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THE ENGLISH STIMULUS TO SCOTTISH NATIONALISM, 1286-1370

Wherever a Scot goes in this world, he usually organizes a Burns Society, establishes a curling rink, and perhaps opens a bank and a Presbyterian church. To those less fortunate individuals who are not Scots or who can claim no Scottish connection, these actions are manifestations of a rather silly but typical Scottish idiosyncrasy, for the Scot is above all other things almost uniquely nationalistic. Most people, even the Scots themselves, take this nationalism very much for granted, failing to realize that it is the result of a long process of history which began in the thirteenth century. Moreover, they fail to recognize that had it not been for Englishmen such as the early Plantagenets, there might have been no Scottish national consciousness and feeling at all, for it was in response to their challenge that the Scots first came to look upon themselves as a nation.

Although some historians have maintained that there was a strong Scottish national consciousness, particularly in the Highlands, before the thirteenth century, this seems to be an overstatement of the situation.¹ It is true that from the days of William the Lion (1165-1214) the monarchy had been generally recognized throughout the country without much controversy, but this recognition hardly guaranteed a feeling of nationality. The relationships of the barons to the crown were, as in most other countries of the time, primarily personal.² Indeed, in Scotland the feeling of personal loyalty largely based upon the prefeudal clan system seems to have been particularly strong, not infrequently leading to violent and prolonged inter-tribal feuds and conflicts. This state of affairs was not helped by the fact that there were a number of different racial elements in the country (Scots, Welsh, Angles, and Anglo-Normans) causing divisions which in some cases manifested themselves in the social stratification of society.

The Scottish deficiency in national sentiment can be traced, however, not merely to differences of race and tongue, but also to the various social classes' orientation. Probably the least nationalistic of all the elements of the population were the nobles. They belonged to an international order which recked little of national loyalties, but seems to have thought of itself rather as a special class superior to all local or other political

ties. As an example one might point to John Balliol, who later became king, and who, holding lands in Scotland, England, and France, owed allegiance to three kings. Similarly the Bruces held in England lands which were probably greater in extent and wealth than those they owned in Scotland. And the same thing could probably be said for the rest of the Scottish nobles, particularly those in high places and those who later laid claim to the Scottish crown.³ Moreover, the Anglo-Scottish aristocracy was bound tightly together by an almost inextricable web of marriage relations which has never been adequately studied or understood.⁴ Consequently, the Scottish nobility had no inherent prejudices against Edward I's claims to be the suzerain of Scotland, for they were all part of the feudal "household" of England, bound to the king by personal and contractual rather than political obligations.⁵ This thirteenth-century point of view must constantly be kept in mind if one is to understand the reluctance of the Scottish nobles to support the national cause against England's expansionism. They did not look upon themselves as different from those who held only English fiefs, except that they possessed lands also in Scotland, owing allegiance to the monarchs of both countries.

Not much more concerned with Scottish nationalism were the commercial elements, who seem to have been primarily interested in their burghs rather than in the country as a whole. Since England was their main market during the thirteenth century, the merchants found there both customers and east-coast towns such as Boston, Lynn, and Dunwich in which to settle. Indeed, Dunwich apparently even elected one of its Scottish residents mayor.⁶ Thus, during the early part of the thirteenth century, the Scottish middle class probably favoured close and friendly relations, if not actual integration, with their neighbours to the south. When in 1275, however, the English parliament granted Edward I the right to levy customs on all wool, skins, and hides leaving England, Ireland, and Wales, their attitude may have changed. As the Scottish kings do not appear to have contemplated such imposts until somewhat later, the merchants of Edinburgh, Berwick, Dundee, Perth, and Aberdeen may have felt in 1275 that too close an integration into the English commercial system might not be to their advantage.⁷ Yet, there is no indication either of their being anti-English or of their having any strong Scottish sentiment.

With a good deal of truth, one might say that the only self-consciously Scottish element in the country was the clergy. Their nationalism, if it could be even called that, was, more than anything else, ecclesiastical: the desire to remain independent of the Archbishop of York, who was continually attempting to assert his authority north of the Tweed, was

their principal motive for asserting the Scottish church's autonomy. To counteract York's claims, the Scottish bishops, insisting that they were directly subordinate to the Pope, had in 1225 obtained papal permission to hold, under the chairmanship of one of their own number, a Scottish national synod. This clerical nationalism could not be anything but largely negative. Since the higher clergy were usually the nominees of the king or other great magnates, who were in turn closely bound to England by feudal ties, they generally had the same international outlook, their only interest in Scottish independence being their aversion to English ecclesiastical control. The importance of this "ecclesiastical nationalism" was, however, that it very quickly combined with true nationalism to give the latter not only a religious colouring but to protect it from the papal thunderbolts hurled at it on the instigation of the English kings. Thus, although hardly "nationalism" in the modern sense, it was closely related to the origins of Scottish nationalistic feeling.⁸

Against this background of an almost total lack of Scottish national feeling, it is quite easy to understand the actions of the leaders of the country when, in 1286, they were suddenly faced with the fact that the king, Alexander III, was dead, leaving as his successor a three-year-old Norwegian princess. Since all the temporal lords who became members of the council of regency—Duncan, Earl of Fife; John Comyn, Earl of Buchan; Lord John Comyn; and James Fitzalan, the Steward—held wide lands in England, it was only natural that they should turn for advice and help to Edward I. It would also seem to have been normal for them to arrange a marriage between the young Prince of Wales and the infant Queen of Scots.⁹ Thus, although in the Treaty of Birgham (1290) in which they made these arrangements formal, they stressed that Scotland should remain an independent nation and especially that the clergy should be free from English control, they subordinated everything ultimately to the proviso "saving the rights of the Lord King." Similarly they do not seem to have considered that they were doing anything unusual when shortly afterwards they also agreed, in order that peace might be maintained in the country, to hand over their key strongholds to the Maid of Norway, or really to Edward who would act as her guardian when she arrived safely in England or Scotland.¹⁰ By so doing, they were not really betraying their country as some have asserted, for they were merely acting in the normal way for men who were vassals of two kings, one of whom was a minor. They never had manifested any particular Scottish loyalty.

All their treaty-making came to nought, however, for the young princess, while on the way to Scotland, died in Orkney. This disaster

left the throne truly vacant, offering Edward his greatest opportunity to incorporate Scotland completely into his dominions.

On the death of Alexander III there had been a serious threat of civil war between two of the claimants of the throne, Balliol and Bruce. Indeed, this had been one of the reasons for the regents' approach to Edward with the request that he help straighten out the matter of the accession of the Maid of Norway. Now, when nine men came forward with conflicting titles to the throne, a strong arbiter was even more necessary. Edward, however, was not willing to be a mere referee, but claimed to act as the judge in a feudal court. For this reason, before he would consent to take action in the case he demanded that all those making suit for the crown should acknowledge him as liege lord. To this they acquiesced quite willingly, since not only was each one hopeful of gaining a crown, but also because most of them had already done homage to him for lands which they held in England.¹¹ Their acts of fealty were simply a re-affirmation of that personal contract which already existed between the king and his vassals, the only difference being that they now included the Kingdom of the Scots.

After a considerable parade of his impartiality and his legal and historical research, Edward finally gave his judgment in favour of John Balliol. Bruce, who had been one of the chief advocates of an appeal to Edward for his judgment, being very much annoyed at this turn of events, rejected the decision and left his grandson, the future Scottish monarch, to do homage to the new king.¹² Yet he had nothing of which to complain, for he, along with the other claimants, the nobility, and the clergy, had in advance agreed to accept Edward's decision, and in proof of this had all acknowledged the English king as the liege lord of the Scots. True, they later claimed that the guarantees concerning Scotland's independence contained in the Treaty of Birgham still stood, but Edward countered with the claim that those clauses referred only to Scotland minus a king. Now that there was a King of Scots of whom he was the acknowledged Lord Paramount, he could and would treat him simply as a vassal.¹³

If Edward had been willing to act with a certain amount of tact or had allowed matters to go along quietly for the moment without forcing any issues, time would probably have brought the Scots completely under the English crown. The English "Justinian" was not, however, the man to have legal rights and to let them lie fallow. By naked force he had incorporated Wales into his kingdom, and he felt confident that he could do the same to Scotland. The result was that in dealing with the Scots and with "Toom Tabard" (Empty Shirt), their king, he adopted strong-arm methods which could not but bring violent opposition even on a

purely personal level.¹⁴ The question of accepting Edward's suzerainty, however, quickly became a much larger issue, the result being embryonic Scottish nationalism.

Nevertheless, this "nationalistic" reaction continued to be for some years fundamentally personal. That this was bound to be so becomes clear when one understands Edward's two-pronged attack upon Scottish independence. While endeavouring to win the support of various nobles and towns by the judicious distribution of privileges, lands, and money, he at the same time sought to use every possible means of humiliating the supple Balliol. Not only was Balliol's court dominated by an English coterie which, with Edward's support, was hopeful of receiving grants of Scottish lands, but Balliol himself was repeatedly summoned to London to answer appeals carried there by his Scottish vassals. In all of this Edward was following tactics identical with those employed by the French kings against him in their attempts to subjugate Gascony, but the result was somewhat different.¹⁵ Before very long, Balliol and his supporters came to the place where sheer exasperation drove them into opposition and rebellion. The Scottish king, supported by his nobles, clergy, and townspeople, allied himself with the French monarch, renounced his homage to Edward, and attempted to throw off the English yoke.¹⁶

Unfortunately for Balliol, his subjects were divided. Apparently the big difficulty for many of the nobles was that by rebellion they were in danger both of losing their English lands and of breaking their oaths of homage. Many, therefore, refused to take up arms, confident that even though Balliol might "disinherit" them for the time being, in the long run they would be doing the right thing because Edward would certainly win.¹⁷ Moreover, Balliol by his rebellion had broken his oath of fealty, thereby, theoretically, forfeiting their obedience. Consequently, since their loyalty was primarily to a person and not to the country, their tendency was to support Edward in his efforts to suppress this rebellious outbreak. Among this group were Robert Bruce and his faction. According to John of Fordun, Edward made sure of Bruce's loyalty by promising him the crown; but even if Edward had not done so, Bruce, because of his large English holdings, would have thought twice before joining the Scottish monarch. Moreover, the Bruce jealousy of Balliol no doubt also had its influence. It is probable that Bruce's refusal to rebel kept others of the nobles from joining the nationalists.¹⁸

While many of the nobles were hesitating as to which side they would support, both the middle class and the clergy quickly threw in their lots with Balliol. The reasons for this decision are not difficult to discern. If Edward ruled the country, the merchants would certainly have their

difficulties. In 1294, the year preceding Balliol's rebellion, Edward had seized all the English wool awaiting export and made its owners redeem it at a fixed price. Moreover, he desired them to send it only to a fixed staple port for sale. These actions did not endear him to his own merchants; and one can imagine the fears they roused in the minds of the Scots. Moreover, when the Scottish rebellion broke out and Balliol allied himself with France, Edward immediately forbade the Scots to have anything to do with French or Flemish traders, which only helped to stimulate the Scottish merchants' awakening nationalism. It may have been their fear for their trade as a result of the English actions that caused the traders of Fife to volunteer to take part in the defence of Berwick, where, with the resident Flemish merchants who also resisted Edward's onslaught, they perished to a man.¹⁹ Thus, because of English threats to their commerce, the middle class was beginning to see itself as "Scottish."

Most of the clergy seem to have followed the same course as the business men. While those, such as Bishop Wishart of Glasgow, who were supporters of Bruce did not participate in the uprising, a large number of clerics did. To Edward's capture of Berwick (1296) they replied by expelling all English ecclesiastics from the country.²⁰ It was a good opportunity to rid themselves and their church of such unwanted aliens. Carrying the matter even farther, a considerable number, among whom was the Bishop of St. Andrews, gave active support to Balliol's forces and eventually fell into Edward's hands.

Despite the efforts of Balliol and the support which the middle class and clergy gave him, the Scots with their feudal leaders divided were able to offer little effective resistance. After Edward had crushed the nationalist army at Dunbar (1296), they were ready to submit. In the parliament held in Berwick in August, 1296, over 2,000 Scots did homage to Edward I, surrendering to him their key castles and fortified towns. It must be emphasized, however, that this submission was the action not merely of the Anglo-Scottish aristocracy but also of the Celtic Highlanders, the towns, and the Church.²¹ The brief flare-up of "nationalism" had just as quickly died down.

Yet it would seem that Edward, perhaps fearing a resurgence of this feeling, was determined to make no concessions to his prodigal vassals. Whether they liked it or not, they would now have to submit to his direct rule. Indeed, he almost seems to have been determined to gain the enmity of all classes in the country by his oppressive policies. Shortly after the Scots submitted, he again seized all the wool ready for export in both England and Scotland. The larger amounts he kept, and the smaller he taxed at the rate of 40s. the sack. This tax applied not only to Englishmen

but also to Scots, whom he now regarded as being equally his subjects. Although in the next year parliament obliged him to agree never to repeat this lawless act, at least in England, there is no evidence that the Scots gained the same promise. By this action he further alienated the merchants, whose annoyance would only grow stronger when he forbade them to leave the country without submitting their personal effects to a search by his officials.²²

If he had stopped here, the pot might not have boiled over; but he was determined to assert his full control over both church and state by appointing his nominees to all important ecclesiastical and political offices.²³ This action angered both the clergy and the nobles. But even more disturbing to the Scots, he set up a commission of three Englishmen to govern Scotland as a conquered kingdom, refusing Bruce's demand that he now fulfil his promise to give him the throne. Moreover, he ordered Scottish vassals to attend the English parliament and insisted that all those holding Scottish lands from him should participate in his French war. Finally, and as the manifestation of his complete disregard of Scottish rights at the local level, he appointed to positions as sheriffs in the country Englishmen or Anglo-Scots, who seem to have been so arrogant and lawless that, instead of pacifying the Scots, they only roused the hatred of all against themselves and their master.²⁴

The immediate result of Edward's foolish tactics was renewed opposition. In 1297 William Wallace headed an uprising which, with the support of some of the nobles, soon gained the backing of most of the people. Although he was not popular with part of the nobility because he was considered "low-born" and because he was apparently inclined to disregard some of their prejudices, Wallace succeeded in stirring up national feeling as it had never been stirred before.²⁵ It would seem that at this point in its history Scotland as a whole, for the first time, became really conscious of its national identity.

In the resistance movement, however, the nobles still made up the uncertain group. Although many of them undoubtedly resented the fact that they had to follow a "low-born" individual,²⁶ this was not their major problem. The real question was: what would become of their feudal obligations to Edward as well as their feudal holdings in England or Scotland if Scottish nationalism continued to grow? It was becoming increasingly difficult to stand with one's feet on both sides of the River Tweed. This became even more obvious after 1303 when Edward, in order to smash all resistance, made a devastating raid as far north as Caithness. At the same time he also established a complete system of import and export duties that applied to Scottish as well as English merchants. By

these actions he strengthened the anti-English feelings of both the country people and the townsfolk, thereby making the nobles' position increasingly difficult. When finally he captured Wallace, took him to London, judged him guilty of treason, and ordered him hanged, drawn, and quartered, national feeling obtained a romantic figure about which to concentrate its antipathy to England and her king. What was of equal importance, this hero was not a noble but really one of the common folk. Whether the nobles liked it or not, nationalism was growing and finding its heroes outside their ranks.

Some of the magnates had, it is true, after Wallace's defeat at Falkirk in 1299, attempted to take the lead in the movement for Scottish independence, but they never seem to have committed themselves wholeheartedly to the cause. They had already revealed their dubious attitude when they had deserted Wallace at the crucial moment at Falkirk, and once Edward had overrun the country in 1303, they all came in to acknowledge his overlordship.²⁷ The feudal point of view was still far stronger than any sense of being part of a Scottish nation. Edward, therefore, with little opposition from the nobles, had a relatively easy task in bringing the country once again to heel.²⁸

It seems likely that, like Wales, Scotland from this time on would have remained under English control, had it not been for the ambitions of Robert Bruce, the younger. Ever since the deposition of Balliol, this man had moved backwards and forwards between the two camps with one primary objective in view: the Crown of Scotland. In 1297 he acknowledged Edward as his Lord, but when Edward would not make him king he defected to the Scottish nationalists and became one of the Guardians of the Realm in 1299. Once again, however, he returned to his allegiance in 1301, perhaps, as Professor Stones thinks, in fear that Edward might reinstate Balliol.²⁹ Finally, early in 1306, Edward named him to a commission to establish a new government for the Scots, but even this brought him no nearer the throne either as a vassal of Edward or as an independent monarch.

By this time Bruce seems to have reached the conclusion that if he would become King of Scots, he must take definite steps which would probably bring about a complete break with Edward I. Since the English king obviously had no intention of giving him the Scottish crown, he would have to take it by main force. To this end he entered into negotiations with the nephew of John Balliol, John (Red) Comyn, Lord of Badenoch, who had been one of the few nobles to adhere consistently for some time to the nationalist cause. From what we know of their dealings with each other, we gather that Comyn agreed to relinquish his claims through

his mother to the crown, and to support Bruce, in return for a large part of the latter's Scottish lands.

In February of 1306, at the Justice Eyre in Dumfries, Comyn and Bruce foregathered in the church of the Minorite Convent where they very soon fell into a violent altercation. At the height of the argument Bruce stabbed Comyn before the High Altar and his followers completed his work.³⁰ Although Bruce apparently accomplished little by this act of violence, it did force him to take his stand on the side of Scottish nationalism. Moreover it obliged many others also to make up their minds. The former leaders of the national cause, the Balliols and the Comyns now in a deadly feud with Bruce, became pro-English, while those supporting him became the nationalists violently hated by Edward of England.

Bruce's open conversion to Scottish nationalism, and his coronation shortly thereafter (1306), seems to have fitted in well with the sentiments of most Scots. For one thing, antipathy to the English, and particularly to Edward I, had been growing not only amongst the commons, middle class, and clergy, but even amongst the nobility. Several acts of Edward intensified the Scots' antipathy. Sir William Douglas, who had aided Wallace when he first raised the standard of revolt, had been imprisoned by Edward in England. After Douglas died in prison, Edward had given the Douglas estates to Sir Robert Clifford, by this move making certain of the enmity of Sir William's heir, James, who later became famous as "The Black Douglas." The same treatment Edward meted out to others who did not have enough influence at court to regain possession of their property after participating in a rebellion. At the same time, he was taking every opportunity to fill Scottish benefices with English clerics, and so naturally angered the Scottish ecclesiastics.³¹ Thus Bruce, despite his act of sacrilege in killing Comyn, very quickly found himself supported by the leading ecclesiastics and by a number of nobles who had suffered from Edward's increasing confiscation of rebels' lands.

The English king now took steps which, contrary to his intention, aided Bruce materially. He issued orders that the newly-crowned Scottish king and any of his supporters whom his forces might capture were to be executed immediately, orders which his officers generally carried out. Clerics who fell into his hands were imprisoned in England, while the womenfolk of the rebels were treated with the greatest indignities. Moreover, he seized the English lands of the rebels and granted them to those whom he considered loyal to himself. By severity and ruthlessness he hoped to overawe the country. Such policies would undoubtedly prevent many from joining Bruce, but they would also engrain in those who did give him their allegiance a new sense of being Scots.³²

Fortunately for Bruce, Edward "the Hammer of the Scots" died in 1307 while leading his last expedition against the rebels; but so determined was he to be in at the kill, he left orders that the expedition was to continue, bearing his bones at its head. It was all in vain, however, for Edward II was not made of the same stuff as his father. A weak man, possessing much less ability, he accomplished relatively little on that expedition or on any of those which followed. Lord Haile's comment that the repeated failure of his incursions into Scotland served only to strengthen Bruce, while discouraging the Comyns and others who were now supporting England, is very true. At the same time, the Englishmen who held offices in the part of Scotland under Edward II's control made themselves so unpopular that increasingly the Scots longed for independence.³³ All this played into the hands of Bruce, who was endeavouring to rally the people to resist.

Despite the slowly increasing hatred of the English, the first two or three years of Bruce's reign were filled with difficulty and near disaster. Only gradually was he able to rouse the country. By 1310, however, unity such as probably had never been known before in Scotland was manifested in the growing popular support of the nationalist cause. The "common" people, as Barbour repeatedly points out, rallied to Bruce's banner, anxious to give him all possible aid.³⁴ Similarly the merchants and traders, particularly those of Aberdeen, quickly showed that they too favoured the nationalist cause, partly because of their dislike for English economic and customs policies, and partly because they were able to use the conflict between the two countries as an excuse to attack English merchantmen on the high seas. This middle class co-operation was of the greatest importance to Bruce's cause, since it was the merchants who brought from the Continent the necessary materials of war.³⁵

The clergy also, even against the orders of the Pope, gave the Scottish national cause their blessing, going so far as to act as Bruce's recruiting sergeants. The Bishop of Moray, one of their leaders, actually preached that "They were not less deserving of merit who rebelled with Sir Robert to help him against the King of England and his men, and took the part of Robert, than if they should fight in the Holy Land against pagans and saracens." Finally in 1310 the clergy declared to the Pope that Bruce had always possessed the right to the crown and was "... solemnly made King of Scots, and with him the faithful people of the Kingdom will live and die as with one who, possessing the right of blood, and endowed with other cardinal virtues, is fitted to rule. . . ."³⁶

The nobles, on the other hand, as usual still did not show nearly the same enthusiasm for resistance to the English. While some came forward early in the conflict to throw in their lot with Bruce, the majority

of the nobles seem to have attempted to continue their middle-of-the-road policy, in the hope of keeping their allegiance and their lands intact in both England and Scotland. Apparently Bruce could count only upon those who had little or nothing to lose south of the Tweed. Consequently, he seems to have attempted either to force or to persuade by means of favours those who held lands in Scotland to submit to him; and if they would not do that, he endeavoured to expel them from the country. While those who were primarily interested in retaining their estates in England resented his demands and became his bitterest enemies, those who chose to be Scots tended to become his strong supporters.³⁷ Bruce was beginning to stimulate a sense of Scottish nationality even amongst some of the aristocracy.

In this development, the Scottish victory at Bannockburn (1314) was a decisive factor. As a result of Bruce's success, many of those who had heretofore avoided a final decision suddenly found it expedient to make up their minds. Almost immediately after the battle, a good many of the waverers hastily came in to render him homage, while on November 6 of the same year, the Scottish Estates at Cambuskenneth attempted to settle the matter finally by ordering all those claiming lands in Scotland to acknowledge Robert as their liege lord within one year, on pain of being irrevocably disinherited.³⁸ This act Robert enforced with vigour. The result was, as is shown by William Robertson's *Index to Charters* and by *The Register of the Great Seal*, that those who refused to submit lost their fiefs, which the king in turn granted to his vassals. Among those disinherited in this way were Edward Balliol, John Comyn, William Soulis, James de Torthorald, and others, who retired to their English estates where they awaited an opportunity to regain their confiscated lands.³⁹

Those who gave their allegiance to Bruce, however, were by now coming to recognize that there was more involved in their formal feudal allegiance than merely a personal relationship, for when in April, 1320, papal legates appeared demanding that the Scots submit to Edward II, the Estates gathered at Arbroath replied with a clear statement of Scottish national sovereignty which closed with these words:

Unto him [Bruce] as the man through whom salvation has been wrought in our people, we are bound both of right and by his service rendered, and are resolved in whatever fortune to cleave, for the preservation of our liberty. Were he to abandon the enterprise begun, choosing to subject us or our kingdom to the English or to the English people, we would strive to thrust him out forthwith as our enemy and the subverter of right, his own and ours, and choose for our king another who would suffice for our defence; for so long as an hundred remain alive we are minded never a whit to bow beneath the yoke of English dominion. It is not for glory, riches or honours that we fight; it is for liberty alone, the liberty which no good man relinquishes but with his life.⁴⁰

The fact that some discontented nobles organized a plot against the king the same year showed that all Scots did not hold this view, but for most of the people, including now a large percentage of the nobility, Scottish nationalism had become inextricably bound up with a search for freedom from "the yoke of English dominion". It was this force which had begun to make the Scots conscious that they were a nation.⁴¹ This was the first clear cut "national" response to the English challenge.

Another phase or aspect of this response was the Scottish attempt to settle the succession to the crown. In 1315, one year after Bannockburn, the Estates of the realm had declared that if Robert died without a male heir, the crown should go to his brother Edward. But when that knight-errant met his death in Ireland, the Estates decided that if Robert had no direct male heir the line of descent should be through his daughter Marjorie, who to her husband, Fitzalan the High Steward, had borne a son, Robert. To the joy of the people, however, the queen soon afterwards presented Bruce with a male heir. To him was given the venerated name of David, and to him also, in 1326, all the magnates swore allegiance. This latter action, it was hoped, would forestall any attempt by an English monarch to interfere again with the freedom of the Scottish nation.

In 1328 Robert Bruce's work came to completion with the recognition of Scotland's national independence by both England and the papacy. The Pope gave him his blessing, and Edward III, who had just ascended the throne, in the Treaty of Northampton agreed to renounce all his claims to the suzerainty of Scotland on condition that David Bruce marry his sister Joanna. When this treaty was ratified by the Scots, peace reigned, at least on the surface, and Scotland, more united than ever before, could look forward to the future with confidence.⁴²

The apparent peace and national consciousness, however, were neither of them very secure, owing to the fact that there were in England two groups which were not content with the state of affairs in Scotland. The "disinherited" nobles were insistent that they must regain possession of their confiscated fiefs, while the clergy who had lost benefices in Scotland also raised their voices in protest against the Scots' continued refusal to return their former holdings. It would seem that after the signing of the Treaty of Northampton, Robert and Edward had agreed to a mutual restitution of ecclesiastical properties, but there is no evidence that this arrangement was ever implemented. That the Scots had ever consented to hand back the lands of the "Disinherited" is very doubtful. Edward claimed that Bruce had given his approval to such a restoration, but there is no evidence that he had done so.⁴³

Edward Balliol, Henry Beaumont, and Thomas Wake, along with others who claimed lands in Scotland, now began to apply pressure to Edward to see that the Scots met their "just" demands. Bruce having died towards the close of 1328, Randolph, Earl of Moray, who was regent, flatly refused to accede to Edward's importunities concerning this matter. Indeed, he seems to have dared the "Disinherited" to do something about it, with the result that they, supported by Edward who saw in this a golden opportunity to repudiate his treaty with Scotland, gathered forces and in 1332 invaded the country. Unfortunately for the Scots, Moray himself passed away about a month before they attacked, his place being taken by the inexperienced Earl of Mar, who met the enemy at Dupplin where he suffered a complete defeat. As David II had already been sent to France where for some years he remained a refugee, Balliol with little opposition now asserted his right to succeed his father on the throne, insisting that he be crowned king and his followers restored to their Scottish estates.⁴⁴ It looked as though all Robert Bruce's labor had gone for nought.

At first it seemed that Balliol and his vassals would have little difficulty in persuading the Scots to accede to their demands. Most of the people, as long as they could live in peace, seem to have been rather indifferent to the question of who should rule the country. Only a relatively small group of nationalists carried on a guerrilla war against the party now in power; and this state of affairs might well have continued for some time. There were two factors, however, which worked to the nationalists' advantage. The "Disinherited" began to fight among themselves over the spoils of war, and Balliol in 1334 showed himself to be a tool of the English king by acknowledging him as suzerain of Scotland and by handing over to him not only Berwick, but the whole of the southeast of Scotland from the River Tweed to the Firth of Forth.⁴⁵ Edward III then proceeded to take possession of this new addition to his domains, to the distress and anger of many of its inhabitants. Here was another clearly discernible English threat, not only to Scotland's national integrity but also to the trade, property, and benefices of a goodly number of individuals.

Although the Scots, because their land had been free of invasion and warfare for some years, had allowed their nationalism to grow cold, the renewed threat of English domination soon rekindled it. Edward III, by his very attempts to aid Balliol and his party, only succeeded in rousing against him the middle class, the clergy, and a considerable number of the nobles.⁴⁶ In order to crush all opposition to Balliol's rule, therefore, both he and his puppet king devastated the country from one end to the

other. By this means they forced some of the nationalistic nobles to submit temporarily, but all they really gained was the violent hatred of those whom they caused to suffer. Moreover, the officials whom they appointed to govern the country strengthened this antipathy and spirit of resistance by their harsh treatment of the people. David Strabolgy, Earl of Athol, gained the reputation of desiring to "wipe all the free holders from off the face of the earth"; and although Sir Andrew Moray and his forces killed him at Kilblain in 1335, there were others who followed in his steps. Thus despite Edward III's hope of subjecting the Scots to his authority by the establishment of a subservient ruler on the throne, he achieved little. He had wasted the country so that it was suffering from chronic famine and he had killed a good many of the nobles, but by his very attempt to destroy it, he had made Scottish nationalism stronger than ever.⁴⁷

Therefore, once Edward became involved in what was to be known as the Hundred Years' War, David II, who had lived since 1332 in France, returned home. Although joyfully welcomed by most Scots, the eighteen-year-old king who landed at Innerbervie on June 2, 1342, was not the man whom the Scots needed to lead them. Impetuous, violent, and jealous, he soon became embroiled with England, and leading an expedition across the border in 1346, he fell a prisoner into Edward's hands at the Battle of Neville's Cross. The consequence of this misfortune to Scotland was a never-ending contest among the nobles as to who should be regent during the king's absence. This rivalry might have given the English their long hoped for opportunity, but France was so occupying Edward's attention that he could not bother with his neighbours to the north.⁴⁸ Consequently, despite their internal divisions, the Scots were for the moment left to enjoy their rather tenuous national independence without interference.

The last great threat to Scottish freedom came in 1357 with David's return from England on parole. During his eleven years of captivity in England, he had become greatly enamoured of Edward and simultaneously very jealous of his nephew Robert, who was to succeed to the throne if David had no direct heir. Therefore, he was prepared to follow the example of Edward Balliol, who in 1356 had surrendered his Scottish crown to the English king. In 1363 David reached an agreement with Edward III that if he himself had no legitimate male heir, he would leave the crown to one of the sons of the English monarch, and that he would restore the lands of the "Disinherited" and of all others who after 1332 had supported Edward III's claims. This treaty he presented in March, 1364, for ratification to the Scottish Estates, who flatly rejected it, declaring that parliament had already settled the succession to the throne on the descendants of Marjorie Bruce, David's sister and that they would adhere

to this decision. They were anxious, they affirmed, to keep the peace with England, but they were not prepared to accept an English king, nor were they willing to restore the lands of those who had proved themselves traitors to the nation.⁴⁹ In this declaration Scottish nationalism had reasserted itself.

There matters rested until 1370. In that year David II died, unwillingly leaving as his heir his nephew, Robert the High Steward, and for a few days there was again the possibility of a disputed succession that the English might turn to their advantage. Any differences of opinion as to who should ascend the throne, however, the nobles quickly resolved. In March, 1371, the magnates, clergy, and commons of the realm met at Scone where the High Steward was crowned Robert II and all the people did him homage.⁵⁰ This act would seem to have brought to a close the first stage in the development of Scottish national consciousness. After eighty-five years of struggle against English attempts to swallow up the kingdom, the Scots had at last come to look upon themselves as a people and a nation. Thus the act of homage of 1370 was more than the establishment of a feudal relationship; it was the manifestation of true national consciousness.

This consciousness, however, as we have seen, was something that was really forced upon the Scots. Edward I was well named "the Hammer of the Scots." His only error was that, instead of breaking down their relatively slight cohesion, he actually began the process of welding them more closely together. His attacks upon the nobles' lands, the merchants' commerce, the ecclesiastics' benefices, and the common peoples' homes brought them together in a common opposition to the English which made out of a loosely linked feudal-tribal state a self-conscious nation. The literature of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, including Barbour's *Bruce*, Blind Harry's *Wallace*, and Fordun's *Scotichronicon*, demonstrates this only too clearly. Although by no means forging a full nationalism such as one often finds in the twentieth century, Edward I and his immediate successors had succeeded in making the Scots conscious of their unity.

From this time on, England would find herself faced with a different Scotland from that which she had known in 1286. There would undoubtedly be Scots who would be willing to play the traitor, but no longer was there that inchoate type of thinking represented by the noble who could not tell whether he was a Scot or an Englishman. If England were to subjugate Scotland, she would have to do so by conquest rather than by absorption. The Scots were now too conscious of being different from, and even at enmity with, their neighbours to the south to be obliterated as a people, except by force.

NOTES

1. Cf. E. M. Barron, *The Scottish War of Independence*, Inverness, 1934, 2nd ed., pp. 18ff.
2. Sir M. Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century*, Oxford, 1953, p. 271; G. Templeman, "Edward III and the Beginnings of the Hundred Years War," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Ser., II, 1952, pp. 78f; G. P. Cuttino, "Historical Revision: The Causes of the Hundred Years War," *Speculum*, XXXI, 1956, pp. 467ff.
3. J. Bain, ed., *Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1884, II, nos. 1776, 1804, 1837; J. B. Paul, *The Scots Peerage*, Edinburgh, 1904, I, 428, 430; II, 259. John Balliol held, among other properties, Ludingeland, Greater Yarmouth, Lesser Torkeseye, and Totenham (*Cal. Docs. re Scot.*, no. 189). Bruce in 1285 was sheriff of Cumberland where both he and his tenants held lands. By 1304 his estates included lands in Essex, Middlesex, Bedford, Durham, and Huntingdon (*Ibid.*, II, nos. 268, 1303, 1493, 1540, 1776, 1804, 1837). When Bruce the "competitor" died he was buried in England in the monastery of Gisburn beside his father (Walter of Hemingburgh, *Chronicon*, H. C. Hamilton, London, 1849, II, 69). John de Hastings was lord of Bergeveney, John de Vescy lord of Alnwick, and Patrick, Earl of March, lord of estates in Northumberland, as was John Comyn, who also held manors in Leicester and Cumberland (*Cal. Docs. re Scot.*, II, nos. 1108, 52, 447, 632, 1594). Besides these, other Scottish nobles possessed lands in Kent, Cambridge, Hereford, and many other shires (*Ibid.*, II, nos. 952, 982, 1440).
4. *Cal. Docs. Scot.*, II, 189, 724, 1440.
5. Templeman, *op. cit.*, p. 79ff. This is brought out in R. L. G. Ritchie, *The Normans in Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1954, where the close connections between the English and Scottish nobility become very clear.
6. I. F. Grant, *The Social and Economic Development of Scotland before 1603*, Edinburgh, 1930, pp. 114, 117f; W. S. Reid, "Trade, Traders and Scottish Independence," *Speculum*, XXIX, 1954, 213f.
7. N. S. B. Gras, *The Early English Customs System*, Harvard, 1918, p. 223.
8. For a more complete statement of the clergy's position see W. S. Reid, "The Papacy and the Scottish War of Independence," *The Catholic Historical Review*, XXXI, 1945, 282.
9. John of Fordun, *Chronicle of the Scottish Nation*, W. S. Skean, ed., Edinburgh, 1872, pp. 306f; J. Bain, *The Edwards in Scotland, A.D. 1296-1377*, Edinburgh, 1901, p. 21.
10. T. Rymer, *Foedera et Acta Publica*, London, 1816, I:2, 735, 737.
11. G. Neilson, "Brus versus Balliol, 1291-1292," *Scottish Historical Review*, XVI, 1919, p. 2ff; *Cal. Docs. Scot.* II, no. 489; Fordun, *op. cit.*, p. 307f; *Foedera*, I:2, 755. Robert Bruce, in 1278, had sworn fealty to Edward I on behalf of Alexander III for the latter's English lands.

According to E. L. G. Stones, "The Records of the 'Great Cause' of 1291-1292," *Scottish Historical Review*, 1956, XXXV, 108-109, some of the magnates of Scotland were perhaps not willing to go this far. The unidentified "hautes hommes Descocce," when requested by Edward I to acknowledge him as liege sovereign, replied that they could not do so until they had a king. The editor of the document feels that by this reply they were endeavouring to evade the issue. It may have been, however, that with the strongly personal attitude which dominated the feudal relationships of the time, they were merely being careful lest they should do something illegal. After all, if the king in theory was the lord of the land, the magnates could hardly bind him

to a sovereign lord before he was even seated on his throne. On the other hand, when Balliol, after his choice by Edward acknowledged the English king as overlord, there seems to have been no objection to his action. Thus the magnates' reply to Edward's demand seems to indicate very little concerning their nationalism.

12. Neilson, *loc. cit.*; Sir Herbert Maxwell, "The Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Gray," *Scottish Historical Review*, III, 1906, 17.
13. P. Tytler, *The History of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1864, I, 39.
14. *Rotuli Scotiae*, London, 1814, I, 11-22.
15. Hemingburgh, *op. cit.*; *c.f.* Cuttino, *op. cit.*, and Templeman, *op. cit.*
16. *Foedera*, I:2, 836; *Acts of the Parliament of Scotland*, 1840, I, 451.
17. Hemingburgh states that when Bruce was expelled for refusing to support Balliol, his lands were given to John Comyn, Earl of Buchan (*op. cit.*, p. 89).
18. Fordun, *op. cit.*, pp. 316, 319.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 317; Hemingburgh, *op. cit.*, II, 54, 90; Powicke, *Thirteenth Century*, p. 663.
20. Fordun, *op. cit.*, p. 318.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 320; *Cal. Docs. Scot.* II, no. 823; Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
22. G. O. Sayles, "The Seizure of Wool at Easter, 1297," *English Historical Review*, LXVII, 1952, 543f; Nicholas Trivet, *Annales*, T. Hog., ed., London, 1845, p. 354; "Scalacronica," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, III, 219; Hemingburgh, *op. cit.*, II, 119.
23. Reid, "The Papacy and the Scot. War," p. 286; *Foedera*, I:3, 189.
24. Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 28; H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, "The Scottish Parliaments of Edward I," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XXV, 1928, 300f; Fordun, *op. cit.*; John Barbour, *The Bruce*, W. W. Skeat, ed., Edinburgh, 1894, I, 9ff. Barbour describes the local situation:

For of the lordis sum thai slew,
And sum thai hangyt and sum thai drew
And sum thai put in [hard] presoun,
For-owtyn caus or enchesoun.
25. Fordun, *op. cit.*, pp. 321ff; Hemingburgh, *op. cit.*, 127f.
26. Fordun, *op. cit.*, pp. 321ff; Hemingburgh, *op. cit.*, II, 231. Both point out that Edward would always allow the nobles to receive back their lands in both countries if they were prepared to submit. For a discussion of the customs levies, *cf.* Gras, *op. cit.*, p. 66f.
27. Bain, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 42; *Foedera*, I:2, 868; Fordun, *op. cit.*, p. 326.
28. Fordun, *op. cit.*, p. 323f; "Scalacronica," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, III, 220; *Cal. Docs. Scot.*, II, no. 1978; G. O. Sayles, "The Guardians of Scotland and a Parliament at Rutherglen in 1300," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XXIV, 1927, 248f.
29. Bain, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-42; E. L. G. Stones, "The Submission of Robert Bruce," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XXXIV, 1955, 122f; *Foedera*, I:2, 868, 915; Fordun, *op. cit.*, p. 319.
30. *Acts*, I, 119f; Barbour, *op. cit.*, I, 20. From what Barbour says it looks as though Comyn revealed his agreement with Bruce to Edward I because of Bruce's earlier unwillingness to support Balliol in his rebellion. Barron, *op. cit.*, pp. 178f, casts considerable doubt on the usual version, holding that Bruce had decided to rebel already, and that the quarrel with Comyn was a phase in a family feud.
31. *Ibid.*, I, 12, 31; Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 49 ff; Hemingburgh, *op. cit.*, I, 250; Barbour, *op. cit.*, I, 36, 45, 51, 81, 93; *Cal. Docs. Scot.*, II, 1771, 1776, 1904, 1837.
33. "Scalacronica," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, III, 457; Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
34. Barbour, *op. cit.*, I, 46, 116, 121 *et passim*.

35. Reid, "Trade," p. 214f.
36. Reid, "The Papacy," p. 292f; W. C. Dickinson *et al*, *Source Book of Scottish History*, Edinburgh, 1952, I, 124f.
37. *Ibid.*, I, 122; Barbour, *op. cit.*, II, 187, 219, 235, 248; Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
38. *Acts*, I, 464; Barbour, *op. cit.*, I, 350; "Scalacronica," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, III, 461.
39. Robertson, *op. cit.*, Edinburgh, 1798, p. 6f; *Register of the Great Seal*, 1814, I.
40. Dickinson, *op. cit.*, I, 128f.
41. Robertson, *loc. cit.*; Fordun, *op. cit.*, p. 341; Barbour, *op. cit.*, I, 139f.
42. *Foedera*, II:2, 730, 734, 741.
43. Dickinson, *op. cit.*, I, 139. Although historians such as Bain (*op. cit.*, p. 79) have usually said that these provisions were included in the treaty, there is no evidence that this was the case. Rather the ecclesiastical provisions would seem to have been made the subject of a separate agreement (*Foedera*, II:2, 753).
44. "Scalacronica," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, IV, 28ff; *Cal. Docs. Scot.*, III, no. 1013; *Foedera*, II:2, 804, 806; Fordun, *op. cit.*, pp. 346ff.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 449-351; *Foedera*, II:2, 847f.
46. *Foedera*, II:2, 854, 862, 866; *Cal. Docs. Scot.*, III, 984.
47. Fordun, *op. cit.*, pp. 347ff; Bain, *op. cit.*, 88ff; Hemingburgh, *op. cit.*, II, 306f.
48. Fordun, *op. cit.*, pp. 359ff; "Scalacronica," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, IV, 202; Bain, *op. cit.*, pp. 90ff.
49. Fordun, *op. cit.*, p. 363; *Cal. Docs. Scot.* IV, 2; *Acts*, I, 492.
50. Tytler, *op. cit.*, I, 326ff.