

Retrieving Trudeau:
Republican Affinities in the Political Thought of Pierre Elliott Trudeau

by

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empire, and also fed by the springs of Hellenic Stoicism (Ebenstein, 1951: 123; italics in original).

All Roman citizens, in Cicero's view, were entitled to *libertas* and *ius* (liberty and justice); consequently, citizenship guaranteed protection from arbitrary treatment. In his treatises on the best constitutional regime (*De res publica*, 2008) and the perfect legal regime for the republic (*De legibus*, 2008), Cicero lays out a clear conception of the rights and duties of citizenship, and the relationship between it and the health of a republic. While citizens had the right to expect the state to secure *libertas* and *ius*, they also knew that they were obligated to view all fellow citizens as equals under, and before, that same law.

Whereas the general Greek view, as typically expressed by Aristotle, held that some people were superior to others, Cicero said that 'there is no human being of any race who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain virtue' (Ebenstein, 1951: 123).

Justice was the lynchpin of the republic: when it was present, the republic existed to protect the common interest and the obedience of the citizen body.

[T]he conception of the people (*populus*) as a political and legal force in the process of government acquired in Roman constitutional history connotations and undertones similar to those the word 'people' has acquired again in modern times in the world-wide struggles for democracy and popular self-government. Plato and Aristotle know of the *polis*, the city state, and of social classes, but not of the people. The conception of the 'people' in western political thinking is a contribution, not of Roman philosophy, but of Roman public law (Ebenstein, 1951: 124–125)

For Cicero, republicanism, the *res publica*, was not only a form of government, but it was defined according to the values and goals served by government (most importantly justice and

the common good). Roman citizenship became a legal status that is analogous to modern nationality; and as is often said, it provided legal and military protections in exchange for allegiance to Rome. The matter of allegiance (or loyalty) will return in my discussion of modern republican patriotism, or in my words, purposeful belonging.

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"Justice was the lynchpin of the republic" and "when it was present, the republic existed to protect the common interest and the obedience of the" citizen body (Digeser, 2004:10).

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Bibliographical reference addendum:

Digeser, Elizabeth De Palma (2004). In *Republicanism: History, Theory, and Practice*. Daniel Weinstock and Christian Nadeau (eds). Frank Cass Publishers.