# The Individual-Society Connection: Action and Change in the Lives of Matthews, Mandela and Biko

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
March, 1993

ISBN 0-315-87467-8

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"...a doctrine of hate can never take people anywhere.
It is too exacting. It warps the mind.
That is why we preach the doctrine of love, love for Africa.
We can never do enough for Africa, nor can we love her enough.
The more we do for her, the more we wish to do.
And I am sure I am speaking for the whole of young Africa
when I say that we are prepared to work with any man
who is fighting for the liberation of Africa
within our lifetime."

Robert Sobukwe, 1949*

* Address on behalf of the Graduating Class at Fort Hare College, delivered at the "Completers' Social", October 21, 1949. In T. Karis and G. M. Carter (Eds). (1973). From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964 (Vol. 2). Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press.

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## Abstract

The dissertation involves two related questions: What is the relationship between individuals and the society in which they live? and, given this relationship, How are social scientists, in particular social psychologists, to study individuals? A duality model of the individual-society connection is proposed, which recognises the irreducibility and the interdependence of individuals and society. Individuals, as autonomous agents with subjective orientations to the society of which they are a part, and social structure, as an objective order of material social forces, dialectically interact and jointly produce social change. The model differs from others in recognising an objective and a subjective aspect to both individuals and society. Social structure affects individual agents through the subjectification of the material structure as culture, and individual agents affect structure through the objectification of their action in social positions. Using this model, the life-histories of three individuals are analysed, showing how the interaction of personal and social variables allowed them to be the persons they were (are). These individuals (Z.K. Matthews [1901-1968]; Nelson Mandela [1918- ] and Stephen Biko [1946-1977]) all contributed to the black opposition movement in South Africa, but, because of the different socio-historical times in which they lived, interacted with different social contexts, resulting in differences (and similarities) between the three lives. Finally, the duality model is evaluated against alternatives and is shown to offer a more adequate understanding of the individual-society connection and to satisfy criteria of a progressive scientific research programme.

## A Note on Terminology and Sources

Deciding on appropriate terminology to describe the groups in South Africa presents the writer with a serious dilemma. Many terms have become associated with the oppressor, and have accordingly been rejected by the oppressed. In earlier periods, the terms 'African', 'Native' and 'Bantu' were used, but are no longer acceptable. Since the 1970s, the preferred term has been 'black', and it has been extended to include all the oppressed, African, Indian and Coloured.

Throughout this dissertation, the terms 'black' and 'white' will be used, with the hope that they will convey the idea of two groups - not 'races' - with their own specific interests determined in the context of their interaction. No absolute, or fundamental, difference is assumed, other than a difference in pigmentation, the exploitation of which has produced gross social injustice. In the discussion of events prior to the extension of the term 'black' by the proponents of Black Consciousness in the 1970s, 'black' will carry the narrower meaning, while in Chapter 5 it will include Coloured and Indian people.

Although the preferred term in this dissertation is 'black', the reader will come across quotations using other terms, sometimes reflecting the historical time in which the statement was made, and at other times reflecting an insensitivity on the part of the speaker.

## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AAC | All-African Convention |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| BCP | Black Community Programmes |
| BPC | Black People's Convention |
| COP | Congress of the People |
| CPSA | Communist Party of South African |
| ICU | Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa |
| MK | Umkhonto we Siswe (Spear of the Nation) |
| NP | National Party |
| NRC | Natives Representative Council |
| NUSAS | National Union of South African Students |
| PAC | Pan-Africanist Congress |
| SACP | South African Communist Party |
| SAIC | South African Indian Congress |
| SAIRR | South African Institute of Race Relations |
| SASO | South African Students' Organization |
| SASM | South African Student Movement |
| SRC | Students' Representative Council |
| SSRC | Soweto Students' Representative Council |
| UCM | University Christian Movement |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNESCO | United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organisation |
| WCC | World Council of Churches |
| YL | Youth League (of African National Congress) |

## Acknowledgements

This dissertation represents the culmination of efforts by many individuals who made possible my Interdisciplinary programme and who supported me as it developed. To all those who have contributed to my progress at Dalhousie, may I express sincere thanks. I am particularly grateful to the following people and source:

Dr. John Barresi, who, even before he took on the responsibility of supervising this project, encouraged me to pursue my research interests. Together we engaged in a dialogue: he made his own views clear, but gave me the freedom to entertain others, and had the patience to allow me to discover my errors.

Drs. David Braybrooke and Ken Heard, both of whom read a number of drafts of this dissertation and provided comments and advice which, in my opinion, far exceeded their obligation. The improvements resulting from their efforts may be hidden in this dissertation, but certainly the weaknesses can be attributed to my failure to heed their comments.

The Faculty of Graduate Studies for a Research and Development Fund Award which assisted in the research undertaken for this dissertation.

Finally, Elke, who, more than anyone, made it possible to get this far...

# Chapter 1. Introduction

The general problem of this dissertation can be stated in the form of two related questions: What is the relationship between individuals and the society with which they interact? and, given this relationship, How are social scientists, in particular social psychologists, to study the individual?

Section 1 argues that individualist understandings of human being overlook the fundamentally social nature of such existence. In their place a non-individualist, interactionist understanding of the individual-society connection is defended. The implications of this ontology for the study of individuals are considered in section 2. The chapter closes with a brief overview of the project, and the structure of the dissertation.

## 1. The Relationship between Individuals and Society

When psychologists study an individual in an artificial situation (or individuals in an artificial 'group'), isolated from (and purposely ignoring) the wider (social) community from which the individual comes, they lose sight of important dynamic aspects of the person they set out to study. The interactive connections between the individual and related variables, including other individuals, social

groups, institutions and geographic locations are temporarily severed in the pursuit of a scientific study of the (universal) individual, unhindered by such complicating variables.

Research that assumes this world-view looks no further than the isolated individual when explaining events, for it assumes that the thinking entity has within it - somewhere, somehow - all the information required for a satisfactory explanation (cf., Churchland, 1978; Fodor, 1980). However, this Cartesian individualism has been challenged by some: Wittgenstein, for example, sought to decompose the cogito into its generative components. His well-known private language argument (1958) is one way in which he attempted to direct our attention to the social nature of our being. He concluded that in order to comprehend behaviour we do not need to know the state of mind (or brain) of the actor, but rather must make sense of the behaviour by including the actor, at least provisionally, in our linguistic community with our shared concepts. In other words, individuals can be explained only by using a social (public) form of language, or more broadly, individuals are constituted as individuals through their action in social relations (cf., Sève, 1978; Bourdieu, 1990).

Burge (1979, 1986), drawing on Putnam's 'Twin Earth' thought experiments, followed Wittgenstein, and showed that

when an individual uses a term like 'arthritis', the meaning of the term depends on the context ('earth' or 'twin-earth') in which the term is used. Burge goes further and argues that the mental states of individuals involving this same-sounding term in the two contexts are different. In other words, even in thinking of arthritis, individuals in the two contexts, because of their different contexts, have different thoughts. It is the action-in-context that makes the psychological (mental) entity.

These insights point to an interactional understanding of the individual-society relation as foundational to a psychology of individual behaviour or mental processes. The ontology demanded by such an analysis was recognised by Marx, in his famous reflection: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past" (1972, p.437).

Marx's comment includes two important premises for an adequate conception of the individual-society connection. He assumes, first, that individual and society are distinct (i.e., irreducible). Social structure provides the material circumstances for intentional human behaviour, but neither the conditions given in society nor the action of individuals can be reduced to each other.

Second, Marx points to the interdependence of individual and society. Both individual and society are contributing forces in history, so that full explanations of individual and social phenomena are possible only if an interactive ontology of individual and society is assumed.

When applied to the psychological individual, this interactional view produces a nonindividualist psychology. For example, Sève (1978, p.68) argues that "the nature of the individual for mature Marxism is not originally to bear the human essence in himself but to find it outside himself in social relations". It is these interactive relations with others, instantiating particular social relations, that give the individual a distinctive character. In Sève's words, "the personality [is] a living system of social relations between acts" (Ibid., p.193). Individuals continually develop as they reflect the interaction of individual organism and social system; the apparent basis of personality in the individual (for example, as traits) is an illusion resulting from the physical salience of the actor and the intangibility of social relations.

Approaching persons with this ontological orientation offers certain advantages. It is possible to see leadership, for example, not as some accidental coincidence of individual character with social need, but rather as continuously reproduced by social forces over time. Leaders

in one era are integrally tied to the social forces that made their leadership possible. This view, therefore, allows one to appreciate the developmental progression of the individual-society interaction in producing different persons through time. The research reported in this dissertation illustrates the process behind this progression of leadership. In fact, the model proposed in Chapter 2 develops this non-individualist ontology and offers a way to understand persons from all times and places, not as accidental variations on a universal blueprint but as explainable manifestations of the interaction of individuals with their social milieux.

## 2. Studying the Individual

If, as suggested above, the individualist ontology is inadequate, can the positivist methodology to which psychology has historically been committed, remain, or does it need to be replaced with a post-positivist, realist methodology (Bhaskar, 1979; Manicas & Secord, 1983)?

The problem is especially important to social psychologists, as their research focuses on the individual's relation to society. Traditionally, social psychology has defined itself as the "scientific study of how individual's thoughts, feelings and behaviors are affected by other people" (Sampson, 1991, p.3). This definition, and the

accompanying research, has emphasised the individual subject. Social stimuli (e.g., size of group, authority relations) are manipulated and the consequent responses of subjects are recorded. The reacting individual is assumed to respond in a lawlike manner to a given stimulus. This explains researchers' heavy reliance on artificial laboratory experiments and easily accessible 'generic individuals' (i.e., college students) (Carlson, 1984; Sears, 1986).

This traditional, or conventional (Sampson, 1991), approach in social psychology places the individual in controlled experimental environments to ensure that confounding variables do not contribute to the results. The results, it is supposed, can be taken to reflect something universal about the nature of human social behaviour. Scientists <u>assume</u> that such universals apply to the wider context, and defend their position by arguing that the influence of these universals is not easily recognised due to the number and complexity of variables that function in reality.

Underlying this methodology is the assumption of unidirectional influence (cf., Vygotsky, 1978). A social stimulus is seen to produce a response in the individual, and, therefore, given <u>any</u> individual, placed in the identical circumstances, the identical response will occur.

But a crucial part of the circumstances in which an individual finds him- or herself is the history of that particular person. Each person is a product of an interaction of social and individual forces: the research subject brings a definite socio-psychological history to the laboratory. Thus, the individual, too, is part of the stimulus (i.e., circumstances). This means that individuals are not purely reactive subjects but are part of the explanation of their own behaviour. It is this dialectical nature of human behaviour that cannot be reflected by the conventional methodology.

In contrast to the conventional approach, the sociohistorical approach (Sampson, 1991) seeks ways to study the interactive nature of individual and society. This approach recognises the social and historical nature of behaviour: the social space we inhabit, along with the historical time in which we live, together profoundly influence the kind of person we become. The behaviour observed by social scientists, therefore, is in each instance a phenotypic manifestation of the dialectical interaction of individual and society (Vygotsky, 1978, p.62). Methodologically, this means that a phenomenon being investigated must be studied "in the process of change", as the developmental unfolding of the phenomenon will reveal its dialectical nature (Ibid., p.65).

The sociohistorical approach contrasts with the individualism of the conventional experimenters, most notably in its emphasis on change. Society, as the social conditions that make possible individual action, changes over time - as a result of 'men making history' (Marx) - meaning that particular individuals, because they develop through an interaction with a given society - thus becoming a 'living system of social relations' (Sève) - also will vary across time and space. This emphasis on process or change makes it possible to study the development of different persons in different social contexts and at different times.

The interaction of individual and society allows for the existence of (1) persons differently formed in different (social) locations within the same society, (2) persons differently formed in different cultures, and (3) persons differently formed through historical time. This follows from the fact that an individual is born into a particular society, at a particular time, with particular possibilities for social interaction, and it is within this constraining reality that the individual forms as a person and acts to reproduce social relations and even to transform them. Changed societies make possible different forms of interaction, and result in changed minds: as Luria (1976, p.163) has summarised the point, "sociohistorical shifts not

only introduce new content into the mental world of human beings; they also create new forms of activity and new structures of cognitive functioning".

A person develops through the interaction of the individual with the social system in which he or she exists; thus, the development of a person is marked heavily by the particular social relations in which the individual is engaged at a particular time. On this approach an individual studied in isolation is not a suitable subject for social scientific enquiry, but instead the dynamic process of individual-social interaction comes into, and must be reflected in, any study of the individual (psychology), the social (sociology), or any explicitly interactionist research of the socio-psychological interface (Bhaskar, 1979). The thesis to be demonstrated in this dissertation is that the study of persons within such an individual-social dynamic offers a profitable approach for social scientists.

Given this dialectic, a suitable methodology is required to study the individual-in-society. In this regard, individual life-histories, analysed in terms of a psychological biography (Anderson, 1981; Runyan, 1984; Wolfenstein, 1981), offer one methodological avenue in the explanation of individual action. This dissertation develops such socio-psychological analyses to show both how individuals relate to society, and how social scientists can

approach the study of individuals, given the complexity of the ontology of human social existence.

## 3. Outline of the Project

The basic question guiding the project - How do social and individual forces interact and develop? - can be made more specific: How do individuals come to be part of a social form and how is society modified by the activity of individuals? Here both the power of society to change individuals and the power of individuals to change society are equally important. The difficulty lies in suitably characterising this relationship.

To address this problem, it is important that the generative power of both individual and society be appreciated. Chapter 2 will consider this issue, arguing for both the irreducibility and mutual influence (interdependence) of individuals and society. Then, taking into account the irreducibility of individual and society, along with their interdependence, a new model that avoids the difficulties of earlier approaches is proposed.

To show the scientific promise of this new model in the study of persons, the model will be applied empirically to the lives of three leaders in the liberation movement in South Africa (Chapters 3 through 5). The three individuals being considered - Professor Z. K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela

and Stephen Biko - each played a distinct role in the liberation movement in South Africa. The evolving historical forces in which they grew up allowed them to develop personalities appropriate to the requirements of the liberation movement of that time.

Z. K. Matthews (1901-68) was an educational pioneer for black South Africans and became their leading intellectual. His controlled and peaceful opposition, and his willingness to cooperate in state-created structures, reflects his character-formation through a system of missionary education which encouraged and reinforced a belief in gradual social liberalisation through educational achievement.

Nelson Mandela (1918- ) was part of a group of young leaders who shared the older leaders' educational tradition, but who were frustrated by the ineffectiveness of the 'old guard' in reversing the state's growing repression. Following the crackdown by the state in the wake of the mass demonstrations of the 1950s, Mandela was one of those able to appraise the situation and lead the opposition movement into a period of militancy and confrontation.

Stephen Biko (1946-77) emerged in the vacuum created after the imprisonment of black leaders in the early 1960s. Legal restrictions made the overtly political mass demonstrations of the 1950's impractical. Instead a strategy that would strengthen black pride and self-reliance, while

minimising state repression, was developed. Biko's reading of, and reaction to, the changed conditions in South Africa created a form of opposition that made it difficult for the state to control the emerging black power.

Detailed 'socio-psychological' accounts of the lives of Matthews, Mandela and Biko are given in Chapters 3 through 5 to support the model of the individual-society connection developed in Chapter 2. Furthermore, because the three individuals lived in consecutive historico-political periods, the comparisons between the three socio-psychological accounts give additional support for the model's usefulness, and especially its temporal dimension, so important to the interactive nature of the model. Following these empirical accounts, Chapter 6 considers the advantages of the duality model over competing approaches to the individual-society connection, and discusses various challenges to all these particular accounts, and more generally, the duality model.

## Chapter 2. The Individual-Society Connection: A Duality Model

Much of the difficulty in formulating a satisfactory model of the individual-society connection has resulted from theorists' attempts to reduce society to (a mass of) individual action, or individuals to (functionaries in a coercing) society. The debate over the primacy of the individual agent or the determining society has often been passionate (e.g., Hook, 1943); however, the vitriol assumes that a solution depends on the supremacy of one or the other form of reduction. According to Lukács (1971/1922), theorists in this tradition are polarised into two groups: "on the one hand, there were the 'great individuals' viewed as the autocratic makers of history, on the other hand, there were the 'natural laws' of the historical environment" (p.158). In the first section of this chapter, it will be argued that both forms of reduction misrepresent the relation of individual and society.

Section 2 focuses on a group of contemporary writers, who, drawing more or less explicitly on work in the Marxist tradition (e.g., Plekhanov, 1940/1898), have tried to overcome these reductions. They have argued that, while society and individuals are interdependent (i.e., presuppose each other's existence and mutually influence each other),

they are ontologically distinct (i.e., irreducible). For this reason, primary causal power should be attributed to neither; questions about the relation of individual and society are not to be framed as 'either-or' choices. Instead, both society and individuals indirectly influence each other as they maintain themselves (Bhaskar, 1979, 1983; Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1981; Shotter, 1983; Sharrock, 1987; Ruben, 1989; Porpora, 1989).

In section 3 the dual natures of social structure and individual action (Giddens, 1976) are shown each to entail an objective dimension and a subjective dimension, with the result that both dualities can be brought together into a single model of the individual-society connection. The power of the model is especially evident in its account of change, as will be shown in chapters 3, 4 and 5, where the duality model is used as a basis for the explanation of individual lives.

## 1. Reductions and Complications

### i. Reduction of Individual or Society

Proposed approaches that give the individual agent primacy, and try to explain society as the sum of individual actions can be called individualistic or 'voluntaristic' (Bhaskar, 1979). In other words, all approaches which argue that the action of individuals (i) is sufficient to explain

the complexity of society (S) are defending a reduction of society to individual. This can be formalised in the following way, where society is a function of (or explainable in terms of) individual action:

$$[M_1] \qquad S = f(i_1, i_2 \ldots i_n)$$

If 'I' is taken to represent the sum of individuals acting ($i_1$, $i_2$ ... $i_n$), the formulation can be simplified:

$$[M_1] \qquad S = f(I)$$

Whatever the details, any proposal that explains the relation of individual to society as one of unidirectional influence (in the sense of produce, create, affect or effect) can be considered individualistic. Typically this view is associated with Weber (Berger and Pullberg, 1966; Bhaskar, 1979; Münch and Smelser, 1987), although other theorists (Elster, 1982; Hayek, 1952; Lukes, 1973) align themselves with this idea.

In Weber's formulation of the individualist thesis [$M_1$] he argues that individual processes (actions and interactions) <u>combine</u> in ways that can be captured only by new concepts or variables that make sense of the collective dimension. This view supports [$M_1$] because even when combinations of individuals are better described in social terms, the social terms refer to (and are made necessary by)

the combined activity of individuals; for Weber there is no social reality aside from individual action.

Neoclassical economic theory also supports [$M_1$]. Its "basic units of analysis...are individual buyers and sellers of resources and products" (Münch and Smelser, 1987, p.358), whose actions together constitute the economic system. The aim is to explain the social and economic patterns that characterise capitalism by aggregating the actions of individual actors. This contrasts with Weber's view that social patterns are imposed by analysts to explain the actions of many. Nevertheless, both approaches see individual action as primary and sufficient to explain social structures.

Methodological individualism is the currently popular incarnation of this Weberian approach (Elster, 1982; Roemer, 1982; Egan, 1991; Popper, 1971; Watkins, 1959; cf., Kincaid, 1986; Weldes, 1989). In this tradition Popper argued that "all social phenomena, and especially the functioning of all social institutions, should always be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes etc., of human individuals, and ... we should never be satisfied by an explanation in terms of so-called 'collectives' (states, nations, races, etc.)" (1971, p.98).

In their opposition to [$M_1$], critics of individual-based theories often overcompensate by emphasising the

primacy of the social or collective (Sharrock, 1987). Such theories explain the individual as a product of social forces; in other words, they try to understand individuals (I) as a function of society, or the functioning of social structures (S). In contrast to [$M_1$], this approach can be illustrated in the following way:

$$[M_2] \qquad I = f(S)$$

Social reductionism (cf., 'holism' in James, 1984) can be identified by its emphasis on the primacy of society (objects and relations) which effects (or determines, produces or causes) the behaviours of the individual. Here individuals lose their power to act, being considered only as individual instantiations of social forces.

Durkheim's approach is most often associated with this view. He "sets society as an entity over and against man, and shows him to be made by it" (Berger and Pullberg, 1966, p.56). Although Durkheim did acknowledge the underlying action of individuals and groups in sustaining social systems, he gave primacy to the power of social systems over individuals. These individuals being constrained by 'social facts' (Mandelbaum, 1959; Ruben, 1989), however, are not psychological, in the sense of intentional and conscious beings, but rather are social actors, important only in their ability to fulfill a socially-required function. This

point will be developed further below.

Some authors (e.g., Hook, 1943; Münch and Smelser, 1987) argue that Marx, too, saw social constraints on individual action, where individuals are forced into certain relationships or roles determined by social structures. Thus in a certain system capitalist and worker are unavoidable categories for individual productive action. Münch and Smelser, for example, claim that in the process of "commodity production, human action is determined by the laws of the system that develop independent of individual motivation and that exert external power on human individuals and are unmodifiable by them" (1987, p.368).

The reductionist formulations of [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] have been summarised by Berger and Pullberg in the following way:

> "The first presents us with a view of society as a network of human meanings as embodiments of human activity. The second, on the other hand, presents us with society conceived as a thing-like facticity, standing over against its individual members with coercive controls and moulding them in its socializing processes. In other words, the first view presents us with man as the social being and with society as being made by him, whereas the second view sets society as an entity over and against man, and shows him to be made by it. ... The difference between them is...seeing society as the incarnation of human actions and seeing it as a reality which human activity has to take as given" (1966, p.56).

ii. <u>Circularity in Mutual Reductions</u>

Because neither [$M_1$] nor [$M_2$], taken alone, seems

satisfactory, a number of theorists have tried to combine both approaches. Münch and Smelser (1987), for example, want to accept both [$M_1$] and [$M_2$], and suggest that each is relevant to a particular kind of explanation, the values of which are made evident in the explanations offered by Weber and Durkheim. The proposal of Münch and Smelser does not necessarily argue for a synthesis of the two into a single model, but rather defends their heuristic potential in different domains of explanation. If [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] are not part of one larger model, however, Münch and Smelser do not explain how the individuals and societies in [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] are different or similar.

Berger (Berger and Pullberg, 1966; Berger and Luckmann, 1967) likewise accepts [$M_1$] and [$M_2$], though he argues for a 'dialectical' synthesis of both views, where "social structure is produced by man and in turn produces him" (p.63). The characteristics of [$M_1$] are clearly evident in the claim of Berger and Pullberg (1966) that social structure is an "objectivation" of human activity. They argue that "social structure is nothing but the result of human enterprise. It has no reality except a human one. It is not characterizable as being a thing able to stand on its own, apart from the human activity that produced it" (p.62f).

While this sounds somewhat Weberian, they go on to

describe the other half (i.e., [$M_2$]) of the dialectic: "Social structure is encountered by the individual as an external facticity... Furthermore, social structure is encountered as a coercive instrumentality... Society constrains, controls and may even destroy the individual" (Ibid., p.63).

The model Berger proposes seems promising (cf., Sharrock, 1987) because it attempts to retain the attractive elements of both unidirectional approaches. But, because [$M_1$] proposes a reductionist explanation of social structures in terms of individual action, often entailing causal claims, and [$M_2$] proposes a reductionist explanation of individual action in terms of social structures and forces, also causally interpreted, it is impossible to make [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] compatible.

Both Münch and Smelser (1987) and Berger (Berger & Pullberg, 1966; Berger & Luckmann, 1967) fail to appreciate that by accepting theories both of type [$M_1$] and type [$M_2$], they are faced with contradictory approaches. Notwithstanding the obvious 'truth' in both approaches, the solution is not to accept both without also explaining how they are reconciled in reality (Münch and Smelser's problem) or to force both together and claim that this describes reality (Berger's problem). The problem for any theorists who want to accept [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] is that they are faced with

two reductionistic forms of explanation.

If, as [$M_1$] asserts, individual action can explain society (or social phenomena, concepts or structure), then society, in some way, is merely a function of individual action (the 'f' in [$M_1$]). On the other hand, [$M_2$] asserts the opposite: social structures can explain individual action, as society socialises individuals in its image, to perform socially-required tasks. On [$M_2$], therefore, individuals are a function of society.

Forcing [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] together results in the following dilemma: As [$M_1$] asserts, society is some function of individuals. So, the society that explains individual action [$M_2$], is, based on [$M_1$], actually some function of individuals. This implies that individuals act the way they do because of other individuals, and society has no reality, other than that of a collectivity (in some form) of individuals.

The situation is equally unsatisfactory when we consider society. Individuals can be explained in social terms [$M_2$], so the individuals that come together and make society [$M_1$] are already only social creations [$M_2$]. Thus, society perpetuates itself, and individuals exist only as socially-based functionaries.

This outcome has the distressing consequence that if society produces particular individuals and these

individuals in turn maintain society through their action, social change (revolution, transformation) cannot be explained as a dialectic between individuals and society despite the claims of Berger and Pullberg. A circular (closed) process involving causal powers attributed on the one hand to social structure and on the other hand to individual action cannot simultaneously satisfy both conditions in its account of social change. If a given society produces individuals as direct instantiations of its structure - and, according to social reductionism, that is all individuals are - then when those individuals act, in their socially-determined way, they must - necessarily - reproduce the original society or express novelty or change that is intrinsic to the causal mechanisms that reproduce social structure. There is no room for the capacity of individuals to act as free self-conscious agents, since they are merely a reflection of the social structure that constituted them as social actors.

Likewise, if society's reproduction is a direct expression of individual action (individual reduction), then all social reproduction as well as novelty must be viewed as resulting from the free choice of the individuals that form society, since the circular process that produces new actors has no causal powers independent of those given through the collective action of individuals. Such a 'conspiracy theory'

of social reproduction and change (Popper, 1959) cannot accommodate the notion that social structure provides a causal force independent of the causal powers of individuals.

Furthermore, neither of these mechanisms of social change seems entirely coherent in itself. Those psychological individuals in [$M_1$], with their characteristics of intentionality, consciousness, and the capacity for free choice, seem irreconcilable with the functional individuals in [$M_2$] that are explainable in terms of (and result from) the society. Similarly, social structure as an independent reality (i.e., irreducible to and) constraining individuals ([$M_2$]) is at odds with a society that is solely a product of (i.e., reducible to) human action ([$M_1$]). Compounding [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] into a single model produces two kinds of individual and two kinds of society that Berger and Pullberg do not reconcile. Not only are the reductionistic explanations of [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] maintained, but additional problems are added when theorists try to make [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] compatible without rejecting their reductionistic premises.

Only if our perspective continually oscillates between individualistic and societal approaches, is Berger's model comprehensible. (Münch and Smelser acknowledge this from the outset, although they do not consider it a limitation).

Berger emphasises individual power when explaining how individuals relate to society, but points to the power of society over impotent individuals when explaining how society relates to individuals. It should be clear that the cause of social change cannot be both the individual and society, so long as one is a product of (or reducible to) the other.

If both society and individuals contribute to, or generate, change, each must be shown to have its own ontological reality. Until this is done, Berger's 'dialectical' model will continue to be "seriously misleading", for individual and society are not "two moments of the same [dialectical] process" (Bhaskar, 1979, p.42); individuals acting purposively do not create society and society does not wholly determine individuals. This does not deny the need for a suitable model of their interaction where individual and society are (1) irreducible, in the sense that they have distinct causal powers, and (2) interdependent, in the sense that each is necessary for the other's existence. But it does deny that the connection is causally reducible, whether this be conceived unidirectionally (as in [$M_1$] and [$M_2$]) or bidirectionally (as in Berger's model).

## 2. Individual and Society as Irreducible and Interdependent

### i. Irreducibility

The above discussion against reductionism presumed the ontological reality and irreducibility of both individual and society. Otherwise, [$M_1$] or [$M_2$] could be a suitable framework for resolving the problem of individual-society interaction. This section aims to defend these presumptions by answering the following questions: What is meant by 'individual' and 'society' that implies they are real and distinct kinds of thing? and What prevents either of them being reduced to the other?

Central to any definition of an individual person is the concept of agency, or the ability to engage in intentional, goal-directed action. Individuals act self-consciously; that is they can reflect on their purposes, and this gives an individual's account of an action a special - although not infallible - status (Bhaskar, 1979, p.44; James, 1984). The unity of the individual depends on the continuity and interconnections of this self-conscious and purposive activity through time. In other words, the unity of the individual is characterised by a continuous subjective life that develops through time and that is based on the individual's organismic capacity to unify experience and generate action.

On the other hand, the unity of society or social structure depends on the network of social relations that make up a social order at a particular time, and on the continuity amid change of that network through time. As Marx has recognised "society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand" (Marx, 1973, p.265). The social order is composed of relations between human beings but is not restricted to these relations. It depends also on other material objects and locations that enter into space-time relations that maintain and transform its structure.

Based on this distinction between individuals and society, it follows that individuals cannot be reduced to, and are not a product of, society. What society may require of the individual as 'social actor' is not necessarily the same as the (conscious, intentional) production of an individual agent (cf., Bhaskar, 1979, p.44). Individuals are more than social actors; as bio-psychological organisms, they adapt to ecological as well as social environments, thus they cannot simply be the product of social relations. Society does not <u>create</u> individuals, though it conditions them as competent social actors and creates (or entails) roles that individuals perform (as social actors). Actual performances of individuals concur more or less well with the social requirements of the role. Nevertheless, what

society determines is not the individual per se, but a social function that conditions the individual to become a competent social actor.

Individuals are independent psychological agents who have the potential to act in a multitude of ways (freely), although the context (social relations) in which they do act places them in a particular locus with particular interests (Porpora, 1989) that influence their choices. Individuals are distinct from, and irreducible to, social structure, but they are connected to social structures through their role-filling activity.

Just as individuals cannot be reduced to society, social structure is not reducible to, or a product of, individual action. Individuals produce (cause) action, which, because it necessarily occurs in social relations, influences society. But that which makes individuals distinct - conscious, intentional action - does not itself cause (or explain) social relations. When individuals act in social positions they are neither entirely knowledgeable of the antecedent social conditions which - in part - determine their actions, nor are they aware of the full consequences of their actions (cf., Giddens, 1976, 1979). Yet such determining relations between the antecedent social conditions and the consequences of their actions are the very medium through which social structure maintains itself.

Though individuals' actions are necessary for the maintenance of social structure they are not sufficient for its creation. Social structure is maintained also through the causal powers of other material objects and space-time relations that fall within the socio-historical realm of a society. Therefore, the causal powers of individual agents, and in particular, the activities of individuals as conscious agents, are not themselves sufficient to maintain and transform the social structure of a society.

To illustrate the point that individuals do not cause society, but through their actions maintain it, consider the following example. Individuals get married, and (the action of) getting married maintains social structures. Individuals do not cause the institution of marriage, but as a consequence of their personal action, such institutions are maintained (cf., Bhaskar, 1979, p.44). However, marriage as an institution depends also on the causal powers of such objects as marriage certificates, churches and city halls, as well as on a vast network of social roles. These roles legitimise and maintain the institution. When individuals act, the characteristics of a particular individual may affect the role, thereby modifying (i.e., causally influencing, but not determining) the social structure. This point will be pursued in the following section.

In summary, the structure of society cannot be

explained in individual terms, and neither can the individual as a whole be explained by a determining society (Kincaid, 1986). Because each is a unity that cannot be reduced to the other, they are ontologically independent. However, because each serves as a necessary condition for the existence of the other, they are interdependent (James, 1984; Weldes, 1989). This interdependency (connection) will be discussed in the next section.

ii. Interdependence

Having established the ontological reality (i.e., non-reducibility) of both individual and society, it is possible to review approaches specifically aimed at linking individual and society in a non-reductionist model. The historical antecedents of this programme are found mainly in the Marxist tradition. In the first Thesis on Feuerbach Marx (1972, p.107) points out that materialism - up to that point - had ignored the subjectivity of action, "human sensuous activity, practice". On the other hand, idealism tried, in an abstract way, to develop this active side, but in the process lost sight of the objectivity of human action.

It is these two aspects of human action that Plekhanov elaborated in The Role of the Individual in History (1940/1898). The promise in Plekhanov's model comes from his distinction between the personal qualities of individuals

and the social role that such individuals fill. For Plekhanov, an individual's social influence exists within a socially determined role, i.e., at the point of intersection of social forces. This allows the role to conform to inevitable historical processes, but at the same time maintains the individual's freedom.

Plekhanov wants to argue that, however idiosyncratic a personality, its influence on the course of history can only "change the individual features of events and some of their particular consequences, but [not] their general trend, which is determined by other forces" (Plekhanov, 1940, p.48, Plekhanov's emphasis). Over and above individuals' abilities to perform the necessary function, their personalities may distinguish their tenure in the role. But all the time they are within socially-created roles and it is these social relations that are historically determined by the productive forces.

Generously interpreting Plekhanov, one may identify means by which to mediate the connection between individual and society. While individual and society are both necessary for each other's existence, the relationship is not direct: individuals change society through roles and only within the purview of the existing productive forces.

Contemporary theorists have pursued the distinction between individual action and action in a social role.

Giddens (1976) and Bhaskar (1979) have noted that individuals act consciously towards their own, personal ends, while also acting - not necessarily with awareness - to reproduce social structures. Individuals also can transform society through their action, although typically such change requires some consciousness by the individual of the role (i.e., the social power) being executed. Bhaskar (1979) refers to this distinction between individual action as personal and individual action as social (role-filling) as the duality of praxis. Giddens (1976) has also identified a duality of structure in the relation between individual and society, by which he means "the essentially recursive character of social life. The structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices that constitute those systems" (Giddens, 1982, p.184).

The concept of duality, as opposed to dualism (Giddens, 1982, p.184), is useful and will be central in the model developed in the following section. In particular, the concept of duality of structure makes possible the interdependence of an objective society and a subjective individual, though Giddens' own formulation fails to realise this resolution. Duality of structure in Giddens' theory links only structure and agency, and says nothing about the equally important interaction of the material, or objective, and the ideal, or subjective, domains (Porpora, 1989). The

problem is rooted in his explicit rejection of social structure "as 'external' to human action, as a source of constraint on the free initiative of the independently constituted subject" (Giddens, 1984, p.16).

Giddens avoids the terms 'society' and 'individual', preferring the terms 'structure' and 'agency' (Giddens, 1985, p.168). Structure, for Giddens, is a deep (explanatory) level of rules and resources (Giddens, 1982; Layder, 1985; Porpora, 1989) which he likens to the "'absent corpus' of synthetic and semantic rules" (1982, p.181) used in language production and comprehension. It is difficult to heed Giddens' warning that the rules and resources of structure should not be understood as analogous to the rules and resources available in a language (1985, p.169), for in his writing there remains a strong similarity between the two (e.g., 1982, p.184; cf., Thompson, 1989).

For Giddens, rules and resources are not material but refer to normative processes. Rules are "recursively involved in all social practices [as] codes of meaning or signification and normative sanctions" (1985, p.169). Resources are of two types: "Authorization refers to capabilities [of actors (Giddens, 1984, p.224)] which generate commands over <u>persons</u>, while 'allocation' refers to capabilities [of actors] which generate control over <u>objects</u>" (Thompson, 1989, p.61).

Rules are linked to resources in the following way: In any social context, Giddens argues, the "criterion of importance" of rules - which rules to employ - depends on power, and this is the central notion in 'resource' (Giddens, 1982, p.185; 1989, p.256). Giddens seems unable to explain how agents select amongst rules, other than by the resources (power) available to them. But, for Giddens, resources are an outcome of agency, for they are capabilities of actors to influence other actors and objects. Giddens' notion of structure (both rules and resources), therefore, is non-material and dependent on normative practices amongst agents. Structure cannot incorporate material changes that do not result from agency; structure is reducible to the intersubjectivity of agents. The power differences (resources) that influence the actions of agents have no causal status independent of the agents.

Structure exists as an immaterial corpus of possible ways of acting, and the particular instantiations of these rules and resources by agents forms the surface system of reproduced social relations (Giddens, 1982; Layder, 1985). Thus, structure has only a "virtual existence" (Giddens, 1981, p.26; 1982, p.181), while social systems exist in time and space as the "patterns of relationships between actors or collectivities" (Ibid.).

As Porpora (1989) emphasises, Giddens acknowledges the

reality and causal power of an intersubjective realm that includes "rules, norms, ideology and symbolic orders" (p.201). Unfortunately, it seems that Giddens' structural rules and resources, and his actual system of intersubjective patterns both concern themselves only with causal mechanisms "internal to the collectivity of agents as cultural constructs that are intersubjectively shared" (Ibid., p.202). A conception of social structure as "objective, social relationships", referring "to the actual organization of society - the distribution of income, the division of labor, etc." (Ibid., p.201), that is analytically prior (Ibid., p.202) to the intersubjective behaviour patterns that characterise culture, is absent from Giddens' model. Without an independent, material and causally powerful notion of society, Giddens

> "obscures the fact that rules and resources only exist in the context of specific sets of historically reproduced and <u>concrete</u> social relations ... [and] that reproduced relations are reproduced relations of power and domination which serve to fix the distribution of 'resources' in some prior, but historically (and humanly) determined fashion, at particular points in time, or periods of time" (Layder, 1985, p.143).

Such objective structural conditions, unlike Giddens' social structure/system, do not "depend for their existence on their at least tacit acknowledgement by the participating agents" (Porpora, 1989, p.202). While it is true that structure, even in this objective, material sense, requires

the activity of agents for its maintenance, structure - as material worksites, public facilities etc. - cannot be reduced to the activity of agents. Importantly, the objective structural relationships, the "organization of society", exist "regardless of whether or not any of the participating actors realizes that they are embedded in them" (Ibid.). In this sense, structure is objective, material and prior to the intersubjective reality which characterises culture and which Giddens captures in his notions of structure and system.

Bhaskar's (1978, 1979) transformational model of the individual-society connection draws on Giddens' notion of duality of structure (as condition and outcome), but it emphasises the irreducibility of society. For Bhaskar, society "is always <u>already made</u> ... [an] ... ever-present <u>condition</u> (material cause)" (1979, p.42f). And so, while Bhaskar's model remains sketchy, it does offer a more promising approach than Giddens'. At the same time, it can be argued that Bhaskar's model essentially consolidates a generous interpretation of Plekhanov.

How does Bhaskar conceive of this relation between individuals and society? Because society and individual "refer to radically different kinds of thing" (Ibid., p.42), Bhaskar speaks of an "ontological hiatus" (Ibid., p.46) between them. At the same time, between them there is a

"mode of connection" (Ibid.). In other words, individuals do not themselves create or make social structures; society is not some function of individuals (cf., [$M_1$] above). But individuals do maintain social structures as an indirect consequence of their action, for when they act they necessarily engage in social relations. While "people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family or work to sustain the capitalist economy ... it is nevertheless the unintended consequence (and inexorable result) of, as it is also a necessary condition for, their activity" (Ibid., p.44).

In Bhaskar's transformational model, where change is an ongoing process of social and individual interaction, the individual's action transforms or reproduces society, while society becomes a condition for individual action through the process of socialization. Bhaskar also offers a descriptive summary of his position:

> "people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did so. ... Neither can, however, be identified with, reduced to, explained in terms of or reconstructed from the other" (1979, p.45f).

Bhaskar's general model respects the ontologically distinct natures of individual and society, but at the same time allows for their interrelation. Importantly, this model of the individual-society connection avoids the mutual

reduction of individual to society and society to individual implied in Berger's 'dialectical' model while, at the same time, maintaining a mutual, but indirect, influence of social structure on individual action and individual action on social structure. In this way, Bhaskar's model has the potential to explain change in a non-circular manner.

## 3. A Duality Model of the Individual-Society Connection

### i. Individual and Society: Subjective and Objective

The duality of praxis captures Plekhanov's distinction between individual action and role-filling behaviour; and the duality of structure, as used here, refers to the difference between Gidden's notion of structure as collective action of individuals and a materialist concept of structure (e.g., Porpora, 1989). Although general, the framework offered by Bhaskar can accommodate these four elements necessary to account fully for the individual-society connection. The problem in this section is to synthesise these dualities into a coherent model sufficiently concrete to generate research enterprises.

Cutting across both dualities is Marx's distinction between subjective ("human sensuous activity, practice") and objective ("'revolutionary', ... practical-critical") activity (1972, p.107). The objective level involves the material modes of production, and the positions that arise

from relationships generated by the mode of production (Porpora, 1989). At this level, therefore, the social structure is a material reality maintained by the activity of individuals in social positions (e.g., worker) relating in a particular way (e.g., exploitation) to other positions (e.g., owner). Importantly, individual activity is objective in the sense that an individual's subjectivity is not required for (although it can influence, see below) the maintenance of the objective or material reality.

Marx's subjective level refers to the psychological (or, in hermeneutical language, the semantic) domain, where individuals act with personal purposes (intentionally, consciously) in terms of their understanding of the material conditions of their existence. In other words, subjective activity is the lived experience of individuals of a culture that reflects, but is not a complete or accurate interpretation of the objective level (cf., Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Husserl, 1970; Schutz, 1972). These acting individuals are part of a socio-historical collectivity of other subjective individuals, and their collective subjectivity forms a culture (of rules, norms etc.) - or, to use Wittgenstein's (1958) term, a 'way of life'. Culture is the outcome of a socio-historical collectivity of individuals acting in their relation to each other and to other material objects and conditions that affect their

existence. Individuals are socialised into this culture, and act in relation to this culture's view of the material conditions of their existence.

The Marxian terminology points to an objective and a subjective dimension in both the individual and society. As Wolfenstein notes, "we must try to develop a set of concepts through which we can comprehend the objectivity as well as the subjectivity of the individual, the subjectivity as well as the objectivity of society, and the simultaneously objective-subjective mediations of these polarities" (1981, p.35). Consider first the individual. The objective element can be equated with the individual-as-actor, or the filling of a social role. Thus, action performed by an individual in a social role (reproduction and/or transformation) can be thought of as manifesting the <u>objectivity of the individual</u>. The subjective aspect of action is the conscious, intentional activity of the individual, or the <u>subjective individual</u>. In action, the individual is simultaneously a sensuous subject and an objective social actor (Ibid.).

This distinction can also be made at the level of society (Ibid.). The subjective aspect of society is expressed by culture, the intersubjective patterns of behaviour which "depend for their existence on their at least tacit acknowledgement by the participating agents" (Porpora, 1989, p.202), while the <u>objective society</u> is the

material system of relationships between positions that characterises social structure (Porpora, 1989). In the former, the participating individuals consciously interact with each other in activities that have intersubjective meaning, while in the latter, these same individuals reproduce those objective relations entailed by the social structure as an indirect consequence of these purposive activities.

The objective level of analysis is graphically depicted in figure 1a. Social structure (objective society) is distinguished from social positions that are determined through the functioning of the society. Social structure (e.g., capitalist, patriarchal, racial systems, cf., Porpora, 1989) entails relations among positions (e.g., owner, worker; black, white; woman, man), that maintain and sometimes even transform the social structure itself.

Certainly social positions rely on the activity of individuals, but this activity is performed by individuals best described as "depersonified actors" (Miller, 1984). The constitution of the individual through objective developmental processes prepares the individual to fulfill a social role. At this level of analysis, unique personal characteristics of concrete individual actors, though also expressed within the constraints of the social role, are subordinated to the role (cf., Plekhanov, 1940).







Figure 1. (a) The Objective Level of Analysis

(b) The Subjective Level of Analysis

Figure 1b depicts what has been called the subjective level of analysis. The subjective society that results from the collectivity of individual action, their intersubjective behaviour patterns, is not material, but rather, is an orientation towards that material reality shared by a group of individuals. Thus, culture refers to a group's interpretation of their material conditions based on their lived experience of those conditions. This interpretation may or may not accurately reflect the material conditions, but it does play a causal (though not fully determining) role in the actions that individuals perform.

Superficially, the objective and subjective levels of analysis, taken together, appear similar to Berger's 'dialectical' model (Berger and Pullberg, 1966; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; see also Bhaskar, 1979) where society produces individuals who in turn produce society. But in this case, the relationship between individuals and social structure, while mutually interdependent, is non-reductive in either direction. By recognising the dualities of structure and praxis, and applying the contrasting distinction between objective and subjective, a non-reductionist, non-circular synthesis of the individual and society is possible. Social structure does not produce individuals but only social positions, and individuals do not produce society, but only collective action. This

process is shown in the duality model depicted in figure 2.

Indirectly, through the (typically unintended) objective dimension of action, an individual has impact on, or makes a contribution to, the material society (objectification), while the material society is made subjective in the interpretations of a collectivity of individuals (subjectification). Because action is determined also by organismic factors inherent to the individual (and non-social environmental factors), the subjective action of an individual is not reducible to society. Equally, the interpretation of the objective society made by individuals only approximates, but does not mirror, the objective conditions. The key to the synthesis lies in the fact that the individual is, simultaneously, an experiencing organism and a social actor, and that society is, simultaneously, a material structure and an intersubjective life experience.

ii. Explaining Change

The duality model (figure 2) is especially powerful in its account of change. The objective and subjective dimensions identified in both society and individuals make it possible to show how all elements change over time, without entailing circularity and without reducing any element to any other. Through the interaction of the objective and subjective levels, structure affects and can change agents through the




Figure 2.2. A Duality Model of the Individual-Society Connection: Relations between the Objective and Subjective Levels of Analysis.

subjectification of the material structure as culture, and agents affect and can change structure through the objectification of their action in positions. These two mediational processes in the interaction will be considered in more detail.

Consider first subjectification. The subjective interpretation of social structure exists in the shared culture of a collection of individuals, who may or may not recognise their overall relations. But because they share a similar locus (historical experience) in the objective structure, they have similar subjective understandings of their locus.

When individuals are born, they are born into an already existing material structure, at a particular point in that structure (position). Their parents (and others) already have a subjective interpretation of this structure and their offspring's position in it, and they transmit this understanding to their offspring during socialisation. But while the child is offered an already existing (though continually developing) interpretation, the child is influenced also by the objective position he/she fills in the material society. Thus, the subjective interpretation offered in the culture is synthesised with the objective position of that child in the social structure, becoming a lived experience for that individual.

Changes in objective structural conditions may arise from various sources, including, for example, ecological changes, legislation affecting social institutions and demographic factors. In response to this changed material reality, individuals may need to modify (or replace) their existing subjective interpretation with one more appropriate to the changed conditions of their existence. Continued participation in the objective structure depends on the appropriateness of the individuals' interpretation of their conditions. A small change in structure may not require any change in the interpretations individuals employ, but individuals who do modify their understanding, making it more appropriate to the changed conditions, may be more successful in that society.

Occasionally, however, changes in structure are so significant that an accompanying subjective change is necessary, for without this subjective change, individuals will be excluded from the objective structure. For instance, the first English settlement in North America, Jamestown, was initially composed of individuals with a totally inappropriate appreciation of the material conditions of their existence. Their subjective understanding of their situation, while appropriate for their existence in England, did not change and was inappropriate in America. Believing they only needed to labour four hours each day, they spent

the rest of their time "bowling in the streets". The objective conditions entailed more labour than the settlers anticipated, and the mismatch of their subjective understanding and the objective conditions resulted in their starving to death in conditions of relative plenty (Morgan, 1971).

Next consider objectification. The subjectivity that an individual develops as a result of the synthesis of a subjective cultural interpretation and an objective social position, when applied to particular circumstances, becomes a basis for action. This subjective interpretation and the related action contribute to the development of the culture. But whatever the individual's subjective interpretation may entail, there is simultaneously an objective position that this individual fills in the material network that is structure. Because the individual is objective, a part of the material reality, his/her action has consequences at the objective level. Therefore, when an individual acts, there is duality of praxis. So while the individual can be constrained to act by the objective position, his/her action as an objective individual with a subjective understanding of the material structure can modify structure. Thus, individuals affect structure through their objectification in social positions.

The same misfit between objective conditions and the

subjective understanding of these conditions that leads to change in the subjective level can lead to change in the objective level. When individuals satisfy the objective conditions of their social roles, they will maintain, without challenging, the social structure. However, when individuals do not 'fit' the social role, there is the potential for structural change. As a misfit, the action of the individual either will modify the role - if the structure accommodates the challenge - or the action of the individual will be modified by the inflexible social network maintaining the role.

For instance, suppose a group misunderstands the material forces in society, and assumes that race is not as significant a force in society as class, and that in reality race can be overcome through achievement. During socialisation, children in the group would be led to expect, for example, that education and hard work will determine their social status. If the material conditions experienced by these children do not immediately discourage this interpretation, as adults they will act on this subjective understanding and have corresponding expectations regarding the society.

If the status, or perceived status, of these 'misfits' does not satisfy their expectations or deteriorates over time, the group may become militant, and demand a

reevaluation of their social position. At this point, rigid objective conditions may exert pressure on the group in order to maintain the status quo. But if the militancy of these 'misfits' persists, the structure may be modified, either through attempts to eliminate this group (which may destroy such resistance or encourage intensified opposition) or through attempts to appease it (e.g., integrationist actions). The form of this change will depend also on other groups whose positions in the material structure will be modified. In the above example, concessions may be made in the objective structure, allowing members of the underprivileged group to achieve certain positions in the objective society, previously unattainable to members of that race. Changes in the structure will lead to new interpretations by all those involved; while the underprivileged group may not be satisfied with the changes and will continue its militant activities, those with power and privilege may be unwilling to make further concessions. Nevertheless, as a result of the subjective understandings of individuals, and consequent action, the objective structure is changed. This is the process of objectification.

Notice that in changing social structure the individual actors may or may not be aware of the effect of their actions. Such awareness is not necessary for change to

occur, although it is unlikely that an individual whose action is changing ('revolutionizing') society can remain entirely unaware of the influence. Nevertheless, a subjective awareness of the objectivity of one's action - as opposed to a subjective interpretation of the objective structural conditions - is not a prerequisite for social change, although such awareness may contribute to the effectiveness of the agents in changing structure to satisfy their interests.

For many social changes it is likely that there will be a coordinated approach where the end is sufficiently clear to unite the various actors into a movement. Thus, a group of individuals share an orientation towards (or an interpretation of) their material conditions (subjectification) and their position in such conditions (objectification). Individuals who become aware of their social role(s) in society become <u>consciencized</u> (cf., Nkrumah, 1964). It seems that individuals continually reproduce society, but to revolutionize it radically requires some awareness of the action and its socially-significant consequences. In other words, individuals come to recognise their social position as actors, in terms of social constraints on, and individual power within, a role. This is evident at a local level when groups of parents try to lobby school authorities to change curricula. Social

movements also exist more globally, as shown by women, aboriginal people, gays and lesbians, the handicapped and other groups asserting their rights and demanding that the existing social relations be changed to accommodate their interests.

In sum, the dialectical interaction of the objective and subjective levels in the model can account for novel changes in individual agents and social structure. Although each of the four elements identified in the model is analytically distinguishable, it is important to recognise that a description of any element entails the functioning of the others. For example, social structure, even as a material reality, is an empty framework without individuals who act in social roles. And the actions performed by these individuals, while constrained by objective conditions, are influenced also by the subjectivity of the individuals, a subjectivity that arises from the individuals' interactions with cultural interpretations and specific material conditions. There is a continuous cycling process of maintenance and modification, with the isolation of elements something of an illusion.

In generating a specific project from the model, however, the research can take a particular focus, presupposed as it is by the ontology described in the duality model. In the analyses presented in Chapters 3

through 5, for example, individual lives form the primary focus. The explanations provided try to situate the person within the social forces applying at the time. They seek to explain the individual's development as a process of social mediation, where an individual comes to share the particular orientation of a social group towards their material conditions. The individuals that emerge are socially competent and personally interested, able to act for themselves and have significance in society. Their activity, because it occurs in a social position, contributes to the modification of the group perspective and the social structure.

Notice, however, that the analyses, while incorporating all the model's elements, maintain their focus on the individual. In this sense the current project is a psychological investigation. But unlike other psychological studies, it presupposes a broad social context which gives the individual life its basis and significance.

## Chapter 3. The Model Applied to the Life of Z. K. Matthews

The general problem of the present study is to understand individuals as they relate to society. In this chapter the life of Z.K. Matthews (1901-68) is used as a case study to show the heuristic potential of the theoretical approach presented in Chapter 2.

Matthews became South Africa's leading black intellectual and an important figure in the liberation movement from the later 1930s to 1960. It will be shown that Matthews' subjectivity largely reflected his parents' interpretation of the objective social conditions, and that this interpretation was characteristic of a group of relatively wealthy and privileged blacks (Cobley, 1990). While this subjective orientation was reinforced through his activities, the objective social conditions changed, and made it increasingly difficult for Matthews to realise his subjective orientation at the objective level. In other words, the society became increasingly resistant and failed to accommodate his action towards a non-racial, integrated society.

### 1. Objective Conditions, Subjective Understandings

Zachariah Keodirelang (Z.K.) Matthews was born in 1901, near the diamond mining centre of Kimberley, in the north of

the Cape Colony (Matthews, 1981). As an urbanised, and relatively wealthy Cape family, the Matthews family enjoyed privileges denied to most black people in the region.

Both Z.K.'s grandfather and father had sufficient personal property and income to qualify for the non-racial Cape franchise. The Cape Colony, under British administration, had committed itself to a liberal tradition in the mid-nineteenth century, when it drew up a constitution allowing all men, without regard to race, to vote if they met a set qualification. This non-racial political system contrasted with those in effect in the Afrikaner Republics to the north. When, in 1910, the Cape Colony joined with the neighbouring Republics and the Colony of Natal to form the Union of South Africa, political structures became explicitly and increasingly racial. It is important, therefore, to consider the emergence of these distinct political systems, and their subsequent interactions following the formation of the Union of South Africa, if we are to explain the political aspirations of blacks like Matthews who were born into a relatively liberal Cape tradition, but became adults in the Union of South Africa.

Blacks, who moved south from tribes probably living in central and eastern Africa, inhabited most of present-day South Africa by the fifteenth century A.D. (Wilson, 1969a,

1969b). The first white settlers were Dutch who arrived at the Cape in 1652. Soon farmers were expanding their settlements into the interior and along the eastern coast. This expansion continued relatively unhindered until the late eighteenth century, when contact was made with tribes of the Xhosa living along the east coast. Conflict between Dutch concepts of land ownership and Xhosa concepts of common land usage developed into war, and over the next century the white settlers succeeded in expanding and securing the eastern boundary of the Cape Colony.

But descendants of the early Dutch settlers - later calling themselves 'Afrikaners' to identify Africa as their home - continued the white expansion into the interior when, in 1836, they began the Great Trek (Armstrong & Worden, 1988, p.167; Paton, 1961, p.90). This mass migration from the eastern region of the Cape Colony was in response to radical changes instituted by the British who had taken control of the Colony in 1806. These changes included the anglicisation of social and political institutions and the emancipation of slaves (Davenport, 1969, p.283; Elphick & Giliomee, 1988, pp.522f; Paton, 1961).

As a result of a chain reaction of war among chiefdoms to the north (Thompson, 1969a, pp.349-51), the Afrikaners moved into a destabilised region, where they were soon able to declare their independence from British rule. By 1854,

they had established the Orange Free State and the South African Republic, and Britain had recognised these as independent states (Ibid., p.410).

The constitutions of these Republics reflected both these settlers' independence from European authority, and the entrenchment of a racial-religious stratification of society, where blacks were denied equality with whites (Ibid., p.430f; Davenport, 1977, pp.63-66), were prevented from owning firearms, and were forced to carry a pass to confirm their employment and right to be in the area (Thompson, 1969b, p.436). In the Orange Free State, blacks were prevented from owning land (Davenport, 1977, p.64).

This contrasted with the political situation of blacks in the Cape and Natal Colonies. In the 1850s, the Cape and Natal had enshrined in their constitutions a system of qualified franchise. In the Cape, "any man who for twelve months preceding registration had occupied property worth £25 or received an aggregate wage of either £50 or £25 with board and lodging" (Simons & Simons, 1983, p.23) was permitted to vote. At this time, however, few blacks were living within the Colony. Following the annexation of the Transkei, with its large black population, legislators in the Cape modified the franchise qualifications in 1887 and 1892.

"Parliament excluded land held under customary tenure

from the franchise qualifications, raised the landed property qualification from £25 to £75, eliminated the £25 wage qualification, and added a literacy test. The effect of the changes was to strike some 30,000 Africans off the rolls and to stimulate the growth of an African political movement" (Ibid., p.31). In Natal, too, an apparently open system was amended with a series of hurdles making it almost impossible for blacks to vote (see Davenport, 1977, p.90).

The discovery of diamonds (1869 and again in 1870-1) within territory claimed by the Orange Free State led the British to annex this region. When gold was discovered in the South African Republic in 1886, the British again sought control. In response to the large influx of prospectors, the Afrikaner government introduced legislation to limit the political influence of these foreigners, while being unable to provide the services required by this burgeoning community. Britain justified interference in the Republic on the grounds that her subjects required protection.

Following a bungled attempt by British agents to instigate a coup in the Republic, tensions between the Afrikaner Republic and British authorities escalated, culminating in the South African War (1899-1902). At the end of the war, the victorious British agreed to the principle of self-government for the former republics, but expected that an overwhelming immigrant population would favour a

federation with the two British Colonies (Thompson, 1975c, p.330f). Furthermore, it was agreed between the British and Afrikaner forces that black participation in the political process would be set aside until self-government had been introduced (Ibid.).

When the two former Republics were given 'responsible government' in 1907, explicit political colour-bars remained in their constitutions (Davenport, 1977, p.161f). Thus, on the eve of the formation of a Union of South Africa, four independent regions existed, each with its own, constitutionally-expressed intentions for relations with blacks. The proposal for Union, agreed to at a National Convention of only white delegates from the four regions, permitted each region to continue with its current franchise policy. But although blacks in the Cape could continue to vote, the new Constitution denied them the right to be members of parliament (Cowen, 1961; Davenport, 1977). When the British government handed over power to the new South African Parliament in 1910, concern with post-war reconciliation between Afrikaner and English continued to take precedence over liberalisation of the political structures to favour the black majority.

Although black political organisations began emerging in the late nineteenth century, Union was the catalyst that brought about national black organisations that could

represent common interests, and work for the expansion of the Cape liberal tradition to other provinces in the Union.

Mission-educated blacks had been the first to organise politically. The missionary influence, especially noteworthy in the eastern Cape region, had created important educational centres for blacks early in the nineteenth century. Now this small, but highly significant, elite organised to protect its rights in the system (mainly the qualified franchise in the Cape) and worked to extend rights to other groups (e.g., tribal blacks, who, because of the communal ownership of land, did not qualify for the vote) (Karis & Carter, 1972, pp. 3-5; Simons & Simons, 1983, p.31).

The members of these new political groups, because of their mission education that emphasised Christian and Western ways of life, were understandably proud of their British citizenship. This commitment to the system, and their belief in the reciprocal openness of the system, made these blacks willing "to work with and through the institutions of the white-dominated colonial political system in order to achieve better representation of African interests" (Karis & Carter, 1972, p.5).

Although this view dominated black political organisation at the turn of the century, there were other interpretations of the society, and the place of blacks in

it, that were to be favoured in coming decades. For instance, members of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa, a break-away from the paternalism of the white Wesleyan Church, rejected white standards of 'civilisation', arguing instead for exclusive black groups to develop the strength and unity needed to preserve and advance black interests (Ibid., p.8). In the optimistic times before Union, such a view was extreme, but as the white government entrenched a racially-divided system, interpretations in terms of racial polarisation were to became increasingly popular (see Chapter 5).

Following the South African War, in the period before Union, black political organisations were still regionally based. However, the terms of Union substantially changed the society, and many blacks were attracted by the call to stand together and develop an African nationalism to counter the growing exclusiveness and nationalism of whites. In response to the whites-only National Convention which drew up terms for Union, blacks called a national meeting of their own in 1909. They endorsed the principle of Union, while calling for equal rights in a non-racial society.

The passing of the South Africa Act that created Union, the constitutional entrenchment of an exclusively white voters' roll in all provinces except the Cape and marginally in Natal, and in the Union parliament, and the provision of

a means by which to amend the Constitution to alter the status of (i.e., potentially excluding) qualified black Cape voters together created the conditions which could transform hitherto regionalised political activities into national bodies reflective of blacks' common interests (Ibid., p.12).

In 1912, the South African Native National Congress (later renamed the African National Congress, ANC) was formed as a federation of black organisations to represent black interests in the new Union (Ibid., p.61). The founders of the ANC had been educated at universities in the United States and Britain, and as part of the educated elite they accepted much liberal and Christian philosophy. But they were more nationally minded than the Cape liberals, wanting to incorporate rural and uneducated people into a movement of black assertiveness (Ibid.). This new political force saw the post-Union period as a time to defend black interests in the face of a deteriorating climate of race relations. Soon they were forced to lead the protests against the new Union government's Native Land Act (1913), which limited black ownership of land to less than 8% of the total area of the Union (Simons & Simons, 1983, p.131).

Leaders of the Cape liberals continued to believe that they could effect change in the system through their representation to government and particularly through their connections with sympathetic whites. These blacks, led by an

eastern Cape journalist and voter, John Tengo Jabavu, opposed the formation of the ANC, arguing it would alienate well-meaning whites. They "felt that society was moving in the direction of the unity of all civilized people. [They supported] The old Cape notion [of a qualified franchise], and [they believed therefore] that the formation of a national organization of the Africans was actually a step against civilization" (J. Matthews, Karis & Carter Collection, XM65:95/1, p.11). But at the same time, Jabavu endorsed the Native Land Act, a move which lost him much support (Karis & Carter, 1972, p.63). Through the decade leading to 1920, Jabavu's strength was increasingly marginalised. Most of the support came from the educational centres of the eastern Cape, where the largest body of black voters lived.

In contrast, the ANC incorporated blacks of the other provinces, representing the majority of the population. Following the First World War, political grievances centred on the failure of the government to reward black loyalty and service, and instead to extend segregation. Blacks faced economic hardships in the wake of the war, while whites were able to protect their interests, unhindered by pass restrictions and labour contracts (Ibid., p.65). The failure of the South African government to act on the promises of democracy enunciated by the allied leaders during the war

(Ibid., p.66) intensified the sense of regression among blacks. Black workers went on strike and the ANC organised a passive resistance campaign in 1919 (Ibid., p.65f). In the ten years since the creation of Union, as black grievances had escalated, the ANC incorporated a wider black constituency into protest activity. But the government was unresponsive to the proposals from deputations of black leaders, and proposed legislation to further structure a segregated society (Ibid., p.64f).

Even Jabavu, leader of the Cape liberals, and opponent of the ANC, recognised these many grievances, and although he maintained that "the cure here lies in our being able to produce well-educated Native leaders trained in a favourable atmosphere, who will be endowed with commonsense, cool heads, with a sense of responsibility, endurance and correct perspective in all things" (Ibid., p.125), his list of grievances shows that, by 1920, he recognised that the white Union government (unlike the liberal government of the former Cape Colony) was not likely to respond to educated blacks with political liberalisation. He cites his own experiences - as an educated black man - to show that blackness, not education, dictated the service received in the post office and on the railways (Ibid., p.121f). And Jabavu acknowledges that blacks lost faith in white liberalism with the transition to Union:

> "[Natives] have vivid recollections of how their political rights were bargained away in the pacification of Vereeniging (1902) [the peace that ended the South African War]. They reckon that the Union Act of 1910 unites only the white races and that as against the blacks; for the colour bar clause struck the death-knell of Native confidence in what used to be called British fair play. ... Out of this seed-bed of racial antipathy and out of a sense of self-preservation there sprang up several native and coloured political organisations, chief of which was the 'South African Native National Congress', which to-day represents the strongest single volume of Native feeling in the Union, although its methods and spokesmen are open to criticism by certain sections of natives" (Ibid., p.120).

Matthews' childhood reflected these political developments: objective social structures around the turn of the century were interpreted by his family, as members of the black (voting) elite of the Cape Colony, as moving towards integration in a non-racial society. The transition to an industrial economy, resulting from the changes effected by the mineral discoveries of the late nineteenth century, was promising to make South Afric a wealthy country. Furthermore, the British victory over the Afrikaner Republics in the South African War gave additional hope that the more liberal forms of government characterising the Empire, and in effect in the Cape Colony, would gradually extend throughout the region.

While members of this black elite experienced racial discrimination in their daily lives, their reaction to this reality was carefully controlled, as they perceived that

their long-term goal of integration would be threatened if race came to define the society. In effect, the black elite ignored important social forces producing racial divisions in South Africa. They failed to see the polarisation arising from the exploitation of racial divisions by the industrialising economy and the politicisation of race by white leaders intent on post-war reconciliation and federation.

For the Matthews family, political participation in the Cape government had been a reality for two generations, and education promised that the male children also would qualify for the vote. This goal overrode the racial reality, and although Z.K.'s father Peter (and later Z.K.) was angered by the injustice of racism, he controlled his reaction, seeking not to antagonise those (whites) upon whom further liberalisation of the society depended. Instead, he focused on what he saw as the real prize - a future where personal achievement defined a person's value.

Thus, in terms of the model of the individual-society connection elaborated in the previous chapter, we see a society where race is becoming a defining feature, or at least the dividing line for a class system. But those blacks who lived in the Cape, influenced by their apparently, or at least potentially, equal status with whites, failed to recognise this development in the objective society, and

essentially misinterpreted the social conditions. This misunderstanding was transmitted to their children, and although it meant that these children, like Matthews, would not be accepted as professional equals in the society, it did provide them with the necessary skills (in the form of education) to lead black action against this racial reality.

2. Subjectification: Interpretation by the Black Elite

Z.K.'s parents were brought up in traditional rural environments, but they moved to the city as a result of the diamond discoveries. Peter, Z.K.'s father, went to a Methodist mission school for a few years, where he learned to read and write; however, when his father decided to run a small transportation business in Kimberley to service the developing diamond diggings, Peter accompanied him (Matthews, 1981, p.8f). Z.K.'s mother, Martha, also had some elementary education as the daughter of an evangelist with the London Missionary Society (Ibid.).

The missionary influence was expressed in two, complementary forms: equality in the form of a Christian humanism, and liberalisation in the form of integration through education. The missionary teaching, therefore, held that the oppression of blacks in the society did not reflect the Christian ideal, and that education was necessary to reach this ideal, for it would effect a gradual elevation of

black status in the society.

Both aspects of the missionary teaching were expressed in the Matthews family. Martha was especially religious (Ibid., p.11) and taught her children that "all men had been created by God in his image and were all his children" (Ibid., p.25). At the same time, the liberal promise of a better future given in the mission schools, and the liberal tradition of the Cape, directly expressed in Peter's father's voting privilege and Peter's own qualification, led Peter and Martha to see education as a means to further liberalise the society. And they encouraged their children in this direction.

But the attitude of Peter and Martha towards education reflects not only their personal experiences in a mission-tradition, but the more pervasive incorporation of blacks into the white society towards the end of the century. For people like Peter and Martha, the power of white culture, that by the end of the nineteeth century was completing its conquest of southern Africa's black nations (Ibid., p.31), was undeniable, and the secrets of this power seemed to lie in the whites' education and knowledge (Ibid., p.14). As Peter and Martha explained to their children "Education was the weapon with which the white man had conquered our people and taken our lands. ... Only by mastering the secrets of his knowledge would we ever be able to regain our strength

and face the conqueror on his own terms" (Ibid., p.14). Simons and Simons (1983, p.48) show that, following the frontier wars, the Matthews family's response to the changing society was quite appropriate: "The struggle for liberation would from then on be fought within the common society by men able to wield the colonist's own weapons of education, propaganda, political organization and the vote". For blacks to function in this emerging society, and to achieve any power of their own, education in white ways was seen as vital. The Matthews' children were taught this truth from the outset.

The Matthews family, living in the northern Cape, far from the black educational centres of the eastern Cape, were not actively involved in political groupings. But, in terms of the duality model, one can see that their mission background and their membership in the elite of qualified voters encouraged in them an interpretation of the objective social conditions consistent with that of the eastern Cape leaders, and this was subjectivised for their children in terms of the value of education.

Z.K. approached education with a singular resolve, determined to 'win' acceptance into the (white) society by successfully meeting standards that whites had set. Early on Z.K. showed that he could do this, and his success in this role ('educated black') fed back to his subjectivity,

building his confidence in his ability to effect the objective changes he sought. The following incident recalled by Z.K. from his first years at school illustrates this process of objectification: every year the School Inspector, a Mr. Satchell, visited the school to examine the children. For Z.K., fear of Satchell was a fear of failure and only those who could not reach the required (white) standard should be frightened. Z.K. overcame his fear of Satchell - representing the power of the white man - by succeeding in the examination (Matthews, 1981, p.18), and his regular top placing in class gave him the confidence needed to maintain interest and determination (Ibid.): "After that first time I was never frightened again; I was always first in the class" (Ibid.). In terms of the duality model, Z.K. objectified himself in the role of pupil, and his success/acceptance in this activity reinforced his subjective notion that an educated black could be accepted in the objective society and bring about integration.

The promise of liberation, or at least greater participation, through education, notwithstanding, Peter, Martha and their children had to contend with the racial reality of the society. Z.K.'s Christian-humanist upbringing, emphasising that all people are equal, contrasted sharply with the politico-economic reality of a racially divided society. Some of Z.K.'s earliest memories

are of discussions in the home about 'the white man', about the exploitative and aggressive manner in which whites came to control the country (Ibid., p.4), and about the "dangerous and unpredictable" (Ibid.) nature of the white man.

The advice which Z.K. received from his parents, relations and friends of the family, and school friends all expressed a similar understanding of the racial structure of the society, and was confirmed in his personal interactions in the system. For example, when police raided the Location in search of anyone without appropriate documentation, the Matthews children "huddled in a corner behind our mother" (Ibid., p.1), and witnessed for themselves the oppressive nature of the white man that they had come to expect. As if to ensure the assimilation of this event to the cultural interpretation, the experience would be talked about among the community: "all the talk in the house and everywhere around would be angry talk about the raid, about so-and-so a standholder, whose receipts were not up to date and had been caught; and about all the others who disappeared that morning in the frightening world of the white men" (Ibid.). Soon Z.K.'s personal perspective (subjectivity of the individual) corresponded to the black South African's view of a racially divided and oppressive society (subjectivity of society). After he went through the white city of

Kimberley, where he saw "huge and brilliant" shops, "paved streets", "street lamps", "tidy, and to me, rich-looking homes" (Ibid., p.19), he thought of the world as "a huge system of life, with the whites occupying its upper portions and our people crowded below" (Ibid., p.20).

It is crucial to notice that this idea of a racially divided and oppressive society is not expressed in Z.K.'s developing subjectivity in the same way as it would be in a black child who was not born into the relatively wealthy and liberal-leaning elite of qualified voters. Importantly, Z.K.'s existence as a black person in the Cape was entwined with his religious upbringing and his existence in the black elite of qualified voters. From religion, Z.K. took the ideal of a "brotherhood of man" (Ibid., p.27), while education stood as an effective means by which to make personal gains that would improve conditions for others. The racial reality, for all its oppressive immediacy, was understood and experienced by Z.K. from a particular social perspective, and this is reflected in his subjectivity. Thus, while the racial inequality was a characteristic shared by all blacks, for Z.K., as a member of the mission-educated and enfranchised elite, racial oppression was surmountable, and therefore, in a sense, was less restrictive.

To explain the fact that Z.K. rose to a leadership

role, it is not sufficient, therefore, to focus only on his existence as a black person, but to explain the unique interaction between race, class and religion that characterised his subjectivity. The crucial catalyst for Z.K.'s rise to prominence came from the belief that the means which his parents identified for overcoming oppression would effect progress towards the religious ideal of equality. It was Z.K.'s acceptance of his parents' analysis of the situation and their commitment to education, along with his educational successes, that allowed Z.K. to rise above the many other black children of his generation, break barriers and become a leader.

### 3. Objectification I: Reinforcing the Elite's Orientation

The subjective understanding that drove Z.K.'s feverish educational activity assumed that the qualifications for acceptance in the white world would remain constant over time. As Z.K. was to discover, this assumption, derived from his group's class-based analysis of liberalisation through education, misrepresented the social forces in the society, particularly the power of race to dominate and maintain white privilege.

At school Z.K. had done well, and this reinforced the analysis that his parents had made of the objective society. The subjectification of the society in terms of

liberalisation that his parents had begun was intensified when, in 1916, he won a scholarship that would allow three years study at Lovedale Missionary Institution in the eastern Cape. This achievement was to bring Z.K. into close contact with the leading black liberals in the Cape.

Z.K. went to Lovedale full of enthusiasm, and he was profoundly affected by the school. Here pupils and teachers shared the "dedicated atmosphere of Victorian self-improvement" (Sampson, 1958, p.120), and Z.K. was no exception. His recollections of Lovedale's position in the society show his devotion to the liberalising power of education:

> "Through Lovedale's gates one passed into the wonderland of education, the same kind of education, we thought, which had given the European his all-conquering power, his ability to master Africans... Here was the school from which some of the teachers whom I had regarded with awe had come, and here was I, on the threshold of a career that might lead me as it had led them, to positions of trust, respect and honour in our community. Here I was among boys and young men who had come from all parts of the country in search of the same treasure, an education that would move us ahead in the world into which the Europeans had thrust us" (1981, p.31).

Nevertheless, the racial oppression that he had come to experience in the society was evident also at Lovedale. For example, the treatment of black staff and students by white missionaries produced resentment in the young Z.K. (Ibid., p.35-43). "[Lovedale's] avowed purpose was to do things <u>for</u> Africans, and Africans, especially those of us who became

students there, were not supposed to allow any extraneous feelings of our own to get in the way of the essential emotion of gratitude" (Ibid., p.42). For students committed to change through education, this was a circumstance that had to be endured, even as they imagined freeing themselves from such paternalism.

With the opening of Fort Hare University College, across the river from Lovedale, in 1916, Z.K. was able to strengthen his already strong subjective commitment to education. At Fort Hare, blacks, for the first time, would be able to study in South Africa for a university degree. Z.K. recalls that "On Sunday afternoons I would walk to Fort Hare and up to the humble farm houses, my mind full of the pictures of myself as one of the college students" (Ibid., p.50).

The combined effect of the liberal interpretation and the concrete possibility of a university education probably explains why Z.K. took the unusual and risky strategy of pursuing courses in Lovedale's College Department, rather than training first to be a teacher. When Z.K. began these courses, the future for a school matriculant was limited, and most students in this department had already taken a teacher-training course.

At Lovedale Z.K. passed the Junior Certificate, and made school history by being one of the first to complete

the course in two years (Ibid., p.47f). In 1918, he entered Fort Hare and continued towards the matriculation. At that time, Fort Hare was still without university-level students, as none of the matriculation candidates had passed in 1917 (Ibid., p.50).

The three faculty members (Ibid., p.50) at Fort Hare perpetuated optimism in the power of education to (gradually) liberate blacks and transform society. Especially important to Z.K. were the Principal, Alexander Kerr and Davidson Jabavu, son of John Tengu Jabavu. While these teachers were showing Z.K. how to reach his goal of equality, the warden of the Anglican hostel, Bishop Smyth, built on Martha's example of what it meant to live a Christian life and practice a 'brotherhood of man' (Ibid., pp.73-80). Just as the racial reality was confirmed at Lovedale, so Z.K.'s humanitarian ideal was kept alive by his close association with Bishop Smyth. Together these factors, pushing Z.K. away from racial division and pulling him towards Christian-humanism, reinforced education as the best means to overcome oppression and bring about integration.

Z.K. passed the matriculation examination at the end of 1919. This put him "at the limit of education available to an African in South Africa" (Ibid., p.63). Eagerly, and with some trepidation, he began studies for the B.A. Kerr had encouraged him to pursue a degree programme, and Z.K.

understood the importance of breaking boundaries for black achievement. Z.K. was aware of his social position (Ibid., p.80) and wanted to be the first black to graduate with a degree in South Africa. But more importantly, he knew that for all blacks, and for Fort Hare as the focus of black educational aspirations, the earlier a degree could be earned, the sooner confidence in the institution would be raised, and consequently, the greater the impact on both blacks and whites, believers and sceptics, in South Africa. "A thousand myths clinging to European minds like cobwebs in a long-empty house were about to be swept away, not by me, but by all who would follow me. It was a significant hour for me and for Fort Hare College, and Alexander Kerr must have been waiting for it too" (Ibid., p.81).

When, in 1923, Z.K. completed the degree, he was making an important, and conscious, objectification of his liberal subjectivity. As the Native Affairs Commissioner noted at the graduation ceremony, Z.K. was forcing the society to accommodate this educated man, or as Z.K. referred to himself, "a new specimen in the zoo of South African mankind" (Ibid., p.82). But before Z.K. could test the flexibility of the society, he returned to Fort Hare to earn the Teaching Diploma.

During this time, while Z.K. became more excited by the promise of liberalism, the society was undergoing radical

changes. Union had ushered in a white Parliament intent on protecting white interests, and aiming, in the long term, to eliminate blacks from the Cape voters roll. Almost immediately the Native Land Act (1912) limited blacks to less than 8% of territory in the Union (Simons & Simons, 1983, p.131). But, importantly, the Act made an exception in the Cape, in accordance with the protection guaranteed in the South Africa Act of the qualified franchise that was dependent on black land ownership (Ibid.). Only in 1936, when the white Parliament finally struck the Cape black voters from the voters' roll, did territorial segregation extend to this province (Ibid.).

Thus, while blacks in the other three provinces recognised that the liberal tradition of the Cape was being eroded, and founded national-minded bodies like the ANC, these developments did not have the same effect on blacks in the Cape elite. Black voters in the Cape, with their mission school education and its respect for British institutions, continued to align themselves with whites in a class-based analysis of the society, even as race became the driving reality.

The crisis of the First World War had rallied support behind the government (Karis & Carter, 1972, p.64), and the promises of freedom for all nations made towards the end of the War encouraged renewed hope (Ibid., p.66), especially

among the liberal-oriented black elite. And while these political changes were overtaken by economic developments in the post-War period, the eastern Cape intellectual establishment, without contact with the black working class, was able to maintain faith in a gradual, top-down process of socio-political liberalisation.

Nevertheless, the strikes and passive resistance activity that blacks had organised after the War, to protest their dislocation from the expanded economy by unionised, skilled and semi-skilled white workers (Ibid., p.65), continued, leading to violent clashes with police and white vigilantes in the early 1920s (Ibid., p.145). These protests notwithstanding, it was as a result of pressure mounted within the white community, particularly from Transvaal miners, that segregation became increasingly legislated through the 1920s (Ibid.; Simons & Simons, 1983). In 1922, the white workers, both English-speaking socialists and Afrikaner militants, under a banner of 'Workers of the World, Fight and Unite for a White South Africa' (cf., Ibid., p.285), went on strike and armed themselves to push their demands. The government responded by declaring martial law and crushing the strike (Karis & Carter, 1972, p.145f).

The labour unrest among white workers had not involved black workers, but the issue and its outcome was to profoundly influence the future for all blacks in South

Africa. In 1924 Smuts' government was replaced by a Pact Government that united Afrikaner and white labour interests. It introduced legislation that reaffirmed the mining industry's colour bar, allowed the government to set wages in particular industries, excluded blacks from the structures for negotiation and settlement of labour disputes, and pursued a 'civilised labour policy' which protected certain jobs for whites, thereby displacing blacks (Ibid., p.147; Kuper, 1965, p.438).

Z.K.'s success, and the willingness of some in the society to accommodate this educated black man, meant, however, that Z.K. could continue with his programme of liberalisation through education, even as objective social conditions were making integration of blacks into the society more difficult. In 1925, the American Board of Foreign Missions approached Z.K. to be Principal at its high school in Natal, Adams College. Z.K. had little hesitation in accepting the offer; he was to be the first black principal of a mission school, and for Z.K. this meant another "chance to break new ground" (Matthews, 1981, p.83). When the position was described to Z.K., he was told that "'The idea of trying an African in a spot where several Europeans have failed is not exactly popular ... So this is an experiment for me ... and an opportunity for you'" (Ibid.).

The appointment was a crucial experiment for Z.K.: personally, or subjectively, it would reflect on the validity of his subjective orientation towards the society, and publicly, or objectively, Z.K.'s activity would affect the future of a gradual integrationist policy. However, while it was necessary that a black incumbent in this role as Principal be successful if the role was to remain open to blacks, the flexibility of society would also determine the future of the role. And in this regard, Z.K. was acting in a society that was moving in an opposite direction, towards greater segregation. The objectivity of his action, as a black educator, was to become increasingly marginalised by a society driven by race interests.

Nevertheless, proud parents who interpreted the objective conditions as fostering liberalisation through education, saw Z.K.'s action as representative of what younger black children could achieve within the society. Z.K.'s success was "the story that ambitious African parents told their children to show the prizes of working hard and 'keeping their noses clean'" (Sampson, 1958, p.117). In earning a B.A. and by accepting a principalship, Z.K., <u>as a black person</u>, as an objective individual, was allowing subsequent generations of black children to see what could be achieved in the society, even as the objective conditions of the society became more restrictive. The parents'

interpretation was a subjectification of a social structure made up of positions that defined their incumbents in terms of educational achievement rather than race (or any other factors). For black parents, this was evidence of a gradual liberalisation of the society.

Z.K. spent over 10 years at Adams College. Although there is little information available on his performance, a letter written by Alexander Kerr and Bishop Smyth in 1933 refers to Z.K.'s work as "very satisfactory" and suggests that "examination results compare favourably with those of such famous schools as Lovedale and Healdtown" (Karis & Carter Collection, unnumbered document, following 2XM66:41/12). Z.K.'s success at Adams College expresses the duality of his action: Within the limits of his role, Z.K., as an objective individual, was realising his programme of liberalisation, and was putting pressure on the objective society to accommodate educated blacks. At the same time, Z.K. was a member of the black elite (a cultural group, expressing the subjectivity of society). So, as Jabavu had done for him, he subjectified society for his pupils by expressing - in action and word - an interpretation of the society where education could effect gradual liberalisation.

During this time at Adams College, the duality of Z.K.'s praxis is evident also in his involvement in local political organisations. He joined the Natal Bantu Teachers'

Union, later becoming its President. This elite group of educated blacks, now in positions of educational leadership, was trying to make their dream of liberation through education a reality: they reasoned that if youths could be educated to high school, teacher-training school and industrial school levels, integration - and consequent freedom - in the white-dominated society necessarily would follow. Because the Teachers' Union expressed so well Z.K.'s vision, he sought to maintain this group through his subjective activity (i.e., by standing for office); at the same time, his action was objective, for the group's existence in the social structure, and his role in the group, challenged the society to accommodate educated blacks.

Z.K. also became involved with the Joint Councils Movement, which began in response to recommendations of the American Phelps-Stokes Commission to South Africa (Karis & Carter, 1972, p.150). The commissioners encouraged inter-racial harmony, and suggested local groups be formed to facilitate intergroup contact, discussion, and cooperation. It was believed that such meetings would "reduce friction" and help "remove the root causes of racial hostility" (Matthews, 1981, p.88). This orientation was reinforced when, in 1929, the Joint Councils Movement "participated in founding the South African Institute of Race Relations

[SAIRR], which has sponsored multi-racial meetings ever since" (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.297). Z.K.'s continued commitment to liberalisation through education is reflected in his membership of the SA[illegible] and his election to its executive committee in 1947.

These [illegible]int Councils, like the Teachers' Union, sought gradual social change through education and rational discussion. But their impact on the society was minor, in part because the whites within the group seemed limited in their commitment to integration, preferring discussion to action. Blacks, like Z.K., who sought liberalisation were so reliant on the generosity of whites to pursue integrationist policies, that they excused the racism of their white friends. Z.K. recalls the problems that blacks had in finding accommodation in the city when these joint councils met: "None of the white friends with whom we met ever asked themselves or us where we were going to spend the night. ... [We] used to make jokes about going to meetings to discuss government policy and having nowhere to sleep for the night. It brought home to us the realities of the South African situation" (Ibid, p.88). Z.K. did not see that the whites in the Joint Councils Movement were just like the other whites he criticised for their attitudes towards the black population: "If the great mass of Africans could de-materialize every night and re-materialize every morning, ...

[whites] would be content" (Ibid., p.61).

As this example shows, the importance of race in defining the objective reality was immediately before Z.K., but, because he was committed to an outmoded subjective understanding of the society, and was being reinforced in this view by his success at Adams College, he failed to see it. In other words, the racial definition of the society was not a lived experience for Z.K.

While Z.K. limited his political action to the Joint Councils and their attempt to effect inter-racial harmony, blacks with other interpretations of the objective society were engaging in wide-ranging political participation. Some blacks accepted government invitations to annual conferences where they could air their grievances, challenge the government and offer their views (Karis & Carter, 1972, p.148f), while the ANC continued through the 1920s to sponsor deputations to protest government policies, and sent delegations to overseas conferences to draw international attention to the white government's failure to accommodate black interests (Ibid., p.152f). Although the ANC continued to give national voice to black grievances - in contrast to Jabavu's continued regional appeal in the eastern Cape constituency of black voters - it continued to be led by an educated, though nationally-minded, elite that could not engage black workers.

Instead, a new force emerged among blacks which activated, and ultimately politicised, the masses of black workers (Ibid., pp.154-8). In 1920, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa (ICU) was formed as a federation of black trade unions. Although the ICU was explicitly socialist, identifying with all workers, the segregationist policies of both the government and white trade unions, made it appeal especially to blacks. At first, the ICU was unable to develop a national cohesiveness, but in 1922, Clements Kadalie took over the leadership and it was largely a result of his charismatic style that the ICU gathered its huge and national following until its demise in 1929, following allegations of financial irregularities and irresponsibility (Ibid., p.156).

Although there were various kinds of responses that could be made by blacks to the changing social conditions, based on the locus of those groups of blacks in the society, Z.K.'s position within the intellectual elite remained secure and distant from other blacks, like the workers in industrial and mining centres. Consequently, Z.K.'s orientation persisted, even as the objective conditions, in which he enacted his subjective understanding of gradual liberalisation through education, were changing. However, it was only with the direct attack on the black Cape electorate, in 1936, that Z.K. finally was forced to adapt

to the changed social conditions.

While at Adams College, Z.K. had enrolled in a correspondence programme for the LL.B. degree from the University of South Africa (Matthews, 1981, p.89) and in 1930 he was the first black South African to be awarded the degree from the University (Ibid., p.91). Z.K. was deciding whether to continue teaching or open a law practice in the Transvaal, when, in 1932, he was offered a Phelps-Stokes Scholarship for one year, to study at Yale University for an M.A. degree. Yet again, Z.K.'s programme of liberalisation through education was being reinforced in his personal activity, and he continued to be an inspiration to other blacks.

## 4. Signs of a Crisis: Objective-Subjective Extremes

In 1932, Z.K. travelled to Yale University to study under C. T. Loram, previously a member of the Native Affairs Commission in South Africa. Z.K.'s understanding of the power of education in liberalising society was strengthened when he accompanied Loram and a group of (white) students on a tour of Negro educational institutions in the southern States, including Tuskegee Institute, where Booker T. Washington had developed his gradual integrationist philosophy in which he encouraged fellow blacks to prove themselves 'worthy' of white society through educational and

economic - not political - channels (Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967, pp.124f). Here Z.K. met school teachers and university faculty, and discussed with them educational issues. "We met the most outstanding Negroes in the educational field... It did one good to come across such a galaxy of Negro talent" (Matthews, 1981, p.96f).

But the growing segregationist reality of South Africa was making Z.K.'s optimism in a gradual liberalisation of South African society an inappropriate response in the developing social conditions. His M.A. thesis, submitted in 1934, records the trend towards greater segregation being legislated by the South African government. Even so, he remained determined to pursue his ideal of liberalisation through education, and in the thesis he offered a view of the future quite inconsistent with the evolving reality. In Z.K.'s thesis, therefore, we have both an account of the increasingly repressive objective reality and Z.K.'s subjective response. The incongruity is the first sign of a future crisis for Z.K.

The specific topic for Z.K.'s thesis changed from a plan to focus on the differences between white and black education in South Africa (Karis & Carter Collection: 2:XM66:41/18), through a focus on the black family (Karis & Carter Collection: 2:XM66:41/22 and 41/25) to the final version which contrasted Native Law and western civilization

(primarily white Roman-Dutch Law) (Matthews, 1934). Nevertheless, through these changes there remained a central focus on the black way of life, its modification following contact with the white way of life, and a view towards the future of this contact, which Z.K. referred to as a "clash of cultures" (Ibid.).

Z.K. had been brought up to worship the educational possibilities that the whites offered, but at the same time, his mother desperately tried to create in him an appreciation for the black traditional way of life, particularly for his heritage (Matthews, 1981, p.11f). Z.K.'s later experiences all had vindicated his parents' commitment to education. By the time Z.K. reached Yale, he was looking for an understanding of the history of the relations between his black heritage and his white education, and a synthesis of the two cultures which would allow him to continue helping his people without making blacks submit completely to white ways, and without blacks denying the strengths of white 'civilization'.

These forces are all evident in Z.K.'s thesis (1934) entitled Bantu Law and Western Civilisation in South Africa: A Study in the Clash of Cultures. In the thesis Z.K. spends much time elaborating traditional structures of the central institution in black culture, the family, and the laws which govern activities within the culture (Chapter II). Then, in

the following two chapters, Z.K. elaborates the impact of western law (and culture) on black life. Here he is concerned with two trends which existed in the country prior to Union, specifically a movement to recognise Native Law and another which tried to suppress Native Law. Z.K. suggests the former won out. In his final chapter there is an attempt to consider various directions which could be pursued in the continuing contact between Native Law and the whites' system of Roman-Dutch Law.

It is this last chapter that is the most revealing, for the earlier work is a detailed and descriptive foundation for the expression of Z.K.'s own interpretation of the unfolding black-white relations in South Africa. Here we see Z.K.'s commitment to the world-view of the educated black elite in its most rational and detailed form, but at the same time, there is evidence that Z.K. is approaching a crisis. The interesting tension exists between Z.K.'s subjective interpretation and the diametrically opposed trend revealed in the actual social changes - in the form of increasingly oppressive laws - which Z.K. describes (see also Matthews, 1932).

Particularly, Z.K. notes that segregation has been "the accepted policy of the country" since the passing of the 1913 Native Land Act (Matthews, 1934, p.221). Z.K. points to the laws that have supported the further entrenchment of the

policy, and recognises the Hertzog Bills (Matthews, 1934, p.279n) as part of this developing policy. The four bills were proposed in 1925 to solve the 'Native Question' (Karis & Carter, 1972, p.149), but were not passed until 1936 when Hertzog was able to forge a union with Smuts' party that would provide the two-thirds majority needed to effect a constitutional amendment (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.3). Included in the proposed legislation was a bill that would remove black Cape voters from the common roll, and instead allow them to vote for three white representatives in the Union Parliament and two white representatives in the Cape Provincial Council (Ibid.).

Z.K. discusses also (1934, pp.324-335) the government's denial, in the 1927 Native Administration Act, of the hitherto existing opportunity for blacks in the provinces of Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal to apply for exemption from Native Law and instead be considered subject to Roman-Dutch Law. Z.K. recognises and criticises the government's attempt to allow exemption (at the Governor-General's discretion) from laws affecting black-white relations (e.g., Pass Laws) while not making allowance for exemption from Native Law itself (i.e., preventing blacks from acquiring citizenship rights within the 'white' country).

His identification of these developments in the society

notwithstanding, Z.K. reveals in the closing discussion his hope for increasing liberalisation of black-white contact. He identified three possible lines of development for Native Law, and, because of his consideration of diverse aspects of black culture, it is possible to read 'black culture' or 'way of life' for Native Law. He contends that to imagine the complete disappearance of Native Law, at least in a short time period, would likely lead to serious difficulties and stresses (Ibid., pp.347-49). Alternatively, a system of parallel development would fail unless "Native Law had to be developed in an independent Native State, [where] it might have a chance of thriving as an independent system. But where it has to contend with a system which has the prestige value of being followed by the dominant group in the country, its chances of survival on the theory of parallel development are very slender" (Ibid., p.352).

Finally, Z.K. offers the approach which he thinks is the only workable possibility (Ibid., p.355). This would involve the "gradual assimilation [of Native law] to European law so that it will contribute its quota to what will ultimately be called not Roman-Dutch law nor Native law but South African Law" (Ibid., p.354). To think of a non-racial society where both conflicting groups live in harmony, contributing the best of what they can, expresses the dream that drove Z.K.'s parents, his teachers and

himself.

But the objective evidence was pointing in an opposite direction, towards increasing confrontation and the destruction (or suppression) of the black culture (option 1) through segregation and later parallel development, or what became apartheid (option 2). At Yale, Z.K.'s subjective dreams (option 3) were at their most distant from the objective reality that was developing.

Z.K. went from Yale (via a tour of Europe with Bishop Smyth, Matthews, 1981, pp.99-103) to study under Malinowski at the London School of Economics. He returned to South Africa in June 1935, completed the year at Adams College and, at the beginning of 1936, moved to Fort Hare to take up an appointment as Lecturer in Social Anthropology and Native Law. Soon he was invited to become a member of the de la Warr Commission that investigated higher education in East Africa.

The appointment at Fort Hare and the honour of being the only black person on the Royal Commission continued to add to the list of accomplishments that followed from his devotion to education. With each successive achievement new positions were opened, and Z.K. continued to break ground for those who would follow. Z.K. pays particular attention to the Commission in his Autobiography (1981, pp.105-114), but makes no mention of the passing of the Hertzog Bills in

this same year, 1936. It was these segregation laws, with their personal impact on Z.K., that explains his subsequent development.

## 5. Reforming Subjectivity: Education and Politics in Tandem

The changes in the society that had occurred since Union (1910) were the result of both economic and racial forces within the society (cf., Wolpe, 1988). The reaction of white workers to capitalist attempts to increase black participation in higher levels of the economy had become a crusade for racial superiority in all sectors of the society. Whites feared that any accommodation of blacks would precipitate a slippery slope of gradual integration - just what educated blacks hoped would happen, and at the same time the economic depression aroused fears of massive unemployment among white blue-collar workers.

For their part, educated blacks had failed to acknowledge the racial motivation behind the segregationist changes. They continued to hope that their educational success and 'civilised' behaviour (i.e., class position) would win white support for gradual integration. With the passing of the Hertzog Bills in 1936, there were widespread feelings of shock and betrayal. The legislation, especially the explicit denial of the final legal vestige of non-racialism left from the Cape Colony, struck at the heart of

black optimism (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.4), as the non-racial, qualified Cape franchise had been a psychological mainstay of their conciliatory strategy. Blacks in other parts of the country, too, had taken encouragement from the Cape system. Now it was undeniable that the whites sought a white republic with blacks as economically useful appendages.

In December 1935, Z.K. had joined Professor Jabavu of Fort Hare, who, along with the president-general of the ANC, inaugurated the All African Convention (AAC) to bring all interested groups together to oppose the proposed Hertzog Bills (Ibid., pp.6-12; Sampson, 1958, p.123). But the protests were ignored, and the legislation passed. This was a deep and personal blow for Z.K. whose family, for generations, had been working towards non-racial integration in the society.

Z.K.'s justification for being an intellectual had been based importantly on the premise that opening educational frontiers to blacks would guarantee the opening of white society. The Hertzog Bills made education (i.e., the role of educator) meaningless without an accompanying political consciousness, for it was clear that education itself was not going to change society. The Hertzog legislation signalled a betrayal by whites of the trust that Z.K. believed the educated elite was forging, and it left him

searching for a relevant understanding of the changing society by which to interpret his action as an intellectual at Fort Hare. Z.K. was forced to become directly involved in national political affairs (in contrast to the local public services he had performed before he left for Yale). Accompanying this changed role was a changed consciousness (subjectivity) of his situation in the society.

Z.K.'s initial political involvement was through the AAC. The AAC, led by Jabavu, had its power centred in the educated elite of the eastern Cape (Matthews, 1951, p.100), and its understanding of the objective social conditions matched well Z.K.'s own understanding. After the AAC's failure to block the Hertzog Bills, however, black intellectuals found themselves in the same situation as blacks throughout the country: they effectively were excluded from the Union Parliament, and instead were given a largely elected Natives Representative Council (NRC) with advisory power.

Z.K. had been an observer at ANC meetings in the 1930s (Walshe, cited in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM66:96/7), but continued to favour the AAC, as seen by his participation on the AAC delegation at a joint AAC-ANC meeting in 1940 (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.110). But by the end of 1940 he had joined the Cape Branch of the ANC (Ibid.), and was immediately drawn into the activities of

the revitalised Congress.

By the late 1930s the ANC had "become nearly moribund" (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.81), at least as a political organizing body. Initially the AAC "attracted such wide representation and enthusiasm that the ANC seemed to be in serious danger of being declared dead in order to make way for a new organization" (Ibid.). During the 1940s, however, the ANC gradually revived itself, challenged by the strength of the AAC, and relying on its traditional place in the hearts of the people (Ibid., p.82). A new president, Dr. Xuma, was elected in 1940, and he guided the movement away from its loose federal form to "a more tightly functioning and centralized national organization that would attract 'graduates' and other intellectuals" (Ibid., p.71).

Z.K.'s prominent position within the black community, his intelligence and skill as a negotiator (careful, reasoned, articulate), and his legal training made him a popular choice for deputations (e.g., Ibid., p.188f) and for committee work (e.g., Ibid., p.212). For example, Z.K. immediately became the ANC's Secretary for Education, was a member of a committee which revised the Constitution of the ANC (1943; Ibid., p.161f), and chaired the committee that drew up African Claims (1943; Ibid., pp.209-23), a response to Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter that incorporated a Bill of Rights. Through this involvement, Z.K. had developed, by the

early 1940s, a sense of the ANC's traditional place within the hearts of the people (Ibid., p.127, n.78) and a growing sense of national solidarity with all the oppressed in South Africa, not just the intellectual elite. Nevertheless, he remained hopeful that the ANC could negotiate with the white government and reverse the segregationist trend.

In this regard, the Second World War gave blacks some grounds for renewed hope. Smuts again led the government, after Hertzog resigned in protest against South Africa's decision to enter the war with the Allies. Smuts, "a rhetorician of freedom" when abroad (Ibid., p.69), and a principal figure in drafting the preamble to the UN's Charter, encouraged blacks to think concessions might be forthcoming. Furthermore, the government seemed to accept integration of education (Ibid., p.74), and Smuts endorsed the findings of a Commission of Inquiry that accepted blacks as permanent residents in urban areas (Ibid., p.75). The rapid expansion of industry during the war years, and the absorption of, and increased dependence on, black labour suggested a necessary acceptance of integration (Ibid., p.74f).

The Smuts years, however, also gave blacks much reason to doubt a true change in white attitudes (Ibid., pp.76-79). Throughout the period, Malan's NP was gaining strength (Ibid., p.79). The Smuts-led government had been a party to

Hertzog's 1936 Bills, and continued enacting legislation aimed at controlling black movement (e.g., Ibid., p.76). They kept black factory workers in separate accommodations, and declared all black strikes illegal. They continued to prevent black workers from organising and using industrial conciliation structures, crushed strikes by force and continued to prevent black soldiers from carrying weapons.

To many at the time, and in retrospect, these moves by the government showed a continuation of a process of growing segregation. But at the time blacks from the educated elite continued to hope that there might be a softening (and potential change) of attitude in the white government. But the war years were only a temporary stalling of the inevitable moves towards greater segregation. The crisis begun with the Hertzog Bills dragged on and culminated in 1946 with a strike by 70,000 black mineworkers, and the collapse of the Natives Representative Council (NRC).

The NRC (cf., Ibid., p.3f) was offered in the Hertzog Bills as an alternative forum for black political consultation. Supporters of the AAC (some of whom were also ANC members) stood for election in 1937, and won half of the 12 elected seats (Ibid., p.11). The ANC also supported candidates for the NRC - some being supported by both the AAC and ANC. At first, most blacks supported the NRC, hoping to find an opportunity to air grievances and make

constructive comments on proposed legislation.

Although shifting his energies to the ANC, Z.K. still had support within the AAC, and at least some of those who encouraged him to stand for election to the NRC in 1942 were AAC supporters, including one of the radical 'progressives' (Matthews, 1981, p.139; Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.160f). But Z.K. was also supported by his colleagues in the Cape Teacher's Association and Rev. Calata, then Secretary-general of the ANC (Matthews, 1981, p.138). Z.K. won a seat and remained on the Council until 1950, paying no heed to the AAC's policy of boycott introduced in 1943.

Z.K. joined the Council out of a sense of obligation to serve his people (Ibid.). He continued to see rational mediation as the most appropriate means to achieve his (and his people's) end of a non-racial society (his 'brotherhood of man'). Even the loss of his Parliamentary vote, signalling the beginning of his crisis of strategy, could not deter him from treating the NRC as a necessary experiment (Matthews, in Karis & Carter, 1973, pp.224-33). It was the only avenue open for blacks to communicate with the government, and many leaders believed it was important to continue showing a willingness to negotiate. In addition, black leaders would have an opportunity to make recommendations to the government and test its willingness to modify its policies. "The African members looked upon the

Council as a forum where they would be allowed freedom of speech: here they were going to unburden themselves of the numerous grievances of their people in the hope that their cry would reach the ear of Government" (Matthews, 1981, p.138).

But the NRC had difficulties from the outset. Many, like Z.K., who stood for election feared that the body might be ineffective, but were torn also by the worry that the government should not have a Council of illegitimate, collaborationist leaders (cf., Matthews, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM66:96/7). The government failed to act on the Council's advice (except one minor amendment to an education Bill, Matthews, 1981, p.142f), and often did not even consult the Council (cf., Karis & Carter, 1973, p.76; Matthews, 1981). This "led to a sense of frustration and bitterness among the members and to an increasing loss of confidence in the Council among the African people" (Matthews, 1981, p.142; Matthews, in Karis & Carter, 1973, p.231). In response, the Council drafted a resolution calling for an indefinite adjournment (Ibid., p.145f).

When the mine workers went on strike in August 1946, the government, without any consultation with the NRC, sent in police and troops, and broke the strike. In the process, nine miners were killed and over 1,200 injured (F.Wilson, cited in Matthews, 1981, p.145). The Councillors demanded the

government immediately commit itself to repeal six central segregation laws. The government refused, and this led the Councillors to adjourn the NRC indefinitely.

Z.K.'s report on the Council's adjournment (November, 1946, Karis & Carter, 1973, pp.224-33), documenting in detail the work of the NRC and the government's failure to respond, shows clearly his frustration as Chairperson of the black caucus. But Z.K. also revealed his more accommodating stance to the government. Z.K. explained that the indefinite adjournment was meant to last "until the Government showed evidence of its intention to give more serious consideration to the views of Council" (Ibid., p.233). After meeting with the Prime Minister the following May, Z.K. again listed grievances against the government, but warned that "we must not allow the caution dictated by ordinary prudence to develop into a mere stubborn refusal to consider proposals put before us on their merits... We are engaged in delicate negotiations on behalf of our people and we must conduct them with a due sense of responsibility" (Ibid., p.254). This moderate stance was quickly rejected by the president of the ANC, who explicitly reaffirmed the strong position expressed in the Council's original resolution to adjourn (Ibid., pp.97, 258).

By participating in the NRC, Z.K. showed a willingness to work within any political structures the state might

offer. Even in the final crisis, Z.K. was more conciliatory than most. But through this time, Z.K. did learn that direct contact with the government was an exercise in futility. Any hope Z.K. had that the Smuts government might show a willingness to alter its segregation policies was quashed in May 1948 when the National Party (NP) took power, promising its white electorate rapid and tightened segregation, under the name apartheid. Z.K. resigned from the NRC in 1950, just before it was dissolved by the government.

By the end of the NRC's life (officially in 1951, although the last working meeting was held in 1946), Z.K. had come to the political realisation that a programme of mass protest action was necessary. The era of deputations and deliberations by small groups of representatives had failed, and Z.K. understood the ANC's need for a Programme of Action.

> "[E]ver since the mine-strike, he [Z.K.] had committed himself to a course which was bound to lead him into opposition. He became convinced that Congress had to become militant, that it would obtain no concessions without pressure. He supported the new 'Programme of Action' of the Youth League, and he was among those who drafted the resolutions calling for a Defiance Campaign. He knew, as he told the executive, that it would be 'no picnic', but he was certain that only such a campaign would have a serious impact not only on the Government, but on his own people" (Sampson, 1958, p.124).

Even though Z.K. remained willing to negotiate when circumstances warranted, the crisis precipitated by the

Hertzog Bills and its culmination in the collapse of the NRC had undermined his hope that gradual integration could be achieved. As a result, his understanding of what was implied by 'circumstances for negotiation' was now significantly different.

In terms of the duality model, we can see that while Z.K. acted intentionally for the liberation of his people, both in his activity at Fort Hare and in his political activity within the NRC and ANC, his action filled social positions - university teacher, political representative - that had implications for the social structure. The unwillingness of the social structure to accommodate Z.K.'s actions within these positions (denial of his voting privilege, failure to respond to recommendations of the NRC) and the group's action within the structure (protest against the Hertzog legislation, NRC recommendations) meant that Z.K., as an agent, and the black group, as a culture, were pressured to modify their subjectivity in accordance with this development. For Z.K., this meant accepting the need to adopt additional strategies for bringing about changes in the objective structure. Likewise, the black group, in particular the ANC, realised that negotiation with the white government was ineffective and a new relationship with other elements in the objective social structure was necessary. For agents, like Z.K., and groups, like the ANC, this new

form of objectifying themselves would replace negotiation by a select few with defiance through mass action. It was now time for the ANC, through the action of Z.K. and other members, to devise a strategy for its next phase of action.

Notice that although Z.K.'s transformation and that of the ANC appear coordinated, Z.K.'s alignment with the ANC arose from the personal impact of the Hertzog legislation. Without this, he would likely have remained apolitical and regional in his activity. By acting within the NRC, Z.K. became conscientized (cf., Nkrumah, 1964) to the necessarily political and national character of liberation in South Africa. The subjectification of an activist political dimension, however, did not replace his basic faith in liberalisation through education; political activity became additional, but secondary, to education as a means of reaching the integrationist end. And it was this long-term commitment to gradual change through education that was to dominate when political activity competed with academic activity.

## 6. Objectification II: The Intellectual in Mass Action

Immediately after they took office in May 1948, the Nationalists began expanding the structures of segregation they had inherited, and worked towards complete racial separation, or what they called 'separate development'

(apartheid). That same month, the traditionally unsegregated first class trains in the Cape Town area were segregated (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.512). This was followed with a law prohibiting marriage between races (1949); the Group Areas Act (1950), restricting races to particular areas; the Population Registration Act (1950), forcing all individuals to be classified by race; and the Immorality Amendment Act (1950), extending a 1927 law forbidding sex between blacks and whites to sex between whites and Coloureds (mixed race) (Ibid., p.411, 513).

The government's plan to recreate the type of Afrikaner Republics which existed before the South African War (Matthews, 1953, p.516) entailed not only 'petty apartheid', expressed, for example, in the separation of public amenities, but also in 'grand apartheid' which created an inferior environment, in the widest sense, for the developing black youth. In this latter regard, educational standards, living conditions, employment opportunities, health services and the like were increasingly devalued for black South Africans.

Consider education as an example. The Bantu Education Act (1953) allowed for the administration of black schools on a national level, replacing provincial control. Most primary and secondary schools, which had been run by missions and churches with state subsidies, were brought

under state control as the subsidies were phased out (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.30). The new 'Bantu Education', according to Hendrik Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs and later Prime Minister, "'must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life...There is no place for him [the Bantu] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour'" (cited Ibid., p.29).

Before the NP took power in 1948, the ANC already was preparing for a move towards militant opposition. The ANC Youth League (YL) had been formed in 1943, and was becoming an increasingly important group within the ANC. The YL leaders, like the older leaders ('old guard'), were educated and professional people, but post-war developments, especially in Africa, allowed them to call for 'Freedom in our Lifetime' (cf., Sobukwe, in Karis & Carter, 1973, p.334). They were impatient with the old guard, arguing that their moderate tactics of the past decades had failed to narrow the growing gulf between black and white visions of the future.

After the failure of the NRC, and the NP's apartheid promises to the white electorate gave it a parliamentary majority, the older leaders of the ANC, including Z.K., became willing to endorse protest action. At its annual conference in December 1948, the ANC decided to develop a programme of action, to channel popular sentiment for mass

action (Ibid , p.103f). Z.K. had helped draft the resolution to develop a programme of action, and in 1949, headed a committee that took the suggestions received from the various local branches of the ANC and formulated a final Programme of Action document (Ibid., pp.337-39). The fact that both factions of the Youth League (those accepting multi-racial cooperation and the exclusively-minded Africanists who later formed the Pan-Africanist Congress, PAC) laid claim to the basic form of the document, and it was supported by older members of the ANC (including Matthews) shows the remarkable unity forged in this brief - but far-reaching - statement (Ibid., p.104). The Programme of Action was adopted at the 1949 conference, opening the way for the Defiance Campaign of 1952-3.

The crucial statements in the Programme of Action called for "active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-co-operation and such other means" (Ibid., p.338) as well as preparation for a one day strike. This marked a radical reorientation of ANC policy, as it was the first time specific acts of militancy were identified. It opened a new era in opposition politics, and admitted the passing of the "tactics of moderation such as petitions and deputations" (Ibid., p.403).

Although Z.K. was identified with the old guard leadership within the ANC, he was more successful than most

in bridging the gap between the old guard and the YL (Karis & Carter, 1977b, p.79). It was probably his intellectual approach, his legal training, and his ability to consider objectively all sides of an issue, that allowed him to bring opposing factions together. Inevitably, this approach caused many to distrust him, as he appeared not to commit himself. But his efforts at frank discussion and reconciliation should not be confused with his own personal views; those close to him respected his views, as he respected theirs (M. Wilson, in Matthews, 1981, p.227).

Z.K.'s standing within the ANC at the end of the decade (1949) was such that the growing Youth League wanted to put him forward as a candidate for president-general of the national ANC, and had he agreed to stand, he would almost definitely have won the election. But he refused, claiming that he would not be a figurehead for the YL to effect its programme.

The Defiance Campaign was launched officially on June 26, 1952, aiming to use passive resistance to challenge six unjust laws. Late in December it was called off, following sporadic riots and violence, and the arrest, imprisonment and restriction of many of the leaders. The campaign saw over 8,000 defiers imprisoned, international recognition for the actions of the ANC, and a dramatic rise in ANC membership (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.403).

By the time of the Defiance Campaign, Z.K. was a key player in the ANC, leading the Cape Branch of the ANC. But for most of the duration of the Campaign he was a visiting professor at Union Theological Seminary in New York. Throughout this time, as the ANC's official representative, he undertook many public engagements (Matthews, 1981, p.165; Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM66:99/1-76) and published articles (e.g., 1951, 1953; see Karis & Carter, 1973, p.435f, n.40 for a full list), that all record his support for the Defiance Campaign, and, more generally, the ANC's strategies (see Z.K.'s evidence at the 1960 treason trial, excerpts in Karis & Carter, 1977a, pp.618-26; also Matthews, 1981, p.194). There were also suggestions that he might be called as a witness to an ad hoc committee of the United Nations (Matthews, 1981, pp.161-6).

In both Z.K.'s refusal to be a candidate for president-general and his decision to visit Union Theological Seminary at the time of the Defiance Campaign, we get an important insight into Z.K.'s subjectivity. Z.K.'s commitment to activism remained secondary to his academic commitments. He felt that he could make his best political contribution as an educator. This does not mean that activism was peripheral, but rather that it was subordinate to his academic programme - liberalisation through education.

To accept the position of president-general would have

identified Z.K. with the political movement, rather than with the Academy, which was the foundation from which he made political forays when expedient. In deciding to attend Union, Z.K. shows not so much an avoidance of activism, but rather his continued commitment to education as the primary means to an integrated society. Changes in the objective conditions of the society, particularly the passing of the Hertzog Bills, had forced Z.K. to modify (but not reject) his liberalisation through education strategy to include a political dimension. Z.K. continued to be primarily an educationalist seeking liberation: activism had to exist in tandem with education, as an additional means, necessitated by deteriorating circumstances, to halt the racial polarisation. In attending Union, therefore, Z.K. saw a unique educational opportunity for himself, and balanced this against his contribution to a mass Defiance Campaign: the contribution he could make, both educationally and politically (as a spokesperson for the ANC abroad) by going to Union outweighed his potential contribution to the Defiance Campaign.

The beginning of a process of desegregation would create conditions for rational mediation and educational transformation to restructure the society. As a black intellectual, then, Z.K. saw his primary responsibility in his role as an academic model and teacher, maintaining

opportunities for the continued education of future black professionals and leaders. Thus, Z.K. remained focused primarily on education, while keeping an interest in political action.

When Z.K. returned from the United States in 1953, the Defiance Campaign had lost its momentum. However, it had succeeded in politicising large numbers of blacks. By 1953, the ANC was emerging as "an embryonic mass movement" (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.426), with the potential to directly challenge the government through passive resistance. Anticipating this growing strength, and determined to carry through its apartheid policies, the government worked to control, and ultimately to suppress, opposition.

Apartheid, both 'petty' and 'grand', had another side to it. Soon laws were required to control those planning to oppose government policy. The Suppression of Communism Act (1950) forced the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) to disband, but the Act's broad definition of 'communist' threatened all opponents of the government (cf., Mr. Justice Rumpff's comment, Ibid., p.421). In 1953, in response to the Defiance Campaign, the government passed the Criminal Law Amendment Act, that instituted whipping, a fine or a jail term (or a combination) for any form of protest, and the Public Safety Act, that gave the Governor-General power to declare a state of emergency during which parliamentary and

judicial processes could be suspended (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.6).

The black opposition, faced with this minefield of punitive legislation, could not pursue passive resistance (Ibid., p.5), but continued to seek ways to capitalise on the massive following they had developed in the Defiance Campaign. Two approaches were offered. In a presidential address to the Cape Congress, Z.K. suggested "convening a National Convention, A CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE, representing all the people of this country irrespective of race or colour to draw up a FREEDOM CHARTER for the DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA OF THE FUTURE" (Ibid., p.105), while in the Transvaal provincial conference, Nelson Mandela reported on development of the M-plan, a cell-based plan for mass communication and organisation (Mandela, Ibid., p.112; J. Matthews, Ibid., p.35f; see Chapter 4, below).

These contrasting approaches show that, in a time of crisis precipitated by government legislation, younger leaders, like Mandela, anticipated further repression leading to the illegal continuation of opposition activities, while the old guard, represented by Z.K., reverted to less activist mass meetings, trying to keep political activity within the increasingly restrictive legal boundaries being set by the government.

In the months preceding the Congress of the People

(COP) there had been massive grassroots organisation in the selection of delegates and the collection of suggestions for the Freedom Charter. The COP was held in 1955, and the Freedom Charter that was adopted (Karis & Carter, 1977a, pp.56-62, 205-8) remains an expression of Z.K.'s non-racial (Christian-humanist) ideal for the society.

Z.K.'s proposal for the COP shows again his recognition that opposition needed to be activist and independent of government. But his inability to attend, "because he was busily engaged in the process of readmitting students expelled from Fort Hare following a controversial series of events at the college" (Ibid., p.60; M. Wilson, in Matthews, 1981, pp.197-89), suggests, again, a decision in favour of the primacy of education over activism.

Note that the point here is not that Z.K. made a political decision to avoid being associated with "left-wing organizers" (an idea scoffed at by those who knew Matthews well, Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.94, n.191), but rather that, when faced with a political action and an academic action, he favoured his academic role. In no way does this mean he did not support the COP or the Freedom Charter.

Events later that year showed that the government certainly saw Z.K. as a key figure in the opposition movement. Z.K.'s home and office, along with those of many others, were searched by the security police. On December 5,

1956, 156 people, including Z.K. and his son Joe, were arrested on charges of high treason. As Karis & Carter (1977, p.58) point out, the government's apparent tolerance of the COP or any meetings associated with it, was no oversight. Already they were planning their cases against a large number of opposition leaders, and the COP was a key opportunity to collect evidence (cf., Ibid., pp.184-204).

In the Treason Trial that unfolded over the next four years, the State failed to convict any of the accused. The preliminary examination concluded that a prima facie case existed against all accused, but the State withdrew charges against 65 of the accused during an adjournment. The remaining individuals were divided into two groups. Z.K. and Joe were among the 61 who had their indictments quashed in 1959, but had the remaining 30 been found guilty, new indictments would have been brought against Z.K. and the others who were released in 1959 (Matthews, 1981, pp.193-95).

While the Treason Trial continued, in 1959, the apartheid government extended its control to tertiary education, forcing the open universities of Cape Town, the Witwatersrand and Natal to serve only white students, opening separate colleges for 'tribal' groups of blacks, Indians and Coloured, and forcing the University College of Fort Hare to admit only Xhosa and Fingo students (Karis &

Carter, 1977a, p.289f).

In the same way that the Hertzog Bills had created a personal crisis for Z.K., that forced him to engage also in political action, so the University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act precipitated another crisis. Z.K. had continued (justifiably) to believe that Fort Hare, in its small, but significant way could continue to educate leaders for a non-racial future. At the university's closing ceremony in 1959, Z.K. explained Fort Hare's role in sponsoring social integration:

> "Right here, within the boundaries of South Africa, not in some island... off the mainland but right within South Africa, Fort Hare has striven to show during the last 40 years that it is possible for people of different racial backgrounds, different cultural backgrounds, different political affiliations, and different faiths, to live in amity. I believe this unhappy country will not become a happy country until that lesson is learnt ... I feel that sooner or later the lesson must be learnt or South Africa will come to disaster. And when it is learnt, when the day does come, I think due credit will be given to Fort Hare for having pioneered the way and been among those who have shown that it is possible for this thing to happen" (Matthews, 1981, p.197).

Now the government sought to control the college, limit enrollment to one 'tribal' group, and deny academic freedom to faculty, by making them answerable - as civil servants - to the Department of Bantu Education (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.290). Z.K. saw the government making the faculty "'automatons hardly able to breathe or pass on to their students the spirit of free inquiry usually associated with

universities'" (Ibid.).

Z.K. feared that he would not be able to continue his membership of the ANC if he were to remain at Fort Hare (Matthews, 1981, p.196), and when offered a contract on condition that he resign from the ANC (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.290), Z.K. - the Acting-Principal - decided to resign from Fort Hare in protest, along with 16 other faculty members. To underscore his rejection of apartheid education, Z.K. refused the offer of a position at the University of Cape Town, which had lost its academic freedom under the Extension (sic) of Universities Act (1959).

For Z.K., Fort Hare was the heart of his intellectual existence, but within two years of retirement, he forfeited all pension rights, which, after 24 years of service, were substantial (Matthews, 1981, p.196f; Karis & Carter, 1977b, p.81). Z.K.'s resignation from Fort Hare in 1959 is the final, and very personal, act of defiance against a regime that from before birth took his freedom, in 1936 took his vote and now took his life-work, education for all South Africans.

Z.K. fell back on his law degree, opening a practice in Alice, the town where he lived. This move was an important reorientation, for although Z.K. remained committed to 'his people', now he was treating symptoms of the repressive state, rather than trying to cure the social illness itself.

This change in focus reveals a man who, in reaction to an unaccommodating society, refused to submit to a racist structure, but in the conditions of the time, could no longer pursue his educational and political programme. Z.K. planned to pursue this law practice for a reasonably short period, pass it over to a junior and retire to his ancestral homeland of Botswana, where he had arranged to continue a practice (Matthews, 1981, p.201). Perhaps the brief interlude as a lawyer was needed to show the government, against which he had battled all these years, that he would not submit to defeat, but would choose his own time of retirement.

By the time the Treason Trial ended on March 29, 1961, the black opposition had been devastated by the banning of the ANC, and the exclusive-minded breakaway group, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). On March 21, the PAC had organised a national anti-pass demonstration. In Sharpeville, police had opened fire on the large, peaceful crowd (Reeves, 1960), killing 67 and wounding 186. The government declared a state of emergency, detained nearly 2,000 activists and banned the ANC and PAC (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.804). In the crackdown, Z.K. was detained and kept without charge for 135 days. During this detention Z.K. gave much of his evidence at the Treason Trial. Later, his wife recalled that his death "'was not as painful to bear as that

terrible Emergency'" (Matthews, 1981, p.193).

Younger leaders within the ANC had anticipated the government crackdown, and were ready to continue their opposition under the new structural conditions (cf., Mandela's M-plan referred to above). Unable to engage in legal protest within the country, they spearheaded an underground campaign, aided by guerrilla attacks. But Z.K., whose subjectivity expressed a Christian-humanistic ideal and a faith in peaceful change, could not personally advocate violence, although he did understand why others had felt compelled to move in that direction. For example, in a paper delivered to a conference in Zambia in 1964, entitled 'The Road from Non-Violence to Violence', Z.K. detailed the peaceful efforts made by black opposition groups to bring about political reform, and explained why some members of the ANC saw violent opposition as unavoidable after the organisation's banning in 1960 (M. Wilson, in Matthews, 1981, p.210). But the way Z.K. saw it, "violence would leave continuing bitterness, and ... African communities would be destroyed in any attempt to meet the power of the South Africa state with violence" (Ibid., p.224).

The government's power was closing in around opposition groups, and Z.K. personally was threatened. Realising that his hope for a non-racial South Africa - for the foreseeable future - was defeated, Z.K. bowed out of the political

movement. Nevertheless, he remained close to many within the ANC (cf., relationship between Z.K. and Robert Resha in an interview, Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM66:96/2), and continued to be sought for advice (M. Wilson, in Matthews, 1981, p.235).

## 7. Postscript: Finding Objective Expression

In December, 1960, following his release from detention, Z.K. attended a 'consultation' at which South African churches met with the World Council of Churches (WCC, Matthews, 1981, p.201). At the same time, an All-In African Conference, jointly called by Z.K. and Chief Luthuli, was held to bring black leaders together (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.353). Because he was attending the 'consultation', Z.K. failed to attend this political gathering. That he chose to attend the churches consultation over the political conference is reminiscent of his absence from the Defiance Campaign and the COP, and indicates, again, his alignment with processes supporting dialogue rather than confrontation.

Following the consultation, Z.K. was approached to join the WCC in the new position of Africa Secretary of the Division of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service. This provided Z.K. with an opportunity, still in African structural conditions, to engage in a position expressing

his subjective orientation. Even though he left South Africa with "something of the air of a fighter who had been defeated" (M. Wilson, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM66:91/2), he was looking forward to leaving South Africa for a time (Matthews, 1981, p.203), seeing it as a chance to "heal the wounds we had suffered both physically and spiritually" (Ibid., p.204).

The position in Geneva promised an opportunity to use his organisational and diplomatic skills throughout Africa (cf., Ibid., pp.206-8) and possibly see real change result. This was an opportunity he could not miss, if he was to overcome his sense of defeat. The concrete nature of the position can be seen, for example, in a UNESCO-sponsored conference into Higher Education in Africa, that Z.K. attended. "The conference was concerned particularly with the Africanization of the syllabus in history, geography, social science, civics, botany, zoology, and fine arts...since in many schools the syllabus hardly differed from that in Britain or France" (Ibid., p.206).

Although Z.K. wanted to retire to Botswana, he felt obligated to accept an invitation from Sir Seretse Khama, President of the newly-independent Botswana, and a former student of Z.K.'s, to be first Ambassador to Washington and Permanent Representative at the United Nations (UN; Ibid., p.215; Kerr, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM66:91/2).

When, in 1966, Z.K. moved from Geneva to Washington, his success in restoring hope to his ideal showed: "He was gay that August, the gaiety of a man who has gone through a valley of the shadow and emerged in a flowery meadow above, unexpected and unforeseen" (M. Wilson, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM66:91/2). In his efforts for the WCC throughout Africa, at the UN and in Botswana itself, the objectivity of his orientation was being accepted, respected and was bringing about, what he considered, improvements in the objective social conditions in which he acted. At the UN, Z.K. met many colleagues and former students, many associated with delegations from other independent African countries (Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM66:99/67).

Certainly Z.K.'s work for the WCC had made practical improvements for refugees, in education, and in policies towards South Africa. At the UN, it is probable that Z.K. did work (or would have worked) for action on South Africa, as well as raising international consciousness of issues relating to Africa as a whole.

When Z.K. died on May 12, 1968, his stature as a diplomat and African hero did not go unnoticed. "President Johnson did him the singular honour of sending his body back to Botswana in his (the President's) own plane" (Kerr, in Karis & Carter collection, 2:XM66:91/2). The funeral was a huge gathering of friends, former colleagues and students

(Buthelezi, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM66:91/2), and memorial services were held in Washington, New York, Geneva, Nairobi; and Port Elizabeth, Umtata and Alice in South Africa.

## 8. Conclusion

Z.K.'s transition from the Booker Washington approach of gradual change through individual educational success to the politicised militancy of W. E. B. DuBois (Sampson, 1958; cf., Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967) was a significant process of development. But throughout Z.K. remained "a conservative and a capitalist" (Ibid., p.126) who could not bring himself to participate in the inevitable violence (Ibid., p.126) arising from the polarisation of the developing relations in South Africa.

In South Africa, Z.K.'s faith in the tradition of liberation through education could have contributed directly, albeit gradually, to change in the society, had other institutions and organisations accommodated the educated black who emerged from the Cape liberal tradition. Z.K.'s action in that objective social position fitted perfectly the expectations of his subjective culture, but, because the objective social conditions were changing, his objective impact, as a gradual integrationist in the tradition of the Cape Colony, was limited.

As an individual actor, Z.K. could not bring himself to give up hope in the liberalising power of education that his parents, his schooling, and his career had emphasised. Fortunately, the opportunity to work in other social conditions (the WCC and the UN), where the objectification of his subjectivity could be accommodated, allowed Z.K. to restore his faith in liberalisation through education, even as conditions in South Africa made such an orientation irrelevant.

## Chapter 4. The Model Applied to the Life of Nelson Mandela

The detailed analysis of Z. K. Matthews' life given in the previous chapter has illustrated how the duality model can be used to develop a socio-psychological account of a single life-history. In this chapter, and the one following, two further socio-psychological accounts give additional evidence of the model's explanatory value, while showing also how subsequent historical periods emerged and contributed to the development of significantly different leadership styles in Nelson Mandela and later, in Stephen Biko.

In this chapter the discussion will focus on Mandela's rise to prominence within the black liberation movement in South Africa, and the socio-psychological circumstances that distinguished him from 'old guard' leaders, like Matthews. Then, in Chapter 5, Biko will be used as a third case study, showing again a progression in leadership as a function of interacting individual and social forces at both the objective and subjective levels.

### 1. Subjectification I: Traditional Culture, Western Education

Sources provide brief and sketchy accounts of Mandela's early years, often relying on the autobiographical notes

Mandela made while on trial in 1964 (Mandela, 1986, p.235f). Meer's authorized biography (1990) gives the most detail. Her account relies on reminiscences given her by Mandela's relatives in 1984, as well as letters and reflections from Mandela himself. Even though Mandela was still imprisoned, access was growing, and Meer was able to interview Mandela for about eighteen hours (p.xix) in 1989. Because he was able to review the text and make appropriate corrections, something not possible in previous accounts published during Mandela's isolation, Meer's biography is the most detailed yet available.

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela was born on July 18, 1918 in Umtata, the capital of the semi-autonomous Transkei Territory (Karis and Carter, 1977b, p.71), in the eastern Cape Province. He was the eldest son of a minor chief, Hendry Gadla (Meer, 1990, p.3) (or Henry; see Mandela, 1986, p.235), and his third wife, Nosekeni Fanny (Meer, 1990, p.3). Mandela's sister recalls that their father "'rode a horse and ... had enough cattle to marry four wives'" (in Meer, 1990, p.3), and their mother grew corn ('mealies') and they relied on milk from their cows and goats (Ibid., p.4).

Nelson's mother was a "'devout Christian'" but Hendry was not a Christian (Ibid., p.4). Nelson followed his mother in her Methodist faith, and attended church and Sunday school regularly (Meer, 1990, p.7).

Both of Mandela's parents lacked western education (Mandela, 1986, p.235); however, they did recognise the importance of it for their children. Nosekeni Fanny was especially worried about her son Nelson, who would not inherit the chieftaincy because, even though he was the eldest son, he was not the first wife's child. Mandela's sister seems to suggest that Chief Hendry was pressured by Nosekeni Fanny to support Nelson's education. Be that as it may, Hendry "'decided that it would be best for Buti [Nelson] to have a good education; then he would have a good job'" (Meer, 1990, p.7).

Nelson attended the local school for a few years, but, when he had to advance to a second school, he went to live with the acting paramount chief, who took responsibility for his subsequent education. Nelson's father was '"deposed for insubordination'" (Meer, 1990, p.3), and when he died, he had lost all his wealth (Mandela, in Meer, 1990, p.8). Nelson was ten (Meer, 1990, p.4; Mandela, in Meer, 1990, p.8), or, if the year was 1930, he was eleven or twelve at this juncture (Mandela, 1986, p.235; Karis & Carter, 1977b, p.71; Tambo, in Mandela, 1973, p.xii). Nevertheless, it was the paramount chief's responsibility to take care of Nelson, and, as his guardian, the chief supported him through his years at Fort Hare (Ibid., p.8), and probably beyond (Ibid., p.26).

While growing up in the paramount chief's house, Nelson learned about Tembu history, and the changes brought about by the arrival of whites. An aging Tembu sage, Tatu Joyi, was especially important in preserving and transmitting the history (Meer, 1990, pp.13-22), and later Mandela was to search government documents to validate the general account he had heard (Meer, 1990, p.14). Although historians may question the accuracy of this romantic view of Tembu history, its impact on Mandela should not be overlooked. The stories told by Tatu Joyi offered a subjectification of the tribe's position in the objective society, and, as such, contributed to Mandela's subjective orientation. Mandela summarized these early impressions in later court appearances (see Mandela, 1986, pp.149f, 161):

> "My political interest was first aroused when I listened to elders of our tribe in my village as a youth. They spoke of the good old days before the arrival of the White man. Our people lived peacefully under the democratic rule of their kings and counsellors and moved freely all over their country. Then the country was ours. We occupied the land, the forests and the rivers. We set up and operated our own government; we controlled our own armies, and organised our own trade and commerce. The elders would tell us about the liberation and how it was fought by our ancestors in defence of our country, as well as the acts of valour performed by generals and soldiers during those epic days. I hoped, and vowed then, that amongst the pleasures that life might offer me, would be the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their struggle for freedom" (1986, p.235).

Nelson witnessed also the functioning of traditional

government. He was impressed by the socialist structure of the traditional society; no one owned the land, although the whole tribe, under the authority of the chief, shared it (Mandela, 1986, p.150). His father had participated in a number of political bodies, and had been chief councillor to the paramount chief (Benson, 1980, p.21). By witnessing the interactions between the paramount chief and local chiefs, Nelson was being prepared for a future position of leadership. "Nelson...was groomed from childhood for respectability, status, and sheltered living" (Tambo, in Mandela, 1973, p.xii).

It is clear from Mandela's early social experience that the elders understood the objective social conditions to involve a racial tension, where blacks had been forced into submission. But the independence of tribal communities, arising from their particular geographical loci, their historico-familial bondings and their economic self-sufficiency together maintained a localised, fragmented resistance to white invasion. As Tatu Joyi noted, intertribal division had been exploited by the whites, and this had allowed whites to dominate (Meer, 1990, p. 16f).

At the same time, however, education was emphasised. It was realised that young people in the community no longer would be able to fight the colonists as warriors, but they could seek to defend their people's interests in the society

by drawing on the white people's education (cf., Simons & Simons, 1983, p.48; see also Chapter 3, section 2). Getting to know the ways of whites would, for example, allow tribal leaders to avoid the pitfalls that their ancestors faced when negotiating treaties with whites (cf., Meer, 1990, p.18f). It is this understanding of western education that Mandela's parents and later his guardian used to encourage Mandela through school.

Recall that Matthews, too, was taught that the objective conditions involved a conquering white group and an unjustly oppressed group of blacks, who needed to restore their dignity and freedom (see Chapter 3, Section 2). For the Matthews family, this subjective understanding of the objective conditions involved also the goal of integration with the means to this end explicitly tied to the white man's education (Matthews, 1981, p.14). For Mandela's tribal elders, protection of their way of life took precedence over integration into the white society, and, consequently, Mandela was trained and educated primarily for a traditional leadership role in the tribe.

The subjective orientation offered to Mandela, although it included education, was based on an understanding of society as primarily divided by race. For Mandela, education would facilitate negotiation between tribal governments and the white man's government, while for Matthews, education

was to blur these distinctions in a non-racial class-based division of society.

Neither the regional political activities of the eastern Cape intellectual establishment nor the movement towards national black unity that had developed among educated blacks at the time of Union (see Chapter 3, section 1), and which sought integration in a single society, had influenced the rural, subsistence communities of the Transkei. The understanding of the objective society that the Tembu elders subjectified for their youth emphasised resistance to white authority (through education), but, importantly, maintained the isolation and primacy of the tribal groups. Especially at the missionary schools of the eastern Cape, where blacks from throughout the Union met, Mandela was to recognise his position in a wider community; his personal experience was to modify the initial subjective understanding of the objective society that he had internalised from his tribal elders.

After passing Standard 5 (Grade 7), the paramount chief took Nelson to another school, where he passed Standard 6.

> "'[T]here was a celebration and they slaughtered a sheep in his honour. [The paramount chief] Jongintaba bought him his school uniform and shining leather shoes and Nelson packed his trunk and they drove the Ford V8 to Engcobo, where he was enrolled at Clarkebury. He matriculated at Healdtown in 1938 and there was an even bigger celebration, for he was now to go to university. Jongintaba took him to a tailor and had a three-piece suit made for him. We thought there could never be

> anyone smarter than him at Fort Hare'" (Ntombizodwa, in Meer, 1990, p.8f).

At this time, over two-thirds of black children in the Union received no education, and less than 2% of those entering school progressed beyond the primary years (Grade 7) (Hoernle, 1939, p.12f). "In 1935 the average enrolment in the twenty secondary schools for Natives in the four Provinces was only 2,273 pupils, compared with over 330,000 pupils in the 3,254 State-aided primary schools" (Ibid., p.13). As Hoernle notes, the educational system for black South Africans could be depicted as an extremely exaggerated pyramid, that "tapers into a long and very thin apex" (Ibid.). Thus, Mandela's achievement of progressing through school and on to University was almost as remarkable as Matthews' achievement, some two decades earlier.

The year or two spent at Clarkebury probably contributed to the broadening of Mandela's understanding of his community, 'his people', but it was at Healdtown and Fort Hare that he subjectivised a nationalist understanding of the objective society. "'Despite the fact that my political outlook was still formative, Healdtown and Fort Hare ... brought me into contact with students from other sections of our people, and at least I had already developed beyond thinking along ethnic lines'" (Mandela, in Meer, 1990, p.26). Healdtown was a Methodist mission school (Karis

and Carter, 1977a, p.124) in the eastern Cape, not unlike Lovedale. Healdtown had been founded in the mid-nineteenth century, as a means to educate (i.e., 'civilize') blacks in western ways (Wilson, 1969d, p.260).

In 1936, when the Hertzog Bills gave legislative finality to the white government's unwillingness to integrate the society through gradual absorption of the educated black elite (see Chapter 3, section 5), Mandela was attending Healdtown. The widespread student protest that ensued affected Healdtown, and this, according to Benson (1980, p.24), affected Mandela, creating the initial conditions for his national political awareness. The highly politicised atmosphere in the eastern Cape, particularly in its educational institutions, where opposition to the legislation was strongest, meant that students, aware of the unfolding political events, could foresee the inevitability of the erosion of black rights.

Mandela, like Matthews before him, was being influenced by the philosophical orientation of missionary schools. His thinking had transcended ethnic lines (Mandela, in Meer, 1990, p.26), but had not expanded to include other races. At this time, while his teachers were introducing him to their subjective understanding of a gradual liberalisation of the society through educational achievement, events in the objective society made it hard to accept that whites were

willing to liberalise the society in response to black educational achievement. Mandela was able to see the divergence that was developing between the objective society with its increasing segregation, and the subjective understanding of the society offered in the missionary school tradition.

This realisation is not unlike the dilemma evident in Matthews' M.A. thesis (see Chapter 3, section 4) which he was preparing during these same years. But, unlike Matthews, who, as we have seen, had difficulty in accepting the limitations of his liberalisation through education orientation within the changing objective conditions, Mandela, as yet uncommitted to a programme of action, was able to acknowledge more easily the objective changes occurring in the society, and the inadequacy - within existing objective conditions - of the subjective understanding being given him by his teachers.

Mandela left school, therefore, with a growing consciousness of the oppression of blacks on a national (nontribal, nonregional) level, and open to forms of political action that would respond to the new conditions created by Hertzog's legislation. At Fort Hare, Mandela was to meet other young blacks who also recognised the inadequacy of the older generation's subjective understanding of gradual liberalisation through education

and the need for new direction under changed objective conditions (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.100).

Mandela progressed to Fort Hare in 1938 (Karis and Carter, 1977b, p.72), where he began a B.A., and most likely intended to follow this with a law degree. At this time, Fort Hare was still relatively small. For example, Hoernle (1939, p.13) cites statistics for 1936: "Fort Hare had, in 1936, a total of 165 students of whom, however, only eighty-one did work of post-Matriculation (i.e., University) standard. In the same year, seven students from that College obtained the B.A. degree of the University of South Africa; two, the B.Sc. degree; and thirteen, the Diploma in Education".

While at Fort Hare, Mandela was influenced by Z. K. Matthews, and probably also was taught by him. In a letter heavily censored by prison authorities, Mandela wrote to Frieda Matthews following Z.K.'s death: "As a lecturer at Fort Hare he [Z.K.] played an important role in producing that generation of trained thinkers in Eastern and Southern Africa who were to serve as pioneers in many fields of endeavour...Many of us associate him with crucial turns on questions of principle and tactics in the course of our political evolution [lines scored out] Z.K.'s influence is clearly to be seen..." (quoted in Matthews, 1981, p.230).

There is no direct evidence of Mandela's academic

performance at Fort Hare. But later academic successes along with remarks by acquaintances relating to his intelligence, organization and determination (e.g., Sisulu, cited in Cruywagen, 1990, p.11), suggest he would have had no problems at University. Whether or not he was noticed for his academic achievements, his growing political interest began to interact with his academic work.

At Fort Hare, groups like the Social Studies Society discussed wide-ranging political issues (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.99). Other students who were to become members of the YL attended meetings of these groups (Ibid.), and it is reasonable to think Mandela did too. His friends included some who later formed the YL and became leading figures in the ANC. For example, Mandela became a friend of Oliver Tambo with whom later he would open a law practice (Karis & Carter, 1977b, p.72). These young intellectuals had not yet brought their energies together into an organisational structure, but their disillusionment with the existing forms of opposition already was evident in their involvement in the Social Studies Society. The subjective understanding of the objective society, given by family and teachers, reflected the fading promise of gradual liberalisation through educational success, and was inconsistent with the experiences of these young students in the society. They had witnessed the effects of social changes on others (e.g., the

Hertzog legislation and the eastern Cape intellectual elite), and recognised that a new (as yet undefined) subjective orientation towards the objective society was necessary.

In his second year at Fort Hare Mandela became involved in student politics (Gordimer, in Karis and Carter Collection, 2:XM33:91/1, p.2), and by his third year was a member of the Students' Representative Council (SRC) (Benson, 1980, p.24). Following moves by the authorities to curtail the power of the SRC, Mandela was one of those to organise a protest strike. It seems the initial trigger involved catering, as a relative remembers "'Nelson got involved in a strike. There is always trouble about food, and he was sent home'" (Meer, 1990, p.9). The authorities reacted by emasculating the SRC, and this led Mandela to help organize a boycott of the SRC election (International Aid and Defence Fund, in Mandela, 1986, p.1). In response, the authorities threatened to expel him unless he served on the new SRC (Gordimer, in Karis and Carter Collection, 2:XM 33:91/1, p.2). He refused, and was suspended [illegible]0 (Benjamin, in W. Mandela, 1984, p.53; Benson, 1980, p.24; Karis & Carter, 1977b, p.72).

Mandela returned home, but the paramount chief clearly valued education before political action, and ordered Mandela "to accept the college ultimatum to abandon the

boycott" (Benson, 1980, p.24). Around the same time, plans were being made for a traditional arranged marriage. The paramount chief had "selected a girl, fat and dignified, paid lobola [bride-price] and arrangements were afoot for the wedding" (Mandela, 1986, p. 236). Mandela's education, with its accompanying western values, led him to reject this approach as 'undemocratic' (Ibid.). Implicit in this action was a wider rejection of traditional values and customs, indicating that his missionary school education, with its emphasis on liberalisation and integration into the wider society, dominated his subjectivity. With a nephew, he stole two oxen, sold them, and used the money to flee to Johannesburg (Mandela, in Meer, 1990, p.10).

2. Subjectification II: The Youth's Nationalism

Mandela arrived in Johannesburg in 1941. The Second World War was creating an economic boom, but huge numbers of people had been forced from the rural areas and were attracted to the city, resulting in poor living conditions and poor employment opportunities for many (Gerhart, 1978, p.45). Mandela was able to find work as a policeman at a mine compound, with the promise that he could advance to a clerk's position as soon as a vacancy was available (Mandela, 1986, p.236). Within days, however, Mandela was forced to leave this position, when the paramount chief

discovered the two young men and sought their return (Meer, 1990, p.26). But Mandela convinced his guardian that he should remain in Johannesburg to pursue his law training (Ibid.), and in the process, avoided the arranged marriage.

Mandela struggled to survive on a small salary, from which he had to pay for rent, transport and food (Ibid.). It was the sympathy of Walter Sisulu's fiancée that brought Mandela into their family circle (Ibid., p.28), and here his academic and political education continued. He remained with the Sisulus until he married in 1944 (Ibid., p.40).

Sisulu had been forced to quit school and had worked at a number of jobs before becoming an estate agent (Karis & Carter, 1977b, p.144). Sisulu was impressed by Mandela's abilities and desire to continue studying. As he recalled to a newspaper reporter in 1990: "Well, he was a very bright young man, impressive and open about things. He appeared quite ambitious to develop educationally. I liked him very much" (Cruywagen, 1990, p.11). Mandela continued to struggle, working as an estate agent for Sisulu (Benson, 1980, p.27), and earning "£2 per month plus commissions" (Mandela, 1986, p.236). Sisulu encouraged Mandela to complete his B.A. (1942), and to continue with an LL.B. through the University of the Witwatersrand (Tambo, in Mandela, 1973, p.xiii). Later Sisulu arranged for him to do articles with a Johannesburg law firm, under the supervision

of a white attorney (Ibid.; Meer, 1990, p.29).

Sisulu had joined the ANC in 1940 and was at the forefront of those moving the ANC towards militant action (Karis & Carter, 1977b, p.144). Most of the young organizers had finished high school, and many had trained further as teachers or attended Fort Hare (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.98). Many of these activists were entertained in the Sisulu home, and Mandela was able to develop (and, in some cases, renew) friendships with them (Meer, 1990, p.31, 40). Soon Mandela was one of the main agitators pressuring the ANC leadership for change (J. Matthews, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM65:94/1, p.29).

These young men were associating in Johannesburg at a time when it was about to eclipse the Cape as the centre for black opposition: "industrial development was beginning to create an urban working class of vast potential strength" (Gerhart, 1978, p.47). The Hertzog legislation had undermined the black elite, and new leaders found a constituency in the growing working class developing in Johnannesburg (Ibid.; Karis & Carter, 1973, p.70). The War began a significant urbanisation process among blacks, with the result that in 1948 the Report of the Native Laws Commission into "the pass laws [and]...the problems of Africans in urban areas and migratory labor" (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.75) recommended to the Government that

blacks be recognised as permanent urban dwellers (Ibid.). Gerhart (1978, p.47, n.1) cites a number of statistics demonstrating this development; for example, the level of urbanisation among blacks was 18.9% in 1936 and by 1951 was 27.1%.

It is true that there were real difficulties involved in organising a black proletariat. But the fact that Kadalie had been able to organize the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa (ICU) in the 1920s (Karis & Carter, 1972, pp.154-8) and the call to strike by the Mineworkers Union had been heeded by 70,000 workers in 1946 (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.94) suggest that political leaders, like Matthews, failed to recognise the growing potential support available in the working class, preferring to win acceptance into 'civilized' white society by keeping their distance from such groups (Gerhart, 1978, p.47f). When the Hertzog Bills revealed the limitations of the Cape intellectuals' subjective orientation involving gradual liberalisation through education, the black elite was forced to recognise its plight as a national and racial group. It was out of these changing objective social conditions that the YL emerged. Its explicit recognition of the racial nature of the society and its encouragement of mass action offered a new and more promising interpretation of the objective social conditions; this subjectification of society promised

increased support for the ANC through the call to all blacks to unite and take an active part in their own liberation. The old guard, even those nationally-minded leaders who founded the ANC, had not entertained the idea of mass involvement.

These young educated men were discovering that their missionary education, which had rejected racial distinctions in favour of individual achievement, had overlooked the (growing) racial division of the objective society. While receiving this education, they had seen the franchise privileges of their educated leaders stripped away. The confrontation of a Matthews-like subjectification of gradual social liberalisation through educational achievement and the objective reality of an increasingly precise racial division of the society challenged these young students to develop an orientation that responded more appropriately to the social reality.

Impatient with the reactive approach of the 'old guard' (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.305), these youths sought change. They looked back at the history of the ANC and saw, among other things, an organization led by a "privileged few" who stood between the government and the masses. These leaders had played a "dual role", warning the government that threats to their privileges would force them to join the masses in protest, while trying to restrain the masses in

their protests against oppression (Ibid.). With the passing of the Hertzog Bills, this elite lost its privilege (Ibid., p.303), and its attempts to convince the masses that, with patience, would come gradual integration, failed.

The youth felt a responsibility to make the leadership more responsive to and representative of the masses. These young radicals interpreted the objective conditions in the following way: the government had failed to heed the warning from the "privileged few", and now, without privilege and in a clearly defined battle against the state, these 'old guard' leaders needed to align themselves completely with the masses or give way to those who could. The way ahead involved standing together as a single body of oppressed blacks, all of whom were effectively disenfranchised and equally targeted by the segregationist policies of the white government. Joe Matthews recalls that these young radicals became "a kind of militant group within the ANC conferences. Inclined to stir them up. Their first effort to try and create a truly militant national organization was to produce the resolution for the expulsion of the Communists. That was '42, I think ... But they were generally an active sort of group" (J. Matthews, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM65:94/1, p.30).

At the annual conference of the ANC in 1943, the president-general, Dr. Xuma, gave official voice to

pressures from the youth to form a Youth League (YL). The conference passed a resolution supporting this process (Karis and Carter, 1973, p.100f), and, in the recruiting drive that followed, Mandela was brought into the ANC organisation through the YL. In 1944, the YL had its first meeting where the constitution (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.309-14) and the League's manifesto (Ibid., pp.300-8) were endorsed (Ibid., p.102). At this meeting, Mandela was elected to the Executive Committee (Meer, 1990, p.33).

The founders of the YL intended to offer an alternative to the tactics being pursued by the 'old guard' leadership, by pressuring the organisation from within (Ngubane, cited in Karis and Carter, 1973, p.102). Their manifesto, drawn up by a committee that included Mandela (Karis and Carter, 1973, p.101), criticised the 'old guard' for both its lack of action in mobilizing the masses and its willingness to cooperate (collaborate) with other groups which, they believed, failed to acknowledge that blacks were uniquely oppressed and needed to unite as a group exclusively concerned with race (Ibid., p.301). But at the same time, these young members were fully cognizant of the ANC's role as the organizing body for black opposition, and believed history showed that splinter bodies did not survive (Ibid., p.307; J. Matthews, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM65:94/1, p.34).

For the YL leaders, the government had acted in terms of race, and their subjective understanding of the objective conditions of the society saw the conflict as racially-defined (e.g., 'Statement of Policy' in YL Manifesto, Karis & Carter, 1973, p.300f). Even moderates in the YL felt the effects of increased segregation, and were sensitive to the special role of blacks in opposing government policies. It is not surprising, therefore, that many in the YL sought to avoid organisations that included whites and Indians, and which claimed to speak for blacks. Citing Mandela, Benson (1980) claims that the YL specifically targeted communists in its policy statement, when it argued that "'There are certain groups which seek to impose on our struggle cut-and-dried formulae, which so far from clarifying the issues of our struggle, only serve to obscure the fundamental fact that we are oppressed not as a class, but as a people, as a Nation'" (Karis and Carter, 1973, p.330). More specifically: "Notes of the committee which drafted the Youth League manifesto recorded the 'need for vigilance against Communists and other groups which foster non-African interests'" (Karis and Carter, 1973, p.100).

Through its first years, the YL expressed two ideological positions, one a racially-exclusive 'Africanist' stance, developed most forcefully by its first president, Anton Lembede (cf., Gerhart, 1978, pp.45-84), and the other

'African Nationalist', which believed that all people committed to a democratic and non-racial society could be accommodated in the future system (Karis and Carter, 1973, p.105f). At the 1943 annual conference, for example, some YL members made an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the adoption of a new, non-racial constitution for the ANC (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.101), although the YL's own constitution of 1944 (Ibid., p.309-14) appeared to support the ANC's non-racial membership policy (Ibid., p.101). Conflicting views on inter-racial cooperation remained evident in YL documents, until, in the 1948 policy document, a clear statement was made concerning both views, and the YL accepted the broader African Nationalist vision:

> "...there are two streams of African Nationalism. One centres around Marcus Garvey's slogan - 'Africa for the Africans'. It is based on the 'Quit Africa slogan' and on the cry 'Hurl the Whiteman to the sea'. This brand of African Nationalism is extreme and ultra revolutionary.
>
> "There is another stream of African Nationalism (Africanism) which is moderate, and which the Congress Youth League professes. We of the Youth League take account of the concrete situation in South Africa, and realise that the different racial groups have come to stay. But we insist that a condition for inter-racial peace and progress is the abandonment of white domination, and such a change in the basic structure of South African Society that those relations which breed exploitation and human misery will disappear" (Ibid., p.328).

However, the tension between these two streams of African Nationalism within the YL did not disappear, and, in 1958, led to the formation of the PAC, as it split from the ANC

(Roux, 1964, p.403f; see section 5, below).

Initially, Mandela was amongst those YL leaders who were suspicious of communists, and who wanted to avoid organisations like the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) which showed sympathy with communists and tried to speak on behalf of blacks (Karis and Carter, 1977b, p.72). Mandela later told a court that

> "...in my younger days I held the view that the policy of admitting communists to the ANC, and the close cooperation which existed at times on specific issues between the ANC and the Communist Party, would lead to a watering down of the concept of African Nationalism. At that stage I was a member of the African National Congress Youth League, and was one of a group which moved for the expulsion of communists from the ANC. This proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who voted against the proposal were some of the most conservative sections of African political opinion. They defended the policy on the ground that from its inception the ANC was formed and built up, not as a political party with one school of political thought, but as a Parliament of the African people, accommodating people of various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national liberation. I was eventually won over to this point of view and I have upheld it ever since" (Mandela, 1973, p.180f).

Within the YL, Mandela was more moderate than the exclusivist president, Lembede (J. Matthews, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM64:94/1, p.32), but still was unsure of his political philosophy. His Africanism, according to Benson (1980, p.33) was a relic from his tribal past, and his anti-communism was a result of his religious upbringing and belief "that communists were anti-Christ". Mandela's subjectivity had expanded the limits of what he considered

to be 'his people' beyond the tribe to include the black nation, as a result of the explicit racial definition of the society enunciated in the Hertzog legislation. Throughout the 1940s, Mandela continued to mistrust the white leadership and the victory of the Nationalists in 1948 was the culmination of a series of events that confirmed in him a nationalist subjective understanding of the objective social conditions.

While Mandela was becoming active within the YL, he was influenced also by fellow students at the University of the Witwatersrand, where he was studying law. The university was still an open (non-racial) campus, and Mandela's friends included whites and Indians, communists and liberals (Meer, 1990, p.33f). They met socially and spent evenings in intellectual discussions of segregation, racism, culture and forms of resistance (Ibid., p.34). This gave him inter-racial experiences quite unusual for YL activists (Gerhart, 1978, p.112), and the interactions and long-term friendships fostered through the university were significant initial influences in his later acceptance of inter-racial cooperation in opposing state oppression.

Through his university experiences, Mandela came to favour passive resistance as a means of effective action. Two of his classmates helped lead an Indian passive resistance campaign in 1946 (Meer, 1990, p.34; Karis &

Carter, 1973, p.103), and he saw in their action a promising alternative form of opposition. Passive resistance came to characterise the mass action of the 1950s, and Mandela's personal recollections of the objective impact of his friends' actions made him an important influence on the ANC's decision to pursue such a campaign.

Along with YL and university friends, Mandela came to know and respect the white attorney with whom he was articled. Sidelsky was an unusual white man, who accepted Mandela as a person, and encouraged him to pursue his education and profession. In this regard, he was not unlike Matthews, for he believed in gradual change through education. Sidelsky disagreed with Mandela's view that political action too was necessary if blacks in South Africa were to practice what they had learned, believing instead that education gave a person independence and freedom (Gordimer, in Karis and Carter Collection, 2:XM 33:91/1, p.2f). Their differences in strategy notwithstanding, Sidelsky impressed Mandela and must have contributed to his broadening perspective.

Although Mandela did not take any leadership roles in the YL until the end of the 1940s (Meer, 1990, p.43), probably because he was continuing his studies, his political education continued. He shared the YL's understanding of the objective social conditions, especially

its belief that the white government, irrespective of leadership, had no serious interest in integration. This set the YL apart from the 'old guard', for the latter group had renewed its hope in the willingness of whites to liberalise the society during the Second World War (see Chapter 3, section 5).

When the 1946 mineworkers' strike was crushed, by an apparently 'liberal' white government, the YL was vindicated in its interpretation of the objective society. The ineffectiveness of the NRC, and its collaborationist approach became painfully obvious, and in 1947 the YL called for a boycott of the Council (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.103; Benson, 1980, p.38). Finally, the election of a Nationalist government (1948), committed to intensifying segregation (apartheid), convinced even the old guard leaders in the ANC, like Matthews, that negotiation with the government was virtually impossible. The YL's understanding of the objective society had anticipated such changes, and therefore became the basis for a new form of action.

In terms of the duality model, this phase of Mandela's development covers a period of transition, from his disillusionment with the limitations of the subjective understanding offered by his teachers in the Cape intellectual elite, to his acceptance of a nationalist subjectivity through the influence of Sisulu and other YL

founders. His contact with the Sisulus was serendipitous, but his desire to serve his people, and his intellectual search for a more appropriate understanding of the changes occurring in the objective society made him open to the nationalism of the youth. Through the 1940s, the YL's message consistently gave more accurate accounts of developments in the society, and this reinforced Mandela's nationalist outlook. Only when his efforts to objectify this nationalism failed to receive the anticipated support of the masses of ANC members, did Mandela again modify his subjectivity, this time to reflect a multi-racial understanding of the society.

### 3. Subjectification III: Exclusivism to Multiracialism

Mandela was drawn into the leadership of the YL in 1948, although he had been active in YL discussions from its inception. He played an important role in drafting the final version of the 1948 'Basic Policy of Congress Youth League' (Benson, 1980, p.34; Karis & Carter, 1973, 323-31), and when the YL expanded nationally in 1948, he became national secretary (Karis & Carter, 1977b, p.72).

By this time, the YL was committed to some form of mass action, but its 'Basic Policy' was vague concerning tactics (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.103): "the programme of organisation and action, may and shall be modified from time

to time to meet new situations and to cope with the ever changing circumstances" (Ibid., p.326). While the old guard's subjective understanding of the objective conditions had become ineffective in directing action, the YL's alternative subjectification captured the need for a significant change in ANC policy, and was widely supported. This gave the YL confidence first to demand that their activist policy be adopted as official ANC policy, and second, to attack the ANC leadership directly.

At the annual conference at the end of 1948, the ANC passed a resolution supporting a programme of mass action (Ibid., p.103f), and in so doing acknowledged the failure of earlier efforts to alter government policy and acknowledged also the popular support for mass action. Over the next year, the new Nationalist government made significant moves towards its policy of racial separation, or apartheid. In a review of the history of the ANC, Joe Matthews confirms that the actions of the white government spurred action in the ANC, expressed particularly at its 1949 conference (Karis and Carter Collection, 2:XM65:82/2, p.5).

Before the 1949 ANC conference, members of the YL's new executive had approached the ANC president general over what they saw as his inability to take the organization forward to mass action. Xuma had worked hard during the 1940s, attracting new members and building a broadly-based and

organised ANC (cf., Karis & Carter, 1973, p.294f). Even so, the YL felt that he represented the old school, preferring organization to action and that he, personally, was too "autocratic" (Karis and Carter, 1977b, p.166). Xuma was a proud leader, and refused to submit to the ultimatum given by Mandela and Sisulu, that he support the YL's Programme of Action. Mji (in Meer, 1990, p.48) recalls that, after Xuma's address to the conference, the YL proposed a vote of no confidence, and, because they had organised themselves well, they were able to carry the motion. The minutes of the conference (Karis & Carter, 1973, pp.288-300) record much discussion following the presidential address (p.290), and the election of a new president (p.294), but there is no record of a no-confidence motion in the official minutes.

Having succeeded in removing Xuma from the presidency, the YL had some difficulty finding a suitable candidate to replace him (J. Matthews, in Karis and Carter Collection, 2:XM65:94/1, p.38). When Z.K. Matthews was approached by members of the YL, he turned them down, refusing to be a figurehead for their policy (see Chapter 3, Section 6). Mandela, although an obvious outsider and not in attendance at the conference (Meer, 1990, p.416), was considered by some in the YL as a possibility (J. Matthews, in Karis and Carter Collection, 2:XM65:94/1, p.38). Others (Mji, in Meer, 1990, p.48) suggest that no one in the YL had the required

prestige for the position.

At least some in the YL appear to have considered Mandela's objective activity to best reflect the YL's own subjectification of the objective social conditions, and to be effective (or potentially effective) in transforming those objective conditions. Nevertheless, his failure to win a nomination suggests that the YL recognised also that the social position of president-general contained objective constraints that required an older and more widely respected incumbent; at the same time the YL's interests were met by finding an older figure whom they could manipulate.

In a surprise move, the YL backed Moroka (Roux, 1964, p.403) who had just been ousted as president of the All-African Convention (AAC) (Mji, in Meer, 1990, p.48). When this busy doctor from the Orange Free State won the position, the YL was able to consolidate its control of the ANC executive (Benson, 1980, p.43; Karis & Carter, 1973, p.407; J. Matthews, in Karis & Carter Collection, 2:XM65:94/1, p.38). As Mji (in Meer, 1990, p.48) states it: "'He was barely suitable, but at that moment he was "our" President'".

Moroka lived far from Johannesburg, the centre of ANC organisation. The new position of secretary-general, won by Walter Sisulu (with a majority of one, Benson, 1980, p.43), allowed the activists from the YL to push forward the

Programme of Action (Ibid.; Karis & Carter, 1973, p.407). Sisulu became the ANC's first "full-time secretary who would be paid a small salary and occupy an office" (Benson, 1980, p.43). In addition, the ANC national executive gave its working committee - those members living within 50 miles of Johannesburg - responsibility for directing activities between meetings of the full executive (Karis and Carter, 1973, p.407). This meant that "In practice... Walter Sisulu, the secretary-general, and some of the younger and more militant members, attained special importance and power" (Ibid.).

Replacing Xuma was part of a general 'coup' effected by the YL over the old guard leadership at the 1949 conference (Karis and Carter, 1977b, p.72; Roux, 1964, p.403). In addition, it was agreed that only individuals who supported the Programme of Action should be elected to the executive (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.293), and of the 18 executive members elected seven were YL organisers (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.428, n.1). Although Mandela did not attend the conference (Meer, 1990, p.416), he was "later co-opted on to the executive" (cf., Karis & Carter, 1977b, p.72), as were another six Youth Leaguers (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.428).

Also at the 1949 conference, and with the support of the YL, the final version of the Programme of Action was adopted (Karis & Carter, 1973, pp.104, 293). One proposed

action called for "a national stoppage of work for one day" (Ibid., p.338), and this was planned for June 26, 1950 (Ibid., p.405f). But the Council of Action that was to prepare for the strike met only once, early in 1950. Instead, a multi-racial committee that included the ANC president, and representatives of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.92) and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) (Ibid., p.406; Meer, 1990, p.48f) called for a stay-at-home on May 1 (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.406).

Those nationalists in the YL, including Mandela, who wished to limit their activity to blacks "actively opposed" the proposed May Day stay-at-home (Ibid.), and interpreted the strike date as further evidence of attempts by "Vendors of Foreign Methods" to dominate the liberation movement and mislead its membership with a class-based subjective understanding of the social conditions (cf., 'Basic Policy', Karis & Carter, 1973, p.330). YL supporters "clashed with organizers, broke up meetings and, in their bulletin attacked the Communist Party" (Benson, 1980, p.44; Karis and Carter, 1973, p.406). Despite this, there was widespread support among black workers for the strike (Ibid.).

For Mandela, this expression by the masses was significant; its objective impact on the movement and the wider society made him gradually change his views on

cooperating with other groups (Benson, 1980, p.45; Karis & Carter, 1973, p.405). As Joe Matthews recalls:

> "'That strike delivered a heavy blow. The Youth League was split on the question of supporting the strike. In the Transvaal the "people" supported the strike and rejected the Youth League approach. Many leaders joined the strike effort. From that date on, Sisulu, Mandela ... and others gave up the exclusivist approach. A.P. Mda did not. He is "the real inspiration" of the PAC ... 1950 was the first time the exclusivists lost. Before that, every time, they won'" (conversation with T. Karis, Karis & Carter Collection, 65:96/3, p.3).

Joe Matthews points out (Ibid.) that the change of viewpoint among YL leaders like Mandela resulted from practical considerations: they needed allies if they were to mobilize the people into a campaign of mass action. Already, Mandela recognised the objective potential of mass action in transforming the society, and it seemed that the masses were supportive of multi-racial cooperation among opposition forces toward this end.

Underlying this realisation were two fundamental facts: first, the people were ready for action - something the YL correctly understood, and second, the people were not overly concerned with ideological subtleties amongst the leaders - something the black nationalists in the Youth League had not understood. Mandela recognised that the action of the masses was consistent with the subjective understanding offered by the multi-racial alliance, and was in sharp contrast to the YL's determination to limit cooperation between groups. For

Mandela, direct experience challenged his rigid Africanist subjective orientation, and, if he was to remain concerned with the plight of 'his people', he had to modify his subjectivity to reflect the concern of the ANC membership with action before ideology. Accordingly, Mandela moved away from an exclusivist nationalism to a multi-racialism that could accommodate all who were working for a non-racial society.

At this point, according to Joe Matthews, people like Sisulu and Mandela took control of the YL (Ibid.), expressing a newfound cooperative orientation. In effect, the 'coup' of young nationalists over the 'old guard' at the 1949 conference had been undermined, and those who still defended exclusivism would exert diminishing influence (Roux, 1964, p.404).

4. Objectification I: Involving the Masses in Resistance

Plans for the June 26 strike continued, coordinated by the multi-racial alliance, reflecting the cooperation of groups in the May Day strike. The ANC maintained a leading role, in what became an alliance of the ANC and the SAIC, as the CPSA had disbanded before the Suppression of Communism Act became law. As evidence of their changing subjectivity, Mandela and Sisulu became actively involved in the multi-racial alliance by joining a strike coordinating

committee (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.408f).

The strike itself received varying support around the country; support in the Transvaal was especially poor (Ibid., p.409f). For those backing the Programme of Action, however, the two strikes represented a positive change in opposition tactics, and the support showed that further mass action should be planned. But it was not until mid-1951 that the ANC, in cooperation with the SAIC, began planning the Defiance Campaign for 1952. Mandela was not chosen to be on the Joint Planning Council (Ibid., p.412), but he did contribute to the decision to pursue a disciplined, nonviolent protest.

The 1946 Indian passive resistance campaign had impressed Mandela. He had seen that passive resistance had mass appeal and was able to draw large numbers of new supporters (Karis and Carter, 1973, p.103). Furthermore, he saw passive resistance as a sensible response in the face of a powerful state (Benson, 1980, p.47f).

As we have seen, the YL, including Mandela, saw that the objective society was becoming increasingly divided along racial lines, and the 'old guard's' subjective response was ineffective. The task, as Mandela saw it, was to select a means of opposing the government in which the objectivity of the action would be likely to effect change in the objective social conditions. At the same time, the

objectification needed to be sufficiently restrained lest the state find justification in their action for violent retaliation. Thus, Mandela saw non-violent mass action as a reasonable means which was likely to make the government change its racist policies, without unnecessarily intensifying the tension between the government and the opposition. He explained in court testimony in 1960 that "if the Defiance Campaign reached the stage of mass defiance, the government would either say to the ANC ... we will repeal these laws ... or if the government refused to take this attitude, we would expect the voters ... to say we can't go on with a government like this" (in Gerhart, 1978, p.96). Mandela interpreted the objective conditions as being modifiable by passive resistance; he believed that more radical means were neither necessary nor expedient at this time.

Mandela became national volunteer-in-chief for the campaign, and this took him around the country to meet with people, raise their consciousness of the power of mass action and to encourage them to join the campaign (Benson, 1980, p.50; Karis and Carter, 1973, p.418). To avoid arrest of organisers, it had been decided that Mandela, along with other leaders in the campaign, would not defy any laws. This would seriously jeopardise the carefully planned and controlled campaign, and might lead to less disciplined acts

which would allow a violent response from the government. On the first day of defiance, however, Mandela was arrested while observing a group of defiers (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.419; Meer, 1990, p.52, Benson, 1980, p.53), but subsequently was released on bail (Meer, 1990, p.52).

Mandela was arrested again in August 1952, following police raids on the homes and offices of a number of leaders. All thirty-five arrested "were charged with promoting communism", recently defined as a crime under the Suppression of Communism Act, and released on bail (Karis and Carter, 1973, p.420f). At the trial in December, Mandela was found guilty of "'statutory communism'", which the judge took pains to distinguish from "'what is commonly known as communism'" (Ibid.). Along with the other 20 on trial, Mandela was given "nine months' imprisonment with hard labor, but this was suspended for two years" (Ibid.).

The Defiance Campaign grew through September, 1952, but violence in the following months, not directly linked to the Campaign (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.421f), caused a drop in volunteers, while the government continued to pursue the leaders (Ibid., p.419), and passed legislation making passive resistance illegal (Meer, 1990, p.58; Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.5ff). Widespread support for the campaign among black leaders - even amongst those, like Xuma of the 'old guard', who did not favour the new activist leadership

(Ibid., p.423) - and the huge increase in support for the ANC among the masses (Ibid., p.403) made the campaign an important demonstration of a new phase of opposition activity, and, in that sense, a success. Even so, the primary goal of the campaign - to force the government to change its policies - had failed (Feit, 1967). With Mandela's close involvement in the campaign, his transformation to an accommodating multi-racialism was now complete. At least one person in the YL referred to him as a 'puppet' of Indian communists in the national executive (Ngubane, cited in Karis and Carter, 1973, p.424).

In defending passive resistance, Mandela showed awareness of the need to objectify himself and the group in a way that could transform the objective society, while limiting state retaliation against individual leaders and the group. Although this latter consideration did not discourage the government from acting against leaders of the Defiance Campaign, the effect of mass objectification of the demands of the oppressed had significant impact on the group's subjective evaluation of its position in the objective society. The government's attempts to silence the leadership gave additional evidence that the objectification in the Defiance Campaign indeed was threatening the objective structure of society. In other words, the power exhibited by the people in the Defiance Campaign intensified

the resolve of those already committed to the ANC and encouraged others to become involved. To those oppressed by apartheid, the Defiance Campaign appeared seriously to challenge the status quo, and the impression of imminent change drew widespread support.

Mandela was elected president of the Transvaal branch of the ANC in October, 1952. As one of the young leaders in the ANC, Mandela took control of an important regional branch, while other regions remained under the influence of older leaders like Z.K. Matthews in the eastern Cape, and Albert Luthuli in Natal. Although the Transvaal was less active in the Defiance Campaign (Ibid., p.419), it was the main centre for ANC organisation, as well as the centre for YL activity. Mandela's election, therefore, continues the process of YL influence in the ANC, but, in choosing Mandela, the Transvaal branch was choosing both a young activist and a cooperative multi-racialist. The organisation - and the masses - accepted the YL's demand for activism without accepting its narrow Africanist ideology: Mandela's ability to modify his subjectivity to these leadership constraints made him a suitable candidate.

In early December 1952, before the annual conference of the ANC, Mandela was among about 90 ANC and SAIC leaders who were banned by the government. This ban restricted him to Johannesburg, and prevented him from participating in public

gatherings (Benson, 1980, p.58f; Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.5), and effectively ended his official participation in ANC portfolios. His effectiveness in leading action that threatened transformation of the objective social conditions caused defenders of the status quo to seek means that would make his objective activity impossible. By banning him, the government sought to remove Mandela from the social conditions which gave his action objective significance; banning was intended to prevent the individual from objectifying himself in the objective society.

Meanwhile, Mandela had qualified as an attorney and had been admitted to the Bar. But the Transvaal Law Society asked the Supreme Court to remove his name from the roll, arguing that his activity in the Defiance Campaign "did not conform to the standards of conduct expected from members of our honourable profession" (Mandela, 1973, p.150; cf., Meer, 1990, p.61). In its response, the Supreme Court sided with Mandela, and charged costs to the Law Society (Benson, 1980, p.63).

Mandela had opened a law office, and had gone into partnership with Tambo (Meer, 1990, p.61). Initially, they rented space from an Indian landlord in central Johannesburg (Tambo, in Mandela, 1973, p.xi), but when the Group Areas Act (1950) was enforced, and their attempts to secure permission from the government to continue business in an

area designated for whites failed, they continued to occupy the premises illegally. As Mandela saw it (1973, p.149), this was an act of defiance made necessary by their need to continue their profession.

Mandela and Tambo dealt with an average of seven cases a day, ranging from the obvious political problems experienced by their clients, to civil and divorce cases (Ibid., p.62). According to Tambo (in Mandela, 1973, p.xii), the continual flood of cases - political, criminal and civil - the source of which could be traced to the inequalities inherent to the system of apartheid, would have forced any attorney to be a 'rebel' against the white system: "if, when we started our law partnership, we had not been rebels against South African apartheid, our experiences in our offices would have remedied the deficiency" (Ibid.). In court, too, Mandela experienced hostility and resentment, from a threatened system which discouraged advancement of black law graduates, however qualified and successful they might prove themselves to be (Mandela, 1973, p.149).

Even though the avenues of political expression were limited by his 1952 banning order, Mandela continued to influence ANC policy from "behind the scenes" (Benson, 1980, p.65), wrote articles which were published in a monthly journal, Liberation (First, in Mandela, 1973, p.33; Karis & Carter, 1877a, p.47), and spoke to small groups of

supporters who would transmit the information to a wider audience (Benson, 1980, p.59).

In June 1953 Mandela's first banning order expired, and, like others whose bans expired, he immediately attended a public gathering. Aware that the objectivity of his action had been restricted by the banning order, immediately he sought to objectify himself in a political action that challenged the objective conditions. In Sophiatown, outside Johannesburg, a large ANC meeting was held to begin a campaign against the forced removal of 58,000 blacks from nearby areas (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.10; Benson, 1980, p.59).

The freedom Mandela enjoyed was short-lived however; in September, a two year ban was imposed, and he was required to resign from the ANC and other organisations (Benson, 1980, p.59). This meant that although he was unable to act for the people of Sophiatown politically, he could still give them legal counsel (Ibid., p.60). Such loopholes in the white government's attempts to silence the black leadership only encouraged them to continue their political involvement, though with added caution.

## 5. Subjectification IV: Anticipating Illegal Action

In response to the Defiance Campaign, and immediately before a general election that would increase their

parliamentary majority, the Nationalist government passed the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Public Safety Act early in 1953 (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.5ff). The first law made civil disobedience illegal, and subject to a three year jail sentence, a £300 fine or a combination of both, while the second gave the Governor-General the power to declare a state of emergency "if he thought public order was seriously threatened... During this state of emergency persons can be summarily arrested and detained, and the government's only obligation is to submit their names to Parliament after thirty days. The emergency can last a year and is subject to renewal; while in effect, parliamentary and judicial functions can be suspended" (Ibid., p.6). Although first used in 1960, this law gave the government huge power that threatened opposition groups and encouraged them to prepare for a new form of opposition. In this regard, Mandela was one of the most farsighted.

Mandela's new banning order prevented him from attending the conference of the Transvaal branch of the ANC in 1953. But an address, entitled No Easy Walk to Freedom (Mandela, 1973, pp.21-31; Karis & Carter, 1977a, pp.106-115) - sponsored by the executive and delivered on its behalf - had been written by Mandela (Benson, 1980, p.60; cf., First, in Mandela, 1973, p.20; Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.12). This speech, delivered at around the time Z.K. Matthews proposed

the Congress of the People in his Cape Presidential address (see chapter 3, section 6), offered a radical new vision of the country's future. While the older leaders like Matthews continued to pursue avenues within the ever-diminishing range of legal possibilities, younger leaders, like Mandela, who were less committed to gradual change through educational achievement, and the consequent protection of the interests of a black elite, were able to perceive in the objective conditions an inevitable process leading to increased restriction, and the probable banning of the ANC (like the SACP in 1950). Consequently, the subjectification of the objective social conditions that they offered recognised that, in time, a new, more aggressive form of opposition probably would be required (cf., Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.11f). Even though the Defiance Campaign had raised the consciousness of many (Mandela, 1973, p.27), Mandela emphasised throughout the address that "The old methods of bringing about mass action through public mass meetings, press statements, and leaflets calling upon the people to go into action have become extremely dangerous and difficult to use effectively" (Ibid., p.23f).

Mandela proposed a system for mass organisation and underground communication which became known as the M-plan (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.36: Mandela, 1973, p.28). Early in 1953, Joe Matthews reported in a letter to his father

that "a 'secret meeting ... of the top leaders of both the S.A.I.C. & A.N.C., half of whom were banned' ... had planned the future with 'cold-blooded realism' ... 'Broadly speaking the idea is to strengthen the organisation tremendously. To prepare for the continuation of the organisation under conditions of illegality by organising on the basis of the cell system'" (in Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.35f).

Interestingly, in 1951 the YL president Mda, who had assumed the position after Lembede's premature death, had opposed Mandela's proposal for the Defiance Campaign and countered with a more radical approach involving "a general strategy for the building of nationalist cells of leadership in both the urban and rural areas. Harsher repression by the government was foreseen..." (Gerhart, 1978, p.131f, n.9). When proposed by Mda, the grassroots network was premature, for mass action remained legal, and the Defiance Campaign received widespread support and appeared likely to win some concessions. After the failure of the Campaign, and the passage of legislation making passive resistance illegal, Mandela recognised that under the new, more repressive social conditions, Mda's idea was appropriate.

In terms of the duality model, Mda had offered an alternative subjective understanding, which, at the time, had not accurately represented the objective social conditions. Mda had perceived a polarised society where

legal action against the government was almost impossible, and in response, plans for an underground organisation were necessary. As the objective conditions developed towards those that Mda had prematurely assumed to exist, his response to such conditions became increasingly appropriate. The impact of, and response to, the Defiance Campaign had transformed the objective society, making it increasingly difficult to seek objective expression of black demands within legal boundaries. In recognising that the racial polarisation in the society had reached a point where illegal action was inevitable, Mandela was able to effect a change in the subjectivity of his colleagues and in the membership. Mda, on the other hand, had offered an interpretation of the objective conditions which, at the time, had been inconsistent with the existing objective conditions, and consequently, had not received support.

To justify this new approach, Mandela sought to convince his listeners that circumstances were indeed changing. He reviewed the growing list of banned leaders and organisations, the declining living conditions experienced by blacks, and new government legislation which promised further restriction (Ibid., pp.23-26). The language used reflects an increased impatience and militancy: "Here in South Africa ... a revolution is maturing" (Ibid., p.30), for "The grave plight of the people compels them to resist

to the death the stinking policies of the gangsters that rule our country" (Ibid., p.27).

Aware that a new phase of opposition was likely, and that weaknesses in the network could wreak serious damage to the whole, Mandela warned the organisation to show increased vigilance in admitting new members. Mandela cited a number of recent cases which showed infiltration of the organisation by unwanted elements, including what he referred to as "splitters, ... agents-provocateurs ... even policemen" (Mandela, 1973, p.29).

The M-plan sought to centralize power in the national executive (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.37), which seems paradoxical, given Mandela's expressed intention to organise grassroots supporters. The dangers of an underground and potentially illegal organisation, however, justified limiting control to the national executive. In this regard, and in response to pressures from the youth, a new Constitution was passed in 1957 which maintained the drive to centralize authority (Ibid., p.279). As this process of centralization progressed, the youth, which already had effective control of the national executive, completed its displacement of the 'old guard' within the ANC.

We have seen that Mandela's subjectivity changed as a result of his action and the actions of others. Mandela had moderated his Africanism, and become a strong

multi-racialist; he had broadened his black versus white analysis of the early YL, with its dangers of excluding potential supporters, to an oppressor versus oppressed analysis (or a government versus opposition analysis). Even so, he remained convinced that the objective society was undergoing a process of polarization, and that it was incumbent upon leaders to be prepared for protest action under more restrictive conditions. As opposition groups challenged the existing social structure, and defenders of the system took whatever action they considered necessary, the needs of the oppressed to have their demands met would come into increasingly direct conflict with the desire of the oppressors to protect their access to privilege within the existing social structure. The government would continue to resist calls for change; it would not give political freedom to the oppressed, nor would it allow protest that threatened the racial-economic structure of the society.

If Mandela's subjective understanding was an accurate reflection of the objective society, then the inevitability of further conflict and repression was obvious, and a plan of action anticipating these changes was imperative. Mandela's decision to pursue the M-plan at this stage, in contrast to the pre-Defiance Campaign proposal by Mda, shows an awareness that action seeking to transform the social structure must be appropriate to the circumstances: only

once the state had developed legislation that could make peaceful protest illegal and it had made clear its determination to destroy the opposition, did it become necessary to intensify the struggle.

At this time Mandela was primarily concerned to build membership and organise the ANC in a way that would effectively unite the leaders and the masses (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.36). Increasing membership parallels Matthews' purpose in calling for a Congress of the People (COP) (Ibid., p.12). But the M-plan had a long-term purpose (Ibid., p.36) that differed from that of the COP, and the fact that Mandela (and his colleagues) anticipated the ANC's banning and, under such circumstances, the necessity of an underground campaign of violence, reflects the appropriateness of his subjective understanding of the current social conditions.

While the M-plan was being attempted, with most branches having great difficulty implementing it (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.37), preparations were being made for the COP. Although still banned, Mandela continued his back-room involvement in the ANC, and was among a number of banned leaders who saw the draft of the Freedom Charter, days before it was presented to the COP delegates. At this late stage it was impossible to effect changes, as copies had already been made (Ibid., p.60).

Mandela's ban prevented him from attending the COP, but his response to the event (1973, pp.55-60) shows that his growing realisation of the inevitability of a militant, underground struggle did not exclude genuine excitement at the democratic process captured in the COP. "The COP was the most spectacular and moving demonstration this country has ever seen; through it the people have given proof that they have the ability and the power to triumph over every obstacle and win the future of their dreams" (Ibid., p.55).

Although it has been argued that the COP reflected Matthews' 'old guard' orientation, and his unwillingness to recognize the inevitable polarization developing in the objective society, it is possible that the COP served a purpose beyond the limited one envisaged by Matthews in his proposal to the Cape Congress of the ANC in 1953 (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.105; see Chapter 3, section 102). In moving to a new phase of resistance, the younger leaders were given, in the Freedom Charter, a document of rights, not unlike African Claims (1943, Karis & Carter, 1973, pp.209-23) which had preceded the change in ANC tactics in the late 1940s. In this sense, without intending to do so, Matthews (and, more generally, the 'old guard'), created a forum for the clear expression of the ideal to which the opposition movement was striving. Insofar as the Freedom Charter emphasised to the oppressed that the gulf between their

concrete existence and their ideal was widening under apartheid, the subjective interpretation of the younger leaders, with its more militant means of opposition, gained support. In this sense at least, the COP and the Freedom Charter may well have been necessary to facilitate the acceptance of, and possibly even give ideological legitimation to, a new phase of opposition action.

Mandela's two year banning order expired in late 1955, but to prevent him making a public appearance, a new banning order was issued, this time for five years (Benson, 1980, p.73). In the wake of the COP, the police raided homes and offices, searching for evidence to support cases of treason. This culminated in the nationwide police swoop of December 5, 1956, in which Mandela was one of 156 arrested and charged with Treason.

The Treason Trial brought many opposition leaders together, and rallied support for the ANC within the country (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.274). Although released on bail, many accused were still under banning orders and the continuation of the trial over four years limited the movement of these leaders and prevented them from interacting with supporters. Effectively, this meant that younger, inexperienced leaders took over much of the organization (Meer, 1990, p.86). Both factors led to a serious confrontation within the ANC.

One month after the Treason arrests, a bus boycott was started in Alexandra Township, and spread to other areas around Johannesburg and Pretoria. The ANC leaders on trial were involved in organising this strike, and continued to guide it (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.276). For the boycotters, the strike was an economic action against rising bus fares, but the ANC saw it also as a political struggle, and sought to politicise those involved in the strike (Ibid., p.275). After three months, and intense negotiation that included some of the accused from the Treason Trial, the strike was called off. By mid-1957 the government had passed legislation that required employers and government to contribute to subsidising transport services (Ibid., p.277).

This success notwithstanding, Africanists within the ANC criticized the ANC leadership for 'selling out', and the drop in ANC popularity in those areas that had been on strike supported the Africanists' claim (Meer, 1990, p.88f). During this period the Africanists were able to organise support through the townships around Johannesburg, and at the national conference of the ANC, held in December, the Africanists sought the removal of the Transvaal Executive, which, it claimed, had been inappropriately elected (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.308). The ANC promised a special conference to consider this issue, but when held in November 1958, the credentials of many Africanist 'delegates' were challenged,

and they were prevented from returning to the conference (Ibid., p.310). Although some of the Africanists were against breaking with the ANC, seeing it as the national representative of the people (Ibid., p.311), the Africanists realised that their brand of nationalism was not likely to become ANC policy: for them, the leadership of the ANC had been captured by 'multi-racialists' who were not willing to lead militant protests, even though the masses were demanding such action (cf., the bus boycott) (Ibid., p.308). As a result, the Africanists broke with the ANC, forming their own Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959 (Ibid., p.314).

The subjectivity of society expressed by the PAC reflected the YL's nationalist stand, and impatience with the ANC's cautious approach to opposition action. The emergence of the PAC can be explained in the following way: Although their particular interpretation of the objective social conditions seemed accurate, nationalist supporters were unable to transform the ANC, and were faced with the choice of capitulating or standing alone. The fact that their interpretation of the objective social conditions typically was premature only confirmed in them their belief that they offered the fundamental analysis, which others copied and claimed as their own.

The Africanist leaders, having supported an alternative

subjective understanding within the ANC for over a decade, finally felt confident that their objective action, because it was grounded in what they perceived to be an accurate and increasingly popular subjective understanding, would be able to effect real transformation of the social structure. The fear of the PAC leaders that their splinter group would become insignificant if it broke with the mother body was overcome in the changed social conditions created by the Treason Trial: the ANC leaders were incapacitated and the masses were demanding a continuation of the activist opposition that had been building through the decade. While the PAC leaders saw the embrace of their ideology by a growing number, it is not unreasonable to suggest that this may have reflected temporary disillusionment amongst the masses with the ANC's inability to act. Whatever the reason, the decision of the Africanists in the ANC to break away and form the PAC arose from their subjective response to the changing objective conditions. They perceived a potential transformation of the society, and, because of their growing support, considered their subjective interpretation to offer the most promising means by which to effect this change.

The formation of the PAC formalized the division that had existed within the YL, but that was never accommodated in the ANC. The Congress Alliance that had developed through inter-racial cooperation in the 1950 stay-at-homes and

through the Defiance Campaign, and that now included liberal and left-wing whites, as well as Coloured groups (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.404), expressed the multi-racialism that dominated the ANC and expressed itself in the Freedom Charter. The Africanists saw this document, especially, as a sell-out: "In 1955, the Kliptown [Freedom] Charter was adopted which, according to us, is in irreconcilable conflict with the 1949 Programme [of Action], seeing that it claims that the land no longer belongs to the African people, but is auctioned for sale to <u>all</u> who live in this country" (in Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.505).

The multi-racialist approach that characterised the ANC was not limited to cooperation with other opposition groups. Multiracialism recognised also the complex composition of South African society, and, in line with the Freedom Charter, the ANC sought to accommodate all people in a future non-racial society. As a result, sometime between December 1958 and the following February, while the Treason Trial continued, Mandela had a secret meeting with a number of Afrikaner leaders, representing the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), an organisation representing "intellectuals, high government officials, and churchmen" (Karis and Carter, 1977a, pp.302, 305). These Afrikaners were toying with the idea of convening a national conference - although they had been unwilling to join a multi-racial

conference held in December 1957 and sponsored by an interdenominational group of black ministers that included representatives from a broad spectrum of political opinion (Ibid., p.300). Mandela's willingness to discuss the political situation, even with people who were identified with apartheid policy, shows his (and his colleagues) continued efforts towards negotiation, and - if possible - away from confrontation. Over 200 blacks met with SABRA leaders, representing the range of ANC opinion, from old guard conservatives to militant exclusivists (Africanists) (Ibid., p.305).

Undoubtedly, the ANC was in a threatened position, and, with their leaders focussed on the trial, protest had diminished (Ibid., p.275). The SABRA initiative may have taken advantage of this circumstance, but it is reasonable to think that the SABRA leadership was genuine in its desire to negotiate. The first ten years of apartheid had not been peaceful, and to secure their future, the government and its supporters had to deal with a groundswell of opposition. At least some in the ruling Afrikaner establishment were considering alternative responses to the objective conditions. Like Mandela, they perceived increasing tension, and while concessions to blacks obviously would mean a loss of power for whites, the objective conditions were becoming sufficiently strained for signs to begin appearing within

the white establishment that negotiation, as a subjective response, might be more expedient under the developing conditions.

At this stage, however, such developments in white consciousness were preliminary and limited, and consequently had no immediate effect in transforming the society. More representative of the subjective understanding of the social conditions shared by most whites was the government's chief prosecutor at the Treason trial who was determined to immobilize the opposition and buy time for the government to pursue its "plans for separate development that appealed to the Natives, 90 percent of whom were 'good'" (Ibid.). Believing (or misbelieving) that their subjectification was shared by most (including blacks) and accurately reflected the objective conditions, allowed whites to continue supporting racial segregation. In so doing, the tension developing in the objective conditions was intensified.

Around the time of the Treason Trial, Mandela had met Winnie Madikizela, and fell in love. He had been separated from Evelyn, his first wife, for a number of years, and now sought a divorce, which was granted in 1957 (Meer, 1990, pp.78ff). Winnie, sixteen years his junior, was a social worker who had graduated at the top of her class (Benson, 1980, p.77). Plans were made for a traditional wedding (Ibid., p.123ff) to be held in the Transkei, their home

region, on June 14, 1958 (Meer, 1990, p.121). Mandela received permission to leave the Johannesburg area for six days for the wedding (Ibid., p.122). Meanwhile, Mandela's attempts to continue his law practice failed (Meer, 1990, p.128); too much time was spent preparing for and attending court, and travelling to Pretoria for the trial.

## 6. Objectification II: Leading the Transition to Violence

The Africanists in the YL who did not become multi-racialists had been preoccupied with ideology, and the need for a purely black struggle finally produced the PAC. For these leaders, action was secondary to their ideology of racially-exclusive organisation (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.326), whereas for Mandela and the other Youth Leaguers, action drove their ideology, meaning that cooperation among all opposition groups was possible (cf., Mandela, in Gerhart, 1978, p.92f). Following its formation, however, the PAC needed to plan action that could attract dissatisfied ANC supporters (Ibid.).

Claiming that the Programme of Action was an expression of Africanist sentiment, and that it had been 'abandoned' by the ANC, the PAC called for an anti-pass campaign in which blacks "were to leave their passes at home and surrender for arrest at their local police stations; no one was to resort to violence or to let himself be provoked..." (Ibid.,

p.331). This was to be the beginning of a final confrontation with the government, and, with a 'snowballing' of such acts of noncooperation, the government would be forced to capitulate (Ibid., p.330). The idealistic theorizing of the PAC leadership was evident to those who had tried to organise mass support for initiatives in the past (Ibid., p.326), and the lack of restraint in their proposed programme was irresponsible, for, if heeded by a significant number, was likely to produce violent confrontation.

In seeking to objectify themselves and transform the objective society, the PAC leaders failed to appreciate the forces acting against them in the objective society. Their lack of restraint arose from inexperience: they had not before organised protest action, and they lacked practical understanding of the effect of one group's objective activity on other groups in the society.

The tragic outcome of the PAC plan came almost immediately (Reeves, 1960). The PAC president, Robert Sobukwe, announced on Friday March 18, 1960 that the campaign would begin the following Monday, March 21, upstaging plans by the ANC for a similar event on March 31 (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.331f). Support for the PAC call was poor, but in Sharpeville, on that first day, a large group (estimates range from 3,000 to 20,000, Ibid., p.333)

surrounded the police station. Without warning, the police fired on the demonstrators, killing 69 (Ibid., pp.332ff). Unrest spread throughout the country, and while the world reacted with shock (Ibid., p.335), the government moved rapidly: they declared a State of Emergency on March 30, detained tens of thousands, including those Treason Trial defendants out on bail, and banned the ANC and PAC under the Suppression of Communism Act on April 8 (Ibid., pp.337ff).

The after-effects of the Sharpeville shootings quickly affected the Treason Trial. The government treated the trial as a substitute for a judicial inquiry, and sought to prove that the accused were part of a communist-engineered plot which had threatened the state from the defiance campaign through to this most recent revolt (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.344; Benson, 1980, p.89).

In response to the Emergency, the lawyers for the defence withdrew from the Treason Trial, only returning in August when the Emergency was ended. In the interim, Mandela defended the accused (Benson, 1980, p.89). However, his most impressive accomplishment came after the defence counsel returned, and Mandela gave his evidence (Ibid., p.89f). Known to his friends as a careful, articulate leader, Mandela commanded the attention of international observers and opponents alike.

After the emergency ended, the accused were again

released on bail. Mandela was one of the 30 who remained on trial until March 29, 1961, when all were found not guilty. The government must not have expected the quick end to the trial, or perhaps they were distracted by international efforts to expel South Africa from the Commonwealth (Ibid., p.95); nevertheless, they missed the fact that Mandela's banning order - in effect since 1952 - expired on 14 March 1961. Later in the month, before the Treason Trial ended, Mandela made a dramatic public appearance - his first since 1952 - at the All-In African Conference being held in Pietermaritzburg (Ibid., p.95; Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.358). Again, Mandela shows his awareness of his own objective role, and his attempts to express himself in it whenever possible. In addition, his unexpected appearance was calculated to encourage his followers as it embarrassed the government.

The All-In African Conference was proposed as a unity forum for opposition activists (many acting as individuals since their political organizations were banned), but it was essentially an ANC meeting. The conference was intended as a continuation of the process begun at the All-In African Conference held in December 1960, that had been called by, among others, Matthews and the former ANC president, Chief Luthuli (Karis & Carter, 1977a, pp.353ff).

The conference called for a national convention,

failing which there would be a three day stay-at-home to coincide with the declaration of a republic in South Africa on May 31, 1961. A National Action Council was formed, with Mandela as secretary. His mandate included communicating the conference's demand for a national convention to the government, and, if necessary, to organise the stay-at-home. After the conference, Mandela returned to court for the last day, and thereafter immediately disappeared underground. Meanwhile, the government sought his arrest (Benson, 1980, p.96; Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.358).

With the ANC and PAC banned, Mandela's subjective understanding of the developing social forces had been shown to accurately reflect the tension in the society. As a result, the underground campaign, which had been anticipated with the M-plan, had to be pursued. In the same way that the group posed a threat to the objective society and was banned, so too did individual leaders who objectified the group's orientation in their action. In a sense, the individual had become identified with the movement to the point that its life was his life; Mandela, aware of his objective role in the movement, saw no alternative but to work from underground.

While working underground, Mandela met with supporters throughout the country, and spoke with white newspaper editors. He issued flyers calling for action, focussing

especially on the student youth (Benson, 1980, p.97f; Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.633ff). Mandela's ability to avoid arrest encouraged supporters, and led to the name 'Black Pimpernel' (Meer, 1990, p.163; Benson, 1980, p.97; Roux, 1964, p.423).

Mandela wrote a letter, dated April 20, 1961, to the Prime Minister calling for a National Convention (Mandela, 1973, p.131-6), and followed this with a letter to the leader of the Opposition, dated May 23 (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.635ff). In both letters Mandela calls for negotiation, while making clear his fear that the alternative - more government violence and counterviolence from the opposition - would lead to continued "strife and disaster ahead" (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.635). Although the Prime Minister made no formal response to Mandela's letter (Mandela, 1973, p.135), the government anticipated the stay-at-home: in late May they arrested opposition leaders along with 10,000 others for minor offenses (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.363), banned meetings, raided printing presses, mobilized the army, police and white civilians (Benson, 1980, p.99; cf., Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.362f).

The stay-at-home began on May 29, and although the government-controlled radio claimed widespread failure of the strike, there was much support in many parts of the country (Benson, 1980, p.101; Mandela, 1973, p.97f; Karis &

Carter, 1977a, p.361f). Students at Fort Hare were sent home (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.364), and white students on English-speaking campuses boycotted classes, while many school children also supported the action (Benson, 1980, p.101; Mandela, 1973, pp.98-103; Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.364). The support was not as strong as had been expected (Mandela, 1973, p.104), however, and Mandela called the strike off on its second day (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.364; Benson, 1980, p.102).

In reviewing the stay-at-home (Mandela, 1973, pp.94-106), Mandela praises those who supported the call, but, in the face of huge government efforts to control the demonstration - "that amounted to placing the country in a state of temporary emergency" (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.363) - and the difficulties of organising the people from underground, he openly wondered whether the non-violent stance of the opposition could still be justified in a context of government-sponsored violence. "Is it politically correct to continue preaching peace and non-violence when dealing with a Government whose barbaric practices have brought so much suffering and misery to Africans? With equal monotony the question is posed: Have we not closed a chapter on this question?" (Mandela, 1973, p.105).

To celebrate June 26, the anniversary of the 1950 strike, and the beginning of the Defiance Campaign, since

known as Freedom Day, Mandela wrote a Letter from Underground (Mandela, 1973, pp.107-9; Karis & Carter, 1977a, pp.699ff). In it he spoke of a "country-wide campaign of non-cooperation with the Government", but he did not specify exactly what actions would be included. He did call for "industrial and economic actions" and promised to "call upon the international bodies to expel South Africa and ... to sever economic and diplomatic relations with the country". However, the plan to resort to violence was not made explicit, although the following sentence from the letter can be seen as an overly confident statement from the emerging military group: "At the present moment it is sufficient to say that we plan to make government impossible".

A number of leaders had met during June 1961 and, after much discussion, had agreed that a violent struggle had to be pursued, distinct from, but in tandem with, the ANC (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.647f). The objective conditions in which the organisation sought to act severely constrained the coordination of mass action. These leaders, therefore, found justification in terms of these changed objective conditions to expand their opposition activity to include armed resistance action. In November, the new organisation, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), or Spear of the Nation was formed, with Mandela a leading figure (Ibid., p.648). Plans to begin

a series of sabotage bombings of strategic, nonhuman, targets began. For this, the M-plan would be vital (Benson, 1980, p.105).

Mandela had anticipated this turn to violence years earlier, although he had resisted the change as long as he thought negotiation was possible. When the Defiance Campaign had failed to win concessions from the government, and instead precipitated further repressive legislation, the objective conditions were further polarized and Mandela saw the need to prepare the ANC for a period of underground organisation. Now, the government crackdown that began with the treason arrests in 1956 and accelerated after Sharpeville had removed opposition leaders, outlawed opposition organisations, and left people frustrated, demanding militancy from their leaders (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.646f). Conditions in the country demanded either submission to the power of the state or resistance through an underground organization. Furthermore, if the ANC did not coordinate a violent struggle, suggestions that some frustrated people in urban areas might resort to random, unorganized violence might be realised, and lead to uncontrolled civil strife (Ibid., p.646f).

At this juncture, Mandela and his colleagues saw that the conditions they had anticipated years earlier had been realised in the objective society. The polarisation between

oppressor and oppressed left them with the subjective understanding that they (and their people) were cornered, with only two forms of action possible: "'submit or fight'" (Ibid., p.647). They differed from the 'old guard' leaders, like Matthews and Luthuli: never completely convinced that education and mass legal protest would produce a gradual transformation of the society, they were able to accept the need to act illegally and violently. Their analysis of the objective society was little different from that of the 'old guard' leaders, but they differed markedly with respect to the means that would be required to change it. And it was this that allowed Mandela to objectify himself in violent action, while Matthews, unable to accept such means, removed himself from the centre of black opposition in South Africa and sought to objectify his orientation under different social conditions.

The underground developments towards a violent struggle nothwithstanding, Luthuli, as ANC president-general, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961, in recognition of the attempts by opposition groups to effect change in South Africa through non-violent protest. Luthuli's acceptance speech, delivered days before the first MK bombing, shows the similarity of his subjective interpretation of the social conditions with that of militant leaders like Mandela, although his actions remained legal and in the

gradualist tradition of the 'old guard': he noted that freedom from oppression was being "pursued by millions of our people with revolutionary zeal, by means of books, representations, demonstrations, and in some places armed force provoked by the adamancy of white rule, [and this] carries the only real promise of peace in Africa" (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.707).

Meanwhile, the constant movement required of the fugitive Mandela was becoming too demanding, and arrangements were made to house him in a room on a farm in Rivonia, outside Johannesburg (Benson, 1980, p.104). He coordinated activities from this location, although insisting that the farm was not, at this time, a headquarters for MK (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.786f). On 16 December 1961, a sacred Afrikaner holiday, MK made its first strikes, in Port Elizabeth, Durban and Johannesburg (Benson, 1980, p.107; Mandela, in Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.779).

Opposition groups sought to capitalise on the international attention they had received as a result of the Defiance Campaign and the Treason Trial. In addition to sabotage, they tried to transform the objective society through their representations to international bodies, which, in turn, would seek to weaken the resistance of the South African government to change the objective conditions. During the 1960 state of emergency, the ANC, PAC and other

opposition groups had formed a United Front abroad, established offices in African capitals and in London, and sent delegations to the UN, and African and Asian countries to press for diplomatic action and economic sanctions against South Africa. The disunity among opposition groups inside the country, however, weakened the United Front's position abroad (Karis & Carter, 1977a, pp.349-61).

Nevertheless, action by the United Front did help raise international attention. For example, the South African Prime Minister, who had applied for South Africa's continued membership of the Commonwealth after she became a Republic, faced harsh criticism from Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and withdrew the request. Meanwhile actions by the government within the country were calculated to impress the international community, and show that apartheid ensured fair treatment for all (Ibid., p.661). The government accelerated its 'homelands' policy, granting a limited form of self-government to the Transkei. But while the government sought increased representation of non-whites in the police force, it expanded its military and security apparatus, and prepared for economic and military self-sufficiency (Ibid., pp.662f). The pressures on the objective society, coming from various quarters, seemed only to intensify the resolve of the white government to remain steadfast in its policy; the anticipated social revolution remained distant, as the

polarisation of the society continued.

## 7. Objectification III: Justifying Illegal Action to the World

On 11 January 1962, Mandela was smuggled out of the country to begin a six-month international tour (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.666). He travelled to a conference in Addis Ababa (Mandela, in Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.781), where he joined an ANC delegation and presented a paper entitled A Land Ruled by the Gun (Mandela, 1973, pp.110-21). In his presentation he explained and justified the move to violent struggle: "it is understandable why today many of our people are turning their faces away from the path of peace and non-violence. They feel that peace in our country must be considered already broken when a minority Government maintains its authority over the majority by force and violence" (Ibid., p.120).

Following the conference, he travelled throughout Africa, meeting with many black leaders (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.745f), collecting money for the campaigns at home, and arranging for military training for those who would become soldiers of MK (Mandela, in Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.781). The tour also was an opportunity for Mandela to thank those who had supported the struggle, financially through the Treason Trial, politically in the United

Nations, and socially by accepting refugees (Benson, 1980, p.107). In London he met the leaders of the Labour and Liberal Parties (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.746) and the editor of The Observer.

While away, Mandela met old friends, notably Oliver Tambo, who was involved in developing ANC offices in exile. The trip, Mandela's first outside South Africa, psychologically was an important experience, as - for the first time in his life - he felt free: "The tour of the Continent made a forceful impression on me. For the first time in my life I was a free man; free from White oppression, from the idiocy of apartheid and racial arrogance, from police molestation, from humiliation and indignity. Wherever I went I was treated like a human being" (in Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.745).

Mandela returned to South Africa on July 20, 1962, and began reporting to relevant groups on his travels. While returning from a visit to Natal's regional MK command, disguised as a black chauffeur for a white friend, Mandela was arrested on August 5 (Mandela, in Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.782; Benson, 1980, p.112). His underground action and his international tour had objective significance in the society: as an individual who represented the ANC, Mandela threatened the state and its response was inevitable. Only its efficiency in capturing him so soon after his return to

South Africa could have surprised him.

On August 8, Mandela was charged in court on two counts: inciting workers to strike in the May 1961 stay-at-home and leaving the country without a valid permit or passport (Mandela, 1973, p.144). The trial continued on October 22, with Mandela conducting his own defence. In his opening statement, Mandela challenged the court's jurisdiction, for he considered himself "neither legally nor morally bound to obey laws made by a Parliament in which I have no representation" (Ibid., p.126). Unsuccessful in this challenge, Mandela led his own defence. He cross-examined witnesses for the prosecution, but did not call any witnesses himself, claiming that he was not guilty.

On November 7, after being found guilty on both charges, Mandela made a statement to the court in mitigation, arguing that responsibility for his actions was - in "large measure" - shared by the government who created laws which "the majority of the population of this country ... opposed" but who found "that every legal means of demonstrating that opposition had been closed" (1973, p.145). Mandela reviewed his personal political development to explain his action, and while he noted the difficulties he faced being separated from his wife and family, he insisted that his conscience was clear: "If I had my time over I would do the same again" (Ibid., p.152). Mandela also

used this public opportunity to record his subjective understanding of the polarising social forces. He warned the government again that

> "violence can only do one thing and that is breed counter-violence. We have warned repeatedly that the Government, by resorting continually to violence, will breed, in this country, counter-violence amongst the people, till ultimately, if there is no dawning of sanity on the part of the Government - ultimately the dispute between the Government and my people will finish up being settled in violence and by force. Already there are indications in this country that people, my people, Africans, are turning to deliberate acts of violence and of force against the Government, in order to persuade the Government, in the only language which this Government shows, by its own behaviour, that it understands" (Ibid., p.155).

The court sentenced Mandela to a total of five years imprisonment with hard labour, three on the first charge and two on the second (Benson, 1980, p.126; Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.667). Mandela remained incarcerated until, in October 1963, he was returned to court, to join his MK colleagues who had been arrested in a police raid of the farm in Rivonia.

The counter-offensive launched by the government against opposition forces after Sharpeville, coupled with their legislative programme and security build-up, was succeeding in immobilising the opposition leadership and creating a calm in the country that appeared peaceful. Western governments failed to heed a call - made in the same month Mandela was convicted - by two-thirds of the UN

General Assembly - for economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.660). For its part, the government produced further restrictive legislation, aimed particularly at individuals considered to be 'instigators'. House arrest, for up to 24-hours per day, was possible under the Sabotage Act of 1962, and 90-day detention without trial, which the minister could extend without explanation, was possible under the General Law Amendment Act (1963). In addition, the Sabotage Act was broad in its definition of sabotage, with the burden of proof on the accused (Ibid., p.665f, 672).

It was under this Sabotage Act that Mandela, as the commander-in-chief of MK, and the first of seven accused, was charged in the Rivonia Trial. Again Mandela faced a possible death sentence (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.677). Huge amounts of incriminating evidence had been found at the Rivonia farmhouse and other sites (Ibid., p.674), and while the defendants admitted to acts of sabotage and preparation for a guerrilla campaign, they denied "that a decision had been made to begin guerrilla war" (Ibid.).

After the state finished its case, Mandela opened the defence case with a statement to the court. According to Karis and Carter (1977a, p.678f), the accused had agreed that "Mandela should provide a framework for the testimony to follow and at the same time use the dock to present to

the widest possible audience a coherent and enduring rationale for the actions of Umkonto and the ANC". The carefully read statement was a lengthy political analysis of recent political history (Mandela, 1973, pp.162-189), which explained how the ANC had pursued its policies of appeal to government, mass action and finally violence. Mandela reviewed specific evidence relevant to the trial, and responded to evidence given by a state witness, 'Mr. X', who had been active in the Natal branch of MK.

Mandela's speech gripped the court, and his electrifying end left them in stunned silence (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.679; Benson, 1980, p.147). According to Benson, this last paragraph was delivered without notes:

> "During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against White domination, and I have fought against Black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die" (Mandela, 1973, p.189).

As has been shown in this chapter, Mandela, like his colleagues, was aware that the government would use increasingly powerful forms of retaliation to subdue opposition. The government's failure to win convictions in the Treason Trial made this trial even more significant. Certainly Mandela and his co-accused realised that this might be their last opportunity in public to influence the

opposition movement. Consequently, they chose to use the court as a forum to present their analysis of the objective social conditions, their response to them, and their conviction that others like them - necessarily - would emerge to fill the social role created by these oppressive conditions. In this way, they objectified themselves in an attempt to transform the objective society by attacking the oppressors and encouraging the oppressed.

Mandela, along with six others, was found guilty on all counts on June 11, and the following day, all were sentenced to life imprisonment. Interestingly, the State's chief prosecutor had purposely chosen to charge the men under the Sabotage Act of 1962 (see Karis & Carter, 1977a, pp.663-66), recalling the failure to win convictions in the Treason Trial. This, according to the judge, allowed him to show leniency and avoid the death sentence (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.677). Immediately after sentencing, all except the white prisoner, were flown to the maximum security prison on Robben Island, near Cape Town (Karis and Carter, 1977a, p.683f).

The end of the trial, for all the international attention it brought, marked the beginning of a period of political calm and rapid economic progress in South Africa (Gerhart, 1978, p.257; Legassick, 1975, p.229). The white government consolidated its strength, while western business

support helped the economic boom (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.685). International pressure weakened, and the oppressed waited for new leadership to fill the vacuum that resulted from the verdict in the Rivonia Trial.

## 8. Postscript: "Your freedom and mine cannot be separated"

It is not within the scope of this dissertation to focus on Mandela's imprisonment, his release, or his activity subsequent to his release in 1990. However, this postscript is offered as a form of closure, briefly reflecting on Mandela's twenty-seven year imprisonment and celebrating his freedom.

Physically separated from the struggle in the country, Mandela's symbolic status remained. However, for the balance of the 1960s the opposition forces had difficulty coordinating activity: the government had imprisoned the top leaders, forced others to flee, and hounded those who remained. For the rest of the world, an appearance of normality drew international investment. The ANC mission-in-exile had not developed sufficiently by the time of the Rivonia arrests, and it took time for the exiled leaders to adapt. Furthermore, MK fighters could not easily return to South Africa as neighbouring countries were still under colonial authority (Mozambique and Angola), or white rule (Rhodesia).

Conditions in the prison improved gradually (Maharaj, in Mandela, 1986, p.202-21), as the political prisoners stood together and persevered in petition and protest. Mandela became the natural leader and spokesperson, meeting with prison authorities, journalists and visiting dignitaries (Ibid.). The few visits allowed from his family were difficult as he could only see his wife behind a glass partition, and could not see his children (all visitors had to be over 16 years of age). Conversations were brief (about 45 minutes) and limited to family matters, and letters were limited to 500 words, and were heavily censored (W. Mandela, 1985, pp.133-6). The first time Nelson and Winnie were allowed a 'contact visit' since 1962 was in May 1984: "We kissed Nelson and held him a long time. It is an experience one just can't put into words. It was fantastic and hurting at the same time. He clung to the [grand]children right through the visit. Gregory, his warder, was so moved, he looked the other way" (Ibid., p.144).

During his imprisonment, it was illegal to quote Mandela (and other political prisoners) in South Africa. He made periodic statements, however, that were smuggled from prison, and published internationally (Mandela, 1986, pp.184-97). Fellow prisoners who were released also reported on prison conditions and Mandela's activities, and his continued strength and leadership (Maharaj and Dingake, in

Mandela, 1986, pp.199-234). In later years, letters were published (W. Mandela, 1985; Meer, 1990) and while these were censored by prison authorities, their publication reminded friends and supporters of a person who loved and was concerned about his family, counted his letters annually, remembered anniversaries, dreamed, and studied through correspondence (Meer, 1990, pp.333-405).

In April 1982, Mandela was moved from Robben Island to a mainland prison close to Cape Town (W. Mandela, 1985, p.141), and in December 1988 was isolated from other prisoners in a well-equipped house on the grounds of Victor Verster Prison, some distance from Cape Town (Meer, 1990, p.320). In 1985, the Nationalist government offered Mandela a conditional release, demanding he reject violence, but Mandela refused (Mandela, 1986, pp.194-196; W. Mandela, 1985, pp.145-8), recognising that his imprisonment was a symbol for his people and the world: "Your freedom and mine cannot be separated. I will return". Finally, on February 11, 1990, the Nationalist Party government released the seventy-one-year-old Mandela, acknowledging his crucial role in resolving the political tensions in the country.

From the perspective of the duality model, it is interesting to note that since his release, Mandela has appeared as a moderate, not unlike Matthews and the 'old guard' leaders in the 1950s. But at the same time, he has

tried to balance this moderate stance with assurances that he is willing to return to confrontation should the government show itself unwilling to radically transform the social conditions. As has been seen throughout this chapter, Mandela's action, like that of Matthews, arose from his interpretation of the objective conditions. While Matthews could not go as far as Mandela in opposing the government, Mandela could, when the objective conditions seemed promising, revert to a more moderate position, making negotiation possible. Throughout, Mandela has sought social change with a minimum of social destruction. Unfortunately, earlier Nationalist governments polarised the objective society and made negotiation impossible.

## 9. Conclusion

Nelson Mandela emerged from a tribal upbringing with a sense that he should do something for 'his people'. Through the missionary school tradition he developed a national consciousness of black oppression, but, with the Hertzog Bills that extended segregation to the Cape Province, Mandela saw the subjective orientation of his teachers flounder. A response that incorporated all blacks - not just the educated elite - into the opposition movement became necessary, and young people, like Mandela, interpreted this to mean an exclusivist black orientation from which to

develop a programme of mass action. But the oppressed people themselves showed, through their support of strike action, that action, and not ideology, was important. Mandela, attentive to 'his people', responded by modifying his subjective orientation and accepting multi-racial cooperation in opposition to government policies. Mandela's growth into multi-racialism was accompanied by a suspicion of government motivations that had emerged in his school years.

The government, meanwhile, made peaceful mass protest illegal, and forced the ANC to prepare to deal with further repression that would likely include declaring the organisation itself illegal. While older leaders of the Matthews generation, because of their non-confrontational approach, were unwilling to openly challenge the government, and curtailed their leadership to the constraints of the law, Mandela and his colleagues began preparing for an illegal future.

When the government did extend its repression to anti-apartheid organisations, Mandela led the move to violent struggle, seeing it as the only alternative still available to those who were determined to win freedom. But the government was not to be deterred: it succeeded in devastating the leadership of the ANC in 1963, and began to enjoy a decade of relative calm and economic growth. It appeared that Mandela's determination to force the

government into a negotiation among equals, at least for the foreseeable future, had failed.

## Chapter 5. The Model Applied to the Life of Stephen Biko

Chapters 3 and 4 showed how the duality model can be used as a framework for the detailed socio-psychological analysis of individual lives. In addition, by contrasting the account of Mandela's life with that of Matthews, it was possible to explain how changes in the objective social conditions encouraged and were affected by changes in subjective responses to these conditions.

The analysis of Stephen Biko to be developed through this chapter continues both processes, for it offers a socio-psychological account of his life, while reflecting also on the changing social conditions which facilitated, and constrained, the form of opposition he led. Like both Matthews and Mandela, Biko pursued education; however, while studying medicine at university he recognised that inter-racial cooperation denied racial distinctions that had been entrenched in the structure of the society through the Nationalists' apartheid policy. His experiences made him aware that, as a doctor in an apartheid-defined society, his activity would not lead to a gradual integration of the society, but rather would serve the government in its bid to have blacks live separately and independently, in their own small 'homelands', dependent on, but separated from, the wealth of South Africa.

## 1. Subjectification I: Liberal Aspirations, Political Awakening

Information on Biko's early years is scarce (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.viif; Woods, 1978, p.74; Gerhart, 1979, p.259; Arnold, 1978, p.xv), but evidence suggests that Biko's political awareness began during his last school years (Gerhart, 1978, p.259; Arnold, 1978, p.xv) and truly flourished only after his entrance to university in 1966. As Arnold (1978, p.xv) notes, "there was no indication in his childhood or early background that Biko possessed the political genius that would lead him to develop an ideology and a mode of action that would irreversibly change the course of history in South Africa".

Stephen Bantu Biko was born on December 18, 1946 in King William's Town in the eastern Cape Province (Biko, in Woods, 1978, p,.174; Gerhart, 1979, p.259; Arnold, 1978; Stubbs, in Biko, 1979) into a family of "ordinary means" (Arnold, 1978, p.xv). His father, a government-employed clerk (Gerhart, 1979, p.259; Arnold, 1978, p.xv), died when he was four (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.vii). His mother was a domestic servant, working in the homes of whites around King William's Town (Arnold, 1978, p.xv). There were three children in the family - two sons and a daughter - with Stephen the youngest (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.vii; Woods,

1978, p.270).

The fact that his father worked as a clerk for the government suggests that he had some education, possibly more than the average black person, and probably, like most black parents living through the difficulties of segregation and apartheid, was more concerned to provide for the family and encourage the children to maximize their opportunities, than to risk his career and his children's future through political activity. In this regard, Biko's parents likely shared the subjective orientation of the older generation of black parents, and encouraged their children to pursue education as a means to a career and some independence. Implicit in this orientation was the faith that gradual integration would occur as education amongst blacks increased.

The initial subjectification offered to Biko by his parents was probably very similar to that given to Matthews by his family (see Chapter 3, section 2). Like Matthews, Biko lived in an urban context, and his parents, although themselves not well educated, probably accepted that education was the most promising means available for their children to achieve a better life, and in the process, to transform the society. Importantly, however, Biko was born after the Hertzog legislation removed qualified black voters in the Cape from the common voters' roll. Stephen's father

might have met (or been close to meeting) the franchise qualifications in the old Cape system (see Chapter 3, section 1). The demise of this preliminary form of a non-racial society probably challenged his commitment to education and gradual integration of blacks into a non-racial society. But, like Matthews, Biko's parents had been brought up and educated in the Cape tradition, and it is likely that, like Matthews, they remained committed to education and gradual, top-down social change. Indeed, Biko's pursuit of education suggests that early influences, notably his parents', and subsequently his teachers', consistently supported education as a promising means towards a better life, and, presumably, the gradual transformation of society.

Biko began his schooling (probably in 1952) at a local primary school (Stubbs, in Biko, 1978, p.vii) where he remained for two years. He continued at a higher primary school for another four years (Woods, 1978, p.74). For at least four years he likely did not come under the influence of the Bantu Education Act, for, although it was promulgated in 1953 and amended in 1954, it was implemented only in 1956 (Lodge, 1983, p.121). Even so, he did become part of that generation which experienced "the change-over from mission schools to schools under the control of the Bantu Education Department" (Beard, 1972, p.161). This change represented a

radical new approach by the Nationalist government, and was bluntly summarised by one of apartheid's ideologues. When Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, introduced the Bantu Education Act, he made clear that the plan was to educate blacks "'in accordance with their opportunities in life'" (in Gerhart, 1979, p.255). Verwoerd maintained that his Department of Native Affairs '"will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge ... What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice? That is quite absurd'" (in Hirson, 1979, p.45).

Bantu Education was extended to secondary schools in 1959 (Hirson, 1979, p.50), probably preceding Biko's entrance into Standard 6 (Grade 8) by a year. In 1963 he went on to Lovedale (Gerhart, 1979, p.259), situated approximately 50 kilometres from King William's Town, and should have remained there until his matriculation (Woods, 1978, p.74). By this time, Lovedale had come under the control of the Bantu Education Department of the central government (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.vii) and had been completely overhauled. Lovedale had been declared a boys-only school, its industrial training department had been closed, and its significant library had been sold off (Ntantala, cited in Hirson, 1979, p.55). Thus, Biko's

attendance at Lovedale should not be seen in the same light as Matthews' earlier attendance. When Matthews went to Lovedale it was a missionary-run, private school, and was the centre of advanced education for black children. As such it played a key role in fostering a black middle class devoted to education as a means to transform the objective society and develop a non-racial, class-divided society (cf., Cobley, 1990). By the time Biko went to Lovedale, it had become reduced to the average standard of government schools for blacks. Nevertheless, Biko's education continued to bring him into contact with a subjective orientation that encouraged education. Political developments during the mid-1950s had been tantalizing, but had not offered teachers and students concrete alternatives. Educators, like Matthews, had continued to see education as an important foundation for whatever society emerged.

Biko's older brother was also a student at Lovedale, but soon after Biko entered Lovedale, his brother was arrested as a suspected activist in the Pan Africanist Congress' (PAC) military wing, Poqo, and imprisoned for nine months. Stephen was interrogated by police, and, after only three months at Lovedale, was expelled (Gerhart, 1979, p.259).

This personal event for Biko (and his brother) coincided with a large government crackdown on the PAC and

Poqo activists. Towards the end of 1962 "a crudely organized PAC underground began to operate, leading to minor acts of violence, many committed by school-age youths" (Gerhart, 1979, p.252). In addition, the PAC leadership, exiled in Basutoland (Lesotho) announced in late March 1963 that a Poqo offensive would begin soon throughout South Africa. Basutoland police raided the PAC headquarters and confiscated lists of PAC members (Ibid., p.252f). Presumably these were shared with South African authorities, as they were able to arrest 3,246 suspects by June, and "1,162 had already been convicted and sentenced" (Ibid., p.253).

The emergence of Biko's political orientation can be traced to his expulsion from Lovedale (Arnold, 1978, p.xv); this event produced in Biko "strong resentment toward white authority" (Gerhart, 1979, p.259), but an accompanying understanding of the objective conditions which gave rise to this event and the emotional reaction he felt seems to have been delayed until his university years.

Because the school year begins in late January, Biko probably was expelled towards the end of April or early May, 1963, in the middle of the government's anti-PAC action. It is not known what offense Biko's brother committed, but the fervor of the time, with the white public strongly behind moves to stop terrorism and communism (Ibid., p.284), may indicate that the sentence was disproportionate to the

crime. Although Gerhart reports that Biko's brother was "arrested as a suspected Poqo activist" (1979, p.259), his crime could have been as minor as possessing illegal documents or propagating PAC-Poqo ideology.

The point remains, however, that Biko's brother most likely was familiar with, and sympathetic towards, the PAC. Gerhart suggests that this incident led Biko to reject PAC tactics, particularly "its reckless rush to confrontation at a time when circumstances did not favor a black victory" (1979, p.285). The fact that his later political ideology was consistent with the Africanism of the PAC may reflect familiarity with PAC thinking; however, the principal impetus generating his exclusivism came later from personal experiences at university which convinced him that multiracial cooperation was impossible (see section 3, below).

The ability of a powerful government to jeopardize the career of Biko's promising brother, and his own narrow escape from a similar fate, appear to have had a strong personal impact on Biko. That he continued through the last two years of school and moved on to university suggests that he had not rejected the education-oriented subjectivity of his parents and teachers that had motivated him thus far. Without an imminent revolution to bring about the desired social change, education remained an important avenue for

those who wished to do something for their people.

Presumably Biko missed the rest of the academic year, as he began at the Catholic boarding school of St. Francis College in Mariannhill outside Durban in 1964 (Ibid.). Having been expelled from Lovedale, he might have had difficulty being accepted at another school under the authority of the Bantu Education Department; in any case, at most schools there were long waiting lists that slowed students' progress (Hirson, 1979). But, importantly, Biko persevered and did not see this interruption as justification for abandoning his studies.

The Mariannhill school had not been brought under government control, and its private status (although teaching the syllabus determined by the government department) allowed it to continue in the missionary school tradition (Gerhart, 1979, p.259f): many graduates became political figures, and typically they were "anti-communist and distinctly conservative in philosophy" (Hirson, 1979, p.20). Biko "did very well" (Woods, 1978, p.74), and matriculated at the end of 1965 (Biko, in Woods, 1978, p.174). The subjective orientation offered at St. Francis College made Biko sympathetic to "the ideals of an integrated, multiracial society" (Arnold, 1978, p.xvi). At the same time, however, this school, because it was less restricted in terms of the Bantu Education Act, can be seen

also to have offered Biko a contrast between the kind of missionary school education which the older generation encouraged and the form being developed under the Bantu Education system. Thus, while St. Francis College represented a humanitarian ideal, changes in the objective society were making the achievement of such an ideal, at least for the foreseeable future, increasingly unlikely.

Biko left school with a subjective understanding of the value of education similar to those of both Matthews and Mandela in their school years. But, in the same way that changed objective conditions soon forced Mandela to modify his subjectivity, Biko had personal experiences at university that made changes to his subjectivity necessary.

The following year Biko entered the black section of the University of Natal to pursue the only course in medicine open to blacks in the country. At the time, there were about 130 blacks (Africans) studying medicine (Gerhart, 1979, p.256). Undoubtedly, Biko's achievement was impressive, reflecting both intelligence and a commitment to educational achievement. Already in a minority of blacks who completed high school, Biko's acceptance into medical school shows how single-mindedly he pursued education. This subjective orientation was similar to that of his parents and teachers, and like Matthews, Biko's academic successes - his personal experience with the objective conditions - had

made this orientation dominant in his own subjectivity. He entered university seeking a profession that could ameliorate the conditions which his fellow blacks experienced. Initially Biko attended to his studies, and apparently did well (Woods, 1978, p.74).

For Biko, pursuit of a degree would guarantee elite status in the black society (cf., Hirson, 1979, p.69), but his intention to pursue a medical career probably showed also a commitment to serve others in an immediate way. In this regard, a survey done among students in Soweto in 1966 may be illustrative. It shows, for example, that the largest group (nearly 26%) of students wanted to become doctors, and their principal reasons for this were to help their people (40%) and because there was a shortage of doctors (34%) (Tunmer, 1972, p.146).

Included in Biko's subjectivity, however, were latent elements, which, although dominated by his desire to pursue education, were in the ascendancy. His experiences of the objective conditions of the society continued to reveal the racial polarisation which made multi-racial cooperation and gradual integration impossible.

Changes in the society during his later school years had further segregated and disadvantaged blacks and accordingly Biko's aspirations were restricted. He found "a society in which Blacks, regardless of talents and skills,

suffered the indignities of patronizing Whites" (Arnold, 1978, p.xvi). In the long-term, black doctors would have to serve black homelands or black hospitals, and effectively accept the apartheid structure. In the shorter-term, segregated university education followed segregated schooling, with white standards (and costs) exceeding black standards. University professors, like virtually all participants in the society, had to work within an unequal system. Their actions could not overcome years of institutionalised discrimination, and even if they could, after graduation students continued in the unequal system.

## 2. Constraints on the Opposition: Developments in the Objective Society

Since they came to power in 1948, the Nationalist government had pursued a two-pronged policy: while legislating extension of segregation, it sought to eliminate opposition to its apartheid plan. Thus, the arrests at Rivonia and the subsequent trial effectively destroyed the ANC's plans for a military programme, while the government actions against Poqo in 1963 had equally dramatic results (Gerhart, 1979, p.253).

Whether or not the leaders in the ANC (and related opposition groups) erred in moving so rapidly to a sabotage campaign before they were fully prepared is debatable

(Johnson, 1977, pp.20-23), for the might of the South African government was always far greater than that of the opposition. After their banning, had the opposition forces consolidated their position before attacking the regime (Ibid., p.23), it is likely that they would have faced an even more powerful regime, as the government was actively developing its strength in the security and military spheres (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.662f). Nevertheless, opposition groups were largely removed from the political stage in South Africa following the state's crackdown in the early 1960s. In a sense, "These movements ... effectively abdicated [or were forced] from any significant role in shaping the burgeoning African movements of the 1970s" (Johnson, 1977, p.23).

The events at Sharpeville had precipitated a "crisis of confidence" that had drawn people and money away from the country (Ibid., p.26). But by the end of 1961, even before the Rivonia arrests, the end of the crisis was evident, and after 1963, the economy grew at a staggering rate (Ibid., p.27f): "Soon only Japan had no need to envy the South African rate of growth. ... At some point around 1970 white South Africans overtook Californians as the single most affluent group in the world. ... She [South Africa] was now the 15th biggest trading nation in the world" (Ibid., p.28).

The short-term crisis that had followed Sharpeville

faded as the South African government created a stable environment for investment which had not characterized the country for nearly a decade. Their advertising overseas was straightforward: foreign capital was attracted by opportunities for industrial growth, the availability of minerals, a large source of cheap labour that was barred from unionizing, and a most attractive return on investments, often reaching 15 to 20% (Ibid., p.30). Money flooded in, and the growth that followed allowed the South African government to obtain foreign loans to finance projects that foreign capital typically would not develop. Essentially, the government-backed enterprises aimed to develop the infrastructure needed for economic self-sufficiency, while ensuring a powerful military machine (Ibid., p.42f).

The political calm that fostered economic growth also gave the government the opportunity to pursue its grand apartheid plans. The repression of the 1950s was succeeded by a progression of apartheid, as the government pushed forward its policies by extending Bantu Education to the university level, and creating homelands to which all blacks would become attached as 'citizens' of 'independent states'. It hoped to impress critics in the international community that 'separate development' (apartheid) could produce stable and independent homelands where blacks of a particular

tribal (ethnic-linguistic) grouping could develop their own institutions, with the full political rights that foreign countries demanded for South Africa's black majority (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.661; Gerhart, 1979, p.254; Johnson, 1977, p.180). At the same time, the Nationalists continued to believe that most blacks in South Africa would support this territorial segregation; the political protests of the 1950s had been led by a few 'agitators'.

The Nationalist government, eager to develop a model homeland for international effect, moved rapidly towards Transkeian self-government (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.661). An election was held in November 1962, and although large numbers of Transkeians voted, three-quarters of the 45 elected representatives opposed the homeland policy. But the legislative assembly was dominated by 64 appointed chiefs, and in 1963, the Transkei became the first homeland to be granted self-government (Ibid.).

This development in the Nationalist programme expressed the emergence of a new response to the objective conditions in the society by a group of black leaders. For these people the power of the white state was making it suicidal to attack the system from outside officially sanctioned structures. Peaceful mass action was now illegal and the fledgling guerrilla programme was unlikely to threaten the white state, even assuming that it had not been decimated in

the Rivonia arrests. Under these conditions, some black leaders understood that their only form of action was to work within the system for change. In other words, the homelands and their leaders would be given government-sanctioned opportunities to express their concerns to the international community; such leverage, they thought, should maximize gains from a government determined to avoid embarrassment (cf., Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.661). In addition, the homelands promised blacks a form of political expression not possible in South Africa as a whole (Gerhart, 1979, p.259). It seemed that blacks might be able to develop their own social institutions that could offer young educated blacks opportunities for advancement.

While the motivation of the homeland leaders to work within the system - because extra-governmental channels appeared doomed - may be defensible, their understanding of the material conditions in which the homelands existed seemed naive, if not politically opportunistic. Cooperation in this homeland policy guaranteed some positions of privilege, although most blacks saw no improvement in their status, and, if the policy succeeded, their conditions might deteriorate. For over 3 million blacks who were forcibly removed to these homelands during the 1960s (Johnson, 1977, p.179) this deterioration soon became a reality. Although all blacks were equally disadvantaged, the government, by

emphasising tribal divisions, sought to divide blacks and weaken nationalist sentiment. Furthermore, every homeland was designed to remain dependent on and serve the white state (Ibid., p.179f): the homelands together covered approximately 13% of the land, an amount that had been determined by the 1913 Land Act, and slightly expanded in 1936 (Ibid., p.179); almost every homeland was made up of a number of geographically separate pieces, surrounded by 'white South Africa'; the land was poor in terms of agricultural potential and mineral resources; the infrastructure was weak, even non-existent, with no homeland having a port or an international airport; and the economy was underdeveloped, with the business, industrial and mining centres located outside the homelands (cf., Horrell, 1973). The white government's pronouncements were only the thinnest veneer on a system designed explicitly to retain a cheap source of black labour, while refusing to take responsibility for these workers or their dependents.

The homeland leaders, through their objective action in apartheid-serving social positions, supported the apartheid apologists, and seemed to confirm that important segments of the black opposition were willing to negotiate with the government. Thus, however the homeland leaders defended their action - subjectively - the objectivity of their action contributed to the maintenance, and extension, of

apartheid.

Meanwhile, other forms of political expression were extremely limited, and a frustrated black population concerned itself with surviving under apartheid: by the late 1960s, "Apathy and silence were all-pervasive" (Gerhart, 1979, p.258). But muted and uncoordinated as the black opposition was, it gradually emerged as a multi-pronged attack on the government.

Workers and students became the principal groups opposing government policy (Hirson, 1979). Ironically, both groups had been targeted by the apartheid planners, and were supposed to become compliant and accepting of their status in the society. For the white government, under their Bantu Education 'machine', the system should produce a generation of young people who had no unreasonable expectations of their future, who supported separate homelands for their 'tribal group' and who had the training to be compliant workers (Gerhart, 1979, p.255). The late 1960s were to see the vanguard of this generation begin participating in the society as adults.

The Nationalists also expected that those students who continued at university would value the opportunity and focus on their education and their future careers, within the existing structures of apartheid society. By accepting the status quo as an unchangeable reality, black students

were expected to seek opportunities within those constraints. To ensure that the reality of apartheid was never doubted, segregation was extended to universities with the 1959 Extension of University Education Act.

Fort Hare came under government control and enrollment was limited to Xhosa and Fingo students. The racially integrated Universities of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town became white campuses, and new universities were built for other tribal-racial groups. The University of the North at Turfloop was to serve Sotho, Tswana, Venda, Tsonga and Northern Ndebele groups, while the University of Zululand at Ngoye was for Zulu and Swazi groups. A University for Coloured people was built near Cape Town, and the University of Durban-Westville served Indians (Gerhart, 1979, p.256). In 1968 Fort Hare and the four new universities for blacks/non-whites had a total of 3,508 students (Ibid.). At the University of Natal in Durban there was one oddity. The white university had a satellite medical school limited to black students, and in 1968, "130 Africans, 209 Indians and 31 Coloureds were enrolled" (Ibid.).

The government kept a tight control on these new universities, and most faculty and administrators were Nationalist-inclined white Afrikaners (Ibid.). This made political organization by students very difficult, and moves by black students on the new university campuses to

affiliate with the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) were consistently blocked by the university authorities (Biko, 1979, p.10; Hirson, 1979, pp.66ff), and the Students' Representative Council (SRC) at Fort Hare was ordered to resign from NUSAS in 1960 (Hirson, 1979, p.55). Instead, black students had formed a number of political organizations with leanings towards one or another banned group. "None of these organizations, however, had survived for long, since identification with banned movements was hazardous, university authorities were hostile to student political groups, and the groups themselves were uncooperative with one another" (Gerhart, 1979, p.257).

NUSAS was active on English-speaking (white) university campuses and the black medical school attached to the white University of Natal, and although it consistently expressed its opposition to government policy, it had difficulty speaking for black students with whom it had limited contact. NUSAS was a multiracial organization that essentially reflected the liberal-progressive mood that permeated the Congress Alliance of the mid-1950s. Nevertheless, in the early 1960s, NUSAS was one of the few anti-government groups that remained legal, and consequently black students were attracted to it as a potential exponent of their views (Ibid., p.257f).

The hiatus in black opposition activity during the

early 1960s was a façade behind which significant realignments were occurring. The material conditions of the society in the late 1950s and early 1960s expressed a dramatic tension between the forces of oppression and those of opposition. In the wake of the Sharpeville killings and the banning of the ANC and PAC, the polarization between the government and its opponents widened. The success of the apartheid regime had devastated its opponents and created new material conditions to which individuals in the society had to respond. Blacks were faced with two possible interpretations of the changed conditions, which Mandela expressed, in his court statement in 1964, as a choice to "submit or fight" (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.777): either submit to the system of separate development, where "the politics of half a loaf of bread was preferable to no politics at all" (Gerhart, 1979, p.259), or oppose it in search of the whole loaf and risk provoking the wrath of the powerful white state.

Some blacks chose to work within the apartheid system, largely because the extra-legal options seemed futile, while others tried to manoeuvre delicately between illegality and resistance to the system. This latter form of activity emerged towards the end of the 1960s and remained fractured as it grew through the 1970s: workers pursued strike action, students developed a Black Consciousness philosophy and

school children rejected Bantu Education (Hirson, 1979).

It was primarily this tension that defined the material conditions that Biko faced as he entered university in 1966. Biko's response to the objective conditions - Black Consciousness - emerged from the continued polarization of white and black, and indeed arose from the government's policy of racialising education. The ideology of the exclusive Africanist faction in the ANC YL, based on a distrust of whites speaking for blacks, had existed for decades but gained added credence in the mid-1960s, when the separation of races under apartheid became virtually complete.

### 3. Subjectification II: Multiracialism in a Segregated Society

Even though Biko had developed some political understanding during his school years, there is no evidence that he sought objective action during this time. Following his parents and teachers, he had faith in the potential of education (Arnold, 1978, p.xvi); he actively pursued his studies and achieved notable success.

The subjective orientation that was reinforced at St. Francis College encouraged black students to accept, as an ultimate goal, a view of society that recognised individual achievement, without racial overtones, and peaceful

multiracial cooperation as the means to that end. This does not mean that Biko was discouraged from student politics; on the contrary, he realised also that his academic efforts were integrally involved in the political structures of the society (Arnold, 1978, p.xvi; cf., Hirson, 1979, p.69). But because his subjectivity was still dominated by the cooperative orientation of the older generation, he was willing to participate in multiracial student political activities, and NUSAS in particular. In such organizations, at least, he expected equality (i.e., nonracialism), and, he believed, effective interracial cooperation among students in these groups would destroy artificial racial boundaries and lead to a gradual integration of the society. Importantly, Biko had not yet rejected cooperation with whites, but instead was trying to seek an accommodation of black aspirations within such an organization. His experiences in NUSAS were to radically change his subjective orientation to social change, however, leading to a rejection of multiracial cooperation as a means towards a nonracial society.

Few students at the medical school were politically active, largely because many of the Indian students, who comprised the majority of medical students, had middle class backgrounds and an accompanying distance from political activism (Beard, 1972, p.161). This likely facilitated

Biko's election to the SRC during his first year, something that may not have been as easy on a more politically active campus (cf., Beard, 1972). The SRC had been politically rejuvenated in the early 1960s when some students, who had been prevented from continuing at Fort Hare after it came under central government control, moved to the black campus of the University of Natal. These students focussed more on national politics, and rejoined NUSAS (Ibid., p.160f).

Together these factors made Biko's situation somewhat unique: first, he could rise quickly to positions of political importance at the medical school. Second, because Fort Hare students had refused to elect an SRC since 1960 (Gerhart, 1979, p.270) and because the newly created University Colleges for blacks were prevented from affiliating to NUSAS, Biko was one of the few black students able to experience the functioning of a racially mixed body like NUSAS (Ibid., p.269).

In July 1966, Biko attended the annual NUSAS conference as an observer, and the following year he travelled to Rhodes University, in the eastern Cape, as an official delegate of the medical school's SRC (Gerhart, 1978, p.260). Rhodes was a 'white' campus, and the authorities, acting in terms of a ministerial decree, prevented black delegates from staying in the residences or eating with the white delegates on the campus (Hirson, 1979, p.70; Gerhart, 1979,

p.260). In a later letter to SRC Presidents, Biko described how

> "blacks were made to stay at a church building somewhere in the Grahamstown location, each day being brought to [the] Conference site by cars etc. On the other hand their white 'brothers' were staying in residence around the conference site. This is perhaps the turning point in the history of black support for NUSAS. So appalling were the conditions that it showed blacks just how valued they were in the organisation" (1979, p.10f; cf, Biko, in Woods, 1978, p.177f).

Biko recalled that the delegates "had been given to understand that residences would be completely integrated for the first time at a NUSAS conference, and on our way to the conference in the train we had a discussion as a delegation from the Natal University (Black Section) to the effect that if this condition was not met we would register our protest, withdraw from the conference and go home" (in Woods, 1978, p.177).

The NUSAS executive immediately proposed a resolution condemning the University for the segregation of residences, and this appeased some of Biko's colleagues. But, seeking to test its commitment to act on what it condemned as segregationist, Biko held NUSAS responsible, and "moved a private motion proposing that the conference adjourn until we could get a nonracist venue" (Biko, in Woods, 1978, p.178). The debate continued for over five hours, during which Biko realized that "for a long time I had been holding onto this whole dogma of nonracism almost like a religion"

(Ibid.). The juxtaposition of his non-racial subjective understanding with the objective conditions - the reality - of a racially divided society, showed that this subjective response to the society was something of a pipe-dream. As a result, Biko was forced to reevaluate his orientation. The promises made by his parents, his teachers and his colleagues in NUSAS all seemed to ignore the fact that the society had been structured so effectively along racial lines that the equality required for interracial cooperation could not be achieved. He saw white students who, because of their position in the objective society, could not understand why he was unwilling to stay in the church in the location for the duration of the conference, "and I began to feel that our understanding of our situation in this country was not coincidental with that of these liberal whites" (Ibid., p.179).

White NUSAS delegates shared the anger of their black colleagues, but even solidarity boycotts of meals could not hide the fact that the society itself was unequal. The position of whites in the society, whatever their subjective response to the society, necessarily gave them privileges, while blacks, however much their subjective understanding suggested that they could improve their conditions through individual achievement, remained disadvantaged in the polarised society that had developed. The NUSAS decision to

"work for the abolition of racial segregation on the campuses" (Hirson, 1979, p.70) looked ineffective in the context of a whole social system that structured inequality.

In addition, NUSAS had been alienating its black supporters in recent years. Following a move by NUSAS leaders in 1963-4 to make NUSAS more responsive to the militant mood among its black minority, suggestions were made to develop the organization into "an extra-legal revolutionary" group. These secret discussions were made public, and the organization, responding to disapproval from white students, moved to the right (Gerhart, 1979, p.258). In the latter years of the decade, therefore, black students found an organization that "largely confined itself to symbolic multiracial activities and protests after-the-fact against government infringements on academic freedom" (Ibid.). The fact that this middle-of-the-road response was necessary for any group that wished to remain legal under apartheid regulations only intensified the resolve of blacks to find an alternative political forum (Hirson, 1979, p.67).

Although NUSAS was made illegal on black campuses in 1967 (Hirson, 1979, p.70f), black delegates attended the NUSAS conference of 1968, and made clear their disaffection. For Biko, again a delegate, "The overriding impression was that the blacks were there in name only. The swing to the right in the organisation did not meet the usual counter

from the blacks. It was clear that none of the blacks felt a part of the organisation. Hence the Executive that was elected was all white" (1979, p.11).

Biko was a leading figure in a black caucus; here he drew the attention of fellow black students to their status within NUSAS. He shared his emerging subjective understanding by arguing that NUSAS's approach was a farce, as the society itself did not permit even the minor integration that NUSAS tried to pursue. In fact, multiracial organizations papered over real distinctions that could not be avoided because of the unnatural structure of the society (cf., Gerhart, 1979, p.260).

In 1970 Biko wrote a critique of those whites he called 'liberals' - those who expressed their rejection of the racial society by seeking to develop forums for multiracial cooperation - under the title Black Souls in White Skins? which explains in general the problem he experienced in NUSAS in 1967-8:

> "the people forming the integrated complex have been extracted from various segregated societies with their in-built complexes of superiority and inferiority and these continue to manifest themselves even in the 'nonracial' set-up of the integrated complex. As a result the integration so achieved is a one-way course, with the whites doing all the talking and the blacks the listening. Let me hasten to say that I am not claiming that segregation is necessarily the natural order; however, given the facts of the situation where a group experiences privilege at the expense of others, then it becomes obvious that a hastily arranged integration cannot be the solution to the problem. It

> is rather like expecting the slave to work together with the slave-master's son to remove all the conditions leading to the former's enslavement" (1979, p.20f).

At the 1968 NUSAS conference, held in Johannesburg, Biko was able to convince the black delegates that their aspirations were not being met - and could not be met - within NUSAS. They left the conference and moved on to a conference of the University Christian Movement (UCM). The UCM had been formed in 1967, and, unlike NUSAS, was tolerated by administrations on black campuses, where it drew a large following. Black delegates had been in the majority at the UCM's inaugural conference that had followed the NUSAS conference at Rhodes University, but, like the NUSAS delegates, UCM delegates had been forced into racially divided accommodations (Hirson, 1979, p.70).

Both NUSAS and UCM faced similar restrictions within the society, and were little different in political expression; however, because NUSAS activity on black campuses had been made illegal in 1967, this meant that blacks, if they were to unite and express themselves, had to attach themselves to a group that could function on black campuses (Ibid., p.70f). At the UCM conference the ex-NUSAS delegates expanded their black caucus and decided to have a meeting of black university SRCs at the end of the year. At this meeting it was decided to form a black student

organization, where 'black' was defined to include (potentially) all 'non-whites', i.e., Africans, Coloureds and Indians. In mid-1969 the South African Students' Organization (SASO) was started (Biko, 1979, p.11; Biko, in Woods, 1978, p.180f; Gerhart, 1979, p.261).

In terms of the duality model, it is possible to see that the material conditions in which black (and white) students found themselves were incompatible with the subjective understanding being offered by groups like NUSAS, which were committed to multiracialism. The racial polarization of the society, which had been developing even in the 1950s and had led the PAC to reject multiracial action, in the late 1960s was virtually complete. The apartheid policy of the government had created such structural inequalities in the society that blacks and whites, even when they pursued multiracial activities, carried the inequalities with them.

Black students could not express their concerns in a multiracial organization like NUSAS, because the society prevented most students from being members, and those that were permitted as members remained a small minority, pampered by white liberals, but sidelined in the organization's leadership. Apartheid itself, through structural transformation of the society and direct legal proscription, had made multiracialism ineffective, and the

Africanist exclusivism that had been rejected by the ANC in the 1950s was seen as a necessary form of political organization in the late 1960s.

Thus, Biko's desire to separate from NUSAS and form an exclusive black organization was a reaction to the restrictive social conditions that existed in the late 1960s. The subjective orientation he had received from his parents (effectively his mother) and later from his teachers, and to which he had clung for so long even in the face of contradictory experiences, was now directly undermined by changes in the objective society. Consequently, he was forced to modify his subjective understanding of the objective society, and, with others who shared this orientation, replaced multiracialism with Black Consciousness.

Notice that Matthews had pursued a programme of liberalisation through educational achievement because he found support for such a process in his activity. In contrast, Mandela had modified his orientation to accommodate increasingly radical forms of protest action, but had found it important to embrace multiracial organization. Importantly, for both earlier leaders multiracial cooperation had remained possible and productive. For Biko, changes in the objective conditions of his existence made it impossible - at least within the

existing apartheid society - to support multiracial cooperation, for the racial differences - and disadvantage - were now entrenched structurally: Matthews' hope that a gradual integration would develop in the future was not tenable for Biko. His future was circumscribed by apartheid, which made no exceptions for educated blacks. Whether a doctor (or a professor, or a lawyer), a black person would receive inferior education at school, would be forced to attend a university designated for a particular tribal group (with no means of determining the standards of their qualifications vis-à-vis those of students at white campuses) and, if apartheid reached its final solution, be legally bound to homeland regimes. Moreover, Biko's historical position, gave him the advantage of seeing a past where the dream of gradual liberalisation had failed to desegregate the society. At the same time, the desire for freedom had been intensified by the Civil Rights and the Black Power Movements in America and through the process of decolonisation that was now reaching southern Africa.

## 4. Subjectification III: The Black Consciousness Analysis

Some of those who formed SASO were reluctant to distance themselves from NUSAS with its ideological commitment to a nonracial society (Nettleton, in 1970 Survey of Race Relation in South Africa, 1971, p.245f), and SASO

was careful not to alienate these supporters. Because NUSAS was banned on black university campuses, there was a romantic attraction to the organization; in addition, some black student leaders were reluctant to reject NUSAS as this would have aligned them with the university administrations on black campuses (Biko, in Woods, 1978, p.182). SASO presented itself, therefore, as a black students' organization that sought to consolidate black students and pressure NUSAS, which it acknowledged as the national student body (Biko, 1979, p.6). For example, SASO listed three objectives: "1/ To promote contact and practical co-operation among black students in South Africa. 2/ To represent black students nationally and internationally. 3/ To establish contact among South African students" (van der Merwe, Charton, Kotzé & Magnusson, 1978, p.98).

At the inaugural conference of SASO, held at the University of the North in July 1969, Biko was elected its first President (Biko, in Woods, 1979, p.181f), a position he held for a year. At the second conference he took on the publications portfolio (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.19). He served on the SASO executive for two years, in these two capacities, and reported that the executive officers agreed that longer terms would encourage a "leadership cult", to the detriment of "the real message" (Biko, in Woods, 1978, p.223). Such reasoning made Biko reject requests for his

return to the executive (Ibid.). Nevertheless, he remained a "foremost protagonist" in the Black Consciousness movement, helping to formulate documents of policy (in Woods, 1978, p.217).

During his presidency he toured the black university campuses (Ibid., p.182), and found students increasingly receptive to the idea of an all-black student organization (Biko, 1979, p.17f). The expression of his emerging subjective orientation, which was later labelled Black Consciousness, was reinforced by the responsiveness of black students to this new understanding. Later in the year he delivered a presidential address in which he attempted to explain the formation of SASO and its relationship to NUSAS, taking care to emphasize that NUSAS, at least in "policy and principles", was supported by SASO. But, in practice, there was much "hypocrisy practiced by the members", resulting from the inability of NUSAS to pursue a truly multiracial policy in the actual conditions of the country. For Biko, participation in NUSAS reflected a kind of tokenism where black students "feel unaccepted and insulted in many instances" (Ibid., p.5). NUSAS was unable to serve the interests of black students, and those blacks who did attend their multiracial meetings listened to discussions "on what the white students believe are the needs of the black students" (Ibid.).

Just two months after his carefully worded comments on NUSAS, Biko wrote a letter that was sent to SRC Presidents throughout South Africa and some student groups overseas. In it he showed growing confidence in the emerging subjective understanding of the society and made the break with NUSAS explicit: "While these aims [of SASO] might appear to be couched in racialistic language, they are in fact a sign that the black student community has at last lost faith with their white counterparts and is now withdrawing from the open society" (Ibid., p.15).

By the time SASO held its second conference in July 1970 the split with NUSAS was clear (Gerhart, 1979, p.262; Biko, in Woods, 1978, p.183): SASO no longer accepted NUSAS "as a true national union" (Nettleton, in 1970 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1971, p.246; cf., Biko, in Woods, 1978, p.183; Gerhart, 1979, p.262). SASO continued to have contact with NUSAS, the UCM and the South African Institute of Race Relations, all of which were multiracial in orientation (Ibid.), but these ties were under strain.

Just one month after the conference the SASO Newsletter published Biko's article Black Souls in White Skins? under the pseudonym, Frank Talk. Liberals and their multiracial message were identified as the principal impediment preventing blacks from recognizing that their oppression was based on race, and that whites, however colourblind,

necessarily were part of the privileged group in the system: "in the ultimate analysis no white person can escape being part of the oppressor camp" (Biko, 1979, p.23). As Biko saw it, "The problem is WHITE RACISM and it rests squarely on the laps of the white society. The sooner the liberals realise this the better for us blacks. Their presence amongst us is irksome and of nuisance value" (Ibid., p.23).

Biko's realisation that the subjective understanding offered by groups like NUSAS had no impact in the objective conditions of the society was now being extended. He no longer simply avoided groups that encouraged multiracial cooperation, but argued instead that, because these groups appeared to bridge the social divide between blacks and whites, they served to confuse the fundamentally racial polarisation of the society. Explicitly rejecting such groups allowed Biko to clarify his subjective understanding of the social conditions which blacks experienced: white racism was the thesis against which the necessary antithesis was "a solid black unity" (1979, p.51). To counter white racism and change the society, Biko argued, required solidarity amongst the oppressed, and this had to exclude whites (Biko, 1979, pp.19-26). Thus Biko's presentation (1972, pp.190-202) to a conference on student activism in January 1971 (van der Merwe & Albertyn, 1972, p.8; Woods, 1978, p.187) contained a wider political analysis that

describes a polarized society where oppression unites his themes of White Racism and Black Consciousness.

The attack on liberals was essentially an attack on the gradualist approach to integration that they supported. Those blacks who joined whites in their 'integrated' parties were condemned as "dull-witted, self-centred blacks" who were "as guilty of the arrest of progress as their white friends" (Biko, 1979, p.24). The problem with such gradual change, as was evident in Matthews' approach (see Chapter 3), was its implicit acceptance of the white-western structure of society. Biko sought to exclude these blacks from the category 'black', arguing that their desire to be white, made impossible by skin colour, made them 'non-white' (Ibid., p.48).

Based on this critique, Biko distinguished two kinds of integration, and emphasized that the integration he sought involved a social revolution:

> "If by integration you understand a breakthrough into white society by blacks, an assimilation and acceptance of blacks into an already established set of norms and code of behaviour set up by and maintained by whites, then YES I am against it...
>
> "If on the other hand by integration you mean there shall be free participation by all members of a society, catering for the full expression of the self in a freely changing society as determined by the will of the people, then I am with you. ... This need not cramp the style of those who feel differently but on the whole, a country in Africa, in which the majority of the people are African must inevitably exhibit African values and be truly African in style" (Ibid., p.24).

If they were to contribute to the integration of society, Biko argued, blacks needed to overcome the inferiority complex that they had developed over the 300 years of white oppression. Otherwise integration would remain artificial, involving blacks listening while whites talked. Biko believed that only when blacks and whites could show mutual respect for each other would "the ingredients for a true and meaningful integration" exist (Ibid., p.21). He called this kind of black self-assertion Black Consciousness, arguing that "what is necessary as a prelude to anything else that may come is a very strong grass-roots build-up of black consciousness such that blacks can learn to assert themselves and stake their rightful claim" (Ibid.).

In December 1971, Biko spoke to a group of SASO members and elaborated on his understanding of Black Consciousness. Blacks - that is, those who shared a black "mental attitude", who saw "themselves as a unit in the struggle towards the realisation of their aspirations" (Ibid., p.48) - had to unite to celebrate their blackness: Black Consciousness

> "seeks to infuse the black community with a new-found pride in themselves, their efforts, their value systems, their culture, their religion and their outlook to life. The interrelationship between the consciousness of the self and the emancipatory programme is of paramount importance... Liberation therefore, is of paramount importance in the concept of

> Black Consciousness, for we cannot be conscious of ourselves and yet remain in bondage" (Ibid., p.49).

In 1976, while giving evidence at a trial of his colleagues, Biko gave an especially clear account of Black Consciousness as a process of emancipation, drawing attention to the material (objective) and psychological (subjective) aspects of the oppression experienced by blacks.

> "I think basically Black Consciousness refers itself to the black man and to his situation, and I think the black man is subjected to two forces in this country. He is first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalised machinery, through laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through poor pay, through very difficult living conditions, through poor education, these are all external to him, and secondly, and this we regard as the most important, the black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation, he rejects himself, precisely because he attaches the meaning white to all that is good, in other words he associates good and he equates good with white. This arises out of his living and it arises out of his development from childhood" (1979, p.100).

Biko's analysis of the objective conditions in the society entailed also some awareness of the transformation of those conditions. If blacks were to overcome their sense of alienation, their action would reflect this transformed subjectivity. Consequently, their action, because it occurs also in social positions, would create pressure in those positions for change. If those filling these social roles found the structure inflexible and unaccommodating, they would be likely to organize with others to modify those

social positions. By modifying individuals' subjectivity, Biko was beginning a cycle of consciousness-raising (subjectification) and social action (objectification) that would transform the social structure. Importantly, this process, because it appeared to be an individual-based strategy rather than organization-based, made Black Consciousness particularly effective in the restrictive society that had developed by the late 1960s.

In fact, Black Consciousness was not only tolerated by the government, but, initially, it was welcomed (Gerhart, 1979, p.268f). The government had found a number of black leaders willing to cooperate with the homeland policy and this probably helped the government think Biko also was calling for racial segregation. An Afrikaans-language newspaper that backed the government commented on the Black Consciousness Movement: "'In South Africa we can be thankful that certain opportunities have been created in advance for the realization of the new ideas. It has been done among other things by the development of Bantu Homelands. ... [The new spirit thus] fits in well with the objectives of our relations policy'" (Ibid., p.269). Even English-language newspapers that traditionally opposed the government saw Black Consciousness as "'doing the Government's work'" (Ibid., p.268).

The similarity of Biko's exclusivism and his

understanding of integration to the Africanist ideology of the YL and the PAC should be evident. Both Lembede, the original formulator of YL ideology, and Sobukwe, the intellectual behind the PAC, had been interested in the psychological oppression of the people, and paid little attention to specific tactics. For them, as for Biko, "mental revolution was the key to liberation, and once it was achieved, PAC leaders felt assured, specific action to effect emancipation would be dictated by the circumstances" (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.326f).

The Africanist ideology had adherents from its earliest formulations in the Ethiopian Church of South Africa (Karis & Carter, 1972, p.8; see Chapter 3, Section 1) through the YL and the PAC, but Biko's expression of Black Consciousness had the greatest potential to transform the society, because the premise that blacks had an inferiority complex could be tied - unequivocally - to the social system, and thereby justified the conclusion that blacks should unite as an exclusivist group. While it is true that the Africanists in the YL never won leadership positions in the ANC (itself a significant point), and the PAC was forced to break with the traditional movement of the people and was banned before it could effect a programme, the government's changes to the education system and its pursuit of the homelands policy made it, for the first time, an all-encompassing Orwellian

machine. "To a large extent the evil-doers have succeeded in producing at the output end of their machine a kind of black man who is man only in form. This is the extent to which the process of dehumanisation has advanced" (Biko, 1979, p.28). In effect, Black Consciousness made so much sense in the late 1960s because the promise that personal effort could give a black person professional status equal to that of a white person, and so would effect gradual integration, could no longer be defended in the model apartheid state.

There were, in addition, external influences that facilitated the acceptance of black consciousness. Decolonisation had swept through Africa during the 1960s, and the Civil Rights Movement had asserted black rights in American society (Gerhart, 1979, p.272f; Lodge, 1983, p.325). These developments were reported in the South African press, and urban blacks especially, became open to calls for African self-assertion (Gerhart, 1978, p.273). African and American leaders asserted the need for self-reliance, and the Black Consciousness Movement rallied behind the slogan "Black Man You Are On Your Own" (Ibid., p.274; cf., Biko, 1979, p.32). Thus, Black Consciousness, in contrast to its Africanist predecessors, became an ideology for the time, developed and justified principally from the extreme racial polarization of apartheid society, while also supporting its ideology through the importation

of ideas from black leaders in America (e.g., Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967) and independent Africa (e.g., Senghor, 1964).

Through its early formulations Black Consciousness became an increasingly confident subjective response to the objective social conditions of the society in the late 1960s. Biko especially, understood the restrictiveness of the society and the racial polarization that made multiracial organization impractical. As one of the few blacks who had personal experience of the futility of multiracial groupings (Gerhart, 1979, p.269), Biko was in a unique position to develop the Black Consciousness response to the material conditions of the society. And in this regard, the initial attack on liberalism, which came directly from Biko's experiences in NUSAS, was an important step in developing the movement.

It is important to distinguish between the emergence of a Black Consciousness ideology and Biko's attack on white liberals, as the former emerged as an inevitable response to the polarization of apartheid society, while the latter was a fortuitous occurrence that depended on Biko and his unique social position vis-a-vis NUSAS. In the early 1960s, black students had tried to form their own student bodies, but each attempt failed (Gerhart, 1979, p.257). Nevertheless, the structure of the society, and the university campuses in

particular, meant that black students would continue to organize, more or less well. Exclusivism was an accepted approach amongst PAC-inclined students, and apartheid was making this approach increasingly justifiable. Black students at the University of the North, for example, were pro-PAC and anti-NUSAS and when SASO was proposed "needed no persuasion to accept the idea of an exclusively black organization" (Gerhart, 1979, p.261). It is reasonable to argue, therefore, that had Biko not led the movement to form SASO, some other exclusivist black student body likely would have emerged.

What can be explained only by reference to Biko's unique social position, however, is his initial subjective response to his experiences with the liberals in NUSAS, and the effect of this beginning on the survival of SASO and the progression of Black Consciousness. If an exclusivist black student organization had emerged at a black university, it might have developed a black consciousness philosophy and attacked government policies, but it would have been unlikely to attack liberals directly, because it lacked experience of such groups. Biko's personal experience of NUSAS and his attack on it served the Black Consciousness Movement in two ways. First, as Biko intended, his attack on NUSAS clarified what he perceived as the fundamentally racial division of the society by eliminating those whose

subjective response to the objective society confused the racial nature of the oppression. The attack on liberals also had an objective consequence that likely was unintended. By avoiding a direct attack on the government, and instead attacking a group that the government opposed, the black consciousness movement won time to propagate its ideology to a wide community.

## 5. Objectification I: Disseminating the Message in Apartheid Society

Biko's attack on white liberals served the movement well, but, because most black students had no experience of multiracial organizations like NUSAS, they did not respond to SASO's anti-liberal campaign (Ibid., p.269). But their experience of Bantu Education, and more generally, the racially oppressive society, however, did make them responsive to the positive call for black solidarity and self-assertion.

The leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement continually faced the dilemma that had hindered the Africanists during the 1950s, namely to "arouse the most demoralized and politically apathetic members of African society" when the ideologues and activists were drawn mainly from "the ranks of the relatively politicized and impatient urban working-class youth" (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.328).

Like their predecessors in the PAC, the Black Consciousness leaders were intellectuals and their programme was more ideological than activist. Decisions taken at the 1972 SASO conference illustrate this emphasis:

> "The Conference ... adopted unanimously a report calling for the composition of Black nursery rhymes and children's stories and the development of Black child art. Materials at present presented to Black children inculcated 'self-hate and psychological oppression'. Also attacked was the pro-Western and anti-Black bias of history taught in Black schools. The Conference discussed at length ways of bridging the gulf between the intellectual elite and the people of ordinary Black communities" (1972 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1973, p.386).

Acutely aware of its intellectual base, SASO sought to extend its influence to the wider community by opening branches off campuses and beginning community programmes. Indirectly the media contributed to the dissemination of the Black Consciousness message. As noted above, the media responded to Black Consciousness, first, by treating it as a black version of separate development. Later they saw it as a dangerous movement that preached racism and anti-white hatred. For all its misrepresentation, the media concern with Black Consciousness made it clear to the public that the students behind SASO were a courageous group of new leaders who were willing to speak out against government policies (Gerhart, 1979, p.295).

By early 1972, SASO had formed branches in a number of cities throughout the country, which attracted non-

university students, including the younger generation of school children (Ibid., p.296). Activity amongst school children was intensified after a student from the University of the North was expelled for criticizing black education and the apartheid society in a graduation speech, and a boycott of classes led to the closing of the university. By the end of 1972, many school students had formed their own groups and the conscientization that these groups effected directly fed the school revolt that developed in 1976 (Ibid., p.296f).

Coinciding with, but apparently unrelated to, events at the University of the North, Biko's course at the medical school of the University of Natal was "terminated" (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.1). The university's decision seemed to be purely academic: after six and a half years at university, he was repeating his third year (Biko, in Arnold, 1978, p.4). His political activity had become all-consuming and, accordingly, his academic performance deteriorated (Woods, 1978, p.74). Biko claims he was expelled, and found the administration's reason of "inadequate academic performance" to be "challengeable" (in Arnold, 1978, p.4). Even so, he had already made up his mind to leave (Ibid.).

Biko joined many others who had been expelled or voluntarily had withdrawn from university and who began working in off-campus groups to realize the black

consciousness dream (Gerhart, 1979, p.297). Biko worked for Black Community Programmes (BCP) around Durban (Biko, in Arnold, 1978, p.4; Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.1), and continued with the kinds of community projects that SASO students had been developing. For example, it was reported that in 1971 "Members of the Natal Medical School ... started a free preventive medicine clinic" (1971 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1972, p.293). In 1972, Biko was involved in a literacy programme (1979, p.112), and likely contributed to other programmes that were developed that year:

> "In February [1972], students from SASO branches at the African universities of Turfloop [University of the North], Fort Hare, Ngoye and at Natal University (Black Section), completed a two month literacy campaign ... Forty-eight adults were taught the rudiments of reading and writing. Medical students in the group assisted at a maternity clinic .. Students at the University of Natal (Black Section) have also been ... advising communities on low-income budgeting, teaching literacy in conjunction with church schools, and raising money to install a water pump. The students also operate a clinic near Wentworth for the Coloured community in the area" (1972 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1973, p.386).

In all these community activities, Biko was subjectivising for others the Black Consciousness analysis, while challenging the existing social conditions through the objectivity of his actions. As a leading Black Consciousness ideologue and a community activist, Biko demanded that he be recognised and respected as a human being in the society.

This objectification encouraged others to subjectivise the Black Consciousness analysis of society, for they could witness its liberating power for the individual and its ability to challenge the existing social conditions. As more people adopted this subjective orientation, and overcame their alienation, the impact of Black Consciousness, through the objectivity of these individuals' actions, would modify the social structure.

In 1971 the Black Consciousness Movement opened discussions with diverse community groups, intending to form a community-oriented wing of the movement (Ibid.). Through a number of conferences delegates supported the moves towards raising black consciousness. but a minority, including some older delegates who had been active in the ANC YL, criticized the militant and overtly political direction being taken by the SASO delegation. They anticipated an early clash with the government if the organization pursued a "'gloves off'" approach. Nevertheless, the militants prevailed and in July 1972 formed the Black People's Convention (BPC) (Gerhart, 1979, p.292f). Biko became honorary president of BPC (Arnold, 1978, p.xiii).

Coinciding with the formation of BPC, SASO was forced to make a clear statement of its militant direction. At the SASO conference, also held in July, the outgoing president, speaking without having consulted the executive, defended

working from within the system. A majority of the executive, including Biko, strongly rejected this suggestion and made explicit its rejection of government-created bodies (Ibid., p.289f).

From the outset, SASO had defined blacks to include all who were politically oppressed, and the psychological emancipation they sought required a rejection of the white system, of the status quo. As noted above, Biko rejected integration of blacks into a reformed white system, and in January 1971, had made his opposition to the homelands policy known (Biko, 1972, p.190). Implicitly at least, Black Consciousness had rejected collaboration with the institutions of apartheid, and this had to include the homeland leaders who believed they could use apartheid-created political platforms to effect change. With their rejection of apartheid and its 'dummy institutions' now explicit, the Black Consciousness Movement came into direct conflict with the government and black homeland leaders. Consciousness-raising became a race against inevitable state repression.

Black Consciousness was a new force in South African politics and succeeded in redefining the field. For example, Gatsha Buthelezi, who was known as an outspoken leader from the KwaZulu homeland, came to appear as a moderate. Many Zulu supporters changed their allegiance away from

Buthelezi, and all leaders who were inclined towards accommodation with government policy lost support (Ibid., p.295f). These politicians who had enjoyed a decade of legitimacy now found their actions condemned; they were labelled 'stooges' and 'sellouts' (Ibid.).

In terms of the duality model, the objective conditions had changed radically since Matthews had supported working within the government-created Natives' Representation Council (NRC). The subjective understanding of these conditions given by homeland leaders maintained that while government-created structures were inadequate, they were progressive and more promising than non-institutionalized forms of opposition which the government could, and would, eliminate. This analysis failed to recognise that apartheid had intensified the process of segregation, to the point that all government actions - including those forums it created for black participation and communication - were intrinsically segregationist. It was not possible, as it may have been in the 1940s, for black leaders to accept positions on government-created bodies without accepting also the apartheid structure of the society. Thus, although the Nationalist government had made clear its intention to communicate with blacks only within the structure of the homeland policy, such communication was necessarily collaborationist, for it was premised on an acceptance of

the government's policy of apartheid. In this sense, the subjective understanding of the society being used by homeland leaders to justify their action was inconsistent with the objective conditions.

SASO's condemnation of homeland leaders, therefore, was not unfounded; the rules for the game were being made by the white government, with the ultimate aim of limiting blacks to the small percentage of land that comprised the homelands. SASO was continuing in the tradition of non-collaboration that had characterized the YL's response to the NRC. It argued "that the government's policies, whatever their superficial appearance, were masterfully designed eventually to lead blacks into a cul-de-sac at every turn ... inevitably, [blacks] would be made to accept the government-prescribed rules of the game" (Ibid., p.290; cf., Biko, 1972, p.190). For SASO the problem was to respond with a form of opposition, without employing government-approved structures, that could be active, legal and enduring. To accurately reflect the objective conditions in their subjectivity and to act on this without encouraging vigorous repression from an unaccommodating social structure, became the Black Consciousness Movement's primary concern. Whatever the demerits of working within the system, working outside of these government-created structures was bound to bring on government repression, sooner or later, for such opposition

explicitly rejected all structures which the government developed within its apartheid programme.

Initially, Black Consciousness had been presented as a cultural awakening process, thereby avoiding a dangerous political connotation (Gerhart, 1979, p.291). SASO members debated the merits of using apartheid structures to bring about change, and for a time SASO was able to avoid making its position explicit by focussing its energies on its role as a student organization. But as the Black Consciousness movement drew increasing support across black campuses - estimates of SASO membership in 1972 ranged between 4,000 and 8,000 (1972 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1973, p.387) - and became involved with the wider community through BPC, it became explicitly political (Arnold, 1978, p.xx).

In its public statements, the Black Consciousness Movement maintained that it was not a political movement seeking revolutionary change, but rather a social movement concerned with psychological emancipation. A BPC leader's comment to the press in 1973 makes this clear: "'We are aware that they [the government] can shove us in gaol at any time ... That is why we are not a movement of confrontation, but a movement of introspection - our aim is to awaken Black Consciousness'" (Koka, in Hirson, 1979, p.107).

Declaring itself a direct oppositional movement to the

government would have courted disaster, but leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement like Biko were fully aware of the objectivity of a process of conscientization. By changing individuals' subjectivity, Black Consciousness would make them aware of their psychological worth. As a result, the positioned-action arising from this changed subjectivity would modify the positions being filled. In this way, individuals, with a changed subjectivity, would change the objective society through their individual activity in social roles. Blacks, conscious of their worth, would question the status quo, their employers, the police and others whose positions maintained the society's (unequal) structure. The Black Consciousness leaders, sensitive to the constraints of the society, did not seek to change society directly, but they were fully aware that by raising consciousness they were starting a revolutionary process (cf., Gerhart, in Arnold, 1978, p.xxiv).

In his 1976 court testimony, Biko made clear his appreciation of the role of Black Consciousness (and, by extension, his own role) in encouraging black South Africans to change their subjective response to their objective conditions. Biko realized he was part of a movement that sought to replace a defeatist subjective orientation to the society with a revived hope in social change:

> "We try to get blacks in conscientisation to grapple realistically with their problems, to attempt to find solutions to their problems, to develop what one might call an awareness, a physical awareness of their situation, to be able to analyse it, and to provide answers for themselves. The purpose behind it really being to provide some kind of hope; I think the central theme about black society is that it has got elements of a defeated society, people often look like they have given up the struggle. ... Now this sense of defeat is basically what we are fighting against; people must not just give in to the hardships of life, people must develop a hope, people must develop some form of security to be together to look at their problems, and people must in this way build up their humanity. This is the point about conscientisation and Black Consciousness" (1979, p.114).

## 6. Objectification II: State Reaction to a Psychological Threat

The influence of the Black Consciousness Movement grew significantly in 1972 with the founding of the Black People's Convention (BPC) and the growing support shown by high school students following the expulsions and boycotts at the University of the North. A network appeared to be developing that could extend the philosophy throughout the black community.

When, in the first months of 1973, a series of strikes disrupted the Durban industrial areas, it may have appeared that the Black Consciousness Movement was responsible. But the movement had virtually no contact with labour and had little influence on the strikes (Hirson, 1979, pp.127-30). Ironically, if there was a political influence, it likely

came from a small group of NUSAS members, who had "publicised black workers' rights under existing legislation, offered some training in organisation work, [and] helped groups of workers prepare evidence for meetings of the [government] Wage Boards" (Ibid., p.126). The strikes seem to have been started by a spontaneous strike near Durban, after which the mood spread to other factories where wages and labour relations were especially poor (Maré, cited in Hirson, 1979, p.134). The Black Consciousness leaders were forced to recognise that their message had not reached black workers, but that a simultaneous process of politicisation was occurring amongst workers which needed to be encouraged and coordinated with the Black Consciousness Movement (Gerhart, 1979, p.297). In the same way that the Black Consciousness Movement was forced by the social conditions to work at a psychological level, workers were engaged in a process of psychological emancipation, and its objectification was evident in the threat to the social structure effected in the strike action.

In March (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.1) the government acted against the leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement, suggesting, at least implicitly, that it perceived Black Consciousness as a threat that might contribute to a national black alliance of workers, students and urban blacks who opposed the homelands policy. Eight SASO and BPC

leaders were restricted under provisions of the Suppression of Communism Act (Arnold, 1978, p.4; Gerhart, 1979, p.297; Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.1), and "when new individuals came forward to take leadership positions, they too were banned" (Gerhart, 1979, p.298). Gerhart (Ibid.) contends that the government action came too late, for there existed already a "momentum", built on an inherent "appeal", and government action only contributed to the process by creating "martyrs for the black cause".

Biko was among the banned leaders, and was restricted to his home town of King William's Town (Biko, in Arnold, 1978, p.4; Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.1). Here he continued the community programme work he had been doing around Durban. He began an eastern Cape branch of Black Community Programmes (BCP) (Biko, in Arnold, 1978, p.4), and worked as its Executive Director until December 1975 when his banning order was modified to prevent this activity (Ibid.; Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.1). The projects organized by the BCP in the area included literacy classes, dressmaking and health education (Woods, 1978, p.85). A clinic outside King William's Town "served thousands of rural blacks who couldn't get to the city hospital. Run by a small staff..., it had an operating theater, a maternity ward and facilities for instruction classes in basic nutrition" (Ibid., p.86).

In 1973, Biko began to study for a law degree by

correspondence through the University of South Africa (Biko, in Arnold, 1978, p.5), and at the time of his death in 1977 was progressing well (Woods, 1979, p.104). Biko had not given up on education, but, like Mandela, had rejected it as a means to liberalise the society. Neither Matthews nor Mandela nor Biko denied the value of education; however, as the social conditions became increasingly oppressive, the need to focus attention on their immediate transformation meant that education and a resulting profession became secondary to political action.

For Matthews, at least through the late 1940s, social conditions promised a gradual liberalisation of the society allowing him to spend most of his life in the University. Although Mandela earned an LL.B., he responded to increasing racial polarisation by making his legal practice secondary to his political action. For Biko, the polarisation in the society demanded an immediate and complete commitment to political action, and this prevented him from completing his degree.

During his banning, Biko also made contact with a white newspaper editor, Donald Woods, and through his newspaper, increased the coverage of the Black Consciousness Movement, and persuaded Woods to run a column defending the Black Consciousness viewpoint to complement columns from other political groups (Woods, 1979, pp.84, 134, 137). Biko's

contact with Woods developed into a genuine friendship, and shows that his anti-liberal stance was more tactical than racist. Woods recalls Biko explaining that "The liberal is no enemy, he's a friend - but for the moment he holds us back, offering a formula too gentle, too inadequate for our struggle" (Ibid., p.83).

During his restriction to King William's Town, Biko took great care to comply with the banning order, or, at least, not to be caught breaking it by being found outside the King William's Town district or by being with more than one person at a time. Nevertheless, Biko was harassed by the police in various ways, and, in his responses expressed the psychological emancipation that made even his persecutors recognize that he was "no ordinary man" (Ibid., p.104). One incident in particular, reveals how his objectification of the Black Consciousness orientation forced the structural constraints around his social position to bend. When some Security officers came to raid his home, he demanded authorization before they could enter and forced them to remain outside and hold up a long document while he read it through a window (Ibid., p.113). The police needed no such justification for the invasion, and their compliance with such a demand was not typical.

From the government's perspective, harassing Biko (and other Black Consciousness leaders) served two purposes.

Through court cases the government put a severe financial strain on the resources of the movement, while the government intimidated the individuals involved directly and through their friends. Legal action aimed directly at Biko included being charged for minor traffic offenses, charged for breaking the restrictions of his banning order and charged for encouraging a group of young witnesses to recant earlier sworn statements (which the witnesses had not been allowed to read and were signed under police duress). On all these occasions, Biko was found not guilty (Ibid., p.115f). Intimidation included the tapping of telephones, and abusive or silent calls (Ibid., p.118), being followed by police, and having homes and offices raided. Some of Biko's close friends were detained without trial, some were tortured by police and others died while being detained (Ibid., pp.134-8). In terms of the duality model, action against the Black Consciousness Movement, whether initiated by the government directly or not, reflects the impact that people like Biko were having on the objective society, and, at the same time, the unwillingness of the system, and those whose positions were threatened, to accommodate the demands of the Black Consciousness Movement.

The efforts by the government to destroy the Black Consciousness movement by silencing and intimidating leaders like Biko were having little effect, however, as the

groundswell of Black Consciousness was growing (Gerhart, 1979, p.298). Then, in 1974, the government, under the guise of individual prosecutions, tried to destroy the organizations themselves. In neighbouring Mozambique the Portuguese colonial government had collapsed, and a transitional government under Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) came to power in September (Gerhart, 1979, p.298; Arnold, 1978, p.xx).

Even as the South African government recognised the Frelimo government and allowed a rally organized by Portuguese to proceed in Johannesburg, it banned a rally being organized by SASO and BPC to be held in Durban (Arnold, 1978, p.xxi; Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.99). Nevertheless, about 5,000 people clashed with police. Many were arrested and even more were injured in the resulting mêlée (Arnold, 1978, p.xxi).

Following this incident, the homes of Black Consciousness leaders were raided and many were detained across the country (Arnold, 1978, p.xii). Early in 1975 thirteen were charged under the 1967 Terrorism Act (Ibid., pp.xxviff). Under this Act, an individual could be found guilty if he/she had "'intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic or elsewhere'. ...The intent ... is presumed if [any] act committed by the person is one that would have any of twelve possible results"

(Ibid., p.xxvii). And once the State had made the accusation, it was for the defense to prove innocence (Ibid., p.xxix).

The lengthy indictment against the Black Consciousness leaders included accusations that these leaders sought to foster black aggression; opposed homeland leaders; sought to isolate South Africa, politically, economically and in the international sporting arena; cooperated with hostile groups outside the country; and organized illegal meetings (Ibid., p.xxvi). Effectively, it was being claimed that Black Consciousness, through its leaders, was endangering public order by propogating a philosophy that sought to mobilize blacks against whites (Woods, 1978, p.173). Black Consciousness, objectifying itself through individual action, was challenging the structural conditions, and the white government was acting to maintain the current social structure. "The all-embracing terms in which the indictment was framed made it clear that what was on trial was the Black Consciousness Movement itself" (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.99; cf., Arnold, 1978, p.xxii), thus repeating the pattern of government intimidation and opposition assertion that had characterized the Treason Trial and Rivonia Trial. Like their predecessors, the accused used the trial for political ends. They detailed the Black Consciousness message, sang freedom songs in the court, and displayed clenched fist

salutes (Gerhart, 1979, p.298).

After a number of delays won by the defense (Arnold, 1978, p.xxix), the trial proper began in mid-1975 and continued into December 1976 (Gerhart, 1979, p.298f), thus spanning the Soweto student uprising of June 1976. Biko was not among those arrested, but he offered to give evidence on the Black Consciousness movement (Biko, in Arnold, 1978, p.141) and was called by the defence (Woods, 1978, p.174) in the first week of May 1976 (Arnold, 1978; Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.99, 120).

Biko's willingness to give evidence is a clear example of the duality of his action. His testimony can be seen both as a subjective desire to contribute to his colleagues' defence, as well as an objective action that circumvented his banning order and allowed his message to reach his followers, while challenging the restrictiveness of the state.

Biko's evidence (Arnold, 1978; also excerpted in Biko, 1979, pp.100-37; and, at times inaccurately, in Woods, 1978, pp.174-240) became a public statement of the Black Consciousness philosophy, and was widely reported in the press (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.120; Gerhart, 1979, p.298). Stubbs claims that Biko's testimony was heralded in black townships, notably Soweto, as the "authentic voice of the people" (in Biko, 1979, p.120), and that it was a

contributing factor that inspired the children in their demonstration of June 16. After giving his evidence, Biko returned to King William's Town.

From the government's perspective the trial succeeded in sentencing nine of the accused to periods of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years (Gerhart, 1979, p.299, n.44; Arnold, 1978, p.xxxv). Earlier, the State had withdrawn its charges against the other four (Arnold, 1978, p.xxix). For the Black Consciousness Movement, the imprisoned leaders became martyrs to the cause, and its programme of conscientization reached a new high. Black Consciousness was the continuation of the heady protests that had characterized the 1950s and early 60s.

Meanwhile, opposition to government changes in the black education system was reaching a crisis. A number of changes had been instituted and there had been varying degrees of protest through the first half of the decade (Hirson, 1979, p.174f), but the decision to force black students to learn arithmetic and social studies in Afrikaans became the immediate cause of the 1976 Soweto uprising (Lodge, 1983, p.328). Already receiving inferior education, blacks saw the move to Afrikaans as a further hindrance to their performance: many black teachers were not competent in Afrikaans, even for conversational purposes, and to expect them to teach technical subjects like arithmetic in

Afrikaans was unreasonable (Hirson, 1979, p.175f). Furthermore, black teachers favoured English as the medium of education (after using the regional African vernacular in the first five years of school), and had publicly stated their preference in the preceding years (e.g., Mawasha, in van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze & Magnusson, 1978, pp.234-42; Transvaal United African Teachers' Association, Ibid., p.243f).

Teachers, parents and pupils favoured English because it was the language of the South African economy, the common language of urban blacks and an international language that was necessary as South Africa became increasingly involved in the global economy (Hirson, 1979, p.177). Early in 1976, one of the government-created school boards spoke out against the new policy (Ibid.). Later, led by the SASO-inclined South African Students' Movement (SASM) (Gerhart, 1979, p.297), school pupils began challenging their principals, destroyed textbooks and began a boycott of classes (Hirson, 1979, p.177). By May, schools throughout Soweto were involved (Ibid., p.178), coinciding with a rapid process of politicisation among a group that, for the most part, had been politically naïve just months before (Ibid.).

The tension increased rapidly, and by June, SASM formed a Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) (Lodge, 1983, p.328) and decided to organize a mass peaceful

demonstration for June 16, to be led by representatives from all Soweto schools. Anticipating the possibility of police violence, the students were willing to respond (Hirson, 1979, p.180).

Early on the morning of June 16, fifteen thousand students (Ibid., p.181; Lodge, 1983, p.328; Johnson, 1977, p.192) congregated, bearing slogans denouncing Afrikaans (Hirson, 1979, p.181). As this demonstration moved towards a large stadium, the police arrived. Although it is not clear which side began the conflict (Ibid., p.181f), in the initial confrontation at least two school children were shot and killed (Lodge, 1983, p.328). Estimates for the day range from 25 to 100, but the police effectively prevented an accurate assessment (Hirson, 1979, p.184; Johnson, 1977, p.192). The deaths sparked a retaliatory riot throughout Soweto aimed at any symbols of white oppression (Hirson, 1979, p.184; Lodge, 1983, p.328; Johnson, 1977, p.192).

The rioting continued as a spontaneous "unorganized group action" (Brewer, 1986, p.65); groups that had existed prior to the demonstration, particularly the SSRC, and those that were formed subsequently, were unable to control or curb the violence (Ibid., p.79f). Within days the revolt had spread among students in many areas surrounding Johannesburg and Pretoria, and students at the Universities of the North, Zululand and Natal were showing their support (Lodge, 1983,

p.328; Brewer, 1983, p.79). Black schools were closed from June 18 until July 22, and during this break the government made a number of concessions to the students. Particularly, the decision that Afrikaans would be a medium of instruction was rescinded, and a number of officials who had been dismissed for their opposition to government policy were reinstated (Hirson, 1979, p.208; Lodge, 1983, p.328; Johnson, 1977, p.192). By this time, however, the students, who had seen the effect of their solidarity, and had lost friends to the cause, were demanding the dismantling of the whole Bantu Education structure (Hirson, 1979, p.208; Johnson, 1977, p.192).

Coinciding with the resumption of classes, following a month of relative calm (Johnson, 1977, p.193), schools became the target of fire burnings. In ten days, over 50 schools were damaged throughout the Transvaal (Lodge, 1983, p.329) and the rioting extended to the Orange Free State and Natal (Johnson, 1977, p.193). Unrest continued through the end of 1976 with 499 deaths recorded, but it is possible that well over 1,000 died (Ibid., p.197).

The role of Black Consciousness in precipitating the events in Soweto and beyond is difficult to determine, and has fostered much debate. Certainly, it is a mistake to deny it a significant role (Hirson, 1979; cf., Lodge, 1983, pp.331-5; Brewer, 1986, p.80). Black Consciousness was a

zeitgeist pervading much of South Africa, and these urban students - perhaps unaware of political leaders from the 1960s - were likely to have heard, even via the government-controlled media, of 'Black Power' and the SASO/BPC trial which was dominating the news (Hirson, 1979, p.178, 286). Biko may have been far from the uprising, but it reflected, in part, a Black Consciousness response to the dehumanisation inherent to Bantu Education.

In many ways the Soweto shooting was reminscent of the Sharpeville shootings. As had occurred in 1960, the economy was devastated (Ibid., p.201-8). What was surprising in 1976, however, were the calls from the white business establishment, both English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking, that the government stop responding to protest with repression and instead institute reforms (Ibid., p.206). Within the Nationalist Party, a split between conservatives and progressives became apparent, and the Afrikaans press openly criticized the government's inflexibility. That small group of Afrikaner leaders that had spoken to Mandela and other black leaders in 1958-9 (Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.305; see Chapter 4, section 5) had grown, and was becoming a significant minority. Their awareness of the detrimental effects of the racial polarisation of the society made them consider the possibility of some form of accommodation. "The White Establishment was, in fact, more deeply and publicly

split than ever before" (Johnson, 1977, p.207).

The government had responded swiftly to the crisis, mobilizing a military-like operation and occupying Soweto (Johnson, 1977, p.192; Benjamin, in W. Mandela, 1985, p.112). They arrested thousands, and by June 1977, of 21,534 prosecutions there had been 13,553 convictions, of whom almost 5,000 were children under eighteen (Benjamin, in W. Mandela, 1985, p.113). In mid-August, Biko was detained and held, without charge for 101 days, in solitary confinement, with no access to a lawyer, to family members, to books (other than the Bible), or newspapers (Stubbs, in Biko, 1979, p.138; Woods, 1978, pp.115, 119). Biko's own understanding of the reason for his detention was the Security Police's desire to "find out how many students had fled to Botswana and Swaziland after the Soweto riots, and what they were doing there" (Haigh, in Woods, 1978, p.143). Towards the end of November he was released without charges being laid.

## 7. Objectification III: Death as a Politicising Process

Biko had become an important spokesperson for the Black Consciousness Movement, and, in the same way that international dignitaries had travelled to rural Natal to visit the ANC's Albert Luthuli, the restricted Nobel laureate, during his restriction in the 1960s, so

"Diplomats, academics, politicians and journalists from all over the world" (Woods, 1978, p.141f) sought Biko in King William's Town. For example, immediately after his detention in 1976, he submitted a memorandum to the Chair of the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee for Africa that discussed "American Policy Towards Azania (South Africa)" (Biko, 1979, pp.139-42); in January 1977 he met with a representative from the Australian Embassy (Haigh, in Woods, 1978, pp.142-44); in July 1977 he had a long discussion with a representative of the Canadian Institute for Christian Studies (Zylstra, in Woods, 1978, pp.145-57); and early in 1977 he was interviewed by a European journalist (Biko, 1979, pp.143-51).

On August 18, 1977 Biko was travelling to Cape Town with a colleague, outside the King William's Town district, when he was stopped by police. The police had "received information that inflammatory pamphlets were being distributed - pamphlets inciting blacks to cause riots" (Woods, 1978, p.276) and they took Biko and his colleague into custody. While his friends prepared to arrange bail, assuming Biko would be charged for contravening his banning order, they learned he was detained and being interrogated (Woods, 1978, p.242). Twenty-five days later it was announced that he was dead. According to the Minister of Police, he had starved following a hunger strike (Pollak, in

Arnold, 1978, p.284; Woods, 1978, p.252).

The events that occurred during Biko's detention are documented in the record of the public inquest that was held into his death (see Pollak, in Arnold, 1978, pp.279-298; Woods, 1978, pp.274-396). There would have been no investigation or hearing into Biko's treatment while in detention had he not died. As it was, the public prosecutor decided that he did not have sufficient evidence to lay criminal charges, and instead opted for a simple inquest into "'the cause or likely cause of death' and 'whether the death was brought about by any act or omission involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person'" (Pollak, in Arnold, 1978, p.285f). Presumably, criminal charges could have followed the inquest, had new evidence emerged which suggested criminal activities. The presiding magistrate was careful to maintain the narrow focus of the inquest, and prevented some potentially significant people from testifying (Woods, 1979, p.399). Despite these limitations, the inquest was remarkable, for, although it did not end with indictments against those who likely inflicted the fatal injuries, it did, for the first time, make public the examination and cross-examination of Security Police members, who, to this point, had never had to account for their actions (Woods, 1978, p.272). The inquest lasted from November 14 to December 2, 1977 (Pollak, in Arnold, 1978,

p.286), and coincided with an election on November 30, in which the Nationalists won their largest majority ever (Gerhart, 1979, p.313; Pollak, in Arnold, 1978, p.293).

At the inquest, police officers reported that Biko's leg irons and handcuffs had been removed during an interrogation session on September 7, and immediately Biko had initiated a 'scuffle', during which time he must have knocked his head against a steel cabinet. Such a thesis is not inconsistent with Biko's previous actions towards his interrogators, although in all these instances, Biko retaliated against what he perceived as inhuman treatment from his captors (see Woods, 1978, p.114; Biko, 1979, p.152). Fifteen minutes after he was subdued and returned to the restraints, he was talking in a slurred and incoherent manner. But the police believed this was all part of a conscious attempt by Biko to avoid further interrogation. Later in the morning a physician reported nothing wrong with Biko. In the following days, the physicians did find incontrovertible evidence of brain damage, but did nothing. Biko was left naked, in a cold cell, while his condition deteriorated. Finally, on September 11 the doctors recommended hospitalization, and he was driven - without an accompanying doctor or his medical records - in the back of a Land Rover to Pretoria, some 1,100 kilometres, where he died the following day (Woods, 1978; Pollak, in Arnold, 1978,

p.181f).

According to the findings of the inquest, Biko sustained a brain injury following a "scuffle with members of the Security Branch" on September 7, and died on September 12, 1977 aged 30. The magistrate declared that "The evidence does not prove that the death was brought about by any act or omission involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person" (in Arnold, 1978, p.293; in Woods, 1979, 396).

For all the contradictions and confusions in the testimony given by the security police officials during the inquest (Woods, 1978, pp.274-395; Pollak, in Arnold, 1978, pp.294-6), it is hard to understand how the magistrate presiding could find nobody responsible for the death. However, recognizing that Biko's death and the inquest were part of the racist system that continually disadvantaged blacks as it served the interests of whites (cf., Runyan, 1984, pp.53-7; Woods, 1978, p.273, 399) does contribute to explaining how Biko's death occurred and how the magistrate at the inquest could find no individual (or group of individuals) responsible. The same system that, among other things, designed an education system that would prepare blacks for subservience and that forcibly removed blacks to impoverished homelands, made it possible to extend the dehumanization of its black citizens from the psychological

level to the physical level.

In death, the State may have silenced an enemy, but they misunderstood the significance of the act. Even their victim was aware of the political significance - the objectivity - of his own death:

> "You are either alive and proud or you are dead, and when you are dead you can't care anyway. And your method of death can itself be a politicizing thing. ... If they beat me up [during interrogation], it's to my advantage. I can use it. They just killed somebody in jail - a friend of mine - about ten days before I was arrested. Now it would have been bloody useful evidence for them to assault me. At least it would indicate what kind of possibilities were there, leading to this guy's death. So, I wanted them to go ahead and do what they could do, so that I could use it" (Biko, 1979, p.152f).

In the same way that the government had underestimated the significance of the Treason Trial and the SASO/BPC Trial, they underestimated the significance of the death of Biko. Many other individuals had died in police detention, and during the crisis of 1976-7, the number of such 'accidental' deaths had risen dramatically, from 1.6 deaths per year in the period 1963-75 (with no deaths in the years 1970, and 1972-75) to 12.0 deaths per year in the years 1976 and 1977 (Woods, 1978, pp.7-9). But the government seemed quite unprepared for the political repercussions of Biko's death.

"News of Biko's death stunned the world" (Arnold, 1978, p.xxiii). Biko's funeral, like all political funerals that followed the 1976 uprising, took on political significance;

a private family affair now became an opportunity to legally demonstrate against the government. "Harsh and fiery words were said about the Nationalist government and individual ministers in it ... and about apartheid, and about security laws and about 300 years of bigotry" (Woods, 1978, p.257). The funeral lasted for five hours and drew a crowd of between 15,000 and 20,000 blacks (excluding thousands more who were kept away by police) and hundreds of whites, including some members of the Parliamentary Opposition and representatives from thirteen foreign embassies (Ibid., p.257f; Arnold, 1978, p.xxiii).

In addition, the inquest was a major concession on the government's part, and, even without a direct indictment of the Security Forces, embarrassed a government that had spent the previous decade creating an appearance of normality, and was struggling to restore stability and international confidence following the Soweto uprising. The information made public during the inquest embarrassed the government in another way too. In 1979, the government, insisting that they were in no way responsible for the death, offered Biko's widow an out-of-court settlement for R65,000 (at the time, worth approximately US $100,000) and legal costs (Runyan, 1984, p.57).

In terms of the duality model, the death of Biko, as an action, had objective significance, threatening the social

structure as it encouraged Black Consciousness supporters to continue challenging government oppression. The government remained committed to an outmoded understanding of the functioning of the opposition forces, believing that a few individuals were responsible for sporadic unrest, rather than acknowledging the polarisation inherent to the society. In the 1960s, when the opposition movement was devastated by the imprisonment of its leaders, it was possible for government supporters to feel vindicated in their subjective response to the objective conditions. But by the mid-1970s, the leaders had created a momentum amongst their followers that the government did not understand and could not contain.

Biko's attempts to liberate the people psychologically have been shown to entail, through the objectification of individuals in positions, a transformation of the objective social conditions, and in this sense, his contribution to the revolution that emerged after 1976 should not be underestimated. The success of the Black Consciousness Movement in awakening political interest was never intended, however, to supersede the banned liberation movements. The explosion of 1976, more than anything, forged the different opposition groupings together. Out of the repression of the 1960s emerged a stronger opposition, better able to speak for all sectors of the population.

## 8. Postscript: An Opposition Gaining Momentum

The government had tried to control the damage following Biko's death. On October 19, in an attempt to halt the continuing protest over Biko's death and the government's response, they banned or detained dozens of people (Woods, 1978, p.264f; Gerhart, 1979, p.312). In addition, all organizations involved in the Black Consciousness Movement were banned, including SASO, BPC, BCP, SASM and SSRC (Gerhart, 1979, p.312). Although these actions intensified international condemnation, and appeared to be aimed primarily at controlling the unrest that had continued since the Soweto uprising of June 1976, Gerhart suggests that these moves were aimed primarily at the white electorate in preparation for the November election (Ibid., p.313). Following the division amongst white supporters of the government in the wake of the Soweto riots, the huge majority won by the Nationalists was remarkable (cf., Johnson, 1977, p.207).

Whatever the reasons for the crackdown, the government miscalculated the extent of black opposition. The quiescence of the 1960s had disguised black frustration (cf., Arnold, 1978, p.xvi), and, although not fully coordinated, the actions of opposition forces, both inside the country and internationally, prevented the completion of the

Nationalists' apartheid dream.

After 1976, the sabotage campaign led by the ANC's military wing (MK) was rejuvenated by large numbers of young people who fled South Africa following the Soweto uprising, and the collapse of colonial governments in Mozambique and Angola facilitated MK's access to South Africa. Internationally, attempts to have sanctions imposed on South Africa were intensified (cf., Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, 1986), while Mandela became a symbol of the black majority. Calls for his release were complemented by numerous awards (Mandela, 1986, pp.241-3).

Inside the country, the Black Consciousness Movement split, reflecting the ANC-PAC split into multiracial and exclusivist camps. Largely because of its stronger organization, the ANC became the major beneficiary of the politicised youth following the Soweto uprising. Internal problems in the PAC had made it ill-prepared to collaborate with the followers of the Black Consciousness Movement.

The activities of workers and students, uncoordinated during the 1970s - and criticized by Hirson (1979; cf., Lodge, 1983, p.330-36) - became increasingly coordinated and formed the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 (Brewer, 1986, p.281f). Along with unions and Black Consciousness groups, the UDF represented ANC sympathies. Presidents of the UDF included former ANC activists and the wife of one of

the men imprisoned after the Rivonia Trial. In addition, a number of the patrons named were ANC leaders, including Mandela (Ibid., p.282). Within months, a second grouping was formalized, the National Forum Committee (NFC), which reflected the exclusivism of the PAC and some Black Consciousness supporters (Ibid., p.283f). Like the PAC, the NFC appeared to reflect a small, but enduring, segment of black opinion.

The divisions between the UDF and the NFC are less important than their similarities (Ibid., p.290). By uniting trade unions and political groups, an opposition emerged which shared a similarity of purpose. As the government and its black allies, who have committed themselves to working within the (homeland) system, became more clearly united, the polarization had been shown to be not purely racial, nor simply economic, but a conflict between those who maintained the oppressive status quo, and those who wished to change the society into a non-racial democracy, where, to paraphrase the Freedom Charter, all those who share the country share the wealth.

## 9. Conclusion

Changes in the objective conditions of the society made Biko's life follow a trajectory different from those of earlier opposition leaders, like Matthews and Mandela. Like

his predecessors, his early upbringing encouraged him to focus on education, and suggested that a professional career would contribute to the alleviation of his people's oppression. Biko shared this subjective understanding of the society, and believed that education would blur the distinctions between the races in South Africa.

Particularly, his experiences in NUSAS forced him to reevaluate his orientation, and in this process he realised that the racial polarisation of the objective society had made it impossible for white and black people - however much they tried to assert their equality - to work together as equals. The society made it necessary to develop a subjective understanding that focussed on the need for blacks to act independently and to assert their worth. Attempts to foster multiracial exchange were inherently unequal, and prevented a clear perception of the racial polarisation of the society.

Biko's Black Consciousness orientation sought a social revolution in the society, and its success was facilitated by its attack on white liberals, rather than a direct confrontation with the government, and by its psychological message. Together, these factors allowed Black Consciousness to gain a momentum that could not be contained by government repression. Even though the government continued to imprison opposition leaders, and expedited Biko's death, the threat

to the social structure was not limited to these leaders. The quiescence in opposition activity during the 1960s that followed the Rivonia Trial did not return after the government's forceful response to the Soweto student uprising, the death of Biko and the banning of Black Consciousness groups.

Biko led a process of reinterpretation, recognising the polarisation that characterised apartheid society, and popularised a form of opposition activity which, in its early stages, the government was forced to tolerate. This process of psychological emancipation necessarily had objective impact on the society, because, as the duality of praxis shows, psychologically liberated individuals express their subjectivity also through their objectification in the social positions.

## Chapter 6. The Socio-Psychological Process of Change

It has been claimed that the duality model developed in Chapter 2 offers a useful framework for understanding individual-social interaction. Accordingly, it was used to develop socio-psychological accounts of the lives of three South African leaders. This chapter attempts to assess the effectiveness of this approach, by evaluating the model and the research that it generates. The first section of this chapter will contrast the duality model with the two approaches which were criticised in Chapter 2 for their reductionism. Drawing on the socio-psychological accounts of Chapters 3 through 5, it will be argued that the duality model makes possible accounts which neither individualism nor societalism can generate, and as such, offers an especially broad and fruitful approach to the individual-society connection.

Section 2 discusses how the ordering of data within the duality framework is part of an ongoing process - a research programme - of improving accounts. Particular ways by which the socio-psychological accounts generated can be challenged are identified, and the scientific progressivity of the research programme is evaluated (Lakatos, 1987).

## 1. Explanatory Advantages in the Duality Model

Two general orientations to the individual-society connection were discussed in Chapter 2: those theories that attempted to explain society as some function of individual action were represented in [$M_1$], where

$$[M_1] \qquad S = f(i_1, i_2 \ldots i_n), \text{ or}$$

$$S = f(I)$$

and those theories that emphasised the primacy of society in explanations of individuals were characterised in a reversed formulation:

$$[M_2] \qquad I = f(S)$$

Both formulations were criticised, and it was argued that the duality model avoids problems inherent to both [$M_1$] and [$M_2$]. It is appropriate, therefore, to review these three approaches in light of the research reported in Chapters 3 through 5. Whether the task is to account for change within an individual's life, or to explain the processes that generate changed lives and changed societies in consecutive historical periods, does the duality model offer the advantages predicted in Chapter 2?

Consider first theories of type [$M_1$]. Underlying all

individualist theories is the assumption that there is no society distinct from that which is derived from the actions of individuals. Social phenomena are the result of similar patterns of action that characterise a number of individual actions and that are simplified by scientists trying to describe such commonality. But, in reality, society has no generative power for it is - always - explainable in terms of (or as the outcome of) the actions of individual agents. If this is true, individual monads act in their own 'worlds', and when we 'see' something that appears as a social phenomenon, it is merely a coincidental similarity of, or a similarity imposed by observers on, a number of individuals acting in the same way.

If society is (explainable as) some function of individuals, then the apparent racial structure of the South African society needs to be reduced to the actions of individual agents. To make the point, consider the following scenario: all South Africans are magically transformed into saints. If the society was simply the outcome of the actions of individuals, or was an orderliness imposed by observers of this mass action, the society would, necessarily, no longer be racist. This is the implication of the individualist thesis. But, obviously, the society would continue to be racist, because race is structurally built into a social system that is distinct from the actions of

individual agents.

In Chapter 3 it was shown that the racial division of the society arose from the objective conditions of existence in South Africa, including (but not necessarily limited to) the discovery of minerals, the skill/education of white workers attracted to the mines, and the numerical threat of a large black majority that could be trained and paid lower wages. As a result of these material conditions in the country, and the social relations (and positions) arising from them, a racial social structure developed. Skilled whites protected their social position with racist actions, but the racially-defined social structure is not to be explained in terms of some accumulation of individual racial beliefs which led to racist action. Rather, individuals performed such actions within material conditions not of their making, and in performing these actions racial beliefs were supported or even developed.

Thus, to change the society, it is not sufficient to change the mentality of the individuals in the society: changes must be made to the modes of interaction in the society (including, but not limited to, the economic, geographic, political and social divisions of apartheid society), thereby breaking down patterns of structured interaction and replacing them with different, non-racial patterns. In this sense, it does not matter how saintly a

policeman, a Nationalist politician, or a mining magnate appears in South Africa; their positions are defined by the structure of the society, and in that sense are unchangeable through the actions of individual agents.

With reference to the analyses developed in Chapters 3 through 5, it should be clear that collective phenomena, like race and class, are not concepts created by the scientist to facilitate explanation, but are objective social processes that have direct effects on individuals. While individualism would be forced to argue that the racial structure of the South African society, and its polarisation over time, arose from the actions of individuals and their interactions, it has been shown that it is necessary to take into account also the social conditions which entail structured interests that influence the individual's activity. The politico-racial structure of the society reflected, more fundamentally, social relationships among structured positions (e.g., skilled worker) arising from, or made necessary by, the material conditions of society. It follows, therefore, that current individuals do not create society, but act in structured relationships vis-à-vis other individuals, and this structure is independent of the actions of any particular individuals. It seems absurd to resort to individualistic accounts, when the process is systemic in the society.

To account for a single life, individualists would be forced to limit themselves to the actions of individual agents. They would avoid statements that employed social terms that entailed a collectivity of individuals (cf., Popper, 1971, p.98), at least insofar as these are given as fundamental explanations. For instance, individualists would contend that Matthews developed his personal orientation because other individuals (parents, friends and teachers) supported the idea that educational achievement would lead to liberalisation, and his action, if it was repeated by many others sharing this perspective, would produce an integrated society. Individualists make reference to social phenomena only insofar as such phenomena can be explained in terms of individuals; social phenomena, according to [$M_1$], arise from, and can be explained in terms of, the actions of individuals.

Importantly, however, Matthews accepted this orientation, not solely because his parents, teachers and friends, as individual agents, supported it, but because these individuals filled socially-significant positions which gave their expressed viewpoint added impact. Furthermore, Matthews had experiences of a material society that made this orientation a reasonable response to his social conditions. These experiences were tied to Matthews' own position in the society, as well as the positions of

those individuals who were significant to him. In other words, had he not experienced the relative privilege of the elite of qualified Cape voters, and had he not been rewarded for his pursuit of education, he would not have developed the personal orientation that he did. Likewise, if his parents, teachers and friends had given him some alternative viewpoint, and his experiences of the society had failed to reflect this orientation, the resulting inconsistency would have encouraged him to modify his viewpoint. We see, therefore, that Matthews' subjectivity was not simply a result of the combined subjectivities of other individual agents, but an interactive result of these other individuals <u>and</u> the material conditions in which they and Matthews lived.

As the structure of the society changed, even though individuals continued to encourage their children to pursue education, the individuals that emerged developed different subjectivities: Mandela's understanding changed, focussing increasing attention on political forms of protest and social transformation. This changed subjectivity did not result because others had already made this new subjectivity real and transmitted it to Mandela, but because he recognised the discordance between the outlook others expressed and the objective conditions. Likewise, Biko's experiences of the structured racial nature of the society

led to a modification of his orientation, and this new orientation was neither the product of other individuals, nor a result of Biko's own subjectivity. The development of Biko's subjectivity showed a novel response to the objective conditions, explainable in terms of his experiences in the material conditions of apartheid (inferior education. homelands, restrictive legislation etc.).

It is important to emphasise that changes in the subjectivities of individuals do not arise because other individuals have already anticipated such changed orientations and simply transmit them to subsequent individuals, but because the combination of individuals acting in particular material circumstances make a novel subjective resolution possible. In adopting (or developing) a novel subjectivity, individuals each need to test the possible alternative approaches against the material circumstances which constrain their existence. Thus, individuals become the persons they are because they actively respond to other individuals, but always, within material conditions not reducible to the actions of any number of individuals.

This discussion shows the inadequacy of the individualist approach. Indeed, to explain how changed societies occur with this approach seems impossible, for if changes in society arise because the individuals comprising

that society change, there is no indication why individuals would make such a change other than because something non-individual (e.g., balance of power relations, environmental changes etc.) precipitated such an adaptation or modification of their way of being.

In contrast to the individualism of [$M_1$], conceptualising the relation of individual and society in the form of [$M_2$] marginalises the individual as some function of primary and powerful social forces. Individual action is seen as a necessary process of social reproduction; if individuals have personal characteristics and intentions, these can be explained as resulting from the functioning of more fundamental social forces. If this approach is an accurate representation of the relation of individual and society, then the appearance of individual-initiated action can be explained completely by (i.e., reduced to) some previous social conditions.

With this perspective, theorists defending [$M_2$] could argue, for example, that Matthews' decision to join the ANC was purely an individual expression of the more fundamental social change that was bringing about an increasingly racial segregation of the society. The Hertzog Bills, therefore, were particular political changes that, with their antecedents, fully explain Matthews' political involvement. Importantly, however, Matthews became politically involved

at this point, not only because of social changes but also because of his personal history. Without his own background and understanding of the society, he would not have faced the dilemma he did over the Hertzog Bills.

Similarly, Mandela adopted a multiracial stance, not because it was determined by social forces and affected all Youth Leaguers equally, but because his personal history - his race, his royal class, his educational standard, his geographical locus, his commitment to serve his people and his sensitivity to the expressions of the masses - made this an appropriate response in the conditions as he experienced them. Biko's rejection of multiracial cooperation, arose not because it was inevitable for blacks (or black students) at this time, but because his personal experiences of the apartheid society made such a response adaptive.

What made Matthews, Mandela and Biko (and any other individual) unique was the way in which each unified the various social influences into that single unity which became their person. Each individual has a history, and, as an individual, is the "living system" (Sève, 1978, p.193) of these diverse influences. From this unity, action is generated, and, while the unity shows elements of social forces, it includes also the individual's own integration of these factors, his understanding, his choices and his purpose. While his action <u>may</u> correspond with the social

requirement for one in his position, there is no necessity that it will; choices, and mistakes, characterise an individual's tenure in social roles.

It can also be shown that the actions of individuals, contrary to the formulation of [$M_2$], can significantly contribute to the development of society. For instance, Matthews' personal characteristics, reflecting his unique background, gave the ANC policy documents of the 1940s a distinctive impression, reflecting his personal accommodation vis-à-vis the white government.

Mandela can be used as a more detailed example to illustrate this point: by the later 1940s conditions in the society made the tactics of the ANC leadership no longer adequate and, in keeping with Plekhanov's (1940) point, someone would fill that social need (position). But that Mandela filled this role had important implications for the history of the ANC, and even the society at large. Had Africanists succeeded in leading the ANC from the early 1950s, for example, it is quite reasonable to think that the relations between the white government and the ANC would have been different. Notice that this state of affairs was quite possible, for the YL already had significant power within the ANC executive, following the YL coup in 1949, and only became less significant because some of their own leading figures, including Mandela, modified their strong

Africanism and accepted multiracial cooperation. Had this not occurred, the Africanist YL, as the strongest (and at the time only real) alternative to the old guard, would have become increasingly influential in defining ANC policy.

Even if Africanists had come to control the ANC executive, the likelihood that opposition groups would have been banned at some point and would have resorted to violence remains high. But the Programme of Action might not have been developed into the Defiance Campaign and instead might have become the covert ideological-psychological process that the Africanist PAC later claimed was the Programme's intent. Allowing that such a minor variation is possible if a different individual (or individuals) fills a social role has significant consequences, for not only would the transformation of the society have been hastened or delayed, but the action of an exclusivist ANC leadership would have had consequences for integration in a non-racial, post-apartheid society.

The point can be extended to Biko: Biko's personal characteristics - his ability to express the ideas of Black Consciousness without degenerating into racist attacks, for example - made his activity contribute to the definition of the developing society. Had another individual emerged in the leadership vacuum of the late 1960s, who, for example, was less articulate and precise in analysing the situation,

the break between multiracial organisations and an exclusivist black organisation may not have been as definite and effective. Alternatively, an aggressive individual may have precipitated violence and insurrection leading to civil war.

If, as [$M_2$] asserts, individuals are redundant in explanations of social change, societalist theorists must explain social change as a pre-ordained process, determined, but not involving individuals in any influential way. As the above analyses have shown, individuals, in their action, maintain and can transform society. While individuals are not god-like planners, conscious of their purpose in changing society, it is imperative that their indirect influence on society and social change be acknowledged, lest we be left with a theory of social change which merely asserts change with no effective mechanism for this.

In the same way that [$M_1$] generated an account with some obvious validity, accounts generated from the foundation of [$M_2$] also contain elements of truth. The problem with both approaches, however, is that much of the complexity of the account seems to have been lost. The discussion of both [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] shows that in each formulation that which is to be explained remains, in important ways, unexplained. According to [$M_1$], society is an illusion arising from the actions of many individuals,

but, as has been shown, society has characteristics, both social and material, that cannot be traced to current individual action. Instead, it was shown that individual action is, in part, a response to existing conditions. Likewise, the individual that [$M_2$] tells us is a nameless cog in a social machine was shown to be important also as an individual with personal characteristics.

In neither [$M_1$] nor [$M_2$] is the explanation given wrong; rather, it has been argued that in important aspects each formulation is incomplete. The duality model outlined in Chapter 2 was developed to overcome this inadequacy, while retaining the truths captured in both [$M_1$] and [$M_2$]. The duality model seeks to show how (1) the characteristics that make individuals significant as persons do have impact on (without causing) the society in which they live, and (2) the objective conditions of a society contribute to (without determining) the personal character of the individuals that act in that society. At the same time, it is recognised from [$M_1$] that individuals determine certain social patterns or practices as they engage in social relations, and, from [$M_2$], that society determines actions, or functions, that individuals are called upon to perform. In other words, the 'individual' that is explained by society is not a particular person, but the social function which an individual - from amongst many suitable individuals -

performs. The 'society' that is explained by individuals is not the objective condition for action, but the cultural rules and patterns that individuals generate through their interactions. Distinguishing two aspects to both individuals and society allows [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] to be brought together without contradiction.

In the duality model, individuals understand and respond to their social and material conditions, and while these conditions may make certain actions probable, there is no way of predicting how the individual will act based solely on knowledge of the society. One needs to take into account too the individual's unity of experience, the thread that connects the experiences together and makes the various potential social conditions into a unique pattern captured by the individual. In each of the socio-psychological accounts given in Chapters 3 through 5, it was shown how social conditions made it possible for individuals to respond in particular ways, but also, how the actual responses of individuals depended on both their understanding of (or orientation towards) society and their experience of these social conditions.

For example, in the case of Biko, there was a social potential to develop some new form of black resistance/opposition, following the quiescence of the mid-1960s. This resistance may have been most likely to emerge

amongst black intellectuals (as had been the case in earlier periods of resistance), and the form of this resistance was constrained by the strength of the white government, which was able to suppress opposition and was likely to do so.

But the fact that this opposition took the form it did - Black Consciousness - seems due, in part at least, to Biko's own personal experiences. Recall that black students were divided into those that sought to develop their own organisations and those that favoured NUSAS as a national student voice. While black student groups had not endured (Gerhart, 1979, p.257), NUSAS remained "[b]older at the verbal level" (Ibid.), unable to effect real social change.

The particular unity of experience that made Biko the person he was became the catalyst to develop a renewed black opposition movement that would be able to survive and grow into a broad and influential movement. This unity of experience included Biko's early leanings towards education, encouraged by his parents and his schooling; his experience of the government crackdown on Poqo and his brother's imprisonment; his attraction to NUSAS; the fact that, as a student at the University of Natal, he could become directly involved in NUSAS (unlike black students on other campuses); his consequent disillusionment with the liberal orientation; and his decision to form an exclusivist black student organisation. This unique set of experiences made it

possible for Biko to form an organisation that endured, unlike previous attempts by black students to form their own groups. Particularly, because Biko defended an exclusivist approach through attacks on liberals - and not the government - SASO was able to grow among black students.

The attack on liberals also gave Black Consciousness a distinctive flavour, for it offered a polarised understanding of the society (and contributed to such a change). Had an exclusive black student organisation developed on a black campus and opposed the government, and had it survived, it may have had a different orientation towards liberals, and not made the polarity of oppositional forces that Black Consciousness developed as clear. Biko's particular experiences, therefore, made Black Consciousness, in part, a reflection of his personal uniqueness, and not simply an inevitable social development.

This analysis of the relation of the individual to the society has been informed by the duality model, and shows that the influence of society on individuals (and vice versa) is indirect and incomplete. Nevertheless, the attractive elements in both [$M_1$] and [$M_2$] - real individuals and social structures - remain without being explained away by each other. In the process of change, society is a general condition to which individuals respond, but there is nothing in the structure of society that defines the outcome

or determines the persons to perform the required roles (functions). Among a group of potential actors, one person emerges who has a unique history, and this can significantly modify the manner in which this role is developed.

The discussion in this section has reviewed the two alternative formulations of the individual-society connection first introduced in Chapter 2. The inadequacies inherent to these formulations have been highlighted with examples drawn from the socio-psychological accounts developed in Chapters 3 through 5. In response to these shortcomings, the duality model proposed in Chapter 2 has been shown to incorporate the strengths of both formulations while being able to avoid their weaknesses. Moreover, the duality model can unite individuals and society in a way that allows for the explanation of change. That individuals and society do not directly determine each other in the duality model allows for the transformation of individuals and society without reducing individuals to society or society to individuals.

## 2. Evaluating the Duality Model and Accounts Generated

Particular accounts generated within a duality-informed research programme need to be evaluated against other accounts. In the present case, three socio-psychological accounts of individual lives have been given, and the

interaction of individual and society captured in the duality perspective has been shown to make possible an account of the temporal continuity that links these three lives.

In evaluating accounts of particular lives generated within a duality perspective, it is useful to consider those elements that contribute to an account of a life. Runyan (1988), for example, has developed an interesting ordering of a number of component processes which he suggests are "involved in advancing our knowledge and understanding of individual lives" (p.306). While Runyan's listing of component processes, and their interrelation, may be idiosyncratic, he appears to have identified the basic factors that contribute to accounts of life histories. The component processes Runyan identifies are captured methodologically, step by step, in an account of the individual's life. Beginning with the available evidence and various processes of data collection (Component 1), one must critically examine the sources and the evidence (Component 2). In addition, knowledge of the person's cultural-historical context and other knowledge may be relevant, as well as theoretical orientations that may contribute to an interpretation (Component 3). From Components 1 to 3, a researcher can form a number of possible explanatory interpretations of the evidence (Component 4). Following

critical testing (Component 5) these outlines can be narrowed to the most complete account and proposed as a coherent and explanatory Life History Account (Component 6). This account too, can be critically evaluated (Component 7) and may lead to new accounts (Component 6). Throughout this whole process, Social, Political, Psychological and Historical Factors (Component 8) can influence the the manner in which each of the other components is processed (Runyan, 1988).

Each component process involved in developing an account can be challenged, and may lead to the replacement of one account with a more progressive (encompassing) explanation. Such ongoing examinations of the steps taken in developing an account are part of the progressive search for (an integrative) understanding (Runyan, 1988, p.305). Not all components, however, are examined in the same manner, with the result that changes in some components may lead to the modification of an account, or its transcendence by another (e.g., components 1 and 2), while changes in others may add to the criticism of an account without necessarily leading to any change or its demise (e.g., components 3 and 8). The difference lies in the fact that some components are concerned directly with data, while others involve issues of theoretical orientation.

With respect to component 1, an advance (progress) in

the account of a particular life may occur if evidence is uncovered which was unknown to earlier researchers or if processes of data collection become such that earlier accounts of the life are shown to be inaccurate. In the present research, this may take the form of documents not discovered by the present researcher, or documents not yet made public (e.g., government archives). For example, new evidence that may allow alternative accounts of the lives of the three individuals to be deemed more encompassing could include the preparation of an autobiography by Mandela, information on Biko's early years which may question some of the inferences made in Chapter 5, or possibly information on Biko's relations with banned organisations. Information of this sort, if it existed, could - potentially - allow more progressive accounts to be generated.

Component 2 - a critical examination of evidence and sources - may show, for example, that the present researcher erred when relying on a source that is later shown to be unreliable in some significant way, or, alternatively when a source considered unreliable is shown to be the only source that accurately reports a particular incident. The kinds of reevaluation suggested in both components 1 and 2 would lead the researcher to modify the account to accommodate the new information, or, if that is not possible, the account will be replaced by an alternative account that can include the

new information.

Not all components are as easily re-evaluated, for some illustrate orientations of particular researchers with respect to the theories they choose to support. For example, component 3 includes "theories of psychological development, an understanding of the relevant cultural and historical background, and knowledge of relevant medical conditions and biological processes" (Ibid.). In the present research, the duality perspective forms an explicit background theory, and alternative accounts developed from within different theoretical orientations are not in direct competition with the accounts developed here. Rather, accounts are part of the empirical content generated by the theory, and if over time one research programme is shown to be more progressive than another (see above), that theoretical approach might transcend alternatives.

Component 8, too, reflects choices made by the researcher and may foster alternative research programmes. For example, in the present research, the sympathy shown to the liberation movement and the rejection of apartheid policy can be seen as unexamined assumptions. Alternative accounts may reverse these sympathies, or, over time, there may be new standards by which to evaluate these social, political, psychological and historical factors, with the consequence that the present accounts are challenged.

In instances like these, the competition between accounts is not easily resolved. The accounts proposed by these various researchers can be distinguished in terms of other components which can be empirically validated (e.g., evidence), but if all things remain equal, the various theories remain in competition until one theory can incorporate into its account something which the others cannot.

The duality model, and the research generated by it, has been presented as a competing research programme, which, it is believed, will be shown to be scientifically progressive in relation to the alternative programmes considered. To do this, the programme must meet the three criteria identified by Lakatos (1987, p.182) for progressivity: (1) there is excess empirical content over its predecessor, (2) the previous success of the theory being replaced is explained, <u>and</u> (3) some of the excess empirical content can be verified or corroborated.

Indeed, it has been argued that the duality-informed research programme already meets some of these criteria. For instance, the programme's ability to generate a coherent and encompassing account of an individual's life which denies neither the structural influence of the society nor the individual's own unique experience gives the current programme excess empirical content over its competitors

(criterion 1). Also, the retention in the duality perspective of the truths inherent to the previous formulations explains the previous success of the formulations being challenged (criterion 2). To satisfy the last criterion the empirical reflections of the dualities of both individual and society, and their interrelation, must be shown to be real. Although the accounts given have attempted to verify the reality of such elements in the process of change, further research is necessary to fully meet criterion 3.

The accounts that have been given in Chapters 3 through 5 are open to criticism, either directly, through challenges regarding particulars of the data, or indirectly, through the competition of an alternative research programme. In the latter case, however, the accounts are evaluated along with the theoretical orientation which informs them. Thus, to replace the present accounts with others may require also that an alternative theoretical understanding of the individual-society connection, and its accompanying research programme, be shown to have scientific progressivity (Lakatos, 1987) when compared to the duality model and its research programme.

## 3. Conclusion

At the outset, two related questions were posed, namely, What is the relationship between individuals and the

society with which they interact? and, given this relationship, How are social scientists, in particular social psychologists, to study the individual?

The duality model has been shown to be an especially fruitful way of conceptualising the individual-society connection, for it avoids the reductionism inherent to other approaches which deny the ontological independence of both individual and society, while allowing for interaction between individual and society in a way that does not suggest separate levels of analysis that need not be integrated. Currently, a duality understanding of the individual-society connection is more promising than alternative formulations.

Socio-psychological accounts, informed by the duality model, offer one approach to the study of the individual, although empirical studies need not be limited to socio-psychological accounts along the lines developed here. If the duality perspective is a suitable framework for the conceptualisation of the individual-society relation, however, social scientific research will need to be united by an implicit recognition of the distinct natures of individual and society, and their necessary, but indirect, connection. Accounts of the individual should be consistent with an understanding of the individual as part of a social process; likewise, accounts of society should not exclude

active individuals from the process of change.

## Epilogue

### For Nelson Mandela

Around the world the image of a 44-year-old man focussed calls for his release from prison. Finally, on February 11, 1990, a 71-year-old man emerged, hand-in-hand with his wife. The juxtaposed images bore witness to 27 years. But there is continuity in the person who said:

> "Whatever sentence Your Worship sees fit to impose upon me for the crime for which I have been convicted before this Court, may it rest assured that when my sentence has been completed, I will still be moved, as men are always moved, by their consciences; I will still be moved by my dislike of the race discrimination against my people when I come out from serving my sentence, to take up again, as best I can, the struggle for the removal of those injustices until they are finally abolished once and for all." (Mandela, Statement in Court, November 7, 1962, in Karis & Carter, 1977a, p.745)

His life is a struggle for freedom, to realise a dream. He was one of the first to hear the cry "Freedom in our lifetime"; few of these people are still alive. May he feel this freedom as a crescendo of the emotion which welcomed him that warm afternoon:

## Prison Gate

Of this dream-day did you dream?
Ever to hold grandchildren on your knee
Clenching their hand around your finger, pointing?
Or to share the sweat and pulsing squeeze
As you waved and smiled and punched the air?
You're Free!

Your image, a symbol for today, has come to life
With body and with mind. And soul.
Living, you were unreal, hidden in a photograph.
But jubilant, proud, defiant, you
Walk, smile. The Fist, the Voice! Palpably sensual
And Free!

And she is smiling your comforted peace.
She sailed and flew and drove. Minutes through a glass.
Holed up. Always leaving and alone. Alone. Hold up!
A silent pact in holding tears, to walk to freedom.
The dream is life, the hour come. You want to remember
He's Free!

The lands rise up behind as rows of vines salute.
Ahead you walk to meet with some
Who only know your name, but sing it loud.
Humility. It's vain hope you're just a one –
They've chosen you to make them
Free!

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