.23	20.76	5.32	19.73	5.05
Woman Partnered as Teenager	0.50	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.58	0.49
Woman's Marriage/Relationship Length	32.60	7.57	16.27	10.84	24.99	11.46
Size of Family in Household	4.57	2.03	3.98	2.04	3.65	2.24
Household is Multi-Generational	0.29	0.45	0.43	0.49	0.40	0.49
Non-Family Members Live in Household	0.04	0.20	0.04	0.19	0.00	0.05
Male Head of Household	0.95	0.21	0.13	0.33	0.07	0.25
Household in Urban Area	0.71	0.46	0.84	0.36	0.67	0.47
	N=3,038		N=523		N=357	

Table A.16: Comparison: Sample of 45-65 Year Old Women - Type of Violence: Physical Violence
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Married or Common-Law (1)	Separated or or Divorced (2)	Widowed Women (3)
Woman Has/Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.014	-0.328***	-0.098
	[0.033]	[0.068]	[0.088]
All Assets Owned by Female	0.024	0.080	-0.379***
	[0.067]	[0.092]	[0.087]
All Assets Owned by Male	0.031	0.259**	-0.350***
	[0.056]	[0.101]	[0.091]
All Assets Are Co-Owned	-0.021	0.224**	-0.467***
	[0.049]	[0.099]	[0.070]
Mixed Ownership of Assets	0.030	-0.054	-0.344***
	[0.055]	[0.125]	[0.081]
Woman's Monthly Income (Scaled)+	-0.034	-0.073	-0.003
	[0.061]	[0.130]	[0.126]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.037***	0.031	-0.020
	[0.012]	[0.034]	[0.032]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.079	-0.529**	0.379
	[0.088]	[0.222]	[0.245]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.203***	0.123	0.113
	[0.028]	[0.076]	[0.081]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.199***	0.210**	0.135
	[0.032]	[0.093]	[0.093]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.100***	0.178**	-0.049
	[0.031]	[0.090]	[0.087]
Observations	3,038	523	357
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.156	0.263	0.285

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 45-65 years old, married, common-law, separated or divorced and widowed. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has/Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'No Ownership of Assets;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.17: Comparison: Sample of 45-65 Year Old Women - Type of Violence: Psychological Violence
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Married or Common-Law (1)	Separated or or Divorced (2)	Widowed Women (3)
Woman Has/Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.068*	-0.279***	-0.170*
	[0.036]	[0.066]	[0.087]
All Assets Owned by Female	0.061	0.049	-0.343***
	[0.065]	[0.093]	[0.093]
All Assets Owned by Male	0.022	0.287***	-0.234**
	[0.049]	[0.085]	[0.114]
All Assets Are Co-Owned	-0.026	0.134	-0.389***
	[0.046]	[0.107]	[0.086]
Mixed Ownership of Assets	0.006	-0.063	-0.241*
	[0.051]	[0.142]	[0.127]
Woman's Monthly Income (Scaled)+	-0.108*	-0.303***	-0.038
	[0.059]	[0.117]	[0.132]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.028**	0.034	0.030
	[0.011]	[0.036]	[0.033]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.008	-0.829***	0.066
	[0.082]	[0.244]	[0.256]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.168***	0.198***	0.141*
	[0.028]	[0.073]	[0.080]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.248***	0.151	0.172*
	[0.033]	[0.093]	[0.099]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.125***	0.143*	0.066
	[0.031]	[0.086]	[0.089]
Observations	3,038	523	350
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.139	0.295	0.247

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 45-65 years old, married, common-law, separated or divorced and widowed. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has/Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'No Ownership of Assets;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.18: Comparison: Sample of 45-65 Year Old Women - Type of Violence: Sexual Violence
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Married or Common-Law (1)	Separated or or Divorced (2)	Widowed Women (3)
Woman Has/Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.051**	-0.145**	-0.012
	[0.022]	[0.072]	[0.039]
All Assets Owned by Female	0.053	-0.017	-0.125***
	[0.039]	[0.084]	[0.041]
All Assets Owned by Male	0.058*	0.371***	-0.058
	[0.034]	[0.107]	[0.037]
All Assets Are Co-Owned	-0.001	0.170	-0.150***
	[0.024]	[0.124]	[0.037]
Mixed Ownership of Assets	0.025	0.157	-0.076***
	[0.033]	[0.131]	[0.028]
Woman's Monthly Income (Scaled)+	-0.041	-0.159	0.110*
	[0.030]	[0.116]	[0.061]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.003	-0.027	-0.022
	[0.006]	[0.030]	[0.016]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.081**	-0.250	-0.212*
	[0.040]	[0.170]	[0.109]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.045***	0.165***	0.056
	[0.014]	[0.056]	[0.037]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.082***	0.249***	0.169***
	[0.019]	[0.072]	[0.055]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.029*	0.024	0.037
	[0.018]	[0.069]	[0.038]
Observations	3,038	523	339
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.130	0.295	0.417

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 45-65 years old, married, common-law, separated or divorced and widowed. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has/Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'No Ownership of Assets;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.19: Comparison: Sample of 45-65 Year Old Women - Type of Violence: Economic Violence
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of the Probability of Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Married or Common-Law (1)	Separated or or Divorced (2)	Widowed Women (3)
Woman Has/Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.019	-0.266***	-0.033
	[0.014]	[0.071]	[0.043]
All Assets Owned by Female	0.018	0.050	-0.091***
	[0.024]	[0.075]	[0.026]
All Assets Owned by Male	0.003	0.211*	-0.065***
	[0.018]	[0.117]	[0.021]
All Assets Are Co-Owned	-0.018	0.078	-0.152***
	[0.015]	[0.104]	[0.033]
Mixed Ownership of Assets	-0.006	-0.128**	-0.078***
	[0.018]	[0.061]	[0.020]
Woman's Monthly Income (Scaled)+	-0.023	-0.037	-0.113*
	[0.027]	[0.107]	[0.066]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.003	-0.003	0.015
	[0.004]	[0.028]	[0.013]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.039	-0.731***	-0.148
	[0.027]	[0.181]	[0.097]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.049***	-0.019	0.002
	[0.011]	[0.061]	[0.036]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.029**	0.132*	0.015
	[0.012]	[0.068]	[0.036]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	-0.001	-0.067	-0.107***
	[0.011]	[0.061]	[0.039]
Observations	3,038	523	297
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.130	0.278	0.434

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 45-65 years old, married, common-law, separated or divorced and widowed. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects from Probit estimates of the probability of experiencing intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has/Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'No Ownership of Assets;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.20: Change of Dependent Variable: Probability of Intimate Partner Violence Normalized by Length of Relationship: Married & Common-Law Women
Coefficients from OLS Estimates of the Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.009***	-0.008**	-0.003***	-0.002*
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Woman Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.010**	-0.011**	0.004	-0.002
	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.003]
Woman Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.000	0.006	0.001	0.003
	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Woman Has Ownership of Savings	0.010	0.008	0.003	0.014
	[0.007]	[0.010]	[0.002]	[0.008]
Woman Has Ownership of House	0.001	0.002	0.003**	0.001
	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Spouse Has Ownership of Land or Crops	0.002	-0.004	-0.001	0.000
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Spouse Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.001	0.002	0.003**	0.004*
	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Spouse Has Ownership of Savings	0.011*	0.006	0.001	-0.001
	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Spouse Has Ownership of House	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Household Has No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.000
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Household Has No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.008***	0.008**	0.002***	0.004***
	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Household Has No Ownership of Savings	0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.001
	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Household Has No Ownership of House	0.006***	0.009***	0.000	0.001
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	0.004	0.003	-0.000	-0.002
	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.002***	-0.002
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index	0.003**	0.002*	-0.000	0.000
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs	0.005	-0.005	-0.004**	-0.005*
	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.015***	0.017***	0.005***	0.005***
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.018***	0.019***	0.004***	0.005***
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.006**	0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801	10,801
R-squared	0.113	0.107	0.037	0.044
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced and widowed. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to coefficients from an OLS regression on the exposure to intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has No Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.21: Change of Dependent Variable: Probability of Intimate Partner Violence Normalized by Length of Relationship: Separated & Divorced Women
Coefficients from OLS Estimates of the Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.008	-0.024	-0.019	-0.014
	[0.018]	[0.021]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Woman Had Ownership of Land or Crops	0.028	0.057	0.018	0.037
	[0.039]	[0.041]	[0.018]	[0.022]
Woman Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	-0.004	0.040	-0.001	0.033
	[0.095]	[0.063]	[0.026]	[0.028]
Woman Had Ownership of Savings	-0.125	-0.128	0.031	0.005
	[0.118]	[0.109]	[0.028]	[0.027]
Woman Had Ownership of House	0.024	0.028	0.001	0.017
	[0.017]	[0.021]	[0.011]	[0.013]
Spouse Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.041	-0.053	0.013	-0.006
	[0.041]	[0.040]	[0.024]	[0.028]
Spouse Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.000	0.045	-0.017	-0.036
	[0.094]	[0.054]	[0.020]	[0.026]
Spouse Had Ownership of Savings	-0.074	0.075	0.047	0.206*
	[0.106]	[0.138]	[0.030]	[0.122]
Spouse Had Ownership of House	0.053*	0.048*	-0.003	-0.011
	[0.030]	[0.029]	[0.014]	[0.021]
Household Had No Ownership of Land or Crops	0.008	-0.000	0.006	0.011
	[0.033]	[0.026]	[0.014]	[0.016]
Household Had No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.035	0.140**	0.010	0.035
	[0.111]	[0.065]	[0.021]	[0.022]
Household Had No Ownership of Savings	-0.094	-0.133	0.010	-0.008
	[0.120]	[0.106]	[0.019]	[0.022]
Household Had No Ownership of House	0.027	0.028*	0.009	0.016
	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.009]	[0.011]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)+	0.059	0.039	-0.024	-0.029
	[0.054]	[0.054]	[0.018]	[0.021]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.010	0.009	0.003	0.008
	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.056	-0.056	-0.093***	-0.064*
	[0.046]	[0.056]	[0.035]	[0.038]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.029	0.034	0.006	0.018
	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.013]	[0.015]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.025	0.007	0.019	0.000
	[0.017]	[0.027]	[0.012]	[0.018]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.028*	0.020	0.021*	-0.001
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.011]	[0.016]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401	1,401
R-squared	0.254	0.266	0.180	0.173
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced and widowed. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to coefficients from an OLS regression on the exposure to intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has No Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.22: Change of Dependent Variable: Probability of Intimate Partner Violence Normalized by Length of Relationship: Married & Common-Law Women
Coefficients from Tobit Estimates of the Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Has Money for Personal Expenses	-0.024***	-0.031***	-0.040***	-0.040***
	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.015]
Woman Has Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.047***	-0.055***	-0.017	-0.033
	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.024]	[0.036]
Woman Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.003	0.033	0.050	0.105**
	[0.020]	[0.025]	[0.040]	[0.044]
Woman Has Ownership of Savings	0.027	0.027	0.059**	0.075*
	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.042]
Woman Has Ownership of House	0.024**	0.034***	0.044***	0.044**
	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.015]	[0.022]
Spouse Has Ownership of Land or Crops	0.003	-0.022*	-0.019	0.014
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.019]	[0.030]
Spouse Has Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.028**	0.021	0.056**	0.068*
	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.023]	[0.036]
Spouse Has Ownership of Savings	0.028	0.012	0.022	-0.003
	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.030]
Spouse Has Ownership of House	0.012	0.021**	0.016	0.028
	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.015]	[0.022]
Household Has No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.019**	-0.019**	-0.023**	-0.007
	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.018]
Household Has No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.040***	0.029**	0.044**	0.057*
	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.030]
Household Has No Ownership of Savings	-0.001	-0.011	0.033*	0.013
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.025]
Household Has No Ownership of House	0.014**	0.028***	0.003	0.001
	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.018]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	0.007	-0.000	-0.010	-0.019
	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.027]
Woman Earns 51% or More of Household Income	-0.024**	-0.015	-0.016	0.010
	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.013]	[0.018]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index	0.011***	0.009***	0.003	0.004
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.006]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs	-0.023	-0.045**	-0.074***	-0.110***
	[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.027]	[0.036]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.076***	0.077***	0.063***	0.107***
	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.017]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.077***	0.086***	0.065***	0.087***
	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.015]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.029***	0.030***	0.003	-0.006
	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.013]
Constant	-0.083**	-0.104**	-0.321***	-0.373***
	[0.041]	[0.046]	[0.066]	[0.079]
Observations	10,801	10,801	10,801	10,801
Pseudo R^2	0.323	0.247	0.203	0.182
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced and widowed. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to coefficients from an OLS regression on the exposure to intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Has No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has No Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.23: Change of Dependent Variable: Probability of Intimate Partner Violence Normalized by Length of Relationship: Separated & Divorced Women
Coefficients from Tobit Estimates of the Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence - Main Results

	Physical Violence (1)	Psychological Violence (2)	Sexual Violence (3)	Economic Violence (4)
Woman Had Money for Personal Expenses	-0.070**	-0.078***	-0.121***	-0.111***
	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.035]	[0.041]
Woman Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.028	0.036	-0.024	0.124
	[0.075]	[0.069]	[0.085]	[0.090]
Woman Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.034	-0.054	0.075	0.169
	[0.154]	[0.134]	[0.121]	[0.116]
Woman Had Ownership of Savings	-0.182	-0.152	0.091	-0.020
	[0.169]	[0.154]	[0.106]	[0.107]
Woman Had Ownership of House	0.036	0.019	-0.056	0.064
	[0.034]	[0.036]	[0.052]	[0.064]
Spouse Had Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.164**	-0.151**	-0.013	0.048
	[0.072]	[0.063]	[0.081]	[0.093]
Spouse Had Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.011	0.071	0.009	-0.203**
	[0.136]	[0.090]	[0.084]	[0.103]
Spouse Had Ownership of Savings	-0.109	0.110	0.060	0.351*
	[0.153]	[0.164]	[0.104]	[0.202]
Spouse Had Ownership of House	0.090*	0.069	-0.011	0.024
	[0.053]	[0.048]	[0.058]	[0.089]
Household Had No Ownership of Land or Crops	-0.021	-0.044	-0.096	0.043
	[0.062]	[0.048]	[0.062]	[0.064]
Household Had No Ownership of Car or Vehicle	0.014	0.169*	0.016	-0.018
	[0.155]	[0.101]	[0.083]	[0.084]
Household Had No Ownership of Savings	-0.120	-0.170	0.062	-0.072
	[0.167]	[0.142]	[0.085]	[0.089]
Household Had No Ownership of House	0.015	0.015	-0.018	0.046
	[0.034]	[0.030]	[0.041]	[0.058]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)+	0.100	0.035	-0.080	-0.122
	[0.078]	[0.080]	[0.078]	[0.102]
Woman's Acceptability of Wife Beating Index+	0.018	0.014	-0.010	0.029
	[0.013]	[0.012]	[0.019]	[0.021]
Woman's Strength of Patriarchal/Traditional Beliefs+	-0.142*	-0.156*	-0.280***	-0.332**
	[0.080]	[0.083]	[0.108]	[0.133]
Violence in Women's Family Background	0.078**	0.086**	0.071*	0.089**
	[0.031]	[0.034]	[0.042]	[0.043]
Violence in Spouse's Family Background	0.105***	0.062*	0.147***	0.087**
	[0.029]	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.044]
Unknown Violence in Spouse's Background	0.062**	0.036	0.066*	-0.024
	[0.031]	[0.029]	[0.036]	[0.043]
Constant	0.085	0.170	-0.337*	0.050
	[0.178]	[0.158]	[0.193]	[0.208]
Observations	1,401	1,401	1,401	1,401
Pseudo R^2	0.258	0.250	0.236	0.186
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. + denotes current variables (at time of survey) as opposed to variables qualifying their past relationship. Sample consists of respondents in the ENVIGMU who are 15 years old or older, married, common-law, separated or divorced and widowed. Physical, Psychological, Sexual and Economic Violence are indicator variables of whether the woman experienced that type of violence. Estimates correspond to coefficients from an OLS regression on the exposure to intimate partner violence. The base categories that are omitted from the regression are: 'Had No Money for Personal Expenses;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Crops;' 'Has Co-Ownership of Vehicle;' 'Has No Ownership of Savings;' 'Has Co-Ownership of House;' 'No Violence in Own Family Background;' 'No Violence in Spouse's Family Background;' 'Woman's Ethnic Identity: White;' 'Woman's Highest Education: No Education,' 'Woman's Activity: Out of the Labour Force;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'Province: Pichincha.'

Table A.24: Correlations: Beliefs Justifying Wife Beating

	Disobedient	Care Children	Unfaithful	Goes Out
Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Disobedient	1.00			
Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Improper Care of Children	0.59	1.00		
Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Unfaithful	0.41	0.50	1.00	
Husband Justified in Hitting Wife if Goes Out Too Much	0.49	0.56	0.60	1.00

Note: table depicts correlations for the set of beliefs justifying wife beating.

Table A.25: Correlations: Beliefs Patriarchal/Traditional Norms

	Obey	Friends	Expenses	Equal Right	Obligation Sex
Good Wife Must Obey All Orders from Husband	1.00				
Wife Can Choose Friends Even Disliked by Husband	-0.07	1.00			
Men Should be Responsible for All Family Expenses	0.34	-0.01	1.00		
Women Have Equal Right to Work and Earn Money	-0.03	0.13	0.06	1.00	
Wife's Obligation to Have Sex Even if Unwanted	0.23	0.01	0.15	-0.03	1.00

Note: table depicts correlations for the set beliefs regarding traditional/patriarchal norms.

Table A.26: Correlations: Strength of Beliefs Patriarchal/Traditional Norms

	Obey	Friends	Expenses	Equal Right	Obligation Sex
Strength: Good Wife Must Obey All Orders from Husband	1.00				
Strength: (Negative) Wife Can Choose Friends if Disliked by Husband	0.06	1.00			
Strength: Man Should be Responsible for All Family Expenses	0.38	-0.02	1.00		
Strength: (Negative) Women Have Equal Right to Work and Earn Money	0.03	0.21	-0.09	1.00	
Strength: It's a Wife's Obligation to Have Sex Even if Unwanted	0.26	-0.02	0.16	0.04	1.00

Note: table depicts correlations for the set of variables depicting the strength traditional/patriarchal norms.

Appendix B

Children's Well-Being

Figure B.1: Children's Hours Spent Working in Chores by Gender



Source: National Survey of Child Labour

Figure B.2: Child's Share of Total Household Hours of Chores
by Total Household Hours of Chores Performed by All Members



Source: National Survey of Child Labour

Figure B.3: Child's Share of Children's Total Household Hours of Chores
by Total Household Hours of Chores Performed by All Children



Source: National Survey of Child Labour

Table B.1: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Feeling like a Happy Child by Gender of Child; Independent Variable: Total Hours of Household Work & Total Hours of Household Work Squared (Self-Reported)

	All Children (1)	**Male Children** (2)	**Female Children** (3)
Child's Total Hours of Household Chores (Scaled)	-0.021*	-0.038**	-0.018
	[0.012]	[0.019]	[0.014]
Child's Total Hours of Household Chores (Squared, Scaled)	0.000	0.005	-0.001
	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.003]
Child's Total Hours in Labour Market Activities (Scaled)	-0.029***	-0.033***	-0.022**
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.009]
Child Attends School	0.136***	0.151***	0.120**
	[0.039]	[0.052]	[0.053]
Age Group: 12 to 15	-0.000	0.018	-0.018
	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Age Group: 15 to 17	-0.001	0.012	-0.015
	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.025]
Oldest Child	-0.005	-0.009	0.000
	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Identifies as: Indigenous	0.004	-0.005	0.009
	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.019]
Identifies as: Afro-descendant	-0.037	-0.055	-0.012
	[0.029]	[0.038]	[0.038]
Identifies as: Other Ethnicity	-0.026	-0.017	-0.038
	[0.026]	[0.033]	[0.034]
Boy	-0.007	-	-
	[0.009]		
Dual-Earner Household	-0.011	0.010	-0.034**
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Mother's Educ.: Primary	0.008	0.034	-0.022
	[0.021]	[0.025]	[0.026]
Mother's Educ.: Secondary	0.028	0.066**	-0.015
	[0.023]	[0.027]	[0.030]
Mother's Educ.: University	0.022	0.028	0.019
	[0.028]	[0.035]	[0.034]
Father's Educ.: Primary	0.017	0.002	0.027
	[0.028]	[0.033]	[0.032]
Father's Educ.: Secondary	0.016	0.001	0.022
	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.035]
Father's Educ.: University	0.060**	0.073**	0.040
	[0.027]	[0.029]	[0.036]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.014	-0.038	0.014
	[0.027]	[0.034]	[0.040]
Household Size	0.006	0.018**	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.008]
House has Children Below Age 5	-0.022	-0.033*	-0.011
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.019]
House has Other Boys Aged 5-17	-0.022*	-0.040**	0.000
	[0.013]	[0.018]	[0.020]
House has Other Girls Aged 5-17	-0.015	-0.039**	0.012
	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.019]
Household Has a Member With A Disability	-0.027	-0.025	-0.026
	[0.022]	[0.028]	[0.030]
Head of Household is Female	0.018	0.005	0.033
	[0.038]	[0.052]	[0.040]
Urban Setting	-0.015	-0.004	-0.025*
	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.015]
Parent or PMK Present During Child's Responses	0.033***	0.033**	0.030*
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Observations	14,810	7,516	7,294
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.0499	0.0585	0.0576

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENTI ages 8-17, living with both parents. The dependent variable, *happiness*, is an indicator variables equal to one if child feels happy most of the time. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects for the probability of the child self-assessing as happy. The base categories are: 'Child Doesn't Attend School;' 'Age: 8-11;' 'Not Oldest Child;' 'Child's Ethnicity: Mestizo;' 'Non-Dual Earners;' 'Less than Primary Educ.;' 'No Additional Members'; 'Male Head of Household;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'PMK not Present.' 'Province: Pichincha' omitted.

Table B.2: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Feeling like a Happy Child by Gender of Child; Independent Variables: Child Performed Chores; Child Worked in Labour Market; Child Attended School (During Current Week, Self-Reported)

	All Children (1)	**Male Children** (2)	**Female Children** (3)
Child Works in Domestic Activities	-0.040***	-0.045***	-0.033*
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.018]
Child Works in Market Activities	-0.084***	-0.101***	-0.065***
	[0.018]	[0.023]	[0.024]
Child Attends School	0.170***	0.177***	0.161***
	[0.036]	[0.045]	[0.052]
Age Group: 12 to 15	-0.002	0.017	-0.022
	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Age Group: 15 to 17	-0.007	0.010	-0.023
	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.025]
Oldest Child	-0.010	-0.014	-0.006
	[0.009]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Identifies as: Indigenous	0.014	0.006	0.017
	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.018]
Identifies as: Afro-descendant	-0.029	-0.043	-0.008
	[0.028]	[0.034]	[0.038]
Identifies as: Other Ethnicity	-0.026	-0.016	-0.040
	[0.026]	[0.033]	[0.034]
Boy	-0.001	-	-
	[0.009]		
Dual-Earner Household	-0.008	0.013	-0.032**
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Mother's Educ.: Primary	0.013	0.042*	-0.021
	[0.021]	[0.024]	[0.026]
Mother's Educ.: Secondary	0.032	0.074***	-0.015
	[0.023]	[0.026]	[0.030]
Mother's Educ.: University	0.025	0.038	0.015
	[0.027]	[0.032]	[0.035]
Father's Educ.: Primary	0.018	-0.003	0.032
	[0.027]	[0.032]	[0.031]
Father's Educ.: Secondary	0.016	-0.006	0.028
	[0.029]	[0.036]	[0.034]
Father's Educ.: University	0.060**	0.066**	0.047
	[0.026]	[0.030]	[0.034]
Household Equivalent Income (Scaled)	-0.014	-0.041	0.015
	[0.027]	[0.034]	[0.040]
Household Size	0.005	0.017**	-0.006
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.008]
House has Children Below Age 5	-0.023	-0.034*	-0.013
	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.019]
House has Other Boys Aged 5-17	-0.022*	-0.039**	-0.002
	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.020]
House has Other Girls Aged 5-17	-0.016	-0.039**	0.011
	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.019]
Household Has a Member With A Disability	-0.029	-0.024	-0.032
	[0.022]	[0.028]	[0.031]
Head of Household is Female	0.021	0.006	0.039
	[0.037]	[0.052]	[0.038]
Urban Setting	-0.015	-0.006	-0.023
	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.015]
Parent or PMK Present During Child's Responses	0.036***	0.037**	0.033**
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.017]
Observations	14,810	7,516	7,294
Province Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.0506	0.0621	0.0555

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENTI ages 8-17, living with both parents. The dependent variable, *happiness*, is an indicator variables equal to one if child feels happy most of the time. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects for the probability of the child self-assessing as happy. The base categories are: 'Child Doesn't Attend School;' 'Age: 8-11;' 'Not Oldest Child;' 'Child's Ethnicity: Mestizo;' 'Non-Dual Earners;' 'Less than Primary Educ.;' 'No Additional Members'; 'Male Head of Household;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'PMK not Present.' 'Province: Pichincha' omitted.

Table B.3: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates for the Probability of Feeling like a Happy Child by Gender of Child; Independent Variables: (i). Total Hours of Household Work; (ii). Child Performed Chores, Child Worked in Labour Market, Child Attended School; (iii). Threshold of Total Hours of Household Work by Age of Child (Self-Reported)

	Children Aged 8-14			**Children Aged 15-17**		
	All Children	Male Children	Female Children	All Children	Male Children	Female Children
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
i. Intensive Margin: Total Hours of Household Work						
Child's Total Hours of Household Chores (Scaled)	-0.025***	-0.027***	-0.022***	-0.013	-0.007	-0.019*
	[0.007]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.017]	[0.011]
Child's Total Hours in Labour Market Activities (Scaled)	-0.040***	-0.046***	-0.033***	-0.022***	-0.025**	-0.014
	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.008]	[0.010]	[0.012]
Child Attends School	0.138**	0.085	0.193**	0.159***	0.198***	0.105*
	[0.060]	[0.074]	[0.088]	[0.048]	[0.070]	[0.057]
ii. Extensive Margin: Binary Variables for Working Activities						
Child Works in Domestic Activities	-0.040***	-0.046***	-0.031*	-0.019	-0.018	-0.041
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.032]	[0.041]	[0.050]
Child Works in Market Activities	-0.099***	-0.132***	-0.066**	-0.054*	-0.041	-0.063
	[0.022]	[0.029]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.034]	[0.040]
Child Attends School	0.180***	0.117*	0.241***	0.187***	0.241***	0.137**
	[0.054]	[0.062]	[0.085]	[0.046]	[0.066]	[0.057]
iii. Threshold of Total Hours of Household Work						
Child Does (0,7] Hours of Household Chores Per Week	-0.035**	-0.047***	-0.019	-0.019	-0.029	-0.026
	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.022]	[0.038]	[0.047]	[0.067]
Child Does (7,14] Hours of Household Chores Per Week	-0.068***	-0.060**	-0.067**	-0.029	-0.032	-0.045
	[0.021]	[0.028]	[0.031]	[0.041]	[0.055]	[0.069]
Child Does (14,21] Hours of Household Chores Per Week	-0.128***	-0.195***	-0.079*	-0.014	-0.067	-0.018
	[0.035]	[0.055]	[0.042]	[0.044]	[0.069]	[0.073]
Child Does More Than 21 Hours of Household Chores Per Week	-0.094***	-0.062	-0.093**	-0.077	0.003	-0.122
	[0.036]	[0.049]	[0.045]	[0.054]	[0.067]	[0.091]
Child's Total Hours in Labour Market Activities Per Week (Scaled)	-0.039***	-0.045***	-0.032**	-0.022***	-0.026**	-0.013
	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.008]	[0.010]	[0.013]
Child Attends School	0.138**	0.080	0.194**	0.163***	0.202***	0.117**
	[0.058]	[0.071]	[0.087]	[0.048]	[0.069]	[0.057]
Observations	11,578	5,849	5,729	3,232	1,667	1,565

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of respondents in the ENTI ages 8-14 and 15-17, living with both parents. The dependent variable, *happiness*, is an indicator variables equal to one if child feels happy most of the time. Estimates correspond to the marginal effects for the probability of the child self-assessing as happy. The base categories are: 'Child Doesn't Attend School;' 'Not Oldest Child;' 'Child's Ethnicity: Mestizo;' 'Non-Dual Earners;' 'Less than Primary Educ.;' 'No Additional Members'; 'Male Head of Household;' 'Household in Rural Area;' 'PMK not Present.' 'Province: Pichincha' omitted.

Appendix C

Child Labour

Figure C.1: Conceptual Definition of Child Labour in Ecuador



Table C.1.a.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, All Children

	All Children			
	Work=1 & School=1 (1)	Work=0 & School=0 (2)	Work=1 & School=0 (3)	Work=0 & School=1 (4)
a. Official Definition Child Labour (n=35,085)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.022***	0.000	0.005***	-0.027***
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.018***	-0.007***	0.000	-0.011*
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.006]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.016***	0.002	0.005***	-0.023***
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.006]
b. Market Activities vs. Domestic Activities				
i. Market Activities (n=12,153)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019*	0.001	0.009	-0.029**
	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.013]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.038***	-0.009***	-0.003	-0.026**
	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.023**	0.001	0.010**	-0.035***
	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]
ii. Domestic Activities (n=34,739)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.008	0.001	0.004	-0.013
	[0.014]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.013]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.014	-0.002*	-0.004	-0.008
	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.027**	0.000	0.006**	-0.033***
	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
c. Unpaid vs. Paid Work				
i. Paid Work (n=8,623)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.000	0.009	0.008	-0.017
	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.012]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.018***	-0.008	0.003	-0.012
	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.009]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.015**	0.002	0.010**	-0.028***
	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.011]
ii. Unpaid Work (n=10,928)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.013	0.002	0.003	-0.019
	[0.010]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.012]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.028***	-0.007*	-0.001	-0.020**
	[0.009]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.023**	-0.000	0.002	-0.025**
	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.1.b.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, All Children (cont.)

	All Children			
	Work=1 & School=1	Work=0 & School=0	Work=1 & School=0	Work=0 & School=1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
d. Light Work vs. Excessive Work				
i. Light Work (n= 24,683)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.011	-0.002	-0.002	-0.007
	[0.018]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.018]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.006	-0.001	-0.001	-0.004
	[0.013]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.013]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.037***	0.001	0.003	-0.040***
	[0.014]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.014]
ii. Heavy Work (n=9,735)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.011	0.018***	0.013**	-0.019
	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.016]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.033***	-0.008*	0.000	-0.026**
	[0.011]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.012]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.036***	-0.003	0.004	-0.037***
	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.014]
e. Safe vs. Unsafe Working Conditions				
i. Safe Working Conditions (n=9,454)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.002	0.009	0.005	-0.017
	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.013]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.026***	-0.008*	-0.000	-0.018
	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.027***	0.003	0.006**	-0.035***
	[0.010]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.012]
ii. Unsafe Working Conditions (n=10,243)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.024***	0.001	0.009*	-0.034***
	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.012]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.026***	-0.008*	0.000	-0.018**
	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.009]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.011	0.001	0.005	-0.016*
	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.010]
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.2.a.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, Male Children

	Male Children			
	Work=1 & School=1	Work=0 & School=0	Work=1 & School=0	Work=0 & School=1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
a. Official Definition Child Labour (n=17,909)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.020**	0.003	0.008**	-0.031***
	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019***	-0.009***	-0.002	-0.008
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.008]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.019***	0.004	0.008***	-0.031***
	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.009]
b. Market Activities vs. Domestic Activities				
i. Market Activities (n=7,002)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.011	0.004	0.011	-0.026
	[0.016]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.017]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.035***	-0.012**	-0.006	-0.017
	[0.012]	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.013]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.015	0.006	0.017**	-0.038***
	[0.014]	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.015]
ii. Domestic Activities (17,625)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.011	0.002	0.009*	-0.023
	[0.018]	[0.002]	[0.005]	[0.018]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.009	-0.003*	-0.008**	0.002
	[0.014]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.014]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.014	0.002	0.009**	-0.026*
	[0.015]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.015]
c. Unpaid vs. Paid Work				
i. Paid Work (n=5,010)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.004	0.009	0.007	-0.013
	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.016]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019**	-0.012*	-0.001	-0.005
	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.012]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.018*	0.006	0.016**	-0.039***
	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.015]
ii. Unpaid Work (n=6,136)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.007	0.004	0.003	-0.014
	[0.013]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.015]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019*	-0.008	-0.002	-0.009
	[0.010]	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.012]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.016	0.005	0.004	-0.026*
	[0.012]	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.014]
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.2.b.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, Male Children (cont.)

	Male Children			
	Work=1 & School=1 (1)	Work=0 & School=0 (2)	Work=1 & School=0 (3)	Work=0 & School=1 (4)
d. Light Work vs. Heavy Work				
i. Light Work (n=12,985)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.016	-0.004	-0.003	-0.009
	[0.023]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.022]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.000	-0.002	-0.002	0.004
	[0.017]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.016]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.025	0.003	0.005*	-0.033*
	[0.018]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.018]
ii. Heavy Work (n=5,179)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.018	0.029**	0.014**	-0.025
	[0.013]	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.020]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.030***	-0.013**	-0.001	-0.016
	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.014]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.009	0.002	0.004	-0.015
	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.016]
e. Safe vs. Unsafe Working Conditions				
i. Safe Working Conditions (n=5,348)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.011	0.009	0.002	0.000
	[0.013]	[0.009]	[0.004]	[0.017]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.023**	-0.007	0.000	-0.016
	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.014]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.030**	0.006	0.008**	-0.044***
	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.016]
ii. Unsafe Working Conditions (n=5,890)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.028**	0.002	0.013*	-0.042**
	[0.014]	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.017]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.025***	-0.014**	-0.005	-0.007
	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.012]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	-0.002	0.008	0.008	-0.014
	[0.010]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.013]
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.3.a.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, Female Children

	Female Children			
	Work=1 & School=1 (1)	Work=0 & School=0 (2)	Work=1 & School=0 (3)	Work=0 & School=1 (4)
a. Official Definition Child Labour (n=17,176)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.017***	-0.002	0.003	-0.018**
	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.007]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.017***	-0.004	0.002	-0.015**
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.007]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.012**	-0.001	0.002	-0.013*
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.007]
b. Market Activities vs. Domestic Activities				
i. Market Activities (n=5,151)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.025**	-0.002	0.002	-0.024*
	[0.011]	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.013]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.046***	-0.005	0.001	-0.042***
	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.013]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.027**	-0.004	-0.000	-0.024*
	[0.011]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.013]
i*i. Domestic Activities (n=17,114)*				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	[0.018]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.017]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.025**	-0.001	-0.000	-0.024**
	[0.012]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.012]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.037***	-0.001	0.002	-0.038***
	[0.013]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.013]
c. Unpaid vs. Paid Work				
i. Paid Work (n=3,613)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.011*	0.002	0.005	-0.019*
	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.011]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.010**	0.004	0.006	-0.020**
	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.010]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.008*	-0.004	0.000	-0.004
	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.009]
ii. Unpaid Work (n=4,792)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019*	-0.001	0.002	-0.020*
	[0.011]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.012]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.042***	-0.005	-0.000	-0.037***
	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.013]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.027**	-0.005	-0.002	-0.020
	[0.011]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.012]
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.3.b.: Summary of Main Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, Female Children (cont.)

	Female Children			
	Work=1 & School=1 (1)	Work=0 & School=0 (2)	Work=1 & School=0 (3)	Work=0 & School=1 (4)
d. Light Work vs. Heavy Work				
i. Light Work (n=11,698)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.003	-0.000	-0.000	-0.003
	[0.024]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.024]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.018	-0.000	0.001	-0.019
	[0.016]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.016]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.046**	-0.002	-0.000	-0.043**
	[0.018]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.017]
ii. Heavy Work (n=4,556)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	-0.014	0.010*	0.009*	-0.005
	[0.021]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.022]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.053***	-0.003	0.004	-0.054***
	[0.016]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.017]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.061***	-0.008**	-0.001	-0.052***
	[0.018]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.019]
e. Safe vs. Unsafe Working Conditions				
i. Safe Working Conditions (n=4,106)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.009	0.004	0.004	-0.017
	[0.455]	[0.000]	[0.455]	[0.603]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.039	-0.006	0.001	-0.033
	[0.354]	[0.000]	[0.354]	[1.004]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.017	-0.001	0.001	-0.017
	[0.236]	[0.000]	[0.236]	[0.221]
ii. Unsafe Working Conditions (n=4,353)				
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.020***	-0.001	0.004	-0.023**
	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.010]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.024***	-0.000	0.005	-0.029***
	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.010]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.027***	-0.007*	-0.001	-0.019*
	[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.010]
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)), an indicator variable denoting whether the household experienced an 'income fall in the last 12 months' and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.4.a.: Full Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance Using the Official Definition of Child Labour, Male and Female Children

	Male Children				Female Children			
	Work=1; School=1 (1)	Work=0; School=0 (2)	Work=1; School=0 (3)	Work=0; School=1 (4)	Work=1; School=1 (5)	Work=0; School=0 (6)	Work=1; School=0 (7)	Work=0; School=1 (8)
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.020**	0.003	0.008**	-0.031***	0.017***	-0.002	0.003	-0.018**
	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.010]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.007]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019***	-0.009***	-0.002	-0.008	0.017***	-0.004	0.002	-0.015**
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.007]
Mother's Educ.: Primary = 1	0.004	-0.009*	-0.006	0.011	0.000	-0.011**	-0.004*	0.015
	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.002]	[0.010]
Mother's Educ.: Secondary = 1	-0.009	-0.012**	-0.011***	0.032**	-0.009	-0.024***	-0.010***	0.043***
	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.013]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.002]	[0.012]
Mother's Educ.: University = 1	-0.023	-0.017***	-0.016***	0.056***	-0.031***	-0.023***	-0.011***	0.065***
	[0.015]	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.016]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.009]
Father's Educ.: Primary = 1	-0.010	-0.017**	-0.016***	0.043***	0.002	-0.011**	-0.004	0.014
	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.015]	[0.010]	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.015]
Father's Educ.: Secondary = 1	-0.013	-0.027***	-0.022***	0.062***	0.007	-0.017***	-0.006**	0.016
	[0.013]	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.016]	[0.012]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.016]
Father's Educ.: University = 1	-0.053***	-0.027***	-0.024***	0.104***	-0.006	-0.024***	-0.010***	0.039***
	[0.010]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.014]
Mother not in Labour Force = 1	-0.056***	0.013***	-0.006**	0.049***	-0.048***	0.008**	-0.008***	0.047***
	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.007]
Father not in Labour Force = 1	-0.014	-0.005	-0.007	0.026	-0.031***	-0.001	-0.006***	0.038***
	[0.015]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.018]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.002]	[0.013]
Age	0.014***	0.003***	0.006***	-0.022***	0.007***	0.006***	0.004***	-0.017***
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Oldest Child = 1	-0.009	0.012***	0.006**	-0.009	-0.003	0.005	0.001	-0.004
	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.007]
Identifies as: Indigenous = 1	0.044***	-0.003	0.008	-0.048***	0.048***	0.002	0.010***	-0.060***
	[0.016]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.017]	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.015]
Identifies as: Afro-descendant = 1	0.007	0.016*	0.015	-0.038	-0.007	0.012	0.003	-0.007
	[0.017]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.026]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.004]	[0.015]
Identifies as: Other Ethnicity = 1	0.020	0.000	0.005	-0.025	-0.006	-0.006	-0.003*	0.015
	[0.016]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.019]	[0.010]	[0.005]	[0.002]	[0.011]
Has a Disability = 1	-0.065***	0.185***	0.028***	-0.148***	-0.038***	0.145***	0.016***	-0.123***
	[0.005]	[0.025]	[0.008]	[0.027]	[0.005]	[0.029]	[0.006]	[0.031]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.019***	0.004	0.008***	-0.031***	0.012**	-0.001	0.002	-0.013*
	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.007]
Mother's Age	0.001**	-0.000	0.000	-0.001*	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Father's Age	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001**	-0.000	0.000	-0.001
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
House has Children Below Age 5 = 1	0.002	0.006*	0.006**	-0.014*	0.000	0.004	0.001	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]
House has Other Children Aged 5-7 = 1	0.002	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.005	-0.002	0.000	-0.004
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]
House has Other Child. Aged 8-14 = 1	0.016***	-0.000	0.004*	-0.019***	0.001	0.003	0.001	-0.006
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]
House has Other Child. Aged 15-17 = 1	-0.003	0.011***	0.008***	-0.016**	0.000	0.003	0.001	-0.004
	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]
Observations	17,909	17,909	17,909	17,909	17,176	17,176	17,176	17,176
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.4.b.: Full Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance Using the Official Definition of Child Labour, Male and Female Children (cont.)

	Male Children				Female Children			
	Work=1; School=1 (1)	Work=0; School=0 (2)	Work=1; School=0 (3)	Work=0; School=1 (4)	Work=1; School=1 (5)	Work=0; School=0 (6)	Work=1; School=0 (7)	Work=0; School=1 (8)
House Has Daughter of Head of Household Aged 18+ = 1	-0.022***	0.001	-0.005**	0.027***	-0.014***	0.000	-0.003	0.016**
	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.008]
House Has Son of Head of Household Aged 18+ = 1	-0.021***	0.014***	0.004	0.003	-0.010**	0.003	-0.001	0.009
	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.007]
House Has Other Female Relatives Aged 18+ = 1	-0.018	-0.003	-0.007*	0.028**	-0.007	-0.006	-0.004*	0.017
	[0.012]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.014]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.002]	[0.011]
House Has Other Male Relatives Aged 18+ = 1	0.009	-0.000	0.002	-0.010	0.008	0.020***	0.010**	-0.037**
	[0.016]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.019]	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.017]
Child's Grandmother Lives in Household = 1	-0.007	-0.001	-0.003	0.011	-0.003	0.009	0.003	-0.009
	[0.011]	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.015]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.014]
Child's Grandfather Lives in Household = 1	0.032*	-0.010*	-0.002	-0.021	-0.015	-0.005	-0.004	0.024*
	[0.019]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.021]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.013]
Urban Setting = 1	-0.040***	-0.005	-0.014***	0.059***	-0.022***	-0.011***	-0.008***	0.041***
	[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.010]	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.009]
Observations	17,909	17,909	17,909	17,909	17,176	17,176	17,176	17,176
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Figure C.2: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Official Definition & Child's Family Receives the BDH Transfer



Figure C.3: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Work in Market Activities & Child's Family Receives the BDH Transfer



Figure C.4: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Work in Domestic Activities & Child's Family Receives the BDH Transfer



Figure C.5: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Paid Work & Child's Family Receives the BDH Transfer



Figure C.6: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Unpaid Work & Child's Family Receives the BDH Transfer



Figure C.7: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Unpaid Work & Child's Family Receives the BDH Transfer



Figure C.8: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Unpaid Work & Child's Family Receives the BDH Transfer



Figure C.9: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Unpaid Work & Child's Family Receives the BDH Transfer



Figure C.10: Average Marginal Effects at Different Ages for All Children
Child Labour: Unpaid Work & Child's Family Receives the BDH Transfer



Table C.5: Summary of Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance Using Working 1+ Hours/Week as the Definition of Child Work, Male & Female Children

	Male Children				Female Children			
	Work=1; School=1 (1)	Work=0; School=0 (2)	Work=1; School=0 (3)	Work=0; School=1 (4)	Work=1; School=1 (5)	Work=0; School=0 (6)	Work=1; School=0 (7)	Work=0; School=1 (8)
i. All Children from Dual-Parent Households								
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.021**	0.003	0.008**	-0.032***	0.017***	-0.002	0.002	-0.018**
	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.007]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019***	-0.009***	-0.002	-0.008	0.017***	-0.004	0.002	-0.015**
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.007]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.016**	0.005	0.008***	-0.028***	0.012**	-0.001	0.002	-0.013*
	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.007]
	n = 17,909				n = 17,176			
ii. Children from Dual-Earner Households								
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.022*	-0.000	0.006	-0.028**	0.020***	-0.003	0.002	-0.019**
	[0.011]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.009]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.025***	-0.010**	-0.003	-0.012	0.016**	-0.003	0.002	-0.015*
	[0.009]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.012]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.008]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.017	0.007*	0.012***	-0.036**	0.025***	0.002	0.005**	-0.032***
	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.014]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.002]	[0.010]
	n = 12,429				n = 11,898			
Canton Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. 'Work' is defined as a binary variable equal to one if the child stated that they worked an hour or more in the previous week, zero otherwise. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.6: Summary of Results: Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions for Work & School Attendance Using Working Before Meeting the Minimum Age Requirement as the Definition of Child Work, Male & Female Children

	Male Children				Female Children			
	Work=1; School=1 (1)	Work=0; School=0 (2)	Work=1; School=0 (3)	Work=0; School=1 (4)	Work=1; School=1 (5)	Work=0; School=0 (6)	Work=1; School=0 (7)	Work=0; School=1 (8)
i. All Children from Dual-Parent Households								
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.013*	0.005	0.005**	-0.024**	0.021***	-0.003	0.002*	-0.021***
	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.002]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.007]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.024***	-0.012***	0.000	-0.013	0.016***	-0.003	0.001	-0.014**
	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.007]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.013**	0.007*	0.006***	-0.026***	0.008	-0.000	0.001	-0.009
	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.007]
	n = 17,909				n = 17,176			
ii. Children from Dual-Earner Households								
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.019*	0.001	0.005	-0.024**	0.025***	-0.004	0.002	-0.024***
	[0.010]	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.012]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.009]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.029***	-0.013**	-0.000	-0.016	0.016**	-0.002	0.001	-0.015*
	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.008]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.008	0.012**	0.008***	-0.028**	0.018**	0.003	0.003**	-0.025***
	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.014]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.002]	[0.009]
	n = 12,429				n = 11,898			
Canton Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. 'Work' is defined as a binary variable equal to one if the child started working before the age of 15, zero otherwise. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.7: Summary of Results: Work & School Attendance by Type of Work, Boys and Girls
Probability of outcomes at mean values for boys and girls in cities: Guayaquil and Cotopaxi

	Male Children				Female Children			
	Work=1; School=1 (1)	Work=0; School=0 (2)	Work=1; School=0 (3)	Work=0; School=1 (4)	Work=1; School=1 (5)	Work=0; School=0 (6)	Work=1; School=0 (7)	Work=0; School=1 (8)
i. Child in Guayaquil								
Official Definition of Child Labour	0.048	0.016	0.011	0.925	0.011	0.010	0.002	0.977
Child Works in Market Activities	0.099	0.032	0.021	0.848	0.024	0.018	0.008	0.949
Child Works in Domestic Activities	0.646	0.013	0.014	0.327	0.762	0.003	0.008	0.226
Child Does Paid Work	0.008	0.041	0.009	0.942	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.981
Child Does Unpaid Work for Family	0.015	0.036	0.001	0.947	0.015	0.015	0.002	0.969
Light Child Work	0.538	0.014	0.007	0.442	0.635	0.004	0.003	0.357
Heavy Child Work	0.027	0.036	0.009	0.928	0.091	0.010	0.004	0.895
Safe Conditions Child Work	0.027	0.032	0.007	0.935	0.008	0.010	0.003	0.979
Unsafe Conditions Child Work	0.020	0.051	0.010	0.919	0.000	0.022	0.001	0.977
Started Work Age: 5-14	0.011	0.044	0.001	0.944	0.006	0.011	0.001	0.983
Started Work Age: 15-17	0.000	0.040	0.000	0.960	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.989
ii. Child in Cotopaxi								
Official Definition of Child Labour	0.035	0.003	0.002	0.960	0.024	0.004	0.001	0.971
Child Works in Market Activities	0.362	0.003	0.015	0.619	0.152	0.000	0.003	0.844
Child Works in Domestic Activities	0.895	0.001	0.004	0.099	0.919	0.001	0.004	0.076
Child Does Paid Work	0.059	0.014	0.019	0.908	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.991
Child Does Unpaid Work for Family	0.199	0.002	0.001	0.798	0.081	0.000	0.000	0.919
Light Child Work	0.840	0.002	0.003	0.156	0.857	0.000	0.000	0.143
Heavy Child Work	0.194	0.003	0.008	0.795	0.285	0.000	0.001	0.714
Safe Conditions Child Work	0.152	0.005	0.007	0.835	0.030	0.001	0.001	0.968
Unsafe Conditions Child Work	0.161	0.004	0.008	0.827	0.058	0.000	0.002	0.939
Started Work Age: 5-14	0.091	0.000	0.000	0.909	0.037	0.000	0.000	0.963
Started Work Age: 15-17	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.979	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.995

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.8: Robustness Check: Income Variable: Household Income Excluding Children's Earnings (Scaled to $1,000 USD) and Average Household Monthly Expenditures (Scaled to $1,000 USD) - Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions

	Official Child Labour				**Market Activities**				**Domestic Activities**			
	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Household Income Excluding Children's Earnings (Scaled to $1,000 USD)												
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.022***	-0.000	0.005***	-0.026***	0.020*	0.001	0.009	-0.030**	0.008	0.001	0.004	-0.012
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.013]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.018***	-0.007***	0.001	-0.011*	0.038***	-0.010***	-0.003	-0.026**	0.016	-0.002*	-0.004	-0.010
	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Household Monthly Income	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003**	0.011**	-0.014**	-0.002	-0.009**	0.025***	-0.031***	-0.000	-0.006**	0.037***
(Excluding Child Earnings) (Scaled)	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.008]
Average Household Monthly Expenditures (Scaled to $1,000 USD)												
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.022***	-0.000	0.005***	-0.026***	0.021*	0.001	0.009	-0.031**	0.009	0.001	0.004	-0.014
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.013]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.018***	-0.007***	0.001	-0.011*	0.038***	-0.010***	-0.003	-0.025**	0.015	-0.002*	-0.004	-0.009
	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Household Average Monthly	-0.020***	-0.000	-0.005	0.025**	-0.049***	0.002	-0.013	0.060***	-0.075***	0.002	-0.007	0.080***
Expenditures ($1,000 USD)	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.014]
Observations	35,085	35,085	35,085	35,085	12,153	12,153	12,153	12,153	34,739	34,739	34,739	34,739
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.9: Robustness Check: Household Assets: Home Tenancy, Ownership of Vehicle, Ownership of Land, Ownership of Livestock
Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions

	Official Child Labour				Market Activities				Domestic Activities			
	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Assets: Home Tenancy, Ownership of Vehicle, Ownership of Land, Ownership of Livestock												
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.018***	-0.000	0.004**	-0.022***	0.016	0.001	0.007	-0.023*	0.003	0.001	0.003	-0.007
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.013]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.017***	-0.007***	0.000	-0.010*	0.037***	-0.009***	-0.003	-0.024**	0.016	-0.002*	-0.004	-0.010
	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Household Owns Dwelling, Fully Paid = 1	0.001	-0.003	-0.002	0.004	0.005	-0.005	-0.007	0.007	-0.004	-0.001	-0.006*	0.012
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Household Owns Dwelling, Partially Paid = 1	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.005	-0.031	0.005	-0.003	0.029	-0.044	0.001	-0.004	0.047*
	[0.013]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.016]	[0.023]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.003]	[0.009]	[0.025]
Household Rents Dwelling = 1	0.013	-0.001	0.002	-0.013	0.002	-0.005	-0.009	0.012	-0.040**	0.002	-0.001	0.040**
	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.020]	[0.018]	[0.002]	[0.005]	[0.018]
Household Has Arable Land = 1	0.046***	-0.005**	0.007***	-0.049***	0.062***	-0.007**	0.007	-0.061***	0.045***	-0.001*	0.003	-0.047***
	[0.005]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.011]	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Household Owns Vehicle = 1	0.002	-0.010***	-0.005***	0.013*	0.003	-0.010***	-0.017***	0.024**	-0.023*	-0.002*	-0.011***	0.035***
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.013]
Household Owns Livestock = 1	0.020***	0.001	0.005***	-0.026***	0.031***	-0.003	0.005	-0.032***	0.007	0.001	0.004	-0.011
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Observations	35,085	35,085	35,085	35,085	12,153	12,153	12,153	12,153	34,739	34,739	34,739	34,739
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.10: Robustness Check: Control for Child Working Last Year
Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions

	Official Child Labour				Market Activities				Domestic Activities			
	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.008*	-0.001	0.001	-0.008	0.008	0.001	0.005	-0.015	0.005	-0.000	0.001	-0.006
	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.014]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.011***	-0.007**	-0.001	-0.003	0.031***	-0.009**	-0.006	-0.016*	0.017	-0.002**	-0.005*	-0.010
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.002	0.003	0.002	-0.007	0.009	0.003	0.007	-0.018**	0.026**	0.000	0.005	-0.031***
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Child Worked Last Year = 1	0.494***	-0.007**	0.095***	-0.581***	0.604***	-0.027***	0.091***	-0.669***	0.168***	-0.007***	0.082***	-0.243***
	[0.017]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.017]	[0.026]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.024]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.009]	[0.008]
Observations	35,085	35,085	35,085	35,085	12,153	12,153	12,153	12,153	34,739	34,739	34,739	34,739
Canton Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.11: Robustness Check: Inclusion of Growth Rates
Results: Official Child Labour & School Attendance
Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions

	Child Labour: Legal Definition			
	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.031***	-0.005	0.005**	-0.031***
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.008]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.020***	-0.005*	0.002	-0.016***
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.006]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.017***	0.006**	0.007***	-0.030***
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]
Observations	32,281	32,281	32,281	32,281
Income Shock Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton Controls	No	No	No	No
Province Growth Rates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.12: Robustness Check: Household Experienced a Negative Shock in the Last 12 Months and Household Took Out Loan or Borrowed Money or a Credit in Last 12 Months - Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions

	Official Child Labour				Market Activities				Domestic Activities			
	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Household Experienced a Negative Shock in the Last 12 Months												
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.022***	-0.000	0.005***	-0.026***	0.020*	0.001	0.009	-0.031**	0.009	0.001	0.004	-0.014
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.013]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.017***	-0.007***	0.001	-0.011*	0.039***	-0.009***	-0.003	-0.027**	0.015	-0.002*	-0.004	-0.009
	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.011**	0.003	0.004***	-0.018***	0.022**	0.002	0.010**	-0.034***	0.026**	0.000	0.006**	-0.032***
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Household Had (-) Shock in Last 12M= 1	0.011**	-0.001	0.002	-0.012**	0.018*	-0.005*	-0.003	-0.010	0.012	-0.000	0.001	-0.013
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Household Took Out Loan or Borrowed Money or a Credit in Last 12 Months												
Mother Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.022***	-0.000	0.005***	-0.027***	0.021*	0.001	0.009	-0.031**	0.009	0.001	0.004	-0.014
	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.012]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.013]
Father Started Working Before 15 = 1	0.017***	-0.007***	0.001	-0.011*	0.040***	-0.010***	-0.003	-0.027**	0.016	-0.002*	-0.004	-0.010
	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.011**	0.003	0.004***	-0.019***	0.023**	0.001	0.010**	-0.035***	0.027**	0.000	0.006**	-0.033***
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Household Loan/Borrowed in Last 12M = 1	0.004	0.000	0.001	-0.005	0.025***	-0.005*	-0.001	-0.019**	0.013	-0.001	0.000	-0.013
	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Observations	35,085	35,085	35,085	35,085	12,153	12,153	12,153	12,153	34,739	34,739	34,739	34,739
Canton Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.

Table C.13: Robustness Check: Changing Age Threshold for Parent Work History to Age 10 and Changing Age Thresholds for Parent Work History to Dummy Variables - Average Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit Regressions

	Official Child Labour				Market Activities				Domestic Activities			
	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1	Work=1; School=1	Work=0; School=0	Work=1; School=0	Work=0; School=1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Changing Age Threshold for Parent Work History to Age 10:												
Mother Started Working Before 10 = 1	0.016**	0.003	0.006**	-0.025***	0.028**	-0.002	0.006	-0.032**	0.028*	0.001	0.010**	-0.038**
	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.008]	[0.014]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.001]	[0.005]	[0.016]
Father Started Working Before 10 = 1	0.025***	-0.002	0.004**	-0.027***	0.036***	-0.001	0.010*	-0.045***	0.015	-0.001	0.001	-0.015
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.016***	0.002	0.005***	-0.023***	0.025**	0.001	0.010**	-0.037***	0.026**	0.000	0.006**	-0.033***
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Changing Age Thresholds for Parent Work History to Dummy Variables:												
Mother Started Work Age: 5-11 = 1	0.075**	-0.003	0.015*	-0.087**	0.078	0.012	0.058**	-0.147**	0.038	0.000	0.010	-0.048
	[0.036]	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.037]	[0.058]	[0.017]	[0.027]	[0.058]	[0.034]	[0.003]	[0.012]	[0.033]
Mother Started Work Age: 12-17 = 1	0.044*	-0.004	0.008	-0.048*	0.041	0.016	0.045**	-0.102**	0.017	-0.000	0.002	-0.019
	[0.023]	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.025]	[0.045]	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.046]	[0.034]	[0.003]	[0.010]	[0.033]
Father Started Work Age: 5-11 = 1	0.034	0.005	0.011	-0.050	0.066*	-0.007	0.009	-0.069	0.090**	-0.003	0.007	-0.094**
	[0.028]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.049]	[0.036]	[0.014]	[0.029]	[0.058]	[0.045]	[0.005]	[0.020]	[0.040]
Father Started Work Age: 12-17 = 1	0.008	0.006	0.005	-0.019	0.029	-0.007	-0.002	-0.020	0.086*	-0.003	0.006	-0.089*
	[0.022]	[0.012]	[0.010]	[0.039]	[0.028]	[0.017]	[0.027]	[0.053]	[0.051]	[0.006]	[0.018]	[0.047]
Household Receives BDH Transfer = 1	0.016***	0.002	0.005***	-0.024***	0.025**	0.001	0.010**	-0.036***	0.026**	0.000	0.006**	-0.033***
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.011]
Observations	35,085	35,085	35,085	35,085	12,153	12,153	12,153	12,153	34,739	34,739	34,739	34,739
Income Shock Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote levels of significance. Sample consists of children in the ENTI who are between the ages of 5-17 and live with their parents. Estimates correspond to the average marginal effects from bivariate Probit estimates for the probabilities of working and attending school (Work=1, School=1); not working and not attending school (Work=0, School=0); working and not attending school (Work=1, School=0); not working and attending school (Work=0, School=1). The regressions include controls for individual characteristics ('age' of the child, an indicator variable for 'oldest child in household,' an indicator variable for 'boy,' indicator variables for ethnicity: 'Indigenous,' 'Afrodescendant,' 'Other: White/Montubio/Other,' 'Mestizo' (base), indicator variables for 'Mother not in the Labour Force,' 'Father not in the Labour Force'), household characteristics (indicator variables denoting household composition, an indicator variable for 'Urban' (base: 'Rural' household)) and indicator variables for the 'canton' in which the household is in.