Secretary of State William H. Seward's instructions to Charles Francis Adams, the newly appointed American Minister to London, reveal the balmy climate of relations across the North American border in early 1861. Although Britain and the United States shared an extensive boundary in America and competed for a large share of the world’s commerce, he wrote, only two minor questions were at stake between them. Discussion of these matters, he confidently predicted, would “proceed amicably and result in a satisfactory conclusion.” But the prospect for good relations faded rapidly with the intervention of the Civil War. By late 1864, as it drew to a close, an alarmed Seward was urging Adams to impress Britain with the grave state of affairs, warning that there was an “imminent” danger of war with the provinces — an assessment that many British North Americans shared.¹

Existing historical scholarship — most notably the work of Robin Winks and more recently a partially completed new study by Brian Jenkins — develops in close detail the corrosive impact of the Civil War on British North American-United States relations.² However, accounts of the period immediately following the American war are less detailed and frequently assume that the tension it kindled remained at a high level and continued to influence relations decisively even after the conflict ended. According to these interpretations, the friction that appeared early in the war, when the provinces began to suspect that preservation of an unwanted union rather than the curtailment of slavery was the real issue, rose constantly in the wake of crises like the Peerless and Trent affairs. Fanned by a stream of recriminating trans-border editorials, the tension reached a peak after the St. Albans raid, when the Lincoln administration ominously announced suspension of the Rush-Bagot agreement and restricted border crossings, and a seemingly vengeful Congress decided to end reciprocity, and continued nearly unabated until 1866. Then the fires of discord were stoked anew as the
provinces sought to obtain another reciprocity agreement by excluding Americans from inshore fisheries, the Fenians rudely burst across the border, and slumbering American annexationism seemed to awaken. Thus one author writes that the strain which was characteristic of British North American-United States relations during the first half of the 19th century increased during the Civil War, and continued throughout the 1860's. "It did not end when the peace had been restored in the United States in 1865, for now there was a fear that the victorious Northern forces, freed from their tasks in the South, might be turned against Canada." Another study implies that relations declined steadily from 1860, when they were "particularly satisfactory" until 1866, when "tension on the Canadian border exceeded that of 1837-8," while according to the historian of the North Atlantic Triangle, a "new and rather grim period" opened in Colonial-American relations with the Congressional decision to end reciprocity. 3

Undoubtedly the animosity aroused by the Civil War continued to infect British North American-United States relations to some degree during the 1860's. But to assert that relations remained seriously strained throughout 1865 until the new problems of 1866 complicated them even further is to overlook a great deal. During the spring and summer of 1865 there were several developments that went far toward healing the wounds inflicted by the events of the previous four years. This brought a marked improvement in British North American-United States relations before the issues of 1866 appeared on the scene to open a new era of tension.

Even before peace came there were signs that British North American-United States relations had begun to reverse their downward spiral. Ironically it was the well-known 1864 border raids by Confederate agents residing in the provinces that began the transformation. Responding to Seward's request, that the raiders who had been captured by the authorities in Canada be returned to the United States in order to stand trial, the Canadian government began extradition hearings. But these aborted in early December, when Judge Charles J. Coursol precipitously released the suspects claiming lack of jurisdiction, and Montreal Police Chief Guillaume Lamothe made matters worse by returning the stolen money to the prisoners without authorization.

These actions, as well as the raids themselves, were roundly condemned throughout the provinces. Many Colonists now came to believe that the Confederate refugees were abusing their privilege of asylum, and that their activities might bring war with the United States. Several or-
ordinarily anti-Northern newspapers, like the Montreal Gazette and the St. John Morning Telegraph, rebuked the South for trampling Canadian neutrality laws under foot, and they agreed with the warning of the Toronto Leader that Southern exiles could not

too clearly understand that, whatever may be the sympathies of our population with that gallant struggle which the Confederate States are making for their independence, it is our fixed resolution not to falter in our duty as neutrals ... to prevent Canadian soil being used for the organization of raiding expeditions against a country with which the Empire is at peace; and offenders against our neutrality must expect the punishment due their crimes. We are not going to be dragged into a war with which we have nothing to do, by parties who may abuse their right of asylum which this Province affords them.

Another editor rejoiced at how “extensive a conversion of public sentiment (had) taken place since the plunder and outrage at St. Albans;” he apologetically acknowledged Judge Coursol’s error in releasing the raiders, and begged Canadians not to condemn General Dix’s order — that Northern officers should pursue future raiders into the provinces if necessary — too hastily, for a patriotic Colonist might have followed a similar course, and Lincoln, as befit the President of a “great nation,” magnanimously had rescinded the order. All things being considered, the editor believed that relations had never been on a “more amicable footing,” and he hoped that the “accord” would remain unbroken.4

David Thurston, the American Consul in Toronto, noted that the segment of the Canada West press that once had sympathized with the Rebels had modified its tone in favor of the North; now it was commonly believed in that region, as it was among the “better and more intelligent people” of Montreal, that the presence of the Rebels in the provinces produced “much more evil than good.”5

This outburst of public indignation quickly stirred the Canadian government into action. It issued new warrants for the raiders’ arrest, and offered a two-hundred-dollar reward for each one who was returned. Two specially organized detective forces were placed at the disposal of a newly appointed Stipendiary Magistrate, who would patrol the border with the assistance of 1500 militia. Moreover, the Executive Council recommended that Canada accept responsibility for the money which Lamothe had returned to the suspects.6

But more important were the steps that Governor General Monck took to strengthen Canada’s neutrality laws. These permitted the authorities to punish hostile acts undertaken against friendly nations,
but made no provision for preventing them from occurring. Monck called the legislature one month early and introduced legislation to remedy this weakness. The new measure, which became law on February 6, enabled Canada to expel aliens suspected of plotting hostile acts against friendly nations and to fine them three thousand dollars. In addition arms or vessels that might be used in such acts could be seized.\textsuperscript{7}

Undoubtedly, these measures did much to discourage new border raids, for by early March the Confederates had ended their organized activities in the provinces. Seward, believing that the danger had passed, told J. Hume Burnley, the British Chargé in Washington, that the United States wanted to "re-establish its amicable policy with Canada," and he quickly withdrew the passport system for the Canadas, and rescinded the decision to cancel the Rush-Bagot agreement.\textsuperscript{8}

In the meantime Canada had re-arrested five of the released raiders and opened new extradition hearings. The court shortly found that the suspects could not be extradited under the 1842 treaty, but when the prisoners were released they were immediately re-arrested, for now the Canadian government had determined to try them for violation of provincial neutrality laws. This would be "entirely satisfactory" to the United States; Seward had previously told Burnley, and the Chargé confidently assured Russell that there would be no further trouble over the St. Albans affair.\textsuperscript{9} The preliminary hearings on the new charge committed only one of the men to stand trial and freed the others. But their release passed almost unnoticed, for now it was late April and new events had long since moved to the centre of the stage.\textsuperscript{10}

Thus while the border raids of 1864 severely strained British North American-United States relations momentarily, their long-run impact was beneficial. By threatening to provoke an armed clash, the raids brought a revulsion for the Confederacy throughout the provinces and goaded the Canadian government into controlling the Southern agents. This removed a major source of conflict that had irritated British North American-United States relations since the opening of the war, and it began the healing process.

It was also becoming apparent by this time that the concern over an Anglo-American War, so plainly evident in the Colonies and England in early 1865, was ill-founded. Most Americans did not clamor for war with England and the seizure of the provinces, as numerous Colonial and English sources claimed. Enervated by four years of war, they anxiously sought to return to peacetime occupations. Though some chauvinistic American editorials fed the war fears, several influential
newspapers discounted the likelihood of war and disparaged talk of marching north. The New York Times believed that Parliament’s worryings over Canadian defence were merely “foolish vaporings,” while the Tribune counselled Americans to mind their own business instead of seeking additional territory. The Toronto Globe discovered that even the Herald, whose columns constantly had trumpeted annexationist tirades throughout the war, was sounding a sweeter note. Probably an accurate reflection of American opinion was given by the renowned minister Henry Ward Beecher, when he proclaimed that the United States had sufficient territory; even if the provinces should apply for membership in the Union, he told a New York congregation, he would question the wisdom of granting their wish, for Americans only wanted to live with the Colonies “as neighbors, in peace and amity.”

Meanwhile, the Lincoln administration took steps showing that it did not intend to attack its British neighbors. Seward, prompted by Adams’ report that British apprehension of an American attack had reached alarming proportions, undertook to allay British fears. On March 10, before the Colonial defense debate had ended in Parliament, Seward wrote to Adams that “in no case . . . whether for Canada, or any other object,” did the United States contemplate war with England — soothing words that the American Minister quickly relayed to the Foreign Office. Two days earlier, as we have already seen, Seward had rescinded the cancellation of the Rush-Bagot treaty and withdrawn the passport regulations.

These friendly measures brought the desired result. Seward soon had word that they had “relieved Canada of apprehension of hostile intentions on our part,” while in England the Palmerston government introduced a note of conciliation and restraint in the continuing debate on Canadian defense, and avoided any war talk. Surprisingly, Earl Russell drew the attention of the House of Lords to the tolerant spirit that the United States had shown toward Britain during the previous four tension-filled years: “Whatever may be the intemperance shown by certain orators in the Senate and Congress of America,” he said, “whatever may be the violence — the unjust and extreme violence — shown by the press of America, I cannot think that the Government of the United States have been wanting in moderation in their communication to us.” By the time the House of Commons debated Colonial defense in mid-March, most speakers shared John Bright’s view that respectable Americans did not desire to attack Canada. Palmerston himself stated that “there can be no well-founded apprehension that the peace happily
prevailing between us is in danger of interruption.” 14 These calming words from Parliament soon quieted the British war fears. Inflammatory editorials disappeared from newspaper columns by mid-April in both England and the provinces, and with a sigh of relief Adams informed Seward that the “alarmist policy” was abandoned. 15

The passing of the war scare in England and the provinces coincided with another development — the end of the Civil War — that advanced the improvement taking place in Colonial-American relations. The arrival of peace in the United States furthered the warming trend by automatically removing some sources of discord that had arisen with the opening of the war primarily because of the proximity of a neutral to a belligerent. Northern crimps now ended their search for recruits north of the border. More important, the North no longer needed to fear that Confederate privateers lurked in Colonial ports waiting to pounce on Union shipping.

But peace celebrations in Northern cities had scarcely ended before another event occurred that profoundly affected Canadian-American relations in 1865: the assassination of President Lincoln. Colonists greeted the news with a display of grief that few would have predicted. The provincial press, with few exceptions, expressed the widely felt sorrow in language that frequently was extravagant. For example the semi-official Toronto Leader, one of Lincoln’s severest critics, believed that nothing since the death of Prince Albert had so moved the residents of the city. Wistfully the paper remembered a time when Colonists had called Americans their “cousins”; as if appealing for a reconciliation, the repentant editorial hoped that Americans would find in the expressions of sympathy at Lincoln’s death assurance that the provinces desired to live in friendship with the United States. Not to be outdone, the Montreal Herald asserted that only the death of the Queen herself would have left a greater void in Colonial hearts. 16

British North Americans expressed their sympathy in many other ways. They lowered flags to half-mast and inundated the State Department with resolutions. Some Colonial cities sent delegations to the Washington ceremonies, while others held their own memorial services. Toronto’s response to the assassination, which Thurston reported in considerable detail, probably was typical of the reaction of many provincial centres, if one may judge from the consular reports. By noon on Saturday, the day following the assassination, flags were at half-mast, people crowded the streets and newspaper offices in search of news of the events, and business had come to a stand-still from which it did not
recover for several days. In the evening a public meeting at the American Hotel selected Thurston as its chairman, heard speeches from “Canadian Gentlemen”, passed suitable resolutions, and laid plans for a memorial service. City officials personally presented their condolences to the American Consul and the Mayor issued a proclamation suspending business on the day of the funeral. The stunned citizenry still thronged newspaper offices on Monday. On Wednesday, the day of the funeral, bells tolled throughout the city and stores closed long before the appointed hour. Hundreds were turned away from the Adelaide Street Church, which seated three thousand, and from Zion’s Church, where the crape-covered flags of England and the United States were displayed side by side from gallery and pulpit. The whole city, Thurston proudly reported, “presented the appearance of mourning and sorrow, and every citizen seemed really to feel that the occasion of this manifestation was not one alone confined to the United States but one in which Canada too most heartily lamented.”

The British North American expression of sorrow at Lincoln’s death won the appreciative attention of Americans, and it was the most important factor in promoting the reconciliation that was underway by late spring in 1865. The American Consul in Saint John told an audience there that the sympathetic Colonial response had raised the intangible but reliable barriers of “sympathy, forebearance and charity” against the likelihood of American encroachment which the “neighboring Republic (could) never overcome.” American newspapers that had engaged their provincial counterparts in an acrimonious editorial duel throughout the war now softened their tone. Acknowledging that it frequently had accused the Colonists of unfriendliness, the Tribune apologetically proclaimed that there was “no precedent in the world’s history of a whole country paying such tribute of honor to the memory of the head of a foreign country.” More noteworthy was the response of the usually hostile Herald which assured its readers that the actions of the Colonists would “do much toward softening the acerbity of feeling” that had recently developed.

Two further developments during the summer of 1865 nurtured this spirit of reconciliation. In July, numerous American boards of trade, led by the Detroit body, called the Detroit Commercial Convention to discuss the renewal of reciprocity; they hoped that through their united effort they could prevent the collapse of a lucrative source of trade. More than 500 leading business men from 28 American cities and 15 Colonial cities attended. After lengthy debate the conference unanimously passed a resolution calling on the President to open negotiations to renew or
revise the reciprocity treaty. This produced a wave of optimism in British North America where many believed that close commercial ties with the United States were essential if the provinces were to prosper. The Ottawa Citizen was "gratified" at the outcome of the convention, while the British Whig predicted the renewal of the 1854 agreement, and another paper asserted that Washington would be "compelled" by the deliberations of the convention "to negotiate another treaty, quite as liberal, and probably more satisfactory" than the original one.19

But surpassing the resolution in importance, was the feeling of goodwill that enveloped the occasion. One Colonial paper, known for its hostility to the North throughout the Civil War, alluded to the convention as the "Detroit reunion" and anticipated that it would inaugurate "an era of that better understanding which is the basis of all true harmony." The discussion, claimed another sheet, had produced "much good, in removing apprehensions as to the relations between the Republic and the British American Provinces." Even the inappropriate statement of John F. Potter, the American Consul General in Canada— that reciprocity should be terminated in order to coerce the provinces, by economic pressure, into joining the United States— failed to dampen the spirit of the occasion. Other American participants quickly censured the discourteous remark. Hamilton A. Hill, a delegate from Boston, commented on "the pleasant social intercourse" and evident desire of the members to live as neighbors in "amity and confidence"; the convention, he believed, would allay prejudice" and erase "painful recollections", and he hoped that it would increase the two peoples' "disposition to forgive and forget the past".20

Supplementing the expression of goodwill that the Detroit Convention evoked, was the enthusiastic reception that Canadians accorded General Grant. In August the Northern hero made a brief tour of Canada extending from Quebec to Niagara Falls. Sherbrooke greeted him with "loud cheering" when he declared that toward "all the British Provinces I cherish only the kindest feelings." Although the trip was a private one, ruling out the possibility of official receptions, he dined with the Governor General in Quebec and was shown about Montreal by Lieutenant General Sir John Michel and Major General Sir Charles Hastings Doyle, the military commanders of the Canadas, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Two hundred of Montreal's leading citizens called on him, while an editor praised him as "one of the most remarkable men in North America", and he was "heartily cheered" by a "considerable crowd" on his departure. In Toronto, where he arrived in a train fes-
tooned with evergreen boughs and Union Jacks, the "great commander" was enthusiastically awaited by "hundreds of spectators", the Globe reported, and "cheer after cheer rent the air" on his appearance. The scene was repeated farther west at Brantford, recorded the Hamilton Times, where crowds received the "gallant general ... amid deafening cheers." This was a remarkable welcome for the man, whom many British North Americans scarcely three months earlier, had regarded as a potential leader of enemy forces.

During the summer of 1865 General William T. Sherman, another leading Northern military figure, won favorable comments from British North Americans. In July several of the Colonial delegates to the Detroit Convention had met Sherman in St. Louis. He showed the most "kindly sentiments" toward the provinces, reported the Montreal Gazette, and expressed his desire that "the two countries might always live together in peace and harmony." The following month another Colonial editor commended him for a speech in Chicago in which he counselled Americans to refrain from maligning Britain and advised them to emulate the good she had done in the world.

The response to Lincoln's death and to Grant's visit, as well as the spirit of the Detroit Convention, unmistakably show that the improvement in Colonial-American relations begun by the St. Albans raid and advanced by the quieting of the alarmist war rumours, had grown to significant proportions by the summer of 1865. But some historians point to the damaging impact of the American decision to abrogate the 1854 reciprocity treaty. Since Congress declared its intention at the close of 1864 when tension was at its peak, they reason, it was a retaliatory step and constitutes the best measure of the depth of hostility between the neighbors.

However, the retaliation thesis has several weaknesses. Congressional opposition to reciprocity did not arise at the time of the border disputes, but antedated those events by several years. Justin Morrill, who led the anti-reciprocity forces in 1864, had voiced his opposition in the House with a resolution questioning the value of the treaty in 1858. Several others criticized the agreement in Congress in the intervening years, and by early 1864 it was evident that the treaty's opponents would launch an attack against it. The attack came and the House passed an anti-reciprocity resolution, but not "after a debate that bristled with hostility toward Canada" over the St. Alban's raid, as has been alleged. The fact is that the House of Representatives virtually completed its debate on reciprocity in May 1864 — five months before the border in-
cidents — but delayed a final vote until after the fall election. When the reciprocity question re-surfaced in December, it was merely voted on without further debate. It was never discussed in the House of Representatives in the context of the St. Albans raid. 25

If hostility toward Canada had been the major cause of abrogation, there was ample opportunity for it to have been expressed in the votes on the Morrill resolution in the House. As British North American—United States tension mounted during 1864, one would expect Congressional opposition to reciprocity to have grown. The Morrill resolution, which directed the President to give notice of intention to terminate the treaty, was voted on twice — in May and in December. In May, 74 supported it, and in December 85, an increase of only 11. These votes, rather than showing a wave of Congressional animosity cresting late in 1864, reveal that most Congressmen already had made up their minds on the question of reciprocity well before the St. Albans raid. 26

An incident closely related to the St. Albans raid confirms the view that Congress reacted with moderation to the border clashes. On December 14, the day after the House vote, Washington learned that Judge Coursol had freed the captured raiders on questionable grounds. On learning this, 9 Congressmen, who had abstained from voting on the Morrill measure, requested permission to record their votes. Six voted in favor and three against. In a chamber strongly motivated by revenge surely more than 9 of the 46 abstainees would have voted, and a large number of them would have favored the resolution. 27

The presence in Congress of a large bloc sympathetic to the provinces and favorable to reciprocity, despite the international tension, further discredits the retaliation thesis. This group, representing grain and flour interests, and border mercantile associations, was strong enough to cast fifty-one votes against the Morrill measure, and it sought to extend reciprocity. 28

Although abrogationists frequently claimed that reciprocity was economically disadvantageous to the United States, 29 the major factor underlying the treaty’s defeat is illuminated by a regional analysis of the House vote on the Morrill measure. New England, with the nation’s heaviest concentration of manufacturing, strongly opposed reciprocity, while the Middle and Western states, where industry was less predominate and economic life more diversified, showed much greater enthusiasm for the treaty. Opposition from industrial areas, supplemented by the well-known hostility of the fishing, lumbering, coal, and woollen interests, bore primary responsibility for defeating the trea-
ty, for manufacturers received little direct benefit from the pact which included only natural products. Nor were American manufactures unmindful that Canada had raised its tariff on industrial goods twice since 1858. More important, Northern industrialists finally had achieved in 1861 the long-sought goal of a protective tariff. As a symbol of free trade, the reciprocity treaty was a potential danger to protectionism which had to be removed. It was more than coincidental that Justin Morrill, the high priest of protection and author of the 1861 tariff, led the fight against reciprocity. The abrogation of reciprocity did not indicate a desire on the part of the United States to retaliate against the provinces. Instead it reflected the growing political power of the protectionists — a power that was enhanced at the close of the war by the absence of the seceded states from Congress. Protectionists struck the blow against reciprocity and continued to block it for the rest of the century.

But the fact is that in the summer of 1865 there was rising hope in the provinces that a new trade agreement would be negotiated. During the previous year, when Congressional murmurings against reciprocity became louder, the Canadian government had asked the Mother country to sound out Washington on revising the 1854 pact. Britain rejected the request, for Lord Lyons, the British Minister in Washington, believed that it was the wrong time to raise the issue. However, the picture quickly changed after Canada restrained the Confederate agents. Seward then told Burnley that he was willing not only to retain the Rush-Bagot agreement and to rescind the passport regulations, but to discuss reciprocity. Sir Frederick Bruce, Britain's new Minister in Washington, soon received instructions to raise the trade question with the American government, in consultation with the Canadian government. These developments, not to mention the Detroit Convention, must have raised Canadian hope that the two commissioners whom they sent to Washington in August would meet with success.

The evidence suggests that the problems in British North American-United States relations raised by the Civil War were more transitory than sometimes has been recognized. Colonial sympathy for the Confederacy dwindled after the St. Albans raid. The North found proof of this in the revised Canadian neutrality laws, and it withdrew the passport regulations and re-instated the Rush-Bagot agreement. Seward's declaration that the United States did not intend to attack the provinces, bolstered by the friendly remarks of Grant and Sherman, laid to rest the war panic. This warming trend grew significantly in the wake
of Lincoln's assassination, when something almost amounting to a reconciliation between the provinces and the North occurred. Furthermore, the abrogation of reciprocity did not indicate a Northern desire to retaliate for the border raids; instead it reflected the growth of protectionist influence. Reciprocity had not yet become the bone of contention that it did after 1866. Indeed by the summer of 1865 the dark clouds that had loomed on the horizon a few months earlier had begun to lift and the stage seemed to be set for a return to the cordial atmosphere of the late 1850's.

Notes


2. Robin Winks, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years (Baltimore, 1960); Brian Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union (Montreal, 1974), 1.


5. National Archives, (Washington), (N.A.), RG 59, Despatches from United States Consuls in Toronto, 1864-1906, vol. 1, Thurston to Seward, Feb. 23, 1865; ibid., Despatches from United States Consuls in Montreal, 1850-1906, vol. 6, Potter to Seward, Jan. 6, 1865, and same to same, Jan. 14, 1865. See also Governor General Monck’s statement that “no sympathy with the persons engaged in the outrage has been expressed in Canada and the Press throughout the Province unanimously denounces the attack,” in Public Archives of Canada, (Ottawa) (P.A.C.), F.O. 5, vol. 1056, Monck to Cardwell, Oct. 27, 1864.


8. P.A.C., F.O. 5, vol. 1099, Monck to Cardwell, March 10, 1865; and the enclosed telegram, Burnley to Monck, March 8, 1865.


10. Ibid., Monck to Cardwell, April 21, 1865; ibid., Michel, Lieutenant Governor of Canada, to Cardwell, Oct. 27, 1865.

11. Boston Advertiser quoted in Toronto Globe, March 15, 1865; New York Times, April 9, 1865; New York Tribune, April 7, 1865; Toronto Globe, April 12, 1865; sermon preached on April 7, excerpted in ibid.
12. Adams to Seward, Feb. 23, 1865. Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1866), I, 182, in which Adams stated that the "impression is now very general that peace and restoration at home are synonymous with war" with England; "I must characterize the present as a period of extraordinary uneasiness and indefinite apprehension as to the future." Seward to Adams, March 10, 1865, ibid., 201. Adams had assured the British government that the United States had no intention of going to war with England before receiving Seward's instructions; see Adams to Seward, March 16, 1865, ibid., 246-47, and Seward to Adams, April 4, 1865, ibid., 303.

13. Seward to Adams, March 20, 1865. ibid., 252.

14. See the speeches of Russell, Granville, and Ripon, in the House of Lords on Feb. 20, 1865, Hansard, 3rd series, CLXXVII, 422-23, 430-32, 434-38, respectively, and the speeches of Forster, Cardwell, Watkin, Bright, and Palmerston, in the House of Commons on March 13, 1865, ibid., 1556, 1565-70, 1598-1602, 1613-33M 1633-37, respectively.

15. Adams to Seward, March 24, 1865. Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1866), I, 262: Adams reported: "You will be glad to perceive how much the tone toward the United States has changed. The alarmist policy ... seems to be at last abandoned, and in lieu of it come earnest professions of a belief that the friendly relations between the two countries are firmly established."

16. Toronto Leader, April 17, 20; Montreal Herald, April 19, 1865. Many newspapers echoed these sentiments. The anti-Northern Montreal Gazette praised the departed leader's character and doubted that the new administration would be as friendly. Papers in Quebec and Kingston reported that those cities had never seen "a more universal tribute of respect." The Oshawa Vindicator described the passing of Lincoln a "good, pious, and kind man," as a "calamity" for the whole world, while it was like the loss of a personal friend for the Toronto Globe which predicted that the slain hero's place in the annals of America would be second only to Washington's. See Montreal Gazette. April 17; Quebec Morning Chronicle. April 21; Kingston British Whig. April 17; Oshawa Vindicator. April 19; Toronto Globe. April 17; and Hamilton Evening Times. April 15, 19, all for 1865.

17. For examples of resolutions see P.A.C., G6, vol. 16a, Monck to Bruce, two despatches dated April 25, 1865, with resolutions from public meetings at Woodstock and London; ibid., two despatches dated April 26, 1865, with resolutions from the London Board of Trade and public meetings in Berlin (now Kitchener) and Waterloo; ibid., despatch dated April 27, 1865, with an address from citizens of Galt; ibid., despatch dated May 17, 1865, with a letter from the Mayor of Hamilton and a resolution from the city council; ibid., despatch dated June 2, 1865, with an address from the Ministers of the "Niagara Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Canada." Surprisingly, numerous memorial sermons were regarded to be important enough to warrant publication in permanent form and three examples are noted here with abbreviated titles: Rev. J. Wood and Rev. W. Cochrane, Abraham Lincoln, The Martyr President (Brantford, 1865); Rev. Robert Norton and Rev. Robert F. Burns, Maple Leaves from Canada, for the Grave of Abraham Lincoln (St. Catherines, 1865); Charles M. Ellis, The Memorial Address on Abraham Lincoln (St. John, N.B., 1865). Consular reports describing the response to Lincoln's death in Toronto, Montreal, Saint John, and Halifax, are found respectively in : N.A., RG 59, Despatches from United States Consuls in Toronto, 1864-1906, vol. I, Thurston to Hunter, April 24, 1865; ibid., Despatches from United States Consuls in Montreal, 1850-1906, vol. 6, Potter to Seward, April 24, 1865; ibid., Despatches from United States Consuls in St. John, New Brunswick, 1835-1906, vol. 6, Howard to Seward, April 26, 1865; Despatches from United States Consuls in Halifax, 1833-1906, vol. 11, Jackson to Hunter, April 27, 1865.

18. ibid., Despatches from United States Consuls in St. John, New Brunswick, 1835-1906, vol. 6, Howard to Seward, June 3, 1865 with a copy of the Saint John Daily Evening Globe, June 2, 1865; New York Tribune, April 24, 1865; New York Herald, April 19, 1865; Fred Landon, "Canadian Opinion of Southern Secession, 1860-61," Canadian Historical Review. I (Sept., 1920), 256, where he states that the provinces' expression of sympathy "did more than diplomacy to wipe out the bitterness felt by the North over the Trent incident and the operation of the Confederates and their sympathizers in Canada"; Winks, Canada and the United States, 366-70.

20. Quebec Morning Chronicle, July 18 and 14, 1865, which noted the "almost fraternal courtesy" of the American participants and commented that "if no result be attained save the re-establishment of international good feeling, we shall have no reason to complain of the trouble and inconvenience to which a number of our representative business men have been put . . . ."; Ottawa Citizen. Aug. 7, 1865; Hill, Review of the Proceedings of the Detroit Convention, 36-40, 54, 56.


23. Donald F. Warner, The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893 (Lexington, 1960), 39-40; Lester B. Shippee, Canadian-American Relations 1849-1874 (New Haven, 1939), 158, where the author states that the "events of the latter part of 1865 aroused such resentment in the Union that the rising tide of indignation desiring to vent itself in abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty could no longer be held back"; Keenleyside and Brown, Canada and the United States, 112-13, who state: "As a result of this attitude on the part of the American people (their desire to retaliate for the border raids) the reciprocity treaty was abrogated . . . ." W.L. Morton implies the same in The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from Earliest Times (Toronto, 1969), 322. D.C. Masters in Reciprocity, 1846-1911, Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 12 (Ottawa, 1951), 11, finds that "protectionist opinion" was the "constant factor" in American opposition to reciprocity, but in The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854: Its History, Its Relation to British Colonial and Foreign Policy and to the Development of Canadian Fiscal Autonomy (Toronto, 1963), 82-83, a new edition of an earlier study, the same author surprisingly writes that "there can be no question that a considerable part of the House was swept off its feet by political prejudice" arising from the border raids.


27. Ibid., 35. Dec. 14, 1864.


29. One analysis of trade during the treaty finds that it was beneficial to the United States. American exports to the provinces, it is true, grew at an annual average rate of only two percent during the life of the treaty, as compared to an average annual rate of fifteen percent in the decade prior to it, but the comparison is an inconclusive one; in the earlier period an extensive program of Colonial railway construction artificially stimulated American exports to the provinces, in some years more than doubling their American imports. Undoubtedly the disruptive impact of the Civil War was the major factor in the low rate of growth of American exports to the Colonies during the treaty. Total American exports during the war years dropped sharply, from an average annual rate of growth of nine percent in 1856-1860 to zero percent in 1861-1865. More significant was the fact that while the average annual rate of growth of American exports to Britain and France for 1861-1865 was minus six percent and minus
eighteen percent respectively, American exports to the provinces during the same period grew at an average annual rate of six percent, and the Colonies replaced France as the second largest importer of American products. During the Civil War, therefore, when America’s sales to the rest of the world declined, its exports to British North America, aided by the 1854 agreement, expanded. Moreover, and contrary to the assertions of the treaty’s opponents, the United States enjoyed an overall balance of trade with the provinces of $18,000,000 during the life of the treaty. For a fuller treatment of the abrogationist attack on reciprocity and comparative data on trade under the treaty, see the present writer’s unpublished doctoral dissertation entitled Canadian-American Relations, 1861-1871 (Claremont, 1971), 40-44.

30. Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., 2 Sess., 32, Dec. 13, 1864. In the analysis the regions were divided as follows: New England included Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire; the Middle States included Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, Rhode Island, Delaware, New Jersey, West Virginia; and the West included Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Missouri, California, Indiana, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Kansas, Minnesota, Oregon. On this basis New England gave 19 votes for the Morrill measure, with only 4 nays and 2 abstentions, while the Middle and Western states had 32 yeas, 18 nays, 21 abstentions, and 34 yeas, 29 nays, and 23 abstentions, respectively.