To the detached student of social history, coming uncommitted and for the first time on the phenomenon of Marxism, the most forceful initial impression made by his study of the movement is of the profoundly evangelical and quasi-religious character that Marxism has displayed since its inception. In several senses Marx's own avowed estimate of his new method of historical analysis and of his programme held it to be in the nature of a revelation—Capital is the testament that shall "lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society"; The Communist Manifesto becomes the new era's rallying cry, "the common platform acknowledged by millions of workingmen from Siberia to California." And in direct continuance of the founder's spirit, the same evangelical fire dominates undiminished the thinking of Marxism's would-be legitimate inheritors down to the present day. Such an observation on the character of Marxism, needless to say, is in no sense novel. Social historians of perspicacity (not excluding theoreticians from the highest Moscow councils of the movement itself) have remarked this quality, for generations, as basic in the Marxist faith. This particular aspect of Marxism will be stressed in the present paper, however, for a special reason: the belief that in the "religious" quality of Marxism lies the basic key and clue to explain not only the great popularity of the philosophy but also its equally great instability. Various reactionary convulsions perenially assault its unity as a political movement. Against these convulsions Marx himself expended infinite energy and resource in fighting right up to the time of his death; after his death Bernstein's systematic critique effectively split the movement, and at the present day Soviet and Chinese violent counterclaims to Marxist (or now Marxist-Leninist) orthodoxy continue to batter the world's ear.

To explain, therefore, the intellectual basis of what is called "revisionism" and in doing so to evaluate the claims of both the Marxist and revisionist camps, it is necessary first of all to understand the nature of this religious passion in the movement from which all revisionism has sprung. The German social democrats were correct in identifying Bernstein's "abandon-
ment" of Marxist philosophy as identical in spirit with the British Fabian heresy, though Bernstein denied the charge; it is the intention to demonstrate here that all of these movements have basically the same source.

It was in a role analogous to that of an empirical philosopher forced to question revelation in apparent conflict with fact, that pragmatists of all persuasions within the socialist camp first began to look critically at the system their prophet had created and bequeathed to them. Did Marxism, can Marxism, conflict with fact? Orthodoxy, dogma, then as now, gives an unqualified negative. It is a fundamental heresy merely to pose the question, for the whole justification of the Marxist system rests on this one basic claim—that the theories of Marx made an empirical science of socialism. From a Marxist viewpoint, indeed, even the use of the word “theories” in the above sentence demonstrates an obvious total lack of “objectivity”(!) clearly revealing a blatant capitulation on the writer’s part to what would probably be called something like “subjective prejudice” or “dogmatic bourgeois thinking”—for there are no “theories” in Marx, only “discoveries” and “truths”. In setting forth the strange semantic contradictions that appear in the last sentence, we have in fact stumbled on what is certainly one of the key elements in the whole philosophy of Marxism, the single element which accounts in large measure for both the unshakeability of Marxist dogma and for its dramatic success in proselytizing. This discussion can go no further without clarifying this feature: the basic and axiomatic opposition that always exists between Marxist and bourgeois logic. The philosophical justification for this opposition should indeed be self-evident; it certainly is to a Marxist. As a concession, however, to any possible residual bourgeois prejudices in the reader (and positively no slur is intended) a brief explanation may be given.

The explanation goes back, of course, as does everything in Marx and Engels, to the basic principles of Marxist science. These, as Marx and Engels themselves make no bones about admitting, are very simple and very few. In one page they can be set out fully; and we can even let the founders speak for themselves.

Engels:

These two great discoveries, the materialistic conception of history [with, it may be added (and without Engels’ objection), its concomitant neo-Hegelian dialectical principle as the source of historical change] and the revelation of the secret of capitalistic production through surplus value, we owe to Marx. With these discoveries socialism became a science.2
And Marx:

[On the basis, then, of the above discoveries,] What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, (3) that this dictatorship itself constitutes only the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.

And this is the Marxist system. As for what his “materialist conception of history” is, here again we can let Marx himself supply the simple explanation:

I was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal relations as well as forms of state could be neither understood by themselves nor explained by the so-called general progress of the human mind, but that they are rooted in the material conditions of life, which are summed up by Hegel after the fashion of the English and French of the eighteenth century under the name “civil society”; the anatomy of the civil society is to be sought in political economy... In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.

And—if it is permissible to assume the reader’s familiarity with the principles of the Hegelian dialectic—it can once more be demonstrated with a final brief quotation from Marx how he reverses Hegel (Idealism is traded for Marxian Materialism)—and how, by doing so, Marx proves the existence of antithetical logic, the logic which leads to the sort of statement that led to this digression. Two statements of Marx’s apply:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought...

In its mystified form dialectic became the fashion in Germany because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the exist-
ing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.6

Thought, by the tenets of historical materialism, can thus be seen as not an absolute, but in its conceptual and even in its rational content, as a direct function of the economic structure—the “productive relations”—of the society and of the era by which the mind of the thinker has been formed or conditioned. And it follows directly from this, if we turn the Marxist coin from “materialism” to its “dialectical” side, that bourgeois thinking and proletarian thinking are, as they must be, each the antithesis of the other—the exact counterpart in the sphere of thought to the class struggle in the sphere of economics.

Though never (so far as I know) stated explicitly in Marx’s writings—because, naturally (the same answer is always there) it is only bourgeois thinking to demand explicitness—this is the rationale that lies behind and supports all of the masses of Marxist polemical literature produced in the last hundred years, the literature whose sole purpose is the complete annihilation of all the ideals that “bourgeoisdom” holds sacred. And no further explanation need be sought for the seemingly (to the bourgeois mind) arbitrary and wilful perversity in evading, twisting, and reversing obvious facts that one runs into quite literally everywhere in Communist literature. This, for example, is why Marx can say that the followers of St. Simon “hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat,”7 and laugh at bourgeois liberalism—understanding its motives perfectly—as it screams its condemnation of the followers of Marx for precisely the same crime. This also is why Trotsky can affirm that one need only “overcome the habit of uncritically accepting the ready-made ideological reflections of economic development,”8 to be able easily to follow Marx through the crystal-clear and unequivocal proletarian arithmetic of Capital. And this, finally, to bring us up to the present day, is why the German Communists can call their state the “Peoples Democratic Republic of Germany”9 and be absolutely correct in their nomenclature. Unquestionably, Marx’s system is the creation of genius, for it is a social philosophy tied up and self-contained in such a way that it literally cannot be refuted. On the contrary, each and every attack upon it, from whatever quarter and no matter how subtle or elaborate the dialectical means, serves only to strengthen its convictions and
to confirm the absolute accuracy of the analysis it presents. And thus is explained Marxism’s success (inevitable), thus its paradoxes (“harmonies!” screams Marx), thus its jargon (“clarity!”) and thus its wild-eyed fanaticism (“cold-eyed logic!”).

The present discussion, however, still only really begins at this point, for we remain with the phenomenon of Marxism being—in terms always of bourgeois semantics—what we began by saying it was: fundamentally a dogma. It is more in fact than a dogma, it is a complete religion, for Materialism establishes its heaven in the physical, moral, intellectual, and economic perfection of the classless society. The sole oracle and interpreter of truth for Marxism is Marx (and Engels subordinately as well, Engels’ utterances alone besides his own having Marx’s blessing); and Marx’s canon is Marxism’s gospel. Proletarian philosophy or ideology, as the next conclusion of our bourgeois logic shows us, exists thus, only insofar as Marx defined it, and not as a separate entity, or way of life, in itself. Indeed, whatever Marx says proletarian philosophy is, then this is what perforce it must be. And there are, as not even Mao Tse-tung himself would deny, slight but significant inconsistencies in the Marxist canon. On just such a little inconsistency, for example, is founded the present very great ideological division between the Soviet and Red Chinese schools of Marxism. Marx, after all, was not a god, and as often as he stressed the inevitability both of the proletarian takeover of the world and of revolution as its means (the logic of his system demands conflict and there can therefore be no question of this being Marx’s settled view), his additional involvement in the practical business of politics did force Marx to take cognizance, on occasion, of the realities of the party he headed. Such an occasion occurred in his 1872 speech to the Amsterdam branch of the International, to which, for the sake of harmony, he offered the possibility in some of the more advanced capitalist countries of a peaceful takeover. The single sentence that contains this unlikely sentiment has now become the rationale behind the present Soviet policy of co-existence with capitalism, while the purists among Marxist theoreticians, the Chinese, recognize this slip for what it was—a purely tactical gesture, obviously meaningless as far as any actual intent is concerned.

And so the difficulties among the direct heirs of Marx continue to go. But with the Bernstein revisionist revolt we come upon a movement that is entirely different. Disputes among true Communists stay within the canons of the prophet and concern obscurities and inconsistencies that the scriptures
themselves may display: national Communism, for example, versus international Communism; Marx talks on both sides of the issue. The revisionist movement, on the other hand, was an attack on the canons themselves. In actual fact, all that Bernstein's publication of *Evolutionary Socialism* achieved was to state formally what had been, for all practical purposes, the political reality of German socialism for the previous twenty-five years. The mere act of getting together by the two social democratic parties at Gotha in 1875 had been an act in direct defiance of everything that Marx stood for, and Marx had not hesitated that very moment to predict the capitulation of the re-formed union to all of the values of their ostensible bourgeois democratic enemies:

The [Gotha] program does not deal with . . . the future state of communist society.

Its political demands contain nothing beyond the old democratic litany familiar to all: universal suffrage, direct legislation, popular rights, a people's militia, etc. They are a mere echo of the bourgeois People's party, of the League of Peace and Freedom.  

It was obviously not a Marxist party of which such a man as Bernstein could have remained a member an instant after avowing or even thinking the kinds of beliefs that this man published. And yet Bernstein sat as a Social Democratic member in the Reichstag for almost thirty years after his heresy.

To understand what motivated Bernstein and what supports true democratic socialists in their dispute with the Marxist purists, it is necessary to consider the diversities that were present in the “Marxist” party at the time of Marx’s death. There were always, basically, two distinct groups of adherents to scientific socialism. We may effectively distinguish these groups by calling one of them “believers” and the other “converts”. Perhaps the names are self-explanatory. The “believers”, the Bernsteins, accepted Marxism rationally, believing that Marx’s analysis of past and future history had been proved true. But they continued to retain with their belief the original bourgeois thought patterns they were born with, as Marx again and again (especially in his dealings with the trade unions) only too frustratingly recognized. They were therefore going to require additional evidence of Marxism’s truth by watching its working out in their own societies: concentration of capital and of the means of production in fewer and fewer hands, deepening economic crises creating greater and greater dislocation between producer and consumer, steadily increasing misery among an expanding proletarian population; concrete evidence, in other words, all the way down the line, of the truth of Marxism. The vexatious apparent errors in Marx’s calculations of the timing
of these events could continue to be pushed aside as long as Marx himself lived to keep his rationalizations alive, but after his death Bernsteinism, from one quarter or another in this group, became inevitable. Bernstein’s book, then, as was said above, supplied only the formal enunciation of an empiricism that had always been latent in the Marxist party:

Social conditions have not developed to such an acute opposition of things and classes as is depicted in the Manifesto. It is not only useless, it is the greatest folly to attempt to conceal this from ourselves. The number of members of the possessing classes is today not smaller but larger. . . . In all advanced countries we see the privileges of the capitalistic bourgeoisie yielding step by step to democratic organizations. 14

No more decisive symbol of the completeness of Bernstein’s rejection of true Marxism need be pointed out than his wished-for rehabilitation of the old moralist Kant as a socialist—Kant, whose concepts perhaps above those of any other philosophy were the particular targets of historical materialism: categorical imperatives, ethical absolutes, indeed! snorts Marx. And while not philosophically tied necessarily to Bernsteinism, the origins and aims of other practical socialist movements such as British Fabianism espoused precisely the same principles. These involved basically the reorientation of the party away from theory, and toward practice, the change of emphasis from ends to means, and the adjustment of the vision from the future to the present. 15

With the other branch of the Marxist party meanwhile, the “converts,” we embrace what are the only really true Marxist believers that have ever existed. And while these, Marxist logicians all of course, in no way require practical results to sustain their faith, there is another element perhaps even more basic that is obviously needed to enable them to continue to exist. This, needless to say, is the living voice of the prophet himself. As Bernstein with great care very effectively pointed out, there are logical contradictions within the writings of Marx with which the dogmatic bourgeois mind cannot, in the final analysis, come to terms. If, as an example, it is the inevitable movement of history for the classless proletarian society to come to pass as the successor of the bourgeois era—that era whose place in turn in this historical inevitability was to bring to perfection the organization of the forces of production—on what logical grounds is it necessarily inevitable that this succession be brought about through revolution? Why not through a spontaneous conversion of the world? In spite of the fact that Marx holds bourgeoisdom irrevocably committed to its creed of self-interest and accumulation, does not the tangible
evidence of individual conversions prove that the contrary is possible? Without the actual personality of a Marx there—living, breathing, and polemicizing—to bridge the gap between such contradictions, the evidence of them forces us to admit that Marxism is left with no foundation. This is the crucial point, and it can be backed up from almost anywhere in the Marxist canon. Leopold Schwarzschild, for example, in a cutting critique of Marx’s Capital makes the interesting point that since it is the sole aim of Capital to prove the inevitability of increasing misery in the working classes, if this proof can in any way be shown to be fallacious, then by the logic of Marx himself, there is no necessary basis left for the regime of capitalism ever to fail. And as not only Bernstein but others as well have shown, the proofs of increasing misery in Book III of Capital do not hang together.

In short, what almost all of the discussion up to this point comes around to demonstrating is that since the system of Marxism as a whole clearly exists only in Marx’s terms—that is, the forever unprovable (in terms of bourgeois logic) hypotheses that form Marxism’s foundation are ultimately only true because Marx says so—then the system depends totally on Marx’s own voice and personality for its reality. It must convert bourgeois minds, after all, and the infallible mind of its secular pope is the only counter that Marxism has to the objections of bourgeois logic. (This principle, of course, holds until bourgeois thinking has been totally overcome or has passed away.) After Marx’s death someone else’s personality had to assume total command to provide that essential subjective continuity without which the system could not continue to exist. And this was Lenin’s destiny—to reincarnate Marx. It was Stalin’s too, as Lenin’s successor, because the need to provide the official Marxist policy on all questions is there indefinitely. Indeed, philosophical bankrupt though Stalin obviously was, it can still logically be claimed that Stalin’s method—banishment and purge—for retaining both ideological and political control in Russia was the same weapon that Marx himself would have been forced to employ to protect his ideology had he been in Stalin’s shoes.

This last question in fact brings us around to where we can consider, as a final point, what is inevitably the most crucial issue with which any discussion of Marxism must deal—the practical political significance of Marxist philosophy. It has been argued before that Leninist Russia is not the ideal society or state that Marx’s philosophy aimed to bring about. This is a point than can never be proved, but even were it so it may be submitted that the reason for it would be that Marx had never followed out the full implications
of his own philosophy. This introduces, of course, a subject of such immense complexity that it is patently impossible even to begin a full exploration of it within present limits. It is possible, however, to set out briefly what may be called the elements of an answer, the basic points of a detailed analysis on which a strong case might rest.

Going back first of all to the distinction made above between the believers and the converts of Marxism, we begin to perceive the issue. The believer is basically a pragmatist, the convert a theorist. And how do these groups differ? They instinctively differ in many ways: in their outlook, in their methods, and in their tools. The only tools with which the pragmatist is interested in dealing are people; the corresponding tools for the theorist are ideas. Inevitably, thus, the pragmatist must look on the “proletariat” and the “bourgeoisie” as the individuals, individually motivated, that common sense tells him they are; the theorist on the other hand continues to see them as two great antagonistic abstract masses. The practical significance of these two different alignments probably begins at this point to appear. And when it comes finally to the methods each would advocate for achieving socialism, the really fundamental split occurs. For the pragmatist, first, living in a broadly literate capitalist society, it is natural, and it is common sense to him, to follow the logic of his forebears and seek his goal by whatever practical, small, but perceptible steps he believes could lead towards it. Locked in his thesis-antithesis concepts of pure Marxism, however, the theorist, on the other hand, continues to trumpet the only theoretical method he has—revolution—as both necessary and inevitable. Marx himself, of course, is the theorist’s theorist. And if there is a chink anywhere in the armour of his philosophy it is here, I believe, that it is to be found. For Marxist theory is only viable as an abstraction. As Bernstein pointed out, whenever Marx in his writings looks at and discusses real people, he talks, as it were in spite of himself, as a revisionist. In short, every point at which the Marxist “system” touches on that enemy of systems, reality, it founders. Perhaps there could be no clearer illustration of the kinds of immediate difficulties that abstraction has when it meets reality than to make a comparison between the abstract “after the revolution” concepts of Marx and the (theoretically purely Marxist) actuality of the Russian communist state. If we take for example the vaunted “dictatorship of the proletariat” phrase, one of the staples of Marxist cant, what could this ever have meant in actual practice but the dictatorship of one man? This lesson had been made by the French Revolution. As for the rest of Marx’s and Engels’ neat abstractions about their materialist heaven—“the classless
society," the “dying away” of the state, “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his need,” and so on—no one knows yet what they mean. There is one school of Marxist criticism that holds that Marx himself knew not what these ideas meant, but there is a contrary school that maintains that Marx knew only too well what they meant, and that this knowledge was the real basis for all of his vagueness and hesitation about elaborating on the particulars of his “after socialism” concepts!20

The most ingenious and most indispensable weapon (as he himself admits) in Marx's dialectical arsenal, the “force of abstraction”21 through which the proofs of Capital and therefore of Marxism hang together, is the weapon by which he can be brought down. To posit a few further examples of what this inherent conflict between abstractions and reality implies: it is only in the abstract that even basic concepts like “proletariat” and “bourgeoisie” are viable. In practical terms they are meaningless. As soon as actuality enters the picture, then questions such as the following begin to be asked: Where does the middle-level employee belong? With the capitalists or with the workers? What about all of the degrees of gradation between the actual proletarian who has nothing to offer but the labour of his hands and the pure capitalist who does no work whatever and lives wholly off the labour of others? These gradations would include, of course, all of the varieties of variably skilled labourers, the foreman class, the section-managerial group, the executive level, the participating capitalist, and many more,—as many indeed, almost, as there are individuals with different capacities and abilities filling different jobs.

And again, it is plainly only in terms of abstract theory that a necessitarian dialectical (and therefore revolutionary) antagonism can be even considered intrinsically to exist between these theoretical workers and employers. In a practical sense such an idea is meaningless. What does the individual workman actually seek in his life? Common sense gives an immediate answer: he seeks improvement of his own condition, economically, culturally, and intellectually. And in what practical or theoretical sense do these aims differ fundamentally from the aims of his bourgeois master? What has happened to Marx's intrinsic antagonism now?

For these and manifold similar reasons—common-sense reasons all—we get an inkling as to why the extension of Marxism as a social system to masses of society as a whole has never been, and would be unlikely ever to be, willingly accepted by those masses themselves.22 This probability, of course,
coming back once again to Marxist logic, does nothing more than once again prove, albeit ironically, that Marx is right—revolution *must* be the means of imposing Communism on a state. It was left for Lenin to achieve, but what an ironically triumphant vindication of Marx his revolution was!

Lenin, it may be suggested, was precisely what Marx would have been had his circumstances placed him in Lenin’s position. Lenin is a monumental theorist just like his master, but in addition, because Russia gave him the opportunity, a practical revolutionary as well. Lenin, most forcefully of all the Marxist writers and thinkers, detected and exposed the heresy of Bernsteinism; he recognized instantly that Bernstein was nothing but a bourgeois reformist, totally devoid of a true Marxist basis. One of the main purposes of the classic *What is to be Done?* was to rally the true Marxists in his own group by exposing Bernstein, which he does in this essay with absolute precision. The additional diatribe he levels there against the trade unionists—as “opportunist”, co-operating with rather than fighting the bourgeoisie—is based on the same principle. He goes further against trade unions than Marx for political reasons had ever done, but since Lenin aimed really at accomplishing something, and at putting Marxism into practice, he had no choice but to expose the trade unions and clean them out of his party. And though Lenin does not state it explicitly, again his reason is clear. For the trade unions basically are not, and cannot be, Marxist. Trade unions identify the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, as just another element of the competitive marketing fraternity. They acknowledge themselves dedicated to the same end as the bourgeoisie—self-advancement. And this is not Marxism, but its antithesis.

The single really great contribution that Lenin made to Marxist theory carries all of the above discrepancies between abstraction and reality inherent in Marxism to their logical extreme. And it was an eminently practical contribution, to which indeed, almost solely, was due the ultimate Bolshevik triumph in Russia. A revolutionary “elite” (of which Lenin himself, the master theorist, quite naturally became absolute master), Lenin says, must direct “the masses” if the revolution is ever actually to work in a Marxist direction. And in this formulation—not of course explicitly set out, again probably because Lenin’s total preoccupation with Marxist ideas blinds him to any bourgeois implications—is the clear recognition that these “masses” on their own will *never* move in the direction Marxism would have them move. The revolution and upheaval that Marxism desires, in other words, is not what the individual worker desires for himself at all, and therefore the
only means by which it can be turned in this direction is through ruthlessness and intrigue. Bourgeois ideology and trade unionism, Lenin confesses with chagrin, is more successful with the masses than revolutionary ideology. But why is this so? Is it perhaps for the common-sense reason that the masses accept and believe in it? No; Marxist logic has its own answer:

But why, the reader will ask, does the spontaneous movement, the movement along the line of least resistance, lead to the domination of bourgeois ideology? For the simple reason that bourgeois ideology is far older in origin than socialist ideology, that it is more fully developed, and that it has at its disposal immeasurably more means of dissemination. The masses, therefore, the Marxist "proletariat", are apparently too stupid not to be taken in by bourgeois ideology. And therefore we, the "revolutionary elite" (and this is the essence of Lenin's argument), must work behind the scenes to liberate the masses in spite of their stupidity. Thus, not only does the proletariat remain the same "it", the same meaningless abstraction that it was for Marx, but it is acknowledged by Lenin to be a stupid abstraction to boot.

Lenin's refusal (because he is a true Marxist) to see or consider the worker as a real individual human being is the basis, then, of the utter disaster in terms of basic human needs and freedoms that the Soviet state became. Marxist "historical necessity" dictates that the proletariat is antagonistic to the bourgeoisie. It is therefore the duty of the Marxist to turn the proletariat away from the bourgeoisie. The proletarian—each individual—must not be allowed to dedicate himself to bourgeois ends. He must not look to the betterment of his personal fortunes with "naked self-interest" (as Marx styled it) as his guide, but he must turn away from these goals to something else. But to what? Lost in their abstractions, Marx and Lenin give no answer; but they do not need to: the answer is embodied in the state their ideas and wills created.

It is recognized, in conclusion, that in this paper there have been necessary limitations both of the argument and especially of the technique that have been employed. If Marx has been chided for losing sight of the issues of reality by relying on his "force of abstraction" as a means of simplifying practical problems out of existence, it is realized that the same charge could be levelled, probably with equal justice, against the analysis of Marx that has been set down here. The only defence is that limitations of time and space have made this approach necessary, and it is believed that in all the spheres that have been touched on the argument could be extended and documented
in detail. On the basis of this, and bearing in mind as well the salutary admonition once delivered by Fredrich Engels, that "it is unfortunately only too common for a man to think he has perfectly understood a theory and is able forthwith to apply it, as soon as he has made the chief proposition his own," it is possible to venture a final estimate of Marxist philosophy. The real and fundamental implications of Marxism are wholly negative: it would replace actuality with dream, naturalness with artificiality, living fact with inert idea—ultimately, life with death. Of course, if one happens at this point to be a Marxist, there is no necessity whatever of pointing out that the opposite of all the above-cited implications can always with equal justice be maintained.

NOTES

3. Continuity supplied by the writer, but probably no differently than Marx himself would have stated it.
8. Leon Trotsky, "Introduction" to The Living Thoughts of Karl Marx, 2.
9. Marxist logic of this kind appears as "doublethink" in Orwell's 1984. Orwell's "doublethink", through which the mind is conditioned both to recognize and not to recognize its own falsifications, misses perhaps a full understanding of the Marxist rationale behind this inverted logic, but in formulations such as the Oceania Motto of 1984, he certainly captures its essence in bourgeois terms:

   WAR IS PEACE
   FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
   IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH

10. Isaiah Berlin mentions a favourite paradox of Marx's which once again illustrates most effectively the direction of Marxist thought: "the passion for destruction is also a creative passion." (The Hedgehog and the Fox [London, 1953], 152.)

11. In Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right the crucial question concerns religion. Materialism replaces religion, as fact replaces fantasy: "Religion is the self-conscious and self-feeling of man, who either has not yet found himself or has already lost himself again . . . . This state, this society produce religion, a perverted world consciousness, because they are a perverted world
... The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness.” (Marx and Engels, 262-3.)


15. See Shaw, “The Fabian Society,” in Essays in Fabian Socialism, 127-166. Basically, says Shaw, the Fabian Society’s aim, as the name implies, is the eventual achievement of socialism with the emphasis on legitimatist and diplomatic means, rejecting revolution, anarchism, and dogmas of all kinds. This compares with Bernstein’s “a greater security for lasting success lies in a steady advance than in the possibilities offered by a catastrophic crash.”

16. This and other points are discussed in the section “Democracy and Socialism,” Bernstein, 135-165.


18. Bernstein’s argument: According to Marx, all value is “concealed” labour time. The Capitalist’s profit traces directly back to unpaid, stolen labour time from his workers. Because his machines reduce the necessary volume of hand labour for the production of the same amount of goods, he must, in order to maintain his profit rate, steal successively more time from the labourer with each increase in his mechanization. But this postulate implies that for the absolute mass of profit to fall and the system to founder, the total absolute mass of labourers employed must become fewer and fewer, and the industrial “reserve army” of unemployed grow to crisis proportions. As long, however, as the absolute numbers of employed workers grows instead of shrinking, by Marx’s own reasoning capitalism is growing stronger instead of weaker, but this growth in the proletariat was what was supposed to bring capitalism down!


20. Although Marx calls up “the classless society” platitude quite frequently in his writings, the other two phrases have but one or two occurrences in the whole Marx and Engels canon. And these formulations are as far as Marx and Engels ever went in picturing the future world. Bismarck grew so exasperated at the German socialist parliamentarians for their inexplicable vagueness here compared to their certainty elsewhere that he made a speech denouncing their whole program specifically on this score. (Discussed in Schwarzschild, 403.)


22. Perhaps Russia’s one free election is the classic example of the worker’s natural antipathy to Marxist logic, where in spite of Lenin’s total control of the propaganda machinery and his saturation campaign, the Bolsheviks were decisively rejected.

23. Lenin, “What is to be Done?”, in Collected Works, V, 386.