STEPHEN HARPER’S INDIA POLICY:
THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE INDO-CANADIAN DIASPORA

By

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Signature of Author
To my family: mom, dad and Milan
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American-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC)
Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL)
Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCC)
Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC)
Canadian Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy (CIJA)
Canadian Foreign Policy (CFP)
Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC)
Canada-India Education Council (CIEC)
Canada India Foundation (CIF)
Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC)
Canada-Israel Council (CIC)
Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA)
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)
Descriptive-Interpretive Case Study (DI)
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)
Foreign-Direct investment (FDI)
Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPPA)
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Indian Border Services (IBS)
Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC)
International Control Commission for Vietnam (ICC)
International Policy Statement (IPS)
Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism (JWGCT)
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA)
Neo-Classical Realism (NCR)
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)
Non-Resident Indian (NRI)
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)
Ontario Chamber of Commerce (OCC)
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD)
Person of Indian Origin (PRI)
Research in Motion (RIM)
Royal Bank of Canada (RBC)
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME)
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)
US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC)
Within-Case Comparative Analysis (WCCA)
Abstract

Ethnic interest organizations have not been considered a salience influence on foreign policy. Traditionally, democratic theory suggests foreign policy should be determined by the will of the general population, rather than the limited and segregated interests of minority groups. Specifically, in Canadian foreign policy, ethnic groups have also had limited access to decision-makers because of increased centralization of Canadian foreign policy. In contrast, the literature on Canada-India relations suggests there is an important foreign policy impact by the large, economically progressive Indo-Canadian Diaspora which has actively attempted to improve relations between these states. This dissertation addresses this obvious contrast, showing how the community has overcome the challenges traditionally associated with ethnic groups and foreign policy. Centrally, the research finds that Indo-Canadians have been active and successful foreign policy participants, influencing implementation, perceptions-editing and direct foreign policy between the two countries. This is determined by two characteristics: first, the Harper government’s decision to actively improve economic relations with New Delhi has opened important cess points for the Indo-Canadian community. Give their intimate knowledge of India’s business and economic environment, the Diaspora has been involved in various overseas missions, consultations and networking between the Canadian government and various stakeholders. Second, ethnic group influence is determined by the community’s internal organization, including the composition of their membership, financial resources and political strategies. With these characteristics, the dissertation assesses three interest organizations: the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC), the Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC) and the Canada-India Foundation (CIF). By conducting a within-case analysis, it finds that each organization has a niche role within Canada-India relations – in Diaspora representation (ICCC), business and trade relations (C-IBC) and policy-related advocacy (CIF). Centrally, this dissertation speaks to the evolving relations between the state and society in Canadian foreign policy. It offers a challenge to earlier work in this field, resulting in theoretical, methodological and policy-oriented advancement of a nascent body of literature, suggesting avenues for further investigation.
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Chapter One:

Introduction

“We are joined by ties of family. More than one million of India’s sons and daughters enrich the life of our country, in every important area of national endeavour: the arts, literature, business, politics.” PM Harper, June 27, 2010

Following the G20 summit in Toronto, Prime Ministers Stephen Harper and Manmohan Singh met for their first official bilateral summit on Canadian soil. At a reception of Indian and Canadian officials, media, and notable Indo-Canadians, Prime Minister Harper acknowledged the importance of the event, as “the first bilateral visit of a sitting Prime Minister of India to Canada in 37 years. It has been a great occasion.”¹ For the first time since 1968, the Prime Minister encouraged Indian officials to “develop its nuclear industry” emphasizing the “important part” Canada could play in achieving these goals.²

With the signing of a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) to supply Canadian uranium and nuclear technologies to India, the summit ended thirty-five years of bilateral

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¹ Canada, Office of the Prime Minister. 2010. “PM celebrates Canada-India relations.” June 27. <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3511> (August 3, 2010). Prime Minister Harper had also invited bollywood actor Akshay Kumar and choreographer Shiamak Davar to the Gala Dinner. Kumar has been made Canada’s Travel Ambassador to India. Some have suggested that this invitation was an attempt to gain electoral leverage from the Diaspora.

² While India’s first nuclear test happened in 1974 after refusing to sign the NPT in 1968. Canada – along with other states - saw this as a sign that India was developing a nuclear weapons programme. CTV News. 2010. “Canada and India agree to nuclear trade pact.” June 27. <http://www.ctv.ca/> (Accessed: July 10, 2010).
animosity and marks a new zenith in Canada-India relations. Conventional accounts of the NCA refer to the precedent set by the US-India 123 Agreement, its mutual economic and trade benefits, and emerging perceptions that India’s nuclear program addressed legitimate regional security concerns. The problem with standard interpretations is that external (exogenous) explanatory factors are unable to explain its link to other improvements in Canada-India bilateral relations. Traditional accounts do not acknowledge the important domestic conditions leading to these improvements. In particular, these explanations exclude any reference to the role played by Canada’s wealthy, sizeable and well-organized Indian Diaspora. This project is designed to correct these oversights by providing a richer and more nuanced account of the important developments in Canada-India relations.

It is important to acknowledge the lack of consensus amongst analysts regarding the foreign policy role of Indo-Canadians. Arthur Rubinoff, a prominent scholar of Canada-India relations, has argued that in comparison to their American counterparts, “[Indo-Canadian] expatriates have not been as politically active in the promotion of enhanced bilateral ties.” One important difference is Canada’s continued struggle with Khalistan fundamentalism, which has, for a long time, negatively affected the Indo-Canadian community’s constructive role in foreign policy. Others have suggested that the Diaspora’s most important contribution is in ‘low politics,’ including educational and

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5 For example, the global War on Terror has fast-forwarded Canada’s decision to ban terrorist groups such as the Babbar Khalsa and Jaish-e-Muhammad, both of which have been terrorist threats to India since the 1980s. John Ibbitson, 2009. “Canada in Step with India on Terror File.” November 17. The Globe and Mail. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/> (Accessed: November 2009).
cultural exchanges. As Ryan Touhey argues, the Diaspora “help[s] solidify economic and cultural linkages,” emphasising the literary and artistic success of Indo-Canadians in “the Canadian cultural mainstream.”6 It is important, however, to derive how these low-politics contributions affect matters of foreign policy.

In contrast, mainstream journalistic accounts overemphasise the Diaspora’s political role, although without the relevant theoretical, empirical or methodological tools to move beyond anecdotal descriptions. A November 11, 2009 Globe and Mail editorial suggests, “[Canada and India] have been attempting to improve relations, which should be close, if only because more than a million Canadians are of Indian ancestry.” 7 Similarly, the National Post insinuates that Prime Minister Harper’s November 2009 mission to India had “… an eye towards the votes of the one million Canadians who have origins in India,” as “[his] itinerary carefully balances events of interests to the Sikh, Hindu and Muslim Indian Diaspora.”8

The contradiction between academic and journalistic observations presents an obvious paradox, given the complexity of the contemporary Canada-India relationship. A more nuanced interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy towards India is clearly required – one that can incorporate international, organizational and domestic factors into a more thorough explanatory model. To date there has been little effort to include the large, prosperous and politically active Indo-Canadian Diaspora into the existing foreign policy frameworks that purportedly explore the complexity of this important bilateral

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The central goal of this research project is to provide a comprehensive account of the relationship by exploring, exposing and explaining the key factors (and confluence of events) that have affected Canada-India relations between 2006 and 2010, up to the groundbreaking nuclear agreement.\(^9\) It focuses on unpacking the strategic policy mechanisms through which this community continues to exert influence on Canadian foreign policy. In so doing, the dissertation challenges alternative arguments that claim ethnic groups have \textit{little to no} influence on foreign policy.

1. \textbf{Research Puzzle}

Two interrelated puzzles are addressed by this project. The first examines the influence of immigrant groups on Canadian foreign policy, a topic that has been largely underemphasized (and often ignored) in academic research. In fact, a good portion of the literature on democratic theory maintains that governments should be responsive to their general public, and not be excessively committed to the special interests of minority groups. Those who accept the effect of demographic changes – for example, due to immigration - suggest a deleterious influence on foreign policy.\(^{10}\) Within these accounts,

\(^9\) Discussed in Chapter three, one of the most damaging events in the Canada-India relationship is India’s 1974 nuclear test, conducted with nuclear material generated from Canada’s CANDU reactor. Since then, bilateral relations have been strained and Canada has maintained strict sanctions against India, particularly in the field of nuclear relations. One example of this perspective is found in: Reeta Tremblay. 2003. “Canada-India Relations: The Need to Re-Engage,” 27 March, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s Roundtable on the Foreign Policy Dialogue; K.R.G. Nair, 2004. “India-Canada Relations: A shining example of unrealised potential.” \textit{Asia-Pacific Foundation.} <http://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/> (Accessed: July 3, 2007); Kant Bhargava, J. C. Sharma and Soodabeh Salehi. 2008. \textit{Building Bridges: A Case Study on The Role of the Indian Diaspora in Canada}. The Centre for the Study of Democracy, Queen’s University. September.

\(^{10}\) Samuel Huntington is arguably the most bombastic of these arguments, please see: Samuel Huntington, 2004. “The Hispanic Challenge.” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 141, March/April, 30-45; Tony Smith, 2000. \textit{Foreign
newly powerful societal actors – often of a particular ethnic background – challenge the government’s ability to make rational and representative foreign policy decisions. Thus, they conclude that governments are unwilling to allow active participation of minority interests. Because these general impressions are largely based on circumstantial empirical evidence and unrefined methodology, they unfairly minimize the impact of immigrant communities.

However, this position is at odds with the literature on Canada-India relations, which recognizes that a large, economically progressive Diaspora has the potential to improve relations between states. Examining the role of an ethnic interest group comments on the effectiveness of multiculturalism in Canada, and its ability to support or inhibit the political activity of Canadian immigrants. The contributions of this study are substantial as they look to energize debate about the changing nature of state-society relations in foreign policy, particularly given Canada’s changing demographic landscape. Accordingly, this dissertation addresses the tension between these two literatures.

Second, this research focuses initially on conventional accounts of (and reliance on) the nuclear impasse as an explanation for contemporary Canada-India relations. But the standard nuclear-centric explanation cannot effectively account for the inconsistent and drastic changes in Canada’s often confrontational relationship with India. Indeed, this dissertation argues that nuclear considerations are not sufficient explanations for the timing and content of Canada’s recent deal with India, or the Canadian decision to support the Indian exemption at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). More generally, the conventional wisdom mistakenly assumes that the nuclear issue determines other dimensions of what has evolved into a very complex and multifaceted relationship.

Instead, this project argues that the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement did not occur in isolation from other current policy initiatives, including bilateral trade, off-shore oil exploration initiatives, dialogue over terrorism, and a potential free-trade agreement. This research shows that the Indo-Canadian Diaspora has had an important effect – helping improve bilateral relations to the point that Canada and India could negotiate a nuclear trade agreement. In this way, it also provides a compelling account of why past attempts to improve the relationship, including economic endeavours, have failed.

My research will demonstrate that the Indian Diaspora was instrumental in improving bilateral relations, as exemplified by a larger set of economic agreements. These findings will add an important layer of nuance and complexity to our understanding of changes in Canadian policy towards India. Among the project’s more important objectives is an alternative account of the domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy toward India, one that is considerably more comprehensive than standard

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11 The United States announced the deal in 2005, and immediately after, several states began formulating similar deals, including France, Britain, and Russia announced tentative interest, but did not pursue negotiations until early 2009. The US-India deal required an ‘India-specific exception’ at the NSG and IAEA. Under the rules of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, states were only allowed to trade nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes. States that had tested a nuclear device were not allowed these benefits. TV Paul and Mahesh Shankar. 2007/2008. “Why the US–India Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal,” *Survival* 49:4, Winter, 111–22.

Two central components of ethnic influence will guide the research: 1) contextual and structural conditions that facilitate the Diaspora’s access to government and 2) the community’s organized components which accomplish these domestic and foreign policy objectives. The following research questions will be addressed:

General Theoretical Questions

1. How interdependent are domestic and international politics?
2. What are the necessary contextual conditions that facilitate domestic inputs to foreign policy?
3. Does the type of democratic system influence the extent of influence?

Case-Specific Research Questions

1. Have Indo-Canadian interest groups influenced the improvement of bilateral relations between Canada and India?
2. How has this influence manifested itself? Has the government been open to interest group strategies?
3. What are the most successful strategies used to achieve a Diaspora’s foreign policy objectives?
4. Methodologically, how can these influences be accurately measured given

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competing explanations of Canada-India relations?

It is important to stress that the dissertation does not consider the Indo-Canadian Diaspora the *single* most important determinant of Canadian foreign policy towards India.\(^{14}\) Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate that Diaspora groups have considerably more influence than standard accounts have acknowledged, and represent a key variable that works within structural constraints that guide Canada’s international priorities.

2. The “So What” and “Why Now” Questions: Purpose of the Study

Given the events since 2006, it is important to understand why and how the Canadian government has come to recognize the economic, cultural, and security benefits from improved relations with India, in direct contrast to decades of indifference, neglect and animosity. While this relationship has reached new levels of cooperation, the production of academic work on Canada-India relations has stagnated: the retirement of key academics means fewer students are specializing in the field, while, more generally, the trend away from regional foci in Canadian political science has been particularly acute for the study of South Asia. As an example, the most recent academic work detailing the Canada-India relationship was produced before 2006, when the Harper government came into power. Thus, there has been no academic work that has mapped

\(^{14}\) Glazer and Moynihan do not discount other domestic inputs for US foreign policy, but argue that politics responds to ethnic inputs more than any other. Please see: Nathan Glazer and DP Moynihan eds., 1975. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 23-24; This approach is largely taken from the neoclassical realism framework, which argues that structural constraints and domestic influences are mutually constituting components of foreign policy. Please see: Steven E. Lobell *et al* eds., 2009 *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Gideon Rose. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” *World Politics* 51:1, October, 144-172.
these notable improvements in bilateral relations. Further, studies have not captured how
the recent politicization of the Indo-Canadian community has affected this relationship.
Among the earlier stated objectives, my work will contribute to a revival in the
methodological, theoretical and empirical study of Canada-India relations by introducing
the Diaspora as a crucial but neglected variable.

The absence of empirical work on the Indo-Canadian community is, at least
partly, due to the stagnation of Canada-India relations after 1974, which has contributed
to a lack of case-study material to provide measurable benchmarks for policy shifts. For
example, Ripsman and Blanchard’s study of Canada’s Jewish lobby focused on Prime
Minister Joe Clark’s decision to move its Israel High Commission from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem. The case was highly publicised, because the move would signal that Canada
supported Jerusalem as the legitimate capital of Israel. To successfully prove the
influence of the Jewish community, the study required evidence of a policy shift to
relocate the High Commission, creating a benchmark to measure a Diaspora-centric
explanatory model to account for the change.

Similarly, other studies have examined the response of the organized Muslim
community to Canada’s foreign policy (particularly in Afghanistan) after the September
11 attacks. In both cases, it was a policy shift that allowed the research to reveal a
confluence of domestic and international conditions, which in turn highlighted the
influence of ethnic groups on foreign policy.

Arab Economic Sanctions against Canada in 1979.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 35:1, March,
Lobby for Israel. Westport: Greenwood Press Ltd.
Foreign Policymaking Process.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association 2009
Annual Conference, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, May 27-29, 2009.
Comparatively, the research draws parallels with studies of ethnic groups in the United States. This theoretical literature outlines organizational characteristics of ethnic interest groups which make them politically influential, including coherent internal organization, unified messaging, ethnic elite leadership and electoral strength. While Canadian and American political systems have their differences, there are important comparative applications between their respective governments. For example, conventional wisdom simplifies the effects of Diaspora groups, focusing on grassroots pressure through the prospects of electoral loss or victory. But because the Canadian system is more closed than the American, it (paradoxically) becomes more amenable to elite connections exercised by the Indo-Canadian community; with these elite linkages, the research can expect to uncover a substantial influence on foreign policy.

*The Indo-Canadian Diaspora*

Given these favourable international conditions, Canada’s Indian Diaspora is *more* important than its size - over one million strong - might suggest. Indian immigrants have lived in Canada since the turn of the nineteenth century, used for manual labour in the agricultural, construction and railroad industries in British Columbia. The liberation of immigration policy under the Pearson and Trudeau governments attracted a more educated, economically-mobile, professional Indian immigrant into Canada. Over the following decades, first and second generation Indo-Canadians have become entrenched in key sectors of the economy and entered important segments of the professional class, including business, law, medicine and engineering.
Organizations like the Canada-India Business Council, the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce and the Canada-India Foundation transform the exceptional economic success of Indo-Canadian elites into political influence. For these organizations, improvements to Canada-India relations offer opportunities for trade, investment and immigration benefits. Simultaneously, Canada’s interest in India has been prompted by the latter’s eight to ten per cent GDP growth rate, as well mutual security concerns and technological requirements. While previous Canadian governments have paid lip-service to the shared democratic, multicultural and pluralist traditions of Canada and India, only the Harper government has recognized and implemented policy to address the shifting power relationship between the two states.

This dissertation argues that the politicization of the Indo-Canadian community and Canada’s policy shift towards India are not coincidental, but are causally related. With its economic growth in the last decade and the resultant international competition for its attention, Canadian officials are now required to keep pace with other Western states in pursuit of the vast economic opportunities in India. Canada’s large Indian Diaspora provides a unique strategic advantage. My research will show why the Diaspora is a necessary condition for the advancement of Canada-India relations, particularly with respect to the implementation of policy decisions congruent with government interests.

The dissertation uncovers a symbiotic relationship between Diaspora groups and the Canadian government, in the pursuit of Canada-India bilateral relations. This dissertation finds that the Canadian government’s focus on an economic relationship with India has created an important space for an economically active and successful Diaspora.
For the most part, agreements between the two countries have been economic, including an investment protection agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding on transportation and a potential free trade agreement. In addition to creating a multifaceted explanation for the bilateral relationship, the Diaspora’s influence on these policy initiatives has created a positive climate for a nuclear deal. Further, the Diaspora has been given more clout on the nuclear agreement because it has been framed as an economic, rather than security arrangement.

3. Chapter Outline

This introductory chapter presents central problem associated with previous attempts to explain the impact of interest groups on Canadian foreign policy. It introduces the Indo-Canadian Diaspora’s impact on Canada-India relations as its central case study. Chapter two provides a literature review that situates the dissertation in the international relations and foreign policy literatures, highlighting three areas central to the research. Neoclassical realism is a theoretical approach to foreign policy that differs from its theoretical predecessors (classical (human nature) and structural (neo-) realism) because it accepts the role of multiple influences on decision-making, an adequate reflection of the complexity of Canada-India relations. The chapter also examines the literature on Canadian foreign policy to explain how the Canadian government has

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17 A Foreign Investment Protection Agreement was signed between the two states to improve business relationships as a possible precursor to a free trade agreement. Other examples include a memorandum of understanding on transportation promising billions of dollars for road and construction contracts, an agricultural deal, offshore oil and gas exploration in the Indian Ocean. India’s Minister of Highways and Transportation has announced a policy to built twenty kilometres of highway per day in India. While critics are sceptical of this plan’s feasibility, the Indian government has committed $50 billion to this project in 2010; Canada. 2010. “Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements.” <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx> (Accessed: June 2010).
traditionally made decisions about its bilateral relations. The literature review concludes with an assessment of American literature and findings on ethnic interest groups, drawing parallels between these organizations and their Canadian counterparts. My objective is to set up the dissertation as a challenge to the reigning consensus regarding the limited impact of interest groups in foreign policy.

Chapter three presents a historical overview of the Canada-India relationship, the nuclear transfer deal agreement, and the history of immigration and Diaspora settlement in Canada. This chapter will describe conventional wisdom that has traditionally interpreted the poor health of the Canada-India relationship in terms of nuclear politics and diplomacy. Canada-India relations have been more adequately characterized in terms of “benign neglect” as neither side shared a common interpretation of their national interest. That being said, most of the work on bilateral relations has tended to reference the Diaspora in an *ad hoc* and atheoretical manner - an afterthought within the central lines of analysis. This chapter also works through the history of bilateral relations, focusing on the changing immigration and demographic patterns affecting the Indo-Canadian community.

Chapter four explores the methodological challenges (and correctives) central to the research project. Research on ethnic interest groups has two common impediments: first, any competent research on these issues must first resolve the question of whether a single case study – the Indo-Canadian Diaspora – can offer theory-testing evidence and generalizable findings to build on previous research. In light of the numerous inputs to foreign policy decision-making, the dissertation must also show how it can identify and measure an independent effect of the interest group. Two methodological approaches
have been adopted to address these challenges. By comparing three separate Indian interest organizations, the dissertation will employ a within-case analysis to provide generalizable explanations of interest group behaviour. At the same time, data triangulation addresses the problem of verifiability by drawing data from several sources, including academic respondents, government contacts and interest group members. This chapter also defines two independent (Indo-Canadian interest groups and government structure) and dependent (policy influence) variables.

Chapters five and six constitute the analysis chapters, focusing on two central areas of ethnic interest group activity. Chapter five has two objectives: first, it discusses the Indo-Canadian community’s access to foreign policy decision-makers. It shows that, since its election in 2006, the Harper government has actively pursued both Canada-India relations and the Indo-Canadian Diaspora. Second, the chapter shows that the government has linked its bilateral policy initiatives to its relationship with the Indian Diaspora. It argues that the Indo-Canadian community and the government have evolved into a relationship of mutual dependence, where Indo-Canadians have become a means to an end for Canadian government policies towards India. Chapter six, in response, examines the activities, organization and composition of the Diaspora groups that have placed themselves in a position to affect Canadian foreign policy. It concludes that the elite-level access of these organizations, largely determined by their economic success, has been the largest determinant of their influence.

Chapter seven concludes with a discussion of theoretical contributions and policy recommendations based on the outcomes of the research. It applies the conclusions from
previous chapters to identify its contributions to the study of Canadian foreign policy and ethnic interest groups.

The project is expected to make three inter-related contributions to the literature. First, it offers a historically informed case-study of one of Canada’s most important yet understudied international relationships. It builds on a foundation of academic literature to explain why the Harper government has been comparatively successful in improving the Canada-India relationship. Second, the research ambitiously applies theoretical literature on the influence of ethnic groups on American foreign policy to the Canadian political system. The project thereby promotes the development of foreign policy theory by testing, validating and refining the benefits and limitations of cross-case comparisons. As discussed in subsequent chapters, it does so by using a unique methodology that combines the inductive approach of previous work with a deductive-based research design. Finally, the research provides policy-relevant findings concerning the role of ethnic groups within the political decision-making processes of Canadian foreign policy.
Chapter Two:

Literature Review

A bias towards “structural” theory in mainstream international relations has undermined the refinement of empirical and theoretical work on ethnic interest groups in foreign policy. As early as 1961, David Singer questioned structural primacy from both a methodological and ontological perspective, suggesting a “micro- or macro-level of analysis is ostensibly a mere matter of methodological or conceptual convenience.”18 Yet, as Singer attests, scholars rarely understand the implications of their levels-of-analysis decisions, which affect their ability to describe, explain or make predictions. Similar to the levels-of-analysis question, foreign policy analysis recognizes a correlative relationship between Diaspora groups and state behaviour – that is, ethnic interest groups transcend the divide between the domestic and international, influencing policy-makers to make favourable decisions for their kin states.

Within the literature, there are two explanations for effective lobbying by an ethnic group. Successful groups require an attentive government that shares policy interests and provides access-channels for these actors in the decision-making process.19


At the same time, an ethnic interest group must be centrally organized, project a unified and coherent message, have ‘elite’ level resources and political contacts to communicate their interests.

To further elucidate these variables, this chapter is divided into three sections that examine the role, access and organization of interest groups within Canadian foreign policy (CFP). The first section reviews the contributions of international relations and foreign policy theory to the study of ethnic interest groups. Specifically, this section describes the logic of neoclassical realism and its approach to domestic influences on foreign policy. The second section examines these theoretical concepts within the context of Canadian foreign policy. Statist perspectives have long suggested that CFP is made by a closed executive. More recently, critical perspectives have acknowledged that decision-making has become increasingly open to domestic inputs, albeit in an indirect manner. The third section reviews the literature on both traditional and ethnic interest groups to understand how these prevailing viewpoints have influenced foreign policy-making in Canada.

1. International Relations and Foreign Policy Contributions

Waltz’s structural realism formally introduced the system-level of analysis as a focal point for extracting relevant explanatory variables. Within this system-level analysis, state actors are treated as unitary, billiard ball-like entities undifferentiated in their sub-systemic components.20 His objective was to explain patterned consistency in

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state behaviour at the international level rather than specific foreign policies. Thus, Waltz’ approach isolated the effects of the system on its constituent parts. While he saw domestic and state-level inputs as important *descriptors* for international behaviour, he argued “without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.”

Despite Waltz’s structural innovation, domestic inputs did not disappear from the study of international relations. Generally speaking, analysts have conceded that structural approaches can *hypothesize* outcomes but can rarely *explain* actual state behaviour. Robert Keohane suggests that structural arguments offer an *a priori* hypothesis for how states *should* act (if they were rational, self-interested actors committed to security and regime survival) - but they also provide a basis to assess deviated behaviour (how states *actually* behave within the system).

Otherwise, if “few vital interests are endangered, a country’s policy becomes sporadic and self-willed. The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.”

While structural international relations theory sees only a tenuous link between foreign policy and domestic constituencies, scholars have yet to shake the intuitive belief that there is an inherent relationship between these variables, and that the strength of the

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relationship varies under different conditions and often for predictable reasons. Thus, the field has danced around numerous explanations seeking to relate domestic constituencies with international outcomes. For example, Samuel Huntington’s political culture approach argues that US foreign policy is a derivative of the “American Creed” — an international manifestation of US political culture, represented by “liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values.” According to Huntington, increased immigration into the United States, particularly by Hispanic populations, changes the driving ethos behind American identity and thus its foreign policy.

In a similar, though more sophisticated analysis, Peter Katzenstein’s *Culture of National Security* examines state-society relations through: “the cultural-institutional context of policy on the one hand and the constructed identity of states, governments and political actors on the other.” Within the Canadian context, Denis Stairs predates Katzenstein, acknowledging political culture as a fundamental determinant of Canada’s foreign policy. He explains “the conduct of foreign policy can sometimes usefully be viewed not merely as the expression abroad of perceived interests of state, but as a

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manifestation of national political character.” In this way, both scholars argue that political culture determines how policy is constructed. This dissertation extrapolates that immigrant groups have an indirect though crucial influence on the constitution of political culture. Thus, aided by their growing economic and political power, these groups have an effect on both domestic and foreign policy.

A societal connection to foreign policy is clearest in the literature on public opinion. Historically, the Almond-Lippmann consensus has argued that American public opinion is both volatile and lacks structure. Almond’s study found that most Americans subscribe to a fundamental vision of US foreign policy, but are not informed enough to comment on specific policies. Thus, he concludes there is no correlation between popular sentiment and the formation of policy. Unsatisfied by this conclusion, studies have since drawn more sophisticated links between the inputs and outputs of foreign policy-making. For example, Ole Holsti argues that while the public might only possess a superficial knowledge of foreign policy issues, constituents have enough information to still be able to arrive at considered and consistent international policies. Similarly, Frank Harvey’s research on the ‘Homeland Security Dilemma’ shows that national crises, such as September 11, establish a public demand for ‘perfect’ security. This expectation compels governments to create a seemingly infallible security policy. Harvey’s analysis shows that public opinion might not directly create policy, but introduces policy constraints on

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decision-makers. While simplistic analyses look for a direct correlation, between policy and domestic groups, Holsti and Harvey suggest a more complex relationship between these variables. They show that domestic inputs have the power to shape political interests.

This is not to suggest that domestic inputs are the only determinants of foreign policy. Ultimately, no simple model can capture the complexity of foreign policy decision-making. In order to be theoretically comprehensive, methodologically-integrative and policy-relevant, Andriole et al contend that foreign policy analysis must move beyond the strict dictates of traditional international relations. Inherently, foreign policy decision-making is much more complex than assumed by adherents the structural and state-levels of analysis. To establish this complexity, Michael Brecher argues that foreign policy analysis must include all relevant variables – at the individual, group, state, inter-state and systemic levels of analysis. Michael Barnett’s sophisticated investigation of the domestic constraints on Israel’s military mobilization demonstrates this complexity. His analysis shows that neorealist predilection towards power outcomes

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avoids explaining how resources are mobilized within a state. Yet domestic influences determine mobilization efforts by affecting the capital available for war preparation and execution, the domestic production of arms, the government’s ability to penetrate civil society and the state’s legitimacy as it pertains to the conscription process.

A Canadian example is John Kirton and David Dewitt’s *Canada as a Principal Power*. The authors argue that Canada “possess[es] surplus capability: a margin of strength in a broad array of sectors well beyond that required to meet the basic requisites of statehood.” Thus, this surplus capability enables the state “to respond to the demands of its own society rather than to the requirements of forces abroad.” Kirton and Dewitt suggest that domestic variables matter in permissive international contexts, and are facilitated by “excess capability” in state resources. As discussed, Canada-India relations are explained by a similar complexity, which include India’s political and economic ascendance, Canada’s interest in economic diversification, and pressure from Indo-Canadian organizations.

This call for a comprehensive framework prompted neoclassical realism (NCR) to develop a ‘holistic approach’ to foreign policy analysis, incorporating non-structural variables into the structural realist paradigm. Gideon Rose argues that a “theory of foreign policy limited to structural factors is bound to be inaccurate.” NCR-based mid-level theories can explain distortions in elite-level decision-making (including

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36 Gideon Rose, 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” *World Politics* 51:1, October, 152. On a theoretical spectrum, Rose sees NCR occupying the space between neorealism and constructivism, where the former identifies a distinct link between systemic constraints and unit-level behaviour and the latter denies any “objective constraints.”
psychological approaches and operational codes), bargaining (over national interests and rational choice) and non-governmental inputs (such as interest groups and media).

By incorporating these multiple variables, NCR offers methodological sophistication with greater depth than traditional IR theories.\(^\text{37}\) It looks to explain the process of decision-making within states rather than the outcomes of these decisions, without sacrificing the fundamental neorealist assumption that relative power is the primary aim of states. While power remains a central variable, NCR argues it has an indirect effect, since state structure and individual perceptions inhibit a state’s pursuit of this goal. Wohlforth suggests incorporating socially-constructed inputs allows for a more comprehensive measure of foreign policy because “decision-makers perception of power is what matters.” Thus, changes in relative power are only important when decision-makers recognize its effect.\(^\text{38}\)

Particularly relevant to this dissertation, neo-classical realism is able to simultaneously account for domestic and international influences on foreign policy.\(^\text{39}\)

\(^{37}\) Since Rose’s groundbreaking work in 1998, Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro have executed the first book-length examination defining the theoretical basis for neoclassical realism. Their objectives were threefold: to add more theoretical rigour to the neoclassical realist framework, to differentiate NCR from both neorealism and classical realism and to reintroduce the concept of the state as an analytical variable in security studies. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro eds. 2009. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press. Gideon Rose suggested that work by authors Thomas J. Christensen, Randall Schweller, William Wohlfforth and Fareed Zakaria are representative of the neoclassical realism. For example, please see: Fareed Zakaria, 1992. "Realism and Domestic Politics." International Security 17:1, Summer, 177-198; William Wohlfforth, 1994. "Realism and the End of the Cold War." International Security 19, 91-129.

\(^{38}\) Wohlfforth’s examination of realism in the post-Cold War era exemplifies an ideational intervening variable. He argues that relative power shifts at the end of the Cold War were only prominent when they were coupled with the ideological shift between the United States and the Soviet Union.

\(^{39}\) Jack Snyder’s Myths of Empire theorizes why states have adopted irrational policies of over-expansion despite overwhelming national impetuses that such a policy would be to the detriment of the state. In the initial stages of their imperial forays, states must convince their domestic constituencies of the benefits of expansion. Once adopted as a national myth, despite the rising costs and diminishing benefits of empire, decision-makers are forced to continue these damaging policies to benefit the domestic elite. In his attempt
With direct relevance to this dissertation, Norrin Ripsman uses a neoclassical realist framework to explain the conditions that allow a foreign policy role for domestic interest groups. He argues that there is little difference between democratic and non-democratic states – rather, the relative autonomy of the state creates similar conditions for domestic interests, including public opinion, interest groups, Diaspora organizations and even media. Ripsman recognizes influential domestic groups as those that have the ability to “provide a sufficient payoff to policy-makers if they construct policies in the desired direction or to impose sufficient penalties if they do not.”\(^{40}\) In this way, cohesive, single-issue and “wealth[y] groups would have more influence than those with limited resources.”\(^{41}\) Given Ripsman’s set of conditions, this research anticipates an evident role for the Indo-Canadian Diaspora in the construction of Canadian foreign policy.

### 2. State-Society Relations in Canadian Foreign Policy

Ethnic Diasporas have been described as “the single most important determinant of American Foreign Policy.”\(^{42}\) With an equally – if not more – robust ethnic mosaic as its American neighbour, it seems reasonable to assume that Canada’s immigrant communities would offer a similar contribution to the formulation of foreign policy.


\(^{41}\) Ibid.

However, two major issues have plagued the development of literature in this field. First, there is no consensus regarding the theoretical and political definition of Canada's national interest, due to its largely centralized, unplanned and reactive foreign policy. Methodologically, there is no ‘measuring stick’ for scholars to compare expected behaviour to actual outcomes, making it difficult to explain the effect of domestic influences on state activity. Consequently, the field is forced to produce work that is largely atheoretical, issue-oriented and descriptive, particularly on ethnic Diasporas in foreign policy.\(^{43}\)

Second, the investigation of domestic inputs is mired in its own fundamental philosophical, practical and political debates. Should the general public be involved in the formation of foreign policy? If so, who should be included in the ‘public’?\(^{44}\) How is their involvement manifested or measured? Does this involvement result in policy


influence, given the exponential number of foreign policy inputs considered by a government?\textsuperscript{45}

To exert influence, interest groups require means of communication, contextual conditions and leverage with the government. Thus, the most significant challenge to an efficacious ethnic interest group is the "permeability of and access to the government."\textsuperscript{46} Studies of the African-American community note that societal groups are relatively ineffective unless "governmental and external conditions facilitate" their engagement.\textsuperscript{47} In this way, the structure of political institutions determines action channels available to filter public demands. Thomas Risse-Kappen recognizes that in countries with open-structured institutions, like the United States and Germany, public opinion limits government activity to a range of legitimate and acceptable foreign policy options.\textsuperscript{48}

Within the American system, ethnic lobby groups have multiple access points due to a constitutionally-defined division of powers, including Congress, the Executive, and state-level officials. Within these access points, interest groups use campaign contributions, volunteering, the promise of ethnic votes and personal relationships. On the other hand, due to Canada’s internal party solidarity and centralized decision-making, individual parliamentarians are inefficient targets for lobbying. An established consensus notes that

\textsuperscript{45} Similar questions are asked by prominent scholars in Canadian Foreign Policy, including: Denis Stairs, 1977-78. "Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy." \textit{International Journal} 33:1, 126-49; Maureen Appel Molot, 1990. “Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature.” \textit{International Journal of Canadian Studies} 1:2, Spring/Autumn, 77-96.


\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}; See also David A. Dickson, 1996. “American Society and the African American Foreign Policy Lobby: Constraints and Opportunities.” \textit{Journal of Black Studies} 27:2, November, 141.

\textsuperscript{48} Risse-Kappen’s research shows that state institutions can be either concentrated or diffuse, and a state’s society can be either homogeneous with few cleavages or can be diverse in several ways. Thomas Risse-Kappen. 1991. “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies.” \textit{World Politics} 43:4, July, 479-512.
Parliament has a nearly non-existent decision-making role in Canadian foreign policy.\(^{49}\)

In the 1960s, James Eayrs’ “Executive Dominance Model” describes Canada’s foreign policy process as centralized within the Executive, the bureaucracy and the prime minister. This centralization leaves limited effective constraints on executive power – other than the Executive’s “own self-restraint and political maturity.”\(^{50}\) The Executive Dominance Model denies an effective domestic group role, because it suggests that these interests are only taken into account if they align with the pre-determined interests of the Executive level.\(^{51}\) Because of this centrality, Kim Nossal notes that “the external behaviour of the Canadian state is assumed by many scholars to be autonomous of civil society.”\(^{52}\)

In this way, John Kirton and Blair Dimock prioritize government structure as the major determinant of group access and success, and suggest that work in Canadian


\(^{51}\) Nelson Michaud, 2002. “Bureaucratic Politics and the Shaping of Policies: Can We Measure Pulling and Hauling Games?” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 35:2, June. 269-300. Similar to the literature on American Foreign Policy, Nelson Michaud uses the 1987 Defence White Paper to show that negotiations on ‘high politics’ issues occurred between the various high level ministers. Graham Allison’s bureaucratic politics model suggests that bureaucratic allegiances determine an individual’s position on policy over considerations of national interest. Allison’s dictum – “where you stand determines where you sit” – has become a mantra in analyses of bureaucratic politics. A bureaucratic politics model has the benefit of hypothesizing how various actors define interests within foreign policy.

foreign policy “must explore how proliferating channels of contact have been constructed, employed, and directed not by societal actors from below but by the state apparatus from above.” In defending their position, Kirton and Dimock echo previous work by Bromke and Nossal that shows the increasing centralization of Trudeau’s foreign policy during his tenure. Trudeau feared that devolving foreign policy jurisdiction to the provinces would provide credibility for Quebec’s separatist movement, endangering Canadian unity. This fear led him to construct foreign policy with an “informal, private set of individuals sensitive and sympathetic to the conceptions and dilemmas of Trudeau himself.”

Ironically, these statist arguments inevitably invoke a domestic explanation – Quebec sovereignty – to explain the federal government’s centralised decision-making structure. Thus, an alternative scholarship has emerged that examines how domestic influence – regardless of how minimal or indirect – exists in Canada’s foreign policy process. Stephen Clarkson’s flagship edited volume An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada critically suggests that domestic factors are a major determinant of a state’s international behaviour. In this book, Paul Painchaud argues that Quebec’s cultural, linguistic and political differences generate alternative foreign policy interests. In his policy prescription, these differences must be resolved through the inclusion of provincial rights and equity within the Department of External Affairs. Similarly, Franklin

55 When this book was published, Foreign Affairs was still the Department of External Affairs. This was not changed until 1982. Paul Painchaud. 1968. “Diplomatie Biculturalism: Doctrine or Delusion?” In
Griffiths accuses the federal government of “being [more] inclined to work in the established framework than try something new to meet the needs of Canadians.” He notes that foreign policy has been an “elite affair,” disconnected from the interests it is supposed to represent. Thus, a new Canadian foreign policy should “broaden the role of interested groups at the intermediate level between the general population and the federal leadership.”

Clarkson himself concludes that rectifying this inertia must “open the process of policy forming so that the public opinions can have an impact.”

Denis Stairs is one scholar who successfully negotiates a space for domestic influences while recognizing the state-centrality of decision-making. To Stairs, foreign policy is a manifestation of both international constraints and Canada’s national political culture, “[f]oreign policy is an ‘output’ – an end-product – of the governmental process, and to focus on it as a manifestation of national political practice is to neglect much of what many students of our political culture would regard as centrally important.” In this vein, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon’s comparative analysis of the UN Law of the Sea Convention and the UN Conference on Trade and Development also straddles the domestic-statist perspective. Her work concludes that numerous contextual considerations, including international alliances, the binding nature of the treaty and

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domestic support all determine the efficacy of domestic groups on policy.  

*Domesticating Canadian Foreign Policy*

After the Cold War, Jean Chrétien’s government made several attempts to open foreign policy to the public through a democratization campaign, creating mechanisms for wide-spread consultation and representation. These included the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, web-based e-consultations and a series of high-level town hall events across the country. Thus, through the 1994 Standing Joint Committee Foreign Policy Review, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade conducted briefings, meetings and interviews with stakeholders across the country.

The Chrétien government’s democratization policy was challenged within both mainstream and critical literature on Canadian Foreign Policy. Kim Nossal questioned the “faddishness” of the “democratic moment,” arguing that public consultations did not

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actually result in a ‘better’ or more democratic foreign policy. Mark Neufeld echoed Nossal’s criticisms, arguing the Foreign Policy Review was not an “affair of, or for, the demos,” despite its large number of participants. Rather, the exercise was created by and conducted for Canada’s conferencing classes and the elite members of society, simultaneously excluding average Canadians. The consultations were criticized because ‘democratization’ was seen as an exercise in ‘manufacturing consent’ for pre-existing government policies than deriving usable input from societal groups. In spite of the effort put into the public consultations, there was little evidence that testimony was taken into account during the policy process. Criticisms of this approach were numerous, with ‘democratization’ seen to be a superficial, discursive shift not backed up by substantive policy action.

Despite the perceived failure of the Chrétien democratization exercise, some analysts have argued these criticisms have ‘thrown the baby out with the bathwater.’ Actually, the democratization program did have an indirect domesticating effect by including those that previously had limited access to foreign policy decision-makers, such as the testimony of expert panels of academics, interest groups and practitioners, increased use of public opinion polls, and an effort at relationship-building between the government and the Canadian public. John Hay concludes that domestication should not be measured solely by policy creation, but should include policy improvement and

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Draimin and Plewes suggest that there were two additional effects of the democratization strategy. First, democratization had the effect of revitalizing political institutions, especially the role of Parliament in foreign policy. Second, this increased Parliamentary role anticipates a regeneration of attention to foreign policy within political parties. Neil Nevitte and Roger Gibbons argue that public opinion has always been interested in foreign politics, but that political parties have failed “to organize and thus mobilize foreign policy debate along party lines.” Frank Harvey notes this exact problem, arguing that foreign policy has had little salience in electoral politics, as “... [it] is ranked quite low in Canadian elections, even lower in provincial elections, and is almost insignificant in Québec politics.” However, given the increasingly blurry lines between domestic and international politics, Harvey notes that political parties have begun to differentiate themselves in foreign policy. In the same vein, Lisa Young has

66 Ibid.
70 Black and Bow’s piece appears in special edition of International Journal which examines political parties and foreign policy. This issue includes a piece by Heather Smith which argues that while the parties differentiate at a rhetorical level between their climate change policies, substantively there is little difference in their perceptions of self-interest. That being said, Smith argues that even rhetorical differences can translate to more substantive policies afterwards. Please see: Brian Bow and David Black. 2008. “Do Politics Stop at the Water’s Edge in Canada? Party and Partisanship in Canadian Foreign Policy.” International Journal 64, Winter, 7-27; Paul Gecolovsky and Christopher Kukucha, 2008. “Much ado about parties: Conservative and Liberal approaches to Canada’s trade policy with the United States”
noted that the war in Afghanistan is a large reason for renewed public interest in foreign policy. For example, with only a third of Quebecers supporting the war in Afghanistan, she argues that “... public opinion [has] become a greater constraint on Harper’s pursuit of foreign policy when one considers how it breaks down in regional terms.”

The Chretien democratization exercise also produced important lessons for interest groups in Canadian Foreign Policy. For example, the Canada 21 Council, led by Janice Stein and composed of a group of prominent CFP academics, conducted cross-country meetings resulting in a consensus of well-reasoned and informed suggestions to improve the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. The Canada 21 Council was successful because it fashioned a unified, policy-relevant, plausible set of solutions for the government, with the added benefit of timing their report before the start of public consultations. Stairs compares their effect with the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), an umbrella organization of 100-plus NGOs, whose report had only a marginal influence due to the homogeneity of, and overlap in, its submissions. Stairs notes that in a “... perceptions-editing process, much of the texture was lost, and with it, an opportunity to make a powerful case.”

In another example, domestic interest groups were also important in promoting Canada’s human security foreign policy. During the Ottawa negotiations to ban anti-personnel landmines, interest groups participated in an agenda-setting, informative and

administrative role.\textsuperscript{74} The Ottawa process was unique because it established a mutually-dependent relationship between domestic groups and the government. NGOs were crucial in identifying the policy agenda and creating issue salience for the landmines treaty, while government determined the political course of action within these parameters.\textsuperscript{75} In this system of mutual-dependence, NGOs involved in the Ottawa Process are an important precursor for the Indo-Canadian Diaspora’s influence on Canada-India relations.

Other analysts have adopted a stricter definition of ‘societal’ impact, focusing on demographic composition as an explanation for indirect effects on foreign policy. John Kirton’s examination of Chrétien’s policy in the Asia-Pacific concludes that “[d]emographic change in Canada, driven by high immigration levels, prompted a reorientation of foreign policy from Europe to Asia, and to a lesser degree, to the Americas.”\textsuperscript{76} Jean Daudelin and Laura Dawson reach a similar conclusion, noting that “the fast-growing number of Spanish speakers in Canada is creating the basis for an authentic social and cultural dialogue between Canadians and Latin Americans.”\textsuperscript{77}

Notably, the growth of an economically vibrant, ethnically-diverse business class

will have implications for Canada’s bilateral relations. Elisabeth Riddell-Dixon argues that recent waves of immigration have introduced an unprecedented level of ethnic diversity in Canada. With business class immigrants representing over sixty per cent of new arrivals in 2001, not only are these immigrants more economically stable, arriving in Canada with business contacts and investment capital, but they are also more likely to be politically active.78 Riddell-Dixon’s conclusions are directly applicable to the Indo-Canadian Diaspora, an ethnic community with exceptional economic power.

The ‘indirect influence’ of demographic shifts and democratization suggest that domestic groups have a much larger influence on Canadian foreign policy than once assumed. First, there are an increased number of access points due to a dissolved distinction between high and low politics, and the inclusion of numerous departments now involved in foreign policy. Another explanation is political legitimization: while both the American and Canadian systems cater to private interests, Canada differs from the United States in that its political culture does not treat government like an “alien apparatus requiring constant surveillance.”79 Instead, elite interest groups are afforded a “legitimacy and autonomy” in which government can acceptably delegate its functions.

3. Ethnic Interest Organizations

Literature on Canadian foreign policy has largely adopted a top-down perspective, examining the government’s role enabling group access. It is this myopic focus that

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privileges state-centricism in Canadian foreign policy. In other words, the debate up to this point has focused on the question of whether domestic groups matter in foreign policy. Equally important, this section uncovers the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions pertaining to interest group activity: What are the most crucial organizational characteristics of interest groups? How do these organizations determine their political strategy? Which strategies are the most and least effective when influencing policy-makers? With the conclusion that the Canadian government is more open to interest groups than previously assumed, this research examines these new questions of ethnic group composition, membership rules, functions and organization.

Paul Pross defines interest organizations as “groups of people associating together within the framework of a formal structure to share and promote a common interest.” However, this narrow definition confuses the differences between the organization, its functions, strategies and membership. Further, a narrow definition inevitably excludes groups with a larger mandate or set of activities. Exemplifying this challenge, describing women’s organizations in Canada, it is difficult to make distinctions between their roles as an interest group or social movement, combining collective identity creation with advocacy, education, social welfare and political objectives. Similarly, Donald Abelson shows that research think-tanks occupy an indefinable position on the spectrum between

professional organization, lobbying group and academic institution.83 Some think-tanks produce academic-style research, while others use their expertise to influence policy or even assume a public policy role such as contracting. However, adopting a broad definition also presents conceptual difficulties. Young and Everitt propose that a pressure group is “any organization that seeks to influence government policy but not to govern.”84 But even the authors acknowledge this broad definition is problematic, including every informal, fledgling organization as well as more formal, well-established groups such as the Canadian Jewish Congress. Further, their definition does not differentiate between groups with selective or collective benefits, identity groups, sports organizations or political organizations.

Differentiating ‘ethnic’ interest groups from the wider definitions does provide some conceptual clarity. Membership within these organizations is based on ethnic identification rather than a formalized, fee-based membership that characterizes unions and other NGOs. Ethnic identification amongst a Diaspora group is dependent on a shared history, language, religion, and immigration pattern. Indo-Canadian groups, specifically, are a unique hybrid of identity-forming, political organization characterized by similar ethnic, economic and foreign policy interests. Moreover, the cohesiveness of the Indian ethnic group is different from other traditional interest organizations. For


example, issue-based groups, such as pro-Palestine interest organizations, differ from Arab-centric groups despite significant overlap in their mandates, membership and strategies. More specifically, the former could include numerous non-Arab participants, such as human rights organizations, philanthropic funders, left-wing Jews, academic organizations, and other irredentist or separatist ethnic groups.

Studies of ethnic conflict and nationalism agree that group formation and continued group loyalty arise from human economic, socio-cultural and political needs. This in-group identification then ascribes certain behaviours that determine political representation, formation of political ideology, intra- and inter-group communication, defining group norms and decision-making processes. In turn, this behaviour is translated into political demands, including improved relations with their home state. The inter-organizational dynamics of Indo-Canadian interest groups – such as the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce, the Canada-India Business Council and the Canada-India Foundation - show how ‘membership’ within the same ethnic group reinforces strategies and methods instead of creating a competitive environment between groups.


87 Similarly, the literature in the field, particularly the theoretical literature from the United States, falsely compares the lobbying activities of the Irish, German and French settlers with political positioning of more recently immigrated ethnic Diasporas. Given the socio-economic, racial, historical and cultural differences
Paradox of Ethnic Groups in Democratic States

Both foreign policy practitioners and international relations scholars remain hesitant to ascribe a strong – or indeed, any – role to ethnic groups in democratic states, despite suggestions that these organizations have always been a part of political decision-making. Within the Canadian democratic system, these focused interests are largely scrutinized for their narrow, sectoral or special interests. Critics, such as Ian Brodie, F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopf, argue that special interests are inherently undemocratic because they rely on non-elected institutions to circumvent the interests and decisions of Parliament.\textsuperscript{88} Their research denounces the judicial system’s role in protecting and promoting special interests over the general interests of society. Even interest groups’ strongest defenders acknowledge the criticism that they “exploit the constitutional debate for their own purposes.”\textsuperscript{89}

The criticism is similar in foreign policy. Critics argue that ethnic Diaspora pressure states to take decisions based on minority demands, rather than in national interest or public opinion. Historical accounts imply that early Irish settlers had a

\footnotesize{between these initial settler communities and recent non-Caucasian immigrants, important questions are raised about the comparability of these groups. Further, by including all groups that have a foreign agenda into the debate over ethnic lobby groups in policymaking, particularly within immigrant-settled states such as the United States and Canada, the literature \textit{pre-determines} the conclusion ethnicity does matter in foreign politics. Three examples of this common argument include: Lawrence H. Fuchs, 1959. “Minority Groups and Foreign Policy.” \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 74: 2, June, 161-175; Tony Smith, \textit{Foreign Attachments}, 2000; Stephen Saideman, 2002. “The Power of the Small: The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on Foreign Policy.” \textit{SAIS Review} XXII:2, Summer/Fall, 93-105. For a book length version, please see: SM Saideman, 2001. \textit{The Ties that Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict}. New York: Columbia University Press.}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{89} Paul Pross, \textit{Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics}, 2.}
‘deleterious’ effect on US-British relations, Greek-Americans soured US foreign policy towards Turkey, while French-English relations have challenged Canada’s role in both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie. Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt abhorred the concept of hyphenated Americans, and as noted by Charles Mathias, “... presidents and political thinkers have warned against the evils of the politics of factions, especially in the conduct of foreign relations.” Samuel Huntington, arguably the most adamant contemporary supporter of this position, argues that minority groups undermine American culture and negatively affect US foreign policy. In Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman’s more diplomatic terms, Diaspora groups challenge the success of the nation-state within the international system, as its predominance should eliminate “transnational loyalties, intra-national divisions and stateless communities.”

The paradox is stark. Democracy establishes the fundamental principles of religious, cultural and linguistic freedom – yet this freedom has also allowed undemocratic ethnic Diaspora groups to flourish. Shain calls these groups ‘isolationist’ Diaspora, who have immigrated to the West but maintain their distinctness and often a sense of superiority from the local culture. Isolationist Diaspora only minimally assimilate to local norms, and create isolated communities based on trust, responsibility

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90 In contemporary foreign policy, the ‘ethnic group’ no longer consists of settler populations, and refers to the non-white, non-mainstream minorities that make up ethnic lobby groups. Paul Arthur, 1991. “Diasporan Intervention in International Affairs: Irish America as a Case Study.” Diaspora 1, Fall, 143-162.
and mutual ethnic identification. Essentially, these groups see the host state as an *instrument* of their political and economic objectives. For example, studies of homegrown terrorism reference an *extreme* version of this isolationist sentiment. The Air India, September 11, and the 2007 London bombings encapsulate a duality of identity and citizenship within immigrant communities in Western states. For example, Sikh Diaspora communities have supported the Khalistan movement in India, concentrating its organizational and fundraising activities in *Gurdwaras*, accentuating the link between religious identity and political objectives.

In stark contrast, this dissertation appraises ‘integrationist’ Diasporas, which use interest group strategies to improve relations between their homeland and host state. Integrationist Diaspora ‘chimes in’ when there is an important issue involving the homeland. These interest groups get involved in politics because they lack the ability to

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advance their political interests by using traditional access points. Involvement in US
foreign policy has been called “one of the clearest indications that an ethnic community
has ‘arrived’ in American society, [to] promote US values overseas.”
Paradoxically, these groups must simultaneously confirm their identity as citizens of the host state while
attempting to generate positive relations with their home state.

In Canada, ‘integrationist’ Diaspora groups exist within a consociationalist
political system, where economic elitism allows the community unprecedented political
access. Canada’s organized social divisions exist within an “elite consensus,” which does
not challenge the constitutive or regulative institutions of the Canadian system but
successfully works within the system. Rather, these elites negotiate within the
distributive framework of the Canadian system. For example, Indo-Canadians are
successful lobbyists because they do not challenge the political system, but find ways to
work alongside and within its institutions.

**Internal Composition and Homogeneous Message**

A distinct but homogenous political objective is a necessary condition for
successful ethnic lobbying. Often, internal heterogeneity within the organization creates
disagreement over the community’s political objective and has thus resulted in
unsuccessful lobbying. For example, Muslim interest groups, such as the Canadian
Islamic Congress (CIC), are an amalgam of ethnic groups from different regions and
religious sects. Studies of these interest groups show that their heterogeneous

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Political Quarterly 35:1, March, 50.
composition divides their foreign policy interests, particularly on controversial issues such as the War on Terror and the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, cleavages within an interest group’s central mandate can also occur in relatively uniform organizations. For example, Jonathan Smith’s research on the Cuban-American community shows that the Diaspora is almost unanimously committed to democracy in Cuba. Yet, the community disagrees over the form of and the means to achieve this democratic outcome.

In this vein, the Indo-Canadian community provides a challenging yet interesting case study. The community does have inherent heterogeneity, since religious (between the Sikh, Hindu and Muslim communities), linguistic and even regional divisions predominant in India have developed within large Diaspora communities overseas. In particular, the Sikh community sees themselves as a distinct ethnic group, forming their own cultural, political and economic organizations. Further, supporters of the Khalistan movement are a distinct but powerful minority with control over many cultural and religious organizations. Particularly after the Air India bombing and in its legal battle, Indo-Canadians have strongly condemned the actions of fundamentalists within the community, illustrated by the continued glorification of Khalistan terrorism during Vaisakhi celebrations and at Gurdwaras in Canada. As the research shows, the influence

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of Indo-Canadian interest groups has not been affected by these divisions. First, there are
signs of growing cleavages within the Sikh community, its internal support divided
between separatist and pro-India factions. Second, the current Canadian government has
not given Khalistan advocates the same policy-level access as other ethnic groups. Third,
much of the Sikh community’s current messaging is internally focused, attempting to
keep members interested and active.

*Issue Congruence and Salience*

A government’s responsiveness to domestic interests is determined by the issue
area in question. Because foreign policy elicits little public attention, decision-makers
are allowed a wide range of policy options. Similarly, neorealists have suggested that the
public has more effect on issues of low-politics, than on elite-level issues of war and
security.\(^{102}\) In a groundbreaking study, Page and Shapiro have challenged both these
perceptions showing that public opinion is more consistent and more influential on large,
drastic and salient issues.\(^{103}\) Ethnic interest groups also have a tendency to coalesce
around the most difficult and salient issues facing their home state, including and
especially questions of ‘high’ politics. Examples include Tamil protests on the Gardiner

\(^{102}\) Despite the success of their empirical findings, Polowick and Katz note that “we still lack an
understanding of the mechanisms by which public opinion becomes a factor in American foreign
Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus.” *Mershon International Studies Review* 42:1, May, 30; Thomas Risse-
Politics* 43:4, July. 479-512.

Science Review* 77:1, March, 175-190. Page and Shapiro lack the information needed to explain the
chicken-and-egg conundrum: are foreign policy decisions driven by public opinion, or does public opinion
simply offer a post-hoc justification of policy? Despite their positive indications, foreign policy issues
were often less salient with the public, marked by consistently larger ‘don’t know’ responses to survey
questions. Page and Shapiro measured ‘salience’ by reference to the number of ‘don’t know’ responses in
their survey research. High numbers of ‘don’t know’ responses were coded as less salient.
Expressway in Toronto, pro-Palestine boycotts of Israel, and Haitian earthquake relief organizations.

In addition to issue salience, successful ‘integrationist’ ethnic groups must also align their political message to pre-existing national interests. This issue congruence eliminates potential opposition to their political objectives. Sean Carter’s study shows how the Croatian Diaspora in the US “... saw the homeland war in ‘American’ terms, as democracy against dictatorship, the free-market against Communism, Western against ‘an Other’.”104 In the Canadian context, David Carment and David Bercuson argue “a Canadian foreign policy cannot be considered viable if it contradicts the preferences of ordinary Canadians.”105 This prescription also works in the opposite way: a societal group is only an effective contributor to foreign policy when its objectives are consistent with the government’s perception of national interest.

However, policy congruence introduces an important methodological challenge, nullifying any measurable effects of interest lobbying. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon asks: “when there is no divergence [between state and society interests], how can one determine if the state is acting autonomously or if it is responding to societal pressures?”106 Paradoxically, empirical measurement of interest group influence is

105 David Carment and David Bercuson, 2006. “Introduction.” In David Carment and David Bercuson eds. The World In Canada. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 5-7. While these demographic shifts intuitively suggest that Canadian values and interests will change as a result, Carment and Bercuson challenge the assumption that the government will actually be responsive to these changes and, rather, argue that “Canadian foreign policy [is] the purview of a cloistered and monochromatic elite, insulated and isolated from cosmopolitan and translational issues.”
106 This challenge is one that has been discussed in Riddell-Dixon’s own work. Please see: Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, 1988. “State Autonomy and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of Deep Seabed Mining.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 21:2, 297-317; Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon. 1991-2. “Winners and
simplified when a) states have an established and well-publicised policy, b) interest
groups pressure the government against this decision and c) the government chooses the
(group’s) prescribed choice. Measurement is only possible when states behave outside
the perceived national interest or defy established patterns of behaviour. This
methodological paradox does two things: first, it reinforces the normative challenge
against sub-state groups by suggesting that their policy interests contradict the national
interest. Second, it reaffirms a state-centric approach to decision-making, assuming that
only political leadership has a special ability to determine what is best for the state and its
national interest.

This dissertation challenges the idea that policy congruence undermines the
capacity to measure ethnic group influence. Increasingly complex political
environments, including bilateral relations between Canada and India, require multiple
means to achieve improvements in economic, political and security objectives. To
analytically incorporate these means, the dissertation must reformulate the concept of
‘influence’ to include indirect pressures. This assertion builds on a long tradition in
international relations literature. For example, Peter Haas explains that epistemic
communities have influence because they control the types of information offered to
knowledge community can limit the government’s awareness of different policy options
by controlling information dissemination. Peter and Ernst Haas argue that “…control of
knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that the diffusion of
new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination.” For instance, without technological expertise, the American government would have little awareness of the environmental harm, clean-up costs and economic damage of the recent British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

Acknowledging indirect influence is particularly relevant for the study of the Indo-Canadian community. K.R.G. Nair states that “the present state of India-Canada economic relations is a shining example of unrealised potential particularly in view of the relative importance of the Indian Diaspora in Canada’s population.” As this dissertation will show, the Canadian government has started to recognize that there are multiple direct and indirect benefits to engagement with the politically charged and economically powerful Indo-Canadian Diaspora.

*Ethnopolitics: Ethnic Groups and Votes*

Traditional examinations have emphasised an ethnic Diaspora’s ability to affect electoral outcomes. Particularly in the United States, academic work has argued that policymakers are acutely sensitive to ethnic voters concentrated in swing states. These

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108 The work on the efficacy of epistemic communities has been challenged on several fronts. Some have argued that science does not produce ‘truth,’ that science in itself is not objective and is based on a power structure within the epistemic community. Others argue that the linkage between epistemic communities and policy is one of *post hoc* justification, where policymakers listen to those that confirm the preconceived policies of government. Haas and Haas do not deny that these challenges to science exist, but posit that there is a legitimised form of science that controls how policymakers conceive of their problematique.


110 Tony Smith, 2000. *Foreign Attachments: the power of ethnic groups in the making of American foreign policy.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 53. He traces the trajectory of US elections to make the case that ethnic voting patterns have effected electoral outcomes since FDR all the way to Clinton. He
include Jewish communities in New Jersey, New York, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, Cuban voters in Florida, Hispanic communities in California, and African American voters in the South. A recent examination of the 2000 American election has shown how both Republican and Democratic presidential candidates (George W. Bush and Al Gore) courted Muslim voters as an important demographic. An extrapolation of this argument would suggest that the electoral concentration of the Indo-Canadian communities in the Greater Toronto Area, Ottawa, Vancouver, Calgary and Edmonton would have an important foreign policy effect.

Yet this interpretation has both theoretical and empirical shortcomings. For example, it assumes that foreign policies are more salient than domestic policies for immigrant communities. Further, if governments wanted to gain favour with large and influential ethnic groups, one would expect to see major foreign policy announcements that cater to key ethnic Diasporas closer to election time, similar to the practice surrounding domestic policy. Yet the empirical evidence does not support this expectation. Vanderbush and Haney note that during the 1992 Presidential election, Bill Clinton supported the Cuban Democracy Act in order to make electoral gains in Florida. Despite this platform, Clinton only earned twenty per cent of Cuban votes, losing

makes the argument that Bill Clinton won his Presidency through the black, Hispanic, Cuban and Jewish votes in strategic constituencies.

111 Robert Keohane made this argument as early as 1971, yet assumed that concentration of groups in these districts was enough evidence to be considered a determinant of foreign policy. Robert Keohane, 1971. “The Big Influence of Small Allies” Foreign Policy 2, Spring, 177.


Florida’s Electoral College to George Bush. Similarly, William LeoGrande’s analysis of the 1996 election suggests that Clinton’s electoral gains in Florida were due to his Medicare policy more than his position on Cuban democracy.116

In Canada, votes are often split between parties in largely ethnic ridings, regardless of whether opposing candidates are from the same or different immigrant group. This suggests that ethnic communities are not tied to a single party or platform.117 Moreover, Canadian political parties have not differentiated themselves on foreign policy. David Black and Brian Bow note that the largest differences between parties are over “means and ‘details.’”118 While the Conservative and Liberal parties might differ on how to pursue improved relations between Canada and India, the differences are not so large as to suppose unified electoral support from the community. Finally, given the religious, ethnic and nationalistic divisions within the Indian Diaspora, it cannot be assumed that they vote as a unified entity.119

However, this is not to argue that electoral explanations are completely invalid. Instead, the research suggests that electoral explanations are only part of the equation.

116 Vanderbush and Haney, “Policy toward Cuba in the Clinton Administration.” 394; William LeoGrande, 1997. “Enemies Evermore: US Policy towards Cuba After Helms-Burton.” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, 214; however, both articles do acknowledge that the Cuban policy did provide other gains, including increased donations from Cuban groups, and forced the Bush campaign to spend unnecessary time and money in Florida.


118 Bow and Black cite Kim Nossal, who suggests that foreign policy differences between parties are marginal at best. Brian Bow and David Black. 2008. “Do Politics Stop at the Water’s Edge in Canada?” 7-27.

119 US literature also suggests that ethnic groups curry favour through large campaign donations. Watanabe argues that candidates might benefit from ethnic groups “provid[ing] a host of valuable resources, including information, votes and campaign contributions.” Stephen Saideman posits that campaign contributions have important outcomes, as “groups contributing money to politicians can gain political access, sometimes even in the form of political appointments.” Please see: Haney and Vanderbush cite Watanabe, “The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy,” 53; Stephen Saideman, “Power of the Small” 101.
The nature of the Harper government’s relationship with the Indo-Canadian Diaspora is motivated by their economic, foreign policy and cultural contributions. The analysis chapters evidence the development of a mutually beneficial relationship between the Diaspora and the Canadian government.

Elite-Level Access

With only partial link between ethnic votes and foreign policy, this dissertation focuses its attention on elite-level linkages, which represent a considerably more relevant dimension of interest group influence. Cranford Pratt argues that a “dominant class” bias is obvious in “the personal and financial links between the corporate sector and the two major parties, the links between the senior civil servants and the corporate sector, and the ideology which is largely shared by the dominant class and the senior bureaucracy.”\textsuperscript{120} Pratt’s interpretation suggests that domestic interests do affect foreign policy, but in a way that limits access to elite members of society.\textsuperscript{121}

Similarly, Robert Presthus argues that interest group influence is a product of elite accommodation, where interpersonal relationships and a ‘shared normative consensus’ exist between the policymakers and interest groups. It is this shared consensus that lends elite interest groups disproportionate legitimacy, expertise, continuity, access and power.\textsuperscript{122} Will Coleman and Henry Jacek have argued that elite lobbying organizations in Canada, particularly those that represent business interests, are different than worker

\textsuperscript{121} Pratt’s work has also been undermined by later work by Elisabeth Riddell-Dixon, who shows that even business groups are unsuccessful in their international negotiations with governments.
unions or other lobbies. Due to their government access, internal structures and economically-powerful membership, these organizations can engage in multiple types of activities, including policy formation, implementation, commercial exchanges and selective services.¹²³

Later in his career, Gabriel Almond reversed his earlier scepticism regarding society’s influence on decision-making. He suggested that effective political organizations consist of an ‘attentive public’ represented by opinion leaders and political elite.¹²⁴ These non-governmental elites have special access and influence with government because they are *simultaneously* sensitive to both societal interests and the more abstract concerns underpinning foreign policy. As with ethnic elites, opinion leaders can wield influence and produce results in various important areas of foreign policy decision-making. According to James Rosenau, these intermediary actors use traditional information dissemination mechanisms - including the media and access to the bureaucracy - to translate public interest into foreign policy directives.¹²⁵ The role of opinion leaders at the nexus between the public and government, challenges the assumption that there must be clear demarcation between the public and political representatives.¹²⁶ Moreover, opinion leaders are common within Indo-Canadian interest


¹²⁴ To see this transition, compare the 1950 and 1977 versions of: Gabriel Almond, *The American people and foreign policy*. Westport: Greenwood Press Ltd. Yet, Almond's new conclusion has not been mirrored in his partner's perspective, as Walter Lippmann’s various works continued to undermine the ability for public opinion to contribute to policy changes. Please see: Walter Lippmann, 1926. *The Phantom Public*. New York: MacMillan Co.


¹²⁶ Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz, 1998. “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus.” *Mershon International Studies Review* 42:1, May, 29-61. Page and Shapiro’s attempt to “illuminate the causal structure of the process by which policy and public opinion are related” has been
groups, as Indian business and political elites have taken on a representative role in the community, conveying interests through their elite-level contacts.

To a large extent, the lobbying activities of the most ‘successful’ ethnic groups mimic the organization and strategies of business and political-elite groups. Goldberg’s investigation of the Canada-Israel Committee shows that its activities are “premised on personal lobbying of the Executive branch.” These personal connections have been developed largely through individual economic success. In this way, important parallels can be drawn between the Israel and Indian lobbies as the Indo-Canadian community has also benefited from its growing economic potential. Binod Khadria shows how recent immigration patterns have facilitated the growth of the Indo-Canadian professional class. While India ‘exports’ blue-collar labourers to the Gulf region, Western industrialized countries overwhelmingly receive skilled Indian migrants. The Indo-Canadian community is still neatly divided into blue-collar working class and upper-middle class professionals. Yet, Indian professionals earn twenty per cent more than the national average and have higher educational levels. The majority of Indo-Canadian high-income earners are between 24 and 44 years of age, and half of the community belongs to the professional class. Further, these statistics do not adequately reflect the community’s highest achieving members. For example, a quick snapshot of the Canada India

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Foundation’s membership reveals a combined net worth close to half a billion dollars.\textsuperscript{130} The research findings rest on the conversion of this economic strength into political influence. Concentrated economic power in the elite levels of the community facilitates the organization of interest groups and streamlines political strategies.\textsuperscript{131} Indo-Canadian organizations, particularly the Canada-India Business Council and the Canada-India Foundation, reflect this elite-centricism, limiting their membership to individuals that have the economic power to affect the politics of the state. An important part of this dissertation examines the effects of this critical subsection of the Indian community.

The literature on ethnic Diasporas tends to view ethnic groups as distinct, non-governmental entities, ignoring the obvious penetrative effects of elected members of parliament from the ethnic community. These individuals manage an important balancing act, simultaneously acting as representatives of the government and of their ethnic community.\textsuperscript{132} In contrast to previous governments, the current Conservative government successfully pushed to have more minorities elected to Parliament in the last election. Of the twenty-four visible minority MPs elected in the 2006 federal election, nine were of Indian origin. As Jerome Black explains, “the Reform Party and its successors were more sensitive to accusations of racism and indeed nominated increasing

\textsuperscript{130} For example, research by Agarwal and Lovell shows that 89.5 per cent of Indian immigrants with a professional degree make over $80,000 per annum. 66.3 per cent of Indo-Canadians that immigrated to Canada before they were 34 years of age make over $80,000 per annum.
\textsuperscript{131} The relationship between an ethnic group’s resources and mobilization is best discussed in the literature on nationalism. The literature has discussed the idea that for groups to coalesce around a nationalist identity, they must have an elite leadership that can catalyze them into action. Daniel Druckman, 1994. “Nationalism, Patriotism and Group Loyalty: A social psychological perspective.” \textit{Mershon International Studies Review} 38:1, April. 43-68; David Horowitz. 1985. \textit{Ethnic Groups in Conflict}. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
numbers of visible minority candidates.” Further, the Indo-Canadian community’s electoral successes reinforce ‘elite-centric’ perspective adopted for this dissertation. All nine Indo-Canadian MPs belong to a high socio-economic class – effectively using their economic power to galvanize electoral support within the community.

The political result of this electoral success is immediately obvious. This dissertation has assumed that MPs of Indian origin have used their political positions to play an active role in promoting Canada-India relations. Deepak Obhrai, Member of Parliament for Calgary East and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is the only Indo-Canadian MP in Cabinet. In 2006, Obhrai was presented with the Pravasi Bharatiya Samaan award by the Indian government for his efforts to improve Canada-India relations.134

Internal Organization

Lastly, the success of ethnic interest groups is determined by their level of organization. Intuitively, it would be fair to assume that larger groups have more resources and thus achieve more lobbying success. However, Mancur Olsen suggests that larger groups suffer from problems of internal cohesion and a unified political message.135 In comparison, smaller groups are often more successful at streamlining strategies and objectives. Steven Saideman notes that smaller groups might be more effective because they rally around issues that have little salience in the rest of society,

which means that there is little competition over political objectives.\textsuperscript{136}

And in some ways, the size of the interest group is inconsequential. As Jeffery Berry argues, the “political reality is that most interest groups represent only a part – possibly a small part – of their potential membership.”\textsuperscript{137} In order to be effective, interest groups do not require sanction from the entire community, but require a small and efficient organization. A major part of the dissertation compares how the internal structures of Indo-Canadian interest organizations allow them to get around some of the challenges of access and influence. Thus, the dissertation uncovers internal dynamics between the community, ‘representative’ interest groups and the elite members that define them.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has identified three important conditions for effective interest group activity. First, neoclassical realism (NCR) provides a framework in which traditional variables – relative power, international constraints and economic concerns – do not negate the impact of domestic influences. As a comprehensive theory of foreign policy, NCR allows for both international and domestic inputs to play a role in determining state policy. Second, this chapter discusses the relationship between domestic groups and Canadian foreign policy. Despite criticisms that democratization of CFP has been ineffective, the Canadian political system is much more open to domestic influences than originally assumed. Finally, the preceding analysis has highlighted the relationship between the composition, organization and elite access of ethnic interest groups with their

\textsuperscript{137} Jeffrey Berry, \textit{The Interest Group Society} 2nd eds. Glenview, IL: Little Brown, 1989, 5.
political effectiveness. It has shown that the Indo-Canadian Diaspora works through multiple international, governmental and domestic channels to effectively influence on Canadian foreign policy. The following chapter explores the historical trajectory of Canada-India relations. It will show how the slow shift from a negative to positive bilateral relationship has provided an opening for Canada’s Indian Diaspora.
Chapter Three:
Canada-India Relations, a Nuclear Deal and the Diaspora that Helped

A decade ago a nuclear deal with India was unthinkable. Yet, in November 2009, Canada announced the end of successful negotiations for a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) with India, surprising both policy-makers and non-proliferation experts. Many recalled India’s use of Canadian technology to carry out its first nuclear test in 1974, a betrayal of the Atoms for Peace agreement between the two countries. The NCA was widely seen to reward a state that considers itself outside the rules and regulations of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By signing the NCA, the Canadian government was also accused of breaking faith with its own long-held principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Among those welcoming the deal, on the other hand, were long-time advocates of Canada-India relations, who recognized that a nuclear agreement was a crucial step towards improving the rocky relationship between the two states.

This chapter provides a contextual history of Canada-India relations and the Indo-Canadian Diaspora. This chapter establishes the necessary background to explain the improvements in economic, cultural and social relations between 2006 and 2010, under the Harper government. It also establishes the history of immigration of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora. Thus, this chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section outlines the origins of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora and its political ‘coming of
age.’ Second, the chapter briefly reviews Canada-India relations over the last fifty years, highlighting recent improvements in the bilateral relationship.

1. The Indo-Canadian Diaspora

Five percent of India’s overseas Diaspora resides in Canada – a significant percentage considering the distance between the two countries and Canada’s small population. One million South Asians constitute the second largest immigrant community and are the largest annual source of immigration to Canada. Indo-Canadian population growth has been paralleled by their rapidly rising economic and political profile. Reeta Tremblay has identified a ‘homogenization’ of Indo-Canadians’ educational and professional profile, with second and third generation Indo-Canadians in the professional and high-tech sectors. Tremblay argues that this homogenization makes it “inevitable that the community’s lobbying efforts in favour of closer and more positive bilateral relations will expand and intensify.”

Similarly, Kant Bhargava and J.C. Sharma have noted that the Indo-Canadian Diaspora’s “size, demography and cosmopolitanism suggest that overall, it is a body naturally predisposed to making connections [with India].” Margaret Walton-Roberts suggests that Indo-Canadian culture preserves strong family ties, reflected in “social linkages that are transnational in

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nature, since communities, families and individuals maintain and reinforce connectivity.”\textsuperscript{142} These connections allow Indo-Canadians to become cultural, economic and communication brokers between their old and new countries. Walton-Roberts continues, “Canada is home to a large Indian immigrant population which should be an obvious and important resource in building trade links.”\textsuperscript{143} Despite these favourable arguments, none have been able to explain how their socio-economic success or transnational connections \textit{translate} into political activity. Most studies assume that the transnational links between Diaspora groups and their country of origin result in a better relationship between the two states, but do not – or cannot – explain \textit{how} this happens. To answer this question, it is useful to unpack the dynamic history of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora.

Indians first arrived in Canada in the early 1900s. Largely to work in agriculture, industry and on the railroads, Indians filled a labour shortage caused by the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885, which legislated a five-hundred dollar head-tax for each Chinese immigrant.\textsuperscript{144} By 1908, there were 5,000 Indian immigrants in British Columbia, and local labourers began to worry that Indians would take over factory, mill

\textsuperscript{143} Walton-Roberts, “Transnational Geographies,” 236.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Ibid}. The Canadian government had raised the head tax on Chinese immigrants and needed Indian immigrants to take their place. The ship was detained because it violated ‘direct passage’ legislation, designed to stop the flow of immigrants from Asian states. Prime Minister Harper has recently issued an apology to the community for the discrimination faced by the immigrants on the Komagata Maru. For an early history of East Indian immigrants. He has also apologized to Chinese Canadians for the head tax. please see: H.F. Angus, 1947. “East Indians in Canada.” \textit{International Journal} 2:1, Winter, 47-50; John Wood, 1978 ‘East Indians and Canada’s new immigration policy’ \textit{Canadian Public Policy} 4:4, Autumn, 547–567.}
and lumberyard jobs. These concerns resulted in legislation restricting Indian immigration, as well as their disenfranchisement in 1907.\(^{145}\) In 1914, anti-Indian policies culminated in the now-infamous Komagata Maru incident, when a chartered Japanese ship carrying over 300 Indian immigrants was denied the right to dock by Canadian officials. Komagata Maru became a symbol of Canada’s racist immigrant policies and politically galvanized the Indian community. It continues to resonate in contemporary politics, as evidenced by Prime Minister Harper’s apology to Vancouver’s Punjabi community in August 2008.\(^{146}\)

Anti-Indian sentiment during the early part of the century pushed British Columbia’s Indian community to politically organize. *Gurdwaras* built in Vancouver in 1908 and Victoria in 1912 served as religious forums and places of cultural and political assembly for *all* Indians. Sahoo and Sangha have described their multi-functionality as centres of fellowship that provided accommodation for newly arrived Indian immigrants. More importantly, they were “a rallying point for all members of the Indian community in their efforts to challenge racial discrimination and to gather money and support for the Indian independence movement.”\(^{147}\) In many ways, foreign policy activism within the Indo-Canadian community began with these early organizations.

These early patterns of Indian immigration have affected the current composition of the community and its role in contemporary Canadian politics. Early immigration was composed of farmers from Punjab, due to their agricultural experience and physical

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\(^{147}\) Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Dave Sangha, 2010. “*Diaspora and cultural heritage: the case of Indians in Canada,*” *Asian Ethnicity* 11: 1, February, 85.
Restrictive immigration laws made non-family class immigration virtually impossible, and as late as the 1950s, only a few thousand Indians resided in Canada. Further, the few allowances made for family reunification privileged immigration from Punjab, because of existing familial links in Canada. It was not until 1947, the year of India’s independence, that Indians were granted the right to vote and apply for citizenship. Two important changes were made to Canada’s immigration policy under L.B. Pearson in 1968 and Trudeau in 1976, creating the current ‘points-based’ system for ‘Independent-class’ immigrants and introducing separate classes for refugee-claimants, family reunification, and independent/professional migrants. In particular, these changes relaxed laws that traditionally prevented immigration from non-European states, and also balanced the “ratios and patterns in terms of sex and ethnicity” within the Indian community.

According to the 2006 census, four per cent of the Canadian population, consisting of 1.2 million people, were from South Asia, a direct result of the Trudeau and Pearson immigration policies. Between 1998 and 2002, immigration from India close to doubled from 15,372 to 28,779 immigrants per year, with professional-class immigration tripling from 4,118 to 13,889. Further, immigration from twice-removed Diaspora, including Indians from the Pacific Islands, Caribbean and East Africa, has further increased Indian representation in Canada. Yet, the early decisions made in Canada’s

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148 The Punjabi physique was thought to be much stronger, taller and fit than other places in India. For this reason, throughout British Raj, Punjabis were sent to places for agriculture and
149 Chandrashekar Bhat and Ajaya Kumar Sahoo, “Diaspora to Transnational Networks,” 141-167.
151 Canadian census figures are skewed for several reasons. First, there is no differentiation between Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or India as a place of origin within the population statistics. Second, there is no way to differentiate between first, second and third generation Indian communities. Third, the
immigration history have permanently biased the Diaspora’s composition. For example, despite representing only two per cent of India’s total population, over thirty per cent of Indo-Canadians come from Punjab. Further, the bulk of Canada’s Indo-Canadian population is concentrated in the Greater Toronto Area (350,000) and in the Greater Vancouver Area (180,000). Vancouver has a sizable Indian population because it was the first port-of-entry for Indians arriving by ship, while Toronto was the first-port-of-entry after commercial flights began between the two countries. Other cities with large Indo-Canadian populations include Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Ottawa and Montreal.

This research shows that changing demographics in the Indo-Canadian community have been responsible for the changes in Canada-India relations. Transnational links between India and its Diaspora are maintained through technological breakthroughs in communication and transportation, which have “helped [D]iasporas to be able to simultaneously integrate into the host country and maintain their links with their country of origin.” For example, the Diaspora’s knowledge of India’s business environment benefits Canada’s efforts to penetrate into the Indian market, an important

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154 For example, sociological and psychological studies have examined how the concentration of the Indo-Canadian community in large urban centres has affected their socialization into Canadian society. Research in the field of social work has examined how reinforcing value structures, despite local socialization, have resulted in the continued practice of traditional gender roles, arranged marriage and even patterns of physical abuse within the community. For example: Margaret Walton-Roberts and D. Hiebert, 1997. “Immigration, entrepreneurship, and the family: Indo-Canadian enterprise in the construction industry of Greater Vancouver,” Canadian Journal of Regional Science 20:1, 119; Nancy S. Netting, 2006. “Two-Lives, One Partner: Indo-Canadian Youth between Love and Arranged Marriages,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 37:1, Winter, 129-146.
factor for Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s decision to take Indo-Canadian caucus members on his 1996 Team Canada trade mission.\footnote{Abd-El-Aziz \textit{et al.}, 2005. “Scoping the role of Canadian Diaspora in global diplomacy and policy making” \texttt{<http://ecommons.uwinnipeg.ca/archive/00000127/01/Scoping_Role_Canadian_Diaspora.pdf>}}

In addition to \textit{personal} transnational linkages, the Indian government has become increasingly interested in connecting with its 20-million person overseas Diaspora, due to the significant amounts of investment from overseas remittances. With an even larger international Diaspora than China, the Indian government has used remittances as an integral part of their strategy for driving economic growth. For example, after its 1998 nuclear tests, the Indian government issued “Resurgence India Bonds,” marketed as a patriotic investment for Non-Resident Indians (NRIs).\footnote{Shefali Rekhi. 1998. “Forging a Bond: This scheme for NRIs is expected to rake in $2 billion.” August 3. \texttt{<http://www.india-today.com/itoday/03081998/biz.html>}} While the Indian government has never divulged the total amount earned, estimates suggest that between two and four billion USD were collected through the bond scheme.\footnote{Express India. 1998. “Resurgent India Bonds rake in $2.25 billion in first 10 days.” (August 19) \texttt{<http://www.expressindia.com/fe/daily/19980819/23155544p.html>}} Diaspora-sent remittances have brought investment into India through multiple channels, including personal cash transfers that are subsequently invested into the local economy by family members, as well as investments into small businesses and travel. For the 2008 fiscal year, the World Bank noted that India continued to be the largest recipient of migrant remittances – 52 billion USD, constituting fifteen per cent of all global remittances that year.\footnote{Rediff.com. 2009. “Remittance: India again tops the world.” (July 27). \texttt{<http://business.rediff.com/slide-show/2009/jul/27/slide-show-1-remittance-india-again-tops-the-world.htm>}}

\footnote{ \texttt{<http://ecommons.uwinnipeg.ca/archive/00000127/01/Scoping_Role_Canadian_Diaspora.pdf>}}
To maximize the benefits from these economic relationships, the Indian government announced a system of dual citizenship for NRIs in Canada, the United States, and United Kingdom in 2003. For second, third and fourth generation Diaspora – those not born in India – the government also created a “Person of Indian Origin” (PIO) designation. The PIO initiative allows later generations to benefit from less stringent visa requirements, facilitating economic, educational, employment and financial transfers to India, without requiring work or study permits.160

The Indian government has also organized annual meetings of the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) (Day of Indians Abroad). In the words of Mani and Varadarajan, the first PBD meeting on January 9, 2003 saw “more than 2,000 people from around the world [arrive] in New Delhi to participate in an event that was touted as the ‘largest gathering of the global Indian family.’”161 The PBD events include seminars, panels and workshops on investment and business opportunities with India, bilateral relations and domestic politics in India.162

The Indian Diaspora in the United States has set an important precedent and example for Indo-Canadians interested in pursuing bilateral relations with India. Some have even suggested that the Indo-American Diaspora has rivalled the influence of the Israel lobby, since the formation of the US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) in 2002. First, the international conditions supporting bilateral relations with India are

160 Consul General of India in Toronto. 2010. “Person of Indian Origin.” <http://www.cgitoronto.ca/PIO/piogeninfo2.html> (Accessed: September 10, 2010); These sixteen countries are the United States of America, Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, France, Sweden, and Finland.


significantly more permissible than with Israel. Second, Indo-Americans have grown into a ‘model community,’ built on the incredible economic and professional successes that Indians have enjoyed in the United States. Indians have a median income (60,093 USD) that is double the average American family and ten per cent of the country’s millionaires are Indo-American. Within this immigrant group, 58 per cent have a college degree and 43.6 per cent are employed as managers or professionals, prominent in the medical, academic and high-tech fields. Mira Kamdar suggests that this economic success has facilitated the community’s major political advances, to the point that “the India lobby is getting results in Washington – and having a profound impact on US policy, with important consequences for the future of Asia and the world.”

Kamdar has concluded that the politicization of the Indian Diaspora was inevitable. Even before USINPAC, the community worked actively to promote US-India relations, particularly after the 1998 nuclear tests. According to Hathaway, the 1999 Kargil War prompted “Indian American computer professionals [to] organize an e-mail campaign that startled congressional offices. One staffer reported receiving 400 e-mails in a 24-hour period.” Since 2002, USINPAC concentrates in two channels of activity. First, it cultivates personal connections with American policy-makers. As is widely known, USINPACs founder and director, Sanjay Puri has contacts with the highest-levels

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163 Amit Gupta, 2004. “The Indian Diaspora’s Political Efforts in the United States” ORF Occasional Paper. September. 6.; Moreover, close to 100,000 Indian students live in the United States with student visas. Even the United States has also started to recognize the long-term benefits of having Indian students educated in the US. When they go back to India, they become the largest advocates of improved relations with the US – a form of soft power for the United States.


of government, including Presidents George Bush and Barack Obama. Second, the community has coalesced over humanitarian and development fundraising, sending emergency funds during the 2002 Gujarat earthquake, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the 2006 Kashmir earthquake.¹⁶⁶

Generally speaking, the Indo-Canadian Diaspora has not achieved the same level of success. One explanation is that Indo-Canadians are not as economically successful as their American counterparts, with *average* wages that parallel those of the typical Canadian. As mentioned, Indo-Canadians are divided into both blue- and white-collar professions. Thus, the community is more financially challenged and its interests more divided than their American counterparts.

Further, the American Diaspora is not as ethnically divisive as the Indo-Canadian community. As mentioned previously, Sikhs make up thirty per cent of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora, whereas the American-Indian Diaspora is mostly composed of Hindus from diverse regions in India. The divisiveness of the Canadian Diaspora is partially due to the different messages emanating from the larger community and its Sikh segments. Differences have the effect of diluting positive messaging from pro-Indian interest organizations. Further, Canadians’ negative perspective towards Khalistan terrorism and the 1985 Air India bombing affects their view of the Indian Diaspora more generally. This has, of course, impacted relations between the two states.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ United States India Political Action Committee. 2010. *USINPAC.* <http://www.usinpac.com/> (September 17, 2010). By proportion, the United States has significantly smaller Indian Diaspora than Canada – 2 million people within a population of 310 million. Canada has 1 million Indians in a population of 35 million.

Another difference between the Indo-American and Indo-Canadian Diasporas is their level of organization. While USINPAC was founded in 2002, the community has long-been involved in American politics. Even the earliest Indo-Canadian organizations, such as the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce, were initially focused on community-building and have only recently become involved in politics. Further, the Indo-Canadian political mandate has been divided into three organizations, instead of being concentrated like within the American system. Interestingly, USINPAC’s success is not dependent on its ability to deliver votes. In the United States, the Indian Diaspora is too widely spread-out across many congressional electoral districts to make an electoral difference. The Indo-Canadian Diaspora’s demographic, economic, social and political development parallels the evolution of the complex relationship between Canada and India.

2. Canada-India Relations

Some commentators assume that bilateral relations took a negative turn with India’s nuclear test in 1974. However, this section shows that this assumption is supported by a weak counterfactual claim. It suggests that without the 1974 test, the bilateral relationship would have continued in a positive direction. Instead, this chapter shows that Canada-India relations have suffered because of contextual determinants that superseded the importance of bilateral relations. Arthur Rubinoff has noted that, in the past, the “two middle powers pursued policies which led to mutual disenchantment

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because in the long run each became involved in matters where the other had no direct or compelling national interest.”

The following section demonstrates that bilateral relations were always dependent on several variables rather than just being determined by the constraints present in the international system.

The negative relationship that developed between the two states was not anticipated by many observers – indeed, many saw Canada and India as natural allies. For example, Escott Reid, Canada’s second envoy to India, boldly suggested the two enjoyed a ‘special relationship.’

For India, Canada was a communication channel for the United States, while Canada saw India as a strategically important ally in the Cold War, particularly for gathering information on China. Within this arrangement, India became Canada’s largest recipient of bilateral aid – over two billion CAD between 1947 and 1974. Canada also insisted that India join the Commonwealth after it achieved independence, helping to ensure that India could accrue economic benefits through its membership.

It was in light of these strategic concerns, as well as Prime Minister Nehru’s commitment to peaceful civilian nuclear energy and global disarmament, that Canada offered India CANDU reactors to launch its nuclear programme. Despite the hesitation of some Canadian officials - who recognized that India’s nuclear ambitions may have been less benign than they at first seemed - the Canadian government’s decision to move

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171 At the time, there was a significant debate whether republican states should be admitted into the Commonwealth. Further, by allowing India and Pakistan membership, it would cease to be a Caucasian-only organization. Delvoie, “A New Beginning,” 54.
forward with a civilian nuclear energy program with India was based on three arguments. First, it assumed that India could get nuclear technology from other states, but only Canada would also offer the necessary safeguards to pre-empt unlawful proliferation. Second, Canadian officials knew that the newly-formed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would help to ensure that India’s reactors were properly safeguarded. Third, Canada wrongly reasoned that India did not have the technical ability to pursue a military program based on the CANDU design. With Nehru’s death in 1964, along with the combination of hostile Indo-Pakistani relations and a military and territorial loss to China in 1962, India began to consider pursuing a military nuclear program.

Importantly, the emerging nuclear challenge was not the only factor that eroded relations prior to 1974. Rather, differences in political outlook, national interest and alliance structures between the two countries strongly contributed to the divisiveness as well. First, the similarities in Canada and India’s shared international interests were exaggerated to fit the image of the special relationship. India had just emerged from a long history of colonialism and was loathe to come under even indirect control by any other state, a position that it emphasized repeatedly. This caused India to adopt an often defiant, quasi-isolationist foreign policy. This was exemplified by its leadership of

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173 Ibid.


175 This is the central argument described by Baldev Raj Nayar and TV Paul, 2003. India in the world order: searching for major power status. New York: Cambridge University Press.
the Non-Aligned Movement, despite its contribution to alienating the United States. This also meant that India made its foreign policy decisions on an issue by issue basis, to avoid being dominated by any one power or alliance structures.176

In comparison, Canada emerged from the post-WWII period looking to create a new international identity. Arthur Rubinoff argued that Canada’s early support for independent India “allowed Canada the semblance of autonomy in its foreign policy ... [and] provided a sense of distance from the US, [of] Canada as an honest broker in world affairs.”177 While wanting to differentiate itself from the United States and Great Britain, Canada’s definition of self-interest was also influenced by these countries. Ashok Kapur explains that Canada’s insensitivity to India’s interests was reminiscent of the United States, while overemphasizing its own constructive role in world affairs like Britain.178 Indeed, Canada signalled that wanted to take a proactive and sustained role in the emerging new world order through the creation of its own Department of External Affairs and by increasing its diplomatic corps in several regions of the world.179 In this self-styled new identity, Canadian expectations to ‘develop’ India were based on an image of a poverty-stricken, uneducated, starving country. This image not only determined Canada’s early policy, but has informed Canada’s self-positioning towards India until very recently.180

178 Kapur argues that the US is less likely to be over-serious and will change its position when confronted by countervailing pressures. Ashok Kapur, 1991. "Canada and India," in Arthur Rubinoff eds. Canada and South Asia: Political and Strategic Relations. Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Toronto. 32.
Constructive engagement between India and Canada was challenged by several events, including Kashmir. Canada feared that the conflict over Kashmir would damage newly-formed relationships within the Commonwealth and thus took advantage of its position as president of the UN Security Council to sponsor UN Resolution 80 in 1950. The resolution called for a plebiscite to be held in Kashmir to determine who should have control of the region.\textsuperscript{181} India was solidly against the resolution since it felt that it constituted international interference in a domestic matter.\textsuperscript{182} Further, it was concerned that plebiscite in Pakistan’s favour would lend support to the ‘two-nation’ thesis that justified the latter’s formation and would undermine India’s identity as a secular state - implying that India was unable to protect the interests of all of its citizens, Hindu and Muslim.\textsuperscript{183}

The relationship between India and Canada was also greatly influenced by the Cold War context of the time, with both countries divided between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two examples highlight this tension. In 1954, an International Control Commission (ICC) was established to oversee the partition of Vietnam, with Canada, India and Poland representing the West, the East and the Non-Aligned bloc respectively. A difference in perspectives between Canada and India became increasingly apparent during negotiations. India began to see Canada as an apologist for

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{181} Salim Mansur, “Canada and Pakistan,” 52.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{183} India has since maintained a policy where bilateral solutions in the Kashmir issue, arguing that any settlement of Kashmir would happen between itself and Pakistan.}
the American point of view, while Canada thought India was making excuses for the Communist bloc.\textsuperscript{184}

A second example followed with the military intervention on October 29, 1956 in the Suez Canal. Canada and India both became involved in crisis-resolution, fearing it would lead to superpower conflict. Almost simultaneously, the Soviet military moved to crack down on a popular uprising against its occupation of Hungary. Despite India’s declared neutrality, it was conspicuously quiet on the Soviet action, which raised the ire of Canadian officials.\textsuperscript{185} In both cases, Canada assumed that its bilateral assistance to India would buy congruence between their foreign policies. India, on the other hand, continued its policy of compartmentalization and did not see why its foreign policy decisions should be determined by its development assistance donors.

Further, superpower involvement in Asia effectively marginalized an already diminished Canadian role. The US and USSR ‘played sides’ to reinforce the divisions between India and Pakistan. India continued to fall out of favour with the United States due to its involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement and a growing US alliance with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{186} The US-Pakistan alliance had resulted in millions of dollars in arms transfers, the 1954 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, and Pakistan’s membership in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.

\textsuperscript{184} Ramesh Thakur has written the most comprehensive account of these negotiations: Ramesh Thakur, 1984. \textit{Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission}. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.


\textsuperscript{186} The United States was suspicious of India's neutrality and held a position of “you are either with us or against us. Stephen Cohen, 2001. \textit{India : Emerging Power}. Washington: The Brookings Institution.
(SEATO). Regarding India, Washington adopted a policy of “either you are with us or against us,” and saw New Delhi’s self-declared neutrality as insufficient commitment to the West.\footnote{Stephen Cohen, *Emerging India*, 268-299; Sumit Ganguly, 2001. *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947*. New York: Columbia University Press. 25.} In the face of these divisions, India signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971, ending any pretense of non-alignment for the remainder of the Cold War.

Another point of conflict between Canada and India was due to India’s intervention in the Bangladeshi War of Independence. India had secured a guarantee that any American involvement in favour of Pakistan would result in a Soviet response on India’s behalf. Canada’s response to the conflict was completely inadequate, though Canada argued its absence was meant to avoid escalating the conflict and challenging the unity of the Commonwealth alliance. Canada also did not want to antagonize its major ally, the United States, which supported a unified Pakistan. Further, Canada assumed that it would be offered a mediation role after the conflict ended, and felt that becoming involved would compromise its ability to carry out such a role.\footnote{Canada never did assume a mediation role in the post-conflict negotiations, mostly because India preferred the negotiation to take place bilaterally, without external interference. The outcome of this summit resulted in the Simla Agreement, which has been the basis for the current line of control in Kashmir.} Heath MacQuarrie, Member of Parliament for Hillsborough, PEI in 1972, apologized for the Canadian role: “Of course,” he said, “we did not do as much as we could or perhaps should have done.”\footnote{Zaglul Haider, 2005. “Unfolding Canada-Bangladesh Relations.” *Asian Survey* 45:2, March-April, 325.} It was this Canadian reluctance to involve itself in South Asia that challenged its future ability to have influence in the region.
While Canada-India relations were obviously affected by the alliance constraints of the Cold War, there are a few important elements of the relationship that need highlighting. First, the largest challenge to Canada’s relationship with India was lack of national interest. Second, Canada lacked expertise in Indian political culture, which would come from having an active Diaspora. As well, some observers have assumed that Canada’s foreign policy at the time was largely informed by American policy in South Asia, though intimations of the opposite emerged within the first two decades of India’s independence. That is, US interests clearly guided Canadian decisions but they did not determine its specific policies. This becomes increasingly obvious when considering Canada’s response to India’s nuclear decisions. While all Western allies agreed on sanctions and international condemnation, eventual US-India rapprochement did not result in a similar Canadian response. Canada had made up its mind about India.

The Nuclear Impasse: Canada-India Relations Between 1974-1998

Dubbed the “Smiling Buddha,” India conducted its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974 to a chorus of international condemnation. In a particularly drastic response to the tests, Canada suspended all diplomatic relations and all bilateral assistance except for food aid.\(^{190}\) Canada’s hard-line reaction to the test was fuelled by anger over India’s betrayal of the terms of their nuclear transfer agreement, since it was obvious that some of the enriched material came from Canadian reactors. It was also a result of its own failure to monitor compliance, assure verification and insist on safeguards for the CANDU reactors. Not only did the test highlight the inadequacy of the safeguards

negotiated between the two states, but it also represented a challenge to the recently negotiated and Canada-championed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which had come into effect in 1968.\textsuperscript{191}

India’s nuclear test led to an immediate strengthening of Canada’s nuclear policy. Before the tests, Canada had focused on two major nuclear objectives - the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and ensuring that Canadian technology would not be used for ‘illegal’ nuclear proliferation. After the tests, Canada stopped all nuclear trade to states that had not signed the non-proliferation treaty, insisted on unconditional, full safeguards on all Canadian nuclear reactors, and would implement a full cessation of trade with nuclear-testing states.\textsuperscript{192}

India’s decision to test was not entirely a surprise to Canada, as there were several indications that the Indian government might be pursuing a non-peaceful nuclear option. For example, each nuclear reactor transfer prompted a new set of negotiations, where Canada attempted to improve safeguard standards against a resistant India. Another signal of India’s nuclear intentions occurred in 1968, the same year as the last bilateral nuclear reactor transfer, when India refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India has long argued that the NPT is discriminatory. It argues that it bases ‘nuclear legitimacy’ on timing: had India carried out its test before the cutoff date, it would have had full rights as a nuclear weapons state.\textsuperscript{193} Further, India argues that the NPT only


\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.

limits horizontal proliferation while nuclear weapons states (NWS) are allowed to vertically proliferate.\textsuperscript{194}

Despite Canada’s outrage over the nuclear issue, sanctions \textit{only} were made permanent after concerns arose over Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s State of Emergency. Ashok Kapur calls this the period of ‘benign neglect,’ during which Canada’s interest in South Asia waned just as its importance in world affairs began to grow.\textsuperscript{195} Kim Nossal explains this benign neglect from a Canadian Foreign Policy perspective. He argues that the nuclear tests happened to coincide with a decidedly less internationalist period in Canadian foreign policy, especially in the \textit{denouement} of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{196} Ryan Touhey blames the impasse on a lack of personal interest under Prime Minister Trudeau, which was vividly illustrated by the fact that no high-level Canadian representatives visited India between 1955 and 1983.\textsuperscript{197}

This is not to say that there were no attempts to improve the relationship between the two states. In 1968, suggested by Professor Michael Brecher, both the Canadian and Indian governments co-sponsored the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute. A major initiative to improve relations between the two countries, Shastri’s mandate aimed to promote the study of India within Canadian universities.\textsuperscript{198} Successful as an academic enterprise, the

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\item \textsuperscript{194} Roger K. Smith. 1987. “Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory.” \textit{International Organization} 41: 2, Spring, 253-281. Julian Lewis states six “forms” of vertical proliferation: Research and Development; Testing; Deployment (Weaponization); Minimum deterrent – to deter a large-scale attack; Maximum deterrent – those that have proliferated beyond the minimum deterrent; Use of a nuclear weapon. Horizontal proliferation simply refers to additional state proliferators.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Ashok Kapur, "Canada and India," 62.
\item \textsuperscript{197} Ryan Touhey, “Canada and India at 60.” 742-3.
\item \textsuperscript{198} The Institute was named after Lal Bahadur Shastri, former Prime Minister of India. In the 1980s, it added to its mandate by promoting the study of Canada in Indian universities.
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Institute has had limited foreign policy achievements for two important reasons. First, the Shastri Institute has been solely focused on academic relations between the two countries. With fundamental issues that have developed between the two states including, but not exclusive to, their nuclear relationship, the improvements in academic relations have not been enough to overcome the bilateral political hurdles. Second, the Shastri Institute was also used a means to express discontent between Canada and India. For example, during the 1990s, the Institute was the focus of Indian diplomats who wanted to limit the academic freedom of researchers funded by the Institute (particularly any negative research relating to India).  

The apathy that characterized the two countries’ relationship came to an abrupt end with the 1985 Air India terrorist attack. Ironically, it was Canada’s domestic constituency that caused Canada’s reengagement with India. India accused Canada of not doing enough to stem domestic Sikh separatist activity, as the Khalistan terrorism was thought to be funded by the overseas Sikh Diaspora in Canada and the UK. William Dobell suggests that Canada’s diplomatic relationship with India was further undermined by the former’s decision to allow the Akali Dal, a Punjab-centric political party, to open unofficial consulates in Vancouver, Ottawa and Toronto. However, Canada did take several small steps to address Sikh extremism in the country. Prime Minister Joe Clark asked provincial premiers to keep an eye on Sikh activities in their provinces, and as an example, a University of British Columbia Chair in Sikh studies was put on hold.

201 Ibid.
More concretely, in 1987, a bilateral extradition treaty was signed between the two countries. This led to the creation of the bilateral Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism (JWGCT) by 1997, to respond to the Khalistan and Tamil terrorist presence in Canada. Yet any suggestion that these cooperative steps on counter-terrorism would improve relations was undermined by Canada’s slow response to prosecuting the perpetrators of the terrorist attack.

Canada’s post-Cold War rhetoric suggested that it was in favour of re-engagement with India, although there were few active steps in this direction. Then, in the early 1990s, India began its economic transformation. This transformation saw India stave off bankruptcy and increase its GDP growth rate from three (colloquially referred to as the Hindu rate of growth) to six per cent by adopting a series of privatization and deregulation measures as well as investment schemes. Recognizing the potential in India’s new economy, Canada conducted three high-level missions to India: Finance Minister Roy MacClaren in 1992, Secretary of State for Asia Raymond Chan in 1994 and the Team Canada delegation in 1996. Team Canada, led by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, included 300 business people, numerous provincial premiers and trade officials, and sought to match India’s market requirements to existing Canadian capabilities. The delegation signed seventy-five trade contracts worth approximately 3.4 billion

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dollars (CAD).\textsuperscript{204} The trip differed from other Team Canada missions because the travel roster included several prominent members of the Indo-Canadian community and MPs of Indian-origin, suggesting that the Chrétien government had made the link between the Diaspora and foreign policy.

Yet critics of the mission have noted that despite its \textit{perceived} success, very few of the contracts were fulfilled after the 1998 tests. Further, the 3.4 billion dollars in trade contacts were only a third of those signed during a similar trade mission to China earlier that year. Ryan Touhey suggests that one explanation for the rather poor results achieved by the trade mission was residual negative opinions of India within the Canadian delegation.\textsuperscript{205} Indian commentators have suggested that Canada continued to treat India as the junior partner in the relationship, negotiating in a slightly high-handed manner informed by a sense of moral condemnation.\textsuperscript{206}

India formally declared itself a nuclear power in May 1998, with two nuclear tests in the Thar Desert. As anticipated, India’s new nuclear capabilities were severely condemned by the major and middle powers, including the US, European Union and Japan.\textsuperscript{207} Canada’s response was particularly severe - it recalled its High Commissioner, Rosemary Spiers, 1996. “‘Team Canada’ visit scores $444 million.” 11 January. \textit{Toronto Star}, A2; John Stackhouse, 1996. “Indian deals herald ‘new era’ Steel, textile, diesel contracts produce big day for Canadian business with subcontinent,” 15 January. \textit{Globe and Mail}, B1; Rosemary Speirs, 1996. “PM's Asian trip called an $8.6 billion success,” 19 January. \textit{Toronto Star}, A11.


These self-identified middle power states include Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden and Sweden. China, as mentioned previously in this chapter, advocated full sanctions against India and limited sanctions against Pakistan. Russia was one of the larger countries that did not forcibly challenge India’s program nor sanction its trade with India. B.R. Nayar and T.V. Paul’s novel is an in-depth look at the pursuit of India’s major power status. B.R. Nayar and T.V. Paul. 2003. \textit{India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
cancelled Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA) programs, suspended trade talks, opposed India’s request for World Bank loans, challenged its Security Council permanent seat bid, and took an anti-India stance at G8 meetings.208 While the 1974 nuclear tests are an important explanation of Canada’s harsh response, the ‘Axworthy Doctrine’ also played a large role in firewalling relations between the two states. Lloyd Axworthy’s ‘Wilsonian’ view of international relations manifested in a personal crusade against violators of international norms, including India. While advocating isolation and punishment for India, Foreign Minister Axworthy attempted to enforce his perspective through soft diplomacy and economic sanctions, which Canada maintained for longer than any other state.

Axworthy’s particularly strong stance differentiated Canada from other Western countries, which ended their sanctions after several months.209 At the same time, Canada’s sanctions had very little effect on India, since years of neglect meant that bilateral trade amounted to only a few hundred million dollars a year – a particularly small amount in comparison to India’s growing trade relationships with Europe, Asia and the United States. Bilateral aid between Canada and India was also nearly non-existent and thus left little room for punitive measures. The limited effect of these sanctions did have one important outcome. India and Canada’s economic relationship had fallen to such an extent that it changed the perception that India ‘needed’ Canada for its economic growth or humanitarian development. Canada’s strong stance had a negative effect, where a tit-for-tat strategy between the two states began to emerge. For example, at one

208 Rubinoff, “Canada Re-engagement,” 850.
209 Touhey, Canada and India, 742; Rubinoff, “Canada Re-engagement,” 847.
point, Canada refused visas to several visiting Indian MPs to which India responded by refusing to allow Canadian Senator Lois Wilson to enter the country.\textsuperscript{210}

\textit{Establishing the Framework for a Nuclear Deal: 1998-2005}

Washington realized relatively soon after 1998 that India’s nuclear program was a permanent fixture in South Asia, and began to pursue relations with India through high-level visits and dialogue, including a visit by President Clinton in 2000. The United States also increased the size of its diplomatic presence. Strobe Talbott, the US Ambassador to India, was especially a key figure in negotiating a post-nuclear ‘peace’ between India and the US. The contrast with Canada’s engagement was stark, since Canada had ordered the members of its diplomatic corps not to discuss any substantive business with their Indian counterparts.\textsuperscript{211}

Between 1998 and 2006, every issue that arose between the states had both positive and negative outcomes, which caused further stagnation in the relationship. Three issues were particularly problematic between Canada and India during this period. First was the ongoing problem of Sikh terrorism. The Air India trials concluded in 2005, and the two accused were found ‘not guilty’ due to insufficient evidence. A post-trial inquiry gave a damning indictment of the Canadian judicial system, particularly the way the RCMP handled the investigations, physical evidence and witness testimony. The Air India case was widely perceived in Canada to be an ‘Indian problem’ and thus not given the attention it required or deserved.

\textsuperscript{210} While advocating for human security, during Axworthy’s time in foreign affairs, Canada’s international development aid fell to 0.24 per cent of its GDP.

\textsuperscript{211} Ashok Kapur, “Canada and India,” 62.
Second, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Canada became involved in the Afghanistan (and Pakistan) issue in South Asia. India has long called attention to the growing fundamentalism in the region, tentatively welcoming intervention in Afghanistan. However, the conduct of the War on Terror in the region has myopically focused on the military effort in Afghanistan, with little awareness of the political and diplomatic challenges in the region. Despite India’s development and infrastructure assistance in Afghanistan, it has refused to support any military effort.212

The final challenge to bilateral relations is simply that Canada has not signalled “what it would like from India.” For example, Paul Martin’s 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) made re-engaging the rising powers a central economic policy, particularly India and China. Yet this political rhetoric remained largely dormant in practice. The Martin government had not clarified the content of its engagement with India, and was thus largely ineffective in encouraging bilateral ties, much like Chrétien’s initiatives towards India. Canada seemed to continue to believe that it could negotiate on its own terms, offering non substantive and inconsequential areas for cooperation rather than dealing with the major issues of Pakistan, terrorism and the nuclear agreement. Indeed, despite various Memoranda of Understanding in educational and agricultural fields, the financial relationship between India and Canada remains anaemic: in 2006,

Indian exports to Canada were a mere 1.2 per cent of the country’s total exports, while imports from Canada represented only 0.9 per cent of its total imports.\(^{213}\)

Since 2006, despite numerous missteps at the beginning of its mandate, the Harper government has made significant inroads with India. This includes several high-level business trips to India by the Ministers of Trade, Natural Resources, Asia-Pacific and Foreign Affairs that included important members of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora. Canada has also hosted numerous Indian Ministers, most importantly Minister of Transport Kamal Nath and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the G20 summit in June 2010. In its analysis, Chapter five details the contemporary relationship between Canada and India, showing how the Indo-Canadian Diaspora has influenced these recent improvements.

### 3. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to establish two important characteristics of Canada-India relations. First, it showed that bilateral relations are not solely determined by the nuclear issue. Instead, Canada-India relations are the result of a complex and convoluted relationship between these countries that has evolved over the past half century, which includes, but is not limited to their nuclear relationship. The chapter has also shown that international constraints have had an important influence on Canada-India relations, but not to the extent that has previously been assumed. While Canada has been accused of matching its foreign policy interests to the United States, this has not

been the case in Canada’s bilateral relations with India. In particular, relations were strongly influenced by the Cold War, but the eventual dissolution of these alliance structures left Canada free to define its own bilateral relations. While most Western states were quick to develop economic ties with India, improved relations were only half-heartedly pursued by the Chrétien and Martin governments. In contrast, Stephen Harper’s government has actively sought to deepen the relationship, using any and all resources available, including active engagement with a newly powerful Indian Diaspora.

Identifying that there have always been multiple inputs in bilateral relations, this chapter underscores that there is a space for a politically active Indo-Canadian Diaspora. As a result of the Indian Diaspora’s growing economic and political strength, later chapters will show that this self-identified group has both directly and indirectly influenced improvements in Canada-India relations. While the chapter has shown that the Diaspora has only very recently become an effective lobbying force in terms of contemporary relations (because it had yet to organize itself to the same degree as its American counterpart, or to become as economically successful as the US Diaspora), the growing stature of the community points toward an ever increasing and more important influence on bilateral relations. The following chapter discusses the methodology used by this dissertation to uncover this role.
Chapter Four:

Research Design and Methodology

As the previous chapter(s) have established, Canada-India relations have never been solely determined by economic and nuclear issues. Rather, the bilateral relationship has been affected by numerous pressures, opportunities, and internal and external constraints. Yet this multivariate explanation presents a methodological challenge -- while it provides the analytical space to consider the influence of Indo-Canadian interest groups, multi-causality makes it difficult to isolate and measure the relative strengths and contributions of specific causal relationships. This is a challenge faced by nearly all research on ethnic interest groups and perhaps explains why so many studies have mistakenly concluded that Diaspora groups have, at best, a minimal influence on foreign policy.214 In contrast, my research begins with the working assumption that the Indo-Canadian Diaspora has had an effect on bilateral relations. Thus, it uncovers how this influence unfolds in the context of the Canadian government’s policies and priorities.

As such, this project arguably represents the first full-scale investigation of the Indian Diaspora’s effects on Canadian foreign policy towards India. The study begins with a relatively simple but challenging question: how are Diaspora groups a salient influence on Canadian foreign policy? This central question raises two related methodological challenges. First, which methodology is best suited to capture the impact

of ethnic interest groups, given the multiple determinants of Canadian foreign policy towards India? Second, to refine previous theoretical work on the role of ethnic interest groups, the research must also extract generalizable findings from data collected on Indo-Canadian relations and policies. To accommodate these challenges, the following chapter unfolds in three sections. Section one explains the case-study selection and counters prominent criticisms of case study analysis. Section two describes the central hypotheses guiding the research (independent and dependent variables), and outlines the main elements of research design and data collection. The chapter concludes with a response to possible criticisms.

1. Case Study Selection

Case studies methodology is fundamental to qualitative research. Arend Lijphart notes six types of case study analysis: atheoretical, interpretive, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming and deviant case studies. Lijphart emphasises that these categories are ‘ideal types,’ as a research project can simultaneously share several of these attributes. Outlined below, this research is a hybrid of descriptive interpretive (DI) and hypothesis-generating case study methods.

This hybrid approach is used to reveal important evidence to support the dissertation’s hypotheses (outlined below). It introduces new empirical facts to “interpret

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215 He explains the differences as follows: “a) atheoretical: are entirely descriptive and are neither guided by established or hypothesized generalizations; b) interpretive: are guided by an interest in the case itself, but make explicit use of established theoretical propositions; c) hypothesis-generating: attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases; d) theory-confirming and theory-infirming: the case study is a test of the proposition, which may turn out to be confirmed or infirmed by it; e) deviant case studies: refines and sharpens existing case hypotheses based on a case that is known to deviate from established generalizations.” Please see: Arend Lijphart, 1971. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.” American Political Science Review 65:3, September, 692.
or explain an event by applying a known theory to the new terrain.”

It is most usefully employed in nascent bodies of literature to “generate an additional type of contribution: new suggestions for improving the theory.” As Harry Eckstein suggests, this type of case-study requires a “disciplined application of theories to cases [which] forces one to state theories more rigorously than previously done.”

From applying theoretical propositions to the Indo-Canadian case study, this research looks to “develop theoretical generalizations where no theory exists yet.” In this way, this research offers an important theoretical contribution to the study of ethnic groups in Canadian foreign policy.

By invoking previous research, case-study research tests new empirical facts from a comparative perspective. While single case-study methods do not involve direct comparisons, as Andrew Bennett and Alexander George argue, interpretative case-study analysis “take[s] place within the context of ongoing research programs, so that studies of single cases may draw comparisons to existing studies.”

Bennett and George note that these comparisons come from the “community of scientists.” Cases are selected and tested against dominant positions, assumptions and findings within the literature, benefitting from the “practice of strategically choosing observations based upon

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220 Ibid.
knowledge of cases from parallel studies.”

As discussed later in further detail, this study is situated in a parallel body of literature on ethnic groups and foreign policy, Canadian foreign policy and traditional interest groups, which establish the central and secondary hypotheses driving this research.

Of course, case study research has inherent challenges. First, critics note an inherent inability to generalize from the case evidence. The inclusion of multiple variables that explain ethnic interest group influence makes it difficult to differentiate between context-specific and generalizable findings. Further, case-study researchers do not build in the checks and balances common in large-n data analysis, and consistently “allow[s] equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions.”

The result is that they are unable to properly identify or operationalize variables, build hypotheses, or test and refine theories. However, this study has adopted a methodology to address these challenges in four important ways.

First, my research focuses on Canada-India relations under the Harper government between 2006 and 2010. As shown in previous chapters, bilateral relations were stagnant before 2006 - despite India’s growing economy and political clout. However, since the 2006 election, the Harper government has actively engaged India through bilateral visits, a foreign investment protection agreement, and most importantly, the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement of June 2010. These changes have significantly improved relations between Canada and India and, therefore, represent an observable

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policy shift that requires an explanation. In contrast to conventional wisdom, this research argues that the Indo-Canadian Diaspora was instrumental in facilitating this important shift.

Second, the study moves beyond a typical single-case research project and is designed to facilitate a “within-case” comparative analysis (WCCA) that explores the effects of three different interest groups through multiple iterations (or data points). As such, the approach differs from other works in this field that rarely provides this kind of detailed, comparative analysis of the effects of different interest groups. For example, David Goldberg’s work compares the influence of the Canada-Israel Council (CIC) to the American-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC). As Goldberg himself notes, due to “the diverse and varying interests of the American and Canadian governments toward Israel and the Middle East, a full and complete comparison [of the 1973-1988 period] is impossible.”

Goldberg’s approach is problematic because the CIC and AIPAC share few commonalities, with differences in their political objectives, national interest, political institutions and the size and demographic of the Diaspora they represent. By contrast, WCCA allows the research to offer a more sophisticated assessment of the characteristics, strategies and organizational factors that emerge as most effective at influencing government policy. In Canada, the Indian Diaspora is represented by three prominent organizations, all of which have actively pursued better relations between Canada and India:

1. Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC)
2. Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC)

3. Canada-India Foundation (CIF)

These comparisons establish an important precedent and future studies on ethnic groups should anticipate using a similar methodology, given the growth of competing interest organizations in Canada and the United States.\(^{226}\)

Third, WCCA allows the research to decipher circumstantial from theoretical (generalizable) conclusions. For example, research on the Israel lobby argues that there is little geostrategic or economic value to sustaining strong US-Israel relations, given the latter’s hostile relationship with other Middle Eastern states. Thus, many studies have concluded that AIPAC must be a very successful interest organization because no alternative (rationalist) accounts can really explain the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and Israel.\(^{227}\) The problem with the conventional accounts is that they are largely dependent on contextual factors that surround the bilateral relationship, and unsatisfactorily deny the salience of other explanations, including strategic, cultural or historical ties. WCCA avoids the simplistic conclusions that plague standard accounts of AIPAC’s power, because in this research, all three interest groups share a common political environment and are affected by the same external conditions. Thus, it can isolate and compare the characteristics that affect an interest group’s influence on foreign policy.

Fourth, the size, composition, and economic success enjoyed by the Indo-Canadian community offers a rich source of new empirical data to test different claims

\(^{226}\) For example, J-street has recently emerged as an important competitor to the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC). Please see: JStreet Public Action Committee. 2010. J-StreetPAC. <http://jstreetpac.org/> (Accessed: June 10, 2010).

emerging from theoretical literature on ethnic interest groups. For example, by isolating two main determinants of interest group success -- i.e., (a) access to government, and (b) internal organization -- this study can evaluate the relative importance of these two factors in the context of the Canadian system and across all three interest groups. These findings can then be compared with conclusions about the effects of other ethnic communities in Canada. For example, David Goldberg’s study on the Canada-Israel Committee shows important parallels between the Indo-Canadian Diaspora and the Jewish community. Both communities are similarly organized with a comparable socio-economic status which allows them elite-level contact with government. Conversely, Liat Radcliffe Ross shows how differences in ethnic identity within the Canadian Islamic Congress (constructed as a religious organization) convolute their external political interests and messaging, challenging their ability to make a significant impact on foreign policy. These similarities and differences explain what factors contribute to the political success of Indo-Canadian organizations.

The research shows that groups are more likely to be influential if there is issue congruence with government interests. This project identifies there are important similarities and differences between ethnic and non-ethnic interest groups, as discovered in the literature review -- elite business groups have proven to be more effective than ‘grassroots-oriented’ organizations. In sum, the extant literature on ethnic interest groups establishes a theoretical framework that can be evaluated through comparative analysis of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora.
2. Detailed Discussion of Methodology

The literature review in Chapter two revealed two key independent variables that are typically cited as most influential when accounting for interest group influence on a state’s foreign policy activity – government access and internal organization. For the purposes of this project, each independent variable will be operationalized along a continuum that includes several ‘enabling conditions.’ The presence of these enabling conditions is expected to provide a more nuanced and reliable indication of interest group success, and serve as an important test of the theoretical propositions and hypotheses outlined below. The following section explains how the independent and dependent variables are defined and measured, followed by a discussion of how each of the research methods addresses the challenges of verifiability and generalizability.

Independent Variable: Government Access and Enabling Conditions

A centralized foreign policy reinforces the assumption that domestic groups have had little influence on CFP decision-makers. However, other Canadian foreign policy experts have argued that this assessment is misleading, because the effect of ‘centralization’ is determined by the salience of government interests with ethnic organizations. For example, centralization on ‘politico-security’ affairs differs

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significantly from economic and trade matters. Taking this argument into account, the independent variable measures the mechanisms with which Indo-Canadian interest groups have had access to foreign-policy decision-makers. To make this case, the approach used here will focus on the following ‘enabling conditions’ to measure an interest group’s access to government:

a) issue congruence between the Diaspora and government
b) issue salience
c) importance of ethnic votes (ethnopolitics)
d) accessibility of government members
   a. Prime Minister
   b. cabinet members
   c. Indo-Canadian members of parliament
   d. opposition members

The measurement of these access points is relatively straightforward and was assessed qualitatively through a timeline of government interactions with the interest groups between 2006 and 2010. Ranking these enabling conditions on a ‘high-medium-low’ scale can provide useful evidence regarding Indo-Canadian interest group access to the Harper government.

**Independent Variable: Diasporas and their Organizations**

The second independent variable operationalizes ‘ethnic Diaspora’ by selecting three representative ethnic organizations. A ‘Diaspora’ incorporates many groups of

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immigrants - including ethnic interest groups, elites, refugees, migrant workers, and new and later-generation immigrants. Further, its connotation suggests that a transnational relationship exists between the new and old homelands. Gabriel Sheffer, a preeminent scholar of Diaspora communities, suggests that they “are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin.” In addition, Diasporas hold a specific set of beliefs and values. William Safran notes that Diaspora groups, overseas Jewish populations are the prototypical example, have “a history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity importantly defined by this relationship.” The key political characteristic within this description – “ongoing support of the homeland” – is crucial to the definition of the organized Diaspora groups examined in this study.

This ‘political Diaspora’ can be divided into two analytical groups: ‘core members,’ which describes organized elites who actively pursue political affairs, and ‘rear guard members’ which include Diaspora activists who are no longer involved in

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231 Gabriel Sheffer, 1986. Modern diasporas in international politics. Kent: Croom Helm Ltd. p. 3; Judith T. Shuval, 2000. “Diaspora Migration: Definitional Ambiguities and a Theoretical Paradigm.” International Migration 38:5, December, 41-56. Shuval identifies the following characteristics for the Diaspora: the critical components of these definitions are a history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return (which can be ambivalent, eschatological or utopian), ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity defined by the above relationship.

community affairs. Because ‘rear-guard’ members do not actively pursue policy, the independent variable focuses exclusively on the community’s politically or socially-organized core members. For this study, these elites are further subdivided into two groups: members of the organized interest groups (which include patrons, executive members of the business community and volunteers) and Indian-origin members of parliament, who have direct access to and involvement in the policy process. By focusing on the most active members of the Indian community, this research will also allow for future comparisons with other ethnic groups in Canada.

Measuring the Independent Variables

Using Within-Case Comparative Analysis (WCCA), hypotheses are tested “by identifying variance between entities [interest groups] within a single unit [the Indo-Canadian Diaspora].” As James Mahoney explains, a within-case comparison “examines multiple features of what was originally considered only a single case to assess whether associations (developed through cross-case analysis) are in fact causal.” The most obvious benefit of a within-case study is its controlled contextual environment where each ‘within-case’ is treated as its own independent variable. In this research, all three organizations are subject to the same political system, government interests and international conditions.

The three organizations studied have important similarities and differences which

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facilitate a within-case analysis. Each organization has a political mandate to improve the relationship with Canada and India, as opposed to regionally-focused interest groups such as the Gujarati Business Association, Probasi Bengali Cultural Association, and the Sindhi Association of Canada. Further, these organizations have members from across Canada, and can reasonably claim to represent a cross-national community rather than a particular geographic segment. This makes them attractive to government, which attempts to communicate with the entire Indo-Canadian community through these elite representatives. This being said, each organization has a relatively closed leadership, led by professionals or high-achieving entrepreneurs from the Indo-Canadian community. Finally, all three organizations have explicitly-stated foreign policy mandates. One example is the Canada-India Foundation, whose mandate is to “foster support for stronger bilateral relations between Canada and India” and to encourage “greater engagement of the Indo-Canadian community in Canadian politics and public policy.”

In contrast, other Indo-Canadian organizations (other than these three) focus exclusively on domestic dimensions of the community’s interests, including immigration, social services and cultural development.

Despite these similarities, these organizations have clear differences which can test the attributes that have the largest impact on the dependent variable (i.e.: policy influence). First, while each group has an overarching mandate to improve Canada-India relations, each organization has interpreted that mandate differently. For example, the Canada-India Foundation is the only organization that lists ‘national security’ as a central objective. It posits the need for a strategic partnership between Canada and India “as

critical to Canada’s future, in areas of immigration, professional accreditation and national security.”\textsuperscript{238} In comparison, the Canada-India Business Council focuses on economic relations, providing corporations with business experience and political knowledge to enter India’s bureaucracy-laden economic market. Its mandate is “dedicated to the sustained growth of trade, investment and services between corporate Canada and corporate India.”\textsuperscript{239} Finally, the ICCC’s mandate focuses on several different elements of the bilateral relationship, including person-to-person exchanges, trade, politics and culture.

Second, each organization has different membership qualifications and organizational models. The ICCC is very much a grassroots organization, with the least restrictive and largest membership. It has over one-thousand members in branches based out of Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Halifax, Winnipeg, Calgary and Vancouver. Both the C-IBC and the CIF are much more restrictive in terms of membership qualifications. The C-IBC has one-hundred members, catering specifically to business organizations, while membership in the CIF is by invitation only. In the CIF, new members are invited by consensus within the executive board for “qualified members of the community in the policy-making and the legislative process.”\textsuperscript{240} In addition, these groups also differ in their executive structures. The CIF is organized into three central decision-making structures: an Executive Branch in charge of administrative business, a Board of Governors that handles organizational decisions, and thirty Charter members, founding individuals who made large financial contributions. By contrast, the ICCHC is much more

hierarchically structured, with one President, several Vice-Presidents who oversee youth programming, finance, small business, and event portfolios, and numerous directors. The C-IBC is a business organization which has several non-Indian executive members, and includes individuals with experience in diplomatic service, business or Indian politics.

Another difference is the scale of their activities. The ICCC, as the largest organization, produces the greatest number of public activities. While the organization has substantially refocused its mandate to include Canada-India relations, a large part of its efforts concentrate on membership-centric activities such as conferences, workshops and lectures.\textsuperscript{241} The C-IBC’s activities are also membership-centric, but are geared towards meetings, roundtables and workshops to provide opportunities for its membership to communicate with policy-makers. The CIF differs because its organization model does not rely on public events as the cornerstone of its activities. Instead, the CIF holds private meetings and issues media statements in its active policy role.\textsuperscript{242}

\textsuperscript{241} Examples of these public events include a “Hard Hats Tour Series” which has tours for members to different business organizations and industries to show how they operate from the inside. Another example of these public lectures is the “Chai with the CEO” or “Breakfast with a CEO” events, where members are invited to listen to different members of the Indian community that have reached Executive levels in major corporations. Please see: Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC). 2010. \textit{ICCC Home Page}. <http://iccc.org/> (Accessed: May 15, 2010).

\textsuperscript{242} One exception is the CIF 2009 Energy Forum and Annual Gala Event
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Characteristic</th>
<th>Indo-Canadian Chamber of Commerce (ICCC)</th>
<th>Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC)</th>
<th>Canada India Foundation (CIF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>1000 members, with 10 Executive Members and an adjunct Board of Advisors</td>
<td>100 members (both individual and institutional memberships)</td>
<td>30 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head office</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branches</td>
<td>Vancouver, Halifax, Ottawa, Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg</td>
<td>Vancouver, Montreal, Ottawa</td>
<td>Toronto, with some members from other urban centres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Structure</td>
<td>Hierarchical structure. An Executive committee leads 10 sub-committees</td>
<td>An administrative executive committee and a Board of Directors</td>
<td>One administrative core (National Executive) and an equally-weighted Board of Directors and Charter members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, comparing these organizations will take into account the following attributes:

a) internal homogeneity of political messaging and the composition of membership,

b) Size of the organization,

c) Centralization of the organization,

d) External messaging and

e) Financial Resources.

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Defining the Dependent Variable: Influence

The dependent variable – policy influence – is a difficult concept to operationalize, evidenced by the numerous competing definitions produced within foreign policy literature. While there is no overarching consensus, most authors are in agreement that ‘direct policy impact’ is an overly strict measure of ethnic group influence. Stephen Garrett’s work, for example, acknowledges a parameter-setting role for Eastern European groups during the Cold War. While these groups were unable to “force the [US] government to do something that it did not want to do,” he does acknowledge that they were able to limit government attempts to improve the American relationship with various Eastern European states.244 Studies that do not incorporate these alternative measurements of influence have limited the accumulation of solid empirical evidence and theoretical advancement in the study of ethnic interest groups.

Various types of influence have been discussed in political science. For example, Denis Stairs’ research on public opinion and Canadian foreign policy suggests that indirect influence manifests in three different ways: parameter-setting, agenda-setting and administrative control.245 In addition to Stairs’ three categories of influence, this research adopts two additional measures of influence, to include policy improvement and perceptions-editing.

Policy-implementation is the least rigorous form of influence. Policy decisions often “direct an official to gain a certain outcome, but do not specify a certain action.”246 Domestic groups can influence policy by assisting in its implementation, but do not

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require changes to the policy itself. Second, policy-improvement occurs when domestic groups are able to ameliorate, enhance, specify or provide technical specifications for a government’s policy. Technical in nature, these adjustments improve the policy without sacrificing the spirit or objective of the policy. Third, perceptions-editing occurs when a domestic group is able to affect a decision-makers awareness, interest or mood towards a policy, such as positive normative shift in Canada’s perception towards India. Fourth, this research combines agenda-setting and parameter-setting under one heading. The former occurs when an interest group, “without necessarily controlling the policymaker's response, can serve to place an issue on his desk and can influence his perception of its urgency and importance.” Similarly, the latter limits the range of policies available to a policy-maker, by determining what activities are “acceptable, or tolerable, [given] political and other costs.” Finally, the ability to assess direct policy influence is “extremely rigorous,” which frequently results in a “disparaging response,” given the multiple determinants of foreign policy. These five measures offer a broad definition of influence, allowing the research a more precise way of measuring the Indo-Canadian community’s influence on Canada’s foreign policy towards India.

**Measuring the Dependent Variable**

There are five ways an ethnic group can have influence on a state’s foreign policy, determined by the two independent variables and enabling conditions. Each type of influence will be operationalized on a continuum ranging from ‘no impact’ to ‘direct

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247 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 147.
249 Ibid., 131.
250 Ibid., 134.
policy control.’

Table 4.2: Types of Policy Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No-Impact</th>
<th>Type of Influence</th>
<th>High-Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy-implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy-improvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>perceptions-editing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agenda-setting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy-making</td>
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</table>

However, it is important to understand that these types of influence are not necessarily mutually inclusive or reinforcing. For example, an interest group’s unhindered and total access to the Prime Minister’s office might suggest it has influence on policy-making, but this level of access is not crucial for policy implementation. The next section will show how influence will be measured through enabling conditions.

3. Primary and Secondary Research Hypotheses

The central (primary) hypotheses are designed to evaluate the relative impact of organizational and structural characteristics that are expected to have an effect on the influence of ethnic interest groups in Canada, particularly with respect to their capacity to have an impact on foreign policy. To accommodate these tests, Barbara Geddes suggests breaking up a single “big” hypothesis into different “branching points” that are then
“tested on additional cases that fit appropriate initial conditions.”

Therefore, to test the hypotheses the research will employ a sequential, deductive research model. Deductive research establishes a set of hypotheses based on previous studies and theories, which are then confirmed or rejected with reference to the evidence uncovered during research. In a sequential model, as additional data is found, hypotheses are altered and refined to produce more accurate conclusions. The approach is consistent with Kvale’s recommendations for conducting strong qualitative research -- “a continual back and forth process between observation and interaction, description and interpretation, conceptualization and theorizing.” As he explains, “there is an interplay between discovery and verification, between data collection, interpretation and theorizing, with a continual formulation of new hypotheses.” Thus, sequential data collection is an important element of this model, since “the method that theoretically drives the project is conducted first, with the second method designed to resolve the problems/issues ... [or] extend the findings of the first method.” With these caveats in mind, the influence of the organized Indo-Canadian community on foreign policy is expected to be directly dependent on the following factors, which reveal the conditional hypotheses to be tested in the next chapter:

253 Sequential methods are thus not appropriate for quantitative research, as “[a] sequential test of each assumption in turn is not appropriate since each test assumes the rest of the model is correct.” Gary King, 1998. Unifying political methodology: the likelihood theory of statistical inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 36.
1. There will be an observable ethnic group influence on government’s foreign policy if the government
   a. and ethnic groups share the same foreign policy interests (issue congruence);
   b. considers these issues to be important (issue salience);
   c. pursues the community for electoral gains (ethnopolitics);
   d. actively provides access points to interest groups (access); and
   e. has few alternative means to improve bilateral relations.  

With respect to WCCA, the following hypotheses determine the influence of activities and composition of the ethnic interest group, challenging some assumptions of mainstream ethnic interest literature:

2. Greater influence on government’s foreign policy will be expected if the interest group
   a. has financial resources to implement their activities
   b. is homogeneous in its composition.
   c. is centrally-organized,
   d. has a large membership
   e. has elite-level connections to promote their interests.

If the above enabling conditions are satisfied, then these types of influence can be expected:

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256 Further study in this area could compare the lobby group impact across levels of government, measuring for effect at the federal, provincial and municipal levels of government.
Table 4.3 Enabling Conditions and their Expected Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling Conditions</th>
<th>Expected Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a., 2a., 2d.</td>
<td>policy-implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a., 1d., 2a., 2b.</td>
<td>policy-improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a., 1b., 2b., 2d., 2e.</td>
<td>perceptions-editing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a., 1b., 1d., 2a., 2b, 2d.</td>
<td>agenda-setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a., 1b., 1c., 1d., 2b.,2c., 2e.</td>
<td>policy-making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are two points of note before discussing data collection. First, it is important to note that issue congruence is a necessary condition for all five-types of influence. It suggests that influence is not possible if domestic groups have interests that confront government interests. Second, as discussed previously, direct policy influence is the most ‘difficult’ to achieve because it has the most conditions that need to be fulfilled. The following section explains how the data will be collected to assess the conditions and hypotheses.

4. Data Collection, Email and Elite Interviews

Previous studies on ethnic interest groups have employed inductive research designs, which use interviews as the basis for data collection. In theory, the inductive approach offers important insights by collecting information from interviews of policy-makers and lobbyists. Inductive research is useful for “generating hypotheses in the first stage of a total research process, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building.” However, there are important limitations to inductive research related to issues of self-selection, a lack of verification and discursive biases that

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257 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings,” 221; Quantitative research has often been the favourite methodology employed to conduct deductive research.
can plague interviews and other forms of human-centric evidence.\textsuperscript{258} Researchers must anticipate the possibility that ethnic group members will tend to exaggerate their importance on policy decisions. Conversely, government members and officials will be less willing to admit that ‘outside’ groups are a salient influence on policy meant to be reflective of the national interest.

To correct for these potential biases, the data collected for this study used three sources of evidence to avoid the pitfalls of inductive research.\textsuperscript{259} First, materials from relevant ethnic organizations and government departments will be analysed. More specifically, transcripts from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hansard records, websites for the ethnic organizations, South Asian-centric publications and publicly available speeches will all be included within data collection.\textsuperscript{260} Speeches to relevant House and Senate Committees contain useful information and insights into the activities of these organizations. For instance, in April 2010, Aditya Jha, National Convenor of the Canada-India Foundation (CIF), addressed the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the bilateral relationship


\textsuperscript{259} Triangulation is an approach that facilitates validity from “a combined series of measures, each with its own idiosyncratic weaknesses, each pointed to a single hypothesis.” As KKV explain, triangulation can occur in three different ways, “by collecting more observations on another dependent variable, by observing the same variable in another context, or by observing another dependent variable that is an implication of the same theory.” Webb et al cited by: Philip Davies, 2001. \textit{Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services.”} Politics 21:1, 73–80. Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1995. “The Importance of Research Design in Political Science.” APSR 89:2, June. 475-481;

\textsuperscript{260} In particular, Hansard will be a useful data point in measuring the effects of the Indian-origin MPs in speaking of parliament about Canada-India relations.
between Canada and India.261 This speech not only pointed out the most important problems with the bilateral relationship, but also discussed how the CIF has acted to improve the bilateral relationship. Another source of data is the South Asian-focused media in Canada. While mainstream news sources report major events, South Asian media focuses specifically on events relevant to the Indo-Canadian community, including political developments affecting the bilateral relationship.262

There are numerous benefits to be gained from obtaining information from these sources. First, such data makes it possible to establish a timeline of lobbying efforts and policy decisions. Second, the mere fact that these interest groups have testified to relevant House and Senate Committees represents a strong indication of their ability to gain the attention of government officials. Third, while personal interviews the bureaucracy or politicians are often the most fruitful, establishing contact with the appropriate Cabinet Members is often difficult, if not impossible.263 Thus, information found on public record is an achievable way of circumventing the inherent biases in interview methodology, while still collecting necessary information.

262 One example is the weekly newspaper India Abroad which caters its news to the “select pockets of affluent Asian Indian communities in major cities. India Abroad is able to reach the prosperous and upscale Asian Indian market in a precise and definite manner using a combined system of paid subscriptions, newsstand sales, and complimentary copies.” India Abroad, 2010. “Subscriptions.” http://indiabroad.rediff.com/
263 Much of the literature on elite interviewing strongly encourages having a solid background understanding of the organization whose members are being interviewed. As Phillip Davies explains, this type of data collection is particularly important when conducting even limited elite interviews. He argues that the solution to biased, forgetful or even secretive interview sources “appears to be a triangulation triad of primary sources [such as] interviews or published first-hand accounts, documentary sources, with published secondary-source information available in cautious reserve. Information can then be cross-referenced both between and within the data types employed.” Philip H.J. Davies, 2001. “Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services.” Politics 21:1, 73–80.
The second source of data is collected through e-mail interviews with two key groups: 1) members of the government bureaucracy (including deputy ministers and executive assistants) and 2) academic experts in the areas of interest groups, foreign policy and Indo-Canadian relations. E-mail interviews consist of three pieces of relevant information: a) an introduction to the project b) a list of central hypotheses and c) a list of questions to which participants were asked to respond. These e-mails consisted of a collection of brief summary statements/conclusions about the interest group’s influence, followed by a request for specific feedback on my interpretation of the case evidence. The attached appendix includes the e-mail questions asked of each respondent.

These e-mail exchanges facilitate data collection from a larger, more knowledgeable group than might otherwise be possible, in a focused exchange around relevant issues directly connected to the dissertation’s central hypotheses. Due to the limited research on ethnic lobbies and foreign policy in Canada, academic experts play a crucial role in verifying and critiquing the potential conclusions of the research, and reflecting on the evidence uncovered regarding the specific Indo-Canadian case study.

E-mail exchanges were used to request feedback on pre-generated conclusions, which is more likely to generate responses that are directly relevant to the hypotheses being tested, and grounded in case-specific information derived from experts. Moreover, this approach generates useful information without having to invest enormous amounts of time and financial resources in arranging formal interviews. Any concern that this method will impede detailed data collection is muted by the larger number of contacts that can be reached and the larger number of responses that can be obtained due to the
ease of access provided by e-mail communication.\textsuperscript{264} At the same time, the highly structured and focused form of the e-mail communication means that the responses will be more relevant to the specific questions at the centre of the proposed research.

Finally, these two sets of data have been supplemented by a limited series of personal interviews aimed at extracting more detailed responses and to build upon initial e-mail exchanges. Unlike large-n studies or psychological studies, elite interviews are a non-random, non-personal and public form of interview research. ‘Elite’ interviews are conducted with individuals representing a specific socio-economic and/or political status (such as elected officials, business executives or community leaders). They are also conducted “whenever it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic.”\textsuperscript{265} Elite interviewing also differs from standardized interview approaches because the questions, assumptions and even hypotheses are not formulated for comparable or survey-type answers. For these reasons, this approach allows for increased flexibility within the interview, as “the investigator is willing, and often eager to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, the question, the situation, is.”\textsuperscript{266} For these reasons, there is a near consensus in the methodological literature that elite interviews should be conducted in a semi-structured interview style. A hybrid model of ethnographic and survey research methods, these interviews are based on a set of core questions which are determined in light of the time allotted for the interview. With this shortened list of questions, the interviewer is at liberty to follow up with new evidence that arises during

\textsuperscript{264} Please see Appendix 1 for the list of names and interview questions.
\textsuperscript{266} Lewis Dexter points this out in his book: Lewis Dexter. 2006. Elite and Specialized Interviewing. Colchester: ECPR Press. 6-7.
the course of the interview, or to pursue more fruitful areas of discussion.\textsuperscript{267}

These interviews were conducted primarily with members of executive boards of the three organizations. Discussions took place in meetings with individual executive members, conducted with an average length of one hour and were based on a series of direct and indirect questions. An example of direct questioning asked “What are the most important contributions of your organization to Canada-India relations?” On the other hand, indirect questions helped with concerns regarding bias, verification and reliability. An example of indirect question include: “What do you think are the most important strengths and weaknesses of other Indo-Canadian interest organizations such as the [insert name]?” Because interviewees were asked to assess their peer group, false or contradictory information from other interviews was rectified and verification could be obtained by comparing similarities within each answer. In addition, while executive members might exaggerate their own influence on foreign policy, they are less likely to exaggerate the contributions of other groups. Finally, recognizing that politics is a group activity where members of interest groups make decisions, organize events and decide future projects, the interviews allowed for observation into the decision-making processes within the organization. As discussed, the three organizations chosen for focus group interviews differ in their composition, mandates and political success. A semi-structured interview for these organizations allows each individual to detail their own role within the policy process.

\textsuperscript{267} For one-hour interviews, most authors suggest eight to ten core questions. In the attached appendices, I provide a list of interviewees, the biographies and questions asked within the semi-structured interviews.
5. **Strengths and Potential Problems**

Before moving on to data analysis and conclusions, there are a number of important caveats and potential limitations to this research project and design, although the benefits outweigh in importance any remaining challenges. First, this project fits into a long intellectual history of foreign policy analysis, which has concluded that foreign policy decisions are simultaneously influenced by events and actors at several levels of analysis. Thus, attempts to isolate the causes of specific policy decisions will inevitably lack a complete explanation. According to this intellectual tradition, the academic, political and practical benefits of the research nonetheless outweigh these limitations. Similarly, while this work examines the independent impact of Indo-Canadian groups, it must also recognize that this impact is contextually dependent on international and domestic conditions. Ultimately, a research design that is able to show a relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable while accounting for numerous contextual factors is a large part of the dissertation’s empirical and theoretical contribution.

Second, the project substitutes Indo-Canadian groups as representatives of the community’s interests, without the necessary resources to survey the Indian community. An interesting paradox is that ethnic groups often draw political clout from their communities while not necessarily representing that community’s interests. Because of these limitations, this dissertation should be considered as the first step in a much larger project which examines the dynamic between domestic, sub-state, and state-level inputs. Later stages of this research program can use additional techniques to build on the perception of the Indian Diaspora community in Canada.
The next chapter analyses Prime Minister Harper’s foreign policy towards India, highlighting the government’s openness towards Diaspora groups to promote and improve relations between these states.
Chapter Five:
The Diaspora’s Access to Government

Since the election of the Harper government, Canada-India relations have gone from “frozen to red hot.” However, these improvements have taken time to evolve. In its first two years, the government rhetorically recognized India’s importance, but did very little to develop or articulate a clear India-specific plan of action. It was not until Harper’s second term that the Conservatives established a regular pattern of engagement with India. During the same period, Indo-Canadian interest groups were reaching political maturity, increasingly engaged in issues tied to Canadian foreign policy. The following chapter will attempt to correlate these two developments, linking the Conservative government’s policy towards India with the politicization of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora. The discussion will provide evidence to show that Indo-Canadian interest groups not only have access to foreign-policy decision-makers in Canada, but have managed to facilitate mutually beneficial policies tied to Indo-Canadian relations. This access has resulted in synchronized domestic and foreign policy interests between the government and Indo-Canadian organizations. In addressing these objectives, its unique contribution will show that congruence has produced a complementary, mutually-reinforcing relationship between the Canadian government and the Indo-Canadian Diaspora.

268 Interview. Peter Sutherland, Former Canadian High Commissioner to India; Vice-Chairman, Canada-India Business Council. Toronto, Canada. August 17, 2010.
1. Wooing the Indo-Canadian Community

While Canada-India relations improved marginally during Harper’s first term, the Conservative government devoted its efforts toward improving relationships with immigrant communities, including, if not especially, Indo-Canadians. Given that ethnic communities have assumed to be Liberal party supporters, the Conservatives made an “obvious effort to move beyond the old Reform image of being less than positive toward Canada's ethnic minorities,”269 making several attempts to improve relations with the Indo-Canadian Diaspora.

Early into the Harper government, within two months of taking office, the government fulfilled one of its major election promises, calling the Air India Inquiry under the jurisdiction of Justice John Major. Calling the Air India inquiry had two important strategic effects. First, it differentiated the Conservatives from other political parties within the Indo-Canadian community. Opposition parties questioned the utility of the Inquiry, citing problems of inefficiency and inflated costs. In particular, Liberal opposition critic Bob Rae challenged that a judicial review would result in an “interminable circus of lawyers.”270 However, the Conservatives recognized the Diaspora’s dissatisfaction with the 2005 Air India trial, and saw the inquiry as a way to publicize these differences.271 To a large extent, the community showed scepticism that the Inquiry would result in any sweeping policy changes, but many in the community

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269 Personal Correspondence, Don Munton, Professor of Political Science, University of Northern British Columbia. September 3, 2010.
271 After the Inquiry report was released in June 2010, the Canadian government announced that it would make a formal apology to the community. The Air India Victims' Association made policy suggestions for judicial reform, demanding that terror suspects be tried by a three-judge panel rather than traditional jury trials. Gloria Galloway, 2006. “Air -India families pushed for special terrorist trials,” 9 May. The Globe and Mail. A4.
believed that the Harper government “at least recognized the need. No one else took that step.” Speaking on behalf of the community, various Indo-Canadian organizations supported the Prime Minister's efforts to personally meet with victim's family members during the review. Second, the Air India inquiry synchronized overseas security concerns of the Indo-Canadian community to the government’s terrorism policy, particularly after the 2006 Mumbai train blasts. The Harper government also received support from Indo-Canadians for adding the Tamil Tigers to Canada's list of terrorist groups.

Then, in May 2006, the Federal Budget included the government’s first set of changes to immigration policy, halving the landing fee for new immigrants from 975 to 490 dollars. While this new fee did not benefit recently arrived immigrants, it was favourably received by Indo-Canadians because of the large number of family-class applications submitted by members of the community. Later that year, in August, during a well-attended Punjabi festival in Surrey, British Columbia, Prime Minister Harper promised to consult the province's Indian community on the best redress for the

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274 As for the suggestion that Harper's policy has alienated the Tamil community, there is mixed feedback on this point. Some observers suggested that many subsections of the Tamil community would be condemn the decision as Indo-Canadian Tamils have long been torn on their support for the LTTE. One hand, the Tigers have been a protective force for Tamils in Sri Lanka, and have promoted the vision a Tamil homeland. On the other, the LTTE has used intimidation, corruption and extortion techniques against Canadian Tamils that have family in Sri Lanka. This list already includes groups such as Babbar Khalsa and Jaish-e-Mohammad, which have carried out major operations against the Indian state.

1914 Komagata Maru incident. By August 2008, the Prime Minister offered an official apology for the racism encountered against early Indian settlers to Canada. The newly founded Canada-India Foundation linked this decision to Canada's relationship with India, stating that it “is an important step toward building a positive and constructive relationship between Canada and India, and Indo-Canadians and the wider Canadian community.”

However, grassroots political engagement was only the beginning of overtures to Indo-Canadian business and community leaders. In April 2006, Harper became the first Prime Minister to address the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce annual gala. The crux of the speech focused on policies of particular interest to the Indo-Canadian community, such as immigration, recognition of foreign credentials and the government's response to terrorist activity (including Air India and the Toronto-18 terrorist group). Prime Minister Harper's attendance was widely noted by members of the Indo-Canadian community, underlining his government's success at connecting with the Diaspora. For example, Imitiaz Seyid, Vice President of RBC for South Asian and Middle Eastern Markets and an ICCC Board Member, noted differences between Conservative and

277 This apology was not well-received by the community which believed it deserved an apology noted in parliament. Dirk Meissner. 2008. “94 Years Later, an apology to South Asian migrants.” 24 May. Globe and Mail. A14; Toronto Star. 2008. “PM apologizes for 1914 ship tragedy; Sikh audience rejects Komagata Maru gesture, wants Commons action.” 4 August. A12.
previous governments, “The Liberals came and went, but they never showed up at this event.” Kam Rathee, former chair of the Canada-India Business Council, has noted that despite the pro-immigrant rhetoric, Indo-Canadians have gotten “little in return” from Liberal governments.

Further changes to immigration policy occurred in 2008, when Immigration Minister Diane Findley announced a new policy to ease the backlog at overseas consulates by giving priority to business class and professional immigrants. Grassroots organizations condemned the policy, arguing that it would be increasingly difficult for underprivileged and refugee-class immigrants to enter Canada. Organized interests, such as the Canada-India Foundation and the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce, had lobbied for these immigration reforms and welcomed the changes. This support prompted the Prime Minister to focus his remarks at the Canada-India Foundation’s inaugural gala in 2008, clarifying how the changed Immigration and Refugee Protection Act would improve access and increase efficiency for skilled Indian immigrants. His address argued that immigration reforms were necessary to “get skilled workers into the country earlier, help families get reunited sooner, [and to] provide the Canadian economy with the human capital it needs.” Harper’s comments reflect important issue congruence between the government and Indo-Canadian organizations, even without

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282 Ibid.
support of the larger community.

Another overture was the private consultations that the Prime Minister undertook with the Indian business community in Canada. In June 2007, Prime Minister Harper met with 16 Indo-Canadians to discuss issues of Canada-India relations and challenges for the Diaspora community. Harper argued that engagement with ethnic communities was necessary because the traditional channels resulted in meetings with “old-stock Canadians ... not necessarily business leaders from more recent immigrant communities, some of whom run multi-billion dollar operations.” In response, Aditya Jha, former director of the ICCC and now National Convenor of the CIF, noted that “never has [the] Prime Minister of Canada consulted our community this openly and seriously ... Many in the community are Conservative-minded, but they have not been engaged or cajoled by this party before.” Given its intimacy, this meeting differs from other events between Prime Minister Harper and Indo-Canadian groups. It was structured to get a more policy-oriented response from community leaders.

This being said, early communication between the Harper government and the Indo-Canadian community was unidirectional. Despite the government’s small minority, it used its early political clout to connect with ethnic communities that traditionally voted against the party. Thus, community engagement focused largely on domestic policies and stayed away from foreign policy. As demonstrated in the next section, this was largely due to an undefined Conservative foreign policy within the first term.

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288 Ibid.
2. The Diaspora and Harper's Foreign Policy

Despite Canada's military role in Afghanistan, there was a notable absence of foreign policy debate during the 2006 federal election. Instead, the election campaign centred on lowering the GST, the Gomery Commission, and Kyoto Accord. An obvious omission was discussion of Canada's bilateral relationships with emerging markets, and no political party was prepared to outline a strategy for engaging either China or India. Even after the election, the new Harper government pursued a foreign policy that was largely reactive to international events, exemplified by its response to the Israel-Lebanon conflict in June 2006, Afghanistan campaign and bilateral relations with the United States.

The idea of formulating an ‘emerging powers’ policy for India and China was a particularly difficult policy initiative to sell to Canadian labour unions and manufacturing centres. On one hand, both competitors were abundant in cheap labour which threatened outsourcing Canadian manufacturing and service-sector jobs. Moreover, their economic ascendance challenged the dominance of the American economy (of which Canada has long been a beneficiary). Yet, China and India, as the second- and fourth-largest world economies, also offered diversification opportunities to lessen Canada’s reliance on the United States. Largely, this paradox shaped a foreign policy of ‘ignorant

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291 For example, there were major debates in Parliament questioning the role of China and India for Canada’s economy. John McCallum. 2006. “Reply to Speech from the Throne.” In Canada. House of Commons. Hansard. 39th Parl., 1st Sess. (April 10). “There are the emerging Goliaths of China and India. China has 30 million engineers; almost as many as we have Canadians. So the question arises: How are we going to make a living? The world does not owe us a living. How are we going to compete with these Goliaths? The answer is certainly not on wages, and we do not want to.”

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isolationism’ towards both China and India, enhanced by what John Kirton describes as the Prime Minister’s “lack of knowledge or interest in international affairs.”

The government's ‘ignorant isolationism’ resulted in a series of early missteps with India. Under the Martin government, Canada had shown interest in signing a nuclear cooperation agreement, similar to the precedent-setting US-India agreement. Then, one month into government, during a visit to Pakistan, Prime Minister Harper announced that Canada was reviewing the “controversial” nuclear deal of the previous Liberal government. He underscored that no Canadian nuclear transfer deal would move forward without Indian acquiescence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. Speaking to reporters in Islamabad, Harper stated, “This is a decision made by the previous government, obviously my new government would want to review the decisions that have been taken. We are against nuclear proliferation.” The location and timing of the announcement raised the suspicion in India that the Conservatives would be even less open to improving relations than previous governments.

Simultaneously, the Canadian business community began to pressure the government to formulate an economic strategy for China and India. While business organizations such as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCC) were involved in this effort, the Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC) was particularly active, pushing the

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294 Ibid.

government to adopt an India-positive trade policy. These efforts were further galvanized by Parliamentary Secretary Deepak Obhrai’s public musing that Canada should pursue a free trade agreement with India. He argued that “with our sizable Diaspora and other connections to India, we should follow a free-trade agreement before [other countries].” In its efforts, the C-IBC presented the government with its findings on Indian trade opportunities, based on a mission it had organized with the Department of International Trade in December 2005.

One year of business community pressure resulted in the inclusion of 'emerging economies' as a foreign policy priority. At end of 2006, the government announced three major foreign policy foci: climate change, economic development and engagement with emerging powers, particularly China and India. However, at the time of this announcement, no official contact had been made with India by the Prime Minister or Cabinet Ministers. In fact, a scheduled trip to India by Immigration Minister Monte Solberg was interrupted due to a cabinet shuffle in early January 2007. Further, the lack of attention paid to India was in contrast to foreign trips to Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan

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298 The C-IBC had already established important connections to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade as one of their partners.
300 Although, this cabinet shuffle became significantly important due to Jason Kenney’s move into the Citizenship and Multiculturalism portfolio; Within foreign affairs, there was a predominant image of David Malone (High Commissioner to India) apologizing to the Indian government for yet another cancelled visit.
and Afghanistan by Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay, and trips to the US, Mexico, China and Switzerland by Minister of International Trade, David Emerson.\footnote{Ian Urquhart. 2007. “Everyone has caught India fever,” 8 March. \textit{Toronto Star}. <http://www.thestar.com/columnists/article/188875> (Accessed: July 10, 2010).}

\textit{Early Trade Missions}

In March 2007, the first official visit to India took place nearly a year and a half after the election. Led by Ted Menzies, Parliamentary Secretary for International Trade, the 30-delegate trade mission included Deepak Obhrai, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, members of the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce and the Canada-India Business Council, as well as representatives of various Canadian businesses and crown corporations.\footnote{Emerson was scheduled to travel to India in March 2007, but because of an illness, Ted Menzies was sent instead. Please see: Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 2007. \textit{Visit of Parliamentary Secretary Ted Menzies to India}. March 12. <http://www.international.gc.ca/commerce/india/ted-menzies-en.asp>. This was followed up by a largely ceremonial visit by David Emerson in the following month.} In many ways, this trip was both a symbolic and productive beginning towards improving relations with India. Largely, Menzies' objective was to establish a framework for a future free-trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries. As agreed within the Department of International Trade, pursuing a FTA would take place “on an incremental basis.”\footnote{Telephone Interview. Deepak Obhrai. Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Calgary, Alberta. September 16, 2010.} Thus, meeting with key Indian Cabinet Ministers, Menzies' first step was to establish negotiations for a Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPPA), aimed at providing greater certainty for “Canadian firms with existing investments in India, as a first step toward an eventual free trade agreement.”\footnote{Deccan Herald. 2010. “FIPPA will conclude soon: Canadian Minister.” September 15. <http://www.deccanherald.com/content/96630/fippa-conclude-soon-canadian-minister.html> (Accessed: October 3, 2010).}
Given the difficulties in establishing business in India, the FIPPA makes important guarantees for businesses interested in establishing a presence in India.

The next significant official visit to India took over a year to materialize. In January 2008, Maxime Bernier became the first Canadian Foreign Minister to visit India in five years. Bernier’s meetings with India’s Ministers of Commerce and Industry and External Affairs focused largely on trade issues and economic engagement. At a meeting with Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Bernier was questioned about Canada’s support for India in the NSG and IAEA. These meetings emphasized the financial impact of the nuclear agreement, framed as a sector-specific trade deal than one of nuclear security. In this vein, Bernier’s delegation had a large business contingent, including members of the Indo-Canadian Chamber of Commerce. The ICC played an important role in articulating to the parliamentarians the potential opportunities for Canadian businesses in India. This visit included the Delhi Metro, for which Bombardier – a C-IBC patron business, had won a 590 million dollar contract to develop a subway system.

During both missions, the Indo-Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Canada-India Business Council provided India-specific expertise and networking opportunities for the government, specifically with introductions to members of the India’s nuclear industry. The inclusion of Indo-Canadian interests during Menzies and Bernier’s visits

307 For example, Ted Menzie's trip included an important meeting with Larsen and Turbot, Mumbai. L & T have been at the forefront of India's energy industry, and were the first to sign an MOU with Canada for future nuclear trade. Reuters India. 2009. “India’s L&T to partner Canada co for nuclear power.” January
allowed the organizations to share “their views with the Minister on future business opportunities in India.”\textsuperscript{308} While the two Indo-Canadian business organizations were not directly involved in political negotiations, they were in charge of organizing meetings between Canadian politicians and Indian business organizations, as well as conducting their own meetings with organizations such as the \textit{Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)} and \textit{Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)}.\textsuperscript{309}

There are two important outcomes of Conservative government's first term. First, the government showed interest in gaining the electoral confidence of ethnic communities, exemplified by Air India and Komagata Maru decisions. Second, there was growing recognition of Indo-Canadian organization’s contribution to the wider India relationship, evidenced by their networking role during foreign visits. This engagement became more obvious during the second term.

3. Stephen Harper's Second Term and the New India Policy

\textit{Table 5.1 Timeline - Harper Government's Relations with India}

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>January 23, 2006</td>
<td>Conservatives win a Minority government</td>
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<td>February 6, 2006</td>
<td>40\textsuperscript{th} Parliament begins its first session</td>
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<td>March 4-6, 2006</td>
<td>Harper travels to Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Air India Inquiry called</td>
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\textsuperscript{309} As described by several commentators and even Prime Minister Harper himself, the relationship between the two leaders has been cordial because of their similar policy-focused and economic backgrounds. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the relationship between Harper and Singh has shifted Canada's foreign policy from China to India-centric under the Harper government. In November 2007, Prime Ministers Harper and Singh met for the first time at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Uganda. Not only was this meeting held under favourable conditions, that is, without Pakistan in attendance, but there was also none of the pressure that an official state visit would have involved.
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Immigration landing fee lowered</td>
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<td>July 2006</td>
<td>Mumbai train bombings, Harper's condemnation</td>
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<td>August 2006</td>
<td>Consultations over Komagata Maru apology for announced</td>
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<td>March 2007</td>
<td>Visit to India by Parliamentary Secretary Ted Menzies</td>
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<td>January 2008</td>
<td>Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier, Citizenship and Immigration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister Jason Kenney and Agriculture Minister Gary Ritz visit India</td>
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<td>April 2008</td>
<td>Immigration policy changes under Minister Diane Findley</td>
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<td>Summer 2008</td>
<td>NSG/IAEA waivers</td>
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<td>August 2008</td>
<td>Komagata Maru apology in Surrey, British Columbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway, Stockwell Day visits</td>
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<td></td>
<td>India, Opens Hyderabad Trade Office</td>
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<td>February 13-19, 2009</td>
<td>Minister of Industry Tony Clement, visits India</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>Minister Day visits India, opens Ahmedabad Trade Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Minister Day visits India, opens Kolkata Trade Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Prime Minister Harper visits India, announces Canada-India Nuclear Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>Finance Minister Jim Flaherty visits India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>PMs Singh and Harper sign Nuclear Cooperation Agreement during the G-20 in Toronto</td>
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During the first term, Canada-India relations followed the 'heavy on rhetoric but light on action' pattern of previous Liberal governments. Further, the Harper government did not show a substantive India-related policy shift until the summer of 2008. India’s history of nuclear proliferation required an exemption at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Canada's position was difficult. Its allies had indicated their support for the India-exemption but a vote in India’s favour undermined its own policy of non-proliferation and disarmament. Further, a vote for India would mute its long-standing criticism of India's nuclear programme.\(^{310}\)

\(^{310}\) The most important moment of the Conservative government's platform towards the Canada-India relationship occurred during the summer of 2008, due to two important strategic votes in both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thus, despite Canada's decision to support an India-specific exemption at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy
In addition to its effect on Canada’s policies of disarmament and non-proliferation, a vote in favour of India would have symbolized an acceptance of India’s nuclear programme.

Efforts by domestic groups in Canada - including Indo-Canadian interest groups, business groups and the nuclear industry - ultimately tipped the scales in favour of Canada’s support for the exemption. Domestic stakeholders communicated their readiness for a nuclear deal with India. For example, Canada's Atomic Energy Agency (AECL) and Saskatchewan’s Cameco Ltd, both patron members of the Canada-India Business Council, began to develop specific nuclear contracts with India. In particular, the former began developing nuclear energy reactor based on enriched-thorium, an abundant mineral in India.311 Further, Canada’s support for the India-specific exemption was interpreted by Indo-Canadian interest groups as evidence that there was potential for Canada to sign its own nuclear deal with India. The Canada-India Foundation began organizing its first themed-forum on bilateral energy relations for April 2009, inviting stakeholders from the Canadian and Indian governments, nuclear experts and business executives to deliberate the benefits of a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.312

The 2008 Federal election highlighted the growing importance of the Indo-Canadian community to the federal government. Early in the campaign, Prime Minister

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Harper invited prominent Indo-Canadians to a luncheon meeting.\textsuperscript{313} In this meeting, Harper made important election promises to improve Canada’s relationship with India. Vasu Chanchalani noted that the Prime Minister has met with the Indo-Canadian community three times since his first election, a “clear indication of the importance that his government and the prime minister himself attaches to the emerging role of Indo-Canadians in Canada.”\textsuperscript{314}

Beginning 2009 with a renewed electoral mandate, the Harper government continued its plan to improve relations with India. International Trade Minister Stockwell Day travelled to India on three separate occasions to open Canadian trade offices in Hyderabad (January),\textsuperscript{315} Kolkata (September),\textsuperscript{316} and Ahmedabad (September),\textsuperscript{316} fulfilling Prime Minister Harper's promise to open a trade consulate in Gujarat.\textsuperscript{317} Of the three new Consulates, the Ahmedabad trade office was the clearest example of Indo-Canadian influence on foreign policy. Canada had unceremoniously ended relations with the state in 2002, after evidence that its government was unresponsive to ethnically-driven riots that targeted Muslims in Gujarat. Both the ICCC and the CIF have pushed for the resumption of Canada-Gujarat relations. Minster Kenney recognized that the Ahmedabad consulate was important to “giving Canada’s growing Indo-Canadian community, in particular our important Gujarati community, more business and trade

\textsuperscript{314} Ibid.
opportunities in Gujarat.” In this way, improved relations with Gujarat suggests an important combination of lobbying by the CIF and ICCC and ethnopolitical considerations by the Canadian government.

Minister Day's trips had two other objectives. In January 2009, he began negotiations on the Canada-India nuclear deal. Second, Minister Day met with both his Indian counterpart, Kamal Nath and the Indian Prime Minister, to discuss improvements to the meagre bilateral trade relationship. Day rearticulated the message central to these foreign visits: “six of us [Ministers] have been up and down [to] India in the last six months. How much more do you want to know that we want to engage?” This trade mission more prominently involved executives from Canada’s nuclear industry and representatives from the Canada-India Business Council. In light of a potential nuclear deal, they were responsible for policy-implementation, negotiating contracts with Indian nuclear industry representatives.

Despite numerous visits by Canadian Ministers, Prime Minister Harper did not visit India until November 2009. This trip had the largest and most influential Indo-Canadian contingent thus far, including Bob Dhillon, Hari Varshney, Lucky Janda, Aditya Jha, Deepak Ruparell, Vikram Khurama and B.S. Ahluwalia. Representing various

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321 Bob Dhillon, CEO, Mainstreet Equity Corp, Hari Varshney, CEO of, Varshney Capital Corp., Lucky Janda, President of TCM Realty Corp., Aditya Jha, National Convenor, Canada-India Foundation and CEO of Karma Candy, Deepak Ruparell, Board member, Canada-India Foundation, and CEO of Silver Hotels, Vikram Khurama, CEO of Prudential Consulting and board member of the Asia-Pacific Foundation and B.S. Ahluwalia Director of Imaging and President of BSA Diagnostics.
ethnic interest groups, their role on the trade mission was ostensibly to promote business opportunities between Canada and India, while highlighting exemplary Indo-Canadian business and political success. As noted by Deepak Obhrai, “Such a high-power delegation should speak volumes that our Conservative government is laying all emphasis possible on strengthening our relations with India.”

For the Indo-Canadian contingent, the most important outcomes were the unprecedented level-of-access to the Prime Minister. For example, Ajit Jain explains, during the flight, interest group members were given the opportunity to have an exclusive, closed-door audience with the Prime Minister.323

Despite government engagement with ‘elite’ Indo-Canadians, Harper's trip was widely condemned for its blatant 'ethnopolitics.' First, the Prime Minister visited the Golden Temple in Amritsar, which is considered one of the holiest Sikh temples.324 In addition to its religious significance, the Golden Temple was the site of Operation Bluestar, where the Indian Army entered the compound to flush out Khalistan terrorists but resulted in a large number of civilian deaths. Second, he visited the Chabad House, one of the sites of the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, gaining the attention of both Indo-Canadians and Canada's Jewish community, which saw the attacks as an example of anti-Semitism. Finally, Harper made an appearance on a popular dance reality show, Dance Premier League, where he met with members of the Indian film industry and an Indian dance troupe from Canada.

Following the Prime Minister, Finance Minister Jim Flahrety also travelled to India in April 2010, as part of a pre-G-20 tour. Flaherty met with Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chair of India's Planning Committee. Flaherty looked to coordinate the G-20 positions on issues related to post-recession economic stability. In anticipation of the G-20, Flaherty called “on the help of partners like India to help implement the G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.” The trip was meant to highlight similarities between Canada and India in terms of weathering the global economic recession, placing particular emphasis on the stability of Canada's banking sector, the country's economic stimulus plans and its fiscally conservative growth philosophy. As on other economy-oriented trips to India, Flaherty’s schedule included meetings with business patrons of the C-IBC, such as Scotiabank and Sunlife Financial, both of which have conducted business in India for two decades.

The government’s sensitivity to the Indo-Canadian community and bilateral relations with India was underlined by its response to the 'visa' row in May 2010. This issue arose when retired members of India's Border Forces – part of India’s G20 contingent - had their visa applications rejected by the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi. Letters sent to the applicants cited their involvement in human rights.
abuses by a “notoriously violent unit” engaged in “systematic torture.” Indo-Canadian organizations responded almost immediately and their strategy included both a media blitz and private meetings with Jason Kenney to convey the problems with the visa policy. Diaspora groups blamed the situation on “a systemic anti-India bias by the Canadian bureaucracy,” which has inhibited Canada-India relations in several areas, including immigration, business and nuclear energy. Kenney’s office responded immediately to these meetings by offering a public apology and rectifying practices at the consular level.

The preceding section provided an overview of improved relations between Canada and India due to active engagement between the government and Indo-Canadians. Centrally, this section has shown that the most crucial attribute of Indo-Canadian groups is their level of issue congruence with the government. This relationship has given evidence of a mutually reinforcing relationship between the ethnic community and government officials. As shown by this chapter thus far, members of Indo-Canadian interest groups have been involved in creating networking opportunities with stakeholders in India, agenda-setting on economic and political issues, and consultations with Ministerial-level policy makers.

331 Ibid.
Improved Relations between the Two States

At a political level, Prime Minister Singh's visit to Canada in June 2010 was the first visit of a sitting Prime Minister in thirty-seven years and most significant sign of improved relations between the two countries. The trip, which PM Singh extended beyond the G-20 summit, gave evidence of the important connections that exist between the Indo-Canadian Diaspora, the Canadian government, and the Indian government. First, the Department of Foreign Affairs involved Diaspora groups in planning stages, soliciting suggestions from the C-IBC, the ICCC and the CIF regarding which prominent Indo-Canadians and businesses should be included. As a result, Indo-Canadians from Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal, Ottawa and Halifax attended the proceedings. The government also ensured that Diaspora groups were involved in various economic discussions and were invited to a gala dinner held in Prime Minister Singh's honour. Second, members of the C-IBC, ICCC and CIF held closed-door sessions with the visiting delegation. Of particular note were meetings with India's Finance Minister, the Deputy Chair of the Planning Committee and various economic bureaucrats. For example, the Canada-India Business Council arranged a closed-door meeting between its patron-members and Montek Singh Ahulwalia, deputy Chairman of India’s planning committee. Further, Prime Minister Harper raised the profile of the visit in the Indo-Canadian community by inviting Bollywood actor Akshay Kumar and renowned choreographer Shiamak Davar.

These efforts have brought Canada and India to a historic zenith, since both countries have finally signed the nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA). 332 Given the

nuclear history between the states, the importance of this announcement cannot be understated, reversing 35 years of nuclear policy. The NCA gives Canada access to India's 100 billion-dollar energy program, “allow[ing] Canada to compete for a cut of the lucrative market after similar agreements were signed by the US, Russia, Korea and Japan.” Other agreements have included two Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) in ‘Earth Sciences and Mining’ and 'Cooperation in Higher Education.' Improvement to the relationship has resulted in a Joint Study on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which lays the basis for the future free-trade agreement.

India has also reciprocated Canada's gestures towards an improved bilateral relationship. Since 2007, Indian Minister of Road Transport and Highways Kamal Nath has visited Canada on three separate occasions. Other visiting dignitaries have included former President Dr. Abdul Kalam, Minister for Communication and Infrastructure Sachin Pilot, and most recently, Minister of Commerce and Industry Anand Sharma. Diaspora groups have played an important role during these visits to Canada, organizing meetings, lectures, workshops and dinners for Indian officials. As Kant Bhargava explains, the Canada India Foundation even chartered a taxi to bring India’s National Security Advisor from the US to Canada, when his flight was grounded due to heavy

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335 Ibid.

snowfall. Economically, the most obvious improvement in Canada-India relations is the growth in trade (given the economic relationship was the central focus of the Harper government). Until 2006, bilateral trade languished at two billion dollars a year. By 2010, this figure is expected to exceed five billion dollars, with a goal of 15 billion dollars by 2015.

Table 5.2 Canada - India Bilateral Trade 2005 – 2009 (in billions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada’s Imports from India</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada’s Exports to India</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A graphical representation shows fruition of the Harper government’s economic

These numbers not only show an improvement in overall bilateral trade, but that the Harper government has successfully evened out the balance of trade between the countries, which has historically been skewed in favour of India.

While the scale of the economic relationship remains small, its steady and impressive level of growth during the Conservative government is significant. It reflects increased business confidence in both the Indian economy and the Canadian government's commitment to bilateral relations. Furthermore, those familiar with the trade relationship suggest that these figures are artificially low. Henry Lotin, Vice-President of the C-IBC, suggests that the statistics have miscalculated the trade in services. Simply put, the contributions made by “engineers, architects and consultants ...
are providing services to India and it is not counted anywhere. Economic figures have suggested that estimates of bilateral trade can easily double with the inclusion of service industry-provisions.

4. Assessing Interest Group Access to the Canadian Government

These results have engendered three general conclusions regarding Indo-Canadian interest group access to government. First, the type of relations the Canadian government wants to pursue with India - economic and trade relations - are well suited to the Indo-Canadian community's strengths, creating space for an active Diaspora role. As such, even the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement has been framed as a trade deal. Second, Indo-Canadian groups have been afforded both 'physical access' to government officials and indirect access through their transnational business and political relationships in India. Third, this has developed into a symbiotic relationship between the government and the Indo-Canadian community. The irony is such: the Harper government pursued a relationship with India because it increased domestic political support from the Indo-Canadian Diaspora, but could only effectively pursue India because the Diaspora itself was involved.

The Harper government has reaped both foreign and domestic policy benefits by providing political access to Indo-Canadian organizations. The following section analyses these findings based on the enabling conditions established in the previous chapter. Largely, it will assess if government's relationship with Indo-Canadian

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342 Interview. Henry Lotin, Vice-Chairman of the Canada-India Business Council. Toronto, Ontario. August 10, 2010. Lotin suggests that this is easily calculated by using figures from Canada's total GDP from services and subtracting the domestic consumption of services to get a figure for Canada's trade income from international service industries.
organizations fulfills the conditions that would lead to influence on government policy.

**Issue Congruence and Issue Salience**

While the openness of government is a necessary condition for any domestic group to play an influencing role, Caroline Andrew notes that “if the government is not interested in the point of view they are presenting it is ... difficult to have impact.”

Thus, ethnic interest organizations are most effective with “confluence of interests between government and lobby groups.” Moreover, congruent interests result in policy when “state officials are in a mind to do so.” The evidence shows a high-level of issue congruence between the Canadian government and its bilateral relationship with India. Even beyond the nuclear deal, community has been supportive of Harper government initiatives and has recognized its efforts to accommodate Indo-Canadians. Asha Luthra, former President of the ICCC, has thanked the government for “delivering on promises to address the issues of importance to the Indo-Canadian community, including recognition of foreign credentials of new immigrants and the immigration backlog.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Indo-Canadian Interests</th>
<th>Government Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Deal</td>
<td>Pushed for Canada’s support at the NSG &amp; IAEA; Showed interest in a Canada-India</td>
<td>Supported India-exception at the NSG &amp; IAEA. Negotiated and signed a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

343 Personal Correspondence. Caroline Andrew, Professor of Political Science, University of Ottawa. July 26, 2010.
344 Personal Correspondence. Heather Smith, Associate Professor, University of Northern British Columbia. August 19, 2010; This argues that if there is an oppositional stance taken by the interest group, then you find a different set of relationships.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Deal</td>
<td>The nuclear deal would erase anti-India bureaucratic stigma in Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuclear deal with India. Has not been tabled for Parliamentary ratification. No trade has yet occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration 'Visa Row'</td>
<td>Requested an immediate apology and an issuance of visas for IBS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issued an immediate apology. Visa requests were addressed on a case-by-case basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Fee</td>
<td>Called for the immigrant landing fee to be scrapped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Halved the landing fee to 425 dollars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Economic Class'</td>
<td>Grassroots organizations thought this would privilege elite-level immigration. Interest Groups have pushed for more skilled labour from India and recognition of their qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Created an 'Economic class' of immigrants that would be fast-tracked through the immigration process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Investment</td>
<td>Open trade offices in various cities in India, including Ahmedabad and Mumbai. Pushing for a bilateral free trade agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opened three trade offices. Concluded the FIPPA negotiations in 2007. Completed a study on the impact of a FTA. No further action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air India Inquiry</td>
<td>Inquiry should result in more serious prosecution of suspected and potential terrorists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Added Tamil Tigers to Terrorist List. No judicial changes to terrorism. Has recently tabled 'Combatting Terrorism Act.'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This comparison is not meant to prove that the interest organizations are causally responsible for government policy. It does, however, confirm that there is a high-level of congruence with respect to issues of interest between the Canadian government and Indo-Canadian interest groups. Further, this chapter has three findings that confirm that these interests have been actively communicated between the two parties.

First, there is ample evidence that the Prime Minister and high-level ministers have organized with Indo-Canadian interest groups. Engagement with the highest-levels of government has taken place in three major forums as outlined in this chapter: during foreign travel, community-based events and private consultations. In fact, the level of
communication between the Indo-Canadian community and policy makers has been disadvantaged by the measurement assumed within the dissertation, which excludes private meetings, correspondence and meetings outside the Prime Minister's office. However, there is an important indication of these additional points of access, exemplified by the Canada-India Foundation's relationship with Jason Kenney's office and the Canada-India Business Council’s consulting work for DFAIT.  

A large reason for this engagement is the economic success of the Indo-Canadian community. Business-oriented Diaspora groups provide a concentrated, organized point of contact within the community. In addition, their business-related knowledge of the Indian economy coupled with their overseas relationships, makes them important contacts for a government attempting to increase its profile in India. Working with the pre-existing Diaspora organizations taps into already-established economic and trade relations. This engagement has successfully matched its definition of the national interest – increased economic and political engagement with India – with the long-standing political objectives of Indo-Canadian organizations.

Second, issue congruence only partly explains government openness and access. This research finds that the Indo-Canadian community has played a role in creating issue salience. More specifically, issue congruence on non-salient policies is not likely to produce policy movement. In other words, Diaspora organizations played a role in

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348 It could be suggested that the American-led economic recession and the subsequent protectionist policies in the United States, culminating in the 'Buy American' plan of January 2009, urged Canadian policy-makers to diversify the Canadian economy.

349 Mohammad Ahrari has argued that government openness is not only dependent on issue congruence but also upon issue salience.
increasing the importance and relevance of the India-file for the Harper government, and the resultant desire to pursue relations with India. Ashok Kapur notes a difference between the Liberal and Conservative governments, “Indo-Canadians have been influential in consciousness-raising with the Conservative government and Harper and his cabinet colleagues.”

Third, these concerns have resulted in linking the government’s India-policy with the Diaspora. Ajit Khanna, the former Chair of the ICCC, has argued that that Prime Minister Harper's communication with the Indo-Canadian community “underlines the rise in importance of India in the world today, as well as the coming of age of the Indo-Canadian community.” This importance has largely contributed to issue congruence between the two parties. This is unlike the Chinese community in Canada, which the government has been unable to engage in a meaningful way. In addition to human rights complaints, the community is divided on relations with the Chinese government, because of the sizable immigration from Taiwan and Hong Kong, whose residents do not typically have a good relationship with China. In comparison, the Indian Diaspora has put its political and economic clout behind improving government relations with India and the Diaspora community. According to Toronto Star journalist Haroon Siddiqui, “segments of Chinese Canadians have spoken out about Tibet or the Falun Gong or economic ties with China. Indo-Canadians have helped improve our economic, academic and political relations with India.”

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Finally, the evidence shows that the government may have formed its India policy, but its *implementation* would not be possible without the community. This analysis challenges the unidirectional relationship between government and Diaspora groups found in the literature on ethnic interest groups. In fact, the relationship that has developed between the Indo-Canadian community and the Canadian government is one of mutual deference, benefit and reinforcement. The government has pursued initiatives that are beneficial to both business and community interests, such as the Foreign Investment Agreement, new trade consulates and nuclear policies. At the same time, it has made sure to avoid decisions that could damage its relationship with the Indo-Canadian community and with the Indian government. For example, the Canadian government sought to avoid any possible fallout from the issue of visas for retired members of Indian border services, as a result of the negative response by Indo-Canadian groups. Indo-Canadian access to Ministerial offices on this issue, effectively confirmed the Indo-Canadian Diaspora's symbiotic relationship with the government. Ultimately then, this chapter's analysis suggests that the relationship between domestic interests and the government is much more complex than has been suggested in earlier literature.

*Ethnopolitics*

The literature has argued that ethnic groups are granted access to government because of the electoral benefits to the governing political party. This perspective has been supported by experts on Canadian foreign policy. Duane Bratt notes that “the Harper government has put a lot of effort into ‘flipping' the Indo-Canadian community into
supporting the Conservative Party of Canada.” Kim Nossal acknowledges that the Harper government is “extraordinarily sensitive to Diaspora groups, given his overall goal of transforming Canadian politics permanently by wooing all of those "ethnic" groups in Canada who for decades unthinkingly voted Liberal and avoided Conservatives.”

Election polling during the 2006 election has shown that ethnic communities are not immune to electoral strategies, suggesting that Conservative support from “visible minorities -- who traditionally have overwhelmingly favoured the Liberals — [reached] just under 30 per cent, within striking distance of the Liberals' 38 per cent.”

During that election, in British Columbia, “the trend [toward the Conservatives] was clearly apparent in the two primary cultural communities, Chinese Canadians and Indo-Canadians.” Further, since the 2006 federal election, the Indo-Canadian community has been wooed by the Conservative leadership through large-scale public meetings, visits to Indian temples, and Bollywood-connections as a mechanism to connect with the Indian public.

Additional proof of ‘ethnopolitics’ are the other federal parties which have attempted to reach out to Indo-Canadian groups as well. In one instance, NDP leader Jack Layton called on the Conservative government to issue an apology on behalf of all Canadians for Komagata Maru during a meeting with Surrey’s Sikh community in 2007. After Harper’s speech at the ICCC’s annual event, then-Liberal leader Stéphane Dion

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353 Personal correspondence. Duane Bratt, Professor and Chair of Political Science, Mount Royal University. August 13, 2010.
spoke to the C-IBC to outline his vision of Canadian foreign policy. He promised 50 million dollars to create “a 'South Asian Foundation of Canada' to promote closer ties between Canada and South Asian countries.”

In the face of this politicking, Indo-Canadian interest organizations have ensured that the Harper government continues to work in their favour by maintaining a largely non-partisan stance. As noted by a representative of the Canada India Foundation, their organization has members that belong to all federal political parties. Further, the three organizations have had conversations, roundtables, and meetings with all federal party leaders.

However, the evidence has shown that ‘ethnopolitics’ only partly explains Harper’s relationship with these domestic groups. Specifically, the ethnopolitical argument does not explain other interactions with 'elite' members of the community, and the more substantive contribution of the Indo-Canadian community.

Prime Minister Harper's 2008 speech to the Canada-India Foundation, noted that the Indo-Canadian community's business ties “... are the bridge builders of a stronger, better relationship between our two great countries,” and highlighted the role of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora in Canada-India relations.

In the course of articulating its India policy, the Harper government has focused on the business sector and members of organized interest groups. It has used selective, selective,
closed-door meetings with these elites to both gauge opinion within the community and to work out action plans for the Canada-India relationship. Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney has been an important figure in this effort. As noted by political observers, Kenney is one of the few Cabinet members to have significant freedoms in his public role, and wields considerable influence in the PMO. It is this closeness to the Prime Minister’s office that has attracted the attention of Indo-Canadian organizations seeking meetings to discuss their interests. Arthur Rubinoff has observed that “Jason Kenney, a minister with a domestic portfolio, is actually a key player in the foreign policy field. This is unprecedented. He seems to be in charge of Canada's India policy.”

Jason Kenney's role in maintaining the Conservatives' relationship with the Indo-Canadian community is highlighted by the handling of immigration and visa issues. These have been a major concern for Indo-Canadian organizations, and Kenney made common cause on the issue by expressing concern over fraudulent immigration consultants: “The Indo-Canadian community has raised a number of important issues with me, including the need to take action against fraudulent immigration consultants, improve visa processing time, encourage immigration from Indian students to Canada, and build stronger connections between Indian and Canadian businesses.” Kenney's interests in India have been furthered by the negative effect of immigration on Canada’s

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larger economic and trade goals.

Access through Parliament

This dissertation hypothesized that Indo-Canadian MPs would be an obvious access-point for ethnic groups and an important asset in Canada's pursuit of an improved relationship with India. Numerically, this proposition also holds some weight. Indo-Canadians consist of only three per cent of all Members of Parliament, but they are concentrated in the Conservative and Liberal parties. Their hypothesized effect on the political landscape becomes more suggestive when singling out their proportion of 'ethnic' Members of Parliament, making up close to 40 per cent of ethnic minorities in the House of Commons. Because of their shared ethnic connections and political identities, it was hypothesised that these individuals would use their clout to advance the relationship.

However, there is no evidence to show that Indo-Canadian representatives have advocated for improved relations. One reason is the centralization of foreign policy, which has limited parliament’s role in Canada-India relations. More particularly, foreign policy consultation has largely been taken off the Parliamentary agenda, while the Standing Committees on Foreign Policy have little influence on policy-decisions. Under Harper, only the PMO and a few Ministers are involved in formulating foreign policy, including those who head up International Trade, Defence and Foreign Affairs. The following graph quantifies, within parliament, the eight MPs with the most references to India.

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A content analysis of Hansard between 2006-2009. The first reference to ‘India’ was recorded by party, repeat references within a debate were not counted. Thus, during Question-Period, there could only be a maximum of two individual references, one recorded for the question and the second for the answer.
Secondly, there is an obvious lack of communication between Indo-Canadian parliamentarians. Indo-Canadian MPs - like all parliamentarians - are more attached to their respective parliamentary caucuses than their shared ethnic ties. This has resulted in little policy consolidation. One example of this phenomenon has been the role of Indian-origin MPs in the Canada-India Parliamentary Friendship Group, which consists of MPs and Senators from all political parties. Despite its promising foundations, the CIPFG has consistently under-delivered in the area of Canada-India relations and has been relatively inactive in the foreign policy domain. Its only recent contribution has

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365 Ibid.
been hosting events for visiting dignitaries from India.\textsuperscript{367}

In fact, evidence has shown that some Indian-origin MPs have been \textit{counter-productive} in the pursuit of better relations with India. Some have been prominent attendees at controversial events, celebrations and rallies supportive of separatist activities. For example, in March 2009, Gurbax Malhi, Member of Parliament for Bramalea-Gore-Malton, attended a pro-Tamil rally on Parliament Hill in Ottawa where some attendees held flags associated with the Tamil Tigers, while others held posters of 'martyred' Tamils.\textsuperscript{368} This has also occurred in British Columbia and Southern Ontario, where Vaisakhi parades\textsuperscript{369} have contained floats with pictures of Sikh terrorists (who are considered martyrs by some), including Jarnail Bhindranwale and Talwinder Parmar, former leaders of the Khalistan movement. Since taking office, the PMO has stopped Conservative MPs from attending these events, but both Liberal and NDP parties have not been as discerning.

More recently, Liberal MPs Sukh Dhaliwal and Andrew Kania, both of whom represent Punjabi-dominated constituencies in Brampton and Surrey, tabled an anti-India petition in the House of Commons. The petition accused the Indian government of genocide in 1984, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination resulted in attacks on Sikhs in Punjab and Delhi.\textsuperscript{370} Sukh Dhaliwal, Member of Parliament for Surrey-

\textsuperscript{367} Rather, the group was marred right from its beginning with divisions within the Group, when Obhrai was accused of insulting Liberal members of the group, and in particular, Ruby Dhalla. Further, the dissertation has found that the activity of Indian-origin MPs is largely determined by their personal interest in the subject. Please see: Ajit Jain. 2007. “2 Indo-Canadian MPs spar over group's leadership.” June 10. Rediff News. <http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jun/10canada.htm> (Accessed: September 23, 2010).


\textsuperscript{369} An important harvest-festival for Punjabis.

\textsuperscript{370} In 1984, high-ranking members of the Khalistan movement were hiding in the basement of the Golden Temple in Amritsar. During Operation Bluestar, the Indian Army entered the Golden Temple complex and
Delta, was quoted as saying, “What happened to Sikhs in India in November 1984 is genocide [and] I urge the Canadian government to take action by raising this matter with the Indian government.” Further, the timing of the petition was scheduled a mere ten days before Prime Minister Singh was scheduled to arrive for the G-20 summit. Aditya Jha's response in the National Post on June 10, 2010, argued that “[the petition] is aimed to embarrass both countries within the context of one of the most important forums for global leadership.” While the Conservative and Liberal parties did not comment on the petition, NDP leader Jack Layton supported raising the motion with the Indian government, stating, “we have an obligation, as one democratic government to another, to ask why and seek honest answers for our citizens.” Layton’s statement seemingly supported the motion, applauded by members of the Sikh community.

Further, Indo-Canadian MPs have not shown to be substantially better connected with community organizations. Indo-Canadian MPs have certainly been invited to various events, shows, and roundtables in these organizations, but these activities have had a negligible policy influence. These findings lead to two related observations. First, an MP's parliamentary role, particularly their party affiliation, is a more important determinant of their interest in foreign policy towards India than their personal ethnic identification. Second, it suggests something about the strategy adopted by interest

opened fire on both suspected Khalistan members and other worshippers. In response, Indira Gandhi was killed by her two Sikh bodyguards, which prompted a wave of riots and targeted killing of turbaned Sikhs in Punjab and Delhi, in particular.

organizations themselves, indicating that Indo-Canadian groups are deliberately targeting Cabinet-level parliamentarians that are more policy-relevant than those who share the same point of view.

There are two exceptions to this rule. First, there are Indian-origin Members of Parliament who represent constituencies with large Indian communities. In this capacity they act upon the concerns of their constituents on a case-by-case basis. Navdeep Bains notes that the concerns of his Indo-Canadian constituents include issues regarding immigration, visas and small-business trade with India. While constituents do not explicitly speak to their MPs about foreign policy issues, the domestic concerns of the Diaspora community tend to be more closely linked to foreign policy issues than they are for other Canadians. That being said, the contribution of Indo-Canadian MPs towards Canada-India relations is based on constituent interests rather than their personal identification with the community.

One exception to the limited influence of Indo-Canadian Members of Parliament is Deepak Obhrai. As Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Policy, Obhrai is currently the highest ranking Indo-Canadian MP and the most actively involved on the India file. His first act was to create the Canada-India Parliamentary Friendship Association, for which he won the Pravasi Bharitya Samaan Award in 2007. Further, Canada’s decision to pursue a Free Trade Agreement with India started after Obhrai publicly mused that an FTA would be beneficial to both states. Since then, Obhrai has on all foreign visits to India, is part of the reception delegation for Indian delegations to Canada, and has been a

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voice for the Indo-Canadian community in Cabinet.375

5. Conclusion

As mentioned earlier, this chapter has two overarching objectives. First, it needed to establish that evidence that Indo-Canadian interest groups have indeed had access to foreign-policy decision-makers. Second, it needed to show that this access has resulted in synchronized domestic and foreign policy interests between the government and Indo-Canadian organizations.

For the most part, this chapter has examined the question of access from a top-down perspective, focused on the government's relationship to Diaspora organizations and its link to a wider-India policy. Moreover, given the objectives of this chapter, it has treated the Indo-Canadian Diaspora as a monolith, without differentiating the activities and contributions of specific Diaspora groups. This being said, the following chapter examines Indo-Canadian organizations from a bottom-up, comparative perspective, which will more clearly differentiate their significance to Canada-India relations.

Chapter Six:

Comparing the Role and Influence of Indo-Canadian Interest Groups - Issues, Strategies & Outcomes

The Diaspora is not shy about involving themselves. Every time a trade delegation goes to India, whether it is provincial or federal, many Indo-Canadians are represented. - Testimony at a Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Meeting, March 24, 2010

As the previous chapter illustrates, Indo-Canadian organizations have gained an impressive degree of access to the Harper government. Ottawa’s interest in improving trade relations have capitalized on the Diaspora’s economic connections and expertise in India. These developments make it clear that the relationship between the government and Indo-Canadian organizations is multi-directional and mutually cooperative. Yet ‘government access’ is only a partial explanation for the ethnic influence on Canadian foreign policy. Equally salient, an interest group’s influence is also determined by their political strategies, internal organization and financial resources.

To complete the second part of this investigation, this chapter compares the organizational, political and financial characteristics of the Canada India Foundation (CIF), the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC) and the Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC). The chapter begins with an analysis of their individual contributions to Canada-India relations, assessing their public strategies, political activities and internal composition. Section two offers a comparative analysis showing how the three organizations co-exist within the space connecting domestic politics and the formulation
of Canadian foreign policy. These findings establish a foundation for chapter seven, which uncovers the major contributions and conclusions of this study.

1. Canada-India Foundation (CIF)

The Canada-India Foundation was established in 2007 by a group of high-profile Indo-Canadians with an interest in public and foreign policy. The CIF’s founders identified a policy-related deficit in existing organizations, which dealt with economic and cultural issues. While the Indo-Canadian community has undergone an economic, political and even philanthropic evolution, no organization has “leverag[ed] this success” to address stagnant Canada-India political relations. The CIF’s charter members see its emergence as a shift in the Indo-Canadian community’s raison d’etre. Instead of asking “what can Canada do for Indo-Canadians?” the CIF asks “what can Indo-Canadians do for the betterment of Canada?” Its mandate claims jurisdiction over “bilateral relations between Canada and India, greater engagement of the Indo-Canadian community in Canadian politics and public policy and increasing awareness of the changing face of India.” With this mandate, the CIF has attempted to differentiate itself from the economic and trade mandates of the other Indo-Canadian organizations.

Traditional ethnic organizations typically represent large segments of the Diaspora and include professionals, entrepreneurs and students. In contrast, the Canada India Foundation has an exclusive membership, where prospective members must provide evidence of both professional success and political engagement in Canada. New

376 Interview. Kalyan Sundaram, Executive Director, Canada-India Foundation. Toronto, Ontario. August 19, 2010
377 Ibid.
members are selected by consensus (amongst charter members), and all members are responsible for a substantial membership fee (a major source of the CIF’s operating funds). Although, this membership fee does not include additional monetary contributions to endowments, CIF sponsored charities, or event-spending. Thus, while other organizations rely on government grants, sponsors and membership fees, the CIF’s financial resources are donated by individual members.

The CIF has approximately 30 members, divided into an Executive Branch, Board of Directors and Charter (founding) Members, with all activities controlled by a few active members. They include some of the most powerful Indians in Canada: Ramesh Chotai, President of Bromed Pharmaceuticals, Aditya Jha, President and CEO of Karma Candy Ltd, former CIF Chairman Surjit Babra, Founder and Chairman of Skylink Group of Companies, and Vasu Chanchlani, Founder and CFO of Sigma Group of Companies. Because of the organization’s relative newness and close-knit membership, the CIF does not have a physical office space or a formal administrative structure.

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379 Canada-India Foundation. 2010. “Executive Team.” <http://www.canadaindia.org/executive-team/> (Accessed: June 03, 2010); Interview with Ajit Jain. Editor of Rediff India Abroad, Toronto Edition, Toronto, Ontario. September 8, 2010. The organization is made up of 25 to 30 individuals. While the figure has not been confirmed, multiple interviews have suggested that the membership fee is upwards of $20,000 spread over four years.

380 For example, Vasu Chanchlani is one major benefactor of many CIF activities, such as the Chanchlani Global Indian Award, the Memorial for the Fallen Soldier and the CIF’s annual theme forum.


382 The CIF’s administrative duties are the responsibility of their Executive Director, Kalyan Sundaram, and his office is also the main contact for the Canada India Foundation.
Political Resources and Lobbying Strategies

For interest organizations, political access is a crucial factor for effective politicking. The CIF’s most effective tool for gaining access is its significant financial resources. In other words, the members' economic success has facilitated their efforts to establish personal relationships with members of the federal government and thus improved their lobbying access. For example, in 2009, Ajit Someshwar, CIF charter member and former national convenor, was appointed to Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s ‘Economic Advisory Council’ as one of 11 “business and academic heavyweights” to advise the Minister on the condition of Canada’s economy. In closed-door meetings with the Finance Minister, the council was assigned responsibility for assessing (and correcting) Canada’s response to the economic downturn, focusing “on the budget and deteriorating economy affected by the global economic meltdown.” Someshwar’s appointment highlights two important aspects. First, it is noteworthy that an Indo-Canadian was included, because it suggests that the government recognizes the growing economic clout of the community. Second, it emphasises the relationship between the CIF’s financial resources and its access to central decision-making units within the Federal government. The fruits of these personal connections were evident later in October 2010, when Cabinet members and opposition leaders attended the CIF sponsored

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384 CBC News. 2008. “Flaherty’s advisory council,” December 18. <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/12/18/f-advisory-council.html> (Accessed: September 15, 2010); The CIF already has meetings with the Canada-India Parliamentary Friendship Committee every six months and has lobbied for its expansion to include MPs with Cabinet portfolios. It is advocating for a parallel parliamentary association in India which would be responsible for communication between the two countries. Creating institutional access points, the CIF looks to soon sponsor Indo-Canadian students to intern with Canadian MPs.
‘Memorial to Fallen Soldiers’ at the Hindu Museum of Civilization.385

The CIF’s personal connections are also evident in its overseas political network, which is accessed when members travel to India. Developing this political network has been a CIF priority, in contrast to the ICCC's and C-IBC's focus on economic connections. One example is the CIF’s relationship with India’s former President Abdul Kalam (architect of India’s nuclear programme). After multiple meetings with CIF members in India, Kalam agreed to attend their CIF's 2008 inaugural gala as Chief guest. He has since attended three CIF events, most recently for the 2010 Forum on Mining and Metals.386 Another example is the CIF's lobbying efforts towards improving Canada’s relations with Gujarat, which have been facilitated by the organization's relationship with the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi.

Part of this networking effort, the CIF has created the Chanchalani Global Indian Award, financed by Vasu Chanchalani and established to recognize global excellence by individuals of Indian-origin.387 Since its inception, awards have been given to Sam Patroda, the father of India's telecommunications revolution, Tulsi Tanti, an innovator in wind-energy technologies, and most recently, Ratan Tata, India’s most successful

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386 Abdul Kalam’s first visit was during the CIF’s 2008 Inaugural gala. During this time, the CIF introduced him to the President of the University of Waterloo. On his most recent visit, in October 2010, he was conferred with an honorary doctorate from the same University. On the same trip, he attended the Canada-India Foundation’s Theme Forum on Metals and Mining. Joe Friesen, 2010. “‘Missile Man’ urges joint Canada-India ventures,” October 8. The Globe and Mail. <http://theglobeandmail.com> (Accessed: October 15, 2010); Ajit Jain, 2008. “The million-dollar man; Software mogul starts rich annual award to honour achievers.” May 9. The Toronto Sun. 52; Ajit Jain. 2008. “A leader on the right path; On his visit to GTA, India's former president inspires the 'builders of our children's future'” May 3. Toronto Sun. 22.

387 This award is meant to move beyond the Indo-Canadian community, and specifically chooses an Indian of global stature. The award gives $50,000 to the winner, which is donated to the charity of the winner's choice. Julia Le. 2010. “Three receive immigrant award” May 25. Toronto Star. A1.
industrialist. In early 2011, the CIF will send a delegation to India to honour Ratan Tata, with attendees drawn from politicians and business leaders from both countries. In this way, each awards gala doubles as a networking and communications opportunity for political elites in both Canada and India. Beyond the networking, the awards have had the effect of raising the CIF’s profile in the Canadian public, government and media. By selecting high-profile Indians, the CIF has successful garnered the attention of overseas media. As such, the Chanchalani Award has been profiled in *The Hindu, Hindustan Times, and Times of India.*

Generally speaking, the CIF has been successful in generating a strong presence in the national media. Unlike the ICCC or C-IBC, the organization has a dedicated media spokesperson responsible for press releases, external communications and publicity. Further, CIF members have contributed editorials to the national press -- in June 2010, Aditya Jha’s *National Post* editorial publically challenged the Kania-Dhaliwal petition, tabled one week before Prime Minister Singh was scheduled to visit Canada. As mentioned in chapter five, the petition called on the Canadian government to recognize the 1984 riots (in Delhi and Punjab) that targeted Sikhs as ‘genocide.’ Jha’s article

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391 In 1984, Indian Army’s counterterrorism operation in the Golden Temple, resulted in the retaliatory murder of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her two Sikh bodyguards. Because of her death, riots ensued in major centres in North India, particularly in Delhi and parts of Punjab, which deliberately targeted Sikhs. The petition was not only condemned in Canada, but received widespread press in India. Please see: Adrian MacNair. 2010. “Sikh Genocide petition has no place in Canada.” June 10. *National Post.* <http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/> (Accessed: August 12, 2010); Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, 2010.
argued that the petition was “calculated to inflame anti-India sentiments among the Sikh community” and derail progress between Canada and India.\(^{392}\)

Similarly, in December 2009, Ramesh Chotai’s coauthored a *National Post* editorial (with Alan Winer, Chair of the United Jewish Alliance of Greater Toronto) asking Canadian to “consider the role Canada can play in standing up” to terrorism and extremism in Canada.\(^{393}\) Within independent ethnic media - *India Abroad*, *Canadian Immigrant*, and the *South Asian Observer* - the CIF has an even higher profile. While media access may not indicate a direct form of influence, it is a relevant illustration of a political strategy to raise the public profile of Indo-Canadians and India amongst Canadians and more importantly, policy-makers. A high-public profile (combined with issue congruence over bilateral relations) shows how groups like the CIF have gained access to Canadian politicians.

Philanthropic activities have also been effective in raising the CIF’s profile. For instance, in 2008 the CIF created a ten-million dollar endowment for the University of Waterloo to promote the study of the “politics, economy and social conditions of contemporary India and [the] bilateral relationship”\(^{394}\) The endowment funds research fellowships for graduate students and faculty in areas of interest to the CIF, and pays to

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host speakers, Indian political figures and visiting researchers. Other philanthropic activities include donations to the Trillium Hospital in Toronto, the Canadian Military Families Fund, a ‘Memorial to Fallen Soldiers,’ overseas development projects, and Aboriginal education at Toronto's George Brown College.

As other influential interest organizations, the CIF’s major strategies have focused on profile-raising in three areas: Canadian public, politicians and its overseas connections. This profile has had the effective of connecting to senior officials in Ottawa, accessing senior officials in India, and utilizing national media. Further, these activities have used unconventional and indirect methods to improve access. The CIF’s attention to ‘benign issues’ - such as education and philanthropy - disarms officials that might otherwise reject interest group interjections into policy-matters. Instead, the CIF successfully links the Indo-Canadian community with the betterment of Canadian society.

Assessing the CIF’s Impact on Canada-India Relations

The Canada-India Foundation’s role in Canada-India relations has been multifaceted. As argued in the literature review, the power to shape political interests (agenda-setting and perceptions-editing) holds equitable significance to direct-policy influence. This effect has been evidenced in several ways.

A central interest group characteristic is its institutional capacity to address pressing political issues in an expedient manner. Unlike the ICCC and C-IBC, the CIF is

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395 Asian Television Network. 2008. “CIF, Chanchlani global Indian award interview on ATN,” Interview with Shan Chandrashekhar. Posted on: <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2514152294339871436> (Accessed: September 24, 2010); Abdul Kalam's first visit to Canada in 2008, the CIF created a tour that included academic institutions to the University of Toronto, the University of Waterloo, the Ontario Innovation Centre, and the MARS institute in Toronto.
able to respond to political challenges. For example, the CIF’s response to Kania-Dhaliwal petition, drew on its government and media connections to both condemn and downplay its negative effect. On this issue, it also contacted members of the Punjabi community, including Vancouver-based radio stations and business people. It uncovered that the bulk of the Punjabi community supports better relations with India as a business opportunity for Punjabi interests. Similarly, the CIF was quick to respond to the High Commission’s decisions to reject visitor visas for members of the Indian Border Services (IBS). The CIF used its connections with the office of Minister Kenney to draw attention to the problem, after which the government publically apologized to India. 396

The CIF has also been effective at both ‘matchmaking’ and ‘agenda-setting’ between governments and business stakeholders. Its 2009 Energy theme forum brought together a high-profile slate of energy-industry stakeholders, including an Indian delegation led by the Deputy Chair of India’s Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Canadian Minister of Natural Resources Lisa Raitt, Ontario Ministers of Energy and Infrastructure Brad Duguid and Bob Chiarelli, and Executives from SNC Lavalin, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Cameco, and Bruce Power Limited. 397 Largely, the Forum is organized to highlight sectors in which have been

396 The Indian government had applied for visas for members of the IBS to provide security during the G20. They were soon sent rejection letters from the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi, which cited their
397 India's Planning Commission is arguably the most powerful bureaucracy in the country. It is responsible for the medium and long-term strategic planning for economic development in the country. It is also the largest administrative bodies in the country, dispersing funds for all projects, including infrastructure, relief projects, power and energy, international donations. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is the Chairman of the Planning Committee and Montek Singh Ahulwalia is his Deputy Chair, thus, the highest representative of the department. A parallel department in Canada would be the Treasury Board. Please see: India. Planning Commission. 2008. <http://www.planningcommission.gov.in/> (September 12, 2010); Canada-India Foundation, 2009. “Energy Forum Speakers.” <http://www.canadaindia.org/events.energy-forum-speakers.html> (Accessed: September 25, 2010).
traditionally ignored in the bilateral relationship. Two central political outcomes resulted from the Energy Forum. First, the Energy Forum resulted in a CIF-commissioned report on renewable and nuclear energy, which it directly presented to the Prime Ministers of India and Canada in the Summer of 2009. This report has the effect of legitimizing Canada’s tentative decision to sign a nuclear agreement amongst the political and business attendees. Further, it was able to offer suggestions for policy-improvement and implementation, specifying areas of cooperation and capability outlined by conference speakers.

The second outcome of the 2009 Energy Forum was the decision to organize the 2010 Forum on Mining and Minerals. Attempting to replicate the 2009’s successful ‘matchmaking’ and agenda-setting outcomes, after the Ontario and Indian governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Mining and Minerals in July 2010, they committed to send delegations to the CIF-organized Canada-India Foundation's Minerals and Mining Forum in September 2010. In August 2010, both government representatives and major private sector interests in India formed a delegation in preparation for attending the conference. Given that the MOU only establishes a policy framework, the Mining and Mineral Forum has a crucial role in policy development, outlining opportunities and plans of action. While the CIF does not directly contribute to the policy outcomes, it does have an important facilitative and

398 The 2010 Theme Forum focuses on Mining and Metals held in September 2010.
399 Deccan Herald. 2010. “India, Ontario inks deal for cooperation in mining sector.” July 9. <http://www.deccanherald.com/content/80268/india-ontario-inks-deal-cooperation.html> (September 25, 2010); Asian Pacific Post. 2009. “Canadians to stage biggest mining conference in India.” September 7. <http://www.asianpacificpost.com/> (Accessed: October 10, 2010); India is estimated to have 20,000 tonnes of gold and diamond reserves spread over several states; India holds about 200 billion barrels of hydrocarbon resources, but nearly half of them have yet to be found.
400 The Forum has since taken place in September 2010; Interview. Kalyan Sundaram, Executive Director, Canada-India Foundation. Toronto, Ontario. August 19, 2010.
agenda-setting role by determining the theme, conference attendees and creating publicity.

One of the CIF’s most important policy successes has been improving Canada’s relations with the Indian state of Gujarat. Canada severed ties with the state after anti-Muslim riots there in 2002. Since then, Gujarat’s Chief Minister Narendra Modi has been denied visas to Canada, the United States, and the UK, due to accusations of his involvement. During “numerous submissions to the Canadian Government over a two year period,” it has highlighted Gujarat’s success as “one of the economic engines of India, [with] a pharmaceutical and diamond centre with 16 deep-water ports.” Further, during trips to India, members of the CIF have met with the Chief Minister on numerous occasions, and convinced him to attend a video-conference meeting with Indo-Canadians, held in association with the Gujarati community, the Gujarati Business Association and three Hindu temples. Soon afterwards, Prime Minister Harper promised that his government would work to establish a “commercial presence in the state of Gujarat.” By April 2009, the Canadian government had opened up a trade consul's office in Ahmedabad, marking a major policy shift from previous Liberal governments.

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401 Evidence suggests that the government was involved in the riots that displaced 65,000 and killed 1000 people, while damaging hundreds of Muslim homes, Mosques and schools. There has been a lot of academic work that has examined this case. Please see: Sanjay Kumar, 2003. “Gujarat Assembly Elections 2002: Analysing the Verdict” Economic and Political Weekly 38:4, Jan. 25-31, 270-275; Lesley Ciarula Taylor. 2008. “Trade office pledge wins Harper praise; Unhappy with Liberal policy, GTA's Gujarati community is now warming to Tories.” 25 September. Toronto Star. A19.


decision underlines the success of CIF lobbying efforts, though ethnopolitical considerations were also important, as “the Gujarati community in Toronto has tripled in size in a decade. It is the fastest-growing South Asian community in Canada's largest city.” This issue convergence is perhaps a mark of the sophistication of CIF lobbying, since the organization successfully tied one of its more controversial policies to the interests of the larger community.

Challenges Confronting the CIF

It is important to assess the role and influence of an interest group in terms of its own mandate and the expectations of its membership. Largely, CIF members have argued that their contribution stands apart from other Indo-Canadian organizations, given their policy focus. The CIF has clearly carried out an impressive roster of activities since its formation in 2007. Yet the group still has some important limitations. First, it has a small membership base. It has not yet reached the critical mass required to effectively run boycotts, letter-writing campaigns or other activities that require a large membership, all strategies pursued by the much larger and more successful Canadian Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy. Indeed, while the Canada-India Foundation is only three years old and has significant potential for growth, it faces a difficult paradox. To remain an effective and relevant lobby organization it must increase its membership without diluting its

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406 Interview. Kalyan Sundaram, Executive Director, Canada-India Foundation. Toronto, Ontario. August 19, 2010. Sundaram has acknowledged that its constitution does has a long-term mandate for additional levels of membership.
the source of its political and financial resources (which are intimately tied to the financial contributions of its members). Relatedly, the CIF’s reliance on personal networks challenges its long-term success, since its ad hoc lobbying efforts have yet to produce formalized or more permanent channels for governmental access.

Finally, in its attempts to identify and pursue a separate mandate from the other interest groups, the CIF has reluctantly become involved in the economic-trade sector of Canada-India relations. Yet because the Canadian government almost exclusively pursues economic relations with India, the CIF's overall impact has been relatively limited. In comparison, Indo-American interest organizations such as USINPAC and the US-India Business Council have been successful at forming mutually-beneficial, sector-specific mandates due to the comprehensive nature of the US-India relationship, which encompasses the military, trade and political spheres. For the CIF, involvement in economic and trade issues risks making the organization redundant, while non-involvement risks rendering it, to some degree, irrelevant.407 The CIF will have to resolve these tensions with the ICCC and C-IBC in the future.

2. Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC)

Prime Minister Trudeau’s immigration liberalization led to the settlement of a critical mass of Indian migrants in Canada. Despite this population growth, the community still lacked a driving mandate or representative organization. As a result, the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce was founded in 1977, to provide a networking and professional development forum for Indo-Canadians. To a large extent, the ICCC

maintains a membership-oriented mandate, offering “seminars on leadership training, the ‘breakfast with the CEO’ series and mentoring programs for youth.” These forums allow Indo-Canadians who run small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to interact with more successful members of the community.

In addition to focusing on its membership, the ICCC also has a mandate to improve Canada-India trade. The organization has been involved in foreign visits, roundtables, and Cabinet-level meetings, actively fosters Canada-India relations through an expanding list of programs and projects, and more recently, has benefited from the Harper government’s growing interest in the Indo-Canadian community. The duality of its membership-trade mandate cannot be understated and continues to directly affect the ICCC’s lobbying efforts.

The ICCC’s hierarchical organizational structure is broadly similar to other traditional ethnic organizations. Unlike the restricted membership schemes of the Canada-India Foundation and the Canada-India Business Council, the ICCC welcomes any interested individual or organizational representative. Similar to the CIF, it is a volunteer-run organization, except for one administrative position at its headquarters in Toronto. But the ICCC’s organizational structure is significantly different from the CIF, lead by a President (elected to a one-year, renewable term) and several elected Vice-Presidents. Each VP runs a volunteer-based sub-committee in the areas of Trade and

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409 This summer the ICCC elected Vinay Nagpal to a two year term. Please see: Bal Krishna. 2010. “Vinay Nagpal elected as new ICCC President” July 1. Press Trust of India.

410 Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC). 2010. ICCC Home Page. <http://iccc.org/> (Accessed: May 15, 2010); It includes several non-Indian members interested in networking with the community or learning about the Indian business market. It has structured levelled-memberships, including individual, corporate or institutional.
Finance, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), Youth Programming, and Events. To facilitate its trade mandate, the ICCC also has a Board of Advisors that includes non-Indians with economic or political experience in India.

*Political Resources and Lobbying Strategies*

The Canadian government heavily sanctioned India after its 1998 nuclear tests, ending nearly all economic and political relations with the country. Only the ICCC and a few established businesses, such as SunLife Insurance, continued to work in India. Referencing the “darkest” days of the bilateral relationship (after the nuclear tests), some observers have noted that at the very least, the ICCC “needs to be credited for maintaining continuity [between Canada and India].”

In addition to its large membership, the ICCC's main strength is its longevity. The ICCC is the most grassroots of the three organizations, which has allowed it to garner an important share of the federal government's attention. The Harper government sees the ICCC as the ‘go-to’ organization for the Indian Diaspora, often using it to communicate policy announcements and to gather perspectives from within the community. For example, the ICCC was the first Indo-Canadian organization to host the (then-new) Prime Minister at its 2006 annual gala dinner. Similarly, during the 2008 election, the Prime Minister invited the ICCC to host an election luncheon for notable members of the community. The organization has hosted Ministers David Emerson, Peter Van Loan, and Jason Kenney in various forums - large receptions and more intimate roundtables - which constitutes important government access for the ICCC to promote its

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Canada-Indian interests. For example, at the 2007 Annual Gala, which hosted Minister Emerson and Minister Kamal Nath, former-ICCC President Ajit Khanna to announced the ICC’s ‘$10-billion-by-2010’ bilateral trade challenge. Readily accepted by all three Indo-Canadian organizations, the Canadian and Indian governments have since adopted ‘$15-billion-by-2015’ goal for trade between the two countries.

The ICC has also benefitted from the political connections and professional expertise of its membership. While only one ICC committee formally works on the Canada-India trade relationship, other subcommittees have contributed to this central organizational mandate. For example, the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) committee is run by Pankaj Mehra, Aditya Vasudev and Sonia Abbas, Vice-Presidents (or Directors) of South Asia and Emerging Economy portfolios for the Bank of Nova Scotia, ICICI bank, and RBC Royal Bank, respectively. The ICC’s Trade Committee also boasts a range of experienced members, including Harjit Kalsi, CCO of Skylink Aviation, Kant Bhargava, former Indian Ambassador to SAARC, and Minoo Bhutani, India Country Advisor at the Schulich School of Business, York University. The crucial experience and connections of its members have been an important resource for the ICC. Largely, its lobbying strategy relies on the political access it gains from its Diaspora membership. In a perceptions-editing and agenda-setting role, the ICC has the (internal) resources available to make an important case for the improvement of Canada-

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413 SAARC stands for ‘South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’ – a regional organization created to promote “economic, social and technical cooperation among the countries of South Asia.” It has been a contentious organization, given the on-again-off-again relationship between India and Pakistan. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 2010. “SAARC Charter.” <http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Charter/5/> (Accessed: October 20, 2010).
India trade relations.

Assessing the ICRC’s Impact on Canada-India Relations

The ICRC's agenda-setting role is (mostly) a product of links between the Diaspora and trade policy. This relationship was exemplified in a 2006 meeting between senior members of the ICRC and Trade Minister David Emerson. Jointly organized with the Canada-India Business Council, the ‘Canada-India Business Roundtable’ focused on: a) market access for Canadian goods and services; b) two-way foreign-direct investment (FDI); c) governmental assistance for Canadian businesses in India; d) Canada’s role in addressing India’s infrastructure needs; e) labour mobility; and f) future objectives in the bilateral trade relationship. Summarizing its outcomes, then-ICRC President Ajit Khanna’s closing remarks pushed for two central ICRC lobbying issues. First, he emphasized the connection between excessively strict immigration regulations and the flow of two-way trade and related opportunities. Relatedly, the second issue pushed for the establishment and implementation of Canada’s foreign credential recognition program.

These two ICRC concerns have become an important priority for the Canadian government. The organization has effectively linked immigration to Canada-India trade efforts. Manoj Pundit, an ICRC Advisory Committee member and a CIF Charter Member, noted that “Indian business executives have skipped joining a trade mission to Canada because they couldn't be bothered with the hassles of getting a visa.” Even

Minister Kenney, between 2009 and 2010, travelled to India on three separate occasions to address the trade-immigration linkage in Canada’s visa offices in India. The Harper government has identified an immigration challenge: in its attempt to stem illegal immigration – which includes the production of fake marriage and birth certificates – the Canadian government must ensure it does not inhibit its target of professional, highly-skilled immigrants.

Arguably the ICCC’s most effective role is policy-implementation and improvement, a result of its successful overseas networking and connections with India-based business organizations. For example, its long-standing relationship with the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) resulted in Memoranda of Understanding to jointly promote Canadian businesses in India during the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi. In this inter-organization communication, these groups have identified key trade areas for bilateral growth, organizing with FICCI to send Indian representatives of small and medium businesses (SMEs) from these sectors to Canada. As noted by the ICCC Trade Committee Chair, Harjit Kalsi, SMEs “get little importance” in the bigger

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417 Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce. 2005. Report on Roundtable Discussions on “India 2020 and Canada India Relations” October 25. Toronto, Ontario; Both the CII and FICCI are government-supported, business organizations, with the mandate to contributed to the growth of business in India through international linkages and opportunities.

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picture of Canada-India trade relations. Thus, the ICCC “has setup shop to meet their requirements. These include services at a smaller level, language editing, transcribing, data processing, and accounting services.”418 Unlike the C-IBC, which focuses on large-scale business, the ICCC’s contribution focuses on these less-likely candidates for economic and trade growth between the two countries.

The ICCC also uses economic missions to conduct its own meetings with Indian economic and industry organizations, to gather information regarding trade opportunities and barriers between the two countries. It has additionally helped to set up meetings for Canadian ministers with Indian corporations and industry leaders, and has hosted numerous Indian businesses in Canada, most recently a Gujarat business delegation in September 2010. As discussed, the ICCC’s major advantage is its connections to Indian business and industry.419 These meetings are crucial to accomplishing the ICCC’s trade mandate, because they gather information useful for both the Canadian government and businesses interested in entering the Indian market.

Another example of the ICCC’s success at overseas networking is its participation in the Indian government's annual Pravasi Bharitya Divas (PBD) conferences. Every year since its formation in 2003, the ICCC has hosted a PBD panel on Canada-India trade links. For example, in 2009, the panel focused on “India as an Emerging Power: The Diaspora Factor,” while in 2010, the focus was on “Fostering Canada-India Trade: Role

of Small and Medium Industries.” The PBD is particularly important because the conference plays host to Indian Cabinet Ministers and Chief Ministers, who discuss “facilities and incentives available in their states for the overseas Indian community.”

The ICC's international profile has even helped it to set up a mini-Pravasi Bharatiya Divas in Toronto in 2011, co-hosted with the Indian High Commission. This mini-PBD will be held in conjunction with the 'Year of India in Canada' initiative that was announced in June 2010 by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Its Diaspora-centric connections that make it uniquely possible for the ICC to host the PBD.

In sum, the ICC differs from the CIF (and the C-IBC) because it focuses on Diaspora-centric and small-business trade between India and Canada. It is the connection between these two issues that have provided it with an important policy-implementation and perceptions-setting role in policy – particular in the areas of immigration and small-business in Canada.

**Challenges Confronting the ICC**

Like the CIF, the ICC faces some important challenges. First, the organization has difficulty coordinating its multiple mandates. While it continues to pursue improvements in the Canada-India trade relationship - such as overseas missions, hosting foreign trips and the PBD – the bulk of its activities are Diaspora-centred, professional-development events. This bifocal mandate has introduced divisiveness in its political

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421 Ibid.

strategy as the ICCC is only able to dedicate a portion of its resources to the Canada-India relationship.

Comparisons with other groups highlight another challenge for the ICCC. Discussed later in the chapter, the ICCC has sought to avoid duplication and redundancy between itself and the other two organizations. Sharing a ‘trade mandate’ with the Canada-India Business Council has limited the ICCC contribution to the economic dimension of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as an apolitical organization, the ICCC has not capitalized on its obvious strength in and unique contribution to Canada’s foreign policy towards India. In this domain, the ICCC is in the best position to advocate for the domestic interests of the Indo-Canadian community, including social services, immigration and political appointments. The subject of expanding and cross-cutting mandates is directly relevant to assessing the impact of these interest groups and will be discussed in more detail following the case studies.

3. Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC)

The C-IBC differs from the ICCC and the CIF in three important respects. First, it is an issue-based organization. Modelled on the US-India Business Council, its main objective is to promote business linkages between Canada and India. Rana Sarkar, its Executive Director, describes the C-IBC as an “apolitical organization that aims to bring together the ‘elite’ of Canadian businesses with the elite of Indian businesses.” The organization thus focuses on providing “advisory services that offer insight and

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423 Interview. Peter Sutherland, Former Canadian High Commissioner to India; Vice-Chairman, Canada-India Business Council. Toronto, Canada. August 17, 2010; Sutherland suggests that Indo-Canadian organizations with large Indian membership have gained clout because of voting blocs and contributions.

information, business intelligence, market entry and operation support.”425 In addition, the C-IBC advocates and promotes Indian investment into Canada, with a focus on sectors prioritized by the federal government, such as education, mining, and clean technology. While the C-IBC considers itself to be ‘apolitical,’ its lobbying efforts concentrate on easing the bureaucratic policies that have been a barrier to business activity between Canada and India. Within this role, the C-IBC’s long term goal is to become the 'go-to' organization in Canada for Indian trade and business.426

Second, the C-IBC differs from the ICCC and CIF as the only organization that is not entirely composed of Indo-Canadians. Instead, its Executive Council is made up of individuals with business and political experience in India. C-IBC Chairman Roy MacLaren was Minister for International Trade in Jean Chrétien’s government, while the C-IBC’s Vice-Chairs include Gary Comerford, Vice-President (Asia) for SunLife Financial (whose portfolio included Indian operations with Birla-SunLife Insurance Management), and Peter Sutherland, Canada's former High Commissioner to India between 2000 and 2003. The organization's Executive Director, Rana Sarkar, is a professional consultant on issues of cross-border trade.427

Finally, unlike the CIF and ICCC, the C-IBC accepts only corporate-level memberships that are reserved exclusively for organizations and businesses directly interested in the Indian market.428 Included among the C-IBC’s patron members are

426 Interview. Peter Sutherland, Former Canadian High Commissioner to India; Vice-Chairman, Canada-India Business Council. Toronto, Canada. August 17, 2010.
427 Ibid. Other the C-IBC’s expertise include Henry Lotin, former Canadian diplomat at the Canadian High Commission in India.
Sunlife Financial, RIM, Scotiabank, Bombardier, Cameco Limited, and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) -- all companies with successful business in India. Indo-Canadians play a role in the organization as members of the Board of Directors. Like the CIF, these include exceptionally successful members of the Indo-Canadian community, including Hon. Baljit Singh Chadha, President of Balcorp Limited, Subbiah Srinivasan, President of Met-Chem Canada Inc, and Akhilesh Tripathi, Regional Director Canada – Tata Consultancy Services.

*Political Resources and Lobbying Strategies*

The C-IBC doubles as both an advisory and an advocacy organization. As a business organization, its success cannot be measured by the adoption of specific policies or the passing of particular legislation. Rather, it focuses its efforts on creating networking forums, laying the groundwork for policy implementation, researching policy papers, engaging in trade missions and implementing trade policies for Canada-India stakeholders.

The C-IBC has been successful as an information-provider for businesses interested in India. The nuclear file is an important example. Henry Lotin, Vice-Director of the Canada-India Business Council, notes that the Canadian government harshly sanctioned India after its 1998 nuclear test. Despite these sanctions, there were still numerous important goods and services that were legal to trade with India, yet organizations were wary of all nuclear-related trade.429 This wariness, coupled with the opaque legislation and the limited research capacity within the business community, caused many organizations to unnecessarily terminate all economic links with India.429

Within the context of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the C-IBC's specific expertise in trade legislation allows members to counsel organizations dealing with contemporary nuclear trade negotiations. For example, during last year’s discussions of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the C-IBC was invited to take part in business-side talks regarding nuclear trade. As a result, it has actively encouraged its members, such as Cameco and AECL, to sign contracts with companies in the Indian nuclear industry. After the NCA is ratified in parliament, these businesses will be able to officially begin fulfilling these contracts.  

C-IBC's research and information capacity is not only beneficial to member businesses, but has also been an important source of information for the government. In early 2007 and in 2010, the Department of Foreign Affairs invited members of the C-IBC and the Canadian Conference of Chief Executives (CCCE) to lead two fact-finding missions to India. During the missions, Roy MacLaren and John Manley met with Indian politicians and business people as part of an effort to uncover impediments to trade between the two states. Both missions established a foundation for political negotiations aimed at a Canada-India Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPPA), which was seen as a crucial precursor to an eventual Canada-India free trade agreement. These missions found that Canadian businesses were leery about entering the Indian market because of corruption, the difficulty of obtaining leases on land, and the unavailability of social services. The C-IBC’s information mission was able to

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431 Interview. Peter Sutherland, Former Canadian High Commissioner to India; Vice-Chairman, Canada-India Business Council. Toronto, Canada. August 17, 2010.
identify these inhibitors to Canada-India trade. Resulting agreements, such as the FIPPA and even the NCA, aim to ease the difficulties of doing business between the two countries.

Another C-IBC strength is its matchmaking capability, “[which is] what a business council does if it does its job properly,” according to Henry Lotin, Vice-Director of the C-IBC. In this way, the C-IBC has successfully fostered strong relationships between governments and business that would not otherwise exist. These include organizing smaller, more informal meetings rather than larger, member-centric events typical of the ICCC or CIF. For example, during the G-20, the C-IBC organized an invitation-only business meeting between its members, selected political officials and Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chair of India’s Planning Committee. The organization also planned an intimate event with Sachin Pilot, India's Minister of Communications and Information, to discuss businesses opportunities in information technologies. The C-IBC organized personal meetings with Minister Pilot and its patron-members – Research In Motion, SunLife Financial and Bennett Jones LLB, a law-firm specializing in oil and gas, climate change, and trade law and public policy - before Pilot addressed 60-person, invitation-only crowd.

These networking meetings are complemented by C-IBC’s larger events - for example, during the G-20 meetings the government approached both the C-IBC and the ICCC to submit lists of organizations, businesses and Indo-Canadians to invite to the gala

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434 As mentioned previously, Montek Singh Ahluwalia is arguably the most powerful bureaucrat in India. The Planning Commission controls all government monetary transactions, writes the Union budget alongside Finance Minister and does medium and long-term planning for India’s fiscal plan.
dinner, the VIP reception and meetings. Not only have these events provided networking opportunities between Cabinet-level politicians and businesses, they have also provided the C-IBC with a forum to articulate its interests. In other words, as a business organization, it uses these events to communicate what it sees as the major barriers to trade between the two countries.

C-IBC's 'matchmaking' abilities are not limited to events in Canada. During its trade missions - the C-IBC has led business-only missions in addition to official trade visits – it has secured industry-related meetings for Canadian political officials in India. For example, during Prime Minister Harper's visit to India in November 2009, the C-IBC, the Chamber of Indian Industry (CII) and Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) – India’s most important business organizations – were responsible for scheduling his business meetings in Mumbai and Delhi. The C-IBC has also played this role for visits to India by Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty, Minister Stockwell Day, and Minister Jim Flaherty. The preceding list demonstrates two crucial characteristics of the C-IBC. First, it highlights the C-IBC’s various levels of access in Canadian politics, which include federal Cabinet ministers, provincial premiers and the Prime Minister. Second, it underlines the benefits of the C-IBC's overseas connections, which have proven to be useful for networking between Canadian officials and business

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438 Rick Westhead. 2009. “Passage to India opportunity missed.” October 17. Toronto Star. <http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/711721--passage-to-india-opportunity-missed> (Accessed: September 3, 2010). In its matchmaking capacity, one of the C-IBC's major negotiations is with companies such as Air Canada. With no direct flights between Canada and India, business opportunities between the two countries are limited by the distance and time it takes to travel.
stakeholders in India.

*Assessing the C-IBC’s Impact on Canada-India Relations*

The Canada-India Business Council’s most important role is policy-implementation. While the Canada-India NCA has approved nuclear trade, businesses are still required to establish contacts, sign contracts, and set up a physical presence overseas. Consequently, company representatives must address the challenges of the Indian market, which include the bureaucracy, corruption, finding a market niche, pricing within a competitive market, and creating confidence in the Canadian brand.\(^{439}\)

The Harper government's prioritization of economic relations has put the C-IBC in a good position to influence the direction and the success of government initiatives. Moreover as the only organization made up of non-Indo-Canadian businesses and executives, it is not limited by the “Indo-Canadianness” that characterizes other organizations. In other words, while the CIF and ICCC are seen as organizations that work to advance the goals of the Diaspora, the C-IBC is seen to serve a pan-Canadian set of concerns, albeit filtered through the lens of the Indo-Canadian community.

It is this perception, coupled with its business-focused mandate, which have made it possible for the C-IBC to establish important linkages with other business councils and chambers of commerce in Canada. Members of the C-IBC’s Executive and Board of Directors are also involved with other organizations that share a similar mandate. For example, Peter Sutherland, C-IBC Vice-Chair and former Canadian High Commissioner to India, is a member of the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce and serves on the Board

of Directors for the Toronto-chapter of The Indus Entrepreneurs (TIE). The C-IBC has also worked in tandem with the Ontario Chamber of Commerce (OCC) and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE). Connections with these organizations are useful for several reasons. In addition to sharing information and resources, by having access to businesses represented by the OCC and CCCE, introduces the Indian market to organizations that would have otherwise not thought about its opportunities. Second, its association with these organizations provides it with additional government access. For example, John Manley is the CCCE’s current Chairman. Despite being a former member of the Liberal caucus, he has important connections within the current government useful for the C-IBC’s mandate. These additional resources, not as readily available to the ICCC or CIF, improve the C-IBC’s ability to impact Canada’s trade policies towards India.

Challenges Confronting the C-IBC

Despite the C-IBC's business expertise, it faces several organizational challenges. Unlike the Canada-India Foundation, which has both financial liquidity and human resources, the C-IBC’s small executive has a limited lobbying capacity. In other words, its services are not substantive enough to represent large organizations like Research in Motion (RIM), who prefer to negotiate directly with high-ranking Indian political officials. This was the case with the recent privacy negotiations between RIM and the

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440 John Manley has developed a good relationship with the Conservative government, particularly after he commissioned his ‘Afghanistan’ report’

Indian government, in which the latter sought to access encrypted metadata from all India-based Blackberry transmissions and threatened, in the absence of this information, to shut down RIM’s Indian operations. RIM and India’s Communications Ministry agreed to a 60-day moratorium, anticipating further negotiations after this period. Centrally, the C-IBC must decide if it wants to work with larger businesses or if the most important value-added service is to focus on small and medium-sized businesses that are interested in penetrating the Indian market.

As part of its ongoing reorganization, the C-IBC must also identify a niche for itself that is different from those occupied by the other Indo-Canadian organizations. The C-IBC recognizes that the implicit competition that exists between the organizations - as a result of having areas of issue overlap - weakens the effectiveness of each organization at achieving their shared broad mandate. Until now, informal discussions have yielded an agreement to coordinate rather than compete. In operational terms, this means that meetings, trade visits, communication and information will all need to be shared amongst the organizations.  

While the ICCC has chapters across Canada, the C-IBC is also challenged by its location in Toronto because it lacks a national presence. This means that industries of interest to India that are located in other parts of Canada are unable to access C-IBC services -- one clear illustration is India’s growing interest in oil and gas exploration technologies used in the Alberta tar sands and for off-shore exploration.

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442 It was suggested that previous discussions have occurred about a merger have resulted in the ICCC offering to takeover the work of the C-IBC. ICCC sees itself as umbrella group.

443 Interview. Peter Sutherland, Former Canadian High Commissioner to India; Vice-Chairman, Canada-India Business Council. Toronto, Canada. August 17, 2010.
4. Comparing the CIF, ICCC and C-IBC

Several important similarities and differences emerge from studying these three organizations. Broadly speaking, the findings suggest that all three fulfil mutually-complimentary roles that positively influence Canada-India relations. The findings derived from the preceding analysis are summarized in the Table and discuss at length below:

Table 6.1 Comparing the Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>CIF</th>
<th>ICCC</th>
<th>C-IBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Resources</td>
<td>Funding for lobbying from members’ personal donations and endowments.</td>
<td>Memberships, sponsorships and fundraisers are the basis for its funding</td>
<td>Similar funding as the ICCC; is also the recipient of DFAIT grants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>Policy-oriented. Focused on policy-issues within the Canada-India relationship.</td>
<td>Domestic focus. Professional development. Mandate includes improved Canada-India trade.</td>
<td>Facilitating growth of Canadian business into India and Indian business to Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size/Organization</td>
<td>Small, leadership is divided into three small, overlapping groups.</td>
<td>Large, divided into 10 sub-committees. Led by an Executive Committee and Board of Advisors.</td>
<td>Medium, lead by an Executive and Board of Directors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Non-partisan, very policy focused.</td>
<td>Non-partisan, moderately policy focused.</td>
<td>Non-partisan, policy interests limited to the removal of trade barriers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant Issue Areas</td>
<td>Indo-Canadian political engagement, Nuclear Agreement,</td>
<td>Promotion of Diaspora issues and concerns within</td>
<td>Limited to the trade, services and economic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As found in chapter two, homogeneity within an ethnic Diaspora is essential for political influence -- in its ethnic composition and political objectives. Divisiveness in these two areas inevitably dilutes the political message and undermines the effectiveness of lobbying activities. This is even more crucial within this research because it examines three separate ‘representative’ organizations that work towards improving Canada-India relations. However, this research has found that the relationship between these groups has been largely cooperative. Generally speaking, all three organizations share a homogenous political message – improving relations between Canada and India. This is not to undermine their differences in administration, management and policy-focus. However, this study has found that these are surface differences, which have created niche roles for each organization instead of infighting or reducing lobbying effectiveness.

**Homogeneity: Cooperation between Organizations**

Thus, cooperation between the groups is explained by two-levels of homogeneity. First, while all organizations share an interest to improve Canada-India relations, each organization has tailored their lobbying efforts to support unique elements of Ottawa’s India policy. Each organization has a self-appointed sector - the CIF is focused on policy-dialogue, the C-IBC on business relations, and the ICCC on Diaspora representation and Canada-India trade. For instance, the ICCC’s Diaspora focus has
oriented its Canada-India trade policy towards Indo-Canadians interested in the Indian market. Its community-based roundtables, professional-development seminars and workshops have focused on information-gathering and networking rather than on influencing policy. By contrast, the C-IBC’s trade mandate aims to remove the barriers to Indian trade for its clientele, and does not include a professional development or Diaspora-centred services component. Nevertheless, their functions combined to produce mutually reinforcing pressures that facilitate overall improvements to the Canada-India relationship. These cooperative differences have been recognized by Ottawa, which has tailored its interactions with these organizations dependent on ‘niche’ area.

*Figure 6.1 Niche Roles of Indo-Canadian Organizations*

Second, these groups share homogeneity at their executive-levels. This research has found significant overlap in the leadership of these organizations. With a small number of active Indo-Canadians in Toronto - where all three organizations are headquartered - it is likely that many of the same representatives attend the same
functions, roundtables and meetings. The Canada-India Foundation, for instance, sees itself as the natural successor to the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce. Many of its Charter members are former ICCC Presidents and Directors, including Aditya Jha, Sujit Babra, Ajit Someshwar and Ramesh Chotai. CIF members continue to attend and even sponsor ICCC events, publications, and awards. Similarly, many C-IBC Directors have roles in the ICCC. For example, both Peter Sutherland and Gary Comerford are part of the ICCC’s Advisory Board, while several members of the ICCC are also on the C-IBC’s advocacy work.

This means that there are established lines of communication and friendly relations between the organizations, suggesting that cooperation on activities and associated pressures on Ottawa are more likely. Evidence of this cooperation is apparent in many activities run by these organizations. For example, all three organizations share strategies and activities, including co-hosting delegations and combining networking efforts in India. The Canada-India Business Roundtable with Minister David Emerson, for instance, was a co-organized event between the ICCC and the C-IBC. As well, the CIF and the ICCC have worked together on Gujarat-related events, including a 2008 teleconference with Chief Minister Modi and a co-hosted Gujarat-trade delegation in September 2010. These efforts serve as an important mechanism to build on the combined strengths of the organizations involved – such as the ICCC’s connection to the Diaspora and the CIF’s elite-connections. This would suggest that areas in which efforts have merged would see the most successful policy ‘influence,’ as represented by the graph below:

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444 Even with the formation of the CIF, many of the organizations represented by these individuals continue to donate and sponsor ICCC activities.
Figure 6.2: Leadership Overlap between Organizations

This diagram makes two important points about the relationship between these organizations. First, inter-organizational overlap only exists between the ICCC and the other two organizations. As discussed above, the ICCC’s two-pronged mandate means that it has shared interests with the other two organizations. Further, ‘leadership overlap’ is only evident between the ICCC/CIF and ICCC/C-IBC. At the same time, there is little organizational connection between the CIF and C-IBC. Instead, their commonality comes from their similar interests, improving the relationship between Canada and India.

However, the previous analysis is not meant to imply that the relationship between these groups is seamless. As pointed out in previous sections, the government’s focus on economic relations has forced the CIF to adopt trade issues within its mandate, alongside the C-IBC and ICCC. Often times, there is evidence of redundancy and overlap in political strategies. One example typically occurs during Indian Ministerial
visits. Given the visitors' busy schedules the three main organizations often compete for meeting timeslots. Moreover, each meeting often hears similar speeches, and indeed features a similar group of audience members. For instance, Transportation Minister Kamal Nath has visited Canada three times since 2007 and has met separately with all three Indo-Canadian organizations. Attempts to consolidate these meetings have resulted in some resistance, perhaps because of embedded perceptions of the importance of their respective mandates.

This being said, the evidence does not suggest maliciousness or competition between the organizations. It does, however, imply that there are wasted resources due to poor coordination. This is less important given the concentration of Canada-India relations in economic areas, as all organizations are generally focused on similar issues. However, with the expansion of the bilateral relationship, these organizations must improve their coordination as to not undermine efforts in bilateral relations.

_Elite Concentration and Political Resources_

As the previous sections have shown, all three organizations have amassed significant financial resources to conduct their lobbying activities. Indo-Canadian groups have also created important networks that connect them to the most influential parts of Canadian society and overseas interests. Their ability to do so is made easier by the concentration of leadership in the hands of a small group of influential individuals within the Indo-Canadian community. In this vein, members of the CIF, C-IBC and ICCC have created broader networks (beyond these organizations) to facilitate various parts of their respective mandates are also noteworthy.

For instance, former C-IBC President Kam Rathee has founded an organization
called the *Canada-India Education Council* (CIEC), whose mandate is to improve education links between Canada and India through student and faculty exchanges, 'brand-building' for Canada at Indian post-secondary institutions, and lobbying governments to remove education-related barriers.\footnote{445} This mandate is in line with efforts by the other three organizations to make it easier for highly-skilled, professional class immigrants to come to Canada.\footnote{446} The C-IBC’s Vice-President, Peter Sutherland chairs the Canadian branch of *The Indus Entrepreneurs* (TIE), an 40-chapter, international organization representing South Asian business, while Ajit Khanna, former ICCC President now runs ‘Panorama India,’ an umbrella cultural organization. Panorama India will work in conjunction with the ICCC to run the 2011 celebration ‘Year of India in Canada.’\footnote{447}

These fluid sets of relationships across multiple organizations extend to other professional, foreign policy and business organizations crucial to Canada-India relations, and provide the community with a variety of tools to influence the Canadian government.\footnote{448} For example, Pradeep Sood, a former President of the ICCC, is now Chair of the Ontario Chamber of Commerce (OCC), an umbrella organization

\footnote{445} Canada India Education Council. 2010. “About Us.” <http://www.canadaindiaeducation.com/AboutUs.aspx> (Accessed: September 29, 2010). The CIEC is running its first conference on 'Synergy' in September 2010, which has attracted many of the key players from the India portfolio, including the Indian High Commissioner, Consul General in Toronto, former Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew, the Shastri-Indo-Canada Institute and others.


\footnote{447} The Indus Entrepreneurs. 2010. “Fostering Entrepreneurship Globally – Main Page.” <http://www.tie.org/> (Accessed: September 20, 2010); Interview. Peter Sutherland, Former Canadian High Commissioner to India; Vice-Chairman, Canada-India Business Council. Toronto, Canada. August 17, 2010; Sutherland notes that TIE’s Toronto chapter continues to largely be Indo-Canadian in composition, and focuses on doing business in India.

representing 60,000 Ontario-based businesses. Primarily focused on trade with the United States, the OCC has lately taken a growing interest in China and India. As an Indo-Canadian involved in various aspects of the community, Sood’s work has been facilitated by his knowledge of, and experience with, the cultural boundaries and business environment in India. His connections with Diaspora organizations, particularly the ICCC, have had a mutually beneficial effect. On one hand, it facilitates their access to the OCC’s political resources and connections. On the other hand, the OCC benefits from the knowledge and experience of these organizations within the Indian market.

Several other examples underline the strong connections that have been forged by Indo-Canadians, entrenched in important Canadian political and financial institutions. For example, Honourable Baljit Chadha, a Director of the C-IBC, was appointed to a five-year term as member of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in 2003. This position made him a member of the Queen’s Privy Council of Canada, the highest non-political appointment for any Indo-Canadian. As mentioned earlier, the CIF’s Ajit Someshwar was one of eleven experts invited to form Minister Flaherty’s Economic Advisory Council, Gopal Bhatangar, an ICCC member, is Chief of Staff at Trillium Hospital in Toronto, and C-IBC Executive Director Rana Sarkar, has been invited to be a Senior fellow at the Munk School for Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.

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449 Mr. Sood's 2009-10 mandate was renewed for another year, and the OCC will retain him as Chair until 2011. While the OCC's mandate has focused on the reduction of taxes for Ontario business, linkages to cross-border economic opportunities and fair practices across Canada, they also include foreign trade and economic diversification. Please see: Ontario Chamber of Commerce (OCC). 2010. “Governance.” <http://occ.on.ca/about-us/board-of-directors/board-profiles/> (Accessed: September 10, 2010).

450 Sood’s office is also headquartered at the offices of Skylink Aviation Ltd. Skylink’s Founder and President is Sujit Babra, the first Chairman of the Canada-India Foundation.

451 India Abroad. 2008. “Togetherness with a Difference – Baljit and Roshni Chadha.” The Power List 2008. Rediff Publication, September, 8. The Chadhas are on the Board of Governors for both Concordia and McGill Universities. Further, they have taken an exhibit of Canadian-Inuit art to India.
Viewed together, these positions draw an important web of connections within a concentrated community that provide clout and an improved perception of the Indo-Canadian community’s advocacy for improved relations between Canada and India.

Role of Ethnicity

Indo-Canadian organizations differ from traditional interest groups (e.g., labour, human rights, feminist or environmental groups) because ‘ethnicity’, as a foundational principle, plays an important ‘dual’ role in their political interests and strategic activities. As a determinant of political interests, the evidence has shown that ethnicity is a sufficient, but not necessary characteristic for Indo-Canadian groups. In other words, ethnically heterogeneous groups – such as the C-IBC – have also demonstrated a dedicated effort towards improving relations between Canada and India. On the other hand, ethnicity is a sufficient explanation for why the CIF and ICCC have an interest in developing bilateral relations. Intrinsically, their shared identity between the two countries has fostered interest in improving bilateral linkages.

The more interesting finding, however, is the role of ethnicity as a strategic characteristic. It was hypothesized earlier that ethnically homogeneous groups are more likely to be effective lobbyists due to reduced divisions in their interests and objectives. To an extent, the research has found that ethnic identity is a strategic determinant of effective policy influence for all three organizations.
Table 6.2 Ethnicity of the Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Composition</th>
<th>ICC</th>
<th>CIF</th>
<th>C-IBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Indo-Canadian executives, with few non-Indo-Canadian individual and corporate members</td>
<td>Executive, Administrators and Charter Members are Indo-Canadian.</td>
<td>Large portion of the executive is non-Indo-Canadian. Corporate Members are largely non-Indo-Canadian.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>Diaspora-focused, grassroots-economic opportunities</td>
<td>Policy-orientation, correcting the image of India within the Canadian government and bureaucracy</td>
<td>Removal of economic barriers to trade.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, the effects of ethnicity are more evident within the CIF and ICC, but the C-IBC has also benefited from the presence of Indo-Canadians within its Executive offices.\(^{452}\) Indo-Canadian connections have helped both Canadian government and business navigate the Indian market by organizing networking opportunities, regulatory red-tape, and information-gathering. As Pradeep Sood argues, business is established through the existence of “common ground ... Being [Indo-Canadian] helps open the door.”\(^{453}\) Further, the research has found that ethnicity is an important strategic tool because it has helped develop international and transnational relationships. For its part,

\(^{452}\) Telephone Interview. Deepak Obhrai. Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Calgary, Alberta. September 16, 2010. This approach has raised the opinion of the Conservatives within the larger Indo-Canadian community. Earlier, it was suggested that ethnic homogeneity within the Diaspora was challenged by separatist elements of the Sikh community. It hypothesized that Khalistan elements negatively affect the relationship between Canada and India, but prompt anti-Indian sentiment within the larger Canadian society. The research has found that the divisiveness of the Sikh community has been neutralized in Canada-India relations. Interestingly, there has been a symbiotic response by both the government and Indo-Canadian interest groups vis-a-vis fundamentalist interests within the Sikh community. First, Khalistan interests have been involved with federal lobbying. Growing divisions within the Sikh community itself have lessened the potency of Khalistan separatism. Khalistan separatism still exists in Canada, but supporters have turned their attention to the community itself, as opposed to trying to gain support from the larger Canadian community or the government. Second, the Harper government has made deliberate efforts to close government access points for separatist groups to influence policy.

New Delhi has facilitated executive- and elite-level meetings, organized conferences and engaged with its Diaspora as a proxy to get the attention of the Canadian government. These overseas connections have also provided useful leverage points when attempting to influence the Canadian government, allowing Diaspora organizations to engage in track-two diplomacy between the Canadian and Indian governments.  

However, the research has also found that the effect of ethnicity - as a basis for policy influence - is greatly magnified when coupled with socio-economic success. Thus, influential groups are those that have an ethnic connection to India and come from an elite socio-economic class. Largely, this finding confirms the elite-centric conclusions of Presthus and Pratt, as discussed in chapter two. Both authors argued that business lobbies differ from grassroots-organizations because the former belong to an ‘elite-consensus’ with government. They have financial resources and interests that complement government objectives. Similarly, this chapter has found that a combination of ethnic affiliation and economic success determines interest and corresponding influence in Canadian foreign policy.

In light of this, Indo-Canadian organizations play two important roles. In addition to their personal success and lobbying accomplishments, organization members - and

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455 Non-Indian businesses have also been important to developing Canada-India relations, as “companies with non-Indian executives in agricultural, infrastructure, power and energy, environment, roads and highways have been steadily growing their businesses in India.” There are numerous examples of these businesses which include SunLife Financial, Bombardier, and Lea Financial. Thus, the dissertation finds that the combination of economic success with Indo-Canadian background that is significant.
influential members of the Indo-Canadian community more generally - are making an important contribution to Canada. This includes being politically active on more than just Diaspora issues and Canada-India relations -- it also includes mentoring, financial contributions and volunteering. Aditya Jha, for instance, has sponsored scholarships for Aboriginal students at George Brown College in Toronto. As well, members of the CIF recently established a ‘Tribute to Fallen Soldiers’ Memorial to honour Canada’s war veterans. The event attracted representatives from all the federal political parties as well as national media coverage.

Second, the organizations can publicize the fact that the Indo-Canadian Diaspora has worked to address Canada’s previous invisibility in India as effective cross-country brand ambassadors. Ryan Touhey explains, “the Diaspora is an accessible and inexpensive form of public diplomacy. The image of India in Canada is being sculpted by the Diaspora as it continues to flourish.”

Similarly, India’s Vice-Consul General in Toronto notes that the Diaspora’s personal success “speaks volumes about what India can provide to the world.”

It is economic success that has rectified the negative image of India within the Canadian political establishment. As Yossi Shain notes, “the involvement of ethnic groups in politics is [an] indication that the community has 'arrived' into mainstream society.”

For example, the current CIF Chairman, Ramesh Chotai has built schools in his native Gujarat, naming them after key Canadian landmarks and individuals, such as the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Secondary School, and has rebuilt

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456 Personal correspondence with Ryan Touhey, Assistant Professor, Department of History, St. Jerome’s University. July 13, 2010.
villages now named after Toronto's Bloor, Dundas and Yonge Streets.\textsuperscript{459}

5. Conclusion

This chapter has three central objectives. First, it provided an investigation of the similarities and differences between the three organizations studied within this project. In this way, the research hypothesised that an ethnic interest group will have successful influence on foreign policy, if it has the following characteristics: financial and political resources, internal homogeneity, centrally-organized, large-membership and elite-level connections. To a large extent, this chapter has found mixed results – organizations like the C-IBC have a homogeneous ethnic composition but have access to crucial financial resources, while the ICCC has a Diaspora-centric membership, but lacks organizational cohesion. Yet, both organizations have exhibited influence on foreign policy. As highlighted in chapter four, these organizations have evidenced different types of influence, including policy-implementation, perceptions-editing and agenda-setting.

Thus, this chapter concludes that that these ‘enabling’ characteristics have an additive relationship with one another. In other words, the absence of one characteristic (e.g. financial resources) does not disconfirm the ability for an interest group to have influence on policy. However, the more ‘enabling conditions’ present for an organization, the more likely they are to be successful. Further, the chapter found that ‘missing’ enabling conditions are less crucial because of the mutually-supportive relationship between organizations. In other words, the shortcomings of one organization are fulfilled by the others. Thus, homogeneity between organizations has allowed for niche roles in

the larger picture of Canada-India relations.

Third, this chapter provides an empirical foundation for the theoretical, political and methodological conclusions in chapter seven. The findings from chapter five (access to government) and this chapter (internal characteristics) will lead to conclusions about each organization’s contribution to Canada’s foreign policy towards India.
Chapter Seven: Findings and Conclusions

The previous chapters provide compelling evidence of how Indo-Canadian organizations have acquired increasing access to government officials and departments. Through a variety of lobbying strategies these groups have influenced the conduct and substance of Ottawa’s priorities vis-a-vis India. The final chapter will explore the connections between the Indo-Canadian organizations and Canadian foreign policy outcomes. The arguments will unfold in four stages. First, the findings from Chapters five and six are evaluated with specific reference to the enabling conditions (and hypotheses) outlined in Chapter four. Part two will use these findings to construct an explanation for the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that clarifies the role and influence of the Indo-Canadian organizations. Section three will address the implications of these findings with specific emphasis on how the results challenge conventional wisdom on the role of ethnic lobbies in Canadian foreign policy. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the contributions of the comparative case study approach more generally and suggests avenues for future research on these important questions.

1. Research Findings

The central objective of this research has been to establish a clearer explication of how, beyond conventional accounts, three Indian ethnic interest groups influence Canada-India relations and other important aspects of Ottawa’s foreign policies and priorities. To
measure this influence, Chapter four introduced two causal mechanisms (independent variables) through which policy influence is manifest - access to government (see Chapter five) and internal organization (see Chapter six). These main causal mechanisms were then sub-divided into several ‘enabling conditions’ that facilitate access and improve the organizations’ capacity to satisfy their mandate.

With respect to the enabling conditions associated with access, the research findings are summarized below:

*Table 7.1 Assessing ‘Access to Government’: Enabling Conditions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>CIF</th>
<th>ICCC</th>
<th>C-IBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a) Policy Congruence</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade and Investment</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Issues (i.e.: Air India)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b) Issue Salience (Bilateral Relations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c) Ethnic Votes/Ethnopolitics</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1d) Availability of Access Points</td>
<td>Opposition Members</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cabinet-Level</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indo-Canadian MP</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister/PMO</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results support the view that Indo-Canadian organizations have acquired important access to the Canadian government at various levels. However, there are important differences among the three organizations that should be noted. With respect to the first enabling condition – policy congruence - the research found that all three organizations had a relatively high level of congruence with government interests. Unsurprisingly, there are slight differences between the CIF and the ICCC on matters of
trade and investment and nuclear relations, due to the differences in their mandates. Similarly, the C-IBC’s exclusive focus on trade anticipated little policy congruence on immigration and domestic policy. On the other hand, issue salience was ranked high for all three organizations due largely to the emphasis placed on India within the Harper government. Generally, on these two measures, there was little differentiation between the three organizations. This would suggest, thus far, that these organizations would have a similar type of policy influence.

This being said, the largest difference between the organizations was their effect on ethnopolitics. With its large membership, the ICCC is the only grassroots-oriented organization. For this reason, Ottawa has treated the ICCC as a ‘go-to’ organization to communicate with the Indo-Canadian Diaspora and consequently, has had a surprising level of access to government officials. The final measure – availability of access points – resulted in a surprising finding. Cabinet-level members have been the most accessible for Indo-Canadian organizations, particularly Ministers Jason Kenney and Stockwell Day. These two Ministers have both been at the forefront of Canada-India relations, and their personal proximity to the Prime Minister provides the Indo-Canadian community with a greater level of policy influence. On the other hand, the results found that Indo-Canadian Members of Parliament have been considerably less effective than expected as ambassadors promoting the bilateral relationship. As seen in chapter five, backbench Indo-Canadian MPs have shown little initiative on the India file, with the exception of Parliamentary Secretary Deepak Obhrai, who has been an active proponent of the bilateral relationship even as a backbench Member of Parliament.

As established in Chapter five, the Canadian government has actively sought out the Indo-Canadian community. From this growing relationship, they have provided government officials with valuable insights into opportunities in India, help to educate officials about India’s political culture, and have helped to overcome economic, social and political barriers to strengthening bilateral relations with India. In combination with the second key independent variable – *internal organization* – the findings reveal an important correlation accounting for the level ethnic group influence in this case. The findings from Chapter six are summarized below:

*Table 7.2 Comparing the Internal Composition of Indo-Canadian Groups*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling Conditions</th>
<th>CIF</th>
<th>ICCC</th>
<th>C-IBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2a) Financial and Political Resources</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b) Internal Homogeneity</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Messaging</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c) Centrally-Organized</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d) Large Membership</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2e) Elite-Level Connections</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On internal organization, the research reveals significant differences between the three organizations. For example, the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce ranked ‘low’ on measures homogeneity in their political message and centralized organization, suggesting that the two measures are interrelated. In this way, the ICCC has expanded its Executive – which now includes sub-committees on bilateral trade, youth development, information technologies and events – to incorporate its wide mandate. In contrast, the
C-IBC unsurprisingly ranked low on ethnic homogeneity. As discussed in the previous chapter, this low ranking has not affected its ability to actively seek improvement in the bilateral trade relationship. This raises questions as to the role of ethnicity as a sufficient determinant of influence. Finally, the Canada-India Foundation ranked high on most enabling conditions – excluding large membership. However, this ‘low’ ranking on membership has not adversely affected its ability to influence policy at the federal level.

These differences allow for an assessment of policy influence. If the following enabling conditions are found to be present, the following types of influence can be expected:

Table 7.3 – Types of Policy Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling Conditions</th>
<th>Expected Influence</th>
<th>CIF</th>
<th>ICC</th>
<th>C-IBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a., 2a., 2d.</td>
<td>policy-implementation</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a., 1d., 2a., 2b.</td>
<td>policy-improvement</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate/Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a., 1b., 2b., 2d., 2e.</td>
<td>perceptions-editing</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a., 1b., 1d., 2a., 2b, 2d.</td>
<td>agenda-setting</td>
<td>Moderate/High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a., 1b., 1c., 1d., 2b.,2c., 2e.</td>
<td>policy-making</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate/Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3 confirms many of the important research hypotheses and empirical findings from earlier chapters. However, the comparison also leads to some unexpected

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461 The rankings for this graph where determined by combining the findings in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. Each ranking was given a value: High=3, Medium=2, Low=1. Scores for each variable were added and divided by the number of variables. For example: Policy-Implementation is determined by variables 1a, 2a, 2d. The CIF ranked 1a: high (3), 2a: high (3), 2d: low (1) = 7/3 = 2.3. Which would give it a moderate rank. For combined measures, such as issue congruence – an average score was used to represent the variables.
findings. Most importantly, the results confirm that the CIF is the most influential Indo-Canadian organization. It has actively lobbied for specific outcomes within the Canada-India relationship, including opening of Canadian trade offices in India, improving relations with Gujarat, easier access to visas and changes to immigration policy. In contrast, both the economic organizations – ICCC and C-IBC – scored low on direct policy-influence. As expected, both organizations have evidenced a strong policy-implementation role, and moderate perceptions-editing and policy-improvement roles. The C-IBC has encouraged Canadian business in India (and vice versa) by identifying barriers to trade between the countries. The ICCC role has been to include the Diaspora in matters of trade and government relations. These differences suggest that the C-IBC and the ICCC have created facilitating conditions for the policy work done by the CIF.

Second, the findings show that all three organizations only had a ‘moderate’ effect on agenda-setting. This can be explained by policy congruence and salience. Because both the government and organizations shared interests, ‘agenda-setting’ was not a crucial form of influence. Indo-Canadian organizations helped developed policy-areas and called attention to important bilateral issues, with little resistance from the Harper government.

Finally, all three organizations have contributed to perceptions-editing. The largest impediment to bilateral relations is perceptual bias between Canada and India. On one hand, policy implementation has been inhibited because of a “systemic bias against India [that] persists in the Canadian bureaucracy.”462 Within business circles,

462 Times of India. 2010. “Canada mum, Indo-Canadians blame ‘anti-India’ bureaucracy.” 28 May. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/> (Accessed: September 10, 2010); The CIF has advocated that Canada appoint professional or business-leaders as its High Commissioner, rather than the current practice which appoints bureaucrats to the position.
India is still perceived to be a distant country with an overburdened bureaucracy.\(^{463}\) On the other hand, due to Canada’s isolation from India after the 1974 nuclear tests, Canada still does not have a high profile in India. As discussed in the next section, the three organizations have effectively addressed this limitation through their various activities.

2. What does this mean for Canadian Foreign Policy?

The findings reveal another important by-product of issue congruence -- the formation of a mutually inter-dependent and reinforcing relationship between Indo-Canadian ethnic organizations and the Canadian government. Previously, Watanabe has argued that policymakers and ethnic interest groups are ‘mutually supportive.’ While interest groups “need policymakers to do something for them,” policymakers in turn gain “information, votes and campaign contributions.”\(^{464}\) This dissertation takes Watanabe’s argument significantly further, because they go well beyond his focus on electoral benefits. By contrast, this case study shows that ‘mutual benefit’ comes from the Indo-Canadian Diaspora’s contribution to foreign policy development and implementation. Previous research in Canadian foreign policy has made a similar connection. Studies of the Ottawa process to ban landmines, for example, found that NGOs were central to agenda-setting and administrative roles during negotiations. In this research, shown in chapter six, the Diaspora’s transnational relationships, its knowledge of the Canadian and Indian markets and expertise in business has provided the government with important


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tools to pursue its foreign policy towards India. One such policy is the Canada-India nuclear agreement.

*Explaining the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement*

Conventional wisdom about Canada’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India typically excludes the role and influence of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora. However, the evidence indicates that the Indo-Canadian community has tended to treat the nuclear deal as a *means* to improving the larger Canada-India relationship, which in turn has affected how these organizations have sought influence over Canada’s pursuit of the deal.

With respect to identifying an appropriate theory, neoclassical realism (NCR) is an important theoretical framework that can be used to clarify the role of Indo-Canadian groups on foreign policy. In particular, the framework focuses on the *process* of decision-making rather than the decision itself. Consequently, NCR allows for the possibility that domestic groups have an indirect influence on policy if they are able to affect a decision-makers’ perceptions of a particular issue. In this vein, Indo-Canadian organizations have had an important indirect effect on the Canadian government’s decision to sign the nuclear deal by creating the *contextual conditions* to improve many aspects of the relationship thus allowing the Canadian government to be confident in the mutually reinforcing benefits of pursuing the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

Given the history of negative relations between Canada and India – particularly in the field of nuclear politics – signing the NCA was possible because of perceptual shift within the government. For Canada, India has been a nuclear pariah state, outside the
behavioural norms of the non-proliferation regime. Thus, Indo-Canadian lobbying was
directed towards creating the link between economic benefits and nuclear power. For
example, the CIF’s Energy Forum highlighted the opportunities available through nuclear
trade between the two countries. Importantly, the discussions were not limited to nuclear
relations; rather it examined all areas of energy cooperation. Thus, it had the effect of
normalizing nuclear power by comparing it to wind, electric and fossil energy sources.
In this vein, it had the additional effect of normalizing India’s nuclear programme within
the context of energy production.

Given the government’s focus on economic relations, it is important to reaffirm
that the NCA is, in fact, a trade deal, and not a security-related agreement. At its most
basic level, the agreement allows businesses to place contracts for the trade of nuclear
technology and material (particularly but not exclusively uranium). The deal is aimed at
increasing India's nuclear energy supply, so as to help meet the country's growing energy
demands. India’s ambitious nuclear goals are constrained by India’s lack of domestic

465 India has had limited safeguards on its nuclear facilities since the 1980s, but has not allowed
international inspectors at any of its weapons sites. Three other initiatives have deepened India’s safeguard
commitments: first, it will fulfill Canada’s long-term request to close its CANDU reactor by 2010. Second,
it has agreed that all future reactors built in India will be subject to safeguards. Third, India is bound by the
deal to create a firewall between the two programs to ensure that nuclear material, expertise or technology
is not transferred between the civilian and military facilities. Zia Mian et al. 2006. “Fissile Materials in
South Asia and the Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal.” Science and Global Security 14, 117–143;
Program) Is Hard to Do,” Science 311. 756.

466 With the safeguards that will be in place by 2014, experts estimate that India could operate its breeder
reactors to produce enough fissile material to increase its weapons stock from an estimated 60 to 100-150
nuclear weapons. Critics have argued that the deal enables India to use imported uranium for its civilian
program while using its own uranium supplies for its military program, thus facilitating proliferation within
the subcontinent. Karthika Sasikumar, 2007. “The Exception that Proves the Rule?: India and the Non-
proliferation Regime,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th
p. 14-16.

467 By 2050, with the help of the US-India Nuclear Agreement, India expects to be producing 400,000 MW
of nuclear energy. India’s Prime Minister’s Office notes “... to make up the difference using coal-based
generation would require about 1,800 million tonnes of coal per year in 2050.” Currently, only three per
uranium resources, as well as trade restrictions imposed by the NPT. Indeed, without the help of imports, India’s nuclear scientists estimate that the country would max out its nuclear energy production by 2020.\footnote{Sanjeev Srivastava. 2005. “Indian PM feels Political Heat.” July 25. BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4715797.stm> (Accessed: July 14, 2010); As India’s foreign ministry noted, “the truth is that we were desperate ... if this agreement had not come through we might as well [have] closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear program.”} The Indian government now estimates that it will be spending $100 billion dollars on its nuclear industry in the next ten years. For energy-starved and uranium-poor India, it provides the resources to fuel the economic growth of its massive population. For Canada, it links a crucial domestic industry to one of the largest nuclear markets in the world.

Thus, Indo-Canadian groups have also been effective policy-implementers, including on the nuclear issue. As shown in earlier chapters, the C-IBC was involved in business-side negotiations between its patron members and their counterparts in the Indian nuclear market. Its major nuclear patrons, such as Cameco and AECL, were the first organizations to sign relevant contracts to provide technologies in India. For example, the AECL has been developing a thorium-uranium based reactor for India since its negotiations in 2009. This activity further emphasised the relationship between the nuclear deal and trade negotiations.

Third, the organizations were able to link the nuclear deal to other important improvements in Canada-India bilateral relations. Generally speaking, removal of trade barriers between the two states has an effect on the nuclear industry. All three organizations, for example, laid the groundwork for the Foreign Investment Protection...
and Promotion Agreement. Further, their work towards the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) – an agreement to establish bilateral free trade – directly affects the success of nuclear trade. Both the ICCC and C-IBC have been committed to easing the issues of corruption, acquiring land for business, and working visas and business licences, all of which are required for successful business in India – include in nuclear trade.

Finally, this research has found that Indo-Canadian groups have not focused their attention on a singular policy issue. Instead, the evidence shows that they are active on all issues related to Canada-India relations, and the NCA is one part of a much larger bilateral relationship. In this way, its perceptions-editing role is probably one of the most important contributions of Indo-Canadian groups. By perpetuating an image of ‘new’ India - democratic, pluralistic, technologically-advanced, internationally-powerful and nuclear-responsible - the Indo-Canadian community has legitimized and supported the development of Canada’s nuclear relationship with Canada.

3. Contributions to the Literature

Theoretical Contributions

Theoretical work on ethnic groups and foreign policy is largely underdeveloped. While it has been successful in identifying an important set of conditions necessary for policy influence, it has not identified a theoretical model that can build, test or refine hypotheses. With all of these issues in mind, this research offers two important theoretical contributions to the literature on ethnic groups and foreign policy.

First, the project refines the theoretical model by focusing on the relationship
between core explanatory variables. Earlier research in the field has used a ‘laundry-list’ of potential factors that (may) determine influence, without determining their relative importance or internal relationships. For example, Haney and Vanderbush’s enabling conditions include organization centralization, membership unity (homogeneity), placement, voter participation (ethnopolitics), and salience and public resonance of the message. Similarly, Goldberg identifies six-characteristics: policy objectives, level of institutionalization, organizational structure, timing of lobbying activities, membership eligibility, and internal cohesion. The approach (and corresponding theoretical model) developed here was derived from a similar list of potentially important causal mechanisms but demonstrated that it is their combined and mutually reinforcing relationships that ultimately determine the overall influence of the Indo-Canadian organizations. The following diagram shows the original model:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 7.1 Modelling Causal Mechanisms and Enabling Conditions**

The problem with the original approach is that it does not adequately show the

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relationship between these variables. For the first independent variable, the refined model (see below) suggests that – congruence, salience and ethnopolitics – are necessary conditions for interest group access. In other words, an ethnic group must ensure that its activities align with government interests (congruence) and contribute to the betterment of Canadian society (salience). A change in any of these variables would expect to alter the Indo-Canadian community's level of access to government. For example, if a Liberal government succeeds in the next Federal election and was interested in a) consolidating the ethnic vote (ethnopolitics), and b) improving relations with India, but did not consider this a foreign policy priority (salience) the model would predict a decline in ethnic group influence and reduced government access.

With respect to the second core independent variable (organizational characteristics) the research has shown that the two most important characteristics for an ethnic organization are mandate and membership. These two variables are mutually inclusive and reinforcing. When combined, they are expected to influence an organization’s financial resources, political connections, and overall strategy. Political influence will be determined if there is symbiosis between the independent and intervening (enabling) variables. The model suggests that substantive changes to either the membership or mandate will change how these intervening variables affect influence.

For example, the CIF was founded by an elite-group of Indo-Canadians (membership) interested in affecting public policy (mandate). To achieve their mandate, the CIF requires financial resources, elite-level connections, and a centralized structure - all of which determine its influence on Canadian foreign policy. Any change to its mandate or membership – such as doubling its membership - would necessarily change
the group's organizational structure, political contacts, and financial resources.

Thus the model should be refined as follows:

*Figure 7.2 Refined Theoretical Model*

The refined theoretical model described above is a direct product of the approach and methodology selected for this study. Methodologically, the dissertation has used within-case analysis (see discussion in Chapter 4) to provide a more systematic, historically rich and empirically accurate examination of ethnic interest groups and their role in foreign policy. Studies of Canadian ethnic organizations have compared these groups with their American counterparts – a poor substitute for the approach developed in this study given the many social, political, institutional, and cultural differences across both systems.  

Instead, an in-depth comparative analysis of three prominent ethnic groups within Canada was able to uncover a) the most significant characteristics of each

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group that facilitate improvements in the bilateral relations, and b) how these characteristics are inter-related and mutually supportive of the interest groups’ efforts.

Moreover, the refined model is also able to explain the limited influence of the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce on bilateral relations. In chapter two, for example, it was determined that the size and organizational structure of an interest group determines its influence. Mancur Olsen was cited for his claim that smaller, more concentrated organizations are less likely to have divisive internal differences, thereby improving their ability to actively lobby government. The findings presented here offer an important corrective to Olsen's claims -- specifically, the actual effects of membership (size and composition) are directly influenced by congruence with the organization’s mandate. As shown in Chapter six, the ICCC’s policy influence is actually undermined because of a lack of congruence between its large membership and its Canada-India trade mandate. This limits the reach of its resources, as well as the effect of its elite networking, political connections and organizational structure. To have a significantly more important and sustained impact on Canada-India relations, the ICCC must consider concentrating its membership activities in more selective directions. Future studies of ethnic groups in Canada should understand the relationship between these variables when speculating about foreign policy influence.

Policy Conclusions

With respect to more general observations about the influence of Diaspora lobbies in Canadian politics, it is important to note that the Harper government has made India a foreign policy priority. However, when viewed in their totality, these efforts have
arguably produced limited results -- the Canadian government’s focus on economic relations has not reaped the expected benefits. The trade relationship continues to float near five-billion dollars, despite the attempts to improve economic cooperation. Even the most optimistic assessments are unable to place the figure higher than ten billion dollars, which amounts to less than 2 per cent of Canada’s overall trade. Given the Harper government’s almost exclusively focus on economic relations with India, these figures are not as encouraging as they perhaps could or should be.

There are several possible explanations for these results. First, Canada continues to have a limited profile in India. Ted Menzies, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade, argued that “[India] has lots of choices [for trade] and it is up to Canada, and Canadians, to step up and become preferred partners.” Evidence of this ‘perception bias’ exists in several sectors. For example, in India, the United States and the United Kingdom have high business and education profiles. Even Australia, with only two-thirds the Canadian population, grants 70,000 student visas to Indian students per year. In contrast, a mere 4,000 students come to Canada annually from India.

Second, the government’s exclusive reliance on economic relations undermines the potential to craft a more comprehensive strategy for improving the bilateral relationship. For example, Canada and India have a shared history in combating terrorism. In addition to the Khalistan and LTTE challenges, this includes Canada’s ongoing civilian role in Afghanistan. While India has not been willing to support

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471 Even elevated estimates – which include service provision – have remained close to $10 billion dollars.
473 Further, in 2008, despite Canada’s vote for the India-exemption at the NSG and IAEA, India first approach Australia for a nuclear trade deal. Another example occurred in October 2010, when this apolitical relationship recently lost Canada India’s vote in the United Nations Security Council elections.
NATO’s military efforts, it has committed 1.2 billion dollars to reconstruction efforts, the largest donor in Asia. The end of Canada’s military efforts in February 2011 increases the scope for cooperation between the two countries beyond Canada’s impending departure. However, this cooperation has yet to manifest.

Third, there is a stark absence in sustained cooperation across other aspects of international politics. For example, India has long lobbied for permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council - hence, Canada’s support for the concept of expanding UNSC permanent membership would be an important public declaration of their relationship. Announcements hinting at the need for these related discussions of power sharing would provide some measure of continuity for Prime Minister Harper’s overtures towards India during the G20. Simply put, in all three cases, the bilateral relationship will continue to stagnate until Canada’s economic efforts are buttressed by more substantive political and security overtures.

However, these limitations raise important questions for organizations pursuing improvements to the Canada-India relationship. If Indo-Canadian organizations are to address these limitations in the bilateral relationship, they must move beyond their own organizational challenges, interests and mandates. These groups are still in their infancy; even policy-oriented groups such as the CIF work on an ad hoc basis without a formalized institutional structure. In contrast, the more organized groups – such as the C-IBC and ICCC - have diluted their influence by remaining explicitly apolitical.

In addition to establishing a more consistent and institutionalized presence, Indo-Canadian groups must continue their work on Canada-India relations, with added urgency. They must introduce and advocate for innovative political initiatives between Canada and India, using their political and economic clout to tactfully broach with political leaders the larger impediments to the Canada-India relationship. Indo-Canadian organizations must continue to build bridges between the government and opposition leaders on issues related to India, while using their overseas connections to improve the image of Canada in India.

To accomplish these large and challenging goals, their long-term goal must look to coordinate inter-organizational efforts. The Canadian Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy (CIJA) provides an important example. Formed in 2004, CIJA is an umbrella group for the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canada-Israel Committee, the Quebec-Israel Committee and National Jewish Campus Life. All these groups maintain separate mandates, while coordinating efforts under the larger CIJA banner. For the Indo-Canadian community, this would allow for an integrated and comprehensive strategy – while maintaining their respective niche roles.

4. Areas for Future Study

As a foundational project, my research has introduced a unique framework of analysis to understand the opportunities and barriers to domestic influences on foreign policy. Despite its promising findings, there are several areas for future research that promise to capture of the full complexity of the field.

For example, by limiting the analysis to federal level politics, Canada-India bilateral trade relations and Canadian foreign policy, the study excluded a more detailed
The Ontario provincial government does not have a dedicated foreign policy institution, which explains why its bilateral relations with India are handled through the Departments of Energy, Natural Resources, and Intergovernmental relations. As Toronto-based organizations, the CIF, ICCC and C-IBC have played important roles in the Ontario government’s policy initiatives directed towards India. These interactions reveal a more layered and significantly more robust Diaspora influence than the current project can capture. Further research on the Indo-Canadian community’s impact on Canada-India relations should explore these other levels-of-analysis.

The research findings presented here also create an important foundation for comparisons between the Indo-Canadian experience and other ethnic groups in Canada. For example, there are important comparisons between Indian and Chinese advocacy groups, the largest and most established new immigrant communities in Canada. These communities share favourable international conditions (the Chinese and Indian economies), a familiar history of migration (manual labour on Canada’s west coast), concentrated in similar parts of the country (Vancouver and Toronto) with similar levels of economic success. Comparing these communities would provide a richer understanding of how the Canadian government takes its Diaspora communities into consideration in their bilateral relations with foreign states.

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476 There are a few other examples: Canada’s rich multicultural landscape provides multiple examples of Diaspora activism. The Haitian community lobbied the provincial and federal governments for humanitarian aid, immigration waivers and military support, after the January 10, 2010 earthquake. Similarly, the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war prompted Canada’s Lebanese community to lobby for military protection and evacuation back to Canada. These comparative studies would provide interesting insights for ethnic organizations’ access to government and organizational characteristics.
Another potential avenue for research is the transnational dimension of interest group activity. Indo-Canadian organizations engaged in track-two diplomacy between Canada and India. The Indian government has actively sought out its overseas Diaspora – including Indo-Canadians – to gain allies for their foreign interests. Future research must further delve into how India has used its Diaspora to influence its relationship with Canada. What mechanisms has India used? How has the Diaspora facilitated this relationship? How has the Canadian government responded to this indirect influence?

Finally, a comparative investigation of Indian Diasporas in other parliamentary democracies - such as the United Kingdom and Australia – would provide a more well-rounded understanding of how political institutions determine Diaspora access. Each of these countries has a substantial, economically-powerful Indian community, which have begun to advocate for improved relations with India. In Canada, Indians are concentrated in the Greater Toronto and Vancouver Areas. They are also economically diverse, with financial success concentrated in a sub-section of professionals within the community. Further, major cleavages continue to exist between Punjabi and non-Punjabi Indo-Canadians. British-Indians share many of these characteristics - its immigration has drawn from a largely Punjabi population, concentrated in Britain’s larger cities with relatively high economic success. On the other hand, British Indians have not has as much success assimilating into the larger population. Trends show that immigrant communities, including the Indian Diaspora have become increasingly ghettoized. In contrast, Australia has a smaller Diaspora than Canada, but are impressively organized and attained significant levels of professional and entrepreneurial success.
5. Conclusion

Studying the Indo-Canadian Diaspora has introduced new data on the influence of ethnic Diaspora on Canada’s domestic and foreign policy -- an important contribution to a literature that remains focussed on Israel, Cuban, African-American and Eastern European groups within the United States. The Canada-India Foundation, the Canada-India Business Council and the Indo-Canadian Chamber of Commerce are just beginning to exert influence on the Canadian political system. Although relatively inactive until the 1990s these groups have experienced a growth in government access, an expansion in their range of involvement, and an increase in observable influence. This research has shown that each group has contributed to improving the bilateral relations, including on important nuclear issues. For the Indo-Canadian community, Canada is undoubtedly “the most successful experiment of pluralism in human history.”

Immigrant communities have become integral parts of Canada’s economic, social and political fabric. The need to understand the influence of these and other ethnic interest groups is becoming crucial in a country that treasures its multicultural legacy. This dissertation has attempted to make an important contribution to our understanding of the politics of ethnic Diaspora.

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APPENDIX A – EMAIL INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS

Personal Correspondence


Bratt, Duane. 2010. Professor and Chair, Political Science, Mount Royal University. August 13.


Kukucha, Chris, 2010. Associate Professor, University of Lethbridge. July 12.


Munton, Don. 2010. Professor, University of Northern British Columbia. September 3.


Smith, Heather. 2010. Associate Professor, University of Northern British Columbia. August 19.


APPENDIX B – EMAIL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Email interviews were conducted with academic experts in the fields of Canadian politics and interest groups, Canadian foreign policy and Canada-India relations. The general questions are listed below. Some changes were made dependent on the expertise of the respondent.

**Canadian Politics and Interest Groups**

1. Given your expertise on the subject, do you agree with the conclusions I present above? A few sentences will be very helpful.

2. How do interest groups traditionally access governments? Would these mechanisms differ when dealing with foreign policy?

3. Generally, what are the most successful strategies interest groups have used to access government?

4. South Asians are concentrated in important constituencies in the greater Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton areas. Does this affect electoral strategies for candidates seeking office? Does the ethnic vote matter in these constituencies? Why or why not?

5. From your research, what are the similarities and differences between traditional interest groups and ethnic interest groups?

6. What would be the largest barriers for ethnic groups influencing Canadian foreign policy?

7. Is there is anything else in this research project that you would like to comment on?

**Questions - Canadian Foreign Policy Experts**

1. Given your expertise on the subject, do you agree with the conclusions I present above? A few sentences from you will be very helpful.

2. The mainstream perspective on Canadian foreign policy suggests that decision-making is centralized and thus does not take domestic interests into account when forming policy. Is there anything about this current government that has changed this decision-making structure?

3. What are the mechanisms available to domestic interest groups to affect Canadian foreign policy?
4. Do ethnic interest groups, given their linkages to homeland politics, differ from traditional interest organizations (such as Defence interests or academic think tanks)? How and why?

5. Is there anything unique about Canada-India relations that allows for a greater access by Diasporan interest groups?

6. Do the multiple dimensions - trade, economic and security - of the Canada-India nuclear trade deal make the Indian Diaspora more or less likely to succeed?

7. Is there is anything else within this research project that you would like to comment on?

Questions – India Specialists

1. Given your expertise on the subject, do you agree with the conclusions I present about the role of the Indo-Canadian community? A few sentences from you will be very helpful.

2. What are the most important contributions of the Indian Diaspora in Canada’s foreign policy making? How is the Indian Diaspora an asset from India’s perspective?

3. There have been few (if any) studies of the Indo-Canadian Diaspora in foreign policy. What do you think are the impediments to studying this Diaspora?

4. How do the divisions in the Indo-Canadian community, such as Sikh separatism, affect the ability of the community to communicate with policy makers on foreign policy?

5. Given the negativity of past Canada-India relations, has the Canada-India nuclear deal completely rectified problems between these countries?

6. What are the other issues that the Indo-Canadian Diaspora has been effective pursuing through the Canadian government?

7. Is there is anything else within this research project that you would like to comment on?
APPENDIX C –

TELEPHONE AND IN-PERSON INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interviews were conducted with three groups of people: representatives of the Indo-Canadian interest groups, Indo-Canadian Members of Parliament and experts of Canada-India relations (citations in bibliography). As discussed in chapter four, semi-structured interviews begin with a general set of questions and diverge dependent on the information gathered. The general questions are listed below:

Ethnic Interest Organization Respondents

1. What are the most successful strategies your organization uses to gain the attention of policy makers in Canada-India relations?
   a. What have been your least successful strategies?

2. Does your organization have any linkages – official or unofficial – with other Indian Diaspora organizations in the area of Canada-India relations? How closely or distantly aligned are your interests in this area?
   a. What differentiates your organization from the other groups?
   b. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the other Indian Diaspora groups that are interested in Canada-India relations?

3. How do divisions in the Indo-Canadian community (such as Sikh separatism) affect your organization’s overall objectives and strategies?

4. What does your organization consider the largest strengths of the Canada-India relations?
   a. Similarly, what does your organization consider the largest weaknesses in the relationship?

5. How interested is your organization been in the following areas? Please describe some of your activities in these issue areas.
   a. Immigration
   b. Trade and Investment
   c. Security/terrorism
   d. Education
1. How important are relations between Canada and India to the Canadian government? Why?

2. What is the most telling sign of an improved Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship?

3. As a Member of Parliament, what are your most important contributions to this bilateral relationship?
   i) What makes you interested in the pursuit of improved Canada-India relations?
   ii) Does the party you belong to change your strategy in the pursuit of Canada-India relations?

4. Have you been in contact with members of the Indo-Canadian community in regards to Canada-India relations?

5. From your interaction, what is the contribution of the Indo-Canadian community in improving this bilateral relationship?
   i) If there is a contribution: in what areas do you think that the Indian community’s influence is the most effective and why?
   ii) What is it about Indo-Canadian community that give them influence?
   iii) What would the Indian community have to do to improve their level of influence in Canada’s foreign policy?

6. How do you think divisions in the Indian community, such as Khalistan interests, affect the relationship between Canada and India?

7. Is there anything of relevance to this topic that I have not asked you, that you would wish to contribute?
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