

**INCORPORATION MODELS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN CANADA, FRANCE,
AND GREAT BRITAIN, 2001-2011**

by

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ABSTRACT

This study looks at the linkages between incorporation models and public opinion. The intention of the study is to determine if a state's incorporation model shapes public opinion or if public opinion shapes the incorporation model. Using Canada, France, and Great Britain as case studies, I explore the question of policy responsiveness to shifts in public opinion, as influenced by immigration, security, and economic concerns. By examining comparative polling data, major events timelines, and single state polling information, I determine that both incorporation models and public opinion have largely been stable over the past decade in Canada and France. In contrast, shifting public opinion in Great Britain has resulted in major changes to the incorporation model in place and relations between state and society. This suggests that there are major differences between the three states in the ways in which public opinion is incorporated into the decision- and policy-making process.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

- BIA: Border and Immigration Agency
- BNP: British National Party
- CCRT: Community Cohesion Review Team
- CIC: Citizenship and Immigration Canada
- CRE: Commission for Racial Equality
- CSA: *Conseil Sondages Analyses*
- ESOL: English for Speakers of Other Languages
- EU: European Union
- FN: *Front National*
- ISSP: International Social Survey Programme
- MIPEX: Migrant Integration Policy Index
- MPG: Migration Policy Group
- PS: *Parti Socialiste*
- UK: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- UKBA: United Kingdom Border Agency
- UMP: *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire*
- US: United States of America

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

While it is not a new phenomenon, the past decade has seen an increase in tension and confrontation between host societies and their foreign-born populations. Emphasis in the media is placed on the ‘failure to integrate’ on the part of these individuals (e.g. Snow, “Muslim Integration Has Come to a Halt,” 2006) who are held responsible for what the public and political leaders perceive as a decline in national pride, identity, and values (e.g. Sacks, “Wanted: A National Culture,” 2007). Public rhetoric on immigration and minority integration has also become increasingly harsh in the past decade (Goodman, 2010: 753). This may be attributed to the fact that immigration “stirs public passions because it touches national core identities and affects fundamental collective notions of citizenship and community” (Koff, 2009: 771). Incidents of civil unrest, urban violence, and terrorist attacks and arrests since 2001, “together with moral panics about threats to the economy, culture, and ‘national security’ posed by immigrants and their descendants, have heightened anxieties about the inclusion of ‘outsiders’ in the nation-state and sharpened national discourses on citizenship rights, national belonging, and inclusion” (Phillips, 2010: 209). In this context, it is important to explore the ways in which a state’s model of incorporation may influence public opinion on citizenship, integration, and belonging within a population.

Broadly speaking, an incorporation model is the “general sociological mechanism that describes the way in which all people, migrants as well as non-migrants, find their place in society” (Lucassen, 2005: 18). Incorporation models may be attributed to a host of differences in a state, including “the historical, demographic, political, and social particularities of each country or region” (Rodríguez-García, 2010: 253). This study will

focus on the three models of incorporation currently found in Canada, France, and Great Britain, respectively: multiculturalism, assimilationism, and integrationism.

The subject of incorporation reflects a society's conception of membership, citizenship and identity (Rodríguez-García, 2010: 253). In the *multicultural* model, distinct group identities are respected and maintained based on shared histories, cultures, languages, or practices (Finney and Simpson, 2009: 17). This model allows for the celebration of difference and diversity, but has also been linked to a perceived fragmentation of society, making it difficult for any type of overarching national identity to flourish (Vasta, 2007: 715). In contrast, *assimilationism* requires the sacrifice of cultural and ethnic identity in return for membership in the polity (Loch, 2009: 795). While this model creates a strong national identity, it can also lead to the "marginalization and alienation of cultural groups who do not conform to the prescribed national prototype" (Rodríguez-García, 2010: 267). *Integrationism* is a social policy that is meant to limit the negative impacts of both multiculturalism and assimilationism. This model promotes a set of shared national values and an overarching national identity or culture while allowing individuals to maintain components of their individual or group identities (Abbas, 2007; Kalra and Kapoor, 2009; Vasta, 2007). This policy has been accused of fostering anti-minority and anti-immigrant rhetoric (Kundnani, 2007: 29) while failing to address the key problems surrounding segregation, discrimination, and disenchantment among minority or immigrant populations (McGhee, 2003: 300; Joppke, 2009: 467). These models of incorporation aim to create specific forms of citizenship and identity within a state population, with varying levels of success and failure.

This thesis aims to examine the changes made to these incorporation models between 2001 and 2011. In the past decade, a focus on non-traditional security threats has put the spotlight on the links between immigration, integration, and state security. At the same time, economic concerns have led to more exclusionary policies in a bid to protect jobs for native workers. Finally, globalization has prompted fears over the durability of national identity and culture. Together, these trends have resulted in major changes to states' integration and immigration policies and incorporation models.

By looking at the case studies of Canada, France, and Great Britain, I will explore the relationship between a state's incorporation model and public opinion. Between 2001 and 2011, a number of major events (e.g. terrorist attacks or arrests, rioting, refugee influxes) prompted changes to state policies on these matters. At the same time, these events increased negative public opinion on immigration and integration issues. This leads to the question: does a state's incorporation policies change due to public opinion, or does public opinion change due to the implementation of new policies?

My thesis reads as follows: *public opinion and incorporation models mutually reinforce and influence one another*. In certain situations, a government's implementation of new incorporation policies will gradually influence public opinion over time. In other situations, public opinion will encourage political leaders to change the state's policies in order to gain or maintain public support. By treating the case studies of Canada, France, and Great Britain, I look to demonstrate in what scenarios this is the case. I hypothesize that there will be the greatest policy responsiveness to public opinion in Great Britain, with less responsiveness in Canada and France. I believe that this will be the case due to the less formalized incorporation model in place in Great Britain, combined with the

added impetus of both ethnic rioting (2001) and deadly terrorist attacks (2005). In contrast, both multiculturalism in Canada and assimilationism in France are embedded within the states' constitutions, which I hypothesize makes them more difficult to change and less responsive to variations in public opinion.

This study will not address the origins of public opinion or the role of the media in public opinion formation. While these topics are undoubtedly interconnected with this subject, they are nevertheless outside of the scope of this study. Instead, this project will treat the relationship between public policy and public opinion. By looking directly at policies, legislation, and initiatives, we can determine the government's direction and attitudes on integration and immigration issues and see if there is any correlation with public attitudes.

To explore these issues, my thesis is divided into a series of chapters. Chapter 2 surveys existing literature on incorporation models, including a discussion of factors influencing these models. Chapter 3 examines approaches to incorporation in Canada, France, and Great Britain, with an emphasis on the legal system in place. Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology used to test hypotheses derived from the thesis, and Chapter 5 examines data from public polling from all three states to identify common themes and phenomena. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of these findings and explores the relationship between public opinion and incorporation models.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The subject of incorporation encompasses far more than discussions surrounding legal frameworks. It raises questions about how one imagines a society, the relations among its members, and the freedoms afforded to these citizens (Rodríguez-García, 2010: 252). The key questions at the heart of the analysis centre around a society's fundamental interpretation of several key issues, including liberty, equality, citizenship, and participation (Pajnik, 2007: 850). Social and ethnic integration, however, "is highly complex because it affects all aspects of a receiving nation's human ecology, defined as the political, social and economic systems that dictate human interaction" (Koff, 2009: 771). This chapter examines the literature dealing with the underlying philosophies behind policies aimed at promoting incorporation in modern liberal democracies.

2.1 INTEGRATION

All states require some degree of integration in their population, because, as Harles explains, "periodically the state requires its members to make sacrifices for the good of the whole; without a sense of collective destiny, individuals would find it difficult to subordinate interest to public welfare" (Harles, 1997: 711). The difficulty, however, is that there are many different conceptions of integration, each with different requirements and demands placed upon citizens and new arrivals. Broadly speaking, integration is the "general sociological mechanism that describes the way in which all people, migrants as well as non-migrants, find their place in society" (Lucassen, 2005: 18). At times, "'integration' has been a broad rubric covering any and all aspects of migrant settlement; at other times it has been set against multiculturalism" (Ireland, 2010: 22). In most cases,

the term ‘integration’ “implies a desirable outcome as newcomers become members of the receiving society, by which the success and failure of immigrants can be gauged, and by which the efficacy of the immigration policy can be determined” (Li, 2003: 1).

Goodman explains: “immigrant integration is predominantly concerned with the *performance* and *degree of incorporation* of newcomers in a host society” (Goodman, 2010: 755). An individual may be considered to have integrated based on a number of different factors.

Structural integration, for example, looks at indicators including employment, income, education, crime, training, dependence on public assistance, language skills, and residential concentration. Political and cultural integration, on the other hand, considers inclusion in institutions and organizations, patronage of recreation and cultural offerings, naturalization, intermarriage, use of homeland media, fluency in the state’s official language, and political involvement (Ireland, 2010). This reflects two different conceptions of integration, with “the newer conception of integration in terms of social control and cohesion [coexisting] with an older one that puts the accent on migrants’ participation in the host society’s economic, social, cultural, and political life” (Ireland, 2010: 21). Integration is a broad subject, which may be analyzed and measured using a variety of factors and indicators. Each state adopts its own conception of integration, stressing certain requirements, such as language or values, over others, such as religion or cultural practices.

Integration is important to a state to ensure a peaceful coexistence among its members; however, integration has also been seen as important for state security. This conception of integration “is cast more broadly than in traditional security studies or in microlevel

and macrolevel studies of migrant participation: is society itself integrated and ‘secure’?” (Ireland, 2010: 25). In terms of societal security, a “failure to successfully integrate and assimilate immigrant populations has a negative impact on national identity, and thus national unity” (Rudolph, 2010: 40). As we will see in following chapters, this type of argument provides the basis for the substitution of multiculturalism with integrationism in states in recent years. Furthermore, when individuals ‘fail to integrate,’ their loyalty may be called into question. This ‘failure to integrate’ could produce

Marginalization, exclusion, religious extremism, and the formation of ‘parallel societies,’ an ethnically Balkanized society, an underclass, or even an ‘enemy within.’ The predicted security-related consequences are dire indeed: a debilitated sense of national identity, higher crime rates, interethnic conflicts and a ‘clash of cultures,’ and increased potential for recruitment by foreign terrorist groups” (Ireland, 2010: 26).

In this conception, integration is vital not only for individuals’ well-being but also for the well-being of the state. As we shall see in later chapters, these types of arguments have been presented to justify and explain new policies encouraging integration and the adoption of national values.

The challenge for the state is that integration involves two actors, and, as Rudolph demonstrates through his own research and findings, it is “not something the state can mandate on a unilateral basis. Successful integration represents a type of social contract, and both parties – immigrant and native – must find the terms of this arrangement agreeable. In other words, it is important to carefully consider *agency* in the process of integration” (Rudolph, 2010: 45) Both states and their populations must be open to adjustment, which Hamdani defines as the “result of the interaction between newcomers’ struggle to strike a balance between integration and preservation of identity and the society’s role in facilitating the search for balance” (Hamdani, 2005: 6). It is in this way

that states and their population can achieve successful integration. In order to promote integration, the state adopts a series of policies that can be collectively referred to as an incorporation or integration model. This process is akin to a negotiation between state, immigrant population and the native society, in which accommodations are sought by each party.

2.2 INCORPORATION MODELS

An incorporation model is a type of contract made between population and state, in which parameters are established for the duties to participate of the former and the responsibility to accommodate of the latter. This process may be seen through both explicit mechanisms, such as compulsory language classes, or through more implicit means, such as social pressure to conform. According to Carens, for liberal democracies to endure “certain norms, attitudes, and dispositions must be widely shared among the population. Thus liberal democracies require a liberal democratic political culture” (Carens, 2000: 9). This political culture may vary slightly, but it is important that individuals feel part of the wider collective. The difference between Canada, France, and Great Britain is the degree to which identification and shared values are considered essential for membership and citizenship in the polity.

While all states employ incorporation models, the types of models in place can vary greatly. Broadly speaking, Rodríguez-García’s description of an incorporation model is useful here – it is usually “linked with colonial history, the emergence of nation-states, and the resulting policies of exclusion and inclusion on the basis of citizenship” (Rodríguez-García, 2010: 253). These models in turn can have a large impact on

conceptions of citizenship and membership within the state, as a state's incorporation model "not only reflects, and has consequences for, the social rights of minority ethnic groups, but also has wider implications for their experience of citizenship in terms of a sense of belonging and national identity" (Phillips, 2010: 212). The following section provides an overview of the types of policies in place in Canada, France, and Great Britain, as well as the European Union (EU), to regulate conceptions of citizenship and integration in these states.

In Canada, the right to difference is enshrined both in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*. This act emphasizes that multiculturalism is "a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future" (1988: 3.1(b)). At the other end of the spectrum, France employs assimilation to incorporate its citizens into a larger political body. In this conception, French identity and values are considered static, making it the duty of the immigrant to assimilate by "embracing the culture, language, and traditions of *La République*" (Murray, 2006: 36). While Great Britain previously employed a form of multiculturalism based on the Canadian model, there has been a shift towards integrationism or 'community cohesion' as the model of choice since 2001. This model seeks to find a balance between integration and diversity in a way that allows for social cohesion as well as social freedom (Johnson, 2007: 26; Abbas, 2007: 288; Rodríguez-García, 2010: 267). In each of these models of incorporation, the individual and the state are assigned a different host of rights and responsibilities. Each model has been both praised and criticized for its role in promoting or inhibiting national cohesion and growth.

Multiculturalism represents a “wide range of potential and existing processes and public policies within a nation-state wherein minority collectivities might gain recognition, protection, and rights” (Abu-Laban, 2002: 462). This model supports and strengthens the identity of minority groups, but critics say that it is at the expense of national identity (Vasta, 2007: 715). Some have accused the model of failing to address the problems of institutional racism, which become further embedded in the system (Vasta, 2007: 727). Rodríguez-García highlights the potential of the ‘cultural mosaic’ or pluralist model to “foster processes of essentialization and segregation to the detriment of fundamental principles of equality and social cohesion. Further, multiculturalism can lead to inequality by violating the individual rights of people *within* a cultural group, namely women, who tend to be subject to discriminatory practices” (Rodríguez-García, 2010: 255). Because multiculturalism has been “misinterpreted as an ideology that somehow grants license to social polarization and ghettoization, it is now viewed as a defunct option for managing migration” (Rodríguez-García, 2010: 268). Finally, “by expressing demands for accommodation, proponents [of multiculturalism] have engendered insecurities among many natives in receiving societies and raised suspicions about the willingness, capacity, and ability of immigrants to integrate” (Rudolph, 2010: 47). While the goal of encouraging the maintenance of personal religious, cultural, or ethnic customs and traditions is considered positive, multiculturalism is said to promote a weak sense of national identity and pride.

Assimilationism or universalism as a model of incorporation is based on the idea that there should be absolute equality for all individuals, aiming to induce conformity to pre-existing norms of the dominant social group within the state. Assimilation “nears its

endpoint when outsiders come to identify more closely with the imperatives of that group and are accepted as equal participants in group life” (Harles, 1997: 713). Koff writes that in the past, “the colour-blind French notion of citizenship was often viewed as a positive alternative” (Koff, 2009: 772) to communitarian models such as those found in the United States and Great Britain. More recently, however, some authors have highlighted the fact that assimilation can lead to equality in legal process, but not in fact for minorities (Koff, 2009; Loch, 2009; Murray, 2006). Assimilationism is based on the duty of the individual to assimilate, with the promise of certain advantages once this takes place. When minorities find that they are still considered alien to the majority population in a state, the model of assimilation breaks down, sometimes leading to violent confrontation, such as the 2005 French riots (Loch, 2009: 797). Assimilationism promotes equality, but becomes unsustainable when the promise of equality in relation to the majority population is not born out for minorities.

Integrationism is often presented as a solution to the problems of both multiculturalism and assimilationism, with states such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Australia adopting this approach in the past decade (Abbas, 2007; Entzinger, 2009; Kolig and Kabir, 2008; Poynting and Mason, 2006; Vasta, 2007). A policy of integrationism is “presented as an attractive middle path between tacitly endorsing cultural segregation and intolerantly suppressing cultural diversity” (Mason, 2010: 858). Some academics and public figures, particularly Cattle, have affirmed that integrationism or community cohesion allows citizens to focus upon commonalities rather than differences, “challenge areas of difference that conflict with wider societal interests, and more vigorously promote a common language and active citizenship, rather than relying

upon ‘peaceful coexistence’” (Cantle, 2008). Critics of the integrationism agenda accuse its adherents of failing to address the key problems surrounding segregation, discrimination, and disenchantment in minority populations (McGhee, 2003: 300; Joppke, 2009: 467). The concept of community cohesion has been subject to criticism for its “alleged de-politicisation of race, its limiting concept of cohesion and its assimilationist tendencies” (Flint, 2010: 261). This agenda has also been accused of fuelling anti-Muslim rhetoric in Great Britain (Kundnani, 2007: 29) through an “implicit series of oppositions masquerading as choices and riven with moral valencies – Britishness (good) versus multiculturalism (bad), cohesion (good) versus diversity (bad), citizenship (good) versus community (mainly bad), majority (good) versus minority (bad), ‘us’ (good) versus ‘them’ (very bad and probably dangerous)” (Alexander, 2007: 116). Integrationism aims to promote the incorporation of minority cultures to the majority culture, but can also exacerbate existing social tensions in a society if citizens’ concerns are not adequately addressed by the state.

2.3 PUBLIC OPINION ON INTEGRATION AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES

Immigration can be seen as threatening to both the state and its native-born population (Koff, 2009: 771). This is because “immigration challenges – and in some cases reaffirms – notions of national identity, sovereignty, and state control that have been historically linked with citizenship” (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, 2008: 154). Furthermore, immigration “entails a tension between inclusion and exclusion” (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, 2008: 155). While this project focuses specifically on the relationship between public opinion and incorporation models, most research on the subject to date has concentrated on public attitudes towards immigration and immigrants, particularly

based on economic determinants (Facchini and Mayda, 2008: 668). Explanations for variations in public opinion on immigration issues can be grouped into three main categories: contact theory, group conflict theory, and economic competition theory (Blinder, 2011: 8).

Contact theory posits that sustained contact between groups will produce more positive attitudes. In 1946, Williams tested 102 propositions on intergroup relations, finding that “intergroup contact would maximally reduce prejudice when the two groups share similar status, interests, and tasks and when the situation fosters personal, intimate intergroup contact” (Pettigrew and Troop, 2006: 751-752). Building upon this research, Allport (1954) found that prejudice would diminish when four features are present: equal status between the groups in the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom (Pettigrew and Troop, 2006: 752). Since then, these theories have been applied to a variety of situations, including housing (Wilner, Walker, and Cook, 1952; Works, 1961), employment (Novak and Rogan, 2010), and education (Niens and Cairns, 2005; Watkins, Larson, and Sullivan, 2007; Schofield *et al.*, 2010; Bridges and Tomkowiak, 2010). This suggests that those with the most positive attitudes towards immigrants are those who come most frequently and closely in contact with other groups.

Group conflict theory predicts that those who feel the most threatened by immigrants will be the most likely to oppose immigration, on the basis of self-interest (McLaren and Johnson, 2007: 713). In particular, “intergroup threat occurs when one group’s actions, beliefs, or characteristics challenge the goal attainment or well-being of another group” (Riek, Mania, and Gaertner, 2006: 336). More broadly, “negative outgroup sentiments

can be seen as a defensive reaction to perceived intergroup competition for scarce goods. These scarce goods can relate to material interests (e.g., affordable housing, well-paid jobs, resources of the welfare state), but also include power and status” (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet, 2008: 354). In this conception, negative opinions towards immigrants and outgroups develop through competition.

Economic competition theory holds that opposition to immigration will come from one of two groups: native workers with the same skill sets as new immigrants who are thus in competition for the same employment opportunities, or else from wealthier natives who see immigrants as a tax burden on the state’s social services (Blinder, 2011: 8). In both cases, individuals are motivated by economic self-interest (Fetzer, 2000: 7). The first group is in competition with immigrants, because “immigrants tend to be perceived as mostly unskilled workers who are willing to perform jobs at lower levels of pay than natives, placing the latter at risk of unemployment” (McLaren and Johnson, 2007: 714). However, attitudes towards immigration can be affected by group-interest as well (Funk, 2010: 38). An individual will feel more negative towards immigrants when he or she perceives that others in his or her ingroup are facing increased competition for resources. As such, “resource-based favouritism may, therefore, be connected to ingroup protectiveness more than self-protection” (McLaren and Johnson, 2007: 714). In this theory, immigration provokes feelings of competition, vulnerability, and protectiveness in the native population.

In addition to these three broad theories, the theory of politicized change suggests that when communities “are undergoing sudden demographic changes at the same time that salient national rhetoric politicizes immigration, immigrants can quickly become the

targets of political hostility” (Hopkins, 2008: 2). This is because sudden demographic changes generate uncertainty, while media coverage of these demographic changes can politicize them in individuals’ minds. This can in turn increase the tendencies already present in a population.

Each of these theories provides different explanations for public attitudes towards immigrants and outgroups. As we shall see in the following chapters, these theories may be applied to the cases of Canada, France, and Great Britain to determine the relationship between public opinion and incorporation models.

2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Studying models of incorporation fills the gap between sociology-based studies of public opinion and state-based studies of migration policy. Each of the three countries chosen for this study has employed various conceptions of citizenship and incorporation with different levels of success and failure. Looking at these types of models is expected to provide useful information for explaining why certain policies provoke intense reactions in some states (such as rioting or protesting) but not in others. While extensive work has been done on types of incorporation, most of these studies are prescriptive in nature and focus on advocating one or another system as the ‘best.’ In contrast, a study of models of incorporation and public opinion opens new avenues of understanding and debate within this discipline.

CHAPTER 3: APPROACHES TO INCORPORATION

As discussed in the previous chapter, an incorporation model requires a delicate compromise between the state's desire to attract immigrant populations, its need for integration to protect what it values most about its own culture, and a minority or immigrant population's wish for some accommodation. Canada, France, and Great Britain have each defended an approach officials believe produces a better balance among these often conflicting considerations, with variations on the degree to which integration is demanded or institutionalized. This chapter treats each state's approach to incorporation by looking at the legislation and policies in place related to citizenship and integration, with the objective of focussing on how each state has managed the incorporation of minorities and immigrants. This discussion will provide both background and context for the analysis of public opinion data in subsequent chapters.

An incorporation model may be thought of as an assembly of policies, laws and practices relating to the interaction between individuals in a society. To distinguish incorporation or citizenship models, "scholars mostly refer to naturalization criteria, integration requirements, and cultural rights" (Helbling, 2010: 3). These policies, laws, and practices influence the patterns of migration to a state and govern who is eligible for citizenship. This is important because it is "commonly assumed that formal citizenship regulations reflect a broader understanding of how a nation-state is organized and cultural boundaries are drawn" (Helbling, 2010: 3). These laws also determine the types of relations between members, and those between members and non-members. The following section provides an overview of the types of policies in place in Canada, France, and Great Britain, as well as the European Union, to regulate conceptions of

citizenship and integration. This chapter shows the different ways in which the three states approach the issue of incorporation of their populations.

3.1 LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN CANADA

In Canada, the incorporation model used is that of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism became official government policy in 1971 and is enshrined within the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* of 1988. In the *Multiculturalism Act*, the Government of Canada “recognizes the diversity of Canadians as regards race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and is committed to a policy of multiculturalism designed to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians” (1988: Preamble). Furthermore, the Act

- Reaffirms multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society;
- Encourages federal institutions to uphold longstanding values of respect, fairness, and equality of opportunity with respect to members of diverse groups;
- Helps protect the rights of all Canadians, foster the full participation of all members of society, celebrate Canada’s diverse heritage, and recognize the vast contributions of all Canadians regardless of their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic background; and
- Encourages federal institutions to carry out their activities in a manner that is sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of Canada (*Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 2009-2010*, 2010: 6).

In addition to the Act, the right to difference is enshrined within the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982), as well as the *Canadian Bill of Rights* (1960). Finally, citizenship and immigration are regulated by the *Immigrant and Refugee Protection Act*, which has as one of its objectives “to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canadian society, while respecting the federal, bilingual, and multicultural character of

Canada” (2001: Art. 3(1)(b)). Together, these pieces of legislation form the core of immigration, integration, and citizenship laws in Canada.

Along with these pieces of legislation, a number of documents are published every year by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) on the state of multiculturalism and immigration in the country. These documents and reports outline the efforts made in the past year to integrate newcomers to Canada. The most recent of these, *Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 2009-2010*, affirms that “Canada is known throughout the world as a place where diversity is celebrated within the context of the core Canadian values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The contributions of Canadians and newcomers of all cultures, ethnicities, and religions have made Canada the country it is today” (2010: 11). The report evaluates the successes and shortcomings of CIC’s Multiculturalism Program, which is aimed at supporting federal and public institutions in implementing multiculturalism within their activities. These efforts are carried out through a number of initiatives, including the Multiculturalism Grants and Contributions Program, public education and outreach, and anti-racism campaigns. The *Current State of Multiculturalism in Canada and Research Themes on Canadian Multiculturalism 2008-2010* document aims to critically examine both academic and non-academic debates regarding multiculturalism in Canada. The document acknowledges that while multiculturalism has been subject to criticism since its adoption in 1971, new evidence has emerged in the past few years that contradicts this criticism. The document affirms that there is “a) evidence that the process of immigrant and minority integration is working better in Canada than in other countries; and b) evidence that the multiculturalism policy plays a positive role in this process” (*Current*

State of Multiculturalism in Canada and Research Themes on Canadian Multiculturalism 2008-2010, 2010: 7). The author arrives at this conclusion by analyzing integration on three different dimensions: economic integration, political integration, and social integration using public opinion polling data, citizenship and political participation figures (e.g. number of foreign-born Members of Parliament), educational outcomes, etc. Within these documents, CIC and the Government of Canada acknowledge that “immigration, citizenship, and multiculturalism are linked across a spectrum and together contribute to the process of each individual’s full integration into Canadian society” (*Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 2009-2010*, 2010: 32). CIC and its partner agencies aim to help newcomers to Canada excel in the economic, political, and social domains in order to become fully-participating members of society.

While the state allows and encourages the maintenance of most cultural traditions, there is an expectation of a certain degree of social assimilation for newcomers to Canada who wish to become Canadian citizens. Language and citizenship tests are required prior to the granting of citizenship. The *Welcome to Canada* guide provided to immigrants highlights the necessity of learning either English or French in order to be able to interact with other residents (*Welcome to Canada*, 2010: 3) and emphasizes the importance of seeking employment (*Welcome to Canada*, 2010: 4). While the guide outlines many of the rights and privileges that Canadians enjoy, it makes it clear that some degree of assimilation is expected of new arrivals. This does not guarantee that individuals will necessarily have the skills needed to adjust to their new life in Canada; however, the focus is upon assuring that they meet the basic requirements.

Multiculturalism in Canada is well embedded in the system and is a principle that departments and agencies throughout the federal government are expected to promote. With a firm legal foundation, as well as constitutional protection for the right to difference, multiculturalism represents not only the model of incorporation currently in place, but also a philosophy of action for the federal government. While the government expects that recent immigrants learn either English or French, respect the law, and find employment, individuals are free to maintain their distinct cultural or religious identities when they move to Canada. This model has not been without conflict (e.g. various legal cases surrounding accommodation and discrimination), but has endured despite these challenges.

3.2 LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN FRANCE

Human rights in France are enshrined in the 1789 *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*. This document establishes a number of individual and collective rights for all French citizens, the first of which is that “men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good” (1789: Art. 1). It is upon this article that the conceptions of citizenship and equality are based. Due to this provision, no distinctions may be made between French citizens on the basis of religion, race, ethnicity or any other marker of difference. The preamble of the *Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958* affirms that the principles of the *Déclaration* are constitutionally binding. Furthermore, it declares that “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without

distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs”¹ (1958: Art. 1).

Together, these documents underline the country’s commitment to equality and secularism and prohibit any distinctions made between French citizens on the basis of origin, ethnicity, or religion.

Discrimination based on these distinctions is also banned in France. Racial, ethnic, national, or religious discrimination in the provision of goods and services and employment was first prohibited in 1972, while discrimination on the basis of gender and family circumstances was prohibited in 1975, customs in 1985, and disabilities and health status in 1989 (Choudhury, 2007: 190). The 1992 *Code Pénal* prohibits discrimination “based on distinction between individuals for reasons of their origin or nationality, gender, family situation, pregnancy, physical appearance, family name, health, handicap, genetic characteristics, morals, sexual orientation, age, political opinions, union activities, or their belonging or non-belonging, real or imagined, to an ethnicity, nation, race, or religion”² (*Loi N°92-684*, 1992: Art. 225-1). Under the *Loi n°2004-1486 du 30 Décembre 2004*, both discriminatory acts and rhetoric are punishable by law, unlike in other states where some discriminatory speech is protected under free speech provisions. Despite this, Choudhury draws attention to the fact that “while France is a signatory and has ratified the major international human rights instruments on discrimination, it has always entered reservations on articles that relate to the rights of individuals belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities” (Choudhury, 2007: 190). Furthermore, France has not

¹ English translation provided by the French *Ministère des affaires étrangères*, 1997.

² Original reads: “Constitue une discrimination toute distinction opérée entre les personnes physiques [ou morales] à raison de leur origine, de leur sexe, de leur situation de famille, de leur grossesse, de leur apparence physique, de leur patronyme, de leur état de santé, de leur handicap, de leurs caractéristiques génétiques, de leurs moeurs, de leur orientation sexuelle, de leur âge, de leurs opinions politiques, de leurs activités syndicales, de leur appartenance ou de leur non-appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion déterminée.”

ratified the Council of Europe's *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*. Discrimination is not permitted in France on the basis of physical, mental, or moral distinctions; however, the country has not made the same commitments to national minorities within its territory, as this would go against the country's principle of universalism.

The incorporation model in place in France is generally considered to be that of assimilationism. The *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* defines assimilation as the “culmination, assumed or anticipated, of the integration process of an immigrant at which point the individual identifies only with the distinct cultural characteristics that are meant to be held in common by the majority of the members of the host society”³ (“Mots de l'Intégration,” 2011). The document notes, however, that while this model of incorporation is most often identified as the French model, it does not have a legal foundation in France. Instead, assimilationism may be considered the model by default because of the way in which French law conceptualizes citizenship. A non-citizen's application for citizenship is judged based on the extent to which he or she has assimilated to French society, which includes the adoption of the French language and acceptance of social norms and customs (“Mots de l'Intégration,” 2011). The *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* specifies that the preferred term in France is in fact ‘integration’ rather than assimilation.⁴ French integration is defined as a framework to “maintain social cohesion at both the local and the national level in such a way that each may live peacefully and normally while respecting the law and exercising his or her rights and

³ Original reads: “Aboutissement supposé ou attendu d'un processus d'intégration de l'immigré tel que celui-ci n'offre plus de caractéristiques culturelles distinctes de celles qui sont censées d'être communes à la majorité des membres de la société d'accueil.”

⁴ Note: for the purposes of this paper, I will continue to use the term ‘assimilation’ when discussing France in order to differentiate it from the British conception of ‘integrationism’ and ‘integration’ more broadly.

obligations. An integration policy does not concern only immigrants [and] does not aim to reduce all difference. Instead, integration requires reciprocity and an openness to diversity”⁵ (“Mots de l’Intégration,” 2011). While a certain degree of assimilation is required of those who seek French citizenship, the French state allows for the maintenance of differences outside of the public sphere. This differs from the Canadian model in its divisions between public life and private life. While in Canada the two go hand in hand, French incorporation requires the clear division between public and private spheres.

3.3 LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN GREAT BRITAIN

Unlike the other two states included in this study, Great Britain’s incorporation model does not have as long a history or as strong a legal framework. The country has employed a number of incorporation models in recent years. Many of the most useful analyses of incorporation models and integration efforts in Great Britain have been the product of commissions aimed at examining sources of inequality in the country and promoting a sense of shared identity and citizenship. It is through these documents that we can see the influences and inspiration of political leaders’ decision-making on integration efforts in the past decade. Presented chronologically here, we can see the passage from multiculturalism to integrationism in Great Britain.

⁵ Original reads: “Mener une politique d’intégration, c’est définir et développer des actions tendant à maintenir la cohésion sociale au niveau local comme au plan national, de sorte que chacun puisse vivre paisiblement et normalement dans le respect des lois et l’exercice de ses droits et de ses devoirs. Ainsi conçue, une politique d’intégration ne concerne pas seulement les immigrés [et] elle ne vise pas à réduire toutes ses différences. L’intégration demande un effort réciproque, une ouverture à la diversité qui est un enrichissement mais aussi une adhésion.”

The increased focus on citizenship in the country began in the late 1990s. *Education for Citizenship and the Teaching Democracy in Schools*, also known as the Crick Report, was published in 1998. The advisory committee, chaired by Bernard Crick, reached the conclusion that “citizenship education [should] be a statutory entitlement in the curriculum and that all schools should be required to show they are fulfilling the obligation that this places upon them” (*Education for Citizenship*, 1998: 22). In the committee’s view, “citizenship education is education for citizenship, behaving and acting as a citizen, therefore it is not just knowledge of citizenship and civic society; it also implies developing values, skills and understanding” (*Education for Citizenship*, 1998: 13). This report marked a renewed focus in Britain towards the creation of a unified and strengthened notion of British citizenship and belonging, heralding the larger changes to come in the country. The report introduced citizenship lessons for all children in British schools, not just for new arrivals.

The *Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*, also known as the Parekh Report, was the end result of a two-year commission set up by the Runnymede Trust. The Commission’s purpose was “to analyse the current state of multi-ethnic Britain and propose ways of countering racial discrimination and disadvantage and making Britain a confident and vibrant multicultural society at ease with its rich diversity” (Parekh, 2000: Preface). The Commission concluded that Britain must build a community of citizens by:

- Rethinking the national story and national identity;
- Understanding that all identities are in a process of transition;
- Developing a balance between cohesion, difference, and equality;
- Addressing and eliminating all forms of racism;
- Reducing material inequalities; and
- Building a human rights culture (Parekh, 2000: Introduction).

Furthermore, the report called for the establishment of a human rights commission and an equality commission, as well as a single Equality Act to cover all unlawful discrimination. Parekh, who chaired the Commission, has advocated for the adoption of an official Canadian-style declaration of multiculturalism as Great Britain's official policy, and it is easy to see the similarities between his findings and the Canadian multicultural model. It is this report that it is so starkly in contrast to the incorporation model of the later half of the decade. While the Home Office studied the conclusions of the Commission, the report was soon overshadowed by the events in 2001, which led to drastic changes to the way Britons conceptualize integration.

Urban riots broke out in the cities of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley in the summer of 2001, predominantly between white and Asian youths. In response, an official investigation headed by Ted Cante was launched to examine the causes of the violence. The investigation's mission was to "obtain the views of local communities, including young people, local authorities, voluntary, and faith organisations, in a number of representative multi-ethnic communities, on the issues that need to be addressed in developing confident, active communities and social cohesion; and to identify good practice and to report this to the Ministerial Group, and also to identify weaknesses in the handling of these issues at local level" (*Community Cohesion*, 2001: 5). In *Community Cohesion: Report of the Independent Review Team*, or the Cante Report as it came to be known, the Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT) determined that "many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges" (*Community Cohesion*, 2001: 9). Furthermore, the CCRT found that there "has been little

attempt to develop clear values which focus on what it means to be a citizen of a modern multi-racial Britain and many still look backwards to some supposedly halcyon days of a mono-cultural society, or alternatively look to their country of origin for some form of identity” (*Community Cohesion*, 2001: 9). This report signalled a clear change in British policy on integration and citizenship. With the Cantle Report, integration policy in Great Britain changed from multiculturalism to that of ‘community cohesion,’ with emphasis on the creation of shared values to be adopted by all individuals living in Britain. The response to the 2005 London terror attacks increased these tendencies and signalled the end of multiculturalism in Great Britain to some (Mason, 2010: 858).

The 2001 riots and the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States also ushered in a renewed focus on security and its connections to both integration and immigration. The *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain* white paper was presented to Parliament by the Home Secretary in February 2002. The document’s authors consider citizenship to be one of the key areas for improvement in the country’s security and integration policy, concluding that “to ensure social integration and cohesion in the UK, we need to develop a stronger understanding of what citizenship really means” (*Secure Borders*, 2002: 10). Concrete examples for improving pride in citizenship include “speeding up the process of obtaining citizenship; preparing people for citizenship by promoting language training and education for citizenship; celebrating the acquisition of citizenship by introducing citizenship ceremonies; updating our deprivation of citizenship procedure; and reforming our nationality legislation” (*Secure Borders*, 2002: 11). The white paper outlines numerous ways to improve interactions between newcomers and the state. The *Secure Borders, Safe Haven* white paper emphasizes the need to promote

citizenship and belonging within minority and immigrant populations.

Further changes to citizenship were introduced in the *Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act* (2002), which “imposed on candidates to British citizenship a ‘pledge of allegiance.’ The new citizen is required to reach a good level in English; to swear to respect the laws of the country and its democratic values; and to accomplish his or her duties and obligations as a British citizen” (Garbaye, 2010: 169). These qualities are evaluated using the electronic test *Life in the United Kingdom*. This test consists of twenty-four multiple-choice questions, requiring a score of eighteen or higher to pass, taken from chapters of a handbook published under the same name. The introduction of this test marked a turning point in the integration of immigrants into British society. While Great Britain was transitioning from a multicultural to integrationism at this time, the changes to the country’s citizenship policies were actually inspired by those in place in Canada. However, it is the focus on values that remained different between the two countries.

The idea of community cohesion was built upon by the *Strength in Diversity: Towards a Community Cohesion and Racial Equality Strategy*, which was published by the Home Office in 2004. The document calls for a single government-wide policy on community cohesion and racial equality. Through this strategy, the government “aim[s] to articulate the vision of a successful integrated society, draw together the evidence, and provide a coherent framework through which we can drive a programme of action across [g]overnment, the public services and more widely” (*Strength in Diversity*, 2004: 5). Rather than establishing a set of objectives, the document highlights the need for dialogue and input from the community before any concrete goals are set. *Strength in Diversity* is

the concretisation of community cohesion as the government's official strategy and aim.

Integrationism was further detailed in the Commission on Integration and Cohesion's publication, *Our Shared Future*, released in 2007. The Commission aimed to set practical guidelines for promoting integration and cohesion at the local level. The document outlines four key principles that underpin integration and cohesion:

Firstly, the sense of shared futures, [emphasizing] what binds communities together rather than what differences divide them, and prioritising a shared future over divided legacies. Secondly, an emphasis on a new model of rights and responsibilities – one that makes clear both a sense of citizenship at national and local level, and the obligations that go along with membership of a community, both for individuals or groups. Thirdly, an ethics of hospitality – a new emphasis on mutual respect and civility that recognises that alongside the need to strengthen the social bonds within groups, the pace of change across the country reconfigures local communities rapidly, meaning that mutual respect is fundamental to issues of integration and cohesion. [Finally], a commitment to equality that sits alongside the need to deliver visible social justice, to prioritise transparency and fairness, and build trust in the institutions that arbitrate between groups. (*Our Shared Future*, 2007: 7).

This document aims to involve the local community and municipal structures to avoid incidents such as those in Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley in 2001. By emphasizing the importance of the local level, *Our Shared Future* aims to create cohesion not merely from the top-down, but also at the grassroots level.

One of the commonalities of these pieces of legislation and policies is the focus on values. Wolton explains: “the loss of common values is a pervasive theme of contemporary British politics. Over the past few years, British politicians have introduced measures that they claim will promote ‘common values’” (Wolton, 2006: 453). This perceived loss has attributed to the effects of immigration (Wolton, 2006: 454). In 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke of the need to “respect both our right to differ and the

duty to express any difference in a way fully consistent with the values that bind us together” (Blair, 2006). Earlier, Home Secretary David Blunkett similarly stressed the need to “articulate and secure the common values that underpin our democracy” (“Are Civil Liberties at Risk?” 2001). It is this focus on ‘British values’ that distinguishes these efforts and policies from those in place in either Canada or France.

In Great Britain, much of the country’s policy on immigration and integration has been the product of both government and independent studies on the issues. Combined with the absence of a constitutionally-protected Bill of Rights, this has meant that incorporation models in Great Britain are much more mutable than in the other two states, where the incorporation models are embedded in the state’s human rights code. Due to the more informal nature of incorporation policies in Great Britain, the model is much easier to change. It is perhaps for this reason that we have seen a dramatic shift from multiculturalism to integrationism in the past decade, while there have not been similar shifts in Canada or France.

3.4 LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

In addition to their national policies on incorporation and citizenship, France and Great Britain are also party to Europe-wide policies on integration due to their membership in the European Union. Phillips explains: “the social integration of minority ethnic groups and new migrants is central to the European Commission’s agenda on social inclusion as embodied in its two Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC and 2000/87/EC) and the development of *A Common Agenda for Integration*” (Phillips, 2010: 210). *A Common Agenda for Integration* conceptualises integration “as a two-way

process, whereby minority groups and the majority population participate in the process of change on an equal footing” (Phillips, 2010: 211). Integration is perceived as a balance between accepting cultural diversity with the maintenance of “a basic set of core, a common language, and cultivation of ‘bridging’ social capital” (Ireland, 2010: 21). The EU supports member states’ integration efforts financially, while promoting initiatives to minimize discrimination towards immigrants from third-party states. This has led to the creation of nine common basic principles on integration:

1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states;
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union;
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible;
4. Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration;
5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society;
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration;
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and member state citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration;
8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law; and
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration (*A Common Agenda for Integration*, 2005: 15-20).

While responsibility for integration lies with the member states, “the Commission encourages a coherent approach to integration that will become integral to policy-making and implementation across member-states” (Phillips, 2010: 210). As member states, France and Great Britain thus have a commitment to the principles outlined by the

European Commission on the integration of third party nationals into their populations, while maintaining their own independent national policies as well.

3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has examined some of the ways in which states integrate both immigrants and non-immigrants into a cohesive polity. As we have seen from the overview of the legislation on the subject, Canada, France, and Great Britain each have measures in place to ensure the equality of their citizens. In Canada, multiculturalism and the right to difference are enshrined within the Charter and the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*. In France, the historic *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* from 1789 continues to be the basis of the country's conception of citizenship, equality, and identity. In Great Britain, human rights are guaranteed by the *Bill of Rights* and the *Equality Act*, while much of the country's policy in recent years has been the product of commission reports. These policies influence the ways in which members interact and also the relations between members and non-members in a state.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

This study will present a comparative analysis of public opinion polls across three states, Canada, France, and Great Britain. Using secondary data – that is, data that were not collected specifically for this project – the study will look for correlations between a state’s policies on integration and public support for these policies. I hypothesize that there will be a greater correlation between changing policies and public opinion in Great Britain, while policies remain constant despite public opinion in Canada and France. I predict that this will be the case due to the more malleable nature of Great Britain’s incorporation policies.

Three different types of data will be used. First, the study collects information from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), the Pew Global Attitudes Project, and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). These resources include data on all three states. Second, I have assembled a basic timeline of events, policy decisions, and statements for each of the three states from January 2001 to May 2011 using a survey of national news articles and government press releases from each state. The purpose here is to establish linkages between government decisions and the population’s support for these policies. Third, data were collected for each individual state to allow for the inclusion of those public opinion polls that do not treat all three states. Together, these three datasets allow for comparison of trends in immigration and integration debates in Canada, France, and Great Britain.

This chapter will outline the methodology employed in this project and the limitations of these methods in relation to the data used. The central hypotheses derived from the literature reviewed in earlier chapters will be assessed in the next chapter.

4.1 COMPARATIVE DATA

When choosing which datasets to employ in this project, I sought studies that included all three states in their analysis. The majority of studies within the field of immigration and integration tend to look either exclusively at the European Union member states or else compare the EU with the United States (US). Despite these challenges, three major, global studies were found that allow for a uniform comparison between Canada, France, and Great Britain.

The first study is the Migrant Integration Policy Index. MIPEX is an ongoing assessment tool of states' integration policies for third-party nationals. In MIPEX, "countries score high on the index when immigrants can easily and with minimal preconditions obtain equal rights" (Koopmans, 2008: 5). MIPEX has been published three times, in 2004, 2007, and 2011, which allows for a multi-year comparison. The Migrant Integration Policy Index III, published in March 2011, measures integration in 31 states⁶ using 148 policy indicators, grouped into seven policy areas. Within each policy area,

The indicator scores are averaged together to give one of four dimension scores which examine the same aspect of policy. The four dimension scores are then averaged together to give the policy area score for each of the seven policy areas per country which, averaged together one more time, lead to the overall scores for each country. In order to make rankings and comparisons,

⁶ These include the 27 European Union member states, in addition to Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the United States. The MIPEX I was published in 2005 and included only the EU-15 member states, while MIPEX II, published in 2007, included the EU-25 member states and Switzerland, Norway, and Canada.

the initial 1, 2, 3 scale is converted into a 0, 50, 100 scale for dimensions and policy areas, where 100 percent is the top score (“MIPEX Methodology,” 2011).

This information is compiled by national experts and checked by anonymous reviewers within the Migration Policy Group (MPG). MIPEX is led by the MPG and the British Council, and is co-financed by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals as part of the Outcomes for Policy Change Project. Since its first publication in 2004, MIPEX has become a respected and influential source on integration issues. It has been referenced by political leaders and institutions both at the state and EU-levels, and employed by members of civil society and the media to stimulate debate on the integration of third-party nationals in Europe and North America.

The second study employed is the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Pew’s key indicators database collects information from states around the world on a variety of issues, ranging from perceptions of the US globally, to evaluating fears of Islamic extremism. Since its creation in 2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Project has conducted more than 270,000 interviews in 57 countries. The question to be utilized in this study is worded: “Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?” This question has been asked on a yearly basis since 2002, which allows for a year-by-year analysis of public satisfaction within these three states. Unfortunately, the question has only been asked every other year for Canada, making the data for this country less complete. The question was asked every year from 2002 to 2010 for both France, and Great Britain. The Pew Global Attitudes Project is directed by Andrew Kohut, who is also president of the Pew Research Centre. The project is funded by the Pew Charitable

Trusts and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. Pew is a non-partisan think-tank located in Washington, D.C.

The third source of comparative information is the ISSP. The International Social Survey Programme is a continuing, cross-national project that brings together on-going surveys and studies from around the world. The ISSP evolved from a bilateral collaboration between the *Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfragen der Socialwissenschaften* (General Population Survey of the Social Sciences) of the *Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden, und Analysen* (Centre for Survey Research and Methodology) in Mannheim, Germany and the General Social Survey of the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago in 1982. Since then, the project has grown to include 43 countries.⁷ The ISSP focuses on set topics for each year, which are developed by a sub-committee and later adopted by the annual plenary meeting of the ISSP. For the purposes of this study, I will be focusing on the years 2003 and 2004, which looked at national identity and citizenship respectively. Unfortunately, the next edition focusing on national identity will not be published until 2013, which means that no comparative data is available for this project.

4.2 TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS, POLICIES, AND DECISIONS

To prepare detailed timelines of major events, policies, and decisions relating to immigration and integration in each of the three states, I chose government press releases

⁷ These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

as well as newspaper articles, selecting those that focused specifically on changes and amendments to government policies.

I found official departmental news releases to be the simplest way to determine the government's shifting attitudes and changing priorities on integration and immigration. In each of the three states, the governing party and/or the state's political leader was replaced at least once between 2001 and 2011. Using the governments' press releases, it is possible to see the ways in which the state's policies have changed during the chosen period in response to emerging global trends and major events. It was not possible to rely solely upon the government press releases, however, as none of the three states made their archives available back to 2001. Citizenship and Immigration Canada's website only has press releases dating back to January 2004, while France's *Ministère de l'Immigration, l'Intégration, l'Asile, et le Codéveloppement Solidaire* only has those dating to mid-2010, and Great Britain's Home Office's press releases date back to the most recent election in May 2010.

To compensate for the unavailability of press releases dating back to 2001, I have relied upon the on-going newspaper database Factiva. Factiva aggregates newspaper articles, as well as press releases and other materials, from around the world. Employing this source rather than individual newspaper archives guaranteed that a greater variety of articles were found, allowing for a more thorough and complete timeline. To locate relevant articles for each state, I used the relevant ministry or department as part of my search terms.⁸ In the case of France, I narrowed the results to those published by the

⁸ For Canada, I searched "Citizenship Immigration Canada." For France, I searched "France + integration + immigration" and "France + intégration + immigration." For Great Britain, I searched "UKBA + immigration" between April 2008 and May 2011, "BIA + immigration" between January 2007 and April

Agence France Press. For Great Britain, I used those from the M2 Presswire, the press release service employed by the British government. As Citizenship and Immigration's press releases data back further, I only had to search for articles published between 2001 and 2003, which meant that I did not need to narrow this search down by source. In each of the three cases, several thousand articles were found for every year. I chose to include only those events that had a major policy implication, meaning that I excluded all stories relating to deportations, human interest stories, and all details about individual cases. This left me with articles on legislation, policies, court cases against the government, speeches, and major reports and publications.

To supplement this information, I also employed the *Chronologie Internationale* from *La Documentation Française* and the BBC's country profiles and timelines. Both of these resources present timelines of all major events taking place in either the state or region in a given year. I took from these sources information on political changes and upheavals in the country, including elections and resignations, as well as major events affecting the country's immigration, integration, or security policies. The inclusion of these events provides context and understanding for the types of decisions and statements being made at the time.

Together, these steps allowed me to create a detailed timeline for each state. These timelines will serve as a means to chronologically compare public opinion polling with the major policy decisions and new legislation and to easily see the legislative reactions to major events (such as rioting, terrorist attacks, or government changes).

2008, and "UK + Home Office + migration or immigrant or immigration" between January 2001 and May 2011.

4.3 SINGLE-STATE DATA

A number of useful and pertinent polls do not include all three states in their scope. For this reason, I have chosen to include public opinion polling information for each state separately. In this, I have aimed to gather polling data that are similar to one another and address the same issues. However, as the questions are not identical, the information will not be combined into a single dataset. In choosing these polls, I have included those that ask questions regarding support for the government, support for the government's immigration policies, sentiments of belonging, feeling of national pride, views on the integration of minorities and immigrants, barriers to economic success, and opinions on immigration. These will be presented in Chapter 5. All figures exclude "don't know," "no opinion," and "no answer" responses, unless these answers amount to over 10 percent of the entire N-sample.

4.4 LIMITATIONS

The major limitations of this study have to do with the nature and availability of reliable public opinion polling data. As I have not collected the data myself, I am unable to compensate for these shortcomings or inconsistencies directly. Instead, I have endeavoured to ensure that there are sufficient data available to allow for a comparison.

There are a number of criticisms raised against public opinion polling. Cohen outlines what he believes are the common of these criticisms: leadership, cost, accuracy, inconsistency and value (Cohen, 2003: 30). Public opinion polling is accused of encouraging political figures to follow the population, rather than to lead it. The costs are often prohibitive, while the results can be inaccurate and inconsistent. Finally, the results

of public opinion polling do not automatically have a value. Instead, the results are valuable only if and when leaders decide to consult these resources and shape their own behaviour and priorities based on the information. Likewise, Altman and Brodie acknowledge similar concerns in the research method. They write that polls do not tell us the whole story, nor do they manage to always accurately capture a true representation of the population (Altman and Brodie, 2002: 276-278). Again, because I am relying upon secondary data, I cannot correct for these deficiencies, but have made an effort to use only data from reputable international polling firms that may be trusted to produce high-quality surveys and representative samples.

A further limitation in this study is the availability of repeated public opinion polling. While some studies, such as those conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, allow for a degree of uniformity over the years, other polls are not repeated, making it difficult to track public opinion over time. This matter is complicated by the fact that the same polls are not available in each of the three countries. This has necessitated finding the best possible national surveys and making allowances for these differences.

The use of data from MIPEX also presents some limitations. MIPEX is calculated based on adherence to the European Union's standards of integration. This means that while EU member states have an obligation to meet and/or surpass the standards set by the community, non-members have no such need or motivation. This, however, does not represent a barrier in practice, as all non-members (with the exception of Switzerland) scored considerably higher as a whole in MIPEX III than EU member states (Figure 1 in Section 5.1.1).

Matters are also complicated when using data from the United Kingdom or Great Britain. While some polls survey individuals from both Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the United Kingdom), other polling focuses only on inhabitants of Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales). As the majority of the polling used in this study includes only the inhabitants of Great Britain and not Northern Ireland, I have chosen to also focus exclusively on data from England, Scotland, and Wales. However, in situations where the information includes Northern Ireland, I have noted it as such.

Finally, the study of incorporation models and public opinion is further complicated by a number of other factors. While an individual may feel negative about immigrants or minorities, it is possible that he or she may feel the same way regardless of the incorporation model. This makes it difficult to determine the exact relation between policies and public opinion; however, I can still expect to draw some general conclusions from this study.

4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study relies upon data from three different sources: multi-state polling information, policy timelines, and single-state public opinion polls. In collecting this information, I have sought studies that include all three states in their scope. As certain studies only focus on one or two of the states, I have chosen to include single-state polling data as well. In addition to public opinion polling, I have created detailed timelines of major events and policy decisions for each state. This will allow me to compare public opinion with government actions and decisions in Chapters 5 and 6.

CHAPTER 5: DATA AND RESULTS

Using the methods outlined in Chapter 4, I have collected both public opinion polling data and detailed timelines of major events and policy decisions for each state. Together, these sources allow for the comparison between a state's changing policies and the population's perceptions and support for those policies. This allows me to test my major hypotheses and to draw conclusions from this comparison. Presented in this chapter are the data from the public opinion polls and the timelines assembled from government press releases and news articles. The broader implications of these results will be discussed and analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

5.1 COMPARATIVE DATA

Comparative polling data were taken from three sources: the Migrant Integration Policy Index, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, and the International Social Survey Programme. Each of these three sources collects information from a number of states on subjects relating to integration, and immigration. These sources will be used to provide a direct comparison between policies and public opinion in Canada, France, and Great Britain.

5.1.1 Migrant Integration Policy Index

The Migrant Integration Policy Index quantifies states' integration policies for third party nationals. Unlike the qualitative comparison of states' policies, MIPEX allows for the ranking of policies based upon the ease with which they help immigrants to integrate into the state and society. In particular, MIPEX measures the rights, responsibilities, and opportunities available to newcomers in the state.

In the most recent edition of MIPeX (MIPeX III), released in March 2011, policies were grouped into seven different areas, made up of 148 indicators. These policy areas were also added together to create composite scores and ranking for each state. In MIPeX III, Canada was ranked third for its integration efforts, with a score of 72 out of a possible 100. France and Great Britain were ranked fifteenth and thirteenth, with scores of 51 and 57 respectively. The results for all thirty-one states included in MIPeX III may be seen in Figure 1. States are given a separate score for each of the seven policy areas, which may be seen in Table 1.

Figure 1: MIPEX III scores (MIPEX, 2011)




Table 1: MIPEX II and III scores for each of the seven policy areas (MIPEX, 2007 and MIPEX, 2011)

	Canada 2007	Canada 2011	France 2007	France 2011	UK 2007	UK 2011
Anti-discrimination	89	89	74	77	81	86
Access to nationality	74	74	59	59	75	59
Long term residence	60	63	46	46	74	31
Political participation	38	38	44	44	53	53
Education⁹	-	71	-	29	-	58
Family reunion	89	89	53	52	56	54
Labour market mobility	77	81	49	49	55	55

⁹ The policy area of education was introduced for the first time in MIPEX III.

In MIPEX III, Canada received high scores for its anti-discrimination (89) and family reunion efforts (89), while scoring low for political participation (38), as non-citizens are not given the right to vote. MIPEX found that newcomers to Canada “start their lives in Canada with near equal opportunities and an encouraging path to citizenship” (“Canada,” 2011). Overall, the country improved its score by one point since 2007 by committing to better recognize foreign qualifications through the *Pan-Canadian Framework for the Assessment and Recognition of Foreign Qualifications*. This framework improved the country’s score by four points in the labour market mobility area and by three points in the long-term residence area. All other scores remained constant for the country between 2007 and 2011. This shows that the country’s commitment to integrating immigrants into Canadian society remained roughly the same throughout the period in question.

For France, the country’s overall score remained the same at 51; however, the country’s policies improved in some areas while worsening in others. In particular, the introduction of protection against discrimination by association (*Conseil de Prud’hommes*, F06/00120) raised the country’s anti-discrimination score by fifteen points, while the *Loi du 20 Novembre 2007 Relative à la Maîtrise de l’Immigration, à l’Intégration et à l’Asile* (known as the Hortefeux Law)’s pre-departure integration measures lowered France’s family reunion score by one point. The country also dropped four points in the enforcement of anti-discrimination due to the introduction of the *Loi N° 2008-496 du 27 Mai 2008*, which limits victimization protection. Overall, France received its highest score in anti-discrimination (77) and its lowest score in education integration (29). MIPEX noted that many of the developments on integration in France are spurred by political debate and the media, giving the national identity debate and the

Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Co-Development as examples. Of the three states included in this study, MIPEX found that France has the worst policies for integrating immigrants into society. Since 2007, the country has made advances in some areas, while limiting the ability of immigrants to integrate into society in others.

Of all the countries included in MIPEX III, the United Kingdom dropped the furthest (10 points), falling out of the top ten countries. The United Kingdom received a score of 57 in MIPEX III, ranking it in thirteenth place. This may be attributed to a number of new measures introduced since 2007 which are considered to have made it more difficult for immigrants to integrate into British society. In particular, the country dropped nine points in long-term residence for the introduction of English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) requirements and the Life in the UK Test for those seeking indefinite leave to remain, with a further four point drop in that same category for the introduction of the *UK Borders Act*, which allows the Home Office to deport foreign national criminals. The country also dropped two points in family reunion for the new requirement that sponsors and spouses must be 21-years of age. The country dropped thirty points in long-term residence and sixteen points in access to nationality due to the new requirements found in the *Borders, Citizenship, and Immigration Act*. The country rose five points for its anti-discrimination efforts in the *UK Equality Act*, which makes equality duties simpler and more coherent. Of all three states included in this study, the United Kingdom's results are particularly interesting. While the government has publicly stated that it intends to encourage integration through language testing, citizenship tests, and other means (Watt, 2011), the MIPEX III results show these efforts are hindering

integration in the state. The country continues to score well for its anti-discrimination efforts and emphasis on intercultural education; however, the MIPEX results show that conditions have become less favourable for immigrants in the United Kingdom since 2007.

The Migrant Integration Policy Index is valuable because it allows for the comparison of a variety of policies, new and old, across seven different policy areas. From this study, we can see that all three states have a strong commitment to anti-discrimination, with varying commitments in the other six policy areas. Conditions in Canada have improved for immigrants since 2007, while remaining the same for France, and worsening for immigrants in the United Kingdom. These results allow us to see beyond the official speeches or commitments to certain goals (e.g. ‘community cohesion’ or integration) to compare conditions for immigrants with those in other, similar states.

5.1.2 Pew Global Attitudes Project

The Pew Global Attitudes Project gathers public opinions from a number of different states every spring. For this study, I have used the question, “Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?” While this question is grouped by Pew into the ‘World Economy and Globalization’ section, the question is open-ended and allows respondents to make their decision based on whichever factors or indicators they consider to be relevant.

Pew has been asking respondents the same question since 2002, which allows for comparison of the population’s support over the past nine years. These results may be found below in Figures 2 and 3. From these two graphs, we can see that Canada has

generally experienced the highest levels of satisfaction, while France has generally experienced the highest levels of dissatisfaction. We can also see that levels satisfaction have generally been dropping in all three states since 2002.

Figure 2: Percentage satisfied with country’s direction, 2002-2010¹⁰ (“Key Indicators Database,” 2010)





Figure 3: Percentage dissatisfied with country’s direction, 2002-2010¹¹ (“Key Indicators Database,” 2010)



When comparing levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction side by side for each state, we can see that the gap between the two has grown steadily in France and Great Britain (Figures 5 and 6). This trend has been less pronounced in Canada (Figure 4); however,

¹⁰ As figures are unavailable for 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 for Canada, the scores for the year before and the year after were averaged together to create this graph.

¹¹ As figures are unavailable for 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 for Canada, the scores for the year before and the year after were averaged together to create this graph.

polling for this country is only conducted every other year, making the data less complete. In all three states, satisfaction was at its highest at the beginning of the decade, particularly in 2003, after which point it began to fall. Dissatisfaction was at its highest in the year preceding the election of a new leader and/or a new party (2005 in Canada, 2006 in France, 2009 in Great Britain). In the year of the election, satisfaction rose in each state (2006 in Canada, 2007 in France, 2010 in Great Britain); however, satisfaction levelled off in subsequent years.

Figure 4: Canadian responses to the question, “Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?” (“Key Indicators Database,” 2010)




Figure 5: French responses to the question, “Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?” (“Key Indicators Database,” 2010)





Figure 6: British responses to the question, “Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?” (“Key Indicators Database,” 2010)



As Pew does not provide follow-up questions in its polling, it is unfortunately impossible to determine in which areas respondents feel satisfied or dissatisfied with their state’s direction. Instead, including this source allows for the general comparison of public support and satisfaction for the country and its government, allowing us to see the variations in this support over the past nine years.

5.1.3 International Social Survey Programme

The International Social Survey Programme groups together public opinion polling from a variety of national studies. Each year, the ISSP chooses a different theme for its research. In this project, I have gathered data from the ISSP’s 2003 and 2004 studies, National Identity II and Citizenship. These two studies explore questions surrounding respondents’ sense of belonging, pride, conceptions of citizenship, and opinions on integration and immigration.

When asked to gauge their national pride (Table 2), Canadian respondents were the most likely to say that they are proud of their country (96.7 percent). There were also high levels of pride in France (88.9 percent) and Great Britain (87.2 percent). Britons were the most likely to feel ashamed of certain things about their country (75.0 percent) compared to Canadian (49.1 percent) and French respondents (55.0 percent) (Table 3). French and British respondents were equally likely (51.6 percent) to state that there are times when they felt less proud of their country than they would like (compared to Canadian respondents at 31.2 percent) (Table 4). These tables show that there is generally a high degree of pride in all three states; however, certain aspects of the state's actions or history temper this pride.

Table 2: Responses to the question, “How proud are you being a [country national]?” (“Data Set: National Identity II,” 2003)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Very proud	69.5%	31.2%	45.9%
Somewhat proud	27.2%	57.7%	41.3%
Not very proud	2.2%	7.2%	10.8%
Not proud at all	1.0%	3.9%	2.0%

Table 3: Responses to the statement, “There are some things about [country] that make me feel ashamed of [country]” (“Data Set: National Identity II,” 2003)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Strongly agree	12.4%	24.3%	18.1%
Agree	36.7%	30.7%	56.9%
Neither agree nor disagree	22.7%	18.4%	16.7%
Disagree	20.6%	14.1%	6.9%
Strongly disagree	7.6%	12.6%	1.4%

Table 4: Responses to the statement, “I am often less proud of [country] than I would like to be” (“Data Set: National Identity II,” 2003)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Strongly agree	4.6%	15.8%	7.3%
Agree	26.6%	35.8%	44.3%
Neither agree nor disagree	24.3%	27.8%	27.9%
Disagree	37.9%	14.4%	18.4%
Strongly disagree	6.6%	6.3%	2.0%

When asked about the relationship between pride, national identity, and immigration, French respondents were the most likely (59.9 percent) to believe that it is impossible for those who do not share the country’s customs to truly become citizens (Table 5). A majority of Britons (54.1 percent) also believed this to be the case. In contrast, a minority of Canadians (41.6 percent) responded that those who do not share Canadian customs cannot be truly Canadian. A majority of Britons (67.0 percent) responded that their government is spending too much money to integrate immigrants (Table 6). French (49.5 percent) and Canadian respondents (47.2 percent) were less likely to believe that their governments are spending too much. French (65.9 percent) and British respondents (77.8 percent) were two times as likely as Canadian respondents (32.2 percent) to believe that their government should reduce immigration (Table 7). These tables show that public opinion in France and Great Britain has been less welcoming to immigrants and those who do not already share national customs and practices, while simultaneously less supportive of government policies on immigration. In contrast, Canadians have a higher level of support for both those who do not share Canadian customs and the government’s immigration policies.

Table 5: Responses to the statement, “It is impossible for people who do not share [country]’s customs and traditions to become fully [country]’s nationality)” (“Data Set: National Identity II,” 2003)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Strongly agree	16.7%	34.9%	16.4%
Agree	24.9%	25.0%	37.7%
Neither agree nor disagree	12.4%	15.3%	18.1%
Disagree	36.8%	14.0%	24.2%
Strongly disagree	9.7%	10.7%	3.6%

Table 6: Responses to the statement, “The government spends too much money assisting immigrants” (“Data Set: National Identity II,” 2003)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Strongly agree	17.8%	27.1%	31.7%
Agree	29.4%	22.4%	35.3%
Neither agree nor disagree	30.4%	23.9%	19.7%
Disagree	19.7%	13.0%	11.0%
Strongly disagree	2.7%	13.6%	2.4%

Table 7: Responses to the statement, “The number of immigrants allowed in to the country should ...” (“Data Set: National Identity II,” 2003)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Increase a lot	7.5%	2.7%	2.1%
Increase a little	22.1%	5.1%	3.7%
Remain the same	38.7%	26.3%	16.4%
Reduced a little	20.9%	24.8%	24.2%
Reduced a lot	11.3%	41.1%	53.6%

The 2004 Citizenship study included questions relating to respondents’ trust in their government and their individual perceived capacity to make a difference. French respondents were by far the most likely to believe that they have the ability to influence the government’s actions (83.4 percent), compared to Canadian (28.6 percent) and British respondents (25.9 percent) (Table 8). Interestingly, nearly equal numbers of respondents from all three states (59.1 percent of Canadians, 58.9 percent of French, and 59.3 percent of Britons) believe that their government does not care what they think (Table 9). All

three states' respondents also had low levels of trust for those in government (37.1 percent of Canadian, 22.2 percent of French, and 28.5 percent of British respondents) (Table 10). A majority of Canadians, however, believe that people should generally be trusted (57.4 percent), compared to 36.9 percent of French and 46.8 percent of British respondents (Table 11). These data show that while respondents have varying degrees of trust in each other and varying perceptions of their capacity to enact change on their government, trust in the government remains low, while a majority of respondents feel that their opinions do not matter to those in power. This demonstrates a certain degree of helplessness within all three populations.

Table 8: Responses to the statement, “Agree: No influence on what the government does” (“Data Set: Citizenship,” 2004)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Strongly agree	21.8%	3.6%	20.5%
Agree	34.7%	4.6%	33.2%
Neither agree nor disagree	15.0%	8.5%	20.4%
Disagree	23.9%	16.1%	23.2%
Strongly disagree	4.7%	67.3%	2.7%

Table 9: Responses to the statement, “Agree: The government does not care what I think” (“Data Set: Citizenship,” 2004)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Strongly agree	22.7%	31.1%	20.7%
Agree	36.4%	27.8%	38.6%
Neither agree nor disagree	16.3%	13.9%	18.0%
Disagree	22.8%	17.2%	20.0%
Strongly disagree	2.0%	10.0%	3.0%

Table 10: Responses to the statement, “Agree: Mostly we can trust people in government” (“Data Set: Citizenship,” 2004)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Strongly agree	2.1%	2.8%	1.1%
Agree	35.0%	19.4%	27.4%
Neither agree nor disagree	27.3%	32.6%	32.0%
Disagree	27.8%	28.6%	30.0%
Strongly disagree	7.9%	16.6%	9.8%

Table 11: Responses to the statement, “People: Be trusted or faced carefully?” (“Data Set: Citizenship,” 2004)

	Canada	France	Great Britain
Always be trusted	2.3%	1.9%	1.1%
Usually be trusted	55.1%	35.0%	45.7%
Usually careful	36.2%	50.3%	47.6%
Always careful	6.5%	12.8%	5.6%

The data collected in the International Social Survey Programme allow for the comparison of public opinion from a number of different states on social issues. Using data from the 2003 National Identity II and the 2004 Citizenship studies, I have presented some of the key findings as relating to this project. From these we can see that Canadians have the highest levels of national pride, are the most open to immigration, and are the most trusting of strangers. French respondents are the most likely to feel that they can make a difference in their government, while support for both the government and its immigration policies is low. The government and its immigration policies are unpopular with British respondents, who were also the most likely to feel ashamed of certain things about their country. These surveys allow for comparison on these issues, creating a general picture of national pride, trust, and support for government policies in Canada, France, and Great Britain.

5.2 MAJOR EVENTS TIMELINES

The following timelines include major political development in the three states, as well as all pertinent immigration, integration, or security events, decisions, and policies. As outlined in Section 4.1.2, this information was collected from government press releases, news articles, and current events timelines. This allows for the systematic analysis of the major decisions that could have an impact upon public opinion in the three states.

5.2.1 Major Events in Canada

In the decade between 2001 and 2011, Canada had three different prime ministers – Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper – from two different political parties – Liberal and Conservative. Despite these leadership and party changes, many of the policies on multiculturalism, integration, citizenship, and immigration have remained unchanged.

The major event of the past decade for Canada was the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. These attacks introduced a new era of security relations between Canada and the United States, prompting stricter border controls, harmonized asylum rules, and greater scrutiny of Canada's perceived 'leniency' on matters of national security. The terrorist attacks led to changes in the country's immigration system, emphasizing the importance of security measures, such as the introduction of biometrics or identification cards for all permanent residents. Unlike most states, following the 2008 global economic crisis, Canada continued to accept record

numbers of immigrants each year. Below are some of the major policy decisions, legislation, and events to take place in Canada from 2001 to 2011.

Table 12: Timeline of major events in Canada, 2001-2011 (assembled from government press releases, newspaper articles, and news timelines)

Year	Events
2001	The Minister of Immigration calls for quicker deportation of criminals. The Federal Court finds the immigration system to be unfair to criminals who are deported without due process.
	Ottawa increases the number of deportations of suspected war criminals.
	In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, refugee applications drop while security checks and new identification requirements are instituted for all travellers.
	The terror attacks speed up plans to tighten border security.
	Maple Leaf identification cards are introduced for all permanent residents.
2002	Canada alters its entry rules, adding new restrictions and requirements.
	New counter-terrorism legislation is implemented, leading to a decline in asylum-seekers.
	New citizenship and immigration laws take effect. Thousands of refugee claimants flood the border before the deadline.
	Canadian universities seek more foreign students. The Minister of Foreign Affairs considers proposing visa changes for students to make the process easier.
2003	The Federal Court rules that the government must process applications of those who applied before the deadline using the older laws; this ruling affects 300,000 applicants.
	Thousands of Pakistanis flee the US for Canada amid concerns over profiling and discrimination.
	Security fears and identity fraud compel the government to consider introducing biometric cards; a pilot project begins implanting fingerprints in permanent resident cards.
	The Auditor General condemns the government's inability to keep track of 36,000 'undesirables.'
	The government unveils a new strategy to attract francophone immigrants to Canada.
	Paul Martin becomes Prime Minister.
	The first refugees under the new group process enter Canada.
	The Canadian Border Services Agency is created by amalgamating Canada Customs, border and enforcement personnel from Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.
2004	New identification rules for permanent residents come into effect.
	The Auditor General says that Canada is still vulnerable despite the security improvements made since 2001.

	The <i>Public Safety Act</i> receives royal assent.
	The Liberals win a minority government, with Paul Martin as Prime Minister.
	The Minister of Labour says the country may need to double immigration to fill the gaps in the workforce.
	The government pledges \$2.4 million for labour market integration programs.
	The Canada-US <i>Safe Third Country Agreement</i> comes into effect.
	CIC speeds up visa processing for those affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.
2005	New rules for spouses and children entering the country come into effect.
	The government announces the Internationally-Trained Workers Initiative, as well as a \$75 million plan to bring more medical workers to Canada. The government also pledges to reduce the citizenship delay, to make family reunions easier, and to allow foreign students to work while studying in Canada.
	Rioting in France prompts fears over temporary foreign workers in Canada.
	Committee votes down the immigration budget.
2006	After the Liberal government falls in a confidence vote, the Conservatives are elected with a minority government and Stephen Harper becomes Prime Minister.
	The off-campus work permit program for foreign students is launched.
	Changes are introduced to make it easier for foreign-adopted children to gain Canadian citizenship.
	The visa process is streamlined by removing the requirement that all supporting documents have to be present at time of application.
	18 individuals are arrested on terrorism charges in Toronto.
	The government pledges \$17 million to help fund immigrant settlement.
2007	Canada works to ban foreign exotic dancers from entering the country, while the adult entertainment industry says there is a severe labour shortage.
	CIC puts an end to the 10-year old policy that required Sikhs named Singh or Kaur to change their name before coming to Canada.
	Federal funding is announced to boost language training for immigrants.
	Businesses call for more immigrants to be admitted to fill labour shortages.
	Special measures are introduced for Iraqis seeking asylum.
2008	CIC is served a class-action suit for overcharging for immigration fees.
	The temporary foreign worker program is expanded to meet industry needs.
	The new immigration bill becomes the next potential election trigger; however, C-50 passes.
	Legislation to restore citizenship to the 'lost Canadians' passes.
	The Canada Experience Class is launched, which provides a route for international students and temporary foreign workers to remain in Canada.
	Rioting breaks out in North Montreal following the death of an 18-year old at the hands of the police. The event reveals tension between the local community and police.
	Canada decides to maintain its immigration levels despite the economic crisis.

	The Conservatives are re-elected with another minority government.
2009	The House of Commons passes a \$40 billion economic stimulus package.
	The Minister of Immigration accuses US deserters of being bogus refugee claimants.
	Federal funding for newcomers is found to not benefit immigrants, as the funding does not follow them if they decide to move once in Canada.
	Lack of healthcare for immigrants is said to be a public health threat for Canadians.
	An amendment to Canadian nationality law enters into force, which means that grandchildren of Canadian citizens will no longer get automatic Canadian citizenship.
	Amendments are introduced to protect temporary foreign workers from human trafficking.
	New permanent resident cards designed to prevent fraud are introduced.
	The government promises to recognize immigrants' foreign credentials sooner, to make it easier for temporary foreign workers to extend their stay, and to protect live-in workers from mistreatment.
2010	A disastrous earthquake in Haiti prompts CIC to speed up visa processing for Haitians.
	Language and occupation requirements for immigration are tightened.
	The Young Newcomers Internship Program is expanded.
	The <i>Balanced Refugee Reform Act</i> is passed.
	The government states its intention to accept more economic migrants in 2011, while introducing new rules to strengthen the value of citizenship.
	Caps of 1,000 per occupation are put on immigration.
	Gay rights are recognized in the new citizenship guide.
	The <i>Preventing Trafficking, Abuse and Exploitation of Vulnerable Immigrants Act</i> is introduced.
2011	A new points system is proposed for skilled workers.
	Legislation intended to crack down on crooked immigration consultants receives royal assent.
	Funding is promised to help gay refugees.
	The government falls after a no-confidence motion. The Conservatives are re-elected with a majority government and the New Democratic Party become the official opposition for the first time in history.

From these events, we can see the importance that the country continues to place both on immigration to Canada and the need for the integration of newcomers upon arrival. Most of the country's integration efforts have concentrated upon improving immigrants' language skills and job market integration. While some policies may have changed since 2001, the country's policy of multiculturalism has not been altered. This shows that

policy on immigration and integration has been relatively constant in Canada in the past decade.

5.2.2 Major Events in France

In France, the focus in the past decade has been upon halting illegal immigration, promoting integration and the adoption of French customs, and encouraging public debate on the nature of French national identity. One of the most disruptive events of the decade was the rioting that began in the *banlieues* of Paris in 2005 and quickly spread throughout France. While this rioting has alternately been attributed to economic inequality (Henley, 2005), racial/ethnic tensions (Valentine, 2005), or even rap music (Muggs, 2005), the event had the effect of provoking debate and prompting intensive self-reflection. More recently, the expulsion of Roma migrants polarized public opinion and sparked international outcry. Some of the major events, policies, and decisions from 2001 to 2011 may be found below.

Table 13: Timeline of major events in France, 2001-2011 (assembled from government press releases, newspaper articles, and news timelines)

Year	Events
2001	Britain and France agree to tackle illegal immigration with the creation of a new intergovernmental body.
2002	Chirac is re-elected President, defeating Le Pen. The UMP win the legislative elections.
	Immigrants tell Chirac to address immigration in the country.
	France aims to better integrate immigrants through language and employment assistance.
2003	Constitutional amendments allowing for greater decentralisation are passed.
	Tough new immigration laws will include the creation of a finger print database.
	French Muslims get their first ever officially recognized national body.
	The EU meeting on religions focuses on the status of immigrants in Europe.
2004	Chirac's UMP are routed in the local elections.

	The religious symbol ban comes into effect at schools. Reactions are peaceful as the ban is overshadowed by the Iraq hostage crisis.
	Sarkozy takes over as leader of the UMP.
	A French report paints a damning picture of racial discrimination in the workplace.
2005	The referendum vote against the EU constitution prompts a political crisis and the resignation of Prime Minister Raffarin.
	A series of deadly fires in Paris highlight the thousands of illegal immigrants living in precarious conditions. Thousands protest in Paris, calling on the government to provide safer accommodations.
	Two minority youths are electrocuted in an electricity substation while fleeing the police. Violent riots erupt in the Parisian <i>banlieues</i> , eventually spreading to other cities. The government introduces emergency measures to restore order.
	Prime Minister Villepin backs tougher immigration laws.
2006	The upper house passes strict new immigration laws making it more difficult for low-skilled migrants to settle in France.
	The EU ministers vet an ‘integration contract’ for immigrants.
	The French National Assembly adopts a controversial new immigration law intended to tilt the system in favour of qualified foreign workers.
	Human rights groups protest racial profiling found in a new French study on ethnic integration.
2007	Immigration becomes a major election issue. Le Pen presents an anti-immigrant, anti-Europe platform in the presidential election. Former minister Veil disowns Sarkozy’s immigration plans, as Sarkozy draws fire for his intention to create a national identity ministry.
	Sarkozy is elected President. The UMP win the parliamentary elections, but with a reduced majority.
	Sarkozy states that there will be a social explosion in France unless immigration is brought under control.
	The Minister of Immigration states that France’s policy is to encourage immigrants to return home.
	Legislation tightening rules of entry for immigrants’ relatives is passed.
	New plans for DNA testing for family members of immigrants spark debate.
2008	France seeks tough EU line with a new immigration pact.
	France reports that it deported nearly 15,000 illegal immigrants in the first five months of 2008.
	France simmers after the national anthem soccer outrage. French-born ethnic-Arab soccer fans booed the <i>Marseillaise</i> during a match at the Stade de France.
	An EU summit takes place, laying the foundations for future Europe-wide immigration policies.
	France injects €10.5 billion into the country’s six largest banks following the financial crisis.
2009	France launches a debate on national identity. The national identity debate is called ‘anti-Muslim’ and accused of fostering Islamophobia.

	The government says it will set up a commission to study the extent of burqa-wearing in France. Sarkozy says such garments undermine the dignity of citizens.
2010	France presses on with the divisive identity debate.
	The government announces a new plan to make newcomers sign a declaration of republican values. The Minister of Families states that newcomers should sign a 'no-burqa' clause upon arrival.
	The UMP suffers a heavy defeat in the regional elections.
	France begins to dismantle illegal Roma camps and deport their residents back to Romania and Bulgaria as part of its new security measures. EU Commissioner Reding urges the EU to take legal action against France over the deportations. The threat of legal action is lifted when France agrees to implement the 2004 EU directive on freedom of movement.
	France defies its critics and deports hundreds more Roma. The Vatican comes down strongly against the French Roma expulsions. Sarkozy is accused of racism within his own party. The United Nations states that France's policies exacerbate stigmatisation of the Roma. A leaked French ministry document on clearing illegal camps explicitly targets the Roma, despite the government's assurances that it is targeting all camp residents equally. France agrees to support the integration of the Roma in Romania.
2011	The face veil ban comes into effect.
	The <i>Conseil d'état</i> publishes its judgment on the country's returns policy.
	The Senate adopts the <i>Immigration, Integration, and Nationality Bill</i> on second reading but sends the bill to a mixed committee for discussion. The bill will create temporary waiting zones, and specify conditions of <i>titre de séjour</i> for sick individuals.
	France and Italy propose a reform to the EU open-borders treaty to allow member states to re-impose internal frontier controls temporarily in cases of major influxes.
	France decentralises part of the repatriation process to the prefectures to avoid delays and overlap.
	The government announces it made 95,000 removals in 2010.

In the past decade, France has instituted changes to make it more difficult for families to reunite, for immigrants to gain citizenship, and for temporary workers to remain in the country. Among these events, there has been a great debate on national identity in France and the role of immigrants and minorities within this identity. The current government has favoured expulsions as a means of dealing with illegal immigration. With presidential elections scheduled for 2012, immigration, integration, and national identity may be expected to figure heavily in the presidential campaign once again. This has the potential

to profoundly change or influence the government’s policies on integration and immigration.

5.2.3 Major Events in Great Britain

In Great Britain, many policy changes have been introduced since 2001. In early 2001, ethnically-motivated riots in Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley prompted much debate and self-reflection upon the nature of modern race relations and community relations in Great Britain. Terrorism also grew as a threat, with the devastating 2005 bombings in London provoking widespread fear and apprehension over ‘homegrown’ terrorists. The admission of new member-states to the European Union in 2004¹² and 2007¹³ increased concerns over the number of EU migrants within the country, while growing numbers of non-EU migrants also heightened negative public opinion on immigration. Since the 2010 election, the coalition government has dramatically reduced the number of immigrants admitted each year, while introducing new requirements for citizenship. These events and policies from 2001 to 2011 are detailed in the table below.

Table 14: Timeline of major events in Great Britain, 2001-2011 (assembled from government press releases, newspaper articles, and news timelines)

Year	Events
2001	Ethnically-motivated riots break out in Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley.
	Entry clearance modernisation receives £7.2 million in funding.
	Blair is re-elected Prime Minister.
	The new race relations legislation comes into force.
	Britain offers strong support to US-led counter-terrorism efforts following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and takes part in air strikes in Afghanistan.
	New anti-terrorist measures are introduced.
	An extra £500,000 is pledged towards refugee integration.
	The <i>Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Bill</i> receives royal assent.

¹² Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in 2004.

¹³ Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007.

	New categories of skilled workers are introduced to boost the economy.
2002	The <i>Secure Borders, Safe Haven</i> white paper on integration is published.
	Yarl's Wood Immigration Removal Centre is burnt down by detainees. Staff members locked detainees inside the burning building, leaving five injured. While an investigation was ordered, no charges were pressed in the incident.
	The Home Office states that discussing citizenship is key to achieving a cohesive community. The Home Secretary sets out the agenda for race equality and community cohesion.
	The government begins to return failed asylum seekers to Afghanistan.
	Citizenship changes are introduced, extending the right to live in UK to more British passport holders.
	The successful innovators immigration scheme is extended.
	The Court of Appeal finds that the <i>Anti-Terrorism Act</i> detention powers are not discriminatory.
	The UK intends to begin citizenship ceremonies modelled off Canada.
2003	Home Secretary states that tackling hidden racism is at the core of Britain's modern race agenda.
	The House of Commons renews the <i>Anti-Terrorism Act</i> detention powers.
	The British-American operation 'Iraqi Freedom' begins.
	The safe country list is expanded to cut asylum abuse.
	New technology replaces passport stamps for those with leave to remain in the UK.
	Asylum decisions for Iraq re-start as voluntary returns begin.
	The government states that learning English and focusing on citizenship will help integration and make people proud to be British.
	The Home Offices aims to clear the backlog of asylum cases before the introduction of tough new measures.
	The government announces its intention to reform the asylum system. The first phase of asylum reform will build upon the government's progress in halving the number of asylum claims.
	The government announces its plan to introduce a new identification card.
	The government pledges new funding to help refugees become full and active citizens.
2004	The UK holds its first ever citizenship ceremony.
	A policy is put into place that restricts citizens of new EU accession member-states from receiving British benefits.
	The first refugees arrive under a new legal route administered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
	Eligibility restrictions are imposed on council housing and homelessness assistance for all EU migrants.
	In the EU elections, the Conservatives come out on top, followed by the Labour Party. The Conservatives also defeat Labour in the country's local elections.
	New restrictions are imposed on low-skill migrant schemes.
	An amendment to the <i>Asylum and Immigration Bill</i> is introduced. The

	amendment will clamp down on abuse and emphasize rights and responsibilities
	The <i>Asylum and Immigration Bill</i> gets royal assent.
	New funding is announced for refugees to contribute to UK society.
	The Home Office publishes its strategic plan for confident communities in a secure Britain.
	A new Advisory Board on Naturalisation and Integration is created.
	Parliament votes in favour of the British identity card for all residents.
	The House of Lords declares the 2000 <i>Anti-Terrorism Law</i> to be illegal because it allows for the indefinite detention of terrorist suspects without charges.
2005	The Home Secretary lays out a five-year strategy to control immigration and asylum so that it will benefit the UK.
	Parliament adopts the <i>Prevention of Terrorism Act</i> . The Act will apply to British citizens as well as foreigners (the 2000 law only applied to foreigners) and includes the controversial control orders for suspects.
	Labour win a third government with a much-reduced majority.
	Terrorist attacks on London leave 56 dead and over 700 injured. Attempted attacks two weeks later fail to detonate.
	A Brazilian man on the London Underground dies at the hands of the police, who say he could have been a terrorist. An inquiry into the case found that the man was not behaving suspiciously.
	Police announce they have thwarted an alleged plot to attack up to ten planes.
	The Life in the UK Test becomes a new requirement for citizenship.
	New refugee integration projects are launched.
2006	Parliament adopts a new law on immigration, based on a points system aiming to accept only the most qualified workers.
	Terrorist plots are uncovered, with 24 suspects arrested, and special counter-terrorism measures announced.
2007	The Border and Immigration Agency begins operations.
	Tony Blair announces his resignation. Gordon Brown replaces him as Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party.
	Terrorist plots are uncovered in London and Glasgow. They are attributed to al-Qaeda.
	New rules are introduced for colleges that teach overseas students.
2008	A compassionate immigration system for children is announced, with a host of new measures that will ensure that children in the immigration system are dealt with humanely.
	The Home Secretary moves to ratify the Council of Europe convention against trafficking.
	A new advertising campaign is launched to stop businesses from employing illegal workers.
	The Labour Party suffers its worst local election results in 40 years.
	Parliament adopts the <i>Anti-Terrorism Law</i> .
	The government part-nationalizes three British banks with a £37 billion rescue

	package.
2009	A support plan and second rescue package is announced for the financial sector.
	The first global review of countries needing a visa to enter takes place (already 3/4 of world's population needs to apply for a visitor visa to enter the UK).
	Brook House, Britain's largest removal centre, opens its doors.
	The United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) reaches full agency status and publishes its framework agreement.
	Labour loses control of the local assemblies after the partial local elections.
	A voluntary returns program for refused asylum families begins.
	The <i>Immigration Act</i> receives royal assent.
	The government introduces a tough new points system for earning citizenship.
	The government declares that it will return fees paid for certificates of approval.
	The Home Secretary appoints the first Identity Commissioner.
	A Supreme Court, made up of twelve Lords, is created. It replaces the Commission of Lords as the highest court in the state.
	More than 100,000 identification cards are issued to foreign nationals.
	Section 55 of the <i>Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act</i> comes into force, giving the UKBA the statutory duty to safeguard and promote children's welfare.
2010	Skilled migrant workers to get identification cards for foreign nationals.
	To seek settlement, individuals must now show they have studied ESOL at an accredited college and progressed at least one level, or else take the Life in the UK Test.
	David Cameron (Conservative Party) and Nick Clegg (Liberal-Democratic Party) form a coalition government following the election on May 6.
	The coalition government announces a plan to reduce public spending by £6.2 billion.
	Identification cards and the national identification register for British citizens are scrapped as part of the government's aim to reduce the control of the state over citizens.
	The coalition commits to imposing a migration limit to reduce immigration back to the level of 1990s, with an interim limit set so that there is not a 'closing down sale.'
	Regulations are placed before Parliament to make more migrants get biometric residence permits if they want to extend their stay.
	Individuals must now show they can speak and understand English if they wish to enter or extend their stay as the partner of a British citizen or immigrant.
	The government sets its first annual limit for non-EU workers.
	The Home Secretary outlines new settlement rules. The new government will not enact Labour's 'earned citizenship' policy.
	The Home Secretary vows to restore public confidence in immigration by reducing immigration, encouraging more entrepreneurs and investors, stopping the abuse of the student route, and cutting the link between those

	who come temporarily and permanent residency.
	Yarl's Wood removal centre will no longer hold children, as the High Court ruled it is unlawful.
2011	Visa reforms are announced for workers, requiring companies to apply for a certificate of sponsorship. The annual limit for sponsorship is set at 20,700.
	Changes to the student visa system are laid before Parliament. The amendments will include tougher entrance requirements, new language requirements, limits on work entitlements, and the end of the post-study work route.
	The government welcomes foreign entrepreneurs and investors.
	The government announces the removal of eight occupations from the shortage list and the removal of 71 professions from 192 approved jobs under Tier 2 because they are now below graduate level.
	The Worker Registration Scheme for the 'A8' countries ends, which means that citizens of those countries now have the same rights to work and migrate as the rest of EU countries.
	Changes to settlement come into effect, with a new criminality threshold, new income requirement, and Life in UK test.
	The government abolishes the Certificate of Approval scheme because it is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. A Certificate of Approval was required for immigrants who wished to marry.

As seen in this timeline, Great Britain has undergone major changes to its immigration and integration policies since 2001. Following the 2001 ethnic riots and the 2005 terrorist attacks, the government introduced new race relations legislation and programs, as well as new security measures. Since the 2010 election, the new government has fulfilled its pledge to dramatically cut non-EU immigration to Great Britain, institute new rules regulating immigration and citizenship, and implement harsh penalties on irregular workers and their employers. These changes have had the effect of limiting immigration, while strongly encouraging integration into British society.

5.3 DATA FROM CANADA

Public opinion data from Canada used in this study may be divided into three categories: opinions on multiculturalism, opinions on integration, and opinions on

immigration. Each of these will be examined in detail here, in order to determine broad trends in Canadian public opinion between 2001 and 2011.

5.3.1 Public Opinion on Multiculturalism

In Canada, multiculturalism goes beyond a simple government policy. The policy is outlined in the 1988 *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*, while the right to difference is enshrined in the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Multiculturalism has grown to become a founding principle of Canadian identity and pride. When asked what makes them proud to be Canadian in 1985, respondents ranked multiculturalism in tenth place. By 2006, respondents ranked multiculturalism in second place (health care was ranked in top place) (Adams, 2009). In following years, similar polling conducted by Angus Reid found that pride in multiculturalism was still growing, albeit at lower levels (Table 15).

Table 15: Responses¹⁴ to the statement, “Below is a list of institutions and features that can elicit feelings of pride among Canadians. For each one, please say if it makes you very proud, moderately proud, not too proud, or not proud at all” (ranked according to cumulative scores over the three years) (“Flag Is Most Cherished Symbol for Canadians,” 2010)

	July 2008	July 2009	July 2010
The Canadian flag	86%	86%	88%
The Canadian Forces	80%	84%	79%
Hockey	71%	72%	80%
Multiculturalism	61%	64%	66%
State of democracy in Canada	57%	64%	68%
The Canadian economy	62%	58%	65%
The health care system	50%	58%	69%
Bilingualism	52%	54%	55%
Aboriginal culture	51%	53%	55%
The Canadian justice system	42%	45%	44%
The Monarchy	36%	42%	40%
Parliament	32%	37%	41%

¹⁴ “Very proud” and “moderately proud” listed.

Multiculturalism continues to enjoy strong support in Canada at a time when other countries, such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, have abandoned the policy. Polling conducted in November 2010 by Angus Reid found that a majority of Canadians (55 percent) surveyed are supportive of the policy of multiculturalism and believe that it has been a positive influence on the country (“Canadians Endorse Multiculturalism, But Pick Melting Pot Over Mosaic,” 2010).

Since the policy was first instituted, however, public perceptions of what multiculturalism entails have changed. Angus Reid found that a majority of Canadians (54 percent) now favour a ‘melting pot,’ in which immigrants and minorities blend into Canadian society, over the ‘cultural mosaic,’ in which everyone is free to maintain his or her own identity, customs, and culture (“Canadians Endorse Multiculturalism, But Pick Melting Pot Over Mosaic,” 2010). Similarly, a study conducted by Environics on behalf of the Trudeau Foundation found that while respondents favour multiculturalism and permitting individuals to maintain their own customs and culture (49 percent), Canadians do not support multiculturalism when it comes in opposition with gender equality. Eighty-one percent feel that immigrants should adapt to Canadian views on the rights and roles of women in society rather than maintaining their own views on women (“Backgrounder – Environics Research Group Poll for the Trudeau Foundation,” 2006). This result shows that while Canadians continue to be supportive of multiculturalism, they expect that certain changes will have to be made by those wishing to become a part of Canadian society.

Broadly speaking, Canadians continue to support the policy of multiculturalism, but also support certain caveats on the right of individuals to freely maintain their own

identity, culture, and customs. The policy continues to be seen as a source of pride and identity for Canadians.

5.3.2 Public Opinion on Citizenship and Integration

Integration efforts in Canada are primarily aimed at helping immigrants to learn one of the country's two official languages and to find employment. In polling conducted by Angus Reid in 2007, 51 percent of respondents stated that immigrants integrate easily into Canadian culture, while 46 percent believed that immigrants integrate with difficulty ("Canadians Want Stricter Citizenship Controls," 2007). Gallup found that most Canadian respondents (69 percent) believe that the country should encourage immigrants to integrate and become part of Canadian culture. In contrast, only 20 percent stated that the country should encourage newcomers to maintain their own cultures and identities ("Canadians Satisfied With Immigration Levels," 2005). A 2010 study found that a majority of those born in Canada (71 percent) and those born outside the country (65 percent) agreed with the statement, "Too many recent immigrants don't want to fit into Canadian society" (Lilley, 2010). These results show that Canadians are largely divided on how they view the integration of newcomers into Canadian society. A substantial number of Canadians do not believe that immigrants are making a sufficient effort to integrate.

When asked what changes they would like to see to Canada's immigration and integration policies, 58 percent responded that Canada should attract immigrants primarily from industrialized countries, while 55 percent were in favour of attracting more immigrants from francophone or anglophone countries ("Canadians Prefer Highly-

Skilled Immigrants,” 2008). This shows a preference for attracting immigrants that are more similar to the ‘average’ Canadian in terms of education, language, and culture.

Canadians would also like the government to enforce tighter citizenship controls. In 2007, Angus Reid found that fifty-seven percent of respondents stated that the government should enforce more strict control, while 35 percent wanted it to remain the same. Three percent were in favour of less strict control (“Canadians Want Stricter Citizenship Controls,” 2007). These polls show a tendency towards more restrictive views among Canadians.

Canadians are roughly divided as to the ease with which newcomers integrate into society. Some measures that have been suggested include the recruitment of more immigrants who already speak either English or French, or who come from industrialized countries, as respondents felt that this would make the integration process easier. Canadians also support making citizenship requirements more demanding. These studies give examples of Canadians opinions on the integration and incorporation of newcomers into their state and society.

5.3.3 Public Opinion on Immigration

Canada has traditionally been a country of immigrants, making the population generally supportive of immigration. While there has been some desire to halt certain kinds of immigration in recent years (e.g. temporary foreign workers (Keung, 2008)), there continues to be fairly strong support for both immigration and immigrants’ impact on Canada.

Angus Reid found that most respondents favour highly-skilled immigrants and business people. The 2008 poll listed eight different policy objectives and asked respondents to say how important each objective was to them (Table 16). The preference among Canadians was for those who could contribute to the economy. In contrast, respondents were substantially less supportive of family reunification and the recruitment of low-skilled workers (“Canadians Prefer Highly-Skilled Immigrants,” 2008).

Table 16: Responses¹⁵ to the statement, “Thinking about Canada’s immigration system, please say whether each of the following directives is very important, moderately important, not too important, or not important at all to you” (“Canadians Prefer Highly-Skilled Immigrants,” 2008)

	CDA	BC	AB	MB/ SK	ON	PQ	ATL
Attracting high-skilled workers who want to immigrate to Canada	83%	83%	86%	83%	82%	84%	80%
Attracting entrepreneurs and investors who can start a business in Canada	81%	79%	75%	79%	81%	87%	76%
Temporary worker programs to address specific skill shortages	72%	70%	71%	74%	69%	78%	72%
Encouraging foreign students to stay in Canada after they obtain their degrees	67%	62%	64%	73%	63%	76%	68%
Offering refugee protection to people who may be at risk in their countries of birth	66%	66%	63%	67%	67%	64%	65%
Working to expedite the adoption of foreign children by Canadian citizens and permanent residents	52%	51%	50%	42%	46%	65%	59%
Reuniting foreign-born residents with family members who live abroad	44%	40%	43%	40%	41%	49%	52%
Attracting low-skilled workers who want to immigrate to Canada	25%	31%	25%	28%	21%	29%	18%

¹⁵ “Very important” and “moderately important” listed

In 2004, Ipsos-Reid found that 73 percent of respondents believed that immigrants had been a good influence on Canada, while 21 percent said that immigrants had been a negative influence. Ipsos-Reid conducted similar polling in the United States and Mexico, where only 42 percent and 36 percent believed immigrants have had a positive impact, respectively. In Canada, 83 percent of respondents stated that having a variety of religions benefited the country, with 58 percent also stating that the country should accept a variety of cultural traditions (“NA GEN AP Poll Immigration Canada,” 2004). Polling conducted in September 2010 by Angus Reid saw a drop in these figures, with only 34 percent of Canadians responding that immigration has had a positive effect on the country, while 46 percent believed it has had a negative effect. This represents a 3 percent drop and a 5 percent rise respectively since August 2009 (“More Canadians Are Questioning the Benefits of Immigration,” 2010). Public opinion in Canada has fluctuated, which raises some concerns over the accuracy of these results. However, it seems that a majority of Canadians continue to believe that immigration has had a positive influence on the country.

Firms have also undertaken numerous polls on Canadians’ desired immigration levels. In 2005 and 2006, Gallup conducted opinion polls on immigration in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. Gallup found that Canadians were generally much more positive about immigration, with 46 percent of Canadians responding that the country accepts about the right number of immigrants, 32 percent responding that the country accepts too many immigrants, and 10 percent responding that the country does not accept enough immigrants. In contrast, British responses were strongly in favour of either decreasing (62.5 percent) or keeping immigration at the same level (30 percent) rather

than increasing immigration (4.5 percent). In the United States, 6 percent were in favour of increasing immigration, with 58 percent against, and 35 percent who wanted to maintain the current levels (Newport, 2006). A poll released by Abacus Data in December 2010 found that half of Canadians surveyed (50 percent) thought that immigration should be decreased. Thirty-four percent thought the number should stay the same, while 8 percent thought it should increase (Lilley, 2010). While support for immigration levels has generally been higher in Canada than in the United States or Great Britain, this trend is perhaps starting to change. These types of questions demonstrate the degree of support among the population for the government's policies on immigration and particularly its policies on the acceptance of potential immigrants to Canada.

Overall, support in Canada remains strong for immigration. While respondents favoured certain forms of immigration over others, the population continues to believe that immigration has had a positive influence on the country.

5.4 DATA FROM FRANCE

Public opinion polling in France has primarily focused on the types of immigration policies citizens would like the government to enact. Since 2005, there have been more polls on the integration of immigrants in the state, as this was a major subject for debate following that year's urban disturbances. This section presents a selection of these polls on integration and immigration issues between 2001 and 2011.

5.4.1 Public Opinion on Integration

In France, there is an expectation that those who come to the country will adopt its culture and customs. While this is particularly the case for those who receive French

citizenship, even those who do not become citizens are expected to adhere to French practices during their time in the country (“Faciliter l’Intégration: L’Intégration des Migrants Légaux,” 2008). Within the population, there is an expectation that those who come to France will adapt to French society, not vice versa.

In 2005, CSA undertook a major study of racism and discrimination in France. As part of the study, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the integration of immigrants to French society. In its November 2005 results, CSA found that respondents were evenly split on how easily immigrants integrate themselves (Table 17). When asked to elaborate upon their opinions, respondents pointed to individual reasons (63 percent), societal factors (44 percent), and ‘other’ factors (20 percent) (Table 18) (*Xénophobie, Antisémitisme, Racisme, Anti-Racisme, et Discriminations en France*, 2005). While a majority of respondents each year stated that immigrants do not integrate because individual factors are to blame, it is perhaps surprising how many (an average of 42.6 percent) believe that it is the state and society that are at the root of integration problems in the country. As the French state supports the equal treatment of all citizens and encourages integration into the state and society, cases of ‘non-integration’ have traditionally been seen as a matter of individual choice. In contrast, this polling suggests that a significant percentage of the population does not believe this to be the case.

Table 17: Responses to the question, “Do you think immigrants integrate into French society very easily, somewhat easily, with some difficulty, or with much difficulty?” (*Xénophobie, Antisémitisme, Racisme, Anti-Racisme, et Discriminations en France, 2005*)

	December 2003	December 2004	November 2005
Very easily	7%	7%	9%
Somewhat easily	36%	33%	40%
With some difficulty	42%	44%	37%
With much difficulty	13%	13%	12%

Table 18: Responses to the question, “Why do you believe immigrants face difficulty in integrating to French society?”¹⁶ (*Xénophobie, Antisémitisme, Racisme, Anti-Racisme, et Discriminations en France, 2005*)

	December 2003	December 2004	November 2005
Individual capacity	62%	63%	63%
Culture, morals, lifestyle/difficulties adapting	24%	25%	31%
Lack of interest/effort	25%	25%	25%
Religious reasons	13%	13%	14%
Limited language skills	13%	14%	11%
Lack of education	3%	4%	5%
Women wearing the veil	2%	2%	1%
Societal/state factors	40%	44%	44%
Racism/discrimination/discrimination in the hiring process	11%	16%	21%
French society is not making an effort to integrate them	23%	14%	16%
Existing policies and practices that do not promote integration	-	5%	10%
Rejected from society/forced to live in ghettos	6%	8%	7%
Difficulties finding housing	3%	4%	3%
Irregular status/‘without papers’	3%	4%	2%
Skin colour or race	-	3%	2%
Growing number	-	2%	2%
Negative media portrayals	-	1%	1%
Other factors	14%	14%	20%
Economic reasons (difficulties finding a job, unemployment, economic situation in France)	12%	14%	11%
They do not integrate	2%	3%	9%
International situation	2%	1%	-

¹⁶ Numbers do not equal to 100 percent, as respondents were permitted to choose several explanations.

In 2006, CSA conducted polling on France’s colonial past and its (possible) links to unrest in the country. When asked how easily they believe non-European immigrants establish themselves in French society, 7 percent stated that the process is very easy, 28 percent said that it is easy, 44 percent said that it is difficult, and 19 percent said that it is very difficult (*L’Europe, la Diversité, le Monde*, 2006). Respondents attributed this to a variety of factors (Table 19). This poll shows that respondents are largely divided as to the reasons that integration is difficult for non-European immigrants. Roughly equal proportions of the population attribute this difficulty to the state and its institutions, to cultural differences, and to a lack of contact between those of different backgrounds. As with the previous poll (Table 18), this shows that a substantial percentage of the population believes that it is the state, not the individual, that is to blame for difficulties in integration.

Table 19: Responses¹⁷ to the question, “Why is the integration of immigrants difficult?” (*L’Europe, la Diversité, le Monde*, 2006)

	% of respondents
Institutions do not encourage integration enough	28%
Europeans and non-Europeans are too different	24%
Europeans and non-Europeans do not come in contact with one another frequently enough	22%
Europeans and non-Europeans work and/or live in different regions	12%
Colonial history continues to be a painful subject	7%

The topic of the integration of immigrants, combined with incidents of unrest in 2005, has raised questions as to the nature of French identity. In the 2007 presidential election, candidate Nicolas Sarkozy pledged to open the debate on French identity and to establish

¹⁷ Question only asked to those who responded that integration is “very difficult” to the question, “Do you believe that integration of non-Europeans in France is extremely easy, easy, difficult, or very difficult?”

a ministry dedicated to the subject. Shortly after becoming President, Sarkozy fulfilled this promise. CSA found that only 25 percent of French respondents were satisfied with the national identity debate, while 50 percent were unsatisfied and 25 percent did not know. Fifty percent of respondents believed that it is necessary to either stop or suspend the debate, with 34 percent in favour of continuing the debate and 16 percent who did not know (“French Disappointed with National Identity Debate,” 2010). In January 2010, TNS Sofres polled French adults on behalf of *Le Monde* to determine their opinions on Éric Besson, then Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development, and the national identity debate. The poll found that 49 percent of respondents believed that the national identity debate was actually about Islam, while 20 percent of respondents believed that the debate dealt with the different components of national identity, including values, culture, heritage, and integration. Thirty-one percent of respondents had no opinion (Petit and Hipolite, 2010). While French citizens may not believe that the national identity debate is disgraceful (59 percent), it appears that most citizens either have no opinion or do not feel that the debate has been interesting or useful (Table 20). This suggests that while the debate has garnered much attention in the media and in academic circles, it is not seen as particularly pertinent to the average French citizen.

Table 20: Responses to the statement, “The national identity debate...” (Petit and Hipolite, 2010)

	...has diverged from its initial objectives	...interests you	...is useful	...is disgraceful
Strongly agree	18%	12%	11%	9%
Agree	28%	30%	29%	15%
Disagree	15%	23%	22%	33%
Strongly disagree	7%	25%	25%	26%
No opinion	32%	10%	13%	17%

Public opinion in France has emphasized the need for immigrants to integrate to society. A majority of respondents feel that individuals are to blame for the perceived lack of integration, though a substantial number believe that the state and society also carry part of the burden. The nationality debate has been prompted over questions regarding the integration of immigrants that do not meet the description of the ‘typical’ French citizen. While this debate may be considered important by those in power, it has not been enthusiastically welcomed by French citizens.

5.4.2 Public Opinion on Immigration

French public opinion on immigration has been generally less positive than that in Canada. In 2005, CSA conducted polling asking respondents their opinions on the benefit of immigration to France (Table 21) and the necessity of immigration for certain industries and sectors (Table 22). Between 2001 and 2005, the percentage of respondents who answered that immigration is a source of cultural enrichment grew substantially (50 percent in 2001, 67 percent in 2002, 71 percent in 2003, and 74 percent in 2004), while dropping in 2005 (62 percent). At the same time, a majority of respondents believed that

immigration is necessary to fill vacancies in certain sectors (58 percent in 2003, 57 percent in 2004) (*Xénophobie, Antisémitisme, Racisme, Anti-Racisme, et Discriminations en France*, 2005). In both these tables, we can see a drop in support in 2005, which can be attributed to the riots that broke out in the *banlieues* that year. While many of those involved were born in France and are French citizens, there was still a perception that the rioting was a result of an influx in immigrants since the end of World War II and the subsequent inability of the state to integrate these large populations, combined with an individual unwillingness to integrate.

Table 21: Responses to the question, “Do you very much agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that immigrants are a source of cultural enrichment?” (*Xénophobie, Antisémitisme, Racisme, Anti-Racisme, et Discriminations en France*, 2005)

	November 2001	December 2002	December 2003	December 2004	November 2005
Very much agree	12%	30%	36%	39%	24%
Agree	38%	37%	35%	35%	38%
Disagree	29%	15%	15%	14%	20%
Very much disagree	17%	10%	10%	9%	15%

Table 22: Responses to the question, “Do you very much agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that immigration is necessary to fill certain professions?” (*Xénophobie, Antisémitisme, Racisme, Anti-Racisme, et Discriminations en France*, 2005)

	December 2003	December 2004	November 2005
Very much agree	28%	26%	17%
Agree	30%	31%	31%
Disagree	17%	19%	23%
Very much disagree	21%	21%	26%

While France requires the integration of immigrants into French society and customs, a majority of French citizens (73 percent) believe that diversity is a fundamental

characteristic of French society. Seventy-two percent responded that the diversity of the French population was a valuable resource, while 26 percent believed that it was not (*L'Europe, la Diversité, le Monde*, 2006). This suggests that while the country expects newcomers to adopt the language, laws, and practices of the state in the public sphere, citizens continue to support the maintenance of diversity in the private sphere. This divide is characteristic of the French model of integration and equality.

French citizens hold positive views of the influence immigration has had on their country; however, a large percentage of respondents favour reducing the number of immigrants that enter the country each year, while a quarter of respondents did not have an opinion (*Xénophobie, Antisémitisme, Racisme, Anti-Racisme, et Discriminations en France*, 2005). As we saw in the previous tables, public support for immigration dropped in 2005, which has been a major trend in all public opinion from the period. Likewise, in the table below (Table 23), we can see a definite increase in the percentage of respondents who felt there were too many immigrants accepted in 2005. The riots had the general effect of worsening public opinion on all social issues that year.

Table 23: Responses to the question, “Do you believe that there are too few, too many, or a sufficient number immigrants in France at present?”
(Xénophobie, Antisémitisme, Racisme, Anti-Racisme, et Discriminations en France, 2005)

	December 2002	December 2003	December 2004	November 2005
Too few	1%	1%	2%	1.5%
Too many	46.5%	41%	41%	55.5%
Sufficient	24.5%	29%	23.5%	17.5%
No opinion	24.5%	24%	29.5%	22%

Public opinion in France on immigration was largely positive at the beginning of the decade, but dropped following the rioting in the *banlieues* in 2005. While these events

were not directly related to immigration, the rioting nonetheless sparked off debate regarding France's national identity, as we saw in the previous section. Despite this tendency, a majority of French citizens continue to see diversity as a fundamental characteristic of French society and believe that immigration has had a largely positive effect on their country.

5.5 DATA FROM GREAT BRITAIN

Of the three states included in this study, Great Britain has undergone the most drastic policy changes since 2001. As many of these changes (e.g. the Conservatives pledge to reduce and possibly end non-EU immigration) have been defended as fitting with the public's wishes,¹⁸ looking at public opinion polling is particularly pertinent in the case of Great Britain. Included in this section are polls relating to citizens' perceptions of integration and immigration, and the government's policies in these areas.

5.5.1 Public Opinion on Integration

Between 2001 and 2011, the British government shifted its policies from support for multiculturalism to an emphasis on integration. In 2009, Ipsos found that Britons are largely divided in their views on multiculturalism. Thirty-eight percent believed that multiculturalism threatens the British way of life, while 30 percent thought that multiculturalism makes Britain a better place to live. When told to choose between developing a shared identity or celebrating diverse values and culture, 41 percent favoured a shared identity while 27 percent supported diverse values (30 percent did not

¹⁸ E.g. in a speech delivered on April 14, 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron talked about what the Conservative Party had "heard on the doorstep": that the British public is "concerned about the levels of immigration in our country ... but [are] fed up of hearing politicians talk tough but do nothing" ("David Cameron on Immigration," 2011).

know). Ipsos also found that “hostility towards multiculturalism and immigration tend to go hand in hand, and it is those over 65 and in social grade C2 (skilled manual workers) who tend to be least in favour of multiculturalism and diverse values. People who vote Conservative are also more inclined to see multiculturalism as a threat” (*Trend Briefing #1: Doubting Multiculturalism, 2009: 3*).

While this suggests that roughly equal percentages of the population support and reject the policy of multiculturalism, these numbers become more poignant when combined with polling on community spirit. YouGov found that there is a perception that community spirit is declining among 85 percent of the population. When asked to elaborate, respondents attributed this to an increase in immigration (24 percent), consumerism (22 percent), family breakdowns and an increase in single-parent families (15 percent), multicultural society (10 percent), the policy of multiculturalism (10 percent), government policy relating to families (7 percent), social exclusion and child poverty (3 percent), and international affairs (3 percent) (“YouGov/Juniper TV Survey Results,” 2008). Combined, this means that 44 percent of the population attribute this decline to immigration and multiculturalism. This suggests that a sizeable percentage of the population believes that immigration and multiculturalism are to blame for a lack of community cohesion or community spirit in Great Britain.

When asked about integration, 2 percent of respondents said that most or all immigrants integrate well into British society. Thirty-five percent believed that many immigrants integrate well into British society, but a minority does not. Forty-five percent responded that a minority of immigrants integrate well into British society but most do not, and 14 percent think that hardly any immigrants integrate well into British society

(“YouGov/The Sun Survey Results,” 2010). These figures show that Britons are sceptical of the ability of immigrants to integrate into British society and that this opinion has not improved with the government’s integration efforts since 2001.

The British public has seen the integration of minorities as a challenge, while support for multiculturalism has dropped. Multiculturalism and immigration have both been attributed to a decline in community spirit in recent years, a trend that Britons find troubling.

5.5.2 Public Opinion on Immigration

Public opinion polling in Great Britain on immigration has primarily focused on the number of immigrants entering the country and the impact that immigration has on society. Much of the public is divided upon these issues, particularly in cases in which fears about asylum seekers and refugee seekers are conflated with economic migrants and family reunification (Griffith and Chan-Kam, 2002: 91).

Large majorities of the British population have been opposed to immigration since the 1960s (Blinder, 2011: 2), a trend that continues today. YouGov has conducted numerous surveys and polls on the numbers of immigrants that British citizens would like to see admitted. In December 2004, YouGov found that 74 percent of respondents felt that there are too many immigrants coming to Britain (“YouGov/Economist Survey Results,” 2004). In 2006, 76 percent of respondents said that there should be an annual limit to the number of immigrants admitted. Fifty percent of respondents said that the number of immigrants admitted made it difficult to achieve good community relations (Table 24). Subsequent polling showed an upward trend in the number of people in favour of

immigration limits (Table 24) (“Britons Suggest Annual Immigration Limits,” 2006). In August 2003, polling conducted by YouGov found that British citizens did not believe that existing immigration and asylum rules were tough enough. Eighty-two percent of respondents said that existing immigration rules were not tough enough, while 6 percent said they were too tough and 8 percent said they were about right (“Britons Want Tougher Immigration Standards,” 2003). In 2006 and 2007, polling data were released that showed that a majority of Britons wanted much tougher immigration laws, while roughly one-tenth of the population wanted immigration stopped altogether (Table 25) (“Most Britons Want Tougher Immigration Laws,” 2006, and “Britons Urge for Tougher Immigration Laws,” 2007). When the coalition government announced its intention to impose drastic cuts to the number of immigrants entering the country every year, these types of figures were used as support for the government’s policies.

Table 24: Responses to the question, “How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?” (“Britons Suggest Annual Immigration Limits,” 2006)

	There must be an annual limit to the number of immigrants allowed to come to Britain	The current levels of immigration are making good community relations more difficult to achieve
Strongly agree	50%	29%
Agree	26%	31%
Neither agree nor disagree	14%	22%
Disagree	6%	13%
Strongly disagree	4%	4%

Table 25: Responses to the question, “Which of these statements comes closest to your views on laws about immigration in Britain?” (“Most Britons Want Tougher Immigration Laws,” 2006, and “Britons Urge for Tougher Immigration Laws,” 2007)

	April 2005	August 2006	October 2007
Laws on immigration should be abolished, so any one can come and live in Britain	2%	1%	2%
Laws on immigration should be relaxed	8%	5%	5%
Laws on immigration should remain as they are	19%	17%	13%
Laws on immigration should be much tougher	58%	63%	64%
Immigration should be stopped altogether	11%	12%	12%

British citizens have tended towards a negative view of the effect of immigration on their country in recent years. In 2004, Ipsos polled citizens of nine different states to determine their perceptions of immigration (Table 26). Of these, Britons believed that immigration has had the worst influence. In 2004, 54 percent of respondents said that parts of the country do not feel British any more because of immigration (“Views on Immigration Differ in Canada, Britain,” 2004). In 2008, 58 percent of respondents said the same (“Country Changed By Immigration, Say Britons,” 2008). In April of that year, 58 percent of Britons surveyed said that British culture had become diluted and damaged as a result of immigration. Twenty-five percent responded that immigration had led to a rich and varied culture. Seventeen percent of respondents did not know, or did not agree with either statement (“Immigration Has Damaged Culture, Say Britons,” 2008). In 2009, Angus Reid found that only 16 percent of Britons thought that immigration had had a positive effect on their country, while 72 percent thought that it had had a negative effect (Table 27) (“Immigration Seen Negatively in Britain and US,” 2009). Polling undertaken

on behalf of the German Marshall Fund found that Great Britain had the highest negative perceptions of immigration of all the countries surveyed (Table 28) (Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, 2010). In 2010, 84 percent of Britons said that immigration had been quite bad (25 percent) or very bad (59 percent) for the country (“Labour’s Immigration Policies Seen as Failure By Britons,” 2010). These numbers show the growing negative perception of immigration and immigrants in Great Britain, which in turn has fuelled leaders’ policies and decisions in recent years.

Table 26: Responses to the question, “Overall, would you say immigrants are having a good influence or a bad influence on the way things are going in your country?” (“Views on Immigration Differ in Canada, Britain,” 2004)

	Good	Bad
Canada	73%	21%
Japan	44%	44%
Spain	43%	47%
United States	42%	46%
France	39%	53%
Germany	39%	57%
Italy	38%	50%
Mexico	36%	53%
Britain	32%	60%

Table 27: Responses to the question, “All things considered, do you think immigration is having a positive or a negative effect on your country?” (“Immigration Seen Negatively in Britain and US,” 2009)

	Canada	United States	Great Britain
Positive effect	37%	18%	16%
Negative effect	41%	66%	72%
Not sure	23%	16%	12%

Table 28: Responses “problem” to the statement, “Immigration is more of a problem than an opportunity for my country” (*Transatlantic Trends: Immigration*, 2010)

	2008	2009	2010
Canada	-	25%	27%
France	39%	43%	42%
Germany	39%	44%	44%
Netherlands	36%	45%	39%
Italy	45%	49%	45%
United States	50%	54%	52%
Spain	-	58%	53%
United Kingdom	61%	66%	65%

Britons have also been polled on a recurring basis by Angus Reid on their top priorities and concerns. In each of the polls, respondents were provided with a number of different issues and asked which one the respondent considered to be the most important. As these lists were different in each poll and used different methods, the polls cannot be combined into a single chart without a large margin of error. Instead, Tables 29 to 33 show some of the results from these polls and Britons’ shifting priorities.

Table 29: Responses¹⁹ to the question, “Which of these issues do you think are the most important facing this country?” (“Criminal Activity Top Issue in Britain,” 2004)

	June 2004
Crime / law and order / police	60%
Health / NHS / hospitals	51%
Immigration / asylum	47%
Europe / EU constitution / the euro	31%
Iraq / the war on terrorism	29%
Pensions / social security / minimum wage / poverty in Britain	29%
Income tax / VAT / National Insurance / Council Tax	23%
The environment / pollution / global warming	22%
Child care / nurseries / schools / universities	19%
Housing / house prices / interest rates	19%
Prices / inflation / cost of living	17%
Economic growth / jobs / unemployment	15%
Transport / bus and train fares / roads	14%
Countryside / farming / GM crops / fox-hunting	5%
International development / poverty	2%
Northern Ireland	1%

Table 30: Responses to the question, “What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today?” (“Foreign Affairs Are Key Issue in Britain,” 2004)

	August 2004
Defence / foreign affairs / international terrorism	24%
Race relations / immigration	17%
Crime / law and order / violence / vandalism	12%
National health service / hospitals	9%
Education / schools	4%
Common market / EU / Europe / single European currency	4%
Economy / economic situation	3%
Taxation	2%
Unemployment / factory closure / lack of industry	2%
Drug abuse	2%
Morality / individual behaviour	2%

¹⁹ Up to four responses were allowed; percentages do not add up to 100.

Table 31: Responses²⁰ to the question, “Which one of the following issues do you think is the most important facing Britain?” (“Health, Crime Key Topics in Britain,” 2005)

	February 2005
National Health Service	49%
Crime	45%
Education	41%
Pensions and social security	32%
Immigration and asylum	28%
The level of taxes	23%
International terrorism	19%
International poverty	17%
Europe	10%
Transport	9%
Iraq	9%
The level of interest rates	6%

Table 32: Responses to the question, “What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today?” (“Immigration Is Now Top Concern in Britain,” 2006)

	October 2006
Race relations / immigration / immigrants	25%
Defence / foreign affairs / international terrorism	20%
National Health Service / hospitals	13%
Crime / law and order / violence / vandalism	10%
Education / schools	4%
Economy / economic situation	3%
Pollution / environment	3%

²⁰ Up to three responses were allowed; percentages do not add up to 100.

Table 33: Responses to the question, “Which of the following issues will be most important in your decision on how to vote at the next general election?” (“Health Care Is Main Issue for British Voters,” 2007)

	January 2007
Health services	86%
Law and order	83%
Education	81%
Taxation and public services	80%
The environment	78%
The economy generally	75%
The fight against terrorism	74%
Asylum and immigration	65%
Europe	48%

From these tables, we can see that Britons’ priorities have at times varied drastically from poll to poll. Generally speaking, health care and crime have been the citizens’ top priorities; however, immigration and race relations issues have also been of concern for respondents. Blinder notes: “immigration and race relations were rarely mentioned by respondents as one of the ‘most important issues’ facing the country prior to 2000. As recently as December 1999, fewer than 5% of Ipsos-MORI’s monthly sample gave a reply that had to do with race relations or immigration. But since then, immigration has become one of the most frequently named issues” (Blinder, *Overall Attitudes*, 2011: 5). These tables show the importance that citizens have placed on a number of issues over the past few years, allowing us to see shifts in public opinion over this period.

Immigration has become increasingly less popular in the past fifty years. Public opinion has encouraged political leaders to make changes to the country’s immigration rules and integration policies. The reasons behind both this change in public opinion and the leaders’ perceptions of the public’s priorities will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 6.

5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has treated the data employed in this project. In order to determine if there is a correlation between changing incorporation policies and public opinion, I have looked at first, public opinion polling data gathered uniformly across the three states; second, at government press releases and newspaper articles; and third, at country-specific public opinion polling results. Taken together, these data have allowed me to create detailed timelines of the major policies decisions in each state, and to amass information relating to public support for governments' priorities. These data sources will be analyzed and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

This project aims to study the linkages between state policies on incorporation and public opinion. By collecting comparative and single-state polling data, we can see some of the major trends in public opinion on the subjects of integration and immigration between 2001 and 2011. Through the use of major events timelines, we can compare variations in public opinion with major events and policy changes to see if there is a correlation between the two.

In this chapter, I aim to discuss the relationship between public opinion and a state's incorporation model. As mentioned in previous chapters, an incorporation model is the framework through which members and non-members negotiate their place in a state or society. An incorporation model is the product of an explicit or implicit exchange between population and state, influenced by a society's conceptions of membership, citizenship, and identity. It is the result of "the historical, demographic, political, and social particularities of each country or region" (Rodríguez-García, 2010: 253). In this project, however, I have hypothesized that a state's incorporation model may also be influenced by public opinion. This chapter discusses this thesis and analyzes the results laid out in the previous chapter.

6.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCORPORATION MODELS AND PUBLIC OPINION

The aim of the study is to compare changes to incorporation policies with shifts in public opinion. As we saw in Chapter 5, there have been much larger changes to British policies from 2001 to 2011 than to Canadian or French policies during the same time period. The relationship between a state's incorporation model and public opinion will be

explored in this section, while possible explanations will be presented in Section 6.2 and implications will be discussed in Section 6.3.

6.1.1 The Relationship in Canada

Through the polling data collected in Section 5.3, we can see that Canadians generally have a strong level of support for the policy of multiculturalism, while maintaining certain reservations when this policy has the potential to limit gender equality. Likewise, Canadians generally believe that immigrants can and should integrate easily into Canadian society. Most respondents believe that immigration has had a positive influence on the country. A majority of Canadians are satisfied with current levels of immigration. Looking at the timeline of major events in the country, we can see an emphasis on both security and continued immigration. While a host of new security measures (such as identification cards for permanent residents or the use of biometric identification) were introduced after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the government has continued to announce new funding for integration projects, new legislation to protect immigrants from exploitation, and new measures to ensure that immigrants can help the economy (such as the recognition of foreign credentials).

With the exception of one poll conducted by Angus Reid in 2010 on the impact of immigration (in which only 34 percent of respondents said that it had had a positive impact), public opinion has remained relatively constant in Canada during the time period in question. In contrast, earlier studies showed that public opinion was much more volatile in the 1970s to 1990s. Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown suggest that public opinion in Canada has traditionally played ‘catch up’ to government policy. The authors found that

while the federal government viewed immigration as economically beneficial, the public was initially less supportive (Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown, 2010: 94). Instead, “changing attitudes over time are the result of an ideological shift towards greater acceptance of immigration and immigrants as well as a response to changing macro-conditions” (Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown, 2010: 94). In particular, support for immigration was associated with a low unemployment rate (Palmer, 1996). Likewise, Simon and Lynch found that Canadians have gradually become more supportive of the government’s immigration policies. Between 1975 and 1993, respondents were initially in favour of a decrease in the number of immigrants admitted; however, over time, Canadians became more supportive of the number of immigrants admitted by the government (Simon and Lynch, 1999: 459). Finally, while multiculturalism has been Canada’s official incorporation model since 1971, it took several decades before public opinion reached its current levels of support for the policy (Adams, 2009). This shows how the government has lead public opinion through the introduction of initially less popular policies that grew in public support over time.

In Canada, the population supports the government’s policy of attracting immigrants and the “default political assumption is in support of continued immigration” (E.G., 2011). Public opinion in Canada on incorporation, multiculturalism, and immigration has traditionally followed behind government policies on these issues. In Canada, we may say that the incorporation model has influenced public opinion over time. Unlike Great Britain, Canada did not undergo drastic shifts in its incorporation models during the period in question. Instead, the country experienced a gradually tightening of

requirements for potential immigrants, new restrictions on access to citizenship and permanent residency, and an increased focus on removals and security measures.

6.1.2 The Relationship in France

In France, the relationship between public opinion and incorporation models is less clear. The country's assimilationist or universalist model has been in place since the French Revolution in the 18th century and is an integral part of French identity and the political system. While multiculturalism in Canada may also be said to be entrenched in Canadian identity, colour-blind equality in France has a much longer history and tradition. Thus, while there can be changes made to the state's immigration policies, incorporation policies are much more difficult to alter.

This has meant that it is more challenging to determine the relationship between incorporation model and public opinion in France. While Sarkozy promoted the creation of a national identity ministry and the launch of a national identity debate during the 2007 presidential election, polling undertaken in later years showed that the French public was not particularly engaged in this debate (Table 20 in Section 5.4.1). Sixty-four percent of respondents believed that the debate was "above else, a desire to mobilize right-wing voters ahead of the regional elections" ("Identité Nationale," 2009), while 36 percent of respondents believed the debate stemmed from a genuine desire to discuss national identity. However, a total of 54 percent of respondents felt that the debate is "important." There is a major right-left divide in this response, as 73 percent of right-wing voters considered it important, compared to 43 percent of left-wing voters ("Identité Nationale," 2009). The French national identity debate was primarily seen as an electoral ploy to

engage right-wing voters; however, this issue shows a broader divide between the left and the right in French politics.

While there has been public support for reducing immigration in France, there is also a perception that the government's policies are intended more to compete with the far right than to follow the voters' wishes. While the *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* (UMP) is currently considered France's major right-wing party, it has to compete with both the left-wing *Parti Socialiste* (PS) and the far-right *Front National* (FN). In the 2002 presidential election, FN leader Jean Marie Le Pen was the surprise run-off candidate against UMP leader Jacques Chirac. With Le Pen's daughter, Marine Le Pen, now in the role of party leader, the *Front national* remains a legitimate threat to the UMP. This presents the UMP and Sarkozy with a dilemma: "whether to try to undercut the FN's electoral appeal by making concessions to its nationalist and xenophobic immigration policy, to seek strategic agreements with Le Pen, or to ignore him and his party" (Marthaler, 2008: 385). Sarkozy has primarily sought to compete with the FN for right-wing voters on immigration. In the lead-up to the 2007 election, Sarkozy stated: "if there are people who are not comfortable in France, they should feel free to leave a country which they do not love." Marthaler points to the similarities between this statement and Le Pen's slogan in the 1980s, "France: love it or leave it" (Marthaler, 2008: 391). While this is only one example, it shows the way in which Sarkozy brought his policies closer to the far right to compete with the Le Pen and the *Front national* on immigration issues.

In France, public opinion has largely been in favour of decreasing immigration particularly among the right. Marthaler suggests that this opinion is, however, becoming less prevalent among the population at large. Instead, Sarkozy's "emphasis on national

identity is designed to appeal to a small but electorally significant section of the French electorate” (Marthaler, 2008: 393). This means that while there is a connection between public opinion on the right and Sarkozy’s policies first as Minister of the Interior, and later as President, it is more challenging to find a clear relationship between public opinion in France more broadly and the country’s incorporation, integration, and immigration policies since 2001.

6.1.3 The Relationship in Great Britain

In the case of Great Britain, major policy shifts between 2001 and 2011 were accompanied by increasingly negative public opinion on integration and immigration issues. At the same time, a number of major incidents in the country hardened public opinion and government policies. Most notably, these include the ethnically-motivated riots in 2001 and the terrorist attacks on the London transit system in July 2005. These events had the effect of raising concerns over the integration of non-white, non-Christian individuals into society and drawing attention to the increasingly diverse and changing face of the British population. This in turn led to a replacement of multiculturalism with ‘community cohesion’ and integrationism as the state’s incorporation model.

When looking at public opinion between 2001 and 2011, we can see that it worsened over time. Over this period, the British public became increasingly in favour of limiting immigration (Table 25). Likewise, in the year following the London bombings, immigration and race relations were considered to be the most pressing issue for British respondents (Table 32). Finally, there was the belief among the population that minorities have not successfully integrated to society.

During the same period, the government introduced a series of measures intended to promote a common set of British values. Looking at the timeline of major events and policies, we can see that these initiatives aimed at encouraging pride and a renewed focus on citizenship. At the same time, a number of new security initiatives and legislature were introduced. Finally, the government also announced measures intended to cut down on immigration to Great Britain and to improve border control. Together, these policies aimed to improve the country's security while tightening immigration standards and procedures.

The worsening public opinion, combined with new security and control-focused legislation suggest that public opinion and public policy may be more responsive to one another in Great Britain. Modood suggests that one of the differences between Canada, France, and Great Britain lies in the fact that British incorporation was largely unplanned. The previous policy of multiculturalism was not carefully constructed in a single legal or policy statement, but was instead “evolutionary and multifaceted, having grown up - sometimes in contradictory ways - in response to crises as well as to mature reflection” (Modood, 2011). Likewise, the policy of community cohesion was introduced as a direct consequence of the 2001 riots and the prognosis by the Community Cohesion Review Team that ethnic communities were living ‘parallel lives.’ While multiculturalism in Canada and assimilationism or universalism in France constitute part of the national identity, “multiculturalism has never been entrenched in government policy in Britain, however, to the extent that it has in Australia [or Canada]. British multiculturalism has been a philosophy, a cultural politics, but not a defining set of national principles” (Poynting and Mason, 2006: 369-370). This made the policy much more open to change

and subject to variations in public opinion. As we have seen here, this has meant that the incorporation model could easily be altered in the past decade. In both cases, these changes have affected state policies and influenced public opinion on integration.

6.2 COMMONALITIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP

One of the difficulties of studying public opinion is narrowing down reactions to a specific series of factors. While those studies that rely on first-hand polling can ask follow-up questions, my work has depended upon secondary data. Despite this, we can see two major commonalities both in the polling data and events timelines. In all three states, the past decade has brought about major changes intended to improve the state's security. At the same time, there have been growing concerns and debates over the nature of national identity and values.

6.2.1 Immigration, Integration, and Security

Immigration and integration had been seen as security issues prior to 2001 (Buzan, Waeber, and de Wilde, 1998); however, “the monumental terrorist attacks that levelled the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon are a key marker for the global security agenda. They jolted the sense of personal security of citizens of Western countries, and changed the threat perspective of Western states” (Dauvergne, 2007: 533). The 2005 terrorist attacks in London had the same effect in Great Britain. In all three states, we can see that these attacks, as well as rioting and other disturbances, were quickly met with plans to put an increased focus on integration while simultaneously cracking down on immigration. It can be said that these events “served as a tidal wave clearing away political opposition to the advance of increasingly strict crack-down

provisions, or at least rendering mute this opposition” (Dauvergne, 2007: 541). This has had an impact on relations within each state, their incorporation models, and public opinion.

In Canada, many of the increased security measures were introduced as a result of the country’s relationship with and geographical proximity to the United States. While the country was not the victim of a terrorist attack on its soil during the time period in question - which has led some to suggest that Canadians’ attitudes on security are more lenient (Newport, 2006) – Canada has been the target of a number of thwarted terrorist attacks. The arrest of suspects on terrorism charges has “prompted questions about immigration policy and the official approach of fostering diversity rather than integration” (“The Toronto Terror Plot,” 2006). Unlike the 2001 attacks, however, neither the 2006 nor the 2010 arrests (nor earlier arrests between 2001 and 2003) provoked an overhaul of the country’s policies. One author suggests that this is because Prime Minister Harper did not want to risk alienating immigrant and minority voters by emphasizing the plots (“The Toronto Terror Plot,” 2006). For Canadians and their government, terrorist arrests within the country prompted introspection, while the 2001 attacks in the United States led to an overhaul of the country’s security policies. In Canada, there was less of a focus on the relationship (real or imagined) between immigration and security, as political leaders hoped to avoid alienating minority voters.

In France, civil unrest in 2005 prompted questions about security, intergroup relations, and integration. While there had been incidents of urban violence, protesting, and car burnings since the 1980s, the 2005 events were the first to spread across the entire country. Koff argues that it is this scope that sets them apart, as “widespread violence,

such as that which occurred in France, does not occur [frequently] and its causes cannot be viewed simplistically. The phenomenon of ‘*la contagion*’ or ‘the contagiousness’ of the 2005 urban violence is the most impressive aspect of the events of those days” (Koff, 2009: 773). While the initial riots broke out in the suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois, 15.8 km from Paris, the unrest soon spread throughout the Île-de-France department and later to all 15 of the country’s major urban areas. The events prompted the government to declare a state of emergency, which was later extended for three months. One of the challenges for the government in the aftermath of the rioting was how to address and solve its causes. While the civil unrest was sparked by the death of two teenagers, the underlying causes are still not agreed upon, though “joblessness, segregation, hard-line policing, discrimination, drug mafias and a lack of parental control—especially, according to one outspoken minister, in polygamous families” have all been suggested (“France: The Aftermath,” 2005). The state of emergency gave the police special powers to arrest and detain those suspected of involvement in the rioting, while Sarkozy (then Minister of the Interior) introduced plans to deport non-citizens found to have been involved. These events helped to cement the immigration, integration, and security concerns together in French public awareness.

In Great Britain, both the riots and the attacks led to new concerns over the ‘failed’ integration of immigrants and second- and third-generation citizens. The 2001 riots increased concerns over ‘parallel lives,’ while the 2005 attacks raised worry over ‘homegrown’ terrorists – British citizens who had become embittered with life in Great Britain (Poynting and Mason, 2006: 375). At the same time, “of the European nations, the United Kingdom responded the most extremely to the events of 9/11 in terms of

legislation invoking a State of Emergency in order to pass the controversial *Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act* two months after 9/11” (Poynting and Mason, 2006: 372). This encouraged the equation of segregation with extremism and terrorism, “which was widely accepted despite its inconsistency with the actual biographies of terrorists” (Kundnani, 2007: 27). These incidents increased existing concerns over national security and made the public and political leaders more likely to equate immigration and integration issues with security threats.

In the past decade, a number of high-profile ethnic riots and terrorist attacks have changed the way in which populations and their leaders think about immigration, integration, and security. This in turn has affected public support for immigration and integration, also influencing government policies on security.

6.2.2 Questions of National Identity

As we saw in the first chapter, immigration “stirs public passions because it touches national core identities and affects fundamental collective notions of citizenship and community” (Koff, 2009: 771). Immigration can both form part of a state’s identity, such as in Canada, or can be seen as detracting or weakening this identity, such as in France or Great Britain. When these identities are put into question, there can be a fierce backlash. This is because “the threat posed by minorities and immigrants may be rather symbolic in nature and may stem from concerns about the loss of certain values or ways of life because of the presence of minority groups and immigrants” (McLaren and Johnson, 2007: 715). It is for this reason that immigration and identity (or values, way of life, culture, etc.) can be seen to be in opposition with one another.

In Canada, immigration and multiculturalism both form part of the country's national identity. Additionally, the desire to balance the anglophone and francophone populations within the province have necessitated bilingualism and biculturalism, which means that multiculturalism comes much more naturally to the country (E.G., 2011). However, the government's policies have not been accepted without conflict. In particular, the province of Quebec has contested multiculturalism on the grounds that it is "a Canadian value, not a Quebec value" (Dougherty, 2011). Multiculturalism has been seen by some as an attempt to undermine the status of the Quebecois and/or French Canadians, as "by severing culture from language, multiculturalism policy rejected the 'two nations' thesis about Canada's development, and reduced the status of French Canadians and/or the Quebecois from that of 'founding people' to the same rank as the 'other ethnic groups'" (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992: 367). In Quebec, there is wide support for the replacement of multiculturalism with an official policy of interculturalism, in which dialogue among cultures would take place within the framework of Quebecois values and the French language. This in turn has raised questions over the role of multiculturalism in Quebecois identity and the role of Quebec in Canadian identity.

In France, the question of identity, immigration, and incorporation can be particularly troubling. This is because "discrimination against minorities is particularly awkward in France because its model of integration does not recognise that such minorities exist" ("An Underclass Rebellion," 2005). Furthermore, the 2005 urban violence "was meaningful first and foremost because it happened in France. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the French Republican model of citizenship was viewed idealistically by many observers" (Koff, 2009: 772). These events challenged French

citizens' conceptions of themselves, their nation, and their incorporation model. Simon and Lynch speculate that "much of the French public's negative reactions to immigrants stems from fear of the loss of a national identity and fear for one's personal safety, rather than concern about what immigrants are doing to jobs, unemployment and education" (Simon and Lynch, 1999: 462). It is for this reason that Sarkozy's national identity debate gained (some) traction within the population, particularly on the right. This debate was seen as a means to solidify a national identity or culture that was thought to have been eroded by both the arrival of immigrants and the large presence of minorities within the country.

Identity can be constructed out of differences, "particularly differences in values and approaches to life" (McLaren and Johnson, 2007: 715). When newcomers have different values and customs from the 'traditional' British population, these new attitudes can be seen as threatening. Manning suggests that the problem with multiculturalism in Great Britain ultimately had more to do with the white population's identity than with the minority or immigrant population's capacity to integrate. He writes: "the biggest failure of multiculturalism is not that it has failed to create a sense of belonging among minorities but that it has paid too little attention to how to sustain support among parts of the white population, who are sceptical about the ability to retain a minority ethnic or religious identity while being British" (Manning, 2011). Manning suggests that this conflict is what spurs support for political organizations such as the British National Party (BNP). His claim is supported by research undertaken by ETHNOS Research and Consultancy on behalf of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in 2006. In focus groups, ETHNOS found that white respondents had the tendency to divert discussions on

British identity to the decline of Britishness. Respondents attributed this decline to four main causes: “the arrival of large numbers of migrants; the ‘unfair’ claims made by people from ethnic minorities on the welfare state; the rise in moral pluralism; and the failure to manage ethnic minority groups properly, due to what participants called ‘political correctness’” (*The Decline of Britishness*, 2006: 4). In the respondents’ view, there is a clear link between the decline in British identity and the arrival of those who do not ‘fit’ with this traditional culture or identity. This loss of common values “is a pervasive theme of contemporary British politics. Over the past few years, British politicians have introduced measures that they claim will promote ‘common values’” (Wolton, 2006: 453). Wolton explains that this shows the assumption that there is no longer a shared ‘British identity’ (Wolton, 2006: 454), which Kundnani believes has been complicated “both by the absence of a clear idea of what it meant to be a citizen of the British state and by the fact that it was a state made up of multiple nations (England, Scotland and Wales)” (Kundnani, 2007: 25). In this context, immigrants are seen as threatening to British values; however, the challenge is that there is no clear consensus on what composes these values.

Immigration and the presence of minorities can raise fear among the native-born population, which can in turn spur changes to official government policies. A number of authors suggest that identity concerns can in fact have a larger impact to public opinion on immigration than economic concerns (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Sniderman, Hagerdoorn, and Prior, 2004). As we have seen in this section, this has arguably been the case in the province of Quebec, France, and Great Britain between 2001 and 2011.

6.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between incorporation models and public opinions raises questions as to the role of the public in policy making and the implications of public attitude to long-term planning. As we have seen from the polling data, citizens have been generally critical of government policies in the areas of immigration and integration. This in turn has led to changes both to government policies and also to the political landscape in these states.

The presence of a large degree of public opposition to immigration can lead to electoral successes for parties with anti-immigration views. While these parties (such as the BNP or the FN) were formerly on the fringes of political debate, recent upset successes (e.g. BNP's successes in the 2008 London mayoral election, the county council elections in 2009, and the European Parliament elections in 2009; the run-off between Le Pen and Chirac in the 2002 presidential election) suggest that this may no longer be the case. However, it is not the success of these parties alone that affects immigration. Anti-immigration parties have "an impact on the direct policy influence they can exercise in parliament and, if they gain access to power, in office. Anti-immigration parties' electoral success might also exert indirect effects, i.e. by influencing other parties' policy positions" (Van Spanje, 2010: 564). The presence of these parties can prompt other parties to copy their anti-immigration rhetoric in two ways: "first, established parties are said to have shifted to the right. Second, many researchers share the view that the mainstream parties have co-opted restrictive immigration policies" (Van Spanje, 2010: 564). As we saw in a previous section, this has been the case in France in recent years, as

the Sarkozy and the UMP have drifted further to the right in order to compete with the *Front national*.

Opposition in the population to immigration can also lead to what Hewitt calls a ‘white backlash’ (Hewitt, 2005). While this theory was primarily developed to explain backlash against African-Americans in the United States (e.g. the organisation of the Ku Klux Klan), Hewitt suggests that white backlash may be used to explain opposition to multiculturalism and immigration in recent years. This is because there has emerged a “perceived sense of ‘unfairness’ amongst some whites, who argued that it was their own culture that was lacking political recognition. This feeling became particularly evident within education, where multicultural policy encouraged an awareness of different ‘ethnic cultures’ and pride in cultural ‘heritage’” (Rhodes, 2010: 80). This sentiment has led some mainstream British politicians to “articulate the sentiments of backlash politics. During the 2005 General Election Campaign, the then Conservative leader Michael Howard combined a hard-line stance on immigration with a critique of ‘political correctness’. Individuals within the Labour Party have also added fuel to the fire of white backlash” (Rhodes, 2010: 82). Altogether, these events have led to a shift to the right in British and French politics and a renewed focus on racial and ethnic divides among the populations. The rise of anti-immigration parties has also made it more acceptable to express anti-foreigner sentiments (Simon and Lynch, 1999: 462)

Beyond these trends towards the right wing and anti-immigration parties, public opinion may also be said to lead to potentially confused (and confusing) policies. In the *Decline of Britishness* study, ETHNOS found that many respondents misunderstood the concept of integration, equating it with assimilation. As a result, when the respondents

saw that ethnic minorities had not seamlessly assimilated, “they then believed that people had simply refused to integrate, and that the project of multiculturalism had failed” (*The Decline of Britishness*, 2006: 5). Likewise, Griffith and Chan-Kam explain that individuals confuse irregular immigrants with asylum seekers. As a result, “as demands for tougher policies such as repatriation grow, our humanitarian responsibilities are put at stake. But negative attitudes towards refugees put the immigration system more broadly at stake. Asylum and migration have and this is problematic when predictions show that immigration of all kinds is set to grow and needs to grow in the UK” (Griffith and Chan-Kam, 2002: 91). Furthermore, individuals can confuse economic immigrants who are in the country legally with those that arrived by irregular means. This unclearness can be potentially dangerous, as it could spur negative public opinion, which could in turn be inspired by and used to justify changes to the incorporation model.

Overall, it would appear that there are more differences than similarities between the three states included in this study, as each has implemented a different set of policies in response to new challenges. In contrast, Simon and Lynch argue that despite major differences in states’ policies on immigration, “there is more consensus than dissensus about how the publics in those countries feel about immigrants” (Simon and Lynch, 1999: 464). Additionally, public opinion on immigration varies over time in each state and there is “not a ready fit between history, population density, and economic conditions and the demand to reduce immigration” (Simon and Lynch, 1999: 464). Furthermore, attitudes towards immigration are not monolithic. While respondents may oppose certain types of immigration (e.g. asylum claimants or low-skilled workers), this does not mean that they are opposed to immigration or immigrants in its entirety. Instead, “negative

attitudes toward specific immigrant groups seem to be generally related to the social distance between the group and the host society. But this relationship is far from perfect, and it could be other factors are important such as the group size and thereby the threat it poses to the host society” (Simon and Lynch, 1999: 465). This means that we must be careful when drawing implications from these findings.

To conclude, we can see that there is a relationship between public opinion and incorporation models. Public opinion has mainly followed government policies in Canada, while immigration and integration have prompted a right-left divide in France. In Great Britain, increasing negative public opinion, combined with major security incidents, prompted the government to introduce new restrictive policies and to change the state’s incorporation model. Between 2001 and 2011, this has meant that we can see shifts in both public opinion and government policies. Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich, however, caution us to frame these changes within a wider picture, as the 2001 attacks in New York City and Washington, together with the London and Madrid transit bombings, “may have helped consolidate changes sought by policymakers on both continents rather than requiring them to embark on a wrenching shift in policy” (Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich, 2008: 8). These changes were arguably part of a larger trend towards enforcing more restrictive policies since the 1990s (Ivarsflaten, 2005: 21).

6.4 AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

While this study has looked at the relationship between incorporation models and public opinion, it remains a broad overview of the subject. This provides avenues for further research on a number of points and variables. Examining these variables would

provide a richer and more complete picture of the interaction between government and population, and between incorporation models and public opinion.

This study concentrates specifically on changes between 2001 and 2011, a decade in which many major security-related events and policy changes took place. In a study with a larger scope, however, it could be rewarding to consider a long time frame. While the issues of immigration and integration continue to be important in all three states today, the biggest debates in Canada are perhaps already past, as most Canadians accept both immigrants and the government's immigration policies (Adams, 2009). In contrast, if we looked back at the 1970s, we would perhaps find wildly different results. While debates over immigration, incorporation, and identity continue to be important in France and Great Britain, it is perhaps only with the inclusion of data from 1970s to present that we could have a more telling comparison with Canada. This in turn would allow for the analysis of broader time trends in public opinion in these states.

An additional avenue for further research would be to profile the types of immigrants and immigration accepted and encouraged by the state. In all three countries, certain kinds of immigrants (e.g. investors, students, and business people) are actively welcomed by the government, while others (such as refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants' family members) are not. By including this information, we could determine whether different types of immigrants produce different public opinion outcomes. In previous sections, I highlighted the confusion in Great Britain between those who are in the country legally and those who are not, or those who are economic refugees and those who are asylum seekers (Griffith and Chan-Kam, 2002: 91). From this we can speculate that public opinion would vary depending on the number and visibility of certain kinds of

immigrants within a state. The addition of this distinction would allow for further analysis of the role of government policy on immigration and integration and its impact on public opinion.

A further distinction could be made on the basis of geography. This would allow us to determine if there are differences between those cities or regions that traditionally attract more immigrants (e.g. Toronto, Marseille, and London) and those that have a higher proportion of native-born residents. As we saw in Section 2.3, contact theory posits that increased contact at the local or individual level leads to more positive attitudes towards immigrants. By including detailed public opinion data divided by cities or urban areas and by geographic regions, we could determine if this has been the case in these three states. This would also allow for the distinction and comparison of public opinion across all three countries on the basis of regional identities and subcultures, providing a more nuanced picture of public opinion differences within the states.

Finally, further avenues for research can be found in the exploration of other intervening variables. Among others, economic factors and the economy more broadly could provide additional explanations for the trends we have seen in this project, adding another facet to the study. In particular, as we saw in the literature review, economic factors have often been provided as explanations for xenophobic reactions to immigrants. Studying this variable would allow for a comparison with identity and security factors to determine which are the most influential to both government policy and public opinion.

Through these additional avenues for research, we could further understand the interaction between public policy and public opinion. Distinguishing between

respondents on the basis of a variety of characteristics would allow for a more detailed analysis of a population's attitudes, while the inclusion of other intervening variables would provide a more complete analysis of the subject.

6.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This project has explored the relationship between public opinion and incorporation models in Canada, France, and Great Britain between 2001 and 2011. By looking at comparative polling data, major events timelines, and single state polling data, I have aimed to compare and contrast the influence of public opinion on a state's policies and vice-versa. From this information, I have found that British policies have been the most responsive to public opinion during the period in question. In contrast, Canadian public opinion has traditionally followed behind the government's policies on integration and immigration issues, while new French policies appear to be directed primarily towards satisfying political supporters.

Between 2001 and 2011, a number of events made citizens and their political leaders question their security and the relationship between security and immigration. Using major events timelines, we saw that these events included terrorist attacks (2001, 2005); arrests on terrorism charges (Canada - 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010; France - 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005; Great Britain - 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011); and riots (2001, 2005, 2008). These events prompted citizens to question their own security and to become more likely to call upon the government to institute new security measures.

At the same time, these events had a profound impact on states' national identity. In the case of Canada, discussions of integration, citizenship, and immigration raised questions over the nature of Canadian identity and the province of Quebec's place in the federation. Likewise, terrorist arrests prompted introspection over the success of multiculturalism to truly integrate all minority groups and populations into a larger polity ("Multiculturalism in Canada," 2006). In France, presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy called for a debate on the nature of national identity in France, a pledge he later instituted after his electoral win. While this debate was ostensibly to discuss the nature of identity in modern France, many citizens felt that it was in fact on the integration of immigrants and minorities, particularly Muslims, into the French majority (Petit and Hipolite, 2010). The presence of minorities who do not conform fully to the French ideals of citizenship challenges the country's policies, especially those relating to the official policy of equality and colour-blindness. In Great Britain, the presence of large minority or immigrant communities has led to what some consider to be 'parallel lives,' in which minority and majority lead separate existences without any interaction. This phenomenon has been blamed for a lack of 'community cohesion,' which was attributed as the cause of rioting in 2001 in Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham. National identity and immigration can be at odds with one another when various populations have conflicting conceptions of identity, citizenship, and values. When these opposing viewpoints are exacerbated by an event such as rioting or a terrorist attack, it can prompt a backlash against those who are not seen to belong.

As we have seen, these trends can have wider implications in a state, leading to the rise of anti-immigration parties and shifts towards more right wing policies on integration

and immigration issues. While it has not been examined in detail here, we can also speculate that the relationship between incorporation models and public opinion is impacted by the degree to which a state encourages or discourages the active participation of its citizens in the political process. This could in turn affect feelings of support and belonging among the population.

The question of integration reflects a state and its society's conceptions on citizenship, participation, and identity. As we have seen in this study, these issues are highly political and can provoke intense debate among different populations within the state. It is important to study these issues to understand the ways in which states incorporate immigrants and minorities within their society. This in turn has wider implications for the legal framework and philosophy upon which the state is built.

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