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NATIONAL NATURES IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: CLIMATE CHANGE, POWER AND THE ERASURE OF THE LOCAL

JOCELYN: WHEN AT AGE NINE I hopped into a canoe in Georgian Bay, paddled to a not-so-distant island, and stayed there overnight with my fellow campers, I had no idea that I had embarked upon what many consider a quintessentially Canadian activity: wilderness travel. Nor did I think much about this canoe trip, my first, as a subject-forming enterprise that allowed me to understand myself as Canadian. I concentrated instead on holding in my pee, hoping I could last our entire overnight trip without having to make a stop in the woods.

Silly though this little story may seem, it speaks, we think, to the distance between our individual experiences and the larger cultural context in which these experiences exist. The idea that Canada is a nation of wilderness, and that wilderness is central to Canadian national identity, predominates in popular culture both within Canada and beyond the nation's borders. Yet, as the well-known anti-racist writer M. Nourbese Philip and three of her colleagues have pointed out, the Canadian wilderness "is a very particular rather than a universal type of thing."¹ The large majority—80 per cent—of Canadians live in urban areas, with one third living in the major urban centres of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.² Leaving the city to experience the Canadian wilderness is a privilege only some can afford, since this privilege requires leisure time, spare money and, usually, a car. Beyond practicalities, however, and as Philip and her colleagues observe, the Canadian wilderness

¹ M. Nourbese Philip, Hiren Mistry, Geoffrey Chan and Kevin Modeste, "Fortress in the Wilderness: A Conversation About Land," *Borderlines* 45 (1997): 20.

² Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, <http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/.3ndic.1t.4r@-eng.jsp?iid=34> (accessed 7 December 2009).

is racialized as a white space even within the context of a supposedly multi-cultural Canada. Jocelyn's canoe trip, then, can be described more accurately a quintessentially white, middle-class Canadian activity. In this article, we show how the Canadian wilderness is indeed a particular rather than a universal type of thing. Wilderness is an idea imposed onto the landscape, an idea that has allowed the land to be considered part of the Canadian nation rather than the territories of specific First Nations, for whom the category of wilderness holds little significance. As such, wilderness is a powerful rather than benign concept. It is also not unique to Canada, and in other places too wilderness has worked to exclude people from the landscape and from the nation. Today, talk of global climate change seems to shift the focus away from national natures to a global climate crisis. Yet this shift in focus risks reinforcing many of the exclusions embedded within the concept of national wilderness. As we in this special issue consider relationships between national identity and place in an era of global climate change, a reflection upon the exclusions embedded within such relationships encourages us, we hope, to forge different pathways of logic in the present and future.

Temagami, Ontario, appears from the outside to be the epitome of Canadian wilderness. Indeed, hundreds of tourists descend upon Temagami each summer—and have done for over a century—to take advantage of the region's wilderness features: forested landscapes, rocky shorelines, lakes and rivers ideal for canoe travel, and fish and game aplenty.³ Robert Bateman has painted the Temagami pine trees. Margaret Atwood canoed through Temagami in order to protest the logging of the region. Bob Rae was arrested along with environmentalists when he helped blockade a Temagami logging road. These prominent Canadians aided in bringing national and international attention to the region in the late 1980s, when logging threatened to destroy what environmentalists called the last great pine wilderness.⁴ Today, with some of the region classified as provincial parkland, Temagami's old-growth pine trees continue to attract tourists to the region. As early as the late nine-

³ On the history of the Temagami region, see: Bruce W. Hodgins and Jamie Benidickson, *The Temagami Experience: Recreation, Resources, and Aboriginal Rights in the Northern Ontario Wilderness* (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1989); Jocelyn Thorpe, "To Visit and to Cut Down: Tourism, Forestry, and the Social Construction of Nature in Twentieth-Century Northeastern Ontario," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association/Revue de la Société historique du Canada* 19. 1 (2008): 331–57; Jocelyn Thorpe, "Temagami's Tangled Wild: Race, Gender and the Making of Canadian Nature" (PhD thesis, York University, Toronto, 2008).

⁴ See *Temagami: A Debate on Wilderness*, ed. Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson (Toronto and Oxford: Dundurn Press, 1990).

teenth century, visitors began to travel to Temagami in order to experience the Canadian wilderness, including its old trees. But in the past, even more so than in the present, relatively few people could afford a Temagami wilderness vacation, and it was largely middle- and upper-class white women and men who made their way from urban centres in Canada and the United States to experience what one visitor called “Nature’s playground.”⁵ As with other places in Ontario, Temagami provided tourists with the opportunity to experience wilderness and to reflect upon the relative merits of “civilized” and “uncivilized” existence.⁶ While the people who travel to Temagami today tend to avoid other people on their excursions, around the turn of the twentieth century tourists often considered interaction with local Aboriginal people to be a fundamental part of their wilderness vacations. Aboriginal people, like the forested landscape, appeared “uncivilized” to tourists, closer to wild nature than to Euro-Canadian culture.⁷ Aboriginal people thus featured as part of the Temagami wilderness, not as people who owned or had any claim to the land that tourists visited.

The Teme-Augama Anishnabai, the Aboriginal people whom tourists encountered on their Temagami wilderness vacations, however, had a very different understanding of themselves and the region than did tourists. They knew themselves as the Teme-Augama Anishnabai, “the people of the deep water,” and they conceptualized the land not as a wilderness, but as a homeland, “n’Daki Menan,” or “our land.” For the Teme-Augama Anishnabai, tourists were not visiting the Canadian wilderness, but rather were (sometimes welcome and other times unwelcome) guests to n’Daki Menan. Yet provincial and federal governments, like tourists, considered Temagami to be part of Ontario, Canada, and did not recognize the Teme-Augama Anishnabai’s claim to the region. Indeed, after almost one hundred years of struggling with provincial and federal government officials to have n’Daki Menan recognized as Teme-Augama Anishnabai territory, the First Nation took legal action in the 1970s to have n’Daki Menan recognized in Canadian law.⁸ The First Nation was ultimately unsuccessful in its endeavour (although negotiations with the provincial and federal governments continue

⁵ Another Wet Bob, “Temagaming,” *Rod and Gun* 1.3 (August 1899): 53.

⁶ See Patricia Jasen, *Wild Things: Nature, Culture, and Tourism in Ontario, 1790–1914* (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1995).

⁷ Jasen, *Wild Things*.

⁸ See Thorpe, “Temagami’s Tangled Wild”; David T. McNab, *No Place for Fairness: Indigenous Land Rights and Policy in the Bear Island Case and Beyond* (McGill-Queen’s U Press, 2009).

to the present), but the action itself reveals the Temagami wilderness to be a social and historical construction—and a colonial imposition—rather than a simple statement of fact.⁹ The Temagami wilderness is a particular rather than a universal thing, invented as it was by the white upper- and middle-class tourists who could afford Temagami vacations.¹⁰

The idea that Aboriginal peoples, and indeed indigenous peoples around the world, are “uncivilized” has lost at least some of its cultural salience since the dismantling of European empires and the rise of anti-colonial thinking.¹¹ In the Canadian context, for example, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has apologized for the policy of assimilation embedded in Indian residential schools. The assimilation of Aboriginal peoples into Euro-Canadian culture was long considered by the Canadian government to be foundational to the “civilization” of Aboriginal peoples, forcing First Nations to abandon their families, languages, and lifeways to be able to claim (always asymmetrically) the subject position of Canadian. Yet now the government officially recognizes that this policy of assimilation not only caused great harm to Aboriginal individuals and cultures, but was also fundamentally wrong. The idea that Aboriginal peoples were uncivilized facilitated not only assimilationist policies like residential schools, but also the European takeover of Aboriginal lands, since, from a European perspective, “uncivilized” peoples did not own land, and so the lands inhabited by Aboriginal peoples could be seen as uninhabited, or wilderness, and open for European exploitation.¹² It is interesting to note that while the idea that there exists a hierarchy of civilization in which Europeans are on the top and indigenous peoples are on the bottom has been thoroughly debunked, the idea of wilderness has not been taken apart to the same extent,¹³ in spite of the fact that wilderness

⁹ On the historical creation of wilderness in the United States, see William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature*, ed. William Cronon (New York: Norton, 1996).

¹⁰ This is only part of the story of the social and historical construction of Temagami wilderness. Tourists alone did not invent the wilderness, but rather played an important role, along with promoters of tourism, forestry advocates and others, in creating wilderness. See Thorpe, “Temagami’s Tangled Wild.”

¹¹ We do not mean to suggest that this kind of racist thinking has disappeared entirely. Sadly, it has not.

¹² For further explanation on this way of thinking, see Cole Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002).

¹³ But see, for example: Kay Anderson, *Race and the Crisis of Humanism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Bruce Braun, *The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, Culture, and Power on Canada’s West Coast* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2002).

is a product of the same mindset that considered Aboriginal peoples to be uncivilized and therefore saw Aboriginal lands as unoccupied wilderness. But since the idea of Aboriginal savagery is recognized as a colonial fallacy, then wilderness too must be understood as a powerful colonial force, and as a myth.

The myth of national wilderness is not unique to Canada, though. All “white settler” nations are founded upon dispossession, where the myth of an unpeopled wilderness or unimproved landscape played a role in the European takeover of indigenous lands.¹⁴ The United States is an example of another nation in which the relationship between national identity and landscape has been both important and exclusionary. It is no coincidence that in both Canada and the United States exclusionary nationalist practices have occurred through contact with places dominantly considered to be national wildernesses. As Eric Kaufmann has argued, a similar relationship between nature and the nation emerged in Canada and the United States during the nineteenth century.¹⁵ While all nationalisms depend upon the existence of a special relationship between the nation and its geography, in places such as Canada and the United States where large areas of land appear to be wilderness, that special relationship is based on the “naturalization of the nation” rather than on the “nationalization of nature.”¹⁶ The nationalization of nature occurs when a community emphasizes the imprint of the nation’s culture upon a specific territory. The naturalization of the nation occurs, on the other hand, when a community celebrates wild nature as that which regenerates the nation.¹⁷ In the former form of nationalism, the nation imposes itself onto nature, whereas in the latter, nature is seen as determining national culture. With the rising influence of Romanticism over the course of the nineteenth century, Canadian and American nationalists came to understand the wilderness (of the north and of the west respectively) as generative of national character. Coming to know the wilderness thus meant becoming a national (Canadian or American) subject.

Nowhere is this relationship between nature and the nation clearer than in Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous frontier idea. According to Turner, American identity was formed through the transformation of land

¹⁴ Daiva K. Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class* (London: Sage, 1995).

¹⁵ Eric Kaufmann, “Naturalizing the Nation: The Rise of Naturalistic Nationalism in the United States and Canada,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40.4 (1998): 666–67.

¹⁶ Kaufmann, 667.

¹⁷ Kaufmann, 667–68.

from wilderness into civilization. Through this process of contact with and transformation of landscape, Americans gained the characteristics that made them truly American: strong, inquisitive, inventive, energetic, individual, and exuberant.¹⁸ The fact, however, that the western frontier was neither unpeopled nor simply free land for Americans to claim, clear, and settle has not been lost on the host of scholars who have critiqued and successfully dismantled Turner's frontier thesis.¹⁹ Prior to American expansion, the region that became the American west was home to several Aboriginal nations, including the Assiniboine, Blackfoot, Crow, Shoshoni, and Sioux. It was only through the forced removal of Aboriginal people to reservations that these inhabited homelands could become empty wilderness spaces for Americans to claim and tame.²⁰ In what William Cronon calls American history's "central and most persistent story,"²¹ the frontier thesis creates the illusion that white men built the nation from the wilderness and therefore are the true citizens of the United States.

In what has parallels to the case of Temagami, the history of Yellowstone National Park provides an American example of the exclusionary relationship between national identity and territory. While the Washburn Expedition of 1870 has received credit for the discovery of Yellowstone, the members of the expedition were not the first people (indeed not even the first white people) to arrive there. The region instead served for hundreds of years as a seasonal hunting range for the Shoshoni, Salish, Nez Perce, Bannock, and Crow nations, and it is likely that members of the Washburn Expedition learned of Yellowstone from members of these Aboriginal groups.²² In the story about Yellowstone that began to circulate among explorers and government agents, however, Native Americans had always avoided the region because of its thermal features such as geysers and hot springs. In spite of the fact that it was untrue, this story about Yellowstone functioned to empty the region of its Aboriginal presence and to facilitate its reimagining as an

¹⁸ Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966).

¹⁹ See, for example, Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge: Harvard U Press, 1970); Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860* (Norman: U of Oklahoma Press, 2000).

²⁰ William Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness," 79.

²¹ William Cronon, "Revisiting the Vanishing Frontier: The Legacy of Frederick Jackson Turner," *Western Historical Quarterly* 18.2 (1987): 176.

²² Mark Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks* (Oxford: Oxford U Press, 1999), 42.

“unblemished wilderness” that could easily become a national park.²³ In representing Native Americans as superstitious, the story also supported the idea that Euro-Americans were culturally superior to indigenous groups, and therefore more deserving of the land.²⁴ This story thus facilitated the erasure of the area’s first inhabitants and helped to legitimize the remaking of Yellowstone into a mecca of tourism (much like Temagami), a place where Americans could go to experience *their* national wilderness.

If Canada is not alone in creating an exclusionary nationalism through contact with wild nature, neither are Canadians unique in coming to care about spaces deemed to be part of the national wilderness. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, environmental concern in Canada and the United States often centred on wilderness regions, for example Clayoquot Sound, British Columbia, Temagami, Ontario, and areas around Portland, Oregon.²⁵ Controversies about whether these areas should be logged or left as wildlife habitats and tourist attractions received national and international media attention, and environmentalists garnered a great deal of public support for their attempts to save pristine nature. Yet environmentalist efforts, in reinforcing the idea of an empty wilderness, this time one that needed rescuing rather than visiting, often resulted in the repetition of historical erasures of Aboriginal peoples from the landscape.²⁶ In the contemporary moment, environmental concern seems to have shifted again, away from an emphasis on specific wilderness regions to focus on the issue of global environmental problems, with climate change being the most pressing. Climate change, like the industrial transformation of “wilderness” landscapes, is certainly an important environmental and social issue to which we must respond. But it also remains imperative to examine how this new environmental concern might exacerbate rather than alleviate some of the exclusions associated with both contact with wild spaces and attempts to save such places from industrial logging.

In *Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development*, Wolfgang Sachs observes that the kind of global imaginary put forward in

²³ Chris J. Magoc, *Yellowstone: The Creation and Selling of an American Landscape, 1870–1903* (Albuquerque: U of New Mexico Press, 1999), 140.

²⁴ Magoc, 140.

²⁵ See Braun, *The Intemperate Rainforest*; Thorpe, “To Visit and to Cut Down”; W. Scott Prudham, *Knock On Wood: Nature as Commodity in Douglas-Fir Country* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

²⁶ Braun, *The Intemperate Rainforest*; Thorpe, “To Visit and to Cut Down.”

climate change discourse can work as a tool of exclusion.²⁷ He argues that the images of earth from space generated by the 1968 Apollo 8 mission shifted Western thinking about environmental problems as local, regional or national in scope to global in character. The earth appeared in these photographs as small and vulnerable, a bounded sphere in need of protection. This representation facilitated the construction of the earth as something that required management, an entity that only trained experts from the First World could understand and control. Local knowledge about environmental problems, and the primarily Third-World local people who possessed such knowledge, became devalued within this emerging imaginary. This story, in light of the previous discussion of the erasure of Aboriginal claims to the land under Canadian and American colonialism, should seem familiar.

Sachs and others also express concern that the new understanding of environmental problems as global has created a “one-world discourse,” in which all the earth’s humans are connected through our intertwined ecological fate.²⁸ All of us are equally endangered by environmental threats and all of us equally responsible for healing a planet in peril. But this way of apprehending environmental problems once again erases the specificity of different peoples’ relationships with the land, leaving no room to discuss issues such as Aboriginal land claims. These are the issues that also disappear when landscapes are considered to be part of the national wilderness rather than the territories of specific First Nations. In its assumption that we are all in the same boat, the one-world discourse also neglects that fact that we are neither all equally responsible for global environmental problems nor all likely to suffer the same consequences. For example, Canadian carbon emissions have increased by 26 per cent rather than being reduced by 6 per cent, as our commitment to the Kyoto Protocol promised, a commitment that Prime Minister Harper has now said the nation will abandon.²⁹ Americans, who make up only four per cent of the world’s population, consume 25 per cent of its resources. This picture is complicated, however, by statistics that

²⁷ Wolfgang Sachs, *Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development* (London: Zed Books, 1999), 83–86.

²⁸ Sachs, *Planet Dialectics*; see also Sheila Jasanoff, “Heaven and Earth: The Politics of Environmental Images,” in *Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance*, ed. Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Long Martello (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).

²⁹ George Monbiot, “Canada’s Image Lies in Tatters: It is Now to Climate what Japan is to Whaling,” *The Guardian* (30 Nov 2009), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/nov/30/canada-tar-sands-copenhagen-climate-deal>.

show that African-Americans emit 20 per cent fewer greenhouse gases per year than do Euro-Americans.³⁰ While both Canada and the United States rely on notions of wilderness to frame a sense of national identity, then, both nations have made it so that these wilderness places, as well as the other less venerated areas of the globe, are under threat. The industrial development, consumer lifestyles, and government inaction in countries like Canada and the United States have certainly led to a web of interconnection, but not of the kind that some proponents of a global view of the environment might describe. Instead, the one-world discourse glosses over the fact that we do not all inhabit one world of equal access to resources or equal threat of environmental risks. Indeed, if we adhere to the notion that “everyone is downstream,” climate change makes it clear that, in the words of Jim Tarter, some of us “live more downstream than others.”³¹ The indigenous peoples of the world, the citizens of island nations, and poor people—the most economically, politically, and environmentally vulnerable among us—will feel the effects of climate change first and most strongly as problems like sea level rise, melting permafrost, poor air quality, and extreme weather events affect those with the least capacity to mitigate their effects. As we write this article in December 2009, we are in the midst of another round of negotiations among countries on targets for global emissions reductions. While several thousand delegates meet in Copenhagen, Shishmaref, Alaska, home to over 600 Inupiaq individuals, threatens to fall into the sea.³² And so, as the global debate on how to manage climate change rages on, its impacts are felt on a very local level. There seems, in some sense, to be an inverse principle at work: those least responsible for the crisis are the most likely to bear its brunt. When we imagine climate change as only a global issue for which we all share equal responsibility, questions of justice are hidden.

This kind of abstraction, however, is not the only option available when thinking about solutions to climate change. Indeed, scholar and environmental justice activist Giovanna Di Chiro offers us a way of thinking about

³⁰ J. Andrew Hoerner and Nia Robinson, *A Climate of Change: African Americans, Global Warming, and a Just Climate Policy in the US* (Oakland: Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative and Redefining Progress, 2008).

³¹ Jim Tarter, “Some Live More Downstream than Others: Cancer, Gender, and Environmental Justice,” in *The Environmental Justice Reader: Politics, Poetics, and Pedagogy*, ed. Joni Adamson, Mei Mei Evans, and Rachel Stein (Tucson: U of Arizona Press, 2002), 213.

³² See Amy Craver, “Alaska Subsistence Lifestyles Face Challenging Climate,” *Northwest Public Heath* Fall/Winter (2001): 8–9.; Antoinette de Jong, “All at Sea,” *Sun Herald* (20 April 2008): 42.

all humans' shared connection to the earth that also pays attention to local people, places and problems.³³ She discusses environmental justice groups that organize "toxic tours" in the United States, in which visitors, guided by local residents, tour through poor communities of colour and experience the environmental hazards faced by these communities. The tours stop at places such as playgrounds and housing developments, and "tourists" hear the stories of people who have developed cancer, respiratory diseases, and immune deficiencies as a result of contamination and pollution in these neighbourhoods. Tourists viscerally experience the smells and sounds of communities that are host to waste incinerators, mountaintop removal coal operations, and oil refineries. Toxic tours work on two levels. First, they operate as a mechanism for awareness, exposing the largely white, middle-class tourists to the fact that poor and racialized communities live within the production and dumping grounds of industrial society. Tourists therefore see the local effects of global industrial processes. Simultaneously, toxic tours function to make connections between diverse communities: visitors see how their lifestyles and consumption patterns impact the local communities that bear a disproportionate environmental cost of these patterns. In this way, Di Chiro argues, political strategies like toxic tourism create a "globalized sense of place," which allows visitors and residents alike to see how their communities are tied together, and makes it possible for them to forge "contentious coalitions" to advocate for change.³⁴

This alternative vision of a common future is also present in the way some environmental justice groups have approached the discourse of climate change. The California Environmental Justice Movement, for example, shocked the broader environmental movement by releasing a declaration in February 2008 in opposition to cap-and-trade proposals to regulate carbon emissions. In their declaration, the group argued that these solutions to climate change, like the Kyoto Protocol, erase differential responsibility for and impacts of pollution. These solutions entrench a business-as-usual approach to reducing emissions by maintaining reliance on fossil fuels while allowing corporations to pay to pollute. As the California Environmental Justice movement points out, people of colour bear the burden of this particular brand of

³³ Giovanna Di Chiro, "Beyond Ecoliberal 'Common Futures': Environmental Justice, Toxic Touring, and a Transcommunal Politics of Place," in *Race, Nature, and the Politics of Difference*, ed. Donald S. Moore, Jake Kosek and Anand Pandian (Durham and London: Duke U Press), 204–32.

³⁴ Di Chiro, 228–29.

energy production, from extraction to waste disposal.³⁵ They propose that to address the issue of climate change adequately, we must restructure the economy so that environmental and social justice are linked. They assert that “capturing energy from the wind, sun, ocean, and heat stored within the Earth’s crust builds the health and self-reliance of people and our communities, protects the planet, creates jobs, and expands the global economy.”³⁶ In this way, the California Environmental Justice Movement calls for a more radical and sustained engagement with the problems associated with fossil-fuel dependence and climate change, one that pays attention to the differential impacts of climate change on people and places.

Similarly, indigenous groups in both the United States and Canada have highlighted what they call the “CO₂lonialism” inherent in mainstream global solutions to climate change. *The Indigenous People’s Guide: False Solutions to Climate Change* shows how current approaches to mitigating climate change serve to support the dispossession of indigenous peoples in a “new land grab.”³⁷ They cite, for instance, the example of the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. This is a program through which countries in the global north can invest in offsetting their emissions by supporting projects in the global south like tree farms, which act as carbon sinks. Drawing on cases in Panama and Colombia, among others, *The Indigenous People’s Guide* shows that Native peoples have been further dispossessed by this mechanism, as the people who live in these carbon sinks are relocated.³⁸ Indigenous groups also stand in opposition to carbon trading, “clean coal,” and geo-engineering, which they, like the California Environmental Justice Movement, suggest serve only to reinforce ways of thinking that degrade the environment, indigenous peoples and people of colour, thus reproducing the colonial thinking that dispossessed Aboriginal peoples during European colonialism. Indigenous groups propose instead the phasing out of fossil fuel-based energy, the promotion of indigenous peoples’ sovereignty, and the transition to “to sustainable models of production, consumption and development.”³⁹ The resistance of these groups reveals how we need to

³⁵ California Environmental Justice Movement, “The California Environmental Justice Movement’s Declaration Against the Use of Carbon Trading Schemes to Address Climate Change,” <http://www.ejmmatters.org/declaration.html>.

³⁶ The California Environmental Justice Movement’s Declaration.

³⁷ Indigenous Environmental Network, *The Indigenous Peoples’ Guide: False Solutions to Climate Change*, http://www.earthpeoples.org/CLIMATE_CHANGE/Indigenous_Peoples_Guide-E.pdf.

³⁸ *The Indigenous Peoples’ Guide*.

³⁹ *The Indigenous Peoples’ Guide*.

“look both ways” when we tackle global environmental problems like climate change, always considering how global issues are also local issues, and how environmental issues are also justice issues.

We have journeyed a distance from Canada and the environment in this paper. But we think that in foregrounding the ways that national identity has been made through particular ideas about wilderness and specific forms of dispossession, we have engaged in the kind of “groundtruthing” that this special issue of *The Dalhousie Review* suggests. We hope that the distance we have covered brings us home to a new place, to a place that recognizes the power dynamics embedded in knowing national natures, and to a place from which we can imagine other kinds of interactions with one another and with the changing climate we share, albeit unequally. Perhaps it is time to take the cue from environmental justice activists and indigenous peoples who understand the land as part of the local and the global at the same time, and who call for us to remember our history as we approach the future.