The thought of Pierre Trudeau is characterized by a deep respect for democracy, and hence for the rule of public or majority opinion, on the one hand, and an intransigent opposition to certain forms of opinion, such as nationalist or theocratic opinion, on the other. This is merely to say that Trudeau is a liberal democrat; for from the liberal democratic perspective, democracy, which is justifiable only on the basis of liberalism, cannot serve ends other than liberal ends without contradicting itself. This is a defensible view, but it clearly points to the central problem faced by the liberal democratic statesman: how is he to understand situations in which democracy chooses to serve non-liberal ends, and what is he to do?

The purpose of this paper is to explore the dimensions of this problem through an analysis of Trudeau’s major writings. Although this analysis is intended to contribute criteria for the evaluation of his later political career, no such evaluation is undertaken here. We begin with an examination of Trudeau’s theory of consent, because it is the logical corollary of the central liberal notions of equality and freedom, and because it justifies the rule of public opinion, the substantive content of which may then deny equality and freedom.

The Two Faces of Consent

In the second article of his Approaches to Politics, Trudeau asks how it happens “that one man has authority over his fellows?” Or, to rephrase it, whence government? He considers and rejects as possible sources God, nature, and force. His reason for rejecting force (or fear) is especially revealing of his eventual answer to the question. Force, he contends, cannot explain authority because “no man or group of men can impose authority on a population against its will.
When injustice reaches a certain point, even soldiers and policemen refuse to obey—as witness the French, Russian, Chinese, Indo-Chinese, and other revolutions. Thus authority does not derive from the force of the rulers, for the force of the ruled is always greater and can destroy the former whenever it wishes. The true source of governmental authority, then lies in the agreement—or, more precisely, the psychological disposition—to suffer it. "In the last analysis," says Trudeau, "any given political authority exists only because men consent to obey it. In this sense what exists is not so much the authority as the obedience."

Far from having disposed of force as the ground of authority, however, this argument merely replaces one sort of force with another, namely, the force of the ruler, with the force of the governed multitude. It simply locates the source of authority in what always remains at bottom the greater force, the force of the greatest number. As Trudeau himself puts it much later in the book, majority rule is simply "a convention"; a convention, moreover, which "is only a roundabout way of applying the law of the stronger, in the form of the law of the more numerous." Granted that the agreement to justify policy "by counting heads instead of breaking them"5 is a great step forward, it nevertheless remains a fact that underlying this agreement is a recognition that the majority has the greatest power to break heads. Indeed, even the tyrant gains his power from the underlying power of the multitude, for any government "can exert only as much force as the citizens lend it."6

In thus grounding authority on the force of the people, rather than on God, nature, or the force of the rulers, however, Trudeau does not take us very far toward a resolution of the question with which he is most concerned: the question not of where governmental authority comes from, but when it is used legitimately. For to recognize consent as the ground of authority, does not dispose of the possibility that the people may consent to the wrong sort of authority. Indeed, by showing that even bad governments rest on consent, Trudeau indicates that the people often do so.

His theory of popular sovereignty, then, is more than a scientific explanation, it is part of a revolutionary rhetoric designed to make the required change possible. It is the necessary precondition of change, because as long as the people believe that the existing system is ordained by God or nature they will not be disposed to change it.

If Trudeau's theory of consent thus appears as both the basis for, and a preliminary part of, a public education in the principles of the
good or just regime, it is only the preliminary part: for while it enlightens the people as to their own responsibility for the kind of government they have, it tells them nothing about the kind of government they should have, and hence nothing about how they should exercise their responsibility. In short, the theory of consent as it stands, while revolutionary in implication, is devoid of substance, and the public education of which it is a part will be complete only when Trudeau has educated consent itself, so that it will be granted only to the proper and legitimate (which is to say just) authority.

It would seem to follow from this, moreover, that the substantive standards of legitimacy which are to govern consent cannot themselves be rooted in consent. But while this is fundamentally true, it is also misleading when stated so baldly, for it might lead one to conclude that consent is no part of these standards. In fact, Trudeau's 'realistic' recognition that all governments are sustained by acquiescent majorities by no means exhausts the role of consent in his thought; as for most of his liberal predecessors, consent is also a central part of the substantive principles of justice. To put it enigmatically, one might say that part of what the majority does when it 'consents' to bad or unjust government is to undermine the principle of government by consent.

The enigma is dispelled when it becomes clear that two different meanings of the word consent are at work. On the one hand, it refers simply to the acquiescence of the majority which is required to sustain any policy; on the other hand, it is the logical derivation, as a principle of government, from substantive liberal standards of justice, the validity of which is entirely independent of the 'consent' of the majority understood in the first sense. The standards in question are those of classical liberalism: the welfare and rights of the individual. Although Trudeau does not resort to notions of the state of nature and the social contract, he does view society in the manner prescribed by the theorists of these notions. In brief, society exists to serve the fulfillment of the individual (as he defines it for himself), and when it does not do so, the individuals who compose it have the right to reconstitute it. Thus consent should be granted only to government which secures the object of individual fulfillment.

For classical liberal theory, which Trudeau follows in this respect, the source of this individual 'pursuit of happiness,' which it is the purpose of government to secure, is equality. Because all men are equal (for political purposes at least), none can rule another by right; hence all are equally free to do as they please. Following Hobbes,
however, Trudeau thinks that such a state of complete freedom leads to an anarchic state of war in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Hence, “(t)o allow human society to develop in order and justice, men agree to some restriction on their liberty, and obey the authority of the state.”

In a word, the notion of consent is derived from equality and liberty; or, more accurately, the three together form a single gestalt. Because men are equal, they are equally free; to the extent that government exists, therefore, it exists not by right (divine or otherwise)—for that would be to deny equality—but by consent. Thus Trudeau insists that liberty is “a free gift” flowing from equality, and not a conquest “wrested from authority.” Indeed, authority, which exists to limit liberty, is established by consent precisely in order better to protect liberty. Freedom is limited in the very name of freedom.

The full implications of this theory become clearer when it is set beside its classical alternative. For the ancients the purpose of government was not better to secure the individual’s right to fulfill himself after his own fashion, but to promote the good life, the content of which could be objectively known. Since the good life had an objective content, there was no right to do as one pleased; rather there was the duty to do as one ought. Moreover, since all were not equal in their capacity to know the standards of the good life, the superior few who did know, and who therefore represented the good in their own lives, had a right to rule the rest for their own good. Consent, in this account, was emphatically not the principled basis of government, although the ancients would have agreed with Trudeau on the prudential necessity for any government of securing the consent of the majority.

It thus becomes clear why the liberal assertion of equality, upon which the freedom to live as one pleases is grounded, went hand in hand for the founders of the theory with a denial of the existence of objective standards of the good, or at least the denial that they could be known with any certainty. For these founders could not deny such obvious inequalities as those of intelligence; nor could they deny the political relevance of such inequalities if in fact objective standards of the good existed. Whatever their intelligence, however, all remain equal before a question which is either absurd or cannot be answered; and being equal, they retain the right to answer the question for themselves. Even with respect to the question of self-preservation—the value of which could be known with cer-
tainty—inequalities were irrelevant because no one else, no matter how much more intelligent, was as concerned with your self-preservation. Hence equality remained intact, and the only legitimate ground for government was consent. And, once again, consent was only given to government in order better to secure the freedom which flows from this equality.

It is this liberal theory which underlies Trudeau's thought. When he speaks of a bad regime being sustained by the 'consent' of the majority, then, he is saying that the majority has 'consented' to policies which oppress at least some of the citizens of the regime. In oppressing these individuals—by denying their freedom for reasons other than the greater security of freedom in general—the regime implicitly denies their equality. By rejecting equality, the regime claims a right to rule and denies that government is based on consent. It thereby forfeits the consent of the oppressed minority, and ought to forfeit the consent of the majority as well—a consent which is only forthcoming because of a psychological disposition to obey as long as one is not being hurt oneself. This disposition Trudeau strives mightly to overcome in the early part of the Approaches.

**Equality, Consent and Prejudice**

Trudeau is a liberal democrat and the tension apparent within his thought between the 'consent' of the majority which sustains all government, and consent as a principle of good government, is a classical tension of liberal democracy. As we shall see, moreover, it is a tension which defines the problem of liberal democratic statesmanship.

Consent as a principle of legitimacy, of course, has been one of the distinguishing features of liberal thought from its inception in the theories of Hobbes and Locke. As the mention of Hobbes indicates, this liberal theory of consent does not necessarily imply what Trudeau calls the democratic "convention" of majority rule, although it is the liberal democratic opinion that this convention offers the best means of securing and maintaining consent. This liberal democratic tradition holds that the requirements of consent are best served when it is expressed not only in the institution of government, but in its day to day operation as well. Interpreted in this active sense the principle of consent requires government by popular or public opinion. Since opinions are bound to differ on any given question of policy, however, the principle of consent is taken to be satisfied by the maxim of
majority rule. But this satisfaction occurs only if the majority rules on behalf of the same limited goal for which the Hobbesian sovereign is instituted, namely, the security of individual freedom—the goal for which consent is given by all to government in the first place. As long as it does so, its opinion can be said to "represent" the consent of all to the fundamental purpose of government. Indeed, liberals become democrats only to the extent that they think the democratic "convention" will serve these ends better than a single sovereign of the Hobbesian kind.

The problem for the liberal democrat arises out of the fact that the opinion of the majority is often actuated by prejudice, and particularly by the kind of prejudice of greatest concern to liberalism: the prejudice of politically relevant inequality. To the extent that the majority acts on such prejudice—or because of its psychological disposition not to oppose those who act on its behalf—it implies that it (or its representatives) possesses the standards of the good and has the right to rule on their behalf. It thereby ceases to be guided by the limited end of securing freedom and begins to adopt the classical approach of prescribing the manner of its exercise. It thus denies equality and relegates consent to a prudential necessity rather than a principle of legitimacy.

For Trudeau theocratic clericalism and nationalism are two forms of such prejudice; indeed, he refers to the modern secular nationalists as "neo-clericalists," who, having escaped the dogmatism of church and state, found freedom "to be too heady a drink," and "took refuge in the bosom of (their) mother, the Holy Nation." Both sorts of dogmatists claim that "they are in sole possession of the truth, so others need only get into line." They thereby assert a politically relevant inequality and seek "to abolish freedom and impose a dictatorship of their minority." It is implicit, furthermore, that even if they were successful in acquiring the 'consent' of the majority, it would be a dictatorship nonetheless, for the majority would then be ruling not to protect the freedom of all to pursue happiness as they see fit (limited only by the consideration that no one define his happiness to consist in prescribing the content of happiness for others), but precisely in the name of a particular version of truth about happiness. It would rule not as a majority among equals—who agree to disagree only about the best means to secure freedom—but as a privileged group which just happens to be the majority. Its majoritarianism would thus be incidental to its possession of the truth, for the truth should rule whether or not it is supported by a majority.
again, such a perspective must ultimately come to see consent as merely a prudential principle of realpolitik, rather than a leading principle of justice.\(^30\)

If, on the other hand, the majority does not fall prey to such inequitable prejudice and agrees to limit itself to questions of how best to secure freedom, the problem does not arise. On such questions there will indeed be disagreement and parties will form, but those disagreements do not fracture the bounds of consent because they take place within a broader agreement on the ends of government—the limited ends for which consent is given to government in the first place. For Trudeau, as the following quotation shows, it is only on the basis of some such agreement that the peaceful partisanship of parliamentary democracy becomes possible.

Parliamentary democracy I take to be a method of governing free men which operates roughly as follows: organized parties that wish to pursue—by different means—a common end, agree to be bound by certain rules according to which the party with the most support governs on condition that leadership will revert to some other party whenever the latter’s means become acceptable to the greater part of the electorate. The common end—the general welfare—which is the aim of all parties may be more or less inclusive, and may be defined in different ways by different men. Yet it must in some way include equality of opportunity for everyone in all important fields of endeavor; otherwise agreement on fundamentals would never obtain. For instance, democracy cannot be made to work in a country where a large part of the citizens are by status condemned to a perpetual state of domination, economic or otherwise. Essentially, a true democracy must permit the periodic transformation of political minorities into majorities.\(^31\)

It is true that Trudeau is somewhat vague here about the nature of the fundamental agreement which makes such a “periodic transformation of political minorities into majorities” possible, but his insistence on equality of opportunity implies the traditional limited end of liberalism: the protection of individual freedom. For equality of opportunity is a kind of freedom and is derived from fundamental political equality. A theocrat, or anyone else who denies political equality (and hence claims a right to rule), denies by that very fact “equality of opportunity for everyone in all important fields of endeavor.” Indeed, it is precisely such a denial of equality, and hence of freedom (including equality of opportunity), that constitutes the kind of “perpetual state of domination” of one part of the population by another which makes democracy impossible.
We have seen that Trudeau considers nationalism one form of such a denial of equality which subverts freedom and leads to domination, and, indeed, he thinks it is because of Canada’s mutually opposing nationalisms that, in the past, the conditions of democracy have not existed. Nor, if this analysis of the character of nationalism is correct, could it be otherwise, for all denials of political equality—whether explicit or implicit—must be based on some notion of the best way of life which entitles its representatives to political superiority (again, this may be explicit or implicit). Since the question of the best way of life admits of only one answer, however, partisans of different answers to it—who agree only in considering the question to be of a supreme public importance—are not likely to consider each other legitimate. In such circumstances the easy transformation of minorities into majorities becomes impossible, and party lines harden. Moreover, parties who, however implicitly, do not consider each other legitimate, will not be graceful losers. Indeed, partisanship of this sort tends to raise politics to a fever pitch which always threatens war, or if war is ruled out by the prudence of the minority, it leads to that minority paying lip-service to the ‘rules of the game’ while doing all it can secretly to subvert them. After all, the rules of any game are ‘impartial’ only as between players who agree on the nature and purpose of the game—a truism especially relevant to the parliamentary game.

By comparison, the kind of partisanship conducted within the liberal consensus may truly be said to be “sound and fury signifying nothing.” One needs only to think of any recent general election to see precisely how amicable can be the dispute between those who agree to banish to the private sphere the question of how to live, and limit themselves to the lower level question of how best to secure the individual’s freedom to decide the former question for himself. However important such controversies are, they do not call into question the political equality which underlies freedom, and they therefore do not destroy the ground of consent. In such an atmosphere it may truly be said that the ‘consent’ of the majority to the policy of the day represents the consent of all, even those who disagree with the policy.

The Problem of Statesmanship

The problem of liberal democratic statesmanship, then, is to ensure that the majority which rules on day to day policy, is an enlightened
majority and not a prejudiced one. In a word, it has an educational or rhetorical function. It must teach the majority to limit itself to securing freedom (the only policy compatible with equality), rather than imposing a way of life. Since the latter approach is always based on an implication of politically relevant inequality, and since such inequality cannot be sustained in the absence of objective and knowable standards of the good, it is always based on prejudice. It follows that Trudeau's chief task as educator is to do battle with prejudice.

How one approaches this task will depend on where one locates the source of the problem. Does it lie with the people themselves because of an inherent disposition to prejudice, or does it lie with corrupting governmental elites who frustrate the ability and tendency of the people to transcend prejudice? There is strong evidence of the latter approach in Trudeau's writings. At many points, for example, it appears that he thinks that the educational task of statesmanship will be sufficiently accomplished primarily by making the people aware of their own power and responsibility, for the doings of government. Once they become aware of this responsibility, and are given the opportunity to act on it, they will no longer acquiesce in policies which transgress the immutable liberal standards of justice. When this condition has been achieved, the demands of statesmanship can be met simply by serving the wants of the people as they express themselves through the democratic process. This may be why Trudeau, who is so obviously concerned with the legitimate use of power, can concentrate in the Approaches on its source.

When the people are unaware of their own power, and do not exercise it actively, on the other hand, they tend to adopt the ways of narrow self-interest: as long as they are not being hurt themselves, then all is well. Since they have been taught to believe that authority comes not from themselves, but from God, or some other transcendent source, they are likely to rationalize governmental damage to others as manifestations of divine will. By the same token, they are likely to turn to political immorality, for since power is vested in the rulers by right, elections are a sham and there is no reason not to sell one's vote to the highest bidder.

Making the people aware of their own sovereignty, and providing them with the opportunity to exercise it, leads to an enlargement and enlightenment of this narrow egoism, to the point where it becomes moral. Each individual discovers that the damage inflicted by the government on others is not ordained by God, but by himself as part
of the acquiescent majority. He is thereby led to see that his own safety, and that of all other individuals, lies in their collective determination no longer to acquiesce in the infliction of injustice on anyone. Thus do the people learn to 'consent' only to policies compatible with the principle of consent, and with the liberal assumptions on which that principle is grounded. And since no policy can exist without acquiescence, justice will emerge triumphant.

As we shall see, this view is not consistently maintained by Trudeau, for he occasionally suggests that the problem is at least in part located in the people themselves, and would remain even in the context of popular sovereignty. This ambivalence reflects two quite different and incompatible streams of liberalism. One is tempted to call these 'conservative' liberalism and 'liberal' liberalism, in order to pay obeisance to their current self-definition, but I shall call them 'realistic' liberalism and 'idealistic' liberalism.

'Realistic' liberalism is that part of the tradition which is founded on the thought of Hobbes and Locke. From this perspective, men are naturally rather nasty and anti-social, though reasonable, creatures who require government, and, indeed, consent to it, primarily to protect themselves from each other. On this account, vanity, pride, and selfishness are considered ineradicable aspects of human nature which will always tempt men to formulate their political opinions in terms of irrational claims to rule. Needless to say, the government required to control this tendency must be strong and able to take its distance from public opinion. For Hobbes, of course, this meant an absolute government completely independent of opinion. Locke and his followers, however, modified Hobbes in a way which allowed liberalism to become democratic. This modification consisted of the introduction of commerce, which allowed one to pit selfishness against the normal results of vanity and pride. Thus it became possible to conceive of the influence of public opinion on government, because public opinion was more likely to limit itself to the limited ends (the security of freedom) contemplated by liberalism. It was not thought that this could be completely relied upon, however, and the liberal democrats of this persuasion maintained a certain governmental independence from opinion through the device of representation.

The 'idealistic' stream of liberalism, on the other hand, is touched by the Rousseauean critique of Hobbes and Locke. Believing men to be, not naturally anti-social, but basically good, this side of liberalism adds fraternity to the traditional concepts of equality and freedom. Not considering selfishness to be natural, such liberals can envision
what would be unthinkable to the realist, namely, “a social state in which men would wish to benefit themselves only in ways that are beneficial or at least not harmful to others. In that state man’s perfect integration into the community would be indistinguishable from their perfect freedom to do as they please.” Governmental coercion, from this perspective, is ultimately unnecessary. It arises not out of the necessity to control the excesses of natural asociality but out of the necessity to protect the artificial selfishness, which is to say the property, of some against others. Property and capitalism, in other words, far from being the natural outlet of natural selfishness, are the artificial cause of artificial selfishness, and government is often the mechanism which, once selfishness has been introduced, sustains the interests of the few against the many. Whereas the ‘realistic’ liberal “supposes that there is a development from man’s asociality to his property,” the ‘idealistic’ liberal “believes the development is from his property to his asociality.”

These two perspectives lead to quite different prescriptions for many of the practical questions of politics. The liberal ‘realist’, for example, is likely to insist on a connection between economic liberty and other forms of liberty. As he sees it, any attempt to interfere with the former would require a suppression of natural selfishness, something which could not be done without limitation of all the other freedoms so dear to the liberal. The idealist, on the other hand, sees no connection between the two; indeed, he is likely to think of interference with property—which is, after all, the cause of man’s antisocial characteristics—as the pre-condition of libertarianism in other spheres. Among the many other questions on which the two approaches tend to diverge is the question of statesmanship. It seems plain, for example, that the ‘idealist’ approach to the problem of inegalitarian prejudice is likely to be one of removing the conditions which cause it, so that the inherent goodness of man may manifest itself. Although the democratic majority may fall prey to such prejudice, the fault does not lie primarily with the people, but with the system. It should be clear that Trudeau’s thinking, insofar as the above sketch of it is representative, falls into this category.

For the liberal democratic realist, on the other hand, because he understands prejudice to be rooted not in external conditions but in the very nature of man, the problem of statesmanship is infinitely more difficult. Let us recall that the very reason which teaches equality (which in turn supplies the standard of justice toward which the statesman must strive), also decrees government by consent,
which, in its active or democratic incarnation, means government by public or majority opinion. For the liberal democratic realist, it thereby teaches, ironically, respect for prejudice to the extent that prejudice must always dominate public opinion. From this perspective, the fact that public opinion, if it denies equality, contradicts the foundations of its own authority, does not entitle the statesman to ignore it altogether, for reasons best expressed by Harry Jaffa in his interpretation of the thought of perhaps the greatest of these 'realistic' liberal democratic statesman, Abraham Lincoln.

To insist upon more equality than men would consent to have would require turning to force or to the arbitrary rule of the few. But to turn to oligarchy as a means of enforcing equality would itself involve a repudiation of equality in the sense of the Declaration.49

In short, the principle of equality, as it is understood by that part of the liberal democratic tradition which takes its bearings from 'realistic' liberalism, has two faces which place upon the statesman demands which are in tension with each other as long as prejudice remains a factor in public life. "In [this] tension between equality and consent," Jaffa concludes, "in the necessity to cling to both and to abandon neither, but to find the zone between which advances the public good, is the creative task of the statesman. For this task there is no formula; for the wise statesman there is no substitute."50

I do not believe that such a Lincolnesque view can be found fully elaborated in Trudeau's early writings. But, as I have already suggested, there are some indications that he is not simply an 'idealist', and that some of the raw materials of a 'realist' approach are present. There is, for example, the strong Hobbesian element in his thought51 which would imply a view of man quite different from that required by the 'idealist' position. Congruent with this is the fact that he admits, toward the end of the Approaches, that even when the people have been properly instructed in the doctrine of popular sovereignty, they may still misuse their power, and that further education may be required.52 An informed judgement of the extent to which a realist perspective may be present in Trudeau's thought, however, would require greater attention than I have been able to give, to his views on the numerous policy questions to which the two approaches give different answers.53 It would also require greater attention to his years as a practical politician, for it may be that what were only raw materials of a 'realist' position in his early writings were more fully elaborated under the pressure of events. Such a study of his
later political life is especially important to an evaluation of his position on political compromise with prejudice, which is, after all, the hallmark of the 'realist' view. But this takes us beyond the limits of the present paper.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 35
3. Ibid., p. 31
4. Ibid., p. 88
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 48.
7. One must not lose sight of the fact that it was, after all, in the service of social and political transformation that these essays were written; as, indeed, were most of Trudeau's writings during the 1950's.
8. We leave aside the perplexing question of where they come from: God, nature, or somewhere else?
12. E.g. Approaches, p. 34; and Federalism, p. 11.
13. E.g. Approaches, pp. 34, 50, 74.
14. See Approaches, pp. 34, 31; and "Matériaux pour servir à une enquête sur le cléricalisme", *Cité Libre* III:7 (May, 1953), p. 32: "Dans la cité politique, tous les hommes pénètrent en égaux et on n’y salue pas n’importe qui." Cf. the Declaration of Independence which, not by accident, places equality before the inalienable rights of "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." See also Locke's *Second Treatise*, section 4.
17. Ibid., p. 49.
18. The restraining of Socrates by Polemarchus at the beginning of Plato's *Republic* shows that the problem of knowledge and consent is as old as political philosophy itself. Indeed, the passage shows that the ancients shared Trudeau's 'realistic' evaluation of the ultimate power of the majority. Reflection upon the fact that they, unlike Trudeau, did not advertise the fact among the people, however, supplies an additional reason for supposing that Trudeau's theory of consent transcends this realism and becomes a basic principle of legitimacy. The ancients did not advertise the power of the people among the people because they thought that the latter, if aware of their own power, might not (indeed would not) consent to what was for their own good. Hence the necessity of noble lies. The education of the many in their own power becomes responsible, rather than imprudent, only upon a different evaluation of the relationship of the good to ordinary wants and needs—a specially modern evaluation which considers such ordinary needs, as they reveal themselves in their pristine purity to an understanding which has been shocked out of its vanity and pride—to be identified with the good. On this basis it became possible to consider consent (properly understood) as the source of the good.
20. It could be known with certainty because it was based, not on reason, but on universally attestable passion, and because life itself was the prerequisite for any answer to the question of the good life.
23. Cf. Approaches, pp. 75-76. One should reflect, moreover, on the fact that liberal democratic electoral representation may be just a different incarnation of Hobbes' formal representation. See Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley, 1972), p. 43.
24. This formulation is paraphrased from Mansfield, "Impartial Representation," p. 95.
25. See Federalism, p. 164, where Trudeau calls the nationalists choice of a solution to the Quebec problem "an emotional and prejudiced choice."
29. This analysis of nationalism may seem at odds with Trudeau's statement on page 160 of Federalism that "... nationalism was born, the child of liberal democracy and the mystique of equality." But as he goes on to say immediately, "Alas, this nationalism, by a singular paradox, was soon to depart from the ideas that presided at its birth. Because the moment the sovereign state was put at the service of the nation it was the nation that became sovereign ..."
31. Federalism, p. 116. Trudeau's thought is not without ambiguity on this point, however. Among the many reasons he values federalism, one is that it provides a compromise between liberal-individualism and nationalism. The right of national self-determination is rejected in the name of self-government understood in the liberal democratic sense, but the force of nationalism is not denied and federalism is offered as the way out. See Federalism, pp. 4, 154, 169, 177-78. Cf. William Matthe, "Political Community and the Canadian Experience: Reflections on Nationalism, Federalism, and Unity," Canadian Journal of Political Science 12 (1979). See, however, Trudeau's ultimate rejection of nationalist emotionalism as a necessary but transitory phase on pages 177 and 194-96. This has led Christian and Campbell to see his enthusiasm for federalism as ultimately a way "to tame, and eventually eliminate nationalism." Political Parties, p. 68.
32. Federalism, p. 161. This parallelism between the two concepts is now, indeed, called forth by the Chrisitan and Campbell to see his enthusiasm for federalism as ultimately a way "to tame, and eventually eliminate nationalism." Federalism, p. 116. Trudeau's thought is not without ambiguity on this point, however. Among the many reasons he values federalism, one is that it provides a compromise between liberal-individualism and nationalism. The right of national self-determination is rejected in the name of self-government understood in the liberal democratic sense, but the force of nationalism is not denied and federalism is offered as the way out. See Federalism, pp. 4, 154, 169, 177-78. Cf. William Matthe, "Political Community and the Canadian Experience: Reflections on Nationalism, Federalism, and Unity," Canadian Journal of Political Science 12 (1979). See, however, Trudeau's ultimate rejection of nationalist emotionalism as a necessary but transitory phase on pages 177 and 194-96. This has led Christian and Campbell to see his enthusiasm for federalism as ultimately a way "to tame, and eventually eliminate nationalism." Political Parties, p. 68.
34. See Federalism, pp. 157-58. For Trudeau such mutually imperialistic nationalisms feed off each other. Thus, to some extent Quebec nationalism had been, and is now, called forth by English Canadian nationalism. (Federalism, pp. 46-51, 114-122, 161-164, 200). Both are transgressions of limited government. His comparison here of nationalism and religion thus reminds one of Laurier's analysis of the religious disputes 100 years earlier. For both Trudeau and Laurier, to leave the realm of limited government and attempt to establish a way of life, is to call forth reactions in kind from adherents of other ways. The result is either civil war or separation.
36. All, that is, who agree to be governed by the principles of equality and consent; i.e. all reasonable men who have, as Hobbes intended, overcome their vain and glory seeking prejudices and have, in recognition of their equality and freedom, agreed to limit the end of politics. Those who form part of such a fundamental agreement may consent to policies with which they disagree but which remain within the framework of the agreement. One cannot expect to gain the consent of those who deny the limited end of government. The
consent of such people is not required for a just society (as justice is defined by liberalism). Indeed, in its revolutionary aspect, liberalism clearly contemplates the violent overthrow and/or suppression of such people. One must not forget Locke's injunction not to tolerate the intolerant. Cf. my "Quebec's 'Holy War' as Regime Politics."

37. This seems to be one of the reasons Trudeau favours federalism. See Federalism, p. 139.

38. Approaches, pp. 63-65, 78.

39. Ibid., p. 32.

40. Ibid., p. 46.

41. Trudeau's attempt to arouse the indignation of the people generally against injustice to another individual reminds one of Hobbes' discussion of moral indignation in chapter 6 of Leviathan.

42. The formulation is borrowed from John Zvesper, Political Philosophy and Rhetoric: A Study of the Origins of American Party Politics (Cambridge, 1977). The inverted commas are used because, as Zvesper points out, the rhetorical difficulties of 'realistic' liberalism may raise questions about its realism. Cf. Joseph Cropsey, "Conservatism and Liberalism" in his Political Philosophy and the Issues of Politics (Chicago, 1977).


44. Ibid., p. 122


47. Ibid., passim.

48. This seems to have been the view of judicial statesmanship taken by Justices Black and Douglas of the United States Supreme Court. See Walter Berns, Freedom, Virtue, and the First Amendment (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 155-160. Berns' quotation from Tom Paine, as a representative of this sort of thought, is suggestive: "Man is not the enemy of man, but through the medium of a false system of government. Instead, therefore, of exclaiming against the ambition of kings, the exclamation should be directed against the principle of such governments; and instead of seeking to reform the individual, the wisdom of a nation should apply itself to reform the system." pp. 158-69.


50. Ibid.

51. This Hobbes element is sufficiently strong to have attracted considerable scholarly comment. See, for example, Christian and Campbell, p. 64; Denis Smith, Bleeding Hearts, Bleeding Country, ch. 5; Henry David Rempel, "The Theory and Practice of the Fragile State," and Reginald Whitaker, "Competition for Power: Hobbes and the Quebec Question," Canadian Forum (January-February, 1979), and his "Reason, Passion and Interest; Pierre Trudeau's Eternal Liberal Triangle," Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 4 (1980).

52. Approaches, pp. 87-88.

53. See note 47. On the question of control of the economy and libertarianism one is tempted to juxtapose Trudeau's questioning of the free market system in 1975 and his famous statement that "the state has no place in the bedrooms of the nation."