Halifax Police Department
and Community Based Policing

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INTRODUCTION

Since 1985 the Halifax Police Department (hereafter HPD) has been embarked upon the course of community-based policing (hereafter CBP). This policing philosophy has four essential components, namely a broadened conception of the police role in society (going well beyond law enforcement), a more extensive and intensive policing partnership with communities of interest (neighbourhood, minority, victim and other), more elaborate networking with other parts of local government, and a cultural and structural reorganization of the policing organization itself (Clairmont, 1991). Advocates of community-based policing have often emphasized that to be successful in implementation and impact a police department committed to this philosophy must engage in profound change which encompasses the entire organization. 'Hived off', departmentally marginal experiments, putative changes in the policing role unaccompanied by changes in performance evaluation, and community outreach without alteration of organizational decision-making mechanism (e.g., decentralization), are the kinds of initiatives that have been subject to convincing criticism (see Kelling, 1985).

To transform an organization from one that is traditionally-oriented, quasi-militaristically-managed and relatively impermeable to external policy collaboration, to one
that can fully embody the community-based policing philosophy is clearly a formidable task. And just as clearly it requires committed and effective leadership. Leadership has to be of the sort that can overcome vested interests, bureaucratic rigidities and subcultural traditional within the organization. Strategies of the 'carrot and the stick' must be simultaneously implemented since vision and determination must complement one another (Sparrow, 1988). Forging a new relationship with the larger society, whether with local policing authorities and other components of city administration or with the various publics and interests, entails other types of leadership skills as well as perhaps a different persona on the part of the chief and his close associates in change.

Halifax PD has undergone a dramatic transformation since 1985 (see Clairmont, 1990). From 'the fortress on the hill' (a perception that used to be common among Haligonians), HPD has become one of the leading Canadian departments exemplifying the philosophy of community-based policing. Internal organizational changes have been extensive as the department reorganized its patrol division, investigative specializations and management structure; in addition it has developed new job descriptions and performance evaluation criteria and has attempted to effect a more participatory decision-making structure within the department. External linkages have been emphasized including closer collaboration with other city departments, zone advisory
councils and voluntary support groups and other innovative programs. HPD has been particularly active in recent years in the area of race relations and multiculturalism, establishing new programs, departmental positions and liaison linkages.

In this paper there will be an overview of this transformation which will deal with seven central themes, namely

a) the police client: the metropolitan Halifax area
b) the background and recent history of policing in Halifax prior to the launching of the community-based policing initiative
c) the CBP initiative: vision, thrusts and implementation
d) the community policing system in Halifax at the end of phase one
e) CBP at HPD; the second phase
f) looking backwards: a retrospective assessment
g) looking forward: key issues concerning the future of community policing in Halifax

Throughout this paper a special focus will be on detailing and analyzing the kinds of leadership that have been responsible for the above transformation. Studies such as Langworthy (1986) have indicated that police chiefs' ideology and motivation may be the most crucial factor in shaping the police organization whether in the traditional para-military style or otherwise. Legality and convention have combined to make the chief's role
in Canadian police organizations pivotal for any change in the service (see Crosby, 1982; Nova Scotia Police Commission, 1982; Clairmont, 1990). The evolution of HPD leadership is also relevant since in the Halifax case there have been two chiefs in the 1985-to-present period, each having a distinct style of leadership and a different though congruent set of priorities. In addition the chiefs have faced quite different challenges to their largely common vision of community-based policing and have mobilized organizational resources differently. To a significant extent HPD 's evolution in community-based policing requires an appreciation of how the distinct phases both retained and advanced an integral philosophy of policing and the progressive policing organization. It is the thesis here that both chiefs have been committed to the community-based policing philosophy and, explicitly, to establishing the department as a centre of excellence in policing circles. At the same time the first chief's primary thrust was on internal departmental challenges and changes. His perspective vis-a-vis HPD might be characterized as an 'organizational development' one. His successor at HPD has been especially focused on external challenges and linkages, and his perspective vis-a-vis HPD might be better characterized as a 'human relations' one (Swanson et al., 1988). The kind of transformation in policing organization implied by community-based policing and modern management theory would seem to require such a serial fusion of
different leadership styles. Indeed it could well be argued, analogous to the more general issue of the institutionalization of cultural change (see Bennett, 1967), that at least three 'generations' or 'chiefs' committed to the common vision but securing and emphasizing it in different though congruent ways, are required.

The Challenge of CBP and Modern Police Management

It is clear that CBP has now become the 'official morality' for modern-day Canadian policing; it has been designated as the preferred type of policing by federal and provincial governments and leading police organizations (see Normandeau and Leighton, 1990; Solicitor General Canada, 1990; Solicitor General Ontario, 1989). At the same time it is also clear (1) that its implementation and impact have been quite modest to date (Clairmont, 1991; Hornick, Leighton and Burrows, 1993). The Canadian experience in this regard is little different than that in Britain (Fielding et al., 1990; Irving et al., 1989) and the United States (Klockars, 1991; Mastrofski, 1991A). Indeed there is increasing suggestion in the literature and in policing circles that CBP might be passe, yielding to a more fiscally constrained and sharply delimited philosophy of policing (Mastrofski, 1991B). Such rumours of impending death seem very premature and are perhaps evidence more of faddism and neophilia in contemporary thinking. But they also indicate how difficult
it has been in practice to transform police organizations and policing styles.

CBP, as operationally defined above, developed from specific important pressures, police interests and police research findings (see Clairmont, 1991). It has been readily linked in theory with greater professionalism via the themes of decentralization and the constable generalist role (Forcese, 1993), with the quality of working life movement (Clairmont, 1990), with what analogously to Etzioni's (1968) 'active society' might be termed 'the active modern organization proactively involved with its environment' (Reiss, 1985; Levine, 1985), with the pursuit of excellence organizationally (Couper et al., 1991) and with effective accountability and order maintenance success (Kelling, 1982, 1985, 1988; Trojanowicz, 1989). In light of these theoretical rationales and the 'official morality' status noted above, why has there been such modest implementation and why are there rumours of CBP's demise?

The challenges to CBP and its associated new police organization evidently are formidable. There has been significant internal resistance from those enjoying high status in the conventional police organization, namely the detective division, the platoon inspectors, and front-line supervisors (see Sparrow, 1988). Moreover constables as well as other officers often have resisted any change in their required job tasks that could ensnarl them further in role ambiguity; and
beyond law enforcement there is considerable ambiguity associated with the police role (see Potts, 1982). The police subculture and indeed according to Klockars (1985) the whole way policing is defined and legitimated both by police and citizens alike, work against such a transformation; as Klockars put it: "the contextual and ideological changes required [for CBP and related change] are unattainable". Sherman (1985, 400) has suggested that achieving the new vision of policing would require greater police professionalism and an effective national police organization in order to resist local political pressures better and transcend reactive policing. Involving the community as a meaningful partner in policing policy has met with considerable resistance too. Some of this resistance is within the policing organization itself (see Walker et al., 1991). Reiss (1985) has observed that a long-term commitment to developing a style of policing that is receptive to community involvement and open to change is required; still, in his view "it is very difficult to involve and sustain the involvement of communities and it definitely requires decentralization and even then the problems may lie beyond [police leaders'] scope" (1985, 65).

In light of the above observations the task facing modern police leadership oriented to CBP is obviously daunting. Added to the typical leadership responsibilities (see Swanson et al., 1985) is the challenge of effecting major organizational
transformation. Nevertheless, in reviewing several works dealing with recent organizational change in large police departments, Huff (1987) observed that such organizations are "more malleable than one might think and it is leadership not structural features that makes the critical difference"; he added that "while changing a police department may sometimes be reminiscent of 'bending granite' as Dorothy Guyot (1979) has suggested, even this task can be accomplished by a leader with vision and the skills to articulate and implement that vision" (Huff, 1987, 508/509).

Clearly much modern leadership 'theory' has emphasized the concepts, vision and transformational leadership and celebrated an assertive, dynamic striving for excellence. Vision, defined by Bennis and Nanus (1985) in terms of providing a clear, communicable direction, a future-oriented selection of 'the angle into wind' (237), appears to be the sine qua non of transformational leadership; Souryal for example even quotes the Old Testament, "where there is no vision the people perish" (Souryal, 1985, 76). While the requisite accompanying characteristics are less unambiguously stated -some writers talk of leadership skills while others emphasize power in the sense of drive and energy (Bennis and Nanus, 1985, 18) and most stress some personal characteristics such as perseverance, integrity and courage (Swanson, 1988; Bryman, 1992)- it is clear that mobilizing support and commitment within the organization is
especially important. Here current writings sometimes refer to charisma or, more specifically, articulating the vision and 'staking a claim for excellence' which is communicated through a variety of tactics including 'management by moving around' (Peters and Austin, 1985; Bryman, 1992). In general it is contended that transformative leadership will be most successful where there is a starting point of strong pressure both externally and internally for change (Swanson, 1988) and that the transformative leader finds it easier to promulgate a vision of change in times of crisis and uncertainty (Bryman, 1992, 158).

Applied to policing organizations and CBP these ideas on transformational leadership suggest a number of important themes. Clearly as Potts has indicated the leader will have to be an educator and a persuader, persuading "officers that social service is a vital part of their job, that they have a social mission that extends beyond law enforcement, namely the preservation of social order" (Potts, 1982, 187). Mobilizing support within the organization and involving subordinates in joint decision-making ('empowering' associates in current jargon) will be another major task; such a task will be difficult since delegation is reportedly one of the least common facets of police managers' leadership styles (Kuykendall et al., 1982) and most police managers and supervisors while preferring a more participative system, characterize their own organization
as 'benevolent-authoritative' (Bruns et al., 1988). The police leader too will have to become more active as a municipal officer, a public policy maker and implementer effecting community involvement and police receptivity to it. Referring to this 'networking', Levine observed: "their role [top police managers] will have to change from that of a commander of a closed hierarchy to that of an arranger of inter-organizational networks" (Levine, 1985, 699). Certainly where there has been strong evidence of effective transformational police leadership there also has been evidence of strong collaborative linkages being forged with other part of the municipal government system (see Couper et al., 1991).

Other implications of transformative leadership for police organizations may relate to the challenge of effecting both internal and external change and the sequencing of such efforts. Given among other things the expectation of stiff resistance within the organization and the tendency for people in different organizations to expect different leadership styles (Rosenfeld, 1973), the type of leadership effective internally may not be effective externally; for instance it has been observed that the way a police leader 'comes across' (eg inviting, empathetic) may be more significant in external relations with the media and city officials (Swanson et al., 1988, 134). Also it would seem, given the ambiguity of the police role beyond law enforcement and the long term commitment apparently required for community
involvement (Reiss, 1985), that the foremost task of transformational leadership in the police organization would be internal change. Accordingly different leadership styles may be appropriate in different phases of the putative transformation.
THE POLICING CLIENT: THE CITY AND THE METROPOLIS

Introduction

Halifax, the foundation city of English-speaking Canada and the provincial capital of Nova Scotia, has had a rich tradition as a port city and defence centre since its founding in 1749. From its very beginnings it has been an open, people-oriented place. As a seaport and administrative capital it always received outsiders and had a lively street life. Not surprisingly it also has had occasional problems of order and control. In 1929, for example, in response to criticism about liquor violations and street crime, the mayor observed "this is a seaport and it is impossible to have ideal conditions". In recent years Halifax has become even more a peoples' city where a colorful, open street life has been encouraged by City leaders. The downtown area has more than eighty entertainment establishments and numerous pedestrian walk areas. Major events now regularly attract thousands of persons, young and old, singly or in family groups, to Halifax streets. Natal Festival days bring street parties, concerts on the citadel hills overlooking the harbour and pedestrian strolls across the bridge connecting Halifax with the city of Dartmouth. The large crowds and good fun are undoubtedly why the American Busing Association has listed this event as one of its top ten North American
attractions. Each August also brings what has been called "17 days of controlled mayhem called the Buskers Festival" to Halifax streets. About 650,000 people have turned out in recent years to enjoy this festival of international street performers which takes place on over thirty sites in the central city area. Other significant festivals and street events include Mardi Gras/Halloween and the Uptown Festival. These activities have built upon Halifax's administrative and port life, generating both economic growth and a quality life style. They could also exacerbate traditional problems of order and control and create more targets and opportunities for crime. The challenge has been (and remains) to have in place an effective community-based and integrated crime prevention program so that Haligonians and visitors can fully enjoy the city.

The Downtown Development

The city of Halifax until 1969 basically was peninsular and therefore as it developed as a port, business and administrative centre, the population sprawled onto the mainland, abetted of course by lifestyle preferences. In 1969 the contiguous 'suburbs' of Halifax (virtually all 'bedroom communities') were amalgamated with the city proper. During the past fifteen years Halifax has evolved as a major entertainment and service area for mainland-especially of course metropolitan-Nova Scotians. Its downtown and waterfront areas regularly attract a large
night crowd while its many offices disgorge thousands of non-residents each weekday in the late afternoon. Table 1 on population size points up this phenomenon well showing the sharp rise in the metropolitan population vis-a-vis Halifax's actual slight decline. Also of salience is the fact that the population between the ages of 15 and 34—the age category most pertinent for legalistic policing—grew both absolutely and in relative terms over the period since 1971, reflecting the moving population bulge caused by the post-war baby boom. In 1971 thirty-five percent of both Halifax's and the metropolitan area's population was between the ages of 15 and 34 whereas in 1981 41 percent of Halifax's population and 40 percent of the metropolitan area's were in that category.

Given the development of a downtown night scene, the baby boom revolution and the


**TABLE 1**

**POPULATION OF HALIFAX CITY AND METROPOLITAN HALIFAX—DARTMOUTH**

1966 To 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Halifax City</th>
<th>Metropolitan Dartmouth</th>
<th>Halifax—Dartmouth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>120,808</td>
<td>120,808</td>
<td>209,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>122,035</td>
<td>122,035</td>
<td>222,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>117,882</td>
<td>117,882</td>
<td>267,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>114,594</td>
<td>114,594</td>
<td>277,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>113,577</td>
<td>113,577</td>
<td>295,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>114,455</td>
<td>114,455</td>
<td>320,501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Statistics Canada Census Reports.
large proportion of unmarried young adults in the metro Halifax area (enhanced by the existence here of four universities and one college) one might have expected that assault and liquor-related charges as well as public disorder calls would also have increased at least somewhat over the past twenty years. Dispatch data (see, Phase III, appendices 3, K and P) from the early 1980s indicate that roughly forty percent of the dispatches were directed to the general downtown area and the lion's share of calls relating to liquor offences also came from that area; however recorded charge data on assaults, disturbing the peace and obstructing police do not especially support the above expectation. While greater centralization of these problems seems to have resulted, the level of charges did not rise. New policing policies and new social factors have instead raised issues about the legalistic crime-fighting mandate that was perhaps at its height at HPD in this post-amalgamation era.

The downtown development has been pivotal to deliberate city planning aimed at revitalizing the city, realizing its metropolis status and capturing its full tourist potential as well as a response to profound social forces such as lifestyle preferences. It has not only created some problems for legalistic policing (e. g., more large crowds and centralized "festive" ambience) but has been important in creating, however implicitly, a demand for a new kind of sophisticated policing –not so much a technically
sophisticated one in the detective sense but rather one where a multiplicity of basic objectives such as service, order and crime fighting, can be smoothly integrated; a policing style more flexible, problem-oriented, sensitive to and participative with formal and informal city decision-makers and interest groups. One longtime street sergeant in the downtown area speaking of this complexity and the need to "bend the rules some", went on to observe that on a busy night one would find that thirty-eight of forty arrests involved persons from outside Halifax; thus knowing the area's residents well, which he did in his first fifteen years on the force, is now rather irrelevant as one is dealing with a metropolitan pattern.

Certainly the downtown area changed remarkably. Virtually all officers interviewed in the late 1980s recognized that point and referred to the new challenges for policing there. Many officers also shared the view of those who emphasized the greater sophistication required nowadays by noting that "in the old days" paddy wagon brawls at the taverns were much more common whereas now the people and circumstances are different and have to be handled differently. Another experienced officer in echoing this view explained that whereas in the "old days" (pre-seventies) the clientele downtown in the evening was more working class and male, the downtown development has effected a greater heterogeneity of both social class and gender.
Halifax Socio-Demographics

As indicated in Table 1, the population of Halifax city crested in 1971 when it reached one hundred and twenty-two thousand. The population of metropolitan Halifax however has been steadily increasing and between 1966 and 1991 grew by about one hundred thousand to surpass 320,000. Halifax city is clearly the hub of the metro area, its centre for business, government services, higher education, recreation and night life. Although there is some collaborative and voluntary regionalization of services as well as considerable and increasing talk of a formal metropolitan government structure, there are four independent municipal-level political authorities operating in the metro area, namely the City of Halifax, the City of Dartmouth, the Town of Bedford and the County of Halifax. All four authorities operate their own police forces. Bedford, Dartmouth and Halifax all have municipal police departments (MPD) while the County contracts through the Province for RCMP services.

The metropolitan Halifax area has always had a relatively small proportion of Black, Aboriginal and other visible minority persons. Its 'minority' population has deep roots (see Clairmont, 1972) but the numbers have not been as dramatically increased due to rapid urbanization or heavy immigration as has been the case in most other metropolitan centres in Canada. The overall proportion of the 1991 metro Halifax population
accounted for by such groupings ranges from 5% to 7% depending on the criteria used. The dominance of British, Irish and West European ethnocultural roots is evident in the fact that when single or multiple origin English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, French, Dutch or German roots reported in the 1991 census are simply aggregated they number about 480,000, considerably higher than the metro population of 320,000 distinct persons. Indeed the aggregated sums for Irish and British single or multiple roots totalled 356,000! Clearly there has been much intermarriage within these dominant groupings.

According to the 1991 census there are 6,795 persons reporting some aboriginal ethnocultural roots in the metro Halifax area (i.e., roughly 2% of the area's population). Still only 830 of these persons reported themselves as 'single origin' aboriginals (i.e., North American Indian, Metis, or Inuit), a number quite similar to the 1185 adults and children who indicated in the Aboriginal Peoples Survey, a follow-up to the 1991 census, that they were either registered aboriginals or identified themselves as aboriginal; the proportion that these latter would constitute of the metro Halifax population would be less than one half of one percent. For the province as a whole the aboriginal population could be considered either about 22,000 (the number of persons reporting in the 1991 census that they had at least some aboriginal roots) or about 8,800 (the number, subsequently indicated in the Aboriginal Peoples Survey,
who were either registered aboriginals or identified themselves as aboriginal).

The Black population has always been more concentrated in the metro Halifax area than the aboriginal population so it is not surprising that the 1991 census indicated that over 60% of the province's 16,485 black population lived there. The census indicated that there are 10,280 persons in the metropolitan area who reported their ethnocultural roots as one or more of Black, African, Caribbean, West Indian or Ghanaese; the total also included persons reporting multiple roots (e.g., Black, Irish and Italian) so long as one of the roots is 'Black', 'African' etc. Most (i.e., 7240) of these 10,280 persons identified themselves simply as 'Black', reflecting not only their indigenous character but also the slight immigration of Blacks to Nova Scotia. The 10,280 figure represents roughly 3% of the metro Halifax population.

Nova Scotia has had a relatively small number of other visible minorities. In 1986 there were but roughly 4,000 persons who identified themselves as single origin East Indian, Pakistani, Punjabi, Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Cambodian or Vietnamese; another roughly 1500 persons listed multiple ethnocultural roots, among which at least one was of the above types. The largest groupings were Chinese and East Indian, each of which accounted for some 2,000 persons (single and multiple origin combined). The 1991 census indicated a
slight decline in these numbers, namely 4155 single origin and 1150 multiple origin. Apart from the above ethnocultural groupings there are a few hundred West Asians (e.g., Armenian, Iranian) and about 3000 persons of Arab ethnocultural background, most of whom are Lebanese with roots in the province; these latter groupings are typically not considered to be 'visible minorities'.

Within the city of Halifax itself the Black, Aboriginal and visible minority/immigrant populations are, residentially, widely distributed. Still nowadays, given the relocation of Africville residents in the mid-1960s, Blacks are especially concentrated in an area of the city known as 'the Uptown' which also has a large number of Vietnamese residents and is the centre for much aboriginal social activity (the native population is not residentially concentrated) via the presence there of the MicMac Native Friendship Centre. The 'Uptown' (see Clairmont, 1993) has some characteristics often found in the North American 'inner city' such as a high proportion of public housing and senior citizen complexes, but there is too an identity and sense of community, as well as significant socio-economic diversity and increasing gentrification.

The economy of metropolitan Halifax has always been rooted in government (including the military) and the tertiary sector. Its labour force has been concentrated in the clerical, sales and service occupations. Part-time employment and unemployment
have been extensive in recent decades, the former accounting for almost 20% of the workforce in 1986 and the latter, the unemployment rate, reaching 10% at that time (Community Needs Task Force, 1989). In the same year, when CBP was being introduced in Halifax, roughly one-fifth of the metro population and about 11% of all families were below the 'official' poverty line or low income cutoff; these figures had varied only slightly since the early 1970s. Public surveys undertaken in the eighties indicated that for metro residents the chief social problems were unemployment and, much less, environmental pollution, followed in turn by vandalism and crime. It may be noted too that metro Halifax residents were more likely than the national average to participate as volunteers in organizations formed to deal with these and other social problems (Metro United Way, 1990).

Crime and Social Problems

Problems of social order fuelled by alcohol consumption have always characterized the Halifax area. Disturbance calls and drunkenness charges have always been a mainstay of the police work in Halifax. In late nineteenth century Halifax "public disorder caused by drunkenness [was] the major problem with which the police had to contend" according to McGahan (1986). McGahan (1988) has shown that drinking offences made up about 60% of all offences recorded in the Halifax Police Court
in 1883/84 and that pattern held over the years. For example drunkenness continued to account for the highest proportion of offences between 1916 and 1942. Disturbance as a distinct offence was also common.

In the 1970 to 1985 time period under consideration here drunkenness and public disturbance were not detailed in HPD's annual reports but, if recorded, were so under the category "other criminal code offences". While the booking cells were (and still are) filled on the busy nights with persons "drunk and/or disorderly" or who have caused disturbances -largely section 85 charges- this fact was not reflected in offence statistics because of new laws and procedures established in the seventies. It seems that until that era the police department itself was fining offenders. This practice was deemed inappropriate and stopped; subsequently the practice of laying charges stopped. According to constables working the wagon downtown, on most nights and especially Thursday, Friday and Saturday they were (and still are) very busy -"going all the time"- carting persons off to the cells. Typically after three or more hours in the cell, as the bookings officer saw fit, the offenders were released without further ado. The only record of having been "in the hole" was a line in the bookings register.

Of course in the 1970s and 1980s students and other young persons frequenting the downtown night scene accounted for many of these bookings.
Over the past two decades crime trends and patterns in Halifax, as well as clearance rates, have mirrored the national scene. Criminal code offences have increased, especially fraud, serious theft and, more cyclically, break and enters; but, overall, crime has been "under control" (see Table 2). Assaults have increased over the period 1970 to 1985 but not nearly as dramatically as other offences. Indeed if one combines assault and sexual assault over the entire period (and not just since 1983 when new legislation required it) then the peak period for that offence was 1978/79. Overall for all offences, reported actual offences increased sharply from roughly 7700 in 1973 to roughly 14600 in 1976 and since then went from a low of about 12400 in 1980 to a high of about 15700 in 1984. Increases in serious theft and fraud have accounted for almost 90% of the increase in reported actual offences over the period between 1979 and 1985.

In the decade prior to 1986 the major crime-related developments were the drug phenomenon and related criminal activities, the growth of street prostitution and the greater use of weapons both in robberies and in fights. In line with national and international trends, in the 1980s drug activity became much more troublesome as cocaine and crack usage increased. The sharp increases in the murder rate, especially the uncleared cases, and in housebreaks, shoplifting and theft from motor vehicles over this period can be largely
### TABLE TWO

**SUMMARY OF SELECTED CRIMINAL CODE OFFENCES CLEARED/REPORTED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ROBBERY</th>
<th>BREAK &amp; ENTER</th>
<th>THEFT OVER $200</th>
<th>THEFT UNDER $200</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970**</td>
<td>16/113</td>
<td>260/1018</td>
<td>227/1713</td>
<td>569/2626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971**</td>
<td>30/138</td>
<td>144/1145</td>
<td>200/1845</td>
<td>636/2612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972**</td>
<td>53/172</td>
<td>243/1434</td>
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<td>176/1738</td>
<td>959/3400</td>
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<td>92/275</td>
<td>410/2355</td>
<td>180/2644</td>
<td>863/3687</td>
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<td>278/2835</td>
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<td>264/2887</td>
<td>1033/3846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Halifax Police Department Annual Reports, 1970–1985

* 'Cleared' refers to the number of offence cases that have been cleared by charges laid or other means. 'Reported' refers to the number of actual offences reported to the police.

** In the years so designated the statistics for theft were based on a $50.00 requirement as opposed to $200.00 as in the latter years.
attributed to drug activity. Research reports clearly showed that prostitution (both prostitutes and pimps), break and enter and fraud/forgery were strongly associated with drug abuse (Clairmont, 1989). Drug dealing and drug-related violence including housebreaks have been especially significant around the public housing complexes in different areas of the city.

**Fear and Victimization**

Information available on public attitudes towards the Halifax police in the 1969-1985 period is generally consistent with research results found elsewhere which suggest very favorable public assessment especially at a general overview level. In her 1973 survey of attitudes towards the police Lowry (1973) found that almost 90% of her respondents reported themselves as either favorable or very favorable in their feelings about the Halifax police; similar proportions reported having some or great respect for the Halifax police. Lowry further observed that "the public think the police are both competent and have integrity" and fewer perceived police misconduct than was the case in similar studies in other countries (ibid., 69). As in other studies the young adults (late teens) and the poor, while sharing the above views for the most part, were somewhat less positive.

Among more specific types of users of police service a similar assessment was found. Campbell's study (1985) indicated
that victims of family (usually spousal) violence overwhelmingly depended upon the police for assistance and most considered the police to have been sympathetic to their plight and helpful within their limits. Also when asked in 1986 about their assessments and images of HPD in retrospect, businesses in the amalgamated areas virtually all agreed that HPD had responded quickly and with good service when they were requested. Most businesses also reported the police as having been quite visible even while often calling for more foot-patrol service; this assessment was commonly expressed in terms such as "they're around a lot and do a good job". Officials in schools and senior citizen complexes, asked their retrospective views, indicated that the service was good when requested but that their contact with police had either been minimal or only at their own initiation. More generally one could say that users were satisfied with what they received but they wanted more close ties, whether in the form of greater police-initiated contacts, foot-patrol or simply as one senior put it "get out of the bloody car".

A large, representative survey of Halifax households and adults dealing with attitudes and experiences concerning public safety and policing was carried out in the fall of 1988 prior to any significant external community-policing impact. Results indicated that levels of fear and actual victimization corresponded to those found in surveys of larger Canadian cities
(Clairmont, 1989). There were strong similarities as well with respect to who worries most about "street" crime (i.e., females, the elderly, the less socio-economically advantaged) and who is most likely to report victimization (e.g., males, young, the better educated).Haligonians were especially likely to perceive crime to be increasing in their area and to believe that more police are required. By far the major "big neighbourhood problem" was seen to be break and enter. Indeed almost a third of all households claimed to have been affected (directly, or indirectly by it happening to a close friend or relative in the neighbourhood) by this crime within the past year. Drug dealing was seen, along with breaks, as requiring more police attention. Respondents gave police good evaluations and the large majority reported that when they experience fear or need help their first response is to think of the police.

There was considerable consensus in expectations for policing and these expectations were very demanding in all respects. The chief conclusion of the survey was "the public appears to want a more permeable, approachable police force, one that responds to a wide range of problems well beyond crime per se; and they want to participate more in the policing effort."

The survey indicated that less socio-economically advantaged citizens not only expressed more fear of crime and more dependence upon the police for help, but also were the most critical and most skeptical concerning police behaviour.
Certainly this was the case in the Uptown area referred to earlier. Uptown residents perceived crime to be a major and increasing problem in their area, reported themselves to be quite fearful of victimization and considered that there were too few police serving the area and not enough of a police presence there. In the 1960s and early seventies there had been street protests especially by black youths there against putatively negative or unfair police actions and attitudes. Subsequently in the pre-CBP period the relationships between HPD and Blacks did not generate much controversy but it appears that the quiescence hid much alienation on the part of Blacks and much reluctance to become involved on the part of the police (Clairmont, 1993). Certainly HPD had no ongoing programs to improve relations with Blacks, no in-service race relations/multicultural training and only four or five Black officers, none beyond the constable level.

**The Social Development Approach in Halifax**

Halifax City bureaucrats since the 1970s have initiated a number of strategies aimed at poverty, welfare dependency and criminogenic areas. These have been done largely under the leadership of the Social Planning Department and without any significant collaboration with police. Spearheading the city's social development approach to crime prevention has been the establishment of the Human Resources Development Association
(HRDA). This is a non-profit association, spawned by but formally independent of the City's Social Planning department. Its goal is "to improve the quality of life for many people who are being adversely affected by a lack of jobs or proper training". Under its umbrella an integrated and thorough program of human capital development, generation of viable business enterprises and enhancement of community life has been developed. While not focused directly on criminogenic areas or offenders, the HRDA is directed at socio-economic conditions and personal characteristics strongly associated with conventional street crime offenders.

Perhaps the most imaginative part of HRDA is the HRDA Enterprises Limited unit. In operation since 1978 it is a stable business-generating, profit-making operation controlling six businesses with a total revenue of about $3 million and over 100 positions. Its goal has been to establish viable enterprises "which can offer a supportive environment for individuals who can make the transition between social assistance and employment". Under a creative financial arrangement with the City (an arrangement formally available to other enterprises as well) Enterprises Limited receives a "fee for service" (i.e., 50% of the pay up to a maximum of $8000) for all persons on social assistance who are hired and hence removed from the welfare rolls. This of course benefits both the City and the worker and is a major inducement for the businesses to
hire from the target population and to be sensitive to workers' needs for housing, day care and the like. While the project has been quite successful there have been three major difficulties, namely finding viable business opportunities, especially ones that will provide jobs for the target group, high turnover levels in the first weeks of employment among the workers and the shortfalls/cutbacks in federal funding for special training programs.

The Training Division of HRDA focuses upon life skills and motivation and offers several areas of specific training (dining room service, clerical, janitorial and maintenance). The centrepiece program here, Options, is funded under the federally and provincially cost-shared Work Neighbourhood Activities Program. Its focus is the disadvantaged but presently stable person aged eighteen or more. Along with a related Employment Support Centre (providing very basic work orientation for persons on social assistance) this division generates possible employees for Enterprises Limited, though of course many graduates go on to other, more advanced training and to other employment. Trainees, who must be referred from other agencies, pass through three phases of training over a thirty week period; their pay and the demands made of them increase accordingly. The Options program has been functioning successfully since 1986. The enrollees represent a good mix by sex, age and race/ethnicity. Less than 15% have had more than
grade ten education and roughly a third have had recorded criminal involvement. More than half of the enrollees graduate from the program and the majority of these are subsequently employed. A recent survey of participants from the first three years found that confidence building and learning to get along with others were the aspects deemed most beneficial by trainees. Chief problems for Options include turnover among poorly-paid staff and lack of resources for more specialized training which is increasingly required for employment.

The third part of HRDA is the Gottingen Street Development Project which is focused on community development in the 'Uptown', one of the most criminogenic areas of Halifax and where a large number of Options' trainees reside. This project was established in 1988. It brings together residents, businesses and institutional representatives in an attempt to enhance the quality of life in the area. It aims at generating an appropriate environment for both business development and cultural expression and identification, playing a broker or facilitative role for mainstreet programs, community development corporations and local festivities.

This social development approach attacks crime and social problems by providing training, employment opportunities and pride in one's community and ethnocultural heritage. Its advocates believe that by simultaneously enhancing self-respect and strengthening the sense of community one can get at the
roots of social problems rather than simply respond to their manifestations. Certainly in the 1970 to 1985 period—and well into the CBP era as shall be noted below—these initiatives were on a different and separate trajectory, than the police approach to crime and social problems.

**City Officials and the Police Prior to CBP**

Questions of HPD's management style and its integration into the central management structure of the city's administrative system were considered to be "of first priority and urgency" (Crosby, 171) by a special commission set up by the council in the fall of 1981 to review and recommend on the structure and processes of city government. Policing was given top priority since a province-wide review of policing and governing authority was already in progress, since the City had just experienced a long bitter police strike, and explicitly because "a number of the top police officers are due to retire. . . . (and the need for) a more effective chain of authority and accountability between the Police Chief and City Council" (Crosby, 171).

Up to this point in time HPD officially came under two committees, the Safety Committee made up of all members of Council and the Board of Police Commissioners which included all members of Council plus a representative from the provincial office of the Attorney-General. Apart from these committees
there was little other collaborative and regular linkage with the City administration. According to all reports there was little effective management direction provided by these large unwieldy bodies and the HPD leadership largely depended upon close ties with individual Council members to support its operation. This might be called the small "p" political strategy of HPD. The evidence suggests that to a large degree the strategy was successful. HPD was expanding and running its own show while senior City officials, cognizant of its political muscle, indicated that they treated it as a "sacred cow". But the costs of this strategy were high and included the chief's office being often inundated by the politicians' complaints and requests, the lack of clear City direction in policing policy and the under-utilization of City administrative resources. Beyond the politicians City senior staff were quite frustrated in their dealing with HPD and between them and the HPD management the situation as described by members of both groups in retrospect was "a stand-off" where little was given and little was received.

The recommendations of the commission with respect to policing organization were submitted to and adopted in entirety by council in the spring of 1982. To a large extent they followed the proposals of the larger provincial study which sought a less politicized governing authority arrangement and a smaller and much more active management board type of police
commission (see Green, 1981). While acknowledging a special status for the police department as compared to all other units including the fire department, the basic message was clear, namely that HPD had to modernize its management and had "to fit into the overall management structure of the City so that taxpayers will receive full value for tax dollars spent on administrative tasks throughout the City government" (Ibid., 176). These objectives were to be achieved through a revamped small board of police commissioners which could act effectively as a management body and could be to some extent a buffer between city council and the police, by closer coordinative arrangements with the city manager and, implicitly, by replacement of the pending retirees with personnel open to organizational change and modern management methods.

Almost immediately the new commission did become quite active. Minutes of the Board of Police Commissioners for the period 1982-1984 show that both budgetary matters and crime statistics (productivity measures as it were) came under regular scrutiny, that matters of training and police mandate priorities were consistently raised and that the commission led by a hands-on, independently wealthy businessman successfully pressed for civilianization, use of management consultants and the development of a five year plan. It seemed clear that if HPD was to retain the considerable autonomy it had experienced over the past few decades it would only be by raising its level of
managerial sophistication and actively interacting with and shaping its organizational environment. At the same time by retaining control over the civilianized financial section, coming to grips better with escalating personnel costs and streamlining its organizational structure the signs were there that HPD however tacitly was groping in that direction.

Controllers vis-a-vis the policing activity include elected municipal officials, senior City staff and of course the police commissioners. A large number, but not the total population, of this grouping were interviewed in the fall of 1986 and the winter of 1987 when community-based zone policing was not yet fully implemented in Halifax. Virtually all the alderpersons indicated that their previous contact with the department had usually been through the chief's office and to a much lesser extent, through the sergeant of the traffic division. A familiar refrain was "I've always done it (contacted the chief) because I saw him at Council meetings every month". These elected officials generally considered themselves reasonably satisfied with HPD in the pre-CBP era and considered it to have constituted an effective police force. As one veteran alderman noted "the police (read chief) had been quick to become involved in whatever the aldermen were interested in". Clearly a quid pro quo existed between alderpersons and HPD where the latter gave prompt service and the former provided political support for HPD's relative autonomy from city staff. Indeed
several of the alderpersons were unhappy with the 1982 reorganization of the police commission (where Council representation is limited to the mayor and two alderpersons) since in their view it limited their input into policing policy.

On the other hand a few aldermen, especially those serving on the local board, felt that the new commission arrangement has created a more efficient departmental governance; one observed that under the old system "there were too many people (on the commission) pushing problems specific to their wards". Whether influenced or not by the publicity and policing assessments associated with the CBP initiative most elected official also reported the view that the department did have a need to improve its image or "p. r." and that the style of policing had to change. One alderman stressed that the old HPD was "generally a reasonable force under the style of policing they were using" while several others echoed the view that there was a need to "get out and rub shoulders; get to know the folks in the area" or that "the police were just getting away from the public". Insofar as there was criticism of the pre-CBP HPD it was on this issue of openness/friendliness more so than effectiveness or any other issue. The image was that of HPD as providing good service but being basically aloof and reactive only.

Other "controllers" as defined above were more sharply critical of HPD in its 1969-1985 form. One commissioner while acknowledging the integrity of the force noted that the
management structure was weak, budget control poor, the promotional system in need of overhaul, morale poor and HPD unacceptably too much "the fortress on the hill". A senior City official echoed all these points contending that while poorly managed the department's political clout with Council had allowed it the status of sacred cow over much of the period in question. These respondents and others suggested that the reorganization of the police commission had been of great significance in breaking down the "politics" and facilitating a shake-up of HPD as an organization. Not being concerned directly with the provision of day-to-day service these persons were less prone to place paramount value on HPD's effective response style.

Consultants and collaborators vis-a-vis HPD also conveyed a image of the department as solid "meat and potatoes", but requiring some change in management structure and style. While some security personnel raised questions about HPD's manpower and expertise for handling fraud and sophisticated white-collar crime, respondents at the prosecutors' office did not cite a problem in that regard. They did however suggest that looking back to the pre-CBP era "the bottom line was HPD needed a shake-up"; the presumption here was that the organization could be managed better. Consultants examining the department in 1982 reached similar conclusions. Doane Raymond Consultants observed that the planning and budget staff associated with HPD's
Executive Office were hard-working but ineffectively utilized and too isolated from senior City administrators. In their recommendations - subsequently adopted virtually in entirety - they urged a streamlining of duties and complete civilianization of that staff.

The Institute of Public Affairs' consultants associated with the Commission on City Government project of 1981/82 noted that City officials (but not the politicians) saw HPD as a fortress and felt that they had a hard time influencing it. They observed also that the department was managed in a rather authoritarian manner by the chief. Like Doane Raymond, these consultants hinted at a morale problem because of management style. Finally they indicated that the top leadership at HPD conveyed a kind of seige mentality in the face of aldermanic requests and complaints on the one hand and financial pressure from City administrators on the other hand - the quid pro quo noted earlier clearly had its costs.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF POLICING IN HALIFAX

Introduction

In this section we examine the Halifax Police Department (HPD) prior to the establishment there of community-based zone policing and related changes. The "suburbs" of Halifax including Spryfield, Armdale, Fairview, Rockingham and Jollimore amalgamated with the city proper in 1969 and it is this post-amalgamation era that will be the focus of concern. The questions to be answered include: how had the department been evolving over the previous two decades? what was the basic style of HPD policing? how typical was the department from the point of view of budget, police per population ratio, civilianization, task emphases? how was the department managed? what were the department's strengths and weaknesses as perceived both by insiders and outsiders?

HPD: Structure and Growth

Structurally the growth of HPD can be gleaned from the accompanying table (see Table 3). Between 1969 and 1986 the Executive Office expanded in numbers and functional differentiation. The main growth area though—certainly from a proportions perspective—was the Detective or Investigations Branch which at various times formally included Technical
Services. Personnel and Training divisions remained essentially unchanged while the Traffic division, including the Mounted squad, was reduced sharply. The Juvenile unit's personnel were never separately listed in the staff establishment reports but the function was being performed by two police court officers and was recognized in departmental annual reports (especially a modest youth diversion program which had been instituted by the department). Community Relations grew and declined rather rapidly over a ten year period. The Licensing division remained roughly the same until it was merged with Technical Services in 1986. The latter was subject to significant gyrations in form and function for a variety of reasons including civilianization but there was an underlying constancy in work performed and the number of people doing it.

Overall the percentage of sworn members outside the watches did not change much over these years if one discounts for recruits who were often listed under Personnel and Training and if one takes into account that in some years (e.g., 1975 and 1976) officers "borrowed" from the platoons were listed under Technical Services. The basic percentage outside the watches was roughly thirty-seven percent of the total sworn members. This percentage, an indication of specialization, falls below but close to the average for cities of Halifax's size; Slovak, (1986) indicates that the average for U. S. urban centres is about 40% of the force outside patrol.
It may also be noted that HPD had been fairly typical for Canada in the proportion of its total police personnel committed to the Criminal Investigation Division, roughly sixteen percent over the years (see Chappell, 201). On the whole it would seem fair to say that HPD in this period experienced modest change and was from a structural point of view a department of moderate to low complexity (see table 4), especially when one considers also that there were no storefronts or precincts and that all officers worked out of headquarters. Associated with the moderate structural complexity was a high level of personnel stability.
TABLE THREE
TABLE THREE, CONTINUED
TABLE FOUR
**TABLE FIVE**

Halifax Police Department Manpower Changes

1969 - 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Authorized Number Officers</th>
<th>Authorized Number Officers</th>
<th>Number* Civilians</th>
<th>Number* Constables</th>
<th>Platoon Patrol Officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>18 + 6</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>234</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>236</td>
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<td>236</td>
<td>21 + 6</td>
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<td>152</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>21 + 6</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>244</td>
<td>23 + 6</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
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<td>267</td>
<td>28 + 6</td>
<td>104</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
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<td>281</td>
<td>29 + 6</td>
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<td>181</td>
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<tr>
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<td>34 + 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>34 + 14</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>268</td>
<td>35 + 16</td>
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<td>167</td>
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<td>280</td>
<td>38 + 14</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>190</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>34 + 14</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>34 + 16</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>174</td>
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<td>282</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>55 + 17</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>164</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

* The two columns shown here refer to civilians and commissionaires respectively. The number of commissionaires prior to 1978 and back to the early sixties was estimated as six. Not indicated are the part-time school crossing guards, some of whom may also be commissionaires.

1 In 1975 an additional 42 persons were authorized for HPD. 36 recruits were taken on in 1975.

2 In 1975 a new section of Records and Communications was set up and about a dozen officers were "transferred" from the platoons.

3 23 recruits were taken on an included in the platoons.

4 The increase in platoon numbers partly reflects the inclusion of communications officers under the platoons.

5 In 1978 the department shifted from a three to a four platoon system.

6 22 new recruits were taken on an are listed under Personnel and Training and not the platoons.

7 The increase in platoon numbers from 1982 reflects partly the recruitment of a new class and partly the shift of roughly 10 officers from Traffic.

8 The low 1986 figure for platoon constables is a result of retirements, resignations and promotions.
TABLE SIX
HALIFAX POLICE DEPARTMENT
MUNICIPAL POLICE STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUNICIPALITY</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>REGULAR POLICE OFFICERS</th>
<th>POLICE TO POPULATION RATION FOR 1,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amherst</td>
<td>9,671</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1:509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annapolis Royal</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1:210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedford</td>
<td>8,010</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1:501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berwick</td>
<td>2,058</td>
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<td>1:412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgewater</td>
<td>6,617</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1:473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>2,754</td>
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<td>1:551</td>
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<td>20,467</td>
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<td>1:585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1:434</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1:364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,772</td>
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throughout the various branches and in the chief's position (Clairmont, 1990).

HPD grew significantly over the period 1969 to 1985. The growth in sworn personnel was rather evenly spread between patrol and specialized units so the surface organizational change was modest. Comparatively, in proportion to the base 1969 numbers the growth in civilianization was much greater (see Table 5). Police personnel were moving from "supportive" departmental roles to more front-line, direct and, as might be said in legalistic policing language, more "real police" roles. A relatively high ratio of police per city population developed (see Table 6) but the growth of Halifax as an activity centre made these figures misleading. Finally a large proportion of sworn personnel were constables becoming increasingly senior in that rank.

**HPD Productivity**

Analyses of reported and clearance data on robbery, break and enter, theft over $200 and theft under $200 for the fifteen years preceding the CBP initiative (see table 2) indicate that as regards criminal code offences where effective legalistic policing might make a difference (i.e., sending a clear signal that the offender will be caught or in fact capturing career criminals) the period between 1969 and 1985 could be termed reasonably stable. A senior CID officer in HPD throughout that
period agreed with this assessment, noting that he and others in top management considered that the department was doing a good job ("and had the comparative stats to prove it") and that crime was "under control" (2). According to him the major crime-related developments during that time period were the drug phenomenon and related criminal activities (between 1972 and 1978, for example, drug-related charges went from 54 to 512), the prostitutes coming out of the houses and onto the streets and the greater use of weapons both in robberies and in fights. To illustrate the armed robbery phenomenon he noted that whereas at the beginning of this period all exits out of peninsular Halifax would be blocked in the event of an armed robbery such acts were so comparatively common by 1986 that this strategy or reaction was rarely employed.

Other sophisticated crime such as business and credit card frauds were also increasing but key police managers deemed that either through RCMP cooperation or by hiring outside experts such as accountants on an adhoc basis, the department had been effectively responding to this challenge. This assertion draws some support from statistical data from annual departmental reports which show that while actual reported frauds tripled between 1969 and 1985, and have grown especially rapidly in the 1980s, the departmental clearance rate has kept pace. It seems fair to say that the crime-fighting success was based on a hard-working, "meat and potatoes" style. Competent hard-working
detectives who knew the community intimately appeared to have
done well despite organizational flaws and limited resources.
Not only was the CID caseload often unbalanced but also attempts
to allocate the investigative burden better between CID and patrol were unsuccessful. Such attempts apparently were made on
a few occasions but without a changed management structure or new ideology of policing they went nowhere. For example one ex-
CID manager talked of sending some meaty cases down to patrol
only to find the response there being negative and the follow-
ups being done poorly; as a result he noted only "p.r." cases
were subsequently sent down; such cases in turn were decried as 'garbage' in patrol and used to justify their alienation from investigation. Moreover escalating personnel costs put
considerable pressure on operating costs since the late
seventies and HPD also lagged in areas such as investigative resources and the utilization of computer technology (Phase III. Operational Productivity Review, 1985).

Examining productivity beyond crime fighting per se involves focusing on dispatch materials and especially the utilization of officers in the watch or patrol where over sixty percent of the HPD members worked. The evidence is that calls to dispatch fell rather equally into crime matters (e.g., alarms), order maintenance problems (e.g., liquor offences) and service calls (e.g., parking tickets). It is difficult to assess effectiveness and efficiency in relation to these calls.
Clearly the department placed great priority on fast response to calls for service and typically responded to a wide range of types of calls. Analogously, in CID emphasis was placed on dealing quickly and effectively with complainant concerns.

In their report on operational productivity in HPD the consulting firm Mercer, Hickling and Johnston (hired through the Board of Police Commissioners in January 1985) did not deal directly with the question: "how effective/efficient is the Halifax Police Department's current operation?". Although the latter was indicated by them as the number one issue in evaluating the pre-CBP system (Phase III, 9), they opted to avoid "the sometimes academic debate on defining and measuring productivity" (Ibid, 10) and concentrate on areas where major improvements in productivity could be achieved. They did argue however that "the Halifax Police Department has performed the response function too well, the City of Halifax has become conditioned to immediate response to a wide range of needs" (Ibid, 27). For the consultants the response emphasis in patrol (about which something could be done) and the twelve-hour shift (secured in the 1981 collective agreement and about which nothing could presumably be done) were constraints upon a more productive department.

In the pre-CBP system at HPD watch or patrol officers concentrated upon response and enforcement, operating with 12 districts and 9 beats. Community relations and crime prevention
activities as well as referrals were formally at least delegated to a specialist division. As for investigations the patrol constable's job was to respond, report and clear, leaving the investigative work to the CID specialists. Any investigative work was largely (there were exceptions and to some extent an aggressive patrolman could sometimes do more if his NCOs encourages it) concerned with minor and usually low solvability cases subsequently reassigned to the watches by CID. In the early eighties the number of platoon investigations (that is assigned cases to be followed up) numbered roughly ten per officer per year and virtually all dealt with minor theft, theft from motor vehicles or minor property damage (Phase III, appendix R).

By 1980 police researchers were convinced that they had pretty much demolished the idea that the traditional strategies employed in patrol were effective in reducing crime or especially effective in apprehending offenders (Huff, 1987). HPD, like other departments, had few productivity measures in place with which to even contest the researchers' argument that 60% of the members (the watch) spent 60% of their time (in mobile patrol enforcement largely) rather unproductively. In a sense perhaps careful productivity measurement and analysis, beyond response time and the absence of complaints, was substituted for by attention to regulations and discipline. Under such circumstances it would have made quite good sense if
the tradition was as was indeed suggested by one sergeant namely "tradition has been to judge supervisors by how strict they are, how much fear they instill in the men". In summary then HPD in the pre-CBP era did appear to be doing an effective crime-fighting job as compared to other departments on some standard measures. Its crime fighting was largely the function of a comparatively honest, hard-working "meat and potatoes" style with limited operating budgets and scant supportive advanced technology. Changes in demographic patterns and in the city lifestyle, generated by formal City policies and underlying social forces, were however causing fundamental changes as to HPD's crime fighting mandate. In terms of response to calls for service the evidence suggests that HPD was effective and productive if by these we refer to wide coverage and fast response. However the need for and value of this reactive emphasis--response and enforcement--in patrol was subject to increasing skepticism in police circles and HPD had little productivity analyses with which to counter that skepticism.

**HPD: The Organization**

HPD during the 1969-1985 era could be characterized as a rather rigid, para-military type organization. Certainly that is the way virtually everyone from informed outsiders and consultants to the officers themselves described it. In referring to this scalar organization, pyramidal in authority
structure, as para-military, police personnel and others also were pointing to the heavy emphasis on close supervision discipline and rule by regulation and, more obviously, to the uniforms and weapons. Despite certain practical autonomy once one was actually "out on the streets" HPD patrol seemed to fit Grossman's characterization of a traditional police administration namely "highly programmed and structured task orientation. . . combined with emphasis on supervision and control over police behaviour at every step" (Grossman, 1975, 10). There were exceptions where certain supervisors encouraged the taking of initiative and the feedback of group discussions but these did appear to be the exceptions. The Grossman characterization appears to have been much less adequate as a description of the CID branch where the exigencies of the tasks necessitated both much individual autonomy and more collaboration than supervision across ranks. Insofar as the co-existence of styles did exist it was pretty much accepted as normative by top management and indeed by many of the rank-and-file. The well-known, long strike by HPD constables in 1981 was for wages (and wage parity with the neighbouring Dartmouth police department) primarily and the twelve hour shift and other issues secondarily; it was not a protest against the organizational dynamics of HPD. Moreover even as the department apparently experienced -according to its two police associations (3)- an increased amount of petty discipline and often arbitrary
action by the top leadership in the late seventies and early eighties, police respondents indicate that CID was largely unaffected. Just as, others might add, it was less affected by the fiscal squeeze the department was simultaneously experiencing. Perhaps then it is not surprising that the impetus for radical departmental change and a new style of policing was to come from ambitious leaders linked with the uniformed branch.

It also appears that HPD like many other Canadian urban police department in these times (see Sewell, 1985) had a rudimentary management system. Little formal management coordination appeared to exist; for example reportedly there were no regularly scheduled meetings of the top management group. Nor was there effective auditing or monitoring for top management policy development. As one informed management respondent noted "the old departmental style of command was to issue an order, put it on the wall and then forget about it". The chiefs were persons who had worked themselves up from the ranks and who had little formal management training. And they did not find in place much management structure. Consequently their personalities and work practices dictated their styles of leadership, either immersed in too much detail and "having fingers in all the pies" or adopting a more passive, "hands-off" approach. It is not surprising that the consultants Mercer, Hickling and Johnston emphasized management structures,
processes and style as the key issues the department faced in 1985 (Phase 1, 6-8).

Although having neither a surfeit of managers nor a sophisticated management structure the department ran its own show - despite formal legal control over finances and other considerations lying with the city manager and other civic authorities. HPD in this era fitted well the Grossman characterization of police departments as "fortress community which takes a clearly defensive attitude towards outsiders and potential critics" (Grossman, 1975, 5). Whether it was a question of supplies or even legal counsel the department through its chief exercised a considerable amount of autonomy. City officials, acknowledging some frustration, interpreted their mandate vis-a-vis HPD in a minimalist way.

As noted above when times of austerity began to set in for government in the latter half of the 1970s the financial accountability of HPD increasingly became an issue for City administration. This more critical focus on HPD's organizational structure was enhanced by the City's assessment of the 1981 police strike but most especially by general developments in the administration and management of government. Provincially, authorities were developing new regulations concerning policing and police commissions while at the city level, Halifax Council had set up a special commission to review and recommend on the structure and processes of city government.
In retrospect it seems clear that the 'fortress on the hill' was becoming an anachronism.

In summary then HPD during the 1969 to 1985 period was indeed a fortress community characterized by a paramilitary organizational style. But organizationally it was also more complicated and fissures had set in as regards both respects, the fortress and the paramilitary style. The working arrangements and styles in CID and patrol differed considerable and to a large extent were taken as given. The former chiefs coming out of CID apparently saw little need for basic change. Indeed it has been suggested that this was the "CID era". Management was neither top-heavy nor sophisticated; accordingly management style outside CID reflected largely the chief's bent. The more authoritarian management style in the later years, reinforced by the 1981 strike and perhaps partly occasioned by the financial constraints of these years, caused many persons inside and outside the department to believe considerable change was required. The modernization of City government and the accountability for the rapidly growing HPD budget raised basic questions as regards external organizational linkages. The challenge from the department-as-an-organization perspective was perhaps to effect these changes while retaining the high level of autonomy which was considered a valued departmental tradition. Meeting that challenge would seem in hindsight to require a new and activist managerial style (Etzioni, 1968).
Images of the Pre-CBP Halifax Police Department

It was widely held by constables, NCOs and top management respondents that HPD was a much less open department in the period preceding the CBP initiative and that a quasi-military command structure and a rather authoritarian style of leadership had reigned. Among the constables and NCOs in patrol there was virtual unanimity on that score. As one constable said, "HPD's style wasn't quasi-military. It was military period". Most management officers looking back at that era would have agreed. There was strict discipline that often became mere pettiness (such as watching for constables' leaving their cars without putting their hats on and then immediately phoning the platoon inspector down at the platoon entrance to waylay the culprit). The lack of an effectively functioning management system resulted in the top leadership "having a finger in all the pies" and believing that only by running "a tight ship" could the job get done and HPD as an organization deal with all its internal and external pressures. Most management personnel interviewed recalled the period prior to CBP as one of "crisis management without particular direction", the working situation as tense and stressful. Even the more sanguine considered that the department - perhaps under pressure, perhaps because of the chief's persona - had been since the late seventies evolving into
an authoritarian mode and that at least "a significant tune-up was required though perhaps not a complete motor job".

Constables and management officers alike retained the image of HPD as a good place to work in large measure because of the extrinsic job conditions such as compensation and work schedules but also because it was possible to find areas of intrinsic job satisfaction such as when "on the street", when the unexpected occurred or when dealing directly with what they perceived to be a usually well-satisfied public. But the organizational structure and style of HPD frustrated many of its members. Constables' image of the department was one where their input was not sought nor appreciated. Consistent with that they saw few opportunities to develop themselves through training and promotional practices were considered suspect. Relatively low morale and much sick time (at least in patrol according to both constables and their NCOs) were perhaps the by-products of their departmental images. Of course not all constables experienced things in the same way. Some did not chafe at the restrictions but rather accepted them as the way it is or had to be; but there are grounds for thinking that the "best" officers, the ones who wanted to contribute and get the most out of their jobs, did so. Management-level officers decried as well the fact that in the old system they were not adequately considered as human resources who could meaningfully contribute to departmental decision-making. While the constables may have pointed to such conditions and the associated adversarial style
of supervision, management officers themselves through their Officers' Association had been calling for a more, open flexible system and a more regulated promotional system.

Although the above assessment of members' images of HPD in the 1969-1985 seems empirically sound there are three important qualifications that should be noted. First as suggested earlier there does seem to have been a major contrast between CID and Patrol. Secondly while there was wide agreement among management officers about the manner in which the department operated in the pre-CBP period there was also sharp divergence in views concerning what changes were necessary and/or possible. For some officers fundamental structural change and not simply new leadership was required. For some a more relaxed atmosphere under a less intrusive and more delegating chief was all that was required. One such officer observed "we're a quasi-military group and when you start deviating from that you get into trouble". The image of HPD as crisis management also did not bother some since as one put it "management by crisis can be devalued too strongly since crisis is our game". Thirdly it was not unusual for police respondents to suggest that the pre-CBP situation had not been static but rather had evolved either in a negative or positive sense since the eighties (often the strike was taken as a turning point). Finally it should be noted that while a consensus was evident about the authoritarian leadership of the department in the period under examination a number of officers were quick to
acclaim the chief at that time for trying to maintain the independence of the department and for recognizing and appreciating hard workers.

Strongly pervasive among the HPD personnel was the view that HPD was relatively free of corruption and did a rather good job in crime-fighting. No officer questioned this basic competence, a fact that may be related to the pride in department that was evident even among the more critical officers. Another commonly held image of the departmental members was that HPD provided prompt response to calls for service. As noted earlier this emphasis on service was also evident in CID where it took the form of keeping complainants placated with respect to investigations. Most HPD management personnel opined that during this period the public was well-served and was well satisfied; in fact one observed that "the public got good policing in patrol even if the men (police) didn't especially like it (covering small areas)". Lastly there was a widespread image of the department as autonomous in the sense of "we depend on ourselves; we draw on our own resources"; such an image, rooted in certain reality (e.g., the isolation from community input, the fact that HPD did its own cadet training, etc.) fuelled a pride in the department.

The images of HPD held by the public, special interest groups and City staff and council members have been noted above. They were generally quite positive about the policing service being delivered, especially as regards enforcement, response and
investigation. At the same time most such persons also considered that the department was not proactive enough and too aloof and distant. City staff and consultants were much more inclined to be perceive major shortcomings in the way HPD as an organization operated. This position was certainly the view of the consultants Mercer, Hickling and Johnston who were hired by the local Police Commission first in 1984 to assist in the selection of a new chief and subsequently re-hired in 1985 to assist the department in the development of a new five year plan of reorganization. In their several reports they repeatedly emphasized the isolation of the department from the community human resources, "the fortress on the hill" (White Paper, 110), the claim that it has been "too response-oriented" (Phase III, 3), the fact that "all significant decisions were made at the top and innovation was not encouraged" (Phase I, 12) and inadequate development of both human resources and technology (White Paper, 39).

Their criticisms were directed most at what they clearly identified as a dated style and structure of management which they saw deeply rooted in HPD and which did not in their view tap well the human resources of the department. Supervisors were seen to use punishment rather than encouragement strategies to garner productivity. It was argued also that in the pre-1985 system "60% of the police force engaged in patrol time which is 60% uncommitted" (White Paper, 127). Surprisingly the
consultants also were quite critical of CID suggesting its
effectiveness had been over-rated (White Paper, 104). The
consultants did note that HPD had developed a tradition of short
response time, corruption-free policing and well-delivered
services; the public was said to have given HPD a high degree of
support. Strong divergence of views and values concerning
policing and management styles were perceived among the HPD
management personnel. What complicates the understanding of
these consultant images and contributes as well to their
significance is the appreciation that the consultants worked
closely (reworking position papers, etc.) with the innovating
leadership group which assumed power at HPD in 1985 and to a
lesser extent with the police commission. Accordingly it is
reasonably to contend that their views and images would be quite
compatible with those held by the officers who had the power and
authority to effect change.

**HPD on the Eve of Change**

An overview of HPD for the period 1969 (when Halifax
amalgamated with several suburbs) to November 1984 (when Blair
Jackson became chief of police) indicates four major points.
First, HPD, like other major police departments in Canada,
underwent significant growth in manpower, both sworn and
civilian, reaching totals in 1984 of 277 and 48 respectively
(Clairmont, 1990, 34). Despite this growth, structurally and
organizationally the department did not appear to change much. Indeed there was also considerable personnel stability at the chief level (i.e., only two persons served as chief over these years) and within divisions such as CID and Traffic. In the HPD organization, according to departmental consultants "all significant decisions were made at the top and innovation was not encouraged" (Mercer, 1985, 12). There was little management training or collaborative management structure and no regularly scheduled meetings among the top leadership grouping. Virtually everyone, from informed outsiders and consultants to the officers themselves, perceived the HPD organizational style as "para-military with heavy emphasis on close supervision, discipline and rule by regulation" (Clairmont, 1990, 51); excepting more leeway for detective work and allowing for the practical autonomy patrol officers experienced once 'out on the streets', HPD 's administration featured the typical top-down, chain of command police style of specific rules, supervision and control. Perhaps an indication that the system was in need of overhauling was the frustration in the later years of the top leadership itself which interpreted the organization in personal terms and tried to retain a strict hands-on control. The 54-day Halifax police strike in 1981, essentially over wages and the 12-hour work shift, deeply affected departmental morale and marked the end of the era where HPD operated as a layered set of fiefdoms, and officers balanced organizational limitations
against a pride in belonging to an autonomous body that looked after its own. Key officers around the chief, in the early eighties, whether in line or staff roles, recognized that the department was simply not being managed well.

A second major theme of this period was the accelerated move to a more legalistic style of policing. The police were moving to a more specifically law enforcement, crime-fighting role. Referring to these times, one management officer noted "we strove to restrict our role to police work". The street call-boxes were removed, the school-crossing function given to civilians, the mounted squad largely disbanded, more commissionaires were hired to handle traffic rule violators or to take complaints from victims and others at the platoon entrance, motorized response became the typical way police encountered the public and so forth. While the departmental adaptation to this public 'distancing' was to set up a specialized community relations unit, the evidence is that this thrust was rather modest and the unit had limited prestige in the department. As one might expect however, the prestige and stature of the detective division, CID, was very high. CID was where the status was, where the chiefs had previously come from, where the promotions were most likely to be given and where the most significant growth in positions occurred since 1969 (see Clairmont, 1990).

A third major trend over the period 1969-1984 was the
increasing penetration of the fortress HPD not only by civilian workers but especially by civilian authorities. HPD in this era would accurately fit Grossman's characterization of the typical large urban police department as "a fortress community". A quid pro quo had developed over the years between HPD and Halifax's elected officials whereby the department exercised much autonomy running its own shop while responding quickly to the specific requests for service by the elected officials and the public in general. But commissions on city government (Antoft, 1982, 1987; Crosby, 1982) and provincial commissions on appropriate structures for civilian policing authorities (Green, 1981) brought forth major recommendations that would make the 'fortress' more permeable to day-to-day scrutiny. The Halifax Board of Police Commissioners, established in 1977 and reorganized in 1982 removed HPD from direct aldermanic control. The new arrangement, certainly as defined by the Commission chair, a dynamic, successful entrepreneur, may have reduced the department's sense of being besieged by politicians and given it a buffer and a lobbying base but it also subjected the department to a much more profound scrutiny than in the past. The principle of HPD 's being a City department, even if a unique one because of less hands-on control by City management, became more clearly a matter of priority as regards financial matters, purchasing, labour-management relations and other administrative concerns.
The fourth point established in the overview was that, comparatively, the HPD 'product' was sound and well-regarded. The reality and the public perception was that crime was dealt with adequately by the department and that the department responded quickly and competently to calls for service (see Campbell, 1985). HPD mirrored the national scene with respect to arrests and clearance rates for most offences and did better than most departments in terms of fast response and response-to-calls ratio (Mercer, 1985). Whether in CID or on patrol, officers appreciated that for their supervisors the chief measures of performance were fast response and avoidance of citizen complaints. While perceived as aloof and conservative, the force was also regarded as honest, disciplined and hard-working. It provided in the eyes of Haligonians a solid if unspectacular and conventional kind of policing.

On the eve of the 'Jackson era', HPD's pending transformation was not a foregone conclusion. Departmental rivals for the chief's position, while all calling for more efficient and enlightened management, did not typically suggest radical change. Community pressures for change were modest at best and fiscal pressures largely meant that the police organization came under more scrutiny, not that the budget itself or even its growth was seriously threatened. There was however strong pressure exerted by the Board of Police Commissioners and the City administrators for HPD's developing a
modern corporate style and an improved relationship with City administration. The Commissioners' chair and the City's manager, both influential, aggressive leaders were desirous of and receptive to a significant transformation in HPD's organizational style. Blair Jackson, deputy chief, a tough-minded, analytically-inclined veteran oriented to organizational development had such a vision. Of all the preconditions for police organizational change cited in the police literature the most relevant in this instance was the following: "the new chief has been given a mandate to move forward with speed to rectify the difficulties in the department and is excited and enthusiastic about the prospect of implementing ideas formulated through years of professional growth and experience" (Swanson et al., 1988, 532).
THE VISION, THRUST AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY POLICING

The Vision and the Thrust

Upon becoming chief in late 1984 Blair Jackson quickly set about the task of transforming HPD. External consultants were hired to work with committees within the department, obtaining and analyzing data and other input from all sections of the organization and developing a strategic five-year plan for change. The chief's close associates in this process, the innovating group as it were, were a handful of officers, basically an inspector, two sergeants and a few constables, none of whom were line managers or supervisors. Indeed to a greater or lesser degree none of the top leadership group (i.e., the deputy, superintendents, CID inspector and senior detectives, platoon inspectors) in their own or the chief's perspective were seen to have 'bought in' to the vision that was being articulated and some were adamantly opposed to it (Clairmont, 1990, 91). The chief's vision was community-based, zone policing in the full sense of that concept as defined above. Powerful allies outside the department and indeed many management officers within it were supportive of a more modern corporate style and greater technological sophistication. But the chief was quite singular in his holistic CBP thrust.

At the heart of the chief's vision was a concern for
organizational development. In his view HPD was a poorly managed organization which did not utilize the talents of its officers well and which organized their work in an ineffective, boring if not demeaning fashion. Twelve hours of motorized patrol over an eight block area, limiting a patrol constable's activity to response and enforcement, uniformed constables being told they were not good enough to do anything other than boring repetitive tasks, poor if not improper promotion procedures, placing priority and status on detective work and other specializations rather than seeing these as serving the uniformed officer, disregarding the value of the constable as a contributor to departmental policy and problem-solver of community and police-related problems, managers not managing, and workloads "all over the place" - these appeared to be the organizational inadequacies that were central to his vision of change. Clearly another major motivation behind the chief's launching of the initiative was more effective crime prevention and better utilization of both police officers and the community to that end; this was indicated in his position paper where he noted "any community concern may be considered a police problem which the member might resolve by bringing the necessary forces together" (see appendix B). While keenly aware of and sensitive to the implications of CBP for external community and City administrative linkages, his thrust clearly was internal and police-oriented, bringing HPD into the forefront of modern
Canadian policing; it was less clear where the external interests lay in his scheme of things and how much of a partnership he would welcome if not strive for. Perhaps that stance or persona helps explain why informed outsiders, collaborators and controllers with respect to policing, often characterized him in perplexing terms as 'progressive' and 'old guard' simultaneously.

The chief's persona within the department was that of a tough-minded leader of considerable integrity who was task-oriented and not especially motivated to receive positive affective responses from other members. As one sergeant put it: "he doesn't make mudballs and ask others to throw them; he throws them himself". Working with consultants and departmental committees, visiting other Canadian policing departments to get a sense of what other reputedly progressive organizations were doing, he and the innovating group fleshed out his vision of HPD and communicated that in the department, inviting others to comment and 'to buy in'. A detailed plan was developed for implementing the transformative program over the next four years and while there was some flexibility in implementation the plan was followed. The chief was not deterred by internal complaint or threat or argument nor did he allow the transformation to derail out of empathy with disheartened members who had lost status and power as a result of the changes. As he commented, his message was simple: "I'm committed... and you're
required". He was confident that where he was taking HPD was indeed "the angle into the wind".

The thrust of Jackson's organizational development approach was clearly not directed at the rank structure though there were indirect rank implications that merit attention (Clairmont, 1990, 85). Nor was civilianization the major strategy though it did occur. Rather the thrust of the dramatic change is best seen in terms of two concepts, the quality of working life (QWL) and 'corporate style'. QWL as the concept is generally used, has two chief pillars namely job variety and enrichment and participatory decision-making (Labour Canada, 1978; Rinehart, 1986). QWL as a concept was not part of HPD's management vocabulary in the sense that this writer never heard the top managers use the term over many interviews and it never appeared in departmental documents. Nor was the CBP program introduced explicitly as a QWL program with a formal agreement developed between management and union/association and appended to current agreements. Yet clearly its essence was reflected in the CBP ideology and change. Reference in documents and interviews was often made to the need to effect a bottom-up management style, better internal communication and a more meaningful work role for the patrol officer as implied in the constable generalist concept. Squad and zone meetings were to be characteristic activities and presumably represent opportunities for officers to develop some lower-level policing policy and perhaps, by
passing up their ideas to top management, to influence departmental policy. The constable generalist could presumably get more involved in more significant investigative work and generally have a wider range of activities to consider in his/her policing task. Getting across these two ideas—and their practicalities—of job enrichment/diversity and participatory decision-making was one of the chief challenges of the four to five week special outside-the-department training given to all zone personnel.

It was commonplace for top management, the Board of Police Commissioners and the external consultants to refer to the HPD changes as effecting a new corporate model of management at HPD. CBP was seen as part of the new corporate style, a key feature of the Five Year Corporate Plan launched by the chief and the Board chairman over the period November 1984 to February 1985. Unlike QWL, the term "corporate style/strategy" was often employed by HPD management in public conferences, interviews and in departmental documents. Along with this usage often went reference to the community as customer and the officer as employee. Despite the talk there was little backup material on a formal operationalization of the 'corporate model' available. Implicitly the idea carried the sense of management being business-like and striving for the kind of managerial style detailed in the highly acclaimed In Search of Excellence (Peters and Waterman, 1982), a book cited enthusiastically by members of
HPD's innovating group.

In the "corporate model" HPD was to emphasize new planning and evaluation roles (e.g., the audit officer, the executive officer). Presumably a new organizational style was to develop which saw employees, wherever they were in the rank structure, as resource people who could contribute to the management process rather than simply being managed; thus a top management team was formed which met weekly, daily meetings were scheduled for Operations (the superintendent, zone commanders and audit inspectors), squad and zone meetings were to be held to generate "monthly" objectives and advance policy suggestions, and so on throughout the organization.

The active management thrust was to utilize task forces, study groups and the experience of other successful organizations in order to adapt HPD's structures and practices to better realize its goals; interesting illustrations of this strategy subsequently included the borrowing of ideas for internal communications from other companies (e.g., use of videotape to clarify departmental orders) and the setting up of problem-solving groups to examine issues such as discipline and promotion. Interfacing more strategically with the external environment was stressed especially at the level of the City administration but also with other police departments in the area for technology purchases and with the community at large through zone offices and community advisory boards.
Productivity concerns also were front and centre in the new system. Presumably the corporate model meant goals and objectives operationalized and regularly measured such that effectiveness (how well the work is being done) and efficiency (whether there is good value for the dollars) could be assessed; accompanying this emphasis were new forms for streamlining such matters as shoplifting offences and case management, daily field reports for patrol officers which yielded detailed information on individual and squad activity and a preoccupation with getting things down on paper in order to justify resource allocation.

The "corporate model" and QWL appeared quite compatible at that time. Participation, job enrichment, good communications and feedback were all advanced in the context of effective modern management and there was little suggestion that management could be replaced by more professionalism and/or collegialism. For police departments like HPD such a general thrust was also an acknowledgement that departmental personnel costs consume virtually all the budget and that the department would be increasingly scrutinized from both a budget and a productivity perspective. Indeed a quite frequent contention was made by HPD officers of all ranks and especially by the innovating group that the high costs of employing police officers necessitated their more effective and efficient use. It was quite common to hear them argue that the relatively high
police salary by Nova Scotian standards necessitated a quid pro quo in competence and service.

Of course emphasizing a corporate style and QWL-type ideology is one thing and fully carrying them out is another. Expectations develop about change even in such basic areas as discipline and the use of task forces/study groups usually results in recommendations that top management must then contend with if they are going to continue to use this tactic. There is also the question of whether there is a profound incompatibility between hierarchy and the acceptance of negative feedback (Barr, 1988). Maintaining the momentum and adjusting to expectations and suggestions/demands from below clearly calls for both sophisticated and committed management; the rarity of these latter undoubtedly is the reason few if any QWL initiatives last long.

The Players

As noted the immediate catalysts and the persons who gave shape to the rather amorphous demand for organizational change were three, the new chief, the chairman of the police board and the city manager. Their broad strokes were further elaborated and pieced together within HPD by what we have labelled 'the innovating group'. Other influences, internal and external, were largely forces and interests to deal with rather than integral parts of the innovation. All three leaders were
strong-willed persons willing to accept confrontation and capable of planning and executing their plans. All were vital contributors to the change. Their goals may not have been fully coterminous. The chief emphasized the need for job enrichment in patrol and more participative management, the chairman emphasized efficiency, integrative planning and modern technology and the city manager emphasized accountability and modernized management. But all agreed on the need for change, for more productive use of police human resources and believed it could be obtained. Clearly the chief had to operationalize modernity and sophisticated management in terms of the realities of HPD policing and the recent trends in policing practice. The chief's role was a very powerful one internally because of the para-military tradition and discipline of HPD and externally because of tradition and legal standing in Nova Scotia (Apostle and Stenning, 1988). The city manager's role was very significant as well. He had major influence over the budget as well as related administrative concerns. An aggressive person, his power had been enhanced by the acceptance of most of the recommendations advanced by the blue-ribbon Committee on Halifax Government just a few years earlier. And finally there was the chairman of the Board—a well-respected, successful businessman, a "builder" used to getting his way, his status was very high and strongly complemented his role as chairman of the Board of Police Commissioners. Insofar as all three formed a
collaborative team oriented to specific change one could well expect that the change and the funding for it would be forthcoming.

Within HPD the major agents of change were, in addition to the chief, a handful of officers who were the central players behind the innovation throughout phase one. All of these officers had a solid reputation at HPD where they had served almost exclusively as uniformed officers. Among them there was a considerable experience in the Personnel and Training unit and a concern for management issues. They were regarded within the department even by their detractors as bright, hard-working and ambitious. None was a toady; in fact they were largely persons who had innovated in the past in various ways and each exhibited a confident if not occasionally cocky demeanor. Their collaboration was based apparently on a similar orientation to organization and management as well as common ambitions; it appeared to have little to do with social ties and camaraderie.

While none were in key management positions prior to the CBP initiative, by the beginning of 1988 when the new organizational system was up and running all these officers had received significant promotions so the initiators of change were in chief management positions both in patrol and CID.

While the constables' union and the officers' association were supportive of organizational change and of the gist of the CBP program in phase one their involvement as such was limited.
Management notified these bodies of the program but not in such a way as to imply any veto or invite significant sharing in effecting the innovation on their part. Apparently the chief did address the officers' association on the five year plan and Working Group members did meet once with the union executive to explain what was happening. The Working Group did not include a union representative and no HPD officer when interviewed could recall any special meetings being held by either the constables' union or the officers' association to discuss the changes and debate their merits. The fact that some members of the innovating group had strong ties with these bodies may have helped to mute any participative urgings but the major factor in this regard appears to have been the tradition of seeing such change as a management prerogative. During the initial phase (i.e., 1985 to 1988) both organizations had a "wait and see; let's give it a try" position (4) and in small ways assisted with the innovation (e.g., the constables' union agreed to limit the right of consecutive vacation to two cycles and to have vacation "pics" decided at the squad rather than the watch levels, thus making the squad a more feasible work unit).

Within HPD there seems to have been little impetus for the CBP change from the senior positions on the operational side whether in patrol or detective service. Virtually all these officers were critical of the previous regime and considered management changes to be necessary. At the same time few if any
felt that radical CBP change was the answer; indeed it was common to hear the view that CBP experience elsewhere had been a failure. Rather they would have argued for more consultative management, directed patrolling, building up the specialist units such as CID and Community Relations and the like. Better training and supervision within the existing structure were emphasized. Indeed since seven HPD officers had contended for the chief position just several months earlier a lot of different perspectives were in the air as the CBP initiative was launched. On the whole however these senior persons were not significantly involved in developing CBP. Certainly there was no debate about alternatives nor any strong sign of adjustment of organizational change to accommodate these different perspectives. Whether by their volition or by actions of the innovating group -it is virtually impossible to sort out which- these senior-ranked officers were largely bystanders as the CBP system was erected. In any event given the traditions of an hierarchical system where "you don't press the chief" and where managers "play it close to the vest", the innovating group did not particularly reach out to these officers nor did the latter particularly come forward. On the part of the constables and NCOs there was considerable diversity in their orientation to organizational change but no especial pressure for or against the launching of the initiative (see Clairmont, 1990).

Outside the department and apart from the police board and
the senior city staff there was little impetus for significant organizational change in HPD. The mid-eighties was a relatively quiet period in City politics and in social mobilization. There was for example no obvious public demand for specific kinds of policing nor any focused criticism from any neighbourhood, racial or ethnic group. Most aldermen/women interviewed in the winter of 1987 indicated that the CBP innovation was the chief's idea and that they had had little input; virtually all were moderately pleased with the new police style. Nor were there any significant developments in criminal activity which acted as stimuli for change. Key persons in the prosecutor's office indicated that they were informed of the CBP initiative and subsequently participated in the training sessions held for constables. Not only did they not have a role in spawning it but they were of mixed minds about its advisability. On the one hand they considered it a backward step from the point of view of investigations since they associated it with a loss of specialization and experience. On the other hand they felt that CBP would have useful internal implications for HPD which needed something of a "shake-up" and would have good "p.r. " value for the department as well. Business interests and others such as security services at shopping malls were informed of the new system but had not been any kind of a lobby for change.

**Tactics and Strategies of Change**

It appears that in effecting change the basic strategy of
the innovating group, supported fully by the police board, was to move forward briskly, anticipating and not being overly concerned about others' reluctance. Task forces were formed, communications were issued and in the words of one member of the innovating group, all officers were encouraged to "buy in". Still the innovating group perceiving resistance, perhaps realizing that any profound organizational change usually produces winners and losers, and pragmatically working through the actual details of the pending organizational change, played it "close to the vest" and did not expend a lot of energy in consensus building. The bottom line was that the change was coming, that the chief wanted it and that senior officers would of course be expected to carry out whatever pertinent departmental standing orders were issued. (5) Police researchers have often contended that the police organization is autocratic and can be subject to quite radical -if short-lived-change; some have emphasized using its autocratic character to effect a more democratic organization (Westley, 1970). It would appear that such development is both more possible and more durable insofar as the rank structure is largely untouched as in this case of HPD and CBP.

Assisted by the external consultants a detailed blueprint (a five year "corporate plan") for erecting the new system was developed. The blueprint was taken seriously and followed for the most part. As the chief observed "we followed the five year
plan pretty much though some things we're never going to do". The changes were introduced rapidly and in fact the whole city was in CBP-Zone policing mode within one year of its trial inauguration in Alpha zone.

The full range of tactics from education to "coercion" were employed in effecting change. Education took the form of regular communications from the chairman of the internal Working Group directing the change. Pamphlets were apparently made available describing CBP. Both the chief and the chairman of the Working Group visited the platoons to discuss the change and a short video-tape describing it was made in-house and shown at fall-in; subsequently over the next three years all sworn members were exposed to several weeks training in the ideas and practice of the new system. Participation took the form of departmental memos calling for suggestions, the creation of task forces and the use of roughly fifty officer-volunteers to staff the first trial zone. Cooptation was evident in the way the innovating group dealt with the union and officers' association -friendly, informing and at a distance. Finally the tactic of coercion or issuing orders to be followed under pain of sanction is not extraordinary in the policing system. This tactic was essentially utilized in dealing with those officers managing in the Operational line (patrol and CID) where as noted reluctance and opposition was perceived to exist. Perhaps the most significant example of this tactic occurred in January 1988 when
patrol sergeants as a group were summoned to a special meeting and given a stern warning to perform as required under CBP or face dismissal.

What is essential in any event is the overall style or strategy not the characterization of specific tactics and in that regard both the innovating group and their leading departmental critics were not far apart in their characterizations. As one member of the former observed "We ran the show. We were referred to as 'the clique'". They differed basically in their interests in and their explanations for the strategy of change discussed above. Innovating group members feeling their way, encountering reluctance if not resistance, identified ideologically and career-wise with successful operationalization and implementation of CBP and perceived even in late 1987 that "the vultures are still circling". The critics and latent opponents were, until CBP was fully implemented, not constables but largely other management who perceived with some accuracy that they were the losers in the organizational change. Studies (Hansen, 1983; Wasson, 1977) have indeed generally shown that when such organizational changes bring team policing, constable generalists and the like occur, platoon inspectors for example do lose some power and status and the detectives sometimes lose status, numbers and resources. (6)

Finally three aspects of the strategy and tactics approach
followed by the innovating group merit mention. Within broad guidelines there was a pragmatic orientation. The analogy of alternatively loosening and tightening the reins was often used by members of the innovating group to describe their approach. Others characterized it as "winging it", "ad hoc all the way" which appears valid only with respect to details such as the schedule for implementation and the like. What the approach did mean was that specific planning was often considered "hush, hush" even by those participating in the various implementation committees. There was an obvious reluctance to discuss matters when it was unclear what would actually happen. This in turn generated some uncertainty and sense of conspiracy since queries were frequently met with a "don't know". A second aspect of the approach was the dependence upon departmental resources and a very limited budget allocation. There was a long-standing tradition of independence at HPD and in keeping with it, a source of considerable pride among the innovating group was the sense that "we're doing it by ourselves on a shoestring". Just as the innovating group was proud of the parsimony and independence so too they emphasized the significance of the HPD innovation, and the vanguard nature of the change in Canadian policing circles, as a way of motivating both themselves and other HPD personnel. In a variety of ways and contexts the point was made, as one officer noted, that the CBP innovation "isn't a foolhardy thing; the eyes of the larger police
community are on us".

Implementation

Implementation of CBP went through several distinct stages over the period January 1985 to January 1988. First there was the period of close collaboration by the departmental innovating group with the chairman of the police board, senior City officials and the external consultants. Here the directions of organizational change were considered, agreed upon and costed. The two crucial committees operating in this period were the Corporate Plan Steering Committee consisting of the chief, the board chairman and the city manager and the Working Committee, an internal committee which, with secondment, included most of the innovating group members. The Steering Committee's role as one member put it was to "manage the consultants, to listen to broad change proposals, comment, criticize". The consultants, in close collaboration with the innovating group, collected detailed information on all facets and units of the department and developed specific proposals and a timetable for specific changes. Members of the innovating group travelled to various police departments in Canada obtaining ideas on CBP, case management and technology. This stage of implementation, where "outsiders" were influential and the innovating group shored up their knowledge and collective commitment, came to an end symbolically with the submission of a detailed five year plan to
City Council in September 1985.

The second major period of implementation focused around preparing for, setting up and operating the first trial CBP model in the mainland area of Halifax, Alpha zone. Here the department was largely on its own, setting up task forces, selecting the experimental site, developing the substance and implications of CBP (e.g., the constable generalist role) and planning for the training and other requirements. The key committee here was the Working Group which included in practice virtually all the innovating group. Working Group members liaised with three more specific committees or task forces also set up, namely the Zone Policing Task Force, the Case Management and Resource Center Task Force and the Systems Working Group. The Zone Task Group was charged with determining the experimental site, recommending on staffing and equipment issues and suggesting guidelines for the zone policing experiment. The Case Management committee dealt with problems relating to the handling of investigations in the zone—the use of new reporting forms itemizing solvability factors, the development of a resource centre to deal with incidents where solvability was virtually zero, and the formulation of criteria for what was to be done in the zones and how zone investigative activity was to relate to CID. In addition to frauds, morality, drugs and intelligence CID also retained responsibility for major crime (see appendix A). The Systems Group focused on questions of
technology (computerization) communications and analysis.

Mainland Halifax consisting of all the 'suburbs' annexed in 1969, was selected as the site for the CBP trial. Staffing this CBP zone -labelled Alpha zone- basically depended upon volunteers who were plentiful at the constable level but scarce for the NCO positions. The motivations of the volunteers were diverse ranging from a desire to get away from a certain NCO or certain constables to an enthusiastic embracing of a new policing philosophy. In light of the limited knowledge most professed having had at the time about CBP and the experiment it is not surprising that many volunteers both constables and NCOs wanted to participate because they saw it as "a career move"; change was coming to HPD and they wanted to get in on the ground floor.

Training in CBP philosophy and practice and in guidelines for policing in the zone was emphasized by the innovating group. The curriculum, detailed in an eighty page manual, covered a wide range of topics (see Figure 1 for the outline) and involved the use of approximately 50 speakers/presenters. Supervisors had to be instructed in modern management methods, constables had to have the training to become constables generalists (i.e., more investigative and "proactive" know-how) and squad esprit de corps and collaboration had to be encouraged. The training period was four weeks for all zone volunteers preceded by a one week session for NCOs alone. In an imaginative stroke it was
decided to hold the training away from the department, using the facilities of a local university; not only did this remove the officers from distractions and opposing definitions of policing but as one officer noted it served to signal that "we are doing something brand new". Following what they deemed to be an important lesson from some American CBP innovations, the HPD innovating group decided to have the project officers go directly from their 4-5 week training program into the field. To a very large extent this extensive training program was based on departmental resources, entailing few outsiders and little extra cost for the department (see Clairmont, 1990, 101).

A third period revolved around the decision to expand CPB fully to cover the entire city rather than waiting and evaluating the Alpha zone experiment in depth. Initially in advancing the CBP-zone policing innovation the plan was to implement it in one area first then after it had been in operation for some time (between one and two years), evaluating it to determine if CBP should be extended (and how modified) throughout the city. It is not clear that this strategy was ever deemed desirable in the CBP literature. Wasson (1977) and others urged a fast extension. Certainly it is known that the old team policing initiatives often suffered because as experiments they were isolated from the rest of the on-going departmental system. In a related context Kelling (1987, 96) has observed that "the internal conflicts generated by having
two ideologies of policing in the same department invariably limit the potential of the specialized community units to operate effectively at the community level”. Certainly some problems and conflicts emerged at HPD over the diverse styles of policing in existence, especially what constables could do and relations between constables and their supervisors (see Clairmont, 1990, 103). Accordingly HPD management after a few months decided, with some justification, to call Alpha a success and expand CPB throughout
FIGURE ONE

OUTLINE OF TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ALPHA VOLUNTEERS
(Themes Covered in Sequence)

Week One: (NCOs only)


Week Two: Full Complement


Week Three: Full Complement


Week Four: Full Complement


Week Five: Full Complement

Preliminary Investigative Procedures (6), Problem Solving (6), Job Analysis, Informant Recruiting, Public Speaking (2), Departmental Policies (2), Review (2), Graduation.

Asterisks indicate that non-HPD personnel were involved in the training session. Numbers following a session theme indicate how many one and one half hour periods were spent on the topic; if only one then no number is given.
the entire city. Similar training was provided for other officers who would police the other two zones (i.e., peninsular Halifax was split into two zones, Bravo and Charlie) and by May 1987 HPD was fully into CBP.

One of the underlying themes of community-based policing is the idea of a better matchup between community interests and needs and styles of policing. Situations where there are sharply different race/ethnic and socio-economic mixes and where different styles of policing are desired by residents might well be the best situation for the kind of mixed-strategy model of policing implied in CBP (see Sherman, 1986, 343-86). Certainly neighbourhood differences along such lines have been shown to be related to different attitudes toward police (Dunham and Alpert, 1988). The zones created by HPD's CBP are not distinct communities of interests, needs or values. It does not appear that in the selection of zones much consideration was given to neighbourhood, socio-economic or race/ethnic factors and perhaps for good reasons. HPD leadership was concerned with creating a new departmental policing style across the city and with task efficiency. CBP did not develop in response to public pressures so zones did not have to be tailored along such lines. And of course erecting large and socially heterogenous geographically-based zones does not preclude adaptation and sensitivity on a more micro scale.

The cost of implementing CBP itself was rather minimal. No
significant manpower increment occurred and the department managed the training by itself, drawing upon free facilities and outside experts. The basic expenses were for the external consultants, on-site visits to other departments by the innovating group and some adjustments to the automotive fleet. Virtually all direct costs were covered from a $250,000 surplus from the 1985 budget which the department was allowed to retain for these purposes. Several million dollars were spent on indirect costs associated with the simultaneous introduction of a new and expensive computer system. Exclusive of these funds the department was favored by city council in the 1985-88 era since its operating budget was increased at a higher proportion than other City departments. Clearly the strong backing by the board of police commissioners, the city manager and the mayor was crucial in securing such funding.

Conclusion

CBP in HPD was a program of organizational change introduced basically "from above" with modest consensus building but with the tacit approval or tolerance of the union, the association and most of the rank and file. Clearly it was identified as the chief's plan or the innovating group's plan and there was considerable consensus on who the potential winners and losers (at least in the short-run) of the organizational change were at the departmental level. It was an
organizational change which had not developed because of revolt in the ranks or attempts by public and legal authorities to alter policing style; nor was it a direct response to public pressure or increasing crime. Its motive was largely related to concerns of modernization, efficiency, morale, better utilization of human resources and sophisticated managerialism. The impetus for it was provided by strong-willed, competent persons namely the chief, the chairman of the police commission and the city manager and a handful of HPD officers basically uniformed and outside the operational line. In effecting the organizational change the overall strategy could be characterized as one of fast directed change, though nevertheless pragmatic and considered. The CBP change was not costly in itself—apart from related capital projects associated with computerization—and indeed throughout this first phase the innovating group exhibited both a cost-conscious and a self-reliant approach to change. The precise settings for CBP, the zones, were heterogenous, geographical areas large enough to command considerable police resources and with sufficient commonality in calls for service, criminal activities and police response to justify at least initially and in broad strokes the notion of a city-wide organizational style.
CBP AT THE END OF THE JACKSON ERA

The Scaffold Erected

The new policing system put in place at HPD can be seen in Table 7 where staff establishment lists for early 1985 and late 1987 are selectively compared to describe how the department looked when CBP was just an idea and when it had been implemented city-wide. Three important changes can be deduced from the table. The number of full time employees increased modestly but this was entirely due to increased civilianization especially in the areas of automation and communications. The number of sworn members declined by about 5% between 1985 and 1987, a decline that was entirely among the watch constables as their numbers temporarily fell by roughly 10%. Watch NCOs jumped from 18 to 29 as three staff sergeant roles were created (i.e., the new zone commanders), a handful more sergeants added (i.e., squad supervisors) and the number of corporals (i.e., squad investigations supervisor) doubled. The third major change as far as sworn members were concerned was the down-sizing of CID and Community Relations and the elaboration of Automation and Communications. The detective division (CID), which had been the fastest growing sector of HPD in the period 1969 to 1985, lost about one-third of its complement while Community Relations was for all intents and purposes reduced to a press information
In more general terms the staff establishment changes indicated accelerated civilianization of support services such as dispatch and warrant delivery; elaboration of front-line supervision as required by the greater decentralization of policing associated with the
**TABLE SEVEN**

**HALIFAX POLICE DEPARTMENT**

**PHASE ONE STAFF ESTABLISHMENT MANPOWER/ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE, 1985 & 1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual Sworn Members</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>254 + 9(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch Constables</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>140 + 9(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Watch Officers</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>168 + 9(^2) + 4(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians And</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissionaires</td>
<td>34 + 16</td>
<td>57 + 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID Officers</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automation &amp; Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Officers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Full-Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>330 + 9(^2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Halifax Police Department

\(^1\) 1985 figures were those in effect in the early months of 1985 while 1987 figures are for the last month of 1987.

\(^2\) In late November 1987 nine recruits, trained at the Atlantic Police Academy, were added increasing the total members, watch constables and total watch officers accordingly. Eight of the recruits were dispatched to Charlie zone, which at the time had a complement of 79 constables. The other recruit was assigned to bravo zone which had 24 constables.

\(^3\) In 1985 the four platoon inspectors had their role redefined under CBP such that in 1987 they were both audit officers and watch commanders.
introduction of zones and squads; and the refocusing and down-sizing of specialist units in keeping with the change to the constable generalist "on the street" who unlike his/her constable predecessor was expected to get meaningfully involved in all basic policing functions. There is of course some irony indicated as well. As some specialist units decreased others such as Automation increased. As more decentralization of decision-making and expansion of the constable role presumably occurred so too did management expand to better control the situation. Still the picture is clear that CPB changed things considerably. The watch constables with numbers slightly less than in the old platoon and district system were expected, as constable generalists in the new CBP, to become more involved in community relations work such as visiting schools. The reorganization of CID into major crimes and intelligence/special enforcement meant that the zone officers also would have to pick up the investigative work associated with break and enter, auto theft and minor crime, all redefined as essentially outside the CID mandate. At the same time the table indicates that via the increase in watch supervisors and the development of new specialist units (such as crime analysts in Automation who analyze criminal activity in the specific zones) a structure was being elaborated to assist the constable generalists (7).

Prior to CBP the uniformed patrol at HPD was organized in terms of four platoons each consisting of an inspector, about
four NCOs and roughly forty constables. The watch was broken down into twelve districts and nine beats policed on a work cycle of two 12 hour day shifts and, after 24 hours, two 12 hour night shifts; between cycles there were four full days of rest. With CBP Halifax was divided into three large zones, each commanded by a staff sergeant assisted by a constable whose responsibility was coordination of crime prevention activity (e.g., Neighbourhood Watch) in the zone. Both these officers worked more conventional daytime hours. Each zone had four squads corresponding to the four watches and working the cycles just noted above. The squad leader was the sergeant whose role remained roughly similar to that under the old platoon/district system (e.g., backup, administrator, motivator) but who was now more "out in the open", more personally accountable than embedded as in the platoon system. Each squad also had a corporal who coordinated all its investigative activity. The corporal's role in CBP differed dramatically from under the old system where the corporal was essentially a lesser sergeant. Assisting the corporal (referred to as the GIS corporal) in directing investigative work was a constable (known as the GIS constable).

At the core of the new CBP system was the constable (i.e., constable generalist) now expected to do investigative and "proactive" (crime prevention, education, referral) functions additional to response and enforcement ("reactive" patrol...
policing). Patrol officers were assigned to a specific zone for at least two years. The principle of zone integrity was adopted so each zone complement exclusively looked after its own area and developed some collective identity even while being available to assist other zones in emergencies or in dealing with major crimes.

Of course CBP involved more than just a new structure. Implicit in it was a new system of managing the organization and a new philosophy of policing. The former reflected in the proliferation of meetings among top management and at the zone/squad levels involved the ideas of "corporate style" and quality of working life (QWL) as discussed above. The philosophy of policing change focused on increasing emphases being given to community concerns and problem-solving, a shift to order and service policing and away from the legalistic policing priority (see Slovak, 1986) which had dominated departmental philosophy of the preceding twenty years. One rather disgruntled senior-rank officer noted that "[up to CBP] we strove to restrict our role to police work but now it's different".

Community-based policing has not simply meant that the constable generalists split among themselves the proactive crime prevention work previously carried out by the community relations division. The basic departmental programs such as neighbourhood watch, school liaison, operation identification and the like continued on but now presumably better integrated
in overall policing activity. All officers, not just a handful hived off from the main force, were to become more knowledgeable and more informative about crime prevention. Moreover the zone format theoretically allowed for more sensitivity to particular problems and preventative techniques applicable to particular communities. Not surprisingly the different zones soon developed their special preventative programs; Alpha zone has emphasized "women alone" and "woods-wise" programs in response to their constituents' circumstances while Bravo zone has developed "venturers" and "shoplifting/alternative measures" programs, and Charlie zone took the lead in a 'taxi watch' program. Indeed a considerable array of preventative programs tapping members' interests and zone issues came into existence. Perhaps more important than anything, community-based policing meant a recognition of the police-community partnership. This was especially reflected in all zones by the establishment of small community police advisory boards in 1988. The boards meet regularly and have developed both a constitution and specific targets, usually focused on information dissemination.

**Major Elaborations of CBP in the Jackson Era**

Once CBP was in place, structurally and ideologically, modifications continued to be made to deal with problems that arose or to enhance its implementation. Four key such developments were changes in middle management structure,
manpower adjustments, special changes to more effectively combat street crime and the elaboration of external linkages that could effect more proactive and problem-oriented policing.

With CBP and its zones and staff sergeant zone commanders came the major problems of what to do with the once-powerful platoon inspectors, how they and the zone commanders divided up responsibilities and related to one another, and how middle managers such as these were to be trained. Figures 2, 3 and 4 depict the various models that were implemented over time. In Figure 2, the initial situation after the launching of CBP, the platoon inspectors became a combination watch commander and audit officer directly linked to the chief's office. Their function vis-a-vis the field patrol was 'control and discipline'—monitoring that rules were followed but not, except in emergencies, directing the activities of the officers. This situation created some confusion with respect to the chain of command and so the model depicted in Figure 3 was introduced. Here a superintendent oversaw both the zone commanders and the former platoon inspectors. Ambivalence continued though as to the appropriate rank for these two roles.

Figure 4 describes the current situation put into effect in late 1990; some appointments and the formalization of the new structure were actually made by new chief, MacDonald, but the plan had been 'in the works' and had been recommended by the external consultants rehired in 1989. As Figure 4 shows the
watch commander function is now filled by staff
FIGURE TWO
FIGURE FOUR
sergeants while the zone commanders, in keeping with the thrust towards decentralization implied in CBP philosophy, now has inspector status. The staff sergeant watch commanders, in daytime when the zone commanders are at work, are supposed to be in a training mode, rotating among the zones and CID. This model both resolves chain-of-command ambiguity and provides training for middle managers.

Crime rates especially for assaults (and murder) and break and enter increased significantly in Halifax in 1987 and 1988; (Clairmont 1990A, Mercer, 1990). Much of the increase was reportedly related to drug abuse. Newspaper stories focused on blatant street-level drug dealing and the intimidation of residents in these areas. At the same time HPD in terms of sworn manpower was at its lowest level since 1975 and eighteen officers under its 'authorized' complement. And of course the department was into community-policing which theoretically at least increased the workload of officers by encouraging them to become constable generalists. Break and enter investigations were major time consumer in all three zones (see Clairmont, 1990, 115). Constables not only handled the complaints but now, with CID effectively out of this responsibility, all the associated follow-up work. Morale sagged considerably among patrol officers at this time as did the earlier spate of enthusiastic proactive projects and involvement. HPD management and union, buttressed by a sympathetic media and led by an
influential police board, were able to get city council to agree to a major one-shot recruitment class of 28 persons who were to be trained at HPD beginning in the fall of 1988. The increased manpower in 1989 appears to have had a positive impact on departmental morale but while it may have made possible a more complete implementation of CBP there is little evidence for such a presumption. Rather crime prevention and proactive police work, apart from school liaison, increasingly became the preserve of the each zone's community coordinator and a small number of constables interested in particular projects such as venturers. (8)

Given the apparent clash of the principle of zone integrity with the reality of street criminals not respecting zone boundaries, and given the increase of such crime in 1987 and 1988, there was much pressure within HPD to modify the zone integrity principle and for the establishment of task forces and special squads that could supplement the activities of the zones' constable generalists and directly attack the crime problems in a plain-clothes, flexible work schedule format. This latter was a particularly popular idea among the 'best cops', namely those uniformed officers identified by both management and their peers as hard-working, energetic etc; such 'best cops' were typically enthusiastic about investigative police work. As the Jackson era at HPD unfolded more such initiatives were launched and by 1990 HPD also had in effect a full-time, small
special street crimes unit linked with the patrol division. In addition new rules were formulated for zone collaboration in response to incidents of major crime (see appendix A for the definition of major crime).

External linkages were elaborated and structured, especially in the later years of the Jackson era. In 1989 each zone organized, apart from its citizen advisory council, a zone support team composed of volunteers trained to assist officers in proactive duties. All zone commanders have operated out of offices in their respective zones and a fundamental part of their role has been to liaise with local alderpersons and City staff. In 1990 the chief established a village constable program—two constable exclusively pursuing community problem-solving out of the zone's storefront office—in the Uptown area of Halifax in response to demands from the residents there for greater police effort in dealing with street-level drug dealing and other order maintenance problems. Apart from these external linkages the Jackson era witnessed more collaboration between HPD and the City administration than had existed under previous HPD chiefs.

Impact of CBP

The major impact areas of CBP in the Jackson era would be internal since that was the thrust of HPD initiative until mid-1988. By his retirement it was still unclear what the impact
would be of the zone advisory boards and support teams and indeed much ambiguity remained about their role. The HPD changes that were effected by the CBP initiative were seen as very radical by virtually all officers, whatever their perspective on CBP, while the external community could see only modest change. In general HPD received much favorable media coverage about its CBP (see Clairmont, 1990A) and zone commanders reported having received much positive correspondence from citizens, businesses and organizations. School officials and local area politicians also, for the most part, noticed and appreciated the more proactive and responsive policing service. A few politicians did however question the level of police service their area was receiving and some prosecutors were critical of the quality of investigation and paperwork follow-up provided in the new system; here it should be noted that whereas formerly they would have dealt, quite regularly, with a much smaller number of police investigators (i.e., CID officers), now they interacted, infrequently, with a large number of patrol constables too.

Internally assessment of impact basically entails examining how CBP affected the
TABLE EIGHT
working conditions at HPD and what impact it had on conventional police productivity, especially investigations and response. Concerning the latter it is interesting to note that despite the increased workload implied by CBP, patrol officers maintained the HPD tradition of providing fast response to calls for service. Indeed data collected by external consultants in 1989 (see Figures 5 and 6) indicated that HPD still provided faster response for all types of calls, whether code 1, 2 or 3 in priority, than did the policing service in many other Canadian cities. Surprisingly too, although CBP meant the assignment of break and enter and auto theft investigations to patrol where officers were presumably restricted or limited by their generalist duties and work schedule (i.e., they worked daytime hours only two of every eight days), tables 8 and 9 show that the cleared-by-charge rate for both offences was as high as before CBP; indeed the only difference was that the 'cleared otherwise' rate in the case of break and enters (surprisingly not in the case of auto theft) was less in the CBP era; this latter difference apparently reflected the loss in communication and 'sense of ownership' that has been associated with the elimination of CID's break and enter unit. Traffic offences also showed no decline in the CBP years (Mercer, 1990). In sum then the CBP initiative was not associated with any apparent decline in traditional HPD productivity.
Working Life at HPD

The quality of working life movement or QWL became popular in Canada during the seventies and led to numerous governmental initiatives (see Clairmont, 1990B). Canadian assessment of these initiatives in the private sector have typically been negative, indicating that the level of actual change was modest and that 'management giveth and taketh away' as it
FIGURE FIVE
suited their profit and control needs (Rinehart, 1986; Wells, 1986). It is less clear what the impact of QWL might be in the public sector and especially in police organizations where there are several unique factors that could work for and against successful implementation (Clairmont, 1990B). In light of the controversy associated with QWL it is useful to identify some criteria by which one could assess the extent to which a QWL initiative might be deemed humanistic or progressive rather than just clever manipulation by management. Figure 8 provides one such list of criteria gleaned from union statements in Europe and North America (Ibid). Below there will be a discussion of the constables' reaction to HPD's thrust and subsequently a brief assessment of it on each of the eight criteria.

As noted earlier the thrust of CBP at HPD in the Jackson era was on improving the quality of working life (QWL) and establishing a modern 'corporate style' of management. Here brief overview-type reference will be made to three groupings of constables and their reaction to the CBP initiative as it bears on their work role. First will be presented observations based on interviews with a general sample of officers (i.e., at least two from each squad). Secondly the view of a sample of fifteen senior constables (i.e., having at least seventeen years in the rank) will be discussed. Senior constables are important to relate to since many authorities champion the internal QWL changes of CBP as a way of providing job satisfaction and higher
departmental status to persons who are unlikely to be promoted in this typically rank conscious organization. Finally the views of a select group of constables, namely "best cops" will be highlighted. These officers are constables who both management and fellow colleagues agree are excellent policemen; they are consensus best cops and their views of the internal changes may be quite significant since an old organizational dictum is in any organizational change do not alienate the 10% of the organization who are the chief doers.

Overall there have been swings in constable reaction to the CBP-wrought changes. At the beginning there was much initial optimism and, especially in the trial Alpha zone, considerable satisfaction with both the constable generalist role and the new participatory departmental style. In the fall of 1987 and winter of 1988 with manpower shortages, zone transfers underway, some retrenchment on specific policies (e.g., fall-in practices, calls for service policy) and a skepticism about management's commitment to the QWL aspects, there was a sharp decline in morale and much less favorable assessment of the CBP approach. By 1990 there was much diversity in the constables' assessment.

Figure 7 provides an summary overview of the impact of CBP on constables' working conditions. Generally it was held that the QWL aspects (i.e., work enrichment and participative decision-making) made for a work life superior to its predecessor in providing variety, opportunity, and job control.
Many liked the opportunity to do investigative work while others have a chance now to get appreciated for their more service orientation. Most officers believed that an ambitious constable who took initiative could do better at HPD than he/she could do before. Also most officers appreciated the squad format and the modest benefits of squad decision-making. Finally the new system generated extra pay for many because of the court time associated with greater investigative work and because of opportunities to take on acting-nco roles in the squads. On the negative side there were lots of problems in having to handle investigations within the restriction of the shift schedule. Most importantly the infrastructure requisites for job enrichment and participative decision-making
were often seen as lacking since constables perceived continuing pressure to give priority to the response function and there was little structure to facilitate their decision-making participation. Positive or negative, most constables indicated that they were working harder and being monitored more closely than before.

Senior constables were about evenly split in their positive and negative 'bottom lines' on the new working arrangements. Virtually all emphasized that the workload was greater and none saw the new changes as enhancing their promotion opportunities at HPD (it of course was not intended to do so). Some senior constables expressed preference for the limited police role constables assumed under the old regime whereas others welcomed the opportunity to do more investigative and proactive police work. Virtually all officers appreciated the wider geographical range of patrol and the squad format. Perhaps more than anything else the seniors who were disgruntled disliked the disruption of their routine at HPD without their meaningful participation and some at least felt that they were having to do things they were not used to nor well-trained for.

The "best cops" were all young veterans with an average of ten years on the job. They were all rather positive about the work changes. The change to constable generalist has enabled them to do more crime-fighting (investigating crime, forming special temporary task forces etc...) and this latter police
function apparently has always appealed to them. Still they acknowledged the relevance of the service or crime prevention/education side of police work and most were among the active members in this area of policing as well. The best cops were particularly good squad members, always doing more than their share while being supportive of colleagues and properly skeptical of management. They varied in their orientation to promotion; a few were expectant along these lines while others - on the surface at least- professed indifference. Among these officers there was not only skepticism but also a fear that management might retrench to the older style.

**Criteria for Progressiveness**

In Figure 8 are listed eight criteria which might be employed, from an employee perspective, to assess the extent to which a particular QWL thrust could be considered humanistic and progressive (see Clairmont, 1990B). The first criterion was that the main goal of the QWL thrust must be to improve the quality of working life of employees. The HPD innovation yielded mixed results on this criterion. Clearly the Chief and the innovating group at HPD at least partly saw themselves as creating a work environment superior, from a worker's viewpoint, than had previously existed. They invariably pointed out in interviews that the previous system produced low morale and was alienating. There was to be less emphasis on KITA-style discipline, more
status for the patrol constable within the organization, more job variety and via the squads more opportunity for constables to contribute to departmental policy. In the first phase of the CBP innovation in Alpha zone there was a sense created among the officers there of a department more open to constables' ideas and interests. Early on tasks forces were set up to bring forth recommendations on appropriate new styles of discipline and on more satisfactory promotion routines. Squads were given "blue books" to record their meetings, agreements and suggestions. Constables were selected to participate at the larger zone meetings.

At the same time it was clear from the beginning that the Chief and other leaders both
FIGURE EIGHT

SOME EMPLOYEE-BASED CRITERIA
FOR A PROGRESSIVE QWL THRUST

1. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE FOR EMPLOYEES IS A MAIN GOAL.

2. PRODUCTIVITY GAINS ARE A BYPRODUCT NOT THE OVERRIDING CONCERN OF THE INITIATIVE.

3. THE CHANGES MUST NOT WEAKEN THE UNION.

4. JOBS SHOULD NOT BE LOST.

5. WORKLOADS SHOULD NOT BE INCREASED.

6. JOB CLASSIFICATIONS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED OR UPGRADED.

7. EMPLOYEES' INTERESTS AND CAPACITY FOR MOBILIZATION SHOULD NOT BE THREATENED.

8. MANAGEMENT BECOMES MORE ACCOUNTABLE TO ITS EMPLOYEES.
inside and outside the department were concerned about productivity. In fact the Chief often remarked that "I told them I was going to work their asses off" and the chairman of the police commission and the city manager were more concerned about efficiency and modern management than community-based policing and QWL per se. There was little consensus among the constables and senior officers, outside the innovating group, as to how valid were the stated objectives (i.e., whether management believed in them and was going to really implement them). Also the goals of the new system were not stated in clear measurable terms nor were they arrived at through a consensus process. In practice the squad meetings fell far short of the ideal, the "blue books" were operative only for a short time, the zone meetings increasingly became open to constables only when they were in acting-nco roles, and new discipline policies were never formulated by management.

A second criterion was that "productivity gains must be a byproduct and not the overriding concern of the initiative". Certainly the new initiative was justified in part by the external consultants who recommended it and by the major players (i.e., the chief, the chair of the police commission and the city manager) as likely to enhance productivity. Indeed underlying it was what was known as the "60 by 60" thesis, namely the idea that patrol (i.e., 60 % of the department) "wasted" a lot of time (i.e., maybe 60%) in random enforcement.
The constable generalist role was partly advanced as a solution to this since by diversifying and enlarging constables' duties, presumably there would be less "down time". In advancing the constable generalist thesis the innovators also contended that it was beneficial to the officers in that it provided them with the opportunity to do more investigations (and get more compensated overtime possibilities too) and more proactive, educational and crime prevention activity.

Many constables did indeed find the constable generalist role advantageous in conception, enabling them to be less bored and to perform police duties that otherwise they would never have a chance to do. It also offered in theory the opportunities for an officer to develop "his/her own thing" with respect to policing (e.g., working with special groups). Of course not all officers did have this view and for those the initiative in this regard boiled down basically to having to do more and being assessed on more criteria. For the others there were still the questions of having the training and work flexibility to perform the generalist role comfortably. In both respects the department came up short, especially on the issue of relieving the officers of the pressure to respond to calls for service which have continued to mount over the years. While some steps have been taken by management to provide the infra-structure requisites for an accommodating calls for service policy (e.g, setting up a resource centre to handle some kinds of investigative call
backs) many officers believed that the problem required management's facing up to the political problems of persuading the public and civic leaders that fast response to all calls was an unwise policy. Given the calls for service and training problems many constables believed the new system just created more job tension.

A third criterion advanced for a progressive QWL was that "changes must in no way weaken the union". Along with the introduction of CBP, management introduced civilianization into the communication-dispatch system. By agreement with the union these civilians became members of the same union local. Virtually no one apparently perceived the CBP innovation to have weakened the union presence at HPD. The segmentation of operational and bread and butter issues presumably underlined this consensus since all agreed that changes have been massive as a result of the initiative. Top management continued to see the union as necessary and in fact appeared to be developing strategies to deal with a stronger union presence through the possible merger of the constables' union and the officers' association. Union officials continued to take strong positions in grievances and contract administration. There were some potential danger signs for the union strength at HPD which can be related to the CBP system. First there was the issue of satisfying both the civilian and officer members since there are significant differences in pay levels, opportunity for overtime
and promotion possibilities. Secondly with CBP has come police auxiliaries and volunteers, a strategy by management to enhance the community linkages of HPD and to relieve the officers of some crime prevention and public relations duties; such developments might also reduce the likelihood of growth of the officer group at HPD. As one union spokesman put it, these two developments along with much of the CBP reorganization may be part of a "trend toward doing more for less".

In a progressive QWL, goes the fourth criterion, jobs should not be lost. The complement of officers and of constables at HPD was in 1990 virtually identical to pre-CBP levels. The department though was clearly doing more and this was reflected not only in the institution of the constable generalist but also in the significant increase in civilians (paid significantly less) and more recently in the taking on of a small number of auxiliaries and volunteers.

The fifth criterion was that "work loads should not increase". It is clear that the new system was designed to increase work loads for constables and other officers. Perhaps more significant than the increase in workload has been the increase in monitoring and measuring performance. Both developments have been justified partly on grounds presumably beneficial to the constables and ncos. It has already been noted that the constable generalist justification included the reduction of boredom and the opportunity for variety. The larger
workload has also been acknowledged by many in management and
the rank and file as appropriate to the salary and benefit
levels and as a justification for their continuance. The much
more detailed and closer assessment of police officers has been
justified on grounds of fairer promotion and performance
appraisal. Whatever these supporting arguments may be, the fact
is that workloads and monitoring of work effort have increased.

A sixth criterion for a progressive QWL was that "job
classifications are being maintained and upgraded". Accompanying
CBP has been significant change in the role of constable,
corporal and sergeant; new job descriptions have been developed
for these and most other positions. It appears that all three
roles became more recognized but also more demanding, though in
different ways. The attention given in the new policing ideology
to the constable generalist and the fact that constables could
now frequently assume acting-corporal and acting-sergeant roles
(with appropriate pay increment) suggested that here there has
been upgrading. Sergeants' responsibilities became more obvious
than they were in the previous system when sergeants were
embedded in the platoon structure, while corporals have distinct
functions and no longer just back-ups for the sergeants. It
cannot be argued that job classifications have not been either
maintained or upgraded.

Perhaps the most complex criterion is that "employees'
interests and capacity for mobilization not be threatened". The
new CBP system has clearly dealt a blow to seniority. While zone and vacation picks still followed seniority and there remained a minute salary adjustment which reflected seniority, in the new system acting roles became related to having taken tests; accordingly it was not unusual for one of the most junior officers in a squad to take the acting-sergeant or acting-corporal role when either of these latter two were unavailable. But the decline of seniority was more pervasive, involving a change in climate that emphasized merit and achievement. Apart from seniority the biggest threat to employees' interests might possibly be in the much greater accountability that now existed. In the platoon system there was not the close monitoring that existed now where a smaller squads were supervised by sergeants (the sergeant had a back-up function on the streets as part of their job description) and corporals; CPB has seen an increase in the number of supervisors as a consequence of the proliferation of squads. In addition to more effective supervision there were more forms to fill out on work performed and also advanced computers to assist in assessment. Of course some officers praised all these developments as appropriately modern and fair.

Virtually all of the above criteria have been more of a "defensive" character. It could well be argued that a progressive QWL should be one where management becomes more accountable to the employees. Certainly among the most common
complaints or assessments of constables were concerns for how much management was committed to the QWL-type principles of the new system and what its (i.e., management's) goals and objectives were. While management has encouraged zones and squads to develop objectives, measurable goals and realistic strategies of implementation, it has not, in the eyes of most officers, been quick to spell out its own. At the squad level there has indeed been effective pressure brought to bear on most sergeants to justify their actions to the squad but beyond that there was little basis for talking about an increase in management accountability.

Overall, using the above criteria of progressiveness, HPD would be given a fair score, at least in comparison to other QWL-initiatives that this writer has examined. There were shortfalls especially at the level of participative management, and increased work loads, but most constables including the 'best cops' were positive about the impact, the program of change was still in effect after four years and external consultants were employed to identify key issues and advise HPD on how it might further evolve along CBP lines.

**Key Issues**

In 1989 external consultants examined the changes effected over the past several years in HPD and in conjunction with management recommended essentially that the department "stay the
course", that it train constables more in order that they might more comfortably fulfil the generalist role, that management strive to make bottom-up management work and that top management commit itself to a revitalization of the new system (Mercer, 1990). More than anything else the report recommended the greater decentralization of resources, programs and decision-making. There was limited involvement by the constables or the union or officers association in the assessment or the recommendations. The thirteen principal points (see Figure 9) that constituted the report's "basic assessment of community-based policing so far" were not especially controversial and probably did represent a modest consensus among the rank and file and between management and union/association. The four key issues identified (see figure 10) were also quite appropriate.
FIGURE NINE
MERCER REPORT 1989-1990

BASIC ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING SO FAR

1. CONSTABLES LIKE THE CONSTABLE GENERALIST ROLE BUT ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SITUATIONS REQUIRING SPECIAL SKILLS (E.G., CHILD ABUSE).

2. PUBLIC RESPONSIVE (CAC A PARTICULARLY GOOD INNOVATION HERE).

3. CALLS FOR SERVICE STILL PROBLEMATIC IN THAT RESPONSE OFTEN GETS IN THE WAY OF OTHER CONSTABLE FUNCTIONS. STILL HPD HAS ONE OF THE BEST RECORDS IN CANADA REGARDING RESPONSE TO CALLS, WHATEVER THE CALL PRIORITY.

4. CONSTABLES IN THE ZONE PERCEIVE S LACK OF COORDINATION OF INVESTIGATIONS (CONSTABLES IN ZONES CARRY OUT MORE INVESTIGATIONS THAN CID).

5. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DEVELOPMENT IN THE ZONES AS REFERRAL, PREVENTION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION.

6. ZONE COMMANDERS HAVE DIFFICULTY ACHIEVING THEIR MANDATE BECAUSE OF "RESOURCE ROBBERY", ETC.

7. THE WATCH COMMANDER ROLE IS AN INEFFECTIVE USE OF INSPECTORS.

8. BOTTOM-UP MANAGEMENT HAS NOT DEVELOPED TO THE DESIRABLE LEVEL.

9. MORE EMPHASIS ON TRAINING, DIFFERENT SORTS OF AND MORE PERSONNEL IN THE HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION ARE REQUIRED. TRAINING STILL COMPRISES LESS THAN 1% OF THE TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET BUT SHOULD BE ABOUT 4%.

10. A NEW PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEM IS REQUIRED.

CONTINUED...

11. THE CURRENT PROMOTIONAL ROUTINE IS INADEQUATE FOR THE NEW POLICING STYLE. IT PUTS TOO MUCH PRIORITY ON
MEMORIZATION.

12. REWARDS AND INCENTIVES HAVE TO BE RE-EXAMINED FOR BOTTOM-UP MANAGEMENT TO WORK, FOR LESSENING KITA-STYLE DISCIPLINE AND FOR INVESTIGATIVE WORK IN CID.

13. RESOURCES HAVE TO BE "RATIONALIZED" BETTER AND SOME CIVILIAN SUPPORT STAFF SHOULD BE HIRED. REDEPLOYMENT OF OFFICERS (RATHER THAN MORE OFFICERS) CAN ALSO BE OF VALUE.
KEY POINTS

1. There has been significant program development but now there is the need "to refine and refocus these programs and the mix among programs" for different zones and areas.

2. Community-Based Policing is more difficult to manage and sustain than the previous style of policing. A major priority for HPD will be to commit considerable investment to accelerate the building of the necessary managerial skills.

3. With the completion of planned technological initiatives indicated by the approval of the MDT's, the emphasis should shift to developing and sustaining expertise and capacity. This shift will require increased support personnel.

4. Feedback from constables and supervisors suggests that significant new investment of time and effort is required by leaders throughout HPD to ensure that the new foundation is capitalized on.
The recommendations on the surface at least appeared to advance the QWL dimensions of the corporate change. Clearly more effort and resources were required to effect the desired organizational change and the emphasis on more sophisticated management, decentralization, more training and new performance evaluation criteria were all appropriate. What was lacking was any indepth analyses or comment concerning why bottom-up management "has not developed to the desirable level" or how and to what degree it might develop. Similarly there was little such elaboration of problems concerning the constable-generalist role. The fact that many constables opposed the generalist role and saw it as forced upon them was essentially taken to be a function of lack of training and/or personal failings. However it was also true that while not wanting to go back to the old system, most constables and their union remained skeptical about the QWL aspects of the new system and the promise of meaningful input into departmental decision-making. At the same time they were concerned about the increased workload, the escalation of performance evaluation and the enhanced monitoring of their worklife; being "out on the street" no longer meant being quite removed from departmental monitoring.

Other issues not especially highlighted by the consultants were also pressing. Specialization had increasingly become characteristic in the squads and how, if at all, this trend was to be reconciled with the constable generalist role was a
significant issue for HPD, especially front-line supervisors. Effecting CBP appeared to clash with much reactive pressure and HPD had not resolved the political dimensions of this political issue by working out new criteria for dealing with alarm calls, alderpersons' request for special traffic monitoring and the like. There was also considerable confusion and ambivalence inside HPD and among the citizen advisory councils and support teams concerning their collaborative role with the department.

Despite the significant changes being wrong by the CBP initiatives, there was little continuous training. HPD's training budget went from a paltry $28,000 in 1985 to about $140,000 in 1989 (Mercer, 1990), still less than 1% of the departmental budget.

Conclusion

The impact of Jackson's transformative leadership has been considerable. HPD has become one of the acknowledged leaders of progressive policing in Canada (see Forcese, 1993). While the Halifax Police Department was certainly not the first police department in Canada to adopt community-based policing it became well-known for the completeness with which this style of policing has been implemented. The entire city was being policed along these lines and all departmental members including detectives and traffic officers had been trained in the new policing philosophy. A new organizational structure was
established and a committed cadre promoted into place to maintain and advance it upon Jackson's departure. By explicitly pursuing excellence in CBP and modern management HPD's leadership increased expectations and pressure upon itself in the department, in the policing community and in the wider society. Interestingly these new developments apparently did not come at the expense of law enforcement and crime-fighting. On traditional measures of departmental productivity HPD was holding its own as the Jackson era came to a close in 1990. Its clearance-by-charge rate for break and enter and for auto theft was as good as before the transformation and its response time for calls for service continued to be one of the best in Canada.

The impact of the Jackson era transformation was largely within HPD. The zone advisory councils and voluntary support teams, while in place, were still in infancy and searching for appropriate roles and for acceptance by the rank-and-file and middle and lower management of HPD. The village constable program had just been launched (Clairmont, 1991). Linkages with City administration while much more extensive than earlier years still fell far short of what civic leaders and theorists of modern police management considered desirable. Little had been done in the field of race relations and multiculturalism, an area of policing that was becoming more pressing as a result of the Marshall Inquiry (9), increasing protests of the local black community and social forces and incidents in the broader society.
(see Sunahara, 1992).

Within the department there were clearly many unfinished tasks, something recognized of course by Jackson who mused recently that a few more years might have been desirable for him to fine-tune things. Among the principal unfinished tasks were case management revisions, executing new performance evaluation methods, developing strategies concerning the creation and operation of special tactical task forces (e.g., street crime unit, special zone tactical units), shoring up the constable generalist role in the face of inevitable pressures for everyday specialization and effecting a substantial level of participatory decision-making in the department. All these aspects of organizational transformation, like the external challenges noted above, take time to realize fully. It is not for nothing that CBP advocates emphasize long-term commitment.

As 1990 drew to a close it was clear that while officers were working harder and some were experiencing job tension meeting the more demanding and sophisticated requirements of the new system, uniformed officers in particular also had greater job variety, wider patrol areas, more experience in supervision, more investigative work and more opportunity to shape their job to their interests and to participate in squad-level decision-making. From Jackson's point of view the trade-off was a good one for the officers ("I always told them I was going to work their asses off"). This appeared also to be the position of
most, though not all, officers and especially those who were active in trying to control their jobs, who relished investigative work or had some particular 'angle' they wanted to bring to their policing. While Jackson was never a charismatic nor especially popular leader, he was a very effective one and able to articulate and implement a coherent vision of a transformed HPD When he retired he bequeathed an organization that was far different from the one he 'inherited' six years earlier and one where in his view "it was now possible to be able to fulfil yourself as a police officer".
The Leadership Style

When Vince MacDonald succeeded Blair Jackson as HPD's chief in late 1990 it could be expected that the department would stay on the transformed path. MacDonald had been the Jackson's closest associate throughout the latter's tenure as chief and, among his many roles in the department, the principal ones (held simultaneously for the most part) were 'Implementation Officer For The Five Year Corporate Plan' and 'Superintendent of CID'. The new chief did indeed maintain the articulated CBP vision but new challenges and opportunities, especially in the area of race and ethnic relations, plus his own distinctive vision and persona have led to a more developmental thrust externally and an integrative, human relations approach internally.

Within HPD the MacDonald years thus far (he has only served one-third of his anticipated seven year tenure) have been focused on maintaining and fine tuning the organizational development effected in the Jackson years. The new chief's perspective internally has been a 'human relations' approach, patching up the wounds and soothing the feelings of those negatively affected by the transformation, building a stronger sense of esprit de corps and 'family' at HPD (e.g., recently HPD held an open house for members' families) and exhibiting a
considerable sensitivity to officers' stress and desire for recognition. Within weeks of assuming the chief's role, he made a number of higher level management promotions and transfers which signalled the new style while maintaining the CBP vision. Consistent with his long-established personal voluntary counselling, the chief has also let all officers know that he can be reached and would respond supportively to their stresses and crises; in fact under his aegis HPD now has a constable deployed full-time providing this kind of support service to members. In addition recognition of outstanding police work has been highlighted by a special award given annually. Through tactics such as an open-door policy, 'management by moving around', communicating his objectives and perspective directly with all squads, and sheer hard work and long hours, he has emphasized a high level of personal accessibility. Virtually all officers interviewed indicated that since 1991 the department has been in 'a humanistic mode'.

Internal Change

In MacDonald's view one of the most, if not the most, important innovation introduced thus far in his tenure as chief has been the departmental 'mission statement' which sets out in capsule form the departmental objectives and approach (see figure 11). There have been few changes in HPD's organizational structure but those that have been made have been consistent
with the QWL and 'corporate style' thrusts introduced by the former chief. A somewhat flatter organizational structure has been achieved by adopting a three deputy model and eliminating the superintendent and executive inspector roles. MacDonald also made the key appointments for, and formally carried through the restructuring of middle management, noted above, which saw the zone commander be designated an inspector rank and the watch commander become a staff sergeant position. Also there has been under his leadership some modest decentralization along the lines suggested by external consultants (i.e., Mercer, 1990).
Halifax Police Department

Mission Statement

"Custos Civitatis"
Guardians of the City

The Halifax Police Department, in concert with the citizens of Halifax, will preserve the quality of life in our community by maintaining Halifax as a secure and safe city.

As a member of the Corporation of the City of Halifax, we will work in partnership with other departments and agencies to optimize public safety.

We are dedicated to the philosophy and operational concept of Community Base Policing and problem solving in partnership with the community, focusing on the policing functions of response, crime solving, enforcement, crime prevention, referral and public education/consultation.

We shall uphold the principles as set forth in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms treating all persons fairly, regardless of sex, race, colour, religion or national origin, exercising our authority and providing employment opportunity without prejudice.
Extensive training was given in supervision and management practice, in both 1991 and 1992, to all patrol sergeants following another recommendation by consultants. The drug squad in CID has been beefed up in response to continuing high levels of street trafficking.

Other modest changes have been made but for all intents and purposes the internal situation, its structures, practices and unfinished CBP business, is much the way it was on Jackson's retirement. This, as suggested above, is partly because of the new chief's perspective and partly (and congruently) an apparently necessary phase of organizational 'breath-taking and maintenance' (see Swanson, 1988 p143). A third reason is that external challenges and opportunities have absorbed much of the new chief's attention.

**The External Challenge**

As the Jackson era drew to a close it was quite clear that the impact of CBP at HPD had been largely internal though the structures for significant external impact had been put into place. These latter were chiefly advisory councils and voluntary support teams in each zone, 'storefront' zone offices, and in response to community demand and serious crime and order problems there, beat patrol and village constables (i.e., two community officers virtually exclusively engaged in proactive and problem-solving activity) in the Uptown area. While the
external challenge for the new chief was similar to the internal challenge he faced —namely make the new structures work well in order to achieve CBP—, the external challenge necessitated changes in attitudes and behaviour among persons inside and outside the department and required subtle forms of leadership.

Changing the relationship between black residents and the police and effecting a new style of policing in the Uptown area became a major challenge to the department in the late 1980s and carried on into the 1990s. A stormy period in late 1960s and early 1970s had been followed by more than a decade of quiescence characterized by little interaction or collaboration between police and the black community in and around the Uptown (see Clairmont 1993A). For a host of reasons, especially street drug dealing, that quiescence was no longer sustainable by the mid-eighties and a new system was required. Interestingly the Uptown situation appears to have been exactly the kind of social situation to which CBP in the U.S.A. and U.K. was often deemed to be the appropriate response.

It has been observed by police researchers that suburbs and similar type city neighbourhoods, with their social homogeneity, little crime and absence of social order problems did not need what might be called 'order maintenance' policing and did not want police around save when needed and then wanted them fast. The legalistic policing which Halifax developed thoroughly in the 1969–1985 period was appropriate to that kind of demand. But
inner city areas such as the Uptown with their social diversity, poverty, order problems etc wanted and needed something different, namely a visible police presence where police emphasized order maintenance rather than legalistic policing and exhibited a sensitivity to and familiarity with the area. In the USA and the UK CBP initiatives were often linked to demands from such areas. Clearly such demands/pressure led to chief Jackson's initiatives in the Uptown. Clearly too how well HPD dealt with the situation would be a good if tough test of its CBP effort externally.

The new chief has developed substantially HPD's external CBP dimensions. Within seven months of his tenure he had to deal with significant disturbances which both reflected and inflamed police-black race relations. He had also an opportunity later to deal innovatively with native-police relations. The chief, empathetic to minority groups and having thought long about issues such as effective police recruitment programs for minorities, has introduced a radical minority cadet recruitment and training program into the department and also a civilian native liaison position (see appendix C), both of which involved considerable departmental resources as well as the department's receiving significant project funding from federal and provincial sources (10). When the cadets come on stream the number of black officers will be fifteen, a percentage of HPD sworn membership greater than the black population/Halifax
population ratio. Visible minorities have also been recruited for the civilian positions at HPD. Apart from these initiatives he responded to a major July 19, 1991 disturbance or riot by establishing numerous linkages with the black community and inviting (and receiving) its full and equal participation on an incident review committee formed to examine that incident, especially as regards police-black relations.

In general MacDonald has oriented HPD significantly to the challenges of race relations and multiculturalism. In addition to forming a departmental race relations committee, the chief has involved HPD in larger City committees concerned with these issues. Most HPD management has also participated in race and cultural sensitivity training workshops within the past two years. He has redefined zone coordinators' job titles (see appendix C) to reflect that emphasis and has plans for a senior management position being devoted to that concern in order to underline further the departmental commitment. More than anything else he has himself taken a highly visible leadership role in that area, becoming almost a fixture at conferences and other local events focused on it in one way or another.

The Other External Challenges

Another dimension of CBP and modern management 'theory' where the new chief has developed HPD considerably is locating the police organization more fully in the nexus of City
administration. Under his leadership the ties between HPD and other City departments have already grown enormously; in addition to the chief's being an active participant at meetings of City departmental managers and thereby helping to shape the modern policing environment, linkages have been formed (i.e., personnel exchanged and/or involved in concerted ways) with 'city legal', recreation, finance, social planning and the fire department. In the chief's words: "we [police] are part of a team; we are part of the corporation".

HPD has also developed more linkages with voluntary organizations in the community primarily through special proactive programs developed by the different zone offices. In this regard its recruitment of female officers has been significant. Whereas there were only two female officers in 1985, there were fifteen by 1993. This change in turn has enabled HPD to take a higher profile in public meetings dealing with matters such as sexual assault. (11)

Consistent with this external focus MacDonald has developed new ties with 'the media' (print, radio and television), making the chief's office more accessible to it, holding regular (about every six weeks) off-the-record scrums with media representatives and facilitating their contact with a wider range of departmental spokespersons. Not surprisingly HPD has also been effective communicating with elected officials and responding to their concerns. A major tactic here has been to
encourage communication between elected officials and the zone commanders responsible for organizing the policing in the areas concerned; the typically high praise accorded zone commanders at meetings of City Council indicates that this decentralization strategy has been working well.

**Impact**

The impact of the MacDonald tenure thus far has been quite considerable externally. To use words noted earlier the 'way he has come across' has impacted big on the media and city officials. Within certain media circles the sobriquet, 'super vince' is often applied respectfully to him and virtually all media have been particularly taken with his openness and commitment to minority concerns; as one media person remarked, before HPD announced its minority recruitment program and native civilian-liaison project, " [the chief] has so far shown himself to be far more open to at least talking about issues like multiculturalism and affirmative action than any of his predecessors" (Kimber, 1992, 39). City officials and other governmental authorities appear to share the high assessment of the chief and even a critical defence lawyer who has recently argued several cases against the department before the Police Review Board allowed that "things are getting better" as regards police-community relations.

In some ways MacDonald has had a more difficult challenge than Jackson in advancing the HPD transformation, basically
because so much of his effort has been directed to changing attitudes, understandings and outlook, not simply putting into place new structures or roles. Internally the challenge for him has been to get what is now in place working better with more positively motivated officers. The structures for officer participation in departmental decision-making may be there but how well they will work depends on outlook, management and officer skills etc. Thus far the situation has not changed noticeably since 1990 as regards working conditions at HPD. Problems with the implementation of the constable generalist role and with participative decision-making remain significant in patrol and new performance evaluation criteria adapted to CBP have not yet been implemented. The alienation of CID from the CBP approach has not been overcome. Indeed as promotion, wages and other benefits continue to reward the uniformed branch (continuing the pattern of the Jackson era) recruitment for CID slots has frequently been difficult.

In the field of police-race relations it has been important internally to encourage greater sensitivity and collaboration since there is much social distance between police and many black citizens as perceived by the officers themselves (Perrott, 1991) and much gain to be achieved in terms of order maintenance and other police tasks (see Trojanowicz, 1988). But it is also important, given the concern about morale and organizational commitment,
simultaneously to support officers who may be unduly anxious in their everyday policing tasks when dealing with minorities. It is too early to determine what the impact will be of the initiatives launched but considerable sensitivity training has been done and more is being planned, including a special program for training in awareness of native issues (see Clairmont 1993C).

On the other side, developing positive relationships with minorities, suspicious about if not alienated from the police, has not been easy despite the considerable amount of time that the chief and others in the department (e.g., the Human Resources section, the zone coordinators, special recruitment officers) have spent in liaison meetings and with their new minorities' cadet recruitment program. The police-black collaboration in the incident review reported above resulted in separate and quite different reports being issued by each 'party'. The tensions in the Uptown have remained considerable and there have been many media reports of alienation on the part of both patrol police and residents. While the storefront and the village constables or community constables did accomplish some effective problem-solving in the Uptown they did not apparently make deep enough ties with the area's black community (see Clairmont, 1993A). Still the department has continued with its programs in the Uptown and is now trying to elaborate them and target them better.
Conclusion

In its second stage with a new chief one-third into his term, CBP at HPD has continued to exist and to be elaborated. Internally there has been thus far a period of 'breath-taking and maintenance' but nevertheless a forward movement as evidenced in the new mission statement and various organizational changes consistent with the QWL and 'corporate style' CBP-thrusts of the previous chief. Partly in reaction to external pressures but more perhaps as a function of his own persona and empathy, the new chief has focused HPD especially on the external facets of CBP. HPD has been linked more intensively with the community and with the local City administration. Initiatives relating to race and multicultural issues have particularly highlighted this major CBP thrust. Specific significant programs, structural changes, recruitment activity etc have been made but it is fair to say that tension management, socialization and cultural style have been highlighted. The human relations approach underlying this leadership style appears to represent a 'pulling together' that might well be required for subsequent successful social change.

Changing behavioural dispositions and ways of thinking is very time-consuming and long-term. An accessible, human relations oriented approach can also lead to very high expectations for one's concerns among organizational members and
in the outside community. And of course attentiveness to people's concerns and feelings ultimately has to be translated somehow into organizational structure and practice if it is not to backfire. The current chief appears to have the vision, the commitment, the popularity of his officers and a number of strategies to effect this kind of cultural or socialization change but such change will not be easy to achieve. Also the key internal and external CBP challenges, work enrichment and participation on the one hand, and policing the Uptown on the other have shown themselves to be tough nuts to crack. The proactive crime prevention thrust of community-based policing, the problem-solving and the organized community linkages remain in their infancy. Within the police department and in the community itself there are still major obstacles to overcome. Limited resources and high public demands may also require trade-offs in police service. And there are questions very much down-the-road perhaps as to the role of community groups in the policing enterprise since of course policing policy is formally directed by the municipal police commission.
LOOKING BACKWARDS AND FORWARD

Looking Backwards:

The style of organizational change that characterized HPD's CBP innovation under chief Jackson could be deemed a 'bold strokes' approach. Organizational development was effected in a top-down, fast manner with the chips falling where they may. Such an approach might be contrasted with a socialization or behavioural approach where the focus is on changing attitudes and expectations (i.e., the subculture) as a prelude to change or putting into place first a new performance evaluation or reward system. As shown in Figure 12, Kotter (1979) has analyzed the strategic options for the management of slow or fast change. It does appear that the situation at HPD in 1985 as well as the persona of the chief responsible for the organizational change, favoured the 'bold strokes' approach (see Clairmont, 1990, 92-96). The problems inherent in a slow approach to CBP change, namely the marginality of the pilot project, the complexity of having multiple styles of discipline and control in patrol etc have been identified elsewhere. And indeed in the few months while HPD's Alpha pilot project was operating as a unique test case, most of these problems emerged in the HPD organization. There seems to be no doubt that the bold strokes approach can generate considerable alienation especially among those who have
lost power and status as a result of the organizational
development. This clearly happened in the HPD case. Still as
many advocates of CBP philosophy have noted, CBP does mean at
least in the short-run that power and status changes will occur
in the police organization so the innovators might just as well
get on with
FIGURE TWELVE

STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rapid Changes</th>
<th>Slow Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearly Planned</td>
<td>Not Clearly Planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Involvement of Others</td>
<td>Lots of Involvement of Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempt to Overcome Any Resistance</td>
<td>Attempt to Minimize Any Resistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Situational Variables**

* The amount and type of resistance that is anticipated.
* The position of the initiators vis-à-vis the resisters (in terms of power, trust, etc.).
* The locus of relevant data for designing the change and of needed energy for implementing it.
* The stakes involved (e.g., the presence or absence of a crisis, the consequences of resistance and lack of change).

the change and not worry about persuading the predictable losers in this process (e.g., Sparrow, 1988).

There are some implications of a bold strokes approach to CBP which became clear in the HPD initiative. Perhaps the foremost implication is the need for continuous training no matter how extensive the initial training has been. HPD's initial training for all patrol officers, constables and supervisors, was substantial if the criterion is what other police organizations have usually done. Still it does not appear to have been enough. Constables experienced work stress in relation to unaccustomed investigative and proactive tasks and sergeants and corporals were hard pressed to encourage/facilitate participatory decision-making. Beyond the initial phase little in-service training was subsequently provided for either group until five years later when the department began a special program for sergeants. The result of this training shortfall has been that incipient specialization reduced the constable generalist role to an ideal-type rather than an actuality and that in six years there have been only a few examples of squad-inspired departmental policy changes.

CBP as a philosophy of policing has certainly been under-implemented in Canada (see Clairmont, 1991). It appears to require a sophisticated management especially since little formal management training along these lines has been available to Canadian police executives and middle managers until quite
recently (see Ogle, 1990). Not only must police management be sophisticated in shaping the QWL and 'corporate style' thrusts of CBP but they must resolve political issues focused on demands in the community and among political authorities and, finally they must conceptualize and implement strategies for involving the community. All three areas - the internal, the political and the external - have remained problematic in HPD's instance though it would be fair also to say that, in all three areas, structures have been erected, some implementation has been effected and HPD stands out in comparison with other Canadian police departments and indeed with similar private sector initiatives. In advancing the CBP initiative, as noted above, little direct additional budget was utilized; in fact it could be argued that management, rather than celebrating their shoe-string approach should have spent much more on communication and training.

Another implication of the HPD initiative may well be the need for a restorative phase, a period of organizational 'breath-taking and maintenance' when change is introduced in a fast, bold strokes fashion. If so then indeed one can see the advantage of a different type of chief in the second phase, one emphasizing socio-emotional and external more than instrumental and internal transformation. In the HPD instance it has been argued here that the leadership styles of the successive chiefs have complemented one another quite well. For many reasons it
appears important that internal change take priority in a CBP initiative and if significant such change may require in the second phase the kind of leadership provide by Chief MacDonald here. Perhaps, if an institutionalized, well-implemented CBP policing style is to be characteristic of a department then a third phase of consolidation and elaboration would likely be necessary.

It has been observed that in implementing community-based zone policing HPD organized patrol responsibility in terms of quite heterogeneous zones. While this heterogeneity presented great opportunity for resource mobilization, it also demanded a more active involvement by police if the community dimension of CBP was to be implemented well. If a zone had been a community such as the Uptown where there is a strong sense of identity and acknowledged indigenous leadership then persons on the zones' advisory councils and support teams would probably have spent much less time considering their role as they would have come to the councils with a strong sense of their legitimacy and mandate. There also might have been less ambivalence towards them on the part of the police. Given that zones were not communities, much more consideration had to be spent by police management on the implementation aspects, something which continues to be quite problematic. Also the zone heterogeneity requires more information on the area be available to officers but little was given in a systematic way after the initial
training in 1986/87. In general the community side of CBP requires more analyses and highlighting than it has been given, especially under the current zone system.

It has been argued by many that CBP requires significant decentralization if it is to be successful. The HPD system has clearly been evolving in such a direction but the resources and autonomy available to the zone commanders and to the squads have been [and remain] very modest indeed (see Mercer, 1990). Moreover decentralization has to be balanced by new structures and communication systems in order to deal with crime and crime prevention matters. In the HPD case special task forces and new policies for collaboration across zones have had to be developed in order to supplement the principle of zone integrity in the policing functions.

**Looking Forward**

In the larger society QWL as a central objective of modern corporate strategy and governmental priority appears to have become passe (Clairmont, 1990B). Insofar as the ideas of and consultants' visions of management reflect the dominant corporate thinking then one might wonder if job enrichment and bottom-up or participatory management, not well implemented yet in HPD's CBP, will be nourished and elaborated in the future. As Piore and Sabel (1984) observe industrial trends suggest the need for 'flexible specialization', not deskilling, at the
workplace so the opportunity is there for a craftsman's style with all that that implies regarding job enhancement and autonomy. In the case of HPD it is hard to imagine that the range of demands on constables' work would not continue to be at least as great as they are now. But if corporate ideology does not push for QWL then clearly the constables and their collective association will have to become actively involved with this issue, something that has not been a priority to date.

It can be argued that too that there may be a threshold effect where decentralization of police decision-making, significant proactive policing and QWL achievement reinforce and build on one another. Many writers in CBP have suggested such a model (see Irving et al., 1989) arguing that with decentralization comes greater autonomy to adjust policing to specific area concerns and as officers link their policing to these concerns they necessarily become more involved in more complex diverse policing tasks and by implication in participating in departmental policing policy. That reinforcing cycle does not yet characterize HPD.

**CBP and Social Development**

Predictably in each zone the areas of greatest criminal activity and victimization are those of lower socio-economic well-being. Further the large majority of persons arrested for conventional street crime appear to live in such areas and have
the predictable characteristics of being unemployed, ill-educated alienated and so forth. CBP as a policing philosophy holds out much promise for primary and secondary crime prevention (focusing on background and precipitating factors) as well as for conventional tertiary crime prevention where the focus is basically on collaring the criminals. With its emphasis on order maintenance and problem-solving CBP would appear to have a stake in social development. In Halifax community-based zone policing has been associated with a significant change in the relationship between police and other agencies/departments of local government. While formal linkages to both city council and the board of police commissioners remain intact, the police department has become more integrated into the City management structure and, at the zone level, more collaborative with local social planning, recreational and housing officials. Some inter-agency collaboration in terms of social development has also been established. Here the major new thrusts have been the creation of new arrangements for dealing with race/ethnic and other inequities (e.g., equity hiring programs) and for effecting greater agency collaboration (e.g., via 'Safer Cities' initiatives) in specially targeted areas.

Crime prevention both at the guardianship and motivational levels will require more inter-agency collaboration. The patterns described above are relatively recent. Certainly the community-based policing and social development approaches will
have to be more thoroughly meshed. Two areas in particular require this greater coordination of effort, namely the effort to reduce racial inequalities and insensitivities and, secondly, improving the quality of life and dealing with crime and fear in the larger public housing complexes. Integrated, community-based programs both at the policing and the social development levels are required for crime prevention, particularly if as in the case of Halifax there is an explicit concern to create an open, peoples' street environment. The key to this collaboration would appear to be, from the policing side, the elaboration of the 'proactive' and community side of CBP. If the 'proactive side' of CBP is only minimally developed, if the constable generalist and community constable roles cannot be developed adequately then perhaps, as police researchers are increasingly arguing, the alternative to CBP of "minimal policing" might be advanced because policing is expensive – the ratio of police to population is already high and the pay and benefits of Canadian police are among the best in the world (see Kinsey, 1986; Murphy, 1992). As Murphy observes "hiring more police officers to deal with crime in communities where they can't afford to hire teachers, social workers, recreation supervisors and gang workers may be good politics but ultimately is bad policing" (Ibid., 29).

A somewhat related development occurring, rather belatedly in this area of Canada, has been the move towards regionalization. The summer 1993 change of governments in Nova
Scotia has shelved plans for immediate regionalization of municipal systems throughout the province but some regionalization of services seems imminent. Policing services appear to be high on the priority list for regionalization of services. HPD management and union spokesmen have both come out strongly for regionalization of policing services in the metropolitan Halifax area. CBP appears to make the regionalization policy more saleable since it conveys the view that accountability and police sensitivity to the concerns of particular areas can be achieved other than through formal political authority. In this sense CBP can have an impact on resources, facilitating some economies of scale. Balanced against this economy however is the real possibilities that a fully implemented CBP is a very labour-intensive policing system requiring more resources (Morgenthau, 1990)

CONCLUSIONS

The transformation of HPD under the leadership of Jackson and MacDonald has been both extensive and intensive. Sharing a common vision of CBP and modern corporate management practice and equally assertive about the pursuit of organizational excellence, they have brought HPD to the forefront as a CBP-oriented policing organization and municipal government department. Their distinctive personae and sub-visions have complemented one another and been appropriate to the particular
phase of HPD's transformation and the particular pressures and opportunities for change at the time of their tenure as chief. Jackson focused largely on organizational development and effected dramatic change in the face of considerable internal resistance. Such transformation it would seem had to precede the development of new and profound external networks and linkages and it seems unlikely that it could have been accomplished with a leadership style of the human relations type. MacDonald thus far has maintained this internal organizational development and focused on responding to and transcending its fall-out and, as well, other more long-standing departmental problems; accordingly in a visible and accessible manner he has been dealing with issues of morale, recognition, stress and organizational commitment. In his tenure thus far the external pressures and opportunities on the policing service have been considerable and they have been met in ways consistent with the further elaboration of CBP and modern police management, namely networking through new structures with minorities, taking an active policy role in City administration and so forth. In this light the emphasis the current chief accords to the creation of a departmental mission statement is understandable; it informs members of the essential purpose of the continuing transformation and signals to the government and the community the kind of policing service that it can expect.

It is important to note that the change wrought by Jackson
and MacDonald thus far has not apparently been with the cost of inefficiency or shortfall on traditional indicators of police productivity. Arrests, clearance by charge rates, response times and traffic ticketing have remained at levels external consultants have considered more than adequate. It is also important to appreciate that the process of transformation is not complete and key impacts, internally and externally, are still problematic. Participatory decision-making and bottom-up 'quality control' and management style remain elusive goals. The constable generalist model remains more an ideal-type than a description of actual constable activity. Performance evaluation changes to suit new job descriptions and a new policing style remain ever-pending.

Externally it is not clear how open or effective HPD will be in responding to and collaborating with community interests. There is still ambivalence and uncertainty concerning the role of zone advisory groups and support teams. The challenge of effecting a new style of policing and a collaborative resident-police relationship in the Uptown remains a major concern. Potentially thorny political and socialization issues associated with a more elaborate and possibly more intrusive police role have yet to be seriously confronted since police activity has not waded much into the murky waters beyond law enforcement and crime fighting. Fiscal constraints and political problems in dealing efficiently with calls for service, alarms and service
requests may also hamstring the transformation. These and other issues indicate clearly that the future is by no means certain for CBP at HPD. Still Jackson and MacDonald have clearly articulated a coherent, complex vision and implemented it structurally at many levels and both internally and externally.
Endnotes:

1) Strong claims of thorough-going community policing implementation have been made on behalf of the Calgary, Edmonton and Halifax police departments but in all these cases the claims rest to a significant degree on anticipated developments rather than measured actuality. For example Hornick, Leighton and Burrows (1993, p. 92) in their study of the Edmonton Police Service refer to a pilot project and the anticipated department-wide implementation of community-based policing, adding "when fully implemented... it may be the only police service in North America which as systematically and comprehensively adopted community policing as a philosophical, organizational and operational mode of policing".

2) HPD's record on murder, manslaughter and attempted murder has been quite good. Since 1970 there have been 83 such actual occurrences and 76 cleared. According to one very knowledgable officer drug-related "executions" account for the most serious short-fall.

3) Shortly after amalgamation came the formation of two associations to represent the interests of the Halifax police officers as regards working conditions. The Halifax Police Patrolmen's Association was established for constables and cadets while for all ranks from corporal to superintendent the Halifax Police Officer and NCO Association was formed. The former is a bona fide union with the right to strike whereas the latter is an association with recourse to binding arbitration. Wages for NCO and Officer ranks are fixed in relation to those of a first-class constable; that is taking the constable as 100%, the corporal's salary is 111. 6%, the sergeant's is 117. 2%, the staff sergeants earn 124. 5%, inspectors draw 148% etc. Traditionally the chief's salary is approximately 200%, not a particularly high wage given the large organization and the considerable legal responsibility that the office has responsibility for. In 1984 the basic cost of a 1st class constable (excluding overtime) was $38,342 with a base salary of $31,970.

4) In 1987 the union did successfully negotiate for the zones being levelled seniority-wise; in effect by seniority constables had a major say in selecting the zone they would work in. As the first phase came to an end in 1988 there were rumblings from both bodies. The Officers' association was upset over some new promotional policies while the union's concerns were more general and diffuse.
5) Certainly some internal resistance was anticipated by the innovating group from some constables but especially from many NCOs and Officers. Indeed it appears that a contingency plan may even have been discussed with the local police board to nip in the bud any coalescence of opposition by an early retirement policy should the resistance begin to take off and mobilize around one or two key senior officers. And middle level officers (e.g., staff sergeants/zone commanders) were personally assured of the chief's support should they be obstructed by higher rank officers. However no such mobilization of resistance nor serious obstructionism did emerge despite significant alienation among middle and top management officers outside the innovating group. Nor is it clear how much resistance the chief and other members of the inner circle really anticipated though at least perhaps some passivity, bad-mouthing and eager waiting for a major foul-up. Virtually all these innovators were themselves strong, aggressive leaders confident in their sense of direction and in the expectation that orders would be followed. It is of course crucial here to appreciate that HPD was a police department with a strong quasi-military tradition buttressing a legally entrenched powerful chief's role. Unilateral action from the top would not be unexpected nor readily generate organized opposition.

It seems also to have been the case that the innovative group members did not perceive themselves especially dependent upon the other police management as regards the information and energy required to effect the CBP-Zone policing change. From their perspective the others could "buy in" and contribute but if not, the change could still go forward effectively. As one noted "others didn't have to do anything other than their required jobs so they had limited power to subvert".

6) As noted a very widespread view in CID was that CBP represented the assumption of power and status in the department by the uniformed side. Clearly there was a decline in CID manpower, special squads and the proportion of officers there with a rank higher than constable. While a case could be made that CID was being relieved of the less important though time consuming criminal investigations (e.g., break and enter) in order to pursue more sophisticated crime, few officers interpreted the change in this positive light, particularly as most detective work continued to involve routine fraud cases.

7) New specialist sections emerged such as Automation and new roles were created to serve the new system. Among the
latter were zone analyst (constables) reporting at zone meetings on criminal activities and other zone data/activities, case reader (a sergeant) who monitored all criminal investigative work for all zones, interpreting case management procedures and checking on the quality of reports, and resource centre officers (constables) who especially dealt with complainants and victims in offences with "zero solvability".

8) It is hard to evaluate the significance of the investigative caseload for the patrol constables. Over the year April 1988 to April 1989 the total number of investigations assigned per patrol officer was 38 in Alpha, 40 in Bravo and 32 in Charlie zone (Mercer, 1990). The averages would have been greater in 1987 when there were fewer patrol officers. In assessing how heavy an investigative load this would be, the reader should remember that most constable generalists received very modest training in investigations and worked limited daytime hours over an eight day work/time off schedule.


10) The cadet recruitment program involved the three officers spending seven months on the recruitment program, supplementing the effort of the Human Resources unit. Additional resources went into publicizing the program and of course the department provided the cadet training. External funds were garnered largely to enable the cadets to avoid the usual recruitment training costs and in fact to receive training grants or living allowances.

11) In the summer of 1993 there has been much public concern in Halifax about an unusual number of stranger-initiated sexual assaults. HPD responded to this situation by arranging a number of public workshops where female officers in collaboration with leaders of pertinent community support groups discussed the issues and advised women. The meetings drew such crowds that additional sessions had to be scheduled across the metropolitan area. Clearly having female officers to draw upon has helped to
link the department better with community organizations.
APPENDIX A

MAJOR CRIME SECTION FUNCTIONS

1. Investigate all homicides.

2. Investigate or coordinate the investigation of all attempted homicides.

3. Investigate or coordinate the investigation of all serious assaults in which death may occur.

4. Investigate or coordinate the investigation of all sudden deaths and suicides in which the cause of death cannot be determined by field personnel or in which foul play is suspected.

5. Investigate or coordinate the investigation of all aggravated sexual assaults where the offender has not been apprehended.

6. Investigate or coordinate the investigation of all sexual assaults where the offender has not been apprehended.

7. Investigate or coordinate the investigation of all robberies or attempted robberies of financial institutions where the offender or offenders have not been apprehended.

8. Investigate or coordinate the investigation of any series of robberies where the MO is similar and appears to have been committed by the same person or persons.

9. Investigate or coordinate kidnapping investigations other than domestic.

10. Investigate or coordinate major extortion investigations.

11. Investigate or coordinate all investigations where a firearm is discharged and the offender has not been apprehended.

12. Investigate or coordinate all investigations where criminal acts (except fraud) appear to be organized and committed by the same person or persons. e.g.,
robberies, housebreaks.

13. Investigate any complaint which requires the expertise of the major crime section.
APPENDIX B

Overview – Zone Policing Concept

Having arrived at a point in time when an overview of basic concepts and philosophies of Zone Policing might be beneficial to our members an attempt will be made to lay out the strategies in their simplest terms.

Zone Policing

Can be defined as a vehicle for the delivery of Community-Based Policing.

Community-Based Policing

Is the delivery to the public (customer) of a service (policing) tailored to community needs.

Community

Is a defined geographical area or zone.

The police must realize that the public requires particular services separate and apart from what we perceive to be our police responsibilities. These services may differ according to geographical areas and can be referred to as "community concerns".

Some of the community concerns are 1) the safety of children both to and from school and the school area of playground. 2) The sanctity of homes and protection from break and enter, damage and theft. 3) Safety of their persons from assaults, accidents and dangerous conditions. 4) Their personal comfort such as noise, nuisance and disturbances.

While the community is concerned about crossing guards, icy sidewalks, truck routes and loud music, the police are concerned with bank robberies, murder, trafficking in narcotics, fraud and the more serious police responsibilities.

As police officers, we must keep the full scope of our duties and responsibilities in full perspective.

PROBLEMS:

1. In the past the Department Order System and Department Structure have made it ever more difficult to communicate between the Department Administrators and the street
operational units. While this is a common problem to most larger police agencies it is not one that this Administration cares to live with. Changes have been incorporated within the zone system which will address this short fall in vertical communication.

2. Another problem encountered is the old system is communication with the public or community liaison between the public and the police. Since the street unit must be aware of both "community concerns" and "departmental concerns", both have been addressed by the zone system.

3. It is often said that the administrative solutions to current street situations are dated or out of touch with reality. Although administrators are reluctant to admit this sometimes it is all too true. The answer to this problem is the adoption of a bottom-up management system in relation to street issues.

4. It has been said that the police do not influence the crime rates through re-active police methods (answering calls and investigating complaints). A study of statistics will indicate that this theory has some basis in fact. We must call for an increased pro-active stand from every member within the zones.

THE ZONE SYSTEM

The City has been divided into three zones.

1. Alpha
2. Bravo
3. Charlie

Each zone consists of four units under the direction of a Zone Commander. An ideal unit should be staffed by a Sergeant, a Corporal and from six to sixteen Constables. The unit should work on team basis, formulating policy in relation to the identified needs of their particular communities.

The Sergeant is responsible for unit command. The Corporal's prime responsibility is as General Investigator, Case Manager, Intelligence Officer and Liaison Officer to the Central Investigation Division. His secondary responsibility will be as second in command of the unit and he will take over the supervision of the unit in the Sergeant's absence.

A Zone Commander (Staff/Sergeant) shall have overall command of the four units within each zone.
He will be responsible for maintaining uniformity of policing laterally across the four units so that each zone receives a continuous application of policy and direction.

The Zone Commander is in daily contact with management and will be aware of the administrative concerns of the Department. He will be responsible for translating those concerns to the units under his command.

A Crime Prevention Coordinator will be assigned to each zone and attached to the office of the Zone Commander. He will be assigned the duties of coordinating a continuous community relations program by all members of the zone. All members should dedicate 50% of their policing effort toward pro-active police activity such as Neighborhood Watch and other target hardening or crime prevention programs. It is our intention to "influence crime rates" by these programs; therefore, the dedication of half our efforts to this end is of the utmost importance.

The Crime Prevention Coordinator will also establish liaison with both formal and informal community leaders within his zone in an effort to determine the "public concerns" and encourage and coordinate public participation in police programs.

In order to interact with the public as a problem solver a unit member must look upon himself as a catalyst which brings about community change.

The problem need not be police related per se. Any community problem may be considered a police problem which the member might resolve by bringing the necessary forces together.

Example:

Poor Street Lighting = People + Power Company = Rectified Situation

This is an over simplification of problem solving; however, if we recognize that most police problems stem from social issues, then it is easier to understand the process needed to eliminate them and the methods required to address that need.

The Police Inspector position within the zone concept requires a dual role. As Auditor he is required to audit all aspects of the police systems both support and operational, reporting back to management on the effectiveness of all programs. His reports will assist management to correct any
errors resulting in negative impact both to zones and other divisions.

As Watch Commander he will be responsible for the overall policing of the City in the absence of senior officers and should be considered the representative of the Office of the Chief of Police. In emergencies he will take control of all zone units and will be responsible for all command decisions.

There are many other side issues to Zone Policing;

The investigative call back unit shall process all complaints not assigned to field units.

The latest in technology will be used to support units in the field.

The traffic unit remains as before - an overall support unit to the policing effort, specializing in traffic concerns, but does not nullify the need for traffic enforcement by zone units.

The same can be said for By-Law Enforcement Officers.

Similarly the Criminal Investigation Division will remain as an entity but will be down-sized and dedicated to serious or "organized" crime. Their efforts will also focus on criminal intelligence and support of zone units through liaison with the GIS Officers.

Operational Planning, through Zone Analysts, will provide zone units with timely information on policing concerns connected with their zones.

Training and development will be continually addressed through Human Resources Division in an effort to upgrade zone members to their highest levels of ability.

It must be realized by all members that every division, technical and support, investigative and administrative, will exist for only one purpose - to support the efforts of the uniformed police officer on the street.

Blair D. Jackson
Chief of Police
APPENDIX C

HALIFAX POLICE DEPARTMENT

JOB FACT SHEET

Date: September 1, 1992

Job Title: Civilian Native Community Police Worker
(Support Operations/Human Resources)

SUMMARY

In conformity with the Halifax Police Department's dedication to the philosophy and operational concept of Community-Based Policing, the incumbent, under the supervision of the Inspector of Human Resources, is responsible to: coordinate community relations programs within the Department related to the native community, liaise with native organizations and promote awareness of native culture and issues with members of the Halifax Police Department.

All duties to be performed in accordance with the Halifax Police Department's Standard Operational Policies and Procedures, Statutory Laws and to be accomplished within the scope of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
APPENDIX C, CONTINUED

HALIFAX POLICE DEPARTMENT

JOB FACT SHEET

Date: March 14, 1992

Job Title: Zone Community Relations and Crime Prevention Coordinator/Zone Race Relations Officers (Field Operations/Patrol)

SUMMARY

In conformity with our dedication to the philosophy and operational concept of Community-Based Policing the incumbent reports to the Zone Commander, and is responsible to: coordinate Community Relations and Crime Prevention Programs within the Zone, liaise with ethnic, racial and religious organizations and promote multiculturalism awareness within the Police Department. All duties to be performed in accordance with the Halifax Police Department's Standard Operational Policies and Procedures, Statutory Laws and to be accompanied within the scope of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
APPENDIX C, CONTINUED

HALIFAX POLICE DEPARTMENT

JOB FACT SHEET

Date: March 14, 1992

Job Title: Community Constable
(Field Operations/Patrol)

SUMMARY

In conformity with our dedication to the philosophy and operational concept of Community-Based Policing the incumbent under the supervision of a Zone Commander, is responsible to perform pro-active functions which include conducting public consultation/education and crime prevention programs and referring members of the community in need to appropriate social or government agencies for assistance. Pro-active duties form a minor aspect of the incumbent's job responsibilities which include responding to calls for service, enforcing Statutory Laws, solving crimes and identifying and apprehending criminals. All duties to be performed in accordance with the Halifax Police Department's Standard Operational Policies and Procedures, Statutory Laws and to be accomplished within the scope of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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