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THE BRITISH INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA, 1917-1920: II

BRITISH INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA was severely restricted until the surrender of Turkey at the end of October, 1918, opened a path of communication. The only operation of importance was that of a military mission under Major General Dunsterville, which was sent from Baghdad to the shores of the Caspian Sea in Persia, in February, 1918, with the object of organizing some force to keep the Baku oil fields out of German hands. By mid-summer the German advance stirred up nationalist feelings in the Caucasus, the Bolshevik Government at Baku was overthrown in July, and Dunsterville was invited to defend the city. The "Dunsterforce" held Baku until mid-September, when any oil produced was too late to be of value to the enemy.⁵⁸

That British intervention in Russia in 1918 was aimed at Germany is indicated in several ways. First, when in January General de Candolle, the British representative with the Cossacks in southern Russia, suggested that the only way to unify anti-German forces in the South was for such forces to compose their differences with the Bolsheviks, the British Government agreed to this step of co-operating with the Soviet regime.⁵⁹ There was at that time even some desire for such co-operation. The results achieved are another indication. Germans who had been prisoners in Siberia were prevented—if they had such an intention—from controlling the area or at least from returning to Germany and the western front, and intervention in the Caucasus kept oil out of Germany's reach. Ludendorff, who was in a position to know, described these moves as serious blows to Germany. The chaos created in southern Russia by subsidized anti-Bolshevik forces probably contributed to the Germans' not getting what they had expected in the way of grain.⁶⁰ General Maynard claimed that his tiny force at Murmansk, men rejected for duty in France, held 40,000 German troops in Finland until it was too late for them to be of any service in the West, as well as preventing German submarines from using the port of Murmansk.⁶¹ Furthermore, though a small force in

Turkestan fought Bolsheviks, not Germans, and set up an anti-Bolshevik regime, it was hardly aimed at overthrowing the distant Moscow government, but rather at preventing the spread of Soviet propaganda in Asia.⁶² Force was considered necessary only against the Germans and not against the Bolsheviks, for one Soviet official came uncomfortably close to the truth when he remarked in June, 1918, "We are a corpse, but no one has the courage to bury us."⁶³ It was assumed then that Bolshevism would fall of its own weight.

Why, then, did intervention continue after the armistice, when its original purpose had vanished? Bolshevism did not fall of its own weight, but grew stronger. So, it seemed at the time, did the anti-Bolshevik forces, and Britain felt obliged to continue supporting the Czech Legion and the various governments which had been organized by anti-Bolsheviks to fight Germany.⁶⁴ As Lloyd George told the House of Commons in April, 1919, it would have been mean and unworthy to allow the Bolsheviks to cut the "white" Russians' throats merely because the latter were no longer needed to fight Germany. They would therefore receive aid as long as they had the Russian people's allegiance.⁶⁵ Besides, added Winston Churchill in June, British troops in the Caucasus were not fighting the Bolsheviks but merely occupying the area until it was disposed of as part of a general peace settlement, and intervention in general was merely helping to stabilize Russia and prevent bloodshed.⁶⁶

Intervention began by summoning Russians of all political colours to fight Germany. Now the non-Bolsheviks were to continue to receive Allied support, which meant, in effect, that the Allies were to subsidize an attempt to overthrow Bolshevism. Some Allied leaders, Winston Churchill and Lord Curzon, for example, relished the idea. Others, including Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George (whose unwillingness to "knock out" Bolshevism caused Field Marshal Wilson to mutter darkly in his diary),⁶⁷ were reluctant. It was at this point, after the armistice, that the difference of opinion within the Imperial War Cabinet came into the open. At a meeting on December 31, 1918, Churchill sought approval for his policy of the use of force by the great powers in order to set up a democratic government in Russia. Lloyd George replied that he opposed such a step for two reasons. First, it would be tremendously difficult, requiring enormous armies which the Allies could not supply; conscripted troops would refuse to go. Secondly, it would strengthen rather than kill Bolshevism, since the Russians would rally against a foreign and hence common foe. His suggestion was that the Allies should invite delegates from all Russian factions to the peace conference in Paris and, in the

meantime, prevent any "external aggression" (foreign conquest) by the Bolsheviks. The cabinet endorsed the policy of Lloyd George.⁶⁸

The British Prime Minister therefore brought his plan before a meeting of the "Big Five" on January 16, 1919, suggesting it in place of either the use of Allied troops to crush the Soviet government or a blockade of Soviet Russia. President Wilson agreed, and since none of the other Allies could offer troops to enforce either alternative,⁶⁹ on January 21 the peace conference invited all the Russian factions to send representatives to a conference at the Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmora in mid-February. The Allied powers would meet with them provided that there was in the meantime a cease-fire among the Russians. The governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania agreed to take part, and the Soviet leaders not only agreed to come but promised to acknowledge the debts of the Russian Empire. Unfortunately, they refused to stop fighting because, as they admitted, events were going in their favour. Finally, the "white" leaders refused to come at all, since it was to them "practically and morally impossible" to treat with Bolsheviks.⁷⁰

When this scheme failed, ending at least for the time any hope of bringing the Russian groups together peacefully, Lloyd George was willing to permit further meddling in Russia, but he placed three limitations on it. First, there would be no attempt by British troops to conquer the Bolsheviks; second, support of the "whites" would continue only so long as it was clear that in the areas they controlled the people were anti-Bolshevik in sentiment; third, the "whites" must not be used to restore the old Tsarist regime, especially its land policy. Even Churchill seemed to accept these conditions,⁷¹ and intervention continued.

Churchill, however, had retained his own ideas. In February, 1919, the War Cabinet was obviously in agreement with Lloyd George, showing no disposition to approve any warlike operations in Russia,⁷² but Churchill took advantage of the Prime Minister's temporary absence from Paris to urge his own plans for an anti-Bolshevik crusade on the great powers' delegations to the peace conference. He secured some support from French military leaders. Warned by Philip Kerr, Lloyd George sent Churchill a telegram which informed the aggressive Secretary of State for War that the cabinet had "never authorized such a proposal", and Balfour set forth the Prime Minister's views at a meeting of the British Empire delegation. The empire delegates followed Lloyd George's lead, and Churchill failed once more to get his way.⁷³

Such intervention as did continue took the form of money, goods, naval support, and military and economic missions. The poor morale and reduced size

of the British Army made it impossible to retain in Russia even as many troops as were there at the time of the armistice,⁷⁴ but there was a huge stock of surplus war supplies prepared for but unused on the western front.⁷⁵

The armistice in the West forced Germany to renounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and hence to withdraw from Russian soil. British troops moved back to Baku and into Batum,⁷⁶ and Britain tried to persuade the Scandinavian countries to aid the people of the Baltic states in defending their newly-won independence against Bolshevik attacks. The Scandinavians would have none of it;⁷⁷ therefore, the German army occupying what had been Baltic Russia was left there as the only force capable of defending the area from the hand of Moscow, and was even reinforced.⁷⁸ In December, 1918, the Royal Navy landed thousands of rifles at Reval, along with some artillery, and bombarded the Bolshevik army when it attacked Estonia. These deeds were aimed not so much at overturning Bolshevism as at giving the new Baltic states a chance for life, and as it turned out these new states along the western borders of Russia were the one concrete result of intervention.⁷⁹ However, Britain also pursued a more aggressive policy in maintaining a blockade of Soviet ports, in willingness to see Finland assist in the capture of Petrograd (provided that the Finns did not establish themselves permanently in Russia), and in furnishing naval units for an attack on the fortress of Kronstadt⁸⁰ as well as for general support of the "white" army of General Yudenitch.

Lloyd George opposed the use of British troops in Russia and was anxious to get them out;⁸¹ and one may well ask why they remained in Archangel and Murmansk until the autumn of 1919. In the first place, the armistice came so late in the year that Archangel would have been ice-bound before the entire force there could have been evacuated. Since Archangel relied entirely on Murmansk for its communications with the outside world, the force at Murmansk, too, had to remain. There was also the matter of protecting the pro-western Russian governments and individuals for whom British leaders felt responsible.⁸²

In the first week of March, 1919, the War Cabinet decided, however, that these forces must be evacuated before another winter set in, and it directed the War Office to make arrangements for bringing them out. The cabinet also prescribed that whatever reinforcements were needed to cover the evacuation should be used and, further, that due regard be had to the obligations contracted with the Russian people, government, and army in the area. The hope was to make the local Russians capable of standing alone after the British troops were gone.⁸³ In June, Field Marshal Wilson, "after great struggles," persuaded Lloyd George and the cabinet to

permit General Ironside to begin an offensive to meet Kolchak's Siberian troops, the hope once more being of bringing a number of the Czechs to Archangel.⁸⁴ However, the Bolsheviks were stronger than had been supposed, there was a mutiny among the "loyal" Russians, Kolchak went into full retreat, and the attack failed miserably. Its only effect was to speed plans for evacuation, despite Ironside's opinion that the local Russians could not possibly hold out alone.⁸⁵

At Murmansk, despite Maynard's advance to Lake Onega, able-bodied citizens refused to join the anti-Bolshevik army, which resorted to conscription to fill its ranks. This not only failed to provide a trustworthy army but also alienated the local population.⁸⁶ The last British troops left Archangel on September 27, 1919, and Murmansk on October 12, sealing the fate of North Russia. The Bolsheviks occupied Archangel on February 21, 1920, and on the same day a revolution proclaimed a Soviet government in Murmansk.⁸⁷

In Siberia, about the time of the armistice in France, the bourgeois element and the anti-Bolshevik Russian army overthrew a weak provisional government in favour of the military dictatorship of Admiral Kolchak.⁸⁸ The British Government decided in December, 1918, to give Kolchak material aid in the form of equipment, clothing, and such heavy ordnance as could be spared (up to 200 pieces). Some help was given in the operation of the Siberian railroads, and the British Government even sponsored the abortive Siberian Supply Company to foster trade among Britain, Canada, and Siberia.⁸⁹ In June, 1919, Kolchak having promised that he would not seek to restore the old regime but would instead promote democratic government in Russia, the Allied powers together agreed to give him aid, though not recognition.⁹⁰ Pares contended that they doomed Kolchak from the start, first by not recognizing him officially, then by giving only meagre support, and finally by showing a lack of confidence in him at the first sign of a reverse in his fortunes.⁹¹ Britain maintained not quite two regiments of troops in Siberia, plus a military mission and a High Commissioner to advise Kolchak and report his progress to London. Even the Foreign Office found this to be "half-hearted support" and doubted Kolchak's ability to win a victory.⁹² Worse yet were orders issued to General Blair, who was commanding a Russian brigade with many British officers, directing him to refrain from fighting and to withdraw at the approach of the enemy. As Pares put it, this was "a step which could only be fatal to all resistance," for despite Kolchak's pleas Blair had to give the signal for retreat.⁹³

From the time of the armistice Britain apparently did not contemplate any actual military operations in southern Russia, contenting herself with sending money

and supplies to General Denikin's army.⁹⁴ There was some talk of helping Ukrainian forces, Balfour telling Curzon in July, 1919, that "the policy of His Majesty's Government has always been to assist such Russian forces as are engaged in fighting the Bolsheviks . . ." The British mission with Denikin was also charged with the duty of helping him organize the well-being of his home front,⁹⁵ since chaos in the rear was a characteristic failing of the "white" Russians. In late July, 1919, the British cabinet decided to limit aid in Russia to Denikin, the other "whites" being in a decline, but to help him "all we can."⁹⁶ Since Denikin was avowedly anti-Bolshevik, this confirmed Balfour's statement that intervention was now aimed at overthrowing the Moscow government.

British policy in the Caucasus from the spring of 1919 was chiefly concerned with finding some other nation willing to replace British troops there with its own. The Supreme Allied War Council decided in April that Italy should furnish troops, but after much delay it was learned in August that Italy would send no force at all. Britain then turned to the United States, because of its traditional (if somewhat imaginary) interest in Armenia, but the political situation in America precluded its sending more troops anywhere.⁹⁷ Curzon told Balfour in August, 1919, that he wanted to leave the British force in the new Caucasian republics until they were strong enough to stand alone but that the cabinet would not hear of it,⁹⁸ and the best Britain could do in response to an American appeal to remain was to leave a small force at Batum.⁹⁹ The British Commissioner in Transcaucasia had orders to report on the situation, to do his utmost to prevent friction among the new-born governments there, and, so far as possible, to advance the interests of British trade in the region.¹⁰⁰

The reasons for Britain's ending its intervention in Russia are to be found in a combination of the "white" Russians' failure to live up to Lloyd George's conditions for support and the situation of Britain and western Europe in 1919 and 1920. Lloyd George, it will be recalled, had consented to continuing intervention after the German defeat as long as the anti-Bolsheviks did not try to restore the old regime and as long as they had the allegiance of the Russian people. There is a possibility that he hoped for the ultimate division of Russia into a number of independent states, each too small to cause trouble.¹⁰¹

The armies of Kolchak and Denikin were handicapped from the first by the economic collapse of Russia. Siberia was flooded with refugees, its transportation system was in ruins,¹⁰² and Kolchak's government was in a desperate financial plight. The condition of southern Russia was equally bad; lack of financial re-

sources forced Denikin's army to live on the country. It was at first welcomed with flowers, but, it thoroughly pillaged the areas conquered and soon made the Bolsheviks appear the lesser of two evils. Corruption, inefficiency, and reactionary tendencies were rife among the "white" Russian officials, peasants were alienated by a "restoration" land policy,¹⁰³ and British leaders became disillusioned with intervention. The Foreign Office noted that Soviet vigour was inspired by "not terrorism, not even long-suffering acquiescence, but something approaching enthusiasm" in the Russians living under communist rule.¹⁰⁴ On August 21, 1919, Lord Curzon stated in the name of the cabinet that intervention had gone beyond its original goal of defeating Germany, the fight against the Bolsheviks had produced only disappointment and failure, the Soviet government was apparently gaining strength, and "the general conclusion is . . . that the results produced by Allied intervention have so far been incommensurate either with the objects for which they were undertaken or with the enormous expenditure involved." His Majesty's Government felt, said Curzon, that the time had arrived for a reassessment of the problem and of Allied action.¹⁰⁵ Lloyd George himself became convinced that the vast majority of Russians preferred Bolshevik rule to that of the "whites."¹⁰⁶

The fate of the anti-Bolshevik armies seemed to substantiate these opinions. Russian troops recruited in the North proved unreliable and even mutinous,¹⁰⁷ Yudenitch's army near Petrograd ceased to exist by November, 1919,¹⁰⁸ and both Kolchak and Denikin collapsed. Kolchak mounted two offensives, in May and September, 1919, but lacked the Czech Legion's support and was defeated.¹⁰⁹ By July he was suspected of being in the hands of reactionaries, and Sir Charles Eliot, British High Commissioner in Siberia, reported that he saw no way for the ill-fated admiral to recover sufficiently even to survive.¹¹⁰ At the end of July the British cabinet decided to stop aiding Kolchak and to concentrate on Denikin. The last British supplies reached Vladivostok in October.¹¹¹

The Churchill-Curzon faction, however, did not lose all interest in Kolchak, Churchill predicting fearful consequences of a Soviet-German rapprochement.¹¹² The War Office, in early September, wanted to use Japanese troops to restore the situation in Siberia,¹¹³ and late in that month Churchill called on American Ambassador Davis, asking that the United States extend immediate aid to Kolchak to prevent his collapse.¹¹⁴ Curzon instructed the British consul at Vladivostok to do nothing to weaken Kolchak and continued into October urging that America give support to prevent the spread of Bolshevism throughout Siberia.¹¹⁵ Apparently Kolchak did not receive enough help, for his army melted before the Bolshevik

advance and at the end of 1919 he resigned, first his military command in favor of Semenov and then as Supreme Ruler of Russia in favor of Denikin. He surrendered himself to French General Janin, commander of the departing Czech Legion, who seems to have given Kolchak to the Siberian Government in exchange for the safe passage of his command. On January 21, 1920, this government turned Bolshevik and two weeks later Kolchak was "executed" or "murdered," depending on one's point of view.¹¹⁶ The British mission in Siberia was abolished in March, 1920.¹¹⁷

Denikin achieved a temporary success greater than Kolchak's, for his army was within 250 miles of Moscow in October, 1919. But his lines were overextended, peasants rebelled against his land policy and conscription, Italian trade unions diverted his ammunition to D'Annunzio at Fiume, a drunken general threw away a large force, and the population was willing to pay almost any price for peace.¹¹⁸ In November a retreat began; in early December Curzon sent word that Britain would give no further help after the end of March, 1920; Denikin's army was cut in two by early January, and escaped to the Crimea by late March. In early April, Denikin himself resigned in favor of General Wrangel and fled to London.¹¹⁹ Britain continued to aid Wrangel with naval support, munitions, and a military mission, until June, when he insisted on once more invading the mainland (to secure a greater food supply for the refugee-packed Crimea). Britain was by that time negotiating with the Bolsheviks and warned Wrangel not to attack them. He saw no alternative and did attack, with brief success. But the military and naval missions were withdrawn; and when the Bolsheviks' war with Poland ended, the Red Army was able to crush Wrangel within a month. By the middle of November, 1920, the "white" armies ceased to exist, save as small and scattered bands.¹²⁰ The tiny British force at Batum was finally withdrawn in July, 1920.¹²¹

Three other factors contributed to the end of intervention. They were the cost of aiding the anti-Bolsheviks, the force of public opinion, and the need or desire to trade with Russia. Early in 1919, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, told Lloyd George that the government could barely make ends meet even at the "present crushing rate of taxation."¹²² Curzon wrote to Balfour in August that Britain had practically exhausted its resources in war material at the very moment when increased demands for it were coming from the "white" Russian armies.¹²³ By October no more supplies were going to Kolchak, and the Baltic states were told that since Britain could no longer afford the support they needed they might do as they liked toward Soviet Russia,¹²⁴ and in December Lloyd George told delegates of the "Big Four" powers that Britain had not got much in

return for the huge sums it had spent helping Denikin.¹²⁵ The latter was informed that he would receive no more supplies after March, 1920, and at the same time Britain warned Poland against attacking the Bolsheviks.¹²⁶

As long as intervention in Russia was plainly a wartime measure aimed at defeating Germany, there was little public outcry against it. But on November 12, 1918, an opposition member of the House of Commons raised the question of ending intervention, and pushed it harder the next day. The Opposition continued throughout the ensuing year to put embarrassing questions to the government,¹²⁷ and the Liberal and Labour press hailed Lloyd George's Guildhall speech in November, 1919, as a belated return to sanity. Even the ranks of the Conservative press broke in January, 1920, when J. L. Garvin of the *Observer*, long in favour of intervention, wrote advocating peace with the Bolsheviks.¹²⁸ Labour opposition to further adventures in Russia became more and more vociferous in 1920, resulting in warnings to the government that the trade unions would prevent a new war from being carried to a successful conclusion, and apparently forced the cabinet to reconsider giving aid to Poland against Soviet Russia.¹²⁹ British troops in Russia had been restless from the moment of the armistice, and Lloyd George predicted a mutiny if more were sent there.¹³⁰

The Prime Minister sounded the death knell of intervention of any kind when on November 8, 1919, he spoke at the Guildhall. He saw no future in Russia but an interminable series of campaigns that would lay waste the country, and he asserted that Bolshevism could not be suppressed by the sword. He spoke of Allied obligations to the "whites" as fully met and no longer pertinent, adding that he hoped the great powers could soon renew their proposal for an all-Russian peace conference.¹³¹ In a debate in the House of Commons a few days later Lloyd George defended his position by pointing out that Britain could not go on financing the Russian civil war, there being no surer road to Bolshevism than bankruptcy. He was "not afraid of Bolshevism in any land which is well governed," and advised fighting that movement by justice instead of bullets.¹³²

Curzon and Churchill were still among the dissenters,¹³³ but a London meeting of the "Big Four" powers in December agreed that no further commitments would be made in Russia.¹³⁴ Curzon himself told the chief of the British military mission with Denikin that the cabinet had turned down the plan of a combined attack on the Bolsheviks by Denikin and Poland because the Poles and "whites" were too weak, and because the food situation in Europe made imperative the pur-

chase of Russian grain as soon as possible. Britain was trying to start an exchange of commodities through co-operative societies in Russia.¹³⁵

The argument based on food supplies was repeated in the address from the throne at the opening of Parliament on February 10, 1920, and by Lloyd George in the debate on the address.¹³⁶ In December, 1919, a Foreign Office memorandum listed as the principal British interests in Russia the early establishment of stable conditions, the renewal of trade, and the insuring that Bolshevism would be no danger to Britain.¹³⁷ An exchange of prisoners was arranged between Britain and the Soviet government in February, and negotiations for a trade agreement began in London in May. An armistice was agreed upon in July, 1920, and the trade agreement was signed in London in March, 1921.¹³⁸ Intervention was an affair of the past. Begun as a war measure against Germany, it had continued half-heartedly because no other alternative seemed possible. Directed by a government divided in opinion, it was never carried out on a scale large enough to transform the "white" Russian factions into successful, self-sufficient governments. Unwilling or unable to make it successful, British leaders became disillusioned with intervention, and it finally died a natural, if somewhat delayed, death at the hands of war-weariness, public opposition, and the interests of trade.

The entire affair is well summed up in one document in the Foreign Office files. When in March, 1920, a memorandum was circulated to the effect that Britain might now abolish the post of High Commissioner in Siberia, Lords Hardinge and Curzon minuted on it as follows:

"So ends a | not very | creditable enterprise.
 | highly dis | H.
 C."¹³⁹

NOTES

58. *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, VI, 180-181; Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 86-87.
59. *Ibid.*, II, 608.
60. Ludendorff, *op. cit.*, II, 262, 297, 302-303.
61. Maynard, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 110-111.
62. Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 28, 87-88.
63. *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, I, 533; Kennan, *op. cit.*, II, 437.
64. *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 456-457, 575; *Ibid.*, 1919, *Russia*, pp. 329-330; 116 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 2462-2464.
65. 114 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 2939-2945.
66. 116 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 2462-2464.
67. Callwell, *op. cit.*, II, 163.

68. Lloyd George, *Peace Treaties*, I, 325-330.
69. *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 11-13; Lloyd George, *Peace Treaties*, I, 359-360.
70. Coates, *Anglo-Soviet Relations*, pp. xi-xiv; Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 440-441; *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 35-36, 60-61.
71. Lloyd George, *Peace Treaties*, I, 382-383.
72. Callwell, *op. cit.*, II, 169.
73. Lloyd George, *Peace Treaties*, I, 367-368, 370-373, 378.
74. *Ibid.*, I, 359-360; Maynard, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191; Callwell, *op. cit.*, II, 165; *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 559; 118 H. C. Deb., 5 s., col. 2000.
75. Churchill, *Aftermath*, p. 287.
76. Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 154-155.
77. *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 843-844, 849.
78. Coates, *Armed Intervention*, pp. 177-180.
79. Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 155; *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 859; Churchill, *Aftermath*, p. 288.
80. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, I, 193-194, 381-382, 826; III, 381, 411n; Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 199.
81. Callwell, *op. cit.*, II, 167-168; *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, p. 38.
82. Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 141-142; Ironside, *op. cit.*, p. 194; Maynard, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.
83. 118 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 1987-1988.
84. Callwell, *op. cit.*, II, 186, 197; Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 403-404.
85. *Ibid.*, III, 431, 466; *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 642-643; Callwell, *op. cit.*, II, 205.
86. Maynard, *op. cit.*, pp. 199, 216-229.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 310; Ironside, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-187; Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 826-827.
88. *Ibid.*, III, 703-704.
89. *Ibid.*, III, 717-725.
90. *Ibid.*, III, 331-332, 362-364, 376-377.
91. Pares, *op. cit.*, pp. 527-528.
92. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 462, 716-717.
93. Pares, *op. cit.*, p. 540.
94. *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 644.
95. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 423-425.
96. Callwell, *op. cit.*, II, 207.
97. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 325-326, 453n, 478, 531-532.
98. *Ibid.*, III, 484.
99. Callwell, *op. cit.*, II, 229.
100. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 451-452.
101. *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, p. 129.
102. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 572-573.
103. *Ibid.*, III, 339-440, 584, 587, 706-709, 775-776; Lloyd George, *Peace Treaties*, I, 383.
104. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 462-463.
105. *Ibid.*, III, 519-526.

106. Lloyd George, *Peace Treaties*, I, 318.
107. *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 642-643; Maynard, *op. cit.*, passim; Ironside, *op. cit.*, passim.
108. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 658.
109. *Ibid.*, III, 339-340; Churchill, *Aftermath*, pp. 255-257.
110. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 415-416, 437.
111. Churchill, *Aftermath*, p. 255.
585.
112. 118 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 1997-1998; 120 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 1629-1630.
113. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 538, 550.
114. *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 435-436.
115. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 558; *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 441,
116. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 900; Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 211-212; Churchill, *Aftermath*, pp. 256-259.
117. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 827.
118. *Ibid.*, III, 775-776; Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 209-211.
119. *Ibid.*, I, 211; Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 673-676; Coates, *Armed Intervention*, pp. 273-274, 280.
120. *Ibid.*, pp. 285-287, 346-357; Coates, *Anglo-Soviet Relations*, p. 46; 131 H. C. Deb., 5 s., col. 1422.
121. Fischer, *op. cit.*, I, 218.
122. Lloyd George, *Peace Treaties*, I, 371-372.
123. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 524-526.
124. *Ibid.*, III, 591.
125. *Foreign Relations, Peace Conference, 1919*, IX, 849.
126. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 633.
127. 110 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 2467, 2790-2798. Two examples of many opposition speeches are: 120 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 116-117; 121 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 209-212.
128. Coates, *Anglo-Soviet Relations*, pp. 1-2, 10.
129. *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 31, 42.
130. *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 559; Lloyd George, *Peace Treaties*, I, 360.
131. *The Times*, November 10, 1919.
132. 121 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 721, 726.
133. 120 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 1629-1630; *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 122, 128-129.
134. *Ibid.*, *Peace Conference, 1919*, IX, 857.
135. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 814.
136. 125 H. C. Deb., 5 s., cols. 6, 39-46.
137. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 736.
138. Coates, *Anglo-Soviet Relations*, pp. 18, 26, 33-34, 52.
139. Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, III, 827.