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**General Sir William Fenwick Williams, the American Civil War and the Defence of Canada, 1859-65:** Observations on his Military Correspondence to the Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards.

## I

The purpose of this paper is to give some account of the performance of Sir William Fenwick Williams as General Officer Commanding the Forces in British North America in the crucial decade dominated by the French war scare, the American Civil War and Canadian Confederation. It is based largely upon William's unpublished *military* correspondence with the Duke of Cambridge, supplemented where necessary with references to other private papers, yet withal set firmly in the context exactly laid down by Professor Charles Stacey and more recently amplified by Kenneth Bourne.<sup>1</sup> The central direction and control of defence administration in peace and war is a complex political, institutional as well as personal business; and that was no less true of the mid-Victorian decade before Confederation which lastingly transfigured the balance of military power in North America than it is of the post-Second World War era of nuclear deterrence. The problems afflicting Williams's command in Canada, insofar as he deals candidly with them in his correspondence, were many and varied, technical as well as political. The dominating event of the decade was the vast and ungovernable war of American national unity and consolidation being fought below and along the vulnerable Canadian border with all the tools and weapons of the Industrial Revolution, and this raised contingent difficulties in defence preparation of a wholly unprecedented and potentially significant kind. Part of this paper will be concerned with telling what those difficulties were and the manner in which Williams met them. Briefly they included such things as the degree of political control or intervention permissible in military operations; the structure of command relationships as between Montreal and Halifax; the training,

armament and discipline of the Canadian Militia: the extent to which shipwreck, murder, crimping and desertion impaired the efficiency and morale of the British regulars; French Canadian loyalty, the vulnerability of the Maritime provincial seaboard and the defence compact of the combined British North American colonies; military intelligence and strategic planning for defence against invasion; American generals and generalship; the political and economic condition of the Union as that might affect British policies in Canada. All these were problems, it must be remembered, arising out of or intensified by a state not of actual but of apprehended war, and therefore Williams's stewardship must be measured not in terms of grand strategic designs or intentions but in terms of local decisions, acts and capabilities calculated not strictly to prepare for war but to avert it. Thus I have attempted only to describe what Williams did — or perhaps more accurately what he said he did — and why he did it, leaving it to historians bolder than myself to establish finally the quality of Williams's war preparedness and the efficacy of his strategic planning.

## II

It will be necessary at the outset to establish briefly the individual professional backgrounds of and relations between the Duke of Cambridge and his local commander in North America because this above all determined the nature of the correspondence upon which the paper is based and the kind of issues with which it deals. Turn firstly to Williams. In his biographical sketch in the *Dictionary of National Biography*,<sup>2</sup> Colonel R.H. Vetch claimed that Williams, born at Annapolis Royal in Nova Scotia on 4 December 1800, was the second son of Commissary General Thomas Williams. But Vetch, being a loyal and official historian of the Royal Engineers and Artillery to which Corps Williams belonged, was capable of pardonable blunders of discretion. For throughout British military society and indeed in the corridors and kitchens of the Royal household it was widely rumoured and believed that Williams was the bastard son of the Duke of Kent: rumours which Williams himself, basking in this perverse association, took no particular pains to discredit or stamp out.<sup>3</sup> It is in this respect only that the question of Williams's legitimacy is relevant to our purposes. That Williams was a Nova Scotian of noble blood would be important to the legend of his fathering Maritime Confederation. In 1815, he graduated

from Woolwich — the oldest of Britain's military academies — but in the retrenchment and demobilisation following the Napoleonic Wars and in the general aversion to all institutionalised military power he could not obtain a commission for ten years. Nevertheless, despite this late start, by 1855 he had risen to the rank of Major-General, and he had spent these forty years, like most technical officers debarred from high command, in lucrative 'colonial' or 'political' service in Gibraltar, Ceylon and finally Turkey where between 1841 and 1848 in the tradition of Lintorn Simmons, Chinese Gordon, Collingwood Dickson and Charles Wilson before and after him he was employed as British Commissioner for the Delimitation of the Turco-Persian frontier — a point vital and integral to the security of the Mediterranean corridor to India. In 1854, on the outbreak of the Crimean War, Williams was appointed Her Britannic Majesty's Commissioner to the Turkish Armies in America — a kind of hybrid liaison officer and military attache whom Britain had traditionally employed since the Napoleonic Wars to keep in touch with allied military headquarters whenever she found herself in the field. With the rapid collapse of Turkish power in Armenia, Williams found himself overnight effective Commander-in-Chief of the ramshackle Turkish Army, and catastrophe thrust upon him the celebrated defence of Kars for which his stubborn, industrious and implacable qualities were admirably suited. In what can only be described as the dark ages of British generalship redeemed only by Indian practical skill and the promise of some official renaissance in MacDougall, Wolseley and the Staff College, Kars came to be invested with an immense, but unwarranted, symbolic importance, comparable to that of Corunna and Dunkirk in other wars. Hence like Wyndam and Massey who on the basis of exceptional personal bravery alone were considered for the chief command in the Crimea,<sup>4</sup> Williams was greeted by a public whom the war correspondents had convinced would never see another Chatham, Nelson or Wellington as a great national hero,<sup>5</sup> the idol of a forlorn, bulldog and vainglorious defence which so well accorded with foreign conceptions of British military prowess and generalship. Williams was created a baronet, and for his trouble received the gratitude of Parliament, the Freedom of the City, an honorary degree from Oxford, a sword of honour from the Nova Scotia Legislature and a life pension of £5,000 per annum. But in all this atavistic magnanimity it was forgotten — and continued to be forgotten except by the critical military press — that Kars had ultimately capitulated, and that

Williams had been led off by his Russian captors under conditions similar to those wherein some fifty years later Townsend deserted his Army at Kut.

For the next three years, from 1856 to 1859, Williams was General Commanding at Woolwich and — by the idiosyncracies of Victorian military politics — also Member of Parliament for Calne, where his fame no doubt did much to inspire the cadets and improve the tone of debate on defence matters in the House — matters which in the post-Crimean aftermath were assuming a revolutionary importance second only to that of the reconstitution and amalgamation of the Armies in India. In 1859, amidst growing difficulties with France despite their paper collaboration in their war against China, Williams was selected for the unusual post of General Officer Commanding the Forces in British North America. It was a decision which, as Williams well knew, broke the convention whereby technical officers were precluded from the chief colonial commands, excepting always that of key maritime fortresses such as Gibraltar and Malta which could be considered integral to the strategic defence of the home waters. It was a decision which reflected the contemporary ascendancy of the technical officer, both British and foreign, in the conduct of siege and defensive warfare, the impact of industry and technology upon war and the shortage of qualified line officers which it was the purpose of the new Staff College to redress. But it was a decision which rapidly became enforced practice, as the appointments of Napier, Roberts and Kitchener — all of whom were gunners or sappers — subsequently illustrated. Between 1859 and 1865, the French war scare, the naval threat in the North Atlantic, the possibility of Fenian or French Canadian risings — indeed the likelihood of war with France, the Northern States or, if some Fenians and French Canadians had their way, against all combined — seemed calculated to thrust upon him once again the glory and distinction of organising and inspiring the Canadian militia (which if one were to believe some accounts was not much better off than the Turkish) to save the British Empire in North America from pernicious republican influences, with a last-ditch stand at Montreal. To the last day of the Civil War, therefore, Williams believed in — and indeed prayed for — a Southern victory. All he could oppose in the alternative was a bluff courage and the enfeebled defence scheme of a precarious inter-provincial compact.

## III

Like Williams, the Duke of Cambridge had come to greatness, or at least high office, by accident. It too had been thrust upon him, and the consequences of that accident were to last almost forty years, the longest period in the history of the British Army that the office of Commander-in-Chief had been held by a single man, and probably the least competent one at that. A few words at this point about the historical character and contemporary function of the Commandership-in-Chief might be useful. Throughout the eighteenth century, except during brief emergencies, there had been no permanent Commander-in-Chief, the Hanoverian kings assuming unto themselves the role and title in deference to and in defence of their Continental interests and ambitions. With the outbreak of war with France in 1793 — the Great War as it was called — a permanent Commander-in-Chief was appointed, to which a jealous and predatory Parliament replied by politicising the Secretary-at-War who would not be of Cabinet rank, be fully accountable to the Commons, and be served by his tried and powerful bureaucracy. Both measures, good at least for the duration, reflected the exhaustive demands of the war upon British society. But in 1806, largely to meet the need to mount joint expeditions to seize every colonial source of raw material and strategic refuge by which the Continental Decrees and Napoleon's campaign in Russia might be enfeebled and checked, the Ministries of War and Colonies were combined, and in the post-war period of domestic reconstruction and imperial consolidation colonial and economic rather than strategic interests came to dominate the making of national military policy. So long as Wellington lived, in whatever capacity, there could be no other Commander-in-Chief powerful and independent enough to keep the Army abreast of social and political reform. With his death in 1852, however, and the outbreak of a European war two years later, the offices were again separated, re-establishing the War Minister as the fifth and independent Secretary of State. The practical advantages of separation were not at once felt. Ill-defined powers of limits of authority, transient Ministers too stupid to move or too ambitious to stay, the inertia of the old War Office: all seemed to show that the new Office was no more than a glorified Secretary-at-War with less exacting powers to command or control.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, it was a position to which the Crown — in a significant

commentary upon the waning of its influence — retaliated by manipulating the appointment of the Duke of Cambridge, as cousin of the Queen, to be Commander-in-Chief. The circumstances are revealing. In 1848, fearing that upon his approaching death the command and discipline of the Army might fall into the hands of a radical Parliament by their refusing to re-appoint a Commander-in-Chief or by making him in all respects subordinate to the elected War Minister, as had been recommended by the Howicke Commission merely ten years before, the Duke of Wellington had suggested that Prince Albert become Commander-in-Chief, thereby embodying the ancient military prerogatives of the Crown and preventing the Army from becoming the mere toy and tool of a dangerously enfranchised Commons.<sup>7</sup> For various reasons — not least of which was the unthinkability of the Prince Consort in accordance with the will of Parliament leading armies to put down his subjects in industrial revolt — Prince Albert declined, and in 1852, Wellington's fears unrealised by his death, Lord Hardinge succeeded to the chief command and the anxieties of a fresh and distant Balkan war. Four years later, in 1856, like the field commanders Raglan, Codrington and Simpson who had each in his own way succumbed beneath the demands of wartime administration, he collapsed and died of a heart attack.<sup>8</sup> As it happened, the Duke of Cambridge was home in England on leave from the Crimea, where he had broken under fire and was now seeking to retrieve his honour by volunteering for employment as Commander of the German Legion or as British military representative to the Anglo-French Supreme War Councils held alternately at Windsor and Versailles periodically to review and formulate the advanced strategy of the allied armies.<sup>9</sup> But from the point of view of the Crown, the real and unsuppressible issues of the day were not those of war and peace — as urgent and as complicated as those were — but of military reforms: reforms which had the effect of strengthening political control and diminishing costs while abridging the military prerogatives of the Crown without significantly improving the tactical efficiency of the Army. In the Staff College, the Intelligence Department and the Royal United Services Institution, an exacting but radical professionalism was emerging in response to the war journalism, which linked Parliament in a new and sinister relationship with the Army, which put military power ahead of social justice and which regarded armed force as the sole final arbiter of international or imperial politics. There can be little doubt from the evidence

available that both Queen Victoria and Prince Albert conceived of the appointment of the Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief as the cloak and conduit through which they would maintain personal control over the affairs of the Army and therefore over the broad direction of military policy and reconstruction.<sup>10</sup> It was the misfortune of the country and the Army that the Prince Consort, a most able critic, should have died shortly after and that the Queen should have imposed upon herself a protracted funereal withdrawal from public affairs: for it left the health and welfare of the Army for the next forty years almost entirely in the hands of one who was originally regarded as a useful puppet. So long as the Prince lived therefore, as the brains behind the office, the Duke proved a dutiful, conscientious and harmless Chief. Lord Clarendon told Greville, the diarist and Clerk of the Privy Council, that Cambridge had performed well before the Cabinet, displaying sense and discretion and a detailed knowledge of his duties.<sup>11</sup> It was this, rather than any bold and broad grasp of strategy or of the role of force in modern politics, which combined with the Queen's egregious and heavily italicised interventions, that characterised the Commandership-in-Chief and the general tenor of military politics for the remainder of the reign. Successive Prime Ministers consistently refused to concede him a seat in Cabinet or to advance knowledge which he might use to obstruct reforms or embarrass policies abroad. With his overseas commanders, therefore, Cambridge developed and maintained a vast correspondence — for only by mastering the minutest detail of army administration, the complexities of patronage and the drift of morale could he hope to preserve from the grasping fingers of reformers and politicians what was generally regarded as the last and most important proprietary interest of the Crown. So long as the Queen and the Duke lived that interest, for good or ill, would survive intact. The relationship between Williams and Cambridge was therefore implicit in the circumstances which had brought each of them to power. Williams was a much lionised General who had conducted a stubborn and skilful defence with poor materials against a powerful European adversary, and had capitulated without disgrace. Cambridge, on the other hand, had displayed something less than bravery, but a surprising twist of fate had thrust upon him the Commandership-in-Chief: an office once occupied only by the illustrious and battle-trying — Marlborough, Ligonier, York and Wellington. Williams's letters therefore were at once officious and obsequious, lack-

ing the smooth modernity of Hastings Doyle, the strategic perception of John Michel or the crisp irreverence of Garnet Wolseley: yet withal giving the impression of one who was doing his plucky best against hopeless odds.

IV: 1859-1861.

To Williams, as indeed to the British high command which had posted him to Canada in 1859, the French war scare and the naval and coastal defence of the Maritime Provinces of North America constituted his most immediate and pressing concern. Before embarking at Liverpool he had submitted to Cambridge a memorandum requesting an extra staff-officer who would look into and organise the militias of the various seaboard provinces.<sup>12</sup> Within three months of his arrival at Halifax on 1 June he had inspected the defences of St. John's, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island. His views are contained in four letters, the first dated 15 June 1859. In summary, he deplored the perverse policy of the withdrawal of the garrisons, the rundown condition of the defences of the principal harbours, arsenals and naval coaling stations (Halifax he described as "this magnificent harbour . . . the key of all England's Maritime Power in North America") and the tendency to disregard the natural military ardour and loyalty of the manpower of the Maritime colonies, especially when French Canadians, manipulated by their priests and consuls, were openly flaunting the *Tricolore* and when French warships were taking secret soundings of the most likely landing places for amphibious assaults. Openly and summarily to attempt to crush French Napoleonism in Canada would be premature and unwise: for that would simply drive it underground where it could not be watched and controlled; it would embitter and alienate the neutral or uncommitted and harden the potential core of armed insurrection. All that need be done in the circumstances was to keep a steady finger on the pulse of French-Canadian feeling and quietly to improve the military dispositions for defence in such a way as to ensure that any French overseas invasion of Canada would be effectively met and blunted until the decisive arrival of British reinforcements.

His specific recommendations were fourfold. Firstly, to multiply the precedent of the Royal Canadian Rifles — the raising of British regiments in Canada for Canadian purposes — into an extended system of military self-sufficiency. Secondly, to encourage the spread of the Volunteer Movement which in England had been greeted, as had the Crimean War five years before, with an astonishing popularity. Thirdly, to stiffen the Regular force — the cutting edge — of British Infantry and



Royal Artillery throughout Canada. Finally, to discredit and discourage any idea of an interprovincial compact for defence purposes and to promote instead, as in India, the separate and independent provincial military traditions, loyalties and obligations. Taken together, these were the only sure means of convincing Canadians that Confederation was at once a pipedream, a scapegoat and a pretext through which Britain could dismiss her responsibilities for the defence of North America, of creating a focal point for loyal resistance to the spread of American Republicanism and French Napoleonism and of overawing both French Canada and the United States. In any war with France or America or both combined Williams reckoned that the French Canadian and Irish Catholic communities were potential fifth columnists and therefore should not be incorporated into any wider scheme for political union where their power for sabotage would be that much greater and more direct. But that was not for him to decide, and for the next twelve months he turned to the question of the condition and control of the great Imperial fortresses at Kingston, Montreal, Quebec, Halifax and St. John's in which lay the security of the British Empire in North America; and he took advantage of the visits of the Prince of Wales and the Prince de Joinville to discuss the matter at length with the Duke of Newcastle. At no time, however, did he advert in his correspondence to the struggle emerging south of the border, or to the implications of that struggle for Canadian unity and security.<sup>13</sup>

#### V: 1861-1862

The outbreak of the American Civil War and the possibility of its spilling over into Canada made Williams's problem of defence more grave, more immediate and more expensive than that posed by a French war had ever been. His appreciation of the situation — an appreciation which he singularly refused to modify or abandon throughout the ups and downs of the Civil War — is contained in the first of a series of weekly letters he now began to compose to the Duke of Cambridge. Secession he believed once accomplished to be irrevocable — a step which would drive the Northern States to seek compensation in Upper Canada where they would not be altogether unwelcome.<sup>14</sup> Insistently Williams implored the British Government to reinforce the garrisons in North America, to strengthen the Fleet in American waters and to incorporate Bermuda into the North American command. The attempt by

Seward and the Governor of Massachusetts to coerce the Governor General, Sir Edmund Head, into seizing a Southern steamer bound for operations against Northern shipping on the Great Lakes, by threatening to blow up the Canals at Beauharnois and Cornwall, illustrated in Williams's opinion the "impudence and arrogance" of the Northern States and their determination to go to any lengths and use any pretext to seek in Canada "a balance for lost theatres of ambition." Only powerful military reinforcements and a dogged refusal to be cowed by the 150,000 mercenaries drilling in the adjoining States would provide a timely deterrent to Northern jingoism and aggrandisement.<sup>15</sup>

There can be little doubt — if one can go entirely by this correspondence — that Williams did everything within his power to live up to the reputation he had won at Kars. His letters are full of ominous but not pessimistic accounts of the Anglophobia of the Northern press — but this is more than offset, in his opinion, by the inevitability of Northern bankruptcy in a war which the South would deliberately prolong, by the inability of the Northern 'political' generals to manoeuvre, feed and fight massive and ramshackle volunteer armies, by the infectious demoralisation brought on by sudden and unexpected defeat and by the imminent split between the Western and New England components of the Union. But "one thing is certain," he declared time and time again, "our danger begins when their war ends, and 100,000 men are adrift . . . ." Like Wolseley, who some years later was asked to write a history of the American Civil War, he believed that "one or two Battalions & a handful of Artillery" would be enough "to deter the evil-minded from attempts upon these bright regions of the Crown." Nevertheless, he took every precaution possible to set in order the defences of Welland, Montreal, Kingston, and London. The American Civil War, he wrote, was England's opportunity, the most providential blessing of the nineteenth century and the logical outcome of the War of the Rebellion less than a hundred years before. It would break the back of "the American Giant" and forever discredit republicanism. British *political* intervention was therefore necessary to a negotiated peace before the war drifted into protracted and murderous guerrilla warfare waged and perpetuated on both sides by armies in the grip of mercenary Irish or Prussians and before French or Fenian fifth columnists went to work in Quebec.<sup>16</sup>

The Trent Crisis of November 1861 destroyed all chances of intervention of this kind, even had it been contemplated. Instead, it raised contingencies of *armed* intervention of quite appalling proportions; and

it led Williams to intensify rather than relax his military precautions. He refused to leave his post. Camps of musketry were formed, guns mounted before Hamilton and Toronto and along the Niagara Peninsula; printing houses, lunatic asylums and church halls were conscripted for the reception and housing of British reinforcements; canals were fortified against seizure or blockade "by armed bands and malignant partisans," and loyal regiments dispersed throughout Quebec, New Brunswick and Newfoundland to check incipient insurrection. If Britain went to war, he urged a strategy of naval blockade and the rejection of all advice and inclination, however tempting, to land and push expeditionary forces into the American interior, where they could only incur the fate of Braddock, Cornwallis and even the present crop of Northern generals confronted as they were by skilful and stubborn adversaries operating in broken country of their own choosing and sustained by the support of a sympathetic population. Such wars invariably led to Caesarism of the worst kind — unscrupulous Generals wielding private armies of undisciplined foreign mercenaries — and the result could only be anarchy. The implications for Anglo-American relations of marauding bands of ungovernable mercenaries were unthinkable.<sup>17</sup>

#### VI: 1862-1863.

But the Trent Crisis posed several problems which were at once urgent yet susceptible of immediate practical solution. Who, in the first place, would command a British Army in North America should war eventuate? What strategic policy would determine its objectives and govern its deployment? What kind of politico-military machinery would be set up to formulate and regulate that policy and to effect the reciprocal transmission of information and orders? What would be its composition and mandate, and to whom would it be finally accountable? Secondly, what information did the British High Command in Canada have about the military strengths and intentions — the resources, topography and leadership — of potential adversaries and what were the means, official and otherwise, of getting it? Finally, what would be the attitudes of the various provincial governments to the question of defence expenditure? Let us deal with these in order.

To the young and opportunist officers who reinforced the Canadian garrisons after the Trent Crisis and who presumably would hold subordinate field and staff commands in any expeditionary army that might

be assembled — men such as Henry Ponsonby, Mackenzie, Wolseley and Fremantle — the first and crucial question was who would hold the chief command.<sup>18</sup> Most had had wide and recent experience in Eastern wars — Burma, the Crimea, India and China — in static or irregular counter-guerilla operations which they felt they were not professionally fitted, either by tradition, training or temperament, to conduct. They constituted the new radical component which was to electrify British military society for the next fifty years, and as such they welcomed what promised to be a more orthodox Continental war in the grand tradition in which they might carve swift and imperishable reputations. Moreover, they had reached that point in the hierarchy of military society where patronage and not promotion could help them. Who would command — whether British or Indian, whether technical or combat arm — was important to them because it would precisely determine the speed of their promotion and the nature of their employment, if indeed they found themselves employed at all. None had much regard for Williams and could not imagine in the event of hostilities, when Canada would be the closest and most vulnerable object of attack, that the Government would allow him to retain the chief command. “No one knows who is to have the command,” Wolseley wrote to Biddulph on 10 December 1861, “but almost all are agreed in thinking that Williams is certainly to be superceded.”<sup>19</sup> For the past six years the British Army — dangerously overdrawn — had been almost continuously at war in the East and in the Pacific, but it had been the Indian Generals, the saviours of the Crimea and India, who had attained an unassailable pre-eminence in the high command of the Empire, and it was upon them that most of the speculation centred. Wolseley, for instance, felt that if large reinforcements were contemplated then Lord Clyde would be sent to command them, with Mansfield as his Chief of Staff and likely successor. That had been a combination which had proven highly efficient and adaptable in the Crimea, in the Mutiny and in China, and Mansfield’s later career as Commander-in-Chief both in India and in Ireland, in which he had given much thought to the Continental practice of appointing soldiers as Ministers of War, suggests that he might have been an inspired choice. But Cambridge had other ideas. On 7 December 1861 in a letter whose chief point was the revival of the War Committee of the Cabinet which since its inception during the Crimea six years before had exercised a fitting and general strategic supervision over all other wars and crises, Cambridge had reminded Sir George

Cornwall Lewis of the need to send their best and most practised officers to Canada and these because of recent wars would necessarily have to be drawn from the East.<sup>20</sup> He suggested that Sir Richard Airey, who had had considerable if unhappy experience of Canada before the Crimean War had compromised a reputation for administrative toughness, might supersede Williams, or if he could not be spared as Quarter Master General, then Clyde or Wetherall, Williams being sent to Nova Scotia or New Brunswick. Lewis replied that discussion of possible commanders might no doubt be made the occasion for convening a meeting of the dormant War Committee, but he "did not think it necessary to relieve Williams until war breaks out or is absolutely certain."<sup>21</sup> There the matter rested; a reflection no doubt of the Cabinet's decision *not* to intervene and to go to arbitration; of the poverty of robust and reliable senior generals in the British Army (of which the Prince Consort habitually complained);<sup>22</sup> and of their fears that a change of command in the midst of crisis would be untimely and might be construed both at home and abroad as needlessly provocative and unsettling. There is no doubt that in political circles Williams was regarded as something of a 'blimp', and when it was suggested in 1870 that Williams be recalled temporarily to succeed General Sir Charles Wyndam — the incumbent General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, who had died in harness — and supervise the general conduct of the Red River Expedition, the Government threw up its hands in horror. Williams's reputation as the hero of Kars, Granville told Cardwell, had been the work of "a regular conspiracy," engineered for purposes of his own by Sandwith, who had "convinced Palmerston" that Williams "was the heaven-born genius who ought to command in the Crimea." Yet later, when there was the chance of war with America, Sandwith "had spontaneously and confidentially advised Newcastle to get rid of him from Canada as he was utterly incompetent." Moreover, Granville had heard that Williams had been "considered a nincompoop at Woolwich."<sup>23</sup> But Cardwell needed no reminding. Williams was competent enough "for military command in time of peace" and had been "useful in carrying Confederation" in Nova Scotia, but he would "not select him for a post of great difficulty or requiring great power of discretion."<sup>24</sup> Events made the question of Williams's retention or supersession academic. For him, as for all those ambitious British colonels who were hungry for professional distinction, the American Civil War did not degenerate into the great hemispheric war they prayed that it might, and for the next four

years, as the chances of intervention receded, he was left to grapple with the more prosaic problems of morale and indiscipline and desertion which afflict all armies which suddenly find that they have nothing to do.

The hostile interposition of the Northern States made it virtually impossible for Williams to acquire accurate and regular information about the military resources and dispositions of Britain's potential ally in the South. As early as June 1861, therefore, Williams began to encourage British officers, unofficially and on leave, to reconnoitre both Southern and Northern Armies and the ground over which any cooperating British Army would be likely to manoeuvre. The first of these was Colonel James Conolly, a peripatetic observer who had served as British Military Commissioner to the Sardinian Army in 1859 and who as British military attache during the Franco-Prussian War would send back detailed secret studies of the Belgian frontier fortifications and the ramshackle quality of the French high command and military administration. It was Conolly who sent back the first professional reports of Northern military preparations and the Anglophobia which motivated them.<sup>25</sup> Throughout the course of the crisis almost every senior British officer serving in Canada including Doyle, Lysons, Wetherall, Ponsonby and Paulet visited the theatre of operations at least once. Wolseley, in his own account in *Blackwood's* and indeed in his private correspondence, gives the impression that these visits, by their nature secret and furtive, were something exceptional.<sup>26</sup> Williams's correspondence suggests that they were not: but were rather an instinctive if casually arranged means of acquiring information vital to the conduct, or the deterrence, of operations. Moreover, the War Office sent over numerous official missions to investigate on the spot technical developments in fortification, gunnery, surgery and signalling. What became of all these reports, official and private, and what impact their observations and conclusions had upon the immediate and long-term organisation and doctrine of the British Army, it would be out of place here to discuss and has already been treated adequately by other historians.<sup>27</sup> So far as Williams himself was concerned, acting in the interests of the British high command, he seemed more prone to trust the reports of his own aides such as Grant and DeWinton than those of professional adventurers or buccaneers such as Wolseley or the more exhaustive technical studies officially commissioned by the War Office. Yet nothing he could learn could alter the broad and basic geographical and demographic

conditions of the posture — if not the strategy — of defence and deterrence he would be compelled to adopt once the American armies turned their attention northward. Moreover, it is a paradox that the British intelligence drive was strongest between 1861 and 1863 when the South, at least in British eyes, seemed certain to win and British intervention therefore seemed superfluous; and weakest after 1863 when the military ascendancy of the North made American aggrandisement possible and almost inevitable but British intervention unthinkable. To a man, British officers were sympathetic to the Southern cause, and this, especially true of Williams, tended to colour their assessments of the eventual outcome.<sup>29</sup> Yet at no time it seems did Williams consciously give material aid to Southern refugees hoping to raise an emigre army in Canada. Nor did he give serious thought, as Wolseley wished he would have done, to the idea of sending officers to turn the Mexican war to strategic advantage in the American rear.

#### VII: 1863-1865.

With the arrival of the British reinforcements and the broadening flow of intelligence, Williams had begun agitating as early as January 1862 for a realistic and "thoroughly official" Militia Bill, comprehensive and precautionary yet with sufficient bite in it to convince Exeter Hall, Goldwin Smith and the Little Englanders — as well as the Northern States — that Canadians were determined to spare no expense or effort or imagination in their defence of the realm.<sup>30</sup> He had written privately to both Macdonald and Cartier "the Ministers of the Day," underlining the stark state and consequences of unpreparedness and had commissioned Colonel Gordon to put on public record a full and official report.<sup>31</sup> On 27 March, 1862, therefore, he could report to Cambridge that the Militia Bill drafted by Lysons had been accepted intact by the Government; that Lysons was in Washington pending its debate and passage; and that Lord Monk and even D'Arcy McGee were confident that it would and should become the law of the land.<sup>32</sup> But on 23 May the Bill was rejected and its architect, Colonel Lysons, recalled to England — a double blow which Williams, like most British officers in Canada, ascribed to French-Canadian malice and intrigue.<sup>33</sup>

By now, Her Majesty's Government were placing a decidedly restraining hand upon costly defence preparations and were quietly recalling their principal staff-officers — Mackenzie, Lysons, Ponsonby and

Russell for instance — for bigger work on the Continent, and suggesting that the detached garrisons at Toronto, Hamilton and London be withdrawn from the West and be concentrated at Montreal and Quebec. Inevitably a reaction set in. Williams's emissaries at McClellan's headquarters continued to send back operational reports — reports now the more valuable since Russell and other war correspondents had been banished from the Northern Armies<sup>34</sup> — and the gist of these, embellished with his own predictions of impending bankruptcy, anarchy and defeat, he faithfully passed on to the Duke of Cambridge and to the Cabinet. But increasingly his time was taken up, if the correspondence is any guide, with the problems of a forgotten and deserted army: with drunkenness, brawls and shipwrecks; with communal feuding and murder between Irish Catholics and Orangemen;<sup>35</sup> and with the prevalence of crimping by Northern agents in search of trained soldiers to stiffen their own diseased and broken ranks, which conscription had signally failed to fill.<sup>36</sup> The ennui and insouciance which gripped the officer corps of medal-hunters might momentarily be diverted but it could not be substantially and permanently arrested by amateur theatricals, balls and hunting expeditions. The best and most disappointed officers — those who saw no instant profit in a policy of watch and ward — looked anxiously for service elsewhere, in China, India, Burma and Australasia, and kept a keen eye cocked for promising European developments. Many deserted, shamelessly pleading Parliamentary duties, private business or even marriage.

Despite all this, Williams never descended to apologetics. He refused to be cowed by indiscipline and defection, maintaining that in the event of invasion, despite Parliament's foot-dragging, Canadians would rise to a man. And he continued breezily to offer platitudinous and impracticable advice to the Confederates on how best to smash McClellan's and Pope's armies and occupy Washington. But he had given up all hope of the Militia Bill and with it the pretence that intervention had been a feasible policy. As winter approached his letters become shorter and less frequent, though always dwelling upon "the utter impossibility of the reconstruction of the Union." In that event, the permanent disunity of America, the defence of Canada by Great Britain would no longer be pressing or even necessary and Her Majesty's Government might as well withdraw all its garrisons from North America, excepting those at Kingston and Quebec.<sup>37</sup>



Indifferent and wishful reasoning of this kind had almost certainly spelled the dissolution of the Provincial Assembly in May of 1863. Preparation and training of a thoroughly specious kind — rifle tournaments, volunteer reviews and schools of instruction — might have some value in arresting the spiral of desertion and indiscipline. But Williams refused to admit, however grudgingly, that Grant's and Burnside's victories at Chattanooga, marginal though they had been, marked the beginning of the end for the Confederacy. Nor could he imagine that the presence of the Russian fleet off Maine was intended to help the Union cause, or implied some defensive alliance or understanding directed against Britain.<sup>38</sup> It had been drawn from the Baltic, he wrote, in anticipation of a war with France; in terms of real naval power it was "utterly insignificant," capable only of sinking Chinese and Japanese junks for which it probably had been designed. Moreover, there were plots to overthrow Lincoln's Administration, the Slavery Manifesto had been exposed as the sham it was, the West was disintegrating, Charleston had not capitulated, Lee was still at large, and the decisive battles were still to come. Altogether, as the calendar turned to 1864, Williams expected a good year.

Desertions had dwindled, a more congenial war had broken out in Europe, and with the American union dismantled forever, Williams could give his blessing — where before he could not — to the idea of Confederation. American political dissolution, not its combined military power, was in his mind the incentive and argument for federation, for in this context it was less likely to lead to secession or independence. In the South, Grant had been "utterly out-generalled", while in Canada and the lower provinces confederation was gaining ground and absorbing ancient inter-colonial jealousies. The Quebec Conference, he told Cambridge, was "the turning point of a cluster of Colonies determined to stick to their old allegiance . . . a firm and lasting union with the Crown and Empire — a great result just at this period of American history." More gratifying still, Colonel W.F.D. Jervoise on his second mission to Canada had told him that the Canadian government had agreed to meet the cost of fortifying Quebec and Montreal and that the money would be raised by loan "prior to the Federal Compact" and would become part of the "Canadian Debt" with which she entered that compact.<sup>39</sup> On 14 October, Williams received word of his successor, and on the 31st with Jervoise attended the Inter-Colonial

Dejeuner where, prompted by the Premier, he disclosed fresh details of the Militia scheme. "I never in my life," he wrote Cambridge, "witnessed more perfect unanimity and loyalty than that displayed on the occasion . . . . This is the turning point in the history of British North America and," he added with a pardonable touch of exaggeration, "has been a dream of mine for several years." The reception of the Delegates both in Upper Canada and Montreal had been enthusiastic, the "most telling and important speech of this eventful month in Canada" coming from that "decided radical and annexationist," Mr. George Brown, who "gave a full and sympathetic account of the 'nature of the Confederacy', dwelt especially on *Defence*, and was listened to and received most enthusiastically." Not a Delegate, he wrote on 7 November, harboured a doubt as to "the realisation of this great project - that of the consolidation of these great provinces and the permanent retention (instead of separation) of 4 million people to the British Crown." He trusted that Cardwell and DeGrey would give serious thought to his memorandum on the defence of Canada which Jervoise would deliver to them. For, at last, he wrote, "the Canadians, Nova Scotians and New Brunswickers have come to their senses." They were disposed to grant "an efficient Militia Bill and money for defensive works" and therefore should not be discouraged by a "hard-driven bargain" about shared defence costs. "This is the sharp edge of the wedge," Williams cautioned, "and pray let it be driven carefully and gradually."<sup>40</sup>

As the last year of the war, and of Williams's command, opened, he maintained his perverse conviction, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, that the South could never be subjugated. Although Lincoln had been reconfirmed in office, the road to unconditional victory seemed by no means smooth. There were peace rumours afloat, French ambitions in Mexico were tipping the balance of power towards the South, the Slavery Act if not aborted by truculent slave owners would bring 20,000 negroes to the Confederate colours, Grant and Sherman had been fought to a standstill and Williams could not believe that the latter's march on Georgia could result in "anything but a shattered Army." But whatever form the final settlement might take, it would be sufficiently explosive to endanger, and might even be deliberately directed against, British interests in Canada. In such an event Williams confidently predicted that Canada would become one vast armed camp whose defence pivoted on Quebec "the true maritime base," enabling the General Commanding "to fight here and higher up the St.

Lawrence" while his treasure, supplies and archives were protected and replenished by the Fleet.<sup>41</sup>

But the process of Confederation — the key to a collective scheme of defence by which such a lumbering guerilla might be transformed into an insidious deterrent — had not gone unchecked and this could only be a matter of gratification to American military annexationists and political saboteurs. While the Canadian Parliament had passed the Inter-Colonial Bill three to one, voted without division an unprecedented million dollars "for the defence works at Montreal and Canada West," and planned to send their delegates almost immediately to England to consult with the Imperial authorities,<sup>42</sup> the new electorates in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had rejected all of these things on the grounds that they would become subordinate partners and have "common" — that is, local civilian rather than Imperial military — governors thrust upon them. Williams was plainly shocked and, conscious that as a native-born Canadian he might carry some weight, had written privately to the "leading men in both Provinces," pointing out to them "the dangers of delay in closing this political compact." Departing from strictly professional ethics, he encouraged Opposition leaders such as James Johnstone and John Hamilton Gray to agitate more fiercely for Confederation, even allowing them to publish his own letters of support.<sup>43</sup> The chief traitors in his eyes were the three Lieutenant Governors of the Maritime Provinces (MacDonall, Gordon and Dundas) who, fearing for their jobs and perquisites, were "dead against the Union." There can be no doubt that in seeking their removal and the return of the 'Confederate' opposition, Williams was clearly trespassing beyond bounds and exposing himself to fair charges that he was interfering in local politics at the very moment when the basic precondition for political union — i.e., the permanent fragmentation of the American states — no longer seemed plausible. By a paradoxical coincidence Lee's Army of Virginia surrendered to Grant, and Lincoln was assassinated while the Canadian delegates, sailing from New York, pressed on with the business of Confederation.<sup>44</sup> It was in these circumstances that Williams set out upon his farewell tour of inspection of the Maritimes to ginger up the Confederate opposition. He had long talks with the Lieutenant Governor and with Charles Tupper and came away convinced that, as the Provinces were coming slowly around, any thought of coercion through dissolution would be not only counter-productive but

positively harmful.<sup>45</sup> It was his last act as General Officer Commanding. On 5 June he gave up his commission to Sir John Michel and sailed for England, little knowing that within six months he would be returning as Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia.

#### VIII: 1865-1867.

He was a logical choice and it was one largely of his own making. As early as 1859, the strategic implications of Confederation had worried him; and that concern, both intensified by and fluctuating with the events of Civil War, had by 1865 amounted to an outright political obsession which it was impolitic as a professional soldier for him to display. As a bachelor, a Nova Scotian with two widowed sisters settled in New Brunswick, a Crimean War hero and commanding general in North America during the greatest political crisis since the Rebellion, Williams's governorship could not have been better calculated to repair the defection of the Maritime Provinces from the full political compact he believed indispensable to future Canadian security. Yet despite his legendary presence it took a fresh crisis and a direct threat of invasion to force the Maritime hand.

Williams arrived in Halifax after a rough passage against strong headwinds on 7 November 1865, and by the 24th he had left no doubt in anyone's mind as to the real purposes of his mission. "I shall do all in my power, sub rosa," he wrote to Cambridge shortly after landing, "to assist in carrying the desired measure of Confederation" with which he had been charged by Cardwell.<sup>46</sup> Like Wolseley's in Natal some ten years later, his assault upon the opponents of Confederation consisted of a mixture of intimidation, persuasion, sharp talk and social flattery. He kept in close touch with people who knew how to make good use of his letters. To keep the Irish element straight, he had several long and pointed talks with the Catholic Bishop. Anglin was squeezed out of the Cabinet and Smith was shelved as Chief Justice — "two dangerous men out of the way" commented Williams. Gordon, thoroughly cowed and converted, was now "working zealously" for the Confederate cause. Williams was even tempted to use his influence to nudge the Lunenburg elections "against the Anti-Confederates" to offset the effect of George Brown's "wayward resignation" from the Canadian Government.<sup>47</sup>

But such expedients, while they might harass and demoralise the Anti-Confederates, could not of themselves either singly or ac-

cumulatively bring about a decisive conversion of electoral opinion. It was the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty, the Newfoundland Fisheries Question, the *Alabama* negotiations but most important of all the fear and threat of militant Fenianism which in the aftermath of rather than during the Civil War itself made this conversion possible. As Williams predicted that it would, it was calculated to strengthen the Confederate hand, especially in New Brunswick, the most exposed of the Maritime Provinces to a combined or amphibious assault from the New England States. Sir John Michel, Williams's successor as G.O.C. at Montreal and the British Army's most practised soldier in counter-guerilla and small war operations, had immediately upon arrival in June taken a long cool look at the depressing question of the defence of a territorial entity which was at once invitingly vulnerable and without an efficient or rapid system of defensive intercommunication, either by land or water. The implementation of the recommendations of the Defence Commission of 1862 to "fortify and militia-ise the whole country" would be a good start, and he saw in Wolseley's brigaded camp of cadets the "nucleus of a Canadian Army." But the question as he saw it was as much Imperial and naval as it was Canadian and military. If Canada was not to be overrun in a single campaign, it would be necessary to construct a water link from the Ottawa River to Georgian Bay, financed by an Imperial guarantee, to bring the ironclad naval power of Britain directly to bear upon the great inland lakes to establish absolute command of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario and attempt parity on Lake Erie. As for the dangers of Fenianism, Michel was not alarmed. He had struck cordial relations with General Grant and felt confident that the American Armies would have better things to do than aid and abet immigrant rogues. While not under-rating their internal squabbles, the support which they might get from a cagey American Government seeking compensations elsewhere, their strength in arms and organisation and their capacity to strike suddenly and secretly at indiscriminate points of their own choosing along an unpatrollable frontier, Michel felt that the Fenians, however well organised, drilled and led, were incapable of sustained operations in bad weather without command of the railroads or the support of a sympathetic population. In these circumstances, nuisances though they might be, they could inflict no permanent or unacceptable damage upon Canada and could best be dealt with in a single, sharp, well-punished raid which Michel assumed would take place around Detroit, Windsor or Sarnia, or along the Niagara

Peninsula or the Upper St. Lawrence.<sup>48</sup>

Over the winter, nothing happened. But in March Williams's spies in Boston reported that they had overheard General Sweeney boasting that such raids against Upper Canada were to be the distractive prelude to the seizure of the Maritimes as the main Fenian base of operations: reports which were shortly confirmed by the British Ambassador in Washington. Williams's reaction was sweeping and immediate. He alerted the Provincial Militias, cabled Cardwell for 10,000 rifles, signalled the Fleet up from the West Indies and with Hastings Doyle set about putting in order the neglected defences of Halifax and St. John with the resources which the Legislature had placed unreservedly at his disposal. Plans were made to frustrate the naval seizure of McNab's Island by sinking block-ships in the Eastern Passage, and desultory cavalry raids against St. John by throwing out a screen of irregular light infantry and mounted rifles in the broken and impassable country separating Maine from New Brunswick.<sup>49</sup>

How far these measures were designed deliberately to overawe anti-Confederate sentiment by suggesting a frightening picture of imminent and inescapable invasion it is difficult to tell. Certainly Michel in Central Canada seems to have reacted in a decidedly less alarmist manner:<sup>50</sup> and while he deplored the absence of mounted and serviced rifled artillery pieces at Halifax, Montreal and St. John, urged the Government to give serious consideration to the improvisation of a small flotilla of gunboats which might patrol the upper St. Lawrence until the decisive arrival of the Royal Navy, and reminded Cambridge of the folly of sending out as reinforcements Irish regiments whose loyalty in such circumstances could not be guaranteed, he does not seem consciously to have manipulated or exploited the threat of invasion for domestic or political purposes. But whether contrived or not, Williams could only rejoice at the new-found mood of unity generated by the Fenian alarm, and on 26 April amidst a fresh scare which had sent Doyle to New Brunswick to arrange an anti-Fenian pact with General Meade, the local American commander, he reported to Cambridge that Confederation had been carried in both Houses by sweeping majorities, despite the traitorous obstructiveness of Joseph Howe, "the worst fellow who ever lived."<sup>51</sup> All that remained was for New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland to follow suit.

His mission was virtually over. With the arrest of Sweeney, the danger of Fenianism, chimerical to the end, evaporated forever. Confederation,

despite Howe and despite the advent of Disraeli's administration, could be taken for granted. Fresh wars seemed imminent in Europe and Africa, and Michel had resigned the Canadian Command on thin grounds of ill-health. At the Governor General's specific request he remained as Lieutenant Governor for two further months to shepherd Nova Scotia into Confederation. The last two years had, after all, been better spent than "lounging about London." But his best reward, he felt, was the pleasure that he would always experience "in having beaten that bad fellow Mr. Howe." On 24 October 1867, Williams turned his back on Canada forever.<sup>52</sup>

## NOTES

1. *C.P. Stacey, Canada and the British Army: A Study in Responsible Government, 1841-1870*. London: Longmans, 1936; K. Bourne, "British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862," *English Historical Review*, LXXVI, 1961, pp. 600-32; *Great Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; Desmond Morton, *Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970; J.M. Hitsman, *Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968. I wish to emphasise that this paper is based almost exclusively upon Williams's correspondence to Cambridge, since Cambridge's replies were not retained by the Royal Archives and have not been located elsewhere by the author. A necessarily one-sided picture therefore emerges and this is the paper's chief limitation - for from such evidence only qualified conclusions can flow. Over the period of his command Williams wrote about 300 letters to the Duke of Cambridge, often padded out with lengthy news-clippings and sketch-maps, especially during the ups and downs of the Civil War. The Cambridge Papers are deposited in the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, and have been used here with the gracious permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.
2. *Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. 21, pp. 466-67.
3. As late as 1909, the question of Williams's legitimacy was still alive. In March of that year, Judge Savary prepared for the Nova Scotia Historical Society a paper on "The Ancestry of the late Sir Fenwick Williams" in which he attempted to dispose of all doubt by suggesting that there had been confusion and maltranscription of the dates of Williams's birth and baptism. But like most myths, it is resistant to facts and statistics and such an attractive one ought not to be put to death so prosaically.
4. In his capacity as Clerk to the Privy Council, Greville saw much if not most of the official correspondence bearing upon the misconduct of the Crimean War. On 23 November 1854, for instance, he records in his diaries that "In reading the various and innumerable narratives of the battle (Inkerman), and the comments of the 'correspondents' . . . it strikes me that there was a lack of military genius and foresight in the recent operations . . . These are melancholy reflections, and the facts prove that we have no Wellingtons in our Army now . . . I am afraid Newcastle, who is totally ignorant of military affairs of every sort, is not equal to his post, and hence the various deficiencies - nor is Sydney Herbert much better . . ." The diaries are full of criticisms of Lord Raglan's lack of imagination, originality and effort as a General. H. Reeve (ed.), *The Greville Memoirs*, London: Longmans Green, vol. VIII, 1888, pp. 204-6, 207-9, 215, 293-5. One of the most sensible attempts to reorganise the High Command without loss of face or confidence was made by Prince Albert. In his plan, Codrington would become Commander-in-Chief with Wyndham as Chief of Staff. See Prince Albert to Baron Stockmar, 29 Oct 1855, T. Martin, *The Life of H.R.H., the Prince Consort*, London: Smith Elder, vol. III, 1878, pp. 384-5.
5. See for instance Sir George Sinclair's lament to the aged Croker, "There seems to prevail a fatal mediocrity in every department - in the Cabinet, no Chatham; in the navy, no Nelson; in the army, no Wellington . . ." Murray, vol. III, p. 354.

6. See especially Olive Anderson, *A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics during the Crimean War*, London: Macmillan, 1967, particularly chapter I "The Machinery of British Government under the Strain of War," pp. 33-69; also by the same author, "Cabinet Government and the Crimean War," *English Historical Review*, LXXIX, 1964, pp. 548-51; "The Constitutional Position of the Secretary at War, 1642-1855," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. 36, 1958, pp. 165-9; Additional material may be found in Sir G. Douglas and Sir G.D. Ramsay (eds.), *The Panmure Papers* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2 vols., 1908, II, pp. 316-7.
7. Prince Albert to Baron Stockmar, 3 April 1850, enclosing his Memorandum; same to Wellington, 6 April 1850, Martin, *Life of Prince Consort*, II, pp. 253-62.
8. See *Greville*, VIII, p. 52; Duke of Cambridge's Diary, 7 and 8 July 1855, *Cambridge Papers*, Royal Archives; G. St. Aubyn, *Royal George: A Life of H.R.H. George, Duke of Cambridge, 1819-1904*, London: Constable, 1963, pp. 103-10. It was the King of Belgium and not Queen Victoria, as St. Aubyn asserts, who said that Hardinge had been killed by the press, see Leopold to Victoria, 10 Oct 1856, G.E. Buckle (ed.), *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, First Series, 1837-67, 3 vols., II, pp. 267-8.
9. See W.W. Verner, *The Military Life of H.R.H. George, Duke of Cambridge*, London: Blackwood's 2 vols., I, p. 87-9.
10. St. Aubyn, *Cambridge*, pp. 109-10; Verner, *Cambridge*, I, pp. 97-8; Diary, 13-16 July 1856, *Cambridge Papers*, Royal Archives.
11. *Greville*, VIII, p. 129.
12. Williams to Cambridge, 14 May 1859, *Cambridge Papers*, Royal Archives.
13. Same to same, 3 May, 15 and 23 June, 11 July, 26 and 29 August, 7 November 1859, 25 January, 22 September, 26 October and 14 December 1860, *ibid*.
14. Same to same, 4 and 22 April 1861, *ibid*.
15. Same to same, 3 to 10 May 1861, *ibid*.
16. Same to same, 20 and 24 June 1861, *ibid*.
17. Same to same, 24 and 30 June, 12, 15 and 25 July 1861, *ibid*.
18. Ponsonby to his mother, 3 January 1862, *Ponsonby Papers*, Shulbrede Priory, Surrey.
19. Wolseley to Biddulph, 10 December 1861, H. Biddulph (ed.), "Canada and the American Civil War: More Wolseley Letters," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, XIX, 1940, pp. 112-7.
20. Cambridge to Lewis, 7 December 1861, *Cambridge Papers*, Royal Archives.
21. Lewis to Cambridge, 8 December 1861, *ibid*.
22. Memorandum by Prince Albert, 22 November 1855, *Army Papers*, Royal Archives.
23. Granville to Cardwell, confd!, 21 May 1870, *Granville Papers*, PRO 3/48/12.
24. Cardwell to Granville, 23 May 1870, *ibid*.
25. Williams to Cambridge, 7 June 1861, *Cambridge Papers*, Royal Archives.
26. G.J. Wolseley, "A Month's Visit to the Conference Headquarters," *Blackwood's*, XCIII, January 1863, pp. 1-29; Wolseley to R. Wolseley, 21 May, 6, 8 and 16 August; 14 and 21 September; 24 and 29 October; 19 November and 19 December 1862, *Wolseley Papers*, Hove Library, Sussex. Wolseley made sure that accounts of his exploits were sent to Lord DeGrey (later Lord Ripon), Parliamentary Undersecretary for War; Lord Clyde (formerly Sir Colin Campbell) and to Williams himself. For Williams's reaction to Wolseley's experiences, see Williams to Cambridge, pte, 21 October 1862: "Colonel Woolsey (sic) (of the Qr Master Genls Staff) has just returned from a most interesting adventure to *Richmond*. He had seen the Northern Army, and got a good opportunity of passing the Potomac: and thence made his way to General Lee's and Jackson's Armies. He gives the most flattering account of the manners, youthfulness (36 & 38) of these Generals, says their faces are as handsome as their reputation is deservedly brilliant. Their men in high discipline, and quite as well appointed as the men of the North. Many privates were pointed out in the ranks who possessed fortunes 10 - 15 & 20,000 pounds, in whose erect form and bright eye was written a cheerful determination to fight and conquer their independence...." Ponsonby it seems met Wolseley for the first time on 13 October and was also regaled with an account of Wolseley's excursion. See Ponsonby to his mother, 13 October 1862, *Ponsonby Papers*.



27. See for instance J. Luvaas, *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959; R.A. Preston, "Military Lessons of the American Civil War: The Influence of Observers from the British Army in Canada on Training the British Army," *Army Quarterly*, LIV, 1953, pp. 229-37; Adrian Preston, "British Military Thought," 1856-91," *Army Quarterly*, LXXXVIII, October 1964, pp. 57-74.
28. Williams to Cambridge, 19 December 1862, *Cambridge Papers*.
29. See especially Luvaas, *op. cit.*
30. Williams to Cambridge, 13 and 24 January 1862, *Cambridge Papers*.
31. Same to same, 25 January 1862, *ibid.*
32. Same to same, pte, 27 March 1862, *ibid.*
33. Wolseley, for instance, was most indignant. "The Militia Bill was thrown out last night by a majority of six. When the news reaches England the indignation will be very great, so much so that I think unless rescinded it will prove the turning point in the history of Canada's connexion with the Mother Country....What is the use of helping a worthless lot of Colonists who won't help themselves." Wolseley to R. Wolseley, 21 May 1862, *Wolseley Papers*.
34. W. Russell, *Canada: its Defences, Condition and Resources*, Boston: Burnham, 1865, pp. 64-5, 133-5, 182-96.
35. In September - October 1863, there were four murders by bayonet stabbing in as many weeks.
36. See especially Williams to Cambridge, 5 and 22 February, 16 April 1864, *Cambridge Papers*. Kingston became a notorious centre for crimping and desertion. Whole squads of deserters would skate across the St. Lawrence to the welcome jingle of \$700 and the grasp of American recruiting agents.
37. Williams to Cambridge, pte, 15 and 26 May, 19 June 1863, *Cambridge Papers*.
38. Same to same, pte, 23 November 1863, *ibid.*; F.A. Golder, "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," *American Historical Review*, XX, 1915, pp. 801-12; E.A. Adamov, "Russia and the United States at the time of the Civil War," *Journal of Modern History*, II, 1930, pp. 586-602.
39. Williams to Cambridge, 24 January, 23 May, 6 June and 17 July 1864, *Cambridge Papers*.
40. Same to same, 3, 21 and 31 October; 4, 7 and 18 November 1864, *ibid.*
41. Same to same, 3 and 27 February 1865, *ibid.*
42. Same to same, 13 and 17 March 1865, *ibid.*
43. Williams had earlier been pressed to stay in the Maritimes, but declined to do so on the grounds that he "could do the cause of intercolonial work more good" by talks with Cambridge and the Cabinet "than by mixing personally with colonial politics and personalities." Same to same, 1 May 1865, *ibid.*
44. Same to same, 10 and 17 April 1865, *ibid.*
45. Same to same, 29 May 1865, *ibid.*
46. Same to same, 9 November 1865, *ibid.*
47. Same to same, 24 November, 7 and 21 December 1865, 1 January 1866, *ibid.*
48. Michel to Cambridge, 22 August and 12 September, 9 and 31 October, 11 November and 1 December 1865, *ibid.*
49. Williams to Cambridge, 16 and 26 March 1866, *ibid.*
50. Michel to Cambridge, 26 March and 17 April 1866, *ibid.*
51. Williams to Cambridge, 11 and 26 April, 5 July 1866; see also Doyle to Cambridge, 12, 13 and 16 April, 7 May 1866, *ibid.*
52. Same to same, 8 November 1866 and 10 October 1867, *ibid.*