ANGOLA:

The Challenges of Democratic Transition.

By
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Brazzaville
Kinshasa

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(Cabinda)
Matadi

ZAIRE

Congo

Kasai

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- ◉ Province capital
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- Road
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0 100 200 Kilometers
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ABSTRACT

Current emphasis on democratization, liberalization, governance, and civil society in Africa reflects the prevailing political, economic and cultural situations resulting from the international economic crisis of the 1980s, structural adjustment, the collapse of Soviet communism and the end of the Cold War.

Today, democratic transition is accepted as an indispensable stage in a more comprehensive process that will eventually liberate Africa from underdevelopment. However, democracy alone is not necessarily the cure-all solution to Africa's problems. Accepting unquestionably Western forms of liberal democracy without exploring alternatives of how to accommodate the losers can easily lead to further political and economic chaos and perhaps precipitate the onset of anarchy. How to make transitions to democracy both relevant and sustainable remains an important challenge. Since democratization in Africa reflects a popular demand for improved governance and economic conditions, the answer may lie in harmonizing or reconciling essentially Western ideas of political rights with more concrete and basic economic rights while taking into account the continent's socio-cultural realities. In other words, Africa must find a way to reconcile its tradition of consensus politics with the "winner-takes-all" model of Western politics.

Elections could not help solve Angola's multifaceted and mutilayered crises in the 1990s. The political settlement reached by the main opponents in the Angolan conflict was imposed upon them by changing international conditions. Civil society was unprepared and unable to play a significant role in the transition process as compared with other, more successful transitions. Thus, the field was left almost exclusively to the two political parties with their powerful military wings. Given a long history of personal animosity, ethnic divisions, and ideological differences, a transition to elected government in Angola could hardly be peaceful in the manner in which it was implemented. Such a peaceful transition in Angola could only have come about if civil society was strong enough to participate actively and decisively in laying the foundations for a new political system and hence a new and sustainable social and economic order.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD   Aliança Democrática (Democratic Alliance Coalition).

ANC   African National Congress.

CABGOC   Cabinda Gulf Oil Company.

CIA   US Central Intelligence Agency.

CNDA   Convenção Nacional Democrática de Angola (Angola National Democratic Convention).

DIAMANG   Companhia dos Diamantes de Angola (Angola Diamond Company).

DTA   Democratic Turnhalle Ailiance.

ECA   United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

ENDIAMA   Empresa de Diamantes de Angola (Angola Diamond Enterprises).

FALA   Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola (Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola).

FAPLA   Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (Peoples Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola).

FDA   Forum Democrático Angolano (Angolan Democratic Forum).

FNLA   Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola).

FpD   Frente para Democracia (Front for Democracy).

FRELIMO   Frente para Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique).

GDP   Gross Domestic Product.

IFI   International Financial Institution.

IMF   International Monetary Fund.

JPMC   Joint Political Military Commission.

LDC   Less Developed Country.

MDIPA   Movimento para a Defesa dos Interesses do Povo (Movement for the Defense of the Angolan People's Interests).

MLSTP   Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe).

MNC   Multinational Corporation.

MPLA   Movimento Popular para Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

MUDAR   Movimento de Unidade de Angola para a Reconstrucção (Movement of Angolan Unity for Reconstruction).

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NGO   Non-Governmental Organization.

OAU   Organization of African Unity.

PAI   Partido Angolano Independente (Angolan Independent Party).

PAJOCA   Partido da Aliança da Juventude Operária e Camponesa de Angola (Angola Youth, Worker, Peasant Alliance Party).

PAL   Partido Liberal de Angola (Angolan Liberal Party).

PDA	Partido Democrático de Angola (Angolan Democratic Party).
PDP-ANA	Partido Democrático para o Progresso/Aliança Nacional de Angola (Democratic Party for the Progress of the Angolan National Alliance).
PDPA	Partido Democrático para Paz de Angola (Angola Democratic Party for Peace).
PF	Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe).
PLDA	Partido Liberal Democrático de Angola (Angola Liberal Democratic Party).
PNEA	Partido Nacional Ecológico de Angola (Angola National Ecological Party).
POW	Prisoner of War.
PRA	Partido Republicano de Angola (Angolan Republican Party).
PRD	Partido Renovador Democrático (Democratic Renewal Party).
PRS	Partido de Renovação Social (Social Renewal Party).
PSD	Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party).
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (National Resistance of Mozambique).
SADF	South African Defense Forces.
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program.
SEF	Saneamento Económico e Financeiro (Economic and Financial Restructuring).
SONANGOL	Sociedade de Combustíveis de Angola (Angola Oil Society).
SPA	Special Program of Assistance for sub-Saharan Africa.
SWAPO	South West Africa Peoples Organization.
SWAPOL	South West African Police.
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia).
UN	United Nations.
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission.
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group.
USAID	United States Agency for International Development.
VORGAN	Voz da Resistência do Galo Negro (Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel -- UNITA's clandestine radio station).
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union.
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

The major concern of this dissertation is the challenges of the transition to democracy in Angola within a framework of multypartyism and civil society. It inquires into the prospects and possibilities of Angola following the examples of most countries in the region that attained a measure of stability after successfully completing transitions to democratically elected governments. Moreover, it addresses the question of whether this country's penchant to slide back to civil war will lead to further anarchy.

A transition to democracy is said to occur when "a competitive election open to all potential participants takes place that is judged to be free and fair, and whose results are accepted by all participants *including the losers*."[1] Angola's transition -- like the ones carried out successfully by other countries in the region including Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, and more recently Mozambique -- was expected to be the culmination of a profound process of transformation supported by political liberalization/democratization and economic reform. Angola did, in fact, take important steps toward removing the controls on political activities of citizens imposed during the MPLA's single-party regime. This process permitted the creation of "independent" political parties, thus broadening the opportunities for political participation and competition. Moreover, the regime embarked on an ambitious program of economic reform which included for the first time the introduction of free-market mechanisms and the transfer of economic functions from the state to the private sector. However, contrary to the experience of the other countries in the region that also carried out transition processes, Angola's has not yet been successful. This thesis seeks to examine

1

the interrelated processes of political and economic change as well as the factors that conditioned the failure of the transition process in Angola.

Many elements, both internal and external, influenced Angola's transition. However, as this dissertation hopes to demonstrate, the absence of a vibrant civil society fatally hindered the peace and related transition processes. Civil society's disengagement from the formal political realm will be attributed to several factors including: a) the regime's ideological hostility toward civil society; b) poor governance and associated corruption; and, c) frustration regarding the regime's inability to solve the major politico-military and socio-economic crises facing the country. In sum, civil society's disengagement was a response to the post-independence regime's reckless attempts to destroy the structures inherited from the colonial experience without clearly defining any that could replace them. Thus, the structures as well as the organization and forms of exercising power in the post-colonial Angolan state are important elements in attempting to explain the decline of formal political participation in Angola of the 1990s.

The option to destroy civil society in Angola represented an unscrupulous implementation of Marxist dogma. Alas, most other Soviet client-states followed the same script. The difference between Angola and, say, the Eastern European countries is that whereas the former succeeded all too well in executing its task, the latter did not! Andrew Arato argues, for example, that in Poland, "the state has not been able to successfully dissolve civil society."[2] Perez-Diaz picks up on this theme and develops it further to include the rest of Eastern Europe.[3] He maintains that, in those former Soviet-bloc states, civil society -- as a set of institutions and actors -- succeeded in differentiating itself sharply from the state and the political class. Social actors and institutions claimed to have an existence of their own, which was not a result of the state's activities, and they

proved this existence through their ability to resist the latter. Moreover, civil society repudiated the state's claim to monopolize the public sphere and challenged the state's definition of the public good, whether in terms of economic growth or in terms of social consensus. This constituted the basis for, on the one hand, civil society's refusal to accept the state's claim to have the chief responsibility for providing these goods while, on the other, asserting its own capacity and responsibility and claiming that it was better placed than the state to solve the problems of growth, social integration, and even national identity. Hence, civil society in Eastern Europe agitated for institutional changes in the political system that would shift the balance between the state and society in favor of the latter, and this implied asking for a liberal democracy, a market economy, a pluralist system of interest representation, and cultural pluralism.[4]

A central argument in this thesis is that, as Angola approached its own transition process, no domestic conditions existed to give it a chance of success. In particular, civil society was absent to counter or mitigate the deep-seated mutual distrust that prevented MPLA and UNITA from negotiating an end to the civil war and the modalities for democratic transition in good faith. In the end, the two adversaries kept their armies intact, making a return to war inevitable. This situation was compounded by the fact that -- contrary to what happened in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and more recently Mozambique -- the international community failed to engage sufficient resources to compel the two warring factions in Angola to abide by the Peace Accords they had signed. Ironically, the end of the Cold War -- in which Angola had played a conspicuous part, at least in terms of superpower rivalry in Southern Africa -- did not benefit this country. In fact, it can be argued that the end of bipolarity and the dawn of a new era of cooperation revolving around the UN and other international organizations produced a new set of pressures and demands, including those for scarce

international resources for peace-making and peace-keeping. Now Angola had to compete with other countries around the world -- like Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique -- for both attention and resources. As a result, and as this dissertation will attempt to demonstrate, the international community -- particularly the United States and Russia in the post-bipolar era -- were not as willing to employ the same resources to make peace in Angola in the 1990s as they both had been to make war in the 1970s and 1980s. Angola's recent history illustrates this point.

Recent History

Angola constitutes an extreme example of a difficult transition to multiparty democracy in Africa. For the first time since gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, internationally supervised elections were held in September 1992, after a long civil war and an endless series of negotiations. The governing MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) won a majority in parliament. In the presidential elections, however, President José Eduardo dos Santos failed to win the 50% of the vote required to prevent a second round for the presidency. Before the run-off could take place, his main political rival, Jonas Savimbi -- whose party, UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola), had been fighting a fierce guerrilla war since independence from Portugal in 1975 -- resumed the civil war, claiming fraud in the election which he and his party had lost. This triggered a resumption of the conflict which quickly escalated into "one of the worst wars on the face of the globe."[5]

On 20 November 1994, the two sides reached a cease-fire accord. However, there is no indication that all the incentives to war have yet been overcome. What went wrong in Angola? What

lessons can be derived from this experience? Can the case of Angola shed some light on the complexities and difficulties of carrying out transitions and elections within the context of economic decay and political instability?

The Bicesse Accord signed on 31 May 1991 between the Angolan President and Jonas Savimbi was expected to end one of Africa's longest-running and bloodiest conflicts. On the surface, most conditions seemed ripe for a political settlement. After sixteen years of civil war, the conflict had reached a stalemate: the government forces did not have the human and material resources to defeat UNITA; similarly, UNITA did not have the means to remove the government from power.

There were further reasons, at both national and international levels, compelling the two belligerents to sign the Peace Accords. At the national level, all segments of society were putting mounting pressure on the governing party to end the war. Sixteen years of civil war (preceded by fourteen years of liberation war against the Portuguese colonial/settler occupation) had brought Angola to a virtual political dead-end, compounded by economic collapse and social disintegration. Most Angolans feared that a continuation of the civil war could lead to irreparable and irreversible damage. Politicians of all persuasions understood the need for reconciliation to ensure national survival, let alone revival.

Although the pressures faced by the government were more visible, the UNITA opposition group also faced serious difficulties. The long military stalemate, compounded by the autocratic style of leadership of Jonas Savimbi, had led to major internal squabbles. Typically, Savimbi dealt with internal dissent by physically eliminating those who opposed him. This brutal method of "problem-solving" led to the killing of UNITA's best and brightest political and military leaders and resulted in fear and political alienation within UNITA ranks.

At the international level, the demise of the Cold War removed the United States' rationale for continued military support to UNITA. The end of bipolarity also coincided with major changes at the regional level, including Namibia's independence and fundamental transformation in South Africa. [See Chapter 3 below] This denied UNITA its rearguard and major conduit of South African military and logistic support. Both SWAPO and the ANC, the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa respectively, had used Angola as their main base in the struggle against the *apartheid* regime in South Africa. UNITA's alliance with the *apartheid* regime also made it an enemy in this struggle. Therefore, when these two liberation movements assumed the reigns of power in their respective countries they worked to sever UNITA's connections with the military and intelligence communities in those countries as well as effectively dismantle UNITA's logistical routes through Namibia and South Africa. Thus, only Mobutu's Zaire remained as UNITA's regional ally.

The two antagonists' changing perceptions of each other also contributed to creating the conditions that led to the signing of the Peace Accords. Given Savimbi's penchant to deplete his party and army of some of its best and brightest through constant purges, the governing MPLA believed that UNITA no longer constituted a credible political alternative. In fact, the former believed that the latter would be perceived more as a terrorist group without a political platform than a political party capable of leading the country out of its severe problems. UNITA's longstanding alliance with the *apartheid* regime in South Africa -- whose armed forces devastated the southern part of Angola through military incursions in the 1980s -- could also be used by the governing party to discredit UNITA and reduce its political appeal. Furthermore, the MPLA counted on the possibility of capitalizing on Savimbi's negative image, especially among the urban population.

Conversely, UNITA also saw serious handicaps on the side of the governing MPLA party.

Throughout the civil war, UNITA sought to paint it as a band of "communist lackeys" who needed massive Eastern Bloc help -- especially Cuban troops and Russian military advisers -- to hold on to power. Economic mismanagement and widespread corruption could also be pointed at to discredit the sixteen-year rule of the MPLA. From a military viewpoint, UNITA perceived the government's armed forces to be a poorly trained, undisciplined army of conscripts. Since, as UNITA believed, the government was on the verge of collapse, it was perceived to be under considerable pressure to negotiate an honorable end to the war. But, at a more basic level, UNITA calculated that the nation was ready for a change of government.

Changed circumstances and political perceptions led the two historical rivals to the outskirts of the Portuguese capital to sign a peace accord in early 1991. Portugal, the United States of America and Russia would act as its guarantors, in the spirit of post-Cold War international cooperation. This accord was expected to be the first step in a comprehensive, protracted and multilayered process of transition to elected, democratic government. In the second stage the two main rivals would move from military confrontation to political competition -- their respective armies would be disbanded and their best soldiers would form a unified army. Also at this stage elements from within the civil society would be encouraged to participate in the political life of the nation through the creation of political parties, associations, NGOs, pressure groups, lobbies, media (i.e., radio stations, newspapers, magazines), and so on. Finally, elections would be held to choose a president and members of the new legislative body, the National Assembly.

The Bicesse Peace Accords would also allow for the establishment of the peaceful conditions necessary for resuming the free movement of persons and goods and initiate overall economic reconstruction.

In short, a nation on the brink of social disintegration would be given another chance. Angola's social fabric could be mended by returning the *deslocados* (people uprooted from their homes) to their areas of origin and enabling them to resume productive activities.

This envisaged process of transition to stability and national reconciliation would also signal the end of excessive foreign interventions in Angola's domestic affairs. Since achieving statehood in November 1975, Angola had become a theater of operations for cold warriors. The United States, the former Soviet Union, Cuba, and South Africa became directly involved in the conflict. On another level, other types of non-state actors -- both MNCs and NGOs -- had also become involved, both in the exploration of Angola's wealth and in the provision of various types of assistance to the state and civil society. Now, the Angolans would at last be given a chance to settle their own differences through less lethal means.

The Bicesse Peace Accords covered various important legal and organizational aspects for the transition to peace and elected government in Angola, including: cease-fire monitoring, disengagement of forces and their concentration in designated areas, formation of a national army, mechanics of the electoral process, and election monitoring. This would reflect the experiences of transitions in other parts of the world. In Southern Africa, for example, Zimbabwe and Namibia had demonstrated the feasibility of such transitions.

In Angola, as in Zimbabwe and Namibia before it, a peace agreement was reached and implemented in spite of all the difficulties expected in a country emerging from thirty years of war and experimening with democracy for the first time. As stipulated, elections were held on 29 and 30 September 1992. The MPLA won a parliamentary majority of 53.74% compared to UNITA's 34.1%. In the presidential elections José Eduardo dos Santos won 49.7% of the vote to Jonas

Savimbi's 40.1%., just six-tenths of one percent short of the 50% needed to avert a runoff presidential election. UNITA rejected the validity of the results sanctioned by the United Nations and other international observers, declaring that massive fraud had taken place. Simultaneously, it militarily occupied large portions of the country, including areas where it had never operated before. The government was caught by surprise: it had demobilized most of its troops. By contrast, UNITA -- in a gambit reminiscent of events following independence in 1975 -- was now poised to take the capital city. Fighting for control of Luanda began on October 30. After several days of intense fighting the government prevailed. Several senior UNITA officials, including its vice-president Jeremias Chitunda, were killed. The Bicesse Peace Accords had collapsed and, once again, Angola reverted to full-scale civil war. But this time around, the two combatants did not attract or need direct external intervention from foreign armies. The government's control of the oil resources and UNITA's control -- albeit informal -- of the diamond mines provided both with sufficient domestic revenues to prosecute the new phase of the war.

Statement of Research Problem

Main Research Question

The main research question for this dissertation is: "*What factors contributed to the failure of the peace process and hindered the transition to democracy in Angola in the 1990s?*"

Unlike Zimbabwe and Namibia -- and more recently South Africa and Mozambique -- Angola's peace process and the framework for its transition to elections and a democratic regime were imposed from abroad within a framework of post cold-war conflict resolution. Thus some

important domestic ingredients were overlooked. It is the failure to take these domestic issues into account that led to the breakdown of the peace process and aborted the transition to a democratic regime in Angola. This constitutes the main thesis of this study.

Free and fair elections -- as demanded both by the international community and some important segments of Angolan society -- could not help solve Angola's problems in the 1990s. As will be shown, the main opponents in the Angolan conflict -- i.e., the governing party and UNITA -- were not yet truly committed to upholding democratic principles and practices: these were not part of their political tradition. The political settlement they had apparently reached to end the civil war was imposed upon them by changing international conditions -- i.e., the end of the Cold War -- and not through a direct, protracted national process of reconciliation. Civil society -- stifled within both the government and UNITA-controlled areas of the country -- was unprepared and unable to play a significant role in the transition process as compared with other, more successful transitions. Thus, the field was left almost exclusively to the two political parties with their powerful military wings. Given a long history of personal animosity, ethnic divisions, and ideological differences, transition to elected government in Angola could hardly be peaceful in the manner in which it was implemented. Such a peaceful transition in Angola could only have come about if civil society was strong enough to participate actively and decisively in laying the foundations for a new political system and hence a new and sustainable social and economic order

In Angola, unlike other African countries where democratic transition succeeded, the level of political participation by the masses in formal politics remained limited due to the continuing domination of the party-state in general and its security apparatus in particular. Angola did not witness students, unemployed workers, civil servants, and other groups taking to the streets to

demand better governance. Thus, public protests and mobilization -- motivated either by economic or political motives -- were glaringly absent from Angola's attempted transition.

Subsidiary Questions

The dissertation will also look at other important questions related to the possibilities, opportunities and constraints for national reconciliation and stable elected government in Angola in comparative perspective. These subsidiary questions include: Why did the Bicesse Peace Accords collapse? Were they unrealistic? What motivated UNITA to return to war? Can the reconciliation process be saved? What lies ahead for Angola? What can be learned from the lessons of successful transitions in the region?

An important element throughout the analysis will be the importance of Angola's natural resources -- particularly oil and diamonds -- and how these have fuelled the war efforts on both sides. Just as important are aspects related to Angola's strategic position in Southern Africa and its transition/transformation from settler colony to Marxist state and beyond.

To address the thesis questions, Angola's recent political history must be searched for important clues. What is more important, at least for the purposes of analyzing the collapse of the Bicesse Peace Accords, one must look at the differing agendas of the main participants: the governing party/UNITA/the new political formations/civil society, and the international community's commitment to support Angola in this period of transition.

Methodology

Sources of Evidence

The bulk of the primary data for the dissertation has been derived from the programs and platforms of the political parties, occasional policy statements, political speeches, leaders' statements on issues, statements by foreign governments and foreign participants especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The main sources of the data include both published analysis of Angola and Southern Africa as well as political parties' documents; transcripts of government statements; transcripts of UNITA statements; transcripts of radio broadcasts from both National Angola Radio and VORGAN (UNITA's clandestine radio station); the *Department of State Dispatch* for official United States administrations' positions and documents; the *United Nations Chronicle* for United Nations' positions and documents; United States Congressional transcripts; newspaper and magazine articles; and dispatches from international news agencies. Economic data are drawn from World Bank publications as well as some Angolan government documents. Many of these sources are found at the Library of Congress. Other sources were found in Luanda and in Lisbon. The Lexis/Nexis computer network was also used extensi ely to find data for this dissertation. Secondary sources were also used extensively, primarily to deal with the period preceding the peace process and elections; i.e., the crucial period between 1975 and 1991.

The participant observation method was used to conduct research during the 1990-93 period. Thus, the author was able to interview key government officials, politicians from both MPLA and UNITA as well as members of the embryonic civil society -- academics, NGOs, workers, students, entrepreneurs -- both in the country and in exile. The researcher was also able to observe closely key phases of the the pe e process, including the negotiations leading to the Bicesse Accord, the pre-

electoral climate in Angola, the electoral campaign, the voting, and the post-electoral debacle.

Limitations of the Study

This dissertation will focus on the peace process in Angola between May 1991 and October 1992. This period has not yet been the subject of academic analysis. Thus, it is hoped that an original contribution to understanding Angola's complexities can be made through this dissertation.

Angola's history both under Portuguese administration and as an independent nation has been dealt with by other writers. So have Angola's foreign relations in the context of the Cold War and in terms of regional dynamics. The civil war and internal decay have also received considerable attention. Areas that have not yet received adequate study include the structure and operations of the political parties, society-party and society-state relationships, politics, economics and the informal sector, and the relationship between party and government in policy-making. These topics also receive their due attention in this dissertation.

Thesis Outline

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first focuses on comparative perspectives and the second on Angola as a specific case study. Part I comprises four sections. This introduction reviews Angola's recent history and provides a succinct overview of the dissertation's major goals and objectives. The sources of evidence for the thesis as well as its limitations are identified in the introduction.

Chapter 1 outlines some of the theoretical approaches used in the dissertation. Modernization,

dependency and underdevelopment, and the "statist school" are identified as well-established approaches in the study of issues related to African politics and development. However, as argued in this first chapter, governance and civil society -- two alternative theoretical approaches -- are better suited for the analysis of matters concerning the process of democratic transition in Africa and particularly Angola.

The major theme of the dissertation -- transitions to democracy -- is introduced in chapter 2, with a continental overview. Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in tracking all the changes that are taking place in the continent as many African countries move towards democracy, it was important to tally them to show that Angola was not alone in 1992 when it was attempting to complete its transition.

A more in-depth analysis of transition to elected government in Southern Africa is presented in chapter 3 with an examination of the processes that led to majority rule in both Zimbabwe and Namibia. Why Zimbabwe and Namibia? Why are other countries in Southern Africa with some historical similarities -- i.e., settler colonialism, racism and long wars of independence, like Mozambique and South Africa -- omitted from this examination?

It could be argued, in fact, that the transitions in all of these countries are interrelated. Moreover, Angola served as an important base for the wars of liberation in Namibia, South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe. But, whereas all countries in Southern Africa, even Mozambique, have completed their transition processes to democracy with varying degrees of success, Angola has consistently failed in its successive attempts. Zimbabwe and Namibia illustrate the challenges involved in such processes and highlight some of the difficulties Angola has experienced. South Africa and Mozambique are not included because their transitions were not yet complete by the time

the bulk of the material for this thesis was gathered. Several constraints, especially time and available resources, would render the inclusion of another chapter impractical. In any event, the present dissertation was conceived to deal primarily with the case of Angola. This discussion, the second part of the thesis, begins in chapter 4.

Chapter 4 examines the various challenges -- military, political, economic, and social -- that confronted Angola and, ultimately, forced the government to embark on an attempt to undertake fundamental economic and political transformations. Thus, this chapter begins by identifying the military threat to Angola as emanating from South Africa's *apartheid* regime which was, in turn, responding to the regional changes arising from the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime and the independence of Angola and Mozambique. This threat would be magnified by, on the one hand, the presence of Cuban troops and SWAPO guerrillas in Angola and, on the other, the alliance forged between SADF and UNITA to topple the new government in Luanda. Superpower involvement -- the former Soviet Union on the side of the MPLA government and the US on the side of UNITA -- further complicated the military situation.

The military threat had a significant impact on the regime at all levels. It obliged the government to become increasingly dependent on the former Soviet Union and Cuba. Consequently, the state also had to demonstrate its ideological correctness and alignment with these two countries. This included the wholesale adoption of economic management practices like central planning. As will be seen in chapter 4, this was particularly debilitating for the regime and, together with the prevailing military threat and civil war, caused considerable political weaknesses as well. It is at this point that we observe civil society's retreat and adoption of informal procedures. This had serious implications for the future because -- when the stage was set for a more active participation of civil

society in the process of transition to democratic government -- it was largely unfit to play a significant role, leaving the arena to opponents who were still willing to use military means to conquer political power.

The government's attempt to cope with the effects of mounting crises involved economic liberalization and political openness. An analysis of these factors is undertaken in chapter 5. Particular attention is directed at attempts to restructure the economy by adopting more conventional classical neo-liberal policies through structural adjustment programs (SAPs). The chapter notes that economic reforms preceded political reforms. This created its own set of problems because, as the government would later find out, the economy did not respond to SAPs because the political changes did not take root and the country descended back into instability.

Political reforms in Angola resulted from both within the regime -- as a way of averting major upheavals like those that occurred in other parts of Africa -- and through long and protracted negotiations with UNITA. These two aspects of political reform contributed to the eventual signing of the Angola Peace Accords in May 1991. These accords were expected to serve as the blueprint for the transition to elected government and democracy in Angola. However, as chapter 6 explains, they did not succeed in breaking Angola's vicious cycle.

Chapter 6 analyzes the main reasons behind the breakdown of the Peace Accords and the failure of the transition process. Many factors contributed to this outcome. The situation prevailing in the country was conducive to political violence and intimidation -- not an environment of tolerance needed for the peace process to reach a successful conclusion. But perhaps most importantly, the Accords were seriously flawed and unenforceable.

This dissertation concludes by suggesting that an important aspect in explaining the collapse

of the peace process in Angola was the lukewarm engagement of civil society. The inability of civil society to play a decisive role in Angola sealed the fate of the transition process. In the conclusion, therefore, the thesis returns to a theme highlighted in the introduction; i.e., by pointing to civil society as the key for the success of any future attempt to effect a sustainable democratic transition in Angola.

Endnotes
(Introduction)

1."Economic Reform in Africa's New Era of Political Liberalization," Proceedings of a USAID Workshop for SPA Donors, (Washington, DC: USAID, April 14-15, 1993), 3.

2.Andrew Arato, From Neo-Marxism to Democratic Theory: Essays on the Critical Theory of Soviet-Type Societies (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 171.

3.Victor Perez-Diaz, The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993), 105.

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PART ONE
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The tragedy of Angola epitomizes Africa's current struggle to achieve effective, sustainable

political rule in an environment where the threats of economic collapse and social upheaval

are constants. Yet, even by African standards, Angola's recent history is distinctive. Attempts

to establish the political framework for nation building in the post-independence period have

been thwarted by recurring civil war. The complexities of the problems facing Angola are

greater than society's abilities to solve, or even manage, them. Such complexities have

historical roots and find expression in various ethnic groups and languages, social and racial

differences, the urban/rural divide, conflicting political and ideological allegiances, and

uneven access to economic opportunities and accumulation. Thus, conflict has been the

central element in Angola's recent history. Inability to curtail or manage this conflict over

the last two decades -- partly a reflection of governmental incapacity -- has brought the state

to the brink of total collapse.[1]

What theoretical tools are available to probe into the complexities of Angolan

politics, particularly as these relate to the failure to make a peaceful transition to elected

government? Are the factors that prevented a peaceful transition peculiar to Angola or do

they reflect common problems associated with underdevelopment in the Less Developed

Countries (LDCs), particularly in the context of structural adjustment and the Cold War

legacy?

There is a wealth of literature dealing with the various problems confronting the

LDCs. This literature reflects a degree of consensus about the symptoms of their underdevelopment but does not yet provide answers about its causes or cures. Nevertheless, there are several well-defined theoretical approaches -- i.e.; *modernization, dependency and underdevelopment,* and *statist* -- that have been used by social scientists to study various aspects of the complex subject that is African politics. More recently, the *governance* and *civil society* approaches have also made a significant contribution to the study of African politics and society.

How will these theoretical approaches shape the present study? Are they useful in helping to explain the main questions asked in this dissertation? I would like to suggest that the first three approaches can no longer fully explain the complexities of a process like transition to democracy. Thus, the thesis must go beyond the interpretation provided by these approaches and incorporate newer ones put forward by the governance and civil society perspectives. The latter are more appropriate to the present realities of change which are conditioned by important factors like democratization and SAPs. This is not to say that the established approaches, some dating back to the 1950s, are no longer relevant. Indeed they are. Some important insights can still be derived from them. In fact, as will be shown later, the newer approaches' emphasis on democracy, democratization, accountability, etc. constitute -- in some respects -- a revival of "old" approaches like modernization theory. For this reason, a succinct review of these approaches is warranted.

The Modernization Approach

This approach originated in the West, especially the United States, after World War II and concentrated primarily on attempts to develop a general theory of development focusing on the transformation from traditional to modern environments. It should be noted here that this approach did not develop simply as an intellectual enterprise. The academic concern of modernization theorists was "deeply molded by foreign policy interests"[2] and was influenced by historical factors. The emergence of fascism and Naziism, the impact of Stalinism, the responses to the Depression, McCarthyism, and the Cold War, all affected the West's official/dominant discourse on development.[3] Modernization theory, from this perspective, reflects one of the West's many responses to changing international environments. As will be shown later, modernization theory is currently enjoying a "revival" which coincides with a new shift in international relations. This time around, however, these revived notions of modernization include aspects related to democratization, governance -- particularly as it touches on government accountability -- and civil society.

The height of this theoretical approach's popularity coincided with the first wave of African independence in the 1950s and 1960s, much like its new incarnation in the 1990s coincides with attempts to promote and/or accelerate the interrelated processes of political liberalization and economic reform in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, modernization theory has provided a convenient, promising framework for steering Africa towards modernity, industrialization, and democracy, envisioned mainly from a Western perspective -- i.e., a very optimistic, unilineal conception of progress.

Early proponents of modernization theory sought to establish advanced industrial Western society as a good model "to which the colonial peoples could be steered by a process of guidance and diffusion."[4] It is from this perspective that modernization was seen as the "process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century and then have spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian and African continents."[5]

Modernization was seen as a linear movement from a "traditional past" to a "modernized future."[6] Early attempts at studying the complexities of African politics were carried out primarily from this perspective. It was premised on the idea that African societies were in the process of becoming modern rational entities in which efficiency and scientific logic would replace traditional values and belief systems.[7] From an economic perspective, modernization favored mechanization, rapid industrialization and growth, while in social terms it entailed increased individual mobility, "controlling the political importance of communal identities," and paying adequate attention to equitable resource allocation.[8] In the realm of formal, national politics, modernization presupposed institutional expansion, the rationalization of the government apparatus, power concentration, managed political participation, and the enlargement of the state's capacities to meet growing demands.[9] Within this framework, politics had a vital role in creating the conditions for equitable growth by ensuring social compliance and stable government.

From a Western perspective, this theoretical approach was presumed to contain the essential prescriptions for African development within a Cold War, anti-communist context:

it would enable African countries to achieve a relatively high degree of stability and autonomy while creating the conditions for a "convergence" with the Western, industrialized model of development. Modernization theorists envisioned modernization as a "syndrome" of changes that included industrialization, urbanization, and the extension of literacy, education and the media. But they also assumed that improvements in economic conditions would lead to the emergence of more "democratic" regimes. Moreover, it was assumed that such regimes would be immune to the temptations of neutralism, socialism, or communism.[10] In this sense, modernization theory had a strong ideological and normative character.

For modernization thinkers this theoretical framework provided a road map. What African countries merely had to do for themselves, proponents suggested, was to follow it to their destination; i.e., Western-style "modernization." If African countries still could not find their way, it could only be due to poor judgement, mistaken ideologies, conflict between competing goals, or entrenched cultural impediments.

By providing this imaginary road map for African development, modernization theory tended to focus on domestic rather than external explanations for political realities, and on socio-cultural rather than structural, economic, and ideological factors. When it became clear, towards the end of the 1960s, that the modernization approach was not working, its proponents came to use socio-cultural variables to explain "political decay." Samuel P. Huntington, a leading modernization theorist in his own right, challenged the unilinearity of modernization theory and stressed other important issues downplayed by other authors. Defining political stability as the absence of open conflict, Huntington saw political development as the growth of institutions competent enough to deal with the strains of social

mobilization and political participation. In this sense, he was among the first to reflect the change of emphasis from "democracy" to "order."[11]

Later works on the subject built on this emphasis in order to focus on governmental capacity to respond to, or to suppress, certain demands.[12] Political development was then seen as a political system's ability to deal with five crises or challenges; i.e., identity, legitimacy, participation, distribution, and penetration.[13]

In hindsight, it can be argued that modernization did not succeed as a theoretical tool to explain African politics because it overlooked some essential aspects of the African condition. First -- much like SAPs' orthodoxy today -- the modernization literature assumed that LDCs were a homogeneous group and that their transition from tradition to modernity would be a simple unilineal one.[14] It assumed, further, that the transition from tradition to modernity was primarily a technical problem. This rather optimistic assumption would later disappear in light of the actual performance of independent African states.

Second, by placing too much emphasis on industrialization, the central role of agriculture in African economy and society was neglected -- or at least relegated to a secondary level. Furthermore, traditional norms and institutions were commonly regarded as outdated and of little consequence. Similarly, modernization theory seemed to emphasize inappropriate sets of priorities that preserved the political, social, and economic *status quo*.

Third, modernization theory had a pronounced ideological and ethnocentric character, and ignored the multi-disciplinary nature of the problems of development.[15]

These shortcomings in modernization theory caused considerable frustration in many African, Asian, and Latin American countries that had recently broken the colonial chains

and were attempting to develop. Particularly in Africa, and especially Southern Africa, the rapid and problematic pace of events rendered modernization theory inadequate. The search for alternatives began towards the end of the 1960s and led to the development of South-centered approaches. The most promising of these initially emerged from the *dependency* and *underdevelopment* school of thought.

Dependency and Underdevelopment

Often referred to as the "radical school," the dependency and underdevelopment school has been described as "an eclectic combination of intellectual thought" borrowing from orthodox development theory on the one hand and Marxism on the other.[16] It developed originally as "a rebuttal to 'developmentalist' or 'modernization' theories."[17]

Unlike the unilinearity of modernization, this approach accepted "the interconnectedness of development, of traditional and modern, and indeed of everything in general."[18] This represents a more dynamic and inclusive view of development which is not based on the outright rejection of everything non-modern -- i.e.; non-Western. Thus, the dependency and underdevelopment approaches formed a direct challenge to the premises of the modernization school.

In analyzing the conditions prevailing in Africa, these perspectives suggested that internal socio-cultural factors cannot adequately be used as the principal variables. Instead, they claimed that African development was being hindered by both internal and external forces organized to exploit the continent's resources. These capitalist forces of exploitation

and underdevelopment could only be curtailed if the structure of the global relations which tie the South with the industrialized nations underwent fundamental transformation. Also, the dependency relationships between the masses and the dominant classes within Africa had to be changed.

In contrast to modernization theory, the underdevelopment and dependency approaches do not emphasize the short-term, immediate process or consequences of development; rather, they focus on the underlying, long-term roots or causes of underdevelopment. Furthermore, they assumed inequality and disequilibrium. Viewed from this perspective, Africa's contemporary political and economic problems are a direct result of the conditions imposed upon it by external forces.

The dependency and underdevelopment schools of thought originated in Latin America. These theoretical tools, however, could be applied to Africa as well. The historical perspective could be used to trace the unequal relationship between Africa and the nations that colonized it. By focusing on class and the global system -- instead of the individual and the state -- a more realistic assessment of the African conditions and its development perspectives could be attained. Dependency and underdevelopment concentrated on issues of political economy. By looking at factors like trade relations, capital flows, and modes and relations of production as the main units of analysis, the dependency and underdevelopment schools were particularly relevant to post-colonial Africa.

The "radical school" argues that the problems of underdevelopment are part and parcel of the integrated nature of world capitalism. Essentially, the dependency and underdevelopment approaches seek to explain how "imperialism" hindered Africa's

development. Imperialism, particularly as it was manifested through settler colonialism, catapulted Africa into the modern economy. But it did so in a structurally unequal manner. Thus, on the eve of African independence, the continent's vulnerability to external forces had been institutionalized. African politics reflect such dependency and vulnerability.

Africa's realities have such a high degree of complexity that even the dependency and underdevelopment schools exhibit some deficiencies in seeking to fully interpret politics and society on the continent. Some major weaknesses in these perspectives have been identified.[19] First, dependency and underdevelopment did not break clearly away from the dichotomous framework that characterized modernization theory. It can be suggested, for example, that while the near-universality of Andre Gunder Frank's metropolis-satellite dichotomy is one of its major attractions, it is also one of its major weaknesses. In descriptive terms "it differs little from the modernization theory's tradition-modernity dichotomy."[20] Others have suggested that the use of the metropolis-satellite, core-periphery dichotomies is not the most adequate means to understand the problems of development and underdevelopment. These dichotomies do not represent two separate sets of economies with two separate laws but "one capitalist economic system with different sectors performing different functions."[21]

A related criticism highlights the fact that this approach saw contemporary Africa as a uniform entity. Thus, as Chazan *et al.* suggest, "The distinction between exploiters and exploited, core and periphery, good and evil, did not always permit refined analysis of variations, degrees, and specific trends and patterns."[22] The dependency and underdevelopment schools failed to take properly into account the significance of such

factors as the nationalism of African leaders, the importance of ethnicity, or the intricacies of political and economic upheavals that gripped the continent in the 1970s and 1980s. Nor did they properly address issues of gender, ecology, and the informal sector. Consequently, these theorists' grasp on African realities was seen to be "as skewed, albeit for very different reasons, as that of the modernization writers whom they treated with such contempt."[23]

A second source of criticism emanates from the dependency and underdevelopment theories' assessment of African futures. While they helped to dispel the false sense of optimism that characterized the modernization approach, dependency and underdevelopment were as pessimistic as modernisationists were optimistic regarding the prospects for the continent. Africa was portrayed as being shackled with such strong chains that attempts at freedom were futile. The only solutions were revolution or fundamental global changes. These choices were rather demanding and depressing for Africans who understood their relatively weak position within the post-World War II international divisions of labor and power.

There is another criticism that attacks the core of dependency and underdevelopment as a useful theoretical construct. This criticism regards it as atheoretical and apolitical.[24] Although its explanatory power is recognized, the approach is criticized for having sacrificed a closer study of the ongoing events and processes in favor of debates over macro-level theory. African political processes are viewed in the context of external or transnational relationships. African actors are seen as lacking autonomy. By framing the debate along these lines, dependency and underdevelopment left little room for analytic growth and further inquiry. Therefore, their contribution fell short of providing a framework for understanding

the complexities of Africa's present crises, let alone providing indications of how the continent may yet organize its survival and development strategies for the 1990s and beyond.

The "Statist" School

The search for explanations and possible solutions for Africa's multifaceted crises of development commanded the interest of both academics and practitioners on the continent and abroad, particularly in the post-independence and crisis period of the 1980s onwards. The revisions of the previous theoretical constructs because of the political/governance, economic, and socio-ecological crises, led to a consensus regarding the importance of the state and state actions in the development process. What emerged from this consensus was a more pragmatic, "Afro-centric" school of thought.

This new school of thought departed from the modernization and dependency schools that preceded it by placing different factors at the center-stage and making them the focus of investigation, analysis, and praxis. By viewing the state as the primary engine behind political, social, and economic occurrences in Africa -- and state leaders as mainly responsible for political and economic deterioration in the 1980s -- this theoretical approach emphasizes state structures as the key for understanding contemporary African processes.

From the statist perspective, the state is much more than a descriptive entity. It is *the* principal actor, with interests, capacities, achievements, and weaknesses. Thus, scholars using the statist approach as their primary theoretical framework tend to concentrate on the

study of the state apparatus, its expansion, its uses and abuses of power, its relations with domestic groups and the international economy, as well as leadership styles, patterns of personal rule, and patron-client relationships. These studies have portrayed African politics as highly instrumental; i.e., power holders have created structures of domination that have allowed them to misuse their offices and accumulate personal wealth at the expense of the vast, impoverished population. It is this extractive view of politics, prevailing among Africa's ruling elites, that is alleged to be responsible for the debt crisis, the food crisis, and the crisis of governability.

If the concentration on Africa-centric actors and processes provided a different -- perhaps better-suited -- analytical framework for the statist school, its most important contribution to date has been documenting the gradual debilitation of the state apparatus in many parts of Africa and the repressive measures undertaken to counterbalance the resulting systemic power decay; i.e., the movement away from, not towards, democratization.

However, the statist model also involves some important theoretical drawbacks. For example, as Chazan et al. suggest, its definition and conceptualization of the state has proven to be elusive, and the distinction between the state and specific governments is frequently confused. Furthermore, state-society relations have not been studied with the rigor they require; the relationship between state and class (particularly in conditions of state decay) is still obscure; the emphasis on personal rule and systems of domination has hampered a close analysis of the role of the state in the actual (instead of only formal) political economy; and there is a need to define properly the limits of state power and adequately assess is relative significance.[25]

The statist approach has focused on the personal character of the post-colonial African state while neglecting a closer analysis of state organization and interactions. African politics, Chazan *et. al.* assert, cannot be reduced to the activities of domestic actors because "State institutions intersect with non-formal structures; social organizations relate, or do not interact, with governments depending on changing conditions; and power constellations are not entirely state-centric."[26]

Governance

Subsequently, governance has developed into an important approach for analyzing African politics, especially during the present period of transition to democracy and development, reflective of the neo-liberal hegemony. Although not a new concept *per se* -- it is implicit in the modernization theory's emphasis on effective, accountable government within a pluralist/democratic framework -- governance has recently become one of the dominant approaches for analyzing African politics and, on a more practical level, in attempts to reverse both economic decline and political disorder in Africa.

In the 1980s, after the "lost decade" of the 1970s, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) attempted to induce better performances in African economies through macroeconomic policies that became known as structural adjustment. However, after a decade or more of such structural adjustment -- apparently without a significant positive change in the overall economic performance of most African countries -- the IFIs have began to accept the fact that the manipulation of macroeconomic policies alone would not achieve

the major goal of accelerated growth. Thus, in addition to focusing on broad managerial and/or institutional issues, they began to advocate policies aimed at changing the "coercive and arbitrary" nature of African states where government officials habitually served their own interests without fear of accountability. Indeed, the crisis affecting the continent has been characterized as a "crisis of governance."[27]

The remedy for this state of political and administrative decay would be found in "political renewal" premised in "a systematic effort to build a pluralistic institutional structure, a determination to respect the rule of law, and a vigorous protection of the freedom of the press and human rights."[28] This position was accepted even by the critics of adjustment policies in Africa. In its "African Alternative Framework", for example, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) suggested that governance -- i.e., the "democratization of the decision-making process at national, local and grassroots levels so as to generate the necessary consensus and people's support" -- was the key to fundamental change in Africa.[29]

As therapy to economies in crisis -- in the mold proposed by the IFIs -- governance lacked theoretical rigor. Recently, however, it has acquired some importance as a theoretical approach in the study of transition in Africa -- particularly in connection with the revival of modernization theory.

One of the basic principles of governance is the establishment of accountable authority. In fact, some proponents of this approach argue that it is "the bottom line of African development."[30] For these theorists of African development, governance pushes the rulers of African states to become more accountable to the populations over which they claim

authority. Furthermore, governance can "facilitate a relationship of bargaining through which the interests of the state and those in society can he adjusted to each other so that the exercise of state power might be regarded as legitimate by those subject to it."[31]

This argument, as will be seen shortly in the discussion on civil society, is derived from Alexis de Tocqueville's observations regarding the inverse relationship between the state's capacity to coerce the governed and the extent to which local interests organize themselves to advance their objectives. This is to say that, the more members of society organize themselves into groups to advance their particular interests, the less likely the state can function in an autonomous and unaccountable manner. Thus, de Tocqueville advocated a proliferation of organized interests to serve as a bulwark against unbridled state power.[32]

The existence of a robust civil society, capable of demanding and securing accountable government, is an essential tenet of the pluralist conception of democracy as propounded by modernization theory. In the African context, Apter and Rosberg assert that "to the extent that a proliferation of rural community organizations raises the prospects for state accountability, it can also be argued that the pluralist model of democracy remains relevant for Africa -- indeed more relevant than was supposed a few years ago."[33] This relevance to understanding the processes of transitions underway in Africa warrants a closer examination of this theoretical approach.

Governance as a Theoretical Approach

At the end of the 1980s -- and after some setbacks to SAPs -- the World Bank came to believe that the crisis of development in Africa was essentially one of governance. This crisis

was reflected in the extensive personalization of power, the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms, widespread corruption, and the prevalence of unelected and unaccountable governments. Thus, an important aspect of the solutions propounded by the World Bank rested on the premise that African development would only be realized with the elimination of authoritarian practices. Consequently, the new strategies of development that emerged emphasized both economic liberalization and political democratization. The process of change that has been stimulated by the implementation of these twin strategies is studied under the heading of governance.

Governance has been defined as "the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm."[34] From this perspective, a regime is viewed as the formal and informal organization at the centre of political power and how it relates to the broader political/economic community. In this sense, therefore, it is the regime that determines who has access to political power and economic resources, and how those who find themselves in positions of power deal with those who are not.[35] A regime is not only a set of political actors; but rather a set of fundamental rules about the organization of the public realm. It provides the structural framework within which resources are authoritatively allocated.[36]

Legitimacy, a critical component in governance, is a direct by-product of effective governance and can be translated into social capital or "rules-in-use" that motivate people to engage themselves to contribute to public causes. In turn, this "social energy" is an important part of socioeconomic and political progress.

Governance, therefore, is seen to be a more useful concept than government or

leadership since, in the study of the processes of change underway in Africa, it does not

prejudge the "locus or character of real decisionmaking". This concept, as Hyden explains,

> does not imply, as *government* does, that real political authority is vested
> somewhere within the formal-legal institutions of the state. Nor does it imply,
> as the term *leadership* does, that political control necessarily rests with the
> head of state or official political elites. It enables us to suspend judgement
> about the exact relationship between political authority and formal
> institutions in society.[37]

The Domain of Governance

As a theoretical construct, governance can be better understood if viewed as a distinctive

domain with two intersecting axes: an "actor dimension" dealing with issues of power,

authority, reciprocity, and exchange; and a "structural dimension" concentrating on aspects

relating to compliance, trust, accountability, and innovation.

Power and exchange constitute the poles of the actor dimension. Governance uses the

concept of power in a Weberian sense; i.e., "the probability that one actor within a social

relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of

the basis on which this probability rests."[38] Exchange is viewed as a "mutually rewarding and

beneficial relationship."[39] Although these two notions tend to dominate conceptualizations

in political science, including the study of African politics, they often reflect extreme

manifestations of political interaction. Reciprocity and authority, as intermediate stations in

this continuum, are just as important in the context of governance.

Reciprocity and exchange can both be seen as mutually productive transfers that

increase welfare. There is, however, a significant difference. While exchange relations "are

opportunistic and need regulation by law," reciprocity "is based fundamentally upon

expectations of behavior, not immediately contingent, on the part of others."[40] Reciprocity, therefore, implies strong moral foundations and requires "broader agreement and consensus on the basic norms of social action."[41] While exchange constitutes the fundamental relationship in market economies and economic development can be equated with the expansion of the range of opportunities for exchange, governance associates political development with an increasing range of opportunities for reciprocal relationships.

In order to complete this side of the governance equation it is necessary to link power and reciprocity with authority. The governance framework adopts a Lockean view of authority; i.e., legitimate power or "the voluntary acceptance of an asymmetrical relationship."[42] As such, it is almost a reciprocal relationship with the crucial difference being that there exists an asymmetry in authority relationships.

The governance framework uses the actor dimension to bridge the gap between power and exchange. With the introduction of authority and reciprocity into the equation, governance has delineated "a middle ground, where politics is a positive-sum game; where reciprocal behavior and legitimate relations of power between governors and governed prevail; and where everybody is a winner not only in the short run but also in the long run."[43]

The structural dimension completes the governance framework. Structure is "the normative framework created by human beings to pursue social, economic, and political ends."[44] It provides the "rules of the game" for persons coexisting in a competitive or cooperative environment, in pursuit of similar objectives. In this sense, the basic laws or rules that govern policy-making and implementation are manifestations of structure. There are two distinctive kinds of structures. One is "god-given," forming part of the natural world

over which humans have little control. These are ascriptive or primordial structures. Examples include family and community. Since these structures are not easily changeable -- i.e., they are more inclined to breed compliance rather than innovation -- the development literature has often identified them as obstacles to progress. What is important in the context of governance is that such structures are better suited to develop and foster such traits as trust and compliance that hold societies together.

The second type of structures are modern, "man-made" in the sense that they may come into existence by decree of the central authority or by agreement between governors and governed. They also need both constant affirmation and frequent amendments. In sum, these civil structures are "spontaneously created with a view to regulating political behavior and interactions."[45]

Although modern structures are often regarded as superior to "god-given" ones in the sense that they are able to transcend the limitations of community, they also provide political leaders with greater opportunities for abuse; i.e., failure to respond to the needs, demands and responses of those being governed. Since, in these spontaneous structures, consensus about the validity of basic norms can no longer be taken for granted, trust becomes a less powerful foundation for effective social action. Other principles, including accountability and innovation, need to be inserted into the structure. Thus, compliance and trust are the hallmarks of god-given structures while accountability and innovation characterize modern ones. For the purpose of governance, Hyden suggests that trust and accountability should be seen as constituting intermediate stations on a continuum between compliance and innovation.

These intermediate stations in both the actor and the structural dimensions are critical in understanding the concept of governance and its significance. The four attributes of "good" politics -- i.e., authority, reciprocity, trust, and accountability -- also constitute the boundaries of the "governance realm" and are a prerequisite for effective and sustainable governance, as measured in terms of legitimacy generated for a regime. Accountability, in particular, is seen as the most crucial element of governance and can be achieved "through the requirement that a government's continuation in office depends on the active approval of the people as expressed in competitive elections."[46]

This general framework suggests that "the more regime management is characterized by the qualities associated with the governance realm, the more it generates legitimacy for the political system and the more, therefore, people will participate in the public realm with enthusiasm."[47] Similarly, regime collapse can be studied on the basis of the degree to which these four variables are absent.

Governance thus not only represents a "growing consensus in the wider development community that political considerations play a crucial role in determining development,"[48] it also offers a meaningful framework to study the ongoing process of reversing autocratic rule, preventing the onset of anarchy as well as creating the conditions for undertaking fundamental democratic transformation in Africa, a necessary condition for sustainable development.

Practical Aspects of Governance

The background for the current emphasis on governance includes several recurring themes:

the successes of market economies in some parts of the world -- particularly the East Asian developmental model -- is being contrasted with the failure of centralized planning; the rejection of authoritarian regimes in favor of more democratic and accountable forms of government; and, the greater challenges involved in nation-building due to the resurgence of ethnicity.

As the IFIs now recognize, the disengagement of the state from productive activities through privatization and economic liberalization does not necessarily result in fundamental changes in socio-economic realities without focusing directly on governance.

From a political point of view, better governance involves political and bureaucratic accountability, freedom of association and participation, freedom of information and expression, and a sound autonomous judicial system. First, the effectiveness of a government depends largely on how it is perceived. Those governments that acquire authority or legitimate power to govern through a credible electoral process have a better chance of becoming real agents of change. Similarly, good governance requires arrangements to make bureaucrats more accountable through regular monitoring of performance of public agencies and officials. This is essential to achieve transparency in bureaucracies, particularly in terms of rigorous financial management.

Political and bureaucratic accountability cannot become realities until citizens acquire the freedom to establish religious groups, professional associations, women's groups, and other private voluntary organizations to pursue political, social, or economic objectives. Furthermore, accountability requires openness and the free dissemination of information. All of these freedoms must be protected by an objective, efficient, reliable and autonomous

judicial system. In this sense, there is a direct relationship between governance and civil society. This relationship will be explored in greater detail in the next section of this dissertation.

Civil Society

The question of democratic transition in Africa, as elsewhere, is directly related to civil society. Why did African societies not revolt against bad governance? Why did peasants, unemployed urban dwellers, and all other neglected/vulnerable groups not revolt against corrupt and authoritarian African regimes?

The answer to these questions resides fundamentally in the fact that, in order to maintain the status quo -- i.e. bad governance -- the post-colonial African state sought first to ignore and then to restrict the civic/public realm. Thus, civil society has been either battered into submission or coopted by authoritarian regimes. Democratic transitions in Africa, and in other parts of the world like Eastern Europe, are only succeeding in those places where civil society has been able to reconstitute and provide support -- or at least compliance -- to a decaying state. But what constitutes the civil society?

Civil society refers to "that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society."[49] It encompasses the space outside the state's realm where voluntary interests organize themselves and operate. In its

current usage as an alternative conceptualization of modes and possibilities for economic and social development, civil society has become "an all-encompassing term that refers to social phenomena putatively beyond formal state structures -- but not necessar 'y free of all contact with the state."[50] From this perspective a modern society consists of two inherently connected parts; i.e., the state and civil society. Therefore, to understand the development of the former it is important that, first, the functioning of the latter be analyzed.

From Aristotle to contemporary political thinkers, the notion of civil society has been central to Western political philosophy. This idea has been particularly dominant since the emergence of the modern industrial nation-state. Many early theorists used the term "civil society" interchangeably with political society and the state.[51] Aristotle, for example, equated civil society with the "civilized" city-states in Greece which stood in contrast with the "barbaric" states in other areas. Others saw civil society as an urban society governed by civil laws.[52] In all of tnese uses civil society is contrasted with the "uncivilized" condition of humanity. This condition characterized both a hypothetical state of nature and an "un-natural" system of government that rules by despotic decree rather than by laws.[53] Thus, the classical conception of civil society expresses a point in societal development where society can be characterized as "civilized." This is an idea that finds expression in the social order of citizenship found in the Athenian polis or the Roman republic "where men (rarely women) regulate their relationships and settle their disputes according to a system of laws; where 'civility' reigns, and citizens take an active part in public life."[54]

The modern idea of civil society -- as the middle realm between the family and the state -- originated in the writings of social contract theorists. Thomas Hobbes, for example,

saw civil society emerging from peoples' rejection of the state of nature where life is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short."[55] It is founded in the readiness of each individual to forgo his or her individual quest for self-preservation in favor of a collective effort to provide security for all. The Hobbesian notion of the civil society is implicit in the social pact entered upon by individuals escaping the state of nature; i.e., unlimited powers are transferred to the sovereign to protect civil society from its earlier destructive impulses.

John Locke, another contract theorist, expanded upon Hobbes' formulation of civil society. For him civil society is a more benign, higher level in which people agree upon basic principles for the mutual preservation of their lives and property.[56] The classical theorists, therefore, defined civil society rather narrowly; i.e., the absence of lawlessness prior to the advent of the state.

From the thoughts of these classical theorists, the modern idea of civil society -- as a sphere outside and independent from the political realm -- developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Several major currents of thought affected this development. Natural rights theorists like Thomas Paine argued that most governments have a marked tendency to threaten the individual freedoms and "natural sociability" in civil society. In this context, the state can only be seen as a necessary evil while civil society is regarded as "a largely self-regulating sphere where the good life may be reached."[57]

As mentioned earlier, the notion of civil society was refined further in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, particularly through his descriptive analysis of democratic life in America. Describing this new state and its innovative institutions, de Tocqueville argued that

All the citizens are independent and feeble; they can do hardly nothing by

themselves.... They all, therefore, become powerless if they do not learn voluntarily to help one another. If men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in great jeopardy.... If they never acquired the habit of forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would be endangered.[58]

Thus constituted, these associations also served to prevent the arbitrary and intrusive tendencies of the state. For de Tocqueville, civil associations such as scientific and literary circles, academic institutions, publishing houses, religious organizations, and so on, constituted powerful barriers against both political despotism and social injustice and inequality.

Another, equally important influence on the notion of civil society as it is presently used came from Frederick Hegel. He inverted the earlier liberal formulations and regarded civil society (Gesellschaft) as being identical with "the private and particularistic, and characterized by the self-seeking, conflicting and avaricious strivings of individuals and classes for largely materialistic ends."[59] By contrast, he saw the state as the embodiment of universal values and rational civilization.

Karl Marx would later theoretically resolve this "conflict" between civil society and the state by arguing that, in the future, civil society would somehow merge with the political sphere, resulting in a classless society. But for Marx, civil society was not necessarily dialectically superior to previous forms. For him it was "the site of crass materialism, of modern property relations, of the struggle of each against all, of egotism."[60] This view would influence so-called Marxist states like Angola which sought to destroy civil society.

The practical problems of implementing his concepts notwithstanding, Marx's

polemical description added to the understanding of civil society particularly as it relates to the state: he perceived the two to be symbiotically joined as "structure" and "superstructure." A more complete Marxian assessment of civil society, however, came from Antonio Gramsci.

Like Hegel and Marx before him, Gramsci was also interested in addressing the relationship between civil society and the state. While defining civil society as the ensemble of "institutions, ideologies, practices, and agents ... that comprise the dominant culture of values,"[61] Gramsci uses the notion of "hegemony" to define the state-society relationship and interpret their interdependence. He suggests that the state uses "hegemony" to resolve its conflicts with the wider society. Gramsci depicts the state-civil society relationship as a formula: "State=political society+civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion."[62] This schema suggests that there are two major hegemonic superstructural entities; i.e., the political society -- which rules directly through the coercive and judicial instruments available to the state -- and the civil society which promotes ethical values in the broader society through the exercise of ideological and cultural hegemony.[63] Thus the state and the dominant capitalist class within it are able to "postpone its demise" by both coercion and co-optation of "subordinate social formations."

While Gramsci focuses his analysis on how the state uses its power to secure the consent of the dominated classes through hegemony, post-Gramscian analyses view civil society in economic, political, and cultural terms; both as "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'" and as "the political and cultural hegemony of a social group on the whole of society, as ethical content of the State."[64] In this context, civil society is a

dynamic and innovative part of the superstructure that "represents the active and positive moment of historical development."[65]

More recent and African analyses of civil society still recognize the complex and dynamic relationship between state and civil society. Fatton[66], for example, argues that the "state and civil society ... form two ensembles of an organic totality." However, this is a conflictual relationship in as much as civil society "seeks to 'breach' and counteract the simultaneous 'totalisation' unleashed by the state."[67] Civil society is "the private sphere of material, cultural, and political activities resisting the incursion of the state."[68] It can be best understood as an aggregate of networks and institutions that have evolved outside the contours of the state. These networks and institutions operate independently of the state and often develop and present alternative views. Thus, civil society looks at those increasingly important spaces or sites where "social actors mobilize their resources to exercise political power or to protect themselves from the predatory reaches of existing regimes."[69] These social actors can be independent households, religious and legal associations, cultural or sports clubs, business organizations, and many types of voluntary organizations.

Civil society is, then, neither a discrete entity completely external to an equally discrete source of power nor a mere expression of dominated social groups. It encompasses "not only popular modes of political action but also the claims of those socially dominant groups (merchants, businessmen, clergy) which are no less excluded from direct participation in political power."[70]

In sum, civil society can best be viewed as a product of both state and society, striving to limit the powers of the former while seeking to civilize the latter.[71] In other words,

it may be defined as "the relationships and behavioral patterns between a large number of interdependent actors within a given political territory."[72]

But, although civil society is an important element in the transition processes toward more democratic forms of government -- particularly in making the state more responsive and accountable -- its embrace in Africa has come somewhat tardily. As noted before, both governance and civil society were introduced into African debates and policies in the 1980s, primarily by the IFIs. What explains the tardy embrace of civil society compared to, say, Eastern Europe and Asia? Did this belated acceptance of civil society reflect its lethargic nature in Africa? What are the implications of this delay for the democratization process in the continent? I explore these and other questions in the next section.

The State and Civil Society in Africa

Two factors can be identified to explain previous reluctance to appreciate the significance of civil society in Africa. First, since African leaders often viewed their interests on the basis of ethnic and/or regional affinities, they regarded members of society who organized themselves outside the reach of the state as forces that exacerbate societal cleavages and retarded the process of political integration. These leaders invariably saw their mostly peasant societies as "plural rather than pluralistic"[73] in structure. From this perspective, civil society -- as an organized source of demands -- constituted a threat rather than a contributor to the establishment of a stable and accountable political order.[74] Second, African leaders further assumed that the number of organized interests on the continent -- especially the number based on functional affinities, such as occupation, that cut across ethnic and regional

cleavages to reduce the salience of these divisions -- was very small and growing slowly.

Events in the 1990s would show that both views of civil society in Africa were too simplistic. Throughout the continent grassroots or social movements have arisen in an attempt to expel autocratic, repressive governments and empower African peoples; to reclaim control over their lives and destinies.

The pressures arising from the grassroots have forced African governments to accept new and powerful forms of political intercourse -- i.e., national conferences that have set specific political reform agendas -- and recently, an unprecedented number of internationally monitored multi-party elections. These developments have generated a new sense of optimism about African futures. For many, "civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago."[75]

As mentioned before, the idea of civil society has been dominant in Western political philosophy particularly since the advent of the modern nation-state. Its present uses in the context of African development occur at a time when the capabilities of existing African nation-states to even minimally satisfy the basic needs of their populations, let alone the political aspirations of nationalities and ethnic communities, is being seriously questioned and eroded.

If the classical political thinkers saw civil society as a theoretical (or at least analytical) concept to further understandings of the relationships between society and state, in the present context civil society can be the "key to understanding and addressing the

political and socio-economic crises in Africa and elsewhere, both on the ground and in contemporary theory."[76]

This re-established notion of civil society addresses an important gap in the social sciences regarding the problems of political and socio-economic development in Africa. This theoretical shortcoming has been highlighted by the unsuccessful policies of African governments and international donor agencies during the "lost decade" and beyond. Civil society provides this "missing dimension" in social science theory and development policy by describing how, "in process terms, working understandings concerning the basic rules of the political game or structure of the state emerge from within society and the economy at large. In substantive terms, civil society typically refers to the points of agreement on what those working rules *should* be."[77]

The usefulness of civil society as an element of theory rests on the possibilities this notion offers to understanding these state-society relations. The idea of civil society can serve to shift the focus from the question of power balances and/or conflicts between the state and society to the more important questions concerning their interdependence. Used in this form, civil society offers a basis for "ongoing empirical investigation on the bases of state legitimacy, and it does so without presuming any necessary connection between legitimacy and democracy."[78] Since this implies that both state and society are empirically as well as analytically distinct, the nature, degree, and consequences of this autonomy constitute researchable empirical questions.[79]

From this perspective, the state is different from civil society in the sense that it is the main defining principle of the political order. Civil society, then, is the means by which the

organizing principles of the state and society at large are harmonized.

In Africa, as Bayart argues, the interests of the state and society are not harmonized since the former emerged, in whatever form, as an "excrescence" developing in and upon society. It developed with a natural tendency to multiply its specialist apparatuses, subjecting populations, and finally subjecting the activities of society to its control.[80]

This stands in stark contrast with modern liberal democracies where the state and civil society relate to each other in a situation of "balanced opposition". In these societies, "the state is not a separate and superior entity ruling over the underlying society, but it is conditioned by society and thus subordinated to it."[81] Civil society not only delineates the boundaries of the state by resisting its "predatory reach", it also has the potential to challenge the most repressive aspects of the state and force it to comply with the public will. In this sense, civil society often becomes both the foundation and the driving force for reform.

In post-colonial Africa, however, the relationship between the state and civil society is more problematic. There,

> a heterogeneous state, either imposed by colonial rule or created by
> revolutionary will (often modelled on other states), has been deliberately set
> up *against* civil society rather than evolved in continual conflict with it.[82]

From this perspective, the ideologies adopted by many ruling parties in post-colonial Africa were used as a convenient cover to camouflage the "hegemonic imperative" of the state and its ruling classes in their attempt to control and shape civil society. The post-colonial African state sought to control and shape civil society by defining the basis and criteria for access to the political system. This often took the form of preventing subordinate

groups from transforming themselves into autonomous and pluralistic organizations. This process was facilitated by the institutionalization of single-party regimes in Africa; i.e., the post-colonial "hegemony" of the "African socialist" project.

Structural adjustment is debilitating civil society even further in the sense that it is being transformed into "the prime depository and disseminator of reactionary forms of knowledge and codes of conduct that confine subaltern classes either to old, unchanging behavior, or to ineffective, disorganized patterns of collective resistance."[83] In some African countries like Angola, the dominant class has shrewdly used the market and the new types of relationships it imposes on social relations to maintain power and privilege. A decaying state meant that certain aspects associated with governance -- i.e., forms of domination, the nature of surplus extraction, and the patterns of resource allocation -- not only increasingly escaped public accountability, they began to be formulated in the private spheres. A "dictatorship of the market" has replaced the dictatorship of the proletariat. Now the elites may no longer control political power and the national purse through their positions as the "vanguard of the proletariat" but their real power has often increased. By effectively controlling the market through the ownership of import-export companies, which are particularly lucrative since little internal production takes place, fleets of fishing boats, supermarkets, and other enterprises,[84] the elites have the power to determine who gets what, when, and at what price.

But, paradoxically, even in a constraining environment -- caused by both SAPs and the dictatorship of the markets -- civil society is assuming an increasingly salient position. In Africa, the revitalization of civil society can be attributed to both state retreat from its

welfare functions and the subordinate classes' retreat from authoritarianism. The African

state has drastically reduced its role of providing for the collective welfare of the citizenry.

This retreat is a consequence of economic decline and the ensuing shortage of resources. It

has been further exacerbated by the market-oriented structural adjustment programs that the

African countries have been forced to adopt.

However, as will be seen later, neither the withdrawal of the state from many of the

functions it had performed with varying degrees of success since independence nor the move

away from authoritarianism has led to the emergence of a more resourceful civil society in

Angola, with negative implications for the transition process. The exigencies of an

authoritarian state have been replaced by the discipline of the market -- both formal and

informal. Angola's rather embryonic and vulnerable civil society is made up mainly of actors

and structures developed around established institutions. The difficulties related to adapting

to a new economic environment have led other potential elements of civil society to

disengage; a phenomenon described by Hirschman[85] as "exit."

For Angola and other societies in turmoil, "exit" is not the appropriate solution.

Rather, the key may reside within civil society itself. As Bobbio explains, civil society

> is the place where, especially in periods of institutional crisis, *de facto*
> powers are formed that aim at obtaining their own legitimacy even at the
> expense of legitimate power; where, in other words, the processes of
> delegitimation and relegitimation take place. This forms the basis of the
> frequent assertion that the solution of a grave crisis threatening the survival
> of a political system must be sought first and foremost in civil society where
> it is possible to find new sources of legitimation and therefore new sources
> of consensus.[86]

Indeed, popular protest has led to reform in those African countries with a strong civil

society; i.e., where popular forces have an independent material, organizational and ideological base.[87]

However significant the concept of civil society may be, both in theoretical as well as practical terms, it is worth noting that it should not be seen as a panacea for democracy and/or development. Civil society may also contain divisions and contradictions. In fact, some argue that it "could be as pathological as the state."[88]

Although the view of civil society as "pathological" may be exaggerated, the idea of civil society as an agent of political change -- capable of instituting public accountability and participatory government -- may be just a misleading. Contrary to East Central Europe, Latin America, or East Asia where the collapse of authoritarian regimes enabled civil societies to re-invigorate and re-assert themselves, African experiences vary.

In many African countries, basic issues of state authority, national identity and social cohesion still have to be resolved. Many of these factors are a direct result of the colonial experience. Other factors are directly related to the types of governance that prevailed throughout most of Africa in the post-colonial period. These modes of governance prevented individuals and groups from fully developing their private interests due to the arbitrariness and highly parasitic behavior of African states and their leaders. Thus, it can be argued that the present decline of predatory states and autocratic rule has only now opened opportunities for the *formation* of civil society.[89]

It follows from this viewpoint that the emergence of civil society in many African countries is still at an embryonic stage and its development is problematic. The pertinent question in this context is whether this embryonic civil society -- with its ethnic, regional,

religious, class or welfare orientation -- will reinforce or transcend existing cleavages in African socities.

There are several examples of African countries where political opposition precipitated fundamental changes. But, what do these developments represent in terms of African civil societies' potential to sustain continuous democratic transformation? It can be argued that throughout most of Sub-Saharan Africa "the nature of domestic social formations and the character of state-society relations provide a weak basis for the emergence of a civil society."[90] Many interests operating in Africa's private realm often have a dependent relationship with the elites, are disengaged from the political arena and lack cohesion. As such, they cannot and have not acted as a bloc representing and defending a common realm. Furthermore, as in the case of Angola, the central institutions of the civil society are not only quiescent and fragmented, they cannot survive without handouts and favors from the state. In many cases associations are led by intellectuals and members of the middle class -- a social stratum that owes much of its relative social well-being to the state they now want reshape along more democratic and institutionally accountable lines. Furthermore, and partly because of these weaknesses, there is no guarantee that these associations' endeavors to reshape the state will be successful. The case of Angola illustrates this point.

The Soviet-style model adopted by the MPLA to organize the state in Angola in the post-independence period did not allow for the development of civil society. In fact, it discouraged even the most simple and innocuous initiatives from individuals and/or groups. Thus, important segments of the populations that had not been co-opted or incorporated into the regime -- including peasants, traditional leaders, religious groups, as well as some

intellectuals and members of the petit bourgeoisie -- were not only excluded from the political arena but also prevented from constituting an independent social sphere outside the realm of the state.

The atrophy of civil society is not unique to Angola. In fact, it was felt acutely in most societies where the state adopted Marxism as a guiding ideology. Such states centralized all aspects of life and developed a single political, economic, and ideological hierarchy which tolerated no rivals and where one single vision defined not only truth but also personal rectitude. Consequently, the rest of society approximated an "atomized condition" where dissent became a mark of heresy and any dissenter could be labelled an "enemy of the people."[91]

States, like Angola, that were attempting to develop along Marxist lines regarded civil society as a fraud, a diversion, or even a threat. For them, the idea of plurality of institutions -- both opposing and balancing the state, and in turn protected by the state -- merely concealed a facade of domination which was reinforced by coercive institutions masquerading as benign, neutral or divinely ordained. According to Gellner, Marxism claims to unmask both partners in this deception -- the state which protects civil society, and civil society which provides a counterweight to the state -- and rebukes both as redundant and fraudulent.[92]

Leaders in Angola, as elsewhere in other former Soviet client-states, internalized the Marxist dogma of the withering away of the state. Since the future structure was meant to bring with it a harmonious order free of exploitation and oppression, civil society and other such institutions envisaged to counterbalance the state were deemed both "spurious and

unnecessary."[93] This served as justification -- both ideological and practical -- for attempts

to destroy civil society in such states. In sum as, Gray points out,

> the single most important feature of totalitarian orders is their suppression
> (partial or complete) of the institutions of civil society -- the autonomous
> institutions of private property and contractual freedom under the rule of law,
> which allow people of different values and world-views to live in peaceful
> coexistence. Because they politicize economic life and repress voluntary
> associations, and because they are *Weltanschavng* states -- that is to say,
> states which seek to impose a single world-view on all -- totalitarian regimes
> have at their very core the project of destroying the key institutions of civil
> society. ... Whatever its degree of success or completeness, totalitarianism is
> to be defined by its opposition to civil society, not by contrast with liberal
> democracy.[94]

In the particular case of Angola, as the state became even more authoritarian -- as a

consequence of both the military threat and economic decay -- individuals were allowed only

enough space to struggle for their survival. In such circumstances, only some sectors of civil

society were able to muster enough strength to prevent complete subjugation by the state.

The Catholic church, in particular, made important contributions in this regard through

various pastoral letters highlighting the plight of the Angolan people and the decay of moral

values in society.

As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4, the MPLA required that popular

participation in politics was carried out solely through officially sanctioned "mass

organizations" that were expected to provide unconditional support for the the party's broad

political, economic, and social programs. This strategy appeared to change somewhat with

the introduction of democratic changes in the early 1990s. However, the fact that most of the

new "independent" organizations emerged within the urban middle class -- a segment of the

population that has supported the one-party state in exchange for both economic and physical security -- can be interpreted as a last-ditch, opportunistic effort by the regime to confront its internal crisis by co-opting potentially important elements of civil society. This attempt by the Anglan state to stifle civil society will feature prominently in this dissertation.

Choice of Conceptual Framework

It has been argued that what makes one theory or model superior to another is its intrinsic value, its logical consistency, elegance of formulation, economy of concepts, and comprehensiveness.[95] An even more important standard is related to its usefulness -- defined in terms of a conceptual framework's actual or potential explanatory power -- in the sphere of analysis and action.[96]

If one uses Sa ibrook's formulation, none of the established, generic theoretical perspectives presented above is fully adequate as a theoretical framework for this dissertation on the failure of the peace process and obstacles to elected government in Angola. Rather, what is needed is a theoretical approach that is able to take into account the various factors that influence politics and society. The theoretical perspectives commonly used to study African politics fall short of this goal. This is also the case for Angola. Why? Let us begin with *modernization* theory.

As noted before, this perspective tends to focus on domestic rather than external explanations for political realities, and on socio-cultural rather than structural and economic factors. In Angola, however, politics and society have been defined -- and, therefore must

be explained -- in terms of both domestic and external factors. If ethnicity, tradition, class, tribe, religion, personal ambition, and other internal factors are important, so too have been the Cold War, "imported ideologies", South African regional strategies, and Angola's potentially privileged position in the New International Divisions of Labor and Power due to its vast natural resources.

The *dependency* and *underdevelopment* approaches could be useful if the dissertation sought to explain how imperialism has hindered Angola's development. Although Angola's condition -- and its inability to create a stable political environment since independence -- can be partly attributed to imperialism and colonialism, there are other complex elements that need to be taken into account. Nationalism, regionalism, ethnicity, class, and ideology are just as important to understand African realities as the distinction between core and periphery, exploiters and exploited.

Finally, although the *statist* model is "Africa-centric", its primary concentration is the state as an independent entity. This is problematic for the purposes of the dissertation. In order to analyze the peace and electoral processes, the thesis will need to concentrate on state-society relations. The question of what prevented civil society from playing a more active and constructive role during the twin peace/electoral processes is crucial to understanding its failure.

Angola represents a unique case. Both in the region and the continent, transitions to elected government have been generally peaceful once the rules governing them were accepted by all involved. In other words, there are no other instances where the loser in an election has both rejected the results and has attempted to use bullets instead of ballots to

change a government.

The study of the failure of the peace and electoral processes in Angola requires a theoretical model that is capable of taking into account many explanations. The case of Angola cannot be attributed to one single internal or external factor. Many interrelated internal and external factors -- i.e. the main parties' ideological orientations, the country's ethnic composition and how ethnicity has become a major factor in domestic politics, the Cold War, South Africa's regional policies, and the disintegration of the Portuguese empire -- all combined to make a peaceful transition to elected government unworkable. An analysis of these factors will make up the bulk of this dissertation.

In the final analysis, however, I argue that the problems now facing Angola are a result of a "crisis of governance" and civil society's inability to provide an alternative framework for change. Thus, governance and civil society are the main theoretical tools guiding this dissertation. However, comprehensiveness will require that other important views -- particularly the neo-liberal context and structural adjustment -- also be considered. In any event, both governance and civil society -- with their emphasis on order, accountability, pluralism, and transition to democracy -- borrow somewhat from earlier notions of modernization .

But before entering into an in-depth study of these issues in the context of Angola, the remaining two chapters of the first part of this dissertation will deal with the central question of transition to democracy and elected government in Africa. I start with a short continental overview. Given the constant changes taking place on the continent, such an overview cannot be either exhaustive or timeless. It is simply meant to support the argument

that Angola's transition to democracy and elected government is part of a continental movement in the same direction. The subsequent chapter looks at examples of two countries in the Southern African region -- Zimbabwe and Namibia -- that carried out successful transitions after emerging from a long period of settler colonialism and debilitating civil wars.

Endnotes
(Chapter 1)

1.Zartman defines state collapse as "a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new." See I. William Zartman, (ed.), <u>Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority</u> (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 1.

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4.Richard Higgott, <u>Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate</u> (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 16.

5.Shmuel Eisenstadt, <u>Modernization: Protest and Change</u> (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 1.

6.Joseph Gunsfeld, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable (eds.) <u>Political Development and Social Change</u> (New York: John Wiley, 1971), 15.

7.Naomi Chazan, et al., <u>Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa</u> (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 14. See also Joseph Gunsfeld, "Tradition and Modernity," ibid.

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10.Gendzier, <u>Managing Political Change</u>, 5.

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28.Ibid., 60-61.

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31.Ibid.

32.Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), Vol. II, p.147.

33.Apter and Rosberg, Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa, 109.

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37. Ibid., 6.

38. Max Weber, <u>The Theory of Social and Economic Organization</u> (New York: Free Press, 1947), 152.

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45. Ibid.

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78.Ibid., 4.

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80.Bayart, 112.

81.Bobbio, 24.

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CHAPTER 2
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY

"In a sense, Angola is the whole post-colonial African tragedy writ small. While most of the rest of the planet moves toward democracy and free markets, this nation is stuck in its own hellish orbit, with a dysfunctional command economy and a civil war fuelled by the momentum of greed and power."[1]

Africans are asking fundamental questions about the continent's recent past in order to help find ways to facilitate one of Africa's most important challenges; i.e., its transition to more democratic regimes. The colonial legacy and the political as well as ideological choices made by African leaders after independence are often blamed for Africa's present state of political instability, social upheaval and economic decay. But it can also be argued that an important reason behind Africa's apparent inability to achieve the political, social and economic development of which it is undeniably capable has to do with the fact that -- for the most part -- democracy is absent in the continent.

Although the method of achieving a successful transition to democracy is largely unsettled -- the final details over which form of democracy is best suited for the African context are still hotly debated -- there appears to be emerging a new consensus regarding the cardinal importance of factors like democracy, governance, and civil society for Africa's future.

This chapter looks at these issues on the basis of the themes and debates emanating from several of the leading authors contributing to the rich, mainly contemporary, literature on African transitions to democracy. Thus, it adds to the three "old" classic perspectives

identified above.

A^c Pearl Robinson points out in her recent article,[2] much of the contemporary literature concerning transitions to democracy in Africa can be attributed as an outgrowth or response to the observations of the United Nations University 1987 publication Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa. Coordinated by Samir Amin and edited by Peter Anyang Nyong'o, the UNU project brought together a network of African scholars to identify and analyze the impact of the international economic crisis of the 1980's on the political, economic and cultural situations prevailing in Africa at the time. The result of this project was a series of essays identifying "revolt of the popular classes" and the "emergence of democracy movements" as important new themes throughout the continent.

The following year, another landmark work, the four-volume Democracy in Developing Countries by Diamond, Linz and Lipset, put together a comprehensive analysis of the factors contributing to the outbreak of the various democratization movements in nations around the world. Included in this project were studies of six African nations which illustrated the fact that the idea of democratization had gained widespread domestic support and could no longer be ignored by the national leaderships. Although these two works presented different approaches and analyses of the problems confronting the continent, they set the stage for many of today's current debates on the necessity and practicality of African transitions to democracy.

The word democracy is currently used in a variety of different ways in Africa as elsewhere. It is used, among other things, to mean popular government, representative government, participatory government, and constitutional government cr government by law.

Most authors currently writing on the subject argue that democracy has certain inalienable characteristics.

Diamond et al., summarize this view with their definition of democracy. They see it as a system of government which meets three fundamental conditions:

> ... meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties --freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations -- sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.[3]

Ironically, Africa's initial transition from colonial rule to statehood was partly fuelled by democratic ideals and pressures. But, immediately after independence, prospects for a peaceful transition to democratic governments on the continent were dampened by the subsequent crises of handover and *legitimation*.

For the most part, the colonial rulers abandoned Africa without building the necessary institutions capable of managing the transition to statehood. Moreover, most of the new African leaders believed that, by virtue of their leadership in the nationalist struggle for independence, they should immediately ascend to the top political, military and economic/financial positions in the young nations. Since the top positions were limited -- both in number and in the extent of the rewards they generated -- this often bred competition and instability.

An example of this could be seen in Zaïre, where the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) led by Patrice Lumumba was immediately pitted against Joseph Kasavubu's

Association des Bakongo du Congo after independence. A government of national unity was formed with Lumumba as Prime Minister and Kasavubu as President. However, from the outset, friction arose between the two over questions of authority. Gridlock ensued, and each side -- in a bizarre play that would be re-enacted some three decades later with a different set of characters -- declared the other illegitimate and claimed control over the central government, thus preventing it from stopping the initial secession of the copper-rich southern-most portion of the nation, Katanga (modern day Shaba). The new country rapidly moved to the verge of civil war and complete break-up, until Joseph Desiré Mobutu staged a successful military coup (one of Africa's first) and solidified his absolute control over the nation.

Once these African nations had successfully gained their independence, debates over democracy and development shifted from a relatively greater emphasis on political issues -- i.e., questions related to transfer of power from colonial/settler regimes to the majority African population -- to equally relevant socio-economic questions. While the older democracies in the West focused on the relationships between formal and legal equality and political democracy, most African governments -- enchanted by the prevailing egalitarian dogma of "African Socialism" and inspired by statist approaches to development -- focused as well on production, distribution, property-holding and class. They asserted their democratic legitimacy in the language of economics, pointing to their supposed egalitarian modes of ownership of capital, production and distribution, guarantees of employment, and their devotion to public planning. Many also focused on issues of basic human needs (BHN) like education, health, shelter, and infrastructure. They often restricted civil society and

denigrated the role of multi-party parliamentary politics, favoring a monolithic one-party

system for guidance on how to reach societal objectives and to resolve -- or at least to

minimize -- ethnic, regional, and racial cleavages.

Furthermore as Björn Beckman argues in his classic article,[4] the West was also ready

to sacrifice democracy in the name of development:

> For many of the early African advocates of one-party or no-party rule, the
> national development project was too urgent and too sensitive to be exposed
> to the divisiveness of competitive party politics, a view which gained some
> support from scholars in the West. Economic development, it was argued,
> must come first and was likely to require authoritarian government. Some
> scholars, like Huntington (1968), were more brutally "realistic" than others,
> but "liberals" generally were quite ready to subordinate the case for liberal
> democracy to other developmental imperatives: order, stability, efficiency,
> growth, etc. The primacy of "development," is reflected also in the way in
> which those who favor liberal democracy often feel obliged to support their
> case with reference to economic performance.

Most African rulers were never quite able to resolve the various seemingly

contradictory choices before them -- i.e., democracy vs. development; statism implicit in the

models of "African socialism" vs. the pluralism advocated by some proponents of

modernization theory or the more authoritarian Huntingtonian versions of it. In the end, these

same leaders could do no better than betray their nations by imposing foreign ideas and

governmental systems upon the people. Some sought to turn away completely from the

capitalism because it was closely associated with colonial-settler systems they had just

overcome. But instead of looking within their own borders for entirely African solutions to

their problems, the new rulers turned to systems which often reflected the nation(s) where

they had been formally educated. Some other leaders attempted to customize these foreign

ideologies to African situations and, sadly enough, for personal gain. The net result has often been economic disaster and political instability.

Many of Africa's independence leaders also sought non-aligned paths between the great power blocs of the East and West, in order to truly extricate any external influences from their nations. Examples include Julius Nyerere's *Ujamaa,* Senghor's "African Socialism" and Sekou Toure's "Communocracy". Although all argued that their system was unique, one factor was similar in most of these hybrid movements -- a preference for an all-encompassing one-party political system.

It is now accepted that the major limitation for Africa resided not so much in African leaders' ability to theorize new democratic formulas nor in their inability to theorize new developmental formulas but in their inability to develop democratic institutions. Had democratic institutions and organized groups in civil society been given the time and space necessary to grow to relative stability immediately after independence, the political structures and subsequently their economies could have been better equipped to succeed. Political regimes which alienated the citizens by denying them the most basic human and democratic rights failed to see, or simply ignored, the long-term effects of political repression on their societies. The question today is no longer whether democracy is right for Africa, but which changes need to be brought about in order to make sustainable democratization possible, so that Africa can finally begin to realize its full potential.

However, as many skeptics proclaim, democracy alone is not necessarily the cure-all solution to Africa's problems. Immediately rushing to the Western form of liberal democracy without exploring alternatives -- particularly innovative African forms and practices

emanating from civil society -- could easily lead to further political and economic chaos. Diamond argues, for example, that democracy should be viewed as a process that could enable countries to evolve from authoritarian regimes to more open political systems.[5]

For Claude Ake, orthodox liberal democracy is basically "the line of least resistance" and Africa should not settle for it simply because of an inability to customize other forms of democracy to meet its needs. Reverting to a theme that has echoed in Africa since independence, Ake maintains that "in order for African democracy to be relevant and sustainable it will have to be radically different from liberal democracy. It will have to de-emphasize abstract political rights and stress concrete economic rights, because the demand for democracy in Africa draws much of its impetus from the prevailing economic conditions within."[6]

Ake argues that liberal democracy in the Western tradition, which advocates universalism, is historically specific. It is born of the emergence of industrial society, and is a product of a "socially atomized society" where production and exchange are already codified. It is a society based on the market, where common interests are problematic in the face of the plethora of private interests.

For African democracy to be relevant it must be unique in the sense that it reflects the socio-cultural realities of Africa. Africa is a continent based on communal societies. Its communalism still largely defines the peoples' perception of self-interest, their freedom and their location in the social whole. Thus it would seem inadvisable to once again embrace models of societal structures which do not take the specifics of Africa into account.

Julius Nyang'oro[7] also beckons those involved in Africa's transitions to democracy

to look beyond a liberal democracy model which will undoubtedly be dominated by elites. Such a model often relegates the needs of the general population to a secondary role, while the elites use their power to influence every aspect of the nation's economy to their advantage. Despite his misgivings, however, Nyang'oro acknowledges the fact that -- its limitations notwithstanding -- liberal democracy represents a step forward from one-party or military authoritarianism.

The issue of class in the context of transitions to democracy is analyzed by Björn Beckman, who raises important and pertinent questions relating to the possibility of bourgeois democracy in a society that is for the most part non-bourgeois. For Beckman, Africa cannot have liberal or "bourgeois democracy" so long as there is no proper bourgeoisie.[8]

Nyang'oro and Beckman represent an increasingly dominant view claiming that the promotion of liberal democracy in Africa may not bring about meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups -- especially political parties -- for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force. Self-seeking bourgeois groups will continue to be the immediate beneficiaries of elections and the rules of the game will remain heavily tilted against popular democratic movements. The latter will continue to face repression, frustration, and manipulation.

Africa's tradition of consensus politics seems to collide with a Western "winner-takes-all" election model, especially when political power means control of the all-important patronage machine and access to economic/financial riches. Opposition parties, seeing in defeat at the ballot box a total loss of power, may fall apart or fail to function as an

opposition -- or even, as in Angola, return to war. Until election losers are reassured that they will not lose everything Africa's transitions to democracy will continue to be problematic. The alternative may reside beyond Western views of multipartyism. There is a growing recognition of the need to create a system that focuses both on economic development as well as the political aspects inherent in the transition to democracy.

Pearl Robinson[9] addresses some of the concerns raised by skeptics of the transitions to democracy in Africa by emphasizing the need to foster "a propertied, entrepreneurial middle class to serve as the custodians of democracy". She also advocates the need for constitutional reforms which guarantee individuals' protection from the state and which affirm civil liberties in the form of a Bill of Rights or some other legally binding contract. Yet, Robinson acknowledges the challenges involved in such arrangements in light of the fact that not all cultures deem the individual's rights as paramount as in the traditional Western context.

Although some advocates of democracy in Africa would prefer indigenous forms -- like, for example, Museveni's regime in Uganda -- there are certain undeniable factors which may continue to stymie such efforts. The end of the Cold War represents in many respects the triumph of Western ideology. It is therefore somewhat problematic as to whether indigenous, untested ideas of democracy will be able to emerge and survive even in a continent fast losing its relevance. As Ake aptly remarks, "it is far more likely that any deviation from orthodox liberal democracy, any distrust of the market, will invoke retribution."[10] In other words, the West is usually more inclined to extend support -- political, economic, technological, etc. -- to countries that are regarded as adhering to the

precepts of neo-liberal hegemony. Thus, the desire to gain favors from the West is also an important element in explaining the continental movement towards more democratic regimes.

A Continental Overview

African politics are undergoing a fundamental transformation, particularly in the methods of defining and transferring power. The military *coup d'etat* -- once the most prevalent way of inducing change against the will of those in office -- is slowly being replaced by "managed political transitions" that bring democratically elected governments to power.[11]

This process of change underway in Africa -- often referred to as democratization -- has been precipitated by two important factors. First, the collapse of Soviet Communism and the end of the Cold War have rendered Africa strategically insignificant while offering the promise of reform and revival. Moreover, both milestones served to further legitimize democracy and civil society globally.

The second factor has to do with structural adjustment.[12] The Western nations have used the Bretton Woods organizations to promote privatization, free markets, floating currencies, and a variety of other economic reforms. Soon after these prescriptions became the new orthodoxy, all those involved -- from the North and the South -- realized that such fundamental economic reform could not be sustained without political reform.[13]

SAP shock therapy led to an almost immediate and sharp drop in the living standards of most Africans mainly due to a steep rise in the price of food, education, and health care.[14]

Predictably, the hostility directed at the "Terrible Two" (World Bank and the IMF)[15] also touched the old African rulers who were perceived both as corrupt and remote -- the main cause of their misery reflected in high prices, shortages, and unemployment. In this sense, Africa's move toward multi-party democracy can also be interpreted as a clear uprising against impoverishment.

Like the independence movement of a generation ago, the change toward multi-party democracy is sweeping Africa -- from Cairo to Cape Town.[16] This movement began in the former French colonies where governments were forced to legalize opposition parties and hold sovereign national conferences made up of representatives of the civil society. In the late 1980s, many African countries began establishing political systems that bear some resemblance to democratic regimes. Most African countries have now accepted multi-party elections as the principal means for restructuring their political systems. There is a recognition that, by its nature, democracy can provide an inclusive and non-violent means of conflict resolution and overall management of change. Thus, it provides a clear alternative to the political violence that has consumed much of Africa's resources in recent decades. The transition to democratically elected governments can also help to reverse Africa's lamentable economic situation since well-structured democratic governments will be more responsive to the material needs of the population.

There are some similarities between the two distinctive African "liberations". As in the 1960s -- when political independence was regarded as a panacea -- democratization is now seen as a sort of "salvation" from past ills. The process of transition to elected government and democracy, however, is a very complex one, particularly given Africa's

political culture and its capacity or lack thereof to deal with it. Democracy in Africa is often simplistically equated with the holding of elections. The reality, however, is more complex. While some transitions have been hailed internationally for their transparency and fairness, others have been highly controversial. In the following paragraphs I present a short typology of transitions in Africa.

Troubled Transitions

Elections have recently taken place in many African countries. For a variety of reasons, however, these alone have not contributed to a smooth transition to democratic government. In fact, many countries have moved from rebellion to peace to elections only to descend back to civil war. As will be argued in the case of Angola, there is a need to create a political and institutional buffer area to minimize conflict between the opponents and thus reduce the risk of a return to civil war and/or other forms of violent disorder. As already noted in the previous chapter, civil society can facilitate the creation of this buffer area through the development of political parties, civic organizations, NGOs, independent media, and various other structures capable of acting as escape mechanisms for the ongoing conflicts in these countries.

Angola is not the only African example of the complexities and uncertainties involved in undertaking a transition process to democratic government. In *Nigeria*, for example, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, the former military ruler in Nigeria, attempted to implement a "perfect" managed transition from military rule to a democratically elected government. He created two political parties and guided the writing of their platforms -- one

a little bit right of centre, the other a little to the left. To keep the transition process clean, he decreed that no former politician or military coup leader -- including himself -- could run for office. Furthermore, he rejected several nominees before the parties selected two candidates that met his standards: Moshood K.O. Abiola for the left-of-centre Social Democratic Party and Bashir Tofa for the right-of-centre National Republican Convention. After voting was held, however, Gen. Babangida annulled the results although Abiola apparently won the elections.[17] Strikes and riots followed, forcing Babangida to step down and name a civilian administrator. Gen. Sani Abacha soon took over the government, "clumsily dissolved the elected federal, state and local governments Babangida had installed, replaced governors with soldiers and wiped out years of market reforms."[18]

But there are still other examples of African nations facing very difficult transitions. *Burundi* and *Rwanda* constitute extreme examples of transition processes gone wrong. In Burundi, the former military ruler, Maj. Pierre Buyoya, was also recently defeated at the polls. Melchior Ndadaye was elected president in June 1993, giving the majority Hutu ethnic group its first president. Ndadaye's party, the Burundi Democratic Front, also secured a majority in the National Assembly by winning 65 of the 85 seats.[19] However, soon after being sworn in as president, Ndadaye was assassinated in an attempted military coup, plunging the country into near anarchy fueled by inter-ethnic strife. Ndadaye's successor died in the plane crash that also killed President Habyarimana of neighboring Rwanda.

In Rwanda, the death of Habyarimana touched off unprecedented ethnic slaughter resulting in the exodus of several million people. The Rwandan Patriotic Front -- formerly a guerrilla group -- has succeeded in restoring order in Rwanda and promises to undertake

democratic reforms.

The international media and NGOs have highlighted *Somalia*'s problems of transition. In 1991, rebels drove dictator Mohamed Siad Barre from the country. The ensuing battle for control of government, however, pushed Somalia into anarchy and famine. A massive international humanitarian effort has alleviated human suffering somewhat but the military component of this intervention has not succeeded in establishing a legitimate government authority in the country.

In *Liberia*, rebels killed former dictator Samuel Doe -- who was regarded as corrupt and the main impediment for democratic rule. After Doe's death, however, the country was plunged into all-out civil war. The three main militias and the interim government reached an agreement to end the civil war but the devolution of power to a civilian government is still problematic.

Zaire's transition to democracy is being undermined by President Mobutu Sesse Seko as the country further slips dangerously into uncontrollable anarchy. This transition was designed to allow Mobutu to reign but not govern. However, serious problems soon arose. Mobutu first accepted the High Council of the Republic -- the interim body chosen by a national democracy conference to lead the country to elections -- as Zaire's ruling body. Also, after rejecting other nominees, he accepted Etienne Tshisekedi as the High Council's choice for prime minister. However, when the prime minister -- a former Mobutu crony -- began to show signs that "he was as hungry for power as the President"[20] he was sacked and replaced by Faustin Birindwa. The former parliament (pre-dating the High Council) was reconvened to give legitimacy to Birindwa. Tshisekedi, however, refused to resign arguing

that only the High Council had the authority to dismiss him. As a result, in an ironic throwback to the early years of independence, Zaire -- one of Angola's neighbors -- presently has two rival but ineffective governments.

In *Sudan*, a nominally democratic government was overthrown by Muslim fundamentalists in 1989. Coup leader, Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir, then established a militant Islamic government. Since this latest coup, basic freedoms have been curtailed; the press is government-controlled; political parties are prohibited; and free trade unions have been replaced by ones compliant with the regime. A Sudanese government minister is quoted as saying that "there is a thin line between opposition and treason."[21] The Sudanese government believes that "Islamic rule will bring a benign autocracy, accountable through a series of consultative bodies, replacing military rule without the uncertainties of multi-party democracy;"[22] i.e.; an indigenous definition of "democracy." Meanwhile, the country is still living through a long-standing, vicious racial civil war between the government-controlled "Muslim" North and the "Christian" South.

Finally, the transition to democracy in *Swaziland*, in Southern Africa, is also very problematic. A monarchy was installed upon receiving independence from Britain in 1968. In 1973 it imposed a state of emergency which banned all political parties and unauthorized political gatherings. The current monarch -- King Mswati III -- faces increasing demands for political reform. Three political parties have been formed in defiance of the monarchy's ban on political activity.[23]

Controversial Transitions

In *Burkina Faso*, President Blaise Campaore -- who came to power in a military coup in 1987 -- as uncontested candidate won widely-boycotted presidential elections in 1991. The Coordination of Democratic Forces -- an alliance of 20 opposition parties -- boycotted the election that returned Campaore to power unopposed. Three-quarters of the voters also boycotted the election.[24] Last year his party also won the first multi-party parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, political and economic instability continue to dominate.

Cameroon's President Paul Biya was reelected with less than 40% of the vote in the first multi-party elections held in October 1992. His victory was marred by sharp criticism by election observers who claimed that fraud and widespread irregularities characterized the election. Violent unrest followed the publication of the election results. Main opposition leader John Fru Ndi said that he was the rightful winner. Following the election Fru Ndi was put under house-arrest and the government imposed a state of emergency in his home area of North-West province.[25]

Widespread boycotts by the opposition also tainted the electoral victory of President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of *Djibouti*. The May 1992 election -- the first since Djibouti achieved independence from France in 1977 -- was boycotted by the main opposition party and all leading presidential contenders. Less than 50% of the electorate participated.[26]

Fraud and political violence also characterized the elections in Ghana and Ivory Coast. In *Ghana*, Jerry Rawlings -- a former fighter pilot who staged a *coup d'etat* in 1979 and another in 1981 -- was elected civilian president in November 1992. In the *Ivory Coast*, the late President Felix Houphouet-Boigny -- in power since independence from France in

1960 -- was declared winner in the first multi-party elections in 1990 marred by controversy and low voter turnout. Houphouet-Boigny, 88 years old at the time, grudgingly accepted multi-party politics after the pro-democracy movement sweeping Africa briefly threatened to topple his government.[27] A short-lived succession crisis arose after Boigny's death without, however, threatening the overall stability of the country.

In the *Comoro Islands*, President Said Mohamed Djohar wo n multi-party elections in 1990 but opponents charged fraud, claiming that he had rigged the polls to win.[28] In the ensuing climate of instability, the newly-elected president suffered an attempted coup led by a supporter of the unsuccessful presidential candidate.[29] In September 1992, junior army officers tried and failed to remove him from power. Military rebellion and tribal uprising also threatens the transition to democracy in *Niger* where Mahamane Ousmane became the country's first democratically elected president.[30]

In *Congo*, exiled politician Pascal Lissouba won the first multi-party elections in August 1992.[31] The leftist Congolese Labor Party lost its one-party dominance in parliament. The transition to democracy, however, has generated widespread political violence. According to the Congolese government, 9,000 people have lost their homes and belongings in politically-motivated acts of violence.[32]

In 1992 *Kenya's* government agreed to hold the first multi-party elections in 25 years after intense international pressure. Arap Moi won the elections after his government used the police, media, and electoral machinery to divide and undermine the opposition. However, the elections did not produce political stability. Instead, Kenya was brought to the brink of anarchy and chaos with the opposition threatening violence due to rampant ballot-rigging and

other irregularities.[33]

In *Gabon*, President Omar Bongo's governing Democratic Party used similar tactics to win a 2-seat majority in the National Assembly in 1990 when forced to hold the country's first multi-party elections in 22 years. Bongo ordered the election after a series of strikes and demonstrations for political reform. The election process was marred by widespread violence and charges by the opposition that the voting was rigged in favor of Bongo.[34] Similarly, in *Mauritania*, President Sid Ahmed Ould Taya -- who came to power in a 1984 coup -- had to rely on state finances and repressive apparatus to win multi-party elections in 1992.

In *Mali*, the army announced on 26 March 1991 that it had arrested President Amadou Moussa Traore after he refused to give in to demonstrators demanding democratic reforms.[35] Subsequently, the first multi-party elections in 23 years were held and Alpha Oumar Konare was elected president following a 15-month transition period overseen by an interim government.[36]

And in *Madagascar*, Didier Ratsiraka -- who held power since 1975 -- was defeated by Albert Zafy in the country's first multi-party elections held in February 1993. Ratsiraka was forced to accept a transition to multi-party politics after troops opened fire on a mass demonstration outside his palace in 1991, killing more than 100 people.[37]

Slow Transitions

Many long-established African regimes have, then, succumbed to both domestic and international pressures for democratic change. For a variety of reasons, however, some countries' progress has been rather slow. In the *Central African Republic* multi-party

elections have been delayed three times by President Andre Kolingba since October 1992 when they were annulled due to chaos on polling day. They were finally held on 22 August 1993.[38]

In *Chad*, President Ibriss Deby ousted Hissene Habre in 1990 and has promised the creation of a democratic state. The prime minister, Fidel Moungar, was elected by the Chadian provisional parliament -- *la Conference Nationale Souveraine* -- which also entrusted him with managing the transition to free elections. But the date for the election has not been set and there are no indications that conditions conducive to a peaceful democratic transition exist in the country. Chad has been immersed in political instability for most of its existence as an independent nation, in part as a Cold War "football."

Equatorial Guinea -- once referred to as a "nasty little dictatorship in the middle of nowhere"[39] -- is also only now emerging from the debilitating rule of dictator Manias Nguema. The one-party government of the new President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, had promised democratic elections for December 1993.[40] A return to democratic government was part of a pact signed between the government and opposition parties.[41]

Eritrea -- the newest African nation -- emerged from a violent transition and achieved independence from Ethiopia in May 1992. The new transitional government has promised to write a new constitution with the participation and approval of all Eritreans and set up a multi-party system but no timetable has been announced.[42]

Guinea's military ruler, Lansana Conte, has postponed the nation's first multi-party elections originally set for last December. Although new elections have been promised for the near future, no date has been set.[43] In *Guinea Bissau*, President Joao Bernardo Vieira

announced that democratic elections will be held on 27 March 1994. Guinea Bissau's parliament had already approved a package of reforms paving the way for multi-party democracy after almost two decades of one-party rule.

In *Sierra Leone*, the new head of state, Capt. Valentine Strausser -- who ousted General Joseph Momoh in a military coup -- has pledged to return power to civilians within three years.[44] A National Advisory Committee has been established to work out the modalities for a return to multi-party democracy. However, peaceful transition to democracy in Sierra Leone appears problematic since this country is affected directly by the war in neighboring Liberia.

Tanzania's ruling party has ended its single-party domination and has introduced multi-party democracy. Tanzania's parliament amended the constitution in May 1992 and endorsed other laws providing for multi-party politics, ending 27 years of single-party "African socialist" rule.[45] According to the revised constitution, the first multi-party legislative and presidential election will take place in 1995, with local government elections scheduled for the end of 1993.

In *Togo*, President Gnassingbe Eyadema's attempts to hold on to power by constantly postponing presidential elections have led to street protests and violence, forcing 230,000 people to flee the capital.[46] Togo's first multi-party presidential elections were finally held on 23 August 1993. President Eyadema -- who has ruled the country for the last 26 years -- easily won another five-year term since the main opposition withdrew from the race. Western observers reported major irregularities in the election.[47]

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni -- who deposed Milton Obote five years ago

after a successful guerrilla campaign -- is defying both Western pressure and African trends towards multi-party democracy. Museveni argues that multi-party democracy may work in Europe, for example, but is not suitable for Uganda. Unlike Europe -- where social divisions are horizontal, based on class -- Africa's divisions are vertical, based on tribe. Therefore, he asserts, multi-party democracy in Africa leads to tribalism and division.

Instead of multi-party elections, Ugandans will elect a constituent assembly. Candidates must stand as individuals since parties remain banned. The assembly will debate a draft constitution already drawn up by an appointed commission and vote on this within a year. Its most difficult task will be to decide whether to continue with the "no-party" state or opt, against Museveni's wishes, for multi-party democracy. In the following year elections would be held -- under whatever system the assembly decides.[48] Uganda represents an attempt to create a democratic system of political representation based on the history and the political realities on the ground. Its outcome will provide important lessons for the entire continent, particularly in terms of the feasibility of creating a functioning democratic system inspired by the unique characteristics of the continent. Notwithstanding Uganda's attempt to design its own transition path, several African countries have followed more conventional, Western-inspired transition processes. Indeed, some of them have even achieved a measure of success.

Successful Transitions

African experience in multi-party democracy varies from country to country reflecting both major shortcomings and a desire to move beyond one-party authoritarianism. In some

countries multi-party democracy exists only at a nominal level. For example, *Botswana*'s ruling Democratic Party has consistentlv won every single election since independence from Britain in 1966. There are eight major opposition parties in Botswana.

Although opposition parties in *Senegal* are legal, all elections since independence in 1960 have been won by the ruling Socialist Party. The last presidential election, in 1988, was marred by widespread violence. President Diouf's reelection was finally accepted only after the imposition of a state of emergency and the jailing of opponents contesting the results.[49]

In *Zimbabwe*, opposition parties remain legal in spite of President Mugabe's earlier attempts to introduce a one-party state controlled by his ruling ZANU party. Establishment of a multi-racial, multi-party democracy was one of the main achievements of the Lancaster House agreement that led to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

Despite their feeble performance -- and often regressions -- in many parts of the continent, however, stable democratic governments are emerging in many African countries. The tiny state of *Mauritius* has, arguably, the best record for a multi-party democratic regime in Africa. Mauritius has upheld multi-party democracy since winning independence from Britain in 1968. Other countries are also consolidating their democratic achievements.

In *Benin*, for example, economic problems led to the electoral defeat of former dictator Mathieu Kerekou in March 1991. Kerekou, who drove Benin into virtual bankruptcy, was defeated by a former World Bank economist, Nicephore Soglo.[50]

Encouraging moves toward multi-party democracy are also taking place in *Ethiopia* where the new ruling party -- the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front -- has sought to broaden its base by including all ethnic-based armed movements in a coalition

government.

In *Cape Verde*, free legislative and presidential elections in 1991 ended one-party rule which had prevailed since independence from Portugal in 1975. Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro was elected president and the Movement for Democracy defeated the leftist African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde.[51]

Sao Tome and Principe, another former Portuguese colony, also ended one-party rule in 1991. Voters in the West African archipelago ousted the ruling Movimento de Libertacao de Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP), ending 15 years of single-party leftist rule. Exiled leader Miguel Trovoada was elected President.[52]

Promising changes took place in yet another former Portuguese colony. *Mozambique's* new constitution has formally ended one-party rule and provided for presidential and parliamentary elections.[53] Parallelling Angola, a peace accord ending the 15-years old civil war was signed between the FRELIMO government and the rebel group RENAMO. Multiparty elections have now been successfully held in Mozambique.

Lesotho's military rulers relinquished power in April 1993, after the long exiled Basotho Congress Party won the first democratic elections in 23 years. The new prime minister, Ntsu Mokhenle, had won the election held in 1970. However, those election's results were annulled by Chief Lebua Jonathan -- prime minister at the time -- who then declared a state of emergency. Jonathan was ousted by the army in 1986.[54] Further strengthening of the democratic regime has been threatened by instability in 1994, but the regime was eventually shored up by external intervention

Malawian former "President-for-life" Hastings Kamuzu Banda was forced to accept

a transition to multi-party democracy under intense international and domestic pressure. In the case of Malawi, the refusal by Western countries to continue providing foreign assistance in the absence of fundamental democratic changes was the catalyst for the holding of a national referendum on the issue. Banda campaigned vigorously against any kind of democratic changes but was defeated in the referendum as well as in the presidential elections that were held subsequently. His party also lost the legislative elections.

*Namibia*has made a successful transition from civil war to multi-party democracy. After 23 years of war between the South African government and nationalist guerrillas, multi-party elections were held in 1989 and independence declared in 1990. As will be seen later, Namibia's model transition was not emulated by its neighbor to the north -- Angola.

After 27 years in power, *Zambia*'s Kenneth Kaunda and his UNIP party were overwhelmingly defeated by Frederick Chiluba -- a trade union leader -- and the Movement for Multi-party Democracy in 1991. Chiluba captured 80% of the votes for the presidency.[55] UNIP lost all but 25 seats in the 150-seat parliament.[56] Kaunda had succumbed to domestic and international pressures for change by allowing other parties to compete for power. These changes were precipitated by violent riots over food price increases and an abortive coup attempt,[57] which can be interpreted as popular responses to SAP. Kaunda's demise reflected popular discontent with both his style of leadership and the hardships imposed by SAP-inspired programs.

One of the most impressive transitions to democratic rule in the continent occurred in *South Africa* where the first non-racial multi-party elections were held on 27 July 1994. Nelson Mandela was elected president while his ANC won the majority in parliament. Given

South Africa's history as a settler colony, the politics of *apartheid*, character and composition of its society, the prevailing structure of the economy with its inherited inequalities, and the participatory nature of civil society, South Africa's largely peaceful transition finds no parallel in the African continent. However, some of the same factors that make this transition unique also hide the potential for violence and war.

Prospects for Democratic Governance in Africa

Having described the movement for democratic change in Africa, it is now necessary to turn to analyses: what are the main causes of this movement, and will it succeed in bringing about better and sustainable governance?

What precipitated the ongoing continent-wide drive for political and economic reform? The answer to this question is of fundamental importance in understanding both popular protest and governmental responses.

The euphoria that characterized African countries' political independence from European colonial powers in the 1950s and 1960s was short-lived. Instead of inaugurating a new era of socioeconomic progress, political independence was followed by a multi-faceted crisis of governance and development. This crisis was reflected in both rapid economic decline and a related loss of political legitimacy, especially in the 1980s, making transitions indispensable in the 1990s.

Political legitimacy for post-colonial African leaders was derived largely from both their zeal in dismantling colonial structures and replacing them with "popular" ones as well

as their ability to establish informal rules for the distribution of the fruits of development. This source of legitimacy was particularly important since many post-colonial African regimes undermined most forms of meaningful political competition that could be used as a means for renewing legitimacy.

Distributive justice, as a form of gaining legitimacy, did not succeed due to prolonged economic decline caused by a combination of factors including falling export revenues, rising import prices, expanding social services, and the mismanagement of state-controlled economies. This was further aggravated by rampant corruption.

By the 1980s, in a belated attempt to avoid total economic collapse, African countries were forced to introduce drastic adjustment measures designed and implemented with the advice of foreign international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the IMF. These measures had immediate social consequences by further lowering the standards of living of an already impoverished continent.

From a political perspective, the combination of externally-driven austerity and internal corruption -- together with lingering militarism and continuing fragmentation of state power -- eroded whatever legitimacy African leaders had to govern. Various segments of African societies -- from civil servants to university students -- understood the connection between economic failure and the lack of accountability in single-party states, and how this lack of accountability encouraged corruption. Thus, the movement for multi-party democracy in Africa can be seen as an attempt by the masses to create better opportunities for their economic well-being by replacing incompetent governors while prying open the doors to political participation. In other words it is also a resonating demand for more open and

accountable governance.

Another important factor in accounting for successful demands for democratic change has to do with the changing international environment. The global democratic revolution that began in the mid-1970s in Portugal and Spain subsequently extended to Latin America in the early 1980s and to Eastern Europe at the end of the decade. It was, arguably, the collapse of the Communist bloc and the political opening in South Africa that had the greatest influence on the direction of change in African politics. In the modern era of global communications a steadily growing segment of the African population -- especially the youth -- was aware of the changing international environment precipitated by momentous events like the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of *apartheid* in South Africa. Africans not only understood the significance of these events; they were inspired to re-invigorate civil society as a first step in changing their own conditions and thus altering the prospects for their future.

There were important variations in the kinds of reforms introduced by African governments to both increase their legitimacy and forestall the emergence of credible alternatives from within civil society. However, most reform initiatives included transformations in the structures of the ruling party, administrative overhaul, and constitutional changes. Although they all constituted important advances, it was the involvement of civil society -- through the convening of national fora like the sovereign national conferences assembling prominent political, religious, and traditional figures to revise constitutions, lift the ban on opposition political parties, and schedule multi-party elections -- that had the most impact. By allowing political opponents to become involved

in the political process, African rulers had "crossed the Rubicon" and "set in motion a process leading inexorably to a revision of the formal rules by which national politics are played."[58] African polities were now beginning the endeavor of creating new structures in which rulers and state elites would be forced to surrender some of their power, through multiparty elections, to an enlarged civil society.

Thus, the desire to achieve legitimacy cannot solely account for the decision to undertake political reforms and the relatively fast pace with which they were initially implemented. Bratton and Van de Walle use a more orthodox analysis to argue that major reform occurred due to the combinations of two circumstances; i.e., the erosion of the state elites' political resources to retain political power; and the emergence of alternative ruling coalitions with an articulate political program for change.[59]

What motivated African leaders to allow the implementation of reforms was invariably their basic desire to remain in power. Given the often riotous forms of protest, the alternative was violent overthrow. Still, in most cases political reform took place incrementally, in a futile effort to manipulate the process of change. Most leaders could no longer make use of the political resources -- including the army, the one-party structure, women and youth groups, and trade unions -- that had been instrumental in the past. The cohesiveness of these resources -- based on clientelism, patronage politics and informality -- had been jolted by externally induced economic austerity and a renewed assertiveness of civil society. African regimes, in an era of structural adjustment, were simply unable to marshall the resources to buy support and co-opt the opposition. Here again, Angola is one of the few exceptions for reasons that this dissertation will make clear.

In many African countries, moves toward democratic governance were facilitated by the emergence of alternative ruling coalitions. These coalitions often included civil servants, university students, unionized labor, NGOs, the independent media, the import trade sector, and the military rank and file. Successful coalitions were able to offer an alternative leadership that was seen as the best hope to create new structures of governance. These new structures, in turn, constitute the best hope for reversing the trend toward political and economic centralization that has characterized African politics for the past thirty years. But do the current experiments in devolution of political power mean that Africa has embarked decisively and irreversibly on a transition to democracy?

The transition to democracy in Africa centres primarily on free and fair elections, an important tenet of liberal democratic thought. But even this criterion is problematic because the irregularities in the electoral campaigns and the polling procedures often lead to questions regarding the legitimacy of the entire electoral process -- especially by the losing parties. The urge to remain in power in order to control access to economic resources often entices ruling elites to use non-democratic methods against opposition movements. Decrees to open up the political system are often accompanied by the introduction of various obstacles by incumbents to prevent the opposition from coming to power. These obstacles may include harassment of political opponents; preventing them from holding rallies; restricting their access to the media; and even assassination of political opponents. Incumbents also take full advantage of their control of state resources to tilt the electoral campaign in their favor: voters may be fed, entertained, and given free goods as well as being ferried to polling stations to vote for the incumbent. When the opposition also has

considerable resources, as in the case of Angola and Mozambique, it often uses the same tactics.

But beyond the questions of legitimacy of the transition process there are deeper economic and socio-political questions: can democratic transitions succeed in a situation of economic decay? Or, put in other words, will African governments be forced once again to choose between economic and political reform; between growth and democracy given the need for austerity policies for the foreseeable future? Furthermore, there are important socio-political factors that may affect negatively the transition to democracy in Africa. Although the educated middle class and the working classes in Africa constitute the most vocal advocates of political reform, they are still a social minority. African societies are still made up primarily of largely uneducated peasants whose attachment to, or awareness of, Western democratic values is highly questionable. Finally, is the political elite's isolation a temporary ploy or a long-term retreat in favor of a more vibrant civil society?

These are not simply theoretical questions. As this dissertation moves to a more in-depth study of the transition process in Angola, many of these questions will re-emerge. The next chapter will show that it is possible to resolve many of the issues implied in these questions. Both Zimbabwe and Namibia succeeded in doing so, at least in the short- to medium-term. Inability to solve them, as in Angola, often leads to catastrophe and precipitates a quick descent into anarchy.

Endnotes

(Chapter 2)

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CHAPTER 3
TRANSITION TO ELECTED GOVERNMENT
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Civil wars have been described as "all-out" wars in a limited setting.[1] Given their nature,

some theories on civil wars suggest that a negotiated settlement cannot be regarded as the

normal outcome:

> the likelihood that the two sides in any dispute can negotiate a settlement
> depends greatly on whether compromise agreements are available. If the
> stakes are chiefly indivisible, so that neither side can get most of what it
> wants, negotiations are less apt to be successful. Stakes are usually less
> divisible in civil wars than in other types of war; the issue is whether one side
> or the other shall control the country. The very fact that a civil war has
> broken out indicates the weakness of any mechanism for compromise, and
> the war itself tends to polarize whatever moderate elements may have existed.
> Furthermore, each side in a civil war is a traitor in the eyes of the other and
> can never expect the enemy to let it live in peace. The struggle for power
> becomes a struggle for survival as the options narrow to the single one of
> fight to the finish.[2]

From this theoretical point of view, the most important element in the settlement of

civil war rests on the divisibility or indivisibility of stakes. Although civil wars have different

causes, the important question in this context, therefore, is whether or not they involve

indivisible stakes. As Grew[3] points out. the fundamental struggles over political power in a

society can be separated into issues of distribution, participation, legitimacy, penetration, and

identity. Such formulations, however, are not generalizable and are better suited to explain

political conflict and interaction in advanced industrial societies. In Africa and other less

developed regions -- where recently civil wars have occurred more frequently -- the

distinctions between distribution, participation, legitimacy, and penetration (a state's ability

to extract resources from the populace) are often blurred. Furthermore, issues like nationalism, regionalism, and ethnicity, together with basic issues of human survival often take precedence: they are often seen as indivisible stakes.

In a study of 68 civil wars in the twentieth century, Stedman found that 41 of these wars ended in elimination or capitulation of one party to the conflict. Seven of these 68 cases were settled through negotiations but relapsed into war. Only twenty cases, including Zimbabwe and Namibia, ended through negotiated settlements.[4]

What reasons have prevented a larger number of negotiated settlements to civil wars? Stedman suggests several possibilities:

> (1) civil wars often concur with revolutionary struggle and involve individuals who place principles before interests, thereby rendering such conflicts nonnegotiable; (2) the mere presence of such individuals in the conflict and their rethoric of the elimination of the enemy establishes a key strategic bargaining dilemma that renders negotiations less likely; (3) since an essential part of power-sharing agreements is the willingness for the combatants to accept vulnerability and make their security dependent on mutual arrangements rather than self-help, individuals in civil war may fear settlement more than they fear continued fighting; (4) since insurgent and government leaders must be aware of their own political survival within their party, and because peacemaking is a risky endeavor, leaders may not be able to commit to negotiations for fear of losing power within their own party; and finally (5) the mere fact that negotiated settlements are so difficult can lead to escalatory processes that may negate the possibility of any compromise.[5]

This chapter will show that -- contrary to Angola's experience -- both sides in the Zimbabwean and Namibian civil wars were able to overcome the various conflicts between principles and interests; accept their political and military vulnerabilities; had the courage (or were forced) to proceed with negotiations to the end; and avoided escalation. Consequently -- again, unlike Angola -- they succeeded in their respective processes of

transition to elected government. Of course, the elements responsible for the successful transition to elected government in Zimbabwe and Namibia cannot be generalized. However, these countries' transitions show that some factors are vitally important, especially in multi-ethnic, multi-racial countries with long histories of animosities between groups living in the same country.

The examples of Zimbabwe and Namibia are used here not as a model but as references to further highlight how deleterious Angola's attempts to undertake its transition to peace, development and elected government have been.

Zimbabwe's Transition to Majority Rule

The territory of Zimbabwe was incorporated into the British empire in the late 1800 by Cecil Rhodes, whose first act was to name the country after himself (i.e. Rhodesia). In 1922 the white settlers in the territory were given the opportunity to chart the destiny of their colony. The three choices presented to them were: no change; join the Union of South Africa; or opt for self-government. The majority chose the latter. Although formally annexed to Britain, the settlers were given a measure of power to manage their "self-governing" colony of Southern Rhodesia with the exception of legislation pertaining to discrimination against the "indigenous population." In such matters, in principle if not practice, Britain -- through a Crown-appointed governor -- retained its power of veto.

This continued devolution of power to the white settlers in Rhodesia became problematic some four decades later when the British Empire began to decolonize. In Africa,

this process of decolonization brought formal independence to many countries north of the Zambezi. In Rhodesia, however, self-government had deeply entrenched settler rule. The white minority, roughly five percent of the population, had used the levers of power to oppress and disenfranchise politically most of the majority African population. Thus, when the settler population in Rhodesia perceived that British decolonization might lead to majority rule in "their" territory, the minority government under Ian Smith unilaterally declared independence (UDI) in 1965.

Even after UDI, Britain attempted to negotiate the terms of formal decolonization that would entail majority African rule. Ian Smith and the British did reach a tentative agreement on the matter but "put the likelihood of majority rule into the twenty-first century."[6] In light of the settlers' intransigence, the majority resorted to armed liberation struggle as the means to force decolonization of Zimbabwe which was led by ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), formed in 1962 and a splinter movement, ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), created in 1963. These two groups would conduct a second *Chimurenga*[7].

The war of national liberation in Zimbabwe in the 1960s and 1970s represented a continuation of a long tradition of opposition to settler rule. Its modern forms can be traced back to the 1920s, with the emergence of the first trade unions, and the 1940s with the creation of embrionic political formations. However, popular resistance dates back to the very imposition of settler rule. In the 1890s, the first *Chimurenga* wars were joined by both Shona and Ndebele people.[8] Later forms of popular resistance would be channeled through small groups of black professionals and educated people, including some trade union officials.[9] Such actions constituted a percursor for the first nationalist political party, the

African National Congress (ANC).

The armed struggle in Zimbabwe began around the declaration of UDI in 1965 but had little impact on white Rhodesia until 1972 when Zimbabwean guerrillas were able to use FRELIMO's[10] newly liberated areas of neighboring Mozambique as sanctuary for armed incursions into Rhodesia.[11] The threat to the Smith government was further heightened with the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime. After Portugal granted independence to Mozambique in 1975, Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas were able to conduct incursions along the 600-mile long border between the two countries.

Paradoxically, the draconian measures introduced by the Rhodesian government to combat the nationalist insurgency contributed to the military pressures upon the settler regime. The activities of the white security forces -- particularly in the rural areas -- drove thousands of Zimbabweans into refuge in Mozambique. These refugees "provided a pool of young and willing prospective guerrilla fighters against the white regime."[12] The military situation deteriorated continuously for the Smith regime. By 1976 it no longer had the means to support or defend itself successfully. In that year a Rhodesian intelligence report conceded that "Rhodesia is totally dependent upon South Africa for military and economic survival."[13] This reality forced the settler regime in Rhodesia to reconsider its position regarding majority rule. But this protracted process of diplomatic and strategic transition would take six years to bear fruit.

Prelude to Lancaster House

<u>Regional Initiatives</u>

The collapse of Portuguese colonial administration in Angola and Mozambique threw the entire region into new heights of turmoil and violence. Two countries in the area -- South Africa and Zambia -- were particularly vulnerable in such an environment, albeit for different reasons. Instability in the region could precipitate the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa by highlighting its strategic vulnerability. Thus the experience of Angola and Mozambique forced the remaining pair of settler regimes in Southern Africa to seriously accept for the first time the possibility of total collapse of white authority in settler colonies. Therefore, South Africa sought to forestall the collapse of its own regime by helping to manage a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe. For Zambia, the problem was mainly economic in character. As a landlocked nation, instability in the neighboring countries affected the Zambian economy directly, with negative social and political consequences.

Thus, beginning in 1975, the leaders of South Africa and Zambia -- John Vorster and Kenneth Kaunda -- developed a common tactical approach for peaceful change in Southern Africa. Zimbabwe would be their starting point. Vorster intended to use South African leverage to press upon Smith the desirability and urgency for a political solution in Zimbabwe while Kaunda would attempt the same in relation to ZANU and ZAPU.[14]

The Vorster-Kaunda plan involved the development of a framework to serve as a basis for negotiation between the Smith government and the African nationalist leaders. This framework revolved around several points: "a five-year transition period for majority rule; a common voters' roll based on a qualified franchise; and the elevation of Africans to senior posts in the Cabinet and the civil service."[15]

This regional plan for Zimbabwe did not move forward mainly due to the nationalist

position that majority rule could not wait for five years. Robert Mugabe said at the time: "We want immediate majority rule accepted as a fact, but we v ill deal with the mechanics after the fact has been accepted."[16]

United States Involvement: No "Angola Scenario"

Given the Cold War context, the events in Angola -- in the aftermath of the collapse of the Portuguese colonial administration -- led both the regional players and the United States to reassess their positions regarding the decolonization process in the region, including Zimbabwe. United States' involvement in the search for a peaceful solution in Zimbabwe can be attributed to two factors. First, both the United States and South Africa were interested in an immediate settlement of the conflict, preferably with "moderate" Zimbabwean political figures in leadership positions. The major concern for South Africa was that failure to move quickly in ending the war could lead to escalation and, possibly, the involvement of Cuban and Eastern Bloc troops, as in Angola. Second, for the African leaders in Southern Africa the war in Angola revealed the perils of superpower confrontation in the region. Thus, they sought avenues that would allow Africans to solve their own problems and thereby avert transforming the entire region into a battleground for the superpowers. The new United States policy towards the region could facilitate this approach to regional conflict-resolution.

These two factors created the conditions for acceptance of United States' diplomatic involvement to facilitate an end to the war. The United States had its own motives for engagement. The collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime led to a fundamental reassessment of United States policy toward Southern Africa. Since the 1960s, United States

policy toward Africa had been characterized by tacit support for settler regimes[17]. This was based on the supposition that the nationalist liberation movements would not succeed in overthrowing such regimes. American reassessment occurred only after Angola became a superpower battleground, and United States support for UNITA and FNLA failed to prevent Soviet and Cuban dominance. The United States was not interested in seeing Rhodesia follow Angola's example.

Thus, the new American policy towards Southern Africa -- as enunciated by then-United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Lusaka on 27 April 1976 -- supported "self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of Southern Africa -- in the name of moral principle, international law and world peace." In the particular case of Zimbabwe's decolonization, Kissinger said that "the United States is wholly committed to help bring about a rapid, just and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia."[18] As events in the region would later show, this was a calculated example of American *realpolitik* -- not a matter of principle.

Kissinger presented specific proposals to the Smith government in an attempt to move the process of Zimbabwe's decolonization forward. His proposals included:

1. Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years.

2. Rhodesian representatives would meet immediately at a mutually agreed place with Black leaders to work out an interim Government until majority rule was implemented.

3. The interim Government would consist of a Council of State, half of whose members would be Black and half White, with a White chairman who would not have a casting vote.

4. All members will take an oath that they will work for rapid progress

to majority ruie.

5.   The United Kingdom would enact enabling legislation for progress
to majority rule. Rhodesia would also enact such legislation as may
be necessary.[19]

The liberation movement's response maintained that accepting the Kissinger plan

"would be tantamount to accepting the structures of racism and imperialism."[20] In light of

the African leaders' unwillingness to participate in a process that would delay majority rule,

Ian Smith attempted to work out an "internal settlement;" i.e., a solution that excluded

Zimbabwe's liberation movements. Thus, in April 1979, Bishop Abel Muzorewa was elected

prime-minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, although Smith's Rhodesian Front still retained

powerful government portfolios. This represented ˜ forlorn attempt to show the international

community that fundamental changes were taking place in Rhodesia.

The ultimate goal of the internal settlement was to attain international recognition

and, therefore, a lifting of the economic sanctions that were paralyzing the economy. The

alternative would be complete collapse due to the worsening military situation. As Smith's

intelligence chief acknowledged, "the military, intelligence, and economic arms of the white

government saw the situation clearly: it would be a matter of time before they faced outright

defeat."[21] Therefore, the Muzorewa-Smith government was willing to entertain any new

initiatives to end the war. The new Thatcher government in Britain provided this opening by

convening the Lancaster House Conference to find a solution to the war through the

decolonization process in Zimbabwe.

Although the Patriotic Front (ZANU and ZAPU) were, arguably, in a position to

achievᴇ an outright military victory, there was pressure mounting for an immediate end to

the war. This pressure was being exerted mainly by the Front Line States (FLS)[22] who were

bearing the brunt of Rhodesian and South African destabilization activities. In fact, the FLS

are said to have given an ultimatum to the Patriotic Front (PF):

> If the PF refused to take part in the Lancaster House negotiations, the Front-Line States would withdraw their support of the PF and close down the war. At the same time, the PF was assured that, if the Conference failed because of Britain or Muzorewa, the Front-Line States would support fully a renewal of the armed conflict.[23]

All indications suggested that the timing was propitious for a mutually acceptable

resolution of the conflict.

The Lancaster House Conference

For the British, this peace and constitutional conference represented a final attempt to carry

out honorably its decolonizing duties. To this end, Britain was willing to do its utmost for

the success of the conference. Thus, from the beginning, British mediation, through Lord

Carrington -- the Chair of the conference -- was careful to stress the importance of the

conference and the responsibilities of all involved for a successful final outcome. Carrington

established several points that would govern the conference proceedings

> "(1) that Britain was acting on a mandate of the Commonwealth; (2) that the British were serious about asserting their decolonizing responsibilities; (3) that the constitution was the key to the settlement, and that only when that was solved would the conference proceed to discussions about arrangements; (4) that Britain had long experience as a decolonizing power, which enabled the British negotiators to deal with the sticky issues involved in the conference; (5) that agreement would demand compromises by all parties; (6) that independence did not mean that one side would win but that all sides would have an equal chance to win an election; and (7) that the British proposals would form the basis of the working document -- other parties'

suggestions would be considered but only insofar as they dealt with the British document."[24]

For Britain, success or failure of the Lancaster House conference depended on three important issues: (1) agreement on a new constitution; (2) acceptance of a plan for a transition period before elections; and (3) arrangements for a cease-fire. On these important issues, the Patriotic Front's overall objectives at the conference did not differ substantially from those of Britain. The Patriotic Front's opening statement, for example, stressed the peace and constitution-making aspect of the conference while imparting other de-colonization issues:

> The fundamental and unique reality of the situation is that for over seven years now a major war of national liberation has been raging in our country. This arose from the simple and tragic fact that Britain failed to meet her de-colonizing responsibilities, even in the face of the continuing and flagrantly illegal acts of the settler minority which challenged the people of Zimbabwe to take up arms and de-colonize themselves. Thus we are faced here with the twin and inextricably interwoven tasks of a peace conference and a constitutional conference.
> ... To achieve de-colonization comparable to that in other Commonwealth states we must first achieve the basic conditions for the movement to independence which existed in those states. That was, peace, safety and security for all in the context of which an independent state would be governed according to an agreed constitution, by a government elected by a people who were essentially free and secure when they choose their government. That essential preliminary situation does not yet prevail in Zimbabwe, and even a perfect and agreed independent constitution will not create. It is one of our basic positive tasks here to create it.[25]

Since all sides could agree beforehand on the major objectives of the conference -- a cease-fire and the drafting of a new constitution for independent Zimbabwe -- most of the discussions concentrated on supposedly practical or technical aspects.

The Constitution: British Proposals

For the PF the cause of the war -- arising from Britain's failure to properly carry out its decolonizing role -- was to be the main objective of the conference. Thus, the PF emphasized peace and transition to democratic government as the main objective. Consequently, the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders believed that the transition period should be discussed first to ensure that, in the words of Robert Mugabe, "progress towards independence was irreversible."[26] Britain, however, was not persuaded. The British believed that, although the causes of the war needed to be looked at, it was more important to ensure that there would be no reasons for more wars in the future. Basing his argument on this need to prevent future wars, Lord Carrington maintained that constitutional matters had to be settled first because "the only way to end the war is to remove the reasons for it."[27]

Thus, the constitutional proposals tabled by Britain at the conference would eliminate the discriminatory provisions that had been entrenched in the Rhodesian constitution. Specifically, they would remove the blocking mechanisms of whites in government while including important safeguards for protecting minorities. Minorities would be protected by an extensive bill of rights guaranteeing individual freedoms. Whites would also have a guaranteed number of seats in the legislature for seven years; would receive remuneration for any land that might be redistributed; and their pension rights would be honored.

The PF accepted the provision for a 20-seat representation for the settler population in the 100-seat legislative assembly. However, strong objections were raised concerning the proposals regarding land, pensions, citizenship, protected rights, and form of constitutional

government proposed by Britain. Once again, such objections did not lead to a change in the British position. The PF was finally forced to accept London's constitutional proposals. In part this was due to international pressure, particularly from African countries who wanted to see an end to the war; but mainly because the war caused considerable economic costs and was being used by the settler regimes in the region as a pretext for distabilizing neighboring African countries.

The Transition Period: British Supervision

Britain proposed a two-month transition period before elections. In the interim, it would take over power in the territory by naming a British governor who would use the existing bureaucracy to govern the country. The Rhodesian military and police apparatus would be relied upon in the transition phase with direct British supervision. No role for the UN was contemplated in this process. The British plan envisioned the cease-fire to be "largely self-enforcing." Only a small contingent of 300 Commonwealth troops would be called upon to monitor the cease-fire.[28] The British proposals were spelled out in detail.[29] [See Appendix 1]

These proposals were not well received by either the Smith-Muzorewa or the Mugabe-Nkomo teams. Muzorewa had just been elected prime minister. The naming of a British governor with executive and legislative powers would be tantamount to his overthrow. The PF's objections were both more extensive and consequential. They argued, first, that a reliance on the existing security apparatus offered no protection whatsoever to their forces. A better arrangement, they believed, would involve equal participation of former

guerrillas -- particularly officers -- in the security forces. Second, lack of incorporation of the guerrillas would diminish their legitimacy and chances for equality. Third, the short time-frame for the transition period was seen as insufficient. It would deny the PF the opportunity to move large numbers of people living as refugees in neighboring countries back into Zimbabwe. And, lastly, the PF wanted full registration of voters for fears that the Muzorewa-Smith regime would try to rig the elections.[30]

On the whole, the PF regarded the British plan as unworkable, as "another example of the kind of disastrous policy pursued by Britain in a number of her former dependencies."[31] The PF preferred a six-month transition period; integrated security forces; UN peacekeeping and police force; an electoral commission; and an interim government formed on a power-sharing basis. Britain rejected these options. Instead a compromise was proposed: a 1,200-person Commonwealth monitoring force; the lengthening of the interim period to thirteen weeks; and British assistance for the resettlement of refugees.

The PF only accepted this revised plan when they were assured that the guerrilla forces would have equal standing with the Rhodesian forces before the British governor.

Cease-Fire and the Transition Period

Once agreement was reached on issues relating to the crucial transition period, a cease-fire accord was needed to successfully conclude the Lancaster House negotiations. The cease-fire proposals tabled by Britain included a re-deployment of the Rhodesian forces to their barracks; and the gathering of PF forces in pre-determined assembly points throughout the country once the confinement of Rhodesian forces to base had been completed. The PF did

not agree with these proposals. Its counter-proposals envisioned the demarcation of different parts of the country to be under the control of the liberation movement's forces and other parts under the Rhodesian security forces; a peacekeeping force that would enforce the cease-fire; and the beginning of the merging process between the two forces. The PF's main concern was that its forces would be become dangerously exposed in assembly points. This was put to the British in the strongest terms by Robert Mugabe who was speaking for the nationalist side:

> I'm not going to stand for my forces being herded like cattle into these detention centers at the mercy of the Rhodesian army and air force. My army could be destroyed within days.[32]

Britain responded with an ultimatum. Lord Carrington demanded that both the PF and the Rhodesian regime accept the British cease-fire proposals. Once again, a British solution could be forced upon the two sides to the dispute -- particularly the PF -- because London could count on FLS support. Mozambique, for instance, wanted to see an immediate end to the war.[33] According to an American observer to the talks, then-president Samora Machel dispatched an envoy to hand Robert Mugabe a message, pressuring him to accept the British cease-fire proposals. The message informed Mugabe that the war was over and that "if he [Mugabe] did not sign the agreement, he would be welcomed back to Mozambique and given a beach villa where he could write his memoirs."[34] Thus, the PF found it prudent to sign the Lancaster House agreement that formed the basis for Zimbabwe's ascent to independent statehood.

The transition period itself was marked by tension and intimidation. Serious doubts

were raised regarding the Salisbury government's compliance with the Lancaster House agreement and what was perceived as British "complicity." The African states at the UN, including the FLS, went as far as accusing Britain -- as the colonizing power -- of "gross violations of the Rhodesian independence accord" and suggested that such violations threatened the holding of free and fair elections.[35]

The PF saw an even more sinister manoeuver and was prepared to reactivate the war. This is made clear in a message sent by Robert Mugabe to then prime minister Margaret Thatcher. [See Appendix 2][36] Although these concerns were genuine[37] and could have compromised or even terminated the transition process, the PF in Zimbabwe -- unlike UNITA in Angola -- was in no position to seriously consider a resumption of the war for the reasons stated previously. Elections were held on 27 to 29 February 1980 and the results were announced on March 4. Robert Mugabe was elected prime-minister. His ZANU party won 57 out of 100 seats in the legislative assembly. Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU won 20 seats and 3 seats went to Abel Muzorewa's party. The remaining 20 seats had been set aside for the white minority. On 18 April 1980, majority-ruled Zimbabwe was granted formal independence from Great Britain.

The successful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe provided added impetus -- political, diplomatic, military -- to efforts to carry out equally effective transition processes in a region afflicted by civil wars and the debilitating effects of racist South African policies. A decade later, Namibia would serve as the next test-case.

Namibia's Transition to Independence

In 1884, Namibia, then called South West Africa, was declared a German protectorate. Six years later it became a crown colony. As in Rhodesia and many other African colonies, those who opposed European domination were dealt with harshly. In Namibia, more than 60,000 members of the Herero ethnic group alone were killed by German troops between 1904 and 1907 for opposing colonial rule. Sixty-percent of the entire population of southern and central Namibian was exterminated before German occupation ended in 1915, when Allied troops invaded the territory from South Africa.

The League of Nations subsequently entrusted the administration of the territory to South Africa with the mandate to "promote the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory." In 1933, the League blocked a South African attempt to annex South West Africa. However, it could not be prevented from maintaining racially discriminatory laws first introduced by Germany and extending to the territory its own brand of institutionalized racism through apartheid.

Opposition to German occupation and subsequent South African rule galvanized elements of civil society in Namibia into various forms of action. Ethnic associations like the *Otjiserando* (Red Band), founded in 1920 to reinforce Herero solidarity,[38] played an important in the early attempts to achieve liberation from foreign rule. Other voluntary associations, particularly churches, were also consistently opposed to all forms of colonial occupation.[39]

After the Second World War, the newly-created United Nations moved to create the conditions to grant independence to all "mandated" territories of the former League of Nations. Thus Namibia would become a "trust territory" of the UN. However, South Africa

refused to relegate its effective control over South West Africa.

In 1950, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an ambiguous ruling on the question of South West Africa. It ruled that the League mandate was still in force under UN supervision. But it also ruled that while South Africa was not obligated to place South West Africa under UN trusteeship, neither did it have the right to simply annex the territory. Unsatisfied with this ambiguous ruling, Liberia and Ethiopia petitioned the Court in 1960 arguing that South Africa's apartheid system -- being enforced in South West Africa -- constituted a breach of the League mandate to protect the well-being of the territory's inhabitants. The ICJ did not rule on the merits of the petition. Instead, after a six-year delay, it ruled that Liberia and Ethiopia had no standing to bring the case to the Court.

The 1950s also witnessed an increase in civil society participation in activities opposing South African rule. In 1952, for example, student groups were inspired by civil disobedience campaigns in South Africa and formed the South West Africa Student Body (SWASB) to protest against unjust and discriminatrory laws. Later, in 1955, young militants created the South West Africa Progressive Association (SWAPA) which, for a short time until it was banned, published the *South West News*, Namibia's first black newspaper. Labour unions were also actively involved in opposing South African rule through collective action in the form of strikes, walk-outs and "go-slows," especially in mines and processing plants in which "contract workers" were concentrated.[40] This campaign carried out by students and workers for the abolition of the contract labor system would lead to the creation of the Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC) in 1957, renamed Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO) a year later. This organization, led by Herman ja Tiovo and later joined by Samuel

Nujoma, was reconstituted as the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in 1960[41]. This demands emanating from Namibia's civil society, coinciding with a period marking the end of colonial regimes in most parts of Africa, constituted a source of pressure on the international community to address Namibia's concerns and aspirations.

But in the 1960s -- while other African countries were gradually achieving their independence -- the international community resorted to little more than symbolic gestures to deal with the question of Namibia. Thus, in 1966, the UN General Assembly revoked the old League of Nations mandate and, under resolution 2145, assumed nominal control of the territory. Two years later, the UN renamed the territory with its original name; i.e., Namibia. And in 1969, the Security Council endorsed the revocation of the League mandate. The following year, the Council asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on South Africa's continued refusal to renounce its control over Namibia. On this occasion the Court established that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and ruled that South Africa had to "put an end to its occupation of the territory."

However, South Africa ignored both the rulings of the International Court of Justice and UN resolutions and pronouncements. Instead, during the 1960s, it continued to tighten its colonial administration of Namibia. All major government functions including defence, foreign affairs, immigration, law and order, health, commerce and industry, and mining were transferred to the colonial metropolis; i.e., Pretoria. Furthermore, South Africa extended its "homelands" or "bantustans" policy -- creating pseudo-states along ethnic lines for the various population groups inside the country -- to Namibia. Thus, the majority African population was to occupy only 40% of the land. Given South Africa's indifference to both

domestic and international pressure, mass protest and armed struggle came to be seen as the only means to achieve independence and majority rule for Namibia.

Regional Changes

The collapse of the colonial regime in Portugal -- and the consequent geo-strategic changes in the region, including the emergence of two anti-apartheid regimes in the area -- led to an immediate hardening of Afrikaner positions and policies in order to preserve the system they had built. Thus, South Africa expanded its security and military apparatus to both suppress opposition at home and destabilize the region. In Namibia, South Africa built a powerful counter-insurgency army of 45,000 men. Both Namibians and the defeated Angolan rebel armies that had fought alongside invading South African troops in Angola prior to its independence in 1975 were integrated into this army.

Angola became identified as its principal regional enemy both due to its ideological orientation -- Marxism-Leninism -- and for being the main SWAPO sanctuary. For this, Angola suffered various South African military invasions -- second in severity only to Mozambique -- that caused much death and destruction. Pretoria also provided support for the rebel movement UNITA. In Mozambique, South Africa armed and trained an insurgent group -- RENAMO. All other countries in the region were also targets of either military or economic destabilization or both.

Meanwhile, South Africa -- paralleling similar efforts in Rhodesia at the time -- attempted an "internal settlement" to the Namibian question. Pretoria convened the 1975 Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, a gathering of 146 delegates from Namibia's various

ethnic groups. This conference designated 31 December 1978 as the target date for Namibian "independence" and drafted a constitution enabling separate ethnic governments to develop social policies for their own people. Under the Turnhalle scheme, white towns would remain under white control and SADF would remain in Namibia after independence. SWAPO rejected this plan.

Although the independence of Angola and Mozambique led to an immediate hardening of Pretoria's regional policy, it also created the necessary momentum at the international level to engage South Africa in meaningful negotiations regarding Namibia's future. Domestically, civil society -- especially the independent churches representing about 90% of the population[42], trade unions, student organizations, and other volunatray associations -- stepped up their activities and protests in efforts to accelerate the process of change. Thus, in 1977, the five Western members of the UN Security Council -- United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Canada -- constituted the "Contact Group" for the specific purpose of negotiating Namibia's independence with the governments of South Africa and the Front Line States.[43]

In April 1978 the Contact Group's diplomatic effort -- aimed at keeping the Russians at bay while giving the appearance of movement on the Namibian front -- resulted in the "Western settlement proposal" which was endorsed as UN Security Council Resolution 435 (UNSCR435) in September 1978. [See Appendix 3] This Council resolution once more condemned South Africa's presence in Namibia as illegal and reiterated the main UN objective of securing complete South African withdrawal and the transfer of power to an elected government. More importantly, this resolution laid the framework for a peaceful

process of transition to elected government and independence. Namibia's transition, as stipulated by UNSCR435, entailed a UN operation of unprecedented scope and complexity that took into account the interests of SWAPO, the internal political parties in Namibia, the South African government and the neighboring countries, whose ultimate goal was to guarantee Namibia's peaceful passage into statehood and entry into the community of nations.

South Africa, however, continued to find ways to prevent the implementation of the UN resolution in favor of an "internal settlement." Thus, in December 1978, ignoring an international outcry and the real possibility of further sanctions and isolation, South Africa conducted elections for a constituent assembly. SWAPO refused to participate and the majority of those elected were from the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), formed by groups that participated in the Turnhalle conference of 1975. The international community did not recognize the outcome of these elections but Pretoria did so and named the members of the constituent assembly to a national advisory council.

It took another ten years of diplomatic and military maneuvers for South Africa to recognize that its multi-faceted "total strategy" was a total failure in Namibia and could not impede the movement towards a post-*apartheid* regime in South Africa itself. This new realism led South Africa to join all parties involved in the conflict to sign an agreement in New York on 22 December 1988, stipulating that the implementation of UNSCR435 would begin on 1 April 1989.[44]

Basically, UNSCR435 called for UN administration of Namibia during the transition process in the sense that South Africa's administrative control and responsibility for law and

order would be offset by simultaneous UN monitoring and supervision. These tasks would

be carried out by the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) consisting of up to ten

thousand civilian and military personnel.

The United Nations' Plan

There was little international consensus on the issue of whether or not the transition process

laid out by UNSCR435 represented an adequate international effort in conflict resolution and

the management of transition to elected government. The resolution established eleven stages

for the implementation of the transition process.[45] [See Appendix 4]

Implementation of Resolution UNSCR435

The implementation of UNSCR435 was part of a general accord aimed at securing Namibia's

independence and resolving the civil war in Angola. This accord had several parts, namely:

> 1. An agreement on the implementation of Resolution 435 through the
> dispatch of separate letters from the South African government and SWAPO
> to the UN Secretary-General.

> 2. A tripartite accord between Angola, Cuba and South Africa on a solution
> for Namibia's conflict, the principles of which had already been approved.

> 3. A bilateral accord between Angola and Cuba on the withdrawal of Cuban
> troops from Angola. And,

> 4. The solution of the civil war in Angola.[46]

The UN placed such importance on the process of Namibia's independence that its

Secretary-General was closely involved in it, including the "practical modalities for

implementation of resolution 435."[47] Prior to beginning the implementation process, Javier

Perez de Cuellar undertook extensive consultation in the region where he reassured the various parties involved that South Africa was particularly concerned about two issues; i.e., UN impartiality in overseeing Namibia's independence and the process of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. The internal political forces in Namibia were assured that all parties would be treated by the UN once the settlement plan leading to independence commenced. This UN position, however, was crafted and presented so that it did not alienate SWAPO, the guerrilla movement that had gained the endorsement of the UN General Assembly as the "sole and authentic" representative of the Namibian people.

Once agreement was reached on the timing for Namibia's move to independence, UN experts were immediately sent to that territory to assess how to carry out the UN programme of independence for Namibia. Thus on 2 October 1988 a 23-member advance team arrived in Namibia to prepare the ground for implementing the independence plan. Upon request from the Secretary-General, France, Italy, Spain, Canada, Sweden, and Denmark agreed to supply troops and/or logistical support for the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) while other countries, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Kenya, Togo, Yugoslavia, Panama, Ghana, Egypt, and Senegal contributed troops for the 7,500-person military contingent. Another 2,000 civilian personnel also took part. An Undersecretary General of the UN, Martti Ahtisaari of Finland, was put in charge of the entire operation.

1 April 1989 was the date stipulated to begin implementation of UNSCR435 and the first major step toward ending the three interlocking wars taking place in Southern Africa at the time: the fighting between South Africa and SWAPO in Namibia; the cross-border war between South Africa and Cuban and Angolan troops; and Angola's civil war.

Shrinking UNTAG

The transition process in Namibia was not as smooth or secure as it appears from a vantage of history. From the start, there was a serious disagreement at the UN regarding the size of UNTAG. On the eve of the date set for the start of the transition process, the Western powers -- who were expected to pay for most of the financial cost -- argued that the planned force of 7,500 troops and 2,000 civilians and 360 police officers was too big and expensive. They maintained that a far smaller contingent would be able to monitor the withdrawal of South African troops and oversee elections. General Vernon Walters, the United States delegate at the UN, said in arguing for a much-reduced UNTAG that "modern technology should enable the UN to do its job in Namibia for much less money than was envisaged 10 years ago."[48]

Most African nations, however, were against any alteration of the spirit and letter of UNSCR435. They pointed to the fact that South Africa had an estimated 100,000 soldiers in Namibia and had created a "puppet" Namibian army of 20,000 men and doubled the territory's police force sine 1978. Additionally, there was the feared "Koevoet" force of some 8,000. This force, originally established as an intelligence unit (made up of mostly "Bushmen" soldiers) to monitor the movement of SWAPO guerrillas, had become widely known as a death squad.

Speaking at an international conference in Paris, Isidoro Malmierca Peoli, then Cuban Foreign Minister expressed the views of many UN members when he argued that "The reduction of UNTAG will signify without doubt the continuation of the mechanisms of power implanted by racist South Africa."[49]

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) "Liberation Coordination Committee"

described attempts to reduce UNTAG's size as "illogical, immoral and totally repugnant to social justice." The Committee went on to say that "Obviously, the reduction will weaken very significantly the capacity of the UN to monitor Namibia's transition to independence and to supervise and control free and fair elections in that territory."[50] The six FLS -- Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe -- held the same view. They feared that the slimming down of UNTAG would leave South Africa with the upper hand in the territory it ruled in defiance of world opinion.

Former Zambian Foreign Minister Luke Mwananshiku said that the Africans had "reasons to believe that elections would not be free and fair" unless there was a sufficiently strong UN force to counter South African control over the territory.[51] Despite these protests, however, the Security Council approved the composition of UNTAG: a contingent of 4,650 troops, 500 civilian police and 2,000 civilian officials.[52] A total of 21 countries contributed to this UN effort. (Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Finland, India, Ireland, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Togo, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia supplied infantry battalions while logistics units came from Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Poland, and Spain. Logistics specialists also came from Switzerland and West Germany). In spite of some misgivings from African countries, the UN's transition plan for Namibia's independence looked good on paper. However, violence could not be averted during the implementation period.

Violent Beginnings

Mutual trust and cooperation seemed to characterize the relations between all the parties

involved in Namibia's independence plan during the period preceding 1 April 1989, the date for the formal start of the independence process. Although some aspects of the UN plan appeared to be implemented ahead of schedule -- Cuban withdrawal from Angola, which conditioned the implementation of resolution 435, was already underway[53]; SADF was already confined to two bases; and a general cease-fire was in place -- the situation inside Namibia remained volatile.

UN investigators, acting upon a request from the South African government, found that SWAPO guerrillas had mounted a major "invasion" from Angola into Namibia to coincide with the date set to begin implementation of the independence plan. The UN investigators calculated that more than 1,000 guerrillas infiltrated back into northern Namibia.[54]

An important part of UNTAG's mission was to ensure that SWAPO guerrillas were confined to their bases in Angola and Zambia, and to prevent any such infiltration into Namibia. However, only about 1,000 members of UNTAG -- from a planned full strength contingent of 4,650 peacekeepers -- were in Namibia by April 1. Thus the peace-keepers were not ready to prevent the major battle which broke out when SWAPO fighters were engaged by the defense forces, killing more than 280 people, most of them "rebels." Given its lack of military personnel on the ground, the UN was forced to allow South African troops to join Namibian police in the battles against SWAPO.

SWAPO was trying to get its fighters into Namibia, along a 400km front, to bolster its claim that it had a strong military presence inside Namibia. They intended to set up more bases in the country than could then be monitored by UNTAG. SWAPO believed that this

could be used to convince the Namibian people that they were a formidable military force. Moreover, although it was expected to win the elections, SWAPO wanted to position itself for any eventuality during or after the independence process.

The military clashes at the beginning of the independence plan highlighted the fragility of the entire process and brought calls for a strengthening of the UNTAG forces in order to prevent returning SWAPO fighters from "being butchered under the UN flag."[55] President Mugabe of Zimbabwe echoed this feeling when he suggested that "the murders, we allege, are being committed in Mr. Martti Ahtisaari's name. What a shame."[56] The African states at the UN who had argued for full implementation of the letter and the spirit of resolution 435 -- particularly regarding the size of the military contingent -- were justified to ask the UN to explain why UNTAG was not fully operational on 1 April 1989. Gen. Vernon Walters' trust in modern technology had been grossly misplaced.

The UN independence plan for Namibia had one glaring omission: no UNTAG monitors were placed in SWAPO camps in southern Angola. Angola insisted -- on the basis of the need to protect its "national sovereignty" (i.e.; to prove that it controlled the South, including UNITA-held territory) -- that it should retain the responsibility for monitoring SWAPO camps throughout the country. Had this omission been addressed in advance, SWAPO would not have attempted such a massive border incursion that resulted in hundreds of deaths and threatened the entire independence process. Furthermore, although the "peace-package" clearly stipulated that SWAPO guerrillas outside Namibia should be confined to bases and South African and Namibian territorial forces should be disarmed and monitored in bases in Namibia, no provisions were made for armed guerrillas already in Namibia on

April 1, the day the peace plan went into effect. Even though South Africa claimed that "SWAPO has never had military bases inside Namibia, it is not entitled to have military bases inside Namibia and it never will have military bases inside Namibia,"[57] in fact hundreds of SWAPO guerrillas roamed Namibia during more than 20 years carrying out attacks. SWAPO's leadership attempted to reinforce this force by pouring in more troops from Angola not only to prove to the world that they were there all along, but also to influence the electoral process.

The Electoral Process

South Africa's Role as "Administrator"

One of the most visible peculiarities of the entire electoral process in Namibia was the fact that, under the UN independence plan, rather than withdraw from the territory South Africa would govern Namibia until independence. Therefore, South Africa was responsible for administering the elections: printing the ballots, staffing the polls and counting the votes. It would also command the police. The role of the UN was merely to **control and supervise** the whole process and ensure that it was free and fair. Both at the domestic and international levels, the players involved believed that the integrity of the elections and the transition to majority rule could only be ensured to the extent that the international community was closely engaged throughout the entire process.[58]

Political Violence

A proliferation of political parties was one of the most visible consequences of the

implementation of UN resolution 435 for Namibia. Any political group with a list of 2,000 party members and a 20,000 rand deposit could qualify as a political party. Thus 48 active political parties were formed during the transition period to independence.[59]

Some of these political parties, including the two largest -- SWAPO and DTA -- signed an electoral code of conduct to guide their pre-electoral campaigning. This code contained 16 rules for campaigning including: prohibition of intimidation in any form; prohibition of carrying weapons to meetings or rallies; not holding marches and rallies of opposing parties close to each other at the same time; avoiding the use of inciting and inflammatory language in speeches and pamphlets; not disrupting rivals' rallies or destroying political materials of other parties; and informing in advance the UNTAG and South West African Police (SWAPOL) of their meetings or rallies.[60] In practice, however, this arrangement proved to be problematic.

Two days before Sam Nujoma returned to Namibia -- after nearly thirty years of exile -- a member of SWAPO's leadership was murdered. Anton Lubowsky, a local attorney, was SWAPO's leading white member and deputy director of that party's election campaign. The largest outbreak of political violence occurred two nights after Nujoma arrived. It began when DTA members staged a march into a neighborhood where SWAPO enjoyed broad support. DTA marchers were armed with sticks and clubs, which were used to attack people who came out to jeer them.[61] Although there were no reported deaths, the ensuing confrontation left many people seriously injured and extensive damage was done to property.

There were UN police monitoring the march but they were not in a position to prevent the violence -- or to intervene to stop it -- because, as a UN spokesman said at the

time, their job was "to monitor the activities of the local police."[62] The non-interventionist role of the UN was a source of considerable disappointment for many Namibians who had assumed that the country would be effectively under UN control during the pre-election and immediate post-election period. UNSCR435, however, placed the administrative authority in Namibia for the transition period under the South African-appointed Administrator-General. The maintenance of law and order fell under the responsibility of the South West African Police (SWAPOL), controlled by South Africa. This facilitated South Africa's attempts to influence the outcome of the elections.

South African Maneuvres

Although SWAPO had considerable popular support and was expected to win both the parliamentary as well as the presidential elections, there were some indications that the South African government wanted to impede this outcome. For example, SWAPO accused the South African government of registering large numbers of non-Namibians as voters. The electoral law made South Africans eligible to vote if they were born in Namibia or lived there for four consecutive years prior to the beginning of voter registration. The law also applied to any South African who had at least one parent of Namibian nationality.

During a press conference in Harare on 1 August 1989, SWAPO's president Sam Nujoma said that the South African government had registered some 150,000 non-Namibians as voters.[63] Nujoma claimed that this was part of an intensive campaign inside South Africa to encourage South African whites, who served in the army and in the civil service in Namibia and those who had business connections there, to register and vote for political

parties other than SWAPO. Nujoma said that "fleets of buses and cars are taking these South Africans to registration border posts, such as Noordoewer and Arriansvlei. We consider this to be an act of rigging the election."[64] According to Nujoma, with about 650,000 people registered to vote, the registration of such large numbers of non-Namibians could determine up to 10 parliamentary seats in the 72-member assembly.

Another attempt to skew the election results in favor of political parties opposed to SWAPO -- particularly the DTA -- was the planned resettlement of some 40,000 Herero-speaking citizens of neighboring Botswana who had left Namibia as long ago as 1907. Under the plan, these citizens of Botswana would secretly drive their cattle across the border at night and resettle in Namibia.[65] Since DTA had strong support among the Herero-speaking community in Namibia, it was hoping that it could also count on 40,000 additional votes if the Hereros in Botswana could be relocated.

Although no precise numbers are known, many Angolans loyal to UNITA also registered to vote in Namibia. Furthermore, the populations of northern Namibia accused UNITA of terrorizing their villages. In a petition to the UN Secretary General, 50,000 signatories called on the UN to ensure peace and security in northern Namibia and put an end to the "atrocities committed by UNITA rebels."[66] Since they were South African allies, an outright SWAPO victory could mean military reprisals against UNITA in southern Angola. So UNITA was all too willing to help SWAPO's opponents.

Police Intimidation

However, political intimidation, and not the irregularities described above, was considered

the most significant threat to the Namibian election process. The Commission on Independence for Namibia, a project of the United States Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and the Law, found that "intimidation and the electoral laws" constituted basic handicaps in the electoral process. The Commission found that "intimidation in the North remained high, and the primary cause of intimidation there was the presence in the police of former members of Koevoet, the notorious counter-insurgency unit." This behavior, as Congressman Howard Wolpe -- a member of the Commission -- suggested "attest to a clear pattern by the South Africans to do everything they possibly can to manipulate this transition process so as to ensure the emergence of a constituent assembly that will be far more amenable to South African views and influence."[67]

As evidence of this manipulative activity, the Commission noted the "extraordinary resistance" on the part of the South African government to the disbanding of the Koevoet forces; an election draft law which made "a series of provisions that would essentially deny a secret ballot"; South Africa's attempt to ascribe veto powers to the Administrator General; and the continuance of the command structure of the South African military.[68] Koevoet forces were particularly disruptive in the electoral period, intimidating much of the population in northern Namibia -- SWAPO's strongest base of support.

The Commission found credible reports of "assaults, death threats, violent disruptions of meetings, and sexual assault" perpetrated by these forces. UNTAG was found to be unable to defuse the atmosphere of intimidation that pervaded much of Namibia since it was understaffed and ill-equipped to fulfill the responsibilities of its mission. An unidentified UNTAG official was quoted by the *Washington Post* as saying that the intimidation carried

out by Koevoet members of the police was potentially as threatening to Namibian independence as the massive cross-border incursion of SWAPO guerrillas on 1 April 1989, when the entire regional peace process was nearly derailed.[69]

According to the *Washington Post* article, UN officials, SWAPO leaders, Namibia Human Rights Commission members and church relief workers have accused police of "running roughshod through northern rural areas, brutalizing villagers suspected of sympathizing with SWAPO and openly campaigning for the rival Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)." Members of the Namibia Human Rights Commission and independent groups quoted in the article said that:

> "a typical police search mission consists of armored personnel carriers speeding unannounced into a rural village and flattening thatched huts before troops round up the inhabitants and interrogate them about their political affiliation. Often, villagers expressing sympathy with SWAPO or those wearing the green, red and blue colors of the guerrilla movement are beaten by black policemen wearing red-and-blue DTA T-shirts."

Other evidence of intimidation included local leaders "being singled out and threatened with death if their followers express loyalty to SWAPO"; security forces with portable video equipment forcing rural peasants to listen to long propaganda films equating SWAPO with the "communist onslaught" and warning of the forced collectivization of farms if DTA did not win the election; and security forces attending SWAPO rallies openly taking photographs of participants and writing down their cars' registration numbers.

Most of the police actions were designed to discourage SWAPO supporters from registering and participating in the electoral process, thus enhancing the electoral chances of the DTA, the right-wing alliance favored by the South African government.

Officially, the South African government "adhered strictly" to the UN independence plan for Namibia. Nevertheless, through its open antagonism towards SWAPO, it encouraged a climate conducive to harassment and intimidation. This made the South African government open to criticisms like Linda Freeman's. She maintains that,

> "During the process of registering voters, the general South African approach was reflected in the harassment of Namibians, particularly SWAPO members in the north, by members of SWAPOL and Koevoet, and by laws which opened a wide latitude for abuse. Generally, a pattern emerged which showed that fewer people were registered in SWAPO strongholds and more in DTA strongholds, than might have been expected from the official population estimates. ... these trends demonstrated clear evidence of registration manipulation which cost SWAPO at least 12.2% of the total vote."[70]

Campaign "Gimmicks"

To prevent SWAPO from winning an outright majority, the other political parties resorted to various kinds of strategies including providing free food and drink to draw crowds to their rallies. According to a report, "truckloads of tinned meat, sausages and bread rolls are positioned at strategic locations at the site of the meeting, and speakers use loudspeakers to exhort their "supporters" to eat and drink their fill."[71] The same report explained how other parties hired buses to travel across the country collecting people and shuttling them to political rallies. Often organizers would tell people that they were being driven to "watch a film." The purpose of such exercises was to give the impression of popular support by swelling crowd numbers.

Other tactics included portraying SWAPO as group of "godless Marxists" who were part of the "communist onslaught" in Southern Africa. SWAPO, however, was able to counter such negative campaigning by presenting itself as "the liberation movement which

succeeded in forcing South Africa to give up Namibia."[72]

The Voting Process

The voting took place from November 7 to 11, with polling stations throughout the country operating from 7am to 7pm. Ten political parties were on the ballot, competing to fill a Constituent Assembly with 72 seats. Seats were awarded on a nationwide proportional basis based on a list system; i.e., each party submitted a list of names -- in order of priority -- of persons to fill the seats it won.

Secret ballots, deposited directly into sealed ballot boxes, were used. Voters for whom there was any doubt about registration or identity used a "tendered ballot," involving a double envelope system designed to permit verification without compromising secrecy. Voters were asked to produce both their voter registration card and a photo identification card in order to vote. Those without one or both cards could still vote by tendered ballot accompanied by an affidavit. Voters had a hand marked with indelible ink to protect against double voting. Voters generally cast their ballot in the district where they registered. Those voting elsewhere used a tendered ballot.

Illiterate voters marked their own ballots after receiving an explanation of party symbols and voting procedures from a South African election official, in the presence of a UN supervisor. Representatives of political parties were present at the polling stations in order to observe all proceedings and to raise objections when needed. They were also allowed to attend the verification and counting of the ballots.

According to the UN, 97% of registered voters cast their ballot. When all the votes

were counted SWAPO emerged as the winner, having won 57.32% of the vote, representing

41 seats in the Assembly. DTA received 28.55% of the popular vote, representing 21 seats.

The other parties with seats in the assembly included the United Democratic Front (4 seats);

Action Christian National (3 seats); National Patriotic Front (1 seat); Federal Convention (1

seat); and the Namibian National Front (1 seat).[73] On 14 November 1989 -- three days after

the polls closed -- the UN declared that the elections had been successfully concluded and

that the UN special representative in Namibia "has certified the electoral process as having

been free and fair and the results correct."[74]

The large number of UNTAG and other international observers ensured tha+ the

voting process was indeed "free". The question remains, however, whether the context in

which the election took place -- particularly the widespread intimidation, and overall South

African strategy to deny SWAPO the two-third majority it needed to pass a constitution

unilaterally -- allowed it to be a "fair" election. This issue notwithstanding, an argument can

be made that the electoral results were healthy for the emerging Namibian democracy since

it prevented a "winner takes all" scenario. SWAPO was forced to work together with rival

political parties in order to ensure the viability of a new pluralistic political regime. Thus

Namibia became one of the first contemporary examples of a country where elections

brought about a moderate regime and the aftermath was generally peaceful. This was in part

due to the constitutional arrangements made during the period of transition.

A Liberal Constitution

The next step for Namibia was the drafting of a new constitution. The seven political parties

that captured seats in the election opted for a democratic, Western-style constitution. The Charter set up a Republic rooted in the principles of multi-party democracy, the rule of law and social justice -- with strong guarantees of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The constitution stipulates that the government shall be headed by an executive president elected by the national assembly who cannot serve more than two five-year terms.

Namibia officially achieved independence on 21 March 1990, culminating a very complex and protracted transition process. It had involved a legal confrontation between the UN and South Africa -- leading to a decade of South African diplomatic intransigence and efforts to dictate an internal settlement for Namibia; military confrontation between SWAPO and South Africa; super-power regional disputes; Cuban and Angolan involvement; and economic interests, among many other aspects. With the Cold War ending, however, the new international climate became more conducive to Namibia's transition. This same international involvement, coupled with emergence of viable political forces and civil society's continuing activism inside Namibia[75], ensured the success of this transition. Unfortunately, the significance of this important lesson was not fully taken into account in the international community's approach to solving the Angolan conflict.

Lessons for and from Angola

Some important lessons for Angola can be drawn from the peace settlements and transition processes of both Zimbabwe and Namibia. Let us consider first the case of Zimbabwe. Some important factors contributed decisively to the success of its transition to majority rule. First,

what made it possible was the fact that all sides involved were willing to make compromises; neither side got all of what it wanted from the Lancaster House conference. Settler rule was abolished and majority African rule re-established within a constitutional framework that protected minority rights. By contrast, in the case of Angola, both sides attempted to use the peace settlement as one more step to destroy the opponent.

Second, agreement on the peace settlement was only arrived at after protracted negotiations involving all sides to the conflict -- it was not imposed by a foreign power. Foreign intervention (in this case Britain's) was needed simply to facilitate the process of reaching an agreement. This helped all parties focus on the need for a speedy and peaceful solution to the conflict. In Angola, it was international pressure and threats that led the two warring factions to the negotiating table in the first place and, as will be shown, the agreement signed by the Angolan government and UNITA was authored primarily by Portugal, the United States and Russia. Finally, there was a significant international component in the management of the transition period leading to elections in Angola.

And third, the constitution -- not participation in government -- was the key to the peace settlement in Zimbabwe. This removed the perception of unfairness from the process. In the case of Zimbabwe, this sense of fairness meant that the cease-fire was largely self-enforcing. It can be argued that the problems encountered after the elections (i.e. Matabeleland) were not fundamentally related to a failure of the transition process. In fact, such growing pains were not able to derail this country's transition from settler to majority rule. In Angola, both sides saw power as the ultimate goal of the transition process. But, since neither UNITA nor MPLA deposited much trust in the constitutional arrangements

established in the Bicesse Peace Accords, they regarded violence to be the best means to achieve political power.

Namibia's successful transition is also relevant to Angola in various ways. First, Angola's direct involvement in Namibia's struggle for independence meant that most of SWAPO's political and military leadership operated from Angola in the 1970s and 1980s. These ties created the basis for a privileged relationship between the two countries, in the 1990s, after SWAPO's electoral victory. Second, Namibia's transition also showed Angola that it was possible to overcome the complexities of a protracted civil war and engender a constitutional outcome whereby all parties to the conflict were included as partners in t post-war/post electoral political system.

Namibia's transition further illustrates the importance of a strong international commitment, preferably in the form of a multinational civilian/military peacekeeping force (including civilian support staff, police, and a military component) with a clear, activist mandate to control and supervise the transition process and create the basis for a new, democratic regime.

In Namibia, the main players involved believed that the integrity of the entire transition process could only be assured by the international community's total engagement throughout the process. This was a maximalist approach reflected in the mandate of UNTAG to "control and supervise" Namibia's transition to elected government. In Angola, this same international community simply provided the blueprints along with the threat of sanctions to the parties involved in Angola's civil war. This minimalist approach was reflected in UNAVEM's mandate -- to "monitor" the transition process -- size, and budget.

Namibia's experience demonstrated the importance of full international involvement to create a climate that is conducive to stability, a key ingredient in a peaceful transition to elections and democratic government. The commitment of international resources played a major part in affecting the behavior of the major players in the end-game of Namibia's transition. The opponents could take leaps of faith -- like the encampment of troops and surrender of weapons -- because there was a real buffer created between them by the presence of an international contingent. In other words, the substantial UN presence expressed in large numbers reduced significantly the opportunities of hostile contact between the main opponents, therefore enabling the transition to proceed.

In Angola, the UN adopted a different approach in the sense that it used minimum resources. The international body was able to carry out its mandate of "monitoring" the transition process. But unlike in Namibia, the UN contingent in Angola was simply unprepared when violence re-surfaced in the implementation of a peace plan that also looked very good on paper. Unfortunately for Angola, by the early 1990s the UN was facing competing post-Cold War demands in other parts of the world.

A more in-depth analysis of the failure of the transition process in Angola constitutes the objective of the second part of this dissertation. In the next chapter, the start of Part II on the case study, I set the stage for the discussion by examining the multiple and interlocking challenges that faced the Angolan state and which ultimately created the rationale for change, albeit protracted and problematic.

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73.BBC, 16 November 1989.

74.Javier Perez de Cuellar, televised speech at UN headquarters, 14 November 1989.

75.Peter Katjavivi suggests that there has been "widespread interaction" between SWAPO and civil society, particularly the churches. He points to the fact that "some individual church leaders also hold key posts in SWAPO." See Katjavivi, "The Role of the Church in the Struggle for Independence," in Peter Katjavivi, et al., (eds.), Church and Liberation in Namibia (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 3. Contrast with the relationship between the MPLA and civil society in Angola.

PART TWO
ANGOLA - A CASE STUDY

CHAPTER 4
A RIPENED STATE FOR TRANSITION IN ANGOLA?

At the end of the 1980s, a combination of domestic and international factors was threatening the viability of the new and fragile Angolan state. Internally, Angola faced a crisis in different areas -- military, political, social, and economic -- which hindered the state from carrying out its basic functions. In this sense, the Angolan state was on the verge of collapse: the civil war had paralyzed the state, rendering it inoperative inasmuch as its reach and authority outside the capital and a handful of major cities was decreasing rapidly, resulting in its incapacity to provide security -- let alone law and order -- to citizens; the state's authority was being challenged by a rebel group -- UNITA -- which ruled over a large portion of the country with population and a working political-military apparatus together with an organized economy, albeit primitive; the legislative process became irrelevant since laws could not be implemented due to lack of state authority as well as the absence of discipline and control in the state bureaucracy; the economy had been driven to ruin by mismanagement and misguided policies based on ideology -- not clear economic principles. This was all compounded by the fact that, as alluded before, the authoritarian state had succeeded to a large extent in subduing civil society, thus stifling its ability to create, aggregate, and articulate demands that might have provided alternatives to breakdown.

These domestic pressures were compounded by interrelated changes at the regional and global levels. The magnitude of the government's domestic problems had reached such alarming proportions that their resolution could no longer be attempted through decrees from

the besieged capital of Luanda. A more profound approach, involving fundamental transformations at all levels, was needed to overcome this multi-faceted crisis. This chapter reviews some of the major problems that led the MPLA government to accept both the democratization of the political system and the liberalization of the economy, and hence the adoption of a new ideological posture.

Military Threat and Political Weaknesses

The military threat to the new Angolan state was closely linked with South African *apartheid* regime's policies in southern Africa after the collapse of the Portuguese settler regime and the instrumentalization of UNITA by external powers -- especially South Africa and the United States -- as a proxy of both South Africa's regional destabilization strategy and the United States' global Cold War strategy.

Soon after Angola's civil war broke out in the mid-1970s, UNITA was virtually destroyed by FAPLA and Cuban troops with Russian assistance and the MPLA was ready to consolidate its power. The coming to power of P.W. Botha in South Africa, however, would thwart this aspiration. Until becoming prime minister in September 1978, Botha had been South Africa's defense minister.[1] As such he supervised SADF's disastrous 1975-76 intervention in Angola's civil war. As prime minister, Botha's regional policy was based on an intensification of the white regime's "total strategy" designed to prevent a perceived "total onslaught" by communist forces in the region. The implementation of the "total strategy" relied heavily on special forces, covert operations and proxy armies like UNITA.

Total strategy was a comprehensive set of policies aiming to ensure the survival of the *apartheid* regime through a combination of reform and repression.[2] It constituted that regime's main response to several developments in the early 1970s.

First, *apartheid* was confronted domestically with the re-emergence of new forms of organized, large-scale black opposition to the racist regime. The 1976 Soweto uprising, and its bloody suppression, heralded both a new phase in the liberation struggle and the regime's determination to use whatever means to preserve the status quo. Second, restrictions on the mobility and training of black labor -- in order to permit its more productive employment in capital-intensive forms of production -- served to aggravate the economic crisis. Third, the growing international condemnation of South Africa and its isolation from its major allies indicated the need for dramatic changes. Finally, the collapse of Portuguese colonialism and the independence of Angola and Mozambique under socialist governments -- followed by the lack of success in the first South African invasion of Angola in 1975-76 and the humiliating withdrawal of the SADF -- all showed that a new vision of South Africa's role in the region was needed.

This regional component of the total strategy was particularly problematic inasmuch as it attempted to internationalize the problems confronting the *apartheid* state. The main proponents of this strategy argued that the source of instability and conflict -- both inside South Africa and across the region -- was neither *apartheid* nor colonialism but external intervention. Therefore, it was necessary to ensure that neighboring states refrained from actively supporting the armed liberation struggle for South Africa and Namibia and that no "communist" power gained a political or military foothold in the region.

Angola became a prime target in South Africa's total strategy primarily because its Marxist regime allowed both the ANC and SWAPO to set up bases and carry out military operation from bases in it. Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos described the devastating effects of total strategy as an "effort to intimidate the Angolan people" with the objective of stopping them from supporting the liberation struggle in Namibia.[3] Just as troublesome for South Africa was the presence of thousands of Cuban troops, along with Soviet and other former eastern bloc military advisers in Angola.

Beginning in 1980 -- partly as a response to regional changes including Zimbabwe's independence under Robert Mugabe s ZANU -- the SADF moved away from mere small-scale assistance to UNITA to large military operations inside Angola. Thus, in June 1980, the SADF launched *Operation Skeptic* in response to an alleged increase in SWAPO attacks in northern Namibia from its bases in southern Angola. Three SADF infantry battalions comprising some 2,000 men and two paratrooper units supported by one tank battalion, two long-range artillery groups, and three squadrons of Mirage fighters penetrated more than 100 miles inside Angola.[4]

Operation Skeptic would mark the beginning of continuous large-scale SADF operations in Angola. An important side-effect of these was that UNITA became the main beneficiary of SADF incursions into Angola. Advancing behind SADF, UNITA would occupy territory and keep most weapons captured by the South African army.[5] Several towns in the Cuando-Cubango province [see map] -- including Mavinga, Cuangar, and Luenge -- fell to SADF/UNITA in 1980.

In August 1981, SADF launched *Operation Protea.* An estimated 10,000 troops

occupied most of the Cunene province, including the capital Ngiva [see map]. According to the Angolan government, the South African troops occupied seven towns and advanced to positions up to 100 kilometers inside Angola.[6] General Jannie Geldenhuys, SADF commander, said on the occasion that 1,000 Angolan soldiers were killed and more than $210 million worth of Soviet-made arms and equipment was captured during the 13-day invasion.[7]

From November 1 to November 20, SADF conducted *Operation Daisy*. Armored columns transporting approximately 4,000 South African soldiers penetrated 150 miles deep into Angolan territory, attacking the main SWAPO headquarters at Chitequeta and Bambi in southeastern Angola. The casualties included 400 Angolans, 71 SWAPO fighters, two Soviet advisers, and 10 South African soldiers.[8]

Meanwhile, using the South African invasion as a smoke-screen, UNITA made significant advances in Moxico province. The following year, while still occupying Cunene province, SADF launched attacks further north. UNITA consolidated its base in Cuando-Cubango and Moxico and began intensive guerrilla operations in the populous central plateau, a rich agricultural area. At the same time, UNITA began a strategy of systematically targeting and capturing foreigners who were subjected to long marches to UNITA's headquarters in Jamba, in the southeastern corner of the country. For maximum propaganda impact, these foreigners would be paraded in front of the international news media before being handed over to representatives of their governments.

If, by 1983 the Angolan government was not yet fully aware of the impact of Pretoria's total strategy, all doubts were removed with another major SADF invasion into

Angola code named *Operation Askari*.

In mid-1983, South African military intelligence -- in collusion with UNITA -- put forward a plan for a sudden military offensive toward Luanda. South Africa expected an immediate collapse of the Angolan government's forces, opening the way for the presentation of Jonas Savimbi in Luanda as a *fait accompli* to the world. Cover for this operation would be a preemptive strike against the annual SWAPO offensive across the Angolan border.

Operation Askari, launched with 10,000 SADF troops on 6 December 1983, had as an operational option the capture of Lubango -- considered a "military hub of the central government's intertwined wars against South Africa and Jonas Savimbi's guerrillas"[9] -- as a basis for a full assault on Luanda. This plan was only thwarted when the Soviet Union secretly warned South Africa that the capture of Luanda would not be permitted.[10]

In all, SADF invaded Angola twelve times after 1975.[11] Furthermore, guerrilla activity had spread across the country and the MPLA government was becoming increasingly dependent on the Cuban expeditionary force -- and other help from East European countries -- to hold on to power. The human cost for Cuba -- in terms of casualties was also increasing. During the first nine years of war, an estimated 3,000 Cuban soldiers were killed or wounded.[12]

It was this combination of SADF invasions and UNITA advances further north -- including operations in the diamond areas -- which forced the government to engage itself in a regional peace process that would, at least, lead to Namibian independence and deny a staging base for SADF invasions. Thus, in February 1984, Angolan and South African negotiators met in Lusaka, Zambia and agreed that SADF would withdraw from southern

Angola in exchange for decreased SWAPO presence in the same area.[13] This accord and the

ongoing international effort for a settlement of the Namibian problem, however, did not halt

the escalating war in Angola. Both South Africa and the United States had not given up the

idea of installing UNITA in power through military means if necessary. This partly explains

the failure to include UNITA in the negotiations leading up to the accords signed in Lusaka.

While visiting Paris in September 1984, Angola's President dos Santos complained

that South Africa had not kept its promise to withdraw its troops from Angolan territory.

This accusation was echoed in a commentary by the Angolan government carried on state

radio. According to the government,

> South African troops occupy parts of southern Angola in total disregard of
> the accord reached between Angola and South Africa in Lusaka. This accord
> calls for the total and unconditional withdrawal of the South African troops
> from Angola and the end of all support for UNITA by the Pretoria regime.
> This part of the accord is also being violated by South Africa, which
> continues to provide material and technical support to the armed bandits
> [UNITA] to enable them -- as Pretoria's complementary army -- to carry out
> acts of sabotage, the mining of roads, the destruction of villages, and other
> acts of vandalism against the Angolan people. In fact, it is these criminal
> actions which are greatly responsible for the social and economic
> backwardness of the Angolan nation.[14]

South Africa did not deny Angola's claim that its troops were still in southern Angola

in contravention of the Lusaka accord. Instead it blamed the victims. The South African

government argued that:

> Angola's President dos Santos is quite right when he says that South Africa
> has not pulled all her forces out of Angola, but he is quite wrong when he
> puts this down simply to a dogged refusal by South Africa to do so. These
> [Lusaka] accords clearly stipulated that in the wake of the South African
> withdrawal, the MPLA's FAPLA[15] forces must not only take control of the
> areas vacated, but must also control the activities of SWAPO terrorists. This

has not happened. Reports from the Joint Monitoring Commission[16], the SADF, and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi -- whose forces operate in southern Angola -- state categorically that SWAPO forces have been regrouping in the area and have become increasingly active. This being the case, there is no chance of South Africa pulling her forces out of southern Angola and keeping her side of the bargain struck in Lusaka.[17]

This South African show of defiance was due primarily to changes at the international level. Two major American policy initiatives -- i.e., "constructive engagement" and the "Reagan Doctrine" -- were being promoted, resulting in much-needed support for South Africa.

Constructive engagement, according to Crocker, was the policy devised by the Reagan administration to "help foster a regional climate conducive to compromise and accommodation in both Southern and South Africa."[18] This policy emerged from the realization that southern Africa's problems were fundamentally intertwined and solutions to those same problems could only be found if this basic interdependence was recognized.

The Reagan administration believed -- as Crocker, one of the main architects of its African policy, puts it -- that in southern Africa "violence in one place triggers fears in another. External threats play directly into domestic anxieties; issues of political change within borders get tangled up with the questions of physical insecurity across borders."[19] It was further assumed that all countries in the region responded essentially in the same manner to domestic problems and external threats.

Those charged with implementing African policy at the Reagan White House saw southern African governments as being particularly "adept at transforming essentially domestic conflicts by referring to threats and scapegoats from across the border."[20] But

external forces -- especially South Africn -- did intervene often using military force. Given these circumstances, regional politics were seen as having "degenerated into the art of making sure you ended up on the winning side. In such conditions, peaceful and democratic change must fail."[21] The need to change the attitudes of the main players in their search for solutions to regional problems constituted the major rationale for constructive engagement. Crocker argued that the task of constructive engagement was "to demolish the myths and fantasies of violence which for decades had transfixed black and white South Africans -- the government's 'total strategy' against the 'total Marxist onslaught,' otherwise known as the ANC's 'armed struggle' campaign waged from neighboring lands vulnerable to the SADF's 'destabilization wars'."[22]

Constructive engagement was intended to move beyond a simple concentration on the ultimate goals of the process of change taking place in the continent -- i.e., a democratic, non-racial order -- to focus on the process itself by addressing the steps and sequence that might lead to it. In concrete terms, this policy committed the United States to "take seriously its responsibility to create a regional climate conducive to negotiated solutions and political change."[23] This involved both forcing an end to "Soviet-Cuban adventurism" in the region and "expand[ing] on the efforts of the private and non-profit sectors to promote US and Western engagement in institution-building and black-empowerment programs" in South Africa.[24] From the African viewpoint, however, this policy did not work. In fact, in the words of Eduardo dos Santos, "the so-called constructive engagement ... has had contrary results and encourage[s] the policy of aggression and destabilization against the frontline states."[25]

If constructive engagement had a primarily politico-diplomatic tone, the parallel

"Reagan Doctrine" had a manifest strategic and military rationale. It was conceived as "a full-blown, global campaign" for providing overt American support for anti-communist guerrilla movements around the world.[26] Crocker explains the "logic" of this doctrine:

> Soviet imperial expansion had created imperial vulnerabilities that could be exploited at low cost. It was much more expensive and challenging to sustain an incumbent government than to back a rebel movement. By providing tangible as well as moral support for anti-Communist insurgents, the United States could raise the price of the Soviets' Third World empire.[27]

The Reagan Doctrine had an almost immediate impact on the Angolan civil war, as it did in other parts of the world like Afghanistan and Central America. For example, in 1984 the MPLA government mounted a major military offensive against UNITA. According to a UNITA communique,[28] FAPLA combined 13 brigades totalling 15,000 troops with a 3,000-man Cuban regiment supported by 150 armored cars, 50 BM-21s (Stalin organs), 200 artillery pieces, and 35 aircraft to dislodge UNITA from Cazombo, Cangamba, Lumbala-Gimbo, Mavinga, and Cuangar [see map]. This offensive, however, was defeated with the help of direct South African intervention and American weaponry. As the Angolan army pushed toward UNITA's main headquarters at Jamba, in southeastern Angola, a South African motorized force struck into Cunene province. This force then moved eastward, crossing the river Kubango at Savate, and entering Cuando-Cubango province.[29] This South African diversionist intervention was vital in taking pressure off UNITA. At this point, South Africa's constant denials that it was providing vital support to UNITA were no longer credible. Consequently, the South African government publicly stated for the first time that it was providing "material, humanitarian, and moral" support to UNITA.[30]

Buoyed by both the overt as well as covert American help provided under the Reagan Doctrine, UNITA significantly escalated its operations in 1985 v ith direct intervention from SADF. In September of that year, for example, the Angolan government forces caught a South African special commando group that was ready to launch an attack against the Cabinda Gulf Oil compound in Malongo, Cabinda province, in the far north of Angola [see map]. Had this operation -- code-named *Argon* -- succeeded, the damage could have amounted to at least USD$ 1 billion.[31] In an attempt to secure the release of a captured SADF officer, and the bodies of other South African soldiers who had died in this failed sabotage mission,[32]Pik Botha -- the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs -- sent a message to the Angolan government. His explanation for the presence of SADF in Cabinda was that northern Angola "was now the main base for the training of ANC terrorists who are dispatched via other countries to South Africa."[33]

Major SADF intervention in Angola continued in 1987. Beginning in late summer, a combined Angolan-Cuban-Soviet offensive again threatened the rebel base at Jamba. South Africa intervened to save UNITA in what was called "the biggest intensification" of the civil war.[34] This intervention was justified on the basis of the need to perform "certain tasks in the interest of South Africa."[35] The national "interest" of South Africa in preventing a military defeat for UNITA was underscored when then-President P.W. Botha and senior cabinet ministers visited their troops in Angola, apparently to boost morale.[36]

By 1988 the war in Angola had reached a high point with massive SADF intervention to save UNITA from the advancing MPLA and crack Cuban units at the battle of Cuito-Cuanavale. This small military base witnessed what has been described as "the fiercest

conventional battles on African soil since Erwin Rommel was defeated at El Amien."[37] A South African invasion force of approximately 8,000 troops equipped with heavy artillery, armored cars and surface-to-air missiles had laid siege to Cuito-Cuanavale, after SADF's long-range artillery staved off an Angolan army assault on the town of Mavinga. Had Mavinga been captured, the Angolan army would have removed the biggest obstacle en route to UNITA's headquarters at Jamba. To defend Cuito-Cuanavale, the Angolan army deployed 10,000 troops supported by the 50th division of the Cuban army and more than 400 tanks.[38] The battle ended with a "crushing humiliation" for the SADF who had become"trapped by the rainy season, bogged down by the terrain, and encircled" by Angolan and Cuban troops.[39]

The battle of Cuito-Cuanavale had a major impact in terms of re-invigorating a stalled negotiation process. The intense military confrontation demonstrated to Cuba and South Africa -- both small, sub-imperial interventionist forces -- that unbearable loss of lives would be involved in protracted military engagements. Consequently, both countries accepted the American proposals for a "comprehensive settlement" in the region, involving both the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the implementation of UNSCR 435/78 regarding Namibia's independence.[40]

In retrospect, the civil war in Angola shows that the MPLA and the state it was attempting to control were not in a position to successfully carry out a counter-insurgency war. During the colonial period, the colonial army and police were some of the most visible agents of repression. As expected, therefore, they disintegrated with the colonial regime. The new army -- formed mainly by former anti-colonial guerrillas -- had no experience in either conventional or counterinsurgency warfare. By 1974, the MPLA had approximately 3,000

guerrillas. Cuban officers hastily attempted to form a well-trained professional army after independence. However, this army was simply not prepaied to cope with the scale of the conflict in the 1980s. By contrast, UNITA had grown into a well organized military structure including conventional regular army and guerrilla units. Furthermore, UNITA had secure sanctuaries as well as generous logistic and back-up support from the SADF. Moreover, the United States was providing "effective" help in many areas including military and intelligence. Thus, this shift in the balance of forces towards the end of the 1980s enabled the rebel movement to systematically destroy the economic, social, and political viability of the regime.

The civil war in Angola can be explained by various historical factors mentioned earlier, which suggest that the origins of the war predate independence and the creation of the post-colonial state. It was fundamentally a continuation of the struggles and contradictions within the anti-colonial movement. The extreme levels of violence registered after independence were basically a result of greater direct external participation in the conflict -- a function of prevailing bipolarity and superpower rivalry -- and domestic aspects related to ideological, religious, ethnic, regional, economic, and personality differences.

Regime Weaknesses

The continuing civil war was the main debilitating factor contributing to political weaknesses, economic decline and government paralysis in the post-independence period in Angola. But it was not the only factor. In a classic example of "statist" approaches to African

development in the 1970s, the post-colonial policies implemented by the MPLA in an attempt to erect a Marxist state in Angola were often misguided and contributed to its weaknesses. Furthermore, such policies contributed to an escalation of the conflict and to widespread loss of faith in the state's ability to undertake meaningful societal transformations.

In the wake of the collapse of the colonial regime in 1974 -- and after being able to turn back invading South African and Zairian armies with Cuban help in the year following the granting of independence -- the MPLA assumed the sole responsibility for building a new state. To do so, it chose to rely upon the segments of the population -- peasants, workers, slum-dwellers, and especially the urban proletariat -- that survived at the periphery of the old colonial regime. Thus, "People's Power" became much more than a political slogan; it assumed the function of a new ideology. This slogan-turned-ideology served two basic purposes: providing hope for those who had been disenfranchised by the colonial rulers while securing popular support for the installation of a new order. This process would be directed by the MPLA which had evolved from a liberation movement into a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party.

From a conceptual level, this "People's Power" ideology drew heavily on Soviet rhetoric, theories of development and underdevelopment, and the revolutionary experiences of Third World countries. It was seen as a way of preventing the neo-colonial experience and dependent relationships of many other African countries. By devolving power to the people, the MPLA hoped to carry out a fundamental and revolutionary transformation instead of simply replacing the colonial elites with indigenous ones without significant changes in the

socio-economic order.

"People's Power" was seen as the best mechanism to engage the working people in building a revolutionary state that would make it impossible for the international capitalist order to turn the new state into a neo-colony. "People's Power" was an ideology aimed to completely destroy the old colonial state apparatus and forge new institutions upon which the people would build a state serving only their own interests. The governing party would ensure that the workers' interests were always upheld by constantly promoting workers and peasants to leadership positions within its ranks. This hegemony would be further strengthened through its control over the state as well as mass organizations such as women's groups, youth groups, trade unions, and peasant associations. These organizations, however, were disconnected from civil society inasmuch as they were offshoots of the ruling party.

Regardless, this new ideology for building a post-colonial state proved to be little more than cynical rhetoric. The repressive colonial order was not replaced by popular and effective democratic institutions and governance. Instead -- as elsewhere in one-party Africa -- the new order became characterized by its excesses in the centralization of power, elite privilege and extravagance, kleptocracy, repression, and widespread economic collapse.

At one level, the colonial legacy can be cited as a possible justification for the errors made in the attempts to build a new state. Portugal -- itself a backward country by Western European standards -- could only play a sub-imperial role, with Angola as king-pin. Since it could never fully exploit the resources of its colony, Portugal opened it to capital from more industrialized countries. US investments dominated in the oil sector, British capital in diamonds and the Benguela railway, German capital in the iron mines, and Japanese, French

and other capital in other resources. Thus, it can be argued that this "multinational character of capital in Angola meant that Portugal was de facto administering its colony on behalf of the European Economic Community and the United States."[41] As the colonial periphery of a peripheral country, Angola's structures of state and civil society were left largely underdeveloped.

Moreover, the settler colonial system had imposed a highly centralized top-down administrative structure; an intolerant political system that prevented the development of representative institutions whether at the metropolis or in the overseas colonies; an elitist and outdated education system geared to the settler community; and a productive sector that relied heavily on forced labor. Furthermore, most skilled personnel left with the colonial functionaries who had managed those structures.

The settler colonial legacy argument, however, does not fully justify all the missteps in attempts to create a new order. First, the massive exodus of the settler community could have been prevented -- as in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa -- had the nationalist movements made attempts to include that community in their plans for a new and more just society.

Most major errors committed by the MPLA were a result of a series of fundamental misconceptions. First and foremost, the leadership of the ruling party believed that it could solve major political and economic problems by instituting a one-party regime and "statist" development strategies like much of Africa had done in the 1960s. The opposition -- especially UNITA -- was violently excluded from the new order. For the MPLA, UNITA was

nothing but a unit of the South African army which is undeniably doomed to disappear. This will inevitably come about because UNITA armed gangsters are condemned by the entire Angolan people. They have no base of political support among the popular masses which are deeply revolted against their terrorist acts of destruction.[42]

This perception denied UNITA and all internal opposition any political space within the new regime, thus leaving them no other realistic option than to resort to a protracted insurgency war against the MPLA.

Another fundamental error was the assumption that a socialist state could be created by the MPLA based on the Marxist principles of "democratic centralism." After defeating internal opposition, the MPLA regarded itself as "the vanguard of the working class and the leading force of society as a whole," solely responsible for "guiding the masses in all fields and enlightening them politically and ideologically."[43] There would be no need, therefore, for either political opposition forces or organized civil society.

The goal of asserting the party's position would be fulfilled through improved organization and "upgraded working methods" as well as through "ideological debate designed to ensure unity and cohesion within the party."[44] The final goal was to strengthen the party's position as "the leading force in society and the state."[45] Dos Santos further elaborated on this theme:

> The party, as the leading force of the entire society, was forced to take a number of measures and strengthen several tasks which should have been carried out by the State bodies. Accordingly, in the context of discipline and control, the party launched a general offensive against liberalism and disorganization to detect irregular situations and sabotage in enterprises, public services and in the private and mixed sectors of the economy and to strengthen discipline, re-establish party and government authority in all sectors, and improve the pace of the revolution.[46]

A further misconception was the belief that the new institutions upon which the post-colonial state would be based could be created virtually overnight. The handful of committed revolutionaries that undertook to create the new revolutionary state soon realized that it was an unmanageable task, particularly since those skilled Angolans who did not belong to the governing party were excluded from access to power. Thus, the state became overstretched and vulnerable. This made the governing party appear particularly inept.

This ineptitude in government became apparent shortly after independence. Widespread mismanagement led to acute economic problems including severe food shortages, forcing the government to use rationing cards. But, while the general population suffered the consequence of government mismanagement, the political and economic elites -- composed primarily of mixed-race Angolans and the remains of the settler community -- did not alter their conspicuous consumption habits. In an example of "clash of civilizations"[47] most Angolan resented the fact that, even after independence, Europeans and their descendants could still live comfortably while the majority of the population suffered the consequences of the regime's reckless economic policies. This dissatisfaction, in turn, caused major dissensions within the ruling party that exploded into a violent coup attempt in May 1977 led by Nito Alves, a leading black member of the MPLA. The coup was crushed with the help of Cuban troops who assisted in defending key government installations and retaking those that had been captured by the putchists. After the failed coup, Angolans of European descent successfully gained control of the MPLA by using the security apparatus to eliminate most of the party cadres who were sympathetic to Alves' Africanist views.[48]

In the wake of this attempt, the MPLA carried out a "rectification" campaign, the main official purpose of which was to screen out all party members whose loyalty could not be verified. Although the primary aim of the campaign was to turn the party into a leaner, more cohesive structure, it also produced an undesirable side-effect: the party became even more elitist. Moreover, this campaign served as a cover for the "disappearing" of scores of educated young black members of the party. Consequently, the pool of available skilled persons who could aspire to hold leadership positions in government was further restricted, thus rendering effective state action nearly impossible. This factor, together with the settler exodus and the war, accounts for most of the setbacks Angola experienced since achieving independence.

The choices made by the MPLA -- both as a political party and as government -- were essentially ideological. They reflected above all its Cold War idealism and romanticism. Little effort was made to assess pragmatically the country's political and economic realities. Thus, a highly monopolistic political system was introduced while, at the economic level, a complete failure was registered in implementing a "people-oriented" strategy for economic development. Economic decline and political instability resulted from those ill-advised choices.

Economic Decline:From Colonial Dependency to Enclave Economy

The Colonial Legacy

The length and nature of the Portuguese colonial presence in Angola left a legacy which has

constrained Angola's economic development. For over 500 years, the Portuguese colonial system was based on the coercive exploitation of an indigenous labor system. Domestic slavery was legal until 1870 when it was replaced by a system of forced labor called "*contrato*."[49] This system was not abolished until the nationalist uprisings of 1961. Besides its reliance on domestic slavery and other subsequent forms of forced labor, Portugal's "development policy" for Angola focused essentially on augmenting the number of settlers and ensuring their prosperity while maximizing revenues at the expense of indigenous labor. Angola became both a depository for Portugal's downtrodden and the destination for its key economic exports. Thus, hundreds of thousands of largely illiterate settlers were sent to Angola where they seized the colony's best agricultural land. Moreover, Angola became a key export market for such Portuguese products as alcoholic beverages, olive oil, fish products, garments, and so on.

Many of the unique distortions characterizing the Angolan economy and society today can be attributed to this colonial/settler legacy. Prior to the nationalist uprisings, for example, Portuguese economic interests enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the colony. But given Portugal's own condition of economic under-development, this colonial monopoly seriously compromised Angola's chances for development. This was compounded by the fact that "over half of the 325,000 white settlers had never gone to school and the vast majority of the rest had less than four years of education result[ing] in the Portuguese occupying almost every position in the modern economic sector from engineers and doctors to taxi drivers."[50] Therefore, few Angolans were trained in any skilled profession. Some of these unique features of Portuguese colonial policy oblige me to briefly analyze the pattern of "colonial

development" in Angola to better understand both the opportunities and constraints this country had to face once it achieved independence.

The pattern of colonial development in Angola can be analyzed with reference to three identifiable cycles defined in terms of specific periods during which the external sector of the economy is dominated by a particular product, market, or both -- i.e., slaves to Brazil, coffee to Portugal, and oil to the United States. This interaction between economic dependence and colonial rule is critical to understanding Angola's development, or lack thereof.

The slave trade, mostly to Brazil, defined the first period in Angola's dependent relationship with Portugal. The second period involves a long transition from slaves to coffee as the main export. This period witnesses both territorial occupation and settlement as well as the reliance on forced labor for the production of coffee. This created a coffee boom which, in turn, led to further settler migration to Angola. Favorable prospects for external trade, combined with new colonial policies for industrial regulation, agricultural incentives, labor laws, and monetary policy, led to a dramatic increase in the settler population after World War II: from 44,000 in 1940 to approximately 325,000 by 1974.[51] A third period began as a result of Portugal's response to the 1961 nationalist armed revolt. Portugal relaxed some of the economic constraints of its colonial rule, allowing rapid industrialization to take place in conjunction with the coffee economy. This period was further driven by Angola's "oil boom" in the early 1970s. The last two periods are particularly important in the analysis of contemporary Angolan society and economy.

The Angolan economy has always been predominantly agricultural and most of the

peace-time population lived in the rural areas. Two-thirds of the country's 1.25 million square kilometers are situated in high plateaus with excellent fertile lands suited for agricultural production. The extraordinary agricultural potential of these lands -- which are criss-crossed by a vast network of rivers -- provided a great incentive for the development of commercial agriculture by the settler community.

By the time of independence, then, Angola was a net exporter of food. The topographic features of the country, together with a favorable climate, permitted the cultivation of a wide variety of crops including tropical foods such as sugar-cane, bananas, coffee, citrus fruits, and palm trees. Temperate crops such as wheat, maize, millet, potatoes, beans, and cotton were also extensively cultivated.

The exodus of the Portuguese settlers who controlled all levels of economic production, the collapse of the market system, and endemic instability have resulted in negative economic growth since independence. To better understand the transformation from a broad-based colonial economy to an enclave economy almost totally dependent on oil, it is important to review Angola's economic condition in the troubled decade prior to independence.

The uprisings of 1961 in Angola forced Portugal to reconsider its long-term presence in the territory. Not willing to follow the example of other colonial powers, however, Portugal began to take serious steps towards integrating Angola's economy into that of the metropolis through increased investment in agriculture, mining, manufactu ing, and transportation.

An examination of Angola's economic inheritance from the colonial period must

begin with the agricultural sector. The most important cash crop produced in Angola during the colonial period was coffee. Most of this was produced in large settler plantations. Increased investments during the 1960s, as well as highly favorable world prices for this commodity, created a boom in coffee production and consolidated Angola's position as the second largest African producer of coffee. In 1973, the last full year of Portuguese administration, Angola exported 218,660 metric tons of coffee which translated into export earnings of 5,089,739,000.00 *escudos.*[52]

Sisal was another important cash crop during the colonial period. Sisal exports reached 53,060 tons in 1973, representing earnings of 467,928,000.00 *escudos.* The production of sisal was a preserve of the settler community because of the substantial investments in capital required for its production and commercialization.[53]

On the eve of independence, cotton was also one of the most promising products cultivated in Angola. Exports of raw cotton reached 23,366 tons in 1973 and earned 619,602,000.00 *escudos* in revenue. Cotton production was particularly important for two reasons: it generated valuable foreign exchange revenues and served as the basis for the development of a textile industry.

Sugar production, controlled by three Portuguese companies operating on a plantation model, was also an important source of revenues. In 1973, Angola exported 9,697 tons worth 39,566,000.00 *escudos,* while 67,000 tons were consumed locally.

In terms of volume, cassava was the main crop produced in Angola. It is one of the most important staple foods for the majority of the population. Up to 1,600,000 tons per year were consumed domestically in the pre-independence period. Although little was exported,

the value of cassava exports reached 3,981,000.00 *escudos* in 1973.

The production of bananas for export was also beginning to assume considerable importance. In 1973 it ranked immediately behind sisal in agricultural exports. A total of 77,064 tons worth 313,132,000.00 *escudos* were exported in the year. Other crops including coconuts, beans, tobacco, wheat, rice, millet, sorghum, fruits,cocoa, and peanuts were also being grown extensively. Together, they held the promise of a strong agricultural sector.

Livestock production experienced a sharp increase after the introduction of disease-resistant breeds. Angola had approximately 4-5 million head of cattle in 1973.

Timber production was also making an important contribution to economic growth in the pre-independence period. Most of the timber resources are concentrated in the tropical rain forests of the Cabinda enclave, where mahogany and other valuable species are found. By 1973, production of logs had reached 555,149 cubic meters. Although most of the timber was consumed domestically, Angola earned 264,371,000 *escudos* from the export of 181,961 metric tons of timber in 1973.

The industrial sector in Angola was also developing very rapidly during the last years of Portuguese domination. The extractive industries ranked immediately behind agriculture in terms of importance to the economy. All mining in Angola was governed by a Portuguese government decree of 20 September 1906 which provided that the state owned all mineral deposits.[54] This meant that mining activities were highly regulated by the government. Nationals (i.e., Portuguese) and foreigners alike could only begin prospecting and exploration of minerals after acquisition of prospecting licenses and mining concessions. Portugal preferred to coopt European capital through granting concessions to large

companies, partly due to their ability to undertake large-scale operations. These large companies holding concessions with exclusive prospecting and exploitation rights over vast portions of the country were instrumental in the production and development of some of Angola's most important mineral resources: diamonds, iron ore, and oil.

Diamonds, first discovered in northeastern Angola in 1912, were Angola's major source of revenue until 1965 when they were surpassed by coffee. Angola's diamonds are ranked among the top three countries in the world in terms of quality.[55] Diamond reserves in Angola are considered "virtually limitless and evaluation of their true potential will take years of prospection."[56]

Commercial extraction of diamonds in Angola began in 1913. Four years later, DIAMANG (Companhia dos Diamantes de Angola) was set up to carry out the mining operations. Soon after independence the new government moved to nationalize all DIAMANG shares held by the Portuguese government, representing 38% of the total shares. The Angolan government's control over DIAMANG increased in August 1977 when 30.85% of the shares in the company held by small shareholders -- mostly expatriates who had fled the country at the beginning of the civil war -- were also nationalized. The government's controlling share in DIAMANG rose to 77.21% in December 1979, following the nationalization of the stock belonging to the larger Portuguese corporations.

In April 1979, the Angolan government passed the "General Law on Geological and Mining Activities," laying out the conditions for mining activities in Angola. In another decree, passed in 1981, the government created the state national mining enterprise ENDIAMA, to which the 77.21% majority shareholding was transferred. This state

enterprise subsequently acquired "the sole non-transferable rights for the prospection, research, surveying, exploitation, treatment and marketing of diamonds over the whole of Angola."[57]

Iron ore mining, which started in 1956, constituted an important economic activity during the 1960s and '70s. In 1973, 6,329,602 tons were exported, mainly to Japan and West Germany.[58] However, although other minerals abound in Angola, it was the discovery of oil that marked the beginning of one of the most important mining activities in the country. This will be looked at later in this chapter.

At the time of independence, then, Angola possessed a respectable manufacturing industry. This sector, however, was geared almost exclusively to the production of goods for the domestic market. In 1973, manufactured goods accounted for only 7% of total exports even though industrial production was estimated at about 18 to 20% of total production. The processing of local agricultural products such as food crops, sisal, cotton, and tobacco, was the principal form of manufacturing activity, comprising 36% of the gross production value of the industrial sector in 1973.[59]

The development of the manufacturing sector, along with the other sectors of the Angolan economy, occurred mainly after 1961 as a response to two main stimuli. First, Portugal renounced its policies preventing the establishment in Angola of any industry that would compete with Portuguese companies. By eliminating protectionist policies in the colony, Portugal allowed foreign interests to establish industries in Angola with up to 100% non-Portuguese ownership.

The second cause of rapid industrial development was both economic and political.

The 1961 uprisings inspired the Portuguese government to take steps towards the creation of a more modern industrial sector in the colony. This was expected to solidify Portuguese control over the entire territory and appease the local population with income-generating employment.

Portugal used a classical "colonial development" strategy to open up the colony to European settlement and explore its rich potential. Thus, the Portuguese colonial authorities developed an extensive transportation network [see map]. By 1973 there were 72,300 kilometers of roads in existence. Of these, 8,500 kilometers were paved and 27,300 kilometers had improved gravel or dirt surface, thus allowing for year-round usage. The remaining 36,500 kilometers were made up of dirt roads.

Earlier this century, Portugal -- with the help of European capital -- laid the foundations in Angola for one of the best railway infrastructures in Africa. The first railway -- the Luanda Railway -- was initially only 275 kilometers long, running from Luanda to Ambaca. By the end of the colonial period it had doubled in length. Construction of a second railway, the Moçamedes Railway, began in 1905. This railway was designed as an instrument to establish Portuguese sovereignty over the southern portion of the territory. In later years it became instrumental in the development of the southern part of Angola.

The Benguela Railway -- the crown jewel of the country's transportation system -- is the main railroad in Angola. Construction of this railway started in 1912. This 1,340 kilometer railroad stretched from the port-city of Lobito on the Atlantic coast to the border with Zambia where it connected with the railway systems of neighboring countries. Angola's transportation infrastructure also included four important commercial ports and dozens of

airports.

Portuguese Exodus and Economic Decline

Many of the problems plaguing the Angolan economy today can be attributed to the exodus of the Portuguese settler population from Angola on the eve of independence. The Portuguese and their descendants constituted a community of about 340,000 out of a total population of approximately 6 million at the time of independence. By early 1976, 300,000 of these settlers had left Angola.[60] This exodus can be attributed mainly to the violence that characterized Angola's transition to independence. The collapsing colonial regime -- and the consequent chaos, insecurity, and uncertainties created by the civil war -- forced most of the Portuguese settlers who were running the political economy to leave.

To understand the impact of this exodus it is important to take into account the fact that the settlers controlled literally all political and economic life in the colony. Even the informal sector -- involving activities like shoe shining, and the selling of lottery tickets -- constituted a preserve of the settler community. The majority of the African population was simply segregated and relegated into a state of permanent dependency in their relationship with the settler population. On the eve of independence, therefore, Angola was left without the people who for scores of years had organized and controlled most economic activities in the country.

In recent years, as prospects for rapid resolution of the civil war faded, thousands of skilled black Angolans joined the exodus, mainly due to constant shortages of food, drinking water, medicine, housing, clothing, and other basic necessities. The country lost most of its

best businesspeople, commercial farmers, senior and mid-level civil servants, engineers, doctors, teachers, shopkeepers, and many other skilled personnel.

The departure of the Portuguese settlers, together with major disruptions of the economy caused by the war, led to drastic reductions in productive activities. The exodus of the settler population had its most immediate and dramatic effect in the agricultural sector. As previously noted, the Portuguese-owned and operated commercial farms constituted the principal suppliers of agricultural products both for domestic consumption as well as for export. Another important role of the settlers was that of intermediaries between the subsistence farmers and the urban and export markets. As such, they bought agricultural products from the subsistence farmers and transported them to the major commercial centers where the products were shipped to the rest of the country and overseas markets. The removal of this crucial link in the chain of agricultural production and distribution caused major shortages in the supply of agricultural goods throughout the country.

In sum, the mass departure of the Portuguese settlers -- which coincided with the initial phase of the civil war (1975-76) -- precipitated the breakdown of the Angolan economy. Although much of the economic infrastructure was destroyed by war, departing settlers abandoned thousands of commercial farms and enterprises and took with them "every asset that could be transported."[61] Thus, between 1974 and 1976 "every sector of the economy experienced sharp output declines (ranging up to 100%)."[62]

The decline in production, scarcities in the supply of consumer goods and other major distortions can be attributed to both the colonial legacy as well as the war. There is, however, another important factor to consider; i.e., the subsequent inadequate economic policies of the

Angolan government already alluded to in this dissertation. The economy has been run

essentially on the basis of administrative decisions, the market has been stifled, prices have

been set at artificially low levels, and an overvalued currency has been tolerated since

independence until the 1990s.

Mistakes and Fallacies: Economic Policies Since Independence[63]

After winning a power struggle with its rivals -- mainly UNITA -- the MPLA proclaimed

Angola's independence and declared it to be a socialist country. A new constitution was

drafted, subordinating the organs of the state to the ruling party. Thus, the basic decisions

concerning the organization of the economic system -- from economic strategy to the choice

of instruments for its implementation -- were taken by the party. It was the party, therefore,

that adopted centralized planning, large-scale nationalization of productive enterprises, and

rigorous state control of economic activities as a way to establish a socialist economic

system. In his sense, the abandonment of a large number of economic enterprises by

departing Portuguese settlers facilitated the governing party's push towards establishing a

fully socialist economy.

A National Planning Commission was established soon after independence as an

organ of the Council of Ministers. The basic mandate of this commission involved

"coordinating planning at all levels and directing activities in almost all sectors of the

economy."[64] By 1978, state monopolies had been established in foreign trade, banking, and

insura..ce. Furthermore, the widespread nationalization and confiscation of enterprises after

independence provided the state with a virtual monopoly in the most productive sectors of

the economy, including coffee and diamond mining.

The MPLA reviewed the economic performance since independence at its First Party Congress in 1977.[65] The Congress -- the highest organ of the party -- concluded that the drive towards building a socialist economy should be accelerated through improvements in centralized planning and supervision of the economy, continuing nationalizations and confiscations, and the establishment of rural cooperatives. At its extra-ordinary Congress in 1980 -- after the death of Angola's first president, Agostinho Neto, and at a time when SAPs were starting to be introduced in Africa -- the MPLA announced, in contrast to this trend, that progress had been made on the road to creating structures for building a socialist society. Faster progress had only been hampered by delays in drawing up the national plan. The Congress concluded that these delays prevented the re-establishment of links between industry and agriculture and the reduction of the rural-urban migration. Furthermore, the country had not yet instituted a "rational system of production" and was beginning to suffer serious inflationary pressures since the total amount of wages paid to workers far outstripped the total volume of production. Also worrisome was the fact that agricultural units under state control only produced 12% of the total food needs of the population and 15% of the raw material requirements for industry.[66]

The Second MPLA Party Congress that took place in December of 1985 reaffirmed Angola's choice of socialist development and adopted the national plan as the main instrument of economic management. It recognized, however, that the economic results achieved in the first ten years of independence had not been entirely satisfactory. The Congress indicated that important changes were needed in economic policy and called for

an improvement in the methods of socialist planning. Since the party itself had a commanding control over the economy, the Congress was not able to identify the principal causes of poor economic performance; i.e., the institutional organization of economic management and the system of economic planning. Ironically, this was taking place at a time when SAPs were already being implemented elsewhere in Africa.

All institutions created in the post-independence period were designed to comply with three principles: unified management, centralism, and planning. Through "unified management" the governing party attempted to safeguard its role in directing all facets of the country's political, economic, and social life. This centralized approach to governing was supposed to cover all levels of administration -- from the central to the local level. This was further reinforced by the principle of centralism which ensured that all decisions made at the top of the pyramid would be binding upon all lower units. These lower units only had a minimum degree of autonomy in searching for the best mechanisms to implement decisions made at the top. A third principle -- planning -- attempted to harmonize the system by defining national priorities and ensuring inter-sectoral as well as inter-regional cooperation while identifying the most efficient uses of scarce factors of production.

The bureaucratic-administrative structures created on the basis of these principles confronted severe problems including high levels of inefficiency and a culture of dependency. Given the omnipresence of the party, all authority was subordinated to its political power. Consequently, little or nothing was decided at the lower levels without proper consultation and approval from the overseeing party department or departments. This often resulted in very slow decision-making and implementation of policies at all levels.

Moreover, the new Angolan state -- reflecting its settler corporatist inheritance -- was erected on a mound of regulations and government intervention in the main areas of economic policy including price controls, licensing, investments, banking, and so on. T . resulting bureaucratic structures of economic management can best be described as rigid, complex, and distorted. In the words of a former Finance Minister, "we have a system that does not work. It is artificial and inefficient."[67]

In light of this situation, society's main response to mitigate some of its economic difficulties has involved the expansion of the informal sector, particularly the setting up of parallel markets. This constituted a response to severe shortages of goods and services at official prices. Such markets escape all government regulations and their prices are freely determined by supply and demand. Initially most of the traders and producers in the parallel markets operated on a small scale. In more recent years, however, some more sophisticated enterprises have opted to take advantages of this sphere outside government control.

Parallel markets have come to provide a vital service to the Angolan economy by providing most consumers with the only possibility of purchasing goods and services not available in state or state-sanctioned stores. Other important features of parallel markets are related to their ability to reduce the gap between aggregate demand and supply as well as contributing to overall social welfare by harmonizing the population's patterns of consumption and their taste preferences. Although parallel markets' prices tend to be higher than in the official market they offer a wider variety of choices for the consumers. The social benefits of parallel markets are further accentuated when viewed in light of their promotion of employment generating activities including the production of agricultural products and

the provision of services like repairs of bicycles, motorcycles, inflatable tires, transportation in private cars, etc.

Parallel markets in Luanda are organized like huge open-air fairs where everything can be traded. Agricultural and dairy products, fish, cereals and cereal products, beverages, and most other types of consumer goods -- both domestic and imported -- can be found. They attest both to the failure of the state's economic policies and the strength of the informal sector, now quite open and organized.

The single major exception to economic decline in the formal sector can be found in the oil industry. In stark contrast to what has happened in the rest of the economy, the oil industry has in fact flourished. Aside from a brief shutdown after independence, it has continued to operate normally, mainly due to the close partnership between the Angolan government and its national oil company, SONANGOL, and several foreign companies including Texaco, Gulf, Chevron, Elf Aquitaine, Braspetro, and others. These companies have been particularly instrumental in the successive discoveries of major oil fields of the Angolan coast. The development of those fields has required the infusion of great quantities of investment capital into the Angolan oil industry as well as increased foreign exchange earnings and government tax revenues.

Enclave Economy

Early Developments in the Oil Industry

Oil exploration on Angola's coast began as long ago as 1910 when the Portuguese colonial

authorities granted an exploration concession to the Portuguese-owned *Companhia de Pesquisas Mineiras de Angola* to explore for oil in the basins of the lower Congo and Kwanza rivers [see map]. The first well was spudded in 1915.

Between 1915 and 1933 a total of 37 wells were drilled but no commercial discoveries were made. In fact, given this lack of commercial success, oil exploration was discontinued until 1952.[68] That year marked a more rewarding stage in the search for oil in Angola and new concessions were granted to Purfina and to the *Companhia de Combustiveis do Lobito*. These two companies were both subsidiaries of Belgium's Petrofina.

Petrofina made its first major commercial oil discovery onshore in 1955, at Benfica, in the Kwanza Basin. Oil production followed the next year. In 1957 Petrofina joined the Portuguese government in a joint venture and the company was reconstituted as the *Companhia de Petroleos de Angola* (Petrangol). Petrangol went on to discover oil onshore in the Congo basin in 1955 and began production in 1965. Petrangol also became the operator for most of the onshore fields in association with Texaco and Angol, a subsidiary of Portugal's Sacor.

Petrangol found the Tobias field -- in the Kwanza basin -- in 1961, and the Catete field five years later [see map]. In 19(? and 1969, respectively, two other fields were identified: the Quelengue and Cabeça da Cobra fields. It was during this period that the American oil company, Gulf Oil, began its heavy involvement in Angola's oil industry. Gulf Oil began geological investigations in Cabinda in 1954 and received its first concession from the Portuguese authorities in 1957, thus clearing the way for the creation of an Angolan subsidiary, the *Cabinda Gulf Oil Company* (CABGOC). Initially, Gulf Oil explored for oil

onshore in the Congo basin, drilling wells mostly unsuccessfully until 1960. Beginning in 1962, however, it made the first of a succession of important commercial discoveries.

In Cabinda, CABGOC was not particularly successful in its years searching for commercial oil fields. In fact, it was only after the company successfully applied for an extension of its concession onto the continental shelf that its fortunes improved considerably. Seismic work began in 1962 and the first discovery in Cabinda waters was made in 1966, when CABGOC found the Malongo North and South fields. Production started in 1968 and output soon exceeded 30,000 b/d of medium crude.[69]

Gulf Oil quickly became the major player in Angola's oil industry by developing a strong relationship with the Portuguese authorities, enabling this multinational to have unhindered access to Angola's vast oil wealth. Thus, once Gulf Oil made its major oil findings, it negotiated a new legal framework for this relationship with the Portuguese government covering production and further exploration.

The close relationship between CABGOC and Portugal benefitted both parties in the sense that the Portuguese government would earn much needed revenues to prosecute the war and carry out its social/economic programs in the colony while Gulf Oil would expand its overseas operations in a potentially oil-rich region of the world.

The concession given to CABGOC included the rights to prospect, explore, develop, and exploit exclusively the deposits of gaseous liquid and solid hydrocarbonates, especially brut oil, ozoquerite, asphalt, and natural gases and also copper, helium, carbon dioxide, and salt substances. Furthermore, the two parties agreed that CABGOC would undertake activities destined to confirm the existence and determine the dimension and extent of

deposits existing in the areas of Cabinda and concurrently with the activities of production in the same area.

The major emphasis was placed on the exploration for and production of oil. The prospecting, exploration and development of the deposits of copper, helium, carbon dioxide, and salt substances could only be done in harmony with special contracts between the Portuguese authorities and the concessionaire.[70] CABGOC was required to spend a minimum of 150 million escudos[71] in the course of the first two years of exploration and development. The penalty for non-compliance could be as great as the forced abandonment of the concession's area.[72]

CABGOC was given the right to sell the oil exploited as well as to utilize freely the necessary quantities of oil products or derivatives for its operation in the areas of concession. The Portuguese state, however, would retain the right to receive 50% of the oil destined for sale or, if preferred, an equal percentage of the oil sold on the international markets. These arrangements were expected to last for a 40-year period beginning in 1971, with the possibility of renewal for another 20 years.[73]

The Portuguese government wanted CABGOC to begin commercial exploration and development of oil fields as rapidly as possible in order to use the oil revenues to foster economic growth as well as pay for war expenditures. To this end, the government took the necessary measures to ensure that CABGOC would exercise its activities as freely, effectively, and completely as possible. By so doing, the Portuguese government allowed CABGOC to develop into a formidable enterprise whose power, resources, and prestige rivalled that of the government in the strategic region of Cabinda.

CABGOC was permitted the use of -- and free access to -- public lands, both dry and submerged, situated in the concession area of Cabinda to meet the objectives of oil exploration and development. Whenever the government and/or CABGOC deemed necessary, lands would be expropriated from the local population. Furthermore, the Portuguese government authorized the construction, installation and use on those lands of any building and industrial, commercial, or social installation necessary for the operation of CABGOC.

Perhaps the most important allowance given by the Portuguese government to CABGOC was the exemption from payment of any tax levies or contributions -- present or future -- with the exception of royalties at 50% of the petroleum exported.[74] CABGOC was also exempted from the payment of any custom duties. Furthermore, the government allowed the wear and depreciation of the property and materials to be discounted at an average annual rate of 15%.

In 1968 CABGOC began oil production. Unlike the oil produced onshore, most of which was used to supply the oil refinery at Luanda, CABGOC's entire output was destined for export.[75] The main reason for the decision to export all of CABGOC's output had to do with the fact that the domestic market was not large enough to absorb the amounts of oil being produced in Cabinda.

CABGOC's successes enticed other foreign companies' involvement in the exploration and development of Angola's oil resources. Thus, Texaco, Amoco, Conoco, Exxon, and Sun Oil became actively involved. Partly due to this international involvement, Angola was producing 172,282 b/d on the eve of independence in 1974.

The Oil Industry in the Post-Independence Period

The new government adopted a very pragmatic approach for the oil sector in the post-independence period. The "Marxist" government did not tamper with the lucrative relationship Portugal had developed with the multinational oil companies; i.e., all the agreements upon which that relationship was based were kept intact. In fact, the Angolan government sought to expand cooperation between its national oil company -- SONANGOL -- and foreign companies through the establishment of joint ventures and production sharing agreements. Joint ventures allow SONANGOL and its foreign partners to share investment costs and receive petroleum produced according to their percentage interests whereas production sharing agreements require foreign companies to bear the full cost of exploration and development and be compensated with a share of the oil produced.

By undertaking this pragmatic strategy in the oil industry, the Angolan government has attempted not only to minimize its potential costs in terms of exploration, production, and development of the oil fields, but also to maximize its benefits accrued through interaction with well-established foreign companies, i.e.; it became a classic *rentier* regime

The close relationship with multinational oil corporations has led to a significant expansion in this vital sector of the economy. By 1993, Angola's oil output reached 504,461 barrels per day, accounting for 90% of all exports. Estimated production for 1994 is set at 524,061 barrels per day on proven and developed reserves estimated at 1.9 billion barrels.[76] Taxes and royalties on oil production provide Angola with about $3 billion a year, more than 75% of government revenues.[77]

The contribution of the oil sector has prevented a further and more serious

deterioration of Angola's economic crisis. However, since this is an enclave sector -- i.e., it is isolated from other sectors of the economy -- its impact on overall socio-economic development has been severely constrained by the policy choices of the government, especially with regards to how oil revenues are spent. The military situation compelled the government to use most of these for the purchase of war material. Most of the remainder was allocated to current consumption. Consequently, "the effect of oil income on medium-term GDP growth was limited."[78]

Heavy reliance on oil revenues produced other negative effects on the economy. For example, total government revenue has been closely related to receipts from the oil sector since independence. In attempting to erect a socialist state, the government maintained high levels of expenditures notwithstanding the fluctuations in oil income. This resulted in high budget deficits and a mounting foreign debt. Moreover, oil revenues led to a policy of real exchange rate appreciation,[79] favoring imports while further marginalizing other sectors of the economy -- especially agriculture. With most other exportable commodities marginalized, oil became the main foreign exchange earner.

Serious inflationary pressures also resulted from the government's heavy reliance on oil windfalls and its propensity to maintain both public expenditures and domestic consumption at unrealistically high levels. Plentiful oil revenues led to widespread fiscal and monetary carelessness particularly in terms of the growth in the money supply. Galloping inflation further eroded the already precarious living standards of most Angolans. The rate of inflation reached 1,840 percent in 1993 while the GDP shrunk by another 22.6 percent.[80] Wages have not kept pace with inflation. The average urban worker still earns, on average,

USD $10.00 per month.

As the World Bank concluded, "out of Angola's oil income little was returned to taxpayers or saved for the future."[81] The Financial Times echoes this view when it points out that "few countries in the world have squandered their vast potential wealth as carelessly as Angola."[82] All the revenues generated from the oil industry proved insufficient to counterbalance the effects of government failure, particularly in terms of its ability to satisfy the people's basic needs.[83] The resulting effects, for both state and society, have been catastrophic. The state lost capacity and legitimacy. This is reflected in the fact that the territory under government control has shrunk. Furthermore, accelerated social and economic imbalances became a part of life, threatening the survival of millions of people. The state's increasingly limited capacity to intervene in order to alleviate social and economic problems is related to its financial difficulties. By borrowing heavily in international financial markets against future oil revenues, the government has been able to purchase weapons and aircraft.[84] Conversely, however, the state has not been successful in carrying out its basic functions of governance.

In this situation of retreat by the state, now exacerbated by structural adjustment, the majority of the population has to rely on their own means to attain minimum levels of physical and economic security outside the boundaries of the state.

Civil Society's Responses to Political Turmoil and Economic Decay

Many of the problems besetting Angola today, including the post-electoral crisis, can be

attributed to civil society's disengagement from the formal political realm. This disengagement can be interpreted as a response to the regime's ideological hostility toward civil society coupled with poor governance and frustration regarding the regime's inability to solve the major politico-military and socio-economic crises facing the country. The post-independence regime attempted to destroy the structures inherited from the colonial experience without clearly defining any that could replace them.

Thus, in order to understand the decline of formal political participation in Angola we must concentrate both on the ways the "new" Angolan state was organized and how its power was exercised. Only then can the failure of its policies and the consequent loss of legitimacy and authority be explained. But, first, a brief foray back into history is in order.

Like most other African countries, Angola has a long tradition of political participation dating back to pre-colonial times. Even during the colonial period, obstacles to political participation were overcome through both political protest and military action. The totalitarian nature of the colonial regime relegated Angolan civil society to the fringes. Still, small religious schools and recreation clubs constituted a strong enough base for organized protest. Thus, for example, the vast majority of the leaders of the liberation movement against colonialism -- including Agostinho Neto, Holden Roberto, and Jonas Savimbi -- were first exposed to politics at these religious schools.

Post-World War II political protest first took the form of small leaflets criticizing the colonial regime. The brutality of that regime's response, however, forced the political leaders of that era to opt for a more violent form of political protest. From 1961 to 1974, the most important form of political participation involved membership in one of the three liberation

movements. This type of participation proved to be useful to the extent that it helped to bring down the colonial regime. But since this participation took place mainly along ethnic lines, it possessed within it the seeds of division and hatred that would characterize Angolan society in the post-colonial period.

Unable to form a common front during the negotiation process with the Portuguese army that had overthrown the colonial regime, the three Angolan liberation movements failed to make the transition from armed guerrilla groups to political parties. Instead, unlike in Zimbabwe and Namibia, they brought their armies intact from their bases in the forests into the urban areas. Thus, the overthrow of the colonial regime did not result in the expansion of the space and importance of civil society. The little space occupied by the civil society was further eroded by "tribal warfare." All three movements wanted to take power by force, believing in the appropriateness of their views and programs for the country.

Although Angola gained independence in extremely difficult conditions[85], the MPLA government was able to extend and consolidate its administration throughout the country. It was expected, therefore, that the winning side would introduce measures to establish a viable political order which, in turn, could promote unity and harmony, social and regional equality, and economic development. Instead, an intolerant, inflexible political order was created based on Marxist-Leninist thought. Lost in the ideological fog of Marxism-Leninism was the basic contractual relationship between the state and the citizen. Instead, the latter became mairly a potentially manipulable element to be used in furthering the goals of the party and/or the totalitarian state. This resulted in ethnic favoritism and divisions, corruption and injustices, economic decline and an even more devastating civil war. These

circumstances posed serious difficulties for the development of civil society in Angola.

With most avenues for political participation closed by a totalitarian state, and in the presence of a highly centralized and dysfunctional economy, Angolan citizens became consumed almost exclusively by concerns affecting their immediate survival; i.e., the search for food, shelter, and security. There is, therefore, some correlation between the atrophy of Angola's civil society and the politics of fear practiced by the MPLA one-party regime.

Politics of Fear

The MPLA succeeded in gaining control of the government with the help of Cuban troops and Russian advisers. After defeating the other two movements, the MPLA mounted a violent assault on civil society in an attempt to indoctrinate and intimidate the population. An authoritarian state was established and an attempt was made to either co-opt or destroy most elements of civil society, including the church. Political participation could only take place when mobilized and organized by the state to serve its own specific purposes.

The governing party mandated revolutionary hostility to all forms of traditional authority and the aspirant petty bourgeoisie for alleged collaboration with the colonial regime. Instead, supposedly mass organizations were created to mobilize -- through coercive means if necessary -- workers, women, students, artists, painters, writers, peasants, even children. Since the state controlled all aspects of life, survival often depended on membership in state-sponsored organizations. This hampered the development of a more open and unrestrained environment where civil society could flourish. Consequently, when the state saw its survival threatened by the weight of war and economic decline, it could not

count on the resourcefulness -- let alone understanding -- of the civil society. Indeed, it can

be argued that hostility to civil society -- particularly the church and traditional authority --

could be characterized as lack of democracy and often provided a degree of legitimacy for

UNITA's insurgency.

The rationale for hostility directed toward the church derived primarily from Marxist

dogma. President Eduardo dos Santos argued, for example, that, "the scientific analysis of

religious phenomena has been a permanent aspect of all the fundamental documents of our

party and our democratic and people's state based on the Marxist-Leninist concept of the

world." Also, religious practices would be tolerated "provided that religious practice is not

used overtly or covertly to oppose the ongoing revolutionary process."[86]

Antagonism towards the church also derived from the latter's close association with

the old colonial regime. This was particularly true in the case of the Catholic church. Soon

after coming to power the MPLA regime abolished all the privileges that stemmed from its

previous role as the "state church." The MPLA succeeded in relegating the once prominent

role of the church in education to negligible levels, denying party membership to overt

church-members, and by persecuting all church leaders who dared to denounce the

revolution.[87]

Even the Protestant churches, with a proven track record of anti-colonial struggle,

were targets of state-sanctioned hostility. But, since these churches did not have the same

prominence as the Catholic church, the state in many cases opted for co-optation instead of

repression. This was particularly the case with the Methodist church which early on

established a strong connection with the MPLA regime.[88] Thus, both hostility from the

regime and co-optation prevented the church from playing a more active and meaningful role in civil society, including the search for peace and development.

Throughout the years of insurgency, UNITA did not demonstrate that it was any better equipped to facilitate the development of a healthy civil society than MPLA, however. After losing its power struggle with the latter in 1976, UNITA returned its troops to the forests and waged a devastating guerrilla war with the help of South Africa and the Un ec States. By the time the Bicesse Peace Accords[89] were signed, UNITA controlled most of the southeastern portion of Angola and had installed a rival administration there.

Political participation in the areas controlled by UNITA was even more restricted than in government-held zones. Several reasons account for this situation. Although UNITA portrayed itself as a democratic organization its political orientation and practice placed it on the extreme left of the political spectrum. UNITA is, in fact, a Maoist party.

UNITA created very centralized structures both at the political as well as at the military levels. In fact, military structures dominated the organization in the sense that no civilians were allowed to hold leadership positions. All members of UNITA's politburo and its Political Commission (the decision-making body) have a military rank.

The merging of military and political positions and functions gave UNITA a particularly rigid and disciplinarian character. UNITA was transformed into a powerful army under the cover of a political party. It can be argued, therefore, that there was little if any space left for political participation for those living under UNITA administration. All were expected to follow obediently the leader's commands.

Most people living under UNITA control were totally dependent on the organization

for survival since the areas they inhabited were not suitable for agriculture. Furthermore, war-related security concerns rendered other kinds of economic activities unviable. People living under government control were better able to show their dissatisfaction by withdrawing from direct engagement in formal political activities, as the next sections shows.

Fear of Politics

Resentment over forced participation in authoritarian politics and the state's incapacity to fulfill its basic functions of governance led to popular withdrawal from political activities. This was particularly evident after the death in 1979 of Agostinho Neto, Angola's first president. Regular mass rallies were no longer a common occurrence and there was a visible and widening gulf between state and civil society in Angola.

This gulf between the state and civil society is the result of various domestic conflicts related to class, race, ethnicity, and overall poor governance. In the war against colonial domination and during its first years in power, the governing party (MPLA) proclaimed itself to be a "movement of the masses". Gradually, however, the urban elites -- who are predominantly *mestiços* or *mulatos* -- used their superior education, political skills, and economic power to take control of the party. But, instead of maintaining the existing strong ties with workers and peasants, the governing elites grew increasingly detached from the common citizen and used the repressive means of the state to preserve their privileged status.

From the ordinary citizen's point of view, the elite's grip on state power has assumed hegemonic proportions and represents a throwback to colonial times when power, prestige, and privilege were closely associated with class and race. Many key posts in government and

the armed forces are currently occupied by *mulatos*. They also dominate the economy. This would not constitute reason enough for alarm, were it not for the fact that this group is also very united in the defense of its race and class interests. This is the only group thriving even in the present situation of political decay and economic crisis gripping Angola.

Given their pivotal position, members of the Angolan ruling elite have enormous resources of patronage. These resources have been put to use to create extensive and intricate patron/client networks. It is within these networks that most political deals are made and significant economic transactions take place. They are an indispensable base to hold political office or seek public employment.

The networks of patron/client relationships have been used by the ruling elites for political control and financial aggrandizement. In the process, however, they engendered high levels of corruption and have eroded public trust in government. It is a combination of these factors that has forced Angola's remaining civil society to withdraw from politics and other state-dominated spheres. Alternative spheres have been developed which take the form of the parallel economy, black markets, informal tribunals[90] and so forth. It would be erroneous, however, to characterize these groups as civil society since many of their activities are illegal.

State - Civil Society Relations in Angola During the Transition Period

Civil society in Angola was unshackled only in the brief period of political and economic liberalization leading to the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accords in 1991 and up to the resumption of the civil war after the elections of September 1992. However, Angola's version

of *glasnost* and *perestroika* revealed important paradoxes in state-society relations. The would-be totalitarian regime had created both dissent and dependency. The dissent which lay mostly dormant throughout the repressive years served as the catalyst for the mushrooming of all types of organizations after the legal framework of the one-party state was abandoned. Paradoxically, however, most of these organizations continued to depend on the state or international organizations for resources. Thus, political parties, churches, cultural groups, women's organizations, and so on, have proliferated not so much as a counterweight to the state but mainly to benefit from it in terms of financial assistance and all the other benefits traditionally allotted to the state elites.

During the single party regime, the MPLA relied on "mass organizations" it created -- for workers, youth, women, and children -- to ensure participation of officially sanctioned groups while making the formation of autonomous organizations illegal. Mass organizations were expected to provide unconditional support for the MPLA's broad political, economic, and social programs. However, since the introduction of economic reforms in the late 1980s and political liberalization initiatives in the early 1990s -- allowing the emergence of truly autonomous organized groups -- the MPLA has tried to influence key groups in society by binding them into organizations that have become dependent on patronage. Thus, the regime can not only continue to influence society -- this time with the additional "civil" label -- by extending its organization, coordination, and supervision of as much of the population as possible; it can also stave off mass opposition.

It has now become clear that in Angola, as elsewhere in Africa where one-party structures had once flourished, the emergence of organized groups commonly associated

with civil society and their dependent relationship with the state constitutes an integral part of a well-designed strategy by the regime to keep itself in power. The MPLA had not planned to liberalize the regime and institute a genuine democratization process that would eventually make the party-state genuinely accountable to common citizens. In fact, the reverse is closer to reality. The liberalization measures introduced at the time were cleverly manipulated to create enough "maneuvering space" -- especially in terms of providing sufficient economic/financial gains -- to ensure that the party would remain in power.

The structures arising under this reordering may not amount to a civil society, but instead resemble "state corporatism." Their continued existence, not to mention degree of influence and well-being, depend on the whims of the state, particularly the party controlling it. By restricting the space of civil society the MPLA is thus preventing alternatives from emerging and impeding further democratization. Furthermore, the party and the state -- ruling over hybrid economic structures combined with centralized power -- could then revert to previous lack of accountability and use public positions for private gain. Unfortunately for Angola and its process of transition to a new order, even some so-called NGOs -- central features of contemporary civil society -- have become re-attached to the state apparatus.

NGOs in Angola: A Coping Mechanism?

To understand African politics, especially contemporary politics of transition, it is important to look at the relationship between non-government organizations (NGOs) and African states. NGOs can be defined as "legal, not-for-profit organizations that include a community-based, voluntary character, and that pursue humanitarian, developmental, environmental, or

relief activities, and/or that deliver social (welfare, health care, educational training --

including management and technical training) services."[91]

According to Korten, NGOs play three important roles in fostering "people-centered"

development. These include:

> 1. focusing public policy thought and action on the creation of enabling
> environments which encourage and support peoples's efforts to meet their
> own needs and solve their own problems at individual, family, and
> community levels; 2. developing organizational structures and processes that
> function according to the principles of self-organizing systems; and 3.
> developing territorially organized production-consumption systems based on
> principles of local ownership and control.[92]

There are various types of NGOs: international or northern; indigenous or local;

intermediary or national; integrated; and cross-national and cross-hemisphere (usually

coalitions of NGOs). At the continental level, NGOs are now taking their places alongside

political parties, elite bureaucratic functions, executive styles of governing, class struggles,

ethnic and other interest group rivalries, military officers, trade unions, and peasants as a new

focus for understanding important domestic actors in Africa.[93] This emerging importance of

NGOs can be attributed to several factors. However, the most important is related to their

increasing economic clout due to their often very significant external partnerships. In other

words, in this era of greater emphasis on governance and civil society, African NGOs are

sometimes better positioned to secure financial resources from both external and domestic

donors to carry out development projects than national governments which are still seen as

less-than-efficient. Also, given the SAP-induced withdrawal in the provision of services to

many vulnerable groups, NGOs are often able to fill this void.[94]

NGOs' emerging propensity to fill the vacuum created by the retreat of the state in this era of SAPs has conferred upon them a political dimension that can be added to their more conventional social/developmental nature. Since, as discussed earlier, civil society -- including NGOs -- can affect the accountability and effectiveness of the state and its officials, they can equally affect a state's legitimacy as will be seen in the case of Angola. How can these organizations affect a state's accountability? The *raison d'etre* of most NGOs is the provision of services where the state is no longer capable of reaching. Since this is essentially a function that has been associated with the state, the latter can derive some credit for such service delivery. This means that the state can now be seen in a better light -- at least as a facilitator -- by the recipients of the services; i.e., those who hold the state accountable. Furthermore, if there exists a symbiotic relationship between NGOs and the state -- especially if the former communicates to the local population that the latter is performing its expected duties -- the state's accountability is promoted. Similarly, NGOs have the ability to affect a state's effectiveness by providing it with low cost and timely ways of performing its functions.[95]

In Angola's case, however, the emergence of associations did not fill the vacuum in the provision of social/humanitarian and economic functions unfulfilled by a retreating and decaying state much like the emergence of a large number of political parties in the post-one-party state did not fill the political gap separating MPLA and UNITA. Most of these new associations were motivated primarily by economic considerations. In other words, there were created by individuals who wanted to take advantage of the real or perceived economic and financial advantages associated with having an NGO. This inflation of pseudo-NGOs

was further stimulated by the perception that financial help would be forthcoming from the government and, possibly, from international partners as well. For its part, the government was too willing to feed this notion since the existence of a large number of these organizations supported its claims of legitimacy.

There are, for example, thirteen organizations purporting to be carrying out various types of development work in agriculture, appropriate technology, and the environment throughout Angola [Table 1]. However, there is no evidence that any significant work is being carried out in those fields. In fact, it can be argued that the majority of these organizations are not equipped to carry out development work. Many are simply one-person (usually one-man) operations.

Table 1
Local Economic/Developmental Organizations

Acção Agrária Angolana para Misericórdia e Necessitados (Angolan Agrarian Action for the Needy)
Acção Angolana para o Desenvolvimento (Angolan Action for Development)
Acção Nacional para o Desenvolvimento e Evangelização (National Action for Evangelical Development)
Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (Action for Rural Development and the Environment)
Acção Social para o Desenvolvimento Communitário (Social Action for Community Development)
Aliança de Cooperação Rudimentar e Solidariedade para o Desenvolvimento Rural (Alliance for Rudimentary Cooperation and Solidarity for Rural Development)
Associação Humana para Desenvolvimento do Jovem Agricultor de Angola (Humane Association for the Development of Angola's Agrarian Youth)
Associação Nacional para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário (National Association for Community Development)
Associação Solidariedade para Desenvolvimento da Província do Uige (Association for Solidarity and Development of Uige Province)
Centro Angolano de Tecnologias Adaptadas e Desenvolvimento Rural (Angolan Centre for Adapted Technologies and Rural Development)
Instituto Africano de Desenvolvimento (African Development Institute)
Juventude Ecologica Angolana (Ecological Youth of Angola)
Movimento Ecologico Democratico e Defesa do Consumidor (Democratic Ecological Movement and Consumer Advocacy)

Source: Researcher's fieldwork

Most of the development work in the areas outside the reach of both the state and UNITA, has been carried out by churches and/or religious organizations. This is the case especially in the area of social assistance to displaced persons. During the period of single-party rule, the Marxist-Leninist MPLA attempted to destroy the foundations of religious activity in Angola. This involved persecution (including detention and executions) of religious leaders and workers as well as the confiscation of church properties. The abandonment of Marxist ideology in the late 1980s meant that churches were once again free to resume their religious activities, including the provision of assistance to the needy. This partly explains the proliferation of churches and religious organizations in the early 1990s. Table 2 shows a representative sample of these organizations. Most of them operate in the capital city, Luanda, and its environs. The unstable situation in the countryside has forced many of the most needy people to seek refuge in the capital.

Ironically, many of the religious organizations, especially those without partners overseas, are forced to depend on the state for charity. Although there is a major religious revival and many people are flocking back to churches, they are not in a position to make donations; they seek help.

Table 2
National Religious Organizations

Acção Cristã para o Desenvolvimento Rural em Angola (Christian Action for Rural Development in Angola)
Acção Cristã para a Infância (Angolan Action for Children)
Associação Cristã de Jovens de Angola (Christian Association of Angolan Youth)
Associação Cristã para o Desenvolvimento do Bembe (Christian Association for the Development of Bembe)
Associação Evangélica para Desenvolvimento Social (Evangelical Association for Social Development)
Congregação de Amizade Afro Europeia (Afro-European Congregation of Friendship)
Congregação da Fé em Jesus Cristo (Congregation of Faith in Jesus Christ)

Conselho das Igrejas Cristãs em Angola (Council of Christian Churches in Angola)
Convenção Baptista de Angola (Angolan Baptist Convention)
Igreja Cristã Evangelica no Mundo (Christian Evangelical Church in the World)
Igreja Cristã União Espirito Santo (Holy Ghost Union Christian Church)
Igreja de Deus em Angola (Church of God in Angola)
Igreja do Espirito Santo e Profética de Angola (Church of the Holy Ghost and Prophecy in Angola)
Igreja Evangelica Baptista em Angola (Evangelical Baptist Church in Angola)
Igreja Evangelica Congregacional em Angola (Evangelical Congregational Church in Angola)
Igreja Evangelica dos Irmãos em Angola (Evangelica. Church of the Brothers in Angola)
Igreja Evangelica Menonitas em Angola (Evangelical Mennonite Church in Angola)
Igreja Evangelica Pentecostal em Angola (Evangelical Pentecostal Church in Angola)
Igreja Evangelica Reformada em Angola (Reformed Evangelical Church in Angola)
Igreja Evangelica do Sudoeste de Angola (Evangelical Church of Angola's Southeast)
Igreja Evangelica Unida - Comunidade Anglicana em Angola (United Evangelical Church - Anglican Community in Angola)
Igreja Jesus Cristo Sobre a Terra (Church of Jesus Christ on Earth)
Missão Evangelica do Espirito Santo em Angola (Evangelical Mission of the Holy Ghost in Angola)
Programa Internacional de Apoio Cristão para Infância (International Program for Christian Help to Children)
Solidariedade Cristã e Ajuda Mutua (Christian Solidarity and Self-Help)

Source: Researcher's fieldwork

Table 3 shows that there are many organizations in Angola that claim to be NGOs carrying out social and humanitarian work. But, much like those supposedly working in development-oriented activities, their impact is minimal simply because they do not have the means and the capacity. In fact most of this type of activity is carried out by international NGOs.

Table 3
Local Social/Humanitarian Organizations

Acção para Promoção Social (Action for Social Development)
Acção pela Vida (Action for Life)
Agência Humanitária com Cooperação Internacional (Humanitarian Agency with International Cooperation)

Associação Amigos do Cazenga (Association of the Friends of Cazenga)
Associação Angolana de Amizade para a Infância (Angolan Association of Friendship for Children)
Associação Angolana de Luta Contra SIDA (Angolan Association for the Fight Against AIDS)
Associação Cívica da Juventude Angolana (Angolan Civic Youth Association)
Associação Humanitária Angolana Lwei (Lwei Humanitarian Association of Angola)
Associação Humanitária Samuel Brace Coles (Samuel Brace Coles Humanitarian Association)
Associação Juvenil Angolana de Habitação (Angolan Youth Association for Housing)
Associação Mundo do Amor (World of Love Association)
Conjunto Fraternidade para o Desenvolvimento da Sociedade (Fraternal Group for the Development of Society)
Convenção Angolana para Apoio do Povo Carente (Angolan Convention for Help of Needy People)
Cruz Vermelha de Angola (Angolan Red Cross)
Jovens com uma Missão (Youths with a Mission)
Liga Angolana de Amizade e Solidariedade com os Povos (Angolan League of Friendship and Solidarity with Peoples)
Liga de Voluntários para Apoio aos Desamparados (League of Volunteers to Help the Homeless)
Movimento Nacional Vida Livre de Angola (National Movement for Free Life in Angola)
Ordem Bhaki Vedanta de Angola (Bhaki Vedanta Order of Angola)
Phlor de Te-Kila
Programa Humanitario para Crianças Orfãs (Humanitarian Program for Orphan Children)
YMCA/YWCA

Source: Researcher's fieldwork

The severity of Angola's crises -- human as well as political, economic, environmental, etc. -- has attracted many international NGOs into the country. As table 4 illustrates, some -- like the International Committee of the Red Cross -- are well-established and financed international organizations with strong capacity for humanitarian intervention. Some European and North American organizations like Care International, Medicins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam and Save the Children have also been able to provide considerable humanitarian assistance to Angola.

Many other organizations, however, have not been able to overcome various types

of obstacles in a country only now emerging from a long and devastating civil war. At the political level, the government seems uncomfortable with the intrusive presence of international NGOs. Their presence, however, is vital for the provision of humanitarian relief and basic services to large segments of the population. In many respects the state has abdicated its responsibilities and entrusted the crucial tasks of seeking, transporting and distribution of food, clothing, and medical care to the international NGOs. This surrender of responsibilities, however, has enabled the state to concentrate on other functions -- political reconciliation and economic management -- without much success to-date.

Table 4
International NGOs Operating in Angola

Name	Country of Origin
German Agrarian Action	Germany
International Action Against Hunger	France
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	United States of America
Africa Corps of Sweden	Sweden
Africa Muslims Agency	Kuwait
African Christian Relief, Inc	United States of America
Africare	United States of America
International Medical Assistance	Portugal
Italian Association Friends of Raoul Fallereu	Italy
Association for Cooperation, Exchange and Culture	Portugal
Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief	Canada
Care International	Canada
Catholic Relief Services	United States of America
Centro Internazionale di Coperazione Allo Sviluppo	Italy
Christian Children's Fund	United States of America
Concern	Ireland
Development Workshop	Canada
Fraternite Tiers-Monde	Belgium
Goal	Ireland

Portuguese Institute for Preventive Medicine and Cooperation	Portugal
International Medical Corps	United States of America
International Committee of the Red Cross	Switzerland
Johonnita Aid Association	Germany
Life Aid	South Africa
International Permanent League of Fight Against Hunger	Portugal
Lutheran World Federation	Switzerland
Medicins du Monde	France
Medicins Sans Frontiers	Belgium
Medicins Sans Frontiers	France
Medicins Sans Frontiers	Netherlands
Medicins Sans Frontiers	Spain
Medicos Mundi / Catalunya	Spain
Medicos del Mundo (Physicians of the World)	Spain
Mission Aviation Fellowship	Canada
Movimento Liberazione e Sviluppo	Italy
Norway Peoples Assistance	Norway
Missionary Work for Social Action	Portugal
Oikos Cooperation and Development	Portugal
Oxfam	United Kingdom
People to People Development Assistance	Denmark
Save the Children	United States of America
World Vision International	United States of America

Source. Researcher's fieldwork

The fact that some organizations that could develop to strengthen Angola s civil

society have been co-opted by the state -- instead of acting to change it, or at least to operate

in "balanced opposition" to it -- can be pointed to as one of the reasons for the current crisis

inasmuch as civil society has not been able to influence the state to change the rules of the

political game. In other words, by accepting co-optation or incorporation, civil society serves

as a legitimizing element for the state and its use of power, including violence. But, in the

case of Angola, there is another side to this issue. The disengagement, voluntary or otherwise, of important segments of civil society has denied it a voice in shaping society's response to the multi-faceted crises facing the country.

In conclusion, this analysis will suggest that many independent associations created in Angola since the introduction of democratic changes in 1991 emerged within the urban middle class as a last-ditch, opportur'stic effort by the regime to confront the economic crisis and provide the co-opted segments of civil society the possibility of partaking in the expected political/economic benefits inherent in a change of regime. On both these counts, however, civil socie'y has not yet been successful: the economic crisis persists due to war and continuing economic mismanagement and the MPLA continues to control the government and the state apparatus.

Thus, although there is a rich and heterogenous associational life thriving in spite of -- and often as a response to -- severe economic crises in most African countries, the activities of these organizations can be best interpreted as a coping mechanism. They have not yet matured to the point of being capable of institutionalizing the limits cf state power or of providing an alternative development framework.

Even more so than most of the rest of the continent, Angola in the 1990s still needs a stratum or class of entrepreneurs, intellectuals, political and social activists with the vision (and means) to create independent organizations capable of mediating the interests of the individual and the state. A strong state, particularly in terms of its judicial functions, and a vibrant civil society are indispensable for the viability of both democracy and development.

From an analytical perspective, the study of these twin processes -- democracy and

development -- highlights the importance of civil society. It will remain a central theme throughout this thesis. In Angola, as this dissertation has attempted to show, civil society -- often seen as "a necessary condition for the existence of representative forms of government, including democracy"[96] -- all but collapsed under the weight of an authoritarian state. As a result, only an armed opposition had enough strength both to confront the Marxist regime and put forward an alternative to it. In this sense, civil society's atrophy contributed to the civil war. Later, when the warring sides agreed on a framework for transition to democracy, civil society's lack of involvement in the process helped to produce its collapse and made a return to civil war inevitable. Ironically, as will be shown in the next chapter, not even economic liberalization and political openness have fully succeeded in re-invigorating civil society.

Endnotes
(Chapter 4)

1.Botha served as defense minister from 1965 to 1978.

2.Dan O'Meara, "Destabilization in Southern Africa: Total Strategy in Total Disarray," <u>Monthly Review</u> 37 (April 1986).

3.Radio Nacional de Angola, 9 September 1981.

4.Angola Ministry of Defense Communique, Radio Nacional de Angola, 1 July 1980.

5.Interview with Gen. Nunda, former UNITA chief of staff, Luanda, February 1994.

6.Angola Defense Ministry Communique, Radio Nacional de Angola, 14 August 1981.

7.UPI, 15 September 1981.

8.UPI, 7 December 1981.

9.<u>The Washington Post</u>, 27 July 1986.

10.<u>The Economist</u>. 30 March 1985.

11.<u>The New York Times</u>, 25 December 1984.

12.Associated Press, 20 September 1984.

13.Crocker, 195-96.

14.Radio Nacional de Angola, 17 October 1984.

15.FAPLA (Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola) were the MPLA government's army.

16.This Commission, integrating both SADF and FAPLA, was set up to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka accords.

17.Radio South Africa, 16 October 1984.

18.Crocker, 75.

19.Ibid.

20.Ibid.

21.Ibid.

22.Ibid., 78.

23.Ibid., 77.

24.Ibid.

25.President José Eduardo dos Santos, speaking at a state banquet in honor of visiting president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Radio Nacional de Angola, 4 October 1985.

26.Crocker, 290

27.Ibid., 292.

28.Communique from UNITA's Central Committee. Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 20 May 1984.

29.Reuters, 19 December 1985.

30.South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan, quoted in The Washington Post, 2 September 1985.

31.UN Chronicle, September 1985.

32.SADF Captain Du Toit was captured in this operation.

33.The York Times, 25 May 1985.

34.The New York Times, 16 November 1987.

35.Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, quoted by the Associated Press, 5 December 1987.

36.Inter Press Service, 23 November 1987.

37.Horace Campbell, "The Military Defeat of the South Africans in Angola," Monthly Review 40, no.11 (April 1989): 1.

38.Inter Press Service, 1 March 1988.

39.Campbell, 1.

40.Crocker, 506-511.

41.Campbell, 1

42.Dos Santos, Radio Nacional de Angola, 28 September 1985.

43.Ibid.

44.Ibid.

45.Dos Santos, Radio Nacional de Angola, 2 December 1985.

46.Dos Santos, address to the MPLA Party Congress, Radio Nacional de Angola, 2 December 1985.

47.Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993).

48.Agostinho Neto, Angola's first President -- who rule from independence until his mysterious death in Moscow in September 1979 -- was married to a Portuguese woman. Settler descents also controlled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the state's oil company, and the Presidential Guard until the mid-1980s, and the Armed Forces to the present.

49.This system was euphemistically called contract labor.

50.World Bank, Angola: An Introductory Economic Review (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1991), 175.

51.Ibid., 176.

52.In 1973 US$1=27.25 Angolan Escudos.

53.Statistics on cash crop production in colonial Angola are drawn from R. Pelissier, "Country Study: Angola," Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa, 1975), 148.

54.A. B. Herrick, et al., Area Handbook for Angola (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), 288.

55. Data on diamonds are drawn from R. Helmore, "Diamond Mining in Angola," Mining Magazine (June 1984).

56.Ibid., 530.

57.Ibid., 531.

58.Ibid., 150.

59.Herrick, 298.

60.M. R. Bhagavan, Angola's Political Economy 1975-1985 (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986), 7.

61.World Bank, Angola, 6.

62.Ibid.

63.This section is based primarily on interviews with Maria Luisa Abrantes, former Director of Angola's Foreign Investment Agency, and Generoso de Almeida, Governor of Banco Nacional de Angola in February 1993.

64.World Bank, Angola, 8.

65.MPLA, Documents of the First Congress (Luanda: MPLA, 1977).

66.MPLA, MPLA Extraordinary Party Congress Documents (Luanda:MPLA, 1980).

67.Aguinaldo Jaime, quoted in The Financial Times (London), 8 May 1991, p.4.

68.Tony Hodges, "Angola to the 1990s: The Potential for Recovery," Economist Intelligence Unit (Special Report No.1079, 1987): 52.

69.OPEC Bulletin, p.37.

70.Contract between the Province of Angola and CABGOC for the concession of exclusive exploration and exploitation of deposits of gaseous liquid and solid hydrocarbonates. Article #1.

71.Article 34 of the contract stipulates that the quantities which are expressed in escudos refer to money of the province of Angola and also stipulates an exchange rate of 28.60 escudos to the dollar at that time.

72.Article 5.

73.Article 7.

74.Article 16.

75.Hodges, 53.

76.Reuters, 23 March 1994, quoting a document from the state oil company SONANGOL.

77.The Oil Daily 44, no.9, 2.

78.World Bank, Angola, 34.

79.From 1975 to 1991 the Angola's Kwanza was artificially set at 29.9 to the US dollar.

80.Reuters, 8 March 1994.

81.World Bank, Angola, 35.

82.The Financial Times (London), 8 May 1991, p4.

83.The Manchester Guardian, 3 October 1993, p.16

84.The Washington Post, 9 August 1994, p.A10.

85.On independence day, 11 November 1975, Angola was already involved in a civil war. Thus, independence was proclaimed separately by the three nationalist movements that had just finished waging a 14-year "war of national liberation" against Portugal. MPLA proclaimed it in the capital city, Luanda, which was under threat to fall to advancing South African forces moving from the south and Zairian troops advancing from the north. UNITA and FNLA proclaimed independence in Huambo.

86.Dos Santos, Radio Nacional de Angola, 2 December 1985.

87.Father Apolonio Graciano, private secretary to Cardinal Dom Alexandre do Nascimento.

88.Agostinho Neto's father was a Methodist minister.

89.The Bicesse Accords between the Angolan government and UNITA were signed in Portugal on 31 May 1991. These Accords were aimed at ending the civil war and created the framework for Angola's transition to elected government.

90.Informal tribunals exist especially in the shanty-towns surrounding the capital. Most crimes committed in those areas are not treated by the legally constituted judicial authorities because there is a widespread perception that these authorities are corrupt. Consequently, elders are often sought to determine sentences for various crimes. When the crimes are considered particularly heinous -- rape, murder, theft -- the criminal often does not enjoy the luxury of being taken before an elder since mob justice (lynching or "necklacing", the practice of lighting a tire soaked with fuel around an alleged criminal) usually takes its course. Less violent disputes are also mediated in these tribunals.

91.Eve Sandberg (ed.), The Changing Politics of Non-Governmental Organizations and African States (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 28.

92.David C. Korten, "People-Centered Development: Toward a Framework," in David Korten and Rudi Klauss (eds), People Centered Development: Contributions Toward Theory and Planning Frameworks (West Hartford: Kumarian, 1984), 301-302.

93.Ibid., 3.

94.Stephen N. Ndegwa, "Civil Society and Political Change in Africa: The Case of Non-Governmental Organizations in Kenya," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 35, No.1-2 (1994), 23.

95.Ibid., 12.

96.Michael Bernhard, The Origins of Democratization in Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 2.

CHAPTER 5
ECONOMIC REFORM AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

In the previous chapter I suggested that the major difficulties faced by the Angolan state after independence can be attributed to three main factors: the decolonization process, civil war, and systemic failure. This chapter deals with Angola's attempts to reverse economic decline and undertake political reforms to end the civil war.

Given the quickly deteriorating military and economic conditions in the 1980s, the regime was faced with two basic and interrelated choices: initiate a transformation by a) ending the war through a peace process involving constitutional changes and leading to free multi-party elections; and/or, b) liberalizing the economy. It was hoped that either choice, whatever the sequence, would prevent or postpone the imminent collapse of the regime due to its military and political weaknesses -- two important factors discussed at length in the preceding chapter.

The first option was not particularly appealing to the ruling class because it might take the form of a national constitutional forum, as in other parts of Africa, with the authority to restrict or take away some powers of the regime. Furthermore, if the government allowed itself to become one of various participants in the peace process,[1] its power and legitimacy would be diluted by the structures -- emanating from civil society -- overseeing the transition to peace and democratic government. This would prevent the government from taking full credit for the peaceful settlement of the civil war and reaping the political benefits in a future multi-party election. Second, popular dissatisfaction with the regime was attributable mainly

to the economic system's inability to produce goods and services in sufficient quantities and adequate quality to meet domestic demand. Major social convulsions could occur if harsh economic reforms were undertaken simultaneously with political transformations because, as some detractors suggest, "democratization can make sustaining economic reforms more complicated. It can raise economic expectations."[2] Thus, by giving priority to economic reforms, the regime was attempting to strengthen itself in anticipation a new era of political competition[3] and greater accountability.

Like many African countries, Angola in the 1980s had to adopt a structural adjustment program to address the main factors adversely affecting its economy; i.e., overly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, overvalued exchange rates, negative interest rates, poor productive sector pricing policies, a trade regime biased against exports, and excessive levels of foreign borrowing. But these reforms had to be carried out at a time when political liberalization could no longer be postponed. Ideally, both would be implemented simultaneously in ways designed to make them mutually reinforcing. But, although it can be argued that political reforms can create an enabling environment for economic growth and sustainable development, some scholars maintain that "for African countries facing the prospect of mere survival, implementing political and market-oriented reforms at the same time seems to be a plunge in the unknown."[4] This partly explains why the Angolan government embarked on economic reforms ahead of political liberalization.

Economic Reforms

Structural Adjustment

Adjustment refers to the process of eliminating serious imbalances or disequilibria in an economy. Adjustment includes short-run stabilization policies aimed at eliminating deviations from a specific equilibrium path or longer-term structural adjustment to shift the equilibrium path itself.

The emphasis on stabilization policies is premised on the notion that a stable macroeconomic environment is a prerequisite for a successful transition to sustainable economic growth.[5] Stabilization at the macroeconomic level requires governments to pay particular attention to their monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies. In the area of monetary policy, stabilization measures involve a reduction in the rate of growth of money supply and the increase in the interest rates to a level where they are positive in real terms; i.e., where they exceed the rate of inflation.

Fiscal policy refers to government revenue and expenditure. In the context of stabilization, fiscal policy is aimed primarily at keeping the fiscal deficit to a low fraction of the GNP. This can be accomplished either by increasing revenues (higher taxes), decreasing expenditures (termination or cut-backs in subsidies on consumer goods and services; i.e., food, agricultural inputs, education, health care, transportation, and so on), or a combination of both.

Maintaining a realistic exchange rate is also a very important goal of macroeconomic stabilization. This very often includes the devaluation of a country's exchange rate. In other

cases, governments have moved away from fixed to floating exchange rates set by "market forces." A devalued currency helps to reduce imports by making them more expensive and therefore reducing domestic demand. It also makes exports more profitable, thus encouraging increases in production. Consequently, exchange rate policy is seen as an important mechanism in helping countries reduce their balance of payment deficits.

In addition to the adoption of these measures in the short-run, many countries must overcome serious long-term structural rigidities. In the view of the World Bank, the present crisis of development in Africa can be overcome with faster growth. The Bank suggests that this objective can be attained by implementing three types of adjustment policies: outward-oriented trade policies; policies to foster macroeconomic stability; and policies to improve the allocation of resources.[6] Together, these policies constitute the core of SAPs.

One of the basic aims of medium and long-term adjustment is to increase a country's international competitiveness. Trade policies are, therefore, particularly important. With regards to trade policies for longer-term adjustment, the World Bank emphasizes the maintenance of realistic exchange rates as well as replacing quantitative restrictions with tariffs in order to reduce the bias against exports facing producers in many developing countries. The World Bank also encourages countries in need of adjustment to design trade reforms that will allow them to move toward a more outward-looking trade strategy. The main objective of such redirection in strategy is to improve trade performance and help achieve greater overall rates of economic growth.[7]

Also, in terms of macroeconomic policies, adjustment is principally aimed at lowering fiscal deficits by reducing or redirecting public expenditures. Fiscal deficits

accommodated by monetary expansion are seen as the main cause of high inflation, low savings, and distorted investment. Lower fiscal deficits are expected to rectify this situation through an increase in savings and an improvement in resource allocation.[8]

There are also several complementary policies aimed at improving resource allocation through structural adjustment. They include fewer price controls to allow prices to reflect the true costs of resources and thus encourage the expansion of economic activities in line with changing incentives; fewer investment regulations to help reduce barriers to entry; encouragement of foreign investment; promotion of technological progress; and fewer labor market regulations to increase labor market flexibility and create more employment.[9] These policies constitute the basis for the structural adjustment programs being implemented in Africa and throughout the world.

Main Features of Adjustment Programs

Structural adjustment programs refer to specific "packages" of policy measures devised by the World Bank and the IMF in order to assist countries experiencing major economic problems. The main objectives of this assistance is to support the introduction and implementation of measures intended to reverse economic decline by institutionalizing "flexible economic management."

SAPs include various measures aimed at reducing internal and external deficits; reducing the size of the public sector while improving its management and overall performance; increase overall economic efficiency by eliminating price distortions in the various sectors of the economy; increase trade liberalization; and promote domestic savings

in the public and private sectors.

Most SAPs require the implementation of several policy measures, including:

(a)   exchange rate adjustment, mainly through devaluation;

(b)   interest rate policy designed to promote domestic savings and appropriate allocation of resources;

(c)   control of money supply and credit;

(d)   fiscal policy aimed at reducing government expenditure and deficit financing;

(e)   trade and payments liberalization; and

(f)   deregulation of prices of goods, services, and factor inputs.[10]

Structural adjustment also entails a dismantling -- and ideally selling to private interests -- of public enterprises. Thus, privatization as well as other forms of state divestiture have become an integral and controversial component of SAPs.

In general, SAPs have become the IFI's instruments of choice to affect changes in economic policy in LDCs. But, as Mosley argues, these programs have been controversial because the link between the instruments (SAPs) and the ultimate target of economic reform has not been certain. Furthermore, the implementation of SAPs can be politically distabilizing since it may hurt many segments of society, including influential groups.[11] In the case of Angola, this was further complicated by the long-running civil war and the need to divert most resources to the military.

Structural Adjustment in Angola

In order to reverse the precipitous and dramatic economic decline, the Angolan government was faced with the daunting tasks of controlling domestic demand while stimulating domestic supply and improving allocation of resources while fighting a civil war. Major

inflationary pressures, reflected essentially in the generalized scarcities -- at official prices -- of consumer goods and inputs for productive activities pointed to the need for strict control of domestic demand. Furthermore, large current account and budget deficits as well as the external debt were directly related to the domestic demand being out of control, and the constant need to divert resources to fight UNITA.

Simultaneously, the Angolan government was aiming to stimulate domestic supply -- primarily in the agricultural sector -- through a series of incentives including more favorable prices for agricultural products; the development of a network of privately-owned commercial enterprises to purchase agricultural products from the farmers and sell agricultural inputs; the creation of better transport and storage facilities for agricultural crops; and the development of a system to provide services and technical assistance to farmers.

Finally, the government needed to tackle the major issue concerning the efficient allocation of economic resources -- a primary cause of the severe distortions in their economy. Better allocation of resources was expected to increase productivity throughout the economy. Beyond economics, however, a more efficient allocation of resources had important political as well as social implications because it could help to increase the welfare of consumers and correct arbitrary inequalities,[12] at least in the areas controlled by the government.

To tackle these and other major economic problems the Angolan government announced in 1987 a comprehensive program of Economic and Financial Restructuring (*Programa de Saneamento Econômico e Financeiro*), commonly known as SEF. This structural adjustment program, designed by a Technical Secretariat, attempted to accomplish

two objectives:

(a) stabilization of the financial situation, by reducing internal and external disequilibria, which are reflected in inflationary pressures, large budgetary deficits, excessive losses and indebtedness of many enterprises, serious deterioration of the financial situation of the banking system, accumulation of the arrears in foreign payments, and difficulties in servicing the external debt;

(b) reform the economic system, in order to increase productivity, improve the allocation of resources and create the conditions for a faster rate of economic growth and equitable development in the future.[13]

Financial stabilization constituted one of the main catalysts for the entire program. Thus the most important measures introduced by SEF to stabilize the financial situation included the reduction in the deficit of the state budget; adoption of new mechanisms to finance the budget deficit; financial restructuring of public enterprises; reform of domestic credit policies; rescheduling of external debts; adjustment of controlled prices; and adjustments in the exchange rates.

To reduce the budget deficit, SEF concentrated on attempting to reform the tax system -- allowing for tax increases including taxation of the profits of public enterprises and the parallel market -- while introducing stricter control over budgetary expenditures, particularly through the reduction of subsidies and other transfer payments. In addition, SEF contemplated increases in the fees charged for most utilities and services provided by the public sector including housing rents, water, electricity, transportation, post and communication, etc. All of this would occur in tandem with currency devaluation and a major push towards allowing the market to determine prices for all other goods and services

in order to enable enterprises to become more profitable.

Still, in relation to the budget deficit, SEF proposed abandoning the financing of budget deficits through monetary creation. To avoid the inflationary pressures of printing money, the government planned to finance a large portion of its deficit by borrowing money from domestic sources -- i.e., households and corporations. A securities market would be created to carry out this function.

The development of a securities market was expected to be only one of many approaches to strengthen the entire financial system. Other measures included the introduction of competition within the banking sector by allowing the establishment of commercial banks. This objective would be further enhanced with the restructuring and/or privatizing public enterprises that were causing a major financial drain of the central bank.

Besides these stabilization measures SEF attempted to introduce structural reforms in the economic system by enlarging the role of the formal private sector, increasing the autonomy of public enterprises, encouraging foreign investment, and improving the planning system.

The enlargement of the private sector's role in the economy found in SEF constituted an official recognition of the abandonment of the socialist economic model. Most public enterprises would be privatized and the state's direct participation in economic activities would be limited to key enterprises with strategic roles; i.e., central banking, military industry, distribution of electric power, oil and diamond industries, etc. Moreover, the state planned to encourage the development of the private sector particularly in the retail trade in order to re-establish the relationship between rural producers and urban consumers. Further

emphasis was placed on internal road transportation, building, repair services, and handicrafts. SEF also provided for the legalization of enterprises operating within the informal sector. This was a very important step since the state had not only attempted to control all economic enterprises operating within the formal economy, it also sought to prevent the emergence and development of enterprises within the informal sector under the guise of central planning. However, since the state enterprises alone could not meet domestic demands for goods and services, consumers began to rely increasingly on enterprises operating in the informal sector, especially open-air markets.

Another important structural reform introduced by SEF was to increase the autonomy of public enterprises. These enterprises would have be allowed to be competitive and to have a greater reliance on their budgets. Although the government was expected to produce a national plan and establish general regulations for the public sector, it would no longer intervene in the managerial decisions of public enterprises, including the setting of prices and labor policies. Public enterprises would be subject to the same tax treatment as private enterprises and the state would no longer be liable for their obligations. State subsidies would only be forthcoming if public enterprises could not perform for reasons beyond their control; i.e., in case of war or other natural disasters.

SEF demonstrated that the Angolan government had finally recognized the potential contribution of foreign investment in the nation's overall economic development. Thus, SEF reflected the government's revision of legislation on foreign investment particularly with regards to facilitating the negotiation and approval of foreign investment ventures. To this end, a Foreign Investment Agency was created to assist foreign investors in all phases of the

process of getting investment projects approved. The sectors of economic activity where foreign investment was permitted enjoyed a significant enlargement and the repatriation of profits was guaranteed by law.

The most important structural reform introduced by SEF was, arguably, the abandonment of the heavy reliance on national plans with an emphasis on administrative mechanisms and bureaucratic methods. Annual plans would now be based on projections of key economic variables and place greater significance on the macro-economic policies required to ensure both internal and external equilibrium. Macro-economic management would concentrate essentially on the level of public expenditures, the average level of taxation, the exchange rate, interest rates, and the average rate of wage increases. Most prices would be determined by the market and the allocation of resources would also be determined by the price mechanisms and market competition.

The government's initial strategy was to implement SEF structural adjustment over a period of three to five years.[14] By using a gradual approach, the government's goal was to avoid major mistakes, learn through experience, and introduce timely corrections in implementing structural adjustment. Political considerations, however, made this course of action unrealistic. By 1988 -- when the bulk of the legislation that served as the legal basis for structural adjustment was approved -- the quadripartite negotiation process leading to independence of Namibia and the removal of Cuban troops from Angola was near conclusion. With Cuban troops out of Angola, the government would have to quicken the process of an internal political settlement with the armed opposition. As mentioned before, the government preferred to settle political matters after restructuring the economy.

It was political and economic pressure -- from both domestic as well as international sources -- therefore, that forced the Angolan government into a full shock adjustment for the Angolan economy. Beginning in 1988, the government removed most price controls and allowed the currency to devalue while attempting to impose controls over monetary expansion.

The government's calculations were based on a peaceful solution of the civil war. The end of the war would bring about a series of mitigating conditions for the effects of shock adjustment policies. Peace would considerably boost the confidence of both domestic economic agents and international investors leading to greater economic activity. Furthermore, the government would be able to divert the bulk of the financial and human resources from the war effort into productive activities. In retrospect, the government was overly optimistic in its projections. The war did not end immediately and when it did, peace only for lasted for an eighteen-month hiatus.[15]

Exacerbated by renewed fighting, rapid liberalization within a framework of full shock adjustment created a new set of disequilibria, often more serious than before. Galloping inflation, caused by persistent scarcities of consumer goods and the government's propensity to print money to meet its current account payments, has been particularly difficult to tame. This, in turn, has resulted in severe social consequences inasmuch as most workers -- especially those in the public sector -- have been adversely affected since prices for most goods and services were allowed to increase while their wages were frozen to keep the budget deficit and inflationary pressures under control. Increased unemployment has been another major side effect of SEF since many nonviable public enterprises were

liquidated while others were privatized -- i.e., sold to party members at preferential terms -- or restructured. SEF's emphasis on reducing the budget deficit also meant that expenditures on social programs were severely curtailed.

But the biggest problem with SEF, however, was that it preceded political reforms. Had the government implemented economic reform after successfully carrying out the peace process, in the context of broader political liberalization policies, SEF's chances of success would have been greater. At least one main obstacle to stability -- i.e. war -- would have been overcome. In the end, the government was not able to attain either economic liberalization or peace. Nevertheless, it is worth looking at the attempts to secure a durable peace through a combination of political reforms.

Political Reforms

The Road to Peace

On 8 August 1988, Angola, Cuba and South Africa issued a joint statement in Geneva declaring that "a de facto cessation of hostilities is now in effect" in the conflict in Angola and Namibia. On December 22, these three countries signed a historic agreement in New York, committing themselves to the phased withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola over a period of 27 months in return for the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia's independence.

The accord marked the culmination of eight years of mediating efforts by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, and was heralded as a

major diplomatic coup for the Reagan Administration. However, for many others, it represented the end of a sad chapter in Africa's modern history and a case study of belated superpower efforts to support the resolution of regional conflicts. Indeed, the agreement facilitated the transition of Namibia to independence. However, it did nothing to hasten the resolution of another major regional conflict; i.e., the civil war in Angola itself.

The "New York Accords" do not mention UNITA, the guerrilla movement supported by the United States and South Africa, that had been waging a debilitating war against the Angolan government and which controlled more than a third of the country. In fact, the talks leading to the signing of the accords were conducted along two tracks. Track I involved the removal of Cuban troops from Angola in return for South African withdrawal from Namibia and independence for that country. Track II entailed national reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA government in Angola.[16] Both tracks were supposed to be pursued simultaneously. However, since the parties to the negotiation had accepted that the question of UNITA and national reconciliation for Angola was an internal matter, little or no pressure was put on the MPLA government and UNITA to settle their differences within the framework of the negotiations leading to peace in the region. Moreover, since the Reagan Administration was convinced that after the Cubans withdrew entirely, reconciliation between UNITA and the Angolan government would naturally follow, little pressure was put independently on the rival parties in Angola to settle their differences. As a senior US official involved in the negotiations said at the time:

> Military solutions have been tried many times and have failed. What this agreement does is address the international question of foreign troops. That should encourage the parties to explore internal solutions.[17]

African leaders were also pushing for a negotiated settlement that would bring together the two warring factions in some form of coalition or national government as in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Mobutu of Zaire, for example, was quoted as saying that "many African countries are calling with all their might for national reconciliation in Angola."[18] This view was also suggested to president Dos Santos by the presidents of Congo and Gabon. Nigeria -- still then an important player in continental affairs -- made it known that "a lot of African countries would buy the idea of a resolution once the foreign forces decamp. The rebels are from a disenfranchised tribe, so there is a need for integration, for reconciliation."[19] Nigeria was also ready to "pass on the lessons of [its] own civil war, for speedy reconciliation and reconstruction, that there can be no victor and no vanquished."[20]

The agreement on international aspects of the conflict, however, did not immediately lead to an end to Angola's conflict. In fact, there was no predisposition on the part of the Angolan government to settle the conflict through political means. Two months before the signing of the regional peace agreement, President José Eduardo dos Santos, declared that an internal peace process in Angola did not entail sharing power with UNITA. In a welcoming banquet offered to former Malian president Mousa Traore -- who, as the acting OAU President in 1988, was in Luanda to offer broad African support for a negotiated solution -- president Dos Santos declared that "Angola does not accept pressures from wherever they may come, which aim is the formation of a so-called coalition government."[21]

For the governing MPLA, negotiations with UNITA would be contrary to the constitutional principles the party had established for the "people's republic". After holding

a summit meeting with neighboring countries on ways to end the civil war in Angola, Dos

Santos declared that "the Angolan state is a one-party state and so the acceptance of such a

political organization [UNITA] is out of the question."[22] Instead, dos Santos suggested that

his government would seek "national harmonization" through peaceful means which would

eventually lead to an end of the civil war. He added that his government was already

implementing a policy of clemency to reintegrate into Angolan society former members of

UNITA who gave themselves up. As the president explained, "the idea is to bring all

Angolans together under the same anthem and flag, under the same state."[23] This government

position was based on the view that UNITA did not represent a political force because it was

armed by outsiders; i.e., South Africa and the United States. The Angolan government's

views of clemency and/or political reconciliation were further highlighted by the defense

minister:

> One of the arguments used by the enemy in its propaganda campaign is that we are adopting a simplistic and intransigent stand on the UNITA puppets. Some do not accept the clemency policy alleging that they are not criminals. It is said, for example, that the MPLA-Workers' Party is bent on destroying UNITA and that it rejects dialogue and the so-called national reconciliation. However, these people forget to mention that four or five years ago, the puppets intended to storm Luanda city and destroy the MPLA-Workers' party. The comrades will recall that, following increased co-ordination between South African forces and UNITA in 1983-84, the puppets believed they could militarily occupy Luanda. The so-called national reconciliation is the puppets' last chance for survival and comes at a time when they realize they will never be able to overthrow our government.
>
> To hint that there is a certain intransigence on the part of the MPLA-Workers' Party is to evade the problem. We do not refuse to accept UNITA compatriots -- officials, cadres, armed elements and civilians -- inasmuch as we know they are being deceived by the personal ambition of individuals and Pretoria's expansionist interests. We disagree with accepting UNITA as an organization on an equal footing with the MPLA-Workers' Party with which we have to share power. This is unacceptable and would amount to

renouncing ourselves as well as the history of our struggle for national liberation.[24]

Dos Santos and his government were planning to address the possibility of ending the civil war only after a regional peace accord was signed. The MPLA believed that its armed forces were superior to UNITA's and that it possessed a well-trained air force. With SADF out of Namibia, the regime in Luanda conclude that it could deal a severe military blow to UNITA even without Cuban support. The Angolan army's intelligence chief was quoted as saying that "we don't need Cuban troops to annihilate UNITA."[25] Months before the regional peace agreement was signed, Dos Santos himself predicted that "unless there is a massive intervention of South African forces, UNITA cannot last very long."[26]

Angolan government strategists presumed that, without foreign -- especially South African -- support to UNITA through Namibia, the rebels could be crushed militarily. The Angolan government's chief spokesman at the time made this position abundantly clear: "if we resolve this problem with South Africa, the internal peace process will move very quickly and neither negotiations nor any other kind of agreement with UNITA will be necessary."[27] No agreement with UNITA would be required because the government was seriously probing the possibility of neutralizing UNITA. In a revealing speech to the country's National Assembly, the Angolan president suggested that UNITA's "neutralization will demand an additional and final sacrifice by our people and by our armed forces, combining political action with military action."[28]

The "problem with South Africa" was settled on 13 December 1988 with the signing of the "Brazaville protocol" by Angola, Cuba and South Africa, pertaining to the withdrawal

of Cuban troops from Angola and implementation of the UN plan for independence of South African-ruled Namibia. To coincide with this major event, Dos Santos announced that his government would promulgate a law granting amnesty and commute death sentences to political opponents who renounced violence, turned themselves in to the authorities, agreed to respect the country's laws and constitution, and pledged allegiance to the governing MPLA. In announcing these measures Dos Santos protested that "there is a group of Angolans who have turned to arms and war to overthrow the government with outside help. But practice and history have proved that this choice is wrong. It is not too late to correct this error."[29]

With a regional peace plan in place, the MPLA was convinced that UNITA would "cease to exist in a year"[30] through a combination of political and military action. This approach to internal conflict resolution, however, was seriously flawed inasmuch as it gravely underestimated UNITA's political and military strength as well as its resources -- both internal and external. Even before the signing of the "Brazaville protocol" and the "New York Accords" for peace in Southern Africa, Jonas Savimbi rejected the Angolan government's approach to ending the civil war through harmonization and clemency and declared prophetically and ominously that "there will be no peace in Angola without UNITA."[31]

In an "address to the nation" broadcast by UNITA's clandestine radio station on 3 October 1988, Savimbi announced his movement's readiness to "enter into direct talks with the MPLA right now to end the 13 years of civil war, death, division and suffering" and pledged that his organization would work "intensively in the mobilization of our entire

people in support of peace through direct negotiations between UNITA and the MPLA." But he went on to say that

> the UNITA leadership violently, indignantly and repulsively rejects the so-called harmony, clemency, or whatever policies. There is division within the Angolan family, civil war and misunderstanding among Angolans and liberation movements that fought colonialism and have yet to find a common denominator to form a government of national unity so that internal and external policies can be outlined in an open debate.[32]

From the outset, UNITA was leery of international attempts to settle regional conflicts. The rebels' leadership believed that the entire process leading to Namibia's independence was being skillfully used by the MPLA to create the conditions for the destruction of UNITA. Although Savimbi constantly affirmed his desire for peace and reconciliation, he was hesitant about embracing a peace process that excluded his organization. Before the signing of the New York Accords, Savimbi said that "What we like to see is peace. But if peace means peace for the Russians and Cubans and the MPLA and the destruction of UNITA, then we are going to fight on."[33]

UNITA was using a combination of threats and conciliatory statements to prod the MPLA government along the path of national reconciliation. Besides publicly stating his organization's readiness to enter into direct talks with the government, Savimbi proposed the formation of a transitional government integrating both MPLA and UNITA members -- of which he would not be a part[34] -- to open the way for elections.[35]

There were signs, however, that Savimbi was not reneging on his long-standing ambition to seize power by any means. Savimbi often appeared to suggest that he had a messianic mission to rule: "I spent 30 years of my adult life fighting for freedom and dignity

of the black man in this country... If the Cubans want to stay, I will fight on and I will win. If the Cubans leave and there is no negotiation with the MPLA, we win. If the Cubans leave and we have elections, we win."[36] Savimbi was leaving no viable political alternatives open for himself or his organization. He conceived no other possibility than outright victory. This predisposition was not suitable to a constructive political process, as it would later become abundantly clear.

The New York Accords paved the way for a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government in Namibia. However, simultaneous attempts to settle the civil war in Angola were not successful. Neither of the combatants were ready to seriously entertain a political solution to the conflict. Savimbi expected a collapse of the regime: "I don't give the MPLA two months in power" without Cuban support, Savimbi declared.[37] On the other hand, the New York Accords had not affected Angola's policy of offering clemency and reintegration to any UNITA rebels who put down their arms and renounced violence. However, the Angolan state's clemency and reintegration policies excluded Savimbi personally. The government regarded him as "the spiritual father of the crimes committed against our nation."[38]

The Angolan government's reluctance to make peace with UNITA rested heavily on the pledge made by South Africa to halt all support for Savimbi's organization within the framework of the regional peace accord. Without South Africa's support UNITA appeared vulnerable. It would now have to rely almost exclusively on support from the United States channelled through neighboring Zaire. But the Angolan government discounted the significance of this conduit for UNITA, partly due to the end of bipolarity in international

affairs and US ambivalence over Mobutu's Zaire. A senior Angolan government official stated categorically that "Zaire can never be as solid a base for Savimbi as South Africa unless there is a level of US involvement that we do not believe will happen."[39]

Once again, the Angolan government's assumption of UNITA's complete external dependence led it to seriously underestimate the rebels' resourcefulness. In fact, the US did raise considerably the level of its involvement in the Angolan conflict by assuming the role played by South Africa as the main UNITA supporter. In his first foreign policy commitment, President-elect George Bush wrote a letter to Jonas Savimbi assuring him of continued US military and diplomatic backing until the Angolan government agreed to reach a political settlement with UNITA.[40]

The US did continue to provide "appropriate and effective assistance" to UNITA. Even before South African disengagement in the Angolan civil war the US was using six military bases in Southern Zaire to train and supply UNITA rebels. The opening of the supply routes through Zaire coincided with joint American-Zairian military maneuvers -- code-named Flintlock 88 -- in April-May 1988. Their stated purpose was to provide mutually-beneficial training for US-allied and friendly forces personnel in airborne operations, communications and ground tactical operations. However, it also included the refurbishing of a major air base in Kamina, Zaire[41] to serve as the hub for secret C.I.A. operations to supply arms, including sophisticated antiaircraft Stinger missiles, to UNITA.[42] Furthermore, the arms and equipment used during these military maneuvers was left behind and given to UNITA,[43] thus upgrading its logistics and infrastructure for a new phase of the war. Afterwards the US continued to provide support to the rebels in order to counterbalance

what the State Department characterized as "the vast amount of assistance coming from the Soviet Union to the other side."[44] Russian military support to the Angolan government in the late 1980s was still estimated at approximately $1 billion per year.[45]

The discontinuation of South Africa's direct involvement in Angola's civil war did not result in the outcome predicted by the MPLA; i.e., a significant weakening of UNITA. In fact, American backing represented a shift, not a reduction in UNITA's dependence on external support. It allowed UNITA to intensify its military operations throughout the country, especially in northern Angola, close to the border with Zaire. The American objective was to exert unbearable pressure on the MPLA government in order to persuade it against the military option to end the conflict. As mentioned before, UNITA was viewed as an American ally in the context of the Cold War. An agreement between the MPLA and UNITA -- i.e., a division of power among them -- would allow the US to exert its influence in Angola, reap the economic benefits of exploring the country's mineral wealth, and help determine its future on the basis of the relationship with UNITA.

The combination of domestic, regional, and international pressures led to several attempts to find a political solution for Angola's civil war on the basis of national reconciliation. This process began in 1989 at Gbadolite, Zaire, and included the long peace negotiations that took place in 1991 at Bicesse, Portugal.

Gbadolite: Fast Track to a Fiasco

Regional and international changes put similar pressures upon both the MPLA government

and UNITA. South Africa's withdrawal from Angola in the late 1980s came at a time when

the former Soviet Union was disengaging from international commitments due to its own

internal crisis. These two factors, combined with American pressure for a political settlement

of the civil war, meant that both the Angolan government and UNITA were more responsive

to the idea of ending the war through negotiations.

Thus, on 1 March 1989, President Dos Santos announced a "peace program" whose

implementation would start the following April 1 -- to coincide with the start of the UN's

plan for independence of Namibia. This programme called for,

a. An end to interference in Angola's domestic affairs by South Africa, the USA, and their allies;

b. Respect for Angola's constitutional laws, including the maintenance of a one-party political system;

c. Application of active political and military measures to end the subversive war;

d. Amnesty within the framework of the policy of clemency and national harmony;

e. Voluntary reintegration of all Angolans in an effort of national reconstruction in accordance with their capacities;

f. Special treatment in the case of Jonas Savimbi;

g. Support from the international community for social reintegration and national reconstruction programs.[46]

Dos Santos also announced that, in order to obtain peace in the shortest possible time,

his government was prepared to host a summit to be attended by all neighboring countries.[47]

On 13 March 1989, UNITA responded with a series of proposals on national

reconciliation reiterating and broadening its position favoring discussion with the MPLA.[48]

UNITA's leader announced a 4-month unilateral moratorium on major military offensive

actions and the release of MPLA military prisoners and offered to reopen the Benguela

railway for non-military traffic. But UNITA also announced that its president would not participate in actual negotiations with the MPLA and would also not participate in a transition government that would administer the country and lead it to free elections after reconciliation was achieved.[49]

The MPLA strongly rejected these proposals saying that "UNITA's alleged peace proposal...does not merit a scrap of credibility and cannot be taken seriously."[50] Existing policies of "amnesty" for individual UNITA members were seen as the best approach to peace. This policy had been adamantly rejected by UNITA, which saw it as an attempt to split and defeat the organization. The MPLA position appeared to change somewhat, however, by the time eight African chiefs of state[51] gathered in Luanda on 16 May 1989 to discuss ways to end the war. A reformulated peace plan that emerged at the end of this summit used the term "national reconciliation" for the first time and suggested the possibility of a dialogue between the warring parties. But the new MPLA peace plan still contained elements which were anathema to UNITA; i.e., "exile" for UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi; the "integration" of UNITA into the MPLA; and "respect for the Constitution" of the People's Republic of Angola.

UNITA objected vigorously to these terms because, despite Savimbi's offer of 13 March 13 1989 not to participate in an interim government, UNITA would continue to require his leadership during the negotiation and transition. Moreover, UNITA had consistently stressed the indivisibility of UNITA from its founder. For example, the organization's Secretary of Information declared that "UNITA and Dr. Savimbi are one and the same thing."[52] Second, UNITA viewed the formulation of "integration" as a means of

submerging its members into the MPLA, a concept viewed as inconsistent with the goal of national reconciliation and political pluralism. Finally, UNITA regarded "respect for the Constitution" as tantamount to acceptance of the existing one-party, Marxist-Leninist state.

Despite these seemingly wide differences in the positions of MPLA and UNITA, intense diplomatic pressure -- both African and American -- as well as the demonstration effect of the transition to pluralism and democracy elsewhere in the sub-continent, prodded the two warring sides to establish a basis for political dialogue. These efforts culminated in the summit of 18 African heads of state at Gbadolite, Zaire, on 22 June 1989.[53] Savimbi was invited to attend the meeting hosted by President Mobutu Sesse Seko. For the first time, Savimbi and Dos Santos met publicly and declared their mutual desire to end the civil war and begin the critical dialogue leading to national reconciliation.

The Gbadolite summit was built on an "intricate choreography of direct and indirect contacts and recitation of positions in the absence or presence of the principal parties, all conducted in at least three languages: English, French, and Portuguese."[54] A number of contentious issues -- including the specific political and military mechanisms to end the war -- were discussed without being resolved. For some of the participants, however, there was agreement on the key MPLA demands; i.e., exile for UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi, integration of UNITA members into MPLA structures, and respect for the existing Constitution.[55] President Moussa Traore -- who was the acting president of the OAU -- claimed that six points were discussed and agreed to at Gbadolite by the Angolan government and UNITA. These points were "an end to armed opposition, security for Savimbi and his followers, the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of Savimbi, granting a

post to Savimbi, the integration of UNITA elements, and the conditions for their integration..."[56]

UNITA categorically rejected this interpretation of what was agreed in Gbadolite. In fact, the published communique seems to support UNITA's view, since it clearly stated that all the parties agreed to only three principles:

a. Mutual desire to end the war and effect national reconciliation;

b. Proclamation of a cease-fire effective 24 June 1989; and,

c. Establishment of a mixed UNITA-MPLA commission under the mediation of President Mobutu to negotiate the political future of Angola.[57]

This view was corroborated by President Mobutu who asserted, for example, that the agreement reached at Gbadolite included "nothing about exile" for Savimbi.[58]

In light of the diverging interpretations of what was pledged in Gbadolite, the cease-fire declared on 24 June 1989 failed to take hold as both sides continued limited operations to gain local and tactical advantages. In the absence of any mechanism to discuss and resolve violations -- or even agreement on what was and was not permitted -- a return to large-scale operations was inevitable. The MPLA launched a major offensive toward the UNITA centre at Mavinga on 18 August 1989.

Against the background of military conflict and public acrimony, a follow-up summit of African leaders took place in Harare on 22 August 1989. UNITA was not invited to participate partly because Mugabe, given his views and alliances with the MPLA in the Angolan conflict, was not as willing to give Savimbi the benefit of the doubt as Mobutu had been. The Harare summit's final communique asserted that three additional principles had

been agreed upon at Gbadolite which had not been publicly disclosed at that time:

a. Respect for the Constitution and laws of the People's Republic of Angola;

b. Integration of UNITA into existing MPLA institutions; and

c. Acceptance of Jonas Savimbi's temporary and voluntary exile.[59]

As mentioned before, UNITA consistently rejected these three additional principles. It maintained that "it is not through the intended and abusive exile of our beloved president, Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, UNITA's integration into MPLA, FALA's[60] integration into FAPLA[61], cessation of support for UNITA, amnesty, clemency, respect for the MPLA constitution and laws, that Angola's serious political and military problems would be resolved."[62] In the wake of the Gbadolite debacle, UNITA proposed its own plan for ending the war. This plan comprised five points:

a. Direct UNITA-MPLA talks;

b. A cease-fire whose implementation must include the liberation of political prisoners under the supervision of the International Red Cross;

c. A transitional government of national unity;

d. A review of the constitution, which must be the government's first task;

e. Democratic elections.[63]

UNITA also put forward a comprehensive timetable spanning an 18-month period for the process of national reconciliation:

For the peace process to begin, it is necessary that we first sign an effective cease-fire. Three months after the cease-fire has been signed, an African military body should have the responsibility of seeing that the cease-fire is observed. Nine months later, with the presence of that African body in the country, the transitional government of national unity will be formed [and]

we shall have the national reconciliation process with the holding of free and democratic elections six months after the transitional government of national unity is formed.[64]

UNITA found the basis for its rejection of the MPLA peace plan and for promoting its own alternative in the ideas of democracy and political pluralism. Its leadership declared that:

> We in UNITA believe that democracy cannot take place without political parties. Democracy is absolutely necessary for any country's social and economic progress. UNITA cannot disappear in any coalition with the MPLA. For that reason, the UNITA militants demand that the UNITA ministers participating in the transitional government of national unity be appointed by UNITA and that the first task of the government of national unity should be to review the constitution. We cannot accept a monolithic, one-party constitutional structure that does not allow political forces other than the MPLA-Workers' Party to exist and work.[65]

The MPLA, on the other hand did not appear to be interested in national reconciliation within a framework/scenario in which there are no losers, only winners. The Angolan government had steadfastly denied Savimbi a role in governing the country and intended to effectively isolate the UNITA leader by co-opting his organization's top leadership into the governmental structures.

Facing a military offensive by government troops and MPLA maneuvers to force him into exile, Jonas Savimbi called off a two-month cease-fire and ordered his army to resume the war on 24 August 1989 saying that "the Angolan people, to their infinite sorrow, accept that the war has restarted."[66]

Why did the Gbadolite process designed to bring peace to Angola fail? Several reasons can be put forward. First, external pressures may be pointed to as a possible reason.

The Angolan government accused the United States and South Africa of pressuring UNITA's leader to reject the peace plan proposed by the African heads of state at Gbadolite. According to the Angolan government, "Savimbi had initially expressed full agreement with the [peace] program, but a few days later, because of US and South African pressures restricting his behavior, he backed down and has been rejecting the Gbadolite principles ever since."[67] In this context, the goal of the US and South African attitudes was to "safeguard their strategic interests in southern Africa in general, and Angola in particular."[68]

Any integration of UNITA into the one-party structures created by a Marxist MPLA and the exile of Jonas Savimbi would have constituted a major defeat for both the US and South Africa inasmuch as they ran counter to the rationale of both the Reagan Doctrine and apartheid's total strategy.

Second, and more fundamentally, however, the breakdown of the Gbadolite process revolved around the question of who said what and when. From this perspective, Gbadolite failed due to incomprehensible flaws in the African mediation effort. The diverging interpretations of what was agreed to at Gbadolite stems from the fact that the assembled African heads of state did not affix the weight of their signatures to an agreement of such significance. It was simply ratified by a handshake between President Dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi.

Third, the Gbadolite summit had been hastily arranged and poorly planned. It had been previously scheduled to take place in August. However, the meeting was quickly convened "in order to proclaim peace and national reconciliation in Angola" in advance of the Zairian president's visit to the USA, which was scheduled to take place later in June.[69]

Mobutu was interested in taking a major diplomatic victory to Washington to divert attention away from the negative images that surrounded his rule.

Beyond all of these considerations, however, Gbadolite also demonstrated that the African heads of state completely misinterpreted the Angolan situation. The crux of the matter that they failed to grasp is that Savimbi was not likely to abandon his life-long quest for personal power and a dominant position for his party in Angolan politics. Savimbi himself characterized such suggestions as "silly" and wondered "Why should UNITA, which has never been stronger militarily and politically, surrender to the Luanda government in negotiations what the government could never obtain on the battlefield?"[70] He also stressed that "UNITA ha[d] not fought 22 years, first against Portuguese colonial rule and then against the Soviet and Cuban-backed regime, only to throw up its hands in surrender."[71] Savimbi was neither ready nor willing to comply with the African heads of states' proposals submitted to him at Gbadolite. He went to the summit mainly to enhance his image in African politics; i.e., "Gbadolite transformed him in black African politics from the status of a CıA-supported 'armed bandit' to a recognized nationalist leader worthy of being included in a major summit conference."[72]

Finally, the major cause of the Gbadolite debacle, however, rested on the fact that the two warring factions had diametrically different views of what peace entailed. This seriously conditioned their respective agendas. The MPLA saw it as the destruction of its main rival while UNITA claimed to define it in terms of fundamental democratic changes; i.e., the establishment of a government of national unity, free and fair elections, and a constitution allowing for a multi-party democracy. In the end the Gbadolite process ended in failure but

UNITA's positions constituted the basis for further negotiations involving greater participation by the US, Russia, and Portugal.

The Road to Bicesse

The failure of the Gbadolite process for peace in Angola led to increased frustration on the part of the Angolan government. For President dos Santos, "the hopes of peace that came alive with the signing of the Gbadolite accord on 22nd June were unfortunately, frivolously and irresponsibly snuffed out by the terrorism that UNITA carries out on behalf of foreign interests."[73] The acceptance to participate in a hastily arranged summit constituted a major personal gamble by President dos Santos since his party had never been fully supportive of any dealings with UNITA while the army continued to seek an outright military victory. Consequently, the failure of Gbadolite to bring peace to Angola led to the questioning of his leadership by both the MPLA party and the army.

To reassert his leadership, President dos Santos opted for a two-pronged strategy to deal with UNITA. First, at the political level, dos Santos produced yet another peace proposal which, for the first time, opened the door for UNITA members to become independent legislative candidates and ensured the freedom of associations of a social or cultural character.[74]

These new proposals suggested that, although UNITA could not participate in the political process as a political entity, the MPLA no longer insisted that UNITA members be integrated into the existing one-party political structures. UNITA could continue to exist as

an association while its members participated in the political process. UNITA, as expected, rejected this proposal, arguing that it "represent[ed] a setback in the efforts in search for peace in Angola" and maintained that "there is no other way out for Angola other than cease-fire, direct UNITA-MPLA negotiations, free elections, multiparty democracy and gaining national reconciliation in the country."[75]

And second, at the military level, the MPLA forces launched a major offensive -- code-named Last Assault -- against UNITA in the Cuito-Cuanavale area in an attempt to take Mavinga and open the way to an attack on UNITA's headquarters at Jamba. The government would, then, be in a better position to dictate peace on its own terms.

But American help would once again enable UNITA to stop a large-scale government offensive. The US was not willing to abandon UNITA before a political settlement had been reached. Consequently, it significantly increased military and logistical support for UNITA to give the latter an edge in the fighting to thwart the government offensive.[76] The Bush administration also issued a strong statement warning the Angolan government that "attempts to crush UNITA militarily are futile and will make it increasingly difficult to reach the negotiated settlement to conclude this tragic conflict."[77] By early April, Savimbi was able to claim that his forces had beaten back the government offensive. This was a major victory by both UNITA and its American allies as was underscored by Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen when he said that "We hope now that the government seems to be blunted and defeated by UNITA they can now think again and find a way to the negotiating table."[78]

For its part, UNITA continued to combine military and diplomatic pressure to seek a political solution. While making threat of waging "a nationwide war, regardless of the

consequences,"[79] Savimbi was seeking the help of the former colonial power, Portugal, to "help towards a rapprochement of UNITA and MPLA viewpoints."[80] Savimbi argued that "the Portuguese have a better understanding of Angola" and thus were better suited to work "discreetly [to] find ways of making Angolans understand each other."[81]

In a dramatic move to increase the likelihood of direct negotiations with the Angolan government, UNITA offered an immediate cease-fire and agreed to recognize the Angolan state on the basis of the Alvor agreements.[82] UNITA had previously conditioned talks on a government troop withdrawal from positions captured in the rebel heartland in southeast Angola. UNITA also had refused even to mention the possibility of recognition under any circumstances. By agreeing to recognize the Angolan state, albeit on the basis of the Alvor Accords that do not recognize MPLA authority, UNITA was aiming to persuade moderates within the Angolan government to reopen talks without losing face. Government hardliners were still insisting on full recognition of the MPLA's single-party authority and state institutions.

The Angolan government was able to overcome some of its members' continued aversion to dealing with the rebels and responded positively to UNITA's offer by dropping the long-standing demand that Jonas Savimbi be exiled from public life in order to allow the peace process to move forward. In fact, the Angolan government now declared that Savimbi "deserved special recognition."[83]

These dramatic changes in the positions of both UNITA and the MPLA can be attributed both to the new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the behind-the-scene diplomacy involving various regional and global actors. This

new relationship constituted the basis upon which solutions could be sought for regional conflicts like Angola. The decision by the superpowers to press Luanda's Marxist government and UNITA to begin direct talks on national reconciliation came at a meeting between US Secretary of State James Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze while both attended independence ceremonies in neighboring Namibia in March 1990. Namibia itself had gained independence partly because of earlier US-Soviet efforts to bring about an agreement ending cross-border invasions into Angola by SADF in return for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

For the US, at the end of the Cold War, Afghanistan, Cuba and Angola were the three places in the Third World still capable of provoking serious tension between Washington and Moscow. From the Soviet Union's viewpoint, Angola might provide a good opportunity to repeat the collaboration that produced Namibia's independence. This major shift in Soviet policy toward Angola -- combined with American promises of diplomatic recognition and help for Angola to join the World Bank and the IMF -- forced the MPLA to the negotiating table.

Another positive factor in this context was Portugal's willingness to become involved, once again, in helping its former colony settle the turmoil which followed the granting of independence. For fifteen years, Portugal had distanced itself from the economic chaos and the civil war that erupted in the wake of independence. But several factors contributed to thrust it back onto the diplomatic center-stage in attempts to sort out the legacy of settler colonial rule in Angola; i.e., Portugal's ability to communicate with both sides, a desire for a higher diplomatic profile, a sense of national guilt for abruptly leaving Angola without

preparing a peaceful transition, and a yearning to regain a business foothold in the former

colony.

On 25 April 1990, the Angolan government made a dramatic announcement:

> In the next few days, direct contacts with the Union for Total Independence
> of Angola [UNITA] will be beginning with the assistance of the Portuguese
> government, which helped create conditions for the talks. We are convinced
> the talks will help us find the path to national reconciliation in Angola.[84]

UNITA reciprocated with two significant gestures. First, it recognized President dos

Santos as the head of state,[85] proposed a three-month cease-fire to "give the peace process

yet another chance,"[86] and declared its intentions to cease "all hostile propaganda against the

Luanda government and its leadership, with the exception of objective criticism of that

government's social and economic programs."[87] And second, UNITA later recognized the

MPLA government as "legitimate until elections are held."[88] The moderation of both sides'

positions -- secured though regional and international pressure -- facilitated the holding of

several exploratory meetings between the Angolan government and UNITA with Portuguese

mediation.

These exploratory talks -- like much of the relationship between the two sides -- were

nevertheless characterized by friction and confrontation. The government wanted to extract

three basic concessions from UNITA at the exploratory talks: a) agreement on a formula

whereby UNITA would stop receiving military aid from the United States and other

countries in exchange for the government's suspension of all arms purchases from the Soviet

Union and other countries; b) an immediate cease-fire to allow the free movement of people

and goods, the creation of a climate of peace and stability, and the implementation of a

programme for the general elections process; and, c) the disarming of UNITA as a first step for the eventual creation of a national army.

But UNITA believed that the government was not negotiating in good faith. In fact, it accused the latter of "inflexibility" and attempting to "prolong the war situation while seek[ing] ways to implement its macabre plan to keep the Angolan people under MPLA subjugation."[89] UNITA was distressed with what it regarded as procedural and other major deficiencies at the talks. The procedural matters that troubled UNITA were mainly related to the composition of the government's delegation: it was composed of low-level officials and the government showed a propensity to change the head of the delegation at the last minute, thus "necessarily chang[ing] the complexion of the talks."[90]

UNITA was also disturbed with the more substantive issues put forward by the government during these exploratory negotiations. First, the MPLA government refused to officially recognize UNITA as a political opposition party. This refusal was viewed as an attempt by the MPLA to monopolize the political process and claim all the dividends of any qualitative transformations in the country. For UNITA this was a very sensitive issue since it viewed itself as the principal catalyst for any such changes. Another contentious issue involved the disarming or demilitarization of UNITA as a pre-requisite for its participation in a democratic process. UNITA argued that it was not willing to make such concessions without prior agreement on a framework of political principles. Without an army, UNITA would be vulnerable to the MPLA. Therefore, it was not willing to accept the MPLA government's demands without first safeguarding its own interests; i.e., its survival as a major political force. But the government -- in light of its bitter past experiences -- was not

willing to embark upon a peace and democratization process while UNITA kept its army intact.

The seemingly intractable barriers separating the warring factions in Angola were set aside due to direct intervention by the United States and the Soviet Union. In a coordinated diplomatic offensive -- symptomatic of the end of the Cold War -- US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze called Jonas Savimbi and Pedro de Castro Van Dunem, Angola's Foreign Minister, to Washington. Both sides were told by their main backers that no additional military and financial aid would be forthcoming from either the United States or the Soviet Union to prosecute the war. Both Washington and Moscow had found a mutually acceptable moment to collaborate on settling the Angolan war. The Bush administration was keen to resolve Third World conflicts hindering steady improvement in Soviet-American relations, while the leadership in the Kremlin was eager to end financially draining involvements in overseas wars like that in Angola.

Instead of providing the financial and military means to sustain the civil war in Angola, then, the US and the Soviet Union further developed their collaborative engagement in Angola's peace process. In fact, the United States and the USSR, along with Portugal, formulated the main documents that constituted the basis for negotiations in subsequent meetings between UNITA and the government. These documents -- on political principles and technical-military issues -- were based on five principles:

    a.   Angola will become a democratic and multi-party nation;
    b.   The international community ought to guarantee a cease-fire;
    c.   There should be free and fair elections in Angola, verified by
            the international community;
    d.   The signing of a cease-fire should be preceded by an accord

on the date for free and fair elections; and,

e.   All military assistance from abroad would stop once a cease-
fire accord has been signed.[91]

An agreement on these principles by the United States, the USSR, and Portugal compelled the Angolan government and UNITA to make further concessions prior to signing a peace accord. Thus, a) UNITA dropped its longstanding demand to be included in a transitional government, agreeing that the MPLA could run the country during the transition; b) abandoned its insistence for specific recognition of UNITA, settling for MPLA recognition of the right for opposition parties to have legal standing; and c) agreed to integration of MPLA and UNITA military forces into a single national army before elections. The MPLA government was also forced to make several dramatic concessions including dropping its demand that Jonas Savimbi should go into exile during the transition period: acknowledging UNITA's right to exist as an opposition party; agreeing to allow the development of a multi-party system; and, accepting the principle of free and fair elections following the signing of a cease-fire.

These concessions cleared the way for the peace agreement between the Angolan government and UNITA. But how solid, in practice, was the commitment to peace by the two sides? Would they be able to fully implement an accord forced upon them by changing international realities; i.e., the new relationship between Washington and the Kremlin and their desire to eliminate potentially dangerous regional conflicts like the one in Angola? Would new elements leading to a more stable environment conducive to peace be introduced or would it simply be a replay of the Gbadolite fiasco? To answer these and other questions

it is important to look at the Angola peace accords in more detail.

The Angola Peace Accords

The peace accords for Angola included four documents dealing with: a) the cease-fire; b) the fundamental principles for peace in Angola, including the formation of the Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC); c) the main concepts for resolution of outstanding questions between the government and UNITA; and d) the Estoril[92] Protocol, dealing with matters regarding the elections, the JPMC, internal security during the transition period to elections, administrative structures, and the creation of the unified armed forces. What follows is a more detailed analysis of these documents.

The Cease-Fire Accord

The peace accords define the cease-fire as "a cessation of hostilities between the government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA, aimed at bringing peace in the entire national territory."[93] The two parties agreed that the cease-fire would be "total and definitive" and would guarantee the free movement of people and goods throughout the entire country. The accord included commitments by the two parties to cease all movement of troops or armed groups; all attempts to occupy militarily new positions; all military manouvres aimed at transporting military material; and all violent actions against the civilian population.[94] The political control of the cease-fire would be the responsibility of both the government and UNITA and would be exercised through the JPMC. The UN would be invited by the

government to send monitors to help both sides.[95]

The cease-fire accord included the undertaking by both sides to end all hostile propaganda both within the country and from abroad.[96] It also obligated both sides to abstain from acquiring lethal material. The United States and the Soviet Union informed the Angolan government that they would support the implementation of the cease-fire by ceasing to provide lethal material to either side as well as encouraging other countries to do likewise.[97]

In terms of its implementation, both the government and UNITA committed themselves to "strict compliance" of the accords as well as all future rulings emanating from the structures created to oversee the cease-fire.[98] Implementation of the cease-fire also included freeing all civilian and military prisoners of war with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross.[99]

To successfully implement the cease-fire accord, and on the insistence of the international community, the Angolan government and UNITA reached agreement on a set of "fundamental principles" that would secure the establishment of peace in Angola and devised a framework to settle all outstanding questions.

Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola

The fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola constituted essentially a number of concessions by both sides to create the political climate necessary to effectuate the transition to a multi-party regime. Thus, the recognition by UNITA of the Angolan state, President José Eduardo dos Santos, and the government until elections were held[100] constituted a major political victory for the governing party in the sense that it provided it

with legitimacy. In turn, UNITA gained the right to freely carry out and take part in political activities under the terms of the revised constitution and relevant laws on the creation of a multi-party democracy, after the signing of a cease-fire.[101]

The fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola also made provisions for the holding of talks between the Angolan government and all political forces with a view to learning about their views on the proposed constitutional changes as well as cooperation from all political parties in order to draft laws to speed up the electoral process[102]; the holding of free and fair elections after the registration of voters and under the supervision of international observers who would remain in Angola until they confirmed that the elections were free and fair and the results were officially announced;[103] and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to free association.[104]

The mechanics to guide elections, the JPMC, the administrative apparatus, and the creation of the unified national army were established in the Estoril Protocol.

The Estoril Protocol

The holding of free elections had been a consistent UNITA demand. In fact, the governing MPLA's refusal to hold elections was used by UNITA to confer some measure of legitimacy on its guerrilla war. The Estoril protocol laid the framework for the electoral process once a cease-fire was secured.

A key element of the protocol was the agreement granting all political parties and interested persons an equal right to organize themselves and participate in the electoral process.[105] Furthermore, this protocol ratified the "observer" countries' proposal that elections

should be held in the period between September 1 and 30 November 1992.[106]

The Estoril protocol also validated the creation of the Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC), conferring upon it the mandate of exercising comprehensive "political control of the cease-fire process" and guaranteeing the "strict compliance of the political and military understandings" inherent in the application of the peace accords.[107] Although the JMPC was not intentionally created to replace the government, its mission of guaranteeing the conditions of peace and security to enable the implementation of the peace process transform·d it into a *de facto* government. In fact, one of the few important areas left in the government domain during the transition period pertained to the "functions and activities" of the police.[108] Thus, having previously lost economic control under SAP, the shrinking of the MPLA state became complete with the devolution of political control to the JPMC.

While the government lost a degree of sovereignty in relation to this new structure, the Estoril Accord included an agreement to allow the extension of central administration to all areas captured by UNITA during the civil war and thus enable the free movement of people and goods.

Finally, the Estoril Protocol established the criteria for the creation of a national non-partisan army. The two sides agreed that the process of combining the two armies and unifying their military doctrines would be complete before the election date.[109]

The accord provided for a de facto end of the fighting from midnight, 15 May 1991 and a formal cease-fire signing on May 31. Elections were scheduled for September 1992. According to Savimbi, the rationale for continued fighting no longer existed. "The MPLA and UNITA have realized that after 15 years of war there is an impasse. No one can achieve

a military victory on the ground. We all realize we have to go through a political solution."[110]

On 31 May 1991, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi signed what was supposed to be a historic peace agreement formally ending Angola's civil war. Witnesses at the ceremony included US Secretary of State James Baker and his Soviet counterpart, Alexander Bessmertnykh, whose governments had pledged to suspend military aid to the two sides. Also present was the UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, whose organization was committed to sending a peacekeeping force to Angola to monitor the cease-fire and the elections. At the signing ceremony, US Secretary of State James Baker warned that, "Implementation of these binding accords will not be easy. Time and again in the months and years ahead the will of the Angolan people and their leaders will be severely tested."[111] This proved to be a prophetic understatement. Unfortunately, but significantly, a number of essential ingredients for unity were missing from the accord. Which? Why?

In principle, the accords appeared solid. The MPLA government -- which had held the capital, the oil fields and the main towns since 1975 -- had conceded that Angola would no longer be a one-party state based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, that elections would be held, and that a unified army would be created. A joint commission would guide the elections process. On the other hand, it seemed that Angola would become an important symbol of post-Cold War international cooperation.

But several ingredients of peace were missing. Most Southern African wars, like those addressed in the earlier case studies of Zimbabwe and Namibia -- and even South Africa and Mozambique -- have ended in spectacular reconciliations because they all shared

a common pre-condition. In all cases, one side was clearly on the defensive due to one or a combination of several factors: i.e.; political, military, economic, and diplomatic. Victory for one side and defeat for the other were just a matter of time. In Angola, a military stalemate had prevailed for some time, suggesting that there would be no winners or losers in the battlefield. The MPLA regime -- discredited by administrative failure and corruption at home -- was becoming increasingly friendless and isolated abroad without Soviet backing. Likewise, UNITA -- bereft of American and South African support -- realized that it was not in a position to fight its way to power.

Trust, another potential facilitating factor in regional processes of reconciliation, had also been lacking in Angola. UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi had been held up as the devil by the MPLA since the struggle against Portuguese rule.[112] From 1975 to the late 1980s, UNITA was allied with South Africa, Angola's arch-enemy, which provided a secure base and supplied the rebels with fuel, weapons and training.

It was also lack of trust that led to the creation and attribution of exceptional powers to the joint political-military commission (JPMC). Since UNITA did not find the MPLA government to be sufficiently able to manage the transition process it pressed for this commission to "act as a parallel government."[113] Given the fact that the MPLA had exercised absolute control, UNITA believed that the JPMC was necessary to prevent "manipulation." The JPMC was integrated by the Angolan government and UNITA -- as full members -- as well as the representatives of Portugal, the USSR, and the US as observers. As previously noted, the JPMC dealt with all matters relating to the cease-fire, the elections, and the forming of the new army. As a result, UNITA attempted to use the JPMC to erode the power

of the government. Thus, the commission was turned into the main stage for UNITA's attacks on the MPLA regime. It did little, as the next chapter will show, to manage peacefully the transition to elections.

The period of transition itself was a contentious issue. The MPLA government had wanted at least a three-year period between the signing of the cease-fire and the holding of the first multi-party elections. UNITA demanded a 12-month period because it did not want the MPLA to have enough time to improve its tarnished image. Eventually, the international mediation "imposed" an 18-month transition period.

Security concerns during the transition period also proved to be very contentious, particularly on questions pertaining to the future of the security apparatus. The MPLA had a well-trained secret police, a police force, and para-military units. Although UNITA attempted to introduce mechanisms whereby the JPMC would directly control these forces, the MPLA government resisted such efforts to the very end. As will be shown, these security forces served as a safety mechanism for the incumbent regime.

But UNITA also had its safety mechanisms. For one thing, it refused to allow the government to extend its administration over the areas of the country under rebel control accounting for roughly one-third of the country. Second, UNITA did not disband its army nor did it give up its weapons.

In sum, since neither party could achieve additional gains through war, it can be argued that they were using diplomacy to continue the war by other means. Superpower rivalry in Angola obfuscated much deeper conflicts which are far more intractable. The urbane leadership of the MPLA is politically and culturally miles apart from the Maoist

Ovimbundu leaders of UNITA. The Stalinist, multiracial, MPLA grew out of Portuguese politics. UNITA is an Africanist movement which exists primarily to bring its leader to power. In this sense, the Savimbi personality cult is far more important than the ideals of the party.

There were other factors that conspired against a lasting peace in Angola. The leaders' personalities posed a problem for national reconciliation, making it particularly difficult and traumatic. Savimbi's abrasive and ruthless personality convinced the MPLA leadership that he would be no less dictatorial once he achieved power. His personality rendered the notion of power-sharing -- i.e., the Vice-Presidency for Savimbi -- inconceivable. This contrasted with President dos Santos' quiet, self-effacing personality.

To further complicate an already difficult scenario, the situation in the countryside escaped both government and UNITA control. Angola had very few tarred roads and the government had failed to deliver administration and services to most of the country. In theory, elections could be organized as they were in Zimbabwe and Namibia. But there was a major difference: in both those countries there were roads and telephones which worked, and an administration in place which had control over the countryside. In both Zimbabwe and Namibia the international monitoring effort was able to take full advantage of the existing administrative apparatus. It is in light of these factors that the aborted transition to peace and elected government in Angola as well as this country's endemic vicious cycle -- from war to peace to war -- should de analyzed.

Endnotes

(Chapter 5)

1.The main participants in the peace process included the two belligerents (the government and UNITA), as well as the international observers (the US, Russia, and Portugal).

2.USAID, "Economic Reform in Africa's New Era of Political Liberalization," Proceedings of a Workshop for SPA Donors (Washington, DC: USAID, 14-15 April 1993), 3.

3.Interview with A. Seita, Commercial Attache, Angolan Embassy, Washington, DC, January 1994.

4. Tessy Bakary, "An Ambiguous Adventure: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and Economic Reforms in Africa,"in USAID, 66.

5.World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989) 24.

6.Ibid., 29-32.

7.Ibid., 32.

8.Ibid.

9.Ibid.

10.ECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (Addis Ababa, 1989), 17-18.

11.Paul Mosley, "Conditionality as a Bargaining Process: Structural-Adjustment Lending, 1980-86," Essays in International Finance 168, (Princeton University: International Finance Section, October 1987):1. For more discussion on the political factors affecting the success or failure of SAPs see Joan M. Nelson, "The Political Economy of Stabilization: Commitment, Capacity, and Public Responses," World Development 12, no. 10, 903-1006.

12.World Bank, Angola, 141.

13.Ibid., 130.

14.Maria Luisa Abrantes, former head of the Foreign Investment Agency, interview with the author, February 1994.

15.See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion.

16.The Washington Post, 20 November 1988, p.D1.

17.The Washington Post, 14 December 1988, p.A1.

18.The New York Times, 19 September 1988, p. A3.

19.The New York Times, 19 September 1988, p.A3.

20.Nigeria's former Foreign Minister, Maj. Gen. Ike Nwachuku, quoted in The New York Times, 2 November 1988, p.A27.

21.The New York Times, 19 September 1988, p.A3.

22.The Reuter Library Report, 1 October 1988.

23.Reuters, 1 October 1988.

24.Pedro Maria Tonha "Pedale", Minister of Defence. Radio Nacional de Angola, 8 October 1988.

25.Lt. Col. Mario Placido Cirilo de Sa, quoted in The New York Times, 9 September 1988, p.A9.

26.Reuter Library Report, 5 October 1988.

27.The Reuter Library Report, 23 November 1988.

28.The New York Times, 9 September 1988, p.A9.

29.The Reuter Library Report, 13 December 1899.

30.Luis Neto Kiambata, Angola's ambassador to Zambia, quoted by Reuters, 11 December 1988.

31.The Reuter Library Report, 11 December 1988.

32.Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 3 October 1988.

33.The Washington Post, 20 November 1988, p.D1.

34.Elisio de Figueiredo, Angola's ambassador in London at the time, declared that national reconciliation was possible only so long as it did not include Savimbi. The Washington Post, 20 November 1988, p.D1.

35.The Washington Post, 20 November 1988, p. D1.

36.The Washington Post, 20 November 1988, p.D1.

37.Ibid.

38.The New York Times, 14 January 1989, p.A15

39.Pedro de Castro Van Dunem, Angola's former Minister of Petroleum and a key foreign policy aide to President Dos Santos, quoted in The New York Times, 14 January 1989, p.A15.

40.The Washington Post, 12 January 1989, p.A1.

41.The New York Times, 26 May 1988, p.A10.

42.The Washington Post, 30 November 1989, p.A1.

4?. The New York Times, 26 May 1988, p.A10. Also interview with Gen. Peregrino Wambu, former chief of UNITA's military intelligence in Luanda, February 1994. Note that General Wambu had been living in Luanda since his capture by the government forces during confrontations with UNITA forces following the latter's resumption of the war in October 1992 following its defeat at the polls a month earlier.

44.Bea Russel, State Department, quoted in The New York Times, 26 May 1988, p. A10.

45.The New York Times, 26 May 1988, p.A10.

46.José Eduardo dos Santos, Radio Nacional de Angola, 1 March 1989.

47.ANGOP, Angolan News Agency, 8 March 1989.

48.The Associated Press, 13 March 1989.

49.This had always been a major MPLA demand.

50.Reuters, 31 March 1989.

51.The Presidents of Angola, Congo, Gabon, Mozambique, Sao Tome e Principe, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe attended the summit.

52.Jorge Valentim, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 29 September 1989.

53.In addition to Mobutu and Dos Santos, the summit brought together the leaders of Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome e Principe, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Morocco and Tanzania sent lower-level officials.

54.Warren Clark, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Hearing of the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "Subject: Angola Negotiations", US Congress, Federal Information Systems Corporation, 27 September 1989.

55.The Washington Post, 25 June 1989, p.A21.

56.Moussa Traore, interview with Radiodiffusion-Television Malienne, 23 June 1989.

57.The text of the "Gbadolite Declaration" was broadcast by Radio Nacional de Angola on 23 June 1989.

58.The Washington Post, 25 June 1989, p.A21.

59. Text of the communique read by Luke Mwananshiki, Zambia's Foreign Minister, quoted by ZIANA/PANA, 22 August 1989.

60.UNITA's armed wing.

61.MPLA's armed wing.

62.Jorge Valentim, UNITA's head of information, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 29 September 1989.

63.Ibid.

64.Ibid.

65.Ibid.

66.The Washington Post, 25 August 1989, p. A16.

67.Pedro de Castro Van Dunem, Angola's Foreign Affairs Minister, ANGOP, 23 September 1989.

68.Ibid.

69.José Eduardo dos Santos, Speech to the People's Assembly, Radio Nacional de Angola, 17 August 1989.

70.Jonas Savimbi, "I Have No Secret Agenda," The New York Times, 30 October 1989, p.A19.

71.Ibid.

72.The Washington Post, 25 June 1989, p.A21.

73.President dos Santos New Year's message, Radio Nacional de Angola, 30 December 1989.

74.Ibid.

75.UNITA's Political Bureau communique, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 9 January 1990.

76.The Associated Press, 25 March 1990.

77.Margaret Tutwiler, State Department spokesperson, Inter Press Service, 2 February 1990.

78.Reuters, 13 January 1990.

79.Jonas Savimbi, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 1 February 1990.

80.Jonas Savimbi, interview with Radiodifusão Portuguesa Internacional, 27 January 1990.

81.Jonas Savimbi, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 1 February 1990.

82.Communique of UNITA's Central Committee Political Bureau and the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola Supreme Command, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 8 April 1990.
The Alvor Accord signed in January 1975 by UNITA, MPLA, and a third guerrilla movement, FNLA, set Angolan independence for November of that year after an interim, power-sharing government had been formed by the three parties. But fighting broke out shortly afterward, and intervention by the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and South Africa escalated the conflict.

83.Venâncio de Moura, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inter Press Service, 12 April 1990.

84.Pedro de Castro Van Dunem, Angola's Foreign Minister, Associated Press, 25 April 1990.

85.Communique by UNITA's Central Committee Political Bureau and FALA Supreme Command, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 1 May 1990.

86.Ibid.

87.Ibid.

88.Jonas Savimbi, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 13 October 1990.

89.UNITA commentary, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 4 December 1990.

90.UNITA commentary, Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 30 August 1990.

91.Radio Nacional de Angola, 23 January 1991.

92.Estoril is a resort area of Portugal where many of the negotiating sessions were held.

93.Angola Peace Accords, Cease-Fire Accord, Section I: Definition and General Principles, Paragraph 1.

94.Angola Peace Accords, Cease-Fire Accord, Section II: Implementation of the Cease-Fire, Paragraph 6.

95.Angola Peace Accords, Cease-Fire Accord, Section I: Definition and General Principles, Paragraph 4.

96.Angola Peace Accords, Cease-Fire Accord, Section I: Definition and General Principles, Paragraph 5.

97.Angola Peace Accords, Cease-Fire Accord, Section I: Definition and General Principles, Paragraph 6.

98.Angola Peace Accords, Cease-Fire Accord, Section II: Implementation of the Cease-Fire, Paragraph 1.

99.Angola Peace Accords, Cease-Fire Accord, Section II: Implementation of the Cease-Fire, Paragraph 3.

100.Angola Peace Accords, Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola, Paragraph 1.

101.Angola Peace Accords, Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola, Paragraph 2.

102.Angola Peace Accords, Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola, Paragraph 3.

103.Angola Peace Accords, Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola, Paragraph 4.

104.Angola Peace Accords, Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola, Paragraph 5.

105.Angola Peace Accords, Estoril Protocol, Section I, paragraph 7.

106.Angola Peace Accords, Estoril Protocol, Section I, Paragraph 9.

107.Angola Peace Accords, Estoril Protocol, Section II, Paragraph 1.

108.Angola Peace Accords, Estoril Protocol, Section III, Paragraph 2.1.

109.Angola Peace Accords, Estoril Protocol, Section VI, Paragraph 9.

110. Jonas Savimbi, quoted by the Associated Press, 30 April 1991.

111. Reuters, 31 May 1994.

112. The MPLA claimed that Savimbi had been a Portuguese secret police agent.

113. Jardo Muekalia, UNITA's Chief Representative to the US, Press Conference, Embassy Row Hotel, Washington, DC, 28 May 1991.

CHAPTER 6
ANGOLA'S VICIOUS CYCLE

These two parties have destroyed the country -- UNITA physically and the MPLA with corruption and arrogance. The people are exhausted and have no confidence in either.[1]

Dramatic changes at the international level in the 1980s, combined with a worsening domestic situation, led the governing MPLA to abandon both ideology and dogma. All doubts about the viability of the MPLA's Marxist ideology were confirmed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact had an immediate effect on Angola both in military/security and economic terms. The Soviet Union no longer existed to subsidize the provision of military hardware and training to counter UNITA. Similarly, East Germany could no longer be counted upon to help manage the security apparatus: it had also ceased to exist.

At the domestic level, the regime was on the verge of collapse due to both mounting military pressure by UNITA and a crumbling economy. To avert a complete breakdown, the MPLA shed its Marxist ideology and attempted to win Western support. In return for help to the Angolan government, Western countries -- particularly the United States -- demanded liberalization of both the political system and the economy.[2] The simultaneous implementation of structural adjustment measures and the peace process can be best understood from this perspective. The economic and political changes introduced by the governing MPLA in the late 1980s constituted a last attempt to avoid collapse and keep power.

The changes being undertaken were externally motivated;[3] there was little good will at the domestic political level to serve as the basis for a lasting settlement to the civil war. The governing party did not trust UNITA and was, therefore, ready to fight on in order to keep power. Moreover, the government and the political elite still included ideologically committed individuals who were not willing to share power with an opposition group that had been instrumentalized during the Cold War and fought alongside racist South Africa. Thus, a serious struggle was taking place within the governing MPLA regarding whether sharing power with UNITA was compatible with its vision of a new society.

Within the government there were those who supported President Eduardo dos Santos' drive for changes in both policies and personnel. However, there was also a powerful section of the governing party that intended to preserve the status quo or allow only limited and gradual change. This section of the party was not convinced that UNITA would be satisfied with political concessions. Instead, they believed, concessions to UNITA would only encourage newer, stronger demands. Thus, the entire peace process could imperil the government's position and would put millions of Angolans at risk.

In this sense, the MPLA was undergoing a period of serious internal divisions and profound reassessment of its political objectives as peace approached. The absence of war might save the regime but would also entail sharing the political arena with competing forces -- especially a UNITA that had been demonized since 1975 -- and, possibly, those emerging from a revitalized civil society. This potentially divisive aspect of peace-making has been described by Ikle who suggests that "nothing is more divisive for a government than having to make peace at the price of major concessions. The process of ending a war almost

inevitably evokes an intense internal struggle..."[4]

José Eduardo dos Santos had to fight these tendencies within his own party. In the end his government promised to adhere to both the letter and the spirit of the peace accord -- including full demobilization of the armed forces. This acceptance of vulnerability was used to convey, to domestic as well as international audiences, that the government was negotiating in good faith.

Dos Santos seemed to believe that even if his party lost the legislative elections and he failed to win the presidency, the international guarantors of the peace process -- the United States, Russia, and Portugal -- would be able to ensure that the victor would not use its position to eliminate the loser. In any event, a new era of political competition -- in which losers would have an opportunity to once again contest for power in the future -- appeared to be dawning. But an important question remained: would the country and its political leaders be able to put the recent past of violence and bloodshed behind them?

Unfortunately for Angola -- and contrary to what UNITA claims -- the failure of the transition to elected government cannot be attributed to electoral fraud; it is primarily a result of attempting to prematurely end the civil war when major issues remained unresolved. The two warring sides had not resolved the issue of whether the civil war was the outcome of conflicting principles or interests; neither fully accepted the other's legitimacy; major intra-party disputes had not been resolved; and neither was willing to accept vulnerability -- i.e., both retained their respective armies -- and thus prevent escalatory tendencies from acquiring their destructive momentum. Just as important, civil society had not yet awaken from the long night under authoritarian rule.

Savimbi has always portrayed himself as an African revolutionary, and his party also developed the image of a revolutionary liberation movement. Throughout his political career, Savimbi promised to "liberate" the Ovimbundu -- first from Portuguese colonialism, and later from Soviet/Cuban "expansionism" and Luanda's "domination." Since this last goal had not been achieved, Savimbi was unwilling to compromise. Savimbi signed the Bicesse Accords only for tactical reasons. He remained ideologically and philosophically committed to the complete destruction of the MPLA regime and was indifferent to the costs involved in achieving it.

UNITA's ideology was based on the premise that the MPLA government was not legitimate because it was not elected and was formed primarily by members of a minority ethnic , racial group. Moreover, the MPLA had a Marxist orientation while Savimbi's UNITA was ostensibly "anti-communist" and "market-oriented." Compounding these ideological and philosophical differences was Savimbi's own personal ambition. He not only believed that the Ovimbundu, as the majority tribe, should govern; he concluded that, as the leader of the party representing the Ovimbundu, he should rule the country.[5]

At the time of independence, UNITA had the weakest army and the least resources of the three main liberation movements. Therefore, it was not in a position to impose its views. It opted, instead, for civil war. Such a war would allow UNITA to achieve two objectives: render the country ungovernable and win enough time to increase its military capabilities. By the time the Peace Accords were signed, UNITA had succeeded on both counts: the government had to choose between making peace or presiding over the total collapse of the country. Savimbi understood that he did not have to compromise. His

adversaries were weak domestically and had been left without any allies of consequence at the international level. The signing of the Bicesse Accords was, for him, simply a form of acquiescing to American demands to end the civil war in a formal manner -- as an example of apparent conflict-resolution in the "new world order." Savimbi was convinced that finally, after 16 years of war, his grand strategy of accepting nothing short of full power was assured of success.

Deep-seated mutual distrust prevented the two parties from negotiating an end to the war in good faith. UNITA sought a total transformation of society and a complete elimination of the governing MPLA. Savimbi succeeded in taking UNITA to this extreme position by physically eliminating or removing all moderate elements from the party's leadership. The deaths of Ornelas Sangumba, Tito Chingunji, and Wilson dos Santos, among many others, can be explained in these terms.

Constant purges, therefore, eliminated factions within UNITA who, while advocating the need for change, stopped short of advocating the complete destruction of the MPLA. The moderates who were eliminated from leadership positions defended changing specific government policies like centralized planning of the economy; proposed the replacement of specific government personnel; championed increased political participation; advocated wealth redistribution; and wanted to stop a perceived erosion of moral standards.[6]

Reigning supreme over a radicalized UNITA -- having silenced or executed moderate members of the leadership in the 1970s and 1980s -- Savimbi entered into negotiations to end the war both to gain as much short-term tactical advantage as possible vis-a-vis the government and to please his former backers, especially the United States. From this fact

alone, the peace settlement could not have been expected to last. The major flaw of the Bicesse Accords -- its failure to establish protections and guarantees strong enough to produce the belief that no side would eliminate the other -- only compounded the problem.

Mistrust on the part of UNITA manifested itself through the constant fear that it would be double-crossed by the governing MPLA. Although the Bicesse Accords called for the dismantling of the two armies -- and the creation of a unified army made up of smaller contingents from the two former enemy armies -- UNITA did not demobilize. It sent mostly older men, women and children to UN assembly points while hiding the more formidable guerrilla forces and their sophisticated weapons in the bush. The former number two man in UNITA, General Puna, denounced UNITA's non-compliance with the peace accord. In fact he left UNITA because he "did not want to be an accomplice to Savimbi's macabre plans for the country."[7] At the time, the UN dismissed Puna's accusations. The events taking place in Angola since UNITA's defeat at the poll demonstrate that, in fact, UNITA's army had been left intact.

Thus, the very arrangements that had been designed to end the war -- especially the integration of the armed forces and security apparatus, and the cease-fire -- were used by UNITA to advance its goal of eliminating its adversary. UNITA cleverly used the pretense of assembling its forces in UN assembly points to move troops into areas -- especially in the northern parts of the country -- where it had never previously penetrated.

Can the radicalization of UNITA after the silencing of many of its moderate voices account fully for Savimbi's refusal to contemplate any power-sharing arrangements with the governing MPLA? Why did UNITA reject the possibility of contesting power at a later date?

The answer lies mainly within the realm of UNITA's internal conflicts. By the time Savimbi signed the peace accord, UNITA was being closely scrutinized domestically and internationally due to confirmed human rights abuses. Many of the people killed and terrorized by Savimbi belonged to powerful ethnic elites who had historically supported UNITA. These elites wanted an immediate end to the war in order to bring Savimbi to justice. This could only be averted if UNITA assumed absolute control in the country and its radical wing dominated the government. In sum, Savimbi's behavior is also a reflection of his concerns regarding "his immediate personal safety."[8]

This highlights the complexity of the Angolan situation inasmuch as issues like race, ethnicity, and class often have more weight than supposedly more important ideological or structural questions. Thus, an analysis based solely on factors like ideology would render it incomplete. For example, no major political antagonism should have been expected in the relations between UNITA and the MPLA government since both profess democratic socialism as their ideological base. But even on this point their views and interpretations differed. Savimbi argued that UNITA's adoption of democratic socialism was "necessary and imperative."[9] He defined it in economic, distributive terms as a way of ensuring that all Angolans could benefit from the riches of their country. Politically, UNITA's claims of espousing democratic socialism are more problematic since its internal practices borrowed heavily from Chinese Maoist thought[10] while outside it used whatever ideological label was best suited for a given time period: "Negritude" in the 1960s and early 1970s, and "anti-communist" until the end of the Cold War. The MPLA also found it convenient to adopt a new ideological label. In the SAP and post-Cold War era the MPLA needed a profound

political and economic realignment away from a discredited Marxist ideology.

All these issues -- both objective and subjective -- are important elements in any attempt to study Angola's inability to sustain a peaceful transition. This chapter looks at some of these inhibiting factors in greater detail; i.e., why did the peace process as delineated in the Peace Accords for Angola collapse into renewed civil war?

The Peace Accords

The peace accord signed by the Angolan government and UNITA established several important targets for its implementation. Thus, on 31 May 1991,[11] the JPMC -- the mechanism created to oversee the implementation of the accords -- came into existence with the signing of the Peace Accords. By June 15, the UN observer groups and joint government-UNITA teams would initiate the monitoring system. On June 30, the UN was expected to have completed the installation of its personnel for the purpose of cease-fire verification. Between July 1 and 1 August 1991 government and UNITA forces would move to assembly areas to be confined for the entire transition period. Confinement to assembly areas would achieve two basic purposes: create a identifiable pool of soldiers from which to create a unified national army and prevent military interference in the transition process. The process for the formation of the unified army would start on 1 August 1991. It would be concluded by August 1992, just ahead of the elections planned for September 1992.

There were serious doubts from the start of the implementation process, particularly regarding each party's perceptions of the other's motives and intentions. UNITA, in

particular, argued that "the plans drawn up by the MPLA were not aimed at achieving peace. They were aimed at eliminating UNITA."[12] The MPLA government also had reasons to believe that UNITA was not seriously engaged in the peace process. These negative perceptions escalated into hostility and degenerated into political violence that, ultimately, booby trapped the entire process.

Political Intimidation and Violence

UNITA undertook to undermine the power of the MPLA regime during the transition process through an intense campaign of intimidation and political violence. For example, it ordered its members to carry out "a persecution campaign against former state security members" of the old regime.[13] In Lobito, Benguela Province, this led to clashes between UNITA soldiers and city residents. In Huambo, UNITA occupied several government buildings and evicted entire families from their homes.[14] It also prevented the holding of several demonstrations in support of peace by MPLA supporters.

The MPLA reacted to UNITA's actions by claiming that they were intended to create "psychological conditions of terror and fear."[15] But the conditions of terror and fear were more than just psychological and were not restricted to the civilian population. For example, angry airmen burned down the regional UNITA offices in Lubango in retaliation for the murders of four air force officers blamed on UNITA.[16]

Yet, UNITA considered itself the victim -- not the cause -- of political violence perpetrated by the governing MPLA. In a communique issued by the Chief of General Staff of its military wing, UNITA announced that the organization's assistant secretary-general,

Col. Pedro Makanga, had been assassinated on 29 September 1991 while travelling by road

to Luanda to attend a meeting of UNITA leadership. The communique claimed that there was

prr ⸗ʳ that Col. Makanga's assassination was the work of forces in the service of the MPLA

and linked it to the "provocative behavior" in every province of the country. UNITA

maintained that the assassination was "intended to sabotage the peace process" and vowed

not to "remain silent in the face of continued violations and provocations."[17]

On 23 October 1991, UNITA again accused the government of having murdered,

through state security officials, the director of the office of the Deputy Communications

Minister, for being a UNITA sympathizer. UNITA claimed that the government was

transferring state security operative officers to the police force in order to commit atrocities

under its guise. For its part, the MPLA accused UNITA of infiltrating armed men into urban

areas to launch terrorist operations against government officials as well as armed forces and

state security officers. In Bié province, for example, a UNITA youth gang called "007" was

reported to have attacked anyone who happened to be wearing an MPLA t-shirt.[18] Also in

Bié, UNITA captured 11 members of the presidential guard. Three of their vehicles were

seized and burned and the city's airport was closed. UNITA claimed that these soldiers had

landed in Bié ten minutes before an aircraft transporting its leader Jonas Savimbi was to

arrive. UNITA claimed that it "could not accept such provocation, in that it was clearly an

attempt on [Savimbi's] life."[19]

Political violence affected smaller parties as well. For example, UNITA soldiers and

sympathizers armed with automatic rifles, pistols, knives and sticks attacked supporters of

the Angolan Democratic Forum (FDA) holding a rally in the coastal city of Benguela,

wounding four people and kidnapping ten others. A UNITA soldier who participated in the attack was quoted as saying that "the attack was a warning that [FDA supporters] should not pass in front of the UNITA provincial office in the city in their election campaign."[20]

Foreigners were also the target of political violence, many shot and killed by gunmen using military-style weapons. According to the police, "all these killings have a strong political connotation."[21] Although the perpetrators were rarely apprehended, clearly the main intention was to destabilize the country, especially during the period leading up to the elections.

The unprecedented rise in both political and common crimes prior to the elections can be attributed to several factors including, first and foremost, the central government's weakness. This emerged from the lack of clear definition -- within the context of the Peace Accords -- of the roles of the government and the institutions created to manage the transition process. In an attempt to gain political points, UNITA frustrated most of the government's efforts to re-establish its authority throughout the country Government administrators were prevented from moving into areas previously controlled by UNITA and the deployment of the police force -- especially the better trained emergency police -- constituted a motive for violent debate. But the institutions created and/or legitimized by the Peace Accords -- i.e., the JPMC and UNAVEM -- were not able to fill quickly enough the vacuum created by the central government's ineffectiveness.

The Peace Accords rested on the crucial assumption that both side would cooperate in its implementation since, at least overtly, all wanted peace. Instead, UNITA took full advantage of the prevailing situation -- i.e., a weak government, a dysfunctional JPMC, and

an ineffective UNAVEM -- to further strengthen its own positions partly by preventing the government from extending its administration to areas it had lost during the civil war. President dos Santos lamented this fact by saying that "we do not understand why they [UNITA] do not let people move about freely. We do not understand why they do not let the government install administrators and commissars in every district and in every village. We also fail to understand why they do not allow our people and our peasants to return to their areas so they can till their fields."[22]

Ironically, the UN unwittingly facilitated UNITA's attempts to keep tens of thousands of peasants under its control instead of being allowed to return to their villages under the terms of the peace accord. UNITA was able to keep large areas under its control because of substantial quantities of food aid supplied to the area by UN agencies for distribution by UNITA officials.[23] This reflected lack of UN "intelligence" regarding the domestic political context.

The Angolan government was not allowed to start the process of putting UNITA-controlled areas under its control until six months after the signing of the peace accord. UNITA finally agreed that the government had the right to appoint administrative officials throughout the entire country but reserved the right to also appoint some of its own people to local government bodies. In practice, however, UNITA did not allowed the extension of government authority into the territory it previously controlled. On the eve of the election, UNITA still controlled militarily 52 districts[24] -- with an estimated population of about one million -- in complete defiance of the Peace Accords. According to government estimates, this would ensure UNITA 30 or 40 uncontested seats in the 220-seat parliament.[25]

But there were other factors contributing to political violence. The demobilized soldiers from both armies retained many of their weapons due to the haphazard way in which the demobilization process was conducted. In many cases, soldiers simply did not report back to their barracks once the cease-fire was signed. There were credible reports of "tens of thousands of angry, and penniless FAPLA soldiers" stopping traffic and rushing onto airplanes in an attempt to return to their homes.[26] Only 38 percent of FAPLA soldiers were officially demobilized. Another 55,000 simply abandoned their units and searched for the fastest way home.[27]

Another factor reflects the relationship between economic decay and political violence. Skyrocketing inflation and high unemployment forced these demobilized soldiers to resort to crime in order to survive. Since there was little distinction between the economic and political elites, many common crimes acquired a political connotation during this explosive period. In this sense, the introduction of SAP before political reforms did not yield the expected results. In other words, no real improvement in economic conditions was achieved to soften the expected convulsions resulting from profound political changes.

The government's approach to mounting political instability was contradictory. On the one hand, President dos Santos vowed never to permit "anarchy, chaos and violence to replace the civic state."[28] But he also acknowledged that his government was acting "in an extremely calm and thoughtful manner in light of the abuses, crimes and affronts that have been committed against peace and the people."[29] According to the Angolan President, this behavior on the part of his government was justified because "it believe[d] that those [were] temporary situations typical of a delicate political process of national reconciliation."[30]

But the incidents were far from temporary. As the date for the elections approached, the government structures appeared unable to prevent violence from spiralling out of control. Six people were killed in central Angola at the beginning of the electoral campaign on 30 August 1992. The MPLA's campaign manager, Kundi Payama, escaped unhurt when UNITA supporters fired on his motorcade. Nine others were wounded in the incident.[31] Less than a month later, Payama suffered another assassination attempt perpetrated by UNITA's "political police."[32]

The MPLA believed that UNITA was attempting to scuttle the entire process for fear of being defeated at the polls. According to the governing party, "seeing that it is going to be defeated at the coming elections, UNITA has panicked and intensified its intimidation and terror tactics throughout the country."[33] As evidence MPLA pointed to the systematic attacks on Angolan police district commands; the indiscriminate killings of citizens for using MPLA propaganda; and other illegal behavior that the Angolan and international communities were well aware of. By seeking direct armed confrontation, whose outcome cannot be predicted, the MPLA argued that Savimbi was "inciting feelings of hatred revenge, tribalism, as well as public disobedience."[34] Such instigations of violence and hatred led to at least 30 politically motivated killings during the month-long election campaign.[35]

The government's inability to handle increasing political violence during the period leading up to elections is related to the fact that, paradoxically, the peace had eroded its power by transferring to new domestic and international structures like the JPMC and UNAVEM. But these structures proved to be highly dysfunctional. Moreover, the three powers expected to act as the guarantors of peace in Angola were not prepared to use

extraordinary measures, i.e. the use of military force, to enforce the peace agreements.

Managing the Transition with Dysfunctional Structures

The Joint Political Military Commission

The application of the Peace Accords for Angola rested on the JPMC.[36] This structure,[37] however, was incapable of managing a peaceful transition to the elections. In fact, it was not even able to prevent the peace process from beginning to unravel soon after the signing of the peace accord in Portugal.

The first major problem encountered concerned the release of government prisoners by UNITA. The government claimed that, in compliance with the peace accord, it had released the first 107 UNITA prisoners. The prisoner releases would be reciprocated by both sides until they were all freed. UNITA refused to reciprocate, claiming that the government POWs were "at liberty in Jamba"[38] and therefore there was no need to provide for their transportation out of the remote UNITA headquarters. Both the government and the International Committee of the Red Cross disputed this assertion on the grounds that, under the peace accord, prisoners had to be transported to their place of choice to be deemed free.

The dispute over POWs held by UNITA continued and was never fully resolved during the pre-electoral transition period. Although UNITA claimed in November 1991 -- six months after the signing of the peace accord -- that it had complied fully with the provisions concerning POWs' release, the government was able to present a list of 4,649 who were still being held.[39] UNITA admitted that it could not satisfy the "abusive position" of the

government since it considered all people residing in UNITA-controlled areas as prisoners.[40]

Besides the row over the release of POWs, the peace process was seriously tested from the beginning by claims and counter-claims that the cease-fire was being violated. From the start, the government accused UNITA of occupying new positions on the ground and using political intimidation. As early as July 1991, the government accused UNITA of beheading a woman for insisting that "she would vote for the MPLA regardless of the situation in Angola."[41] Furthermore, UNITA imposed a ban on the free movement of people and goods in UNITA-controlled areas. UNITA often made similar accusations concerning the MPLA.

There was little surprise, therefore, when less than three months into the implementation of the peace accord, UNITA withdrew from the JPMC. UNITA accused the government of bad faith and hindering consultations by sending junior officials to the meetings of the joint political-military commission. Moreover, UNITA claimed that the government was failing to move its troops to assembly areas. More importantly, UNITA further accused the government of violating the peace accord by importing arms into the country. UNITA cited the unloading of tanks, armored vehicles, and military trucks which it said were destined for the presidential guard.[42] UNITA issued a statement protesting vigorously what it perceived to be violations of the peace accord and demanded that the material be "returned to the Soviet Union under United Nations escort."[43] The government denied UNITA's accusation by saying that the vehicles involved were "non-lethal material not covered by the limitations imposed by the cease-fire accord."[44]

To counteract the government's acquisition of war material, UNITA also unloaded

military equipment in Luanda including "RPG [rocket-propelled grenade]-7s, AKM and PKM rifles, pistols, rocket launchers, RPG-7 shells and assorted ammunition."[45] UNITA justified this action in terms of the peace accord. According to UNITA, the peace accord granted it the right to use its internal security apparatus until the holding of elections to protect its senior leaders.

Besides these accusations, there were clear signs that -- three months into the implementation period -- little had been accomplished. By the beginning of August 1991, the monitoring teams that should have been established in prearranged areas were not operational; second, the UN verification system for troop assembly, as well as the troop assembly itself, was seriously behind schedule[46]; and third, the JPMC could not agree on "any significant far-reaching decisions."[47] Additionally, fourth, compounding these difficulties, a population census was yet to be taken, and fifth, the rules for the election campaign needed to be clearly defined.

UNITA maintained that the MPLA government was not seriously implementing the peace accord, thus endangering the entire peace process. UNITA acted on this belief by withdrawing from the JPMC. A communique from its Political Commission's Standing Committee elaborated on the reasons for the withdrawal. It claimed that:

> a. President dos Santos' "dishonesty" was endangering the entire peace process;
>
> b. The Ministry of State Security was unleashing its "murderous wrath" against UNITA soldiers and sympathizers throughout the country;
>
> c. The Angolan government was delaying the release of UNITA POWs and declined to disclose the exact number of UNITA members detained in its prisons.[48]

UNITA demanded that several conditions be met before it reconsidered its participation in the JPMC. The conditions included:

a. Reduction of crimes committed against UNITA members and soldiers;
b. Total compliance with the confinement programme for government forces;
c. Setting of an election timetable;
d. Impartiality of the UN verification and monitoring mission;
e. Police neutrality; and,
f. Free movement of people and goods throughout Angola.[49]

Although UNITA returned to the JPMC shortly afterwards, this body had lost most of its effectiveness. Without a strong mechanism to manage the transition process, the country completed its descent into political turmoil characterized by intimidation and violence. As a crucial mechanism for the transition process, the JPMC was poorly designed in the sense that many of the problems it had to face were not anticipated by the signatories of the peace accord. Thus, many "weaknesses" that were detected in the functioning of the Commission's verification and control organs -- particularly in the working methods that could permit a "more dynamic interaction" between the verification and control organs at the central and local levels[50] -- could not be modified due to the relatively short transition period. Morcover, the other central mechanism in the transition -- UNAVEM -- also proved timid and ineffective mainly, as we will see, due to lack of resources.

The United Nations

As in Namibia, the international community participated in Angola's transition process through the United Nations. In fact, the creation of the United Nations Angola Verification

Mission (UNAVEM) was an integral par of the settlement that led to Namibia's independence. UNAVEM was created on 20 December 1988 to monitor the withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban military contingent from Angola. It was made up of 70 military observers and 20 civilian officials from ten countries including Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain, and Yugoslavia. UNAVEM was given a 31-month mandate, beginning with its deployment one week before the start of the Cuban withdrawal and ending one month after the completion of the withdrawal.

On the eve of the signing of the Bicesse peace accord, the UN Security Council agreed to extend UNAVEM's mandate. UNAVEM II would become a 24-nation multinational force with the mission of monitoring the cease-fire between the Angolan government and UNITA. UNAVEM II, which began its deployment on 1 July 1991, included 548 personnel [51] and had a budget of $132.3 million dollars.

The UN personnel comprised 350 military observers and 90 police officers. The military observers were given the task of ensuring that the provisions of the peace accord regarding the encampment of government troops in 27 zones and UNITA in 23 others were respected. They were also deployed in 12 critical areas and had additional responsibilities of conducting patrols over the entire country. UNAVEM also included 90 international police officers whose main task was to ensure the functioning of a new, integrated national police force.

On 24 March 1992, the UN Security Council unanimously approved the expansion of UNAVEM and the enlargement of its mandate. A 400-person division was added to the existing mission to monitor and evaluate the operations and impartiality of the electoral

authorities at all level in the legislative and presidential elections. This division was expected to operate in all the 1° provinces of the country to monitor and verify the three main phases of the electoral process including the registration of voters, the electoral campaign, and the poll itself. An additional $18.8 million was allocated to UNAVEM's budget.[52]

In terms of both human and financial resources UNAVEM was, at best, a diminutive reproduction of other UN operations like those in Namibia and Cambodia. In contrast to the UN role during Namibia's transition to independence, UNAVEM did not have to organize the elections. The UN stressed that the Angolan elections were essentially a national, sovereign affair. Therefore the UN assumed an auxiliary role; i.e., to observe and verify the elections, not to organize them. As UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized, "the government must be seen clearly to be taking charge of their organization, especially concerning logistics."[53] This was expected from a country emerging from a devastating civil war that had crippled most of its infrastructures! By contrast, in Namibia -- a country of roughly 1 million people with most of its infrastructures and bureaucracy intact -- the UN mounted a full-scale operation involving more than 6,000 of its personnel.

This position by the UN was partly responsible for a transition process fraught with fear and tension. The UN did not intervene in preventing armed UNITA cadres in civilian clothing from moving into towns across the country. Nor did it investigate widespread reports by frightened local people of UNITA arms caches. Moreover, UNITA's heavy arms were not brought into the internationally supervised cantonments of troops as the peace accord required.

Not surprisingly, UNAVEM was not able to defuse escalating tension ahead of the

country's first multi-party elections and was caught completely unprepared to deal with pre-electoral clashes between Angola's former civil war enemies.

The failure to steer the peace process and the transition to elected government and a democratic regime in Angola was, to a considerable degree, a failure of the UN This failure derived from the mismatch between the role of the UN mission in Angola and the realities of the Angolan conflict. The stated goal of the UN mission in Angola was neither peacebuilding, peacemaking, peacekeeping nor peace enforcement. It was vaguely defined as "verification" and "monitoring." Consequently, the UN was unable to act as a deterring factor in the sense of traditional peacekeeping operations; i.e., to monitor the cease-fire, control buffer zones and military encampment sites, investigate arms flows, and prevent the resumption of fighting. Nor was the UN effective in reforming and/or reducing the two armies, creating a new police force, reforming the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land reform, and so on.

The difficulties inherent in a post-civil war society compounded by Angola's weak bureaucracy and the profound distrust between the MPLA and UNITA had left vital features of the transition process -- particularly the demobilization of the two armies and their fusion into a single, unified, non-partisan national army -- unfulfilled. These difficulties impeded the government from carrying out some of the basic functions required during an election; i.e., the efficient distribution and collection of ballot boxes. Given its small resources, the UN mission was also unable to make a definitive pronouncement on whether the exercise had been free and fair in a manner that could satisfy all parties. In the end, and given all of these shortcomings, the UN was not able to prevent the reversion to war.

Ultimately, the failure of the UN's mission in Angola must be evaluated within the context of a post-Cold War international environment that witnessed an expanded role for this world body. This new interventionism, in turn, induced severe budgetary strains that were not always mitigated by member countries who faced their own internal problems of adjusting to new circumstances. The post-Cold War context also included a resurgent US and Western domination within the UN. Now the UN could be mobilized to act decisively and forcefully in the Gulf to defend Western interests but -- symptomatic of Africa's marginalization -- not in Angola. In fact not even the so-called guarantors of peace for Angola -- the US, Portugal and Russia -- could muster the will to ensure a lasting peace.

The Guarantors of Peace: US, Russia, and Portugal

The peace accord for Angola would not have been negotiated or signed without constant international pressure, particularly from the US, Russia, and Portugal. The Angolan parties to the conflict expected that these countries' involvement as international guarantors would prevent any deviation from strict implementation of the peace accord. After all, the US was the world's only remaining superpower and -- in a new era of post-Cold War international relations -- could certainly use its influence to compel both sides to adhere to the letter and the spirit of the Angolan Peace Accords with the help of Russia (the MPLA's former patron) and Portugal (Angola's former colonizer). In this context, President dos Santos said, for example, that he was convinced that the peace process would proceed smoothly, inasmuch as it did not only involve the government and UNITA. The success of the peace agreement was "guaranteed by the involvement of the Angolan parties, the USSR, and the USA, as well

as the UN."[54]

The US in particular regarded democratic changes in Angola as a offering the best chance for both internal peace and "well-being" as well as promoting stability in the region. For this reason, the US pledged its "support as Angola begins the difficult process of healing and democratic nation-building."[55] Specifically, the US committed itself to support Angola's new multi-party system and help ensure that the elections were free and fair by working through the JPMC, to honor the commitment not to provide lethal material to anyone, and to help provide the resources for voter education programs and for maximum popular participation in the election process.[56]

Six months into the implementation of the peace accord, the international guarantors met in Luanda to assess the entire process. Their optimistic "final communique" did not conceal entirely some anxiety concerning the viability and future of the peace process. Although expressing great satisfaction about the effective observance of the cease-fire and the definition of the period for the holding of elections, the US, Russia, and Portugal found it necessary to "recommend that parliamentary and presidential elections be held simultaneously" and suggest that a National Election Commission be created.[57] The guarantors also had to exert pressure on various aspects related to the peace process. Thus, while expressing their belief in the irreversibility of the Angolan peace process, the representatives of the US, Russian, and Portuguese governments were adamant on the need for speeding up the demobilization of both armies and the creation of a unified army, the authority of the police, the need to implement UN recommendations concerning arms and ammunition storage, access to the media by the newly formed political parties, the cessation

of hostile propaganda by all parties, and the importance of extending central administration to every part of the Angolan territory.

The chaotic realities of the pre-electoral period had a profound effect on the international guarantors, particularly in terms of their commitment to remain actively engaged to the end. The US, Russia, and Portugal -- the powers responsibie for forging the peace agreement -- were not prepared to manage a violent transition and so tu..ed its implementation completely over to the UN The American government in particular was not interested in "commit[ting] much time or energy to resolving the unending problems of Angola"[58] since it was also an election year in the US The extent of the American involvement, once the pre-electoral political violence escalated, was to "exhort all parties to stay the rocky course to elections in September."[59]

In the end, when Washington's protege refused to accept the results of a process that had been partly imposed by his main backers, the Bush administration made one last effort to persuade the UNITA leader. The top Africa policy maker in the administration sent a message to the Angolan rebel leader: "Mr. Savimbi, it is now time to think of the Angolan people and the need for national reconstruction. You will be a great statesman if you accept the outcome of these elections and together, the MPLA and UNITA, you should build a prosperous Angola."[60] Having accepted Washington's orders for man·· years, Savimbi rejected this one. With it, he also rejected the experiment in multi-party democracy, at least as defined in the Peace Accords.

Besides the problems related to political violence and a dysfunctional structure charged with managing the transition, there were other important factors that conspired

against a successful drive toward a democratic regime: the Angolan political forces and civil society were not able to hold a national conference to chart the course of the transition; and no unified military and security apparatus existed in the country to ensure the necessary climate of stability.

The Absence of a National Conference

The MPLA government refused to call a national conference to work out the ground rules for the transition process to elections. The governing party dismissed the calls from emerging opposition parties to convene a national conference on the grounds that it was "unnecessary" and "very dangerous to the Angola peace course in the present moment."[61] Surprisingly, Savimbi sided with the governing party. He saw those conferences as, in his own words, "civilian coups d'etat."[62]

In many African countries, national conferences were held due to popular pressure aimed at changing existing political systems. But, for the MPLA, Angola had witnessed a totally opposite situation; i.e., it had been the governing party itself that took a leading role in changing the political system.

The MPLA maintained that the convening of a national "sovereign" conference would necessarily lead to the dissolution of the existing legislative body, the People's Assembly. Moreover, in the words of President dos Santos, "the sovereign conference will be the parliament to be elected by the Angolan people."[63] Instead, the governing party opted for the creation of a national consultative mechanism consisting mainly of representatives

of emerging political parties to examine legislation already submitted to the People's Assembly.

The governing party did not intend to devolve power to a national conference. Without access to the financial and coercive means of the state, the MPLA saw itself as vulnerable politically. It preferred to gain legitimacy through the election process. UNITA, on the other hand, was not interested in diluting its role as the main opposition by participating in a national conference with about two dozen other parties. Although Savimbi had argued that all parties -- including the ones formed recently -- had the same rights and UNITA wanted to "establish a dialogue with them,"[64] he did not hide his belief that there were essentially two groups of political parties: one comprising the traditional parties, formed to fight colonial rule, and the others created to take advantage of the new era of multipartyism. Implicit in this argument was the suggestion that the traditional parties -- i.e., MPLA and UNITA -- were more important. After all, they commanded powerful armies!

The Absence of a National, Unified Army

The creation of a national, unified army posed a serious yet different set of problems to both UNITA and the government. The former derived most of its power from its armed wing. The creation of a single national army required that this armed wing be split. Some of UNITA's military would not be included. For UNITA, the creation of a new army involved much more than numbers. Without the ability to command thousands of men under arms, and without time to fully transform itself into a political party, UNITA faced a bleak future.

Aware of this predicament, Savimbi attempted to keep UNITA's army intact by arguing that it should constitute the bulk of the national army. Savimbi proposed that the government should only provide the higher echelon's officers. He argued that "it would be a mistake to entrust the defense of Angola to FAPLA [government] troops."[65]

Under the peace accord the two sides were expected to form a new 50,000-person united army from their estimated 250,000 troops and demobilize the rest before elections were held. However, from the start, the process of assembling government and rebel troops was very slow, resulting in huge delays in the establishment of the new and united national army. The slowness was caused by lack of food, transportation, and other logistical elements in the areas where the troops should have been confined.

In a report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General pointed out that, two and a half months after the assembly of troops was supposed to have been completed, barely 60 percent of the troops declared by both sides had been encamped in those assembly areas. The report declared that such a state of affairs undermined confidence and imperilled the implementation of various other aspects of the peace accord.[66]

UNITA claimed that it had concluded the process of confining its troops to UN-controlled assembly areas just before the 15 November 1991 deadline stipulated by the JPMC. UNITA noted, however, that not all government troops had been encamped and suggested that many government soldiers were being transferred from the army into the secret police and into the Public Order Police to avoid demobilization.[67] This suggested that the government was not complying with the peace accord.

According to UNAVEM's count, a total of 95,634 troops (68,666 government troops

and 26,968 from UNITA) were in 45 assembly areas, compared with the projected total strength for all assembly areas of 165,440 troops (115,640 government troops and 49,800 UNITA troops.)

By early April 1992, it became clear that the provisions of the Peace Accords regarding the formation of a unified national army would not be met. Given the slow pace of implementing some of the crucial aspects of the Peace Accords, the UN and the foreign powers involved in overseeing the application of the accords had all but given up attempting to meet the stipulated schedule for demobilizing more than 200,000 soldiers and guerrillas and forming a unified army before the elections. The British, Portuguese and French officers in charge of forming the new army had only succeeded in creating a unified command structure on paper.[68] Thus, in a move that would prove fatal to the country's long-term unity and stability, the parties involved undertook to make the first serious revision of the Peace Accords. The government and UNITA decided to hold back on their initial pledge to demobilize all their soldiers or integrate them into the new national army. UNITA decided to keep at least 15,000 soldiers in reserve while the government kept about 33,000 including a 6,000-strong air force and a 4,000-person navy.

A month before the elections only about 25 percent of the combined soldiers had been demobilized and a mere 12 percent of the national army had been formed.[69] It was becoming clear that Angola would not have one army, but three -- the national army, FAPLA, and FALA -- at election time.

Pressured by the international observers to the peace process -- the US, Russia and Portugal -- the MPLA government and UNITA agreed to officially disband their armies on

27 September 1992, just 48 hours before the start of the first democratic elections in Angola. However, the unity of the new armed forces -- the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) -- only lasted a week. UNITA withdrew from the country's newly formed joint armed forces on 5 October 1992, in protest at alleged fraud in the country's first multi-party elections. UNITA's CGS [Chief of General Staff], General Arlindo Chenda Pena "Ben Ben" said in a statement that "As soldiers of the country and in the name of all our colleagues in arms -- generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers of the UNITA Armed Forces (FALA) have decided in deep protest to abandon the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)."[70] The vicious cycle of war and destruction was, once again, about to begin.

The only institution that could have prevented the war from breaking out again was the police. But even the police force was rendered impotent due to intense political squabbles regarding its "neutrality." In fact, the difficulties involved in creating a national, unified army were duplicated in relation to the police force. Under the terms of the Peace Accords, the government retained responsibility for the functions and activities of the civilian police. The accords also stipulated, however, that police neutrality was a precondition for the holding of free and fair elections. This neutrality would be ensured through government cooperation with both UNITA and the UN. Instead -- in a move that was claimed by UNITA to have violated both the letter and the spirit of the accords -- the government created a well-trained, well-equipped anti-riot police. About a month before the elections, the US joined UNITA in asserting that "the newly created anti-riot police [were] a principal cause of rising tensions,"[71] thus putting the electoral process in jeopardy.

According to the government, the accusations from the US Administration and

UNITA "were aimed at confusing the national and international communities on the true reasons for the existence of this police force by alleging that it has repressive intentions against one of the signatories of the Peace Accords -- the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi."[72] The Angolan government argued that "the increasing rate of crime and anti-social actions fully justified the establishment of a fully trained police force, possessing strong dissuasive power, to support the special operations which are being successfully carried out by the public police."[73]

UNITA still maintained that its forces "would never tolerate the riot police because it was a body that was established outside the Bicesse Accords, with FAPLA's connivance."[74] For UNITA, this force constituted a parallel army of the government formed by transferring nearly 28,000 soldiers into the police to avoid demobilization.[75] The riot police, according to UNITA, was an instrument to be used by the ruling MPLA government to remain in power in the event of losing the elections.

The mere fact that UNITA could make such a claim demonstrated that it had little faith in the international community's efforts in Angola. Both the UN as well as the countries directly involved in the peace process -- the US, Russia and Portugal -- were ill-equipped to handle deviations from the letter and the spirit of the Peace Accords. More importantly, it reflected UNITA's complete disregard for the multi-party democratic system that the Peace Accords were supposed to have secured. In the final analysis, however, the Peace Accords could not have brought about the creation of a viable multi-party system for Angola since they aimed primarily at solving a perennial source of international conflict; they did little to create the basis for the establishment of a new democratic order.

Multypartyism ?

Angola formally became a multi-party state on 11 May 1991, when the official government gazette published a law allowing the formation of other political parties. This milestone followed the ruling party's abandonment of Marxism in April 1991 and the signing of the peace accord with UNITA in May of the same year.

According to the Law of Political Parties, each party must have a minimum of 3,000 members who must be Angolan citizens over the age of 18. They must also show that they have at least 140 members in at least 14 of the country's 18 provinces. By requiring a relatively low number of members, the government intended to facilitate the emergence of various political parties to dilute UNITA's electoral base. However, the requirement that the membership be dispersed throughout the country was aimed at preventing the emergence of regional or tribally-based parties.

More than 30 political parties emerged after the introduction of this multi-party system. However, the process of acquiring legal status proved to be a difficult one and only 18 would be eventually legalized by the Supreme Court. For many new parties the problem did not reside so much in the rules but, rather, in the ways to meet those requirements. For example, those wanting to add their names to the new parties' lists were required to produce photocopies of their identification documents as well as stamps. Both were difficult to get in Luanda and nearly impossible to get in many parts of the country. These requirements seemed to favor the traditional parties with well-established organizations.

These difficulties notwithstanding, some of these new parties did make a strong

initial impression. The Democratic Renewal Party (PRD), for example, was viewed as a new, autonomous and alternative force integrating many professionals. Thus, many young -- especially urban -- people regarded this party as not only capable of uniting the democratic forces in the struggle against bipolarization between MPLA and UNITA but also the best organized to put forward credible social, political, and economic options for the future.

The PRD, however, seemed unable to present a coherent alternative due to intense political infighting, especially at the leadership level. Having been formed by mostly younger people disaffected with the regime[76], this party chose Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, a one-time honorary president of the MPLA, to become its president. But it soon became evident that Pinto de Andrade was not capable of creating the necessary consensus and/or discipline within the party to ensure the expansion of its electoral base beyond Luanda.[77]

This inability of the PRD leader to win the hearts of the party's members lay at the core of his leadership difficulties resulting in a quarrelsome split with the party at its first national convention. By splitting into two factions, the PRD -- until then one of the best organized of the non-traditional political parties -- effectively destroyed its chances in the first multi-party elections.

Hopes that a credible political alternative had finally emerged were raised when the National Opposition Council was proclaimed on 26 October 1991 "to coordinate the political activities of its member parties within the framework of bringing together the political opposition forces."[78] This Council was to have included 12 political forces as effective members and one observer. They included the Angola National Liberation Front, FNLA; the Angola National Democratic Convention, CNDA; the Democratic Renewal Party, PRD; the

Front for Democracy, FpD; the Angola Democratic Party for Peace, PDPA; the Democratic

Party for the Progress of the Angolan National Alliance, PDP-ANA; the Angola Liberal

Democratic Party, PDLA; the Social Democratic Party, PSD; the Angola National Ecological

Party, PNEA; the Movement for the Defense of the Angolan People's Interests, MDIPA, the

Movement of Angolan Unity for Reconstruction, MUDAR; and the Angolan Liberal Party,

PAL. The Angola Democratic Union participated as an observer.[79]

But the National Opposition Council did not last very long. Less than a week after

its proclamation several opposition parties claimed that no such Council had been created.[80]

The Democratic Angola Coalition replaced the National Opposition Council, but this time

without the participation of the PRD, CNDA, and FNLA.[81] These three parties believed that

they could do better in terms of establishing their name recognition and independent

constituencies outside the alphabet-soup of political parties included in the National

Opposition Council.

Although most opposition parties claimed to oppose both MPLA and UNITA, they

failed to form a credible "third force." This failure can be explained by pointing to the fact

that the opening up of the political system created real material inducements for the creation

of political parties.

The government made available monies, cars, and other means to any small group

of people which constituted itself into an "installing commission" for a future political party.

Even more money, cars, houses, and other favors were made available once these

commissions gathered the signatures and fulfilled all requirements to form a political party.

Given the conditions of poverty in which most people were living, the creation of political

parties often constituted a means to improve one's economic lot. Thus, many new parties

suffered through financial scandals. While most were dealt with internally, others were made

public. The Angolan Liberal Party, for example, publicly expelled its President for diverting

party funds and property to personal uses.[82]

In terms of availability of resources, the traditional parties, particularly the MPLA,

had other important advantages over newer ones. The MPLA not only had better

organization and more financial resources, it also owned most of the capital's real estate

while other parties had difficulties even finding office space.[83]

Also, the MPLA did not relinquish its tight control over the media. President dos

Santos and his governing party took full advantage of radio, newspapers and especially the

state-run television with the assistance of a Brazilian public relations firm. During the weeks

leading up to the elections, television news presented nightly images of UNITA attacks still

plaguing the country at a time when the country was supposedly at peace. The media also

provided extensive coverage of the President's speeches to large crowds, constantly

reminding them of the years of South African- and US- sponsored UNITA attacks which

prevented the resource-rich country from realizing its potential.

UNITA did not install its own television station and this party's radio station was not

equipped to compete with the government's image blitz. Under the Electoral Law, all of the

18 legalized political parties had the right to 10 minutes of television and 20 minutes of radio

time a day to air their campaign messages. But the parties still had to find the resources to

produce those information programs. Insufficient funds and experience often resulted in the

new parties' inability to use their allotted time. As a result, the impact of the smaller parties

was minimal. Some of these parties, acknowledging the odds against them, transferred their allegiances to one of the two major parties -- reflecting their weak social base and the apathy of civil society -- thus accentuating the political bipolarization of the country. This factor, in turn, constituted the main cause of the high levels of insecurity and anxiety which prevented the creation of a unified army and eventually contributed to the resumption of the war after the election results were announced. Another important factor resided on the fact that UNITA faced major obstacles in its attempt to transform itself from a guerrilla force into a political party.

UNITA and the Challenges of Political Adaptation

UNITA attempted to cultivate the image of the main champion of multipartyism. It attempted to portray itself as a movement "fighting for the ideals of peace, freedom and multi-party democracy ... since its foundation" and as the main catalyst for all the political and social transformations that took place in Angola; i.e., the movement toward multipartyism.[84] UNITA stated specifically that its struggle had "forced the MPLA to review its political thinking," thus precipitating all democratic transformations in Angola.[85] But UNITA itself had an even harder time adjusting to the new conditions and realities.

The complexities involved in UNITA's transformation from a guerrilla group into a political party arose from the fact that "UNITA was not born as a political party, but as a military force with a political outlook."[86] Thus the end of the civil war posed stark choices for UNITA: either find additional justifications and/or rationales for continued fighting or succumb to the pressures involved in both the rapid transformations needed to develop a

political outlook and the demands of political life; i.e., organizing a political party, developing a coherent electoral strategy, carrying out an election campaign with an alternative program of government, and so on. Whereas in the past UNITA cadres were taught to "think politically in order to find the best way of fighting,"[87] the new era of multipartyism required UNITA to fight politically. Without the rigid discipline of the army, UNITA was expected to lack cohesiveness as a political party.[88]

The political fight against the MPLA posed serious problems for UNITA inasmuch as the former clearly had some recognized advantages. Savimbi pointed this out when he argued that "the MPLA will benefit from certain advantages because it has been a politically inspired and motivated organization, whereas we have always been guided by our political though out with emphasis on the armed struggle."[89]

UNITA made an attempt to acquire a political o look by seeking to adapt its structures to the new political conditions. Some changes were announced at its 7th Congress held just before the signing of the peace accord. Thus, UNITA opted to keep the Party Congress as the supreme organ of its structure. This organ would meet every four years. The party kept its Central Committee to represent various political, economic, and religious interests.

The Central Committee was relieved of all its powers and assumed a merely consultative role. UNITA's decision-making powers were transferred to the Political Commission, a new organ created to define the party's policies, guide the executive organ, and correct deviations. The Political Commission thus gained all the powers that used to be in the hands of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. The latter was kept with the

sole function of advising the party's president. UNITA's Executive Committee, or "government-in-waiting," was charged with the responsibility of executing the decisions of the Political Commission.[90]

These changes in UNITA's structures, however, did not change the public perception of it as an extremist organization. This view was further reinforced by the serious divisions that occurred within the organization soon after the signing of the peace accord. Two prominent UNITA figures -- Tony da Costa Fernandes, who founded the movement with Jonas Savimbi in 1966, and General Miguel N'Zau Puna, UNITA's deputy leader for nearly 24 years -- defected on 29 February 1992, and accused Jonas Savimbi of serious human rights abuses, including the execution of prominent figures within UNITA and their entire families.

The divisions within UNITA also exposed for the first time the rebel group's intentions to block moves toward a genuine democracy in Angola. Fernandes and Puna claimed that UNITA was preparing to use military force to usurp power if it failed to win the elections. Tony Fernandes attested, for example, that Savimbi maintained a secret army in UNITA-controlled areas on the border with Namibia. This view was corroborated by Western diplomats in Angola who indicated that UNITA had only demobilized ten percent of its army and retained an effective force of 47,000 men, with heavy equipment intact.[91] Furthermore, many of those who had been demobilized were re-integrated into UNITA military structures as armed guards to its local committees.[92]

Taken together, these factors -- especially persisting political violence and intimidation; the dysfunctionality of the structures entrusted with managing the transition

process; the inability to form a national army; the anemic participation of the civil society --

i.e., no national conference -- and continuing bipolarity in national politics -- all contributed

to the failure of the electoral process.

The Electoral Process

The MPLA government had little choice but to embark on an electoral process in a hopeless

attempt to change the course of Angola's history. Both the government and the country were

exhausted by civil war and a collapsing economy. Elections were viewed as the only way to

avoid Kaplan's scenario, i.e., to prevent a total descent into chaos and reestablish some

legitimacy for a central government whose control over the national territory was

progressively shrinking.

The government announced that, in compliance with the peace accord, general

elections would be held in September 1992. To do so, however, it argued that certain

minimum conditions should be met. These included: a) the confinement of all government

and UNITA troops by mid-December 1991; b) the resolution of all prevailing shortcomings

concerning the extension of state administration to areas still under UNITA control; and c)

the approval of the legal framework for the holding of elections; i.e., the electoral law, the

law on international monitoring of general elections, the law on the right of political parties

to radio and television time, the law on the creation of the news media council, and the law

on the registration of commercial radio stations. Furthermore, iv) there was a need approve

the law on the review of the constitution, and the law on political parties and government

assistance to political parties.[93]

Although these legal and political aspects were intended to open the political arena to the entire society, they served mainly to legalize UNITA participation in electoral politics while attempting to legitimize the governing party and thus strengthen its chances of electoral victory.

UNITA intended to take full advantage of these changes. Savimbi was convinced that he would win the presidential elections and his party would have the majority in the future National Assembly. The fact that UNITA was perceived in some quarters -- both internally and abroad -- as the main force behind the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and the MPLA was seen as both corrupt and unable to manage the economy reinforced his optimistic, partisan views that an electoral victory was within reach. However, in the event of losing the election, Savimbi vowed "not to go back to the bush fighting a guerrilla war."[94]

The MPLA was just as over-confident of winning the elections. Dos Santos argued that "we don't see why [the MPLA] should lose the elections after having worked so long to defend the people and the country's territorial integrity, after installing democracy and a market economy and after achieving peace."[95] In order to strengthen this grossly over-optimistic image -- while attempting to overcome the widely-held perception, even among its supporters, that it was to blame for the country's economic and administrative mess as well as for prolonging the war in vain hopes of a military victory -- the MPLA carried out a sophisticated electoral campaign complete with glossy posters, banners, balloons, t-shirts, etc.

The other political parties, including one (FNLA) with a long history, held no

illusions of attaining an electoral victory because they lacked resources. At least one Angolan

political party -- the Angolan Democratic Unity Movement for Reconstruction (MUDAR) --

decided not to take part in the electoral process due to the shortcomings of the Peace Accords

that had established the basis for the transition to elected government. MUDAR argued that

the shortcomings and ambiguities contained in the Bicesse accords had distorted the process

of democratization in Angola from the outset. This party pointed to the bipolarity between

the MPLA and UNITA legitimized in the Bicesse Accords as the main shortcoming of the

entire process.

For MUDAR, this bipolarity "transformed the country and its citizens into the

hostages of those who waged war and of the extraneous interests which have imposed hasty

elections on Angola."[96] MUDAR further maintained that, in view of the lack of equal

resources between the parties, the election campaign would be an uneven race at the end of

which the one-party regime would not be effectively eliminated and "since elections have

been imposed on Angolans, and bearing in mind the current political situation in Angola, the

polls can never be clear-cut, free, or fair."[97]

Elections

The elections in Angola were indeed "an exercise in make-believe."[98] By the time they were

held, many of the fundamental pre-conditions stipulated in the Peace Accords were not

fulfilled. The Peace Accords had failed to create a peaceful climate for political discourse

and intercourse; i.e., the two main opponents -- having been denied victory on the battlefield

-- were attempting to win the civil war at the ballot box. Both sides still had armies and UNITA still controlled the territory it occupied during the civil war.

These factors notwithstanding -- and given the mounting international pressure to adhere to the electoral schedule -- the electoral process went ahead regardless.

The first phase of the election process involved voter registration. All nationals over the age of 18 could register and receive a voter identification card. An estimated 4,828,468 Angolans -- representing 92% of the adult population -- registered to vote in simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 29 and 30 September 1992. By law, the election results were expected to be made public on 9 October 1092.[99]

At the end of voter registration UNITA claimed that it was "not pleased that the government in power should impose [upon] the National Electoral Council[100] rules of the game which prevented the registration of 500,000 Angolans of voting age"[101] and warned that "UNITA will only accept the results of the national voting if the elections are free, fair and clear."[102] The statement went on to say that UNITA "would like to remind the government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA] that it no longer possesses the monopoly of force to manipulate events in our beloved fatherland as it did in 1975."[103] The message coming from UNITA was clearly threatening and bellicose, leading many politicians to believe that post-electoral war was inevitable.[104]

Savimbi did little to allay the fears of a post-electoral debacle. In fact, he seemed to anticipate it by claiming that "if UNITA and its allies lose the elections it means that they were not free and fair."[105] Even more sobering, Savimbi announced that "whatever the election result, UNITA will be in office October 1."[106]

On 3 October 1992, as voting returns continued to show Jonas Savimbi trailing in the country's first democratic elections, he accused the governing party of fraud and threatened a resumption of the civil war if he and his party lost.[107] In a radio speech, Savimbi accused the MPLA of wanting "to cling to power illegally with tooth and nail, by stealing ballot boxes, beating up and deviating polling list delegates and distorting facts and numbers." He went on to say that "it is the duty of us, freedom fighters those who through their blood and sweat brought about democracy to this country, to tell you that the MPLA is not winning and cannot win. He, then warned that, if UNITA lost the election, it might be forced "to take a position that could deeply disturb the situation of this country."[108] He meant war. UNITA and its allies did, in fact, lose the election.

The head of the National Electoral Council made public the election results on 17 October 1992. The week's delay in publishing the results was caused by investigations of fraud claims levelled by UNITA as well as various attempts (involving both domestic politicians and international diplomats) to convince UNITA to accept its expected electoral defeat without plunging the country back into war. As table 5 shows, there were 11 candidates running in the presidential election the total number of votes cast was 4,828,468.

Table 5
Presidential Election Results

Candidate	Party Affiliation	Number of Votes	% of Votes
José E dos Santos	MPLA	1,953,335	49 57
Jonas Savimbi	UNITA	1,579,298	40.07
Alberto Neto	PDA	85,249	2.16
Holden Roberto	FNLA	83,135	2.11
Honorato Lando	PLDA	75,789	1.92
Luis dos Passos	PRD	58,121	1.47

Bengue P. João	PSDA	38,243	0.97
Simão Cacete	AD	26,385	0.67
Daniel Chipenda	Independent	20,646	0.52
Maria V. Pereira	PLD	11,475	0.29
Rui V. Pereira	PRI	9,208	0.23

Source: National Electoral Commission

The results of the presidential election confirmed the view that this was a contest between President dos Santos and guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi. The inconclusive results also showed that the electorate was not ready to give a convincing mandate to either of the candidates. Under the terms of Article 147 of the Electoral Law, a run-off election was needed since no candidate had at least 50% in the first round. The resumption of the civil war after UNITA refused to accept the election results prevented the second round from ever taking place, leaving the country in a permanent state of instability and uncertainty.

For the legislative election, the 18 parties fielded candidates for the 220-seat National Assembly. The results of the legislative elections are depicted in table 6.

Table 6
Legislative Election Results

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats
MPLA	2,124,126	53 74	129
UNITA	1,347,636	34 10	70
FNLA	94,742	2.40	6
PLD	94,269	2 39	5
PRS	89,875	2.27	3
PRD	35,293	0.89	1
AD	34,166	0.86	1
PSD	33,088	0.84	1
PAJOCA	13,924	0.35	1
FDA	12,038	0.30	1

PDP-ANA	10,620	0 27	1
PNDA	10,281	0 26	1
CNDA	10,237	0 26	1
PSDA	10,217	0 26	1
PAI	9,007	0 23	1
PLDA	8,025	0 20	1
PDA	8,014	0 20	1
PRA	6,719	0 17	1

Source: National Electoral Commission

As predicted, UNITA claimed that the results were fraudulent. Savimbi not only accused the MPLA of rigging the vote, he also described the National Electoral Commission as a puppet of the government and dismissed the views of the nearly 800 international observers who affirmed that the elections had been generally free and fair.

Although President dos Santos declared that "no one can question the justness and neutrality in the counting of votes,"[109] six small opposition political parties[110] joined UNITA in claiming that "the electoral process was on the whole characterized by massive, systematic and general fraud and irregularities, thereby ceasing to be credible."[111]

There will be much debate about the first multi-party elections in Angola for a long time to come. This debate will surely concentrate on the alleged electoral fraud as the main cause of the collapse of the transition process to a peaceful democratic regime and the recrudescing of the civil war. The evidence from having personally observed the election while conducting research suggests that contrasting campaign strategies -- not fraud -- is the major factor in assessing the electoral results.

From the outset, each side believed that it was going to win the elections. However, the MPLA and President dos Santos conveyed the image that they deserved to win the

elections while UNITA and Jonas Savimbi portrayed themselves as a party that could not lose them. President dos Santos in particular ran a campaign whose main themes stressed stability and the goal of unifying Angola's fractured and traumatized society emerging from a costly civil war. Furthermore, his campaign exploited the fears of many Angolans, particularly urban dwellers -- the educated, financially better off, many of mixed race -- that Jonas Savimbi was a power-hungry human rights violator and a racist whose victory would throw Angola into a period of witch-hunting and instability.

As the incumbent, dos Santos was able to use the state purse to contract a Brazilian public relations firm that cultivated and marketed the image of a soft-spoken, well-educated family man gently leading his country to a new and prosperous future.

In contrast, Jonas Savimbi and UNITA presented an aggressive, arrogant and threatening look. Jonas Savimbi, in particular, had failed to make the leap from authoritarian guerrilla leader to peacetime politician capable of placing the national interest above his personal and party ambitions at a time when national reconciliation was absolutely vital. His use of inflammatory rhetoric and veiled threats against MPLA members and sympathizers, people from ethnic groups other than his own, whites and mixed race Angolans, and even to the police, alienated enough people to deny him and his party an electoral victory.

At election time Angolans faced two equally bad choices: the governing party, once avowedly Marxist-Leninist, which was sustained for years by Soviet and Cuban support and whose economic mismanagement brought the country to the brink of collapse; or UNITA which, with support from racist South Africa and the United States, fought a vicious war that had ravaged the country. In the end, Angolans voted not so much for President dos Santos

but against Jonas Savimbi. Many people were simply not convinced that the latter would not still act as a guerrilla if elected president.

The country's worse fears were realized when, after the publication c ᶜ the election results, Savimbi ordered his army back to war.

Endnotes
(Chapter 6)

1.Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, former priest, former honorary president of the MPLA. Quoted in The Guardian, March 30, 1992, p.8.

2.Crocker, 341 ff.

3.Even UNITA was portrayed in the government-controlled media as a creation of the United States and South Africa.

4.Ikle, 59.

5.Researcher's interview with former UNITA Secretary General, Miguel N'Zau Puna, Luanda, February 1994.

6.Tito Chingunji, former UNITA Foreign Affairs Secretary and Representative in the United States. Conversation with the researcher, Washington, DC, July 1988.

7.Interview with the researcher, Portugal, February 1992.

8.President José Eduardo dos Santos; conversation with the researcher, Luanda, 14 June 1993.

9.Jonas Savimbi, speech to the 7th UNITA Congress, 12 March 1991 (transmitted by Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel on 14 March 1991.)

10.Savimbi, and the group of cadres that created UNITA in the 1966, received both political as well as military training in China after leaving GRAE in the early 1960s.

11.The date of the accord's signing.

12.Jonas Savimbi, speech to the 7th UNITA Congress, 12 March 1991 (transmitted by Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel on 14 March 1991.)

13.Radio Nacional de Angola, 4 October 1991.

14.Ibid.

15.Ibid.

16.Reuters, 21 March 1992.

17.Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 5 October 1991.

18.Inter Press Service, 26 August 1992.

19.Radio Nacional de Angola, 23 September 1992.

20.Xinhua News Service, 14 September 1992.

21.The Associated Press, 30 April 1992.

22.Radio Nacional de Angola, 26 October 1991.

23.The Guardian, 23 March 1992, p.7.

24.The Guardian, 25 September 1992, p.11.

25.Ibid.

26.Ibid.

27.Ibid.

28.José Eduardo dos Santos, Address to the Nation, Radio Nacional de Angola, 10 November 1991.

29.Ibid.

30.Ibid.

31.Inter Press Service, 3 September 1992.

32.Agence France Presse, 22 September 1992.

33.João Lourenço, MPLA Information Secretary, Radio Nacional de Angola, 21 September 1992.

34.Ibid.

35.The Associated Press, 27 September 1992.

36.Peace Accords for Angola, Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola, Annex I, Paragraph 3.

37.The JPMC was composed by the Angolan government, UNITA, representatives from the United States, Russia, Portugal and the UN

38.Reuters, 25 July 1991.

39.Radio Nacional de Angola, 5 August 1992.

40.Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 9 August 1992.

41.ANGOP, 23 July 1991.

42.The Washington Times, 27 August 1991; Reuters, 27 August 1991.

43.Agence France Press, 26 August 1991.

44.Jornal de Angola, 27 August 1991.

45.Radio Nacional de Angola, 30 September 30 1991.

46.Radio Nacional de Angola reported on 5 August 1991 that, "according to available information no soldier has moved to assembly points."

47.Radio Nacional de Angola, 5 August 1991.

48.Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 10 September 1991.

49.Radio Renascença, Lisbon, 11 September 1991.

50.Radio Nacional de Angola, 19 September 1991.

51.Besides the original participants, 14 other countries -- including Canada, Egypt, Guine-Bissau, Hungary, Ireland, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, and Zimbabwe -- also participated. UNAVEM personnel included 350 military observers, up to 90 police officers, 14 medical staff, 80 international and 80 local staff for administrative and support units. The entire operation was supported by three aircraft and 12 helicopters. (Figures taken from a Reuters dispatch from the UN, 31 May 1991.)

52.Reuters, 24 March 1992.

53.Xinhua News Agency, 6 March 1991.

54.José Eduardo dos Santos, Speech to the 27th OAU summit in Abuja, Radio Nacional de Angola, 5 June 1991.

55.James Baker, American Secretary of State, Remarks at the Angola peace accord signing ceremony, in Department of State Dispatch, 10 June 1991.

56.Ibid.

57.Radio Nacional de Angola, 12 November 1991.

58.The Washington Post, 11 April 1992, p.A14.

59.Ibid.

60.Herman Cohen, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, quoted by the Agence France Presse, 4 October 1992.

61.Marcolino Moco, MPLA General Secretary, quoted in Xinhua, 27 June 1991.

62.Radio nacional de Angola, 1 November 1991.

63.José Eduardo dos Santos, Address to the Nation, Radio nacional de Angola, 10 November 1991.

64.The Associated Press, 30 September 1991.

65.Jonas Savimbi, speech to the 7th UNITA Congress, 12 March 1991 (transmitted by Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel on 14 March 1991.)

66.Xinhua News Service, 6 November 1991.

67.Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 18 November 1991.

68.The Washington Post, 11 April 1992, p.A14.

69.Inter Press Service, 26 August 1992.

70.Reuters, 5 October 1992.

71.Richard Boucher, Deputy State Department Spokesman, Federal News Service, 15 August 1992.

72.Press communique issued by the government of Angola, Radio Nacional de Angola, 26 August 1992.

73.Ibid.

74.Statement issued by the General Staff of UNITA, Radio Nacional de Angola, 26 August 1992.

75.Reuters, quoting a UNITA communique, 17 August 1992.

76.Many of them had been viciously persecuted in the aftermath of the failed coup d'etat of 27 May 1978.

77.The Washington Post, 26 June 1991, p.A13.

78.Radio Nacional de Angola, 2 November 1991.

79.Ibid.

80.Radio Nacional de Angola, 29 October 1991.

81.Radio Nacional de Angola, 10 August 1992.

82.Radio Nacional de Angola, 14 September 1992.

83.The Washington Post, 26 June 1991, p.A13.

84.KUP-UNITA Press, 7 November 1990.

85.Ibid.

86.Jonas Savimbi, speech to the 7th UNITA Congress, 12 March 1991 (transmitted by Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel on 14 March 1991.)

87.Ibid.

88.Ibid.

89.Ibid.

90.Ibid.

91.The Guardian, 25 September 1992, p.11.

92.Ibid.

93.José Eduardo dos Santos, Address to the Nation, Radio nacional de Angola, 10 November 1991.

94.The Independent, 2 June 1991, p.15.

95.The Washington Post, 26 June 1991, p.A13.

96.Manuel Lima, leader of MUDAR, Radio Nacional de Angola, 29 July 1992.

97.Ibid.

98.Christine Messiant, Centre d'Etudes Africaines, Paris, quoted in Inter Press Service, 26 September 1992.

99.Antonio Caetano de Sousa, Chairman of the National Electoral Commission, Radio Nacional de Angola, 28 September 1992.

100.The National Electoral Council is the independent body entrusted with the management of the electoral process.

101.Statement issued by the General Staff of UNITA. Radio Nacional de Angola, 26 August 1992.

102.Ibid.

103.Ibid.

104.Inter Press Service, 26 August 1992.

105.Reuters, 30 August 1992.

106.Associated Press, 28 September 1992.

107.The New York Times, 3 October 1992, p.15.

108.Ibid.

109.Message to the Nation, Radio Nacional de Angola, 8 October 1992.

110.Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA), Angola Democratic Alliance Coalition (AD), Democratic Party for Progress of the Angolan National Alliance (PDP-ANA), Angolan National Democratic Convention (CNDA), Angolan Social Democratic Party (PSDA), and the Angolan Democratic Party (PDA).

111.Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 16 October 1992.

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this dissertation is to present an analysis of a major issue confronting Africa today; i.e., the problematic question of democratic transition. In so doing, the thesis deals with a number of important and interlocking aspects of this process, including elections, civil society, governance, and structural adjustment. Angola was chosen as a case study because of its peculiarities in the sense that various attempts to undertake this process of change have undeniably failed.

This thesis concentrates particularly on the events that led up to the holding of elections in September 1992 that culminated in failure inasmuch as the loser did not accept the results and returned to war. As such, it is a small contribution to the ongoing debate about the methods of achieving a successful transition to democracy in Africa and addresses a more general concern regarding which form of democracy is best suited for the continent.

The current emphasis on democratization, liberalization, governance, and civil society in Africa reflects the prevailing political, economic and cultural situations resulting from the international economic crisis of the 1980s, structural adjustment, the collapse of Soviet communism and the end of the Cold War which combined to render Africa strategically insignificant. Ironically, it was the profound reverberations of these events in the continent that led to the "revolt of the popular classes" and the "emergence of democracy movements" -- important early precursors of the drive towards sustainable democratization in Africa.

Today, democratic transition is accepted as an indispensable stage in a more comprehensive process that will eventually liberate Africa from underdevelopment. However, as this thesis has attempted to illustrate in the case of Angola, democracy alone is not necessarily the cure-all solution to Africa's problems. Accepting unquestionably Western forms of liberal democracy without exploring alternatives of how to accommodate the losers -- particularly in elections -- can easily lead to further political and economic chaos and perhaps precipitate the onset of anarchy. How to make transitions to democracy -- including the holding of free and fair elections -- both relevant and sustainable to Africa remains an important challenge. Since democratization in Africa reflects a popular demand for improved governance and economic conditions, the answer may lie in harmonizing or reconciling essentially Western ideas of political rights with more concrete and basic economic rights while taking into account the continent's socio-cultural realities. In other words, Africa must find a way to reconcile its tradition of consensus politics with the "winner-takes-all" model of Western politics. As this dissertation attempted to demonstrate, the methods for achieving a successful transition to democracy in Africa remain largely unsettled. Alas, the debate regarding which form of democracy is best suited for the African context is far from being resolved. In fact, the importance of factors like governance and civil society in the context of Africa's political and economic development has only recently been recognized.

In many respects, the multi-party democracy movement that originated in the former French colonies fundamentally reflected civil society's willingness to recapture its voice and influence Africa's multidimensional challenges of development. Thus, the sovereign national

conferences that legalized political parties and created the legal framework for systems bearing some resemblance to democratic regimes were made up of representatives of civil society. However, the process of democratic transition in countries emerging from long periods of settler colonial rule and civil war is more problematic. In such cases, democracy cannot simplistically be regarded as a panacea nor can it be equated with the holding of elections, especially when civil society is not able to play a significant role.

The chapter on Zimbabwe and Namibia showed that civil wars were not ended -- and the democratic transition was not accomplished -- simply by the promise and reality of elections. These wars ended and the transition was successfully carried out only after various conflicts between principles and interests were overcome. Just as significantly, all sides had to accept their political and military vulnerabilities and opt to place the national interest above personal and/or party ambitions. The purpose of the chapter on Zimbabwe and Namibia was not to make generalizations about those two very specific cases. However, some important lessons can be learned. These countries' successful transitions help us identify what factors are vitally important in such complex processes of transition -- especially in multi-racial, multi-ethnic countries with long histories of animosities between groups cohabiting the same territory. By contrasting these cases with Angola this thesis has attempted to highlight how deleterious the latter's attempts to undertake its transition to elected government have been.

Zimbabwe's peace settlement was possible because all sides involved were willing to make compromises, permitting an agreement on the peace settlement to be arrived at after protracted negotiations involving all sides to the conflict. It was not, as in Angola, imposed

by external forces. Moreover, constitutional change, not participation in government, was the key to the peace. In Namibia, the transition was so designed as to overcome the complexities of a protracted civil war and to engender an outcome whereby no party to the conflict perceived itself as a loser. Furthermore, it illustrates the importance of a strong international commitment to create a new, post-apartheid democratic regime in the post-bipolar period. All those involved believed in the integrity of the entire transition process because it was assured on the ground by the international community's total engagement.

However, in Angola, both sides saw power as the ultimate goal of the transition process. With civil society moribund -- having almost succumbed under the weight of an authoritarian state -- and with minimal international engagement, the outcome of this attempt to grab and consolidate power through the transition process was all but predictable. The regime had not completely shed its ideological mantle nor did it undertake to implement democratic changes by conviction. It did so because, at the end of the 1980s, a combination of domestic and international factors were threatening its very survival. The young Angolan state faced a combination of military, political, social, and economic problems internally that were compounded by changes in the region and globally. Thus the only escape route for survival entailed profound and fundamental transformations at all levels.

Faced with the stark choice of turning the situation around by either a) ending the war through a peace process involving constitutional changes and leading to free multi-party elections; or, b) liberalizing the economy, the government identified the economy -- not the political system -- as the area in need of immediate reform in an attempt to gain time and thus postpone its imminent collapse. Economic reforms, it was hoped, would strengthen the

regime in anticipation of a new era of political competition and unrestricted space for organized, autonomous groups. Thus, like many African countries, Angola adopted a structural adjustment program to address the main factors adversely affecting its economy.

But, in the absence of peace, adjustment did not produce the anticipated results. In fact, rapid liberalization created a new set of disequilibria, often more serious than before. Galloping inflation, caused by persistent scarcities of consumer goods and the government's propensity to print money to meet its current account payments, has been particularly difficult to tame. Furthermore, as many nonviable public enterprises were liquidated while others were privatized -- i.e., sold to party members at preferential terms -- or restructured, increased unemployment became another major side effect of adjustment. SAP's emphasis on reducing the budget deficit through the slashing of expenditures on social programs also contributed to a worsening of living conditions.

Society's main responses to economic difficulties -- especially the endemic shortages of goods and services at official prices -- involved the expansion of the informal sector, particularly the development of parallel markets. These markets escape all government regulations and their prices are freely determined by supply and demand. They render a vital service to the Angolan economy by providing most consumers with the only possibility of purchasing goods and services not available elsewhere in the formal markets.

Given the less-than stellar performance of SAPs, the government has continued to rely on the oil sector for its economic survival. But, since this is an enclave sector isolated from other sectors of the economy, its impact on the general well-being of Angolans has been minimal. Alas, most of the revenues have been used to pay for the war effort.

Ironically, the Angolan regime was no more successful in the pursuit of the second aspect of its transformation strategy; i.e., ending the war through a peace process involving constitutional changes and leading to free multi-party elections. Both Gbadolite and Bicesse ended in failure. In Gbadolite, a number of contentious issues -- including the specific political and military mechanisms to end the war -- were discussed without being resolved. Consequently, the cease-fire reached at this summit did not last. The peace process designed in Bicesse appeared solid because it reflected the collaborative engagement by the US and the Soviet Union. In fact, the main documents that constituted the basis for negotiations between UNITA and the Angolan government were drafted by the United States, the USSR and Portugal.

This thesis has attempted to show that neither the Angolan government nor UNITA, as the principal domestic participants in the war, fully controlled all the elements involved in the conflict. They were basically proxies and, as such, depended on / responded to, external stimuli -- whether international threats of sanctions or promises of support. It is this external element that prevented the proxies from fully addressing -- and possibly eliminating -- all the major issues that divided them prior to signing the Peace Accords. In short, neither the MPLA government nor UNITA was ready to make peace by the time they signed the Bicesse Accords. This would become obvious during the implementation stage leading to the election.

Does the external dimension fully account for the difficulties associated with the process of democratic transition in Angola? This thesis suggests that there are other important aspects. Salient among them is civil society. In fact, this dissertation puts forth the

argument that many of the problems besetting Angola today, including the post-electoral crisis, can be attributed to civil society's separation from -- and therefore irrelevance to -- the formal political realm. And, what lies behind this disengagement? The regime's ideological hostility toward civil society coupled with poor governance and frustration regarding the regime's inability to solve the major politico-military and socio-economic crises facing the country have been presented as the main causes. Civil society's disengagement was a response to the post-independence regime's reckless attempts to destroy the structures inherited from the colonial experience without clearly defining any that could replace them. Thus, this dissertation also looked at the ways the "new" Angolan state was organized and how its power was exercised in an attempt to begin to explain the decline of formal political participation in Angola.

The thesis also argues that UNITA was not in a position to become a catalyst for change in Angola because it failed to demonstrate that it was any better equipped politically than the MPLA to facilitate the development of a healthy civil society. UNITA was an insurgent rebel organization which viewed political participation and other democratic rights as unnecessary luxuries. In fact, political participation in the areas controlled by UNITA was even more restricted than in government-held zones because its structures, both political and military, were highly centralized and personalized. UNITA was nothing but a powerful guerrilla army under the cover of a political party. All of its members were expected to follow dutifully the leader's commands.

Thus, Angola approached its transition process when no domestic conditions existed to give it a chance of success. There was nothing to counter the deep-seated mutual distrust

that prevented MPLA and UNITA from negotiating an end to the civil war and the modalities for democratic transition in good faith. Consequently, the elections held in September 1992 became nothing more than a tragic exercise in make-believe. Angola's civil society powerless and ineffectual, too weak to insist on a scrupulous implementation of the Peace Accords. A return to war was inevitable.

What could have prevented such a return to war? The complete demilitarization of the two combatants was an unrealistic prospect from the beginning given the small size of the international contingent trusted with the task of verifying the transition process. Only the full engagement of civil society could have deflected the antagonisms developed during long years of civil war. Any future attempt to carry out a successful transition will require the involvement of the religious, traditional authority figures, youth and women groups, students, intellectuals, trade organizations, environmentalists, and other independent groups. In combination, if not competition, their engagement would serve as a natural restraint on the main antagonists and could also serve as important avenues were political action and interaction can take place without violence. But, in the absence of this engagement -- and given the long history of distrust and fratricidal war, economic mismanagement leading to decay, heightening social conflict fueled by ethnic and racial divisions combined with unequal distribution of mineral wealth -- what lies ahead for Angola?

On the Road to Anarchy?

Angola is already at the point of lawlessness and rampant crime that Kaplan writes about in

his celebrated article.[1] In this sense it shares some similarities with collapsed states like Somalia.[2] For example, the Angolan state has no national administration with the capacity and competence of exercising real authority at the central level, let alone outside the capital. Attempts to implement the Soviet model without taking into account the specific conditions of the country as well as the negative consequences of a protracted civil war -- particularly the ensuing exodus of qualified personnel and the politically-motivated killings of those who stayed -- compounded by mismanagement, corruption and the lack of a clear vision of development has rendered the government particularly ineffective. The bureaucracy functions on a quasi-voluntary basis partly because the state has no ability to provide full remuneration to its employees. Furthermore, workers are decreasingly able to acquire basic goods and services due to an increasingly debilitating hyper-inflation that erodes the purchasing power of the meager salaries that are occasionally dispensed. As a result, these workers must resort to extorting bribes and/or joining the informal sector to survive. This has precipitated the breakdown of the rule of law.

The rule of law has collapsed mainly because the formal legal system has been rendered irrelevant. It has not kept pace with the political, economic, and social mutations that have profoundly affected the state -- from colonialism to Marxism-Leninism to Westernism. The revolutionaries that took power after the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime set out to dismantle the legal foundations of that exploitative system. However, they did not have any clear idea of how a new system should be structured. Cold War logic dictated that Angola would become a legal clone of the Soviet system -- just as it was in politics and economics. The dismantling of the Soviet legal system initiated under

Gorbachev forced Angola to make another U turn and look once again to Portugal and other Western countries for inspiration for restructuring the legal system.

The health care system is also in sore need of restructuring, having collapsed soon after the Portuguese departed. The handful of hospitals that remain open operate in miserable conditions, often without running water or electricity. The few well-trained professionals employed there are overworked and are grossly underpaid. A medical doctor may earn the equivalent of US$ 5.00 per month. As a result, morale is low and labor strife high. Patients are poorly treated not only because of lack of medication and deplorable hygienic conditions but also because medical workers do not find it worth their while to work. They spend most of their time engaged in informal activities.

In the event of seeing a doctor who is able to correctly diagnose an ailment, the prescription cannot be filled at the few operating pharmacies. Prescribed medication must be found in the open markets peppered around the city. There, it is exposed to the elements -- including tropical heat and rains -- and is sold by people with little or no awareness of the risks involved in selling bad medicine.

How the medication bypasses hospitals and pharmacies to end up in open-air markets typifies the anarchic state of affairs in Angola. When the state operated along socialist lines it attempted to run the health care sector and, therefore, assumed upon itself the responsibility for the importation and distribution of all medication and medical supplies. Centralized planning in this sector, as in the rest of the economy, proved to be a complete disaster in the sense that inefficiencies were prevalent and endemic. Changing ideologies and SAPs forced the state to retreat from directly managing most economic sectors, including

health care. However, the state elites kept control of this potentially very lucrative sector. Thus, a number of companies belonging to the governing elite were created and given licenses for the importation and distribution of medication and medical supplies. But, since the state still sets the prices for medication sold in hospitals and pharmacies, the elites cleverly arrange for the medication to be sold in open air parallel markets where huge, untaxed profits can be realized quickly. In fact, this scheme applies to most commodities imported into Angola -- from bottled drinking water to cars. Members of the governing elite are now setting up private health clinics. However, any incoming patient must pay up-front an average of USD $100.00 cash in American currency even before seeing a doctor. This in a country where the vast majority of the population earns less than USD $1.00 per month.

The situation in the education sector mirrors that in health care. During the period when the governing MPLA attempted to build socialism in Angola, all citizens with at least an 8th grade education were required to teach. Exemptions from military duty for teachers served as an added incentive. As a result -- and even though the state never invested much resources in education and other social services due to very high military expenditures -- major strides were made in reducing the upwards of 90% illiteracy rate inherited from the colonialism. However, this commitment to education was forsaken with the abandonment of Marxist principles. Thus, the education system is presently in a major crisis with unpaid teachers who can hardly read or write and who demand bribes from students to ensure passage to higher grades; dilapidated schools with no water or electricity, desks, chairs, blackboards, etc. Students invariably must bring their own small tin cans (the preferred one is a 5lb empty can of Nido powdered milk) to use as stools in class. As expected, the new

generation of students can only reflect the environment in which they have been educated. The sons and daughters of the elites are, of course, the exception. They can be found attending prestigious educational institutions in the West.

Another sector in need of urgent remedy is the banking system. It has become chaotic and inconsequential as the parallel market emptied the central bank of most of its value and purpose in the domestic economy. Without a clear monetary policy and with inflation reaching a frightening annual rate of 2000%, the government seems to have lost control on the supply of money -- relegating the central bank almost exclusively to the task of printing money -- thus further deteriorating an already calamitous situation. Most monetized transactions now involve acquiring money at *kinguilas* (women who trade large quantities of currency in the parallel market).

The phone system is primitive and postal service, where it still exists, is rudimentary. Still, members of the elites can the found driving around Luanda speaking on their portable cellular telephones and picking up or delivering parcels through DHL and other international courier companies.

The only international airport is grossly mismanaged; ditto for port facilities. Customers must face angry, unpaid/underpaid customs officers who are eager to raise groundless problems (common allegations include insufficient identification; no invitation to enter the country; insufficient funds, etc.) in order to extort money, at both ports and airports. Arriving in Angola by plane, one finds at the airport a microcosm of the anarchy that reigns in the country: long delays to claim luggage often caused by lack of electricity to power the conveyer belt, breakdown in the system itself, or both; retrieving the baggage from

the belt requires intense effort because most passengers must bring everything they can -- food, clothing, medicine, and durable goods -- since little is available in the country at affordable prices; the many family members waiting for arriving passengers in order to help transport the incoming merchandise add to the chaotic carnival atmosphere rendering airport authorities even more inept to control baggage retrieval -- every passenger must remove his or hers quickly because it may simply disappear amidst the confusion.

Decreasing economic and social security as described above has engendered lack of physical security as well. More than three decades of war has turned Angola into an extremely militarized and violent society. Most people between the ages of 15 and 45 years not only have a weapon or access to one -- guns and ammunition are easily available in the black market -- they are highly proficient in their use. There is anecdotal evidence of people having tanks and anti-aircraft weapons in the backyards. This is in addition to an estimated 20 million land mines strewn throughout a country that already has one of the highest numbers of war amputees in the world.

The oversupply of weapons in a country with a severe shortage of all basic needs -- food, clothing, medicine, housing, clean drinking water -- and where salaries are symbolic (skilled workers earn less than USD $1.00 per month when a loaf of bread costs about USD $1.00) forcing the vast majority of the population to rely on the informal sector has led to uncontrolled violence throughout the country. Anyone exhibiting signs of belonging to the elite classes -- either through racial characteristics or the basis of place of residence, type of car one drives or clothing one wears -- can be a target of seemingly random crime. The crackling of gunfire can be heard day or night as armed burglars, carjackers and muggers

carry out the criminal activities or become the victim of citizens defending their lives and/or properties. Young women are perhaps the most vulnerable victims. Soldiers are known to solicit sexual favors, especially in the countryside. Women who refuse are often shot in the leg. Given the miserable state of health care, a bullet wound in the leg can lead to amputation or even death.

The police force is not only inept, it is also incapable of dealing with the problems since its ranks are filled with common criminals since its salaries do not attract honest members of society. Lack of police salaries, in turn, force its members to demand bribes from the population, especially drivers who are pulled over constantly and asked for obscure types of identification. A driver may be stopped by police up to twenty times in a single day. Most Angolan drivers now carry a bag full of money in their cars to bribe the police during the day. In the absence of order imposed through the police and other state bodies, Angola has seen a proliferation of small private armies. Every enterprise, commercial or otherwise, of any perceived or real value must be protected by members of private armies. The police is so unreliable and untrustworthy that they are often regarded in the same light as common criminals

This lack of security -- caused by war and political instability, mismanagement leading to economic decay, the breakdown of law and order, and overall moral impoverishment of society -- has affected the children of Angola with particular harshness. On any given day, thousands of children can be observed roaming the street of Luanda, the capital. This city, built for 500,000 people in colonial times, must now accommodate about 3,000,000 or roughly a third of the country's population. It is in this overcrowded city where

hordes of children scavenge for food, attempt to sell all sorts of trinkets to pedestrians or motorists stopped at traffic lights or in the chaotic traffic jams, and beg for anything that will enable them to survive for one more day of their Hobbesian existence. The lucky ones are able to obtain some food or money by protecting and/or washing cars of the well-off while they dine or shop in the comfort of secured, air-conditioned haute-cuisine restaurants or well-stocked supermarkets that operate only on the basis of US currency. At night, many of these children can be found sleeping on tree branches and in dugouts on the beach in a bizarre throwback to primitive times.

These children -- who, in the future, will be expected to become productive members of society -- wander on the streets partly because the state no longer feels compelled to provide for their education and overall well-being due to the changing ideologies and structural adjustment. The "market" is somehow expected to improve the conditions of all, including children who have been forced to drift into the relative "security" of capital city and surrounding areas because their parents have been killed in the civil war and their entire support base (family, church, school, traditional authority figures) has been uprooted. This, in short, is the image of the state and society in Angola and serves to highlight the bleak prospects for renewal and reconstructing in the near future.

Peace and Development: Prospects and Possibilities

In order to bounce back from its long flirtation with anarchy, the Angolan state must muster the resources to establish a credible -- i.e., accountable -- and functioning central political

authority with control over the entire national territory. This essential prerequisite in establishing both law and order as well as state authority -- including functioning institutions -- may prove to be rather problematic since it has been absent from the post-colonial Angolan state. What, then, must be done? How can Angola reconstruct a social and economic order upon which a political order conducive to development can be erected?

A political settlement, although necessary, is not enough especially if it is seen by the people as simply a way to co-opt former enemies into a corrupt and decaying system. A viable state must allow civil society to reconstitute itself and became useful again as a source for the creation, aggregation, and articulation of local/indigenous demands that can act to improve prospects for both political and economic development. These useful demands must be incorporated into public policies by competent and politically committed leaders working to restore the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state. This involves necessarily the critical process of institutional strengthening which is needed both to break the cycle of institutionalized violence and to prevent the creation of fragmented and detached centers of power and authority in those portions of the state that survived outside its reach since independence.

But the above discussion suggests that although civil society holds the key for a successful transition to democracy, as a first step in a much longer and problematic process of political and economic development, the decaying state in Angola will continue to regard it as a threat. The state may, therefore, revert to earlier attempts to subjugate civil society as a way of delaying its final and complete collapse. This renewed attack on civil society will be facilitated by rendering the armed opposition, i.e. UNITA, irrelevant through its

incorporation into national MPLA-dominated army, party, and governmental structures as was done in relation to FNLA in the 1980s. Thus, renewed corporatism and authoritarianism -- not a strengthened/empowered civil society -- can be expected in the future.

By preventing civil society from playing its crucial role in development -- particularly in terms of achieving accountable governance through the articulation demands and their incorporation into public policies -- Angola may once again be missing the opportunity to establish a hitherto absent mode of state-society relationship: one based on harmonization of interests, not violence.

Endnotes

(Conclusion)

1.Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," <u>Atlantic Monthly</u>, February 1994.

2.Hussein M. Adam, "Somalia: A Terrible Beauty being Born?," in William Zartman, (ed.), <u>Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority</u> (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 78.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1
BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE

1. Elections would be held with all parties free to participate. The elections would be held under the following circumstances:

    a) "Administration of the election will be scrupulously fair and impartial."

    b) "Peaceful political activity will be freely conducted."

    c) "All ... will have free and uncensored access to all the public media."

2. "It will be the constitutional responsibility of the British Government, as recognized in the Lusaka communique, to ensure that these requirements are met." During the two-month period there will be:

    a) A British governor with executive and legislative authority;

    b) An Election Commissioner and staff appointed by the British to supervise the elections;

    c) Commonwealth observers;

    d) An election Council to satisfy parties that elections are fair and impartial and to make recommendations to the Commissioner and Governor on any election matter; and

    e) No registration of voters and a party-list method of voting.[1]

3. "The Governor's instructions will require him to do all things necessary to secure compliance with the conditions for free and fair elections. The Commanders of the security forces will be responsible to him."

4. "The Governor will assume authority over the civil police. They will be responsible, under his supervision, for the maintenance of law and order."

5. "There will be agreement ... regarding a cease-fire."

6. "After elections result are finalized and a government formed, independence will be granted.

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[1]A party-list method of voting calls for the voter to vote for a political party and not for a specific candidate. The political parties create lists of candidates in order of their importance to the party. The number of votes the party gains determines how many candidates on the list are chosen.

APPENDIX 2
MESSAGE SENT BY ROBERT MUGABE TO THEN-PRIME
MINISTER MARGARETH THATCHER, 10 JANUARY 1980.

The Patriotic Front agreed to the cease-fire arrangement only after certain assurances had been made by Lord Carrington. We have repeatedly been assured that:

1. South African troops would be withdrawn from Southern Rhodesia as soon as the Governor had arrived in Salisbury. Now Governor Soames informs us that South African troops are there with his consent. Why were we told lies in the first instance? ... We cannot at all accept the presence of South African troops in our country, as this is not only an act of aggression but also a violation of our agreement.

2. That the maintenance of law and order during the interim period would be the responsibility of the police. You have now authorized your Governor to deploy General Walls's armed forces throughout the country for ostensibly law and order purposes. This is a flagrant violation of the Lancaster House agreement and amounts in fact to a misapplication of the powers vested in him. The effect of deploying Rhodesian troops is to place our own troops in a position where they alone are assembled and stationary, and most of all faced with the threat of encirclement by Rhodesian troops. We cannot allow our troops to be placed in danger. In any case, why should the Governor choose to rely on Rhodesian troops and not on our own?

3. A crucial element in the cease-fire scheme was, and remains, the disengagement formula. It was agreed at Lancaster that the Rhodesian forces would disengage first by withdrawing to their bases. It was explained to us that Selous Scouts and the various components of the auxiliary forces would be expected to gather and remain in their bases. There is absolutely no evidence that the auxiliary forces of Bishop Abel Muzorewa have disingaged and assembled at any base. He, in the circumstances, is breaching the cease-fire agreement. It is clear that Lord Soames is allowing the auxiliary forces to remain deployed, and deploying the Rhodesian forces in order, deliberately, to upset the balance of the forces in their favor. We have evidence that attempts at occupying areas from which our forces have moved are being made in a definite strategic pattern. ... We stated publicly ... that we are unwilling to surrender any of our liberated zones, nor abandon our bases and combat positions in the contested areas unless the Rhodesian forces as well as auxiliary forces are properly disingaged and re-positioned in their barracks, this is not what happened.

In light of the above observations, I feel compelled to demand from you and the other parties concerned that these violations of the Lancaster

House agreement must cease immediately. If they continue, I shall regard my side and its forces as equally free to dishonor in a similar way the cease-fire agreement.

APPENDIX 3
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 385(1976) and 431(1978) and 432(1978),

Having considered the report submitted by the Secretay-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431(1978) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978,

Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) addressed to the Secretary-General,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United nations over Namibia,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation and his explanatory statement;

2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United nations in accordance with resolution 385(1976);

3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of the Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United nations;

4. Welcomes SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of SWAPO dated 8 September 1978;

5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration of Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385(1976), (1978) and this resolution are null and void;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council no later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.

APPENDIX 4
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435

Phase I

1. Approval of a Security Council resolution authorizing the Secretary General to appoint a UN Special Representative and requesting him to submit a plan for UN involvement.

2. Appointment by the Secretary General of the UN Special Representative and the sending of a UN contingency planning group to Namibia while consultation begins with potential participants in UNTAG.

Phase II

1. Adoption of a UN resolution accepting the plan for its involvement. At this stage, provisions are also to be made for financing the operation.

Phase III

1. Start of the transitional period on the ground. South African Defence Forces (SADF) stationed in Namibia (including ethnic forces) and the South West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) forces cease military acts and come under UN supervision.

2. The UN Special Representative and UNTAG staff arrive in Namibia to assume their duties. For the military personnel duties involve the monitoring of cessation of hostilities, the monitoring of both SADF and SWAPO troop restrictions and confinement to specific bases. The UNTAG military personnel are also given the mandate to begin infiltration prevention and border surveillance especially designed to prevent the movement of SWAPO troops from their bases in southern Angola into northern Namibia. Simultaneously, UNTAG is given the role of monitoring the police, "citizens" forces, and military personnel performing civilian functions.

3. Provisions are made for the Special Representative to further reinforce UNTAG preparations in Namibia by making the necessary arrangements for coordination with neighboring countries concerning the provisions for the transitional period

4. All political prisoners and/or detainees are released, wherever they were being held.

Phase IV

1. The confinement of military forces to base continues: the SADF levels fall to 12,000 troops.

2. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees helps in the return of all exiles outside Namibia. Within the country, the UN helps to establish the provisions to facilitate this return.

3. Other complementary actions, planned for this stage, included the establishment and publication of general rules for elections; completion of repeal of discriminatory laws; dismantlement of command structures of citizens forces, commandos and ethnic forces, including the withdrawal of all South African soldiers attached to these units; confinement of all arms, military equipment, and ammunition of citizens forces and commandos to drill halls under UN supervision. In this context, the Administrator General would ensure that no organized military force errerge during the transition period and is given the mandate to determine whether and under what circumstances those military personnel performing civilian functions would continue those functions

Phase V
1. Reduction of SADF to the 8,000 men level and their restriction to base.
2. SWAPO soldiers inside Namibia would are also be restricted to base while those in neighboring countries are repatriated peacefully under UN supervision through designated entry points.

Phase VI
1. SADF levels would stand at 1,500 men restricted to the bases of Grootfontein or Oshivello or both. All military installations along the northern border with Angola would be either deactivated or put under civilian control with UN supervision. The deployment of UNTAG military personnel would peak at this stage in anticipation of the next stage at the start of week thirteen,i.e. the official start of the election campaign.

Phase VII
1. Election to the Constituent Assembly.

Phase VIII
1. Convening of the Constituent Assembly.

Phase IX
1. The installation of a new government.

Phase X
1. Official granting of independence.

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