| dc.contributor.author | Tomsons, Kira. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-21T12:36:45Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2006 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | AAINR19596 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10222/54834 | |
| dc.description | The concept of oppression has played a central role in feminist theory. But the concept itself is rarely examined. The goal of my thesis is to resituate the concept of oppression within feminist theory, in particular within criticisms of liberal theory. I argue that traditional and recently developed liberal theories are inadequate for addressing social justice because they lack a satisfactory understanding of oppression. | en_US |
| dc.description | My analysis of oppression consists of five main parts. I argue that oppression is a state of affairs that (a) is situated in an historical context, (b) that results in diverse harms to people, (c) on the basis of their membership in social groups, (d) where the harms are mediated by social institutions and structures in systemic ways, (e) which benefit members of privileged groups. This analysis highlights the great complexity of oppression. What makes my account of oppression unique is that I place the historical context at the centre of analysis, as a lens through which all other aspects must be understood. | en_US |
| dc.description | This conception of oppression has three implications which I explore. First, my account enables me to provide responses to groups who claim to have oppressive experiences when in fact, oppression is an incorrect description of those experiences. In particular, I examine the claims of men and Whites who argue they are oppressed by policies which are aimed at the amelioration of sexism and racism. | en_US |
| dc.description | Second, my account provides additional insight needed to properly examine moral responsibility for oppression. In stressing the structural and institutional nature of oppression, I challenge the arguments of those who claim that privileged groups as wholes cannot be held morally responsible for the oppression of others. | en_US |
| dc.description | Finally, I argue that my concept of oppression is necessary for properly situating debates about social injustices. I look at the issue of pornography and demonstrate that contemporary liberal approaches to solving the moral and legal issues of censorship of pornography are inadequate because they fail to use an adequate conceptualization of oppression. | en_US |
| dc.description | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Dalhousie University (Canada), 2006. | en_US |
| dc.language | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Dalhousie University | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Women's Studies. | en_US |
| dc.title | Oppression: A conceptual analysis. | en_US |
| dc.type | text | en_US |
| dc.contributor.degree | Ph.D. | en_US |
