By the beginning of the twentieth century it was generally understood in London and in Britain's self-governing colonies that whenever the dependencies pursued relations with the foreign world the diplomacy involved would bring the Foreign Office and appropriate colonial plenipotentiaries together on a basis of relative equality in order to promote the negotiations at stake. Nowhere was this policy more marked than in the case of Canada and that country's relations with Whitehall.

Thus, over the period 1878 to 1883, Ottawa's First High Commissioner to London, Sir Alexander Galt, conducted full-fledged though sporadic negotiations with Spanish and French diplomats with a view to commercial agreements and generally as a co-equal negotiator with the British envoys to Madrid and Paris. Though neither negotiation produced results, Galt's successor as High Commissioner, Sir Charles Tupper, successfully concluded a commercial treaty with France in 1892, ultimately ratified in 1895, on an equal basis with the British ambassador to Paris, Lord Dufferin. 1

The achievement of a rough equality with British diplomats and an imperial recognition of Canada's interests suffered a marked set-back on October 20, 1903, when a judicial tribunal sitting in London awarded the United States nearly all its claims regarding the Alaska-Canada boundary. Canadian rage knew hardly any bounds when it became known that the British delegate, Lord Alverstone, had consistently sided with his American colleagues on the panel to the marked discomfiture of Ottawa's delegates, Sir Louis Jette and Allen Aylesworth.

Leading the assault against the inadequacies of British diplomacy was Canada's Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier. In an interview which appeared in the London Daily Mail and which was obviously designed to attract as much publicity as possible, Laurier indicated that
Canadians would not forget their defeat over the Alaska boundary. In order to avoid such situations in the future Canada would demand the “right of making her own treaties with foreign powers.” Sir Wilfrid did accept a degree of imperial control over Ottawa’s conclusion of treaties by acknowledging the right of the monarch to veto such arrangements if, on the advice of his Ministers, he found them to be detrimental to the interests of the Empire. However, he insisted that Canada must be granted the right to arrange all the preliminaries that affected the country’s trade and territory.2

Laurier’s demand for a far greater voice in treaty-making was viewed with dismay by London’s Spectator. That journal observed, incorrectly, that there was little desire among Canadians for control of their own foreign affairs. The Spectator admitted that the Canadian people were bitterly disappointed over the Alaska award particularly because it was a decision arrived at by other than Canada’s delegates. However, if a genuine imperial constitution was to be maintained, authority in treaty-making had to be retained in London. Wilfrid Laurier’s claim for broader treaty-making facilities was to be welcomed, provided that it meant a more intimate involvement by Canadians in imperial decision-making circles.3 This suggestion, of course, was diametrically opposed to comments made by Laurier on a previous occasion to Lord Minto, the Governor-General, that Canada did not seek expanded political links with Britain.4

Toronto’s partisan Globe, as might have been expected, applauded the Prime Minister’s views. Canada was a growing community and would not submit for long to being placed at a disadvantage in diplomatic negotiations as the Alaska Boundary tribunal had so obviously done.5 The Globe’s observations were complemented by prominent members of Canada’s judiciary in the aftermath of the Spectator’s critical editorial and the Daily Mail’s celebrated interview.

Writing to Laurier after the Spectator’s editorial had appeared, Thomas Hodgins of Toronto and a judge in the Court of Admiralty damned the editorial as “hostile” and applauded Laurier’s demand as an “absolute necessity”. Hodgins’ observations were important as he was an excellent commentator on both the treaty-making issue and the boundary dispute. Only a year earlier he had written a lengthy letter to the Spectator clinically dissecting and rejecting the advanced claims of the United States on the boundary question. His efforts had earned him the editor’s praise for displaying both “good temper” and “learning”.6

At the same time that Thomas Hodgins was giving Laurier his support, added encouragement came from the Archer Martin, also a judge
in Admiralty residing in Victoria, B.C. According to Martin, Laurier's claim to the treaty-making faculty was of the "first importance" in shaping the future of Canada. To Martin the question of obtaining the treaty-making power was a "national" one and completely divorced from the realm of partisan policies. Only his judicial position prevented him from joining Laurier on public platforms in the quest of this goal. 

In the light of the foregoing opinions it seems reasonable to analyse the Prime Minister's more private observations on the treaty-making issue over and beyond his comments as they appeared in the public press. Following the Alaska verdict, Laurier observed that the demand for the treaty-making power was not new. It had been enunciated clearly in 1882 by Edward Blake. Now, in the aftermath of Alaska, Blake's demand had become even more imperative. Canada should obtain a treaty-making power where both her commercial and territorial interests were affected. This did not mean that Ottawa insisted on plenary powers for concluding treaties of alliance whether defensive or offensive with foreign powers. However, where Canada's trade and territory were at stake the demand for treaty-making autonomy was "right, just and should be granted." 

Though the Alaska imbroglio had quite obviously involved Canada's territorial interests and had engendered considerable hostility towards London, the Laurier administration's quest for an expanded external role came quickly to involve the country's commercial relations. At the same time that the Prime Minister was commenting upon the deficiencies of imperial diplomacy his Finance Minister, William Stevens Fielding, commenced an analysis of Canada's tariff policy.

Writing privately to Joseph Chamberlain, the former Colonial Secretary who had resigned from the British cabinet in 1903 to lead the campaign for tariff reform — a euphemism for Britain's abandonment of free-trade, Fielding referred to Ottawa's grant of preference for British goods. The continuation of preference which had been set at twenty-five per cent in 1898 and subsequently raised to thirty-three and a third per cent in 1900 was in some doubt, Fielding indicated. Many Canadian manufacturers were opposed to the administration's generosity on this score. Further, Canada's trade relations with foreign states had been jeopardized because of British preference. Fielding noted that there were many powers with which Ottawa wished to establish a flourishing commerce. One means of achieving this goal would be to grant such powers tariff rates equal to those accorded Britain. In essence, William Fielding was giving London a hint that in the future
Canada would manipulate her tariff in order to develop the country's trade with the world and also that such manipulation would be one stratagem in an emerging treaty-making faculty.

With a view to revamping the Canadian tariff and utilizing it as a means of advancing the country's commercial fortunes, the administration appointed a Tariff Commission in 1905 chaired by Fielding. Over the period September 1905 to February 1906 the Commission travelled more than 14,000 miles throughout the country soliciting the opinions and briefs of Canadian industrialists and agriculturalists. Predictably, manufacturers generally argued for increased protection, low duties on their raw materials and a reduction in British preference. Equally predictably, Canadian farmers in Quebec, Ontario and the West plumped for stable or lower duties and the establishment of a tariff for revenue purposes only.

The conflict between industrial and agricultural interests anticipated a generally unchanged tariff schedule with some modifications being made regarding the degree of British preference and new initiatives promoting commercial relations with the foreign world. Fielding himself alerted the public regarding the latter changes in a major address in Montreal on November 20, 1906. Though re-affirming the administration's dedication to preference for United Kingdom products, the Finance Minister noted that "the degree of preference" might have to be varied. Of more significance was his reference to the need for "another tariff column" which would enable Ottawa to favour the commodities of countries willing to trade liberally with Canada and to discriminate against other nations which "put up the bars against us."

With the labours of the Commission behind him and the public aware of impending tariff changes, Fielding introduced his budget resolutions to the Canadian Commons on November 29, 1906. In presenting his resolutions he noted that four different tariff schedules would be implemented. British preference, now eight years old, would remain though with greater flexibility. Preference would no longer be an across-the-board reduction of thirty-three and a third per cent but rather a specific reduction on each article. There would be a general tariff applying to nations who discriminated against Canada. The reduced tariffs approved of in the Franco-Canadian treaty of 1895 would continue, though there was always the hope that renewed negotiations with Paris would modify or replace that agreement. Finally, and most significantly, there would be an intermediate tariff. The rates in this schedule would be granted to countries willing to accord Canada comparable concessions.
As the Finance Minister described the intermediate tariff it would become “the instrument by which we may conduct negotiations, from time to time, with any country.” Subject only to the imperial veto which was a “necessary link” between the country and Great Britain, Canada was “practically a free country, having her own Customs law.” The intermediate tariff might be extended to another power on an ad hoc basis by a mere order-in-council. To make the offer of the tariff permanent over a period of years required a treaty and the assistance of imperial authorities.

On the score of having to resort to London for authority and assistance in concluding treaties under the intermediate tariff, Fielding as much as stated that Canada did in fact conduct her own foreign affairs. Using as an example the predicament of a German national who had run into trouble with the authorities in Montreal, the Finance Minister indicated how such problems were solved. The German Consul General in that city came to Ottawa on behalf of his fellow-citizen and probably within an hour the matter was settled. Thus Canada, in reality, had “diplomatic relations in a sense” with foreign states. As a member of the British Empire the country was not supposed to have such contacts, but as a matter of sheer practicality Canada did have “business relations with the representatives of foreign countries.”

Should Ottawa decide that a long-term commitment over the intermediate tariff with a foreign power was desirable, then the imperial government would be called upon in order that a proper treaty might be negotiated. Until that point was reached, however, the intermediate tariff would not be implemented. Rather, it would stand as a statement of Canada’s intentions to the world at large whereby other nations would become aware of the conditions under which Ottawa would conduct genuine commercial negotiations.

Perfectly aware that Canada was still bound by Britain’s most-favoured-nations treaties, Fielding suggested to the Commons a means of avoiding or at least modifying their impact. Ottawa would attempt to negotiate over the extension of the intermediate tariff with several countries simultaneously and then attempt to bring all such agreements into effect at the same time. In this manner, though other powers could then claim most-favoured-nation privileges, the impact would be considerably lessened by the concessions Ottawa’s negotiators had won abroad.

William Fielding’s presentation and interpretation of his tariff resolutions are vital to an understanding of Canadian external policy. Though
he had paid lip service to the sovereignty of the imperial government in the negotiation of treaties, Fielding had clearly outlined an all but autonomous role for Canada in such discussions. His references to Canadian autonomy and the use of the intermediate tariff as a lever to force negotiations upon other countries gave ample proof of the government’s intentions. Further, his assertion of Canada’s right to enter into discussions with foreign consuls in Canada, and he might just as well have said negotiations, cannot be dismissed as mere parliamentary rhetoric. Fielding had, after all, told the Commons that the country was engaged in foreign relations, and his gestures to imperial authority could not disguise this development. Indeed, the Finance Minister’s frankness on this point stands in marked contrast to John A. Macdonald’s apology to parliament for the efforts of France’s consul in Montreal to force unilateral negotiations upon the government in 1882.\(^\text{16}\)

Fielding’s forthright remarks and his emphasis on an emerging Canadian sovereignty attracted considerable interest in the country’s press. The *Monetary Times* of Toronto described the tariff revision as a wise measure and noted that the introduction of the intermediate rates would reduce somewhat the advantages British goods enjoyed. Significantly, the journal praised the tariff as a step in the direction of the treaty-making power which would ultimately become Canada’s “in the fullness of time.” Negotiations would mean the appointment of a plenipotentiary who would have to be a Canadian chosen by the Laurier government. The *Monetary Times* insisted that the “actual force in negotiating would reside in Ottawa”, arguing that Canada could never permit herself “to be at the mercy of Downing Street.”\(^\text{17}\)

Toronto’s *Globe* referred to the tariff and its implications for Canadian sovereignty rather briefly. The intermediate tariff was “a powerful means” whereby Ottawa could negotiate meaningfully with foreign powers, it observed.\(^\text{18}\) Across the Atlantic, *The Economist* described the new tariff as more “ornamental than useful.” Its main value lay in the fact that it enabled government supporters to claim that their sympathies still lay in the direction of free trade. Given its time-honoured adherence to *laissez faire* fiscal policies, the *Economist’s* editorial stand was understandable and not unusual.\(^\text{19}\)

Imperial reaction to Fielding’s announcement was brief and reflected an acceptance of the inevitable. Hugh Bertram Cox of the Colonial Office remarked that the sections of Fielding’s speech he regarded as most important were those touching upon British preference, the in-
termediate tariff and the Finance Minister's remarks regarding Canada's diplomatic relations with foreign powers. He also drew up a memorandum listing those powers entitled to most-favoured-nation treatment should Ottawa extend the intermediate tariff to one or more states.\textsuperscript{20} These numbered some fourteen and Cox agreed that their effect could be considerably reduced if the Canadians successfully negotiated with several countries. The end result, he predicted, would be a marked reduction in the existing value of British preference.\textsuperscript{21}

In utilizing the intermediate tariff as a means of opening negotiations with the foreign world it seemed logical that Ottawa should look initially to France, with whom a limited commercial agreement had been concluded twelve years earlier. The hostile United States Dingley tariff of 1898 had precluded any hope of Canadian-American commercial reciprocity. Equally, Canada's establishment of preference for British products in the same year had not resulted in a reciprocal gesture for Canadian commodities on London's part. The great Liberal election victory of January, 1906, in Britain had proved conclusively that the United Kingdom would not abandon the sacred script of free trade and grant colonial goods preference. Wilfrid Laurier himself had recognized the impossibility of Anglo-Canadian tariff preference in the aftermath of the British elections. Commenting upon their results he tersely observed that "the idea of protection is abhorrent to the democracy of England."\textsuperscript{22}

Regarding the French market, the Laurier administration had been alerted to its potential by prominent Canadian businessmen. Andrew Allan of Montreal brought to Laurier's attention the fact that Canadian livestock entering France was not receiving as favourable treatment as American livestock. Allan felt that negotiations should be opened with Paris on this issue and offered his services. Allan's interest in a Franco-Canadian treaty arrangement was undoubtedly influenced by his position as manager of the Allan Steamship Line. Should the Canadian government ever decide to subsidize a line of steamships plying the trade routes directly between Canada and France, his company might well stand an excellent chance of obtaining the contract. Indicative of his desire to promote both the company and himself was Allan's remark that the Liberal administration had yet to make up its mind regarding appointments to the Montreal Board of Harbour Commissioners. He expressed the hope that his name would not be forgotten when such appointments were made!\textsuperscript{23}

In mid-summer of 1906 Wilfrid Laurier was further encouraged to take up the negotiations by Hugh Allan, Andrew's older brother. It ap-
peared to the elder Allan that France and the United States were on the
verge of revising their commercial treaty with possible consequences for
Canada. No time should be lost. Ottawa must commence serious discus-
sions with Paris before a Franco-American agreement was reached.24
Hugh Allan himself had already completed a preliminary study on the
possibilities offered by the French market. In the spring of 1906 he had
met informally with government officials in Paris and later had com-
municated with H.F. Fletcher, the Canadian Agent to Paris. According
to Fletcher, it was important for Canada to obtain the French minimum
tariff for a number of agricultural commodities and for farm im-
plements over and beyond the minimum rates granted by the 1895
agreement.25

Assisted by Louis Philippe Brodeur, appointed Minister of Marine
and Fisheries in February, 1906, Fielding began preliminary conver-
sations with the French in the early summer of 1907. Almost immediate-
ly Fielding revealed his concern regarding Britain’s most-favoured-
nation treaties and repeated his advice as to how their impact might be
mitigated. Negotiations with France should be brought to the point
where an agreement had been reached. At this juncture the discussions
should be suspended while the Canadians sought a similar arrangement
with Italy and perhaps other countries. With a series of negotiations
behind them, Ottawa’s plenipotentiaries should then attempt to bring
all the agreements into effect at once.

Fielding did admit that there would be difficulties in promoting treaty
negotiations on several fronts. Britain might well look askance at such
an obvious move by her dependency to develop a farflung diplomatic
presence. He recalled that the imperial government had been particu-
larly “sensitive” over his conversations with the French in 1902. To offset
British hostility and ensure the broadest diplomatic co-operation from
Whitehall, Ottawa should reach “a clear understanding” with Whitehall regarding Canada’s goals and how they might be obtained.26

Wilfrid Laurier, in London to attend the 1907 Colonial Conference,
immediately took steps to ensure a broad degree of Canadian autonomy
in the projected negotiations. In private discussions with Sir Edward
Grey, the Foreign Secretary, he received assurances that Canada would
have an all but free hand in the discussions. Further, Sir Wilfrid had
already held preliminary talks with Gaston Doumercque, the French
Minister of Commerce as well as with Count Bosdari, the Italian Charge
d’Affaires in London. Later, while in Rome, the Prime Minister had con-
tacted the Italian Foreign Secretary on the subject of commercial rela-
tions and had observed the niceties by calling on the British ambassador
to Italy.27
Wilfrid Laurier's diplomatic probings in London, Paris and Rome revealed much regarding Canada's external relations. In the first instance his contacts in London involved Edward Grey and the Foreign Office. No longer was Ottawa in the position of a supplicant pleading a case through the Colonial Office which would then spur the Foreign Office and its personnel abroad to take some form of action on behalf of Canada. Equally significant was the fact that Sir Wilfrid had already been in contact with members of both the French and Italian governments and had only made the required gesture to imperial suzerainty by paying courtesy visits to the British diplomats accredited to those countries.

While Fielding and Brodeur carried on their preliminary discussions, the Prime Minister set the stage for the initiation of the formal negotiations in which his representatives would play an independent role. His first step was to obtain approval that both Canadians would be "personally authorized" to negotiate the treaty. He did not, however, want this authority conferred immediately but only at that time when it appeared that a genuine agreement was in sight.28

The Foreign Office, which had been apprised of Laurier's views earlier, had proceeded in late May to accord Fielding and Brodeur the full powers with which they would negotiate and conclude a treaty with France. In the first instance, the Office noted that it was no longer possible to insist that colonial plenipotentiaries negotiate with the participation of the British ambassador concerned as had been the case in 1892 with Sir Charles Tupper and Lord Dufferin or Dufferin's alter ego, the omnipresent commercial attaché, Sir Joseph Crowe.29 The imperial government could not prevent a self-governing colony from negotiating with a foreign power unknown to London. As a case in point, the Foreign Office cited the negotiations carried on by Laurier in 1901 with the German Consul to Montreal in an abortive attempt to end the tariff war prevailing between the two countries.30 It was also pointed out, in a not very convincing manner, that absence of British diplomats at the bargaining table in Paris would remove any Canadian criticism of the imperial government should the actual negotiations fail.31

A recognition that Canada had made great strides towards an all but unilateral treaty-making power revealed itself at the highest level of policy-making in the Foreign Office. Louis Mallet, the permanent under-secretary, agreed with his staff that the 1892 format could not be enforced on Ottawa. The negotiations would be carried out by Laurier or his cabinet colleagues, and the only role for the British ambassador in Paris would be merely to facilitate the actual opening of the talks.
Mallet raised the obvious question as to who should sign the agreement if one was ever reached. Certainly the Canadians would be granted full powers both to negotiate and sign the accord. The ambassador, Sir Francis Bertie, might also affix his signature and in this way the facade of imperial supremacy would be maintained. As Mallet delightfully described the situation, Bertie “might sign, also, so that nominally the negotiations may appear to have been conducted” by the imperial government. Mallet’s pithy statement was of great significance. As Foreign Office under-secretary he had conceded to Fielding and Brodeur the genuine attributes of diplomatic independence. Though he went on to describe the Paris scenario as “a mere matter of form and not of much importance” he had, given his previous comments, surrendered entire control of the negotiations to the Canadians. In no manner could his decision be related to the position of Charles Tupper in 1892 and the arduous labours that resulted from that earlier visit to the French capital.

On July 9, Sir Edward Grey reached agreement with his departmental advisers. Full powers to negotiate and sign an agreement with France would be issued to Fielding and Brodeur. Indeed, instructions to this effect had already been forwarded to the Paris embassy. Sir Francis Bertie would join the Canadians only when the discussions had been concluded and at that point time would affix his signature along with theirs. Grey expressed the hope that the draft agreement would be sent to London before the formality of signing the document had been reached.

An examination of Canadian official papers on the Paris negotiations shows without a doubt that the Foreign Office had abandoned all diplomatic initiative and competence to Ottawa’s delegates. In 1892 both Sir Charles Tupper and Lord Dufferin had been appointed to negotiate and sign an agreement with Paris. In 1907, however, London had “named, made, constituted and appointed” Fielding and Brodeur as the sole plenipotentiaries with “all manner of power and authority.” Sir Francis Bertie was referred to along with the Canadians as a plenipotentiary but only in the preamble to the treaty as finally agreed upon by Fielding, Brodeur and their French counterparts after weeks of arduous bargaining and not as an official delegate to the negotiations.

On July 25, the formal negotiations began. Canada’s negotiating team had been reinforced by T.C. Boville, the Deputy Minister of Finance, and J. Poindron, the new Canadian Commercial Agent to France. The French officials included Arsene Henry, Director of Consulates and Commercial Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Fer-
nand Chapsal, Director of Commercial and Industrial Affairs at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; J. Vallieres, Director of Agriculture at the Ministry of Agriculture and Marcel Delanney, the Director of Customs.

As the negotiations proceeded, Louis Brodeur indicated that a strong current of nationalism would colour his role as negotiator particularly where imperial authority was concerned. He reported to Laurier that the initial talks involved duty reductions for Canadian butter, cattle and sheep in return for concessions on French light wines. Though France's imports of butter were minimal, preferential treatment for that product would make any agreement more acceptable to Canada’s agricultural population. The French Ministers of Finance and Agriculture were ardent protectionists, particularly the former who represented a butter-producing country. Nonetheless, Brodeur recommended that Canada refuse any reduction on French champagnes until Paris agreed to the minimum tariff for the three primary Canadian agricultural commodities.

Brodeur’s stance was clearly indicative of hard bargaining. His more important observations displayed an acerbic nationalism that would brook little interference from London. According to Brodeur, the British ambassador to Washington, James Bryce, had given the American Secretary of State assurances regarding Canadian seizures of United States fishing vessels within Canada’s territorial limits. Canada had been instructed not to seize the vessels in those cases where, in similar circumstances, licenses would have been issued to British schooners. The Minister of Marine did not see how the imperial government could order Ottawa to issue licenses merely because such privileges would have been extended to British fishing fleets. Imperial dictation flew in the face of Canadian autonomy, and Ottawa should not take steps to implement instructions that qualified Canada’s administrative liberties.37

Turning to Canada's Governor-General, Brodeur remarked that Earl Grey had recently called upon Ottawa to assume a fair share of the imperial defence burden. This was an unnecessary and impolitic observation by the Governor-General and completely unjustified. Canada already protected her own coasts against American fishing incursions, guarded the Great Lakes and had taken over Halifax and Esquimalt from the imperial navy. 38 Brodeur's comments on what he regarded as imperial dictation and interference in Canadian affairs, following immediately upon his analysis of the initial negotiations indicated the in-
dependent attitude he would display as the negotiations proceeded. They were also a clear reflection of his opinions regarding the political evolution of Canada.

As a Liberal Member of Parliament first elected to the Commons from the Quebec constituency of Rouville in 1891, Brodeur took pains to assert both his nationalism and promotion of Canadian autonomy. Thus, in an autobiographical submission he described himself as the son of Toussaint Brodeur "a patriot of 1837" which was a less than subtle reference to the fact that his father had participated in the Lower Canadian rebellion of that year against the colonial administration. A parallel biographical sketch cited the death of Brodeur's maternal grandfather on the side of the rebels in 1837 and emphasized the Minister's political creed as "the political independence of Canada."

When the negotiations were concluded at the end of August the Canadians felt that they had struck a good bargain. According to Brodeur, Canada had obtained the minimum tariff for her major exports. The agreement even provided for French minimum rates on commodities which the country had yet to export in any great quantity. With the steady growth of industry, Canadian manufacturers would sooner or later look to France as a market where preferential treatment was now assured. As a case in point Brodeur cited the Massey-Harris company whose exports of farm machinery to France had increased despite competition from German, British and Austro-Hungarian firms whose products already enjoyed the minimum rates. Now, with Canada in an ideal position, companies like Massey-Harris would do even better. Other Canadian industries would surely follow this lead in the future, the Minister of Marine suggested.

It is more than obvious that Louis Brodeur did not enjoy the most harmonious relations with William Fielding during the negotiations. The Finance Minister, Brodeur noted, was far too timid regarding Canada's fiscal links with Great Britain. Fielding, it seemed, was concerned that duty reductions on French goods would jeopardize the preference British exports were currently enjoying in Canada. He sarcastically observed that Fielding's worry on this score was based on the dubious assumption that London was anxious to grant Canada tariff preference in return for Ottawa's generosity of 1898 and 1900!

A comment regarding Louis Brodeur's less than harmonious relations with William Fielding seems appropriate. Given his political creed Canada's Minister of Marine and Fisheries understandably took a less than generous attitude regarding British preference. The Finance Minister on the other hand was the author of just such preference. When
he introduced his budget resolutions in 1897, Fielding had referred to
the hostility of the United States as reflected in the proposed Dingley
tariff and had argued for tariff amendments that would favour United
Kingdom products "above all others." 42

On the eve of his 1906 tariff revision Fielding had gone out of his way
to praise British preference as a measure which had "done much for the
advancement of Canada in the eyes of the Empire and of the civilized
world." 43 During his actual budget presentation the Finance Minister,
though admitting that some changes were proposed, lauded preference
as a means by which Britain had been encouraged to purchase more
Canadian commodities. Similarly, he argued that preference on United
Kingdom goods had meant a considerable reduction in the tariff rates
and thus a marked saving to the Canadian consumer. 44 Given public
utterances of this nature it was not at all surprising that Fielding found
himself on occasion at odds with his highly nationalistic cabinet col-
league particularly where British preference was at issue.

Regarding the actual implementation of the treaty and the fact that
only specified French and Canadian goods would receive duty reduc-
tions, Louis Brodeur reported that he had succeeded in obtaining agree-
ment that the origin of such commodities would be verified by inspection
in both France and Canada. In order to implement this condition in the
treaty Ottawa and Paris would appoint officials to work in each other's
country. These agents would issue the appropriate certificates of origin
or visas before actual shipment took place.

The commercial attache to the British embassy, Sir Henry Austen
Lee, had suggested that the treaty, as approved, called for the appoint-
ment of officials for this purpose. Brodeur demurred. Canada’s com-
mercial agents abroad were not officials in the purely diplomatic sense
of the word. In order to avoid the exclusion of Canadians from this role
and their replacement by Foreign Office personnel from the embassy in
Paris, Brodeur insisted on important textual changes in the treaty.
Thus, in the French version of the treaty he obtained agreement that the
officers abroad could be termed "agents" (the French agents) as well as
"officials" (the French officiels). Also, such personnel could be "nam-
ed" (the French nommer) as well as "appointed" (the French designer)
by the governments concerned. Therefore, Canada could now select her
own emissaries for service abroad, and they could properly be regarded,
by Ottawa at least, as officers on a foreign mission.

Louis Brodeur’s insistence on an independent role for Canada’s com-
mmercial agents abroad had brought the country to the stage of
establishing a diplomatic corps in a foreign nation. His subtle bargain-
ing over such terms as "agents" and "officials" won Canada international recognition as his choice of words appeared in the cold clear print of the French version.\(^{45}\)

Though Ottawa's aggressive Minister of Marine had won a major victory for Canada in terms of a diplomatic presence in a foreign state, he was not entirely satisfied that the treaty would meet Canadian goals and aspirations. He noted, in his usual petulant fashion, that Fielding had left Paris for London to explain the agreement to the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade. There, Brodeur feared, imperial officials would attempt to obstruct the implementation of the treaty on the grounds that Canadian concessions would threaten British goods enjoying preference. In this context Brodeur was referring to the two specific schedules of the agreement as they affected France. Under one schedule a range of French goods would be granted the intermediate tariff which would, of course, reduce the advantage many British products enjoyed under preference. By the terms of the second schedule, certain French commodities were granted special rates below those provided for in the intermediate tariff and which would, when implemented, all but eliminate the preference enjoyed by competing British exports.

Louis Brodeur's stand on the agreement was emphatic if not blunt. Under no conditions would he countenance interference by Whitehall over the terms of the agreement. Indeed, Brodeur was incensed that Fielding had felt obliged to travel to London at all and that he had prepared a memorandum for the attention of the Colonial Office outlining the possible effects Canada's concessions might have on British exports. Fielding's gesture was quite unnecessary. The treaty and its terms were solely Ottawa's responsibility and to emphasize this point Brodeur noted that he had written to the Finance Minister dissociating himself from the memorandum.

Louis Brodeur concluded his lengthy analysis of the treaty negotiations and Canada's relations with London by expressing the hope that he, Fielding and Sir Francis Bertie might quickly and formally sign the agreement. Here, too, trouble could be expected. Whitehall would take its time as the departments concerned seemed to be very worried at the degree of unilateral treaty-making the Canadians had accomplished. Should London temporize unduly then swift action should be taken by Ottawa. Canadian newspapers should be immediately informed that imperial authority was retarding the implementation of a treaty that concerned Canada alone. At the same time, pressure might be brought to
bear on the Governor-General in order that the imperial government would be aware of Canada’s annoyance.46

Imperial reaction to the draft treaty was subdued. The Colonial Office noted that the extension of the intermediate tariff to France and the implementation of the special rates would markedly reduce British preference in Canada. However, little could be done on this score. The intermediate tariff was an “essential feature” of Canada’s over-all tariff structure and was the weapon with which she negotiated for better commercial terms with foreign world.

Where the special rates were at issue, a different situation had developed. Here, the Canadians had reduced the duties below even those in the intermediate schedule. With one major exception British exporters, generally, would not suffer. The special rates applicable to French laces might well diminish if not destroy the market British lace goods had been developing in Canada. Already concern had been expressed by industrialists in Nottingham on this point. Nonetheless, the Colonial Office suggested that the imperial government’s hands were bound. All that could be hoped for was an increase in the future of preference for British lace goods. This, of course, was at best a pious hope and if actually granted by Ottawa could be legitimately criticized by Paris as a breach of the spirit if not the letter of the Franco-Canadian treaty.47

Britain’s concern over her export trade to Canada was minimal compared to both the praise and criticism Canada’s negotiators and their administration received in the aftermath of the Paris discussions. Sensing that his aggressive stand in the French capital might be construed as anti-British, Louis Brodeur attempted to mend his political fences. In an interview with a Reuters correspondent Brodeur flatly denied that the negotiations had been conducted in a spirit of pique against the imperial government. Rather, the talks had been planned as far back as 1905 and were not designed with any intent to harm United Kingdom commerce. Canada was a major industrial and agricultural producer and the negotiations with France were one means of disposing of the country’s surplus commodities.48

Louis Brodeur was not totally candid in his comments. His private observations during the talks prove conclusively that he was opposed to imperial authority and that he placed Canadian trade above the merits of British preference. His recognition that the concessions to France might well imperil preference was attested to by Professor W.S. Hewins, a renowned economist who subsequently, during World War 1, served as
A STUDY IN IMPERIAL RELATIONS

the parliamentary under-secretary to the Colonial Office. Hewins pointed out that the special rates granted certain French commodities were equal to or even lower than the preferential duties. The effect was to “materially reduce the margin” Britain had previously enjoyed in Canada.

Glancing over the treaty, Toronto’s Globe felt that the Canadians had struck a good bargain. The French minimum rates had been obtained for a lengthy list of Canada’s agricultural products ranging from livestock to cheese and eggs. Further, as Brodeur himself had emphasized, the minimum duties on the production of the country’s iron and steel industries was a happy augury for the future. The fact that Canada would have to extend the tariff concessions made to France to other most-favoured-nation countries such as Austria-Hungary, Russia and Denmark did not bother the Globe. Products from these countries entering at the preferred rates merely added to the general freedom of trade which should be every nation’s goal.

Other Canadian journals highlighted the treaty-making independence Ottawa had achieved. Montreal’s Le Canada, for example, regarded the negotiations and their successful conclusion as an imperial admission of the country’s “absolute autonomy in fiscal matters.” The Herald of the same city seized upon Article XI of the agreement providing for the issuance by Canadian and French officials of certificates of origin. This, argued the Herald, was the treaty’s most important feature. Whenever Canada pleased, she could establish “a Consular system” in France.

In the far West, the Daily Herald of Calgary gave its cordial approval of Fielding and Brodeur. Canada possessed the power to negotiate and conclude her own trade treaties. What had occurred in Paris was merely a reiteration of Canadian self-government in matters commercial.

Parliamentary reception over the conclusion of the treaty and the administration’s claim that Canada had independently negotiated with a foreign power was hardly as approving as the country’s press. At the opening of the fourth session of the tenth parliament, Wilfrid Laurier proudly announced that the privilege of independent negotiation of commercial treaties had been granted Ottawa. As the Paris discussions and the terms of the agreement were purely Canadian affairs, the government had indicated quite clearly to London that the negotiations would be better advanced if left entirely to Canada’s plenipotentiaries.

Sir Wilfrid’s Commons statement was subject to bitter Conservative criticism. Speaking for the Opposition, George Foster insisted that Canada was a dependent member of the British Empire. Given this status, the Laurier administration was both “silly and mischievous”
when it told Canadians that they possessed independent treaty-making powers. If such powers did exist and were genuinely exercised, it could only mean Canada's separation from the Empire. The only course the administration could pursue with honesty would be to commence a campaign for the treaty-making power in its entirety and to acknowledge that this meant separation from the ranks of the imperial brotherhood.54

Was George Foster correct in his assessment and accurate in his statement that Ottawa had not advanced one whit beyond the prerogatives accorded Charles Tupper fifteen years earlier? The evidence already produced demonstrates quite conclusively that Brodeur and Fielding had negotiated a treaty independent of imperial participation and quite unlike the situation in which Sir Charles found himself during the winter of 1892-1893. Further, Foster's reference to the indivisibility of the British Empire simplistically overlooked the fact that within the Empire the forces of self-government had been at work for close to sixty years. Self-government and fiscal autonomy could only lead sooner or later to the Dominion using that autonomy to the full, which meant unilateral negotiations with foreign powers on commercial issues. As will become apparent, this development was not lost on the personnel of the Foreign Office.

Unofficial as well as official opinion agreed that Canada had advanced rapidly towards commercial treaty-making autonomy. In Paris, most journals of comment paid scant attention to the negotiations. However, both L'Aurore and Le Temps observed that Sir Francis Bertie had postponed his annual vacation and was waiting until the talks had ended in order that he might sign the agreement together with Fielding and Brodeur.55 Both Paris dailies were merely underlining the fact that when the Canadians had completed their business the facade of imperial authority would be maintained by Bertie's signature though he had played no role in the negotiations themselves.

The fact that Canada had concluded an agreement free of imperial control was tacitly admitted by the Foreign Office. There, attention was drawn to the fact that questions had been raised in parliament regarding the powers granted to Ottawa's delegates. Also, an unidentified caller had presented himself to the Foreign Office with a copy of the Canadian Sessional Paper outlining those powers. A request that these credentials be compared with Sir Charles Tupper's was refused. However, departmental comment on these incidents cast additional light on the Canadian gains in Paris.

Regarding the anonymous caller, Algernon Law suggested that he might well have made his appearance on behalf of Canada's Opposition
Conservatives who were seeking any information to refute Laurier’s claims regarding the country’s treaty-making prerogatives. Though this suggestion cannot be completely confirmed, comments in the imperial parliament indicate that more than passing interest had been engendered by the Paris negotiations.

Comparing the instructions issued to Sir Francis Bertie with those forwarded to Lord Dufferin in 1892, Viscount Ridley noted that “large powers” had been granted Canada’s plenipotentiaries. Such powers had never been conferred before and what Britain was witnessing was nothing short of “a revolution in the policy of the Empire. . . .” Ridley’s observations were to the point and probably reflected a mature judgment on the evolution of Canadian policy given the fact that he had previously served in Ottawa as secretary to Lord Aberdeen when the latter was Governor-General from 1893 to 1898.

Lord Ridley neither approved nor disapproved the great latitude accorded Ottawa. He did, however, justify his parliamentary observations in private discussions with the Foreign Office. He confided to Louis Mallet that the only reason he had risen in the Lords was to bring home to the British public the great strides Canada had taken towards “practical independence” in the negotiation of the French treaty. One is tempted to speculate on George Foster’s reaction had he been privy to Ridley’s comments.

Viscount Ridley’s frank assessment of Canada’s powers left the issue in Louis Mallet’s hands. He infat least been submitted to the Board of Trade and the Colonial Office before formal signature and to that extent London had preserved “the spirit” though not the letter of Lord Ripon’s famous circular letter of 1895. The under-secretary’s rearguard defence of imperial suzerainty was open to considerable criticism. The draft treaty had indeed been submitted to Whitehall for scrutiny and there, as has been pointed out, the Colonial Office had ruefully observed that it could not prevent Ottawa from using its several tariff schedules as a means of forcing genuine treaty negotiations on a foreign power.

The degree to which the Laurier administration had successfully asserted Canada’s external autonomy in commercial treaty relations was confirmed in early 1909. William Fielding returned to Paris to conclude a supplementary agreement designed to meet certain criticisms from protectionist members of the French Senate. In discussions with the Foreign Office, Fielding noted that the new agreement would only come into force upon its approval by the Canadian parliament. This brief observation once more raised the issue of imperial sovereignty in conflict with Canadian aggressiveness.
The Foreign Office regarded Fielding’s comments as a marked departure from imperial unity and the sanctity of Britain’s diplomatic prerogatives. Once again, Algernon Law entered the lists to counter what he must have regarded as exaggerated Canadian pretensions. Canada’s Finance Minister was informed that a memorandum he had prepared for the attention of the French was in error. It read as follows:

“In recent times no treaty made by the Imperial authority is binding on Canada until it has received the approval of the Canadian Parliament.”

This statement, according to Law, was far too sweeping. It could conceivably apply to the approval of a peace treaty which surely was solely a British responsibility. Further, Fielding’s “doctrine” contradicted the British constitution, as the crown itself often concluded treaties without previously consulting parliament. A treaty made without parliamentary sanction was nonetheless binding between Britain and a foreign power. As Law viewed the situation, a refusal by parliament to carry out the terms of an agreement did not necessarily invalidate it. What one parliament approved, another could very easily revoke.

Law’s polite lecture on the subtleties of constitutional practice appeared initially to have had some effect, as Fielding “seemed inclined” to accept the suggestion that the word “Government” be substituted for “Parliament.” This assertion of imperial authority and its clear reference to the indivisibility of the crown seems to have been a last ditch attempt by the Foreign Office to convince itself that nothing had changed in the imperial relationship with Canada. In actual fact it glossed over the “revolution” that had been consummated.

Whether the Canadian parliament or administration approved the French treaty was irrelevant. The Foreign Office had conceded that the centre of authority in commercial treaties rested in Ottawa and whether that centre was the administration of the day or parliament itself was beside the point. It is also worth noting that the official correspondence tabled in the Canadian Commons on the treaty of 1907 and its 1909 supplement provided that both agreements would only be ratified after approval by parliament.

By 1909, Wilfrid Laurier’s Liberal administration could look back with justifiable pride on its treaty-making accomplishments of the past several years. The right by Ottawa to negotiate commercial agreements outside the supervision of Whitehall and to have such agreements approved by Canadians alone had been wrested from a relatively benevolent British bureaucracy. This diplomatic “revolution” within the Empire was undoubtedly based upon a growing recognition by Ottawa that the goal of Anglo-Canadian tariff preference was illusory when
faced with an implacable adherence to free trade by successive United Kingdom administrations. The "revolution" was equally due to the determination of a Canadian Prime Minister to obtain for his country "the right of making her own treaties with foreign powers."

Notes
1. For details of this agreement and the diplomacy involved see R.A. Shields, "The Franco-Canadian Treaty of 1895: A Study in Imperial Relations", The Canadian Historical Review, XLIX, No. 1, March, 1958, pp. 1-23.
2. See issue of December 22, 1903. The interview was conducted by R.J. Lucas, the Conservative Member for Portsmouth in the British House of Commons. It is interesting to speculate on Lucas’ opinions regarding Laurier’s demand given the fact that he had served as private secretary from 1892 to 1896 to the chief Unionist whip. The Unionist Party in its dedication to the union of Ireland with Britain was hardly celebrated for its support of imperial decentralization!
7. Martin to Laurier, Personal, Victoria, January 12, 1904, ibid. vol. CCLXXXXVI.
8. Blake, who had been Laurier’s predecessor as head of the Liberal Party, had demanded in the Commons “all necessary powers” for Canada in order that the country’s delegates could be put in “direct communication” with a member of the British Empire or a foreign power for the purpose of concluding commercial treaties. See Canada, Debates, Commons, April 21, 1882, Vol. I, col. 1075.
9. Laurier to A. McGoun, Ottawa, December 21, 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. CCLXXXXVI.
10. For details regarding the establishment of British preference see R.A. Shields, "Imperial Reaction to the Fielding Tariff of 1897", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXXI, No. 4, Nov. 1965, pp. 524-537.
11. Fielding to Chamberlain, copy, Ottawa, November 4, 1903, Minto Papers. Vol. XXVII.
12. In addition to Fielding, the Commission comprised Sir Richard Cartwright, Minister of Trade and Commerce; William Patterson, Minister of Customs and Louis Philippe Brodeur, Minister of Inland Revenue.
14. During the Victorian era and into the Edwardian period London was obliged to grant many powers as favourable a market in her colonies as was enjoyed by any one nation. Thus, if Canada for example, granted France tariff preference, a number of European and other powers could demand identical privileges in the Canadian market as a result of agreements concluded with Britain.
16. When the French Consul to Quebec City approached Canada’s Minister of Public Works, Hector Langevin, with a view to opening commercial negotiations between Canada and France, he was rebuffed by Macdonald. The Prime Minister had argued that it would be "penny-wise and pound foolish" for Canada to reject the advantages gained by having treaties made between "Great Britain and the nation not between Canada and the nation". See Canada, Debates, Commons, April 22, 1882, II, col. 1078.
20. In 1907 the countries to whom Canada was obliged to grant most-favoured-nation privileges together with the dates of their agreements with Britain read as follows: Argentine (1825), Austria-Hungary (1876), Bolivia (1840), Columbia (1866), Costa Rica (1849), France (1893), Denmark (1666), Japan (1906), Persia (1903), Russia (1859), Sweden and Norway (1826), Uruguay (1885) and Venezuela (1825).
22. Laurier to W.A.S. Hewins, Private, Ottawa, February 7, 1906, ibid., vol. CCCXLIX.
23. A. Allan to Laurier, Montreal, July 4, 1906, ibid., vol. CMXIX.
24. Hugh A. Allan to Laurier, Confidential, Montreal, August 6, 1906, ibid., vol. CMXXII.
27. Laurier to Fielding, Confidential, Rome, June 3, 1907, ibid.
30. In late 1901 Laurier and F. Bopp, the German Consul to Montreal, began discussion on the termination of the Canadian-German tariff war that had its origins in the British cancellation in 1896 of the United Kingdom's commercial agreement with Berlin that had granted Germany most-favoured-nation treatment in colonial markets. The Colonial Office which finally heard of the discussions nearly two years later protested bitterly: "It practically gives diplomatic status to the German Consular Officers. Further, Ottawa was at fault for failing completely to inform the Colonial Office of the negotiations". See Minutes of October 2, 1903, C.O. 42/893.
32. Minutes by Grey of May 28, 1907, ibid. Italics the author's.
35. Ibid. (1907-1908), vol. VI, No. 10b, p. 10.
36. Ibid (1907-1908), vol. VI, No. 10a, p. 3.
37. Brodeur based his criticism on a despatch from The Times's Washington correspondent published in the August 7, 1907, issue. The essence of the report does not completely substantiate Brodeur's complaint as it read as follows: "The Dominion Government hopes that the Americans will apply for licenses which will be issued to them on the same conditions as to British subjects."
38. Brodeur to Laurier, Paris, August 12, 1907, Laurier Papers, vol. CMTLXXIII.
42. Canada, Debates, Commons, April 22, 1897, I, cols. 1107-1111.
43. See Fielding's speech reported in the Montreal Herald, November 21, 1906.
44. Canada, Debates, Commons, November 29, 1906, I, col. 290.
45. See article XI of the treaty, Sessional Papers of Canada (1907-1908), vol. VI, No. 10a.
47. Minutes of September 7, 1907, C.O. 42/916.
48. See Brodeur's interview published in The Times, September 27, 1907.
49. Hewins to the editor, The Times, November 30, 1907, published in the December 2, 1907 issue.
50. See editorials both entitled "The French Treaty", November 30, 1907 and January 16, 1908.
51. The editorials of the Herald and Le Canada both appeared in the December 2, 1907 issue of The Times.
52. See editorial entitled "The British Preference", November 1, 1907.
53. Canada, Debates. Commons, December 2, 1907, I, col. 43.
54. Ibid. January 24, 1908, I, cols. 1260-1265. Foster, who had served as Finance Minister in the last Conservative administration, was more often than not one of the Opposition's more critical analysts of the government's commercial policies and its claims to having augmented the country's external autonomy.
55. See editions of September 7, 1907.
56. Minutes of May 26, 1908, F.O. 368/243. At this period Law was the Senior Clerk in charge of the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office. Subsequently, from 1912 to 1914, he was Controller of Commercial and Consular Affairs. Appointed Assistant Under-Secretary in 1914, he was knighted in 1916.
57. Hansard, 4th Series, Lords, May 2, 1908, vol. CLXXXIX, col. 239.
58. On June 28, 1895, the Colonial Secretary, the Marquis of Ripon, had issued a circular letter to the self-governing colonies rejecting a demand from them for an enhancement of their treaty-making powers in commercial negotiations. See R.A. Shields, "Imperial Policy and the Ripon Circular of 1895," The Canadian Historical Review, XLVII, no. 2, June, 1966, pp. 119-135. See also Mallet's minutes of May 26, 1908, F.O. 368/243.