Retrieving Trudeau:
Republican Affinities in the Political Thought of Pierre Elliott Trudeau

by

Marcella Firmini

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Abstract

This thesis argues that the political ideas of Pierre Elliott Trudeau have consistently been misrepresented by his critics and commentators for decades. A careful reading of primary works by Trudeau makes it clear that he espoused political positions much more clearly informed by the tradition of classical republicanism than by that of liberal individualism (or socialism, as some of his biographers contend). Trudeau is most often portrayed as an enigma: for some, he is deeply individualist and indifferent to the needs and aspirations of the community; for others, he is an advocate for a powerful centralized and regulatory state dedicated to wealth redistribution, and too sensitive to the common good. In other words, he is too liberal for some, and too collectivist for others. As this thesis will show, this interpretation of Trudeau’s thought may not have been fortuitous or inadvertent; rather, as is often the case with powerful ideas, his ideas were construed and interpreted in specific ways for precise purposes.

Understood as a republican, Trudeau becomes more exciting and innovative, and possesses greater political foresight than is often conceded to him. Utilizing a framework based on intellectual history, I examine theories of republicanism and explain why Trudeau’s ideas have a clear republican orientation. Using discursive approaches, I contend that Trudeau’s ideas, more than ever, offer a startlingly relevant critique of contemporary Canadian democracy. How Canadians understand democracy and politics was a theme that absorbed Trudeau throughout his life. He invited Canadians to think about the way in which liberty and democracy depended upon both the strength of citizen responsibility and the articulation of a sense of the common good. To this end, he tasked political leaders with the duty to inform and educate citizens about democracy. In sum, identifying Trudeau’s insights more accurately allows us to structure a political narrative that challenges current practices which fragment and weaken modern political relations between citizens. Retrieving Trudeau’s ideas, in other words, allows us to envision a truly Canadian “Machiavellian moment.”
List of Abbreviations Used:

IR = Institutional Republicanism

TR = Theoretical Republicanism

CR = Civic Republicanism (Neo–Aristotelianism)

NRR = Neo–Roman Republicanism (Modern Republicanism)

US = United States of America

MP = Member of Parliament
Chapter One: Introduction

Pierre Elliott Trudeau was, for all intents and purposes, clearly a classical republican despite the largely unchallenged assumption that he exemplified the ideas of liberal–individualism. When not being portrayed as the quintessential liberal by his supporters, he is accused of ideological inconsistency by his detractors. Trudeau should be understood neither as a straightforward liberal nor as ideologically confused. Rather, he espoused political positions that fit clearly into the tradition of classical republican political thought. Thus, this thesis argues that not only has Trudeau been consistently misrepresented as a political thinker, but it also holds that Trudeau’s vision for what Canada ought to be is timelier than ever. By understanding Trudeau’s insights more accurately, one can structure a political narrative that challenges current practices which fragment and weaken modern political relations between citizens. Retrieving Trudeau’s ideas, in sum, allows us to envision a truly Canadian Machiavellian Moment.

Given the vigorous debate in the past few decades between individualists and communitarians, it is not surprising that commentators have placed Trudeau in one or the other ideological silo: either he is deeply individualist and indifferent to needs and aspirations of the community or, conversely, he is an advocate for a powerful centralized and regulatory state dedicated to wealth redistribution, and is too sensitive to the common good. In other words, Pierre Trudeau is too liberal for some, too collectivist for others — a mystifying contradiction, indeed. Strictly confining Trudeau to one or the other silo may be a symptom of the predilection for binary categories (liberal/communitarian)
rather than the result of an accurate portrayal of one who employed language and constructed societal paradigms that spoke to a more nuanced and sophisticated thoughtfulness. If one reads Trudeau’s writings carefully, classical republican dispositions are clearly evident.

Before going any further, it is important to delineate the terminology I use throughout the thesis. An entire chapter will be dedicated to the matter of defining and circumscribing the variants of republicanism, so there is no need for great detail here. When referring to ‘liberalism’, it is well understood that there are several variants and schools of thought that are housed under its banner. When the term ‘liberal’ is used in relation to Trudeau, it is usually in reference to hyper–individualist (or procedural) liberalism; it is within these parameters that the word will be used for this work. Most research has qualified the kinds of liberalism attributed to Trudeau (intellectual liberalism, American–style individualism, procedural, and so on), and throughout the thesis, I will make clear the type of liberalism that is under discussion so as to avoid confusion.

It is understood that the type of liberalism attributed to Trudeau is not primarily the classical or the neo–liberal variants — to argue otherwise would be a redundant and futile exercise since Trudeau’s rejected them outright in his autobiography (Trudeau 1993: 40). I challenge the customary ascription of the ‘liberal’ tag to Trudeau, and point out the presence of classical republican sensibilities in Trudeau’s thought. I then ask why Trudeau’s ideas were so egregiously misinterpreted and I explore whether his powerful ideas were presented by others in specific ways for particular purposes. I move now to give a more detailed explanation of my goals. It is important to stress that the focus of
this work is limited to discerning any republican influences and it will not engage in evaluations of republican-inspired policies implemented (or not implemented) during his time in office. Analyses of this kind are outside the scope of this work, and would require a separate and more complex study.

As indicated, the objectives of this thesis are twofold. First, I try to understand Trudeau’s political thought by challenging the current practice of placing him within narrow liberal–individualist paradigms. To the contrary, I attribute to him a deeper, more complex, and distinct intellectual contribution to Canadian political thought. Casting Trudeau as a classical republican offers an appropriate picture of a forward–looking prime minister who placed great importance on the way in which Canadians thought about politics and society. This leads to my secondary objective: explaining how an erroneous interpretation of Trudeau’s thoughts has become the orthodox way of understanding him. It is one thing to show Trudeau’s use of a specific political rhetoric or language, it is quite another to ascertain how (or why) others have understood and interpreted that language to mean particular things. An oblique reading of Trudeau’s thought may not have been unintentional; rather, it is often the case that powerful ideas like those of Trudeau are presented in specific ways for precise purposes. It is therefore important to retrieve accurately Pierre Trudeau’s political thought because it has profound implications for how Canadians can view their political processes and their democracy in the context of modern social relations and structures. The Trudeau legacy–holders — those who analyze a thinker’s ideas, interpret them, and perpetuate those interpretations — have an interest in explaining his work thoroughly since he remains one of Canada’s most influential prime ministers.
Underlying the proposed research is the guiding assumption that although Trudeau’s legacy continues to be vastly scrutinized the features of his political thought remain basically unexplored. Trudeau envisioned a sophisticated form of collectivism without ever descending into communitarianism and, in doing so, he elaborated on the type of society and citizen necessary for the exercise of individual freedom, and the proper duties of, and relationships between, political leaders and the electorate.

In his book *John A.: the Man Who Made Us*, Richard Gwyn (2007) states that “Macdonald made us by making confederation out of a disconnected, mutually suspicious collection of colonies…” (4) and that “[i]n a fundamental sense, all of Canada’s prime ministers have functioned as managers of the estate that Macdonald created, Trudeau alone expanding it significantly” (311). One interpretation of this could be that while Sir John A. Macdonald *made* Canada, Pierre Elliott Trudeau *shaped* Canada and, perhaps most importantly, *defined* what it means to be Canadian. If we subscribe to the notion that Trudeau’s legacy is the most significant since the time of Sir John, the importance of approaching his contributions to Canadian political thought and society cannot be understated, particularly if the goal is to correct an unrepresentative utilization of his ideas.

The research fits with recent works that trace the evolution of Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s thought (Nemni 2006, 2011) as well as those that try to assess his legacy (ibid; McRoberts, 1997; English, 2006, 2009). The sheer number of books, journal and magazine articles, and treatises on Trudeau is truly staggering; however, the only unanimous consensus regarding his political thought (other than the thoroughgoing assumption that he is a liberal) is that he embodies baffling contradictions or paradoxes.
(A. Westell, 1972; C. Couture, 1996; Ricci 2009) that some theorists and authors have difficulty explaining away. Researchers have studied the development of Trudeau’s thought, they analyze his time in office, and some attribute to him particular ideologies which vary widely and present complex discrepancies. Here, the only consistent feature seems to be the inconsistency of Trudeau’s political thought.

One possibility never mentioned is that Trudeau was influenced by classical republicanism; in fact, the perceived lack of consistency arises only when we try to fit him into the mould of a liberal when he was, in fact, a classical republican. The dissonances and inconsistencies within his thought can be resolved, and the overarching trajectory of his republican ideas — which are profoundly relevant for contemporary politics — can be more clearly identified by understanding Trudeau within this paradigm. I argue that when he is analyzed in this way we are left with a man who finds his intellectual inspiration situated in Niccolò Machiavelli’s *Discourses* more so than in John Locke’s *Second Treatise*.

Republican theory is currently enjoying a revival and a significant amount of debate has been sparked regarding the latent influences of this strain of thought on various theorists, thinkers, and national ‘founding fathers’. Whenever revivals occur and theorists’ thoughts are revisited with new lenses, it is important to stress that the goal of revivals is to refine and elucidate thoughts, paradigms, and ideas that already exist; the goal is not to invent or create new ones. It is imperative that revivalists underscore this so as not to suffer from charges of anachronism. For example, investigations into the theoretical nature of the American founding is centred on weighing the influence of John Locke’s theory of limited government and natural rights against the weight of James
Harrington’s theory — as suggested by Pocock (1975) — of popular sovereignty and factional contestation caused primarily by power, and property ownership and distribution. When revivalists debate these influences, they cannot be accused of anachronism since they are merely testing paradigms that already exist in the attempt at retrieving an accurate reading of the underlying political thought that inspired, in this case, the founding of the United States. In this same way, when retrieving Trudeau, works of modern republican revivalists will be considered and used as they, too, are merely explaining and clarifying ideas that already exist. I use these researchers’ insights to help explain the content of the theory in modern nomenclature and to verify if republican tendencies are discernable in the works of Pierre Trudeau.

Trudeau was rather clear about his theoretical propensities. While he did not claim adherence to any particular ideology other than to personalism (which I will discuss later in this thesis), his virulent anti-nationalism always receives the greatest attention. This aversion is seen as being informed by an atomistic liberalism when, in reality, the manner in which he expresses himself on this topic is, in essence, republican. Republicanism is not a political theory completely dependent on a particular type of liberty brought about by an elusive virtue or active political participation. Rather, it is, above all, a strategy for building a particular type of society and citizen; in other words, a discussion about citizenship and what I have called purposeful belonging.

This concept, commonly referred to as ‘patriotism’, is better understood as purposeful belonging to fit modern sensibilities. Whether it is the Aristotelian ‘political man’ or the Roman Republican ‘social man’ that is under discussion, both remain ‘man’ nonetheless and thus are perhaps motivated by self-preservation or self-interest to the
point where sacrificing themselves for appeals to the ‘common good’ or the ‘public interest’ may be an empty plea if not animated by a greater calling. I contend that this ‘greater calling’ is purposeful belonging through which calls to protect the national interest may be heeded in a more significant way. Thus, the individual, as understood even by liberalism, is not compromised; rather, s/he is fully realized and cognizant of being, at the same time, an important member of society. This concept, a key aspect of republican thought, merits an extensive treatment which will occur in chapter three; for the moment, it should be stressed that purposeful belonging is not to be confused with nationalisms of any kind. At its core, the republican notion of purposeful belonging is an understanding of, and elaboration on, the creation of a particular type of politically rational and purposeful society that gives life to political citizenship. For modern republicans, this is the foundation for a more thoroughgoing democracy, a more equal democracy, and a more complete democracy.

Trudeau’s understanding of democracy and citizenship seems to reflect these republican proclivities toward purposeful belonging, political participation, and a particular type of freedom. In his writings, he indicated that his major influences were Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier (Trudeau 1993: 40), Lord Acton, and Thomas Hill Green (Trudeau, 1990: 359). I will dedicate more on these particular influences in a discrete section of the thesis because it is imperative to address this statement lest significant details of Trudeau’s thought be overlooked. For now, it is important to note that references to Maritain — the personalist philosopher — are present in Trudeau’s work while T.H. Green is rarely mentioned even by biographers and scholars; moreover, notes found by the Nemnis (2011: 91–92) in Trudeau’s personal papers seem to also raise
some doubts about the actual depth of Green’s influence. Also, one should not discount research into the political thought of T.H. Green and his own overt republican influences. I will address Maritain, Mounier, Acton, and Green in the section dedicated to Trudeau’s stated influences to identify which of these had the greatest impact on the development of his political theory.

As a republican, Trudeau is not only more exciting and innovative, but seems to be endowed with greater political foresight than is often conceded to him. Given this, my thesis will have to be dedicated to both looking back to understand the theory of republicanism and how Trudeau fits there, and looking ahead to isolate why Trudeau is still relevant to Canadian democracy perhaps now more than ever before.

Retrieving Trudeau: Looking Back and Looking Ahead

My study begins with a backward gaze by investigating the different strains of the republican revival and isolating the content of the variant that most significantly influenced Trudeau. Also, some time will be dedicated to explaining the reasons why republican tenets and its language seem to live on undisturbed, but the ‘republican’ label itself seems to fade away and then resurface intermittently. Even though Trudeau often speaks in the language of republicanism and refers to its tenets, he did not define his positions as ‘republican’. It does not follow from this that classical republicanism was unknown or even unappealing to him; rather, as I will show, it reflects the hypothesis
that while republican theory remains an undercurrent of thought that never completely disappears, its historical conflation with nationalism and fascism made the use of the label ‘republican’ a problematic one. The theory characteristically resurfaces as a contender during Pocockian Machiavellian Moments — and it is then that republican tenets and language enjoy a resurgence. We are currently experiencing a revival of republican theory and given the concurrence of revivals with Machiavellian Moments, Canada may be on the cusp of experiencing a Machiavellian Moment of its own.

I delve into Trudeau’s writings to substantiate my claim that he was influenced greatly by classical republicanism and often used its language to explain his positions and beliefs. I will then employ a forward gaze by shining a light on how theorists' works are sometimes used politically and I will provide some important examples of this. I will show that placing Trudeau in an incorrect paradigm was perhaps not accidental. It is useful to retrieve Trudeau because his understandings of democracy, freedom, purposeful belonging, and a particular kind of collectivism may be exactly what our democracy and institutions need in order to be revitalized.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s lifelong goal was to create a Canadian political society in which every person and every citizen could achieve according to his/her own desire

1 Tim Porteous (2005) tells us a humorous yet interesting anecdote. During a 1988 “reunion dinner to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of” (61) Trudeau’s leadership of the Liberal Party, they organized a game of “Trivial Pierresuit” (a spin on the title of the popular board game Trivial Pursuit) (61). “Question Five referred to Pierre’s appearance on Radio–Canada’s late–night comedy program Les Couche–Tard: On Les Couche—Tard, Trudeau was asked by Clémence Desrochers who was his favourite author. What did he reply?” (63); the choices were between “Charles Baudelaire, Niccolo [sic] Machiavelli, Marshall McLuhan. Pierre’s reply displayed the streak of mischief that frequently got him into trouble...To most people, Niccolo [sic] Machiavelli represents the epitome of cynical and unscrupulous politics. For a candidate for Prime Minister to claim, on national television, that Machiavelli was his favourite author was provocative, if not reckless. I doubt if any other politician would have given such an answer, even on a comedy show. On his quiz sheet, Pierre first checked ‘Machiavelli’ and then crossed it out and checked ‘Baudelaire’, who was, in fact, one of his favourite poets (but not the right answer)” (63).
regardless of cultural and ethnic background thanks to a climate of equality and justice. His enthusiasm for the repatriation of the constitution reflects republican concerns and provides strong clues confirming this theoretical propensity, since constitutions provide the rationale for a people and a counterweight to temporary ideological passions that may endanger a political society. In other words, constitutions are instruments of reason before passion. The primary motive for the repatriation of the constitution was to reaffirm the rationale for Canada and provide its citizens with a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that established the basic values and principles upon which the Canadian state and the contract of citizenship were founded. With Trudeau, even the most supposedly thoroughgoing liberal action — like the creation and implementation of the Charter — has a republican origin and intent.

Trudeau’s critiques of cultural determinism and nationalism certainly remain compelling and relevant for liberal democratic societies and thanks to his republican affinities, Trudeau offers solutions that can be deemed moderately collectivist without being communitarian while critiquing liberal hyper-individualism (in particular neo-liberalism and the business-oriented ideas of rational choice and New Public Management\(^2\)) which increasingly seems to view citizens primarily as consumers and taxpayers. This leads, at the end of the thesis, to a discussion about Trudeau’s relevance to modern Canadian democracy.

\(^2\) This is a theory of public–sector administration which introduced private–sector strategies and approaches designed to increase the efficiency of the public service. Arguably, by reconfiguring the role of the public service towards ‘efficiency’, ‘value for money’, and ‘transparency’, by extension, also reconfigures the relationship between the state and the citizenry by making the former a mere service–provider (services which are often executed by the private sector) and the latter as ‘customer’ or ‘consumer’.
Liberalism is persistently linked to, if not coterminous with, democracy, but in the popular mind, it is increasingly associated, whether justifiably or not, with neo–liberal economic practices that have emerged from a particular understanding — some might say corruption — of capitalism. Liberalism is charged with atomizing society because of a conception of democracy that gives inordinate importance to individual achievement, and to the superior organizational capacity of the market. Democracy, in essence, has come to mean something very different from its original conception. Of particular concern is the practice of segmentation of the electorate at the expense of societal cohesiveness. This differentiation may be economic, social, ethnic and of course political, and it is used by political parties and strategists for political gain; in other words, to win power and influence, and not necessarily to discern and determine the common good. Political leaders who would be in a position to create a sense of belonging and shared political values are instead dividing the citizenry into silos which, in turn, eventually results in a higher degree of polarization.

Research is being conducted into the relatively new phenomenon of ‘political marketing’ which is very different from political advertising. Advertising tries to convince people that, compared to the competition, someone or something has a better solution to a particular problem; marketing tries to find out what exactly is being perceived as a problem and then it tries to construct a product to solve it (Delacourt 2013). The political implications of this are obvious and well–known — politicians and politics become products to be sold (and bought) on the basis of imagery and emotion rather than selected on the foundation of trust and attentive substance (ibid).
How Canadians think about democracy and politics was a Trudeauvian preoccupation. Rather than advocate for a liberal–individualist society, Trudeau invited Canadians to think about notions of a republican common good, and he tasked political leaders with the duty to inform and educate citizens about democracy. Retrieving his republican political thought is important because he can still supply accounts as to why Canadian society and citizenship should be viewed as predominantly political, and how we might be able to reconcile notions of the common good with the primacy of the individual — a quintessential republican pursuit.

This thesis is structured in the following way: Chapters three through five will support the backward gaze and operate on the understanding that substantial proof is required to both justify and substantiate my claim that Trudeau has been misinterpreted and that he, in fact, belongs in a different theoretical paradigm than the one that is most frequently ascribed to him. To frame the study, in chapter two I explain the methodology employed to facilitate and carry out my study; namely, intellectual history and discursive approaches. Identifying the nature of Trudeau’s political thought will be achieved through the use of intellectual history and analyzing his suggestions about how Canadians should be thinking about politics. The task of revealing how his ideas are interpreted and used (and why it is so) will be achieved through the use of discursive approaches uncovering the power and importance of ideas to political science. In chapter three I elaborate on the content of modern republicanism and discuss the current revival it is enjoying; I also give an explanation as to why the appeal of this theory waxes and wanes through time, and sometimes fades altogether. Republicanism and liberalism are often pitted against one another, but it is a mistake to deny the fluidity with which
republicanism and its tenets, not to mention their appeal, ebb and flow. It is intellectual rigidity to claim that republican theory had no importance to founders and disciples of various strains of liberalism since republicanism is an ongoing ethos (Pocock 1975) that can be found in the schools of liberal thought that followed it. Liberals are, it is said, the intellectual progenies of republicanism and some modern liberals go so far as to claim that republicanism and liberalism are not really all that different. Chapter four will discuss the myth of a liberal Trudeau. I will begin by discussing how myths are created and propagated in society. By virtue of a literature review, I will determine how the myth of a ‘liberal’ Trudeau was created and subsequently consolidated. Chapter five will be dedicated to Trudeau’s own writings and I will link the content of these to classical republicanism. In helping to identify the philosophical roots of some elements that compose his political thought, I can begin to separate what he actually said from how others have interpreted and used his ideas. Chapter six will support the forward gaze of the thesis and elaborate on the relevance of addressing Pierre Elliott Trudeau for the current Canadian political environment. At the core of the importance are the perceived lacunae (some might even say deterioration) of Canadian democracy. Here I attempt to examine how legacy-holders ultimately interpret and use ideas with the goal of showing how others have placed Trudeau within a specific paradigm for political purposes to aid their own projects. Chapter Seven will offer a summary of my findings, and the importance and relevance of Trudeau’s (republican) vision of society to Canadian democracy.

Customarily, one would begin a study with a literature review, however, since my primary claim is that Trudeau fits comfortably within a classical republican paradigm and
I challenge the ordinary practice of placing him within various strains of liberalism, I begin this study at the most opportune place; that is, with a description of the methodology used for this study, and I then move to an explanation of modern republicanism so that readers can be clear on the terms being used and I can begin to substantiate my claim of a republican Trudeau. Insofar as Trudeau is a liberal, he is a faithful one; but we must examine the totality of his thought rather than compartmentalize it. If we do so, we realize that Trudeau is a liberal only where liberal and republican theories converge. When the two theories differ, however, they do so very significantly, and it is at this ‘intersection’ that Trudeau expresses himself in classical republican speech.
Chapter Two: Theoretical Approaches

This chapter explains the two theoretical paradigms adopted for this study, namely intellectual history and discursive approaches. I justify the rationale that guided my choices, and I provide an overview of the methodology for data collection.

In the introductory chapter, I elaborated on the normative and methodological relevance of addressing Pierre Elliott Trudeau for the current Canadian political environment. The core of this relevance is the importance of first identifying correctly the nature of his ideas and then revealing how they were interpreted and used in specific ways. The first task — that of identifying the nature of his political thought — will be achieved through the use of intellectual history which will allow me to also explain republicanism and its variants. In identifying the philosophical roots of his political thought, I can begin to separate what he actually said from how the legacy holders have interpreted and used his ideas. This second task — revealing how and why his ideas are interpreted and used (and why it might be so) — will be achieved through the use of discursive approaches that focus on the power and importance of ideas to political science. By analyzing his suggestions about how Canadians should be thinking about politics, the conclusion of this thesis will also look at why Trudeau is still relevant.

Intellectual history can be understood in several ways, so it is important to explain clearly how it is being used in this study. The words ‘intellectual history’ may lead readers to believe that this study is aimed at tracing Trudeau’s sociological development or the formative influences that caused the germination of ideas and their changes over
time. Were I to employ intellectual history in this way, the study would have a decidedly 
backwards gaze and circumscribing it within this ambit would misinterpret my 
investigation. I plan to give intellectual history a distinctly forward gaze by 
supplementing it with discursive approaches in order to illustrate how theorists' ideas are 
used politically, and investigating the way in which they are interpreted and employed.

**Intellectual History**

“The term ‘intellectual history’ [was] coined by James Harvey Robinson at the 
beginning of the twentieth century” (Bavaj, 2010: 1). Leonard Krieger (1973) defines 
intellectual history as

an overlapping category of literature that has been more 
comprehensive than the history of ideas in two dimensions: 
it has included inarticulate beliefs, amorphous opinions, 
and unspoken assumptions as well as formal ideas; and its 
primary unit of historical concern has not been the set of 
these notions as such but rather their external relations with 
the larger life of the people who have borne them (500–
501).

According to Kramer (2004), “[i]ntellectual historians seek to explain how people have 
interpreted their cultures, beliefs, and actions” (81) and he understands Kelley as having 
said that the discipline “seeks to bring ideas ‘down’ from the realm of timeless, 
transcendent truths into the complex historical realities of social experience, collective or 
personal identities, human institutions, and the struggle for power” (81).³ Here we see 
that intellectual history is more interested in how ideas are expressed in terms of actions

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rather than how or why they develop sociologically. Through Kelley, Kramer (2004) determined that

ideas always represent some kind of interaction or exchange with the language and cultural world in which they are expressed. It is therefore impossible to establish a purely ‘internal’ essence or reality for ideas because ‘external’ cultural systems and interpreters always mediate the meanings that ideas convey\(^4\) (86)...ideas ultimately express the concerns and debates of a specific historical era (87).

Intellectual history is interested primarily in the “experiences occurring inside men’s heads. It centers on man’s inner experiences, the experiences which he has in thinking” (Higham, 1954: 340). According to Higham (1954) there are two different conceptions of the approach which allow its use to social scientists: “In one view the connections lead outward to an external context of events and behavior. Intellectual history becomes an investigation of the connections between thought and deed” (341; emphasis mine). Referring to Brinton, Higham states that

intellectual history’s primary task is the uncovering of relations between what a few men write or say and what many men actually do.\(^5\) On the other hand, a second school has insisted principally on establishing the internal relationship between what some men write or say and what other men write or say (341).

All this leads Higham (ibid) to conclude that “[i]n so far as he studies ideas, therefore, the social scientist wants to learn how numbers of people put them to work within a larger pattern of living” (346, bold and emphasis mine):

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\(^4\) In this sense, there is an affinity with discursive institutionalism.

\(^5\) Here the author is referring to Crane Brinton’s Ideas and Men: the Story of Western Thought (New York, 1950).
Very likely few principles of human affairs are exactly applicable outside of the historical epoch which conceived them, but since we bring our own notions and hunches to the past in any case, we may well find, in social science, hypotheses which discipline the historical imagination. These fields can guide us especially in formulating generalizations which connect thought and behavior, for the social sciences — in contrast to the humanities — have lavished attention on functional problems (346–47, bold and emphasis mine).

The use of intellectual history can itself lead to certain difficulties. The first is discerning whether it is a discipline apart from any other that engages in some sort of intellectual inquiry or whether it is an approach that seeks to engage in a particular type of inquiry. For the purposes of this thesis, I will understand intellectual history as an approach because what I want to do is discover the “relations between what a few men write or say and what many men actually do” (Higham, 341) and, most importantly, try to “connect thought and behavior” (ibid, 346–7). I have chosen ‘intellectual history’ over the ‘history of ideas’ as my approach because, at least as I comprehend it, it is interested in tracing the role of thoughts and ideas as the basis for historical and institutional changes in society; in particular, political changes. Intellectual history tries to understand, in essence, how ideas are interpreted. While the history of ideas concentrates on analyzing the content of large concepts, intellectual history is interested in taking the result of those analyses, and studying how that content is interpreted and divulged by various actors. This is my understanding of its goals; but it should be said that intellectual history is not uniformly defined nor is there large agreement on how the approach should be structured. Specifically for this project, I will use the approach to isolate and define Trudeau’s republican ideas.
As mentioned previously, this type of approach is necessary in order to uncover the nature of Trudeau’s thought and justify his normative relevance for current politics. This will satisfy this thesis’ foray into history while building the foundations for its forward gaze. This thesis will avail itself of intellectual history, therefore, in order to understand the nature of Trudeau’s political thought and uncover its normative relevance. I now move to explain the use of discursive approaches.

**Discursive Approaches**

Vivian Schmidt (2008) points out that the discipline of political science is recognizing the incisive power of ideas and the importance of discourse with increasing interest (304). The ‘new institutionalism’ in particular is of interest here. Schmidt (2008) reminds us that, historically, institutionalisms have been divided into three distinct ‘categories’: “rational choice institutionalism (RI), historical institutionalism (HI), and sociological institutionalism (SI)” (304). A fourth ‘new institutionalism’ — *discursive institutionalism* (DI) — has offered an exciting avenue for political scientists who are aware of the fundamental role and influence of ideas in institutions and their changes over time, but were hindered in their research efforts by the lack of approaches or methodologies that might help to explain just how ideas contribute to changes (ibid); in

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6 In the classic, *Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms* by Peter Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996), definitions and extensive treatments of each are available. In *Give Peace a Chance: Reconciling Four (not Three) “New Institutionalisms”*, Schmidt (n.d.) summarizes them neatly: “Rational choice institutionalism focuses on rational actors pursuing their interests and following their preferences within political institutions, defined as structures of incentives, according to ‘logic of calculation’; Historical institutionalism concentrates instead on the history of political institutions and their constituent parts, which have their origins in the…outcomes of purposeful choices and historically unique initial conditions, and which develop over time following a ‘logic of path–dependence’. Sociological institutionalism sees political institutions as socially constituted and culturally framed, with political agents acting according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that follows from culturally–specific rules and norms” (1). Retrieved June 1, 2014 at [http://www.poleconchula.com/upload/Institutions/givepeaceachancefinal.pdf](http://www.poleconchula.com/upload/Institutions/givepeaceachancefinal.pdf)
other words, investigations into causal links (ibid). Schmidt (n.d.) says that DI “considers the discourse that actors engage in the process of generating, deliberating, and/or legitimizing ideas about political action in institutional context according to a ‘logic of communication’” (1). Schmidt (ibid) indicates, therefore, that DI is certainly “about…ideas or text” and the way in which they are communicated, “but also about the institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated” (9):

Discursive institutionalism differs from the three older ‘new institutionalisms’ in its objects of explanation, its logic of explanation, its problems of explanation, and its approach to questions of continuity and change…Importantly, it also has a greater ability to explain the dynamics of institutional change. This is because [DI] offers a framework within which to theorize about how and when ideas in discursive interactions may enable actors to overcome constraints that explanations in terms of rational behavior and interests, historical rules and regularities, and/or cultural norms and frames present as overwhelming impediments to action (9–10).

Discursive approaches, put simply, are able to help explain how and why ideas come to shape or change the institutions of the state and perhaps, in addition, why particular ideas are framed in specific ways so as to influence the function and form of those same institutions. Schmidt (2008) tells us that,

Political scientists whose work fits the DI rubric tend to have four things in common. First, they take ideas and discourse seriously…Second, they set ideas and discourse in institutional context…Third, they put ideas into their ‘meaning context’…Finally, and most importantly, they take a more dynamic view of change, in which ideas and discourse overcome obstacles that the three more equilibrium–focused and static older institutionalisms posit as insurmountable. What most clearly differentiates discursive institutionalists from one another is not their basic approach to ideas and discourse but rather the kinds of questions they ask and the problems they seek to resolve,
which tend to come from the institutionalist tradition(s) with which they seek to engage (304).

Postmodern connotations attached to the word ‘discourse’ have been a deterrent for some researchers (Schmidt: 304–305), but Schmidt’s definition is careful to rid it of “postmodern baggage to serve as a more generic term that encompasses not only the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed” (305). Her efforts are quite significant for the purposes of this thesis since it will make use of discursive approaches with exactly that intent: to help to uncover the ‘substantive content’ of Trudeau’s ideas and, most importantly, the ‘interactive processes’ at the heart of how ‘ideas are conveyed’. Discursive approaches, in short, can help to reveal how Trudeau’s ideas were interpreted and conveyed, and perhaps even help us to determine by means of which process this was achieved. Put simply, discursive approaches enable the exploration and understanding of how ideas are built, and how they are then understood and used to build meaning. Discourse is, at heart, an interactive process therefore the originators, carriers, and recipients of the ideas in question all have important roles to play in this interactional relationship of understanding, interpretation, and diffusion of ideas (Schmidt, n.d.:12, 24, 25). Ideas, in this context, may have different meanings for different people; ultimately, the aim of discursive approaches is to explore those different meanings.

Discursive approaches can help me do this in a very specific way because the approach allows me to analyze ideas and “text (what is said) but also context (where, when, how, and why it is said)” (Schmidt 2008: 305). In other words, “[t]he term refers not only to structure (what is said, or where and how) but also to agency (who said what to whom)” (ibid). Ideas and their dissemination “through discourse” is an important
aspect of discursive approaches because it represents the “interactive side of discourse” (Schmidt n.d.: 16) and ultimately can help researchers in their efforts to determine how ideas affect changes in society and the institutions of the state (ibid).

In identifying the inherent limitations of discursive approaches, Schmidt (n.d.: 23) points out factors with which this research had to contend as well:

[T]he big question for [DI] in explaining change, once we have established that ideas and discourse do matter and how they matter, is: When do ideas and discourse matter, that is, when do they exert a causal influence? And when don’t they? Establishing causality with regard to ideas and discourse can be problematic (emphasis in original, 23).

Schmidt maintains that it is precisely the problem of causality that leads many political scientists to eschew propositions regarding the impact or role of ideas in institutional change; the problem, put simply, involves trying to prove that a specific idea was the cause of institutional change or societal shift experienced at a specific time (ibid: 23, 24).

An example of just such an investigation could be efforts in trying to determine if Trudeau’s republican tendencies caused a heightened sense of purposeful belonging in Canada culminating in the creation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — a document that expressly states the purpose for its own existence (namely to instill common values for Canadians). But, to our point, how would a researcher be able to prove the link between Trudeau’s republicanism and his policy advice for Canada? Substantiating something of this nature would be an arduous task indeed.

As Schmidt (n.d.) points out, “[p]art of the reason many political scientists avoid explanations related to discourse is that it is difficult to separate it from other variables, to identify it as the independent variable” (emphasis in original, 24). How would we know,
for instance, that it is Trudeau’s republicanism that caused the formulation of one particular policy rather than some other factor? Schmidt (ibid) is also quick to point out, however, that simply because a task presents itself as challenging, and even perhaps unorthodox, should not mean that a researcher should consider it unfeasible — quite the contrary: “…instead of ignoring discourse because of the difficulties…it is much better to ask when is discourse a cause, that is, when does discourse serve to reconceptualize interests, to chart new institutional paths, and to reframe cultural norms” (emphasis in original, 24). The answers we retrieve from an analysis of this nature would be of enormous interest to political science, but also to the intellectual history and the history of ideas.

Once the importance of discourse is recognized, researchers could find ways to determine how and why a particular idea has more currency than another, and why it comes to dominate the political discourse in particular. Schimdt (n.d) says,

[W]e need to establish what criteria to use in evaluating whether discourse has a causal influence, that is, when it is ‘transformative’ and when not…Suffice it to say that in the realm of ideas, a ‘good’ discourse depends upon the relative strength or ‘truthfulness’ of its cognitive arguments, the resonance of its normative arguments, the adequacy of the information upon which the arguments build; the relevance or applicability of its recommendations; the coherence and consistency of its ideas and more (24, referencing Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004). In the realm of discursive interactions, who is speaking to whom in coordinative and communicative spheres also matters (24).

She proceeds to give us precise ways in which this can be achieved by referencing other scholars who have endeavored to provide empirical methods:
And all of this can be investigated empirically, for example, through process–tracing of ideas held by different actors that led to different policy choices (Berman 1998); …through speeches and debates of political elites that then lead to political action (Dobbin, 1994; Art 2006); through opinion polls and surveys to measure the impact of the communicative discourse (Koopmans, 2004); through interviews and network analysis to gauge the significance of the coordinative discourse, and more (Schmidt, n.d.: 24–25).

In summary, this thesis will make use of discursive approaches with the intent of exposing the actual content of Trudeau’s ideas and, to use Schimdt’s words, try to analyze those ‘interactive processes’ that determined how his ideas were — and still are — transmitted. The discursive approach is the best tool to show how Trudeau’s ideas were interpreted and conveyed, and perhaps even help us to determine by means of which process this was achieved. In particular, the strategy allows researchers to isolate the ways in which thinkers’ articulated ideas are effectively co–opted or appropriated and interpreted for other purposes, and thus contribute to the creation of a political myth. It is this aspect of discourse that I employ for the study as it is the one in which I am most interested.

Specifically, I will use examples provided by Arnold Rogow who offered his analysis of how Thomas Hobbes used Thucydides with the goal of discrediting democracy; I move then to Gad Horowitz and his theory of Canada’s Tory origins with the underlying objective of persuading Canadians to accept socialism; and finally, I use Janet Ajzenstat’s interesting evaluation of Lord Durham’s legacy which tries to rescue him from charges of racism and place him in a liberal paradigm. I will then try to show how Pierre Trudeau’s ideas were equally misinterpreted and I will try to show how these practices had particular goals. This will ultimately aid in my attempt to elaborate clearly
on importance of examining Trudeau, and also in my effort to uncover why the political thought of Pierre Elliott Trudeau remains relevant for Canada (and perhaps beyond).

These all lead to a discussion regarding data collection methods that may help to determine the fundamental role of discourse in shaping society and the institutions of the state. Additionally, for our purposes, it will allow me to approach an understanding as to why and how Trudeau’s political ideas were interpreted in a specific way. My data collection methods and analysis are described in the next section.

**Data Collection and Analysis: Secondary and Primary Sources**

Gathering and scrutinizing Trudeau’s own writing and relevant literature was necessary for this project and much time was dedicated to these tasks. An exorbitant amount of his own works as well as biographies and political analyses exist, not to mention peer reviewed journal articles, magazines, and newspaper articles, all of which contributed to the development of the perspective I convey. The information obtained supplied a constructive background and helped to uncover questions and topics addressed by the primary research.

I claim that the attribution to Trudeau of a hyper–individualist form of liberalism is inaccurate; nevertheless, the label of ‘liberal’ remains entrenched even though it is essentially a myth. For myths to attain this degree of societal consolidation it must be diffused broadly. In order to establish if Trudeau is subject of mythology then, it is necessary to assess both formal and informal literature. Some informal literature I examined was written by journalists, biographers, and commentators (Westell 1972 and Ricci 2009) as well as by those who worked closely with him (Gossage 1986; Burelle 2005). Other sources are formally written by well–known academics (Clarkson 2000;
Couture 1996; Laxers 1977); others still bridge the divide being written in refined ways by scholars but finding a wider readership (Cook 2006; Nemni 2006, 2011). It was necessary to evaluate these different strains of available literature in order to ascertain how and where the idea (or ‘label’) of a ‘liberal’ Trudeau began and how it quickly became the accepted narrative. It was also imperative to explore authors writing in English as well as French–Canadian authors in order to examine both perspectives. Through this exercise, it was possible to discern two distinct myths regarding Trudeau: the first that he was a liberal; the second, mainly perpetrated by Québécois commentators, that he did not understand Québec and was not sensitive to the plight of his fellow Québécois. From this, flowed the rather unfounded assertion that Trudeau did not understand his home province because, being of dual heritage (French–Canadian and Scottish), he suffered from a lifelong identity crisis. We will discover that nothing could be further from the truth.

Trudeau’s own writings were readily accessible since almost all of his articles from *Vrai* to *Cité Libre*7 and beyond are published in anthology format (1968, 1996, 2010), and his later thoughts are gathered in such books as his own memoirs (1993) and reflections on his policies and time in office (1990). Some very important and interesting material is available in his personal papers housed at Library and Archives Canada, however, I did not access these personally; instead, I made ample use of the two books written by Max and Monique Nemni (2006, 2011) to study any relevant content therein. When Trudeau’s writings were available in English translations, I preferred to read those;

7 Articles written in *Cité Libre* are all available online at [http://collections.banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/2225350](http://collections.banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/2225350)
of course, if they (and other works) were only available in French — such as some reflections contained in *Cité Libre* — I relied on the original text. Any errors of translation or interpretation are mine alone.

Through consultation of Trudeau’s work, including his own memoirs, I isolated particular individuals with whom I wanted to speak regarding their recollection of events surrounding specific moments of the Trudeau era as they possessed unique knowledge about the ideas and actions that informed the policy process related to Trudeau’s republican tendencies. I also consulted with members of my dissertation committee to obtain advice on who they thought would be suitable candidates for interviews. Speaking to these individuals helped verify (and solidify) my contention that there is a great deal of republicanism in Trudeau’s thought and theory.

I employed purposive sampling in selecting my interviewees; that is, I selected people who I thought had experience and knowledge of the subject at hand. As Walliman (2005) states, purposive sampling (or theoretical sampling) is “a method of getting information from a sample of a population that the researcher thinks knows much or has a considerable amount of knowledge about the subject in question” (279). In the case of Trudeau, elite interviews were necessary. There were, however, significant limitations to the interview process.

Elite individuals are considered to be significantly knowledgeable about specific topics or events. I selected carefully individuals on the basis of their competence in areas pertinent to my research project. The purpose of the semi–structured elite interviews was to reflect on past events and their relevance for today as perceived by the elite. Particular attention was paid to their description of events, and their reaction to, and understanding
of, those events. These interviews allowed me to discuss comprehensively Trudeau with people who knew him personally or professionally. I began with a relatively substantial list of candidates for interviews, but, as predicted, difficulties prevented me from realizing to the fullest extent this portion of my project. Nevertheless, the proximity and availability in Halifax, Nova Scotia of two prominent figures associated with Trudeau during his time in office, offered insight into the reasoning, personality, and state of mind behind some policy decisions and attitudes allowing me to understand the former Prime Minister in a unique and more profound way. The data generated from these interviews is used throughout this thesis.

The advantage of elite interviews, of course, was the valuable information they provided and the fascinating personal reflections Trudeau shared with them. The individuals I was able to interview were readily available to me and were very open to being contacted for future follow–up questions or clarifications. Given the initial pool of interview candidates I envisioned, one must mention that the disadvantage of including elite interviews in a project is always difficulty of access because these prominent individuals are normally rather busy, and operate under considerable time constraints. And in the case of Trudeau, associates from his time in office are now scattered across the country and some are located abroad making them difficult to contact. I believe that the few interviews I did conduct allowed me to isolate particular comments or ideas that were determining factors in Trudeau’s political thought. Once the interviews were analyzed and grouped, themes began to emerge and Trudeau’s republican tendencies were apparent and helped me prove my innovative way of looking at his influence on Canada.
I invited the candidates via email which implied consent. The interviewees were aware of the possibility of being quoted for this project and consented to this. Confidentiality was ensured by recording the interviews on an electronic device protected by password; if requested, a transcript was sent to the interviewee, and the interviews have subsequently been deleted from the storage device. Interviewees’ recollections and comments are quoted throughout this study, and when requested, they were contacted to inform them of the context within which the material was being used. One interviewee requested a final copy of the dissertation which will be sent to him when it is available.

Given the small number of interviewees, the matter of sampling must be addressed. Robson (2002) refers to sampling as “the search for typicality” (135) which I understand to mean the extent to which specific observations can be applied generally. Walliman (2005) states that it is crucial to select a sample which will form a reasonable representation from which one can formulate generalizations; a reasonable sample is determined, in other words, by size and by type. The type of sample was no issue for this research; as I indicated earlier, the difficulty of accessing those proposed on my list of interviewees made the issue of size a rather different story. I interviewed only two elite individuals with knowledge of Trudeau, and both were readily available and very willing to share details of their time with the former Prime Minister and, as indicated earlier, their insights were invaluable and will be used throughout this thesis. The question of ‘generalizing’ from only two interviews is a legitimate one; for this reason, interviews will be used primarily to further stress particular points that can be made by way of other sources, and to emphasize aspects of Trudeau’s behaviours and attitudes.
Conclusion

In the introductory chapter, I elaborated on both the normative and the methodological relevance of addressing Pierre Elliott Trudeau for the current Canadian political environment. This involves first identifying correctly the nature of his ideas and then revealing how they are interpreted and used in specific ways. Identifying the nature of his political thought will be achieved through the use of intellectual history and analyzing his suggestions about how Canadians should be thinking about politics. In helping to identify the philosophical roots of some elements that compose his political thought, I can begin to separate what he actually said from how others have interpreted and used his ideas. The task of revealing how his ideas are interpreted and used (and why it is so) will be achieved through the use of discursive approaches uncovering the power and importance of ideas to political science. I plan to give intellectual history a decidedly forward gaze by supplementing it with hermeneutical/discursive approaches in order to shine a light on how theorists' ideas are used politically by investigating the way in which they are interpreted and employed.

Most literature regarding Trudeau is quick to point out his steadfast adherence to classical liberal principles, and with the intent of developing a platform from which to gaze forward and determine why he is still relevant at all, it is first necessary to delve into what has been said about Trudeau. However, it is first necessary for the next chapter to focus on a detailed explanation of modern republican theory which is essential so as to make clear my statement that Trudeau fits more comfortably within this paradigm. By the end of the discussion, I hope to make clear the variants of republicanism and which one
influenced Trudeau more profoundly as well as explain the reason why the use of republican language and the label itself wax and wane while its tenets retain their appeal.
Chapter Three: Understanding Modern Republicanism

“Je suis Québécois, je suis Canadien français, et je le suis de tout coeur, mais je suis également, je suis profondément, je suis irrévocablement Canadien”. Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Montreal: November 10, 1968). 8

Introduction

We have misunderstood Trudeau. We have accused him of contradiction and confusion; yet the error is ours. If we situate his ideas more accurately, we recognize quickly that he is a neo–Roman (or classical) republican.

English Canada views republicanism mainly as an institutional arrangement (i.e., the absence of monarchy) and Canadian history immortalized the hostility towards this design expressed by the Fathers of Confederation. At the same time, francophone Québec seems to have missed classical republicanism as the theoretical foundation of Trudeau’s political thought despite a brief history with the civic republican vernacular (Smith & Ajzenstat, 1995) and the permeation of personalism9 that would alert one to his republican tendencies. This may be because it is often his virulent anti–nationalism that receives the greatest attention in that province. This antipathy towards nationalism is seen as being informed by an individualistic liberalism when, in reality, the manner in which he expresses himself on this topic is quintessentially republican. Trudeau tried to


9 I believe the philosophy of personalism and classical republicanism share some interesting traits and since Trudeau said that personalism (1993: 40) is the only ideology to which he subscribes, this is indeed a significant connection and an important clue to his republican political thought. I will explore personalism and justify my position in some depth in chapter five dedicated to the exploration of Pierre Trudeau’s republican tendencies in his own words and writings.
encourage the citizenry to be united and secure in its pride of being Canadian through the practice of a particular set of political values; and this, in its most basic form, is a fundamental principle of republican thought.

I begin this chapter by tracing the theoretical foundations of the recent republican revival, giving both a very brief account of the historical germination and an explanation of each of the two re–emerging camps of republican thought. It is important to discuss both variants in order to identify correctly the paradigm within which Trudeau sits most comfortably. I will then proceed to give an interpretation which I will characterize as modern republicanism.

Republicanism is not, as commonly asserted, a political theory completely dependent on a particular type of liberty brought about by an elusive virtue; rather it is, above all, a strategy for building a particular type of society and shaping a particular type of citizen. In other words, modern republicanism is a discussion about purposeful belonging and active political citizenship that encourages the pursuit of a particular kind of freedom. I then conclude the chapter by exploring the circumstances I believe contributed to the overall eclipse of the republican rhetoric, and how each variant declined for specific reasons. This will aid in understanding why republicanism is often overlooked in some thinkers despite the convincing evidence of its influence. Overall, this chapter will allow a deeper understanding of the underlying principles of

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10 I concede this is an important and fundamental tenet, but I contend that equal importance should be given to republicanism’s attempt to build a particular type of society and citizen first, so that its particular kind of freedom can be enjoyed.

11 I borrow this word from Viroli (1999).
republicanism and prepare the ground for my claim that those principles indeed constitute the core of Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s political thought.

**Theoretical Foundations of the Republican Revival**

A new zeal for the principles of republicanism filled “the vacuum created by the demise of” the twentieth century’s prevailing ideologies, “most notably Marxism” (Jennings, 2000: 576). In particular, the revival is attributed to an increasing unease with the failed promises of liberalism. Pinzani (2005) stated that the neo–republicans’ “punto di partenza…consiste nel mostrare l’esistenza di una tradizione politica alternativa al liberalismo” (301). For Maurizio Viroli (1999) liberalism is not only a product of republicanism, but is also a rather “impoverished” version of it (61). The liberal requirement that the rule of law be spelled out in constitutions and charters, for instance, stems from the Roman republican tradition, even though liberalism did articulate a highly sophisticated justification for this position, most clearly in John Locke’s *Second Treatise of Government*.

Not all theorists demonstrate an open enthusiasm for republicanism, which is often depicted as an antiquated theory ill–suited for the modern (liberal–minded) world, but there is much to disagree with in this assumption. If understood correctly, republicanism is indeed an excellent contender to save our institutions from decay and irrelevancy in an age of globalization, low voter turn–out, information saturation, the concentration of political power, persistent forms of nationalisms, and new brands of

12 Republicans’ “starting point is to prove the existence of a political tradition that is an alternative to liberalism” (my translation).
populism that seek to alter the foundational institutions of Canada. Republicanism places citizens prior to government (not vice-versa) and in doing so suggests that, if a democratic malaise were to surface, waves of revitalization of the political systems must rise from the people to their institutions.

To begin the discussion, it is important to sketch briefly what is meant by ‘republicanism’ in the broadest terms since it seems to encapsulate so much that its use can be confusing and often comes without a precise definition. I will thus begin by presenting a preliminary explanation of the different ways in which the term can be used.

In the first instance, one can speak of either institutional republicanism (IR) or theoretical republicanism (TR); subsequent to this categorization, one can speak of civic republicanism (CR) or neo–roman or classical republicanism (NRR). As the term implies, IR focuses mainly on institutional characteristics and arrangements, principal among which is the absence of a monarchy and the invitation to institutional reforms that are deemed necessary to the exercise of self–government, including promoting forms of direct democracy and strengthening the bonds of the community. This is a

13 It should be said that Montesquieu did put forward the notion that republicanism was possible under any form of government and declared that, according to him, England functioned as a republic despite it being a constitutional monarchy. In my understanding, he was referring to TR not IR. Even the likes of Robespierre used the terms republic and monarchy in a somewhat vague fashion and although he thought a republic to be incompatible with a monarchy, he did say that England was essentially a republic since in practical terms, it was a functional “constitutional government” (Cobban, 1948: 36).

14 The literature on the critiques and perceived benefits of deliberative democracy is vast, but not a significant factor for the purposes of this thesis; therefore, I will not engage here in an evaluation of the merits or failings of this model. Rather, I will leave to the reader the choice of exploring the concept further. It will suffice here to say that these models would be a difficult fit in Westminster parliamentary systems such as that which is in place in Canada; in fact, in my estimation, the neo–Athenian (or civic republican) variant of republicanism has consigned itself to an unrealistic (or impracticable) framework potentially rendering it inadaptable to modern societies and would require massive institutional reforms that likely do not work well with our parliamentary system or that would just duplicate similar mechanisms that already exist within our system such as Royal Commissions.
belief in the power of community and direct sovereignty of the people. Conversely, TR\textsuperscript{16} can be practiced under any form of government although the preference for one without a monarch is obvious. The oft–cited and main (but not exclusive) reason for this is that the institution of the monarchy requires habits of deference from a people; in fact, it is quite possible that this deference is the only way monarchy can remain a legitimate option.

When the break in the pattern of deference occurs (and this may take considerable time), a dramatic change in political culture is usually observed because citizens view quite differently their institutions of government and, most importantly, themselves. They realize, in essence, that the true promise of citizenship can be fulfilled through a newly acquired type of freedom that is fundamentally different in nature from the one they might have previously enjoyed. This is not to suggest that TR does not mention institutional reform at all; some suggestions even mirror those of IR. Overall though, TR

\textsuperscript{15} Because of its institutional reform focus, IR suffers from a theoretical defect in that it stresses form over function. Most literature of this strain is rife with suggestions about creating forums for deliberation, how they should be composed, even the intervals at which they should be convened, but few if any theorists take into consideration how these forums would fit into, for example, a Westminster parliamentary system and, perhaps most significantly, how our existing institutions should handle the results of the deliberative process, and who is to take responsibility for the implementation and outcome of the policies generated and so on. The spotlight on a ‘part’ of the system has taken all the focus away from the whole of the system. To repeat, this type of republicanism, it seems to me, is stressing form over function. Proponents wish to change the institutions of government in the hopes of making citizens ‘better’, or at least encourage their participation. It is difficult to see, however, how this transition from individualistic, material citizen to one interested in the common good can occur without, as Rousseau argued, first moulding them into the type of citizen that will respond to this pressure. In essence, they are building parts without examining the whole.

\textsuperscript{16} It seems to me that TR stresses function over form and seeks to create a particular kind of society and educate its citizens as to their role in it before it proceeds to reforming the institutions, if reforms are to occur at all. Much like a computer where one must first input a language through which it can operate, TR wishes to imbue its citizens with a language through which they can understand their institutions, communicate with them, and form their political culture. It is only once the foundational institutions of the country are understood to a sufficient degree that any real reforms can be contemplated. If the citizenry does not understand what a part of the system does, how can they know it requires (or if they themselves even desire) reform? And even if the demand for reform persists, how can they know the best way to change it? TR would suggest that the state has a function in educating the citizens as to their significant role in shaping and participating in their institutions of government. It is essential, not only for the civic engagement that would potentially follow, but also for the depth of the democratic process.
describes an ideal, an ethos, or even a societal condition, not aimed primarily at the institutions of government, but at first creating citizens who understand their role in moulding their institutions, want to live securely under the rule of law, and seek to strengthen the bonds of society. This is the belief in the power of purposeful belonging and citizenship.

The distinction is important because I associate IR with the Greek polis and the revivalist strand of CR which has a strong communitarian bent; but I link TR with the Roman civitas and revivalist strand of NRR which encourages a more sophisticated form of collectivism.17 Also, the division is important because the focus of each will be the reason for their eclipse as I will show in a discrete section of this chapter. In short, 

17 Defined in its simplest terms, collectivism is “a social pattern in which individuals construe themselves as parts of collectives and are primarily motivated by duties to those collectives” and is opposite of individualism that, in its simplest terms, can be defined as “a social pattern in which individuals see themselves as independent of collectives and are primarily motivated by their own preferences and needs”. Retrieved June 20, 2014 at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/culture-cogsci/ Communitarianism is far more complex to define; in summary it involves “the promotion of… three forms of valued communal life”: 1. “Communities of place, or communities based on geographical location. This is perhaps the most common meaning associated with the word community. In this sense, community is linked to locality, in the physical, geographical sense of a community that is located somewhere. It can refer to a small village or a big city. A community of place also has an affective component—it refers to the place one calls ‘home’, often the place where one is born and bred and the place where one would like to end one's days even if home is left as an adult. At the very least, communitarians posit an interest in identifying with familiar surroundings”; 2. Communities of memory, or groups of strangers who share a morally–significant history. This term — first employed by the co-authors of Habits of the Heart — refers to imagined communities that have a shared history going back several generations. Besides tying us to the past, such communities turn us towards the future — members strive to realize the ideals and aspirations embedded in past experiences of those communities, seeing their efforts as being, in part, contributions to a common good. They provide a source of meaning and hope in people’s lives. Typical examples include the nation and language–based ethnocultural groups”; 3. “Psychological communities, or communities of face–to–face personal interaction governed by sentiments of trust, co–operation, and altruism. This refers to a group of persons who participate in common activity and experience a psychological sense of togetherness as shared ends are sought. Such communities, based on face–to–face interaction, are governed by sentiments of trust, cooperation, and altruism in the sense that constituent members have the good of the community in mind and act on behalf of the community’s interest. They differ from communities of place by not being necessarily defined by locality and proximity. The differ from communities of memory in the sense that they are more ‘real’, they are typically based on face to face social interaction at one point in time and consequently tend to be restricted in size. The family is the prototypical example. Other examples include small–scale work or school settings founded on trust and social cooperation”. Retrieved June 20, 2014 at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/
besides a conflation with patriarchy and tyranny, CR slowly withered away because its focus is the creation of institutional arrangements that functioned best in a polity that was limited in size (the ever–present problem of scale) and relatively homogenous. The impact of democracy presaged the demise of this strain since the extension of the franchise made small polities impracticable.\textsuperscript{18} On the other hand, while NRR’s focus was primarily theoretical and was impervious to regime change, the pairing of the rhetoric of nationalism with the language of republican patriotism was its downfall. So, while the two strains share characteristics and concerns, they stressed different aspects of republican theory and were eventually conflated with two different things. Each, therefore, tended to recede because of their respective associations. My elaboration on the theme of republicanism’s eclipse aids in explaining why the finer elements of the theory and its language are often misidentified, appropriated by other schools of thought, or ignored altogether.

As mentioned, I will dedicate an entire section to the matter of republicanism’s eclipse, so I limit the discussion here to justifying the association between the Greek \textit{polis} and CR, and how the Roman \textit{civitas} and NRR also share a connection. The difference between the two underscores what I understand to be the diverging goals of the two revivalist strains: CR is interested in building \textit{communities}; NRR is interested in building political \textit{societies}.

\textsuperscript{18} Of course, the \textit{Federalist Papers} (1982) first published in 1787–1788, offer solutions to this problem by creating the hybrid Democratic Republicanism. Held (1992) will confirm this later in the thesis.
Figure 1: Republican Origins, Orientations, and Revivalist Strands

Institutional Republicanism and Civic Republicanism

Borrowing from Jacques Maritain’s (2008) differentiation between *community* and *society*, we understand that “community is more of a work of nature and more nearly related to the biological” (164); in other words, the community is an organic body that arises spontaneously as opposed to a society which “is more of a work of reason, and more nearly related to the intellectual and spiritual properties of man” (164). Maritain (2008) says that social life always brings people together in the pursuit of a common goal. But what is the goal? In a community,

[T]he object is a *fact* which precedes the determinations of human intelligence and will, and which acts independently of them to create a common unconscious psyche, common feeling and psychological structures, and common mores. But in a *society* the object is a *task* to be done or an *end* to be aimed at, which depends on the determinations of
human intelligence and will and is preceded by the activity
— either decision or at least consent — of the reason of
individuals (emphasis in original, ibid: 165).

Thus, community is a product of history and “heredity” and is sustained by passion or
zeal, while society is the “product of reason and moral strength (what the ancients called
‘virtue’)” (Maritain, 2008: 165). Here, communities are associated with passion; societies
with reason.

Aristotle maintained that justice and happiness can only be achieved through
relationships with others in the polis: a notion based on the belief that social unity was
dependent largely on a homogenous polity — the more homogenous the better. Although
contested, it is perhaps fair to say that membership in the polis was restricted to a
homogenous group of individuals who would find it quite easy to reach a consensus
about the common good. While the Greek polis was made up of a community of citizens,
the Roman civitas was made up of a society of citizens; in other words, the Roman
Republic sought to manage a diverse society as opposed to the polis’ efforts to sustain an
organic community. In the latter, the individual is absorbed by the whole, giving life to
the unity known as the polis. Here political participation is not just a mere aspect of life,
but necessary for the good life itself. Pocock (1975) relays how “participation…formed
both a means to an end and an end — or good — in itself” (64–67); in other words,
political participation was an intrinsic good.19 This is a communitarian project and is
analogous to the civic republican mission.

19 A definition of intrinsic value is as follows: “Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the
heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something
is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.”
Civic (or Neo–Athenian) republicanism\textsuperscript{20} derives its inspiration from ancient Athens and is informed primarily by Aristotle; its main proponents are Pocock, Sandel, and Arendt among others. The city–state of Athens (5th century B.C.) is usually and justifiably presented as the progenitor of modern democracy.\textsuperscript{21} “Democracy has been aptly described as government by discussion. This is preeminently a true description of Athenian democracy. Pericles in the Funeral Oration points out that the Athenians believed in the fullest discussion of all public questions” (Bonner, 1993: 47). Athenian democracy was, in essence, rule by the people the majority of which were the ‘masses’.\textsuperscript{22}

The first example of what could be deemed a direct democracy\textsuperscript{23} “was created in Athens [and] [b]y direct democracy, [what is meant is] that laws were made by the citizens themselves — no senators or deputies or councilors of any kind were allowed to dilute expression of the popular will” (Frost, 1969: 1). We must, however, understand the word ‘democracy’ in contextual terms since rights to deliberation and election were restricted to Athenian male citizens (Held, 1992: 13). This practice excluded large

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\textsuperscript{20} The temptation here is to call this variant civic humanism since I find this particular incarnation to be far from the republican ideal as we currently understand it through Skinner and Viroli, calling into question whether this is republicanism at all; but, for expediency, I shall continue to call it civic republicanism.

\textsuperscript{21} An exact definition of democracy remains both elusive and contested. Although there is a broad concurrence that it represents the best kind of political practice and that it is apt to produce the best kind of society, there is still widespread disagreement about how to achieve these ends.

\textsuperscript{22} “The philosopher Plato condemned the theoretical form out of hand: the People, when they are ruled by themselves instead of by their betters, become morally corrupt because they are motivated by their desires rather than by knowledge of what is best for them. Aristotle was preoccupied with organization and structure: ‘good’ democracy was possible, he thought, but only if such a government possessed suitable institutions and constitutional safeguards to restrain the selfish impulses of the lower orders” (Frost, 1969: 5). Also, “…democracies often do what is expedient rather than what is right — thus seeming to confirm Plato’s suspicions. And a generation of European statesmen believed that the excesses of the French Revolution proved Aristotle’s prediction of what the common people would do when unrestrained by law” (Frost, 1969: 6).

\textsuperscript{23} For an elaborate account of direct democracy in a Canadian context, refer to chapter four (Electoral Democracy) of The People’s House of Commons: Theories of Democracy in Contention by David E. Smith (University of Toronto Press, 2007: 51–71).
segments of the population such as women, slaves, and those who were considered aliens;\textsuperscript{24} in fact,

[T]he Athenians never became egalitarian. They continued to require status of some kind in their statesmen, whether it was good family, wealth, military prowess or simply a reputation for moral probity...Athenians intuitively placed their confidence in men of achievement or property (Frost, 1969: 5).

“Men” were expected “to participate in public affairs” and if they avoided this obligation, they were looked upon “with contempt, if not with suspicion” (Bonner, 1933: 14).

Residency in the city was, of course, a central requisite and condition of citizenship.\textsuperscript{25}

Arguably, individual autonomy as we currently understand it was virtually unknown because the political and the social were quite enmeshed (Held, 1992: 12–13). In this

\textsuperscript{24} Citizenship, in this ancient context, was quite prestigious, but not available to aliens. ‘Aliens’ included a large swath of people not born of Athenian parents. According to Bonner (1933), the value of citizenship can be deduced from the practice of stripping an individual of that right as punishment for various crimes (86).

\textsuperscript{25} Connor (1994 in Boegehold & Scafuro) states that Greek citizenship had three principal characteristics: genealogy, homogeneity, and legality (34–35), and his essay seeks to refute these views. In terms of homogeneity, Connor (ibid) states that “Athenian civic identity was indeed problematic” (40) and that Athenians showed “persistent affection...for their local cults, festivals, and residences” (38). For this and other factors, there is “need for caution in adopting the view that Attika was culturally and politically homogenous in the classical period” (39). From the genealogical perspective, Connor (ibid) states that “Before the establishment of a formal status, the boundary between citizen and non–citizen must have been very permeable” thus “interrmarriage” and “mobility” probably played significant roles in blurring the lines of descent (36). Connor (ibid) goes on to say that the widespread practice of slavery might well have “encouraged mixture” as well (37). The porosity of the system, in fact, may be behind the reason for introducing the Periclean citizenship law of 451/0 BC (37) which limited Athenian citizenship to males “born of two” Athenian citizens (Boegehold in Boegehold & Scafuro, 1994: 57): “The reason for the statute, Aristotle volunteers elliptically, was ‘too many citizens’” (ibid). It can be assumed, then, that in authorities’ estimation, “too many people were claiming rights of citizenship” thus having an impact on society (ibid). Some scholars doubt that this impact was ‘racial’ in nature. Boegehold (1994) maintains that “to fix upon purity of racial stock as a basis for conjecture” is perhaps due to the “volatile issues of World War II”, however “it is helpful to remember that many passionate concerns of the twentieth century are at a far remove from those of Athenians 2,400 years and more ago. Among such concerns, that for purity of racial stock may find a place. What evidence can be presented for such a concern in the fifth century B.C.?” (58). It may be solely a “hypothetical creation” (ibid). “[T]he pressure on a limited amount of land, and hence on heirs who hope to get their living from that land” (ibid: 61) may be a more plausible explanation; “Perikles (sic) made his definition rigorous because there were claims on the land...” (ibid: 65).
context, polities were usually limited in size so as to make participation in political affairs and the consequent deliberation easier.

CR values the Aristotelian understanding of political participation and wishes to re-establish it as an intrinsic good placing prime importance on the institutionalization of deliberative (or discursive) democratic practices — that framework according to which people will come together and deliberate on issues they deem important, and through these deliberations, not only will they come to an agreement about what actually constitutes the common good, but will also become more tolerant and understanding in the process; in other words, they will become better members of the community.

In keeping with the great thinkers of antiquity, the neo–Athenians see political participation as conducive to prosperity and excellence, and thus as an intrinsic good; in other words, it is only by virtue of living in a self–governing republic that people can flourish. Following Rousseau, self–government becomes the only form of government through which democratic life can be expressed. In this type of republicanism, civic virtue and political participation become intrinsic goods because they help in people’s maturation as political beings, fulfilling Aristotle’s vision which held that man is a political animal and that it is only through political life that men realize the ‘good’. Maynor (2003) explained it best:

[T]he neo–Athenian model stresses direct participation in the governing process as a way of realizing true freedom. The thought is that the act of participation itself helps to constitute certain ultimate goods that contribute to individual well–being and self–mastery (12).
As mentioned, the institutional devices required for this model are forums for deliberation where a political process can take place through which the community creates legislation for itself with the intent of making governing fairer. Personal preferences are not a given, but instead they must be sought by engaged citizens, and through deliberation, they must come to a consensus about what is best for the community. Presumably, the goal is to change the norms that govern society itself and, for some proponents, potentially improve social justice. In short, the idea is to uphold a specific conception of the good life that will manifest through active and direct political participation and a healthy dose of *civic virtue* which, in this interpretation, means the ability to put the common good of the entire community above one’s own self-interest. As I understand it, this is nothing more than the resurrection of the ancient Greek *polis*.26

Pocock (1975) alleges that a march of political thought began in Aristotle’s Athens, went all the way into 17th century England and reached its epitome in 19th century America. The march to which he alludes is republicanism which, for him, is not only an organizing principle of government, but mainly expresses a language that is recovered periodically — these are Pocock’s *Machiavellian Moments*: the junctures at which republics face their temporal limits and fight to survive. I understand these junctures, then, to coincide with the time in which republican rhetoric or language reappears. In my understanding of this, there are particular periods of societal unease or malaise which can be more or less threatening to the survival of a state (or republic). It is during these periods that republican language is retrieved and used in order to recover

26 Minus, of course, some of the most disturbing attributes associated with it, i.e. various forms of discrimination and inequality.
important political values. These factors presage *Machiavellian Moments* which, to repeat, are those moments in which a state faces the periods of struggle, of possible dissolution, or upheaval. The ‘moments’ of particular regard for Pocock are Athens and Rome and, after centuries, another *Moment* re–emerged in Italian city–states of the Renaissance, followed by events in England, and the republican experiences during the Enlightenment all culminating in the American and French Revolutions.\(^{27}\)

*Theoretical Republicanism and Neo–Roman Republicanism*

Held (1992) maintained that Athenian democracy shared common traits with Rome under the form of a republic or *res publica* (13).\(^ {28}\) Finding a single definition of NRR is quite challenging, but almost all of the definitions offered by scholars share some features in common: individuals/citizens can only be fulfilled by actively taking part in the exercise of self–government which, however, is characterized as an *instrumental good*\(^ {29}\) in this paradigm, and the goal of the political community should be the promotion of virtue with an eye towards the common good. Besides the desire to reform the institutional arrangements of the state, CR and NRR also differ vastly in terms of how they view political participation: CR sees it as an *intrinsic* value while NRR sees it as an

\(^{27}\) It is not my intention here to delve into the history of these events which is far too vast and complex to relay and analyze in this thesis, and is perhaps the province of historians in any case. For those interested, Pocock (1975) and Pettit (1999) retrace these events and their importance for republicanism with keen analyses.

\(^{28}\) *Res Publica* was coined in Republican Rome and is Latin usually translated as ‘public affair’ (from *res* meaning ‘thing’ and *publica* meaning ‘public’). In Roman times it was used to both as indicate the state itself and a particular type of state, namely the ‘good’ state. It is similar though not identical to the Greek notions of *politeia*.

\(^{29}\) A comprehensive definition of instrumental politics is given by Burtt (1993): “the development of virtuous citizens is not seen as the end or purpose of political life. Rather, the political or civic virtues are praised for being especially good means to the advancement of other worthy political ends, such as liberty, equality, democracy, and order” (360).
instrumental one. Through this foundational difference, we can deduce that CR wishes to build a community similar to Maritain’s typology whereas NRR seeks to build a society that is founded on abstract political values, not grounded in communitarian ones. The end result for NRR is the realization of a particular type of freedom known as freedom as non-domination that will come about through the cultivation of purposeful belonging and active political citizenship.

The NRR camp claims its origins from the Roman Republic and, in particular, from the Italian city–states of the Renaissance inspired primarily by the political thought of Cicero and Niccolò Machiavelli. The contemporary exponents of this approach are Skinner, Maynor, and Viroli among others. This strand of the revival embodies the notion of the Roman civitas which finds its foundations in legal terms. In effect, of the countless things for which the Romans are due credit, the invention of rights30 is certainly a stand–out. The Roman civitas was based on the principles of the law. “From civis is derived the abstract term civitas, meaning the status of a civis, that is to say, citizenship…meaning the incorporate body of the cives, to wit, the state” (Salmond 1901: 274).31 Nicolet (1980) tells us that “Civis is an associative term: its proper meaning is not ‘citizen’, but ‘fellow–citizen’” (22); however, societal cohesion was based on respect for the law shared by all. Here is Nicolet (ibid) again: “Citizenship…was a unitary status: all citizens…enjoyed equal political rights” (23). It would seem that, for the Romans,

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30 “Roman citizenship meant above all, and almost exclusively, the enjoyment of what might be called a right of habeas corpus” (Nicolet, 1980: 19).

31 In this classic and much–cited article, the author goes on to specify that “The mediaeval use of civitas, as equivalent not to state but to city, was unknown to the Romans. The city of Rome was urbs, not civitas” (274).

32 I understand ‘associative’ to mean ‘collective’ as opposed to ‘polis’ which may be considered a communal (or communitarian) term.
homogeneity of the population was unnecessary. Everyone who became a Roman citizen was part of the civitas regardless of his or her cultural or ethnic heritage. What mattered here was obedience of the law which was to treat everyone equally and allegiance to the state. As stated in Salmond (1901), “[t]he Hellenes were of one blood, but formed many states, while the Roman Empire included many nations, but was one state” (272). This would have been true at the time of the Republic as well.

This is the attempt to create a citizenry that shares political values and is informed of the workings of the state so as to monitor its institutions to ensure their proper functioning; in other words, it was a theoretical republicanism that created a political society. That is not to say that the institutions of the state played insignificant roles — quite the contrary; many administrative, governmental, and legal practices (especially rights) invented by the Romans are still with us today; however, what was more important was that citizens did not need to participate directly in government for the republic to prosper.

The Roman Republic and Italian Renaissance republics were not infused with, nor informed by, populism; in fact, their proponents stated emphatically that those regimes should not be confused with democracy. The difference, for the republicans, was an important one: while democracies tended to encourage vice, republics promoted virtù.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33} An analysis of republican literature in Jennings (2000) reveals this sentiment persists in modern republicanism.

\textsuperscript{34} Italian for ‘virtue’. The etymology suggests that this word means “moral life and conduct, moral excellence” or a “moral strength, manliness, valor, excellence, worth”, since it stems from vir (man, as in “virile”). Biblically, we find the description of seven cardinal virtues that were divided into theological (faith, hope and charity) and natural (justice, temperance, fortitude and prudence). It is, in essence, a word burdened heavily with meaning. \url{http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=virtue}. Retrieved June 06, 2012.
Therefore, while it is fair to surmise that some of the values embodied in the Athenian city–state re-emerged in the Roman civitas in the form of a republic (circa 5th century B.C. — circa 1st century B.C.), Rome, in that era, cannot be characterized as a direct democracy as it was governed by sophisticated institutions like numerous councils and an important Senate structured by social status; in other words, by economic class (Nicolet 1980).35

The leading Roman republican writer was Marcus Tullius Cicero who admired Greek thinkers, but was well aware of the Roman aversion to theorizing and philosophizing, favouring instead practical, immediate solutions (Ebenstein, 1951). While Athenians conceived of the polis — that is the merger of society and government until they are indistinguishable one from the other — Roman republicans envisioned government as a completely separate entity. Government’s duty, for Cicero, was to serve its society. Pinzani (2005) noted that Cicero defined a republic as “una riunione di individui che si sono associati per mezzo di un accordo concernente determinati obblighi di giustizia e la persecuzione dell’interesse comune” (302).36

Cicero had a sense of the world, whereas Plato and Aristotle were never able to go beyond the conception of the city–state as the ultimate in political organization. Both Plato and Aristotle had no place for mankind in their political theories; the world was divided into Greeks and others, who were barbarians and…inferior to cultured Greeks who had the right to enslave them. By contrast, Cicero has a more universal outlook, fostered by his political and administrative experience in Rome and the

35 Of course, it is important to point out that imperial Rome became essentially an oligarchy (ibid: 20–21).
36 “…a collection of individuals who are associated by way of an agreement regarding certain obligations of justice and the pursuit of the common interest” (my translation).
empire, and also fed by the springs of Hellenic Stoicism (Ebenstein, 1951: 123; italics in original).

All Roman citizens, in Cicero’s view, were entitled to *libertas* and *ius* (liberty and justice); consequently, citizenship guaranteed protection from arbitrary treatment. In his treatises on the best constitutional regime (*De res publica*, 2008) and the perfect legal regime for the republic (*De legibus*, 2008), Cicero lays out a clear conception of the rights and duties of citizenship, and the relationship between it and the health of a republic. While citizens had the right to expect the state to secure *libertas* and *ius*, they also knew that they were obligated to view all fellow citizens as equals under, and before, that same law.

Whereas the general Greek view, as typically expressed by Aristotle, held that some people were superior to others, Cicero said that ‘there is no human being of any race who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain virtue’ (Ebenstein, 1951: 123).

Justice was the lynchpin of the republic: when it was present, the republic existed to protect the common interest and the obedience of the citizen body.

[T]he conception of the people (populus) as a political and legal force in the process of government acquired in Roman constitutional history connotations and undertones similar to those the word ‘people’ has acquired again in modern times in the world–wide struggles for democracy and popular self–government. Plato and Aristotle know of the *polis*, the city state, and of social classes, but not of the people. The conception of the ‘people’ in western political thinking is a contribution, not of Roman philosophy, but of Roman public law (Ebenstein, 1951: 124–125)

For Cicero, republicanism, the *res publica*, was not only a form of government, but it was defined according to the values and goals served by government (most importantly justice
and the common good). Roman citizenship, therefore, became a legal status that is analogous to modern nationality (Ebenstein, 1951); and as is often said, it provided legal and military protections in exchange for allegiance to Rome. The matter of allegiance (or loyalty) will return in my discussion of modern republican patriotism, or in my words, purposeful belonging.

The Roman Republic would fall to a succession of autocrats who turned the republic into an empire that would eventually colonize and influence the known world. The values of republicanism would resurface again, however, in the city–states of the Italian Renaissance. The republicanism that is articulated in this era is the basis for our current understanding of the theory as it moved away from Roman republicanism and was enriched theoretically by the great thinkers of the Renaissance (Viroli, 1999: 21).

Viroli (1999) stated that “political science proceeds not by inventing new theories to replace old ones but by rediscovering and refining forgotten ideas and themes; and sometimes the work of rediscovery helps actual political practice” (4). Republicanism as a theory or attitude, never really went away. Pinzani (2005) contends that many neo–republican theorists speak of the tradition as if it “avrebbe continuato a scorrere sotto la superficie, dominata dalle grandi ideologie liberale, socialista e — nel secolo ventesimo — fascista, fino a riemergere per proporsi come terza via” (300). 37 But, some theorists believe that the “interpretation of republicanism as a form of political Aristotelianism is historiographical error” (Viroli, 1999: 65), leading one to question whether the civic humanism of the Greek polis is republicanism at all. Ultimately, it may be fair to say that

37 “continued to flow below the surface which was dominated by the great ideologies of liberalism, socialism and — in the twentieth century – fascism, until it resurfaced to present itself as a third way (or option)” (My translation).
modern republicanism can trace its roots back to ancient Greek musings about politics through to Rome and subsequently to the republics in Renaissance Italy. But, perhaps it is more precise to say that the first slave–free, modern republics were created in Italy in cities like Florence, Genoa, and Venice during the Renaissance (Viroli, 1999: 3). Viroli (1999) noted that,

[T]he free republics of Italy, between the fourteenth and the early sixteenth century...witnessed the birth of that ‘classical republicanism’ which served as the fountainhead for the many republican theories...that flourished in the next centuries in the Netherlands, England, France, and the United States (21).

The republicanism that came to life in Renaissance Italy was based on “a distinctive body of political theory committed to sustaining the principle of liberty and to explaining the political and legal means to attain and preserve it” (Viroli, 1999: 3).

NRR, aimed as it is against tyranny of any form, is mainly associated with Niccolò Machiavelli, best known for *The Prince*, although it has long been established that this book does not represent accurately his personal political views or preferences. The book was likely written to incur political favour from the de’ Medici family and is merely an attempt to explain how to run a principality. It was not declaring his preference for that form of government. Machiavelli’s ideas are best expressed in the *Discorsi sopra prima deca di Tito Livio*.

He parts ways with the neo–Athenians due mainly to his view on political conflict and how these should be anticipated and allowed: factions may create temporary anxiety, but they also force citizens to be vigilant, and promote *virtù* against

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38 Known in English by the title *Discourses on Livy*.
He did not place emphasis on human flourishing, but concentrated more on the republic and citizens’ duty in preserving civic virtue and a mixed form of government. Political participation, in his view, is an instrumental good.

It is not unusual to read work by some (though not all) modern republicans and detect the attempt at attenuating those features that might make the theory appear threatening or unappealing to liberals. There is a danger in these attempts in that they may result in theoretical confusion, and may hinder efforts in developing the theory any further in a cohesive fashion. Currently, the main charge against republican theory is that it is, in fact, underdeveloped; while not completely irreconcilable, I think the differences between liberalism and republicanism are considerable enough to warrant two separate and quite discrete theories that should be kept in their own unique paradigm. What is apparent, nonetheless, is their mutual commitment to the rule of law, constitutionally–entrenched rights, and a separation of powers — all ideas inherited from antiquity, in particular republican Rome. It is obvious that both liberalism and republicanism are strongly rights–based, but I believe it fair to say that republicanism has little patience for some forms of liberalism (e.g., the neo–liberalism of Hayek or Nozick. Aversion toward this form of liberalism was shared by Pierre Trudeau who stated as much in his autobiography released in 1993: 189–190) and, conversely, liberalism would eschew completely the fundamental tenets of classical republicanism. A deeper elaboration on the difference between these two philosophies is warranted at this point.

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39 Corruption – as per Machiavelli, this occurs when citizens put their individual interests above the common good and citizens fall victim to ozio — inertia, apathy, or passivity.
**Liberalism and Republicanism**

For most republicans, the distinction between liberalism and republicanism is real and it is important. Patten (1996) explains it for us thusly:

The *distinctive* claim made by republicans — the claim which they think takes them beyond the liberal tradition — emphasizes the role of political participation and civic virtue. It is a necessary condition of the maintenance of a free state, they argue, that its citizens be politically active and motivated by a high degree of civic virtue. Unless citizens participate actively in political life, they will allow their institutions to stagnate and corrupt, and they will eventually lose them. Moreover, this participation is only likely if citizens are motivated by commitment to the common good and a high degree of civic virtue rather than by self-interest (28, emphasis in original).

Jennings (2000) maintained that modern republicanism, being primarily the product of the French Revolution, is still seen as the theory “where the claims of popular democracy and sovereignty are wedded to demands for greater social justice” (577). However, a more exhaustive definition can be found in Maurizio Viroli’s *Republicanism* (1999) where he described it as

a distinctive body of political theory committed to sustaining the principle of liberty and to explaining the political and legal means to attain and preserve it (3) [and]…considers citizens’ participation in sovereign deliberation necessary to the defense of liberty only when it remains within well–defined boundaries…If sovereign deliberations are entrusted to a large body rather than a small one, it is more likely that the council or legislature will have the political strength to carry out the common good against factional interests (4).
What is immediately apparent in his definition is that, for him, republicanism is not a theory of political participation as such (Viroli, 1999: 4, 6); rather, he sees it as a theory of “representative self-government within constitutional boundaries” (ibid: 6).\footnote{At first glance, this seems a contradiction in terms since questions could arise about how representation can square with self-government, but this is only if one adheres to the notion of delegate representation rather than the trustee model as per Edmund Burke’s famous typology.} It would seem that political participation is merely one of the instruments — albeit a significant one — through which a republican polity can be created and maintained.

In Viroli’s vision, republicanism reserves an important place for the concept of patria\footnote{La parola ‘patria’ significava ‘terra patria’, la terra dei padri.” (Viroli, 1995, 23), [but has since evolved to mean] “a rational love because it is the love for a particular good, the free city, the preservation of which is in the interest of every citizen” (my translation).} although he still maintains, as the definition above shows, that in essence, republicanism is about a love of liberty first. It is from the word ‘patria’ that the word ‘patriotism’ is derived and it can be stated that, for modern republicans, ‘patriotism’ might well be defined as love of the republic and its brand of non-dominated liberty. This is a perfectly acceptable conflation; however, I prefer to use the language of purposeful belonging when expressing this idea. It is a subtle difference, but not one of mere semantics.

In my evaluation, liberty is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of republicanism. It is balanced by other necessary but insufficient conditions, namely purposeful belonging, which creates a particular kind of rational society, and political citizenship which creates the sense of loyalty necessary to sustain that kind of society. In Maynor’s (2003) words,
republicanism is a non-neutral doctrine that promotes the values and ideals of liberty as nondomination. For republicans, citizenship, civic virtue, and other forms of participation are goods that have quasi-perfectionist elements that provide stability and are able to command allegiance without actual or threatened domination. To this end, republican citizens are provided with a distinctive republican context for choice that secures the necessary conditions for individuals to choose, question, and revise their life choices (117).

I will be discussing liberty as non-domination in a discrete section of this chapter.

When represented as a Venn diagram (fig. 2), it becomes evident that several principles of classical republicanism and liberalism coincide clearly and for obvious reasons: liberalism is the direct, and most triumphant, descendent of republicanism. But, where the two theories diverge, they do so considerably; and, intriguingly, it is in these differences that most of the perplexity regarding Trudeau originates. As I will show in chapter four, many authors hold that Trudeau was a staunch liberal individualist, but that he sometimes engaged in mystifying self-contradictions in words and actions. When one evaluates Trudeau with a republican checklist, however, these so-called ‘deviations’ from liberalism are not really departures at all; they are merely republican tendencies. Trudeau sits comfortably within the republican spectrum and what some have considered ‘digressions’ from liberal theory is, as the Venn diagram shows, merely adherence to tenets of classical or neo-Roman republican theory.
In this section, I attempt to sketch an interpretation of republicanism which, for expediency, I will call *modern republicanism*. Republicanism has, in the Anglo–Saxon tradition, predominantly focused upon institutional republicanism. If, however, we focus more intensely upon its rival — neo–Roman Republicanism (NRR) — we can identify other themes and ideas which seem to describe Trudeau’s *weltanschauung* in a richer, more accurate way than liberalism can. Most notably, few scholars have been committed to a sympathetic exploration of Trudeau’s ideas of purposeful belonging in place of a more emotive and cultural nationalism which underscore his modern republican sensibilities. It is, then, to a discussion of the modern republican ideal that I now turn.
While many theorists of the republican revival concentrate on the components of the theory (for example, civic virtue) that express themselves through political participation, in my interpretation, republicanism is not exclusively a theory of public participation in political affairs geared toward the establishment of a particular type of freedom — though they are important means to an end. Rather, at its core, republicanism is an understanding of, and elaboration on, the creation of a particular type of politically rational society that gives life to political citizenship — an active citizenry that understands its government and thus can actively participate in, and monitor, it. In effect, purposeful belonging and political citizenship are at the heart of the theory and all other elements mentioned (civic virtue, the common good, political participation, and liberty as non-domination) are instruments through which a purposeful political citizenship can be achieved, enhanced, and find expression. In other words, in the modern definition of republicanism, purposeful belonging must precede the use of these tools. Without a strong sense of belonging as the foundation of the theory, it is difficult to see how any of those instruments could inspire a citizenry to action; how they could be used effectively; or how the desired results can be achieved.

The theoretical substance of Trudeau’s political thought is similar to that which animates the republican revival; however, there are some important oversights in the revivalist literature that I wish to address and perhaps suggest a different way of looking at the main tenets of republicanism.

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42 Here, we see function over form. TR wishes first to mould citizens through civic education to prepare them to play their fundamental role in the patria. Here we see what the parts are expected to do before we build the car. While CR and NRR share the tools of common good, political participation and virtue, the CR emphasis on political participation make it so that the only reasonable outcome is institutional change because citizens must participate directly in law making and thus require those institutional devices.
As Maurizio Viroli (1995) said, when interpreted correctly, patriotism can encourage the type of citizenship needed to secure the well-being of one's country and instil the desire that other countries have that same prosperity and sense of security and, “se inteso correttamente, il linguaggio del patriottismo repubblicano può funzionare come un valido antidoto al nazionalismo” (11–12). This is not the patriotism of ‘my country wrong or right’ rather it is a purposeful belonging of citizens who, because of a strong feeling of loyalty towards their country (whether by birth or adoption) demand their political leaders — their government — be just and uphold fundamental principles, and that they act in the national interest. Citizens can ensure this happens by participating actively in the public discourse.

Since I have said that freedom as non-domination is a necessary but insufficient substance for republicanism’s implementation, I will begin by explaining what exactly is meant by this term and why some believe it is not distinguishable enough from the liberal ‘non-interference’ paradigm to constitute the foundation for the tradition.

*Freedom as non-domination*

In this section, I will look more closely at the role that freedom plays in modern republican thought. I argue that freedom as non-domination is not sufficient to serve as the *key* distinguishing feature between liberalism and republicanism. I contend that freedom as non-domination must be seen as the *result* of other interactive relationships in society; therefore, TR should be understood (first) as an elaboration of purposeful belonging and citizenship that (second) leads to freedom as non-domination.

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43 ‘[I]f understood correctly, the language of republican patriotism can function as a valid antidote to nationalism’ (my translation).
Throughout the revivalist literature, the question of how to reconcile the so–called ‘liberty of the ancients’ with that of the ‘moderns’ is confronted constantly. For liberals, freedom can only be understood as an absence of coercion so that the requirements of active republican citizenship are thus completely incompatible with modern societies. While there are several (and competing) notions of freedom, it was Isaiah Berlin who put forward the best–known analysis which, because of its perceived breadth and convincing nature, remained solidly within the popular ideological landscape. Put simply, Berlin (1969) stated that there are two types of liberty: positive and negative. The latter, known as freedom as non–interference, conveys the absence of obstacles, thus people are said to be free insofar as their choices are not interfered with; the former, universally known as freedom as self–mastery, stresses the possibility to act freely and realize one’s full potential.

Phillip Pettit (1999) persuasively disputed this observation and moved further by challenging the non–interference archetype, claiming it to be unsatisfactory. For him, Berlin’s division between positive and negative freedom is not sufficient. He conceived of a third type of freedom which is that of freedom as non–domination (51–79). For classical republicans, an individual can be free only to the extent to which s/he is secure from arbitrary interference (Pettit, 1999). They regard people as ‘un–free’ whenever there is the possibility of someone arbitrarily interfering with the range of choice options available; and whenever someone is subjected to the arbitrium of another, they are being dominated (ibid). Interference can be defined as the intentional or ‘quasi–

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44 For the philosophically–inclined, some important observations about the problems with freedom as non–domination can be found in Larmore (2003) and Markell (2008). Full citations are in the bibliography.

45 Latin for ‘will or ruling’.
intentional’ deterioration of one’s choices and it will occur only to the extent that one is under the *arbitrium* of someone else (Pettit, 1999). The *capacity* for interference here is more important than the act of interfering itself and this constitutes domination — interference that is not deemed arbitrary is not considered to be domination (ibid).

The oft–cited example elaborated by Pettit (1999) is that of the slave who, even when not necessarily facing interference from his/her master, remains a slave nonetheless and thus subjected to the arbitrary will of another. In other words, it matters not whether the master chooses to make use of this arbitrary power; the point in question is that s/he has this power in the first place. The non–interfering master may not interfere as such, but is still a source of domination. According to Pettit (1999) republican freedom is characterized by the absence of three particular elements: uncertainty, the need to defer to power, and the subordination to other citizens. Pettit insists that liberty can only be secure in a republic made up of free citizens ruled by the law which will clearly forbid anyone (or any institution) from infringing arbitrarily on another’s freedom; in other words, the law will prohibit domination by eradicating or removing dependency and the possibility of arbitrary interference (ibid). One can see the reverberation of Roman law here that was so dear to Machiavelli.

For some, an important question arises when reading the republican revivalists’ critique of the so–called ‘liberal’ non–interference and their alternative to it; specifically, what kind of liberal regime would accept the existence of a slave in the first place?

46 These thoughts are echoed by most republican theorists including Maynor (2003).
What makes a regime legitimate under liberalism is that it is grounded in the consent of its citizens or that it takes sufficient account of those who will be affected by its actions....So it is not only that the interference embodied in, for instance, police enforcement, juridical punishment and, more generally, the law, is legitimized by the consent of the individuals, but that persons are reasonably clear that legitimacy is understood in just this way. The concerns that liberals have is not simply in the area in which I am controlled…but also with the source of control itself (Rogers, 2008: 807).

It is difficult for Rogers (2008), therefore, to fathom a scenario where liberals would tolerate slavery whether the slave is being simply interfered with or dominated.47 This seems to suggest the assumption that if the revivalists continue to rely on this facet (i.e. non–domination) as the distinguishing feature of republicanism, and offer it as an alternative for immediate implementation, it may remain elusive and underdeveloped. Moreover, if non–domination means that citizens must participate directly in making the laws that govern society (otherwise they will always be under some form of domination), republicanism can only occur in very small states that operate under particular forms of government where sovereignty lies directly with the people and power ascends from them to the state. Instead, theoretical republicanism understood (first) as an elaboration of purposeful belonging and citizenship that (second) leads to freedom as non–domination, is viable under any regime and makes participation in political affairs much more vibrant and enlightened. Insisting on the non–domination paradigm would only continue to prove that both liberals and republicans seem to share an understanding of freedom as

independence from “dominio altrui” (Pinzani, 2004: 307); in fact, Pinzani (ibid) stated that,

nessun liberale…si sognerrebbe di identificare la libertà da lui [Pettit] propugnata come la semplice assenza di una interferenza…Al contrario, il liberalismo nasce dall’esigenza di garantire all’individuo il rispetto incondizionato di uno spazio di azione, e quindi di garantire il rispetto incondizionato delle sue libertà, variamente definite. Nessun liberale considererebbe accettabile la situazione prospettata da Pettit, ossia quella di un despota benevolo disposto a garantire tali libertà riservandosi però il diritto di violarle a suo piacimento (307).

Melvin L. Rogers (2008) questioned the assault on liberalism based on its supposed conception of freedom and asked if it made sense to differentiate between republican and liberal along the lines of freedom because the distinction does not describe accurately liberal theory (799). For one thing, he questioned the “link” to Hobbes and classical and contemporary liberals, but he also looked at “the normative framework in which liberal freedom takes root and is made politically defensible” because the framework itself encompasses a “constellation of other concepts like consent”, the importance of public life, and “the rule of law” which are now all part of liberal theory and freedom (ibid: 805–806). He concluded that once these two aspects are considered, liberalism “mean[s] something less than being free from any and all constraints”, but

48 “others’ dominance” (my translation).
49 “[N]o liberal would dream of identifying the liberty he [Pettit] is espousing as simply absence of interference…On the contrary, liberalism was borne from the need to provide the individual with the guarantee of unconditional respect for a space of action, and therefore the guarantee of unconditional respect of his freedoms, as variably defined. No liberal would consider Pettit’s proposed situation acceptable, which is that of a kind despot who is willing to guarantee freedoms, however, reserves the right to violate them according at his own whim” (my translation).
“also mean[s] something more than being free from actual interference” (ibid: 801, 807).

Rogers (2008), claimed that there is

the mistaken connection republicans draw between liberalism and Hobbes. Once this link is severed, the distinction between freedom as non-interference and as non-domination dissolves altogether, and with it the presumption that liberals are unable to address the specific worries that republicans advance (801)...[which is that] citizens under a liberal regime live without peace of mind. They are in a condition of perpetual uncertainty regarding the security of their freedom in the present, but more significantly, this insecurity figures in how they conceive of their future worlds (803).

In essence, Hobbes might be a precursor to liberalism but the tradition has evolved to the point of not resembling his model at all (ibid: 807). The same perhaps could be said about classical republicanism that has been able to shed some of the more restrictive and antiquated notions of the tradition to emerge as a theory that, according to its current supporters, is a contender for gradual, or sometimes immediate, implementation. For example, Pinzani (2004) talked about how the militaristic component of classical republicanism is also glossed over (309–310), but I would not begrudge that since the admiration for theories — their driving ideals — does not necessarily mean their wholesale adoption. Republicanism should be allowed to refashion itself to fit modern sensibilities; after all, modern liberals have done the same creating liberal multiculturalism, liberal nationalism, and so on. In the same way, republicans should be allowed to jettison what no longer makes sense in a modern society and take what is still valid particularly if this does not fundamentally alter the basics of the theory itself.
In terms of law and law-making, for Rogers (2008), liberals would only accept the principle in which proposed laws be put to public scrutiny; they would be subjected to analysis or “contestation”, and accepted according to “their ability to secure individuals’ freedom from coercive interference from others” (in other words, from arbitrary domination) (807).

[L]iberalism’s conceptual framework requires, as Jeremy Waldron observes, that ‘a social and political order is illegitimate unless it is rooted in the consent or agreement of these people is a condition of its being morally permissible to enforce the order against them’ (805)… [L]iberals are not simply concerned with liberty understood merely as a property of an isolated self, but rather as a fundamental feature of social and political life. In fact, liberalism’s conception of freedom is intrinsically linked to psychological security and personal independence for all, legal impartiality within a single system of laws applied equally to all and collective self-rule through elected governments (Rogers, 2008: 806).

For some then, the differentiation between liberalism and republicanism along the lines of freedom turns out to be more a matter of semantics than substance. Given the presumed weakness attributed to the divergent understanding of freedom, if one wishes to continue to endorse republicanism, perhaps its distinctiveness should be rooted in something else. While the discussion certainly makes for an interesting philosophical and theoretical debate, freedom as non-domination remains one of republicanism’s defining features and it does figure prominently in my understanding of the tradition. However, republicanism must be fed by something more important before it can grow and flourish.

If liberty by itself is an insufficient defining quality of republicanism, then it must be supplemented by considerations of purposeful belonging and citizenship. Purposeful
belonging, however, is not to be conflated with nationalism; rather it should make use of the characteristics that give republicanism life: civic virtue, the common good, and political participation, all geared toward achieving a purposeful and united citizenship.

In essence, republicanism’s goal is freedom as non–domination, and the creation of a type of society characterized by a certain type of citizen. I move now to describe the tools republicanism has chosen for the task of building a particular kind of society, so that when I engage in the explanation of purposeful belonging and citizenship, these will be clear.

**Virtue, the Common Good, and Public Participation**

Most liberals will argue that notions of virtue and the common good have, respectively, a whiff of elitism and a stench of totalitarianism. The potential dangers inherent with these notions, they argue, far outweigh any of their perceived benefits. Thus these sentiments, however evocative, are to be rejected as they are no longer reasonable or even realistic options for modern society. As far as public participation in political affairs goes, from the pantheon of liberals one could chose any one of its most famous proponents to find descriptions of individuals as bearers of private, disparate desires that can only be fulfilled adequately through market mechanisms because of the greater measure of choice that they afford; thus, public participation in public affairs is optional.

The concepts of virtue, political participation, and the common good, however, are crucial to the classical republican paradigm (and to republicanism in general), and it seems that possessing the first leads to the exercise of the second, and exercising the second leads to the realization of the third; thus, an attempt to rehabilitate the notion of virtue must be the starting point by stressing that it is not the aristocratic virtue or
noblesse oblige. The Oxford dictionary defines it as behaviour showing high moral standards, but republicanism strips the definition of its moral content: it is quite different, and far more complex.

During the Renaissance, Italian city–states began arguing for a revival of civic life in which public–spirited citizens could take an active part in the governance of their independent city or country:

Here Machiavelli’s wisdom offers us a valuable insight about the much-contested and unclear conception of the common good. For him the common good is neither the good (or interest) of all citizens nor a transcendent or higher good that all citizens are supposed to identify and then aspire to, detaching themselves from their special interests and parochial loyalties. For Machiavelli the common good is the good of citizens who do not want to be oppressed and have no ambition to dominate (Viroli, 1999: 4–5).

Since Machiavelli seems crucial, it is appropriate to summarize his thoughts on this subject more clearly. Machiavelli states that virtù is necessary if the republic is to survive in freedom; without it, the republic would fall prey to corruption and be destroyed. The greatest enemies of free governments, he continues, are complacent and self–interested citizens. The love of wealth, luxury and ease together with corresponding indifference to public affairs is what Machiavelli calls corruption. To keep corruption at bay, citizens must have virtù (Discorsi, ed.1984) — I understand this to mean an attentiveness and alertness to public affairs or, put differently, citizens must be vigilant and guard their liberty against anyone who would seek to diminish or destroy it; after all, for republicans,

\[50 \text{http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/virtue?q=virtue retrieved July 1, 2012}\]
liberty can only mean self-government and thus can only be realized if one is attentive to public life. The citizen must bear the onus of vigilance because if complacency is allowed to overtake a *civitas* and it becomes somewhat tired or disillusioned, there will always be a tyrant waiting in the wings to relieve it of the burdens of citizenship. From there, it would not be long before the *civitas* loses its freedom as well (Machiavelli, 1984).

When explaining Machiavelli’s thought, Viroli (1995) reminded us that when the Italian writer used the word ‘virtue’ he “intende patriottismo, ovvero l’amore della libertà comune che rende gli uomini generosi, e li aiuta a vedere il loro bene come parte del bene commune della repubblica” (34). The care for the common good and the ‘*amor della patria*’ that Machiavelli took pains to describe is, in fact, modeled on the Roman ideal which means that it is based on a respect for the laws that “protect common freedoms” (Viroli, 1995: 35). A government of laws is more consistent, more concerned with fairness and, most importantly, is impersonal (even dispassionate).

A mixed constitutional republic therefore was the best form of government: the rule of law promulgated by a mixed government monitored by an attentive and engaged citizenry form the ideals of Machiavelli’s republic as described in the *Discourses*. One detail that republicans often ignore is Machiavelli’s conviction that if the greatest danger for the republic is being destroyed from within by corruption, foreign enemies are also threats; thus, a genuinely free republic must also require all able-bodied males to create a citizen militia (ibid). Whether this has any relevance to modern republicanism is

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51 He “…means patriotism that is the love of a common freedom that makes men generous and it helps them see their own good as part of the common good of the republic” (my translation).

52 “Love of country” (my translation).
questionable when understood as an armed citizen militia, but it is pertinent if understood as standing (national) armed forces.

“Although republicans agree on the nature or content of civic virtue, they differ profoundly on the ways such virtue is to be cultivated, expressed, and psychologically grounded” (Burtt, 1990: 27). The concept of virtù is expressed differently according to any one author’s argument, but one usually finds it defined as the ability of an individual to rise above personal or class interest to place the good of the whole community above one’s own. In my mind, this is limited to the civic republican ideal. Virtù, in the modern republican sense, requires citizens to take their rights and responsibilities to heart and try to consider not only their narrow self-interest, but to understand that they should allow room for “self-interest as members of the political community” (Burtt, 1993: 365). According to Burtt (1990) some republicans believe the narrow “pursuit of self-interest, when properly structured by the norms and institutions of the commonwealth, can in itself produce politically virtuous behavior” (25).

Burtt (1990) says that James Harrington was the first to put forward this argument by saying that “a good constitution could successfully produce civic virtue by structuring the way in which such private interests found expression” (25). Constitutions and charters are able to instil political values that allow the full enjoyment of society. Not surprisingly, this was the stated goal behind the creation of the Canadian Charter of

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53 Numerous theorists have addressed this problem and accounts can be found in Machiavelli’s Discorsi (his treatment of factions), Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (his treatment of ‘self–interest properly understood’), and James Madison in the Federalist Papers (Federalist 10 and the discussion on the role of factions). Constitutions, again, appear to be tools of ‘reason before passion’.
*Rights and Freedoms* as will be shown in chapter five when I discuss Trudeau’s republican thought.

From this description, it is easy to discern why republicans place such great emphasis on political participation. Classical republicans believe that participation is necessary in order to protect freedom and it is the single most effective way to ensure that the country’s well-being is entrusted to the best possible leadership (Viroli, 1999: 11). Put simply, civic and “[p]olitical engagement educates citizens” and “tries to inspire a mentality that is hostile to both servility and arrogance” (Viroli, 1999: 11). Freedom thus can only endure if citizens practice their civic virtue which is not meant as a “martial, heroic, and austere virtue, but a civilized, ordinary, and tolerant one of citizens of commercial republics” (Viroli, 1999: 12–13). This needs to be clarified further.

When one speaks of virtue in the modern republican sense, it is opportune to add the word *political* and it is applicable to citizens who live in a particular bounded state who share a political reality and are united by the political relationship known as citizenship. The realization that private interests flourish best and are more easily pursued in a free society should make citizens want to be actively involved in the political process so as to ensure that laws and policies are such that they continue to ensure the freedom to pursue those interests, and that those laws apply equally and fairly. This attention to, and involvement in, the public sphere is what I consider to be *republican political virtue* because not only does it allow for the articulation and pursuit of private interests, but it creates an atmosphere of solidarity among citizens allowing for the realization of their social interdependence, and does not undermine their individualism. The individual here is not absorbed by the whole, but rather is aware that, in order to protect that
individualism and ensure that it is not jeopardized by tyrannical laws or by stringent notions of communitarianism, s/he must play an active role in the political process. It is an awareness that the individual, while maintaining the highest degree of independence, nonetheless lives in a *society* (not necessarily a community) with his fellow–citizens and must both protect his/her own sphere of privacy and action by monitoring the activities of government, and realize the interdependence that naturally arises from simply living in a society.

Virtue in this interpretation *is* synonymous with an active political participation but *not* with purposeful belonging which can exist independently since it is a sentiment that is not contingent on action for its existence, rather it drives virtue/political participation in the hopes of improving public life whether it is one’s society of birth or adoption. Virtue/political participation, therefore, is that characteristic that will save society from *corruzione*; it is the firm belief that a citizen’s well–being is intrinsically linked to society’s well–being. For if the society in which individuals live falls to corruption, it will be impossible for them to exercise those freedoms they hold so dear. Citizens have to cultivate particular political virtues in order for the society to be successful, wealthy, and prosperous.

One more detail is missing: the notion that *virtù* relies on reason, specifically political reason. Related to this is modern republicanism’s ability to recognize that without a large number of citizens participating in the political process, the ensuing apathy will result in a sclerosis of the political system, the institutions, and eventually society. Apathy, of course, benefits particular political parties and interest groups, so there is no substantive drive on their part to encourage participation. If only particular
segments of society participate in the process, those who live on the margins will never feel part of the system and a profound sense of alienation may set in causing an even deeper sense of disenfranchisement; in effect, one could argue that this is the very definition of alienation. In Maritain’s (2008) mind, alienation occurs when the opportunity to participate in society is hampered, impeded, or worse, is denied.

Strategies to combat apathy and promote virtù are essential, and the state can play a role in this through civic education\(^{54}\) in schools or other forums. Once a prominent part of the curricula, civic education has all but disappeared and the consequences are discernible. The ideal of civic virtue can be strengthened through education because it can impart specific knowledge regarding a state’s system of government, it makes clear a citizen’s role in it, and the impacts s/he can have as well as help to cultivate political habits. If these are not cultivated, citizens may understand poorly how governments work and their role in it. This may lead to the widespread notion that citizens have no real impact on the government or that they ‘do not matter’. A slip into apathy — ozio — is not far, and that which Machiavelli feared, that is the capitulation into the hands of authoritarians, may be the next step.

It is a fundamental issue for republicans to emphasize the importance of social institutions in moulding individuals into citizens.\(^{55}\) Most republican literature iterates in one way or another that it is a necessary condition of individuals becoming and remaining good citizens, that their social institutions imbue them with certain attitudes and

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\(^{54}\) Burtt (1993), Maynor (2003: 180–192), and Jennings (2000) and of course Trudeau are just a few examples of many in the literature where mention/discussion of civic education takes place.

\(^{55}\) More on this in the section dedicated to the elaboration on republican citizenship.
dispositions. They must be nourished and fostered by education. Trudeau believed that if a state can offer a variety and range of other services, it can surely offer education on how best to understand government, democracy, and fulfill citizenship. The state, after all, belongs to its citizens who have an important role in affecting or reforming its institutions. A well-functioning, democratic state depends on an active citizenry. Without this, Trudeau said, it has only an administrative body and a political process influenced by the wealthy and the well-connected, and led by those who incur their favour and are beholden to them (Powe in Southam, 2005: 347–349). This is the modern understanding of republican political virtue (attentiveness to public life), the common good (national interest), and political participation (active citizenship).

Republican Purposeful Belonging

I will attempt to define modern republican patriotism so as not to confine it to jingoistic, narrow-minded, or rhetorical banter. Viroli (1999) would likely agree that purposeful belonging is a politics of rationality while nationalism is a politics of emotion. In a familiar Trudeauism, it is ‘reason before passion’. In modern republicanism, belonging is not something that is limited to the function of nurturing citizens, but it also has to be nurtured by them in return. Viroli traced the language of patriotism back to its roots and claimed that there is a net distinction between natio and patria, and used Giuseppe Mazzini56 to defend the statement that one’s country (meant as territorial
boundaries) is merely a foundation for purposeful belonging. In my understanding, republican purposeful belonging is more than just discussions about ‘love’ for one’s country; modern republicanism should rather prefer to speak of allegiance or loyalty to one’s country. Both sentiments, of course, could be considered irrational and unquantifiable, but while ‘love’ gives the impression of an intimate response (a personal, passionate reaction), the second is slightly more detached and conveys a political response (a calculated, reasoned reaction).

La ragione prescrive di amare la repubblica perché solo in una repubblica possiamo vivere liberi, e la libertà è il bene più prezioso dell’uomo (Viroli, 1995: 120).57

That is not to say that both cannot be felt at the same time, but ‘love’ is perhaps the passionate side of the coin, while ‘loyalty’ is the more temperate and even more rational one.

A sense of allegiance or loyalty to one’s country, i.e. the bounded state, need not inspire terror in our hearts. One’s country, after all, is not necessarily where one is born; thus ‘patriotic’ loyalty need not be conflated with ‘blood and soil’ attachments. One’s

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56 Readers of Lord Acton will recognize Mazzini as the subject of a critique regarding nationalism. Viroli has a different reading of Mazzini in that regard, and it is somewhat more forgiving. In Italy, Mazzini is largely regarded as hero, patriot, and champion for the republican cause. He was staunchly opposed to the reigning Royal House of Savoy, and was a prominent figure of the 19th century Italian movement known as the Risorgimento (the word comes from the verb ‘risorgere’ — to rise again). Mazzini’s republican convictions led him to join a secret society (the Carboneria) which worked to overthrow the monarchy. When the Carboneria failed in all attempts to do so, Mazzini worked within a new clandestine organization known as the Giovine Italia (Young Italy) which had a strong stance in favour of the establishment of a republic, and was dedicated to the moral and political risorgimento of the Italian people and to educate them to their political role in society. Many of Mazzini’s works have been collected and published; in particular, I Doveri dell’Uomo (Duties of Man — 1860) is replete with early republican rhetoric. As with many intellectual, political, and artistic movements, no firm dates regarding the beginning or end of the Risorgimento are established, but the1800s saw fervent revolutionary activity with the culmination being the unification of Italy as a kingdom in 1861.

57 “Reason prescribes a love of the republic because it is only in a republic that we live freely, and freedom is the most precious good belonging to mankind” (my translation).
country is where one chooses to make one’s home and, through the political contract of citizenship, one underwrites the duties and rights associated with that contract; it is the place that aids in forming one’s understanding of the surrounding world. Loyalty to a particular bounded state becomes rational and justifiable because in a contractual exchange for it, the institutions provide services, rights, and protections which instil and strengthen the desire to continue to live within those boundaries. The mutual exchange is the grounds for active citizenship.

This attachment then is more than just the love of freedom and of the republic. The allegiance, in other words, is more than political, but less than nationalistic: it is more than political because if it were relegated to a political sentiment based in civil and political rights, it would not explain why people continue to live in states where these are difficult to come by. It might be that affection for that bounded state is what would spur citizens to political action in order to change a detrimental status quo.

There is something intangible, but very real about the affection toward the bounded state. But that loyalty is less than nationalistic since it can blossom in those who were not born in particular boundaries, but instead have chosen to call a particular state ‘home’. These individuals obviously see a particular parcel of land as theirs due to the mutual exchange known as citizenship. There is no space here for ethnicity. Home is not where an ethnic group lives, but where one chooses home to be. One need not be born in it, but may have developed affection for the place because of a political system that allows freedoms of various kinds, and allows prosperity and fulfillment. It is incumbent on the state to make efforts to nurture this feeling and, in fact, foster integration into the political society. The contract of citizenship and the active participation in society
cultivate that concern for fellow citizens and for the country itself. These individuals are an intrinsic part of the political functioning of the country and thus are full citizens of that state.

Viroli (1999) told us that

Theorists of the early Italian republics equated civic virtue with the love of country, and they described true love of the republic as the passion that translated into acts of service and acts of care. It is precisely this meaning of love of country that has been almost entirely lost in contemporary democratic theory…[R]epublican patriotism is first of all a political passion based on the experience of citizenship, not on shared pre–political elements derived from being born in the same territory, belonging to the same race, speaking the same language, worshipping the same gods, having the same customs…[these are]…hardy sufficient to generate patriotism…[true love of country is] a passion that needs to be stimulated through laws or…through good government and the participation of the citizens in public life (13–14).

The real language of republican patriotism began in the Italian republics as Viroli (1995) reminds us:

He made an important distinction when he said, “Patria…non significa luogo natio, come vuole la concezione convenzionale, ma l’organizzazione politica della società le cui leggi

58 “It was…in the context of the medieval Italian republics and the political thought of civic humanism that the language of republican patriotism became an essential feature of the political language of the time…” (my translation).
proteggono la libertà e la felicità dei cittadini" (Viroli, 1995: 103). 59 According to Viroli (1995), Machiavelli, and thus classical republicans, thought that “bisogna distinguere la patria dal paese: il paese è qualsiasi luogo in cui siamo nati o dove viviamo; la patria esiste solo nella libertà e nel buongoverno” (Viroli, 1995: 103); 60 it is rather “una passione per un bene comune o condiviso: si ama la repubblica che è tanto nostra quanto degli altri cittadini” (ibid: 107). 61 This statement leads me to think that there is reluctance — perhaps justifiably — to conflate the bounded state with purposeful belonging (or patriotism) in the fear that it, in return, will be associated with nationalism, or worse, with fascism.

The distinction between natio and patria was crucial for contextual proposes at one time, in fact, the Romans used two different terms: “patria meant the res publica or politic[al] constitution…; natio meant the place of birth and all that was linked to the place, such as ethnic identity and language” (Bobbio and Viroli 2003: 18). This differentiation is no longer necessary. The long history of pluralism, immigration, and globalization has accustomed us to the reality that the bounded state cannot, and surely should not, mean cultural, ethnic, or religious homogeneity — for what could be more stolid? One must not let the spectre of extreme nationalism prevent the association between purposeful belonging and the bounded state. What is truly valid in the republican analyses is the differentiation between nationalism and purposeful belonging, and here

59 “Homeland does not mean native place, as required by the conventional design, but the organization of political society whose laws protect the freedom and happiness of its citizens” (my translation).

60 “the patria and country must be distinguished: the country any place in which we were born or where we live; the ‘patria’ exists only in freedom and good government” (my translation).

61 “it is a passion for the common or shared good: we love the republic which belongs to us as much as it does to the other citizens” (my translation).
Viroli has again served us particularly well. The difference between nationalism and purposeful belonging must be underscored:

[I]l patriottismo deve cercare di rafforzare l’attaccamento dei cittadini alla repubblica per mezzo del buon governo e la partecipazione alla vita politica, senza mettere a repentaglio il pluralismo culturale, religioso e ideologico. C’è una importante differenza fra chi ama il bene comune perché ama l’unità e l’omogeneità culturale della comunità nazionale cui appartiene, e chi ama il bene comune perché ama la libertà comune; fra chi vuole prima di tutto conservare la purezza della cultura e chi vuole che nessuno sia oppresso o discriminato (Viroli, 1995: IX–X).

Moreover,

Il linguaggio del patriottismo è stato usato nei secoli per rafforzare o suscitare l’amore per le istituzioni politiche e il modo di vita che sostengono la libertà comune di un popolo, in una parola, la repubblica; il linguaggio del nazionalismo nato in Europa nel tardo Settecento fu elaborato per difendere e rafforzare l’unità e l’omogeneità etnica, linguistica e culturale di un popolo. Mentre i nemici del patriottismo sono stati, storicamente, la tirannide, il despotismo, l’oppressione e la corruzione, gli avversari del nazionalismo sono stati e sono la contaminazione, l’eterogeneità, l’unità etnica e culturale, e la disunione politica e sociale (5).

\[\text{62}\] “[P]atriotism must seek to strengthen the citizenry’s attachment to the republic by way of good government and participation in political life without jeopardizing cultural, religious, or ideological pluralism. There is an important difference between those who love the common good because they love cultural unity and homogeneity, and those who love the common good because they love common liberty; between those who wish, above all else, to preserve cultural purity and those who wish to prevent oppression and discrimination” (my translation).

\[\text{63}\]“The language of patriotism has been used throughout the centuries to reinforce or elicit the love for political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common freedom of a people, in a word, the republic; the language of nationalism born in the late 1700s in Europe was elaborated in order to defend and reinforce unity and ethnic, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity of a people. While the enemies of patriotism have historically been tyranny, despotism, oppression and corruption, the adversaries of nationalism have been and still are contamination, heterogeneity, ethnic and cultural unity, and political and social disunity (my translation).
The difference between the two concepts is easy enough to see:

Republican patriots considered love of country to be an artificial passion to be instilled and constantly reinforced by political means; nationalists thought of it as a natural feeling to be protected from cultural contamination and cultural assimilation. The patria of the republicans is a moral and political institution; the nation of the nationalists is a natural creation (Viroli, 1999:15).

Viroli (1999) explains that for republicans, republics are built by founders and citizens; for nationalists, nations are created by God — a familiar notion. This reflects Jacques Maritain’s distinction between society and community mentioned earlier.

Much has been written about the dangers of extreme nationalism as that intransigent passion that attaches so much importance to the idea of culture and ethnic identity, and its reactionary tendency to see the good of the community as a function of the group rather than the individual or society rendering nationalisms intolerant and totalitarian — for ethnic nations are not ineludibly political societies (Maritain, 1951: 4–9). A democratic, constitutional, political society can never be nationalistic since it exists for the benefit of all citizens without prejudice and is guided by laws that are fair and equal, and every citizen is at home his/her bounded state no matter where s/he resides or what ethnic heritage they may carry.\(^{64}\) One can almost hear Trudeau, speech in hand, elaborating on this very matter in much the same way.

Republican purposeful belonging, in sum, should not be viewed in the narrow sense of rhetorical patriotic banter. In modern republicanism, belonging is something that has to be nurtured by citizens and, through participation in political life, a sense of loyalty

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\(^{64}\) These reflections are constant in republican literature and, not surprisingly, in Trudeau’s own writings.
to a particular bounded state is produced and, in exchange for these attachments, the institutions provide services, rights, and protections which instil and strengthen the desire to continue to live within those boundaries. This mutual exchange is the grounds for active republican citizenship.

**Republican Citizenship**

The modern republican understanding of citizenship is founded in the notion of political membership. In a classic and oft–cited example, T.H. Marshall (1950) defined citizenship as follows:

Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed (28–29).

And citizenship demands

a [particular type of]…direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a Common law (40–41).

Jennings (2000) elaborated on the existence of three ways in which republicanism’s response to diversity is currently examined in France: 1. a “traditionalist view” which is, in my reading, classical republicanism (or NRR) and is therefore secular and suspicious about the accommodation of cultural particularisms; 2. a “modernizing view” which is open to some forms of cultural accommodation; and 3. a “multicultural view” that “calls for a pluralist conception of civic identity and a recognition of the
positive value of minority cultures” (575). It seems to me that the latter two variants are not really republicanism at all and are merely endorsing the same values that ‘multicultural liberalism’ has been trying to promote for the better part of the last twenty-five years.

Rather than referring to the first model as the traditionalist variant, it should be referred to as either authentic or modern republicanism since it is really the only model that retains republican values at all and it is this form that resembles most closely the theoretical republicanism elaborated by various scholars. As such, this authentic or modern (not “traditionalist”) form will be the basis for my explanation of republican citizenship.

With the advent of post–modernism, the meaning of citizenship has undergone constant revision perhaps burdening it with too many tasks for which it is not equipped. In short, citizenship is now a multifaceted and disputed notion, and for Honohan (2009) “[i]t has at least three principal dimensions — legal status, with its rights and obligations; activity; and membership” (1). Modern republicanism would seek to emphasize “the activity of the citizenship” (ibid). “Republican citizenship is…demanding”; it is a much more demanding model than the liberal one because it requires the individual to acquire a sense of political responsibility and realize the interdependence with others in society (Honohan, 2009: 1). It would also expect, but not order, citizens to participate actively in the political process so as to ensure the individual rights of each are never compromised (Honohan, 2009). I will not attempt to contrast liberal and republican citizenship in any great detail, but a brief nod is necessary.
According to the liberal view, citizenship is a legal status (Honohan, 2009:1) that allows individuals to pursue their interests without interference as long as those pursuits to do impede others in society from doing the same. For civic republicans, this version of citizenship leaves too little room for the development of a civic or relational ethos. As stated in a previous section, the civic humanist model is too close to the Greek polis to be feasible, so I will address the model modern republicanism would endorse.

To explain republicanism in general terms, Jennings (2000) stated that it is a theory which “stresses the virtues of civil equality and with that produces a distinctive conception of what it means to be a member of the political community and the nation” (577) and, referencing Louis Dumont65, he relayed that, in this paradigm, “belonging is political, but it also contains a vocation towards universalism” (577). Analyzing Ernest Renan’s famous lecture in which he defined a nation as a ‘daily plebiscite’ to citizenship, Jennings (2000) continued by suggesting that Renan’s conception of citizenship, “has no place for either race or ethnicity as defining characteristics for membership of the political community”; in essence, this view sees the “individual citizen divested of all particularistic affiliations” (577). In summarizing Jennings’ findings then, it could be said that classical European republicanism sees state affiliations (in other words, citizenship) as a political reality fostered through civic education not as reactionary group association (ibid) steeped in romantic elevations of the ‘nation’. Citizenship is political, not normative; it can only be realized through political institutions because it is nothing more

65 The author is referring to Louis Dumont, German Ideology: from France to Germany and Back (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994). I have not read this particular book.
than a political contract between a citizen and the state. To attribute any ulterior meaning to citizenship is to strip it of the purpose for which it was created in the first place.

Similar to Jennings’ (2000) explanations of this form of citizenship, in the modern sense for republicans it means belonging to a political community and participating in a political project where membership is not dictated by ancestry, but by willingness to be part of a community that attaches particular value to patriotism, freedom, the rule of law, and equality. Citizenship is the mechanism through which a state rises above cultural and ethnic particularisms; anyone can join this political project provided they subscribe to the central ideas around which their political values gather. These ideas are not stridently exclusionist and they can coexist with many other cultures and beliefs (although, admittedly and perhaps justifiably, not all of them) and serve to integrate residents in the society to which they belong. In other words, they create a national political identity.

Modern republican literature would suggest that citizenship refers to political relationships which are only possible within the institutions of the state; in other words, a proposed liberal cosmopolitan citizenship is untenable, if not impossible, since there is no corresponding international body able to grant rights and protections to the extent that a national state does. Calls for global citizenship may be appealing to some, but they empty citizenship of its meaning.

[T]here are good normative arguments for the persistence of bounded polities. Apart from a principled fear of the potential tyranny of a single world government…Citizenship is bounded because this is the only way in which politically guaranteed freedom can be constructed….Even if many rights arguably can and should be guaranteed without reference to a specific population, that of collective self–government cannot, and world
citizenship in this sense is not yet available to us (Honohan, 2009: 2).

In essence then, the nation state provides a framework for important functions such as health care (Honohan, 2009: 2) and civil and political rights that cannot, and perhaps should not, be entrusted to transnational organizations or institutions.

As previously stated, citizenship in a state should be used as a powerful integrating tool. What drives integration is not the sense that one is now part of a culture, or worse, an ethnicity, but that politically s/he is equal, entitled to the same rights, has equal access to the state, performs the same duties, and adheres to the laws promulgated by the state providing a political identity where citizens no longer are just the possessors of rights and some minor obligations as well as being protected by laws; rather, they also become citizens who, while having different conceptions of the good, agree to participate in a political project that binds them with their fellow citizens in recognition of *political* values. This explanation of republican citizenship is recurrent in the literature.

The republican account of citizenship favours relatively generous conditions of naturalization. Long-term residents become citizens on a virtually automatic basis, just as natives do – taking residence in the state as shorthand for interdependence and the sharing of a common future (Honohan, 2009: 10).

Since republican citizenship is a political identity, ethnic identities would become of negligible import to the state. Political nationality is a choice, ethnic provenance is not. The latter is completely irrelevant to citizenship because it is a political contract between a person and the state which cannot differentiate its citizenship rules according to one’s ethnic heritage as that would lead to unequal membership and would eventually erode the
bonds of ‘society’ that are necessary for a republican citizenship to flourish. Also, political nationality is linked to the bonds of allegiance that citizenship is meant to foster.

Some terms are so laden with meaning, memory, and emotion that it becomes difficult to use them without ruffling a few feathers. Patriotism is certainly one of them, but I would also suggest that when one broaches the subject of a state attempting to ‘educate’ its citizenry and intervening in the attempt to create a particular type of society also leads some to believe that disreputable, totalitarian plots are afoot. This, of course, places little faith in the citizenry’s capacity for reasoning; critical education serves precisely to prevent any of these nefarious plots and it is essential for the citizenry to be educated to democracy, to be active in the political life of their country, their province, their city and their communities. This call to action requires an animating force; it is that force that republicans have called patriotism and I prefer to call purposeful belonging.

Loyalty to one’s country and to one’s fellow citizens is the driver behind any republican aspiration. This is loyalty to one’s country of choice, where one has chosen to reside and call home, not necessarily loyalty to one’s country of birth, although the two may of course coincide and they often do; this is loyalty to the political community which one has contributed to building. Birth is coincidental and random, citizenship is a choice.

If education is of primary importance to republicans as it is the fulcrum of “individual emancipation” (Jennings, 2000) then republicans see the school system as a place where individuals are freed from “dogmas” and traditional familial or religious
customs (Jennings, 2000: 579, emphasis mine), and they are free to exchange ideas with the intent of challenging preconceived notions and beliefs — not necessarily change or replace them, but at least bring them into question and under scrutiny. Schools are where convictions should be challenged freely and these will either be strengthened by such scrutiny, or will be legitimately contested; regardless, education’s task is to question beliefs particularly if they are built on the prohibition to do so. If beliefs persist, it may be evidence of sound epistemology; if they cannot withstand scrutiny or forbid it altogether, the task of education is, in either case, to find out why.

Citizens are not born, but made. This is the basis for the republican emphasis on education for citizenship in the broadest sense — in knowledge, skills, and dispositions. But though these can be promoted, they cannot be required of citizens, and we must expect that different kinds and levels of civic virtue will be forthcoming (Honohan, 2009: 4).

The state has the duty to educate its citizens to this particular kind of citizenship. This is an education towards effective citizenship, not indoctrination to a specific ideology; more exactly, it is imparting knowledge of how our system works, our place as citizens, and the meaning of political citizenship and how we, in final tally, are the state.

If we really wish to preserve our own freedom, that of our fellow citizens, and the values of our country, we must endeavour to educate ourselves about government and as citizens understand that its most important (although not exclusive) purpose is to preserve our freedoms and protect our rights. This can only occur when citizens know how the system works, what it is doing, and how it will affect them. As Trudeau (1998) said “People can be made fit to participate directly or indirectly in the guidance of the society

66 Here he references Yves Deloye, École et Citoyenneté (Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1995). I’ve not read this work.
of which they are members” (59) and he quoted Pascal’s admonition that the price to be paid for lack of political participation is being ruled by mad men (2010: 26) and that if people are not willing to devote some time to public life, it is possible that power will be an instrument in the hands of the few endangering the survival of democracy itself. Republicans of every era shared this concern.

The Eclipse of Republicanism

Why, if the idea of republicanism is so evocative, has it played such a limited role in the modern era? In Federalist 10 (1982), Madison’s arguments are no longer about the “rightful place of the active citizen” (Held 1992: 15); rather, his preoccupations turn to the “legitimate pursuit by individuals of their interests, and government as a means for the enhancement of these interests” (Held, 1992: 15; Federalist 10, 1982). While Madison conceded that the issue of private property might elicit the creation of factions, rather than suggest redistributive measures, he thought that introducing checks and balances as well as a strong separation of powers were the antidote needed to quell any anxieties (Federalist 10, 51: 1982). The Americans saw the British government in an almost Montesquieuian light; that is, they believed that despite the presence of a monarch, it functioned as a de–facto republic, but they still clung to worries about corruption, tyranny, and inequality. According to Held (1992) American theorists began to enact “a clear shift from classical ideals of civic virtue …to liberal preoccupations” (15). Alexis de Tocqueville (1968) warned that democracy with its overbearing emphasis on equality, threatened to produce mediocrity precisely because it celebrated equality. When everyone is supposed to be equal, there might be tremendous pressure to conform and therefore act and think like everyone else. The result will be society in which those
who have something original or outstanding to contribute will remain silent because of the social pressure toward equality; he called this pressure to conform ‘tyranny of the majority’ (ibid).

Tocqueville (1968) did see something positive in democracy in that it could be joined to the republican ideal; he believed that civic virtue could be promoted through participation in public affairs and people who come together to discuss common issues develop ‘habits of the heart’ that lead them to identify their own welfare with that of the community. Through participation, he thought, democracy promises to cultivate a widespread and deeply–rooted devotion to the common good, so he was particularly impressed by institutions like New England town hall meetings and the notion of jury duty.

Eventually, “the theory and practice of popular government shook off its traditional association with small states and cities, opening itself to become the legitimating creed of the emerging world of nation–states” (Held, 1992: 16). Held (ibid) continues to explain that democracy in the 1700s was not the notion centered on citizen self–rule as it was in ancient Athens because the problem of scale became apparent and the question of institutional sustainability arose contributing to the diffidence exhibited toward direct democracy. The love affair with democracy solidified exponentially with the growth of cities and civil society (ibid: 15–17). Its gradual acceptance led to democracy’s establishment as the best possible form of government and the extension of the franchise soon followed (Held, 1992: 16–17).

This extension soon caused the impossibility for citizens to govern themselves directly and therefore required representative mechanisms (ibid). Representative
democracy would, of course, contravene the civic republican spirit according to which freedom can only be achieved through self-government and the direct involvement of the community in law-making procedures. The civic republican paradigm and its language could not survive the increasing popularity of democracy because it could not provide an adequate institutional arrangement to accommodate the size of an increasingly diverse population that would be obligated to participate directly in government; in short, the popularity of civic republicanism waned as democracy gained acceptance and eventually gave life to liberal democracy (Held, 1992); where republicanism survived, it was primarily in an institutional form, and in its theoretical form which, however, was in the eve of its own demise.

According to Maurizio Viroli (1995), from the 1500s onward, the language of republican patriotism begins its pattern of intermittent appeal (43); the language was subjected to various “metamorfosi” (45) and eventually the birth of nationalistic terminology will bring with it a change in the meaning of patriotism which will no longer be a “political concept founded on principles of liberty”, but will become “based on the values of the spiritual unity of the people” (Viroli, 1995: 91–92); in other words, ethnic nationalisms. It will be, in essence, the “nationalization of patriotism” (Viroli, 1995).69

67 “A partire dalla metà del Cinquecento, il linguaggio del patriotismo repubblicano entra in una storia di eclissi e di ritorni” (Viroli, 1995: 43). “Beginning from the mid–1500s, the language of republican patriotism enters a history of eclipses and returns” (My translation).
68 Metamorphoses (my translation).
69 “…un concetto politico fondato sui principi della libertà” [but will become] fondato sui valori dell’unita spirituale del popolo” (Viroli, 1995: 91–92). This is the title of chapter five (La Nazionalizzazione del Patriotismo, pg. 137) in Maurizio Viroli’s book “Per Amore della Patria” (1995).
Some scholars have suggested that the French Revolution, Italian Fascism, and its German cousin under the name of National Socialism, were all inspired by Machiavelli’s political thought which seems to “resist[e] imperterrito all’usura del tempo” (Fulci, 2005: 37). This is an important connection that should not be discounted given that Machiavelli is often upheld as the main inspiration for the classical republican revival. That being said, it is well–known that the ideas of one theorist can be interpreted in one way by a scholar and a completely different way by another — such is the case with Machiavelli.

According to some, during the French Revolution Machiavelli was “rivitalizz[ato] …creando l’immagine di un Machiavelli amico del popolo che si sofferma a illustrare le nefandezze dei principi” (Fulci, 2005: 37). Viroli (1999) confirmed that the French Revolution did much to pollute and adulterate the republican discourse allowing it to be reduced to a dogma that “was critical of commercial society”, and based on an unrelenting “primacy of political will” (33). He states that a theory that stresses the dominance of “political will, social and political cohesion, and terror has strayed” too far from its republican “roots” to even be considered such anymore (Viroli, 1999: 33).

For Baker (2001) the “nature and power” of classical republicanism will take an unsuspected turn in France where it will “mutate into the call for Terror” (42) and “[w]ith the fall of the Bastille” it will meet with the principles of the Enlightenment to form “an explosive combination” and the “classical–republican script” was embellished with

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70 “undauntedly resists the wear of time…” (my translation). Fulci’s (2005) work investigates Machiavelli asking whether there are traces of postmodernism in his thought (51).

71 “revitaliz[ed]…creating an image of a Machiavelli as a friend of the people who takes time to illustrate the wrongdoings of princes” (my translation).
Enlightenment rhetoric seeing in the Revolution the chance at perfecting humanity — the French saw themselves charged with a kind of historical mission (45–46) as most ‘nations’ do. Baker (2001) explained it thusly:

How could the French Revolution be brought to a close until humanity itself had been transformed? How could it be assured of the outcome promised by philosophy until all its enemies — ultimately, all those not yet transformed — had been destroyed? In effect, the sudden combination of the Enlightenment conception of indefinite progress and the classical–republican notion of (now extended) crises produced an explosive escalation, a kind of sustained political chain reaction (46).

To put it succinctly “power was destabilized during the French Revolution…in a way that particularly fostered the radicalization of classical–republican language” (Baker, 2001: 46) and eventually, “[c]lassical republicanism…metastasized into a discourse of terror [and] [a]s it metastasized, so also was it moralized…by…Robespierre…in the speeches he gave at the Jacobin Club” (Baker, 2001: 47) as he used the language of republicanism “as a means to create patriotic fervour that would secure the Revolution” (Baker, 2001: 47). It is not therefore surprising to see the tools of republicanism evoked; the notion of virtue, in particular is often used by Robespierre because “it is virtue…which produced” the glories of Rome and those virtues for him were “nothing more than love of the patrie and its laws” (Baker, 2001: 49, quoting Robespierre); for Robespierre, “la vertu est l’essence de la République” (Cobban, 1948: 31 quoting Robespierre).72 The language he used throughout his public career is very similar, if not identical to the Renaissance republicans of old and echoes of Machiavelli are audible almost everywhere: “C’est dans

72 “Virtue is the essence of the Republic” (my translation).
la vertu et dans la souveraineté du peuple qu’il faut chercher un préservatif contre les vices et le despotisme du gouvernement” (Cobban, 1948: 31 quoting Robespierre).73

The ardent sense of purposeful belonging expressed here is quintessentially republican, but Cobban (1948) noticed a shift that I believe caused the reticence to discuss republicanism even today. He noticed that, as expressed in the previous section, the patria – in this case, la patrie – was a concept of common usage, and he noted that “[o]nce the…territorial conception of the community had declined…the patrie…came to mean…the inhabitants, that is, the people” (33). Some historians have referred to this period as ‘pre–romantic’, and for many the patriotism expressed was not just “abstract”, but had an intensely passionate quality (ibid: 34). Cobban (ibid) continued to say about Robespierre:

For the people he most often substituted the term ‘nation’; and without suggesting that by nation he understood what the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have understood by the word, it is legitimate to argue that when, as he usually did, he talked of the sovereignty of the nation rather than of the people, he foreshadowed the later development from democracy to nationalism (34).

I would suggest he did more than just ‘foreshadow’ nationalism. In effect, the French Revolution and German Romanticism with all the rhetoric that accompanied them were really the originators of the ethnic nationalism that we still see today. Fascist propaganda further confused republican concepts (Viroli, 1995: 166–167).

It is not a new thing to see political (or religious) theories being distorted, taken out of context, and used for nefarious purposes, but whether the theorists themselves are

73 “The safeguard against the vices and despotism of the government must be sought in the virtue and in the sovereignty of the people” (my translation).
to blame remains debatable. Conversely, those who might be somewhat overzealous in their attempt to rehabilitate a theorist by omitting the most worrisome elements of his/her political thought as if they never existed at all should fall under scrutiny as well. For some, in the case of Machiavelli “[t]he totalitarian doctrinaires are alone directly responsible for the use they have made of these notions” (Germino, 1964: 126); for others, “the ideology of Italian fascism is permeated by Machiavellian themes and principles [which] can be seen as the precursor[s]” to it (Femia, 2004: 1). The article states: “One might expect Machiavelli to enjoy a prominent place in the pantheon of Italian fascism. Here is a man who once famously claimed to value his patria more than his own soul” (ibid). Machiavelli, however, is mentioned rarely in Mussolini’s own writings and in those of Gentile (another important figure in Italian fascist history), and neither of them acknowledged Machiavelli as a mentor or inspiration; probably because neither of them wanted to confer credit to any “intellectual source” or to “prophets” (ibid: 2).

The irony of Machiavelli as an icon in, or even a precursor to, fascism does not escape Femia (2004) who stated that “[t]he fascist ‘style’, heavily influenced by the romantic notion that reality, in all its dark complexity, could only be grasped intuitively, was impatient with rational debate and systematic argument” (2) is in stark contrast to “Machiavelli’s love of rationality [and] his insistence of judging everything logically” (ibid). But there may be an even more important “reason why fascist writers did not choose to appropriate Machiavelli. Curious though it may seem, their liberal and democratic enemies had already laid claim to his legacy” (ibid: 3) because, already by the 1600s, the redemption of Machiavelli began as he slowly was disassociated with the
notions of deceit and immorality that had come to characterize his portrait and was reified by English republicans who quoted extensively from the *Discorsi* (Pocock, 1975; Femia, 2004: 3). It was not long before Italian patriots too saw in Machiavelli an idealism that was easily transferrable to the principles of the *Risorgimento* (Femia, 2004: 3).

Machiavelli’s rehabilitation is mystifying for some scholars who believe that “[t]he fashionable maxim that Machiavelli understood politics in terms of Aristotelian teleology is distinctly odd, as he barely mentioned Aristotle and never defined politics as a transformative or ‘expressive’ activity” (Femia, 2004: 5) cautioning the practice of some theorists who seem to be remodelling Machiavelli’s thought to fit a particular political agenda: “Commentators such as Pocock are so anxious to fit Machiavelli into a tradition of Aristotelian republicanism that they give priority to what they think he meant over what he actually said” (ibid: 5, italics in original). Femia is dubious about Machiavelli’s rehabilitation because he believes that “[t]he Machiavellian hostility to abstract universals underpins the fascist idea of an all–powerful state” (ibid: 7) and that “Viroli’s case for a kinder, gentler Machiavelli is often more baffling than convincing” (ibid: 11) because, according to Femia (2004) it must be remembered that “[o]f all the Renaissance thinkers, he was the one who provided the paradigm for the fascist image of ‘rebirth’” (14); however, he acknowledged that there is no “perfect congruence between Machiavelli’s thought and that of the Italian fascists” (ibid: 15). But, “[t]he dark, authoritarian and militaristic element in Machiavelli’s writings is too often submerged by commentators with a political agenda. While the temptation to interpret past thinkers in our own image is understandable, it should be resisted” (ibid: 15).
The indictment of Machiavelli is not unanimous. Germino (1964) stated correctly that many political thinkers have been imputed with being the “precursors of Fascism” and “Machiavelli…Hobbes and Hegel” are just some of them (110) and resisted placing blame on any one theorist stating that a thorough study of the intellectual roots of fascism “absolves any of the major theorists mentioned in the literature of any direct responsibility for the emergence of the movement; indeed, in many cases it will be argued that not even a remote connection exists” since an attentive reading often reveals positions that are inherently unsympathetic to the ideological tenets of fascism (ibid: 111). Mussolini may have mentioned Machiavelli and Nietzsche, but his “intellectual ancestry” lies more aptly with “anarchist[s], Marxist[s], and utopian socialist[s]” (ibid: 111) and “[n]o single thinker seems to have influenced him decisively” (ibid: 112). In particular, “[o]ne would be hard put to discover any traces of Machiavellian sobriety in either the thought or the practice of Benito Mussolini” (Germino, 1964: 113). In one of the principal tenets of fascism, we hear that “salvation for the individual lies in the collectivity; in submitting his own will to that of the One whom destiny calls to lead and represent the collectivity, the individual achieves fulfillment” (ibid: 123–124) — hardly a Machiavellian echo. Germino suggests it is more likely that “[n]ationalism and [s]yndicalism” were the wellsprings from which Mussolini drew inspiration for the development of his “distinctive doctrinal position” (ibid: 113).
Whichever side one falls on this debate regarding Machiavelli, the conflation between nationalism and purposeful belonging was a fait accompli by the end of the Nazi/fascist era, and remains real and frustrating. As Viroli (1995) points out,

Benché sia teoricamente difendibile, il patriottismo repubblicano non possiede oggi un proprio linguaggio che lo distingua nettamente dal nazionalismo. Sembra quasi impossibile dire in modo convincente che patria vuol dire in primo luogo repubblica e libertà commune, che amore della patria non è né infatuazione per la grandezza della nazione, né desiderio esclusivo di possesso, ma un amore compassionevole e generoso che dà forza e si traduce in solidarietà con chi soffre l’ingiustizia e l’oppressione...l’unico patriottismo che vale la pena recuperare dal passato deve essere un patriottismo che parla di repubblica… deve essere un patriottismo della libertà (21).

Notions of ‘nation’ and ‘fatherland’ would be wed to fascism causing the decline of classical republicanism and its notions of patriotism; in fact, a widespread anxiety over talking about patriotism at all would overtake the discourse to the point where it is hardly

74 It is interesting to note that references to Machiavelli in various contexts appear often in writings about Trudeau. In Trudeau’s Shadow (1998) Machiavelli is mentioned several times (again in varying contexts): in Zolf’s essay in relation to the War Measures Act: “The Platonic gowns had been put in mothballs, and the humble, arrogant mask of Machiavelli now separated Trudeau from the smug, haughty faces in the Trudeau lyceum. A wonderful opportunity soon presented itself to Trudeau as Machiavelli” (58); in Mulhallen’s essay in relation to people’s perception and treatment of Trudeau in the media, she states, “By mid–career, there were complaints about his lack of decorum, his autocratic behavior, the way he made people edgy...He was no longer the ‘philosopher king’, just the ‘king’...He was a boxer, and the press had a ringside seat at his matches. He was Machiavelli, a Napoleon IV in the making...” (104); in Robert Mason Lee’s essay we find the following: “Trudeau’s forcefulness made the difference: He was still hated, but he had earned deference. As Machiavelli taught, it is better to be feared than loved, since men can withdraw their love, but not their fear” (119); also “They were loyal to Trudeau because they shared his anxiety over the eclipse of love and the waning of the Just Society. But they had not read Machiavelli on love. Trudeau had” (123). And of course, most interestingly, Southam’s book of course recalls the incident in which Trudeau named Machiavelli as his favourite author (2005).

75 “Although it may be theoretically defensible, republican patriotism does not currently possess its own language that separates it sharply from nationalism. It seems almost impossible to say convincingly that ‘patria’ means first and foremost a republic and common freedom, that love of country is not an infatuation with national grandeur, nor is it the exclusive desire of possession, but it is a compassionate and generous love that gives strength and translates into solidarity with those who suffer from injustice and oppression...the only patriotism that is worth recovering from the past is a form of patriotism that speaks of the republic...it must be a patriotism of freedom” (my translation).
ever addressed if not in hushed tones. To reiterate, most classical republicans of the
ever addressed if not in hushed tones. To reiterate, most classical republicans of the
revival are still remiss in omitting discussions of it in their elaborations of the tradition.
However, patriotism of the republican type — i.e., as purposeful belonging — is not to be
feared; rather, as I hope to have elaborated in sufficient detail,

Inteso come amore della libertà comune, il patriotismo non
è una virtù pericolosa che produce inevitabilmente
bigottismo, intolleranza e militarismo. Un amore
caritatevole della libertà produce solo libertà (Viroli, 1995:
183). 76

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have endeavoured to make clear that modern republicanism is
not a political theory entirely dependent on a particular type of liberty; rather it is, above
all, a strategy for building a particular type of society and citizen. In other words, modern
republicanism is a discussion about purposeful belonging and citizenship that is required
by an account of freedom as non–domination. At its core, republicanism is an
understanding of, and elaboration on, the creation of a particular type of politically
rational society that gives life to political citizenship — an active, patriotic citizenry that
understands its government and thus can actively participate in, and monitor, it. Without
a strong sense of purposeful belonging as the foundation of the theory, it is difficult to see
how any of those instruments could inspire a citizenry to action.

Republican belonging, however, is not to be conflated with nationalism; rather it
should make use of the characteristics that give republicanism life: civic virtue, the

76 “Understood as a love for common liberty, patriotism is not a dangerous virtue that inevitably produces
bigotry, intolerance, and militarism. A charitable love of freedom only produces freedom” (my translation).
common good, and political participation, which are all geared toward achieving a unified citizenship. When I speak of virtue in the modern republican sense, I am referring to political virtue which is stripped of any elitist or emotive undercurrents, and is applicable to citizens who live in a particular bounded state who share a political reality and are united by the political relationship known as citizenship. The realization that private interests flourish best and are more easily pursued in a free society should make citizens want to be actively involved in the political process so as to ensure that laws and policies are such that they continue to ensure the freedom to pursue those interests and that those laws apply equally and fairly. This attention to, and involvement in, the public sphere is a republican political virtue not only because it allows for the articulation and pursuit of private interests, but because it creates an atmosphere of solidarity among citizens allowing for the realization of their social interdependence, without jeopardizing their individualism.

Virtue in this interpretation is synonymous with an active political participation, but not to purposeful belonging because the latter can exist independently since it is a sentiment that is not contingent on any particular action for its existence; rather, virtue is simply a political attentiveness and alertness to the political process to safeguard the good of the political society. Modern republicanism recognizes that without a large number of citizens engaged in the political process, the resulting apathy will cause a sclerosis of the political system, the institutions of the state, and eventually a society’s loss of freedom. In my understanding, virtù is nothing more than the habit of being politically engaged.

As for the definition of purposeful belonging, rather than speak of ‘love’ for one’s country, modern republicanism should rather prefer to speak of loyalty to one’s country:
the first gives the sense of an *intimate response*; the second conveys a *political response*. One’s country is where one chooses to make his/her home and through the political contract of citizenship, underwrites the duties and rights associated with that contract. Loyalty to a particular bounded state becomes rational and justifiable because in exchange for it, the institutions provide services, rights, and protections and instil the desire to continue to live within its boundaries. This mutual exchange is the grounds for active citizenship. This attachment then is more than just the love of freedom and of the republic. That love, in other words, is more than political, but less than nationalistic: it is more than political because if it were relegated to a political sentiment based in civil and political rights, it would not explain why people continue to live in states where these are difficult to come by despite a desire to change that reality, and it is less than nationalistic since it can blossom in those who were not born in those boundaries, but instead have chosen to call a particular state ‘home’.

It is incumbent on the state to make efforts to nurture this feeling and, in fact, foster integration into the political society. The contract of citizenship and the active participation in society cultivate that concern for fellow citizens and for the country itself. Scholars of republicanism all tend towards conceiving citizenship as a *political identity* — and it is *political*, not normative; it can only be realized through *political institutions* because it is nothing more than a political contract between a citizen and the state. It is the basis for a political community and participating in a political project where membership is not dictated by ancestry, but by willingness to be part of a community that attaches particular value to purposeful belonging, freedom, the rule of law, and equality.
Citizenship is the state’s way of transcending particularistic adherences and everyone can join provided they subscribe to the central ideas.

Citizenship is a powerful integrating factor. What drives integration is not the sense that one is now part of a culture, but that politically s/he is equal, entitled to the same rights, and has equal access to the state. This implies a political, not cultural, empowerment through participation. Citizenship attributes a political identity, and citizens no longer are just the possessors of rights and some minor obligations as well as being protected by laws; rather, they become persons who, while having different conception of the good, agree to participate in a political project that bind them to their fellow citizen in recognition of political values. Ultimately, a republican state must govern for the good of all citizens within its borders regardless of ethnic origin or religion or any other distinguishing feature. In the same way, we can see how the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is an attempt at constructing a value system; in essence, there is an attempt here to create and define the content of Canadian identity and the political values upon which it is founded. This is the essence of the contract of citizenship. I also tried to explain the reasons why republican language is used and remains popular, but there is resistance to calling it, or labelling it as ‘republican’. The reason is clear: the conflation between nationalism and purposeful belonging was a fait accompli by the end of the Nazi/fascist era; I have explained why this association is rather simplistic, but this association remains real and quite frustrating.

In chapter five, I will move to identify tenets of republican theory in Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s own writings and seek to prove that he is indeed more at home within the paradigm of neo–Roman republicanism than in liberalism. First, however, it is necessary
to delve into what has been said about Trudeau. The next chapter focuses on the literature produced about Trudeau the scope of which will act as a testament to his widespread influence, impact, and continued significance. This will show just how entrenched the mythologies about him actually are.
Chapter Four: Building Myths

“By slipping into our unconsciousness [myths] can come to deeply influence our more basic perceptions of the world that will be thereafter hard to dismantle”. Bottici and Challand

Introduction

There are two primary myths regarding Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The first myth is that he is a very straightforward liberal thinker. This misreading produces what appear to be irresolvable contradictions in behaviour, policy, and thought. The second myth — which stands out as remarkably curious particularly since he was a Québécois — is that he misunderstood Québec nationalism and the nature of Canadian Confederation. This misreading produces the notion that his supposed intellectual stringency divided the country even more than it was before he began his public odyssey to ‘put Québec in its place’. Examining Trudeau’s own writings and actions will allow me to challenge these myths created by, and entrenched in, much of the narrative. However, before probing his own work, it is essential to examine the literature regarding Trudeau to see where the myths originated. Some publications on the former Prime Minister are somewhat dated and most of the preoccupations expressed therein have been resolved (or never materialized). Despite their age, however, for our purposes they still carry some interest with regards to their elaborations on the nature of Trudeau’s liberalism.

77 In Rethinking Political Myth (2006: 325).
In this chapter, I will first define myth and ascertain its primary functions. Once these are established, I will consider the *creation/consolidation* paradigm of political myths, and then move to a discussion concentrating on those who have contributed to the formation and establishment of the two primary myths surrounding Pierre Trudeau. This will set the stage for chapter seven in which I examine what functions these Trudeauvian myths might serve.

**Mythology: Definition and functions**

The literature on mythology is vast, but for my purposes, it is not necessary to elaborate in great detail. I will limit my treatment to giving a satisfactory explanation of the concept and establishing mythology’s primary functions. In my examination of the literature, it became apparent that myths are often perceived in two ways: in relation to *truth*, and in relation to their *purpose* in societies. In the first instance, myths are regarded as fictitious stories and are often populated by a colourful array of supernatural characters who accomplish superhuman feats:

[L]e mythe raconte une histoire sacrée; il relate un événement qui a eu lieu dans le temps primordial, le temps fabuleux des ‘commencement’. Autrement dit, le mythe raconte comment, grâce aux exploits des Êtres Surnaturels, une réalité est venue à l’existence, que ce soit la réalité totale, le Cosmos, ou seulement un fragment…C’est donc toujours le récit d’une ‘création’: on rapporte comment quelque chose a été produit, a commencé a être. Le mythe ne parle que de ce qui est arrivé réellement, de ce qui s’est pleinement manifesté. Les personages des myths sont des Êtres Surnaturels (Eliade, 1963: 15).\(^7^8\)
A terse consideration of the literature on this first aspect of mythology leads one to conclude that myths are literary (or oral) devices through which values are communicated in a rather dramatic fashion; in other words, it is not ‘fact’ that is being conveyed, rather it is a message of some kind expressed imaginatively. Referencing George Schöpflin, Della Sala (2010) relays that “myths provide collective groups with a story about where they have come from and the values that set them apart from others. They are beliefs that are not necessarily rooted in refutable facts” (5). Della Sala (ibid) continues on to explain that myths, especially if considered politically, “have very specific functions” (5).

Myths should not be placed in competition with facts, nor should they be held to that standard since they are not inviting their audiences to reject or accept one scientific theory or another (Bottici and Challand, 2006: 316, 321; Della Sala, 2010: 7; Eliade, 1963; Felkins and Goldman, 1993: 451). They simply encourage listeners to analyze the meaning of the human experience. In a way, myths convey a truth, but it is different from the (scientific) truth: “the so–called objective sciences challenge myth as lacking in validity and truth, while humanistic studies celebrate myth as central to culture and self…[M]ythic narrative within culture can be best understood by its multiplicity of meaning, creativity, diversity of language…” (Felkins and Goldman, 1993: 448). In sum, it is fair to say that while the details of the story may be mythological, what resonates is not whether the content is truthful, but rather its message; in fact, it can be said that many

78 “…a myth tells a sacred story, it relates an event that took place in primordial times, the fabled ‘beginnings’ of time. Said in another way, (the) myth, thanks to the exploits of Supernatural Beings, tells how a reality came into existence, either the totality of reality, the Cosmos, or a mere fragment [of it]…Therefore, it is always the reciting of a ‘creation’ story: it reports on how something was produced, began to be. The myth only speaks of what actually occurred, of what is fully revealed [or manifested, expressed]. The characters of [in] myths are Supernatural Beings.” (Eliade, 1963: 15, my translation).
myths narrate events that are quite similar cross–culturally. Once one accounts for the appropriate adjustments made for the audience they address, it becomes evident that myths contain creation stories, admonitory tales, and moral teachings that are, to a degree, curiously universal. This could lead one to deduce guardedly that there is a fundamental commonality to humankind’s traits and that, therefore, it must be admonished collectively against acting in ways peculiar to human nature. An examination of this, however, lies far beyond the scope or concern of my main goal and purposes.

Myth in this sense is marginal, but not insignificant in relation to Trudeau since, in a way, the Trudeau saga does tell a tale of ‘creation’ and ‘how things came into being’ and at the same time, the interpretations of his ‘feats’ serve a particular audience; however, as remarkable as his personal and professional accomplishments were, Pierre Trudeau was neither superhuman nor supernatural, so analyzing how the uses and interpretations of his ideas became myth from the viewpoint of ‘sacredness’ would not be appropriate or particularly helpful. It is thus important to consider that: “[m]yths…are born in facts but then take on a life of their own in the hands of storytellers and listeners” (Della Sala, 2010: 4); in other words, the purpose of ‘myth’ becomes crucial, making Trudeau the subject of political mythology. I move now to the examination of myth in the second sense, that is, in relation to its purpose in society; specifically, I refer to political myths.

79 The creation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the beginnings of a new conception of Canada could be an example of this.

80 Not to mention one 1980 biography is entitled The Northern Magus by Richard Gwyn which, besides the title itself, uses words associated with mythology when describing a “mythic bond” between Trudeau and Canadians; or the curious Christmas day birth of two of his three sons.

81 This term is used in Della Sala, 2010.
Myth, in relation to its purpose, is a story that seeks to steer or guide its audience toward something — a behaviour, a belief or maybe a custom; typically, it may tell a people who they are, explain why they engage in the activities they prefer, and what their place is in the world (Felkins and Goldman, 1993: 451). To use Eliade’s (1963) words: a myth “fournit des modèles pour la conduite humaine et confère par là même signification et valeur à l’existence” (10). Bottici and Challand (2006) have stated that political mythology is a relatively modern phenomenon due mainly to the separation of church and state (317); however, one could argue that it was due precisely to the fusion of religion and politics that, in the hands of powerful legacy–holders, particularly those charged by some divine power to interpret ‘stories’, that myths could be used to tyrannize, oppress, or otherwise dominate the weak. From here, the leap to using mythology as a means to secure and maintain power is a fairly short one, and thus one could argue that, for however crudely, myth has always been used ‘politically’.

In any event, Della Sala (2010), referring to Henry Tudor, tells us that “[m]yths are stories that have very specific functions, especially in the political realm. A myth, as Henry Tudor says, is a story, but a story told for a purpose, and not simply to amuse” (5). The questions then become: what exactly is meant by the term political myth, and what makes a myth, in generalized terms, political? Bottici and Challand (2006) state that the reception of the myth is just as important as its production because it is often “the way in which a narrative is received that makes a political myth out of it” (320), and that

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82 “…provides models for human conduct [or behaviour] and, because of this, bestows meaning and value to life” (Eliade, 1963: 10, my translation).

A political myth can be defined as the work on a common narrative, which provides significance to the political conditions and experiences of a social group. Therefore, what makes a political myth out of a simple narrative is not its content or its claim to truth, but (1) the fact that it coagulates and reproduces significance; (2) that it is shared by a given group; and (3) that it is capable of addressing the specifically political conditions in which a given group lives.

I interpret the three factors enumerated in the quotation above as being essential for the creation of a political myth. To these constitutive elements of myth, I will add what I interpret to be the essential aspects for the consolidation of political myth which appears to have three stages that become particularly important with regards to legacy-holders:

[D]iffusion, ritual and sacredness. In the first, a range of actors seek some gain through the diffusion of a particular narrative [i.e.] nationalist movements… In the second stage, the myth becomes a ritual, entering into political discourse and practice…. In the third stage, a myth becomes sacred so that to question the myth is to raise doubts about the polity and the very basis of the political community (Della Sala, 2010: 8–9, [with references to Bell, 2003], emphasis mine).

This is similar to what Christopher Flood (1996, as referenced by Bottici and Challand, 2006) called the primacy effect: that is “by slipping into our unconsciousness, political

84 Bottici and Challand (2006) provide a definition of ‘significance’ borrowing from Blumenberg (1985) and it is as follows: “Blumenberg (1985: I, 3) understood Bedeutsamkeit [significance] as a defence against the indifference of the world. The need for Bedeutsamkeit is therefore the need to live in a world that is not indifferent to us. In this sense, it is not simply the need to live in a world which has a meaning, because something can have a meaning and remain nevertheless indifferent to us. On the other hand, the need for Bedeutsamkeit, as defined here, is not the need for ultimate meanings either, in the sense that something that is significant to a given group is not necessarily what answers their ultimate questions on the meaning of life. To sum up, the concept of significance helps point out that between a simple meaning, such as that which can be provided by a scientific theory, and the question of the ultimate meaning of life and death, which is answered by religion, there is a space – it is in this space that the work on myth operates” (318).

myths can come to deeply influence our basic and most fundamental perceptions of the world and thus escape the possibility of critical scrutiny” (Bottici and Challand: 320–21).

When taken together, the ‘significance–coagulation/sharing/addressing of conditions’ in the creation paradigm, and the ‘diffusion/ritual/sacredness’ in the consolidation paradigm systematically produce a comprehensive framework which I will use to evaluate and verify if particular ideas are being used to create political mythologies. Henceforth, I will call it the creation/consolidation paradigm.

Figure 3: Creation/Consolidation Paradigm

Following the literature, I suggest that myths can be created for political purposes and that once an interpretation has consolidated it becomes difficult to argue against the orthodoxy. This is often because the interpretation becomes the accepted, prevailing view
which is then “transmitted both formally, through instruments such as education and history textbooks, as well as informally” (Della Sala, 2010: 9, my emphasis). For myths to attain consolidation, then, it must be well–accepted both on a societal level (informally) as well as in more academic (formal) realms thus it must be broadly diffused. In order to establish if Trudeau is subject of mythology, then, it is necessary to assess both formal and informal literature.

Della Sala (2010) suggests that myths can be used deliberately and “serve to perpetuate particular political objectives” (9). The same might be said about ideas and their fate. It is reasonable to argue that ideas are sometimes accidentally misinterpreted; for example, it may be easier to describe Trudeau as a liberal because, until recently, a modern understanding of republicanism was undeveloped and liberalism provided a more convenient language with which to express similar ideas. But when meant to serve an ideological or political purpose, the misreading of ideas could be voluntary and aimed at forwarding a particular agenda. Some notorious examples exist which we can summarily test to see if they meet the criteria of political myth. In chapter six, I will return to analyze these writings in depth to show how ideas are sometimes used for specific purposes.

It is against the pernicious nature of ethnic nationalisms that Pierre Trudeau fought for most of his adult life, and his understanding of the phenomenon would lead to the creation and consolidation of mythology surrounding his own person. I move now to explore whence the origins of the liberal ‘myth’.
Pierre Trudeau: the Man and the Myth — the Contradictory Liberal Individualist

The curious thing about myths in general is that, quite often, what others believe amounts to myth while what we ourselves believe almost never does; this includes the myth that our brand of nationalism is different, and somehow more benevolent, than that of others.\textsuperscript{86} Researchers seem to have accepted ubiquitously the prevailing consensus, and somewhat unquestioned assumption, that Trudeau was a liberal thinker. The classics of republicanism would seem a crucial component of a Jesuit education (besides exposing him to personalism, which I believe has republican undercurrents),\textsuperscript{87} yet the most obvious leap to republicanism is almost never mentioned even by Trudeau himself. If it is referenced in association with Trudeau, it is more in terms of a supposed (though unlikely) desire to inject into Canadian society some sort of American–style liberal–republicanism;\textsuperscript{88} however, Trudeau’s formative (Catholic) years at the Jesuit Brébeuf College and resultant political theory of Counterweights, as well as the aspirational program known as the Just Society would suggest, at the very least, a hybrid thinker and, at the very most, an excursion into classical republicanism rather than an overtly liberal trajectory.

Oddly, suspicions about the authenticity and purity of his liberalism have in fact been alluded to. Nevertheless, instead of exploring the true nature of his political thought, writers have preferred to tinker with the definitions of liberalism in order to justify presumed contradictory positions. Published in 1977, the reflections of James and Robert

\textsuperscript{86} Cook (2006) tells us that Trudeau thought this of nationalisms as well.

\textsuperscript{87} This notion will return in the next chapter with an examination of primary sources.

\textsuperscript{88} By which most intend a Jacksonian liberalism.
Laxer came at a time when Trudeau faced the country’s economic challenges and made it clear that individuals would have to expect less from government. Referring to Trudeau, the Laxers (1977) ask outwardly: “is he a liberal at all?” (94). This question is spurred by their analysis of the economic and political realities of the late 1970s. Most of the issues and fears they raise have been dealt with elsewhere, so I will only refer to their treatment of the supposed characteristics of Trudeau’s imputed brand of liberalism.

The Laxers (1977) begin answering their question about whether Trudeau is in fact a liberal by saying that a “new liberalism” was en vogue in Canada and that it was at odds “with the North American–style populism which had been the traditionally dominant ideology in Canada” (78). A full quote is appropriate to allow the Laxers (ibid) to elaborate on their characterization of liberalism:

There is a tension at the heart of liberalism, a fundamental ambivalence about the nature of man and society, that allows liberal thinkers to shift the emphasis of their doctrine depending on social circumstance. At its centre, liberalism is a union of two warring ideas, both present at all times, with first one and then the other in the ascendancy. The two tendencies can be characterized as realism and utopianism. The first emphasizes the need for men to face up to the necessities imposed by existing limitations. It defends the status quo with its inequality between the economically powerful and the great majority of the population. The second emphasizes that by nature men are basically equal, and that all men should have the chance to strive for whatever achievements are within the range of their potential. The realist tendency provides a rationale for the existing order to things; the utopian tendency gives hope for the future (italics in original, 80).

Thus, they claim that liberalism has a ‘dichotic’ nature “can be traced” back to its origins, namely to Thomas Hobbes (the realist) and John Locke (the utopian) (ibid: 80–81); and it is this constant tension inherent within the philosophy itself that made the development of
capitalism possible (81). As time went on, the French and Industrial Revolutions contributed to the development of liberalism with intermittent emphases on the realist strain and then on the utopian strain (82). They go on to explain:

In our own time, the growing fear concerning social stability has led to a change in intellectual liberalism that has brought its realist face so much to the fore that utopian optimism and belief in the inevitability of progress have been completely overshadowed...[L]iberal thinkers have directly attacked the appetites of the individual citizen, branding them dangerous in terms of man’s relationship to his physical environment. Such an attack pushes the notion of equality, the other face of liberalism into the background...‘Killing expectations’ becomes the goal of a liberalism in which individual ambition threatens social stability. This new corporate liberalism is a philosophy of individualism that has lost faith in the individual (82–83).

The Laxers (ibid) go on to state that the dominant ideology in the United States is also liberalism and that its populism has resolved the tension between the utopian and realist aspects “through that harmonious projection of the future that has been called the American Dream” (84). I will leave this part of their analysis up for discussion since there is much debate about whether liberalism or republicanism is, in fact, the dominant ideology in the United States, and whether the so–called American Dream, provided we agree such a thing even exists, resolves anything at all. What is interesting is how their analysis proceeds to tell us that Canada is the “battleground between the two liberalisms”

89 “American populism, with is faith in the little man who works hard, captured the optimistic mood of mid–nineteenth–century America so completely that its characteristic posture has remained the basis of popular American politics ever since. However, populist faith that the little man is the true source of social wisdom retained its power not because American society continued to be made up of small competitive businesses, but because of the rise of the U.S. to world dominance in the twentieth century”. (Laxers 1977: 84).

90 “According to this philosophy, present inequalities and limitations are no more than bracing challenges to the individual who is prepared to work to overcome them. With this optimistic outlook the tension between private enterprise and equality of opportunity is overcome. In such a society, event the little man can agree that ‘business is the business of America’” (Laxers 1977: 84)
which had become the “one characterized by the utopian stance of American populism” (coloured, no doubt, by this much–touted American Dream) and “the realist posture of modern intellectual liberalism” (86).

Enter Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The Laxers (ibid) claim that “[i]ntellectual liberalism with its realist flavour rather than American populism with its utopianism has been his natural” philosophy (88).

Trudeau sees political leadership as an exercise in social engineering. Very much in the mould of intellectual liberalism with its realist posture, he regards the passions and desires of people as a highly dangerous force that must be contained and directed to keep the ship of state on its proper course (91).91

Two important claims are being made in the above quotation: the first is that Trudeau believed the role of a statesman is to guide and educate the citizenry — to ‘socially engineer’ society. I do not dispute this claim; in fact, Trudeau’s own writings reveal this tendency rather strongly. The second claim is that Trudeau fears the citizenry’s “passions”. Are the Laxers correct in stating that Trudeau believes people’s passions are “highly dangerous”? (91) Could it perhaps be that Trudeau is merely stating that particular kinds of passions are retrograde and dangerous therefore reason should prevail over passion? I believe this to be a more accurate characterization.

The Laxers go on to claim that intellectual liberalism — and thus Trudeau — does not allow for the belief that “people possess the ultimate political wisdom and their aspirations ought to guide the behaviour of governments” (91–2). I dispute this claim

91 This preoccupation is addressed in similar ways by Machiavelli in The Prince.
strongly as Trudeau’s faith in the Canadian people’s judgment was expressed clearly in his writings. Jim Coutts (1999) can offer us this insight to substantiate my claim:

> Trudeau thought that every citizen should have his own stake in the country’s politics and play a role in his own right, not through an agent. While previous prime ministers had to master the art of negotiating with regional ministers and provincial premiers, Trudeau said the regional baron system diminished the rights of the citizen. He believed that the central power must remain strong and that citizens’ access to that power should be direct. He was not saying, ‘Follow me and I will protect your rights’. Rather, he was advocating, ‘Demand your own rights’ (152).

These beliefs could not be sustained by someone who thought the people were ‘dangerous’. In fact,

> My faith in Canada is, indeed, based on my faith in the people. Throughout my years in office, that faith proved justified over and over again, whenever the going was tough and the reforms we were trying to introduce were being opposed by the multinational corporations, by the provincial premiers, or by a superpower. I invariably found that if our cause was right, all we had to do to win was talk over the heads of our adversaries directly to the people of this land (Trudeau, 1993: 365).

Coutts and many other writers who address Trudeau’s program of participatory democracy concur that this goal was never achieved (Coutts 1999: 145, 152–153) due mainly to the inherent difficulties of such a task in a Westminster (federal) parliamentary democracy (not to mention Canadians’ overall lackadaisical response to it), but the encouragement to be active in public life never diminished throughout his lifetime.

In the end, the Laxers seem satisfied that Trudeau does indeed support “popular sovereignty” and that he favours “popular reason…as the basis for government”, but they do this by delivering him to the altar of “modern intellectual liberalism” and telling us that Trudeau eschews the “emotional masses of the people as they are and have always
been” and that he would rather exercise “social engineering by which a highly prepared elite can guide mankind to a society in which popular reason can serve as the basis of government” (95). Could this mean he favours a state that educates its citizenry to democracy? In other words, is Trudeau advocating for a strong civic education as do most republicans? I think he is.

The Laxers (1977) conclude “Trudeau is a liberal, but not at all in the North American sense” (95) with the following consequence:

As an advocate of the new liberalism, [he] has contributed two important ideas to contemporary Canada: the idea that individual expectations for greater material well-being can no longer be regarded as an engine of social progress; and the idea that nationalism, in both its Quebec and Canadian forms, is an outmoded emotionalism that can only damage a modern society. Both the ideas have their origin in the tradition of intellectual liberalism with its pessimism about the rationality of people (98).

Again, while these conclusions are debatable, what is of interest here is whether these ‘ideas’ are, in fact, liberal at all or whether the exclusive focus on material well-being at the expense of political, equal citizenship and the aversion towards ethnic nationalisms have their origins in classical republican ideology. My answer is, unequivocally, yes.

In his biography, Radwanski (1978) states something that Trudeau himself would later confirm: “[Trudeau] abhors ideologies, considering them irrational in that they dictate approaches without reference to the particular facts of each situation” (121).

Radwanski (ibid) also follows his predecessors and provides material for his successors when he states that

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92 Provided again that we agree with the Laxers on this — which is up for debate — this attitude they impute to Trudeau seems consonant with Plato’s philosopher kings. The Nemnis talk about Trudeau’s comments on Plato in his personal papers that are in the archives to which they had access.
here is little that is original in his philosophy; stripped to its essentials, it consists primarily of an overlay of Acton, de Tocqueville, Montesquieu and a host of other thinkers on a foundation of the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill and John Locke (119).

He goes on to say that Trudeau essentially took “parts that appeal[ed] to him most in various philosophies and construct[ed] them into a structured, closely reasoned system of his own” (120). This is arguable since there is a great deal of originality in Trudeau’s thought, in particular in the aspirational program known as the *Just Society*, but perhaps the most astonishing omission is the clear republicanism discernable in some of Radwanski’s own assessments of Trudeau’s thought. He states correctly that, according to Trudeau,

> The state is a tool for the direction of a society by that society, and its role is to perform society’s mission of liberating the individual. Since it is a collectively owned and operated tool, every member of the society must share responsibility for its actions and omissions…Participation by everyone in the control and guidance of the state is therefore a moral imperative as well as a practical necessity; politics, as the act of preserving and expanding freedom, becomes the most important of human activities (123).

In the above, it is clear that, for Trudeau, public participation is an instrumental good.

Radwanski claims that this is conventional liberal thought. However, sidestepping whether this is an accurate assessment of ‘liberal thought’, consider the following passage where Radwanski states that despite these ‘conventional liberal thoughts’, Trudeau veers off in a direction rather more his own in the overwhelming emphasis he puts on the individual’s political responsibility within society. He approaches political participation not as a right, like the liberal
philosophers, but with the more Platonic view that it is an inescapable and fundamental human duty (123). 93

If Radwanski is correct in evaluating Trudeau’s understanding of political participation (and I believe he is) this is not an example of Trudeau developing his ‘own direction’; this assessment of his belief in the importance of public participation in politics is classical republicanism.

Marsden (1990) states that Trudeau made several changes to the “working conditions of parliamentarians” with the “purpose of…create[ing] ‘participatory democracy’ a mandatory feature of any ‘just society’” (262). Ricci (2009) observes:

Trudeau required that all substantial issues come before the entire Cabinet for discussion rather than being simply presented as a fact accompli by the responsible ministry…Trudeau’s system not only held true to his promise to make government more democratic but made a great deal of sense, allowing the accumulated experience and expertise of the government’s senior members to be brought to bear on major questions. Since Trudeau’s time most prime ministers have reverted to the close-fisted style of old, keeping a much tighter rein on decision making (113–4).

‘The just society’ is of course a broad concept, but it was a prominent feature of the Trudeau era; in particular, his belief that “[t]he more Canadians…participated in politics, the more complete democracy would be” (Marsden, 1996: 268).

Trudeau’s (2010) view was that “[t]he real purpose of laws, then, is to educate the citizen in the common good, and persuade him to behave in the public interest…” (50)

93 This duty extended to involvement and participation in international affairs as well: “…nobody gave the superpowers the right to decide the future, the survival of humanity. In reality, if they don’t make progress, if crisis becomes the current state of affairs, then the future of humanity is very much at stake and therefore we all have a right and a duty to be involved in that” (Trudeau, January 28, 1984 in McIlroy, 1984: 122).
and “…by invoking some sort of popular participation…assure[s] the full development of the individual” (62). He goes on to say that “[i]n such a state the liberty of citizens is an end in itself. The authorities….encourage it as the surest guide to the common good” (78). And perhaps most decidedly: “…the truly democratic state is bound to encourage the exercise of freedom among its citizens so that, by listening to them, it may learn better what paths to follow to attain the common good” (Trudeau, 2010: 80); after all “[u]n état où les citoyens se désentéressent de la chose politique est vouée à l’esclavage”94 (Trudeau, 1951: 28). How delightfully republican!95

That Trudeau is repeatedly cast as an apologist for individualism is hardly surprising given the frequent associations researchers make between him and the liberal ideas of Lord Acton and John Stuart Mill. Laden and Owen (2007) state that those who support theorists such as John Stuart Mill and T. H. Green advocate that “political stability requires…‘common sympathies’96 brought about by a shared language, culture, and history; in other words ‘cultural homogeneity’ (3). Equality is thus a matter of equal treatment in matters of culture and religion which can only be obtained by the creation of a neutral state that protects individual liberties (ibid: 9); this leads to a form of individualism where “the individual is morally prior to the community” (Kymlicka 2007: 27) for which Trudeau is deemed the champion.

94 (My translation): “A state whose citizens do not take an interest in politics is doomed to slavery”. Jean–Jacques Rousseau is a clear influence here.

95These statements seem to mirror those of the modern republicans who believe that without a strong sense of civic virtue, liberty is imperilled. By promoting civic virtue and access to a common language of citizenship, the state’s essential function is to prepare citizens to play the necessary active role (Pettit, 1997; Maynor, 2003).

96 The authors state that the term ‘common sympathies’ is from John Stuart Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government (chapter 16).
Yet, Trudeau never openly advocates for cultural homogeneity; in fact, he believes this to be not only impossible, but highly undesirable. Rather, he advocates for the creation of a political society where the only ‘common sympathy’ (Mill, 1861) is the creation of a politically active citizen who holds his/her government to account. Trudeau holds citizens prior to governments, but not ‘individuals prior to the community’; individual freedom is the foundation upon which political systems rest, but he would be suspicious about one individual dominating the other, or a community dominating the individual. Kymlicka is correct in saying that liberal individualists see the “individual [as]…prior to the community” (2007: 27) and therefore, Trudeau cannot find a home in the school of this particular strain of liberalism. Rather than seeing the ‘individual as prior to the community’, I argue that Trudeau does precisely the opposite: given his adherence to personalism (which has strong classical republican foundations) Trudeau holds that the individual is not prior or after, but part of the political community. As Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib (1999) says:

Trudeau’s championing of individual liberty, however, did not lead him to the position that political theorists would later denigrate as ‘atomism’, where the individual is considered independent of society and culture. Although he opposed state–engendered nationalism, he valued cultural identity, and he regarded the protection of language as a means of assuring its continuity. He thought that the state should protect cultural values, so long as it did so ‘as a natural consequence of the equality of citizens, not as a special privilege of the largest group’ (261–262).

In other words, this a classical republican stance on the matter, even though she later describes the institutional impact of Trudeau’s actions as the epitome of his dedication to “liberal democracy, postwar constitutionalism and the pluralist and multicultural society bound together by rights–based constitutionalism” (ibid: 277) which, if one substitutes
‘republican’ for ‘liberal’ democracy, we could all agree that these values have their origin in classical republicanism. In fact, Eisenstat Weinrib’s (1999) chapter concludes by offering the following:

> Trudeau has said that the politician is a teacher. His political career provided a twenty–year national seminar on the nature of citizenship in the modern, liberal, multicultural state….In this vision, the common bond of equal rights binds together a pluralistic and far–flung, even a divided, population. Whether one agrees with Trudeau or not, one cannot deny the clarity, consistency, and logic of his united Canada (282).

Trudeau was nothing if not consistent but, as I will show, many have indeed denied Trudeau the traits the author above lists. Leaving that aside for a moment, what is being described here is not a ‘liberal’ understanding of citizenship, which is notoriously weak. What Eisenstat Weinrib is describing is the republican concern for both civic education and the understanding of political citizenship that are the stuff of classical republicanism.

A stunning association occurs in the work of the historian Ramsay Cook (2006) where he comes close to identifying the true nature of Trudeau’s political thought, but then reverts back to accepting the prevailing consensus. He states the following: “In a remarkable essay on patriotism and nationalism, entitled *For Love of Country*, Maurizio Viroli drew exactly the same distinction that Trudeau made when he discreetly changed ‘nationalist’ to ‘patriot’ in 1969” (92). The passage reads as follows:

> I know a man whose school could never teach him patriotism, but who acquired that virtue when he felt in his bones the vastness of this land, and the greatness of those who founded it (Trudeau, 1996: 12).

Cook (2006) quotes Viroli’s position on patriotism and nationalism (92–93),
The language of patriotism...has been used over the centuries to strengthen or invoke love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common liberty of the people, that is love of the republic; the language of nationalism was forged in the late eighteenth–century Europe to defend or reinforce the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic oneness and homogeneity of a people” (Cook, 2006: 92–93, quoting Viroli, 1995, For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism. Oxford).

And Cook is wise to note that

[t]hese lines describe almost perfectly the difference between Trudeau’s mature vision of Canada and that of nationalists inside and outside Quebec. Those who later claimed that Trudeau’s insistence on a charter of rights and his rejection of every effort to identify the Province of Quebec with the francophone nation made him a Canadian nationalist, failed to understand this subtle but fundamental distinction (2006: 93).

A ‘subtle distinction’ indeed; but what is missing is a comment about the underlying republicanism of the distinction. With the exception of classical republicans, many still today ignore it; just as many failed to see the important distinction between branding Trudeau’s thoughts as a form of liberalism rather than as classically republican. Take, for example, Cook’s (2006) other association: “He [Trudeau] had not ‘made us a nation over again’, but he had lastingly remoulded the pattern by which a civic nation could flourish, a nation for patriots if not for nationalists” (151). In other words, Trudeau evoked a classical republican citizenry founded on purposeful belonging.

Cook (2006) claims confidently that “[a]lthough [Trudeau] had always been a reformist and a supporter” of social activism of various kinds, “his philosophy was liberal, left liberal” (97); and it would seem that, having said this, the book should be closed since the distinguished professor knew Trudeau personally for many years. But, as
previously said, republicanism has only recently returned to prominence and it could be that Cook was unfamiliar with its tenets. Another possibility is that because modern republicanism remains somewhat underdeveloped, there may be a certain discomfort in attributing its adherence to someone with such a remarkable intellect and as important as a former Prime Minister, or it could be the absence of a Pocockian Machiavellian Moment. In any event, Cook did not make the connection between these typical Trudeau positions and classical republicanism. Arguably, this might, in fact, further substantiate the power of political mythology and its pervasive (and persuasive) resilience.

In the chapter addressing republicanism, I noted that, when represented as a Venn diagram, several principles of classical republicanism and liberalism coincide. The reason for this is obvious: liberalism is the direct, and most successful, descendent of republicanism. But, where the two theories differ, they do so significantly and, curiously, it is here where most of the confusion regarding Trudeau originates. Legacy–holders claim that he makes ‘deviations’ from liberalism when in reality, he is simply adhering to the republican principles that distinguish it from liberalism. What some legacy–holders considered to be at best innocent digressions from liberal theory and practice and, at worst, mystifying self–contradictions, is, as the Venn diagram showed, simply classical republicanism. If they were to consider the totality of Trudeau’s writings, actions, speeches, and policies rather than compartmentalize them, his classical republicanism is apparent and there are no longer seemingly confused contradictions.

Forcing Trudeau to wear a liberal hat has produced the notion that he was nothing if not a thoroughgoing contradiction. Even in Trudeau’s time, his positions were misunderstood. He was alternately accused of harbouring socialist and communist
sympathies (Zink, 1977)—an idea that cannot withstand serious scrutiny and that Trudeau ridiculed openly anyway (1993: 197–198)—as well as contradicting himself and his own theories (Clarkson, 2000) exemplified by the implementation of the War Measures Act during the crisis caused by the Front de la Libération du Québec (FLQ) and his expressed desire to limit people’s expectations of government (Trudeau, 1993) as well as his own resistance to declaring adherence to any particular ideology (Radwanski, 1978; Trudeau, 1993) other than to the doctrine of personalism (Trudeau, 1993).

Today, the widely-accepted consensus, articulated by the legacy-holders through thoughtful biographies, popular literature, and academic works, places Trudeau within a firm procedural (or atomistic) liberal framework (McRoberts, 1997; Burelle, 2005) and portrays him as the defender of an unapologetic form of individualism which, in terms of policy implications, may have resulted in the creation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The misinterpretation of Trudeau creates a picture that is confusing and inconsistent: he becomes a conservative here (an assessment attributed to Ed Broadbent in Westell, 1972) and a hyper-individualist liberal there (Burelle, 2005; Dufour, 2003); a

97 Ramsay Cook (2006) suggests: “That he was sometimes accused of being a communist or a communist sympathizer resulted mainly from his travels in the Soviet Union with identifiable leftists such as Madeleine Parent, or in Red China with that other innocent, Jacques Hébert” (97). Zink (1977), however, does offer comments that go beyond this justification.

98 I reference here only Clarkson since he wrote an essay entitled Charisma and Contradiction the content of which both mirrored what had been said numerous times, and echoes what has been said several times since.

99 Canadian separatist group formed in the 1960s to bring about the independence of Quebec, which has a French heritage, from the rest of Canada, which has a primarily British tradition. Using public demonstrations and terrorist activities, the FLQ attracted considerable attention. In 1970 members of the organization, demanding release of separatist prisoners, kidnapped a British official and the Canadian minister of labor; the latter was murdered. Their action persuaded Prime Minister Trudeau to institute martial law for six months”. Retrieved June 22, 2014 at http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Front+de+Liberation+du+Quebec

100 A broad look at this Catholic philosophy will be given in the chapter on the primary sources.
Marxist communist here (Zink, 1977); and finally as a confusing, contradictory albeit benevolent mix of ideologies there (Ricci, 2009). This conventional representation has prevented an accurate assessment of Trudeau’s legacy and political thought. If one ventures outside the conventional consensus and places Trudeau in a republican paradigm, these ideas no longer present themselves as contradictory.

It was apparent early in his public life that his political positions were confusing to those who were unfamiliar or did not consider classical republicanism as a possible candidate for Trudeau. One of the earliest examples is Anthony Westell’s 1972 publication called Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister. The author refers to his book as a work of ‘journalism’ not history and, therefore, I am not surprised to find an absence of classical republicanism being mentioned. That being said, he opens the book by stating “Pierre Elliott Trudeau is paradoxical. He seems to be a collection of contradictions, and sometimes they are absurd” (Westell, 1972: 1). He claims, not without merit, that there is confusion “about what sort of man he is, where he stands in the political spectrum, what his goals are” and that “he was to many people an enigma: a wealthy socialist, an advocate of state power and personal liberty, a French Canadian proud of his culture and yet bitterly critical of French Canadian society, and so on” (2). Future observers will mirror Westell (1972) in seeking to justify actions that contradict the supposed liberalism Trudeau embraces:

So in power he continued to be a puzzling political personality. He sought to entrench a charter of fundamental

101 In his 1980 biography on Trudeau, Gwyn reports that “Trudeau is aware of the contradictions; he enjoys them; he perpetuates them. They are devices for attracting attention to himself…They are devices also for diverting attention toward himself as an entertainer, away from his real self” (18, emphasis in original). It appears he wanted to people to concentrate on the public Trudeau so as to divert attention from the rather shy personal Trudeau.
freedoms in the constitution, but suspended civil liberties during the FLQ crisis. He promoted participatory democracy, but took the power to limit debate in Parliament. He spoke of a Just Society and pressed measures to redistribute income, but squeezed the economy and raised unemployment among the poor. He was generous to his opponents on one day and swore at them the next. A man of culture, he could descend abruptly to obscenity (2).

Westell (1972) is not surprised at the variety of opinions regarding Trudeau either: “To Lubor Zink, the columnist, [he] is a socialist, perhaps worse. But Ed Broadbent, a socialist MP\textsuperscript{102} and political scientist, describes him as ‘probably the most able conservative head of government we have had since the Second World War’” (3). Clearly, the confusion about Trudeau was present from the inception of his public life and was never really resolved. Westell (1972) says that Trudeau informed citizens “not to look for narrow consistency” and that he considered “himself a pragmatist” who “steers by no compass of ideology” (3). This is something confirmed by numerous legacy-holders; yet, while one can agree Trudeau had no discernable ideology, if we look and listen carefully, there is a political theory supporting his thought and it is \textit{not} the liberalism most often attributed to him through political mythology. Trudeau’s guiding political theory is republicanism.

A final interesting note to add about Westell’s work is that he uses the word ‘myth’ in his book albeit without much of an explanation about how he is employing it. One chapter is entitled \textit{Myths, Men and Power} and it opens with the statement “Myths flourish in politics” (Westell, 1972: 219) — one cannot argue against that; however, there is no real discussion of myths and the scenarios he discusses would not meet the

\textsuperscript{102} Abbreviation for ‘Member of Parliament’. 
creation/consolidation test; in that context, it would be more appropriate to call his examples rumours or false impressions rather than ‘myths’.

In a positive light, Trudeau is seen (perhaps unwarrantedly) as the ‘father of Canada’ (Nemni, 2006; 2011) and in a negative one (perhaps equally unwarrantedly) as the Prime Minister who left Canada more profoundly divided than he found it (McRoberts, 1997). In a less threatening light, Trudeau is often depicted as something of a paradox (Ricci, 2009). As I noted, Ricci (ibid) is not the first to charge Trudeau with embodying numerous contradictions, but he seems to encapsulate what some have said by stating that, “[i]t was one of the paradoxes of Trudeau, the anti–nationalist, that he brought to so many Canadians a sense of national identity they could finally live with” (11) and that

Trudeau was nothing if not a package of contradictions. The anglophone French Canadian. The woodsy sophisticate. The rich socialist. The passionate man of reason. Follow any thread of his life and you inevitably end up in some paradox. The fierce advocate for human rights who went spearfishing with dictators. The devout Roman Catholic who took buggery off the law books, gave us no-fault divorce, and laid the ground for abortion on demand (13).

In his book, however, Ricci (2009) does somewhat allow that while the contradictions, in his mind, are real, not all of them are justified. For example, in his historical account of the FLQ crisis of 1970, he does admit that Trudeau’s “actions during the crisis, far from betraying his principles, had sprung from them: he had upheld the rule of law” and that “the evidence suggests that at the time of the October Crisis, at least, he acted in good
faith” (127). Curiously, Ricci (ibid) also states that “[t]here had always been something of an American spirit to Trudeau” (161), in particular with his fixation on giving Canada a charter of rights and repatriation of our constitution (Ricci, 2009). This is more of a republican spirit than an exclusively American one, however,

Trudeau was the man of bilingualism and of language rights, yet he knew that the ultimate function of a charter of rights was to shift a country’s culture away from the commonalities of history and language and blood toward a commonality of values, values that ultimately knew no borders. That made people citizens of the world. If Quebec nationalism saw a threat to their own Quebecois culture in his vision, they were right to. However much a charter would protect the right to difference, it would ultimately be assimilationist in its emphasis on universality and on the individual, as the American model showed (161).

Individualism, yes, but always as part of a society:

[Trudeau] believed in the intellectual capacity of individuals but I think he would be almost Greek in the view that you judge a society by the nature of the cities — that it’s the ability to do things together that makes us all individually more productive and better. You need individualists, you need individuals with great minds who can argue and fight and disagree, and that’s one of the things about the political process, he would argue, that is important. But, you need somebody to argue with! You can’t do it alone, and it’s the bringing together of the combat of the ideas or the intellectual development, or the scientific research…that creates a bigger result. Yes, you need individual rights and individual capacity and opportunity but you need others to have a say because collectively and together you create [something better] (John Young, personal communication, November 15, 2013).

103 Cohen (1998) quotes Eugene Forsey as saying “In my judgement Pierre Trudeau kept Quebec in Canada when no one else in Canada could have done it…In my judgement also, he saved us from Baader–Meinhof gangs and Red Brigades” (315).
Trudeau believes in the common good and he couches its meaning within a non-domination framework. He does not refer to freedom is absolute terms, nor does he assign to governments the sole duty of protecting it. Governments must actively pursue the common good which they can understand by encouraging the public’s participation in political affairs. Trudeau spoke often about the importance the citizens’ participation in politics and the notion of ‘participatory democracy’:

Yes, he spoke a lot about it prior to the 1968 election when he was Justice Minister. What he really meant was citizen engagement, I think, to a large degree in the sense that [it is] not just simply voting and not just simply being attached to a political party although he thought that was a useful vehicle…But what he really meant, I think, and I think if you read Federalism and the French Canadians you’d get [a sense of this]…people both have an obligation, a duty, and they derive a benefit from, becoming involved. Whether you are with an NGO [non–governmental organization], or with an interest group…or an individual – you cannot absent yourself from the process in a democracy or the system will fail eventually and therefore it is both a duty and an obligation as well as a right…I think that’s what he meant by participatory democracy (J. Young, personal communication, November 15, 2013).104

If one continues to apply the label of liberal to Trudeau, it can only be done in regard to the importance he attributes to the individual; however, this is only a part of Trudeau’s vision of society. Confining him to liberalism compartmentalizes his thought; taken as whole, we must recognize that for him, there is no conflict between notions of the common good and individual freedom; indeed, one secures the other in an atmosphere of purposeful belonging.

104 John Young has held several prestigious positions including assistant to Allan J. MacEachen (deputy Prime Minister of Canada 1977–1979 and 1980–1984).
A rather lengthy anthology entitled *L’Anti–Trudeau* (1972) reflects the prevailing mood in Québec a few years after Trudeau moved his public struggle for national unity to Ottawa. Trudeau had been politically active in his home province for some time prior to his ‘ascent’ to the federal stage, and was used to the critics and the depth of their resentment. Many of the essays assembled in this 1972 volume contribute to the vision of a liberal Trudeau, but also put forward the notion that he ill–understood Québec, the nature of Canadian Confederation, and the nationalist aspirations of the Québécois. Some contributors’ names are quite well–known: Charles Taylor, René Lévesque, Jacques Parizeau, and perhaps most notably, Claude Ryan who, at this time, was editor of the newspaper *Le Devoir.*

For this thesis, the interest in this anthology is the premise (or myth) that Trudeau somehow did not understand his home province and was in the throes of a lifelong identity crisis. For the Nemnis (2006), there is a constant underlying theme that animates “the writings of French–speaking Quebeckers” and it paints the baffling picture of Pierre Trudeau as a “rootless individual who lost touch with the society in which he was born” (6). The premise of ‘the outsider’, the Nemnis (ibid) remind us, finds its way into academic and popular literature through biographies such as that published by Michel

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106 He would succeed Robert Bourassa becoming leader of the Liberal Party in Québec (1978 – 1982) and later was elected member of the National Assembly and appointed minister with various responsibilities until the early 1990s.
Vastel in 1989 entitled in French Trudeau: le Québécois, and in English (in 1990) as The Outsider: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau (6–7). It is noteworthy for the Nemnis to state that the French title is willfully sardonic and they report Vastel’s insinuation that “Trudeau was definitely not in his heart and soul, in his mind and sensibility, a Québécois, even though he could speak” fluently both official languages (ibid: 7). How Vastel could know ‘definitely’ what is in an individual’s ‘heart and soul’ is a fascinating question to confront, but even more interesting is the claim Vastel makes in The Outsider and quoted by the Nemnis (2006): “‘In 1944, Trudeau was essentially a French–speaking person in search of an identity’” (7).107 They go on to note:

This paradox reveals one dimension of the Trudeau enigma. But the charge against him goes even further. As stigmatized by his detractors, Trudeau combined his defining arrogance with an incapacity to understand Québec (Nemnis 2006: 6).

The notion is confirmed throughout the anthology. One Claude Ryan’s contributions reads as follows:

M. Pierre Elliott Trudeau vit–il dans un monde de plus en plus coupé du Québec? Ou, prisonnier d’une problématique étroite qu’il a lui–même inventée, chercherait–il de plus en plus refuge dans le sophisme afin d’éviter de faire face aux questions qu’on lui adresse à juste titre en sa qualité de chef du gouvernement fédéral? Quelle qu’en soit l’explication, M. Trudeau adopte de plus en plus, en face de questions difficiles, des attitudes qui le font paraître étranger au

107 Though this assumption (or myth) is widespread in Québec, it strikes those who knew him well as quite odd. “[O]n May 14, 1980, in the electric atmosphere of the Paul Sauvé arena in Montreal” Trudeau gave one of his most compelling speeches as recalled by Gossage (1986), “Trudeau spoke as if to family or close relatives: ‘Bien sûr , mon nom est Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Oui, Elliott, c’était le nom de ma mère…Et puis mon nom est québécois, mon nom est canadien aussi, et, oui, c’est ça, mon nom’. With a single phrase, he took on the whole PQ referendum subplot of racial purity, flinging his bi–racial background back at them, personifying and embodying Canada and accusing the PQ of trying to destroy, not just the county, but his own personal birthright and that of many Quebecers”. (The French translates to: “Indeed, my name is Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Yes, Elliott, was my mother’s name…as well, my name is Quebeccois, my name is Canadian, too, and yes, this is my name”; my translation: 197).
climat dans lequel se poursuit le débat politique au Québec… Chez M. Trudeau, hélas, l'esprit polémique et, disons-le, l'esprit de parti l'ont emporté sur le souci de l'unité. Avec ce résultat paradoxal: plus il triomphe extérieurement, plus l'unité de ce pays apparaît fragile et superficielle (Ryan, 1972: 70–71, 74).108

French-speaking Québécois had more to say and some of it is astonishing. Guy Laforest “bestowed on Trudeau the invidious title of ‘Lord Durham’” (Nemni 2006: 7)109 because Laforest interpreted Trudeau’s predilection for federalism110 and his efforts to elevate nationally the French language and culture as a desire to obliterate Quebec’s communitarianism or, as he is quoted by the Nemnis, he saw in Trudeau’s actions the desire to “‘crush the collective identity of the Québécois’” (ibid, quoting Laforest).

These appear to be rather odd conclusions to draw from a reading of Trudeau; perhaps they should be seen in another light. They could be examples of how Trudeau’s ideas were perceived as dangerous to a communitarian project (and provincial power) so they were interpreted in a particular way so as to solidify particular political positions. In other words, this interpretation of the ‘outsider’ who does not understand Québec could be the attempt to dissuade the public from considering the opinions of someone who does not understand Québec, does not really represent Québec, and is ultimately confused about...
his own identity. French–speaking literature of this era is brimming with notions like those of Léon Dion which state unequivocally that Trudeau showed nothing but disdain and condescension for Québec (Nemni 2006: 8). These widespread notions helped to cement in Québec the myth of a man burdened by a severe identity crisis intent on destroying the communitarian ethos of la Nation Québécoise.

André Burelle’s (2005)111 book grazes Trudeau’s republicanism, but fails to recognize the theory in its classical incarnation referring to it as an American–style liberal republicanism; in other words, as doctrinaire liberalism. Burelle seems to subscribe to the notion that there were two fundamentally different versions of Trudeau: the intellectual and the politician, the former being a personalist, the latter a liberal individualist inspired by American–style (melting pot) republicanism. Burelle seems particularly troubled by the oft–cited incident of Trudeau affixing the famous ‘Citizen of the World’ sign outside his dorm room at Harvard as sees this confirmation that “pour devenir un individu libre, il faut s’affranchir de toute aliénation communautaire ou encore pour devenir un citoyen du monde, il faut se faire citoyen de nulle part” (70, emphasis in original).112 Trudeau’s republicanism, however, is not American in origin, but classical and what is most intriguing about this book is that the author uses personalism as a way to justify communitarianism and lessen the fears of Québec nationalism.

Personalism, if it is to be associated with any political philosophy at all, it cannot be communitarianism, but must be classical republicanism which espouses a particular form of collectivism not communitarianism. Burelle (2005) ascribes to Trudeau an

111 André Burelle was one of Trudeau’s speech writers and political advisors from 1977 to 1984.
112 “to become a free individual, one must free oneself of all communitarian alienation or to become a citizen of the world, one must make oneself a citizen of nowhere”. My translation.
individualistic liberalism (that he qualifies as American–style ‘republican liberalism’) and charges him with having abandoned presumed communitarian principles of personalism. Trudeau (1993) claimed that personalism was, in fact, a major influence in the development of his political thought, and the Nemnis state that he mentions Jacques Maritain frequently for exactly the purposes of “avoid[ing] the pitfall of precisely the type of liberalism Burelle is pinning on him” (226); in other words, Trudeau mentions personalism frequently — in particular Jacques Maritain, more so than Mounier — because he believes that its tenets prevent him from espousing the type of hyper–individualism ascribed to him by Burelle and the communitarianism espoused by Mounier. It is clear that Burelle sees personalism in a far more communitarian light than does Trudeau.

Claude Couture (1996) also makes the case that contradiction laid at the heart of Trudeau’s political thought (xiii) and that ultimately, he unwittingly contributed to the resurgence of what he loathed the most — nationalistic movements both French Canadian and aboriginal (xiv).

On the intellectual level, Trudeau, considered by others and by himself to be a liberal thinker, seems unwittingly to have imposed collectivist, determinist, and anti–individualist concepts…On the political level, what Trudeau actually did was to use an abstract, metaphysical definition of individual rights to reproduce, apparently without critical reflection, one of the key elements of Anglo–American culture: in this case, the idea that English and American liberty is superior to the concept of liberty in other cultures. In constructing a nation, as Trudeau attempted to do, on the basis of the principle of individual rights mainly confined to one culture… [he] managed only to reproduce…and consequently accentuate a form of ‘Canadian’ nationalism (Couture, 1996: xiii–xiv).
And by doing so, as referenced above, he unwittingly “brought about…the hardening of other nationalisms…” (xiv). It may be too simplistic to attribute the rise of Canadian nationalisms in the late 1980s and 1990s to Trudeau’s actions since nationalisms rose all over the world with the fall of the Soviet Union; the resurgence of demands from various ethnic groups was a global phenomenon. Nonetheless, the quotation deserves some reflection.

To begin, the imputation that Trudeau would have approached anything “without critical reflection” (Couture, 1996: xiv) is highly unlikely; thus, when he addressed individual rights, it is perhaps erroneous to conclude that what he has in mind is an English or even an American form of liberty. Rather, what he had in mind is the classical republican form of liberty as non–domination. Non–domination can only occur when the individual is free from the constraints of arbitrary power including the power that cultural affiliation may exert over the individual. There is not much of the “metaphysical” in this concept at all (Couture, 1996: xiv), nor does it inherently comport the belief in the superiority of one culture over another. It does however accord with the belief that one form of liberty is better than another, and that the superior form is classical republican liberty (as non–domination). Laws govern states, not cultures; laws are impartial mechanisms through which the republic can ensure the rights and liberties of its citizens.

Couture is correct in saying that Trudeau managed to produce pride of place in Canadians, but what Trudeau produced was not Canadian ‘nationalism’; what he helped develop was a sense of purposeful belonging — a classical republican sense of belonging that has none of the dangers that have accompanied nationalisms throughout history, and has all of the duties and rights of citizenship that allow for, in Viroli’s words, a vigorous
love of country. “Trudeauism” says Couture (1996) “appears to be a doctrine inherited from Anglo–American historicist thought which, despite its individualist claims, can be, as we will demonstrate, strongly tainted with collectivism and nationalism” (xiv–xv). I do not dispute the presence of a form of collectivism in Trudeau’s political thought; however, I do dispute the provenance and nature that Couture attributes to it. It is not from Anglo–American thought that Trudeau garnered his ideas, but from classical republicanism as his own writings will show and the collectivism espoused by Trudeau is a more sophisticated variant expressed by NRR. In the meantime, Richard Gwyn (1999: 24) explains Trudeau’s legacy in this area in the following way:

The idea of being Canadian now commands wide and deep appeal….Canadianism means membership in a collective enterprise that, however diverse, pluralist, regionalized, or postmodern, inspires genuine pride, commands a real sense of belonging, and participates in a remarkable and virtually unparalleled human enterprise (24–25, emphasis mine).

For his part, Dufour (2003) states that:

the worst part of the Trudeau legacy is a stunning paradox, considering the ex–Prime Minister’s well–known supposed aversion for nationalism of any kind. This odd legacy is a new Canadian nationalism — for which Trudeau is a hero — an ideology doomed in the longer run because it based on the denial of the Québécois heart of the country. A big problem with this ideology, that can be surprisingly intolerant toward modern Québec political difference, is that it is not aware of itself: it doesn’t see itself as nationalism at all (10–11).

One of the primary figures in the resurgence of contemporary republican thought, Maurizio Viroli (2011), would find no contradiction or paradox here at all: “Il nostro miglior patriottismo potrebbe dunque essere l’antidoto migliore sia nei confronti delle
tendenza particolaristiche, sia nei confronti del generale declino civile”
(www.laterza.it).

Reason before Passion was Trudeau’s motto. Some say that even in following this seemingly cold mantra, he contradicted himself since he pursued his vision of a united Canada with passionate fervour. There is indeed difficulty in framing Trudeau as a completely dispassionate man; therefore, one is compelled to examine the motto more carefully. It reads reason before passion, not reason without passion; in other words, in the affairs of the state, issues that arouse deep feelings such as nationalisms, religion, culture, should be treated with cool intelligence since these may be issues that will continue to divide peoples who form a citizenry. Only a more rational (republican) sense of belonging that is based on a ‘republic’ of fundamental principles and laws applied equally to all can allow pluralistic states to flourish. This is not to say that republican belonging is devoid of passion; it is to say that it is a passion tempered by reason — it is reason before passion. As Andrew Cohen (1999) states “Trudeau gave no quarter in his defense of Canada. Between 1968 and 1996, in seven tests of will, he declared, enacted, and defended his vision. By any standard, it was an extraordinary act of citizenship” (312). One could add that it was a dedicated commitment to a classical republican understanding of patria as well as citizenship.

McRoberts (1997) is one of the eminent scholars who assessed the Trudeau legacy in his book, *Misconceiving Canada*. In it, he studies how Trudeau rejected nationalism while at the same time advocated for the strengthening of Canadian identity and Canadian nationalism. As with other legacy–holders however, I argue that McRoberts himself ‘misconceives’ Trudeau’s understanding of nationalism, and the relationship between the individual and the community. In particular, the charge that Trudeau was the pre–eminent cause of the rise of nationalism in Québec remains unconvincing.

That conflict between Trudeau and Quebec’s aspirations was not put forward exclusively by politicians, journalists, and intellectuals whose first language was French. Take, for example, Kenneth McRoberts, a political scientist who made his reputation as an expert on Quebec. He advanced the view that Trudeau’s policies fuelled Quebec separatism…In other words, without Trudeau there would be no separatism (Nemni 2006: 8).

Even if the argument that Trudeau somehow *exacerbated* (not created) separatist sentiments, the fact that the separatists have repeatedly failed in their efforts, makes it equally probable that, for the majority of Québécois, ‘Trudeau’s Canada’, and their place in it, remains far more appealing. In any event, McRoberts states that a dualist vision of Canada was notoriously rejected by Trudeau in favour of what he believes is a liberal model.

As stated, many have argued that the rejection of dualism was caused by his own ambivalence about his own identity, but Trudeau’s writings and statements show no trace of ambivalence in this regard nor do those who worked closely with him recall any such ambivalence:
Perhaps, too, the Canadian public neither wanted nor needed to have its fundamental divisions and weaknesses so exposed by one man’s thinking. I have lots of evidence of Trudeau’s anger at Canadians’ lack of care for their country; a lack of care as he understands it. Francophone reporters in the plane loved to throw back at Trudeau over and over again in the most mocking tone the PM’s phrase that summed up his challenge to francophones to love and preserve their stake in Canada: ‘On va lâcher ça? Mais, voyons donc!’ He used this with varying success to provoke a proud sense of proprietary affection for the whole country, for all its beauty, for all its opportunities, and so on, in audiences where many were ready to separate. Roughly translated, it means, ‘Are you going to throw all that away? Come on, now!’ …Trudeau also rightly despised the divisions between French and English because he considered his exposure to both great cultures a privilege” (Gossage, 1986: 175, my emphasis).

Also,

I think he would say he was a Canadian, a Quebecker, a French–Canadian, but put all together — I’m a Canadian…He wasn’t trying to deny his heritage; he was a Quebecker and he would say that – I’m a French–Canadian, I’m a Canadian (J. Young, personal communication, November 15, 2013).

Children of dual heritage are often accused of being ambivalent about their identity, so this probably was not a novel story for Trudeau.114 In his memoirs, Trudeau states (1993) that language and culture were never a grave concern in his family:

I never felt that there was any problem. My father spoke to us in French, and my mother spoke in either language…Did

114 “‘Moi, je crois qu’on peut être à la fois bon Québécois et bon Canadien, et je me battrai jusqu’au bout contre ceux qui voudraient m’empêcher d’être l’un et l’autre’. Discours à la Radio Télévision (24 novembre, 1976)”. Taken from the long–playing album Pierre Elliott Trudeau – Premier ministre du Canada, 1968-1979. Disques Collection (Montreal, PQ). Production and conception: Eric Vilon. (As for me, I think it is possible to be at once a good Québécois and a good Canadian, and I will fight to the end against those who would prevent me from being the one and the other. Speech for Radio Television, November 24, 1976; my translation).
that create any difficulty for us children? Very few and very minor ones... You might say that, long before it was formally invented, I benefited from ‘total immersion’ (17–18).

Apparently, this is unsatisfactory and unconvincing for some who continued to assert that he felt some sort of “unease” or “ambivalence about being a French Canadian” (Clarkson and McCall, 1990: 38). McRoberts (1997) asserts that

To a very considerable extent, the distinctiveness of Trudeau’s political vision can be traced to the distinctiveness of his life, which had begun in circumstances very different from those of most Canadians, francophone or anglophone. As the son of a French–Canadian father and an English–Canadian mother of Scottish descent, Trudeau acquired a degree of bilingualism that is rare not only in Canada, but in any country. The result was profound: he was unable or unprepared to identify exclusively with either English Canada or French Canada. Instead he fastened upon the supremacy of the individual (55–56).

One wonders just how ‘distinctive’ it was to grow up in a bicultural family in a country like Canada, but even if it were, the proponents of the ‘identity crisis’ thesis ever tell us why Trudeau would have had to make a definitive choice between the two cultures. Why did he have to choose one to the exclusion of the other? As an adult, Trudeau often expressed the notion that he did not have to, nor did he want to, choose. He was French–Canadian; he saw no contradiction in being both. This attitude was not enough to quell the charges of confusion and rootlessness which remained with him throughout his life.

McRoberts (1997) says that Trudeau sees Canada as the national community. This is undisputable, but it is not the community Trudeau is envisioning but a political (not a cultural) society. Trudeau wrote a seminal article *La Nouvelle Trahison des Clercs* (1968) in which he elaborates on the dangers of nation–states and nationalisms (by which he
means those ethno–cultural binds that impede individual human progress and have been the cause of many human tragedies throughout history). In talking about states and creating a community, Trudeau does not have an ethnic state or nation in mind; instead, he is referring to the creation of a political society, one freed of ancient moorings promising instead the freedom to pursue one’s life free from domination of the state or communities.

**Conclusion**

The creation of a political society is a quintessential republican goal. In his pursuit of a stronger Canadian nationality, it is my contention that Trudeau’s endgame is a republican political society, not a purely liberal one, and certainly not a communitarian one.

‘When I speak of Canada’, said Trudeau, ‘I do not have in mind an ‘identity’ which competes with that which a French–Canadian and a Quebecker, conscious of his or her specific history and roots, holds dear’. He did not aspire to create, he said, ‘some higher-order Canadian ‘personality’ in which would be absorbed or subsumed’ the distinctive cultures of any region or province. Bilingualism meant simply a ‘political society, the ideals of which are liberty, equality, and, yes, fraternity’. In brief, everybody could be Canadian and keep on being themselves (Gwyn, 1980: 244).

As stated, this is republican belonging and it is in this regard, it seems to me that some legacy–holders neglect Trudeau’s republican intention. Cohen (1999) contributes the following:

Trudeau trumpeted ‘the Canadian Charter of Human Rights’ and mused about a political community in which both French and English Canadians could move freely, live and work in Canada. Trudeau knew that the greatest threat to special status for Quebec was the idea that Quebeckers could be at home everywhere in Canada, not just in la belle
province...he was prepared to offer a pan-Canadian vision against those who would retreat into Quebec (313–4).

Salutin (1999: 186) claims that Trudeau’s Canadian nationalism was itself a myth and that “it was mainly in response to Québec nationalism” (186). This could be regarded as partially accurate given that it is not Canadian nationalism to which Trudeau aspired, but a republican notion of (Canadian) purposeful belonging. The difference is not merely reducible to semantics. As previously stated, nationalism in the blood–and–soil sense was and is impossible for Canada; however, purposeful belonging is not only possible, but remains a viable and vibrant option.

Classical liberalism is hostile to ethnic nationalisms. We can declare this with a measure of certainty that has led researchers and academics to declare unshakeably Trudeau a liberal. However, anti–nationalism was not born with liberalism, nor is exclusive to it. In reality, classical republicanism eschewed nationalisms from its inception and continues to do so on the grounds that it is not one’s ethnic background that determines his/her allegiance to a particular society or way of life, but one’s dedication to the republic and its laws. In Trudeau’s mind, nationalisms are endemically reactionary and are responsible for worst types of fundamentalism: the ‘us against them’ mentality that is not amenable to building the edifice upon which citizenship can rest, and will ultimately destroy those bonds that hold citizens together. In particular, he believes that when peoples remain in isolation — in their ‘fortresses’— they will ultimately be unable to reap the benefits of equal citizenship.

This rigidity could potentially be labelled a product of Trudeau’s liberal thought even going so far as to say that liberalism’s refusal to accommodate ‘difference’ is its
primary deficiency. Those who criticize Trudeau on this front do so mainly because they accuse him of not understanding how the Québécois identity and its resultant nationalism were important to the people in that province. They accuse him of being out of touch with the aspirations of the Québécois, of not seeing the big picture. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Trudeau’s unwavering repugnance of nationalisms of any kind may have deeper origins than most care to mention. It may not have begun at Harvard, nor is it thanks to one professor or another. A man who, from a young age, had begun travelling the world (Coutts 1999) and “personally witnessed outbreaks of aggression, civil war, and political turmoil” (ibid: 150), he would have seen the brutish devastation of war and the depths of unimagined poverty. It is one thing to philosophize about the potential benefits and benevolence of ethnic nationalism, it is quite another to experience firsthand the thoughtlessness with which people squander the opportunities for peace and prosperity in the name of protecting provenance and heritage. As Coutts (ibid) explains though, Trudeau’s vision of ‘one Canada–one People’ “made him an easy target for those who did not share this agenda” (159). Others have opted to claim that “he grew

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115 His travels are documented in several biographies and perhaps most vibrantly in the Nemnis, Trudeau: Son of Quebec, Father of Canada (2006) and his own Memoirs (1993). Brian Flemming, Assistant Principal Secretary and Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Trudeau from 1976 to 1979, recounts an anecdote that speaks to Trudeau’s interest in world cultures: “He knew so much…I remember once bringing a group of Brazilian students in to meet him who were passing through Canada and were wanting to meet the Prime Minister. They were all teenagers and they walked into his office — there were 20 of them — he immediately started speaking Portuguese and they were just astounded! And I’m staggered too. I didn’t know he knew any Portuguese and he could speak some Italian. And he really loved different people. I mean, he travelled the world and met everybody” (Personal Communication, October 3, 2013).

116 “He would say Canada is bigger than the sum of the parts and it’s all of these disparate elements that actually create the whole, and the whole would not be the same if any one of them separated or disappeared…His view would be it’s the collectivity or the whole which makes us unique and it’s the individual participation by all of the community…that contributes to the bigger whole” (John Young, personal communication, November 15, 2013).
intellectually lazy” refusing to see the difference between a “new nationalism as against the old” (Salutin, 1999: 186). Cohen (1999) reports how he took reports of ‘rigidity’ rather as a mark of “praise, thinking his consistency enlightened rather than foolish” (321). Cook (2006) tells of the time when he sent Trudeau a copy of his review of McRoberts’ book Misconceiving Canada alerting him to the need “to be kept straight on these matters” (178). Trudeau had this to say according to Cook (2006):

Your quip about me needing ‘to be kept straight on these matters’ is not unwarranted: in arguing in favour of institutional bilingualism, it is possible that I might sometimes have sounded like a dualist! But certainly not in a constitutional sense (178–179).

All of this contributes to the construction of the myth that Trudeau never really understood the nature of Québec or Canada.

Coutts (1999) also recognized that there is a contingent of scholars and legacy–holders who subscribe to this myth. He states: “[t]he single–minded way he conducted his political battle also allowed Trudeau to be cast as a leader who failed to recognize regional identities, when in fact he understood the complexity of the country better than most” (159). In fact,

thanks to a combination of character and circumstance, he educated a generation of Canadians about their constitutional past, present, and future. With the support

117 “Trudeau knew that the distinction often drawn by nationalists between ‘good’ nationalism (mine) and ‘bad’ nationalism (yours) did not stand up to serious analysis. Nationalism in all its manifestations stood for ethnic homogeneity and cultural conformity. Modern, progressive societies were nourished by ethnic plurality and cultural hybridity” (Cook, 2006: 32–33)

118 Those who worked closely with Trudeau all seem to repeat vehemently but in different ways that, for all other criticisms that may be leveled against the former prime minister, one thing stands as certain — Trudeau was, in fact, consistent and the sentiment is summarized nicely in the following: “Yet, for those who cared to seek beneath what seemed to be contradictory signals, Trudeau was consistent” (Gossage, 1986: 252).

119 Cook’s bibliography refers to a letter written by Trudeau to him dated September 10, 1997.
and participation of a wide cross-section of Canadians, Trudeau undertook the challenge of transforming the deferential Canadian political culture into one of genuine democratic deliberation. As a result, Canadians are finally coming to perceive themselves as a sovereign people” (Behiels, 1999: 331).

In essence, then, we have a Trudeau who understood Canada deeply and who elicited public participation in politics by strengthening civic education and encouraging the citizenry to live free from domination and finally become sovereign. It is becoming clearer then, that we have before us a classical republican, not a liberal.

The treatment of Trudeau as a liberal thinker has met both the creation criteria of political myth and has been consolidated through the three stages: in terms of the creation paradigm, the perceived liberal motivations that coloured Trudeau’s actions and thought continue to have significance for many scholars and academics; it is shared by a large number of them; and it addresses the conditions of the Canadian population. In terms of the consolidation paradigm, this myth is diffused nationally, has assumed the status of ‘ritual’ and, given its orthodoxy, it has reached the pinnacle of ‘sacredness’. In addition, the treatment of Trudeau as a Quebecker who misunderstood the political aspirations of his own province (due mainly to a supposed identity crisis) has also met both the creation criteria of political myth and has consolidated through the three stages: in terms of the creation paradigm, the perceived confusion regarding Québec nationalism continues to have significance for many French-speaking and non French-speaking researchers in Québec and is shared by a large number of them; and, importantly, this myth addresses the conditions of a specific people, i.e. French Canadians. In terms of the consolidation paradigm, this myth is diffused nationally (in Québec and beyond), has assumed the
status of ‘ritual’ and here too, its pervasiveness has allowed it to reach the pinnacle of ‘sacredness’.

Given the year in which McRoberts wrote his book — 1997 — it was perhaps too soon to evaluate the effects of Trudeau’s legacy, given that societal shocks take an extended period of time to be absorbed. There is no doubt that the Trudeauvian vision of Canada had its share of growing pains, but when McRoberts mentions Quebec’s dissatisfaction as evidence of Trudeau’s failure, he never attributes the separatists’ constant failure to tear the country asunder to the success of Trudeau’s vision. In any event, although changes in attitudes can take time, sometimes generations, it is arguable that Trudeau’s strategy is, in fact, working and that Quebec’s appetite for independence is at the lowest it has ever been.\textsuperscript{120}

In the end, McRoberts says that Trudeau was “redefining Canadian dualism in purely individualist terms” (201) as well attributing to him, once again, an almost atomistic vision of the country. For all the reputed resentment allegedly aimed at Trudeau, one walks away without being convinced of the extent of Québec’s rejection of Trudeau’s vision. Other than the lingering romanticism of nationalism in some quarters of the province, Québec seems to be a solid member of the Canadian polity.

It is easy to see Trudeau as a contradiction when his ideas are being used for different reasons. He is a communist for some, a liberal for others; but if one sees him for what he is — a classical republican — there is no contradiction, but a clear, consistent, and coherent view of what he wanted Canada to be, i.e., a classical republican polity. It is

\textsuperscript{120} Sovereignty on its Deathbed: Sovereignty losing ground in Quebec at:
Retrieved December 16, 2011 from the Globe and Mail website www.globeandmail.com
imperative at this point to explore Trudeau’s own writings in order to substantiate if there is any merit to my claim that he is, in fact, a republican. I dedicate some time to those philosophers whom he claims influenced him the most to verify if they, in fact, harboured any republican influences themselves and then I will move to separate what Trudeau actually said from what others have said he did.
Chapter Five: The Neo-Roman Republican Personalist

Introduction

Trudeau was a personalist. It is the only ideology we can ascribe to him with absolute certainty; thus, any attempt to understand his political thought should be preceded by an introduction to personalism. My aim in this chapter is to substantiate my claim that if we read Trudeau correctly, we can conclude that he was a neo–Roman republican. An important link between Trudeau and republicanism, I shall argue, lies in the concept of personalism. I hope to substantiate the correlation between neo–Roman republicanism and Pierre Trudeau by addressing philosophies and thinkers that influenced him, and by examining his own material.

I will begin by giving a brief nod to those thinkers by whom Trudeau claims to have been inspired. I address both Thomas Hill Green and John Emerich Edward Dalberg (Lord Acton) rather briefly, and then I dedicate a deeper examination to Jacques Maritain, since Trudeau speaks most frequently of this particular philosopher. Unsurprisingly, Lord Acton’s views on nationalism and federalism seem to have impacted Trudeau the most, but perhaps most interesting are Trudeau’s mention of T.H. Green as an influence. Recent scholarship revisiting T.H. Green questions the label of ‘liberal’ and acknowledges instead his ‘radical republican’ roots. I then move to explaining in some depth the philosophy of personalism with particular regard to Jacques Maritain. The rationale for addressing personalism is that the philosophy has affinity with republicanism, but I do not claim that it is thoroughly republican nor for that matter that it has any ‘political’ utility; I wish merely to glance at the ideas of this philosophy to verify if there is any kinship with
republican political theory. My argument is that personalism is aligned more with republicanism than liberalism and certainly more to republicanism than communitarianism as claimed by some Québécois nationalists.

According to my understanding of this complex and multifaceted philosophy which was originally inspired by Catholic writers, anybody can be a personalist, regardless of one’s religious persuasion or lack thereof.\textsuperscript{121} I would suggest tentatively that sometimes, a theory that purports to mean too many things to too many people runs the risk of being altogether meaningless, and the flexibility with which personalism is defined and the adaptability of its concepts may, in time, produce the same effect. However, I will not engage here in a debate as to whether or not personalism should retain strictly its religious connotations; rather, I merely suggest that it is both logical and fair to speak about personalism, in particular the Thomistic strain,\textsuperscript{122} in its original Catholic tradition, when referring to Pierre Trudeau. The chapter will also include, of course, an exploration of Trudeau’s own writings to identify his republican propensities, ideas, and political thought.

In a previous chapter, I mentioned that, because of their intertwined development, liberalism and republicanism share some fundamental beliefs like secularism, individualism, and the importance of the concept of rights. I also stated that where the

\textsuperscript{121} Researchers seem to agree that personalism is not a fixed doctrine nor is it a specifically religious one; rather, it is “a philosophic school, but can be applied as well to other branches of speculative thought, yielding such titles as theological personalism, economic personalism, and psychological personalism…and so forth” (Williams, 2004, 164)

\textsuperscript{122} It is perhaps interesting to note that some of the most famous names in personalism have linked Thomas Aquinas to personalism by suggesting that he is, in fact, the precursor to the philosophy. This is of interest because Jesuit teachings can be traced to Aquinas and thus perhaps a link between Jesuits and personalism is possible but must be a guarded one nonetheless, since this is the province of theologians or students of religious thought to determine.
two differed, they did so significantly, most notably in the difference between the types of freedom they endorsed (non–domination for republicans and non–interference for liberals), their view on citizenship/civic virtue/active political participation, and the republican imperative of purposeful belonging. I will limit my examination of Trudeau’s work to each of these differences that distinguish republicanism from liberalism to verify his position on these matters.

It is relatively safe to say that Trudeau’s education had a crucial formative function, and through what (and by whom) he learned, coupled with his life experiences, he came to form his ideas. If this premise is acceptable, one should also keep in mind the nature of the education he received. It is well–known that his training at the Jesuit Brébeuf College in Montreal, Québec moulded Trudeau’s personality and intellect,¹²³ both of which were challenged in his graduate studies.

The Nemnis (2006, 2011) produced a two–volume opera magnum on Trudeau’s intellectual journey providing a painstaking exploration into his intellectual foundation, evolution, and development.¹²⁴ I will not engage in analyses regarding this evolution or

¹²³ The Nemnis (2006, 2011) are likely correct to say that these years spent at Brébeuf were formative to Trudeau’s character and is the place where he began to hone and refine the intellect that would come to define him. If the classic Jesuit manual Ratio Studiorum (RS) is any indication, Trudeau’s training would have been rigorous and disciplined (not to mention, of course, religious). This was not an education for the faint of heart. The RS is a pedagogical manual that dates back to 1599, and despite its ripe old age, still provides credible insight and clues into the nature and aims of a Jesuitical education. It will not come as a surprise that the spiritual nurturing of students is paramount to the Jesuits and when one speaks of ‘spiritual’ of course at heart is the Christian, perhaps more precisely, the Catholic religion. Jesuit education then must be seen through the lenses of spirituality, but these should not obfuscate the rest of the material the Jesuits thought (perhaps still think) is essential to the formation of the ‘good Christian man’ based on the pedagogy of Ignatius Loyola.

¹²⁴ I would recommend highly both of these volumes to anyone who wishes to garner a complete, and at times surprising, understanding of Pierre Elliott Trudeau.
development since my interest, in this thesis, is the *culmination* of that intellectual journey. Trudeau stated:

I never came to believe in the doctrine of absolute liberalism (1993: 40); [and] I would describe myself as a middle-of-the-road liberal who believes that the public authorities have to provide counterweights to make sure that private enterprise doesn’t, through greed, put everything into one class (1998: 34).

These statements require some investigation. While refuting the adoption of a thoroughgoing liberalism, he never really attributes a theoretical label to the underlying propensities\(^{125}\) of his political thought which will coalesce, to borrow from Pocock, in a very significant Canadian *Machiavellian Moment*.\(^{126}\)

**Ad Fontes!**

Trudeau clearly stated whence his influences came:

But when active politics gave me a way to bring a larger measure of justice to the organization of the state, I recall that I found most useful thinking to be that underlying the

\(^{125}\)Ideological systems are the true enemies of freedom. On the political front, accepted opinions are not only inhibiting to the mind, they contain the very source of error. When a political ideology is universally accepted by the elite, when the people who ‘define situations’ embrace and venerate it, this means that it is high time free men were fighting it. For political freedom finds its essential strength in a sense of balance and proportion. As soon as any one tendency becomes too strong, it constitutes a menace. For in a society, if everybody begins to follow a certain fashion, then that fashion becomes a tyranny. Those who don’t follow it are looked down upon as being out of fashion and they lose their individuality. And when everybody starts to think or do the same thing, we all lose our freedom” (A: 7-9). One must concede from this, that Trudeau eschewed ideologies, but ideologies are different from theoretical undercurrents, so we are permitted to investigate which theory might have influenced him the most. My answer, of course, is neo-Roman republicanism.

\(^{126}\)It could be speculated that his republicanism is epitomized in practical republican outcomes in the form of policies and legacies such as the 1969 *White Paper on Indian Affairs*, the repatriation of the Constitution and the implementation of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Future research in this direction to verify if there is any weight to this assertion is of profound interest for anyone interested in modern republican theory and the application of discursive institutionalism.
liberal philosophies of Lord Acton, T.H. Green and Jacques Maritain (1990: 359).

And also,

I learned the philosophy of T.H. Green, whose liberalism preceded the personalism of Maritain and Mounier in saying that the focal point was not the state but the individual — the individual seen as a person integrated into society, which is to say endowed with fundamental rights and essential liberties, but also with responsibilities. This position is very close to that of the Fabian Society, the ancestor of the British Labour Party (1993: 47).

These quotations are of interest for their mention of Thomas Hill Green (in particular) and John Emerich Edward Dalberg, or simply Lord Acton. Without losing focus on the principle theme of the thesis, it is imperative to discuss these two thinkers to some degree since Trudeau found their influence important enough to mention and, most especially, since he qualifies both Maritain’s and Green’s thought as ‘liberal’. This is neither surprising nor unconventional, but it can be (and, in Green’s case, has been) challenged. Jacques Maritain and personalism merit the deepest attention since Maritain appears frequently in Trudeau’s work; but I will begin with a brief nod to Lord Acton and Thomas Hill Green.

Lord Acton and Thomas Hill Green

Some biographers point to Lord Acton’s influence on Trudeau and there is justification for this. Acton is not recognized primarily as a political theorist or philosopher, but as an ‘historian of liberty’, and therefore it is not a surprise to find references to his work in Trudeau’s own writings. Arguably, however, the influence is
limited to Acton’s reflections on nationalism and federalism. These seem to have had the most marked impact on Trudeau who used some of Acton’s famous quotations early in his work. Trudeau uses one to open his essay *The Practice and Theory of Federalism* (1968: 124) and numerous others can be found in what is arguably Trudeau’s most famous paper *New Treason of the Intellectuals* (ibid: 151–181) where he recommends the reading of Lord Acton (ibid: 161), and quotes him extensively in footnotes (ibid: 169, 177). Notably, the concluding pages of the essay read:

By the terms of the existing Canadian constitution, that of 1867, French Canadians have all the powers they need to make Quebec a political society affording due respect for nationalist aspirations and at the same time giving unprecedented scope for human potential in the broadest sense… I close with a final word from the great Lord Acton: ‘Nationalism does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative of necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind’ (Trudeau, 1968: 180–181, emphasis mine).

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127 It is worth a reminder that federalism was Trudeau’s way of reconciling “patriotism and humanism” (Nemnis, 2011: 80).

128 In its entirety, the quotation reads: “For true republicanism is the principle of self-government in the whole and in all the parts. In an extensive country, it can prevail only by the union of several independent communities in a single confederacy, as in Greece, in Switzerland, in the Netherlands, and in America; so that a large republic not founded on the federal principle must result in the government of a single city, like Rome and Paris, and, in a less degree, Athens, Berne, and Amsterdam; or, in other words, a great democracy must either sacrifice self-government to unity, or preserve it by federalism”. Retrieved June 24, 2014 at [http://www.panarchy.org/acton/nationality.html](http://www.panarchy.org/acton/nationality.html) (para. 8)

129 Trudeau is quoting the 1948 edition of Acton’s famous passage from *Essays on Freedom and Power* which states: “The nation is here an ideal unit founded on the race…It overrules the rights and wishes of the inhabitants, absorbing their divergent interests in a fictitious unity; sacrifices their several inclinations and duties to the higher claim of nationality, and crushes all natural rights and all established liberties for the purpose of vindicating itself. Whenever a single definite object is made the supreme end of the State — the State becomes for the time being inevitably absolute” (in *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 1968: 169); and “In the ancient world idolatriy and nationality went together, and the same term is applied in Scripture to both” (ibid: 177).
When researchers make the acceptable link between Acton and Trudeau, it is mainly due to the two men’s similar views on nationalism. In addition to this, as stated earlier, multicultural theory suggests that admiration for Lord Acton and T.H. Green may lead to the encouragement of cultural homogeneity of the kind critics say is required by liberalism. While studies into the political thought of Lord Acton revolve around his particular brand of liberalism (he is referred to as a Liberal Catholic), some new scholarship regarding the political thought of T.H. Green is trying to determine the degree to which he was influenced by republican thought. Green is not quoted extensively in Trudeau’s work, but is mentioned as an influence thus a brief foray into his political thought is warranted.

T.H. Green’s influence on Trudeau is not analyzed with any great detail in most writings perhaps because it is either regarded as a given or perhaps other influences are considered to be more important. A notable exception comes by way of the Nemnis (2011) who acknowledge Trudeau’s assertion that he “learned the philosophy of T.H. Green, whose liberalism [said] that the focal point was not the state” (Trudeau, 1993: 47), but they rather question the depth of that influence. They state the following:

This interpretation of Green, written in 1993, contradicts what we find in his seven pages of notes, taken down in 1947, during the ‘Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation’. Several times, Trudeau expressed reservations similar to [Harold] Laski’s: [Trudeau’s notes read] ‘Green starts from the postulate that rights and duties are social in

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130 Part of the ‘New Liberalism’ movement of the late 1800s, Green — a deeply religious man — was a British idealist who believed that the state should have a role to play in creating an environment that is conducive to allowing individuals to make moral choices. The influence of Hegel is obvious here. He is often seen as a major contributor to the development of ‘welfare liberalism’.
principle…This conception draws him dangerously close to the Hegelian form of the state’ (Nemnis, 2011: 91–92).

While Green was certainly influenced by Hegel, interpretations vary regarding the degree to which he was; perhaps Trudeau was somewhat harsh in this assessment. Green’s importance to the development of liberalism cannot be underestimated, but as Biagini (2003) states “of all the major liberal thinkers, he was the one sharing neo–roman values most explicitly” (59); in fact, “Green’s whole theory of the state was quintessentially ‘neo–roman’” (60) with an “almost Mazzinian\textsuperscript{131} version of ‘civic virtue’” (59). Tyler (2006) opens his study on Green’s relationship to modern republicans with the following:

Looking back to the 1850s and his undergraduate days at Balliol with T. H. Green, Edward Caird, and John Nicol, A. V. Dicey recalled that ‘we considered ourselves advanced Radicals, not to say Republicans’.\textsuperscript{132} Later in life Green identified himself explicitly with the radical wing of Advanced Liberalism, an orientation which implied republican leanings. Unfortunately, ‘republicanism’ was a rather vague concept during that period (262).

Tyler notes that leading theorists like Pettit and Braithwaite point to Green as one in a handful of liberals who can be described as latent republicans (ibid: 263). It is striking to note that Trudeau admired Acton who was suspicious of Mazzini, and Green who, as per MacCunn (1910), shared an affinity of thought with him. MacCunn (1910) also notes that

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{131} Here Biagini is referencing MacCunn (1910) and a full quotation will clarify: “For it is evident that to Green, as to Mazzini (with whom he is upon so many points at one), respect for men is inseparably interwoven with the belief that mankind in their ‘divine discontent’, in their spiritual cravings for betterment, in their service of ideals, ‘participate’ (the Platonic metaphor is also Green’s) in the very life of God. Mazzini’s watchword ‘God and the People’ is perhaps not a phrase which Green would have cared to use. The reasoning sobriety of his thought is in marked contrast to the unrestrained intuitive appeal of Mazzini. But no reader can doubt that upon his own grounds he was in profound sympathy with that watchword of the great political saint of Italy” (MacCunn, 1910: 252).
\item \textsuperscript{132} Here the author quotes: Reminiscence of A.V. Dicey, in William Knight, \textit{Memoir of John Nichol} (Glasgow, 1896).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
[t]he possession of rights is not freedom. This was the message of Green as it was of Mazzini. For actual freedom is found only in that satisfying fulfillment of civic duties to which rights, however precious, are but the vestibule. This is the characteristic view of Green. His eye is always on substantial freedom. It is not free institutions alone, nor rights alone, nor immunity from interference alone, that can satisfy him. Nothing will satisfy him but the fuller and better life into which the citizen comes when all these preliminaries have opened the way. His definition of freedom shows this…Freedom is ‘a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that too something that we do or enjoy in common with others’…To him the only genuine freeman is the fully-developed man and citizen… (259–260).

For MacCunn (ibid) Green is “neither for State intervention like the socialist, or against it” (260); if one is able to show that state intervention prevents people from developing into the best they can be then Green will eschew and discourage intervention (ibid). It might be said that Green stresses strongly a positive version of liberty. Tyler (2006) argues that Green’s “freedom is shown to contain negative and positive freedom…as well as autonomy” (263) and that his version is more complex than the republican non-domination paradigm alone (267). For Tyler (2006), “Green places very great stress on the need for a predictable context for reflective agency” which he summarizes to mean “the State should secure a…system of negative rights, a system of effective rights and freedoms from interference by others. Once again, this is a recurring theme in contemporary republican writings” (285). Indeed, it is. This describes perfectly the republican preoccupation for predictability of state intervention which is justifiable only when it is of a non–dominating nature. Tyler (ibid) sees Green as

advocat[ing for] the creation of a political sphere characterized by non–domination, secured via the enforcement of a robust system of both negative rights and obligations as well as positive rights, in the context of
which citizens can rationally plan and execute actions which grow out of their self-reflective and informed wills (285).

Green was struck by the notions of Greek civic virtue and was also taken with the ancient notions of democracy as was John Stuart Mill (Biagini, 2003: 61–62), but that should not lead us to believe that [Green] was a “follow[er of] Plato and Aristotle” (MacCunn, 1910: 246); rather, the problem with which he was presented will ring familiar “How to unite the intense civic spirit of the ancient world with modern democratic aspirations?” (ibid). MacCunn (ibid) notes that “the political message of Green” in regards to “active citizenship” is that “[i]t is not enough for him that men should be loyal citizens” he would have them become “‘intelligent patriots’ in whom an appreciation of social ends has awakened a passion to serve their country” (255).133

It is interesting to note Tyler (2006) remarks:

Green advocates a form of republicanism that is radical even by contemporary standards. His distinctive and coherent position straddles the divide between protective [or neo–Roman] and civic humanist [civic republican] variants, and shares the respective strengths of both (264).

Those who would argue that Trudeau’s liberalism can be proven by his associations with Lord Acton are perhaps correct to the extent that the justification for his virulent anti-nationalism and his defence of pluralism and the federalist principle can be found in the works of Acton. I argue that the influence ends there since Acton’s understanding of

133 MacCunn (1910) quotes Green in a footnote: “The citizens of the Roman Empire were loyal subjects; the admirable maintenance of private rights made them that; but they were not intelligent patriots, and chiefly because of they were not, the Empire fell. That active interest in the service of the State, which makes patriotism in the better sense, can hardly arise while the individual’s relation to the State is that of a passive recipient of protection in the exercise of this rights of person and property” (from Green’s Political Obligation, section 122; in MacCunn, 255). It is not difficult to see why Trudeau had some reservations about Green and his ‘Hegelian sympathies’. 155
democracy is rather limited and is not likely to have found much sympathy from Trudeau. The Nemnis (2011) suggest Green’s influence on Trudeau is sparsely documented and they mention only one note, so I infer that the influence might not have been that important to begin with. If one were to advance the argument that lack of notes or specific mentions do not prove lack of influence — which is, in fact, rather reasonable — new scholarship regarding the nature of Green’s political thought attributes to him a republican sensibility since it centres on a ‘cloaked’ republicanism that was perhaps shared by liberals of his time.\textsuperscript{134}

Green’s own republicanism and the depth of his actual influence on Trudeau are, of course, debateable; however, one school of thought remains without question when speaking about Pierre Trudeau. Without a doubt, one of the most influential figures for the development of his political thought was Jacques Maritain and the philosophy of personalism. I will begin the next section by explaining personalism which is the philosophy to which both Maritain and Trudeau claim varying degrees of allegiance.

*Personalism*

Personalism has been described in so many ways it is almost impossible to find a consistent and established definition, let alone any agreement on its content. Trudeau (1993) limits his elaboration on personalism to stating simply that

\[ \text{T}hanks to two French thinkers, Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, I never came to believe in the doctrine\]

\textsuperscript{134} Biagini’s (2003) argument is that “…Victorian liberalism was both individualist and ‘republican’ at one and the same time. There was no opposition between these characteristics, because, rather than being opposed, they were merely different facets of the same tradition” (58, italics in original).
of absolute liberalism... During my stay in France... I became a follower of personalism, a philosophy that reconciles the individual and society. The person, according to these two teachers, is the individual enriched with a social conscience, integrated into the life of the communities around him and the economic context of his time, both of which must in turn give persons the means to exercise their freedom of choice. It was thus that the fundamental notion of justice came to stand alongside that of freedom in my political thought (40).

By way of summary, Trudeau’s statement is quite concise and gives a relatively clear idea about what the aim of this philosophy might be; however, it is necessary to elaborate on this intellectual movement in more detail. The best aid for explaining personalism is its origins which lie in post–war Paris when thinkers began to engage in exploration of the meaning and nature of the person himself. Contrary to Hegelian collectivism and the fierce individualism of Nietzsche’s superman, these thinkers... stressed the inviolable dignity of the individual person and at the same time his social nature and vocation to communion (Williams, 2004: 168–9).

The most well–known of these thinkers are, of course, Emmanuel Mounier136 (founder of the journal Esprit) and later Jacques Maritain,137 both men cited as having had profound

135 It is important to point out a subtlety in language here. One should notice the use of the words communal and communion in personalism which I believe they use to distinguish purposefully that notion from community and communitarianism — a subtle but important difference.

136 Williams (2004) offered an interpretation of Mounier’s view of “the Christian as the watchful athlete engaged in spiritual combat [which] provided a stark response to Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity as a religion of the weak” (169–170). For anyone who has read the many Trudeau biographies, this view and interpretation of Christianity seems to make a great deal of sense and may provide the rationale for his penchant for experiencing the world first–hand and seeking to test himself and his limits through his many outdoor adventures.

137 Maritain if often credited in various studies with introducing personalism to North America when he began teaching at an American university. He is also widely credited with having a major influence on the Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 by the United Nations (Williams, 2004 is just one of the many articles that credit Maritain with these).
influences on Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Trudeau, 1993). Another prominent personalist is Karol Wojtyla who “was influenced by his experience of the Hegelian totalitarianism in his native Poland, both of Nietzschean (National Socialism) and Marxist (Leninist Communism) stamp” (Williams, 2004: 172). Williams (2004) stated that

Nineteenth–century philosophy was marked by different forms of determinism and materialism. Enamored of the scientific method, some followers of Isaac Newton posited theories of human nature that blurred or cancelled the distinction between man and the rest of nature, depriving him of his spiritual character and free will (167).

Williams (2004) suggested that the combination of G.W.F. Hegel’s theoretical contributions which, in turn, inspired Charles Darwin’s seminal theories of evolution, Karl Marx’s materialistic spin on dialectics and, of course, the most prominent party, Friedrich Nietzsche’s individualistic übermensch (167-169) all saw humankind

as a mere phenomenal being, easily assimilated into the collectivities of the family, the community and the state. [Humankind] was a product of external forces, an insignificant piece in a cosmic puzzle, without dignity, freedom, or responsibility. Darwinism, in particular, uprooted the classical understanding of man as essentially superior to the rest of creation by offering a theory whereby man would be simply the most advanced life form along an unbroken continuum, and the difference between man and

138 The Nemnis (2010) cite another personalist, namely, Berdyaev as having also had an important impact on Trudeau and provide ample evidence for this assertion (70–72); however, I prefer to investigate those authors that Trudeau mentions more frequently, rather than those to whom he refers sporadically. That being said, Trudeau does indeed mention Berdyaev in Conversations with Canadians (1972): “In my formative years the people who influenced me the most were the Christian existentialists. I mean men like Mounier and Kierkegaard and perhaps most of all Nicholas Berdyaev” (9). Curiously, however, Maritain is mentioned more frequently, thus I will take that to mean that, cumulatively, he was perhaps the most important influence.

139 Perhaps more recognizable with his papal name Pope John Paul II

140 As a side note, although the association between Nietzsche and National Socialism is commonplace, I am not particularly comfortable with it nor have I ever been entirely convinced of its accuracy.
irrational animals would merely be in degree, not in kind (Williams, 2004: 167).

Williams (2004) also suggested that liberalism is a contributor to this particular understanding of humankind because, in his view, it “grounds itself in an extreme individualism, yet this individualism more closely resembles Darwin’s survival of the fittest than a Christian understanding of the inviolable dignity of and worth of the human person” (168). He supported this interpretation by stating that liberalism encouraged each man to look for his own welfare with the assurance that such ‘enlightened self-interest’ would guarantee the best outcome for all. Despite their many differences, both Hobbes and Locke have posited their philosophies on a pre-social natural state of man, contrary to the classical and Christian understanding of the person as naturally social (168).

To summarize briefly my understanding of this, personalism seems to have come as a reaction to the excessive individualism heralded by liberalism, the stolid collectivism of communism, and the strictures of communitarian nationalism. If this sounds familiar, it is because I have made the claim that modern theoretical interpretations of republicanism, in essence, are trying to do the same thing although perhaps for different reasons. Personalists, in essence, appear to be recognizing the elemental importance and prominence of the individual person and his/her conscience and freedom, and at the same time, they are recognizing the importance of the social and communal nature of persons.

By simply glimpsing at the name personalism, it becomes clear that persons, or more specifically, ‘the person’, reign supreme. Given this statement, one might immediately associate the supremacy of the person in personalism with the supremacy of the individual touted in liberalism. This would be a hasty association indeed because
attention should be drawn to the use of two distinct (albeit similar) words: *person* (and non–person) versus *individual*. According to personalism, the difference is of great magnitude: “the person is an individual possessing a rational nature. Precisely this rational, spiritual nature gives rise to the different qualities that distinguish the person…” (Williams, 2004: 176).

Thomas Aquinas suggested that humankind is part of God’s creation, but is adamant that it is the most dignified part of creation precisely because of the rational nature with which it is endowed (Aquinas, 1948: 42; Williams, 2004: 178). Because of this rational nature and its “fundamental similarity to the Blessed Trinity”,¹¹¹ there is a “gulf between man and all other creatures” (Williams, 2004: 179). An elaboration here is necessary:

Indeed, man’s dignity is rooted in his rational nature, which separates him from the rest of visible creation and wherein chiefly lies his resemblance to God. No matter what other elements are emphasized — the person’s freedom, his creativity, his action, his self–consciousness, his interiority, his sociability, and so forth — they all have their objective base in an intellectual, and thus a spiritual nature. According to Thomistic theology and philosophy, the distinguishing characteristic of the person is precisely his rational nature, from which his unique dignity derives and this essential tenet distinguishes Thomistic personalism from other personalist schools (Williams, 2004: 176).

Jacques Maritain (1946) stated that “[t]he doctrine of the distinction between individuality and personality…is revealed in the principle of St. Thomas” (419) and that, in the personalism that developed out of the works of Aquinas, the difference between the

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¹¹¹ Statements like these of course link the philosophy to Christianity and the beliefs regarding trans–substantiation and the trichotic essence of its transcendent being.
person and the individual became largely metaphysical (420). This distinction can be found in many other cultures and philosophies (ibid: 429), but I will limit the analysis to Thomistic personalism’s view of the matter.

In my reading of Maritain (1946), I understand him to differentiate personhood and individuality in terms of an interior life versus exterior needs. He asserted emphatically that personhood is much more intricate and complex than individuality (431–3) though the two are not separate (433) — each lives within a human being and depending on which one is given primacy, life will be richer or poorer (431–3). I deduce that the individual is merely a component, replaceable with any other component in a given piece of an apparatus, so there is nothing intimately unique or special about an individual since s/he is merely a member of species identical to all other members.

As an individual each of us is a fragment of a species, a part of the universe, a unique point in the immense web of cosmic, ethnical, historical forces and influences — and bound by their laws. Each of us is subject to the determinism of the physical world. Nonetheless, each of us

142 “[I]n order to avoid misunderstandings and nonsense, we must emphasize that they are not two separate things. There is not in me one reality, called my individual, and another reality, called my person (433)…Our whole being is an individual by reason of that in us which derives from matter, and a person by reason of that in us which derives from spirit” (Maritain, 1946: 434).

143 “Of course, material individuality is not something evil in itself. Obviously, as the very condition of our existence, it is something good. But it is precisely as related to personality that individuality is good. Evil arises when, in our action, we give preponderance to the individual aspect of our being. For although each of our acts is simultaneously the act of ourselves as an individual and as a person, yet, by the very act that it is free and involves our whole being, each act is linked in a movement towards the supreme center to which personality tends, or a movement towards that dispersion into which, if left to itself, material individuality is inclined to fall” (Maritain, 1946: 434).

144 “[H]is actions can follow the bent either of personality or of material individuality. If the development occurs in the direction of material individuality, it will be orientated toward the detestable ego whose law is to grasp or absorb for itself. At the same time personality, as such, will tend to be adulterated and to dissolve. But if the development occurs in the direction of spiritual personality, man will be oriented towards the generous self of the heroes and saints. Thus, man will be truly a person only in so far as the life of the spirit and of liberty reigns over that of the senses and passions” (Maritain, 1946: 434, emphasis in original).
is also a person and, as such, is not controlled by the stars. Our whole being subsists in virtue of the subsistence of the spiritual soul which is in us a principle of creative unity, independence and liberty (Maritain, 1946: 431).

As Williams (2004) explains, a person is not merely a carbon copy or replica of the next person rather within him/her is an intrinsic dignity that ascribes moral obligations, but also and perhaps most importantly, this dignity attributes value as a *unique person* rather than as a simple interchangeable cog in a machine. A person is not merely a member of a species; instead, there is a quality about him/her that is exceptional and of inestimable value rendering him/her absolutely irreplaceable and unique (ibid).

Williams (2004) suggested that “[t]he major difference is that an individual represents a single, countable unit in a homogeneous species of being, interchangeable with any other member of the species, whereas a person is characterized by his uniqueness and irreplaceability” (180). Essentially then,

…[i]n [a] deeper sense persons cannot, properly speaking, be counted, because a single person is not merely one in a series within which each member is identical to the rest for all practical purposes, and thus exchangeable for any other. One can count apples, because one apple is as good as another (i.e. what matters is not that it is *this* apple, but simply that it is *an* apple)...but one cannot count *persons* in this way. One can count human beings, as individuals of the same species, but the word *person* emphasizes the uniqueness of each member of the human species, his incommunicability (181, emphases in original).

Personhood, then, implies rationality and free will (Williams, 2004: 182), and an intrinsic sociability.

Some thinkers have proposed a *real* distinction between a human person and a human individual. From their perspective, personhood would be an acquired ‘extra’ for a human being, a status reached not simply by being an
individual of the species, but by entering into relationships with other persons in a conscious, intentional way. In other words, while all human persons could be human individuals, the reverse would not be true (Williams, 181–2).\footnote{Williams (2004) quotes Von Balthasar thusly: “If one distinguishes between \textit{individual} and \textit{person} (and we should for the sake of clarity), then a special dignity is ascribed to the person, which the individual as such does not possess. We see this in the animal kingdom where there are many individuals but no persons. Carrying this distinction over to the realm of human beings, we will speak in the same sense of ‘individuals’ when primarily concerned with the identity of human nature, to which, of course, a certain dignity cannot be denied insofar as all human beings are spiritual subjects. We will speak of a ‘person’, however, when considering the uniqueness, the incomparability and therefore irreplaceability of the individual (181; in Balthasar, ‘on the Concept of Person”, 18; emphases in original).}

We begin here to see the person’s \textit{communal} reality rather than the atomistic, individual one:

\begin{quote}
Personality…signifies interiority to self. And because it is the spirit in man which takes him, in contrast to the plant and animal, beyond the threshold of independence properly so called, and of interiority to oneself, the subjectivity of the person has nothing in common with the isolated unity…of the Leibnitzian monad. It requires communications of knowledge and love. By the very fact that each of us is a person and expresses himself to himself, each of us requires communication with \textit{other} and \textit{the others} in the order of knowledge and love. Personality, of its essence, requires a dialogue in which souls really communicate (Maritain, 1946: 433, emphasis in original).
\end{quote}

It is this sociability that perhaps leads us to consider the dimensions of a \textit{common good}. Maritain referenced Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of a \textit{cosmic} common good and the belief that humankind is created in God’s image. While not ignoring or diminishing those beliefs, I will not spend time analyzing this particular understanding of \textit{common good} since it is not of any real importance to our treatment of personalism’s potential impact on political society. What I seek to do here, is try to gauge if this
philosophy’s understanding of a political or societal common good in any way resembles a neo–Roman republican notion.

As a reminder, the concept of virtù/common good requires citizens to take their rights and responsibilities to heart and try to consider not only their narrow self–interest, but to understand they should allow room for “self–interest as members of the political community” (Burtt, 1993: 365). Attention to, and involvement in, the public sphere is what I consider to be republican political virtue/common good because not only does it allow for the articulation and pursuit of private interests, but it creates an atmosphere of solidarity among citizens allowing for the realization of their social interdependence, but does not undermine their individualism.

Maritain (1946) stated

No one more than St. Thomas has emphasized the primacy of the common good in practical or political order of the life of the city, as in every order, where, in relation to a same category of good, the dictation between the private and common good is found. At every opportunity, he repeats the maxim of Aristotle that the good of the whole is ‘more divine’ than the good of the parts. Unceasingly he strives to preserve this dictum authenticum, applied according to the most diverse degrees of analogy. A fortiori, then, does he give it its full value in strictly social matters. Because the common good is the human common good, it includes within its essence...the service of the human person. The adage of the superiority of the common good is understood in its true sense only in the measure that the common good itself implies a reference to the human person (427–8, emphases in original).
Maritain (1946) noted that because of our humanity, or perhaps more precisely, our personhood, we tend to gravitate toward “communion” (435–6); we are propelled toward others in order to build human societies satisfying both our personal nature which speaks to the “inner urge to the communications of knowledge and love which require relationships with other persons” (435–6), and our individual nature which requires the fulfillment of our “material needs” (435–6). Put differently, “[s]ociety appears, therefore, to provide the human person with just those conditions of existence and development which it needs. It is not by itself alone that it reaches its plenitude but by receiving essential goods from society” (Maritain: 436). Maritain links his understanding of the communal nature of humans and the notion of personhood to the common good of political societies:

There is a correlation between this notion of the person as social unit and the notion of the common good as the end of the social whole. They imply one another. The common good is common because it is received in persons, each one of whom is a mirror of the whole….The end of society, therefore, is neither the individual good nor the collection of the individual goods of each of the persons who constitute it. Such a conception would dissolve society as such to the advantage of its parts, and would amount to either a frankly anarchistic conception, or the old disguised anarchistic conception of individualistic materialism in which the whole function of the city is to safeguard the liberty of each; thus giving to the strong full freedom to oppress the weak (Maritain, 1946: 436–437).

Pierre Trudeau (1998) expresses the idea thusly,

I was influenced here by my reading of Jacques Maritain and the so-called personalists. Personalism essentially said

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146 Again, I understand him here to be distinguishing between communitarianism and communion since community would be a collection of individuals whereas societies are aggregates built for and by persons.
that the individual, not the state, must be supreme, with basic rights and freedoms, because the individual is the only moral entity, the only one who has significance. But, granted that, we should view the individual as a person involved in society and with responsibilities to it. In other words, sovereign individuals can get together to co–insure each other against the accidents and hazards of living in society. This co–insurance is exercised through the welfare state, by helping those who can’t help themselves. I found personalism a good way to distinguish my thinking from the self–centered individualism of laissez–faire liberalism (or modern–day neo–conservativism, for that matter) by bestowing it with a sense of duty to the community in which one is living (5).

In a previous quotation, Maritain spoke of an essential end to (or rationale for),
societies. To understand more completely what Maritain meant by the \textit{common good} and the ultimate \textit{end} for society, I must have him first answer the questions: ‘what is a \textit{society}?’ and why, if for any specific reason, is he using this term in particular?\textsuperscript{147}

For Maritain, there are important distinctions\textsuperscript{148} that, if understood properly, place him comfortably in a republican paradigm. For example, he places importance on the difference between \textit{community} and \textit{society}\textsuperscript{149} by informing us that the ‘objects’ for which people justify aggregation, are different. In a community, defined as “…a product of instinct and heredity in given circumstances and historical frameworks…[where] social relations proceed from given historical situations and environments…[and where] man

\textsuperscript{147} This is important because some Quebeccois nationalists or supporters of ‘special status’ used Maritain’s writings to provide supposed evidence of Trudeau’s betrayal of his community and his belief system, Burelle going so far as to say that he abandoned Maritain’s principles in favour of an individualistic American republican understanding of community. These allegations are incorrect. If one reads Maritain carefully, it is obvious that Trudeau strayed from Maritain’s teachings only insofar as the highly religious nature of them, but retained the fundamentals.

\textsuperscript{148} Community versus society (this resembles the distinction between CR and NRR discussed in chapter two); and nation versus the body politic/State and so on.

\textsuperscript{149} “…society finally springs up from human freedom…community springs up from nature” (Maritain, 2008: 165)
appears as a product of the social group”, the object “is a fact which precedes the
determination of human intelligence and will, and which acts independently of them to
create a common unconscious psyche, common feelings and psychological structures,
and common mores”\(^{150}\) (Maritain, 2008: 165). By contrast, a society is “a product of
reason and moral strength [where] personal consciousness retains priority, the social
group is shaped by men, and social relations proceed from a given initiative…and the
voluntary determination of human persons” (165). The object in a society is “a task to be
done or an end to be aimed at, which depends on the determinations of human
intelligence and will and is preceded by the activity — either decision, or, at least,
consent — of the reason of individuals” (Maritain, 2008: 165).\(^{151}\) So, then

\[t]he common good is not only the collection of public commodities and services….The common good also
includes the sociological integration of all the civic conscience, political virtues and sense of law and freedom,
of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches,
of unconsciously operating hereditary wisdom, or moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism
in the individual lives of the members of the body politic (ibid: 172).

He continues on to say that

…the common good is not only…an end, a good in itself
or, as the Ancients expressed it, a \textit{bonum honestum}…The
common good is something ethically good. Included in it,
as an essential element, is the maximum possible

\(^{150}\) Here he makes reference to J.T. Delos.

\(^{151}\) “In society, social pressure derives from law or rational regulations, or from an idea of the
common aim; it calls forth personal conscience and liberty, which must obey the law freely. A
society always gives rise to communities…Never can a community develop into a society, though
it can be the natural soil from which some societal organization springs up through reason” (ibid: 166).
development, *hic et nunc*, of the persons making up the united multitude to the end of forming a people, organized not by force alone but by justice (Maritain, 2008: 438).

We can return briefly now to Maritain’s conclusions about the rationale for political society. He stated,

The end of society is the good of the community, of the social body. But if the good of the social body is not understood to be a common good of *human persons*, just as the social body itself is a whole of human persons, this conception also would lead to other errors of a totalitarian type. The common good of the city is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole…It is the good *human* life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living…Unless it would vitiate itself, it implies and requires recognition of the fundamental rights of persons and those of the domestic society in which the persons are more primitively engaged than in the political society. It includes within itself as principal value, the highest access, compatible with the good of the whole, of the persons to their life of person and liberty of expansion, as well as to the communications of generosity consequent upon such expansion…Thus, that which constitutes the common good of political society is not only: the collection of public commodities and services…[but also]…and above all, the whole sum itself of these; a sum which is quite different from a simple collection of juxtaposed units…It includes the sum or sociological integration of all the civic conscience, political virtues and sense of right and liberty, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches, of consciously operative hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in the individual lives of its members (437–8).

Trudeau (2010) mirrors this albeit, as is his custom, by using more spartan terms:

[W]e live in society precisely so that we *can* tackle collectively the problems that we cannot solve individually…the community simply decided to solve these problems communally, through the state….After all, as Aristotle said, men live in society so that they can live a full life. The point of human society is that men living
together, by mutual help, co–operation, and the division of labour, can fulfill themselves better than if they lived apart (43, emphasis in original).

These understandings of society and the common good, which resemble strongly the republican notions of them, leads to questions regarding the function of the state and political participation of the citizenry in it. The state, considered in this paradigm as the “superior embodiment of reason”, is not above the body politic according to Maritain (2008: 173); rather it is that apparatus charged with maintaining law and order, political administration, and promoting the common good. This description appears to be disputing the Hegelian emphasis on the state as the “supreme incarnation of the Idea” (Maritain, 2008: 173). Trudeau (2010) stated that

In any stable, self–governing society, the state is simply a creature, emanating from the members of that society. In other words, the state is precisely what the people want it to be, and has only such reality as they choose to give it. Its authority is limited by the general agreement to obey it. And it can exert only as much force as the citizens lend it (48).

For Maritain (1951: 13) and Trudeau (2010: 48), it would seem that the state remains entitled, of course, to its use of coercion and the exercise of power that are necessary to secure public order, but through its institutions, it is charged with safeguarding the whole

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152 “The notion of body politic means the whole unit composed of the people. The notion of the people means the members organically united who compose the body politic...the concept of the people is the highest and noblest concept among the basic concepts that we are analyzing. The people are the very substance, the living and free substance, of the body politic. The people are above the State, the people are not for the State, the State is for the people. I should finally like to point out that the people have a special need of the State, precisely because the State is a particular agency specializing in the care of the whole, and thus has normally to defend and protect the people, their rights and the improvement of their lives against the selfishness and particularism of privileged groups or classes” (Maritain, 2008: 184).
of political society. Maritain (1951) calls this an instrumentalist conception of the state because it — the state — is seen as only a part of the whole body politic which, in effect, is subordinate to it and is entitled to exercise its authority only insofar and until it is seen as functioning for the benefit of the common good (13). Maritain states that this instrumentalist conception of the state makes it a political conception (ibid). Trudeau shared this interpretation of the state when he said “[t]he function of a state is to ensure the establishment and maintenance of a legal order that will safeguard the development of its citizens” (1968: 21). Notice however the use of the word ‘development’; this concept will return later when, in classic republican language, Trudeau will suggest that the state can and should make efforts to educate its citizens to democracy and be made fit to participate in the political process. In Approaches to Politics (2010), Trudeau stated

[T]he state is by definition the instrument whereby human society collectively organizes and expresses itself. A sovereign society that fears the state is a moribund society, unconvinced of the usefulness of its own existence as a group…I want the state to do more, but only after we have stopped thinking of it as an absolute master. In fact, if we were to extend the powers of the state without having multiplied our means of controlling its policy and limiting its methods of acting, we would tend to increase our enslavement. That is why I am wary of those who preach indiscriminate nationalization without setting themselves first to undermine the undue majesty of political power (44).

153 “Men do not exist for states: states are created to make it easier for men to attain some of their common objectives” (Trudeau, 1968: 18).

154 Undeniable tip of the hat to Rousseau it seems.
So, what of the *people* and its *sovereignty*? Relying on a rather fanciful definition of sovereignty, Maritain reaches the conclusion that “there is no sovereignty, that is, no natural and inalienable right to *transcendent* or *separate* supreme power in political society…Nor is the State sovereign; nor are even the people sovereign. God alone is sovereign” (Maritain, 2008: 182, emphasis in original). Trudeau (2010) did not seem to share this particular conclusion:

But whence comes authority in civil and political society?…Some take the easy way out by reiterating that authority comes from God. They omit to explain why God conferred it on a Stalin or a Hitler; or why in our democracies, God would choose to express himself through the intermediary of electoral thugs and big campaign contributors. According to others, authority is founded on force…Still other invoke natural law…Like the divine explanation, this is an abstraction; while it is not false, it fails to explain the contradictory variety of forms of authority and law (27–28).

While clearly religious thought had a very personal impact on Trudeau, publicly it was more muted. Certainly, for Trudeau, Maritain’s vision would be too anchored in religion to be of any political use. Nor can it make any sense in the context of considering a common good. The ‘God’ of which Maritain speaks is relevant only to a segment of society and does not hold the same significance for the whole of the body politic. One cannot speak of a common good of the *whole* of society if sovereignty belongs to a particular God. If one relies on the concept of a transcendent being of one kind of another being the ultimate sovereign, it would follow that only a segment of the citizenry could

155 Maritain (2008) said: “[P]eople are not sovereign in the genuine sense of this word. For in its genuine sense the notion of sovereignty relates to a power and independence which are supreme *separately from* and *above* the whole ruled by the sovereign. And obviously the power and independence of the people are not supreme *separately from* and *above the people themselves*” (183, emphasis in original). In other words, God is sovereign.
agree with the source of sovereignty that supports its society — hardly a recipe for a stable and communal society. Sovereignty must lie elsewhere. Trudeau (2010) likely understood that sovereignty of the people does not necessarily undermine religious belief, tracing the concept back for ages:

But these theories go back to the very origins of political thought. Traces of it are found in Plato, in Epicurus, in the *lex regia* of the Romans, and in Cicero, for whom the authority of the state flows from the collective power of the people...Theories of popular sovereignty are even more widespread, if possible. Let us just recall precursors like St. Isidore, and tyrannicides like the monk John of Salisbury and the Jesuit Mariana. The idea that political authority flows from the will of the governed has deep foundations in medieval theology. Thus, with John of Paris, ‘*populo faciente et Deo inspirante*’; Marsilius of Padua and St. Thomas Aquinas also hold that God is only the ‘*causa remota*’ of authority...they elaborated systems that, by invoking some sort of popular participation or consent, set limits to political authority, protected the liberty of the citizens, and assured the full development of the individual (60–62).

About God, he (ibid) merely says that society is a given fact for man...wherever men live they in fact live in society and depend on a social order...there is no territory in the world that does not fall under the dominion of some sovereign power....The human being, then, lives in the framework of society; and life in society cannot be pictured without subjection to an established order – that is, a government. It is in this sense that one can say that authority, philosophically speaking, comes from God or from the nature of things, since God has created man with a nature that compels him to live in society: subject, that is, to politics. Political authority comes from God in the same sense as the queen’s authority in a beehive comes from God...Men stay free because no one is fully vested by God or nature with authority to rule his fellows...Human societies, then, differ from the beehives in that men are always free to decide what form of authority they will adopt, and who will exercise it. And it really is
men who have the responsibility of taking these decisions – not God, Providence, or Nature. In the last analysis any given political authority exists only because men consent to obey it. In this sense what exists is not so much authority as the obedience (30–31).

At one point, Maritain does leave religion at the pulpit and tells us that the people will always have the right — a natural and perpetual right — “to full autonomy, or to self–government” which they exercise “when they establish the Constitution, written or unwritten, of the body politic; or when, in a small political group, they meet together to make a law or a decision; or when they elect their representatives” who then become custodians of the common good and are trusted to make laws and represent interests for a limited term of power (Maritain, 2008: 183). He concludes

To sum up, the common good of the body politic demands a network of authority and power in political society, and therefore a special agency endowed with uppermost power, for the sake of justice and law. The State is that uppermost political agency. But the State is neither a whole nor a subject of right, or a person. It is a part of the body politic, and, as such, inferior to the body politic as a whole, subordinate to it, and at the service of its common good. The common good of the political society is the final aim of the State, and comes before the immediate aim of the State, which is the maintenance of the public order. The State has a primary duty concerning justice, which should be exercised only in the manner of an ultimate supervision in a body politic basically just in its inner structures. Finally the body politic must control the State…At the point of the pyramid of all the particular structures of authority which in a democratic society should take form in the body politic from the bottom up, the State enjoys topmost supervising authority. But this supreme authority is received by the State from the body politic, that is, from the people; it is not a natural right to supreme power which the State possesses itself (ibid: 181–182, emphasis in original).

The influence of Maritain on Trudeau is very apparent. Personalism’s, and in particular Maritain’s treatments of the common good, the nature of society and the body
politic, power and authority, and the role of the state all share a strong affinity with those of classical republicanism. Having established that there is a close theoretical connection between republicanism and personalism, and between Trudeau and Maritain, I will leave personalism and now concentrate on Trudeau’s own writings to verify if his understanding of the virtue/common good/ political participation and purposeful belonging are, in fact, republican.

Trudeau’s Classical Republicanism

I will begin with a reminder from the introduction of this thesis of why it is relevant to examine Trudeau’s political thought in this paradigm. The relevancy can be summarized in one word: democracy. Our current understanding of democracy is so multifaceted that it has become almost impossible for us to determine what exactly we think democracy is and what we expect it to do. In particular, it would appear that democracy has become a merely a mechanism through which each segment of society gets what it wants and deems necessary without much regard for the common good of the whole of society. In other words, we conceive democracy to be and do things for which it was not intended; in fact, we are forcing it to do the exact opposite. This is certainly not the democracy that Trudeau had in mind.

We know that he appreciated democracy for several reasons, many of which resonate today more than ever:

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\text{[T]he merit of democracy is precisely that it makes peaceful changes possible \ldots precisely because it is a system of government that allows changes } \textit{without} \text{ revolution, } \textit{without} \text{ illegality. As long as we have freedom of speech and free elections, I think it childish and}
\]
irresponsible to want to drag us out of our political ills by violence” (Trudeau, 2010: 50 and 56, emphasis in original).

The democracy of which he speaks, however, is neither a populist direct democracy nor one that would require (or even desire) the participation of every citizen in every decision of government through forums of discursive or deliberative democracy.

In a previous chapter, I indicated the important difference between CR and NRR, and one may recall that one of the fundamental (and unworkable) characteristics of CR was forms of direct democracy or deliberative/discursive democracy.\(^{156}\) NRR does not require fundamental changes in the institutional arrangements since it is seeking a change in the citizenry first, and in the institutions, if necessary, later. Trudeau’s understanding of democracy does not mirror CR in any way; as a matter of fact, while not eschewing some instruments of direct democracy, he expresses openly that some are untenable in modern societies and should only be utilized under strict conditions. He disagrees with “detractors of democracy” (2010: 78) who tend to consider it akin to anarchy and puts forward the notion that, in fact, democracies show faith in the people since the state would operate by their consensus and only in the direction in which citizens wish to take it (ibid). In his own words:

Direct democracy is not a progressive form of democracy.
If you try to let everybody make the decisions, you’ll have

\(^{156}\) “Nor do I believe that elected representatives should abdicate their responsibility by being nothing but the mouthpieces for their constituencies. In its extreme form this ceases to be representative democracy and becomes direct democracy. Though it may look more democratic, it’s really tantamount to saying that policies and laws must be decided by the people themselves coming to grips with their problems; policies and laws must be decided in the streets by the masses. It’s a misunderstanding of parliamentary democracy, and it cannot be made to work in large societies because small groups meeting to deal with very important problems from their regional or local point of view cannot have in mind the legalistic, administrative, constitutional functions of government that are the fabric society must have to function in an orderly way” (Trudeau, 1998: 53–4).
complete anarchy. Even the Greeks discovered two and a half thousand years ago that they needed smaller groups of people to execute the decisions. Participatory democracy means that you have a chance to have your ideas known to those who govern you. It doesn’t mean that the government must always decide the way you think it should. You participate, the government decides, then you judge its decisions at election time (Trudeau, 1998: 54).

Here he makes reference to his notion of participatory democracy to which I will refer later in this chapter; for now, suffice it to say that while he is eliciting the participation of citizens in the political process, he is aware that principles and forums of direct democracy are no longer realistic in modern societies where the citizenry has neither the time nor proclivity, and perhaps does not even possess the technical knowledge to make large–scale decisions,¹⁵⁷ not to mention the incipient dangers of populism and its tendency to minimize important concerns reducing them to trivialities. Populism, therefore, is not a component of Trudeau’s political thought nor does he display any appreciation for it.

Trudeau reiterated time and again that in our Westminster system of parliamentary democracy, elected representatives must not abdicate their duties and become mere delegates for their constituencies, but must continue to be trustees for their portion of the electorate, and make decisions that will benefit both it and the common good. He stated that come election time, if the citizenry believes that its representatives have performed well, they will be compensated for their efforts by a return to public

¹⁵⁷ “That is why modern democracies hardly ever resort to the plebiscite — which requires each citizen to decide on what is often too technical a question. In contrast, the electoral system asks of the citizen only that they should decide on a set of ideas and tendencies, and on men who can hold them and give effect to them. These sets of ideas and men constitute political parties, which are indispensable for the functioning of parliamentary democracy” (1998: 67).
office; if the public deems otherwise, they will not be rewarded with that opportunity (1998: 67–8). To repeat, one of democracy’s greatest claims to fame, in fact, is that it allows citizens to express their opinions and change their governments without recourse to violence (2010: 50 and 56).

For citizens to make these important decisions regarding the retention or dismissal of governments, and to be able to articulate evaluations regarding their policies, Trudeau maintained that it was vital to secure a high degree of exchange of information. To ensure accountability, citizens must be aware of why governments are crafting particular policies and on which bases suggesting that a strengthened role for political parties and riding associations were an excellent way to do this (1998: 67–68). These would provide a vehicle through which the state (the government of the day) can investigate the preferences of its people in order to avoid interfering arbitrarily in their lives. If the state can intervene to set up mechanisms whereby it is able to investigate and assess the desires, needs, and preferences of citizens, it would be able to craft policies and legislation that are not deemed to be arbitrarily infringing on people’s freedom. In Trudeau’s (2010) words:

Now, what is it that citizens desire? That is the question that every democratic government must ask itself constantly. And it is in this respect that the democratic state, better than any other, turns to account the creative liberty of people living in society. For if it is to establish an order that citizens will agree to support, the state must go further than merely investigating their needs; it must also encourage them to demand what they consider just. In this way democracy becomes a system in which all citizens participate in government: the laws, in a sense, reflect the wishes of the citizens and thus turn to account the special wisdom of each one; the social order to some extent embodies all the wealth of human experience that the
citizens possess...In such a state the liberty of citizens is an end in itself. The authorities don’t think of it as an annoying phrase; on the contrary, they want it, and encourage it as the surest guide to the common good (78, emphasis in original).

I turn my attention now to investigating Trudeau’s interpretation of how participatory democracy can contribute to the common good and his understanding of this concept.

Common Good, Civic Virtue, and Public Participation

Trudeau (1990) stated “Pericles understood...democracy when he told the inhabitants of Athens, ‘We say that a man who takes no interest in politics and does not participate in the affairs of his city has no business here at all’” (259). It is clear that participation in the political life of one’s country was paramount to his appreciation for the democratic process.

We saw earlier that Trudeau’s understanding of the common good was inspired by the reflections of Jacques Maritain in addition, most likely, to other theorists with which he became familiar during his studies, and it appears clear that the only method through which Trudeau believed the common good can be achieved is through mechanisms of participatory democracy — “a mandatory feature of any ‘just society’” (Marsden, 1990: 262). In fact, “[t]he more Canadians who participated in politics, the more complete democracy would be” (ibid: 268). History tells us that Trudeau’s vision of participatory democracy was never fully realized, but some progress was established through numerous changes to how the House of Commons operated (ibid: 263–267) believing ministers should influence the government and represent constituencies more
effectively (ibid: 264–5). In fact, he maintained that the most essential component to the exercise of self–government was participation and he endeavoured to change the cabinet system to allow his own ministers to participate more efficiently:

[T]hat is why we altered the rules of Parliament so members of Parliament could play a more effective role; that is why we introduced reforms into the system of election financing so that representatives of every party would be on a more even footing; and that is why we fought for a referendum provision in the Constitution so that every citizen would have the opportunity to participate in shaping the fundamental law of the land (Trudeau, 1990: 259).

Trudeau’s understanding of participation is in keeping with the neo–Roman republican version of the concept. By way of reminder, I stated in a previous chapter that most liberals will argue that notions of virtue and the common good have elitist or totalitarian connotations. The potential dangers inherent with these notions far outweigh any of their perceived benefits and thus these sentiments, for however evocative, are to be rejected in modern society. As far as public participation in political affairs goes, from the pantheon of liberals one could chose any one of its most famous proponents to find public participation is not only optional, but sometimes it is actively discouraged.

Machiavelli’s virtù is necessary if the republic is to survive in freedom; without it, republics would be susceptible to corruption and disintegrate since the real enemies of free governments are complacent and self–interested citizens. To keep ozio and

158 “We really believed that the MPs were the creative process through which laws were made and the public was represented. So, aside from the shouting matches and fighting words, we made it a modern instrument of governing” (Trudeau, 1998: 63).
159 Echoes of Machiavelli ring clear here.
160 Here we see in which context he maintains an acceptable use of one of the instruments of direct democracy.
**Corruzione** at bay, citizens must have *virtù* (Discorsi, 1984) — and I claimed that this meant an attentiveness and alertness to public affairs. Political participation, then, is necessary in order to protect freedom because civic and “[p]olitical engagement educates citizens” and “tries to inspire a mentality that is hostile to…servility and arrogance” (Viroli, 1999: 11). Freedom thus can only endure if citizens practice their civic virtue because not only does it allow for the articulation and pursuit of private interests, but it creates an atmosphere of solidarity among citizens allowing for the realization of their social interdependence; however, this does not undermine their individualism. Citizens have to cultivate particular political virtues in order for the society to be successful, wealthy, and prosperous. Our question then becomes, ‘did Trudeau agree with any of this’?

For Trudeau, participating in the political process represented an opportunity for the electorate to articulate its ideas to each other and to the government.\(^{161}\) Although he never meant participatory democracy to allow every citizen to involve him/herself directly in the political process on a daily basis, he did wish to elicit a sense of importance about being aware of the machinations of government and sought to promote a relatively consistent exchange of information between those in power and those who put them there through political parties\(^{162}\) and “other vehicles for expressing our

\(^{161}\)“We believe that the great danger would be that young people cop out or drop out, feeling that governments are irrelevant, that they are not honest, and that you really can’t trust them…This of course is, to me, a wrong solution. By dropping out you renounce the possibility of shaping the destiny of your society. I believe you should drop in, and I believe it’s up to parties and governmental structures to facilitate this. In other words, I’d rather…have the young people in our society give their governments hell, or their authorities or their establishments hell…than have them out invading administration building or marching on parliament or setting fires to research centres” (Trudeau, 1972: 17).
concerns” (Trudeau, 1998: 62). The most memorable of these mechanisms were the extensive use of white papers and town–hall meetings.163

Consulting with Canadians is the way in which Trudeau sought to determine the common good. This, of course, is a typical republican attitude. He sought to enrich decision–making by encouraging as many citizens as possible to participate in the political process and in doing so, government would appear more accessible, more open to the citizenry’s concerns and would be ‘brought closer’ to it (Trudeau, 1998: 64–5).

This reflects a republican belief that “[t]he main purpose of government today is getting citizens to realize what their priorities must be. And explaining to them the choices they have to make” (ibid: 66). After all, it is republican democracy and its participatory demands that lead towards the good of the community by encouraging each citizen and each group of citizens to protest against the defects of society and to demand justice. A state enlightened in this way can then play its part, which is to protect the rights of every individual, and especially of the weak...So if the citizen wants to avoid being ordered about against his will, he must provide himself with a protector in the form of a state strong enough to subordinate to the public good all the individuals and organisms that go to make up society. That is why, as well as possessing...the monopoly on physical force, the state must assure itself of

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162 “For that purpose, our government tried to build the Liberal party into a mass party — one in which constituencies weren’t cornered by the so–called old guard who kept re–electing the same member who, in turn, kept protecting the old guard. We tried to open the party to all dissenters so they would be able to get involved in the policy conferences and constituency teach–ins. And we introduced major electoral reforms to encourage participation and counterbalance the influence of money” (Trudeau, 1998: 62).

163 “We instituted ‘regional desks’ in the Prime Minister’s Office, not to make it presidential, but to keep me informed about problems across the country. We kept people better informed by televising the parliamentary debates and establishing Information Canada to make government documents more readily available to the press and public. We consulted Canadian via white papers and town–hall meetings” (Trudeau, 1998: 63–4).
the services of capable men...without that, it is impossible to ensure the triumph of the public over private good (Trudeau, 2010: 84–5).

He has in mind a society of persons who together compose the body politic and work together towards the common good of it. The state works for the good of ‘man’ and it can only determine what that ‘good’ is if it can consult, hear, and evaluate what the citizenry believes it needs and wants. Trudeau (1972) said:

I guess most of the authors I’ve read crystallize my particular idea of virtue — that justice is a cornerstone of the society I live in, the basis of all human relations in the family or the state. I was not dreaming the Just Society up as a catchword or cliché, and I shrink from that thought now. To me, it summed up the total of the relationships in a society of free men. The Just Society is the kind of society freedom would establish. Looking ahead, I don’t think a state can say, ‘Here’s a state, a package imposed on you’. A Just Society is one toward which every citizen must work, and the first condition of such a society is that of respecting the liberty of individuals (12).

It is now necessary to examine his position on, and understanding of, freedom in order to ascertain if they correspond more closely to liberalism’s variant widely known as freedom as non–interference or if, indeed, it is more akin to republicanism’s freedom as non–domination.

Freedom as Non–Domination

It will be remembered that republicans conceive of a type of freedom they call freedom as non–domination. For classical republicans, an individual can be free only to the extent to which s/he is secure from arbitrary interference (Pettit, 1999). They regard people as ‘un–free’ whenever there is the possibility of someone arbitrarily interfering with the range of choice options available; and whenever someone is subjected to the
arbitrium of another, they are being dominated (ibid). Even a cursory reading of Trudeau allows one to detect immediately his compelling dedication to freedom.\footnote{164 “Freedom is the most important value of a just society, and the exercise of freedom its principal characteristic” (Trudeau, 1998: 16).}

I have long believed that freedom is the most important value of a just society, and the exercise of freedom its principal characteristic. Without these, a human being could not hope for true fulfilment — an individual in society could not realize his or her full potential. And deprived of its freedom, a people could not pursue its own destiny — the destiny that best suits its collective will to live (Trudeau, 1990: 357).

When he speaks of freedom, he often prefaces his pronouncements using the adjective ‘liberal’ or claiming they derive from a ‘liberal philosophy’. While liberalism does, in fact, set the highest possible value on individual freedom (which is not foreign or hostile to republicanism), Trudeau (1998) completes the thought by explaining his understanding of the individual defining him/her as “…the total individual, the individual as a member of a society to which he is inextricably bound by his way of life, and by community of interest and culture” (4). This is hardly a classical liberal definition for the individual. It is undisputable that liberalism places the individual above all else, but what to make of the following: “For a liberal, the individual represents an absolute personal value; the human person has a transcending social significance” (ibid: 5)? One will notice the use of word ‘person’ here and the view of him/her having a ‘social’ significance — his personalist influences are clear. He goes on to say that liberty is in fact a “free gift” and a “birthright” (2010: 49) and citizens must be careful to concede to the state only as much authority as necessary to secure public order and maintain the law. Using a classic
republican phrase, he states emphatically that “[i]n a constitutional society it is not men, but rather laws, that control us” (2010: 63) and that “[t]he real purpose of laws, then is to educate the citizen in the common good, and persuade him to behave in the public interest, rather than to command and constrain” (ibid: 50, emphasis mine). One would likely encounter great difficulty in trying to find any classical liberal who would endorse the notion that an appropriate role for the state is to ‘educate’ its people toward the public good or anything else for that matter. But Trudeau (2010) speaks like a republican in this regard:

Liberty can thrive only if consciously nurtured; liberty is never won for all time; liberty never sleeps…At certain times, on certain subjects, the government is either behind the people or in step with the people. But I believe a government should also try to be slightly ahead of the people. It must indicate the directions it thinks the society should follow for its future well-being. That’s what you might call leadership. However, you can’t go too far ahead of the people, too isolated, too dictatorial, or else the people will cease following. You can’t lead a people like you can lead a horse (3–4).

Echoes of assigning this role to the state can be found all the way back into the very first publications where he sings the praises of democracy and urges Quebecers to be educated to democracy. There he decries what he perceives as the backwardness of Québec society of the time, and attributes that not to any deficiency in the Québécois

165 “Our obedience, then, is not to individuals but to the general will of the nation, a will embodied in laws, to whose service and execution the rulers are appointed...[I]t is the general will that must prevail...That is why the statesman must be attentive to the needs of all sectors of society, with no bias towards thwarting any one of them, and must wish only to reconcile them all and direct them towards the general interest” (2010: 64).

166 He references none other than Jefferson in this regard: “I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion” (2010: 87).
culture or its people, but to the lack of democratic education. In *Federalism and the French Canadians* (1968), he talked about what the task of a socialist might be with regards to these matters. It would be unwise to dismiss this reference to socialism and the role of state with regards to citizens’ education in that regard, but the way in which the idea is expressed is not germane exclusively to socialism; so one is justified in investigating if what is being expressed here is really, or at least also, republican.

Among those authors mentioned in this classic collection of essays are Montesquieu and Tocqueville with regards to how the Canadian constitution is a blend of their interest in parliamentary democracy for the first and democracy in America for the second (Trudeau, 1968: xxii–xxiii). He forgets to mention, of course, that Montesquieu thought the English style of parliamentary government functioned under republican principles as a de facto republic despite the presence of the monarch, and that Tocqueville’s praises of how democracy was playing out in America was really a tribute to that unique American blend of democracy and republicanism. In fact, Trudeau quotes from Thomas Jefferson quite often — he being one of the crafters of American brand of republicanism — so one is forgiven if this choice casts doubts on the authenticity and depth of the ‘socialism’ being espoused here (1968: 145).

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167 “Canada also possessed a political tradition that was neither entirely libertarian nor entirely socialist, but rested on an indispensable partnership between government and the private sector, and on direct action by the state to protect the weak from the strong, the disadvantaged from the well-heeled” (1990: 359).

168 “Strangely enough, the classic analyses of these two systems are found in French thinkers: Montesquieu observing the British parliamentary system, and de Tocqueville describing American democracy. (In view of the fact that it was the Canadian constitution that united the qualities of these two systems for the first time in history, it is rather paradoxical that French–Canadian ‘thinkers’ should have such difficulty in perceiving its merits” (1968: xxii–xxiii)
In any event, Trudeau says that education should occur “at all levels of the electorate” (1968: 149, emphasis in original) and that “the first task of the socialist is to educate all of the people to demand maximum service from all of their government” (1968: 147) and laments the lack of democratic education in Québec imputing the blame in more than a few places from political parties to the elite in the province:

A party cannot have the approval of a majority of the electorate for well over half a century without accepting much of the blame for that electorate’s political immaturity….Instead of educating the French–speaking electorate to believe in democracy, the Liberals seemed content to cultivate the ignorance and prejudices of that electorate….[and] failed to inject valid democratic concepts into the innumerable campaigns waged during the present century (1968: 119).…They [the elite] had succeeded so well in subordinating the pursuit of the common weal to the pursuit of their particular ethnic needs that they never achieved any sense of obligation towards the general welfare (ibid: 107).

He is beginning to lament here the one thing that will come to define his legacy more than any other: his revulsion for ethnic nationalism, which he believed to be reactionary and intolerant. He stated that his

objection has always been to identifying a nation in the sociological sense with a nation in the political sense. The state must govern for the good of all the people within its boundaries. If you want to call that nationalism, so be it, though I prefer to call it patriotism or the common good (1998: 94, emphasis in original).

I stated previously that modern interpretations of republicanism see the common good as being synonymous to the national interest. It would appear that Trudeau would, in fact, agree with this statement. In fact, he takes one step further and uses language similar to Viroli’s when referring to ‘patriotism’. I preferred to use the language of purposeful
belonging when expressing this idea. I move now to examine Trudeau’s understanding of purposeful belonging and citizenship to establish if he speaks more as a liberal or republican.

Purposeful Belonging

I redefined modern republicanism’s understanding of ‘patriotism’ so as not to confine it to rhetoric. Instead of an antiquated notion of patriotism, I proposed the use of the term purposeful belonging which I see as a politics of rationality where the sense of allegiance or loyalty to one’s country (i.e. the bounded state) need not be conflated with ‘blood and soil’ attachments; rather, one’s country is where one chooses to make his/her home underwriting the duties and rights associated with the political contract of citizenship. Trudeau stated that

The nationalists — even those of the left — are politically reactionary because, in attaching such importance to the idea of nation, they are surely led to a definition of the common good as a function of an ethnic group, rather than of all the people, regardless of characteristics. That is why a nationalistic movement is by nature intolerant, discriminatory, and when all is said and done, totalitarian. A truly democratic government cannot be “nationalist”, because it must pursue the good of all its citizens, without prejudice to ethnic origin. The democratic government, then, stands for and encourages good citizenship (1998: 102, emphasis in original).

169 The ‘Blut und Boden’ of the Romantics.
170 Trudeau said that from all the controversies of repatriation and the Charter, he learned “that the people of Canada want a citizenship that means holding shared values and not merely a shared passport (1990: 309)
171 “A country, after all, is not something you build as the pharaohs built the pyramids, and then leave standing there to defy eternity. A country is something that is built every day out of certain basic shared values. And so it is in the hands of every Canadian to determine how well and wisely we shall build the country of the future” (1998: 182).
In addition,

[T]he modern state is a pluralistic society whose citizens must come together on the basis of their citizenship, as individuals with equal rights and mutual tolerance, not on the basis of their ethnicity or background or religion. *Otherwise, it’s a self-defeating principle* (1998: 100, emphases mine).\(^{172}\)

Trudeau claims to understand the “national will” as something quite different from the nationalisms he loathes (1998: 176–177); he thinks that ‘national will’ is synonymous with a “sense of belonging, a sense of patriotism, a sense that being together is better than being apart” (ibid: 176)\(^{173}\). This is an interesting combination of (republican) words, indeed.

So, in Trudeau’s mind, the best way to heal the ruptures in Canadian society and start a fresh contract of citizenship was through repatriation of the Canadian constitution and the addition of a charter of rights that he says is in keeping with the best liberalism:

Clearly, the very adoption of a constitutional charter is in keeping with the purest liberalism, according to which all members of civil society enjoy certain fundamental, inalienable rights and cannot be deprived of them by any collectivity (state or government) or on behalf of any collectivity (nation, ethnic group, religious group or other). To use Maritain’s phrase, they are ‘human personalities’, they are beings of moral order — that is, free and equal among themselves, each having absolute dignity and

\(^{172}\) It seems to me that in this sentence, he is repudiating modern understandings of multiculturalism and would likely not agree with where the concept was taken by liberal ‘multiculturalists’ like Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor.

\(^{173}\)“Sometimes, I’m afraid, the will to exist as a country is not very strong in Canada. There are all kinds of centrifugal forces…which have caused the national will to weaken. It has to be strengthened. The first thing we should do is ask ourselves: Do we really want to sacrifice something of our provincialism in order that we be a country or do we want to take the easy road towards regionalism or egocentric personal gain? Is it going to be every man for himself or is it going to be every man for his country?” (1998: 176–177)
infinite value. As such, they transcend the accidents of place and time, and partake in the essence of universal Humanity. They are therefore not coercible by any ancestral tradition, being vassal neither to their race, nor to their religion, nor to their condition of birth, nor to their collective history (1990: 363–364).

However, we know from Cicero onward that rights as described above are not the exclusive purview of liberalism, but were an invention of the Romans and their beloved Republic.

Trudeau’s intention with repatriation and the addition of the Charter was, of course, to “change society” (1990: Hebert, 131). He wanted to refashion citizenship to mean equality and shared values (Trudeau, 1990: 260), and the promotion of purposeful belonging (1998: 78–9). The Charter of course also gave increased sovereignty to the people of Canada establishing entrenched limits to the powers of all levels government — a “new beginning for the Canadian nation” (ibid). The intention was to give assurance to Canadians:

Knowing, whether they be Manitobans, Quebeckers, or Prince Edward Islanders, that they have common values, that they are united in these respects as Canadians — not divided provincially by differences — this is the strength of Canada. And if this structure exposes our cultures to some danger, should we not accept the challenge? Great cultures have always flourished when they have been forced to, but many have suffocated when over—protected (1972: 94, emphasis in original).

Neo–Roman republicanism might require a strong central government that could speak to the national interest and Trudeau’s governments were often accused of having strong centralizing tendencies (Trudeau, 1990: 205). But he argues that, in fact, through the
adoption of the Charter, the powers of all governments were curtailed in favour of the people and stated in the House that:

The feeling of being a Canadian, that individual feeling which we must cultivate, the feeling of being loyal to something which is bigger than the province or the city in which we happen to live, must be based on a protection of the basic rights of the citizens, of an access by that citizen to a fair share of the abundance of wealth in this country and to the richness and diversity of its laws. In that sense, the national interest must prevail over the regional interest, difficult as it is for some of us sometimes to set aside our feelings as citizens of this town or inhabitants of that province, because the provincial governments and other groups are there to speak for their interests. That is their duty and that is what they are elected for. But we are elected to speak for all of Canada, and if a person cannot feel that in any part of the country he or she will get a fair share, then they will transfer their loyalty from the whole to the particular part of the country in which they choose to live…That concept of sharing can only be guaranteed, I repeat, if there is a national government which is prepared to state that the national interest must prevail in any situation of conflict over regional differences (Trudeau, April 15, 1980 from Hansard quoted in Chrétien, 1990: 290–291).

A strong sense of purposeful belonging indeed.

The previous three sections taken together illustrate rather conclusively that what we are talking about here is a republican not a liberal. Classical liberals do not often make pronouncements regarding the common good, they have little to say on the topic of political participation and education to democracy, and are rather more cosmopolitan than patriotic in inclination (or we might say, they do not discuss adamantly any notion of purposeful belonging). What I have tried to show here is that, while we know liberalism and republicanism share common traits that do not clash with each other, where they differ, they do so significantly and it is in those very differences that we hear Trudeau
express himself in typical republican language. The only conclusion left to draw is that, contrary to the mythologies and the verdicts that steep him in liberalism, he was, in fact, a republican.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I elaborated on Lord Acton and his influence on Trudeau’s understanding of nationalism and federalism, and Thomas Hill Green’s political philosophy stemming from innovative scholarship that places him within a republican paradigm thus bringing into question the practice of referring to him solely as a liberal. Also, I attempted to sketch an understanding of the philosophy known as personalism which Pierre Trudeau indicated was the only ideology to which he adhered. If this is true, it was imperative for the purposes of investigating his republican tendencies, to ascertain if personalism shared any common traits with the strain of republicanism I believe is represented strongly in Trudeau’s political thought.

I began by offering some insight into personalism with the aid of works by prominent scholars. Through their scholarship, I tried to explain the essential tenets of personalism and tried to exclude some of the more ethereal components in favor of those that might provide useful material to the construction of a political theory. It is in these more practical components that we find Trudeau very much at home. If Trudeau declared himself a personalist and I, in turn, believe Trudeau was indeed a republican, it follows that personalism must show some affinity for republican sensibilities. Granted, Maritain’s work is coloured by very rich religious undertones (Catholic in particular), but since
republicanism is by nature secular, I tried to overlook those nuances to see what would remain. I believe the remnants are republican.

I also tried to show that, while we can acknowledge comfortably the existence of overlap between republicanism and liberalism, the distinguishing features of republicanism are quite significant and it is within these differences that Trudeau crystallizes as a republican. I tried to show this by elaborating on his view of the common good/public participation/citizenship, freedom as non-domination, and purposeful belonging.

Trudeau’s understanding of the common good is quintessentially republican. I indicated that, in modern societies, the republican notion of the common good is in fact reducible to what may be considered the national interest. Trudeau expressed this same idea. Consulting with Canadians is the way in which Trudeau sought to determine the common good. This, of course, is a typical republican attitude. He sought to enrich decision–making by encouraging as many citizens as possible to participate in the political process, and in doing so, government would appear more accessible, more open to the citizenry’s concerns. This reflects a republican belief that “[t]he main purpose of government today is getting citizens to realize what their priorities must be. And explaining to them the choices they have to make” (1998: 66).

He has in mind a society of persons who together compose the body politic and work together towards the common good of it stating that the state can only determine what that ‘good’ is if it can consult, hear, and evaluate what the citizenry believes it needs and wants. Using a classic Machiavellian republican phrase, he states emphatically that
“[i]n a constitutional society it is not men, but rather laws, that control us” (2010: 63) and that [t]he real purpose of laws, then is to educate the citizen in the common good, and persuade him to behave in the public interest, rather than to command and constrain” (ibid: 50, emphasis mine). One would likely encounter great difficulty in trying to find any classical liberal who would endorse the notion that an appropriate role for the state is to ‘educate’ its people toward the public good, but Trudeau speaks like a republican in this regard.

Echoes of assigning and educative role to the state can be found all the way back into the very first publications where he sings the praises of democracy and urges Quebecers to be educated to democracy. There he decries what he perceives as the backwardness of Québec society of the time, and attributes that not to any deficiency in the Québécois culture or its people, but to the lack of democratic education. He goes so far as to state that people “can be made fit to participate, directly or indirectly, in the guidance of the society of which they are members” (2010: 87–88). Rousseau might as well have been looking over Trudeau’s shoulder as he wrote this.

The one component that defines his legacy more than any other is his distaste for ethnic and cultural nationalism which he believed to be reactionary and intolerant. Trudeau claims to understand the “national will” as something quite different from the nationalisms he loathes (2010: 176–7). He thinks that ‘national will’ is synonymous with a “sense of belonging, a sense of patriotism, a sense that being together is better than being apart” (2010: 176, emphasis mine). In other words, national will, common good, and patriotism (or purposeful belonging) can bring a citizenry together. There would not be much more for a proponent of classical or neo–Roman republican theory to add.
Trudeau’s intention with patriation and the addition of the Charter was, of course, to change society (Hebert, 1990: 131). He wanted to refashion citizenship to mean equality and shared values (Trudeau, 1990: 260); to encourage purposeful belonging (1998: 78–9).

The pertinent question to be asked here is whether it is relevant to talk about republicanism with regards to Trudeau when it would appear that just about everything there is to say about him has already been said a hundred times over. As stated in my introduction, it is necessary because our understanding and practice of democracy is becoming skewed. We no longer know what it is and what it is supposed to do, or even how we are supposed to exercise it. Democracy is now about pleasing hyper–segmented groups rather than the citizenry as a whole. Trudeau’s vision of democracy and citizenship was certainly contrary to these practices. He wanted to prevent just this type of ‘special’ statuses in society by trying to inculcate a series of political values that would secure freedom, equality, and justice for all Canadians, and discourage the view that citizens are, in some way, consumers of politics rather than initiators, protectors, and beneficiaries of democracy. Parliament was not to become something to be packaged and sold, but was to remain the repository of political wisdom and democracy.

As I suggested, operating during a profound Machiavellian Moment — a republicain zeitgeist — seems to invite the adoption of republican language to express something of political value that is being in danger of being lost, or has already disappeared; however, the conflations discussed in chapter two give reasons why people are often restive about applying the label ‘republican’ to these thoughts. These were possibly the reasons why Trudeau himself did not define his positions as ‘republican’ though he must have been familiar with the theory. However, given the intermittent
resurgence of republican theory why has Trudeau’s classical republicanism been so entirely overlooked? Why and how was the republican Trudeau pushed aside to accommodate a liberal one? How did his republican ideas become associated so strongly with liberalism; indeed, why are ideas used in particular times in particular ways? These questions merit elaboration. I move to explore these themes in the next chapter.
Chapter Six: The Dynamism of Ideas

“A new or unconventional interpretation of a nation’s history can give powerful support to one or another of its political factions. The desire to influence future events can override the desire to describe the past accurately, since the future will be determined in part by the interpretations of the past that are commonly accepted”. H.D. Forbes (1987: 304)

Introduction

So far, this thesis has been dedicated to understanding the nature of Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s political thought. The preceding chapters argued that he cannot be merely understood as a thinker within the liberal–individualist paradigm; rather, one can discern clear neo–Roman republican sensibilities in his ideas — a contention substantiated by his own writings. The working premise was that we have inaccurately understood his overarching ideas. Corroborating this statement required significant proof in order to undermine the predominant interpretation of his ideas. My effort in this chapter is to explain why and how this erroneous interpretation of Trudeau’s thoughts has become the orthodox way of understanding him. My point of departure here is the claim that the treatment of ideas related to the social and political is never really a neutral exercise. A value–free study of ideas would hold that a distorted interpretation of Trudeau’s thought was simply unintentional; I challenge this position and hold that powerful ideas — as with myths — are often presented in specific ways for very particular purposes.

Recently scholarship around ‘ideas’ (and, in particular, discursive institutionalism — DI) has been interested in explaining institutional change (or continuity). As Schmidt (2010) outlines,
discursive institutionalism...is concerned with both the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in institutional context....[and] has the greatest potential for providing insights into the dynamics of institutional change by explaining the actual preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors (1).

Given this statement, one avenue for establishing more definitively if my claim of a republican Trudeau is accurate would be to search for — and find — those theoretical attributes in policy streams and outcomes from his time in office. While certainly an interesting and feasible project (and would be a next logical step to take after this thesis), it is beyond the scope of this particular work. Were I to do so, using Schmidt’s (2010) words, I would have “to show empirically how, when, where, and why ideas and discourse matter for institutional change, and when they do not” (21); therefore, to postulate that republicanism influenced his policies is an endeavour entailing standards of proof that are as high as those met in the first part of this thesis. However, my goal here is not to prove that his ideas influenced policies emanating from his administration, nor to prove that his ideas provoked change (or continuity) in Canadian political institutions; rather, I ask why his ideas were interpreted in one particular way rather than another. By returning to the examples of Thomas Hobbes, Gad Horowitz, and Janet Ajzenstat to suggest that political ideas are rarely (re)interpreted without a motive, I speculate that the Trudeau legacy-holders have a purpose as well.

Ideational scholarship is rich in the use of words like language, pictures (Schmidt, 2010: 8, 10), reinterpretation (ibid, 12), frames (18–19), meaning (14), meaning contexts (8) narratives, scripts, and meaning systems (13), as well as words that describe ideas as tools and instruments through which perhaps something specific — like setting an agenda
or thwarting one — can be achieved. Intriguingly, citing Blyth\textsuperscript{174}, Schmidt (2010) relays the use of the word “weapon” in this context: “…ideas serv[e] as ‘weapons’ and ‘blueprints’ in the struggle to replace existing institutions” (8; emphasis mine). I have said that I will not delve into institutional change, but this particular phrasing is interesting. ‘Weapons’ are generally used for either defense or aggression, to mitigate a threat or to present one. Based on this choice of words, perhaps the treatment of ideas is not always benign and constitutes, in effect, a pattern of defense or attack. One can easily see how the nationalists in Quebec used culture and language as weapons against Trudeau’s ideas; but what weapon did they think Trudeau unsheathed? Conversely, what was Trudeau defending (or attacking)?

I speculate that the republican Trudeau seems to fall away repeatedly because his ideas posed different threats at different times. During the constitutional reform era of the 1980s, his staunch rejection of nationalism posed a threat to communitarians who saw in nationalism the last line of defense for group rights: communitarian ideas are here a weapon of defense against individualism. Neo–liberals would move to classify Trudeau as socialist to criticize him for notions of large–scale government intervention in the economy. Today, Trudeau is widely considered a (procedural) liberal, though he continues to be scrutinized.

I addressed this confusion in a previous chapter, but I would add that Trudeau continues to be discussed because his ideas are still used by legacy–holders to substantiate (or negate) particular political positions, and just as importantly, he continues

\textsuperscript{174} Here she is using M. Blyth (2002): \textit{Great Transformations}. New York: Cambridge University Press.
to ‘haunt us’ because he is, in effect, still very relevant. The reason for this assumption is simple: he invited Canadians to think about politics not as a product that politicians sell to voters (Delacourt, 2013) but as a fundamental duty of the citizenry. Trudeau presents a very clear republican theme in his articulation that citizens are not solely, or even primarily, consumers and he suggested a sophisticated form of common good — of collectivism even — without descending into communitarianism. He offered solutions for a political society not based in culture, but on a more sophisticated, less deterministic, collectivist account which perhaps seemed suspicious to some, and certainly threatening to others. The legacy-holders are those who have been most active in using Trudeau’s ideas and by labelling him a ‘liberal’ they were able to neutralize this nuanced account of a political society which was threatening both to the cultural communitarians and to neo-liberals. Put in simpler terms, he was too collectivist for neo-liberals and too individualist for communitarians.

Attributing the label of ‘liberal’ to Trudeau may be convenient, but it is not, as I have argued, particularly accurate. However, categorizing Trudeau definitively in terms of his political thought may not be as important as trying to ascertain why his nuanced account of society is often ignored, and why the sophisticated ways in which he invited Canadians to think about politics is overshadowed. On the one hand, one could impute this distortion to a mere misreading or to overcoming a Pocksonian Machiavellian Moment; on the other hand, as I speculate here, it may be that the distortion is purposeful.

\[175\] In the words of Clarkson (1990).
Is it, in other words, simply too coincidental that his ideas are represented at a given time in a certain way?

With the parameters established, I move to elaborating on the theme of the chapter: the political use of political ideas. The legacy of a republican Trudeau is in some way more threatening than that of a liberal one; why and to whom? And why ought we to bother studying his ideas at all?

The Strategic Use of Ideas

Most literature dealing with ‘ideas’ underscores similar sentiments: “ideas matter”. I echo this assertion but add a caveat. Not only do ideas matter, but they matter at a particular time, for specific reasons. ‘Ideational scholarship’ — as it is known — is devoted to the study of ideas and is attracting significant interest. Generally speaking, the fascinating questions ideational scholarship attempts to answer include queries about how and why exactly ideas matter as well as excogitating methods through which to establish causal relationships with institutional change (or continuity) and policy outcomes. In other words, it tracks the dynamism of ideas by finding ways in which to follow (and prove) the trajectory from ideas to policy choices to institutional change. This is my understanding of DI’s approach, which seeks “to explain the origins of or shifts in interest–based preferences, historical paths, or cultural frames” and “the role of ideas in constituting political action, the power of persuasion in political debate…the (re)construction of political interests and values…” and so on (Schmidt, 2010: 2).

As Viroli (1999) suggests, political science builds on ideas that already exist (4). New ideas mingle with older ones creating variations or formulating innovative ones, so
that one can talk about paradigms like *liberal nationalism* or *liberal multiculturalism*. At the same time, one could come to the conclusion that political ideas are never really value–free (or neutral) and that their use and (re)interpretation is hardly coincidental. The (re)appearance of ideas or innovative analyses of particular ones occur at specific times as tools to *fix* something that feels broken or to prevent it from coming apart in the first place.

I provide examples of how this has occurred by using Thomas Hobbes’ treatment of democracy, Gad Horowitz’s theories on the ideological foundations of Canada, and Janet Ajzenstat’s work on Lord Durham. They will help to illustrate why legacy–holders (re)interpret ideas at particular times, and help clarify my position that these exercises are not the product of coincidence. I will then dedicate a section of this chapter to explain why the Trudeau legacy–holders have (re)interpreted his republican ideas. Trudeau’s theories speak to an effort at mitigating two tensions: the marketization of the political activity (most specifically the electorate), and the fragmentation caused by group politics. His attempts to balance these threats reflect republican preoccupations and illustrate why his ideas are, if anything, even more relevant today then ever before.

*Thomas Hobbes and Thucydides*

Thomas Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*\(^{176}\) was published in 1629. His treatment of Thucydides claims the Greek writer was, in fact,
a steadfast anti-democrat (Rogow, 1986) despite all evidence to the contrary.\textsuperscript{177}

“Thucydides, according to Hobbes, ‘least of all liked the democracy’, and while he praised Athenian government, ‘when it was mixed of \textit{the few} and \textit{the many} he much preferred it when ‘it was democratical in name, but in effect monarchical…’” (ibid: 82). A careful reader of Thucydides however would not take long to realize that there is something amiss in Hobbes’ interpretation:

Thucydides was not writing against democracy…but about a war and its effects that were, up to that time, without precedent in the history of mankind. The Peloponnesian War, between Athens and Sparta, 431 to 404 BC, in the course of which there occurred the worst plague ever experienced by Greece, was not a war between ideals and ideologies, whether of democracy or oligarchy, but one between empires (Rogow 1986: 79).

Even a cursory reading of Thucydides would lead one to surmise that Hobbes’ translation is a serious misrepresentation of Thucydides’ ideas. Rogow (1986) states that “[f]ar from believing that democracy was the cause of Athens’s downfall, Thucydides attributed to democracy Athens’s sensational rise to power in the first half of the fifth century BC”

\textsuperscript{177} …the major themes of Thucydides’s work are not the defeat of Athens by Sparta…or, as Hobbes implied, the ‘stupidity’ of democracy. Thucydides’s main concerns…were to establish the decisive role of human nature in the rise and fall of both societies and individuals, to demonstrate the corrupting effects of war upon morality and decency, and to raise the question whether freedom or democracy, and discipline or self-control, can coexist. He was inclined to believe that, given peace and able leadership…coexistence was possible. After Pericles’s death…he became convinced that democratic government, by which he meant government based upon ‘a reasonable and moderate blending of the few and the many’ could not withstand the strains of war (Rogow 1986: 80–81).
(81) but he is also willing to concede that perhaps Hobbes’ misrepresentation may have been ‘unconscious’ (84). \(^{178}\) Schlatter (1945) indicates that

> Turning to Thucydides [Hobbes] found precisely the view of human nature and the state which he himself had been constructing. No doubt in his eagerness he strained the meaning of Thucydides at times; but the result was an example of the thing which happens when a great mind, on the verge of a great discovery, suddenly happens upon the book which crystallizes its ideas (362).

Perhaps this is the case. In his great enthusiasm, Hobbes may have unintentionally interpreted Thucydides erroneously; in other words, the use of Thucydides’ ideas may have been benign. However, it is more likely that, in the attempt to build his own case against democracy and in favour of monarchy, he found in the *History* some passages to justify and support his own political theory. Hobbes’ interpretation may be a rather unambiguous attempt to wilfully misinterpret ideas in order to advance his own political agenda. The reasons are clear:

Hobbes wrote that Thucydides, his ‘special favorite’ among historians, taught him ‘how stupid democracy is and how much one man is wiser than an assembly’…Hobbes was saying, in other words, that a new translation of Thucydides’s great *History*….was particularly relevant to the England of 1629 in that Thucydides had shown ‘how stupid democracy is’ and had warned against listening to ‘rhetoric’ by which term Hobbes meant the impassioned and emotional appeals of demagogues…(Rogow 1986: 79).

Rogow (1986) rightly questions why Hobbes might have thought it necessary to warn against democracy and why it would be wise for his English contemporaries to ignore the

\(^{178}\) “Hobbes’s translation of the *History* suffered from certain inaccuracies;…A few inaccuracies may owe less to ‘roughness’ and carelessness than to Hobbes’s desire, albeit unconscious, to make Thucydides say or not say things that Hobbes, had he written the *History* would have said or not said” (Rogow, 1986: 84).
rhetoric associated with it (79): “Hobbes view[ed] the conflicts between crown and Parliament as, in effect, unresolvable [sic] conflicts between the wisdom of monarchy and the ‘stupidity’ of democracy” (88); therefore,

[i]n making Thucydides into an anti–democrat, Hobbes, in effect, was making him into a Hobbesian, for by 1629 Hobbes himself was passionately in favor of ‘regal government’ and a strong supporter of the crown against parliamentary challenges [although] we still do remember that by 1629 Hobbes had developed, or was in the process of developing, attitudes and opinions not unlike some of those manifested two thousand years earlier by Thucydides (Rogow 1986: 83).

Schlatter (1945) states

_The History of the Peloponnesian War_ was a necessary antidote to the poison of ancient political theory: the _Leviathan_ complains that men have adopted the political opinions of Aristotle, Cicero, and other classical writers whose false notions of democracy and liberty lead directly to sedition and rebellion…In _Behemoth_ Hobbes cites as the ultimate cause of Civil Wars the teaching in the Universities of political theory taken from Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and the classical historians (359).

Schlatter (1945) rightfully asks “[w]hat political lessons did [Hobbes] learn from Thucydides?” (356). He says that “_The History of the Peloponnesian War_…crystallized for Hobbes many of the ideas fundamental in his later political philosophy” (ibid: 350).

Schlatter (ibid) elaborates:

[F]or both men the analysis of human nature was only part of the solution of a problem which they had set themselves; given the nature of man, how can the good society be set up and kept going? Thucydides had seen the good society in Periclean Athens and his history can be taken as a record and analysis of its decline. Hobbes apparently found the good society in Jacobean and Stuart England and he saw with prophetic eye that it needed to learn the lessons of history — particularly from Thucydides — if it too was not
to decline. Thucydides offered no solution to his problem, but he did make clear that the cause of Athens’ downfall was political disunity at home, faction and rebellion. Perhaps he was sceptical of any ideal solution…But when Hobbes translated that phrase he was already thinking of his ideal solution of the problem. He accepted the opinion that the problem was one of political unity; and he found in Thucydides’ magnificent history outlines of his answer (Schlatter 1945: 358–359).

Hobbes’ reading of Thucydides seems to lead us to the conclusion that democracy is the reason behind the eventual demise of Athens but, as stated, it is questionable whether in fact Thucydides is criticizing democracy per se; rather he was simply trying to discern how democracy and responsible leadership could co–exist and if they could withstand pressures of warfare (Rogow 1986). One could argue therefore, that in fact Hobbes is merely (re)interpreting an idea at a specific time for a specific purpose, and that purpose was to caution his countrymen against the ‘stupidity’ of democracy, urge them to ignore the ‘rhetoric’ (Rogow 1986), and recognize the wisdom of monarchy. Schlatter (1945) argues that

[Hobbes’] reading into the History a preference for monarchy is clear evidence that Hobbes himself, whatever Thucydides may have in fact preferred, had already thought out his solution of the political problem — government by one man (360).

Rogow (1986) says

179 “In reality, however, for Thucydides, if not for Hobbes, the alternative to the irresponsible and self–serving ‘rhetoric’ of a demagogue…was not ‘regal government’ but a return to the sane and rational leadership of the Periclean Age’ (Rogow, 1986: 82). [Thucydides was asking himself] how democracy and responsible leadership, both of which had been responsible for Athens’s greatness, could be preserved ‘under the stress of war and the hot demands of the populace’” (ibid).
Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides… despite the claims he put forward, had little relevance to the England for which he intended it to serve as a ‘warning’. But the work does tell us a good deal about Hobbes himself. The History reveals, to begin with, that Hobbes, long before the Civil War and even before 1629, was intolerant of challenges to establish order, however moderate and reasonable such challenges were (91).

By presenting Thucydides as surreptitiously preferring monarchy to democracy, Hobbes was able to use the political thought of a great thinker as a ‘weapon’ to justify and promote his own preference for monarchical government.

_Gad Horowitz and the Tory Touch_

Gad Horowitz’s (1966) study on the so–called _tory touch_ is still widely read and opens in following way:

In the United States, organized socialism is dead; in Canada socialism, though far from national power, is a significant political force. Why this striking difference in the fortunes of socialism in two very similar societies? (143)

One goal is immediately clear and apparent: the work represents an attempt to identify the feature – political or societal – that distinguishes Canada from the United States (US). For Horowitz, that differentiating feature is the _tory touch_ which, he believes, allowed for the emergence of a domestic brand of socialism. Horowitz (1966) states that there are “…important un–American characteristics of English Canada” (150) which can be traced to the “presence of toryism” (ibid) and those are:

(a) the presence of tory ideology in the founding of English Canada by the Loyalists, and its continuing influence on English–Canadian political culture; (b) the persistent power of whiggery or right–wing liberalism in Canada (the Family Compacts) as contrasted with the rapid and easy victory of liberal democracy (Jefferson, Jackson) in the United States;
(c) the ambivalent centrist character of left–wing liberalism in Canada as contrasted with the unambiguously leftist position of left–wing liberalism in the United States; (d) the presence of an influential and legitimate socialist movement in English Canada as contrasted with the illegitimacy and early death of American socialism; (e) the failure of English–Canadian liberalism to develop into the one true myth, the nationalist cult, and the parallel failure to exclude toryism and socialism as ‘un–Canadian’; in other words, the legitimacy of ideological diversity in English Canada (150)

Horowitz’s work was written largely in reaction to Louis Hartz’s\(^{180}\) fragment theory which claims that so–called settler societies such as Canada, the US, and Australia originated as fragments of the European society from which they derive. He maintains that these societies retain the class structure and the dominant ideology of the societies from which the ‘settlers’ come, and that these do not undergo any significant evolution. Given this, Hartz concludes that there is no substantial or significant difference between the political cultures or societies of the US and Canada. Horowitz is adamant: Hartz seriously underestimated the significance of the tory fragment that migrated along with the liberal fragment from England to Canada. He states that Canada and the US are, indeed, two very different countries despite some glaring and obvious similarities. Where they are different, he believes, is mainly in the area of social justice and claims this is

\(^{180}\) Louis Hartz’s two most famous publications are *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955) and *The Founding of New Societies* (1964). In the first work, he presented potential explanations for the lack of variety of political ideologies in the US claiming that Lockeian paradigms inform much of the political thought guiding that society. He attributes this deference to John Locke to the absence of America’s feudal past and the overwhelming presence of a particular (liberal) fragment from European society. He uses this scenario to explain the conspicuous absence of socialism in America. In his second publication – the one to which I refer most frequently in this chapter – the fragment theory finds its complete expression. Here he posits that colonial societies develop out of fragments of their mother countries. These fragments remain frozen at the time of their foundations. Hartz believes that Latin America and French Canada are feudal fragments from Europe, while the United States and English Canada are liberal fragments; Australia is a ‘radical’ fragment presumably because it is influenced by 19th century British working–class radicalism.
because Canada retained those tory values from Great Britain and thus it developed a far less individualistic strain of liberalism.

Put simply, the tory touch, as Horowitz describes it, is a set of values that is rooted in deference to authority and in a socialist brand of collectivism based on the importance of community. According to this paradigm then, toryism expresses preference for tradition, hierarchy, and collectivism — attributes that fit descriptions that were once used in reference to Canadian attitudes and political culture. Presumably, these principles followed British settlers to Canada. Horowitz places these principles in opposition to the classical liberalism of John Locke which has assumed preeminent status in the US and which he sees as advocating the absolute priority of the individual and the importance of competition. In addition to Horowitz’s contention that the tory touch is the most significant differentiating feature between the US and Canada, he says that without it, there would not have been socialist parties (or socialism) in Canada at all. It is toryism, then — that familiar, non–threatening set of values that sailed across the ocean with the British — that makes socialism acceptable to Canadians.

For Horowitz (ibid) then, Canadian socialism is the combination of toryism (in particular its collectivism) and liberalism (in particular its demand for equality). He states that “[s]ocialism is an ideology which combines the corporate–organic–collectivist ideas of toryism with the rationalist–egalitarian ideas of liberalism” (1966: 144) and that “the

Forbes (1987) suggests there might be other explanations for the differences between the two societies and the emergence of socialist parties: “Many relevant hypotheses could be considered. For example, Canada is more British than the United States and Canada’s ‘organized socialism’ is the best imitation of the British Labour Party that can be managed in the circumstances. Or Canada’s cabinet–parliamentary system of government requires stricter party discipline than the American presidential–congressional system is more likely to spawn third parties” (298).
relative strength of socialism in Canada is related to the relative strength of toryism”; in addition, he maintains that liberalism had a “different position and character” in Canada than it had in the US (143).

It is because socialists have a conception of society as more than an agglomeration of competing individuals — a conception close to the tory view of society as an organic community — that they find the liberal idea of equality (equality of opportunity) inadequate. Socialists disagree with liberals about the essential meaning of equality because socialists have a tory conception of society (Horowitz, 1966: 144; emphasis in original).

Horowitz (1966) theorizes that socialism was never accepted by Americans because they understand it differently than do Canadians. For the US, socialism is “German, Marxist, and other–worldly” whereas Canada saw socialism as “British, non–Maxist, and worldly” (159). The absence of the tory touch in the US, in essence, prevented the development of a socialist sensibility. Conversely, Canadian socialism is related to, inspired by, and a consequence of, toryism. Through this association, not only does Horowitz make socialism familiar and acceptable to Canadians, he suggests that it is what makes us who we are. One could argue, in other words, that Horowitz’s tory touch is both an attempt to isolate that elusive, differentiating feature between Americans and Canadians, but it also is, more importantly, the attempt to make socialism acceptable to Canadians.

The heart of [the] argument is the claim that ‘the tory and socialist minds have some crucial assumptions, orientations, and values in common so that from certain angles they may appear not as enemies, but as two different expressions of the same basic outlook’ (Forbes 1987: 299).

Forbes (1987) wonders if “tory collectivism ha[s] very much in common with socialist collectivism, or do they resemble each other only very loosely, like sandbars and
snack bars?” (299–300). I do not wish to offer here a solution to this debate nor do I argue against or in favour of various assertions; rather, I use Horowitz’s treatment of toryism as a vehicle to illustrate another way ideas matter at a particular time for specific reasons. Forbes (1987) states

Horowitz plainly wanted to stress what Hartz…implicitly denied — the legitimacy of socialism as an element of Canadian political culture derived from Canada’s Tory past. His essential argument was that ‘non–liberal British elements [had] entered into English–Canadian society together with American liberal elements at the foundations’ and that consequently liberalism today ‘is accompanied by vital and legitimate streams of toryism and socialism which have as close a relation to English Canada’s ‘essence’ or ‘foundations as does liberalism’ (298, emphasis in original).

It seems that Forbes, too, sees two main goals in Horowitz’s work: to isolate once and for all what distinguishes Canadians from Americans, but most importantly to show that a domestic socialism was a natural progression from Canada’s tory heritage. “[Horowitz] maintained that only socialism, in the long run, can preserve Canadian independence” (Forbes 1987: 311), but Forbes concludes that the progression from toryism to socialism is not a given even though he concedes that socialism does distinguish Canadians from Americans to a certain degree.

For our purposes, it is important to ask whether Horowitz’s treatment of the constitutive ideas of Canada had a particular objective. One could speculate that indeed it did, and the intention may have been to render socialism more palatable to Canadians. As stated, creating a Canadian variant of socialism and labelling it as the differentiating factor from the US would, on the one hand, offer Canadians a crucial trait within which to couch their identity, but on the other hand, it would also offer a less suspicious account
of socialism. Imbuing toryism with socialist traits and presenting it as a foundational theoretical paradigm for Canada means that one has simultaneously found the one defining element that renders Canadians different from Americans while simultaneously presenting an idea that was rather intimidating at the time in a non–threatening way. In one fell swoop, one has offered socialism in Canada as an acceptable, harmless alternative and contributed an answer to a question that was quite fashionable at the time: *what is a Canadian?* A Canadian — in this configuration — was simply not American because s/he was socialist, or better yet, he/she was touched by toryism. And to the extent that toryism and socialism are conflated into a comfortable and familiar form of collectivism that is non–threatening, it makes socialism a palatable option. At a time in which there was an obsession with defining ‘Canadian’, the only solution found was to state without equivocation that, whatever else it meant, it primarily signified *not* being American.

*Janet Ajzenstat and Lord Durham*

Lord Durham’s famous *Report* provides another interesting example. As indicated in a previous chapter, Janet Ajzenstat maintains that Durham was sorely misjudged. Before her book *The Political Thought of Lord Durham* (1998) it seemed that orthodoxy about him had been long established. Thanks to her work, the academic community had to revisit its prevailing attitude with regards to the *Report’s* actual intent. She states: “My first object in this book is to see that Durham is recognised as a spokesman for the liberal mainstream, so that the force and coherence of his position come to light” (12). The perceived ‘race’–based motivations that the mainstream believes coloured Lord
Durham’s assimilationist proposals continue to be shared by a large number of scholars, academics, and historians.

The assumption concerning Lord Durham was that, given his heritage, he believed in the superiority of British culture and political institutions, and that the French in Canada should simply acquiesce to this reality given their inferiority. Ajzenstat (1998), however, argues that assimilation results from modern liberal practices and liberal justice…What prompts assimilation according to ‘mainstream’ liberal philosophers and social scientists is exactly ‘la force naturelle des choses’ in a system based on equality of right, with institutions promoting the cooperation of peoples of every origin and background.

Despite this, Durham is still excoriated as a ‘racist’ who sought to expunge the French Canadian character from Canada. In my reading of her work, Ajzenstat believes this claim to be unsubstantiated. The main argument is that the orthodoxy misunderstands the Report with regards to its proposals for assimilation and responsible government. By using Alexis de Tocqueville in particular, but also Etienne Parent, she seeks to demonstrate how assimilation proposals were not based in considerations of culture, but rather on the apprehension that if the French were — to use a Trudeauism — ‘trapped inside their fortresses’, they would not be able to enjoy the same liberal rights and

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182 Literally, ‘the natural force of things’ (my translation).
183 In Democracy in America, Tocqueville also commented on cultural assimilation of the French in North America and how this would seem to be a precondition for material prosperity.
184 “Parent] argued, in the end, that French nationality might be preserved in a federal union…he never turned his back on the fundamental idea he had derived from the Report or found confirmed there: that there is something problematic about the supposition that nationalism and liberalism may be easily reconciled” (Ajzenstat, 1998: 19).
privileges as their English counterparts; in particular, the French would not be able to reach the same levels of economic prosperity.

Durham believed that in a society offering equal opportunity for all, assimilation was inevitable…They wish to see the French-Canadian nationality retain its luster while at the same time ensuring French Canadians perfect political equality. The idea is sympathetic, but from the perspective of the liberal mainstream, simplistic (Ajzenstat, 1998: 21).

Rather than relegating Durham to the category of ‘racist’, she places him in the 19th century mainstream liberal paradigm within which self–government and equality were paramount. At first this placement seems counterintuitive since liberals are known for eschewing nationalism in favour of equal citizenship regardless of ethnic heritage; but she argues that this was exactly the goal sought by Lord Durham: proposing assimilation hoping that the benefits of a liberal society could be reaped by everyone in the colonies.

To whom (or what) is her study is directed? What is she defending Durham against; or conversely, at what is her book directed? Ajzenstat is taking aim at ‘culturalism’ and ethnic nationalists. She makes their argument clear:

It is sometimes suggested that membership in a collectivity virtually defines personal identity. Charles Taylor…maintains that most, or all, individuals understand themselves by means of, and in terms of, their linguistic and cultural community. Their sense of their own worth depends in part on their knowledge that their community is recognized and valued by other peoples and other communities. David Cameron argues that membership in a collectivity is for many a condition of the good life (15)…They assume that identification with a community defined in terms of origin, history, or tradition is a good
that many or most Canadians will not relinquish, and that such collectivities should be acknowledged in law (Ajzenstat, 1998: 16).

It would appear that her entire book is a means through which she can argue against this belief by showing how Durham’s political thought was misread and misused. In fact, throughout her book, there are numerous references that lead one to believe that while she is trying to dispel some well–accepted ideas about Durham and the political myth surrounding him, she is also trying to convey something important about the use of ideas. Her work itself may have been a reaction to the enthusiasm for Québec nationalism at the time, and so perhaps it is not a coincidence that her book appeared when it did — as a ‘weapon’ of defense against encroaching ethnic nationalism that continued to threaten Canadian national unity. The orthodoxy used Durham to justify nationalism, communitarianism, and the phenomenon of culturalism. Ajzenstat (re)interpreted his Report in order to defend his (classical) liberal solutions to what he saw as the ‘problems’ of isolation endured by French Canada.

*Pierre Elliott Trudeau — Liberalism and the Identity Crisis*

Trudeau’s efforts and ideas directed to secure a position of equality for his beloved Québec seem to have been used to cement two different, but related ideas: because he had difficulty defining his own identity, he resorted to a political philosophy that underscored hyper–individualism, i.e. atomistic/procedural, or American–style liberalism. Conversely, in some quarters, his economic policies in particular, suggested a man who was too sensitive to the needs of the community that left him at the mercy of socialism, some going so far as to say that he embraced communism. Trudeau and his ideas, then, somehow became dangerous to the communitarians and nationalists, but also
to staunch libertarians. What weapons were being unleashed by (or against) Trudeau? Let us explore.

The introductory essay in *L’Anti–Trudeau* (1972) leaves little room for interpretation: “Les textes qui suivent nous disent que Trudeau est formaliste, idéaliste, arrogant et dangereux... On dit qu’il ressemble à Duplessis,¹⁸⁵ son enemi préféré... En effet, il n’y a pas beaucoup de différence entre eux” (Potvin et al: 8, emphasis mine).¹⁸⁶ His individualism is interpreted in the classical liberal paradigm and it takes little imagination to discern to what (or to whom) Trudeau is dangerous — Québec nationalism and the elite, including the clergy, that supported it. Trudeau’s supposed communist sympathies were so threatening that active steps were taken by Duplessis and “university authorities” to block him from being hired as a professor despite Trudeau’s numerous attempts (Nemni, 2011: 275). The Nemnis (2006) ask:

Dangerous? Dangerous for whom? In one of the selected pieces, originally published in 1971, Claude Ryan attacked Trudeau for ‘treating today with incomprehensible disdain, from the height of his promontory, those who rank as the most substantial thinkers that Quebec has produced and who, say what he will, display none of that narrow isolationism that he chooses to ascribe to them out of sheer demagogy” (6).¹⁸⁷

A familiar argument transpires as Burelle (2005) takes up the recognizable theme:

¹⁸⁵ Maurice Duplessis was premier of Québec from 1936 to 1939, and again from 1944 to 1959.

¹⁸⁶ “The following texts tell us that Trudeau is formalistic, idealistic, arrogant and dangerous ... It is said that he resembles [behaves like, is similar to] Duplessis, his favorite [most targeted] enemy ... Indeed, there is not much difference between them” (my translation, my emphasis).

¹⁸⁷ The original text reads: “Et il commencera à regretter l’incompréhensible dédain avec lequel il traite aujourd’hui, du haut de son promontoire, des esprits qui comptent parmi les plus solides qu’ait produits le Québec et qui n’ont rien, quoi qu’il en dise, de cet isolationnisme étroit dont il aime, par pure démagogie, les affubler” (Ryan, 1972: 75)
Mais ce qui est impardonnable, dan son cas, c’est la mauvaise foi avec laquelle il a nié jusqu’a la fin de sa vie l’émergence, au Québec, d’un nouveau nationalism ouvert aux valeurs universelles et pluraliste de la modernité (76).\textsuperscript{188}

A ‘universal’ and ‘pluralist’ nationalism no less! In other words, my nationalism is benevolent; yours is not — a recurring theme.

Far from being a hyper–individualist liberal, the notion of Pierre Trudeau, the fellow traveler, followed him for a time; neo–liberals still today regard the Trudeau era as nothing short of catastrophic. A CTV year–end interview (December 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1975) in which Trudeau stated that “we haven’t been able to make…the free market system”\textsuperscript{189} work and that “the government is going to have to take a larger role in running institutions” is a strong enough statement for them to place Trudeau in the ranks of the socialist, collectivist, or worse:

Mr. Trudeau can now talk openly about the ‘new society’ he has been envisaging all along…Whether the new society Mr. Trudeau has always been after is labeled corporate state or socialism does not really matter…Even if Trudeau’s political essays were not clear as they are, it wouldn’t make much difference which form of big brother rule he was after. They all boil down to the throttling of the liberties we take for granted (Zink, 1977: 5).

Having fled from a communist country, Zink sees parallels between Trudeau’s collectivism and Maxist collectivism. This connection is inaccurate; however, Zink links

\textsuperscript{188} “But what is unforgivable in his case, it is the bad faith with which he denied until the end of his life the emergence in Québec, of a new nationalism open to the universal and pluralistic values of modernity” (my translation).

\textsuperscript{189} Trudeau qualified and explained this statement by saying that he did not attack \textit{free enterprise} but the \textit{free market} which he explained as laissez–faire capitalism (Trudeau, 1993:197–199).
the creation of the ‘just society’ or ‘new society’ to Marxist leanings and that Trudeau’s intellectual background provides the clues to understanding him:

When…Trudeau came across theoretical Marxism–Leninism in his university days, he already had a solid grounding in the sophistry of his Jesuit schooling. His intellectual arrogance, I suppose, thus stems from the early mixture of the two seemingly disparate but in fact mutually reinforcing doctrines of elitist absolutism…When this boundless intellectual arrogance is combined with a sense of ideological mission through political action, you have the making of a very capricious and dangerous autocrat (ibid: 13).

The rather peculiar conflation of Jesuit education and Marxist theory is indeed bizarre, but more of interest for the purpose here, are the varying interpretations of Trudeau’s thought. The road from hyper–individualist to Marxist, it seems, is a short one, but the supposed link between Trudeau and socialism/Marxism is not just a product of the times. The republican collectivism advocated by Trudeau was often misread and continues to be. These views reflect common criticisms directed toward Trudeau and his government’s policies. The insinuation here, of course, is that the prime minister was not a liberal (or libertarian) at all, but rather, that he flirted with notions of a command economy.190

David Frum191 does not mince words: “Canada’s achievement overcoming Trudeau’s disastrous legacy should not inure Canadians to how disastrous that legacy

190 “I hope people would not say that I was a tool of the Soviet Union. I am trying to do what is best for Canada” (Trudeau, May 14, 1983 in McIlroy, 1984: 120).

191 Mr. Frum is a well–regarded political commentator, a journalist, author, and former speechwriter for George W. Bush.
was” (National Post: 03/23/2011).192 He conveys the position of many neo–liberals when he states “Trudeau deserves at least this much credit: There was nothing small–scale or parochial about him. As a political wrecker, he was truly world class” (ibid). The worldwide economic crises of the Trudeau era seem to bother Frum (ibid) particularly:

Pierre Trudeau was a spending fool. He was not alone in that, in the 1970s. But here’s where he was alone. No contemporary leader of an advanced industrial economy – not even the German Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt or the British socialist James Callaghan – had so little understanding as Pierre Trudeau of the private market economy. ‘Little understanding?’ I should have said: ‘active animosity.’ Trudeau believed in a state-led economy, and the longer he lasted in office, the more statist he became. The Foreign Investment Review Agency was succeeded by Petro–Canada. Petro–Canada was succeeded by wage and price controls. Wage and price controls were succeeded by the single worst economic decision of Canada’s 20th century: the National Energy Program (para. 26–27)

‘Statist’ is a simplistic label that distorts Trudeau’s political thought. In his biography, Trudeau (1993) states

During my graduate studies, I began to favour a balance between the role of the state and the role of the private sector. You need a state strong enough to provide the counterweight to the profit motive and to make sure that once the wealth is produced, it is distributed with fairness…The state has an active role to play in ensuring that there is equilibrium between the constituent parts of the economy, the consumers and the producers. In my opinion, the recent changes in many Western countries exalting the free market and weakening the counterbalancing role of the state have not been a notable success. When I saw Thatcherism and Reaganism and later Mulroneyism become all the fashion…I just felt that this

was wrong, wrong, wrong…[R]eliance on market forces makes the economy work well in strictly economic terms, but it doesn’t necessarily prove beneficial for a society because there is nothing to control the excesses of the market (189).

It is hard to argue against claims that Trudeau saw a role for government in the market since he saw the “infatuation with deregulation and strict reliance on the market as purveyor of justice” as inadequate and wrongheaded (ibid: 190); he said that “the market alone can’t regulate the economy” (190). In a famous statement, he summarizes his stance in this regard: “As against the ‘invisible hand’ of Adam Smith, there has to be a visible hand of politicians whose objective is to have the kind of society that is caring and humane” (ibid: 190). One wonders what economists would have to say about this notion in light of the global economic crash of 2008 and its reverberating consequences.

Government intervention in the economy was not only requested, but it seemed to be the only viable solution to confront the dire prospect of worldwide economic collapse.

Frum (2011) also criticized Trudeau’s supposed propensity to ‘gratuitously offend’ (para. 39) Americans, his approach to national unity and, although not completely hostile to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Frum mentions the continued practice of judicial appointment which, according to him, “give[s] unelected judges the power to void acts of Parliament” (para. 54). This same concern is mentioned by some academics and researchers as well, but Trudeau (1990) addressed this notion in detail:

Our Section 1 [of the Charter]…does not leave it entirely to the wisdom of judges to validate a law restricting freedom; it places the onus on whoever invokes such a law to show that the restraint is reasonable and justified in a free and democratic society. In other words, the lawmaker who wishes to restrain a freedom guaranteed by the Charter must be able to invoke the wisdom of nations, so to
speak…It is therefore wrong to pretend that the existence of a Charter is in contradiction with the supremacy of Parliament, and that it replaces the people’s representatives with judges who are appointed for life. For Section 1 speaks of a ‘free and democratic society’, which is to say, a society in which sovereignty belongs to the people. Also, the Charter itself is the work of parliamentarians; they have imposed restrictions on themselves (Section 4 and 5) and on judges as well (Sections 7 to 14) (371).

The charge that Trudeau was an annoyance to the American political establishment is well–known. Gossage’s (1986) comments made during Trudeau’s peace initiatives (after the prime minister’s retirement from federal politics) shed some light on the prime minister’s attitude:

But, more profoundly, he was proud for Canada. He would not tolerate being patronized, or having his views treated as second rate because they did not come from the platform of a major power. He believed his views on world affairs were as valid as those of any other world leader, and that a nation’s influence should not only be measured by strength of its armies, but also by its intelligence, understanding, and will (252). 193

Gossage (1986) however does not hide that there was “creative tension in Canada–US relations” and that “Trudeau was irregularly naughty about U.S. foreign policy excesses” (267). When Brian Mulroney was appointed prime minister,

The White House National Security and Press Office types we had dealt with so many times for Trudeau’s visits were overtly delighted with Canada’s new PM. Some of us were uneasily aware of the sighs of relief from our State Department and White House contacts. They were pleased that the irritating Trudeau, who insisted on forcing

193 Trudeau (1998) also noted regarding foreign policy: “We weren’t being anti–American. We were trying, in a positive and pragmatic fashion, to protect Canadian interests case by case as a counterweight to keep our individual citizens from being overwhelmed through the destruction of the institutions through which they express themselves” (125).
Canadian concerns and views onto their crowded international agenda, was gone (ibid: 266).

In the forward to Lubor Zink’s (1977) book *Viva Chairman Pierre*, Peter Worthington writes: “In the years since…Trudeau became Prime Minister…, more and more Canadians have felt the chill wind that hints of freedom’s loss and authoritarianism’s gain” (vi) and claims that Zink “spotted tendencies” in Trudeau that escaped other observers (vii). The notion of those supposed ‘tendencies’ did not ‘escape’ for long. The Nemnis (2011) know that “Trudeau deplored the lack of democracy in Communist regimes” (128) and although some researchers claim Harold Laski had a formative influence on him, this can be easily disputed:

Trudeau did not display any sympathy whatsoever for Communism in his summary of the position of all parties in Canada. This should come as no surprise since we know that in London he admired…Laski while deploring his Marxist outlook. We have also seen that during his tour of Asia he was upset about the progress of Communism, since to him Christianity had so much more to offer. But rejecting Communist ideology did not entail breaking off all relations with Communist countries. Peace in the world depended on keeping communications open with one’s adversaries (Nemnis, 2011: 209).

This also explains why Trudeau continued talks with Fidel Castro\(^{194}\) even though this put him on the Americans’ political naughty list! As the Nemnis (ibid) indicate:

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\(^{194}\) Brian Flemming states the following: “It’s one of the reasons why I [dispute those who asked Trudeau], are you getting your instructions from Havana?...because Trudeau was so close to Fidel...well the thing they had in common was they were both rich kids who went to a Jesuit school in Montreal and Havana respectively, and had a common language because they studied basically the same curriculum. They read Plato and they read Aristotle and they read Kant and they read this and they read that...the staggering thing about Trudeau was his religiosity which had an impact on his political philosophy because I think he read all of the encyclicals of the popes on social justice and that sort of thing. And when he came to power, he talked about the Just Society which is a very old concept going back to the Greeks...” (Personal Communication, October 3, 2013).
Throughout his life, Trudeau would argue that in international relations, peace necessarily involves negotiating with adversaries and even enemies. Refusing to talk to the enemy was no way to avoid war; on the contrary, the better way was to maintain open channel of communication (211).

Several pages of the Nemnis’ second volume on Trudeau’s intellectual development tell of Trudeau’s penchant for getting himself into trouble with the Québécois clergy because of their suspicions regarding his ‘real’ political sympathies. His republican support for degree of popular political sovereignty was certainly a threat to the established religious order in Québec. When he laboured to explain his political thought in Vrai, it was not long before his references to various theorists would appear as threats to the authority of the Catholic Church. Some of the legendary back–and–forth with his opponents are reprinted in the small volume Approaches to Politics (2010) which collects many of his writings in Vrai (dating from February 15 to July 5, 1958). Here, Trudeau made light of his supposed connection to communism from early on:

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195 This is confirmed by John Young: “He used to love going to high schools...When we went across the country, he’d love doing high schools and the reason was, high school students are interesting and unlike adults, they’re prepared to say what they want — it’s unfiltered. And that’s when he’d get to be a political professor...The press was always wondering...they were always there because they were never sure about what was going to happen...you might get the story of a lifetime! I remember at Prince Andrew [a high school located in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia]...a kid asked, ‘why are we trading with Cuba when it’s a communist country?’ And Trudeau said, ‘That’s a good question...you know, you have to be careful when you decide how you’re going to do this. If we choose to trade with only the people I like, I may run into a small problem; I mean, do we trade with Russia? Yugoslavia? China?’ And then he picked Argentina which was a dictatorship at the time. [Trudeau continued] ‘...In world trade ...first of all...you’d have to change from week to week because what happens when we get mad at the Americans because of the Vietnam war? Do we stop trading with them? You have to understand international trade is a way of improving relations between countries and making changes’ and he was alluding to the fact that supposedly international trade requires certain nations to commit to higher standards etc, and he’d get into this kind of education. And after he said all this, the kids started to laugh because he’d made the point, but it also made the point for all of the reporters who used it as a story because it was a very simple way of explaining a complex issue because at the time the Americans were going berserk about us trading with Cuba” (personal communication, November 15, 2013).
It is not surprising then, that two weeks ago I had to interrupt the normal course of these approaches to assure the Jesuits of Relations that my theories were not Protestant, and to avow theologians of the Salaberry and Notre-Temps that I had never questioned any Catholic dogma. Today I am forced to contradict a worthy, well–accredited (and very pretty) lady who is whispering in the salons that my theories make me a Communist! Let everyone be reassured — and instructed. Neither the Protestants, nor Jean–Jacques Rousseau, nor le Sillon, nor Karl Marx are the inventors or exclusive proprietors of the philosophy of political consensus expounded in the present series of articles and often embodied in systems of social contract or popular sovereignty (Trudeau, 2010: 60).

Trudeau goes on to mention “[t]he idea that political authority flows from the will of the governed” was not foreign to religious figures like Marsiglio da Padova (or Padua, in English) and Thomas Aquinas, and he hoped that by making mention of these names, he quelled the fears regarding any communist sympathies he was accused of harbouring:

Are those names enough…to convince you that Communism has nothing to do with my approaches? I hope so; for I should very much like to close the parenthesis I have kept open for two weeks, and resume my reflections on the assumption that I have a few open–minded readers left (62).

It appears the association with communism irritated him greatly.

Thucydides becomes an anti–democrat in the hands of Thomas Hobbes; Lord Durham is a bigot in the hands of orthodoxy and a 19th century classical liberal for Janet Ajzenstat; and for Horowitz, Canada’s most distinguishing feature is its supposed socialism–friendly character owing to its tory touch. Similarly, I contend that Pierre Elliott Trudeau becomes a socialist for neo–liberals and an individualist–liberal for ethnic nationalists and multicultural communitarians. The republican Trudeau never appears because he serves neither camp particularly well.
When ideas are (re)interpreted to suit a *zeitgeist* or a particular political agenda, it is easy to see how the originator of that idea might seem ‘contradictory’. When Trudeau’s ideas are used for different purposes they assume different characteristics and thus, at times, they seem contradictory. However, if one takes his ideas for what they are, there is no contradiction. He is quite simply a neo–Roman or Classical Republican with a particular idea of the kind of society he expected Canada to be. Perhaps the legacy–holders (re)interpret his ideas differently because, as Forbes (1987) indicated, “…the future will be determined in part by the interpretations of the past…” (304) and the imprint Trudeau wanted to leave on Canada is threatening for some.

Reframing Trudeau’s ideas about Canadian politics and society may, in effect, be an attempt to shape ideas about the future of Canadian politics and society. It becomes essential therefore to try and understand why Trudeau’s articulations matter at all. Put another way, we must try to discern, in essence, why it is important to re–examine Trudeau’s ideas. One final task, therefore, remains in this study; I must elaborate on why Pierre Elliott Trudeau still matters; I must convey why it has been important to retrieve Trudeau.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

There is a deeper bond than that of blood. [There is the bond of] fraternity, of hope and of charity...for if the Canadian nation is to survive, it will only survive in mutual respect and in love for one another. Pierre Elliott Trudeau (in Gwyn, 1980: 243 & McIlroy, 1984:42)

This thesis has been an exercise in retrieving Trudeau. In particular, I sought to evaluate the most important features of Trudeau’s political and social ideas within a classical (or neo–Roman) republican paradigm because, taken as a whole, his political thought fits more comfortably there. Rather than force the liberal identification and claim that he often contradicted himself or that he is some sort of political enigma, I claimed he is neither. He simply shows clear classical republican thought — a notion that is substantiated by delving into the works of those by whom he claimed to be influenced, especially Jacques Maritain.

Trudeau appeared at the time of a Canadian Machiavellian Moment — those profound moments in which ‘republics’ (states) face moments of insecurity and are in danger. Even though he often speaks in republicanism’s language and refers to its tenets, he never openly calls himself a republican, but it does not follow from this that classical republicanism meant nothing to him. Rather, it shows that while republican theory remains an undercurrent of thought that never thoroughly disappears, its unfortunate history of conflation with nationalism and fascism makes the use of the label ‘republican’ a difficult one. Every so often, though, the theory resurfaces as a contender to ‘fix’ what needs repairing in a political society and it is in these moments —these Machiavellian Moments — that republican theory and language enjoy a resurgence. We are currently
experiencing a republican revival, and this should alert us to the notion of a nascent Machiavellian Moment.

There is an undeniable feeling of nostalgia that often accompanies these Moments, thus it becomes important to avoid romanticizing the subject of the revival itself, and evaluate objectively whether whatever is being ‘revived’ is, in fact, worthy of resuscitation at all. We know instinctively that revivals generally occur when there is the overwhelming sense that something of deep value has been lost and that ‘something’ is in need of repair and cannot be fixed with the tools available. If this is so, what is the ‘it’ that the republican revivalists are seeking to fix? According to some, the answer is clear: the atomism of liberalism has caused general frustration encouraging some scholars to search for workable solutions keeping in mind modern concerns about rights and freedoms. For them, classical republicanism offers the right tools to address these concerns; it can fix what is causing the current democratic malaise.

If Machiavellian Moments occur when ‘republics’ are threatened, and revivals occur when something of value has been lost, it follows that, at times, political societies experience a sense of disquiet that is difficult to define. Canada had one of its important Machiavellian Moments during the Trudeau era when a sense of growing unease regarding national unity led him to use republican language and espouse republican theories inviting Canadians to view their society and their politics in a particular way. The current resurgence of republican theory would suggest that, once more, Canadian society is experiencing an unease the causes of which are complex, but not difficult to isolate. Understanding the malaise is quintessential to explaining why it is important to retrieve Trudeau and I seek to do so in this concluding chapter. My placement of Trudeau
in the classical republican paradigm leads to questions of what he himself might have thought was broken in the Canadian society of his time, which solutions he sought in order to set about repairing it, and whether some of his concerns are still valid; in other words, I will try to convey why Trudeau’s vision for, and of, Canada is still valid and thus why we ought to bother with Pierre Elliott Trudeau at all.

‘Who Speaks for Canada?’ Who Speaks for Canadian Democracy?

Trudeau asked this famous question during his years in public life:

Who speaks for Canada? Our strength lies in our national will to live and work together as a people. Weaken that will, that spirit of community, and you weaken Canada. Weaken Canada, and you damage all the parts, no matter how rich some of those parts may be. My friends, you and I must stand up for Canada, and we must see that there is a national government that has the courage to do so as well (1998: 183, emphasis mine).

In addition to this question, today Trudeau might well also ask ‘who speaks for Canadian democracy?’ Trudeau sought to change his society because he thought there was a particularly dangerous situation threatening Canada. What could this have been in Trudeau’s mind? There is no real need to delve too deep to answer this question: the fragmentation or segmentation of Canadian society. One can also detect a Trudeauvian concern for the marketization of politics. I will address these phenomena — fragmentation/segmentation and marketization — in the pages of this concluding chapter, and examine Trudeau’s reactions to them; for it is here that Trudeau’s relevance remains influential and significant.
Fragmentation and Segmentation

Cultural, ethnic, societal, political fragmentation — these were all a concern for Trudeau. He knew Canada is a complex society which balances parliamentary sovereignty with a Charter of Rights and Freedoms (i.e. Crown sovereignty versus popular sovereignty), liberalism and multiculturalism (i.e. neutrality versus accommodation), and federalism and monarchy (i.e. centrifugal versus centripetal forces). Any student of the principles, structures, and institutional manifestations of federalism recognizes that, by its very nature, federalism unites constituent parts into a larger whole, and that those units chose federalism precisely because their thrust toward self-government was strong enough to reject unitary structures. The precise relationship between federalism and republicanism has yet to be explored satisfactorily, but in no small measure, it is possible to conceive of the federal principle — which encourages autonomy and shares jurisdiction — as a loose reproduction of free city states for the modern age since renaissance republics too insisted on independence and struggled against the centralizing forces of empires that surrounded them. Given that sub-units establish their own governments to remain closer to the people, the citizenry’s sense of republican self-government is encouraged.

Federalism’s centrifugal forces could run the risk of fragmenting the citizenry, but far from being inimical to republicanism’s purposeful belonging, federalism is eminently amenable to republicanism because it fulfills the sub-units’ need to be self-governing while not taking away from central governments’ interest in establishing, nurturing, and maintaining a national identity through mechanisms which strengthen the democratic principle. Federalism contains several links to democracy, and to republicans, the most
immediately identifiable of these is the notion that federal principle institutionalizes the kinds factious conflicts that Machiavelli (1984) believed would promote vigilance and require compromise.

Canada is no stranger to various types of fragmentation: neighbourhoods, social class, geography, nations, political loyalties, and multiculturalism (especially when interpreted as prescription). At the very least, every student of Canadian political science will be familiar with, and has likely had his fill of, the terms ‘cleavage’ and ‘brokerage’; however, the kind of fragmentation with which our democracy is now confronted is new and requires a different degree of attention. Democracy is notoriously — and perhaps perilously — susceptible to erosion if not to disintegration. The proliferation of countless ‘communities’ who demand allegiance from their members and action from the politicians, tend to classify citizens into separate (and isolating) silos each of which pursues its own ‘good’ to the detriment of establishing and reinforcing a sense of purposeful belonging. Citizens are, at times, rancorously divided along conflict-ridden lines that threaten the democratic health of the body politic. Viewed optimistically, one might see these silos as mechanisms through which to aggregate interests and present positions with a cohesive voice; viewed pessimistically (or realistically) a high degree of fragmentation of the citizenry is nothing more than the failure of rational democratic politics. Democracy requires politically rational relationships which aim at bringing citizens together regardless of difference.

In Canada, citizens turn to the federal Parliament for a sense of unity since it was created to represent the whole of the people, to debate their concerns, and to propose laws and policies for their benefit. Parliament’s role is diminished, if not demeaned, by
members of parliament who, of late, spend a great deal of time strategizing about ways to ascend to, or remain in, office — they are in ‘permanent campaign mode’. Much of what they plan is determined by market research and almost all of what they pledge to accomplish during upcoming legislative sessions is basically pointless. Politicians often speak and act to elicit an emotional response from the public rather than confront the electorate with information to help it make rational decisions and urge it to make what might be difficult choices.

Trudeau would say that a functioning, healthy democracy depends on reason. Democracy and reason are intertwined, so that the demise of rationale politics might lead, in turn, to the demise of any democracy worthy of the name. Canadian parliamentary democracy when carried out as it is designed to do, is an exercise in reason over passion because substantial political debate and policy making require logic, discourse, and critical thinking. When democracy is prevented from functioning as intended, the foundational institutions of parliamentary democracy pay the price since their life depends on a debate, contestation, and reasoned agreement.

It is easy to look to foundational institutions of the state, clamour for their reform imputing to them the blame for the disconnect citizens feel. Some citizens become indignant and cast aspersions about institutional inertia and unresponsiveness, about notions of democratic deficit and supposed shortcomings of electoral systems, but are the institutions the cause of the malaise? If dissatisfaction with ‘politics’ and the sense of ‘disconnect’ are both widespread and deleteriously affecting civic engagement, it may be time for the citizenry to look at itself first. Citizens must first make efforts to understand, and engage in, their system of government because it may be that the lack of democratic
education that is the real cause of the disengagement, not the institutions themselves. After all, it is difficult to engage with, and be passionate about, something one does not understand. Also, an electorate that increasingly behaves with only short-term needs/wants in mind, and demands the state to respond to these, can hardly blame politicians, or the institutions themselves, for lacking long-term ‘vision’ since both are ultimately tasked with responding to citizens.

It was, and is, increasingly difficult to define what citizens expect from Canadian democracy and its institutions. Today, in liberal democracies, citizens expect, at a minimum, governments that exercise limited authority, whose actions are transparent, and remain accountable to the people. Citizens, however, should also expect democracy to mean engagement so as to ensure that the limits on government power,\(^\text{196}\) government transparency and accountability are actually taking place rather than merely being talked about.

The aforementioned balance in a complex society like Canada must also take note of different voices with different demands all clamouring to be heard. Modern notions of democracy make it so that the people to whom those voices belong are being referred to increasingly as ‘tax–payers’ rather than citizens (Delacourt, 2013). Politicians currently

\(^{196}\) “[Trudeau] talks about the duty to one another and to the country, and there’s an underlying obligation to collective responsibility. But he was concerned — and this is the whole [idea] that underlies the Charter of Rights and Freedoms — …[and] thought that governments should be restrained which is the whole principle that government is a good thing and can do wonderful things for a community but that in the modern world…in any society, governments have enormous authority and even though he [Trudeau] was capable of using it, the War Measures Act being an obvious example, he was conscious of the fact that in the long term, individuals in society, and indeed groups and organizations, had to be protected against abuse particularly in the British Parliamentary system where you have majority governments…the tyranny of the majority can become an issue and he really did believe that the citizen as the individual and as a collective entity should have some capacity to limit the overwhelming authority of their governments” (John Young, personal communication, November 15, 2013).
view Canadians in terms of the coffee they consume, i.e. the Tim Hortons coffee drinker versus the Starbucks consumer (Marland et al, 2012; Delacourt, 2013) and a curious exchange takes place. Citizens are increasingly aware, and perhaps displeased, with their classification as ‘consumer’ and ‘tax–payer’, but when they approach governments, it is often with the notion that because they diligently paid their taxes, they are entitled to make demands on government and have their wants satisfied.

Delacourt (2013) — and on several occasions, Trudeau — reminds us that the wisdom to suggest the differentiation between wants and needs used to be purview of the statesperson; this is no longer the case since politicians no longer seek to educate and inform citizens regarding choices. This is not to suggest that governments imposed choices on citizens; rather, it suggests that in order to make meaningful choices, citizens must be informed of the implications and ramifications of particular policy proposals. Put simply, as the old adage suggests, what we want might not be what we need (Delacourt, 2013) — or what is ‘good’. Formal and informal literature seem to suggest that the goal in modern democracy is to sell an image (which is often devoid of substance), and through fragmentation and hyper–segmentation political parties are able to ‘win’ elections with the narrowest of margins targeting those enclaves, groups, or segments to whom they promise to deliver the desired (or demanded) product. Providing information to a disengaged public is time–consuming and expensive, but it would lead presumably to more thoughtful choices. Trudeau (1993) remembered how difficult it was in the 1972 campaign to engage the citizenry in discussions about politics:

I described the exercise as ‘a conversation with Canadians’. ‘Here’s what we’ve accomplished in the past four years’, I said to them, ‘and here are our plans for the next four years.'
If you like them, if you approve of them, then vote for us’. I was counting on the infectious nature of good ideas to bring us victory. Well, as I soon realized (but not soon enough!), the approach was too cerebral. Politics can’t be conducted at such a rational level, devoid of all emotion. The voters wanted a leader to guide them, and I was giving them a professor. The members of my party wanted to jump into combat, and I was giving them a lecture. The electorate was eager for its regular dose of eloquence, attack, riposte, cheers, and rallies, and there I was giving them calm, lucid propositions in pedagogical tones. That is not how you win elections (158).

The current climate in which voter turnout and apathy are in freefall, particularly among younger citizens, is symptomatic of a deep malaise; an indication, perhaps that we are on the verge of a Machiavellian Moment.

Instincts might lead one to believe that institutional reforms are necessary to encourage engagement. Perhaps this is the case; however, it is difficult to imagine a citizenry newly energized by the introduction of a new electoral system, or an elected senate. These may be desirable and, in the long run, they may be considered necessary, but republicanism puts the citizenry first. In other words, republicanism sees citizens preceding institutions of government and thus if there is a sense of malaise, we must look to ourselves first to diagnose what ails us. Following this, if we still think our institutions are ossified, then reform should take place. Before we move to redesigning our foundational institutions, though, a thorough check–up of our own understanding of democracy should take place. Strategies of fragmentation and hyper–segmentation, rather than working to underscore our common political values, undermine the possibility for meaningful interaction and exchange. Are these practices beneficial to democracy or are they a danger to it?
We know with a high degree of certainty that Trudeau found national and cultural fragmentation a clear danger. Fragmentation can be defined as the “[d]ivision of individuals into new groups, to allow more efficient targeting of resources, and also creation of new segments, such as ethnic minorities or seniors, as society evolves” (Marland et al., 2012: 263). For Trudeau, practices such as these pose a deep challenge to democracy. Nationalisms, in particular, placed peoples in isolation create an ‘us versus them’ mentality — in Trudeau’s words, a ‘state of siege mentality’ where people feel they are constantly under some sort of threat. He sought solutions to these problems in his understanding of democracy (republican democracy in particular) whereby the state is governed ‘by laws not by men’ ensuring a broader and fairer democracy. Individuals would be protected by a charter of rights and through those freedoms it guaranteed they could participate in the creation of political society in which a sense of the common good would not be overlooked. We have seen that some quarters of Québec society and its intelligentsia still hold a grudge against Trudeau and charge him with having somehow damaged Canadian Confederation.

With regards to Québec, one wonders if what is being lamented is failed expectations. Was Trudeau expected to believe in certain things because he was a Québécois? Was he expected to support particular ideas because of his heritage? And when he did not, was he betraying his province, his heritage or being ‘ambivalent’ about the degree of his French Canadian pride and identity? If this were the case, it would simply confirm how intellectually and personally stifling nationalisms can be. Why should he be viewed as less of a French Canadian or ‘ambivalent’ about his identity simply because he regards ethnic nationalisms as dangerous? Why does McRoberts feel
that “such an intense rejection of nationalism and of ethnically or culturally defined collectivities came naturally to someone who himself did not feel a clear membership in any such collectivity” (59)? Is one part of a collectivity only if they comply with particular standards of thought and only if they behave in a predetermined way? If so, nationalism once again reveals itself for what it is — reactionary. Forced into a box, forced to wear a label that if refused means one is no longer part of the community — this is in fact the very essence of ethnic nationalisms that Trudeau abhorred. He found it limiting and oppressive. Quebeckers, he believed, were better than this.

For Trudeau, impersonal laws were the best way to secure democracy especially after securing the participation of citizens in helping government make those decisions. This speaks to the republican imperative of political participation. Democracy would work best when determined in this way because it would help make policy decisions. Disagreement — in particular moral disagreement — would be inevitable, but that did not mean that a judgement could not be made with regards to the best way to proceed. Just because people disagree does not mean they cannot come to the realization that some arguments are more persuasive than others. If the people did not agree with those decisions even after broad participation, they had the opportunity, come election time, to reject democratically the government that advanced them. The basis of Canadian Confederation, after all, was to give the numerous and diverse voices a democratic forum — Parliament — in which to contest differing notions of the ‘good’. Parliament is also the place in which we come to determine the kind of society in which we wish to live.

As I have tried to show throughout this thesis, Trudeau’s understanding of the state and the political society are characteristically republican. He elaborated on a
sophisticated version of collectivism that resembles strongly that envisioned by the theorists of the modern republican revival. I return to Richard Gwyn’s account (1999) where he states the reason why Trudeau continues to be relevant in this regard:

He haunts us because he has given us an idea of what being Canadian means — the only idea that gives us any national cohesion… In his person and by his ideas, Trudeau made a signal contribution to the evolution of the idea of Canadianism (31–32).

In other words, Trudeau elaborated on a purposeful belonging that still makes sense to Canadians. By bringing back the Constitution and including a singularly Canadian Charter of Rights, he provided a blueprint for building a patriotism upon which citizens of the country could construct a future – an inclusive future – of their own choosing. Indeed, for some people old enough to remember the day the Constitution came home and Canada got its Charter, the moment will always be associated with Trudeau: “When we thought about what it meant to be Canadian…he inevitably comes to mind” (Kingwell, 1999: 90).

Marketization of Politics

The history of brokerage politics in Canada might lead to confusion with regards to the difference between it and political marketing. While political marketing is not new, it has certainly evolved and has gained a dominant position in political life. Canadians, of course, are no strangers to political pandering since brokerage is part of our Canadian heritage, but there is a marked difference between brokerage and political marketing. Brokerage politics, by definition, used to be associated intimately with Canadian politics. Brokerage is
Canadian term for successful big tent parties that embody a pluralistic catch-all approach to appeal to the median voter and to broker regional tensions, particularly those emanating from Quebec. This involves adopting centrist policies and electoral coalitions to satisfy the short-term preferences of electors who are not located on the ideological fringes (Marland et al, 2012: 257).

Conversely, political marketing is defined as “the use of marketing to develop and promote policy packages to citizens, as well as to encourage compliance” (Marland et al. 2012: 257). Political marketing must, in turn, be differentiated from political advertising which is defined as “[p]aid political communication, such as a newspaper ad, billboard, radio commercial, TV spot or website, whereby the sponsor controls all aspects of the communication” (ibid: 261). As is immediately apparent from these definitions, the study of practical politics is becoming a much more complex endeavour indeed. A quotation can help elucidate further:

Political marketing is not just about advertising…Ads are one of several communication options available to political marketers — media relations, direct mail, and public appearances being others. When marketers do develop advertising campaigns, they use marketing concepts and tools (for instance, market research). Computer databases and online research allow parties to produce informative advertising that creates an evidence–based strategic messaging frame, one that can be quickly disseminated in response to emerging events. But studies also explore whether ads reflect voter preferences, how effectively they convey the political product, and if they support the overall brand…Indeed, as with commercial marketing, the aim of political marketing strategy and research is to create a product that the market wants, so there should be less need for persuasive advertising, as opposed to informative advertising, that generates product awareness (Marland et al, 2010: 12–13, emphasis mine).
Concerns have been raised with regards to the impact of political marketing on democracy in the US (ibid, 16), so scholars were quick to examine whether the importation of American strategies in this field would “produce significant democratic implications” in Canada as well; in particular, the potential for “…giving elites the tools to both reflect and manipulate citizens’ viewpoints” (ibid, 16). Marland et al (2012) summarize concerns related to this and of particular interest are the notions that third parties such as pollsters, researchers, or consultants might be in a position to influence directly government policy; that political leaders might be too beholden to poll results and thus have their decisions dictated primarily by these means; that political life might become centred on image rather than substance; that people will increasingly be seen as taxpayers or consumers rather than as first and foremost citizens; that segmentation and micro–targeting will have an impact on notions of democratic representation; and finally, that the entire exercise of political marketing will turn voters off completely from the political process (16–17).

These phenomena have been noticed and reported outside academia as well; increasingly, popular literature and journalists have commented on these strategies and note that they might be having an impact on the political life of the country. A major concern is market segmentation which “encourages political parties…to use” strategies like market intelligence and micro–targeting to “target [those] groups whose support they

\[197\] It is important to note that Marland et al (2012) also list “potential positives” associated with political marketing: politicians might be more enticed to listen more attentively to voters; the practice might allow for the targeting of “minorities” and “not just majorities”; it may assist in “[e]levating citizens’ position in the political process” and may allow them to understand better the political process and government; it has the potential for “[r]educing elite domination”; and may assist in matters of responsiveness and accountability of government and politicians alike (18–19).
need, and thus exclude others rather than represent [the] whole” (Marland et al, 2010: 17).

Market intelligence can be defined as the collection of “[e]mpirical data about the political marketplace and public views” through “methods such as polls, opinion surveys, focus groups…and consultation, as well as analysis of existing public data such as census data and election records” all of which are used to “decide on issue priorities, develop communication strategies, and help present [a party or politician] as the most competent to address those issues” (ibid: 259–260). This is aided by the use of micro–targeting:

A strategic use of resources designed to focus efforts on small segments of the electorate, uncovered through market intelligence, whose socio– and geo–demographic profiles indicate a propensity for supporting the sponsor; sometimes called hypersegmentation. It relies on complex voter profiling or databases. A Canadian example is the Conservatives’ use of micro–policies such as boutique tax credits targeted at construction workers and truck drivers (ibid: 260).

It is important to point out that political marketing has been said to possess positive attributes as well and that the outcome of its use really depends on the way in which political leaders and their associates use this tool (Giasson et al, 2012: 250) and scholars are quite careful to assess both the positive and negative potential impacts the practices might have. In a chapter summarizing the potential positive and negative outcomes of the practices, Giasson et al (2012) state the following positives:

As a theoretical model, market orientation presents the opportunity to craft a political product that responds to electors’ demands, which may be beneficial for citizens whose needs and interests are therefore better represented.
The process is also conceived as an ongoing enterprise during which political actors engage in a conversation with citizens...[and]...[s]egmentation could be used to identify the needs of minorities that have previously been neglected (250).198

The authors are also careful to state the “implications for democracy” that are attached to political marketing, segmentation and micro–targeting (ibid: 251) including the possibility of “some electors’ views becoming more important than others” since political strategists might “focus on a small group in society that may affect the election” (ibid).

Another important point made is the following:

Critics say that any expected democratic enhancements are linked to a simplistic and idealistic view of the actions of citizens and, mostly, of political actors involved in the political marketing process. First...considering political elites as genuinely altruistic or inherently preoccupied with the fluctuating state of democratic vitality is nothing short of naïve. Political actors use political marketing tools and tactics to gain and retain power (Giasson et al, 2012: 251).199

Perhaps most importantly,

[T]he presupposed rationality of citizens presented by political marketing theorists to justify the expected democratic benefits might be off the mark too. Rational choice imposes that citizens are able to identify their needs, are able to make a near–perfect evaluation of the cost–benefit implications of their choices, and have access to use appropriate information to make a decision. Canadians have a much greater opportunity to access information

198 “[P]olitical marketing could be seen to have empowered Canadians by creating the perception that the use of such techniques has opened up parties and made them more responsive to citizens’ wishes. The more market–oriented that Canada’s elites become, the more open they are to input from citizens, which could theoretically have positive implications for democracy” (Giasson et al, 2012: 254)

199 Not to mention that political apathy is apt to favour some political parties rather than be a hindrance to them.
about politics and public policy than they ever have before, but their decision-making process may not fit the economic rationality model. When Canadians are polled, or when they participate in focus groups…do they know where their interests lie? Do they inevitably prioritize imagery over political substance? What do they make of the larger Canadian common good? Moreover, there remains the dilemma of how to reconcile political wants with policy needs when these conflict, as they often do (Giasson et al, 2012: 251–52)

Ultimately, the statement that the outcome will be positive or negative for democracy will depend on “how political marketing is implemented by political actors and institutions” (ibid: 255) may be true; however, the practices outlined and defined above remain a deep concern.

It is important to spend some time addressing notions of politics in modern Canada.

The sophistication and dissemination of communications and research technology, and the competitive pressures to reflect the needs and wants of the electoral market, are changing Canadian democracy…[C]ompetition brings pressures to edge out rivals, necessitating product differentiation, salesmanship, mass communication, and perhaps hyperbole. Some products and services find niche markets, as do political parties and politicians, and intentionally differentiate themselves from the demands of the mass market — think of high-end or community-oriented coffee shops or, in the Canadian politics, the Bloc Québécois (Marland et al, 2012: xi).

Coffee shop analogies seem to be quite pertinent for Canadian politics. Many publications note how political and marketing advisors are keen to separate the Tim Hortons crowd from the Starbucks patron (Marland et al, 2012; Delacourt, 2013) and seems to suggest that just as which brand of coffee is consumed can help identify who the patron votes for, so too has politics become something to sell.
Using technology, Canadian practitioners have identified new target groups that cut across physical divides, such as Tim Hortons coffee drinkers, Canadian Tire shoppers, and the hockey moms of suburbia. This may mean greater resources need to be spent on voter profiling, segmentation, micro-targeting, and get-out-the-vote efforts (Giasson et al., 2012: 242).

A recent publication by Susan Delacourt (2013) also reveals how politics is increasingly viewed in terms of a product to be purchased by the voters. She examines how political parties no longer discuss politics in terms of the national interest and citizenship: rather, they carve out ‘niches’ (ibid: 327) of potential supporters/voters and promise to cater to demands of that particular segment of the electorate — or, “…in the building lexicon of this era, ‘taxpayers’” (ibid: 133). This approach “…threaten[s] to turn citizenship into a mere monetary transaction” (ibid: 321).

Unlike the work of Marland et al (2012), Delacourt’s (2013) book is not an academic treatise, but it is a revealing investigation into how politics is increasingly viewed in terms of a product and the citizenry as its purchaser. One passage is particularly revealing and summarizes her entire argument:

> In this world, citizens aren’t informed consumers. They tune in only to the politicians — and the governments — who provide them with tangible improvements to their material world. It creates a democratic debate resting on value for the dollar, not values of the heart or head; one about wants, not about needs. And in turn, this is not a citizenry that can be easily sold on anything that increases their taxes, or reduces their consumption…What’s more, in

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200 She refers to her work as “more of a story than a study” (8). There is nothing particularly new about analyses or preoccupations regarding the confluence of consumerism and democracy (or put in Machiavelli’s words, the conflict between corruzione and the common good, and the consequences of ozzo) nor are questions regarding whether or not democracy — liberal democracy specifically — breeds complacency; however, her book is an accessible exposition of the development of ‘politics as consumer product’ and provides perspicacious insights into its ramifications.
a nation of consumer–citizens, the customer is always right. It is not the politician’s job to change people’s minds or prejudices, but to confirm them or play to them, to seal the deal of support. Speeches aren’t made to educate or inform the audience but to serve up marketing slogans. Political parties become ‘brands’ and political announcements become product launches (Delacourt, 2013: 15–16).

Two themes emerge from this quotation and are at the heart of the matter: the marketization of politics, and relationship between politicians and citizens. It is important for our purposes, then, to address Trudeau’s thoughts in relation to these. In a previous chapter, I addressed his views on the role of political leadership in educating the citizenry to democracy and his definition of the common good. I will address here his concerns regarding ‘politics as a consumer good’ and his views of the proper relationship between politicians and citizens.

Delacourt’s (2013) foray into Pierre Trudeau’s political administration reveals how advertising was part of his political strategist’s plan to either promote a particular message (most notably the introduction of the wage and price controls policy, national unity, the repatriation of the Constitution, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms) or to present a particular image of the Prime Minister which needed to be particularly polished after the introduction of television cameras in the House of Commons in 1977.201
Interestingly, she points out that today’s politics has made it so that “[i]t is not the politician’s job to change people’s minds or prejudices, but to confirm them or play to them, to seal the deal of support. Speeches aren’t made to educate or inform the audience, but to serve up marketing slogans” (16) and although I will address what Trudeau’s reaction to this might be, his ‘strategists’ on the campaign trail in 1980 might well have agreed. They quickly realized that Trudeau’s efforts to appeal to the intellectual side of voters were not translating satisfactorily into electoral support. The ‘strategists’ reacted swiftly: “Gone were the earnest efforts of the 1972 campaign to engage the intellectual Trudeau in a ‘conversation with Canadians’; Trudeau would be more removed from the fray — an image more than a personality…” (Delacourt 2013: 68). The strategy was completed by efforts to keep Trudeau as far away as possible from the press.\(^{202}\)

\(^{201}\) Delacourt (2013) says that “…Trudeau himself took more time in the Commons to better ‘frame’ his replies for the camera lens” (89). Gossage (1986) wrote the following in his entry dated October 30, 1977, “Just to make sure we don’t get away with anything, television was launched in the House this week. Show business has now penetrated the sanctum of Canada’s most exclusive club. The regime is terrified. They are not performing. In fact, they look indifferent in the face of economic and political turmoil. How flip they seem in front of the ‘eye’ — how mercilessly real. The PM is woefully unprepared and struggles (but not too much) to put his heart into the instant adversarial politics of Question Period, which provides the only juice that gets the daily attention of television. TV gives us instant winners and losers every day. How wonderful! I have this image of him, talking on a point of privilege, shuffling papers, looking down, never fixing his tormentor, glasses perched precariously on his nose, making a professorial point, then blowing a good line…by mumbling it as he sits down. Why doesn’t he play the game and fling it at the adversary? The demands of the ‘eye’ are set and unswerving. We will have to find a way to teach him how to master this medium” (99–100).

\(^{202}\) “As my job as master of the press was to keep them happy and away from direct contact with the PM (the press called it a ‘peek–aboos’[sic] campaign), my role…was to report on the media’s increasingly bored and sullen mood. I lived a permanent paradox. I knew the strategy was working. Scripted words were being spoken, however unenthusiastically, by a leader ready this time to do what had to be done to become prime minister again…Trudeau was both predictable and looking good. His words got out to the public because, most days, there was just enough substance in his speeches to provide a television or a radio clip, or a Canadian Press ‘lead’…Working through the night in his pajamas, [Tom] Axworthy also crafted into his speeches irresistible short snappy lines (often poking fun at [Joe] Clark) for TV and radio clips. Sure enough, they would be picked up and used”. (Gossage 1986: 190–191)
In an article written for *The Montreal Gazette* dated January 4, 1980 entitled *Trudeau Has Low Opinion of Voters* McGillivray laments reporters’ lack of accessibility to the former PM “in what was dubbed the ‘Peek–a–Boo’ campaign” (a term remembered by Delacourt, 2013: 68). It is important to point out that Delacourt reminds her readers of the well–known distinction between advertising and marketing, and it appears that Trudeau’s hesitant attitude toward particular media practices was located more prominently in the marketing/image management aspect rather than with the mere advertising side, and his relationship with the ‘fourth estate’ seems to reflect this.

Patrick Gossage (1986) recounts the ambiguous relationship the Prime Minister had with the press, with the practice of polling, and with what Gossage evocatively calls ‘image–cooking’ (113). Gossage (ibid) states rather tersely, but effectively “I now realize that Trudeau sees the media as an irritant in the great transactions of government” (39) and recounts frustrations emanating from advertising agency professionals who “were giving staff the pitch to package Trudeau like soap” and were not getting the kind of reception they expected when senior staff like Jim Coutts predicted that Trudeau would ask ‘Why should I?’” (Gossage 1986: 71). Gossage (ibid) states that “The PM has clear

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203 “Trudeau has never been one to overestimate the intelligence of the voters. But his performance this time suggests that his estimate has now reached rock bottom” Don McGillivray (Montreal Gazette, January 1980).

204 “Advertising is what you do after you have a product to sell; marketing is what you do to come up with the product in the first place” (Delacourt 2013: 107)

205 “[W]hen it comes to cooking his own image, the PM can only be led so far. He won’t go all the way in playing the office politics of which we are increasingly a part”. (Gossage, 1986: 113).
and classic views of the proper role of the fourth estate in a democracy, but since the practitioners here in Ottawa seldom reach his standards, he is quickly frustrated” (40).

While the demands of practical politics may have convinced him to defer albeit limitedly, perhaps begrudgingly, to media experts, pollsters, and ‘image-cookers’, his theoretical writings reveal a deep concern for the scenario described by Delacourt (2013). In particular, Trudeau elaborates on what he thinks is the statesman’s duty, the role of the state in democratic education, and the consequences of pursuing exclusively personal interest over the interest of society; in other words, he warns against the corruption of the common good in favour of the one’s interest exclusively. Echoes of Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean–Jacques Rousseau are clearly audible in his concerns and in his words.

Trudeau’s (2010) view on the kind of politics described by Delacourt is quite clear:

[A] government is an organization whose job is to fulfil the needs of the men and women, grouped in society, who consent to obey it. Consequently the value of a government derives not from the promises it makes, from what it claims to be, or from what it alleges it is defending, but from what it achieves in practice. And it is for each citizen to judge of that. But by what standards will he form his judgement? In a society of egoists, clearly, every citizen will want a government that will cater to him personally even at the expense of others: he will therefore pledge his loyalty to a

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206 Gossage (1986), whose work with Trudeau began as press secretary in 1976, kept a journal detailing his years with the former PM. About this particular anecdote, he recounts: “Why should [Trudeau] deliver on cue the blockbuster speech others had promised him and pushed him into? On our recent foray to the prairies, he preferred to save his inner fire for an unadvertised special with a crowd in Saskatoon that didn’t expect it, and was bland where fireworks were required in the televised speech so carefully planned for the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB) convention in Winnipeg. Confound all adversaries, even your own staff. Why not?” (71). In another instance, Gossage says, “What of the PM himself? He was frustrated, I would say. Frustrated by his assistants’ attempts to sell him speech ideas he often did not believe in. Alone on so many platforms, thumbs in his pants in the famous ‘gunslinger’ stance, when the spirit or the crowd so moved him, he developed his own material that grew out of this real convictions. Perhaps he did this to assert his authority against the advice of this staff. Then we would hear about patriation, constitutional reform, and the need for a strong central government. But he seemed to sense it wasn’t going down, that he was casting pearls before swine” (178).
government that will give him, as circumstances require, a bottle of beer, a refrigerator, a church pavement, or a university subsidy. But a society of egoists quickly becomes a society of slaves...To remain free, then, citizens must seek their welfare in a social order that is just to the largest number...It follows that men can live free and at peace only if their society is just (36–37).

Delacourt (2013) states that “[w]hen a marketing–oriented government is in power, everything becomes a transaction” (244) and that “[h]ardcore political marketing...works best in polarized, partisan climates. It thrives on that vaunted consumer virtue of choice, but it has to be a sharp, well–defined choice: left versus right, good versus bad, no ambivalent middle” (314). A full quotation here is necessary to illustrate Trudeau’s (2010) concerns in this regard:

The statesman may well think differently from his fellow–citizens on certain subjects, he can try to convey his special wisdom to them; but in the final analysis it is the general will that must prevail, not his own will. That is why the statesman must be attentive to the needs of all sectors of society, with no bias towards thwarting any one of them, and must wish only to reconcile them all and direct them towards the general interest.... We should start, then, by banishing from our political mores the whole concept that a prime minister gives bridges, roads, schools to his province. These are works that society needs, that it gives to itself and pays for through taxes. A prime minister gives nothing at all...quite simply, he works in the service of the state as an instrument through which society gives to itself. A bad statesman, then, is one who refuses to serve the community and goes so far as to obstruct the mechanisms by which society serves itself....[a] bad statesman [is one who says] to the voters of a constituency, ‘Vote for so–and–so and we’ll give you a bridge’. These servants who lay down conditions rather than doing what they are paid to do are bad servants: they ought to be fired (64–65, emphasis in original).

Interestingly, Delacourt (2013) points out that politicians today no longer consider it their job to educate the citizenry and persuade it of what might be in its best interest. It will be
recalled that republicanism maintains that the state can have a non–arbitrary role in the
democratic education of its citizenry so that it can, in turn, inform the state as to what it
requires and demands. To use Rousseau’s words perhaps, they can be ‘forced to be free’.

Trudeau (2010) states:

That is not to say that democracy is a perfect form of
government…If the people use their sovereignty badly, the
remedy is not to take it away from them…but rather to
educate them to do better. To be precise, democracy is the
only form of government that fully respects the dignity of
man, because it alone is based on the belief that all men can
be made fit to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
guidance of the society of which they are members (87–
88).

One of Trudeau’s statements would indicate that he also thinks governments (the state)
should be able to anticipate needs of the citizenry and educate it as to why particular
political solutions are preferable to others. This is not to say that the citizenry must accept
these solutions, but that it is the state’s duty to inform its citizens if this can be done in a
non–arbitrary fashion. These solutions might not always be the popular ones, but they
may be options that serve the republican common good.

I believe a government should also try to be slightly ahead
of the people. It must indicate the directions it thinks the
society should follow for its future well–being (Trudeau,
1998: 4). The main purpose of government today is getting
citizens to realize what their priorities must be. And
explaining to them the choices they have to make (ibid: 66).

The way in which Trudeau invited Canadians to think about politics is particularly
interesting in this context. While it is more convenient to speak of a liberal Trudeau, it
deprives him of the nuances of these overt republican influences. His sophisticated
version of what it is to be an engaged part of a community (without being a
communitarian), his version of purposeful belonging (without being a nationalist), and his invitation to consider politics as a duty rather than as a vehicle through which individual wants are satisfied all point to classical republicanism. More importantly, Trudeau’s ideas shed light on what some commentators have argued is destructive to modern politics in Canada.

If Delacourt’s book is any indication, there seems to be a prevailing notion that politics is too often treated like a business in which clients rather than citizens must be satisfied or are entitled to receive ‘bang for their buck’, or where “…consumer–citizens…believed that government was something they purchased with their tax dollars” (Delacourt 2013: 244) and with “…segments of the population who cared more about their consumer concerns than they did about politics” (ibid: 273). Citizens are, in essence, tuned out. Academic literature has also addressed these issues both qualitatively and quantitatively in terms of low voter turn–out, disengagement, disillusionment, and dissatisfaction. Some literature attempts to address citizens’ apathy or distrust of politics by encouraging more avenues for direct participation and even reforms to electoral systems. Modern republicans would likely suggest that the solution does not primarily, or necessarily, rest in institutional reforms but is best addressed at the societal level first. These certainly seem to be solutions that Trudeau would endorse – at least from a theoretical standpoint.

Trudeau advocated for a particular type of collective (republican) society in which the realization that living together in a relationship of mutual respect and interdependence was essential for freedom to flourish. The term ‘collective’ may be frightening to some, but the orientation here is one that eschews the marketization of politics which
increasingly underscores the things that make citizens different from one another rather
than what stakes they have in common. It is a collectivity whereby people living in a
society are not differentiated to the extreme by where they shop, where they live, what
coffee they drink, but rather are united in common concerns that lead to a better
democracy and a more fulfilling society. Trudeau is not advocating here for equality of
condition (though certainly for equality of opportunity), but his republican sensibilities
urge us still to meet one another and share a common social life, contest and negotiate the
common good, and demand that our political leaders speak to and with us rather than try
to sell us products we do not really need.

The potential for entrenched ideological silos – by which I mean the intense
polarization of the electorate – is very real. While adversarial, partisan politics, and
political advertising have their place in our political system (they are even expected in a
vibrant democracy), poll results are becoming an obsession for politicians. Polls are
cheaper, quicker, and certainly easier than engaging in dialogue, but they run the risk of
encouraging political leaders to respond either to populist demands, or defining by
themselves what the common good is. Trudeau (2010) himself was sensitive to this
danger: “Tyrants always claim that their social order is founded on the common
weal…but they reserve the right to define it” according to their own views and needs
(36); therefore, it becomes imperative to be cautious about whence the notion of common
good comes and how citizens address and construct it.

Trudeau’s version of a neo–Roman republican society provides detailed
comments about what politics should be for citizens. Politics, for the theoretical Trudeau,
is not about offering solutions to political problems only in return for the promise of
electoral support; rather, for him, it is about finding and advocating for solutions that cater to the whole rather than the parts and finding ways to engage citizens more decisively in the political processes of the country. It is then the duty of the political leadership to try and convince the entire citizenry that these solutions are just and will, in the end, be of general and long–term benefit. It will also be up to the electorate to decide whether or not to accept these proposals.

It should be remembered that for Trudeau politics was not merely about a ‘just community’ or a ‘just nation’, but a Just Society, which, in his view, is a much more viable and attractive option for a pluralist, republican polity. In reading Trudeau’s vision of the Just Society one could extrapolate his belief that classical republican tenets create the ideal conditions for it and vice versa. He gave Canada a roadmap on how to think about politics in a pluralistic, multicultural society. This roadmap is often misread by the communitarian and neo–liberal interpreters who often obfuscate his republican ideas. Although I believe it critical to be accurate in circumscribing and identifying the directions in which this roadmap leads, for others labels may not be as crucial as identifying why Trudeau’s theoretical approaches to politics should be relevant at all.

So why is it important to retrieve Trudeau? His critiques of cultural determinism and nationalism certainly remain cogent and pertinent in liberal societies which still struggle to find ways to reconcile particularistic demands with notions of neutrality. In his republican affinities, Trudeau seems to offer solutions that can be deemed moderately collectivist without being communitarian and, at the same time, he can critique liberal hyper–individualism (in particular neo–liberalism and business–oriented ideas of New Public Management) which too often is contaminated by a view of citizens as consumers.
How Canadians think about politics is a Trudeauvian preoccupation. Rather than advocate for a liberal–individualist society as is most often attributed to him, Trudeau invited Canadians to think about notions of the common good as contributing to individual fulfillment. He tasked the political class with the duty to inform and educate citizens about democracy, and to deliver services that reflect those notions.

‘Republican’ is the most appropriate ‘label’ for Trudeau despite the fact that he never described himself as such. But even if one is convinced that his political thought continues to elude neat classification, retrieving Trudeau remains essential because he offered a useful way of looking at the Canadian political landscape. He supplied pertinent and coherent answers for why we should insist on viewing citizenship and society as political entities rather than cultural ones, and cautioned political leaders against perceiving government as a business and the citizenry as its clients. This nuanced account is inconvenient, perhaps even threatening, for communitarians and nationalists (who therefore insist on his liberalism) and for neo–liberals (who therefore insist on his socialism).

The fascination with Trudeau perhaps has not ended because there is still something particularly relevant in his theoretical ideas for society. I speculate that he is as relevant now as he ever was. The widespread notion of disillusionment with politics is one of the reasons for this assumption. Trudeau seemed to offer solutions that invited Canadians to think about politics as a fundamental duty of the citizenry and he articulated a sophisticated notion of the individual’s duty to, and role in, society without descending into communitarianism. Citizens are not, in his view, consumers and government is not a business. By labelling him a liberal here and a socialist there, the legacy–holders most
active in using Trudeau’s ideas were able to neutralize this nuanced account of a political society which was unappealing both to the cultural communitarians and the hyper–individualist liberals.

Susan Delacourt (2013) allows us to see how politics is increasingly viewed in terms of a product and the citizenry as its purchaser. She states that “…when voters see themselves as consumers of democracy, they place a high premium on customer satisfaction” (ibid: 222). When the consumer–citizen views democracy through the exclusive lens of ‘taxpayers’, is the expectation of ‘satisfaction guaranteed’ bound to follow along with being entitled to one’s ‘money back’? Delacourt (2013) states that the political front line has become “…Tim Hortons, not…Starbucks” (11) because “[t]he Tim Hortons constituency speaks of solid, double–double–drinking citizens, looking for politicians to serve them up simple, plainspoken truths in Timbit-sized, consumable portions” (11). Cormack (2012) states “…political parties now think of their constituents in terms of their consumer habits because there seems to be a strong predictive value of political leaning and consumption practices” (219). It seems that what we buy is a strong predictor of who we might support politically. However,

All of us are both citizens and consumers, yet this does not mean that these social roles are easily reconciled. The obligation of the citizen is to maintain an imaginative or thoughtful relationship to the notion of the common good. The consumer is not a political actor in this sense, at least not without a huge degradation of the notion of the political (ibid: 222)

Democracy, however, cannot live on simplified, bite–sized pronouncements packaged for immediate consumption. Democracy’s diet consists of involved participation with active citizenship supplying its nutrients. An important problem is
always present: what people want might not be what they need or even what’s best for them.

Although policy can be said to follow from general values (found at Tim Hortons, perhaps), policy is also the implementation of values into practice. Practice, rather than sentiment, allows debate about what the Canadian common good is. Politicians and parties may try to make the most of sentiment, but their actual policies make them appear on the political scene and gain meaning for citizens (Cormack, 2012: 223).

Although advertising in politics, particularly for promoting specific messages or ideas, has come to be expected, the concept of politics as a product sold, a leader’s message as ‘bought’, and ‘citizens’ identified only as ‘taxpayers’ would be offensive to republican sensibilities which still place a high value in political citizenship and in the pursuit of a common good — i.e., a national vision. In light of modern politics, one might conclude this viewing of politics “…in high-minded, institutional terms – civics as akin to religion, education or even military service” as old-fashioned, particularly since “…by the 1970s, this more exalted view of politics had taken a bit of a battering” (Delacourt, 2013: 119–120). However,

Political marketing, if not held in check, veers dangerously close to the view of consumers as morons. In its extreme forms, it plays to people’s emotions, not their thoughts. It operates on the belief that repeating a catchy phrase, even if it’s untrue, will seal an idea in the mind of the unknowing or uncaring public. It assumes that citizens will always choose on the basis of their individual wants and not society’s needs. It divides the country into ‘niche’ markets and abandons the hard political work of knitting together broad consensus or national vision” (Delacourt 2013: 327).

So much for reason over passion.
The theoretical Trudeau was of interest for this study because I contend that he gave Canadians realistic and nuanced ideas on how to think about politics in a pluralistic, multicultural society and elaborated on reasons why it is detrimental to view citizens too strongly as consumers. How Canadians think about politics therefore was a profound Trudeauvian preoccupation. Rather than claiming he is an advocate for a hyper–individualist, liberal society as is most often the case, retrieving his republican political thought is a more interesting and constructing endeavour.

Even if his theoretical inclination is thought to be one that escapes tidy categorization, his ideas remain relevant and important as he can still supply accounts as to why society and citizenship should be viewed as predominantly political, and how we might be able to reconcile notions of the common good with the primacy of the individual — a quintessential republican pursuit.

Eisenstat Weinrib (1999) highlighted Trudeau’s declaration that “the politician is a teacher. His political career provided a twenty–year seminar on the nature of citizenship in the modern, liberal, multicultural state” (282). Trudeau himself proclaimed that

> Canadians by and large tend to think of Canada as a land of immense potential. Not just as a big land, which is unquestionably is. Or a privileged land, as many others enviously regard us. But as a land of limitless promise. A land, perhaps, on the threshold of greatness (Trudeau, 1972: 214).

The Clarksons (1990) once stated that Trudeau continues to ‘haunt us’. Indeed, he does. Perhaps he ‘haunts us’ because he understood something about Canada and Canadian democracy that we still need to keep in mind. Perhaps he ‘haunts us’ because he still has something relevant to say and which we should still heed:
Canada appears when looked at from abroad…to be not so much a magnificent expanse of geography or a cluster of surging cities; rather it appears as people. Canada is Canadians. The great strength of this country lies in the good nature, the good sense and the goodwill of her men and women…To be vigorous and forward–looking is not enough to guarantee our future, however. We will be called upon to look upon it with imagination, to approach it with spirit, to plan for it with boldness. Daily problems will always be with us, but the government is not permitted the false luxury of concentrating only on the moment at hand….Governments must deal as best they can with current difficulties; they must discharge as well the responsibility of preparing for the future (Trudeau, 1972: 213).

Political marketing does not have the tools to guide the country into this kind of future; it does not equip governments with the tools necessary to make difficult choices, and it does not place on governments any responsibility for the future. Political marketing satisfies immediate wants and does not address our future needs. It appeals to our emotions rather than our intellect. Perhaps Trudeau ‘haunts us still’ because he left such a significant legacy; an indelible imprint on our institutions, our society, and our political culture. He invited Canadians to be vigilant, engaged and informed. And as current politicians appeal more and more to emotions in order to gain power, his words lose none of their wisdom and they ‘haunt us still’: reason over passion.
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