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THE HUMAN - WAVE STRATEGY

HIDING BY DAY IN CAVES, mine shafts, and native huts, moving by night, as one observer later explained, a vast Chinese Communist army secretly advanced under cover of blizzards through mountainous terrain to attack the United States Marines on the Korean ridges in the fall of 1950. In the night, when they finally attacked, it was with bugles blowing and hordes of white-clad soldiers flowing in human waves against lonely outposts in the hills.

These human waves—this tide of hostile human flesh—served as a battlefield weapon of the Chinese. But it was more than a tactical device on the field of combat; it was a national strategy, for the Chinese human wave clearly is to be launched against entire nations, not simply against company units or even against divisions on one peninsula of Northern Asia. Nor is China the only Asian country to view its exploding population as a powerful weapon fit for use against developed nations. India also understands the military uses of massed humanity. And while the advanced nations wrestle with the problem of command and control of nuclear arms, and become anguished over the question of whether the use of such armaments is moral, the Chinese Communists and other Asians acquire the increasingly powerful population bomb which is as potentially decisive as any thermonuclear device in Western missile silos.

It is time, therefore, that the advanced countries comprehend that the immense force of population growth in the undeveloped world has military significance. The vast populations that are bursting forth in Asia and other backward areas constitute a human wave that threatens to break over the developed nations of the globe.

The significance of the population wave was only dimly seen in the postwar years when it was beginning to gather force in the outlying reaches of the Afro-Asian and Latin worlds. But now this wave is beginning to be recognized in its frightening proportions. We know, for example, that Communist China today has 731 million people, compared with the approximately 200 million people in the

United States. By the year 1975 this Chinese population will rise to more than a billion. India has 461 million, and an estimated population of 600 million by 1975. Indonesia has 93 million people. Fifteen years from now it will have 137 million.

In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the populations of the undeveloped areas increased by only 20 per cent. In the last quarter of this century, the populations of these areas are likely to double. This means that the populations of these countries will have increased from one billion in 1900 to almost $5\frac{1}{2}$ billion in the year 2000. Whereas the developed countries had one-third of the world's population in 1900, they will have only one-fifth at the end of this century.

Nor do these statistics tell the complete story. The heart of the story is that the largest populations will be concentrated in the areas that have the least capacity to produce additional food. The African population is expected to increase from 272 million to 550 million in the year 2000. But Africa cannot be depended on to produce food for such numbers, not at least in lands under the control of new regimes devoid of skilled manpower, administrative efficiency, or the political wisdom to make a tremendous breakthrough in agricultural production.

In Asia, the Chinese, Indian, and Indonesian populations already occupy all the lands suitable for agriculture. With steady population growth sapping the progress of the industrial sectors of the economy, it is highly unlikely that these nations will be able to feed the populations they will have in 1975. The Indian diet of today is already poorer than the Indian diet of a generation ago. In China the food shortage has assumed crisis proportions.

Even if the Western nations were to feel a moral compunction to feed Afro-Asia with surplus foodstuffs, and if such surpluses could be maintained and the money to ship them were forthcoming from the Western populations, it is unlikely that such shipments would be sufficient to feed the 1.7 billion people in India and China alone. The cost of transporting this food from the prairies of the United States and Canada to the interior of Africa and Asia would be staggering.

What, then, is the answer to the problem? The countries facing a terrible food shortage may drastically curb their populations by birth control and abortion, but a great change could not be achieved overnight. Japan has successfully regulated its population. In that Asian country, however, the level of education is exceptionally high and the people are unusually disciplined in their approach to life and national necessities. Even so, it took Japan twenty years to achieve its goal of population regulation. In twenty years time, the crisis elsewhere in Asia will be out of hand.

It seems hard to dispute the statement that Asia and Africa face a period of

increasing starvation which poorly organized governments will have difficulty in combating. Asia has known famine in the past, and it seems certain that famine will once again become a familiar terror. But famine alone—one of the historic regulators of population—will not restore the balance. Today's governments are unlike the fatalistic governments of the past. They will be forced into action—into war and conflict.

Here we touch on one of the age-old pressures behind human conflict—the pressure of people seeking food. It is this pressure that sent waves of humanity across the plains of Asia in centuries past, waves that in time bore down on the civilized Roman empire. The truth is that a population explosion shortly produces a military explosion.

And so we come face to face with the reality of war in the near future—the countries with the atomic bomb confronted by the countries with the population bomb. Whatever hesitancy the West—and perhaps the Soviet Union as well—may have concerning the use of its nuclear weapons, one can be sure that the nations with the population bomb will display no similar reluctance. Where there is a border to cross, a country ripe for invasion or land to occupy, one can be confident that every effort will be made by the undeveloped nations to achieve an advance by the force of numbers.

While the West has been complacent about the military danger of the population bomb, Asian countries have only to look at recent experience to appreciate its efficiency. The history of the comparatively recent past is full of lessons for Asian nations bent on conquest through pressure of population. The Indians, for example, have only to look at their settlements in Fiji. The first Indians arrived in the Fiji Islands on May 14, 1879. The group consisted of 498 indentured agricultural workers from Calcutta. By 1960, when the last census was taken, there were 197,952 Indo-Fijians in the islands, and they were the dominant population group. In Mauritius and other islands of the Indian Ocean the Indians have completely outnumbered the original population. On the East African coast, from the Republic of South Africa to Kenya, Indians have established a tremendous population beachhead. Today they number more than 1.5 million. Furthermore, they double their number each sixteen years. In time, the Indians may be too numerous even for the black Africans on the coastal strip. In Kenya and Tanganyika, the presence of the large Indian minorities is already a source of much strife and antagonism.

Or consider the Chinese experience. Brought into the island of Borneo only a century ago, the Chinese today form one-third of the population of Sarawak. They are to be found elsewhere in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

This dispersion of Asian peoples resulted from relatively minor population pressures and economic needs within the Afro-Asian ocean world. It took place in the days before Asians had their own governments to support migrations. The migrations of tomorrow, planned by Asian governments, will have tremendously greater impact. To understand what lies ahead in this respect it is important to study the history of the two biggest Asian countries, India and China.

The Indians are sea voyagers, though this fact has escaped the knowledge of many Westerners. From the dawn of history they traded along the rim of the Indian Ocean and sent large numbers of their people to Java, Borneo, and other distant regions where their religion and racial stock took hold. For India, Africa is the hinterland—the region of greatest opportunity. This is where Indians already possess a population base and where their intelligence and enterprise are at a premium, where they can obtain a privileged position for themselves through their superior industry, knowledge, and skill. Thus India's drive for power—its use of the population bomb—will almost certainly be in Africa. This fact goes far to explain the Indian government's involvement in the Congo drama and commitment of troops in Central Africa even at a time when India herself is under attack by Communist China. A number of observers of the African scene are of the opinion that New Delhi is determined to keep troops on duty in Africa to provide security for the Indian populations of the new African states on the east coast of the continent. Instead of removing their military presence from Africa, the Indians are more likely to expand it and seek ground, air, and naval bases on the continent. It should be borne in mind, too, that India is a naval power, albeit not a large one. She is the only Asian country that possesses an aircraft carrier—an instrument for projecting national power across the oceans. India has a tremendous stake in expanding its position in Africa, for the African continent could serve as a dumping ground for the sub-continent's teeming millions. Southern Africa in particular, with its highly developed industrial economy, must gleam especially bright in the dreams and ambitions of Indian expansionists.

China, on the other hand, has been a land power since the period of the Ming emperors, although it also eyes the African continent and is politically involved in Somalia, Tanganyika, and the Congo. The principal immediate Chinese objective, however, is the domination of Southeast Asia, a region that was under Chinese direction in centuries past. There is, however, no end to Chinese national ambitions or expansionist goals. The Chinese are not only stirring revolution throughout Southeast Asia but are active in Yemen on the Arabian peninsula and in Albania on the European continent. Furthermore, they are threatening territorial claims

against the Soviet Union in Central Asia. Because of this the Soviets must be deeply alarmed for the future and mindful of the need, from their standpoint, of channelling Chinese aggression in a southerly direction.

The Soviet Union today occupies vast territories that were formerly part of the Chinese empire. These include the maritime provinces on the Pacific coast and the Sinkiang border region. The growth of Czarist Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by the acquisition of lands now inherited by the communist government of the Soviet republics, was achieved at the expense of the Chinese. Today, an industrialized and increasingly wealthy though vastly underpopulated Soviet Central Asia and Far East face a China that is poor and teeming with people seeking more living space. If the pressure of Chinese population increases, as it most assuredly will, it is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to prevent infiltration along their Asian borders unless a desirable alternative target is offered to Communist China.

One has only to recall the flood of Chinese refugees into Hong Kong in 1962 to appreciate what could happen along the Soviet Union's eastern borders. The Hong Kong pressure was not actively fomented by the Peking government, or so it is believed; let us imagine, therefore, what would take place if Peking encouraged huge masses to make a concerted push across the Soviet borders in a human wave. Reference to this "human wave" is meaningful, for this is the strategy employed by the Chinese army in the Korean war—the engulfment of an enemy by the force of numbers.

The presence of Chinese hordes at the Soviet Union's back door must be tremendously disturbing to the Kremlin. Indeed this presence is certainly a major factor in the Soviet government's determination to move young people into Siberia. The populating of open territory by forced draft makes no sense in an era in which other developed countries are making plans to leave rural regions for urban centres; that is, it makes no sense except in terms of the population danger posed by the Chinese masses. Obviously, the Kremlin believes that the USSR cannot afford to leave vacant land in the east, land that may be taken over by Chinese squatters in the fashion of other Chinese squatters who moved into the Malayan countryside more than a generation ago as part of the work force for rubber plantations and tin mines.

In considering China's manoeuvres with its population, it is important to bear in mind that the Chinese form an ancient nation. Their time sense in conquests is quite different from that of Western countries such as the United States. Americans tend to look at very narrow segments of time, a decade or two at the most. The Chinese, on the other hand, tend to think in terms of a century or more.

Westerners, furthermore, should not forget that the Chinese in the last century have regarded themselves as a humiliated people. In the ages before the arrival of Westerners in China, the Chinese empire was the heart of the world; China simply means "here", the centre of the globe. Therefore, the Chinese long have considered themselves the dominant people on this planet and viewed those far beyond their borders as crude barbarians. This attitude, formed in imperial times, has not diminished under a communist regime. Indeed the history of modern China is a history of reaction against Western influences and intervention. The present government of mainland China clearly intends to endeavour to reverse the tide of history that brought the Western nations to the fore.

Communist China's new-found interest in a submarine fleet is interesting evidence touching on the mammoth ambitions of the ruling circles in Peking. They aim to reassert Chinese influence in waters where Chinese power has been virtually non-existent since the land-power faction in the Ming dynasty gained supremacy over the sea-power faction, effectively curtailing China's strength in what the people of the time called "the Southern Ocean". India's naval leaders are mindful of China's new pretensions to sea power and have warned that the future may find the Chinese attempting naval aggression in the Bay of Bengal.

The ambitions of Peking, which are being manifested in many ways and many areas, are of special concern to the Soviet Union. Indeed both Lenin and Stalin, as well as Khrushchev, devoted much time to the China problem. For more than forty years, the Soviets attempted to control China through the Communist Party apparatus. The Soviets established the party organization and aimed to curb Chinese nationalism by means of direction of the political lines of communication with Moscow. By arms pacts, loans, and technical advisory missions, the USSR hoped to make China completely dependent on and subservient to Soviet control. But this effort ceased to be a success by the late 1950s.

If direct manipulation of China's destiny has failed, as it seems to have done, then clearly the USSR must attempt to channel Chinese ambitions and aggressiveness in directions that are not dangerous to the Soviet Union. A Chinese penetration of India cannot be described as a safe channel of aggression. A Chinese victory which secured control of India's northern border areas would tighten the ring around the Soviet Union's Central Asian territories. A Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia would be safe from the Soviet standpoint, though Moscow cannot expect that such a power drive would absorb all of Communist China's aggressive energies. It is apparent that Peking will seek a much wider frame for its ambitions in the decades ahead. And the only target of sufficient size and importance to Communist China,

an attack on which would not represent a security threat to the Soviet Union, is Australia. A Chinese Australia would not be a threat to the Soviet. Indeed, attainment by the Chinese of this objective would mean a reduction in the mainland Chinese population and a shift of the Chinese people and national interest southward into the Pacific world.

The Soviet willingness to indulge in attacks on Australia is not widely recognized in the West. But the depiction of Australia as an alien outpost crops up periodically in the Soviet press. This theme was emphasized, for example, in the March 9, 1962, issue of *International Affairs* (USSR) which featured attacks on what this Communist journal termed "colonialists of the Australian bourgeoisie." The existence of a grand design against Australia is sometimes—in the United States, for example—regarded as far-fetched. But what is far-fetched about an objective which was one of the central ambitions of Japan, a much smaller country than Communist China, in the 1940s? If Japan could hope to conquer Australia, obviously the Chinese Communist colossus of today can entertain such hopes.

The country-continent of Australia, which is markedly under-populated, would represent for the Chinese people an America beyond the seas. Capture of this vast land space would free the Asian mainland occupied by Communist China of its crushing population problem. An escape to a new continent was the solution to Europe's population pressures in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The populating of North and South America and, later, of Australia and New Zealand, created new Europes across the seas.

To achieve the objective of conquering Australia, Communist China would have to move across other countries and peoples. It would have to smash several states in Southeast Asia and make a final determination as to how to deal with Indonesia. There is a real possibility that Communist China, instead of forcing Indonesia out of the path of Chinese ambitions, might deflect Indonesian aggressions by urging that country to vent its aggressiveness against the Philippine Republic.

Ultimately, Communist China must acquire or have available to it a considerable measure of sea power if it is to move down from Southeast Asia for a direct assault against Australia. A nation that cannot cross the narrow stretch of water to Matsu and the other offshore islands is not in a position to cross to Australia. But it is at this point that the Soviet Union could intervene to help the Chinese attain their ambitions and, in so doing, ease the threat to the USSR's Asian borders with Communist China.

Of itself, China, in the period immediately ahead, would not be able to build or to buy the shipping necessary for a seaborne invasion of Australia. The

Soviet Union, however, has the shipping that, in the service of Communist China, could make such an invasion a distinct possibility. For what reason, one may ask, is the Soviet Union, a land power, building an immense merchant marine and a large fleet? Whatever the answer to that question, it is disturbingly clear that if the Soviets were to assign vessels to Chinese use, then Communist China would be able to carry its power drive to the shores of the free world's greatest bastion in the southern hemisphere.

Even the suggestion of Soviet movements in the direction of co-operation with Communist China in an attack on Australia would create a crisis of staggering proportions. Indeed all the preliminary skirmishing in South Viet Nam and Malaysia between the free world and Chinese-supported forces is precisely that—a rehearsal for the confrontation that, in time, must take place over the destiny of Australia. The United States, in World War II, could not afford to let Australia be invaded by imperial Japan. How much less the United States or any of the free-world countries could afford to let the Chinese colossus menace Australia in the 1960s or 1970s!

The great question is, would the free world rally to Australia's aid in the event of a threatened invasion? The question may shock many English-speaking people. But it should be borne in mind that the free world did not rally to the cause of the Netherlands when Indonesia threatened aggression against West New Guinea. And Indonesian aggression, it should be recalled, was possible because of the supply of arms by the Soviet Union, precisely what is described here in the hypothetical case of Communist China. If a defence partner of the United States was denied moral support and military aid in the West New Guinea situation, it might be argued that the same kind of non-support might result in a crisis involving Communist China. Certainly a clash with Communist China would mean the outbreak of a general Pacific or Far Eastern War comparable in scope with World War II. The danger of defeatism in certain Western countries cannot be ignored, for the will to win in some quarters is not what it was when the Japanese were pouring south in early 1942.

In considering the strategic crises which may occur in the future, it is well to be mentally prepared for a situation in which the Soviet Union, a developed country, would join Communist China, an undeveloped nation, in a challenge to Western security interests in an area remote from the USSR's danger areas. At the same time, the West must reckon with the possibility of a deal between the Indians and Chinese that would leave the Indians free to move into the hinterland of Africa,

establishing there a sphere of influence such as the Chinese Communists seek in Southeast Asia.

In both instances, Asian conquerors would be seeking to build new empires in regions that had been developed by Western nations and that constitute important parts of the strength of the Western world. The Soviet thinking, with respect to these powers drives, might be that it stood to gain time to complete its industrialization and modernization from Central Europe to the Pacific.

Whatever the precise pattern of aggression in the years ahead, it is clear that the arena of international conflict lies in the southern hemisphere and that the strife will involve clashes between the developed and the undeveloped states, between quantity and quality, between the parliamentary and the one-party nations, and between the industrialized and the proletarian nations. In the Far East and the southern hemisphere humanity is concentrated in great numbers. There are to be found population pressures with resultant aggression, hatred, cruel demands, and rampant ideologies. While the advanced, Western states have grown fond of peace, the Afro-Asian world has become accustomed to permanent revolution. A nation such as Communist China, for example, seeks advance through violence, not gradual and peaceful progress. Thus the Far East and the southern hemisphere are together the matrix of strife from which is likely to emerge an epochal clash as significant to world history as the wars between Greeks and Persians or between the forces of Islam and Christianity.

The coming clash of nations and peoples will also be a stupendous clash of national wills, involving the stamina of entire peoples. This struggle contains great perils for the West. The danger lies not in the material resources or the armaments of the proletarian nations: neither their industrial capacity nor their military forces are sufficient to overwhelm the Western world. The danger lies in the area of will and stamina.

Since the end of World War II or before, some proletarian nations have been engaged in revolutionary warfare. They have been refining their aggressive instincts in the long string of battles from the fight for Java to the Viet Cong rebellion. The Chinese Communists have never laid down their arms since the 1930s. They have lived with protracted conflict involving not only an army but an entire society. In the hard school of revolutionary war, many Asian peoples have learned to thirst for victory and to show no tolerance, no yielding spirit, no willingness to accept the compromise and accommodation that in the West is now equated with a civilized spirit. The West once had such a battle spirit, at the end of the mediaeval period when the conquistadors marched from Mexico to Cape Horn, when Englishmen

stormed the seas and tiny bands of Portuguese extended their kingdom's power from the Bay of Biscay to Macao. But the West has been in retreat since the end of World War II. The West has fallen back from Singapore and Shanghai, from New Delhi and Baghdad, and from Leopoldville, Mombasa, and Dakar. Everywhere in Afro-Asia, the hard work of four hundred years has been abandoned overnight. This withdrawal has been accomplished for what many Westerners believe to be highly moral and enlightened purposes, out of the conviction that people are being set free and that this is good because freedom is a positive good. But they fail to recognize that freedom in the language of present-day Indonesia is not freedom as Englishmen and Americans understand it. They also fail to acknowledge the fact that many Eastern and Southeastern peoples regard kindness as weakness, emancipation as an opportunity for fresh aggression. So as the West created a power vacuum, the new Chinese empire has rushed to fill it. Peking has been quick to exploit every weakness, withdrawal, or failure of resolve.

In analyzing the possible effects of the Asian human-wave strategy, employing the population bomb, the question must be asked whether the West can pull out of its own peculiar brand of thinking, as manifested in the last generation, and whether it can return to the struggle for survival which characterized it in the past. The danger to the West—to Australia, for instance—is in the mental outlook of the Western civilization of which Australia is a part. This outlook is characterized by an unwillingness to recognize the decisive role of force in human affairs. In a noble effort to establish a permanently pacified world, many Westerners have closed their eyes to the ultimate reality of life, which is conflict. They have refused to recognize that it is conflict that gives rise to strength, and that nations that will not face up to the demands of force may find that they are destined for defeat. Powerful men in the West have become so conciliatory in their thinking with regard to Asia that they have closed their eyes to the grim life-and-death struggle of our times.

Now conciliation is a virtue, but like all virtues it must be tempered with prudence. Surely no religious imperative requires Westerners to conciliate an enemy to the point of accepting liquidation. We do not need to be reminded of the actual and the potential effects of "appeasement" before the Second World War. Christianity is not nihilism; and no Christian need feel compelled to embrace a solution to his national problems of survival that is nihilistic in that it is destined to end in national self-destruction.

Westerners can feel compassion for the vast numbers of Asians living in misery until it is oppressive in the extreme. But this should not induce Westerners —

Australians, Americans, and members of other threatened national groups — to help the enemy put a knife to the throats of our children.

The West must face the fact that if it fails to hold back the human wave that threatens to sweep out of Asia in our time, it will be exposed to all the devices and weapons of modern war from blockade to nuclear bombs. The will to live of the aggressors must be confronted by the will to live of those whose lives are placed in jeopardy. Self-preservation is the first instinct of living creatures on entering this world. To question the will to live is to question life itself, and the use of weapons as one of its functions must be matched by equal measures for protection or defence. To leave one's home open to known marauders is to pose the dilemma of either committing one's family to passive exposure to murder or rape or defending it with whatever effective weapons are at hand. So it is with a nation whose survival is threatened by the population bomb of an opposing people. Either a nation and a people are determined to survive, or they are willing to accept extinction. It is this kind of either-or question that faces the Western countries in a world in which they are technologically superior but in which they are outnumbered by the proletarian nations. It is the task of the West's leadership to convince their own people that the human-wave strategy is only effective against undisciplined, irresolute opponents; that it cannot overcome elite populations any more than it could smash elite military units such as the American Marines in Korea.