Disorienting Responsibility

Abstract

Experiences of disorientation can be common and powerful parts of moral agents' lives yet they have not been characterized by mainstream Western philosophers, and their effects have not been adequately recognized by ethicists. In this dissertation, I remedy these gaps by providing an account of disorientations as multi-­dimensional experiences and by fleshing out a more nuanced analysis of disorientation within the framework of experienced agency. I argue that, contra the philosophical tradition, disorientations are not always bad for moral agency. This thesis has two main aims: first, to introduce a philosophical framework to clarify experiences of disorientation and their effects;; and second, to clarify the relation between disorientation and moral agency, showing how responsible action can both require and produce disorientation. In chapter one, I introduce disorientations as complex experiences of unease, discomfort, and uncertainty which vary in degree and in effects. In chapters two to four, I characterize disorientations on three axes: corporeal, affective, and epistemological. I argue that disorientations always involve all three dimensions of bodily, emotional, and cognitive experience and that shifts in body, affect, and knowledge can trigger experiences of disorientation. I draw on examples of how agents can become disoriented in periods of illness, trauma, grief, self-­doubt, and education. In chapter five, I draw two lines of connection between disorientation and moral agency: experiences of disorientation can help us act more responsibly, and acting responsibly can be disorienting. In chapter six, I consider the political promise of disorientations, focusing on the way individuals' disorientations in response to a hate crime in their community prompted the creation of less harmful norms, and thereby a better place for individuals to live. In chapter seven, I conclude by outlining implications of my view for how we should face disorientations and what kinds of conditions should be in place to support those who are disoriented. Disorientations do not always enable moral agency. Given that moral philosophers are better versed in the ways disorientations can harm, my project is to distinguish the ways they can help, contesting the assumption that moral agency is always better the more oriented we are.